Prisoner swaps between Russia and the West have an asymmetric quality: Arms dealers and assassins get traded for journalists and dissidents. Such is the moral calculus between autocratic regimes and those striving to uphold the ideals of democracy and republican governance. It is regrettable that such deals must be struck, but the cost might be quite a bit higher if truth-speakers in the dark spots of the world thought no one would bargain for their freedom in a pinch. So, the multinational deal on Thursday that returned journalists, political dissidents, and friends of the West in exchange for the release of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cadres can be welcomed and regretted at the same time.

Given the sharp divide between Western democracies and their authoritarian antagonists in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere, it is remarkable that deals remain possible at all. The reality of global polarization and great-power competition means that a very small number of countries maintain diplomatic contact and influence across dividing lines, and Turkey is one of the few. Thus, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, as well as its geographic position, made it a linchpin of the recent prisoner swap. Ankara receives a fairly steady stream of Western criticism for hedging and balancing behaviors keeping the door open to Russia, but Thursday’s deal demonstrates the wisdom of having allies with an open line to rival camps—which is why the West has generally acquiesced to the Turkish balancing act.

The politics of prisoner exchanges have been unfortunately prominent in 2024, in light of the ongoing wars in Ukraine and in Gaza, where Hamas has sought to use Israeli hostages as tools to shape the outcome of the war that followed its October 7 attacks into Israel. There have been previous exchanges of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine, including several facilitated by the United Arab Emirates, some via joint Saudi-Turkish mediation, and roughly fifty other prisoner exchanges done bilaterally or through third parties. But this week’s deal represented a different level of difficulty—politically prominent prisoners and accused spies, a half dozen countries, complex negotiations, and US electoral politics in the mix. Before this week, Ankara had been the site and the facilitator for less high-profile swaps of Russians and Americans, but after the complex deal this week, the trade space may narrow.

The international system has left an era of aspirational globalization and entered an era of hard power-driven geopolitical competition. In this era, diplomatic agility will matter a great deal, especially when coupled with economic and military leverage over prospective negotiating parties. Mediating or facilitating countries must not only have a reputation for even-handedness in the dispute in question, but they also need a degree of trust with the parties and enough geopolitical sway to incentivize cooperation. Turkey meets two key criteria in this regard: It has an imperfect alignment with the West, with sufficient friction to foster understanding of and hedging positions with non-Western powers. It also has relative self-sufficiency in defense matters, which provides it a risk tolerance in diverging from strict adherence to Western policy lines.

Prisoner exchanges, peace talks, and creative diplomacy become more difficult as alignments, bloc behavior, and other aspects of great-power competition reemerge as norms in the international system. While deterrence requires intra-alliance solidarity and discipline, deal-making requires occasional line-crossing, albeit not nonalignment altogether. Ankara clearly favors this aspect of modern statecraft. It remains a robust NATO member, passing the 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending commitment this year and solidly supporting collective defense requirements, including significant military support to Ukraine in the current conflict. Yet it engages in line-crossing diplomatic gambits in pursuit of de-escalation with some frequency, including in the Caucasus, Libya, Israel-Palestine (less successfully), and the war in Ukraine.

The swap just completed is in part a fruit of such line-crossing. That Ankara can pull off the balancing act of providing lethal aid to Russia’s enemies, fully supporting Western military deterrence, yet trading and making deals with Moscow in a manner that helps US policy interests is both rare and valuable. So the next time an article in a Western publication claims that Turkey is an ally in name only or not an ally at all due to imperfect alignment, it might be worth remembering that bad allies are a good deal more useful than enemies or neutrals, especially when they have demonstrated military, economic, and diplomatic heft.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

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NATO has established its place among the most successful political and military alliances in history—despite facing very challenging circumstances since its founding—by dint of solidarity, unity of purpose, and resolve.

Today, allies are presented with challenges such as increasing global systemic rivalry and a complex, interconnected, and unstable security landscape, which threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Russia, as the most significant and direct threat for NATO, has been undermining Euro-Atlantic security since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its aggression has since expanded in the form of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, terrorism—in all forms and manifestations—persists. The topic has been on NATO’s agenda since the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept and it (specifically, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States) was the reason the Alliance decided to invoke Article 5 for the first and only time in history. Since 2001, nonstate actors have continued to lodge a series of terror attacks on a number of allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium as well as Turkey, which still grapples with terror attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the latter’s Syrian leg.

NATO allies must maintain their resolve and remain vigilant and ready to face challenges from any direction. Defense is not cheap, and it requires constant attention, care, and investment.

Since joining the Alliance seventy-two years ago, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s security in various theaters of instability and conflicts. Turkey was a bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Cold War period, and it continued to spend significantly on defense, sacrificing the opportunity to spend more elsewhere. For example, Turkey dedicated a level of forces and capabilities NATO in that period that was significant for the Alliance’s security and reduced pressure on allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkey, because it continued to spend on defense, did not benefit from the post-Cold War “peace dividend” to the extent that European NATO allies enjoyed during the early 1990s when the unifying vision to establish a belt of security, stability, and prosperity that included Russia (extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok) was first launched by the United States. During this period, Turkey spent around or above 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while most other allies saw their commitments wane over time.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey faced challenges from nearby regional conflicts in the Gulf, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Yet this conflictual period did not stop Turkey from contributing to NATO efforts designed to protect peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Turkey actively took part in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and it also made significant contributions to the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, which was followed by the Resolute Support Mission.

Today, Turkey has similarly consistently supported NATO efforts to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area, even despite divergent perceptions in allied capitals about Turkey’s approach to recent global challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

For example, Turkey did join its NATO allies in approving the most recent NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at Madrid in 2022, that identified Russia and terrorism (along with other regional and global challenges) as threats for the Alliance. Turkey is also set to play a pivotal role in the implementation of regional plans launched at the Vilnius summit last year which are dedicated to the defense of Southern Europe against the pervasive challenges in its immediate vicinity.

Turkey’s role in Washington summit outcomes

With the Russian threat looming over European security, it is high time to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Allies at the NATO summit acknowledged the need to close the gaps between Europe’s defense needs and its capabilities. This includes, as highlighted at the Washington summit, expanding European allies’ defense manufacturing capacity in a coherent, complementary, and interoperable manner. To achieve interoperability will also require Turkey and NATO to find a lasting solution to the spat over the current Turkish administration’s decision in 2017 to procure the S-400 Russian missile system. While expanding capacity, the allies must take into account both the Alliance’s defense priorities and Ukraine’s needs as it continues to face up against Russian aggression.

Turkey can play a crucial role in helping expand the Alliance’s defense capacity through its contributions to collective deterrence and defense. Capabilities being produced by the growing Turkish defense industry cannot be sidelined in the Alliance’s endeavor to enhance deterrence and defense and maintain a technological edge against both state and nonstate adversaries. This will require result-oriented consultations within NATO and especially between European allies and Turkey, conducted with renewed vigor and mutual resolve. To this end, it is high time for the European Union (EU) to revisit its policies that engage only EU members in enhancing Europe’s defense capacity. Today’s challenges require collaboration with non-EU countries, such as Turkey, to the fullest extent.

With terrorism plaguing Turkey’s neighborhood, and with the issue remaining high on Turkey’s agenda, Ankara likely welcomed allies’ commitment (as outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration) to “counter, deter, defend, and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.” If allies align their perceptions of the threat to Turkey posed by the PKK and its affiliates by including, for instance, deterrence and defensive measures against the threat in the regional defense plan for Southern Europe, this would help ease the friction on this major issue and help erase the Turkish society’s negative perceptions of NATO allies.

The Washington Summit Declaration also included a reference to the 1936 Montreux Convention. While some Turkish observers have oddly argued the reference is ill-intentioned, it is actually a major outcome for Turkey, as the allies reaffirmed their commitments to “regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region.” The communiqué also welcomed the joint endeavor of three littoral allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) to launch the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group.

Finally, with the global order at stake—due to Russia’s aggression, China’s growing global influence, and threats to security including terrorism—it has become vitally important to maintain and increase cooperation with southern neighborhood countries. The Alliance recognized this importance at the Washington summit, when it committed to taking a new approach toward its “southern neighborhood.” As part of that approach, the NATO secretary general appointed a new special representative for the southern neighborhood to coordinate NATO’s efforts in that neighborhood. Turkey could play a positive role in improving ties between the Alliance and the southern neighborhood by leveraging the linguistic, kinship, religious, and cultural ties it has with other countries. Turkey could also mobilize opportunities that it has in being part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Organization of Turkic States, and in working with the Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union.

The Alliance has once again proven its relevance and value in protecting and defending the Euro-Atlantic area. As it continues to work to keep the Euro-Atlantic area safe, secure, and stable, Turkey has an important role to play.

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a retired career ambassador with forty years of experience in international security and defense affairs. Formerly, he served in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2018.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Among those attending the summit will be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey has been a major contributor to NATO’s operations around the world since it joined the Alliance in 1952 to defend itself and NATO’s southeastern flank against the Soviet threat. Today, as the Alliance’s second-largest military power and the gatekeeper of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey plays a critical role in European stability and security. However, the complex nature of Ankara’s relationship with Washington and a lack of dialogue between the allies have often overshadowed the successes in the transatlantic partnership and limited opportunities for cooperation.

US Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake recently said that the NATO Summit provides an opportunity for a meeting between Erdoğan and US President Joe Biden, as “there is some desire on both sides” to do so. It remains unclear, however, whether this meeting will take place. Erdoğan’s previously scheduled visit to the White House in May was canceled due to scheduling problems, as cited by both sides, and Flake said it happened at a time when the crisis in Gaza cast a “difficult political backdrop.”

Despite that backdrop, Biden and Erdoğan shouldn’t let another opportunity to meet go to waste, as close cooperation would bring to bear several geopolitical, economic, and security benefits.

Why the timing matters

It is important that the meeting takes place this time. Biden has met Erdoğan in person only twice during his presidency, and both times on the sidelines of international summits. Erdoğan will travel to Washington for the NATO Summit shortly after his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakhstan and just weeks after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement in China about Turkey’s interest in joining the developing country grouping known as BRICS.

Russia has embraced its opportunities to widen the rifts between Turkey and other NATO allies, so it’s no wonder the Kremlin was quick to welcome Ankara’s desire to join BRICS. A cold shoulder from Biden, contrasted with warm welcomes from the leaders of Russia and China, would only reinforce Ankara’s quest for what it perceives as a fair multipolarity and Turkey’s feeling sidelined by both the European Union and the United States. The perception of Erdoğan as an unwanted guest in the West would become another brick in the wall of mistrust between Ankara and Washington.

Winds of positive change

Significant progress in the F-16 deal, the successful completion of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership processes, and increasing US-Turkey cooperation on joint military production have had a positive impact on both regional security and Turkey’s relations with the West. For example, as the Pentagon set about revamping its munitions factories, several such factories in Texas worked with Turkish company Repkon for the design and installation of machinery. Flake estimated that around 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds produced in the United States will come from these factories, boosting military production and helping support Ukraine. In addition, the effort is strengthening US-Turkey strategic ties and demonstrating to Europe that increasing cooperation with Turkey can help bolster defense capabilities.

Both the United States and Turkey stand to gain significant geopolitical and economic benefits from a reinvigorated relationship. As Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations put it, “Turkey sits in the middle of too many global flashpoints for the United States to delay a new dialogue.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza, geopolitical realignments in the South Caucasus, and the emergence of the Russia-Iran-China axis add weight to Turkey’s already central role in NATO.

For its part, Turkey must understand that while it may gain immediate benefits from trade and energy cooperation with Russia, its economic and security interests are closely aligned with the West, not with autocratic regimes such as China and Russia. Doing business with sanctioned, unstable, and undemocratic countries is a major geopolitical risk and comes at a huge economic cost. Russia’s economy has become a war economy, and there is not much future in doing business with Moscow, especially with the prospect of secondary sanctions looming. For many years, Germany and the United States have maintained their leading positions as Turkey’s largest export partners, and while joining BRICS may help Turkey manage a balancing act between the West and the Global South, the bloc wouldn’t be likely to help sustain Turkey’s economic growth in the long run. This economic pragmatism, combined with new geopolitical realities, should provide a solid basis for revitalizing the transatlantic partnership.

To engage Turkey, make it part of the plan

The Black Sea can become a test case for Turkey’s reinvigorated cooperation with the West, as that is where core interests of NATO allies in the region—such as restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and freedom of navigation, deterring Russia, counterbalancing Russia-Iran ties, and promoting energy diversification—largely converge. While the region remains sensitive to fluctuations in the US-Turkey relationship, it also hosts an opportunity, particularly in maritime security, to improve transatlantic relations and collectively defend the region.

Turkey has developed close cooperation with Black Sea NATO members Romania and Bulgaria and has been a vocal supporter of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine’s recent successes in degrading Russia’s naval capabilities and shifting the balance of maritime power in Turkey’s favor have made Kyiv a natural ally for Ankara, as both countries seek to counter Russian superiority in the Black Sea. This strategic connection that runs via Kyiv could anchor Turkey’s tilt to the West.

Closer maritime cooperation between Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, potentially joined by Ukraine, would deny Russia the ability to conduct provocations and false flag operations in their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and help protect assets deployed in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. This is particularly important as both Turkey and Romania are working to develop their offshore gas fields—Sakarya and Neptun Deep. Since the successful development of these reserves would help reduce the region’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and thus undermine Moscow’s energy strategy in the region, one could expect the Kremlin to employ a variety of hybrid tactics to prevent the implementation of these offshore energy projects.

Since Romania and Bulgaria do not have significant naval capabilities, increased cooperation with Turkey is necessary to protect their critical infrastructure. For example, now that the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force—launched in January 2024 as a trilateral initiative between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to clear their territorial waters of floating mines—has become operational, it should become a permanent patrol mission to ensure the security of sea lines of communication and maritime trade and to curb Russia’s illegal activities in the Black Sea.

Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine are working together to shore up defense and deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea region. At the NATO Summit, Biden and Erdoğan should discuss, among many topics, how the United States and other European allies can increase support for these efforts.

While the Montreux Convention limits the ability of non-littoral states to increase their Black Sea naval presence, the United States and European allies could strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities in the region by enhancing the air defense and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of littoral states; supporting defense industrial projects; and deploying more coastal-defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and electronic-warfare systems to NATO’s eastern flank. For its part, Turkey could play a central role in strengthening NATO’s sea-denial capabilities to secure Black Sea port infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Key to enabling this cooperation with the United States and European allies is first engaging in dialogue.

As the United States works on its new Black Sea strategy and prepares the agenda for the NATO Summit—which will be dominated by regional security issues—it’s time to integrate Turkey, a regional leader, into its plans. Against the backdrop of continued Russian aggression in Ukraine and the growing involvement of Iran and China in the Black Sea, increased cooperation between Turkey, Ukraine, and Western partners is critical to both European security and the democratic resilience of these countries.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Follow her on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @GaberYevgeniya.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

This blog is part of a joint research project of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies entitled “A Sea of Opportunities: Can the West Benefit from Turkey’s Autonomous Foreign Policy in the Black Sea?” The research provides a lens into Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership and identifies possible avenues of collaboration between Ankara and its Western allies in the Black Sea region in several areas, such as defense and military cooperation, political and diplomatic dialogue, and maritime and energy security.

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These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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But the mood heading into the meeting was difficult to gauge, as just days before the two leaders met, Turkey officially reopened a United Nations World Heritage Site as a mosque (the Kariye Camii)—a location that, before it was turned into a mosque during Ottoman rule and a museum in 1945, was originally a prominent Byzantine church (the Church of St. Saviour in Chora). In response, Greece lodged a démarche to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

In the past, such embittered instances between Turkey and Greece had fed a repeating cycle of mutual suspicion and angry rhetoric. But the prime minister’s visit to Ankara went ahead as planned. Although the press conference revealed the leaders’ disagreements, their decision to highlight their different takes on the Hamas-Israel war instead of lingering on bilateral disputes demonstrates their desire to maintain a positive momentum.

This is remarkable, given that the two NATO allies almost came to the brink of conflict in the summer of 2020, averted through some shrewd diplomacy and cool-headed maneuvring. The list of bilateral disputes has gotten longer: the Cyprus problem remains——but in recent years, new disputes such as competing claims to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean have been added to the list of bilateral disputes. As Greece reinforced defense and energy cooperation with the United States, France, and Israel, Turkey accused Greece of a maximalist position in the Eastern Mediterranean, while calling on Athens to demilitarize the Aegean islands.

Tensions rose after Turkey sent a seismic research ship, accompanied by gunboats, to waters contested by Greece and Cyprus and signed a controversial maritime boundary treaty with the former Government of National Accord in Libya, angering nearby countries in the area. Moreover, Ankara’s decision to open Turkey’s border with Greece in February 2020 for migrant travel into Europe, and Greece’s refusal to allow passage into the country, added to the tension, as police from both countries fired tear gas at their shared border, eventually leading to the construction of a twenty-five-mile fence and surveillance system along the border. As these tensions built up over time, Greece’s official position remained that the two countries’ sole differences lie in delimiting the continental shelf and their respective exclusive economic zones, and that failure to agree bilaterally on these issues should lead the two nations to arbitration through the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

A rare opening

The devastating February 2023 earthquakes in Turkey and Syria paved the way for an attempt to reset relations. Greece was among the first countries to pledge support to Turkey, and the then Greek foreign minister rushed to visit his Turkish counterpart and tour the affected region, pledging support from the European Union (EU). A few months later, Mitsotakis and Erdoğan got a fresh mandate in their countries’ respective elections, effectively freeing them to act independent of electoral calculations. In that context in December 2023, a large Turkish delegation of ministers and businesspeople, headed by Erdoğan, traveled to Athens. The two sides signed a total of fifteen bilateral agreements including the Athens Declaration, a nonbinding political document committing the two sides to boosting their friendship and cultivating good neighborly relations.

Greece and Turkey pursue dialogue on three levels: first is the so-called “positive agenda” of cooperation on trade, education, research, and tourism among others. The two countries have pledged to double their bilateral trade volume to ten billion dollars and agreed to setting up a Greek-Turkish Business Forum. Greece’s decision to extend tourist visas to Turkish citizens to visit select eastern Aegean islands all year round aims at boosting people-to-people ties; it is also a recognition of Ankara’s intensified cooperation with Greek and EU authorities on migration, one of the many areas of common concern, as such an arrangement likely required EU approval.

The second level relates to confidence-building measures, for example to avoid tension over the Aegean Sea through agreements on the rules of military drills and training exercises and the creation of a hotline between the two countries’ military and civilian headquarters. Talks resumed in 2023 after a long hiatus and have so far led to calm over the Aegean. Such calm makes economic, as well as political, sense: Dogfights are expensive, and both sides would rather invest in health, education, and services that support busy tourist seasons.

The third level is the political dialogue to address the already thorny bilateral disputes that have been around for decades. Substantial progress on this front has not been achieved and will require solid preparation, political courage, and a desire to compromise on issues that both sides have grown accustomed to viewing as nonnegotiable.  

Will the positive momentum last?

While wars in Ukraine and Gaza rage on, both Greece and Turkey have a vested interest in being perceived as a stabilizing force in an unstable neighborhood. Ankara’s friendlier posture towards Greece suggests that it recognizes the elevated role Athens plays in the Eastern Mediterranean and that working alongside (rather than against) Greece is important in its wider attempts to rebuild its relationship with regional neighbors. Moreover, both Washington and Brussels support Greece and Turkey’s reconciliation efforts: Energy and defense cooperation are high on the agenda of Ankara and Washington as they attempt to set aside major differences over Israel, Russia, and Syria. For the EU, Ankara is a key player in its attempt to externalize the governance of its migration policy, and EU-Turkey cooperation on trade and energy matters is crucial too.  

Nonetheless, overt optimism about the prospects of Greece-Turkey ties is not warranted.

First, the two countries disagree on a range of issues, and they have not attempted to move away from their entrenched positions. On sovereignty and identity matters, not to speak of the Cyprus dispute, the political cost of attempting a genuine breakthrough could prove prohibitively high.

Second, even “second-order” issues carry the potential for derailing the positive atmosphere. Greece’s announcement of a second marine national park in the Aegean Sea, in the name of environmental protection and as part of the country’s EU-related obligations, has sparked a response from Ankara, in which the foreign ministry warned Greece that the park is located in a disputed area and said it suspected the move was politically motivated.

Third, this isn’t the first time the two countries are looking to improve ties: The Greek-Turkish rapprochement of the early 2000s was premised on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy and Turkey’s reform efforts to enter the EU, spearheaded by what can be considered earthquake diplomacy 1.0. A Greece-Turkey Cooperation Council was set up in 2010, only to be forgotten amid rising tension and geopolitical rivalry.

It is therefore premature to speak of a new era in bilateral relations. As of now, all contentious political issues remain unresolved. However, the progress the two sides have made is genuine. Their economic relations have become stronger, and nonstate actors, such as businesses and civil-society organizations, are playing a bigger role in deepening ties.

Erdoğan and Mitsotakis are scheduled to meet again this year on the sidelines of the NATO summit in the summer and the UN General Assembly in September, after having met three times in 2023. This year will be telling about whether the two leaders can deepen their mutual understanding and build up reservoirs of trust that will eventually permit a breakthrough on high-level political items.

Dimitris Tsarouhas is head of the Turkey Research Program at the Center for European and Transatlantic Studies (CEUTS) at Virginia Tech, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, and a Global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program. Follow him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Why the latest attempt at a Greece-Turkey reset, while positive, falls short appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Currently, the primary land-based trade route between Europe and China is the Northern Corridor, a rail-freight system that runs through Russia with a cargo capacity of over one hundred million tons. But following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Northern Corridor has become a political and financial liability, particularly for NATO allies and partners anxious to reduce dependence on Russia and countries in the West who are reluctant to support Russia and aiming to counter the Kremlin’s adventurism.

In searching for an alternative to the Northern Corridor, one option is the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), otherwise known as the Middle Corridor, a multimodal network of railways and ports that begins in China and runs across Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea before reaching Europe.

Trade along the Middle Corridor grew from 530,000 tons in 2021 to 2.3 million tons in 2023. In the first six months of 2023, the TITR had reported a 77 percent increase in tonnage over the same time period in 2022, while Northern Corridor tonnage fell by 56 percent. The World Bank estimates with adequate infrastructure investment, TITR trade volume could be as high as eleven million tons by 2030. It is no coincidence that the dramatic increase in the Middle Corridor, along with the precipitous drop in Russian-based freight traffic, has occurred in the period following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

While the TITR may offer a reasonable solution for reducing trade along the Northern Corridor, there are many challenges.

Notably, the TITR’s infrastructure isn’t very modern or integrated across borders, meaning its ability to handle increased freight volume is limited. One source even reported that TITR has only 5 percent of the Northern Corridor’s capacity. Thus, it will be necessary to build out and expand the system. The TITR also suffers from long lead times, often exceeding fifty days. It also presents higher costs: The multimodal nature of the route (rail and seaborne) requires costly transfers of loads from one method of transportation to another, while the number of countries along the route increases administrative costs. These challenges also reduce efficiency and increase shipping time. In fact, these delays and higher costs have subsequently pushed shippers back to the Northern Corridor or to seek alternative maritime routes to the Middle Corridor.

Several countries along the route—notably Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey—are stitching together an integrated rail and shipping network that transcends this politically volatile and geographically challenging region. On March 31, 2022, the governments of these countries signed a declaration to improve cooperation along the route. On May 11, 2022, rail executives from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey met in Ankara to discuss the Middle Corridor project. There, they approved an action plan that included measures to modernize the trade network, harmonize tariffs and trade policies, and make cross-border interactions more efficient.

Within a year after the 2021 reinvigoration of the Turkic Council (now called the Organization of Turkic States), Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the Baku Declaration, which was designed to reinforce “existing coordination between the three countries and strengthen regional connectivity.” Kazakhstan provides the longest rail access, and its Caspian port city of Aktau will be expanded to meet demand. On the western side of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan’s Baku port—supported by an expansion and modernization program—will forward freight to Georgia and Turkey.  

The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway, also called the “Iron Silk Road,” plays an important role in moving loads westward from the Caspian Sea. Opened in October 2017, BTK travels between Azerbaijan and Turkey via Georgia, a connection that had been closed since the early 1990s due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Another critical component in the TITR is Georgia’s Black Sea coast, specifically the ports of Batumi, Kulevi, Poti, and Supsa, which provide the route’s final sea-based segment. There are modernization projects underway here, specifically in Poti’s port facilities, and Georgia is cooperating with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to develop a new shipping route between Poti and Romania’s Constanța Port. The fifth major port along Georgia’s Black Sea coast, Anaklia, is currently being revitalized, and at one point (according to plans) was slated to be the largest port in the Black Sea.

Western countries have shown interest in developing the Middle Corridor. The route would help provide the infrastructure necessary for the European Union’s economic diversification strategy. In 2022, Danish shipping firm Maersk and Finnish company Nurminen Logistics began increasing their presence along the route. Austria’s OBB Rail Cargo Group has also shown interest in expanding its contribution to east-west trade via the TITR. And at the October 2023 Germany-Central Asia Summit, Berlin announced it will help develop the Middle Corridor under the EU Global Gateway Initiative; the EU also announced that financial institutions have committed to investing ten billion euros in support. The Germany-Central Asia Summit is a sign that the transatlantic community is finally recognizing the region’s strategic importance; Washington has also begun to make such a recognition, in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act’s Black Sea Security and Development Strategy and in the US Congress passing the most recent package of US support to Ukraine.

China has also shown interest in the Middle Corridor. For example, China had invested in an earlier Anaklia revitalization project when Mikheil Saakashvili was president of Georgia—although subsequent administrations shelved it. This has not lessened Anaklia’s appeal, as Beijing’s interest in the Middle Corridor complements its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, China contributed $1.5 billion for an industrial park at Alat, adjacent to the Port of Baku, in Azerbaijan. Investments to strengthen the Middle Corridor’s infrastructure provide Beijing with greater political and economic influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Russia has tolerated this foray into its “near abroad” for now, likely because a chastened and dependent Kremlin is reluctant to disrupt its burgeoning partnership with Beijing. However, considering Russia’s sensitivity to great-power intrusions into what was once part of the Soviet Union, one can only speculate how long before there is some pushback from Moscow.

While Russia is viewed as the immediate threat to regional stability, the Middle Corridor’s stakeholders are also distrustful of Beijing because of the poor press about the BRI. Thus, there is an opportunity for the private and public sectors in the United States, EU, and Turkey to invest in building resilient supply chains with clear strategic benefits, notably a politically acceptable alternative to the Northern Corridor.

Further support for the TITR from Washington, Brussels, and Ankara would send a strong message to the stakeholder nations as well as to Beijing and Moscow. This would also demonstrate to the regional nations that long-term stability and economic growth can be achieved through closer cooperation with NATO countries and the EU. The United States and its allies have an opportunity to positively impact security and engender goodwill along the Middle Corridor through enhanced trade and infrastructure investment.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” Follow him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The visit by Erdoğan and a large delegation of ministers and other officials yielded a raft of new bilateral agreements, positive optics after several years of tense relations, and new opportunities for strategic cooperation in critical fields such as energy, trade, and security.

The visit marked a major pivot in the Iraq-Turkey relationship—and how Ankara and Baghdad portray it. Despite parts of the visit that may come off as performative, the meeting did set the stage for improved regional stability and prosperity, with knock-on effects for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Iraq-Turkey relations have been fraught for the past decade, driven in part by an acrimonious international legal battle over the export of KRG oil through a pipeline to Turkey without Baghdad’s permission. The two have bickered over Turkish military operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants on Iraqi soil, with Ankara charging Iraq with tolerating presence of the Foreign Terrorist Organization-designated group and Baghdad charging the Turks with violating Iraq’s sovereignty. Disputes over water flows from the Euphrates and Tigris remain thorny too.

Yet with the broader Middle East roiling due to the war in Gaza and increasingly open conflict between Israel and Iran, leaders in Turkey and Iraq seem to have realized the need to protect their interests and shore up stability through regional cooperation. With a year of careful diplomatic groundwork laid since the May 2023 Turkish elections, the two sides prepared an agenda with an ambitious set of economic, security, and diplomatic goals. Chief among these have been Baghdad’s decision to ban the PKK, a commitment to repair the portion of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline that doesn’t run through the KRG, and a multilateral agreement (also signed by ministers from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates) to cooperate on a trade corridor from the Gulf to Europe with a new network of roads and railways through Iraq and Turkey.

The United States and Iran, although not openly discussed, played a role in motivating the visit. Baghdad remains dependent on Washington for counterterrorism assistance and financial assistance, despite calling publicly for US troops to leave—and would like to reduce that dependence through stronger security and development cooperation with Turkey and the Gulf. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani has to cope delicately with Iranian influence over Iraqi politics and security as he tries to balance or reduce it, and better ties with Turkey are another dimension of that strategy. In a region subject to cutthroat competition among great powers (and also mid-sized ones), local cooperation strengthens defensive leverage.

As one observer in Erbil noted during the visit, the symbolic purpose of the visit for Iraq was to show that Baghdad has productive relations with its neighbors to the north and south, not just with the dominant one to the east. “Caliph Abu Jaafar al-Mansour built four gates for the city, the main one facing Khorasan . . . but the gate of Baghdad was not only open to Iran and Khorasan,” the commentator wrote. He relayed remarks from several Iraqi officials that “Erdogan’s arrival signifies a new stage for them. This shows that not only the Khorasan gate of Baghdad is open.”

Generally low trust in US plans for the region provides Turkey and Iraq—both US allies—additional incentives to hedge through local cooperation. Most Iraqis (and Turks) doubt US commitment to stability, sovereignty, and democracy in the region. Regional observers are skeptical whether the United States has militarily deterred Iran in Iraq or Syria or whether it is even possible for Washington to do so—and such observers aren’t that anxious to see it try. Tellingly, the United States has backed a major development and transit project, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), that bypasses both Turkey and Iraq.

Countering IMEC seems to have given new impetus to efforts at a bilateral reset between Baghdad and Ankara. The Development Road project (launched by Iraq in 2023) centers on a 1,200-kilometer highway and rail system linking al-Faw Grand Port in Iraq’s Basra province to international markets. Now, with the agreements solidified last week, that route is set to run through Turkey, with investment and participation from both Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The project is expected to not only generate a projected four billion dollars in annual income (on a seventeen-billion-dollar initial investment) but also create over one hundred thousand jobs and further integrate Iraq into regional and global economic networks.

Beyond the quadrilateral signing of the agreement to cooperate on the Development Road project, Erdoğan’s visit yielded a Turkey-Iraq strategic framework with nearly thirty separate agreements. Senior officials from both the Iraqi and Turkish ministries of trade, energy, agriculture, transportation, health, defense, and foreign affairs participated and agreed to permanent joint committees to reenergize the 2008 High Level Strategic Cooperation Council mechanism. From Ankara’s perspective, cooperation and legal authorization for its anti-PKK operations is the most pressing area to see concrete developments. For Iraq, a collaborative and mutually profitable approach on water and oil are high priorities. Of course, fulfillment—not just the announcement—of these cooperative agreements will be the parameter for success, but to hold such a high-level, detailed, and ambitious foundational meeting was a good start.

The visit was portrayed positively, albeit with different emphases, in the Iraqi and Turkish national press. Turkish reporting noted Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s patient diplomacy and strategic design, highlighted the potential mutual economic gains, and outlined potential benefits of the Development Road—such as its role in possibly eroding de facto PKK control of large areas in northern Iraq. Iraqi media focused on the need to overcome longstanding problems and on the ample room for growth and improvement in ties. Kurdish coverage quoted officials and experts praising Turkish engagement in Iraq and underscoring the need for Ankara to sustain close ties with Erbil, as well as Baghdad, to prevent the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s exclusion from the benefits of closer national ties.

This apparent new chapter in bilateral relations has limits and brings risks. One limit is the central Iraqi government’s relatively limited reach with regards to the PKK. It has scarce military or intelligence resources in the remote border areas where the PKK operates and scant motive to commit them. There is some possibility that Baghdad is dangling potential counter-PKK support to co-opt Ankara into reducing support to the KRG. Therein lies a strategic risk for Ankara to guard against: Close Ankara-Erbil ties have had tremendous economic and security benefits for both. Another limit is Iran’s continuing influence over Baghdad and suspicion of Turkish influence there, which its agents and proxies will certainly seek to minimize.

The Development Road adds a dynamic new economic element to the bilateral equation, though, making it likely that the promise of more neighborly ties is less theatrical, and more substantive, than past expressions of intent. A practical and institutionalized strategic framework, coupled with an increasingly turbulent region and a newly compelling economic project with Gulf support, means that the current pivot may be both sincere and strategically significant. Handled deftly, it may produce the most stable Iraq—and a real community of interest between the two neighbors—the world has seen since Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Colonel (retired) Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Turkey program. He served thirty years in the US Army—with tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, and Germany—and served in senior policy positions at the State Department and Department of Defense.

The post A fair wind over Mesopotamia, or just hot air? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But as the region continues to be destabilized by Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is a sign that this period of US neglect may be ending. This sign comes in the form of Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (NDAA), which US President Joe Biden signed on December 22 last year, authorizing a total national security budget of $886 billion.

Section 1247 instructs the National Security Council to develop a Black Sea security and development strategy across government agencies. But until that strategy is released, Section 1247 outlines five ways the United States will aim to support the region: “(1) to increase coordination with [NATO] and the [European Union (EU)]; (2) to deepen economic ties; (3) to strengthen energy security; (4) to support efforts to bolster their democratic resilience; and (5) to enhance security assistance with regional partners in accordance with the values and interests of the United States.”

These aims will require a whole-of-government approach in addition to participation from the private sector, for example through private investment in projects across Black Sea regional partners—which the NDAA lists as Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Some initial assessments can be made about the United States’ five aims.

US coordination with NATO and the EU

The Black Sea region’s most pressing concern is Ukraine, which is struggling to fend off Russia. Though Ukraine has already received considerable military and economic support from the West, this aid will continue in the form of the EU’s recently approved fifty-billion-euro package. The US Congress is still in gridlock over additional aid. Ultimately, Ukraine’s role as a bulwark against Russian aggression is too important for Washington and Brussels to ignore.

Over the long term, there is a need for greater military capability and interoperability, as well as a more resilient civil-military infrastructure, across the Black Sea region. While all the littoral states would benefit from a greater US presence, two nations will be particularly important for achieving the United States’ coordination goals. Turkey is not only home to the second-largest military in NATO; it is also the guardian of the straits that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea (and beyond), so any US strategy must include Ankara. Therefore, rapprochement between Ankara, Washington, and Brussels will be necessary. Romania’s size, strategic location, and strong transatlantic ties have positioned it to become a military and economic hub for the region, particularly as more NATO assets are deployed there.

Deepening economic ties

Section 1247 calls for enhancing US business ties with Black Sea regional partners in part to reduce the impact of Russian and Chinese “economic coercion.” It is here where the various chambers of commerce—as well as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US government development organs—can contribute by coordinating with stakeholders, lending institutions, and entrepreneurs.

Corruption and entrenched bureaucracies prevalent in the region inhibit growth and investment and undermine public confidence in national institutions. There have been improvements, though. Hopefully, increased attention from Washington will provide the impetus for the regional states to implement and enforce additional serious anticorruption measures.

Strengthening energy security

There is a need to strengthen the wider Black Sea region’s energy security by enhancing source diversification and reducing or eliminating dependence on Russia. Due to their geographical location and historical ties with Russia, most countries in the region are dependent on Russia for oil and gas imports. With the price cap placed on Russian oil—designed to reduce money flows to Moscow—these countries have worked on reducing their dependences. However, because of waivers, lax controls, or illegal trading activities, money from around the world still flows into the Kremlin’s coffers.

Moldova’s efforts to wean itself from Russian energy have had some success, with notable Romanian support. Ankara has worked to diversify its energy sources—although Turkey is proceeding with an agreement it signed with Russia that allows Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom to build, own, and operate a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, drawing criticism from experts in the West. Moreover, Russian energy still flows into Turkey. For example, Turkey has become the second-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels.

Finally, NATO’s lack of pipeline infrastructure in Eastern Europe is a potential vulnerability, meaning that it may not be able to rapidly move fuel to forward-deployed forces in the Black Sea region. Addressing that vulnerability will require a major effort that includes increasing oil and gas production by Black Sea states, exploiting renewable energy sources, and expanding the distribution network through expanded pipeline, road, rail, and barge infrastructure. This will be expensive, controversial, and time consuming, requiring funding, strong diplomacy, and patience.

Bolstering democratic resilience

Russia’s relentless malign influence campaigns are difficult to counter for small states without the vast resources to do so. A comprehensive, multinational response is needed to blunt Russian propaganda and disinformation in the Black Sea region. The NDAA advocates for an increase in independent media and US-supported media initiatives in the region, in addition to initiatives led by the State Department and USAID, to “combat foreign malign influence in the region.” This also presents the opportunity to leverage US-owned news network Voice of America and US-supported media organization Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The United States could look to incorporate other resources, such as NATO’s strategic communications arm—including its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence based in Riga, Latvia.

Enhancing security assistance with regional partners

The longstanding mistrust between the littoral states creates an indispensable role for the United States. Indeed, the United States has encouraged collaboration on Black Sea security among the region’s states. Such collaboration is on the rise, most recently seen in January when Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania agreed to conduct demining operations in the Black Sea once Russia’s war in Ukraine comes to an end. Georgia is positioning itself as a key player in the middle corridor—promoting itself as a trusted partner in Eastern Europe’s trade system—by improving its port facilities and ancillary infrastructure. Georgia is also the proposed source for a potential undersea power and internet cable to Romania. Additionally, the strategy calls for assessments on “sustainable, long-term” food-security solutions. Cooperation between Ukraine and the countries along its Black Sea shipping corridor (Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) has allowed shipping, including millions of tons of agricultural goods such as grain, to continue along the Black Sea’s western coast within each state’s territorial waters. The United States’ aim to enhance security assistance with these regional partners is an opportunity for Washington to solidify its role as a trusted third party in such cooperation.

Section 1247 of the NDAA appears to be the beginning of an effort to bring stability to the United States’ traditionally unpredictable and uneven commitment to lend focus to the Black Sea region. However, Russia will continue to present a threat to the region. Thus, the United States must solidify its plans for engagement in order to change Russia’s perception of the political and economic costs of its activities and, ultimately, to deter the Kremlin.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” Follow him on LinkedIn.

The post Why Washington’s approach to Black Sea security may be about to change—for the better appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The benefits of that partnership have been made clearer over the past two years, with Bayraktar TB2 drones—manufactured by Turkish defense company Baykar—grabbing headlines for helping Ukraine by bolstering Kyiv’s air-strike capabilities in the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Just weeks before Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the war, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—during a visit to Kyiv—struck a deal with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to allow Ukrainian factories to produce Turkish drones. That deal is now bearing fruit, with Baykar breaking ground on a drone factory near Kyiv in February. The factory, which will take twelve months to build, is expected to create five hundred jobs and produce 120 units a year. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed to the project, calling it an example of how NATO allies are supporting Ukraine not only “with direct deliveries of weapons and ammunition but also by investing in and ramping up their capacity to produce their own weapons.”

Turkey and Ukraine’s strategic partnership stretches further. For example, Baykar’s Akıncı combat drone (introduced in 2021) and its Kızılelma combat drone (expected to be introduced this year) use Ukrainian-made Ivchenko-Progress engines. The Kızılelma has even been called a “Turkish bird with a Ukrainian heart.” Kyiv and Ankara also cooperate in the maritime domain; since 2021, Turkey has been building two Ada-class anti-submarine corvettes for Ukraine’s naval forces, expected to be completed and delivered this year. The Ukrainian Armed Forces received Cobra II tactical vehicles—developed by Turkish company Otokar—and were seen deploying them last year. Also in 2023: Ukraine sent two engines to the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the company’s T929 ATAK-II attack helicopter; Ukraine has committed to send twelve more by 2025.

While the flow of Turkish defense equipment northward to Ukraine has been strong, it has experienced headwinds. For example, European countries have been unable to come to a consensus on topping up the European Peace Facility, the mechanism with which the European Union (EU) funds weapons supplies for Ukraine. France, Greece, and Cyprus have blocked additional financing out of a desire to ensure that funds are spent on weapons, technologies, and ammunition from the EU. Greece said that it did not want the money to go to Turkish defense companies. The countries should let up on this demand—France recently has, for the procurement of artillery. Supplying Ukraine is not just about Kyiv’s security; it is also about Black Sea security and Euro-Atlantic security.

Nevertheless, the Ukraine-Turkey bilateral defense partnership has room to expand. On February 21, TAI announced that its KAAN fighter jet conducted its first flight. The jet was conceptualized and developed initially to replace the Turkish Air Force’s aging F-16 fleet and to bolster Turkey’s self-sufficiency—before the United States decided to sell Turkey forty new F-16s and equipment to upgrade dozens more. While the KAAN jet prototype is currently powered by General Electric F-110 engines (the engine that powers F-16s), Turkey is aiming to start using domestically produced engines produced by TAI Engine Industries by 2028. However, there may be a role for Ukraine in the project, as Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bodnar recently stated that not only is Ukraine looking to buy and use the KAAN jet, but “Ukrainian teams continue to work on the engine” and are “competing” to be a partner on the project.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on joint engine production for the KAAN jet would contribute to Ukraine’s economy and also provide Turkey a trustworthy and steady partner in bolstering its self-defense—political divides between Ankara and the West could potentially erupt into measures such as export license bans as was the case in 2019 with some European Union governments’ limiting arms exports following Turkey’s operation in northeast Syria and in 2020 with the United States imposing sanctions on Turkey following Ankara’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system.

NATO countries have acknowledged the important role that fighter jets play in the region’s security. Ukraine has been offered sixty second-hand F-16 fighter jets by the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Last year, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom began training Ukrainian pilots. In November last year, Romania received three of the thirty-two F-16s it bought from Norway. By 2025, Romania is expected to own forty-nine F-16s. Bulgaria is also gearing up to receive the sixteen F-16 Block 70 fighter jets it bought from the United States; the first eight are expected to arrive by 2025.

Turkey plans to export some KAAN jets, which could offer countries an alternative to fighter aircraft manufactured and sold by Russia and China. And, once Turkey has more KAAN jets off the ground and more F-16 upgraded in its fleet, it could support Ukraine with second-hand F-16s or by serving as a repair and upgrade hub for the F-16s that Ukraine and other Black Sea countries own.

Benefits that ripple across the sea

An expanded Ukraine-Turkey security partnership would compound upon the beneficial effects of previous efforts to secure the region undertaken by NATO countries.

In both its 2022 Strategic Concept and its 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué, NATO called Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” In both documents, the Alliance also reiterated the “strategic importance” of the Black Sea. The United States—the NATO member with the largest military—echoed this in its 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, where it emphasized the need to bolster defenses in the region and increase cooperation on Black Sea security, not only bilaterally with regional partners—specifically Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Georgia—but also with NATO and the EU to minimize the risk of duplicating efforts and to improve interoperability.

Strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region is even more important as the US presidential election looms. Former US President Donald Trump, a candidate again this year, has repeatedly argued that the United States is unfairly carrying the burden of financing NATO. Recently, he added that he would encourage Russia to do whatever it wants to any NATO country that doesn’t meet the Alliance’s defense spending guidelines. This kind of announcement unfortunately encourages an imperialist president such as Putin.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began and threats to the Black Sea region increased, NATO and its members have worked to bolster the region’s defense and deterrence capabilities. NATO increased its forward presence in the region by establishing four new battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. The United States has developed close security cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, providing them with important defense technology and weapons as well as Foreign Military Financing to support their military modernization efforts and regional defense capabilities. The United States is also leading a Black Sea Maritime Domain Awareness project, in which Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia are participants.

Ukraine has disabled one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. With Turkey being the guardian of the straits under the Montreux Convention, Russia will not easily be able to replace these losses. NATO allies should take advantage of the opportunity they now have to get the upper hand in the maritime domain against Russia. Montreux limits the passage of non-Black Sea countries’ naval forces through the straits and the amount of time these forces can spend in the Black Sea; but the United States and non-littoral European countries, seeking to bolster Black Sea allies’ defense capabilities, can lean more on Turkey. The erosion of Russia’s capabilities has shifted the balance of power in the Black Sea to Turkey’s advantage. Turkey could lead naval operations in the international waters in the Black Sea, further out from its coastline, with its TCG Anadolu assault ship without a NATO mandate. While there is no specific mention of Turkey in the US Black Sea strategy, the outline for which is reflected in the US National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, the existing structure of the law is enough for the US to support—alone or in cooperation with other NATO allies—the Black Sea countries with additional capabilities and efforts to improve interoperability.

A Ukraine-Turkey partnership on the KAAN jet would add to these efforts and bolster security in the region.

What’s at stake

Gridlock in the US Congress over approving additional financial support to Ukraine and debate over whether the war is at a stalemate—in addition to Ukraine’s losses on the battleground and its ammunition shortage—have alarmed many European capitals.

After weeks of resistance from Hungary, the EU agreed to $54 billion in long-term aid to Ukraine. European countries, for their part, are also pitching in to shore up Ukraine’s and the Euro-Atlantic community’s security. Germany, which ranks second in military assistance committed to Ukraine, is—among other initiatives—building a new ammunition factory in response to Germany’s and Europe’s needs. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also called on Europe to “move… towards large-scale production of defense equipment.” Good news also came out of Denmark, as the prime minister announced that she would pledge all of the country’s artillery arsenal to Ukraine. France has also recently concluded a security pact with Ukraine, pledging up to three billion euros in military aid—including cooperation on artillery—and the Netherlands has committed to providing 2.2 billion euros in military aid this year.

Turkey has also looked to boost Euro-Atlantic security. Turkey and the United States are already cooperating to replenish the United States’ munitions stockpiles, critical considering Washington’s role in supplying ammunition to Ukraine. According to the US ambassador to Turkey, by next year, 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds made in the United States will be manufactured by factories that are part of a partnership between the US Department of Defense and a Turkish defense company. Turkey, as well as Greece, recently joined the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative, which offers participating countries a platform through which they can jointly procure air defense capabilities, an important contribution to European security. All these efforts and initiatives are important, as the United States, NATO, and EU will need to prepare over the next eleven months for a potential Trump presidency.

Leaders in the West are putting into words how important it is for Ukraine to win. As French President Emmanuel Macron said, Russian defeat in Ukraine is vital for security in Europe; Scholz stressed that what happens in Ukraine will decide “if our [peaceful] order, our rules-based world has a future.” Ukraine’s defense-industrial know-how and Turkey’s experience in manufacturing combine into a win-win security partnership that can pay dividends for Black Sea security, Euro-Atlantic security, and—ultimately—the international rules-based order.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Follow her on LinkedIn.

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During more than two hours of what a European Commission spokesperson called “old lies, distortions, and manipulations, and . . . hostility towards the West,” Putin demonstrated a morbid obsession with Russian imperial grandeur, justified the invasion of neighboring states, and showed zero respect for international law and peace treaties.

As a country that has spent more years in wars with Russia than with any other rival and that has competed for dominance in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea over centuries, Turkey should not take the Russian threat lightly.

Watch Russia’s claims on “Constantinople”

In February 2023, while Turkey was still recovering from a devastating earthquake, Russian State Duma Member Semyon Bagdasarov issued a call to attack Turkey and annex Istanbul: “Turkey is the historical lands of Russia. Turkey is now in a dire situation. Let’s take advantage of this and return our lands. Let’s squeeze it out of the Central Asia, undermine its influence in Ukraine, drive it out of the South Caucasus, raise certain forces in Turkey and return what historically belonged to us—Constantinople.” He went as far as to suggest that “the crisis in Turkey must end up in its collapse” and in Russia’s return to Istanbul: “We will erect a cross over the Church of Hagia Sophia and reveal frescoes that are now hidden from people. And we’ll put on music—a prayer in Aramaic or perhaps in Russian.”

References to “Constantinople”—a name now seen only in history textbooks in most other countries—are still frequently seen in Russian modern political rhetoric. In fact, Aleksandr Dugin (the ideologue, sometimes referred to as Putin’s philosopher, behind the ultranationalist Eurasianism movement in Russia and one of the most agile agitators and propagandists of Eurasianism globally) for years was running a popular TV channel called Telekanal Constantinople. Later, he became a mastermind of the Russian Orthodox TV channel Tsargrad, which is owned by Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev (currently on the European Union sanctions list for his support of the 2014 invasion of Ukraine). Tsargrad is another name used within Russia for contemporary Istanbul, meaning “the city of the emperor”—another reminder of Russia’s imperial nostalgia for control over the Black Sea

Some Russian opinion leaders have not abandoned the idea of conquering Istanbul when the opportunity arises. For example, Alexey Vladimirovich Oleynikov (a professor at a Russian public university) argued in 2020 that over the course of the twentieth century, Russia missed two opportunities to “decide the fate of” the Turkish straits—the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus—and that Moscow should not miss its “third chance”: “At the present stage of history Russia has the third one. It is obvious that at present the most acceptable option for Russia is the internationalization of Constantinople and the straits.”

Oleynikov writes that “Constantinople could well receive the status of a free self-governing city. This would be natural: After all, Turkey already has a capital—Ankara.” And later, he elaborates that “historically, Constantinople should be controlled by Russia but owned by Greece.” If that is not to happen, the professor suggests that the internationalization of Constantinople and the straits could be maintained “under the control of great powers with a special status for Russia—a great power in the Black Sea.” His ideas resonate with Bagdasarov’s calls to take advantage of a weakened Turkey: “Turkey itself, torn apart by problems and contradictions, is finding it increasingly difficult to single-handedly control the fate of the strategic region of Europe.” Of course, Russia is always eager to offer help.

Be wary of historical justifications

It isn’t only Istanbul that has been contested. For example, a blogger with nearly 140,000 subscribers on the popular Russian media platform Dzen wrote that Russians “quickly forget about” their “rich imperial past, in comparison with which the achievements of the USSR already seem like awkward attempts to restore the status quo.” He continues, “today we will talk only about part of . . . eastern Turkey, which, after the end of the Russian-Turkish War in 1878, was added to the Russian Empire, namely the Kars region, located on the modern territory of three Turkish regions: Kars, Ardahan, and Erzurum.” Later, the blogger blames the “Bolsheviks of the young Soviet state” for “mediocrely transferring these territories to Turkey in exchange for assistance in consolidating Soviet power in Transcaucasia” under the Moscow Treaty of 1921.

Russian historical grievances have become particularly evident in times of crisis. For instance, in December 2015, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 tactical bomber violated Turkish air space and was downed by the Turkish air forces. As BBC Russia put it at the time, the event “brings to mind the long and dramatic history of the Black Sea straits”—including Russia’s past claims on Turkish territories. In November 1940, then-Premier of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin reportedly told the head of the Communist International that the USSR “will drive the Turks out to Asia. What kind of Turkey is this? There are two million Georgians, one and a half million Armenians, one million Kurds. They are only 6-7 million Turks.” And according to Russian historian Alexander Goryanin, Stalin planned to invade Turkey from the Caucasus and Bulgaria at the end of World War II, but that plan went down the drain with Ankara’s joining the anti-Hitler coalition in February 1945.

At the 1945 Potsdam Conference, Stalin expressed his desire to obtain the eastern Turkish provinces of Kars and Lazistan (in northeastern Turkey), and a naval base in the Dardanelles. The partners at the conference responded that Turkey did not fight on Hitler’s side and that there was nothing to punish it for. After the end of the war, it was Soviet demands for joint control over the straits and territorial claims over the eastern regions of Turkey that became a driving force behind Turkey’s decision to seek NATO membership.

Given Putin’s ardent passion for the restoration of Stalin’s legacy, Ankara should carefully take note of this history.

Resist efforts to divide NATO

The Russian threat to Turkey might seem exaggerated, as the country is now a NATO member with the second-largest military in the Alliance.

However, before Russia attacks with armies of tanks, it attacks with armies of bots and trolls. In Russia’s way of war, cognitive warfare unfolds first—paving the way for a kinetic war effort. And in the battle for hearts and minds, with the Russian news agency Sputnik, the television network RT, and the Rossotrudnichestvo (a cultural agency under the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) still operational in Turkey, the country remains highly vulnerable to Russian penetrations.

A RAND study on Russia’s use of media and information operations in Turkey outlined the goals of Russia’s media efforts in Turkey: 1) to undermine NATO unity and instigate suspicion between Turkey and its Western allies; 2) to enlist Turkey’s support in and erode its opposition to Russian activity in Eurasia and the Middle East; and 3) to influence Turkey’s politics and make Ankara a more “compliant” partner. It also highlighted that in Turkey, Russian media is primarily focused on fueling anti-US discourse, which could help push Ankara into Russia’s embrace.

Back in 2007, Dugin had explicitly outlined this aim in a book he wrote (and published only in Turkish) on what he called the Moscow-Ankara axis: “It is important that anti-Americanism unites three morally different, sometimes antagonistic forces in Turkish society: leftists, nationalists, and representatives of religious circles. Such a wide range shows that Eurasianism in Turkey has great prospects, far beyond the level of any single political force or party.” This message has been amplified by Turkish Eurasianists who have relentlessly promoted a narrative that Ankara should always support Russia, because—as one Turkish proponent put it—“if Russia falls, Turkey will be the next one to be divided by NATO.”

As Putin continues his efforts to restore the Russian empire, Ankara must remain clear-eyed about the real threats to its national security. It’s not a risk of being divided by NATO, but a risk of a divided NATO that would leave Turkey most vulnerable to Russian revisionism in the region.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Follow her on X, formerly known as Twitter, @GaberYevgeniya.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

The post Listen closely to Putin: His imperial ambitions could include Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Defne Arslan: Erdogan’s political gamble hints at a deal on F-16s

Anna Wieslander: Will Hungary now follow Turkey’s lead in approving Sweden’s accession?

Rich Outzen: A long road for Sweden’s accession, but it’s heading in the right direction

Erdogan’s political gamble hints at a deal on F-16s

The Turkish parliament’s vote for Sweden’s accession to NATO marks a milestone in a prolonged approval process since Erdoğan announced in July 2023 that he would send the ratification to parliament. The bill was finally discussed at parliament’s foreign affairs commission in late December, resulting in a recommendation just before parliament’s winter recess to get the bill approved on the floor. It’s worth noting that the accession protocol was supported by the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in addition to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and their alliance partner the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).

During the long negotiations, Ankara has demanded that Stockholm step up in its fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and others. Turkey’s point was that NATO members should take member countries’ security concerns seriously, and Sweden needs to take Turkey’s concerns seriously in order to be in NATO. Eventually, a series of measures passed by Sweden, including a new anti-terrorism law that went into effect last year, helped to ease Turkey’s concerns.  

Meanwhile, as these discussions continued with Sweden, Turkey also saw an opportunity to receive from the United States its long-delayed package of new F-16 fighter jets and upgrades to its existing fleet, noting again that NATO members need to take fellow member-state security measures seriously. Indeed, the renewal of the F-16 program is not only in Turkey’s security interest, but also in the United States’ security interest in the region. 

The next step is Erdoğan sending the bill to Turkey’s official gazette, so the law can take effect. But after the recent PKK attacks in Northern Iraq killing twenty-one Turkish soldiers, Erdoğan is taking a big risk in giving a green light to the bill given the sensitivity of the PKK issue among the Turkish people. The most likely explanation is that Turkey has secured F-16s from the United States in return. That would help Erdoğan use this deal as a political issue in the upcoming March local elections, which are hugely important for the Turkish president as he is determined to take back Istanbul and several other major cities that the AKP lost to the opposition in previous local elections.  

—Defne Arslan is the senior director and founder of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, leading the Council’s global work and programming on Turkey.

Will Hungary now follow Turkey’s lead in approving Sweden’s accession?

There is one word that sums up the feelings in Stockholm today: FINALLY! The Turkish parliament has, at last, voted yes to Sweden’s accession protocol to NATO. What was supposed to be a “fast-track” process hand-in-hand with Finland, after quick ratifications by twenty-eight allies, turned into a frustrating journey for Sweden, as the process first was haltered and then fragmented by Turkey when Finland was allowed to join on April 4, 2023, but not Sweden. Meanwhile, the security situation in Europe has continued to deteriorate.  

Step-by-step, rather than fast-track, is the best way to characterize the process. The question now is what the final steps will be. On the Turkish side, the parallel F-16 deal with the United States is still looming. On the Hungarian side, the other ally that has not yet ratified Sweden’s accession, new obstacles are emerging. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced today on X that he had sent a letter to Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and invited him to visit Hungary to “negotiate” on Sweden’s NATO accession. Up until now, Sweden has taken comfort in earlier Hungarian promises that the country would not be the last to ratify.

While Hungary has put nothing openly on the table other than a vague discontent with Sweden’s “attitude,” fighter jets could be a negotiation card here as well, as Hungary leases Swedish JAS Gripen, a contract which is up for extension and possible expansion. 

For NATO and the twenty-nine allies that want to see Sweden as ally number thirty-two as soon as possible, concerns are growing. The urgent executability of the new regional plans in the High North will be more difficult with Sweden on the outside of the Alliance. In addition, the inability to advance on enlargement weakens NATO politically at a critical time for European security, to the benefit of Russia. One problem is that Hungary might have nothing left to lose when it comes to reputational damage to NATO; on the contrary, Orbán might feel strengthened by his recent negotiation success in the European Union as a consequence of blocking support to Ukraine.

—Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and chair of the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) in Stockholm, Sweden.

A long road for Sweden’s accession, but it’s heading in the right direction

The Turkish parliament’s vote to approve Sweden’s accession into NATO brings a long and complicated process of “assurance building” nearer to completion. Several hurdles have been cleared since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine led Sweden to seek accession. The first was Ankara’s insistence that Sweden cannot enter NATO as a haven for activities of the PKK, an anti-Turkish terror-designated movement by US and European Union law. Constitutional reforms and the advent of a Swedish government more sympathetic to Turkish security concerns have not fully satisfied the Turks but have provided enough of a start to indicate a trend in a positive direction—a significant accomplishment. By agreeing with Turkey and Finland in a Trilateral Memorandum to heed each other’s security concerns with appropriate gravity, and by following through with substantive steps, Sweden overcame this obstacle.

The second obstacle has been the defense industrial imbroglio between the United States and Turkey, which became entangled with Sweden’s accession after politicians first in Washington and later in Ankara tied them together. With Turkey seeking new and upgraded F-16s after the United States expelled it from the F-35 program—and with NATO clearly standing to benefit from updated Turkish air capabilities—the necessary congressional approvals became difficult even as Sweden’s accession lagged behind Finland’s due to holdouts Turkey and Hungary. It was clear from the start that given congressional dislike for Erdoğan’s government, it would take US President Joe Biden personally, and the executive branch collectively, exerting massive efforts to assure that F-16 approval would quickly follow (or occur simultaneously) with the Turkish parliament’s approval for Sweden. It appears that Ankara now believes that the groundwork for F-16 passage has been effectively laid in Washington, and that the assurances are firm. 

The final obstacle has been Russia’s campaign to persuade Turkey (and Hungary) not to allow Sweden in. There is a theme woven into the NATO expansion process of Turkey carefully balancing to keep Russia from defeating Ukraine but also offering some concessions—like not enforcing US sanctions and slowing Swedish accession. Yet with Russian President Vladimir Putin coming to Turkey in the coming weeks (as announced by Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskov today), it is a fair inference that Putin has pushed Erdoğan as far as he can in the process and will shrug as it crosses the finish line. 

There are still wildcards at play here. Hungary’s invitation to Sweden to negotiate on the accession deal may delay things a while more, even after the Turkish parliament says yes. Erdogan may tarry a bit before publishing the parliamentary decision in the official gazette. Congress may say “What F-16s?” in a manner that damages both Swedish accession hopes and NATO’s southern flank. One possible theory Ankara insiders are discussing is that Biden, accounting for congressional prerogatives, may have assured Erdoğan that if the F-16s stall, he will lobby Germany aggressively to approve the sale of Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft in lieu of F-16s. There are several alternative scenarios. For now, though, fans of the Alliance should take heart from the decision in Ankara—it is moving in the right direction. 

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

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The Israel-Hamas war broke out just as efforts by Israel and Turkey to normalize their diplomatic relations were gaining steam. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Erdoğan held their first-ever meeting in person in New York on September 19, just a few weeks before October 7. The discussion reportedly went well, clearing the way for a new phase of bilateral cooperation. One former ministerial-level Israeli official affirmed to me at that time that Netanyahu acceded to Erdoğan’s request to focus on joint energy projects, while a current ministerial-level Turkish official told me that Ankara believes Israel was then ready to resurrect a natural gas pipeline project connecting its giant Leviathan field in the Mediterranean Sea with Turkey.

Following such efforts to normalize relations, Erdoğan’s initial statements after Israel’s military response in Gaza were restrained. On October 7, Erdoğan called upon “the parties to act with restraint in light of the events in Israel this morning and to stay away from impulsive steps that will escalate tension.” Four days later, the Turkish president told members of his party, “We openly oppose the killing of civilians on Israeli territories. Likewise, we can never accept the massacre of defenseless innocents in Gaza by indiscriminate, constant bombardments.” 

As Israel’s bombardment of Gaza intensified and civilian casualties mounted, however, Erdoğan’s tone shifted back toward his more typical support for the Palestinian people. His anti-Israel rhetoric crescendoed for a fortnight, peaking in late October when the Turkish president said to his party that Hamas fighters are liberators, and when—at a pro-Palestinian rally in Istanbul—he told hundreds of thousands of supporters, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization,” and “Israel is an occupier.” At the rally, Erdoğan further said that Turkey would “declare Israel a war criminal” and that Netanyahu “is no longer someone we can talk to, we have crossed him out.”

Despite this rhetoric, it could still be valuable for Turkey to play a leading role in diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire and then pursue a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Ankara has succeeded in mediating in the past, particularly in facilitating talks (in collaboration with the United Nations) between Russia and Ukraine, resulting in the Black Sea grain deal in July 2022—although the deal fell apart a year later. In addition, Turkey is home to NATO’s second-largest military and has extensive peacekeeping experience in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, and Kosovo. The Turkish president may have been angered when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken—during his first post-October 7 trip to the Middle East—skipped visiting Turkey, which could have suggested that the United States didn’t see Turkey as a possible mediator. Later that month, Erdoğan seemed to have snubbed Blinken by not meeting him when he visited Ankara.

Turkey, among other countries, has offered to mediate and serve as a “guarantor” to end the conflict and to ensure the implementation of a political solution. However, the guarantor proposal—first outlined by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on October 17—has not gained traction despite Fidan’s flurry of international diplomacy, including at the Cairo Peace Conference on October 21 as well as talks in London and Paris. Instead, Qatar (in coordination with Egypt and the United States) led negotiations to obtain the week-long “humanitarian pause” that began on November 24 and included hostage and prisoner releases plus aid deliveries into Gaza from Egypt. 

In the future, Qatar and Turkey could form a valuable diplomatic partnership to pursue additional humanitarian pauses or even an eventual ceasefire, building on their existing (and strong) security and economic relations. Turkey maintains a military base in Qatar under the Qatar-Turkey Joint Forces Command and was Doha’s staunchest supporter when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates blockaded Qatar from 2017 to 2021. Doha, meanwhile, has provided Ankara significant financial support, including a $500-million presidential jet that Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani donated to Erdoğan in September 2018.

The trust Qatar has garnered from both Israel and Hamas coupled with Turkey’s military and diplomatic capabilities could eventually enable multilateral discussions about a two-state solution. And despite his bitter rhetorical attacks on Netanyahu and Israel, Erdoğan has arguably kept the diplomatic door ajar by allowing Turkey’s diplomatic mission in Israel to remain open. 

Moreover, Israel and Turkey have muddled through previous bouts of intense diplomatic tensions. Following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident—when Israeli commandos killed eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish American during a raid on the flagship of a flotilla trying to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza—Israel-Turkey relations entered a deep chill. Yet (despite episodic and reciprocal withdrawals of each country’s ambassadors) the countries largely kept their respective embassies open and bilateral trade and investment continued to flourish, leading to a doubling of the two countries’ trade volume from $3.4 billion to $8.4 billion by 2021.  

But that was before October 7, the day the largest loss of Jewish lives since the Holocaust took place. For the foreseeable future, Israel’s entire political spectrum will remain shaken and embittered by Erdoğan’s embrace of Hamas and condemnation of Israel and will thus recoil at any suggestion of a “guarantor” role for Turkey. 

Still, Turkey’s past engagement with Hamas could pay dividends for peace in the Middle East. Erdoğan disclosed on November 21 that Fidan and Turkey’s intelligence director, Ibrahim Kalın, were working with Qatar on the release of hostages held by Hamas. These efforts appear to have produced results. Even Hamas credited Turkey for having facilitated the release of citizens held by Hamas, saying in a November 27 statement, “In response to the efforts of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas has completed the release of Thai detainees inside the Gaza Strip.” Moreover, Turkey’s ambition to be a “guarantor” of a future ceasefire and eventual political solution could help persuade Egypt and other countries to play an eventual role on the ground and avoid a political vacuum in Gaza. 

What is less evident, however, is whether Erdoğan will moderate his rhetorical attacks on Israel, and even if so, whether Israelis, stung by Ankara’s embrace of Hamas, would even accept Turkey (in tandem with Qatar) as a mediator or guarantor in achieving tangible benefits in Gaza.

Matthew Bryza was a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

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Once a vital player, France now has a footprint on the continent that is rapidly fading away, with few prospects for its return. This void creates an opportunity for the West’s adversaries—particularly China, Russia, and Iran—who are asserting an increasingly active stance in Africa.

France is leaving behind a power vacuum; Turkey’s strategy in Africa offers lessons for NATO on how to fill it.

Ankara’s ‘soft’ approach

Ankara’s foreign policy in Africa rests on a careful balance of soft and hard power. On one hand, Turkey’s cultural and political engagement with Africa has been a prominent element in Ankara’s foreign policy since the late 1990s. As Elif Çomoğlu Ülgen, general director of Eastern and Southern Africa at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explained in a recent panel discussion, the political-cultural opening to the continent gained momentum with the proliferation of Turkish embassies across Africa and the expansion of Turkish Airlines’ flight network, connecting Ankara to many African capital cities.

Turkey’s strategic opening to Africa, and Turkey-Africa relations overall, gained attention in 2005 with Ankara’s “Year of Africa” agenda. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the initiative helped pave the way for enhanced political and economic ties, including trade cooperation agreements, with African countries. That year, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency opened its first office in Africa; now it has more than twenty offices across the continent, implementing culture and development projects. Over the last few decades, Turkey has signed free trade agreements with five African nations: Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritius, Sudan, and Egypt. From 1980 to 2017, the trade volume between Turkey and several African countries grew dramatically: For example, Turkey-Algeria trade tripled, while Turkey-Egypt trade increased by five times. The improvement in relations was also accompanied by the expansion of efforts to promote the Turkish language and culture on the continent.

Today, thousands of African students study in Turkish universities or among the Turkish Cypriot community with the help of Turkish scholarships. Additionally, Turkey’s Maarif schools provide Turkish-language education to around twenty thousand students across twenty-four African countries. Under the ruling Justice and Development Party, Turkish-African relations improved further, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saying that the Turkish people and African populations had built “heart-to-heart” connections. Such heart-to-heart connections were evident in state visits, with Erdoğan’s 2011 visit to Mogadishu amid a large-scale famine and drought that affected more than twelve million people across the Horn of Africa.

Turkey’s ‘hard power’ contributions

In addition to using soft power, Turkey has deployed hard power—in the form of its burgeoning defense diplomacy and military-capacity building—to connect with African countries. The positive momentum in Turkey-Africa relations has also led to closer security-military cooperation, specifically in counterterrorism operations.

As Turkey struggles with its own decades-long terrorism problem with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party—a Kurdish militant group which Turkey, the United States, and the European Union recognize as a terrorist organization—Ankara can empathize with its African partners who are facing their own challenges from terrorist groups. As these countries look to combat terrorism, Turkey exports lessons learned from its counterterrorism operations to its African partners.

Turkish companies have sold armored vehicles to African countries; the Turkish government has donated such vehicles to some countries as well. Troops in Kenya, Chad, and Somalia are pursuing terrorist groups with the help of these Turkish armored vehicles.

Additionally, Turkish drones hover over the African continent. An increasing number of African nations—including Niger and Ethiopia—are deploying Turkish unmanned aerial systems to conduct pinpoint strikes and collect intelligence on terrorist targets.

Several announcements from Turkish officials and improving Turkey-Africa relations suggest that the Turkish defense industry’s footprint in the continent might deepen in the future. Importantly, in contrast with some other countries arming African nations, Turkey’s military policy involves a high degree of cooperation, after-sale support, and other forms of assistance. In this sense, Ankara is transferring its concept of operations to African countries such as Somalia.

In addition to equipping the Somali Armed Forces with high-end Turkish weapons systems, Turkey also established a defense university, Camp TURKSOM, in Mogadishu in 2017 to train Somalia’s military. Such a university demonstrates that for Turkey and Somalia, their military relations rest on bolstering their joint capabilities (rather than simply a set of transactions), strengthening Somalia’s security, and fostering a common identity for the two nations’ armed forces. Additionally, Turkish military policy in Africa has remained mostly unchanged despite recent security challenges in the region and the open threats Ankara has received from terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab. This unchanged posture shows the importance and depth of its military-security cooperation with Somalia.

Beyond its involvement in counterterrorism and capacity-building efforts in Africa, Ankara’s positioning in recent affairs in the region also differs from the positions taken by many other NATO countries. During the recent political turmoil in Niger, while some countries cut off or threatened to halt humanitarian aid, Turkey refrained from making bold claims on the matter. Later, Erdoğan opposed proposals for a military intervention in Niger and expressed hopes that the country could reach constitutional order and democratic governance soon. This noninterventionist stance seems closely tied to Ankara’s strategic objective to establish a long-lasting relationship with Niger—and to possibly secure the continuation of military-security cooperation deals signed between Ankara and Niamey (which involve the prospect of opening a military base in Niger) and protect Ankara’s investments in the country, which depend on Niger’s stability.

Moving forward, the steps NATO allies take in Africa will greatly shape the continent’s geopolitical orientation. As Western capitals are increasingly pushed to recalibrate their Africa strategies, Ankara’s approach—one that rests on the pillars of a careful mix of hard and soft power, capacity building, noninterventionism, and mutual cooperation—can provide lessons. And while that process is underway, Turkey—whose political-military ties to the continent sit on strong foundations—can help counterbalance the growing footprint of NATO’s strategic rivals.

Sine Özkaraşahin is an analyst in the security and defense program at the Istanbul-based think tank the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. Follow her on X (formerly known as Twitter) @sineozkarasahin.

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Following remarks on October 25 and at the “Great Palestine Meeting” on October 28, Turkey’s citizens are wondering whether Erdoğan’s party intended to overshadow the republic’s historic centenary. Regardless, Erdoğan seems to have adopted a shift in rhetoric, perhaps to take advantage of the high emotions of the rally’s participants—using growing anger over Israel’s actions, and US support for those actions, to solidify support for him. Given this sea of enmity against Israel, Erdoğan could have concluded that it would be risky for the West to call out Ankara for his remarks (as that could further fuel anti-West sentiment), offering him an opening to give his speech and appeal to his base.

Erdoğan’s divergence from the West—shown in his remarks at the rally for Palestine—stands in stark contrast to his signing of the protocol for Sweden’s NATO accession and sending it to parliament for final approval just days before the speech. Although the Turkish parliament’s foreign affairs subcommittee has not yet voted on the matter, Erdoğan’s move with the protocol seems to have been strategically timed as an olive branch to the West. But neither the West nor Erdoğan’s opponents have any obligation to see these developments the way he wants them to be seen and acted upon.

Erdoğan’s rhetoric, specifically about Israel and the West, has evolved, contrasting sharply with the more moderate, balanced foreign policy that the president has touted since 2020. After reestablishing diplomatic ties with Israel in 2022, he began choosing his words carefully. For example, when Israel violently raided the Jenin refugee camp in July this year in its fight against terrorism, Erdoğan largely stuck to releasing statements through the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, killing around 1,200 Israelis, Erdoğan initially called for calm and made carefully written statements, even offering to mediate to end the conflict. 

But Erdoğan’s choice of words began to evolve, particularly after the October 17 blast at al-Ahli Hospital—which killed hundreds of people—when the president rushed to blame Israel for the strike and called upon “all humanity” to stop the “unprecedented brutality” in Gaza (the source of the blast remains unconfirmed, but US and other allied intelligence agencies have been explicit that, according to their assessments, it was not an Israeli strike). On October 25, Erdoğan called Hamas a mujahadeen, casting it as a religious freedom fighter group rather than a terror organization. He also doubled down on his anti-West rhetoric and accused Israel of committing crimes against humanity. At the “Great Palestine Meeting,” Erdoğan said Turkey would “proclaim” Israel a “war criminal.” In response, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen ordered the return of Israel’s diplomats from Turkey “to conduct a reevaluation of the relations between Israel and Turkey.”

Despite what Erdoğan’s remarks may convey, there are far more Turkish citizens who want their government to remain neutral in the war than there are citizens who want to back Hamas, according to the Metropoll Strategic and Social Research Centre (in a poll conducted in the weeks before the al-Alhi Hospital blast). In the background of those poll results, the public continues to struggle with staggeringly high inflation and the ongoing depreciation of the lira, and the government continues to attempt to balance its priorities—ones that, at the moment, more directly impact Turkey’s economic stability and national security than the Israel-Hamas war.

But Erdoğan’s rhetoric doesn’t necessarily match his official actions, which leave the door open to Israel. While he did recall Turkish Ambassador to Israel Şakir Özkan Torunlar for consultations, a week after Israel withdrew its diplomats for consultations, he hasn’t completely downgraded relations, saying that “complete disconnection is not possible.”  

Turkey has temporarily halted plans for joint energy cooperation and exploration with Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, but Erdoğan did not unveil any other potential actions against Israel at the rally. Turkey’s trade relations with Israel have consistently remained strong despite the ups and downs in bilateral relations. Given Turkey’s economic problems, it would be hard for Erdoğan to unilaterally call off relations with Israel. Turkey’s president is in a bind of his own making, with two choices: further rally only those who back his new rhetoric—and risk alienating citizens who still prefer neutrality in this war—or tread carefully and serve his country’s interests, and in doing so, put his party in a position to make gains in the 2024 local elections.

While Erdoğan’s rhetoric has raised concern that Turkey might unilaterally send troops to Gaza, he is unlikely to do so. However, if a United Nations-approved force comes to being, Erdoğan could—and is likely to—secure a role for the Turkish military in safeguarding Palestinian civilians. Turkey has a track record for working in multinational and NATO peacekeeping and military operations such as ones in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Turkey’s credibility in the region as a power broker is also at stake: The more that Turkey turns away from the West, the more that it loses its credibility in the region. Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric will no longer win him the points in the Arab world it would have before the Arab Spring.  

Going forward, Erdoğan must undertake a difficult balancing act, as he wields the most influence—and serves his country’s political and economic interests best—from a neutral position.

Tulin Daloglu is a Turkey-based journalist. Follow her on Twitter @TulinDaloglu.

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The testimony follows after US senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Mitt Romney (R-UT) introduced the Black Sea Security Act, which called upon the National Security Council, Department of State, Department of Defense, and other agencies to produce an interagency Black Sea security and development strategy. Shortly after, congressmen Mike Turner (R-OH) and William Keating (D-MA) introduced the House companion of the bill. Shaheen later promised to “continue to push” the Biden administration to develop the strategy.  

Speaking in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, O’Brien outlined the strategy’s five pillars: increased bilateral and multilateral engagement; regional security cooperation, buttressed by an enhanced NATO presence; economic cooperation; energy security; and democratic resilience.

For Black Sea watchers concerned with the decades of US indifference or mixed messages toward this critical region, the bipartisan efforts to address the growing instability under Russian aggression are welcome. For too long, rhetoric about the Black Sea region’s strategic importance to European security and US national interests has not resulted in much action. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 raised the stakes and the urgency for Western leaders to act.

While the efforts behind the Biden administration’s strategy may be a good start, a loosely defined strategy does not necessarily mean a positive impact on the ground—much still needs to be done. Appropriations will need approval from Congress, some members of which are growing skeptical and showing fatigue with the war in Ukraine—and their attention is split with deteriorating conditions in the Middle East and China’s rising threats in the South China Sea. The United States is on the cusp of an election year, during which foreign policy discussions will likely be distorted or shelved. In other words, don’t expect to see anything substantive on the Black Sea security strategy until 2025.

Perhaps more challenging, it will also be necessary to get buy-in from the Black Sea’s regional players, a notoriously diverse and contentious group of countries. While temporarily united by a fear of Russia, this unity may not last, requiring a long-term, structured, and comprehensive approach—with Washington as the honest broker, placing even more importance on a US-derived regional strategy.

Buy-in—particularly from large regional players such as Ukraine, Romania, and Turkey—cannot be ignored. Turkey controls the Straits in and out of the Black Sea and thus maintains considerable military and political sway beyond its borders. Any broad regional security strategy without Ankara’s tacit acceptance will be virtually impossible to execute.

The Black Sea’s NATO member states—Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey—will certainly benefit from the increased US attention on Black Sea region security. However, these countries already have NATO Article 5 protection, and Russia has assiduously refrained from any overt military actions against a NATO member. Ukraine, while not a NATO member, has received considerable support from Washington and has proven it can go toe-to-toe with Russia in the battlespace. Moreover, as it holds Russia back from accessing other areas of Europe, Kyiv will continue to receive Western support.

The Black Sea region’s smaller, non-NATO states could be left behind. The United States should lend particular focus to them. Moldova is under tremendous pressure from the Kremlin, while Georgia (already invaded and occupied by Russia) is also vulnerable. Armenia is now reevaluating its close ties with Russia and is considering a stronger relationship with the West. Any attempt by Yerevan to leave Moscow’s orbit will trigger a harsh response from the Kremlin. The specific needs of Azerbaijan—a key source of European oil and gas and a major competitor to Russia—must also be considered within a Black Sea strategy.

Additionally, it will be important to protect freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, notably amid the presence of sea mines and UAV attacks on shipping. While the Montreux Convention may limit direct military support, continual US leadership is vital to coordinate greater cooperation between the littoral states, as well as US funding and training to regional military establishments.

Arguably, it is the economic and energy security pillars of the strategy that hold the most promise. This strategy must include a strong private sector component; in implementing the strategy, Washington must offer support and incentives to US companies to venture into the region. Moreover, the countries in the region must demonstrate good governance and offer a level playing field for this outside investment to materialize.

In his testimony, O’Brien detailed Project Phoenix, a partnership between Romania and the United States designed to increase the region’s energy security. O’Brien said the Development Finance Corporation and Export-Import Bank of the United States signed letters of interest totaling four billion dollars “to deploy a small modular reactor project in Romania.” At the same time, littoral states are working to boost their own energy security, for example with offshore energy projects underway in Bulgarian, Romanian, and Turkish waters. Yet Russia is determined to keep its energy dominance, and with a penchant for malign influence operations, will likely attempt to scuttle the United States’ efforts to help the Black Sea’s littoral states. The United States and its regional allies must be prepared with an effective strategic communications response if Russia unleashes malign influence operations—including a strategic disinformation campaign—designed to stop Project Phoenix. Such campaigns may not be unprecedented, as some European officials suspect (although without clear proof) that Russia helped finance protests against Chevron projects in Lithuania and Romania in the 2010s.

Any strategy that does not follow with a long-term focus, adequate funding, and a communication campaign highlighting that the region is open for business will ultimately fail. The United States’ attempt at getting serious about a Black Sea security strategy will require continued persistence, patience, and deep pockets to succeed. Ultimately, it is worth the price.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

The post The Biden administration finally has a Black Sea security strategy. It’s what comes next that matters. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey has evolved from a small, rump state trying to consolidate its regime, economy, and army, into a rising middle power and important regional and global player. The country is now the home of NATO’s second-largest army and the world’s nineteenth-largest economy; it is also the world’s twelfth-largest arms exporter, the twelfth-largest country by manufacturing output, and the host of more refugees than any other country. While it sits at the forefront of many of the world’s most pressing issues, Turkey has at the same time come under heavy criticism from Western countries, based on their notion that Turkey is abandoning secular democracy for sectarian authoritarianism and on Turkey’s adoption of an autonomous and assertive foreign policy, which has been branded as Neo-Ottomanism.

Today, Turkey is one of the rising middle powers pursuing an independent path. Its moves on the global stage—especially in the military domain—demonstrate that the balance of global power is determined by much more than great power competition. Those moves are a reminder for the West that developing countries are shaping and will continue to influence the course of international relations.

A different trajectory, but persisting tensions

Turkey was founded one hundred years ago on the ruins of the six-hundred-year-old Ottoman Empire, which once stretched across the Balkans, Anatolia, the Gulf, and North Africa. After managing to keep Anatolia and some of Thrace in its war for independence, the young republic was quite introverted. This was translated in the words of the republic’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “Peace at home, peace in the world.”

Over the course of its first few decades, Turkey adopted a foreign policy of neutrality in major confrontations and entered into peace and friendship treaties with its neighbors. Ankara prioritized creating a nation-state within internationally recognized frontiers and modernizing its state and population as a continuation of the Ottoman Empire’s modernization efforts in the nineteenth century. It also looked to break away from its Ottoman past with reforms that set out to completely transform the society and the state by installing a set of codes through which the Muslim Turks identified themselves—and through which the West perceived them.

Despite having conducted democratic elections—and despite having had a multi-party system since 1946—Turkey’s democratic progress has been threatened or all-out disrupted by coups and military memorandums, including a “postmodern” coup in 1997 and a failed coup attempt in 2016 that was led by FETÖ, the group associated with cleric Fethullah Gülen. Turkish society is polarized today, split based on whether they support or oppose Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Turkey’s transition from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential system in 2018 has been perceived in the West as a death warrant for Turkish democracy. While needing improvements, Turkish elections remain democratic and competitive. Obviously, a country’s democratic health is more than its electoral democracy; but looking beyond elections, Turkey continues to suffer from the ramifications of insufficient progress in boosting rights for women and religious, ethnic, and social minority groups.

An expanding sphere of influence and independent foreign policy

Turkey underwent a foreign-policy transformation after the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise to power in 2002, turning attention more deeply toward non-Western countries in the Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia, and Africa.

While before the AKP era, there were leaders who supported Turkey taking on a role as a bridge between the West and Islamic civilizations and supported Turkey adopting an assertive foreign policy and close relations with the Middle East, the application and extension of these ideas happened under AKP rule.

The Balkan countries have historically been important for Turkey’s national security, fueling Turkey’s engagement in the region even before the AKP era. For example, Turkey supported fragile Balkan countries (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Kosovo) following the end of the Cold War and the breakup of Yugoslavia. But later, Turkey was among the first countries to recognize the independence of Kosovo, was involved in mediation efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and initiated trilateral talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in 2009 and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in 2010. It also supported peacekeeping missions in the region. AKP foreign-policy leaders strongly supported Western Balkan countries’ integration into NATO and intensified economic relations while encouraging Turkish investments in the region.

Regarding Turkey’s relationship with Central Asian countries, the Organization of Turkic States (previously called the Turkic Council) formalized those relationships when it was established in 2009, bringing together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan as members and Hungary, Turkmenistan, and the Turkish Cypriot community as observers.

In the first decade of AKP rule, party leaders pursued a soft-power-based foreign policy, putting emphasis on creating relationships with other countries based on shared history, cultural resemblances, and economic exchanges. Historical and cultural ties made clear that it was particularly important for Turkey to play a central role in the Middle East. After the Arab Spring and the start of the Syrian civil war, Turkey shifted to a more assertive foreign policy to respond to increasing threats in the immediate neighborhood, with Turkey starting to use hard power and its military beyond its borders.

Over the past decade, Turkey struck deals with Somalia, Libya, Ethiopia, Niger, and Togo for jointly training troops and developing military programs. In Syria, Turkish armed forces trained and supported opposition groups in the northwest, helping to centralize them into the Syrian National Army (SNA). To prevent the establishment of an autonomous Syrian Kurdish state on its borders, Turkish troops, together with the SNA, held several military operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—labeled a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union—and its Syrian offshoot, the People’s Defense Units (YPG). As a result of these operations, areas overseen by the Syrian Interim Government are now assisted by the Turkey-backed SNA through an array of different bases and posts.

Additionally, Turkey sent its troops to and supported other groups in military operations in Libya, helping the internationally recognized government in its struggle against strongman Khalifa Belqasim Haftar. Ankara also sent drones to and advised Azeri military personnel in operational planning and command to back them in their fight against Armenia in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war; Turkey and Azerbaijan also held more than twenty joint military exercises in 2022. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Turkish drones helped Ukrainian forces keep Kyiv while the West was still proposing assistance to Ukraine to evacuate the city. Turkey has also been continuing operations in northern Iraq against PKK/YPG targets and Iran-supported groups.

Currently, Turkey’s power projection outside its borders can also be seen in its growing number of military posts and bases. Since 1974, Turkey has maintained a Cyprus Turkish Peace Command with more than forty thousand troops in the north. There are around forty different Turkish posts on the Turkey-Iraq and Iran-Iraq borders in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In 2015, Turkey announced that it would be opening its first base abroad (in Qatar); yet the biggest Turkish military base is one in Somalia (built in 2017), where Turkish armed forces train Somali armed forces and are currently structuring them with the hopes of reconstituting the army.

In addition, Turkey has also contributed peacekeeping troops and established a military presence as part of programs with the United Nations, European Union, and NATO. This is the case in the Balkans (Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), in Lebanon, in African countries (South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Somalia), and in Afghanistan.

Turkey’s broader foreign policy—from its efforts to increase its diplomatic agency to its striving for energy independence—has also played a role in helping the country evolve from a small state and into a rising middle power. For example, by ramping up arms production (especially of unmanned aerial vehicles) Turkey carved out for itself a role as a key player in arms exports and, therefore, the global defense ecosystem writ large. Turkey’s rise to middle-power status can also be seen in its eagerness to play a leading role in mediation efforts among conflicting parties, such as with the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and its worldwide humanitarian diplomacy efforts, best illustrated by the high level of humanitarian aid it gives (it is the top donor country globally, when considering the aid in relation to gross domestic product) and the number of refugees it hosts (more than any other country).

On Turkey’s one-hundredth anniversary, the West would be wise to recognize how Turkey has become a frontrunner in a group of middle powers that is “increasingly influential, self-confident, and independent.” If the West is to contend with this new era, in which middle powers have increased influence on the global stage, it must consider the needs and concerns of these countries—and especially the wants and priorities of such a close partner and NATO ally as Turkey.

Pınar Dost is a nonresident fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a historian of international relations. She is also the former deputy director of Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. She is an associated researcher with the French Institute for Anatolian Studies and the author of Le bon dictateur: L’image de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk en France (1939-1938) (Libra, 2014). Follow her on X (formerly known as Twitter): @pdosting.

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Even if he does not resign—which many of his Democratic colleagues are now calling for him to do—Menendez’s departure from the powerful position seems to have already set in motion changes for the US-Turkey relationship. Throughout his time as chairman, Menendez was sharply critical of Turkey and more favorable toward pro-Greek and pro-Armenian causes.

What could Menendez’s departure as committee chair change? After all, the basic structure of the US-Turkey relationship remains the same. Turkey is, as it has long been, a strategically important but challenging ally for the United States. Concerns over human rights and democracy in Turkey, as well as over its relations with Russia, are widely shared among US lawmakers, but they are weighed against the country’s positive contributions to NATO (including with the Alliance’s second-largest military, which is conflict tested), its support for Ukraine, its pivotal position for regional energy security, and more.

This balanced spirit was encapsulated in a letter signed by a bipartisan group of twenty-seven senators in February. Addressed to US President Joe Biden, the letter stated the lawmakers’ opposition to the sale of F-16 fighter jets for as long as Turkey held up Sweden’s (and at that time Finland’s) accession to NATO. While it was not stated outright in the letter, a clear implication was that Turkey’s removal of this obstacle could pave the way for the United States to approve the sale of the aircraft.

Menendez was notably not among the letter’s signatories.

Menendez’s departure means a potential change because as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee he held an effective veto over foreign arms sales, and he signaled his opposition to the sale of F-16s to Turkey early and often. He maintained this position even after the breakthrough at July’s NATO Summit in Vilnius, where Erdoğan indicated that he would send the ratification of Sweden’s accession to parliament. Asked after the NATO Summit about the issue, Menendez cited as a concern that Turkey’s parliament had not yet ratified Sweden’s NATO accession, but he also listed other grievances, including Turkey’s disputes with Greece. He appeared unwilling to budge on the issue, his reasons seemingly marshaled to justify a decision that had already been made.

Menendez’s departure as chair does not guarantee that the United States will now sell Turkey F-16s, but it does open space for a fresh look at the apparent deal on the table. Since negotiations on Sweden’s accession began, it’s been widely assumed—but not openly stated—that the sale of F-16s would be a decisive factor in Turkey’s calculus. For a year, diplomats on both sides took pains to deny the two issues were linked. However, Erdoğan abandoned all pretext on September 26, stating that “if they [the United States] keep their promises, our parliament will keep its own promise as well.” In a statement at the Vilnius summit, Turkey has committed to sending Sweden’s accession to parliament and working to ensure its ratification.

This apparent recognition that the F-16 sale and Sweden’s NATO accession vote in Turkey’s parliament are linked is a positive step. The risk now is that questions of sequencing or other issues devolve into a standoff in which Turkey is waiting for movement from Congress, while Congress waits for movement from Turkey’s parliament.

“I think it’s more likely it’s going to be approved,” explained House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-TX) on September 27 about a possible deal on F-16s. But, he added, “We’re saying we’re not going to consider this if you’re going to play hardball against Sweden.” On September 28, new Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Ben Cardin (D-MD) said that he still had to talk to the Biden administration about the F-16 deal, “but there are other issues in addition to just NATO accession” that need to be resolved. The White House has been notably silent on the issue since Menendez’s departure. Nor did Biden meet with Erdoğan earlier in September at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, following a pattern of minimizing leader-to-leader contact with the Turkish president compared with previous administrations.

Time is running out. Turkey’s parliament returned from recess this week, and the longer the situation goes without progress, the more paralyzed and corrosive it could become. The Biden administration, through its diplomats and its outreach to Congress, should work diligently to overcome this dilemma. 

Beyond the singular issue of Sweden’s accession—which has been awaiting final ratification from Turkey and Hungary for more than a year—the F-16 deal holds strategic importance for the US-Turkey relationship. Defense cooperation has traditionally been a main cornerstone of bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey. That cooperation, however, has been damaged at the strategic level by disagreements over policy toward Syria and imperiled further by Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air-defense system in 2017. The United States responded to the purchase by removing Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019 and imposing sanctions on Ankara in 2020. If Turkey cannot secure F-16s and instead looks to source its jets elsewhere, then the United States and Turkey could face a broader rupture in defense ties that may last a generation or more. Such an outcome would not be in the strategic interests of Turkey or the United States.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

The post How the Menendez scandal could end up with Turkey getting F-16s—and Sweden getting into NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the United Kingdom seeks new opportunities to diversify its trade relations post-Brexit, it has recognized Turkey as a market of interest and as an integral partner. Most recently, following Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reelection in May, UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak took to Twitter, writing that he “[looks] forward to continuing the strong collaboration” between the United Kingdom and Turkey, “from growing trade to tackling security threats as NATO allies.”

Both countries have set about making their partnership even stronger, including by starting talks to renegotiate the existing UK-Turkey free trade agreement. But this strengthening partnership can be seen in several areas other than trade such as investment, migration policy, and defense cooperation, which builds on the strategic partnership that the UK government outlined in 2010.

Trade

As part of its strategy to diversify its trade partnerships, particularly searching outside of the EU, the United Kingdom has courted Turkey, labeling it as a target market. Turkey provides the United Kingdom with access to its own market, and it also serves as an entry point to other dynamic markets in Eastern Europe and the Middle East where the United Kingdom has additional strategic interests.

Following Brexit, Turkey and the United Kingdom set up an initial free trade agreement, which came into effect on January 1, 2021. The agreement aimed to maintain preferential trade relations (replacing the EU-Turkey customs union) as well as to enhance future bilateral trade relations. Over time, UK-Turkey trade grew, with trade totaling 23.8 billion pounds between March 2022 and March 2023—up more than 20 percent from the previous year when adjusting for price changes.

The decision announced on July 18 to renegotiate the existing agreement came after a review found several areas for improvement, notably regarding services, data, and the digital sector. Should an updated agreement that reduces trade barriers and tariffs be agreed upon, it could further deepen economic ties—and cooperation more broadly—between the United Kingdom and Turkey.

However, this effort to strengthen the UK-Turkey partnership will take time—it could take years to negotiate a new free trade agreement, and implementation will be complex. It will also require a willingness on both sides to compromise and find common ground. So far, it would appear that both the United Kingdom and Turkey are ready to engage accordingly. It is also unlikely that the free trade negotiations or the overall trajectory of bilateral relations would be impacted should there be a change in government in the United Kingdom.

Migration, security, and stability

In addition to growing trade relations, the United Kingdom and Turkey have increased their geopolitical cooperation. Both countries have collaborated on various diplomatic fronts and engaged in dialogue on issues relating to regional stability—particularly in relation to Iraq and Syria—as well as counterterrorism efforts. 

The United Kingdom and Turkey have demonstrated strong bilateral cooperation on humanitarian and migration issues, most recently with rescue efforts following the earthquakes earlier this year. The refugee crisis resulting from the conflict in Syria has considerably affected both countries with higher migration numbers. Ankara and London have come together in an attempt to manage and address these issues and find ways to alleviate the risks associated with the crisis—such as domestic security concerns, strains on national resources, and social integration challenges.

Migration beyond the Syria context—specifically smuggling and illegal migration—has become a priority area for the United Kingdom since it exited the EU, prompting the passage of the 2023 Illegal Migration Act. Turkey, which hosts the largest refugee population in the world, has been a strategic partner in managing the United Kingdom’s migration-related concerns. The UK government recently struck a deal with Turkey to disrupt people-smuggling gangs and tackle illegal migration. The willingness of the countries to sign an agreement that tackles a problem both countries are committed to confronting is a sign of their strengthening relationship. According to the UK government, the partnership will involve a “centre of excellence” in Turkey that will, among other things, increase intelligence-sharing between enforcement agencies. This builds on an existing partnership, which last year saw the UK Home Office provide over three million pounds in funding to Turkish border forces to help block a common route for migrants to reach the United Kingdom.

Investment and defense

The United Kingdom, as it seeks to diversify its project and partner portfolios post-Brexit, is taking on new investment ventures. Earlier in July, the UK government announced it would back a 680-million-pound loan guarantee for a new high-speed electric railway in Turkey designed to connect a few major cities via a lower-carbon route. The plans connect Mersin, Adana, Osmaniye, and Gaziantep; the latter three cities were significantly impacted by the earthquakes earlier this year.

Defense cooperation has also contributed to the deepening of UK-Turkey bilateral ties. The two partners have engaged in training and capacity-building efforts, joint military operations, and defense-related trade and technology exchanges; and in recent years, the UK defense industry has secured various deals with Turkish counterparts. Turkey has imported UK arms for several years (aside from a brief halt in new export licenses for arms sales to Turkey in late 2019 due to Turkish military activity in Syria; licensing resumed in 2021). Last year, the UK defense secretary met his Turkish counterpart and asserted that both countries share a long-standing defense partnership that builds on their increased cooperation.

Yet tensions have emerged when the United Kingdom and Turkey’s strategic and foreign-policy priorities diverge, for example in the case of Syria. Furthermore, Turkey’s decision to purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system in 2019 raised concerns over trust in the partnership due to the potential security risks associated with compatibility issues with NATO defense systems. Competing security concerns, especially in relation to Turkey’s involvement across the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, have also contributed at times to complications for Ankara and London.   

Nevertheless, UK-Turkey ties are growing stronger—and it is not just due to trade. The countries are working together to tackle deep-rooted issues such as illegal migration and smuggling, especially in relation to tightened immigration policies post-Brexit—and as risks continue to evolve globally, so too does defense cooperation between both countries, whose strategic and security concerns are closely aligned. If the United Kingdom and Turkey continue the same trajectory, their relations will go from strength to strength. 

Ilayda Nijhar is a global risk analyst at ODI and a London Labour Councillor. Follow her on Twitter @ilaydanijhar.

The views expressed in this piece are solely those of the author.

The post What’s behind the strengthening UK-Turkey partnership? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite its efforts, the United States has thus far been unable to establish a significant presence in the region. There are ways that Washington could ramp up its direct engagement with the region to a certain degree, for instance by using the C5+1 vehicle—an annual meeting of the US secretary of state with the five Central Asian foreign ministers—to promote regional integration.

But the United States could also ramp up its engagement by working with partners who share its interests in Central Asia. One such partner is Turkey, which has robust cultural, historical, and economic connections with the region. The United States should work to promote Turkey’s presence in Central Asia, helping to set up Ankara as a primary trade, energy, and security partner. Deepening Turkish-Central Asian ties can help the United States gain a strategic advantage over China, Iran, and Russia in the region and diversify the Central Asian republics’ economic partnerships, preventing them from becoming overly dependent on US adversaries.

Why Turkey?

Russia, China, and Iran possess distinct advantages that give them an edge over the United States in the region: their proximity and long history of interaction. China has an edge as the primary economic partner for Central Asia. Russia plays a major role in security and its media enjoys extensive coverage and influence in the region. Recently, Iran has shown interest in filling the power vacuum in the region resulting from the ongoing war in Ukraine. However, because of the war in Ukraine, most Central Asian countries are now seeking to distance themselves from Russia and broaden their horizons by forging new partnerships. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan especially are seeking more cooperation with the West and Turkey. (Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are less active in this regard, though no Central Asian state has shown support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.) That shift is being fueled by these countries’ concerns over their own security, a desire to avoid negative repercussions from the sanctions imposed on Russia, and concerns about Russia’s reputation on the world stage.

At this pivotal moment, Turkey is the US ally best suited to offset the influence of US rivals in Central Asian states by expanding its ties to the region. First, as a NATO ally, Turkey shares security concerns with the United States, including common interests in preventing the spread of terrorism and preserving European security. Second, Turkey possesses important historical and cultural links to the region. A shared Soviet past, Sunni Islam religious practice, and Turkic ethnic and language groups are Central Asia’s three primary sources of identity. Improved cooperation between Turkey and the Central Asia region will naturally bring more focus to the common Turkic identity, help Turkey get its foot in the door of the region, offer a strong alternative to the still substantial Russian influence there, and increase pressure on Chinese leadership for the treatment of the Uyghur people (who are Turkic-speaking).

There is great potential to improve relations between Turkey and Central Asia since both sides are interested in becoming more connected. Turkey’s current economic situation compels it to seek more connections, while Central Asian countries are interested in having more access to Western markets. Turkey seeks to diversify its own energy sources and become a global energy hub, while Central Asia is interested in diversifying its energy import and export routes. In terms of security, while Turkey is interested in exporting weapons, especially drones, the security concern caused by the war in Ukraine has led Central Asian countries to diversify away from their heavy reliance on Russian military support. The United States can capitalize on this mutual interest to strengthen Turkish-Central Asian ties and get the upper hand over its rivals in the region.

How the United States can help

The United States should work with the Organization of Turkic States (which includes Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan) to expand the existing economic partnerships between Turkey and Central Asia. While Turkey also has robust trade relations with non-member states Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, at least in the near future, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan will be the most active players in cooperation with Turkey. Therefore, working within the Organization of Turkic States will allow Turkey to bolster ties with the region’s key players. The primary objective of this partnership would be to develop the Middle Corridor, a trade route that would connect Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian Sea. The ongoing war in Ukraine has accentuated the importance of the Middle Corridor and the need for robust transregional economic cooperation to guarantee Central Asia’s continued development and prosperity. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have made efforts in recent years to expand their trade relations with Turkey via the Middle Corridor. For example, in 2022, Uzbekistan and Turkey signed series of partnership agreements which involved increasing bilateral trade. Similarly, Kazakhstan and Turkey agreed to increase their trade volume to $10 billion. This ongoing trend in the region creates opportunities for increased trade flows and expanded Turkish influence. To strengthen economic ties between neighboring countries, the United States can leverage the present momentum to increase trade flows by supporting economic partnership agreements and helping overcome hindrances for cooperation such as the lack of strong infrastructure in the region.

The United States can also benefit from supporting Turkey’s interests in boosting its weapons shipments to Central Asia. Russia has always maintained a significant security presence in the region. Central Asia has become dependent on Russia for this purpose, which has exposed it to future potential Russian threats. In addition, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine has piqued Turkey’s and Central Asia’s interests in military cooperation. Turkey has signed an increasing number of strategic cooperation agreements with several countries in Central Asia since the beginning of the war. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan announced earlier this year that it had purchased additional Turkish drones, while last year, Kazakhstan agreed to an arrangement in which it would start co-producing Turkish drones. To boost Turkish security in Central Asia, the United States could give explicit or implicit support for the creation of security treaties between Central Asian countries and Turkey. Furthermore, the United States may also lend support for increased Turkish armaments sales to the region to reinforce Turkey’s security presence there. Russia’s largely neutral position toward Turkey may open the door to a greater Turkish military deployment that can supplement NATO’s presence without angering Russia. This measure can serve as a deterrent against future Russian aggression in Central Asia, encouraging greater regional stability.

The United States and its allies would benefit from improved energy ties between Central Asia and Turkey through more frequent use of existing pipelines and the faster development of new ones. Turkey is home to several pipelines that promise to transmit energy from Central Asia to Europe. In light of sanctions imposed on Moscow and the threat of Russia cutting off energy flows to Central Asian states, Kazakhstan is turning to energy transit across the Caspian Sea, which eventually passes from Turkey to the West. The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline are among the extant pipelines. In this scenario, Turkmenistan’s role as an energy provider and Azerbaijan’s role as both energy provider and transferrer become more significant. Just like it supported the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in the early 2000s, the United States should collaborate with Turkey to encourage export routes to bypass Russia and help its allies meet their energy needs. Indeed, Central Asian states are already working with Ankara to develop export routes that bypass Russia, as evidenced by Kazakhstan’s recent oil transfer to Romania via Turkey.

Central Asia is an area of strategic importance for the United States, which has an interest in reducing the region’s reliance on US adversaries for their security, economic, and energy needs. The United States needs to pursue a more energetic and creative policy towards the region. Working with Turkey is one way to do that.

Ali Mammadov is a recent graduate of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies with a focus on the economics and security of the Eurasia region. Follow him on Twitter: @alimammadoov.

The post The United States can’t offset its rivals in Central Asia alone. Turkey can help. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But Russia has been aggressive in the maritime domain since long before the first Russian missiles of Moscow’s full-scale invasion hit Ukrainian cities last year.

Back in 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin opened a twelve-mile bridge—which was illegal in its violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty—across the Kerch Strait connecting Russia and Crimea, thus setting the stage for Russia’s creeping occupation of the Sea of Azov. Subsequent attacks on Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait were major violations of the universal principle of freedom of navigation. They became an early indication of Russia’s desire to cut Ukraine off from the seas and impose an economic blockade on its main seaports—and a warning that Putin may follow the same pattern in the Black Sea.

In 2019, the Russian Black Sea Fleet conducted 197 combat training drills, with 80 percent of the exercises being offensive in nature, employing combined forces, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft, and live missile launches. With training activities taking place in waters off of illegally annexed Crimea, this “war of drills” has prevented free navigation in the northern and northwestern Black Sea sometimes for a few months in a row. As a result, Ukraine has lost control of over 100,000 of the 137,000 square kilometers (about the size of South Korea’s landmass) of its territorial waters and exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea—zones that are rich in natural resources.

This has not only threatened Ukraine’s security; it has also jeopardized Turkey’s interests. Russia has always been keen to access the “warm water” seas. Turkey, the gatekeeper of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, has been the main obstacle to the realization of this dream since the Russo-Ottoman Wars.

Turkey’s closure of the straits to warships in the early days of the war has helped prevent further escalation on sea. Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian Moskva cruiser and subsequent liberation of the small but strategically important Snake Island made Russian seizure of major Ukrainian seaports in Odesa very difficult. However, the Russian navy still remains highly capable. According to expert estimations, Russian forces in the Black Sea include at least four diesel-powered submarines; two frigates armed with rockets, torpedoes, and cruise missiles with a range of about 1,550 miles; ten large amphibious ships; and smaller patrol ships.

Were Russia to succeed in cutting Ukraine off from the Black Sea, Turkey would have found itself on the southern coast of a “Russian lake,” with Russia’s anti-access/area denial bubble covering much of the coastline and the surrounding region.   

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Moscow has sought to establish more control over maritime routes in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Russia has been arbitrarily granting commercial vessels passage in international waters according to the Kremlin’s will, even within the United Nations and Ankara-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, violating the freedom of navigation and presenting a challenge for countries along the Black Sea, which include three NATO members: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey.

Russia’s expanding control over the Black Sea bodes poorly for the critical and energy infrastructure (including several gas pipelines) located there. Russia not only carried out the development of the Black Sea shelf in an area it illegally seized from Ukraine; according to Kyiv, Moscow has also used captured Ukrainian offshore drilling platforms for intelligence purposes and the deployment of its troops.

Against this backdrop of a mounting Russian military build-up, Turkey’s vocal support of Ukraine’s NATO membership and willingness to boost defense cooperation with Kyiv is hardly surprising. Ukraine appears to be the only country capable of pushing back against Russian naval and military dominance in the region, even without increasing the presence of the non-littoral NATO countries in the region. That capability could serve Turkey well. Ukraine’s highly capable land forces, combined with Romanian air defense systems and the Turkish navy, would form a strong shield against further Russian aggression on NATO’s eastern flank. Russia’s recent attacks on Ukrainian ports and agricultural infrastructure just across the Danube River from Romania compel NATO allies to do more to stop the destruction of grain storages and to keep the Black Sea open for navigation.

With the Black Sea being essentially a Turkish-Russian maritime condominium, Ankara sees the Montreux Convention—which governs maritime traffic through the Turkish straits—as a valuable instrument that helps enable Turkey’s regional ownership strategy. But with Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, any kind of regional cooperative security arrangement that would include Russia is no longer possible, while security risks posed by Russia to the region are increasing.

Back in 2016, Erdoğan warned that Putin must not be allowed to turn the Black Sea into a “Russian lake”. Now that Russia has expanded its control over the maritime and global supply routes in the area, this prospect seems closer than ever.

The war in Ukraine and Russian escalation in the Black Sea, while damaging to the global order, have created an opportunity for Ukraine, Turkey, and NATO allies to step up security cooperation. According to a NATO survey conducted this year, 76 percent of Turkish citizens consider the Alliance to be important for the future of Turkey’s national security; 58 percent believe that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has negatively affected their safety.

This does not imply that Ankara may give up on its role as a guardian of the straits to allow non-littoral NATO members unlimited presence in the Black Sea for their warships. But Turkish leadership is pragmatic, and Turkey’s current interests—both security and economic—demand a strong re-alignment with the West. Ankara could tap its potential to be a regional power and garner praise both in the West and in the Global South by choosing to step up its efforts to lift Russian blockades in the Black Sea and provide military convoys for commercial vessels seeking to access Ukrainian seaports.

These efforts should be backed by other NATO allies. While there doesn’t seem to be much political appetite for greater engagement in the Black Sea in Washington or Berlin, Ankara should get a clear message from its partners that it will not be left to face an aggressive Russia alone. That would not only help secure the Black Sea; it would also help resolve one of Turkey’s grievances with its transatlantic partners: its perception that allies in the West “have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns” and its contributions to the collective security of the Alliance.

Turkey should be credited for what it’s done for Ukrainian and Euro-Atlantic security in the region so far—be it closing the straits to Russian warships, building corvettes for Kyiv, or brokering the grain deal. It can still do more. Turkish leadership could help enhance Ukrainian naval and coastal defense capabilities, warn Putin off attacks on Ukrainian seaport infrastructure, and pressure the Kremlin to lift blockades. Given that Ankara holds the key to the straits, including for Russian oil tankers, and provides a lifeline for the free flow of Russian citizens and goods, Erdoğan has enough leverage to persuade Putin in their negotiations planned for this month.

NATO allies should not shy away from taking a stronger stance in the Black Sea, showing full support to Turkey and Ukraine, including by providing both countries with F-16s and boosting defense ties. Of course, there is a price to be paid by the Alliance for security and stability in its eastern flank. But in the long run, setting Ukraine up to win this war and retake all of its territories, including Crimea, and finding ways to realign with a major NATO ally Turkey will be less costly than inviting more Russian aggression to the Black Sea and silently watching Russia and its drone-supplying partner Iran gain control over the airspace just outside NATO’s door.   

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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Much of the Black Sea has been off limits for oil and gas production mostly because of geopolitical tensions, the sea’s exceptional depths, and environmental and worker safety concerns. Prior to 2014, sizeable natural gas fields existed in Ukraine’s Black Sea exclusive economic zone (EEZ); however, when Russia annexed Crimea, it appropriated Ukraine’s gas deposits, effectively removing these assets and potential revenues for the foreseeable future.

In recent years, Turkey and Romania have emerged as players in the region’s gas projects. For example, in August 2020, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation discovered the Sakarya gas field, the largest in the western Black Sea. Estimates indicate that Sakarya holds 540 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas reserves and it will meet roughly 30 percent of Turkey’s natural gas demand. The first deliveries of gas are anticipated in 2023.

Romania has also discovered significant offshore gas reserves in its EEZ and plans to exploit about 200 bcm. Romania started doing so in 2023, producing 1 bcm from the Ana platform, a field developed by Black Sea Oil & Gas. However, the largest field in the Romanian sector is Neptun Deep, estimated at 100 bcm, in water depths between 100-1,700 meters.

OMV Petrom (a Romanian oil and gas company owned by Austria’s OMV) and Romgaz (a Romanian state-owned gas company) will lead the development of the project. Infrastructure development will start in 2024, and first production is expected in early 2027. According to George Scutaru, director of the New Strategy Center (a Romanian think tank) and former national security advisor to the Romanian president, Neptun Deep will produce between 7 bcm and 8 bcm per year, with potential revenues of over twenty-five billion dollars—the equivalent of three and a half years of Bucharest’s current defense expenditures.

While many Black Sea countries are dependent on Russian gas imports, Romania meets roughly 80 percent of its gas consumption from domestic production. Neptun Deep and Ana, combined with existing production, will satisfy Romania’s annual consumption of about 12 bcm if all goes as planned. Once its Black Sea production comes online, Romania could export excess product to its neighbors, thereby substituting for their imports of Russian gas. Romania has already taken steps to supplant Moldova’s gas imports from Russia, yet there is the potential for Black Sea gas to alleviate much of the regional dependence on TurkStream, the undersea pipeline that supplies Russian gas to many Eastern European countries. For comparison, Moldova’s annual gas consumption is 2.9 bcm, Bulgaria’s is 3 bcm, and Serbia’s is 2.4 bcm. (Of Moldova’s 2.9 bcm, Romania will only supply 1.5 bcm for the territory controlled by Chisinau, according to Scutaro, while the remaining 1.4 bcm consumed by the Kremlin-controlled breakaway territory of Transnistria will be supplied by Russia.) Improving relations between Romania and Hungary could also be a factor in lessening Budapest’s reliance on Russian gas giant Gazprom.

It is expected that Russia will oppose these natural gas projects, seeing as the Kremlin has already demonstrated a range of hybrid warfare tactics in the Black Sea.

That deliberate, obstructive, and hostile behavior—which has the potential to gravely impact gas production and regional stability—takes many forms. One such form is Moscow’s seizure of Ukrainian offshore oil and gas wells immediately following its annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia has also taken actions in the Black Sea that endanger navigation and inhibit freedom of movement. For instance, Russia is accused of launching a mass GPS spoofing attack in June 2017; the attack clouded navigation for Black Sea shipping and prompted a warning from the NATO Shipping Center. Moscow is also accused of blocking large segments of the Black Sea by declaring fictitious or running real naval exercises.

More recently, Russia has been accused of deliberately delaying the inspection of ships related to the United Nations-negotiated grain shipment deal, which allowed Ukraine to export critically needed food supplies to developing countries; the Kremlin pulled out of the deal last week. On February 10, 2023, a Russian kamikaze drone boat attacked the Zatoka Bridge over the Dniester estuary. This bridge is a critical railway link between Odesa (Ukraine’s only major seaport) and Romania’s port at Galati. Sea mines, sown by both sides in the prosecution of the war, have also become major hazards.

Because of Russia’s seizures in 2014, Romania’s EEZ border de facto abuts the Russian EEZ. Additionally, Romania’s location and relative naval weakness make it arguably more susceptible than Turkey to Russian interference. Whether offshore gas facilities located in the EEZ benefit from NATO Article 5 or Article 6 protection is debatable, so there is the potential for much mischief from the Kremlin.

Romania’s decision to begin exploiting Neptun Deep prompted speculation that Bucharest could join Ankara in leading a regional energy renaissance. However, both countries are presented with a blessing and a curse. Military, political, and economic pressure from Moscow will be intense, with the potential for even greater regional destabilization. Conversely, this natural gas project opens opportunities not only for reaping large windfalls and supporting regional energy security, but also for cooperation between these two NATO members. More specifically, this could entail greater multi-domain cooperation between the countries, leading to higher resilience, capabilities, and interoperability, while leveraging the Alliance’s broad support infrastructure.

In its summit communiqué this month, NATO acknowledged the Black Sea’s strategic value as well as Russia’s potential use of hybrid tactics to undermine regional allies and partners. NATO, with US leadership, must maintain a credible deterrent to Moscow’s actions in the Black Sea. At a minimum, the West must continue to support regional allies and partners by demonstrating solidarity against Russian aggression and promoting regional energy security through source diversification. This can only be accomplished through domestic energy production of both fossil fuels and renewables. More specifically, these actions need to be coupled with developing greater military operational capability through a combination of modern weapons acquisition and joint exercises. Romania has the potential to propel these efforts further with its Neptun Deep project; other NATO allies must follow suit by increasing their contributions to a credible deterrent.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

The post A new Black Sea natural gas project could be a game changer for the region—and a challenge for Putin appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The trip builds on Erdoğan’s previous visit to the UAE more than a year ago, which had opened a new chapter to bolster the two countries’ political and economic ties ahead of Turkey’s May 2023 elections.

After his re-election, Erdoğan reinstated Mehmet Şimşek as minister of finance, putting the former investment banker back in charge of the state coffers. Şimşek’s appointment signaled the return to economic orthodoxy and prioritization of market stability that provided confidence to Gulf investors about the investment climate in Turkey. This raised hopes for the Turkish economy, which faces runaway inflation, chronic current account deficits, the devaluation of the lira, and the depletion of much-needed foreign currency reserves.

Erdoğan’s re-election and his appointment of Şimşek also signaled building momentum for normalization with the Gulf region—momentum that began with reciprocal official visits in 2021. This June, Şimşek has already held high-level meetings in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to lay the groundwork for Erdoğan’s most recent visits and help promote bilateral economic partnerships.

Turkey’s developing relations with these three Gulf countries show a convergence of interests and agreement on many issues. These include agreement on their complementary comparative advantages, their eagerness to diversify trade partnerships, and their desire for strategic autonomy from the West. Reflecting their growing cooperation, Turkey announced that it had struck framework agreements for bilateral investment with the UAE that reached over $50 billion—it also announced agreements with Saudi Arabia and Qatar (the values of which are still undisclosed). Deepening partnerships in key sectors such as defense, energy, and transport indicate an interest among Turkey and Gulf countries to leverage financial capital, know-how, and geographic advantages for economic growth; they also indicate a realignment to share political risks in a volatile region and reduce dependence on the United States.

A solid foundation

The main rationale behind Turkey’s renewed interest in strengthening ties with the Gulf countries is to attract capital inflows and sustain Erdoğan’s legacy as a leader who delivered economic growth over the past two decades. After a brief slowdown during political upheavals between 2013 and 2020, the volume of Turkey’s trade with the Gulf has reached $22 billion, according to the Turkish government. Turkey has ambitious plans to almost triple this figure in the next five years.

The Gulf countries are also keen to scale up their footprint in Turkey. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries account for 7.1 percent of foreign direct investment in Turkey since 2020, with $15.8 billion in stock as of 2022. Qatar provided Turkey with the most foreign direct investment of the GCC countries, investing $9.9 billion. The UAE comes in second with $3.4 billion, and Saudi Arabia is the third highest, with $500 million. This amount is likely to increase two-fold to $30 billion over the next few years through investments prioritizing the energy, defense, finance, retail, and transport sectors. Previously, the UAE and Qatar provided Turkey with $20 billion in currency-swap agreements and Saudi Arabia deposited $5 billion into the central bank to support dollar liquidity.

But the new package of agreements signed during Erdoğan’s trip focus on capital investments in productive assets such as land, factory plants, and infrastructure. Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding sovereign wealth fund (ADQ) alone signed a memorandum of understanding to finance up to $8.5 billion of Turkey earthquake relief bonds and to provide $3 billion in credit facilities to support Turkish exports. Collectively, these are evidence of a longer-term vision for closer coordination between the GCC and Turkey at a strategic level.

Economic cooperation also draws Turkish investment to the Gulf, primarily toward construction and services sectors such as information technology, telecommunications, and agricultural technology. Possible joint manufacturing in the defense industry between Turkey and Gulf states, such as manufacturing of Baykar’s Akıncı and TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles, carries the potential to upgrade this relationship beyond the economic realm. Even for Saudi Arabia, which has a domestic plant to produce Turkish Vestel Karayel drones primarily for reconnaissance missions, Akıncı could upgrade drone warfare doctrine to a new level.

Mutual advantages

This evolving partnership is a clear win-win situation. Turkey and the GCC countries’ combined geography connects three lucrative subregions—the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea—that can help the countries build their connections and enhance their interdependence, when beneficial, in a volatile world. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, which boast a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.8 trillion, have plentiful resources and tremendous comparative advantages, not only in the oil and gas sector but also in their solid legal framework, world-class infrastructure, and relative ease of doing business.

The UAE, for instance, implements social and business reforms to attract foreign investment. They also have a young, tech-savvy, and talented population open to learning and determined to make an impact on emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and robotics. Turkey, meanwhile, has comparative advantages in the defense, hospitality, and construction sectors. Turkey had traditionally been a capital-scarce, labor-intensive country that faced declining terms of trade, especially after joining the European Customs Union in 1995. But gradually, through upskilling in technology and investment in capital-intensive sectors, Turkey repositioned itself as an alternative industrial hub for the emerging markets of the Middle East. It has become a diversified, technologically advanced, and sophisticated economy as a member of the Group of Twenty.

Turkey is now more eager to expand its bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements into a multilateral agreement with the GCC. Moreover, the earthquakes in February 2023 are estimated to have cost Turkey $104 billion in infrastructural damage and economic loss—equivalent to 12 percent of its GDP—so Turkey needs to diversify and deepen its trade partnerships to recover quickly.

Nonaligned, interconnected

A major driving factor behind this rising economic cooperation is the quest to gain strategic autonomy from the West and distribute risks by hedging against changes in US policy toward Turkey and the Gulf’s neighborhood after the next US presidential elections and beyond. Turkey and the Gulf countries have emerged as nonaligned middle powers, adapting to a multipolar world as the global economy’s center of gravity shifts toward the Indo-Pacific region.

The war in Ukraine heightened Turkey’s geopolitical significance and provided it with leverage in negotiations with the United States and NATO, as witnessed at the Vilnius summit last week. Russia’s ongoing attack and consequential Western sanctions also turned countries’ eyes toward the Gulf countries in search of an alternative supplier of hydrocarbons. Windfall profits from oil and gas sales strengthened the war chests of Gulf sovereign wealth funds that are now looking to increase non-oil trade and diversify their portfolios into sustainable, long-term investments such as renewable energy, advanced technology, healthcare, tourism, and leisure.

A few major deals exemplify these diversification efforts. The Arab-China Business Conference—held in Riyadh this June—concluded with $10 billion worth of investment deals struck between Arab countries and China. Iraq is developing a $17-billion-dollar railroad, which is planned to run through Turkey to Europe, a project in which the GCC countries have also shown interest. Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding Company and the Turkey Wealth Fund launched a $300-million-dollar partnership to invest in Turkish technology startups. The UAE is also eager to invest in Istanbul’s metro and its high-speed railway to Ankara. The two countries aim to increase their trade volume from $18 billion to $40 billion in the next five years.

Ultimately, this flurry of new investments shows that the Gulf countries and Turkey view each other as mutually advantageous partners. Erdoğan’s visit to the Gulf this week further reaffirms their deepening partnership in the economic realm—with potential implications for the strategic realm in the long term.

Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu is a senior fellow in strategic studies at TRENDS Research & Advisory in Abu Dhabi.

Mouza Hasan Almarzooqi is a researcher in economic studies at TRENDS Research & Advisory in Abu Dhabi.

The post What’s behind growing ties between Turkey and the Gulf states appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer four pressing questions about what just happened and what to expect next.

1. Why did Russia pull out of the deal?

Moscow’s notification to the UN, Kyiv, and Ankara that it was suspending participation in the grain deal and would not renew the deal further is part of a negotiating strategy to loosen sanctions and gain more freedom of maneuver. Russian standard practice is to make humanitarian measures conditional upon concessions that serve its military, economic, and political interests—as it has with earlier negotiations on the grain deal and numerous times over relief and aid deliveries in Syria. 

Specific demands in this case include readmitting the Russian agricultural lender Rosselkhozbank back into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) mechanism, allowing Russia to import repair parts for agricultural machinery, and unfreezing other assets. Moscow claims that the deal, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, has not delivered on points that were to benefit Russia, but this round of pressure is certainly about more than the letter of the deal; it is about easing sanctions pressure.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

2. What’s the next move for Ukraine and its Western partners?

In October 2022, Russia left the grain deal, actually suspended its participation, and there were only three parties left: the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. The grain corridors at that time functioned well, in part because the Russian inspectors had been disrupting the grain deals from inside. The most rational way to react to this withdrawal is to proceed in the trilateral format with the UN, Ukraine, and Turkey. I don’t think Russia has a lot of options now. In the northwestern part of the Black Sea, Russia lacks capacity to inflict any major damage. Since Ukrainian armed forces retook Snake Island last year, the maritime area has been largely controlled by the Ukrainian side. So there is little possibility for a major disruption by Russian vessels in this part of the Black Sea.

Russia could say that continuing the deal in a trilateral format crosses a “red line.” But if Russian forces attack a vessel transporting grain, it could trigger a major reaction that Moscow would not want to face, depending on which country the vessel belongs to, who is the owner, and who the sailors are. I would not be surprised if after a meeting or phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next few weeks, Russia rejoins the grain deal.

Meanwhile, messages from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have been very clear that there has been no deal between Ukraine and Russia. The deal is among Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN. What Putin undermines now is his agreement with the UN and Turkey, not with Ukraine. Russia’s halt of its participation in the deal will likely further increase insurance costs, but in June the Ukrainian government approved a maritime compensation scheme so that vessels calling at Ukrainian ports will be compensated if they are damaged due to Russian military activity. So, from the Ukrainian side, there is readiness to proceed with the deal.

While trying to keep the grain corridors functioning, it’s also important to step up efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, a basic principle of international law. Crimea must be de-occupied and should not become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow, because Russia will continue to use Crimea to threaten security in the Black Sea and global food markets for as long as it is allowed to do so.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister. 

In practice, the deal had pretty much collapsed some time ago when ships started to disappear from the horizon off of Odesa’s Black Sea coast. Normally, up to a dozen bulk carriers are waiting to be loaded; in the past couple weeks, one or two at best—indicating things weren’t working well at the joint clearance center in Istanbul. (Ukrainians have blamed Russian inspectors for deliberately slowing down clearance procedures.) 

So what happens next? The UN and Western nations should not succumb to the Kremlin’s blackmailing tactics. Russia should not be given another chance to weaponize food—nor be given sanctions relief in exchange for allowing ships carrying food to sail through international waters.

A global food emergency should be declared and, as I told BBC World News this morning, arrangements made for ships to sail under armed escort through the Black Sea. Of course, such a measure would never get past Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council. So creative diplomacy is required, perhaps with the European Union taking the lead.

In the near term, Ukraine should also be assisted with moving grain transport onto alternative arteries such as the Danube River and onto trains and trucks. Poland can play a key role by alleviating the days-long waits truck drivers currently face entering Poland from Ukraine. 

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center based in Odesa, Ukraine.

3. What are the prospects for getting the deal back, and what could the UN and Turkey do right now?

The deal will likely survive because Ukraine, Turkey, and Europe more broadly, as well as a number of developing nations, benefit from it, which likely makes modest concessions to the Russian position acceptable to the leaders of those countries. Given the disinclination of either the Turks or NATO to directly intervene in the conflict, it is unlikely that there will be direct military escorts for grain ships rather than a negotiated deal. Nor do the Russian forces appear ready for a major naval escalation in the Black Sea, so there is a fair chance they will settle in the end. The reputational and economic costs of a prolonged end to grain shipments will hurt Russia, too, so I do not expect a prolonged or permanent cancellation of the deal.

—Rich Outzen

4. What impact does this have on the developing world?

The threat to global economic landscape and food security—especially in Africa and other developing regions—is hard to overstate. While once soaring food prices amid pandemic supply chain disruptions and Russia’s war had begun to stabilize, thanks in large part to the more than thirty million tons of wheat exported from Ukraine under this deal, the situation remains volatile. Down from its peak of 160 in March of 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Price Index was at 122 in June, still a third higher than June 2020, when it was 93. Globally, food price inflation remains higher than 5 percent per year in more than 60 percent of low-income countries and nearly 80 percent of lower-middle-income and high-income countries. Real food inflation is as high as 80 percent in Zimbabwe, 30 percent in Egypt, and 14 percent in Laos. And within countries, women and already vulnerable communities tend to be hardest hit. In just the last two weeks, the World Bank reported that wheat prices had decreased by 3 percent globally—gains Monday’s announcement are all but certain to reverse.

—Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and global head, inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates.

The post Russia just quit a grain deal critical to global food supply. What happens now? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Sweden’s journey to accession seems to be playing out along Turkey’s preferred timeline, coming one month after Sweden’s tougher anti-terror laws came into force and having been affirmed at the Alliance’s marquee gathering for maximum effect. Recent developments—including fresh pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) demonstrations and a Quran burning in Sweden—threatened to derail the process, but Turkey should be credited for not giving in to these provocations.

The agreement is the latest and greatest signal that Turkey has decided to align more with the West. Other notable signals came in the form of Turkey’s hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (during which Ankara reiterated its longstanding support for Ukraine’s NATO membership and angered Moscow by releasing Azov battalion commanders) and the reiteration of the value it places on European Union membership. All these signals happened in a span of three days. The developments stand in stark contrast to speculation—that has arisen since before Turkey first raised an issue with Sweden’s accession—that Turkey, under Erdoğan, is pivoting toward Russia and the East.

Two months ago, when in the heat of a tough re-election campaign, Erdoğan accused Western countries (including the United States) of colluding with the opposition to remove him from power. At that point, the trajectory of Turkey’s relations with transatlantic allies appeared much less clear. Once Erdoğan won the presidential elections and the parliament became distinctly more nationalist, there were fears an emboldened Turkey would move toward the East. The first hint that this would not be the case, and that the president’s pragmatism would once again emerge, appeared in the selection of the post-election cabinet, which broadly elevated several pro-Western voices—including widely respected Mehmet Şimşek, who was brought back as minister of treasury and finance—and sidelined the most outspoken transatlantic skeptics.

Analysts close to the Turkish government were quick to assert that Turkey’s moves constitute not so much a pivot to the West but a push to balance relations and mend troubled relationships in line with a course Turkey has been pursuing for many years. On the other hand, there is speculation that part of the impetus lies in the perception of a weakened Russia following the Wagner Group mutiny in June and its aftermath. What is clear is that a weaker Russian President Vladimir Putin renders Moscow a less reliable partner for Turkey. Particularly since the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan’s government, Turkey-Russia relations have been driven from the top down by leader-to-leader chemistry. While Turkey and Russia’s deep economic relations are unlikely to be interrupted or curtailed, the idea or illusion of Russia as a balance or alternative to the West in any kind of strategic sense will begin to fray.

This move from Erdoğan is a major win for Sweden, Turkey, and the whole Alliance. It’s also a big win for the Biden administration and for NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who both worked very hard behind the scenes to make the agreement possible.

The breakthrough followed soon after a phone call between the US and Turkish presidents and after a flurry of contact between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and their counterparts. A major, yet unofficial, sweetener to the agreement appears to be the United States’ assurance, issued one day after Erdoğan’s agreement, that it will sell F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, which Turkey first requested in October 2021 (after its ejection from the F-35 program) but has been thus far blocked by Congress.

In a pre-NATO Summit interview over the weekend, Biden alluded to boosting support for both Greece and Turkey’s defense capabilities simultaneously as a way to push the F-16 deal through Congress. That hearkens back to how the United States has historically balanced its two key allies in Southeastern Europe through aid dating back to the Truman Doctrine, which laid the groundwork for the eventual inclusion of both in NATO. It also underlines the importance of Turkey’s warming of ties with Greece in the wake of the devastating earthquake this February. These factors may play a role in overcoming the concerns of key members of the US Congress, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who confirmed that he is in talks with the Biden administration on the F-16 sale.

Finalizing Sweden’s NATO accession—which still needs to be ratified by Turkey’s parliament (as well as Hungary’s)—and completing the F-16 deal would be big steps toward rebuilding trust between Turkey and its transatlantic partners. In a speech on July 12, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s parliament will take up ratification after the long recess in October, in line with the parliamentary calendar. 

One grievance from Turkey regarding its troubled transatlantic relationship is the perception that its Western allies have never fully appreciated Turkey’s security concerns. Despite officially designating the PKK—Turkey’s number one security threat—as a terrorist organization, the United States and Europe have not shown Turkey the deference that it feels due on this issue. This is in part due to the United States’ cooperation with the PKK’s Syrian affiliate to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham. Turkey’s temporary block on Sweden afforded Turkey the opportunity, in high-stakes fashion, to remind the Alliance that its concerns need to be taken more seriously moving forward. 

One way to read Turkey’s post-election foreign-policy posture is a willingness to improve its relations with the West. Over the past three years, Turkey has aggressively pursued and concluded rapprochements with many countries in its neighborhood including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies never deteriorated as much as they did with the aforementioned countries, there is without question room to improve. Turkey, Sweden, the United States, and NATO have all committed to win-win moves that would contribute to a more positive and productive atmosphere. Now, they all need to follow through.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

The post With re-election behind him, Erdogan is turning toward the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The wait is (nearly) over. After more than a year of ups and downs since Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has agreed to back Stockholm’s bid to become the Alliance’s thirty-second member. The announcement came on the eve of the NATO Summit in Vilnius after Erdoğan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson held a lightning round of negotiations. Erdoğan agreed to advance ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession to Turkey’s legislature, with Hungary expected to follow suit to complete the process. What changed Erdoğan’s mind? What’s next for the Alliance? Our experts on the ground in Vilnius and beyond share their insights.

• Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, former US State Department official, and former US Army foreign area officer
• Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
• Christopher Skaluba: Director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department
• Anna Wieslander (@AnnwieAnna): Director for Northern Europe and secretary-general of the Swedish Defence Association

How done is this deal?

• The joint memorandum from Monday’s meeting spells out increased counterterrorism efforts by NATO to address Turkey’s security concerns and fresh support from Sweden for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, among other provisions—and came as a surprise, following Erdogan’s skeptical comments in recent days about the prospects for an agreement.
• “It is a typical Erdoğan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands,” Rich tells us.  
• Not (yet) in writing is a looming deal for Turkey to buy F-16 fighter jets from the United States, a likely carrot for Turkish approval of Sweden’s membership. “The practice of international relations is not an art for the purist,” says Dan. “If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.”
• Chris, who’s in Vilnius, notes that Erdoğan is only sending the decision on Sweden’s NATO accession to the Turkish parliament, which his party controls, so this is not a done deal. Erdoğan made a show of lending his support to an invitation for Finland and Sweden to join NATO a year ago in Madrid before drawing out the process until now. “There is a non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning [in Sweden]) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again,” he says. “I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.”  
• With the action now moving to the Turkish legislature, Erdoğan “retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror” measures that Turkey wants or if an F-16 deal doesn’t materialize, Rich adds.
• Nevertheless, there was a palpable sense of celebration and relief in Vilnius. “It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance,” Anna tells us from the summit.

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The Wagner factor

• Erdoğan’s turnabout comes two weeks after mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s short-lived mutiny in Russia—and on the same day that news broke of Russian leader Vladimir Putin meeting with Prigozhin in the days after the revolt—developments that “suggest [Putin] regime weakness,” according to Dan.
• “Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages,” Dan adds. In choosing to advance Sweden’s efforts to join NATO, “Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.”
• Rich argues that the Prigozhin drama was not much of a factor, since this agreement was all part of a long-term push for NATO to help address Turkish security concerns such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK): “The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security.” 
• If its security concerns are addressed, Turkey actually favors a bigger NATO with countries such as Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, and Georgia, Rich tells us, “because by NATO structure and bylaws” Turkey, like other Alliance members, “gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization.” So “the bigger the better.” 

All for one

• “The deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start,” Anna says, as the Alliance “faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak” with its members not yet fully united around Sweden’s NATO membership. Now focus turns to a possible membership roadmap and security guarantees for Ukraine, where “tough decisions” await, she says. 
• Erdoğan also gets to bask in the limelight. “He has lost no real leverage,” Rich notes, “but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.”

The post What’s behind Erdogan’s backing of Sweden’s NATO bid? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts weigh in on what’s behind this dramatic and consequential turnabout from Erdoğan and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Defne Arslan: Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

Rich Outzen: Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

Anna Wieslander: Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Christopher Skaluba: Don’t spike the football just yet

Rachel Rizzo: Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

Daniel Fried: Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

Ian Brzezinski: Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Turkey comes away with major gains as it prepares to ratify in the fall

On July 10, Erdoğan committed to send Sweden’s NATO membership ratification to the Turkish parliament. The news was welcomed by all NATO members heading into the NATO summit in Vilnius—and will prove beneficial to Turkey, a major ally with a key role in the Alliance’s southern flank, from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean. The announcement also came right after Erdoğan demanded long-sought EU membership for Turkey in return for Sweden’s accession, in addition to Sweden taking Turkey’s security concerns seriously. Sweden eventually took steps on adopting an anti-terrorism law in June. Additionally, language regarding terrorist organizations, which pose an existential threat to Turkey, appeared in the NATO communiqué. These were important gains for Turkey. It is also encouraging to see that NATO will be establishing a terrorism coordination mechanism for the first time.

What will be the timeline for Sweden’s ratification in the Turkish parliament? It is important to note that apart from Erdoğan’s remarks, there has not been any official announcement from the Turkish side regarding Sweden’s accession yet. This tells me that Erdoğan will wait for the next steps both from Sweden and NATO, as well as from the EU before he sends the protocol to the Turkish parliament.

Erdoğan also announced on July 12 in Vilnius that Sweden’s accession will move forward once the Turkish Parliament opens in October, but not before. As the parliament opens, the ratification needs to be discussed and adopted at the parliament’s foreign affairs committee first, before it goes to the floor.   

Erdogan’s move on July 10 not only took the pressure off of Turkey during the summit, but also gave the president more time to monitor the developments in Turkey’s favor. From the EU side, a customs union revitalization and update, as well as visa liberalization will be beneficial for Turkey, and if things move fast enough, there is always a chance that Sweden’s ratification can happen in September. That said, I also would like to underline that this announcement in Vilnius will also bring obligations to Turkey to meet its side of the agreement.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. 

Inside Erdoğan’s calculus

I am mildly surprised that this comes before and not during the Summit, which convenes Tuesday, but overall it makes sense. It is a typical Erdogan move to take a maximalist position in a high-stakes negotiation, show readiness to walk, then compromise for progress on key demands.  

It’s the wrong question to ask, “What pushed Erdogan to do this?” Because it underestimates the degree of strategy he and his advisors have applied—and misreads their original intent. Erdogan and the Turks have long said publicly and privately that they favor NATO enlargement. They have supported Ukraine and Georgia in the past, approved Finland this past year, and would like to see Sweden in—if the notoriously lax Swedish counterterror laws, now amended, are fully implemented. Turkey wants a big NATO because by NATO structure and bylaws Erdogan gets a veto on the world’s most powerful security organization—as do all members. The bigger the better. Yet the nature of the enlargement matters greatly for a country with a serious terrorism threat. So the better question is: Did Erdogan get what he thinks he needs on his own security needs, regarding the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and a potential F-16 fighter jet deal with the United States, to advance Sweden’s candidacy? What was the quid pro quo? 

It’s important to remember that Erdogan’s announcement was not approval of the bid; it was a statement of intent to pass the question of approval to the Turkish parliament, which Erdogan’s party controls. Thus he retains the ability to kill or delay accession if Sweden backs off on counterterror implementation, or if the United States reneges on the F-16 deal. So all in all, he has lost no real leverage, but gained a tremendous optic of Turkey supporting the Atlantic Alliance.

This removes the question of Swedish accession from the summit’s main agenda, and places it in the category of “business successfully managed.” Thus the summit can focus on two more pressing issues: how to support Ukraine and how to implement NATO’s revised security concept. I would expect that on the first topic (Ukraine) we will see a roadmap or statement of principles that lays out robust military support for Ukraine’s defense, amounting to a security guarantee, but carefully calibrated not to constitute a near-term prospect of accession, an escalation, or an engagement of NATO as an organization in the current defensive war against Russia. On the second topic (security concept), there will be technical progress on how to divide responsibilities and resources more equitably, but this will likely be of less interest to general audiences. 

I think this has less to do with the mutiny of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and perceptions of Vladimir Putin’s standing than with the leverage game vis-a-vis NATO allies and how to ensure that if European NATO problems become Turkish problems, Turkish problems become European NATO problems. Ankara will continue to conduct a balancing act by which it maintains trade, diplomatic relations, and occasional strategic cooperation with Russia—while ensuring that together with other NATO powers Turkey disabuses Russia of its dreams of imperial revanche. Putin, Prigozhin, Wagner—in Turkish eyes these are all just layers of the Russian Matryoshka or Maskirovka, deceptive games that obscure a fairly direct power play. The Turks need a functional relationship with Russia but see more common cause with the West; the approach to Sweden should be seen in those terms, as how to prove bona fides to the Western Alliance while extracting necessary concessions to their own security. 

As to quid pro quo, for Turkey, it can be only two things—counter-PKK commitments by Sweden, and agreement on F-16s (and perhaps broader strategic engagement) by Washington. Anything else is peripheral, and if these are not obtained, the deal is a bad one for Ankara. Of course there is an escape hatch—Erdogan passed the ball to the Turkish parliament and approved nothing directly—but the pieces are in place now for a good transactional deal that helps NATO, Sweden, and Turkey in a stroke.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. 

Sweden gets out of limbo as the Alliance shows a united front

Finally Sweden got its green light from Turkey to join NATO. Late in the evening in Vilnius, Stoltenberg called July 10, 2023, “a historic day.” The agreement between Sweden, Turkey, and NATO that was signed on Monday evening means that Sweden will join the Alliance as its thirty-second member “as soon as possible,” given that the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments need to ratify the accession protocol.  

It is unclear how long it will take, but the agreement undoubtedly removes the risk of Sweden falling into a limbo situation—that is, being close to, but not fully in, the Alliance. Sweden´s military and political adjustments toward NATO membership can proceed with full speed, which is beneficial not only for Sweden, but for the defense of Northern Europe, in which Sweden could play a crucial role.   

The green light also facilitates Finland’s integration as a new member, since the security and defense of the two Nordics is heavily interlinked. As Finnish President Sauli Niinistö stated: “Finland’s NATO membership is not complete without Sweden.”

For NATO, the deal means that the Vilnius Summit is off to a good start. As twenty-nine allies already have ratified Sweden’s accession, NATO otherwise faced the risk of appearing fragmented and weak. Lack of progress could put the credibility of NATO’s “open door” policy at risk, since the Alliance also has to make some tough decisions on Ukrainian membership. 

Turkey managed to push Sweden and NATO to take a step forward on counterterrorism measures, and in the end, Erdoğan also put the EU into the mix. Sweden’s decision to support Turkish ambitions to get the European Commission to restart the accession process appeared to seal their NATO agreement. Whether Turkey will also get to purchase the long-sought F-16 fighter jets from the United States remains to be seen. But then, the summit has not even started and US President Joe Biden has yet to arrive. 

—Anna Wieslander is the director for Northern Europe and head of the Atlantic Council’s Northern Europe office in Stockholm. 

Don’t spike the football just yet

While my instinct tells me that it would be difficult for Erdoğan to backtrack on an agreement he has seemingly made in good faith, recent history provides a cautionary tale. Just over a year ago on the margins of the Madrid Summit, glasses were clinking on what most observers assumed would be a straightforward process for admission once Turkey joined consensus in inviting Finland and Sweden to become members. Yet Erdoğan knew he had a second bite at the apple. He took the accolades in Madrid, only to run Sweden through the paces for another year before another dramatic set of negotiations in Vilnius, where he once again demanded the spotlight before conceding. If he moves with alacrity to push the ratification through the Turkish parliament, skeptics can be reassured. But there is non-zero chance that some intervening circumstance (like another public Quran burning) could serve as pretext for derailing the process again. I want to be optimistic, but worry that I have seen this movie before. NATO should not spike the football until it is over the goal line.  

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Both sides gain in this geopolitical tit-for-tat

For months, NATO leaders have been working behind the scenes to broker this agreement between Turkey and Sweden. It’s important to tip our hats to Stoltenberg, Biden, and other leaders who exerted diplomatic pressure to see this through. This is a classic example of a geopolitical tit-for-tat: Erdoğan using his strategic position—as a member of NATO but also straddling the East and West—to extract concessions from Sweden that both bolster his power at home and demonstrate to the broader NATO Alliance that they need him. It also gives both sides something they want: Erdoğan gets to look like a statesman, and Sweden appears on track to finally get its NATO membership. It will be interesting in the coming days to follow reports of what took place behind closed doors over the last few weeks, days, and even hours, and what was actually on offer for Erdoğan to create this shift. He wouldn’t have changed his tune if he didn’t see this move as in his interests. Next up: Be sure to watch the US-Turkey F-16 space closely.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Did Erdoğan sense Putin’s weakness?

While it’s only speculation, the Prigozhin mutiny and the Kremlin’s uncertain response (Prigozhin at liberty in Russia, not in exile in Belarus; Prigozhin’s meeting with Putin) suggest regime weakness. Erdoğan’s reaction to the failed 2016 coup in Turkey showed no such mixed messages. Erdoğan might have concluded that betting on Putin after the mutiny seemed less wise.

We won’t know what the United States might do with respect to F-16 or other military sales to Turkey. If there were an understanding, the details will become clear in coming weeks. Whether a possible deal is a good deal depends on the details. But the practice of international relations is not an art for the purist. Erdoğan’s decision to support Sweden’s (and Ukraine’s) NATO accession is a big deal and worth advancing. If the Biden team made some understanding, I would look favorably on it.

Sweden will bring to the Alliance military capacity (though it will need to build more), political savvy, and good geography. Sweden will help with the defense of NATO’s eastern flank countries and the Baltic Sea. Having worked with Swedish diplomats for many years, I believe they will also be excellent partners in forging NATO consensus and a sustainable, strong policy toward Russia.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Sweden makes the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake—and seals the Vilnius summit’s place in history

Assuming Erdoğan’s announcement is followed by expeditious approvals from the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments, it will be one of the key substantive and geopolitically significant deliverables of NATO’s Vilnius summit. Sweden’s accession will bring to the Alliance real military capability, reinforce its transatlantic outlook, and above all, bring into the Alliance’s ranks a new member determined to fulfill its military responsibilities. Sweden’s membership will complete the transformation of the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake, thereby strengthening the security and military stability of North Central Europe.

—​​Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post Experts react: Erdogan just agreed to support Sweden’s NATO bid. What does that mean for Turkey, Sweden, and the Alliance? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the 2022 summit, Finland and Sweden signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining a path for accession through progress on Turkey’s security concerns. After Finland officially became a member country on April 4, 2023, the United States and other NATO member countries started to exert pressure on Turkey to accelerate approval for Sweden prior to the Vilnius summit. Sweden, with two hundred years of military non-alignment, and Finland, neutral throughout the Cold War, applied for membership only after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February last year. Enhancing Ukraine’s security is high on the agenda at the NATO Summit, necessitating attention to direct support for Ukraine’s defense, Alliance enlargement, and effective cooperation in the Black Sea region.

For Ankara the primary consideration in approving Sweden is tougher enforcement of counter-terror laws against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), an internationally recognized terrorist group, and its offshoots. Washington has dangled possible approval of Turkey’s proposed purchase of F-16 fighter jets and upgrade kits in attempts to influence Ankara’s calculation. Ankara, which is a long-time F-16 producer and user, desires reasonable compensation for its earlier expulsion from the F-35 program, after it went ahead with the purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system which also led to the imposition of US sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Both the United States and Turkey see Turkish air power as a NATO anchor in the Black Sea region.

Securing the Black Sea

Alongside Romania and Bulgaria, Turkey is the largest of three NATO member countries in the Black Sea region and controls access to it under the Montreux Convention. With the Alliance’s second largest military and unique geographic positioning, Turkey has been a crucial player in the Russia-Ukraine war both diplomatically and militarily. Turkey has managed to maintain trade and diplomatic ties with Russia while providing vigorous support to Ukraine’s defense, and it has built a record of frustrating Russian military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Securing NATO’s interests in the Black Sea depends on a strong Turkey. Ukraine understands this, leading its officials to consider Turkey as one of the few potential security guarantor countries.

Turkey has provided support to NATO maritime operations in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, and most recently agreed to sell Bayraktar drones to Romania. Yet Turkey’s ability to deter Russia depends in part on the health of its F-16 fleet—the third largest in the world but feeling its age. Ankara’s request for forty new F-16s and upgrade packages for its seventy-nine existing fighters to sustain its air capabilities has made little headway over the past two years, and members of the US Congress have added Swedish accession as a new condition to the frozen sale. At the same time, many members of Congress have indicated that Turkey agreeing to Sweden’s accession will not be enough for them to approve Ankara’s F-16 request.

Ironically, Turkey is not an ordinary F-16 buyer. It has been an important F-16 manufacturer through Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) established in 1984, according to the company, as a “Turkish-U.S. joint investment company to carry out the manufacture of F-16 aircraft, integration of on-board systems and flight tests” following the initial Turkish decision to acquire F-16s. Working with US defense giants such as General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and General Electric, TUSAŞ manufactured and tested almost all of the Turkish F-16 fleet—nearly three hundred aircraft in various configurations.

Additionally, TUSAŞ produced forty-six F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995, and helped modernize the F-16 fleet of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. In short, Turkey has been a critical partner in the F-16 program for decades—and a further sale remains in the mutual interest of Ankara, Washington, and NATO.

A de facto arms embargo?

In February 2023, the US Senate NATO Observer Group co-chairs, Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), presented a bipartisan letter to President Joe Biden requesting that “F-16 fighter jet sales to Türkiye should not begin until the NATO protocols [for Finland and Sweden] are ratified.” This followed, according to a report in Defense News, multiple congressional holds of US arms sales to Turkey starting in 2018 or earlier.

Turkey has not added any new F-16s to its inventory since 2012 as the country was expecting to receive more than one hundred F-35 jets, for which it has already paid $1.4 billion. After Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program in March 2020, Ankara requested F-16s in exchange for the amount it had already paid.

The Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries also remains sanctioned by the United States under CAATSA. There has been a sustained campaign by congressional opponents of Turkey to deny major new arms sales to Ankara, spearheaded by the Hellenic and Armenian caucuses. Ironically, 1970s-era congressional sanctions against arms sales to Turkey catalyzed the drive for defense industrial autonomy that drove Turkey’s rise as a defense exporter. The ongoing replay of similar resistance from the US Congress is only reinforcing Turkey’s view that the United States is not a reliable arms provider in the long run. The resulting drive for self-sufficiency has increased the domestic share of Turkish defense production from roughly 20 percent to 80 percent and established the Turkish arms industry as a major international player.

Defense industrial decoupling

Consequently, Turkey has dropped from the seventh-largest US arms importer between 2013-17 to the twenty-seventh largest between 2018-2022. Meanwhile, Turkey’s defense exports skyrocketed by 69 percent during the same period, making the country the twelfth largest exporter of arms globally. In 2022, it set a new arms export record of $4.3 billion—an increase of nearly 37 percent from the previous year. 

In order to produce a national fighter aircraft that can replace the aging F-16, the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries signed a contract with TUSAŞ in 2016 to develop the fifth-generation National Combat Aircraft. The first successful taxi test of the prototype was completed in March this year, and it is expected that the first Kaan (previously known as the TF-X) will join the Turkish air force by 2030. 

In the medium to long term, defense industrial decoupling of Turkey from the United States would seem to suit both sides. Ankara will be free from the strings that come with US systems, and Congress will be able to satisfy select constituencies that it is not complicit in Turkish military actions. Bilateral relations can move on to happier and less complicated storylines—like the drive towards one hundred billion dollars in bilateral trade. Turkey will continue to partner with countries with a more streamlined defense cooperation model, such as the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

In the short term, a deal on F-16s could restore a modicum of mutual trust, meet the needs of the Alliance, and close the chapter of US-Turkish defense cooperation on a positive note. For those reasons, far more than to spur Swedish accession, US and Turkish leaders continue to push for progress.

Approval of Swedish accession before the Vilnius Summit is unlikely not because of F-16 haggling, but due to the early stage of implementation of Sweden’s new counter-terror laws. The arrest and conviction of a PKK financier in Stockholm in early July, a first of its kind under Sweden’s newly strengthened anti-terror laws, could mark a new phase of progress. It is unlikely that enough can be done in a few days to conclude the process. More likely, and encouraging nonetheless, would be positive signals out of the summit that real progress is being made: in counter-terror implementation, in F-16 talks, and in eventual Swedish accession. Vilnius probably will not mark the completion of these processes, but it could mark the start of a decisive and positive stage toward their conclusion.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Pınar Dost is a historian of international relations with a PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations (Sciences Po Paris). Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

The post A looming US-Turkey F-16 deal is about much more than Sweden’s NATO bid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the aftermath of such disasters, there is often a rush to quickly rebuild and restore affected areas. However, Turkey must rebuild its affected cities in a sustainable way that provides for both the short- and long-term needs of its residents. This requires holistic planning, community engagement, and integrating urban sustainability and resilience.

In Turkey, more than 160,000 buildings containing 520,000 apartments collapsed or were severely damaged across provinces such as Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Gaziantep, and Malatya. According to data from the Turkish Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, the vast majority of the affected buildings were built before 1999. In addition, official estimates in the months after the earthquake indicated that more than 230,000 buildings would have to be demolished, representing approximately 30 percent of the existing building stock.

In response, the Turkish government announced an ambitious plan to build 488,000 homes in the affected region within a year. It also pledged to build an unspecified number of nonresidential buildings such as schools and hospitals. The plan also includes retrofitting and strengthening the existing properties that have sustained light, nonstructural damage, as well as redeveloping infrastructure such as roads and bridges.

The plan is overseen by the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization, and Climate Change, and the work is being assigned to the Turkish Housing Development Administration (TOKI), a government agency that has been building public housing for the last four decades. TOKI had recently reported that 134,000 of the houses it built in the earthquake zone did not suffer any structural damage. It did not, however, rule out that any of its buildings were affected.

Construction is already under way in some areas. On May 3, the outgoing minister of environment, urbanization, and climate change announced that 132,000 housing units are already under construction. The total reconstruction cost is estimated to exceed one hundred billion dollars.

Sustainable reconstruction

As long as builders follow Turkey’s earthquake codes for construction, those units and others will be built to be earthquake-resistant. Yet to capitalize on this massive investment and to reduce future risks, the planned neighborhoods and buildings should not merely be resilient to future earthquakes: They should also be rebuilt resilient to known hazards caused or intensified by climate change.

According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Southern Turkey is expected to experience more frequent heatwaves and droughts, in addition to higher temperatures and sea levels. If newly built homes become unlivable in a just few decades because builders didn’t take into account future cooling and ventilation needs, or if neighborhoods rebuilt after this earthquake suffer from congestion and pollution in the future, such large-scale investments could become stranded assets. Major reconstruction at this scale should also not only adapt to climate change but also mitigate it; cities should be sustainably rebuilt so that their damage to the environment—and contribution to climate change—is limited.

Turkish officials’ desires to reconstruct quickly is understandable given the urgency to restore normalcy. However, the benefits of rebuilding with long-term viability in mind—by taking the time to plan for more sustainable, resilient, and inclusive neighborhoods—far outweigh the short-term gains of hasty reconstruction.

In order to rebuild sustainably, builders should approach reconstruction with a wider focus on districts and neighborhoods rather than a narrow focus on individual buildings and infrastructure. These new neighborhoods should use land efficiently, with buildings that have smaller footprints, in order to make more land available for public green spaces—which offer nearby residents improved air quality, among other benefits—urban agriculture, and pedestrian and cycling paths.

Despite the availability of bus networks, cars still represent a significant share of transportation in the five most affected provinces, which contributes to air pollution and traffic congestion. Planning for future neighborhoods should mix residential and commercial areas to reduce the need for commuting. The planning should also develop reliable and sustainable transportation networks, similar to the Kahramanmaraş 2030 transportation plans. This includes measures to reduce air pollution such as encouraging residents to use public transportation and minimizing spaces dedicated to car parking.

The planning that shapes these new neighborhoods should also aim to create a more comfortable environment for residents. This includes orienting the street network and designing buildings in a way that allows for breezes during hot seasons. It also includes planting trees and vegetation and using new materials for roofs and pavements. These measures help keep the sun’s heat at bay while managing rainfall naturally to reduce flooding risk. Local ecosystems such as forests, wetlands, and agricultural lands under threat from deforestation, pollution, and climate change should also be restored.

New neighborhoods also need to be planned with future energy and water use in mind. This includes reducing peak electricity demand by designing buildings that require minimal energy to heat and cool and providing spaces for power installations on rooftops and above pedestrian walkways. Improving water efficiency is also critical given that the five most affected provinces already face high levels of water stress.

The new neighborhoods should also be planned so that they do not displace vulnerable communities and disrupt their social networks and livelihoods. These risks can be avoided by including these communities in the planning, including at the local community level, and engaging stakeholders in the decision-making process.

Leveraging international assistance

In any humanitarian crisis, the pressure on local and national decision makers to act quickly is always immense. Yet, hasty reconstruction brings many risks: inefficient land use; the increased use of energy, water, and material resources; increased carbon emissions; a higher flooding risk; increased congestion; poor air quality; limited access to public spaces; loss of biodiversity; increased vulnerability to climate change impacts; and increased social and economic inequality. The long-term cost of failing to address these issues is nothing short of a failure to protect the surviving earthquake victims and other residents from future disasters.

Being less constrained by the pressure to rebuild hastily, international donors could play a role in ensuring a more positive outcome in Turkey. The European Union pledged six billion euros in grants and loans, while the World Bank pledged $1.78 billion in initial assistance to help with relief and recovery efforts in Turkey. If those institutions and future international donors encourage Turkish policymakers to create sustainable, resilient, and inclusive neighborhoods, they could have a positive impact on the trajectory of the reconstruction efforts.

The window of opportunity to create the foundations for more sustainable and resilient cities is narrow and closing quickly. Thoughtful and inclusive planning requires additional coordination and consultation and may result in a delay of a few weeks or months. Yet it remains the only way to capitalize on this opportunity for Turkey and to address the needs of both current residents and future generations.

Karim Elgendy is an urban sustainability and climate expert based in London. He is an associate director at Buro Happold, an associate fellow at Chatham House, and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington. Elgendy is also the founder and coordinator of Carboun, an advocacy initiative promoting sustainability in cities of the Middle East and North Africa through research and communication.

The post A blueprint for Turkey’s resilient reconstruction and recovery post-earthquake appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the same time, Turkey is beset by change, including a reeling economy at home and open conflict in its neighborhood. To its north, Russia wages war on Ukraine. To its south, Syria is on edge. Below, Atlantic Council experts share their insights on what to expect on these issues and more.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Defne Arslan: It’s time for Turkey to shift its economic policy

Borzou Daragahi: Erdoğan signals he will tighten his grip

Rich Outzen: Expect more strategic semi-independence and balancing among great powers

Yevgeniya Gaber: How Erdoğan could use his leverage on Russia’s war in Ukraine

Ariel Cohen: Expect Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US to weaken

Ali Bakir: Stability alone will not solve Turkey’s pressing issues

It’s time for Turkey to shift its economic policy

Turkey is getting ready for another five-year term under Erdoğan with an AK Party-led alliance holding a majority in the parliament. Given the presidential system and with a parliament majority behind him, the reelection of Erdoğan will give Turkey a five-year stable term without elections, except for municipal elections to be held in ten months. Erdoğan’s reelection means Turkey will be entering another era of centralized decision-making, however this five-year term can also be regarded as securing political stability for Turkey. If Turkey’s economic team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems through setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms, then I believe Turkey can be a destination for foreign capital in time, given the current state of other emerging markets. 

The Turkish economy currently has serious problems, including a high inflation rate and low currency reserves caused in part by a controlled exchange rate regime. Current unconventional policy is not helping Turkey achieve a high growth rate or a boost in its exports. In short, the economy needs to be addressed quickly. It is important for Erdoğan and the new government to reassure confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors. With a strong economic team and more conventional and independent policies, this is possible. In his victory remarks, Erdoğan discussed the Turkish economy at length, which shows that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy. Regarding regional energy policies, I do not expect any shift there. Current policies will continue. We will be hearing from the new cabinet this weekend, if not by Friday, but early news signals that the economy is a major priority for Erdoğan.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey programs, and former chief Turkey economist and senior energy policy adviser in the US embassy in Ankara.

Erdoğan signals he will tighten his grip

Early signs suggest that the reelection of Erdoğan will lead to further erosion of human rights and political freedoms in Turkey.

In the run-up to the second round of voting, it was an open question as to whether Erdoğan, who had promised to serve only one more five-year term, would burnish his legacy by easing some of the harsh measures he has imposed against his liberal and leftist political opponents and minority communities.

But in a pair of victory speeches on Sunday in Istanbul and Ankara, Erdoğan was hardly magnanimous in victory. He dispensed quickly with the obligatory post-election call to put aside differences. “There will be no losers in such a victory. The winner is Turkey,” he said, dutifully thanking all Turks who voted.

But his tone quickly darkened. He slammed his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as incompetent and smirked as the crowd booed him. He described jailed Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas and other political opponents as “terrorists.”

He accused the Anglophone, French, and German media outlets covering Turkey of trying to overthrow him. He drew howls of delight from the crowd when he warned that opposition parties were pursuing a pro-LGBTQI+ agenda. “For us, family is sacred,” he said.

He also warned that he would prevent political opponents from damaging Turkey’s “success with other people and other intermediaries,” suggesting he would crack down on journalists, human-rights campaigners, and political dissidents who attempted to pressure Ankara by appealing to international governments and institutions.

Erdoğan’s vow to stay in office for just one more term appeared to fall by the wayside. “My commitment is until I die, until the grave,” he said. 

Erdoğan still has time, opportunity, and breathing space to moderate his ways, draw in opponents, and focus the nation’s efforts on improving the country’s battered economy, which is now the most pressing concern for most Turks. But Erdoğan’s post-election posturing suggests he may have already settled on a path of demonizing vulnerable minorities and targeting political opponents to retain social control ahead of potentially rough economic times.

—Borzou Daragahi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and an Istanbul-based journalist.

Expect more strategic semi-independence and balancing among great powers

When an incumbent president wins reelection—as Erdoğan has in Turkey by a roughly 52-48 margin—one expects more continuity than change in foreign policy. For Erdoğan, this means hewing to three pillars that have evolved as the basis for Turkish foreign policy under his lead: strategic semi-independence (anchored by NATO with expansive caveats), balancing and hedging among great powers, and a carrot-and-stick mixture of hard power and adaptive diplomacy in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood.

NATO remains the cornerstone of Turkish security, and Ankara has spoken in favor of admitting Ukraine and Georgia. After extracting concessions on defense cooperation and prosecution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror group, the Turkish parliament approved Finland’s accession in March. As Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation takes full effect next month, the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up. Under Erdoğan’s upcoming presidential term, Turkey will remain a strong contributor to the Alliance’s training, readiness, and mutual defense missions. Should the war in Ukraine end during his presidential term, Erdoğan can be expected to continue offering strong defense partnership to Ukraine, as he has for the past decade.

Yet NATO membership offers little help to Erdoğan in an arc of conflict—and tension with Russia—that spans Turkey’s eastern and southern borders. The counter-PKK campaigns in Iraq and Syria, standoffs in the Caucasus and Libya, and the unresolved Syrian civil war all require that Erdoğan alternately deter and negotiate with Moscow, Tehran, Damascus, and other regional powers without much help from the West. One might add the Mediterranean and Aegean seas, where Turkey butts heads with Greece and Cyprus, necessitating an independent approach. In this “zone beyond NATO” for Turkish security, Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect. 

Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan; he will want to remove the PKK-linked People’s Defense Units (YPG) from the Turkish border, while facilitating the safe return of significant numbers of Syrian refugees to their homeland. What mixture of diplomatic finesse and military threats compels Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to provide assurances on refugee protection and border security remains to be seen. If Ankara believes it can weaken the YPG and bring Assad to the table through drone and artillery strikes alone, it may forgo a large ground operation, but a major new operation against the YPG this year or next cannot be ruled out. Syrian refugees and Turkish nationalists both favored Erdoğan in the recent election, and the Turkish president feels an obligation to both—which he will seek to fulfill by ending YPG control of border areas and keeping Assad from annihilating the Syrian opposition or returning refugees.

Erdoğan emerges from his reelection campaign with a reasonably strong public mandate, an experienced foreign policy team, endorsement of his conservative-nationalist approach, and some margin for risk-taking. It will be interesting to see how he uses those things.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former military and civilian adviser in the US State Department.

How Erdoğan could use his leverage on Russia’s war in Ukraine

Erdoğan’s winning the presidential elections means much more continuity rather than change in Ankara’s foreign policy and business as usual with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey’s ambivalent stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine—trading and developing economic cooperation with the former while providing support for the self-defense of the latter—will likely remain unchanged. Turkey’s balancing policy between the two warring parties has paid off, not least in domestic politics. At the same time, Erdoğan’s shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow has brought concrete results—enabling prisoner swaps in the early days of war, brokering the grain deal, and facilitating meetings of the delegations. With Erdoğan strengthening his position with a new “vote of confidence” from the Turkish people, and Russian President Vladimir Putin losing his grip on power both internally and externally, Erdoğan might play hard this time—pushing both sides for a ceasefire, maintaining the work of the grain corridors, and negotiating to get the rest of the Turkish ships out of Ukrainian ports. 

One might assume that with a new, much more nationalistic parliament, the issue of Crimean Tatars and other Turkic communities discriminated against and persecuted by the Russian occupational authorities in Ukraine would play a bigger role in the future. However, this is very unlikely since both Turkey’s economic woes and geopolitical setting in the region demand its close cooperation with Russia. Tackling the problem of Syrian refugees, refueling exhausted central bank reserves, and accumulated problems in relations with the United States and European Union will keep Russia high among Turkey’s top partners, no matter what. “[Turkey’s] relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States,” was Erdoğan’s message in the final days of the campaign. It’s no surprise that Putin was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on the victory—even before the official results were announced.

At the same time, ongoing projects with Ukraine—most notably in defense industry and military cooperation—will also likely remain in place, meaning that no time will be wasted on a transition period in Ankara had the leadership changed. 

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine.

Expect Turkey’s relationship with Europe and the US to weaken

Erdoğan’s unprecedented two decades in office and third presidential term of five years will have far-ranging consequences for Europe and Asia. As Turkey continues its ascent as a major power, it will drift away from the West and weaken its relationship with Europe and the United States. Ankara is building ties with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Erdogan is weighing joining. He also has aspirations to become a member of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa).

At the same time, its support of Ukraine and power projection into the Caucasus via Azerbaijan will lead to clashes with Russia and Iran, as will Turkey’s continuing involvement in the Middle East, where Iran is demonstrating insatiable quasi-imperial ambitions. The Turkey-Azerbaijan axis and Ankara’s support of the Organization of Turkic States, a tool of Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, will likely bring both Moscow’s and Tehran’s ire.

Arab allies of Turkey, including Qatar, and old-new “friends” such as Saudi Arabia may also become weary of Ankara’s vast ambitions rooted in the Ottoman legacy. Frustrated with barriers to US arms supplies, Turkey, a leader in drone technology with its widely lauded Bayraktar, is likely to embark on an even more robust military-industrial build-up to boost its muscle. This could include investing more in its native fifth generation TAI Kaan (TF-X / F-X) fighter jet, its Altay Main Battle Tank, and its Hisar and Siper missile systems.

Finally, the challenges of economic reform and curbing inflation will be front and center. Erdoğan will likely (and hopefully) review his religiously inspired anti-usury, inflation-denying monetary policy. He may also support economic growth by building up Turkey’s role as an energy hub, with Azeri, Eastern Mediterranean, Iranian, Russian, Turkmen, and Gulf gas pipelines going through the country and into Europe. Erdoğan may also push for constructing a massive Mediterranean-Black Sea canal to bypass the congested and hard-to-navigate Bosporus, representing a significant economic development engine for the next decade and beyond.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Stability alone will not solve Turkey’s pressing issues

With Erdoğan’s win, both the presidency and parliament are now aligned under a single political front. This will likely facilitate Erdoğan’s task of maintaining stability and ensuring the continuity of his policies. However, this is not a panacea; no magical solutions will materialize to the most pressing issues.

Internally, this scenario could spell disaster for the opposition. The opposition coalition may now crumble, signaling the end of Kılıçdaroğlu’s political career, with Meral Akşener, head of the Good Party (Iyi), another possible political casualty. Sweeping changes are anticipated within the opposition camp if they are willing to show responsibility.

The most pressing issue on Erdoğan’s agenda is the economic situation. The president has already made clear that he has no intention of revising his unconventional economic theory. Should pressure mount, he would likely resort to a mix of strategies, including soliciting more money from regional partners and allies such as Azerbaijan, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Moreover, Erdoğan may expedite the exploration of oil and gas in the Black Sea and possibly in the Eastern Mediterranean and boost defense exports to secure hard currency. As he continues the normalization process with regional countries, including Egypt, to stabilize the situation and increase Turkey’s trade with the region, Syria is poised to emerge as the most significant obstacle.

From Erdoğan’s viewpoint, if normalization with Assad becomes inevitable due to the emerging regional and international dynamics, it should come at a price. Erdoğan will likely seek financial support from Qatar, other Gulf countries, and the international community to fund housing projects in liberated areas to accommodate returning refugees. He insists that Assad should demonstrate commitment on at least three fronts: countering the YPG and Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), ensuring the safety of those who choose to return voluntarily at the current moment, and making notable progress on the political front in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. Should Assad fail to show such commitment, Erdoğan will be in a suitable position vis-à-vis Russia to launch a new military operation in northern Syria versus the offshoots of the PKK, backed by the nationalist voices in the parliament.

Under Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey will prioritize its own interests and bolster its autonomous and independent foreign policy, as well as its forward defense policy. He has already reached out to Biden’s administration to try to resolve some persistent issues, including the F-16 fighter jet deal, and may discuss other hot topics such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Syria. Ankara is expected to affirm its position on the YPG and even show more assertiveness with its deployed unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Erdoğan will likely reassert Ankara’s position toward Sweden, emphasizing the need to counter terrorism to ensure Sweden’s access to NATO. Moreover, Erdoğan will likely reach out to Putin to ensure the continuation of Ankara’s constructive efforts in halting the ongoing war against Ukraine.

—Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Middle East programs and an assistant professor at Qatar University’s Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences.

The post Five more years for Erdogan. What’s first on his agenda? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

They’re staying the course. A majority of Turkish voters backed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Sunday’s runoff election, earning him another five-year term as president and extending his twenty-year hold on power. Yet the vote for continuity comes amid major changes in and around Turkey, which is still recovering from a devastating earthquake, dealing with financial turmoil, and contending with security challenges in its neighborhood. Our experts elected to share their insights on what to expect from another Erdoğan term.

• Defne Arslan (@defnesadiklar): Senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey programs, former chief Turkey economist and senior energy policy adviser in the US embassy in Ankara
• Yevgeniya Gaber (@GaberYevgeniya): Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister
• Rich Outzen (@RichOutzen): Nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and former military and civilian adviser in the US State Department

Pivotal position

• Erdoğan winning about 52 percent of the vote against challenger Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, combined with the parties supporting him having secured a majority in parliament, means Turkey will be entering another period of “centralized decision making” but also one of “political stability,” Defne tells us.
• “Turkey’s ambivalent stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, trading and developing economic cooperation with the former while providing support for the self-defense of the latter, will likely remain unchanged,” explains Yevgeniya. But secure in his power, “Erdoğan might play hard this time,” she adds, by asking Russia for more in negotiations over grain exports from Ukraine and even pushing both sides for a ceasefire.
• Turkey’s foreign policy will likely continue with its strategic semi-independence and its balancing and hedging among great powers, explains Rich. Yet within NATO, “the prospects for Swedish accession are looking up,” he adds, especially with Sweden’s new counter-terror legislation taking full effect next month.

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An economic rethink?

• At home, Erdoğan’s first priority will be the Turkish economy, which is currently battling slow growth, low reserves, and high inflation due in part to the government’s low interest rate policy. “If Turkey’s economy team can go back to credible and more conventional economic policies that can fix the current problems,” Defne says, the country could become a destination for foreign capital once again.
• In his victory remarks, Erdoğan referenced this year’s one hundredth anniversary of the Turkish Republic and discussed the Turkish economy at length, which Defne interprets as a signal “that he is determined to deliver a stronger road map for the economy.”
• It will take “setting strong economic benchmarks and implementing crucial structural reforms,” Defne adds, to reestablish “confidence in the Turkish economy both for domestic and foreign investors.”
• Expect Russia to remain high among Turkey’s economic partners, as Ankara seeks to refuel its exhausted central bank reserves, explains Yevgeniya. She underscores that Erdoğan’s message at the close of his campaign was: “[Turkey’s] relations with Russia are no less important than those with the United States.” It’s no surprise, she adds, that Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick to congratulate Erdoğan on the victory—even before the official results were announced.
• But for Ukraine, Yevgeniya notes that Erdoğan is likely to continue “Turkey’s military support and ongoing projects in the defense sphere.”

Contesting the ‘zone beyond NATO’

• “Syria stands out as a matter of personal legacy for Erdoğan,” says Rich. The Turkish president wants to remove the Kurdistan Workers’ Party–linked People’s Defense Units (YGP) from the Turkish border and facilitate the return of a significant number of refugees to Syria, he explains.
• Rich warns that “a major new [military] operation against the YPG this year or next cannot be ruled out.” However, if Turkey can sufficiently weaken the YPG and bring Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to negotiations through drone and artillery strikes alone, then it may forgo a large ground operation.
• Turkish security concerns extend beyond Syria, Rich points out, to Libya, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean and Aegean seas—all of which require deft negotiation with regional powers. “In this ‘zone beyond NATO’ for Turkish security,” he says, “Erdoğan is likely to leave the door open for deals while rattling the saber occasionally for effect.”

The post What the world should expect from Erdogan now appeared first on Atlantic Council.

1. What do the results tell us about the Turkish electorate? What factors are driving their votes?

The outcome was a choice for many Turks between pain tolerance (Erdoğan’s poor economic performance and heavy hand domestically) versus risk tolerance (an ideologically diverse coalition with untested personalities, scant unifying principles other than opposing Erdoğan, and a lot of policy unknowns). A comparison with the 2018 results shows progress for the opposition in a sense—the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) vote share and parliamentary seats dropped, the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) share rose, Erdoğan’s vote share dropped over 3 percent—but the opposition also underperformed expectations. Polls prior to the election generally showed Kılıçdaroğlu ahead by several percentage points, and if we tally the 2018 total of opposition candidates (CHP; Good Party, or Iyi; and Peoples’ Democratic Party, or HDP), their 46.33 percent exceeded the 44.45 percent garnered by Kılıçdaroğlu as a unified candidate with ex officio HDP support. 

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant.

With a turnout of almost 90 percent, the Turkish people proved their commitment to the democratic process. There were, in fact, two elections on May 14: One for the Turkish parliament, Turkey’s legislative organ under a presidential system, and a second one to select the next Turkish president. The results showed an electorate still highly divided, but also showed an increase in nationalist votes. Compared to previous elections, the AKP votes decreased from 43 percent to 35.4 percent. Its alliance partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), surprisingly protected its vote share, in contrast to pre-election polls. The end result appears to be the People’s Alliance (AKP plus MHP) as the majority group in the parliament, securing 321 seats. This number will be sufficient for a legislative majority, but short of the 360 seats needed to make a constitutional amendment. On the other hand, the main opposition Nation Alliance, led by the CHP and Iyi, secured only 213 seats.

Despite the general expectations, it was surprising to see that the recent economic policies of the government—which led to high inflation, low reserves, and a foreign exchange crunch—were not determinant for those who voted for the AKP. This suggests that the recent economic incentives Erdoğan announced, and nationalist motives combined with Erdoğan’s leadership style, played a bigger role in their votes. The increasing nationalist votes were also reflected in the surprisingly strong showing by third-place presidential candidate Sinan Oğan, who secured 5.3 percent of the vote when pre-election polls projected him only at only 1-2 percent.

As a final note, with the exception of the hard-hit Hatay province in southern Turkey, the recent earthquake in Turkey did not make the expected impact on the electorate’s decision, according to the current results. Again, half of Turkey thinks that securing stability rather than a change will be better for the country.

—Defne Arslan is senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. 

Across Turkey, Erdoğan’s vote total in 2023 decreased between 1-5 percent in most provinces compared to the last presidential election in 2018, in which he took 52.6 percent of the vote, enough to avoid a runoff. That modest decline does not match the high hopes of the opposition, buoyed by many but not all polls heading into the election. Despite years of economic struggle and runaway inflation, Erdoğan was able to hold on to the loyalty of most of his base and end up just shy of 50 percent. The results remind us again that the Turkish electorate leans heavily right, with right-wing parties winning over 60 percent of the parliamentary vote. It also hints that the electorate is not convinced in the opposition’s vision for the country or its ability to solve the challenges facing the country. In its campaign, the AKP heavily played on the achievements realized in the past twenty-one years under its rule, from its signature infrastructure projects to health care reforms and defense industry development, which may have resonated with voters more than intangible promises and change promoted by the opposition.

—Grady Wilson is an associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

2.  What do you make of the composition of the new parliament, and what impact will it have on the ultimate winner of the presidential race?

Adding up the current numbers as broadcasted by news outlets (no official numbers are out yet), AKP will have 266 seats and CHP will have 169 seats, of which 37 seats actually belong to four other coalition partners. These include political parties led by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Ali Babacan, and Temel Karamollaoğlu. In addition, the Green Left Party (YSP) will have 62 seats, the MHP 50 seats, the Iyi 44 seats, and two others parties with a total of 9 seats. These numbers put the People’s Alliance (AKP plus MHP) at 312 seats and Nation’s Alliance (a CHP-led group of six parties) at 213 seats. These numbers give the majority to the AKP-led alliance.

Two options appear possible for the runoff:

• The Turkish electorate could consolidate around nationalist votes. They may prefer continuity of the current status quo: a president supported by a majority in the parliament.
• Turks can decide it is risky to consolidate too much power around the AKP and consolidate, instead, for Kılıçdaroğlu.

—Defne Arslan

The Turkish electorate remains a center-right electorate. Kılıçdaroğlu did not attract enough of the winnable center-right votes to win and, in my view, that was the key to the outcome. Over 20 percent of the parliament will consist of explicitly nationalist parties (MHP, Iyi, BBP), and Oğan’s surprising 5 percent in the presidential race shows the persistence of anti-Erdoğan nationalist voters who also rejected the primary opposition candidate. It is possible that the more explicit support to Kılıçdaroğlu from the heavily Kurdish HDP, and Erdoğan’s instrumentalization of it by accusing his opponent of being adjacent to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist group, worked by driving some potential nationalist votes from the opposition to Oğan or the MHP. 

Despite Western predictions that the Kurds of Turkey would be kingmakers in a tightly divided electorate, it did not pan out that way. The HDP/YSP (sympathetic to the PKK) drew only 8.8 percent, down roughly 3 percent from 2018, and dropped from 67 to 62 parliamentary seats. Even in the Kurdish-majority areas of the southeast, the race was competitive, with Erdoğan’s alliance ahead of the HDP/YSP in half the provinces and the opposition CHP pulling five parliamentary seats while HDP/YSP held roughly half the provinces.

—Rich Outzen

One of the most surprising results from the election is the resilience of the second largest party in the People’s Alliance, the MHP. Once again (as they did in 2018), the MHP surpassed all pre-election predictions, taking about 10 percent of the vote and guaranteeing the People’s Alliance will continue its control of parliament. Meanwhile, the CHP and Iyi underperformed. The results will not help the opposition’s morale going into the runoff.

—Grady Wilson

3. What is your take on allegations of Russian influence in the election?

Despite the fact that foreign policy was almost absent from the agenda of the current Turkish elections, the Russian factor became a major issue in domestic politics just days before the voting with the opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu saying he had evidence of Russian interference in the upcoming elections. Erdoğan denied the accusations and added that cooperation with the Russian Federation was no less important for Turkey than with the United States. Though no evidence of Russian meddling has been shared so far, Moscow’s influence on the Turkish domestic politics may go far beyond deep fakes and cyber-attacks in the aftermath of the voting when the newly elected Turkish president will have to deliver on electoral promises, pay for Russian gas, get to the negotiation table with the Assad regime, and stabilize the economic situation. Whatever the name of the president, Russia is likely to remain a major factor in Turkey’s foreign and domestic politics.   

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a Ukrainian foreign-policy expert, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University.

4.  What is your expectation for the second round given that the first round showed Erdoğan with a significant lead?

There was a negative market reaction to results this morning, Turkish credit default swaps, which are an indicator of the country’s economic risk, rose by 70 basis points to 576. The Turkish lira depreciated despite the controlled foreign exchange markets. The Turkish stock exchange fell, too, led by banking sector stocks—after a significant jump last week in expectation that the opposition, which promised to deliver more conventional economic policies supported by structural reforms, would win. The market reaction might have been more severe if there were more foreign investors in Turkish markets, but there are very few now. The outcome shows that if current economic policies continue, then Turkey will continue to suffer from reserve losses and a high inflation rate, which is no longer sustainable. For this reason, we might now expect to see a shift in Erdoğan’s rhetoric toward new economic policies, while also increasing his tone to attract nationalist votes.

—Defne Arslan

In the absence of any major unforeseen developments, it is very difficult to see Kılıçdaroğlu making up the difference in the second round. He would essentially need 90 percent of the vote that went to Oğan, who took 5.3 percent of the vote.

—Grady Wilson

What did come as a surprise to many is an unexpectedly high level of support for the third-place candidate, Oğan, who has built his electoral campaign on nationalistic and anti-migrant rhetoric. Having gained more than 5 percent of the votes, he has turned from a marginal outsider to a joker with a trump card for the runoff as both front-runners fell short of the support required to win the election in the first round. As both Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu will try to mobilize constituencies for the May 28 voting, it is the voters of Oğan—Turkish nationalists with largely anti-Western sentiments but supportive of the parliamentary system in Turkey—who may play the decisive role. The unexpectedly high level of support for the nationalistic MHP aligning with the ruling AKP party adds to the feeling that observers may have underestimated the level of anti-immigrant sentiments in a Turkish society that is hosting more than 4.5 million Syrian refugees amidst a deep economic crisis. 

—Yevgeniya Gaber

Turkey has had an impressive, though for the West disappointing, exercise in democracy. The verdict—pending completion of the second round—seems to have been “better the devil we know.” Erdoğan’s attempts to sow doubt about Kılıçdaroğlu’s proximity to PKK-adjacent Kurds, his lack of international expertise (the CHP leader does not speak English or have foreign-policy experience), and his deference to Atlanticism seems to have worked. Erdoğan’s distribution of pre-election money and promises seems to have worked, as well. 

Kılıçdaroğlu was an unimpressive campaigner, though a thoroughly decent man. His coalition proved too scant on policy details, proved vulnerable to charges of being weak on security and not ready for prime time. Worst-case scenarios of obvious cheating or civil unrest seem not to have materialized. The Turks have affirmed their essentially risk-averse and conservative outlook embodied in the statement “böyle geldi, böyle gider” (as it came, so also will it go).

—Rich Outzen

The post Four questions (and expert answers) about the Turkish presidential election runoff appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moscow has led its coercion campaign ever since pro-European Union (EU) candidate Maia Sandu won the presidential election in a landslide in November 2020—much to the Kremlin’s displeasure. Then, Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity won the 2021 parliamentary elections, paving the way for Sandu to officially apply to join the EU. A sustained effort by the Kremlin to undermine the Moldovan government’s credibility followed, and with the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, this intimidation campaign moved into high gear, notably through airspace violations, energy-supply manipulation, and official comments about Moldova being “the next Ukraine.” In the most recent example of this campaign, Russian armored forces conducted unannounced military maneuvers in the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria last week.

On February 10 this year, Moldovan Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned following months of protests over inflation and high energy prices, resulting from Moscow’s decision to limit gas exports to Moldova, which is almost completely dependent on Russian energy. Then on February 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin abrogated a 2012 decree that acknowledged Moldovan sovereignty in resolving questions over the future of Transnistria. That cancelation, viewed in Moldova as a hostile act, de facto signaled Putin’s willingness to use force to achieve his aims, as Russian troops in the region lost their status as “peacekeepers” and instead became more like occupation forces. It also shows the lengths to which the Kremlin will go to open a new front in its invasion of Ukraine and to advance its interests in the Black Sea.

Moldova’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is roughly $5,200 a year (one of the lowest in Europe), and its inflation rate peaked at 34 percent after Russia invaded Ukraine and reduced fuel supplies. Yet many Moldovans blame their own government, not the Kremlin, an indication of Russia’s disinformation efforts that inflame the already tense domestic political divide.

While it is landlocked, Moldovan territory includes the Prut, the Dniester, and the Danube rivers, which empty into the Black Sea. Moreover, because it borders Ukraine and is only fifty kilometers from Odesa (Ukraine’s largest seaport), instability in Moldova—especially in Transnistria, which is effectively controlled by Moscow—could directly impact its neighbor’s security. A Russian-dominated Moldova could effectively become a southern Kaliningrad, and in conjunction with Crimea, it could provide Moscow with more control over the northern Black Sea and also possibly the ability to hamper Ukraine’s maritime activities. And, should Russia gain access to more Moldovan territory and flip Chisinau in its favor, Moscow’s expanded presence would also threaten Romania’s security and put even greater pressure on NATO’s southeastern flank.

Moldova has maintained its neutrality, which it had enshrined in its constitution. Despite this sentiment, Moldova is a member of the Partnership for Peace, which allows cooperation with NATO on a variety of activities. Yet Moldova has starved its security sector for decades, hoping its neutrality and Ukraine would protect it. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, Chisinau has sought to reverse this neglect of its military; for example, it expanded its 2024 defense budget by 68 percent compared to its budget in 2022—but that’s still only an increase of approximately eighty million dollars, or 0.55 percent of its GDP.

On paper, Moldova can field a security contingent of 45,000 personnel; however, this force is poorly trained and equipped with virtually no air support. In Transnistria, Russia has 1,500 troops, mainly comprising local recruits. While Moscow might seek to augment these forces, that would be logistically difficult given its failure to take Odesa. Moscow does, however, have significant agents of influence in Moldova who could work more forcefully against the government.

Keeping Moldova out of the Kremlin’s grasp is vital to Eastern European security and NATO’s Black Sea mission. Moldova, NATO, and the West must send clear, unmistakable signals to the Kremlin:

1. The EU should approve the fast-tracking of Moldova’s EU accession, a plan for which Poland recently made the case.
2. While it would be problematic to offer Moldova a fast track to NATO membership—as the Alliance is viewed unfavorably in Moldova, and leaving the policy of neutrality is unpopular there—NATO or its members can take other actions. For example, the promise of air defense and heavy weapons and training in the case of conflict with Russia/Transnistria would be a deterrent.
3. Moldova and the West should provide Moldova’s armed forces with more training and modern equipment, ultimately to improve capabilities and interoperability. Ukraine demonstrated how a Western-oriented training program can give a smaller country’s military an edge over Russia’s armed forces. This could be accomplished without violating Moldova’s neutrality as it would not require deploying foreign forces on Moldovan territory.
4. Moldova should institute a robust strategic-communications and cyber-defense platform to counter Russian malign influence—and the West should help. A platform designed to counter misinformation and disinformation could help galvanize domestic support for greater alignment with NATO and the West.
5. Finally, Moldova is one of the world’s least energy-self-sufficient countries. While Chisinau, with the West’s support, has made progress in source diversification and sector reform, it should continue to wean itself off of Russian oil and gas and electricity from Transnistria. Moldova must build a more resilient energy infrastructure that is not dependent on Russia.

Through its energy manipulation, military intimidation, and official threats, the Kremlin is conducting a classic hybrid warfare campaign against Moldova. In comparison to early 2014—when the world stood stunned in the wake of ‘little green men’ and the effective dismemberment of Ukraine—NATO and Western allies have become more sophisticated in detecting and combating hybrid warfare tactics. Additionally, NATO members’ support to Ukraine, while belated and arguably still inadequate, has been instrumental in Kyiv’s successful defense against Russia’s full-scale invasion. The lessons in Ukraine are unmistakable and should not be lost on Western and Moldovan leadership. Strong leadership, a determined population, and NATO support are indispensable in halting Russian aggression.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

The post To secure the Black Sea, the West must help Moldova stand up to Russian aggression appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The local economy of the earthquake-affected provinces accounts for 9.8 percent of Turkey’s gross domestic product (GDP), 8.6 percent of exports, and 15 percent of agricultural products. With a lower GDP per capita and a higher unemployment rate than the national average even before the disaster, the region employs over 3.8 million people, primarily in the agriculture, trade, textile, and food sectors, almost 40 percent of whom are employed informally. The local private sector—made up of more than 538,000 enterprises—now needs wide-ranging support to recover from the earthquakes.

Recovery and rebuilding will require a multi-faceted approach prioritizing private-sector support for local development along with social impact. This approach will need to ensure that the region continues progressing toward United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and does not leave vulnerable communities behind, including the displaced. Of the 3.7 million Syrian refugees who fled to Turkey since the Syrian war began, half of them lived in this region, constituting over 11 percent of its overall population, and were affected by the earthquakes. Turkey is now home to over three million internally displaced people, who are looking for economic and social support after this disaster.

One of the essential tools at Turkey’s disposal to tackle these daunting challenges and to design a more sustainable, resilient recovery is impact investing. These are “investments made with the intention to generate positive, measurable social and environmental impact alongside a financial return,” according to the Global Impact Investing Network, targeting a spectrum of returns depending on the type of capital and instruments used. As Turkey’s Impact Investing Advisory Board stated in a report published shortly before the earthquakes, urban resilience—which will need to be a priority following this disaster—will benefit from “innovative, sustainable capital allocation and commercial value generation” with an impact focus. Thankfully, the local impact investing ecosystem has been taking root to enable this.

Impact investing can also aim to create self-reliance for refugees and internally displaced people through “refugee lens” investing, which is a framework to qualify and track investments developed by the Refugee Investment Network (RIN), where I work with enterprises and investors focused on impact.  

Forced displacement cuts across at least thirteen of the seventeen SDGs around the world, according to RIN. Actively investing in displaced populations leads to new and sustainable solutions. In the aftermath of the earthquakes, that could include supporting the thousands of refugee-owned small businesses in the earthquake region, providing microfinance to local farmers and artisans, or facilitating tech-based remote employment. The goal is to increase displaced people’s livelihoods, financial inclusion, and continued skills development (especially to respond to workforce losses due to the earthquake), thus leading to equitable economic and social revival. Funding the communities and employers around the country that welcome the displaced will also be important.

Having value chains focused on supplier diversity, economic inclusion, and job creation will also help this cause. The public and private sectors can strengthen community resilience by prioritizing local and displaced suppliers affected by the disaster, including social enterprises and cooperatives employing and supporting vulnerable communities through “social procurement.” For instance, Innovation for Development (i4D), a local economic development organization, aims to connect three hundred local producers from the earthquake-affected region with buyers to ensure business continuity and new contracts.

In international trade, proponents of a “Turkiye Compact” call for trade concessions from the European Union, United States, and Canada to incentivize the private sector to hire both Syrian refugees and locals in Turkey with the goal of boosting the local economy and improving social cohesion. According to a United Nations Development Programme feasibility study conducted prior to the earthquakes, such a policy could create 284,000 new jobs (including 57,000 jobs for refugees) and boost exports by 3 percent, primarily of labor-intensive agricultural, processed food, and textile products. Furthermore, local enterprises participating in the Turkiye Compact would become attractive investment opportunities given their tangible impact on displaced communities through employment and sourcing.

Finally, Turkey’s vibrant entrepreneurial ecosystem is more crucial than ever. Accelerators, specialized funds, and growing communities of practice can nurture innovative, impact-driven ventures for earthquake-affected communities and create inclusive solutions. Examples so far have included a waste management start-up facilitating food aid, e-commerce solutions enabling microentrepreneurs, online mental health platforms offering therapy to survivors, and tech innovations in rescue and relief, among many others. Additionally, catalyzing entrepreneurship by underserved communities, especially those experiencing intersectional disadvantages, such as the refugee women entrepreneurs featured in an Atlantic Council documentary last year, will create new pathways to self-reliance.

Bringing all of these solutions together and amplifying their impact through the resources of the global impact investing community, local partnerships, and blended financing—with guarantees, concessional loans, or grants to attract private investments, for instance—will yield tremendous, complementary results.

With such a comprehensive toolbox, it will be possible to rebuild better after this terrible disaster and create more inclusive economies and resilient communities.

Selen Ucak is a social impact professional working at the intersection of private sector and international development. She currently leads a global community of refugee-led and refugee-supporting businesses and social enterprises at the Refugee Investment Network, as well as serving as a consultant on additional projects.

The post Impact investing can help rebuild an inclusive, resilient Turkey after the earthquakes appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On March 30, Turkey’s Parliament voted in favor of ratifying Finland’s accession to NATO, pushing its bid over the finish line after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan indicated his support two weeks earlier during a visit to Ankara by Finnish President Sauli Niinistö.

The breakthrough caps off a nine-month process since Turkey, Finland, and Sweden signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding (MoU) outlining an agreement on the Nordic countries’ accession last June. This is poised to be the fastest accession process in NATO history, but bringing it to a close will require both Turkey and Sweden to give ground.

Turkey has contributed to all major NATO missions, from the Korean War to the Balkans and Afghanistan. It has been a net provider of security, serving as a bulwark on the Alliance’s Southeastern flank. Along with Norway, it was the only NATO country to share a border with the Soviet Union. And over the last twenty years, it has had to deal with greater conflict and geopolitical instability on its borders, from Iraq to Syria, than any other NATO country.

Furthermore, Turkey has consistently been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of NATO enlargement, including in the Baltics and former Warsaw Pact countries. Turkey even advocated in favor of Ukraine and Georgia’s inclusion in the Alliance at a time when other allies were worried about provoking Russia.

Turkey is no Trojan horse for Russia, as some have argued.

To be sure, Turkey’s relationship with Russia is complex. Its purchase of the Russian S-400 air-defense system in particular set off alarm bells in NATO and cost Turkey its position in the US F-35 fighter jet program. It has also maintained relations with Russia throughout the war in Ukraine and refused to join Western sanctions.

At the same time, it has taken steps to crack down on the transit of Western-sanctioned goods to Russia. Turkey has condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, has provided military support to Ukraine, and refuses to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, Turkey finds itself at odds with Russia in several theaters around the region including the South Caucasus, Syria, and Libya.

Turkey’s concerns

Delaying the Nordic countries’ NATO accession, with only Turkey and Hungary still holding out against admitting Sweden, is to Russia’s benefit. However, Turkey’s stance was and continues to be informed by its own defense and security calculations. That is why now that Finland, in Turkey’s perspective, has fulfilled the terms of its agreement, Turkey gave the green light to its inclusion in the Alliance. This calculation is also the reason why Turkey is not ready to greenlight Sweden’s accession yet.

The trilateral memorandum includes important commitments by Finland and Sweden to make regulatory changes to cooperate with Turkey on counterterrorism and against threats to national security and to enable arms exports to Turkey, among other clauses. Accordingly, the memorandum states that “Finland and Sweden will not provide support to” and will “commit to prevent activities of” a set of groups Turkey identifies as terrorist organizations. The MoU specifically identifies the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its offshoots, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the associated People’s Defense Units (YPG), along with FETÖ, the group associated with cleric Fethullah Gülen. Furthermore, the memorandum states that all three countries “unambiguously condemn all terrorist organizations perpetrating attacks against Turkey” and will “investigate and interdict any financing and recruitment activities” of the groups and individuals identified as terrorist organizations and their extensions by Turkey. Additionally, the memorandum says that Finland and Sweden “will address Turkey’s pending deportation or extradition requests of terror suspects.”

The main issue of contention, which Turkey accused not just Finland and Sweden, but many existing NATO allies of not fully appreciating, involves the PKK, which the United States and European Union (EU) have designated as a terrorist organization.

Turkey has been fighting the PKK for forty years in Turkey and Iraq and has launched three military operations in Northeast Syria against the PYD and YPG, aiming to create a safe zone on its border free of PKK-affiliated elements.

In spite of Turkey’s protestations, the PYD/YPG has been a key partner of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, led by the United States, forming the backbone of the coalition-created Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Despite Turkey’s requests, PYD/YPG is not considered as a terrorist organization by the EU or the United States, although US officials have accepted that the SDF is dominated by the YPG and that the YPG is an offshoot of the PKK. Another group of concern for Turkey is FETÖ, which Turkey has labeled a terrorist organization and accused of plotting a failed coup attempt in 2016. Following the coup attempt, several members of the organization fled to Sweden and received asylum.

Since the beginning of the accession talks, Turkey has signaled that its concerns over pro-PKK activity in Sweden far outweigh its concerns in Finland. Sweden is home to a large and politically active émigré Kurdish community and in segments of that community, PKK membership, fundraising, and propaganda have flourished.

Previously, Sweden openly supported the PYD/YPG, welcoming the head of the PYD Salih Muslim, who was interviewed on state television. The former Swedish minister of foreign affairs welcomed and took a picture with the commander of the YPG’s all-female arm, kept close relations with Syrian Democratic Council—the political wing of the SDF—and was accused by Turkey of financially supporting the PYD/YPG through the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.

Sweden’s steps

Since the signing of the trilateral memorandum, Sweden has taken important steps. It resumed arms exports to Turkey, enacted a new anti-terror law in July 2022, and amended its constitution to allow more stringent terrorism laws. Another comprehensive anti-terror bill is currently under discussion in the Swedish Parliament and is scheduled for a vote on May 3. With the new law, legal liability will extend to cover not only violent terrorist acts, but support for a terrorist organization such as providing housing, logistics, or even food. Notably, it would criminalize publicly soliciting or recruiting for travel abroad with the intention of participating in a terrorist organization, thus helping prevent sympathizers from physically joining the PKK or its regional affiliates. Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström also announced that his country has decided to distance itself from the YPG, which is a big win for Turkey.

Yet it is clear that a big gap persists between what Turkey wants and where Sweden stands at the moment. While Sweden contends that it has addressed its obligations under the memorandum, Turkish officials insist on seeing it implemented in the form of legal action.

The MoU is deliberately vague and open to interpretation. While Sweden and Finland aren’t committing to explicitly accept PYD/YPG and FETÖ as terrorist organizations, courts in both countries will have to deal with cases related to ‘terrorist suspects’ from these groups and to their activities relating to recruitment, propaganda, and financing. The new law in Sweden, if passed, won’t enter into force until June. And even then, the investigation, arrest, and judicial process of a designated terrorist can take a significant amount of time, and a conviction is not guaranteed. 

Another important point to make is about the constitutional right to freedom of expression in Sweden. Pro-PKK public demonstrations in Sweden, where PKK flags and posters of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan are displayed, have been heavily publicized. Additionally, incidents of Quran burnings have happened on numerous occasions, including once this January in front of the Turkish Embassy in Sweden, which provoked anger and reaction in Turkey and other Muslim-majority societies. These acts are allowed because of Sweden’s constitutional right of free expression, a principle that Sweden will not bend on.

Likewise, the deportation or extradition process for individuals identified by Turkey may not be easy. Following the last NATO summit Erdogan said that Sweden promised to extradite seventy-three “terrorists” and “had so far extradited only three or four of them.” Regarding deportation or extradition requests, the memorandum makes reference to the European Convention on Extradition, which gives Sweden the right to refuse the extradition of its nationals but at Turkey’s request would need to “submit the case to its competent authorities in order that proceedings may be taken if they are considered appropriate.”

According to Swedish law, “if the person whose extradition is requested opposes extradition, it falls to the Supreme Court to examine whether extradition can be legally granted under the conditions laid down by law.” While for cases where the Supreme Court agrees to extradite, the government has the final word on the decision, if the Supreme Court refuses the extradition, the government has no power to overrule that judgment.

Many of the cases could involve political refugees or asylum seekers protected by the non-refoulement principle of the Refugee Convention or by subsidiary protection, though exemptions for serious (non-political) crimes are allowed. Based on news reports, among the thirty-three names listed by the Turkish media, Stockholm’s Supreme Court has previously rejected the extradition for nineteen, while seven have been granted citizenship despite the extradition request by Turkey.

All of this underscores why it will take time for Turkey to see concrete positive—or negative—results on many of its requests.

Washington’s worries

When Turkey announced its position on the Nordic countries’ NATO accession last year, it took the allies by surprise. Confidence in Turkey sunk to new lows, and its interests and legitimate security concerns were lost in rhetoric. In the highly emotive environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this was completely understandable.

While allied governments and NATO’s leadership publicly emphasize their understanding for Turkey’s position and the need for dialogue, there is a sense of growing impatience. In Washington, the issue comes up in every conversation on Turkey. It’s commonly expressed that Turkey doesn’t appreciate how important the issue is in Washington. This may be true, but Turkey could easily say that its North American and European allies don’t appreciate its sensitivity when it comes to the PKK and YPG.

A sign of the growing pressure in Washington for action on the Nordic countries’ accession was a bipartisan letter in February from the co-chairs of the US Senate NATO Observer Group, Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Thom Tillis (R-NC), along with twenty-seven other colleagues to US President Joe Biden demanding that Congress not consider the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey until it completes the ratification of Sweden’s and Finland’s accession protocols. The letter came amid reports that the Biden administration, which supports the sale for the sake of US and NATO security interests, would formally ask lawmakers for approval of the deal, which it has since held off from doing.

Possibly in a nod to the growing pressure but also in recognition of support from NATO and its aspirant partners following the devastating earthquakes in Turkey in February, Turkey went on a charm offensive in Washington in March, dispatching presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalın.

Kalın arrived fresh from the latest round of trilateral talks with Finland and Sweden in Brussels and met with ten senators, including Shaheen and Tillis, in addition to National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland.

Turkey’s ratification of Finland’s accession should help ease the concerns of US and European leaders who doubted Turkey’s intentions, but Sweden’s membership can be more challenging and requires compromise. While the condition for Turkey to see progress on the implementation of the memorandum after new laws enter into force in Sweden before giving its green light remains unchanged, the tone has clearly softened.

The timeline for implementation could work in favor of resolution, with the new law—if passed—coming into effect on June 1, soon after what looks to be highly competitive elections in Turkey in May. There will be less pressure against moving forward with Sweden’s accession after the elections, whether or not the current government remains in power. However, sensitivity to issues involving the PKK and YPG are above politics in Turkey.

Outline of a compromise

The addition of Sweden into NATO will strengthen the Alliance. So will addressing Turkey’s security concerns. One should not come at the expense of the other but instead be the basis of compromise, with Sweden recognizing Turkey’s security concerns and Turkey recognizing the genuine contribution Sweden, together with Finland will provide to NATO, especially in terms of strengthening the Alliance’s position in the vulnerable Baltic region.

The recent resumption of dialogue with Sweden after a two-month break following the Quran burning incident in Stockholm is a positive step. These recommendations can help to close the gap of understanding between countries:

• Turkey and Sweden need to come to an understanding about a list of realistic and legally viable extradition/deportation cases to proceed with. Turkey should be satisfied with the launch of the judicial process for extradition in order to move forward with Sweden’s NATO membership, rather than wait for the ultimate resolution of these cases.
• Turkey and Sweden should publicly share every step of progress or lack of progress in Sweden’s implementation of the MoU.
• Until the new anti-terror law enters in force, Sweden should thoroughly investigate incoming asylum applicants to ensure individuals suspected of being members of groups mentioned in the memorandum are denied entry.
• Turkey needs to understand that in Sweden, joining peaceful demonstrations featuring flags and pictures associated with terror organizations is not considered as “promotion of terrorist organizations” or “as an activity that incites violence against Turkey,” per the language of the MoU. Equally, Sweden needs to understand that while the police can’t intervene in the content of the demonstrations, they can prevent terrorist organizations’ rallies or Quran burning demonstrations from taking place in sensitive areas such as in front of the Turkish Embassy, a neighborhood with a significant Turkish population, or near a mosque.  
• While Turkey has the right to advance its national security interests in the context of NATO accession, it is in the interest of Turkey to not delay this process. With Finland now officially a NATO member, the case of Sweden becomes even more pressing considering how integrated and interlinked the two countries’ defense plans are.

If Turkey takes a maximalist approach, it’s unlikely Sweden will ever be able to fulfill Turkey’s criteria, bearing in mind international and EU law. Likewise, if Sweden takes the view that its commitments have already been met, it is unlikely to be accepted by Turkey.

One of the most significant achievements of the MoU is the creation of a Permanent Joint Mechanism between Finland, Sweden, and Turkey at all levels of government, “to enhance cooperation on counterterrorism, organized crime, and other common challenges.” In other words, the process of formally becoming allies is just the beginning of a promising security cooperation that should only deepen.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, now based in Washington after living for seven years in Istanbul. Grady graduated from McGill University in 2014. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

Pınar Dost is the Istanbul-based deputy director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. She is a historian of international relations who wrote her PhD dissertation on the history of US-Turkey relations at Sciences Po Paris in 2010. Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

The post How to close the gap between Turkey and Sweden on NATO enlargement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Full interview

Featured Quotes

Here are a few highlights from the conversation.

On the wave of aid

“The help should be really continuous… This is such a big tragedy.”

On the international community

“It was nice to see also a lot of help was provided [internationally]; not just [by] countries, but on a personal level.”

On building for the future in southeast Turkey

“Every building, every structure has to be built responsibly and according to the codes of that earthquake region.”

On the responsibility to build for resilience

“We cannot prevent [all] damage; but we have to prevent the damage to human life.”

The post How the Turkish private sector is responding to the country’s devastating earthquake appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The bill, passed by a bipartisan 412-2 vote, was introduced by Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia as well as co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on US-Turkey Relations and Turkish Americans.

The bill is important for several reasons.

First, it represents a friendly hand extended in support to Turkey from an institution whose Turkey-related actions usually consist of warning or admonishing the country or its government—and whose tone has reflected strained relations in recent years.

Second, the bill is a reminder of the forgotten circumstances of Syrians in the Syrian opposition-held northwest. Before the earthquakes, over 4.5 million people in northwest Syria—including 2.9 million internally displaced people—already faced precarious situations after more than a decade of war, cold, and disease. The earthquakes made support for them even more urgent.

While rescue teams and assistance from all over the world arrived quickly in Turkey, it took many days for rescue teams and help to access Syria’s northwest—the part of the country most damaged in the earthquake. The aid that was dispatched immediately following the earthquake, including at least two dozen shipments of disaster relief aid, was sent to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus and none reached opposition-controlled areas in northwest Syria in the first week.

Third, against that backdrop, the bill is also a warning to the Assad regime. It accuses the regime of “cynically exploit[ing] the disaster to evade international pressure and accountability, including by preventing the United Nations from providing assistance through multiple border crossings between [Turkey] and Syria.” The bill also calls upon the Biden administration to use diplomatic tools “to open all [Turkey]-Syria border crossings for United Nations assistance”; and calls for an oversight mechanism “to ensure that United States-funded assistance is not diverted for the benefit of the Assad regime.”

Finally, the bill signals that the United States is watching the region’s geopolitical currents closely, at a time when Russia in particular is trying to stitch together an understanding between Turkey and Syria.

A history of politicized aid

The humanitarian response in Syria has been politicized and exploited throughout the war by the Assad regime and its supporters. Already in 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2165—which set the legal framework for the UN to deliver cross-border humanitarian aid from four crossings on Syria’s borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey—highlighted that the body was “deeply disturbed by the continued, arbitrary, and unjustified withholding of consent to relief operations and the persistence of conditions that impede the delivery of humanitarian supplies to destinations within Syria, in particular to besieged and hard-to-reach areas.” Over the years, Russia’s attempts at the UNSC to limit cross-border aid and thus legitimize the Syrian regime’s territorial control have led to a continuous reduction in the number of allowed crossings. Eventually, in July 2020, only the Bab al-Hawa crossing from Turkey was renewed.

Following the earthquake, this sole crossing was not used for three days due to damaged roads and logistical problems, and the UN only started using other crossings following the Assad regime’s approval—even though some observers, as well as members of the UN-appointed commission of inquiry, believe the UN did not need the green light from Damascus. The post-earthquake relief work also revealed the UN’s tangled relations with the regime.

According to UN data, at least 148 cities and towns in northwest Syria have been affected by the earthquakes. The region is divided into territories governed by the regime: the former al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).

While a 2020 ceasefire in Idlib saved many lives and brought relative calm to the region, the stability has been hampered several times mainly because of infighting among SNA factions and HTS’s attempts to expand its area of influence. In many cases, these incidents resulted in Turkey attempting to mediate among groups or in the Turkish army intervening to end the violence and bring the groups all to their assigned areas, as was the case last October. Therefore, Turkey’s intervention was limited to maintaining the status quo.

In the weeks after Assad agreed to open two more crossings to facilitate the delivery of aid, many countries and UN agencies provided truckloads of aid to the region. The UN launched a call for $397 million in aid support for Syria, while US Secretary of State Antony Blinken—during his first official visit to Turkey on February 19—toured the earthquake-hit areas around Hatay Province. He also visited Incirlik Airbase, met US search and rescue teams, and announced an additional $100 million in aid for the recovery, bringing total US assistance in response to the earthquake to $185 million.

Moves on the region’s chessboard

The United States and Turkey have been at odds with each other in Syria as the United States has supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in its fight against the Islamic State in Syria, while also pushing back on Iran and dealing with Assad and Russia.

The SDF is dominated by the People’s Protection Units (YPG): the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is recognized by the United States and the European Union as a terrorist organization and which Turkey has been fighting for almost forty years. That’s why Turkey has launched three operations in northern Syria to create a “safe zone” in the region with the aim of securing its borders and enabling Syrians in Turkey to voluntarily return to Syria.

Turkey has been signaling its intent to launch another incursion into northern Syria since May 2022, and the United States, Russia, and Iran have all publicly declared their objection to such an attempt. Russia instead has been trying to mediate between Turkey and Syria for the normalization of ties between the two countries.

In December 2022, Turkish, Syrian, and Russian defense ministers and intelligence chiefs met in Moscow, the first ministerial-level meeting between Turkey and Syria in over a decade. The United States and the Syrian opposition, including the Syrian Interim Government and HTS, are against a normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime. Following the talks in December, demonstrations took place in various opposition-held cities in the Aleppo and Idlib governorates to protest the Turkish rapprochement with the regime.

During a recent visit by the Iranian foreign minister to Ankara, the Turkish foreign minister announced that the deputy foreign ministers of Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran (who was invited after expressing resentment about not being included) would meet in Moscow. A meeting scheduled for March 15 was then postponed for “technical reasons” following a meeting the day before between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Assad in Moscow on the twelfth anniversary of the anti-regime uprising.

It’s clear that the earthquake has helped Assad politically and financially.

Assad’s say over border crossings, and therefore his control over these territories, has effectively been recognized by the UN. He got a 180-day exemption to Syria sanctions for disaster aid from the United States, even though US sanctions never targeted humanitarian assistance in the first place. And he received international assistance and political support, including in the form of visits by foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan.

However, none of those visits would be as important as Turkey fully normalizing relations with the regime, which would be a strategic gain for Assad and his supporter, Putin.

It is unclear whether Erdoğan is engaging in a political maneuver ahead of upcoming elections this May to save face with an electorate that, while divided over many issues, is seemingly united in their opposition to Syrian refugees staying in Turkey. Normalization with Assad would facilitate the return of Syrians to their country. Turkey is the world’s largest refugee-hosting country and hosts 3.6 million Syrians alone.

While the US bill mourning the lives lost in the earthquakes rightly recognized “[Turkey’s] continuing support to Syrian refugees in [Turkey] and in northwestern Syria,” it is worth highlighting that any deal between Syria, Turkey, and others trying to mediate (including Iran and Russia) seems not only unrealistic in the near future (because of the parties’ conflicting expectations) but also unproductive for Turkey, the future of Syria, the Syrians in the northwest, and the Syrians in Turkey. 

It is clear that both Syrians in the northwest of their country and in Turkey will need continuous humanitarian support in the coming year. The earthquake has brought the forgotten fate of Syrians and of Syria to the forefront of the US agenda in the region. They must not be forgotten again.

Pınar Dost is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

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Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has opted for a delicate balancing act, which has appeared to be a risky but overall successful strategy. With interests that lie in both sides, Ankara has consistently supported Ukraine politically and militarily without alienating Russia economically.

Ukraine has played a crucial role in deterring the Kremlin’s military build-up in the Black Sea, which also poses a threat to Turkey. Thus, by supporting Ukraine, Turkey has been strengthening its own position in the region. At the same time, the Russian presence in Syria can also potentially create problems for Turkey by destabilizing the border areas and causing new refugee flows from Syria. Besides, Russia remains a major source of Turkey’s energy imports, economic benefits, and financial resources. These considerations have largely shaped Turkey’s desire to keep the channels for cooperation with Russia open.   

However, a year after Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the benefits of such a balancing act for Turkey have reached their limits. The country now needs a new regional strategy—a bold, ambitious, and clear-eyed one.

Early leadership

Though occasionally warned by the United States and Europe about the implications of burgeoning trade with an increasingly sanctioned Russia, Turkey has won praise from Ukraine and the West for its firm refusal to recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea and for its insistence on the territorial integrity of Ukraine in its 1991 borders.

Turkey was also the first country to provide Ukraine with combat drones when other partners were still hesitant about their military aid. Ankara’s decision to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits for Russian warships also helped prevent escalation in the Black Sea.  

At the same time, by maintaining close ties with “dear friend” Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a skillful diplomat and seasoned politician, managed to position Turkey as a pivotal mediator in the conflict, highlighting successes of his balancing act. This personal relationship allowed him to bring the Russian leader to the negotiation table, albeit with little practical results for ending the war.

Turkey-brokered diplomatic deals, such as the grain initiative or prisoner swaps—including as recently as January—helped to solve pressing humanitarian issues, though Ankara has been unable to broker a ceasefire or comprehensive peace talks. Above all, Erdoğan’s peace-talking and food diplomacy has strengthened Turkey’s posture in, and far beyond, the region.

This strategy had its obvious advantages for Turkey in the first months of the full-scale invasion, before Russia’s military weakened significantly at the hands of Ukrainian forces, the evidence of mass Russian atrocities in Ukraine started to emerge, and all hope for a peaceful resolution crumbled. The situation has dramatically changed ever since, but Turkey’s regional policy hasn’t.

A need for course correction

Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones had helped Ukraine in the early days of the war. However, with other allies stepping up their military support to Ukraine and rallying around Kyiv in coalitions to send tanks and advocate for sending jets, Turkey’s role has been overshadowed.

According to Oryx, an open-source intelligence research group, Turkey has sent military supplies to Ukraine beyond combat and reconnaisance drones, but Ankara’s desire to keep its military assistance to Ukraine low-profile, due to sensitivities with Russia, has created a distorted image of Turkey’s stance in this war, leading to accusations that Ankara is fence-sitting.

Despite Turkey’s status as the second-largest NATO army and Ankara’s diplomatic ambitions of a global power, it is not Turkey but smaller countries such as Poland and the Baltic states that have been the most vocal in condemning Russian atrocities in Ukraine and have taken the lead in international coalitions to deter Russian aggression in the region.  

Turkey’s economic cooperation with Russia has allowed it to find some short-term solutions, but left a long-lasting negative impact on the public perception of Turkey in Ukraine and the West. According to a recent poll by the New Europe Center, the level of distrust of Erdoğan among Ukrainians has leaped from 19.5 percent in 2021 to 46.6 percent in 2022. The absence of high-profile visits of Turkish leadership to Kyiv or to de-occupied territories of Ukraine during the war has added to this sentiment.

From a purely pragmatic point of view, some economists have warned that deepening links with a declining Russian economy could drag Turkey into an “economic disaster.” Though Russia-Turkey trade doubled between 2021 and 2022, reaching $68.1 billion, Turkey’s largest market remains the European Union (EU) with $196.4 billion in trade in 2022, making Ankara’s relations with the European partners a key priority. 

Dim prospects for a negotiated peace

The prospects of a negotiated peace with Putin’s regime, which Turkey has been long pushing for, are now unlikelier than ever. Besides, Putin has bluntly violated most of his previous commitments to Erdoğan. For example, Russia bombed the Odesa seaport, undermining the grain deal struck in Istanbul just the day before. Ukrainian officials have expressed concerns that Russia has been using commercial ships to carry weapons through the Bosphorus Strait, which experts recognize as a clear violation of the Montreux Convention. The officials also accused Russia of creating an explosion at the Olenivka prison after having rejected Turkey’s offer to evacuate fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal plant in May—some of the fighters were among the dozens of Ukrainian prisoners of war killed in the blast. Moreover, Russia has been blocking the work of Turkey-brokered grain corridors and obstructing navigation in the Black Sea—to no reaction from Ankara.

Turkey has never shied away from playing hard when its interests are at stake or its regional ambitions are challenged. Russia’s occupation of the Black Sea is undermining not only Turkey’s efforts to ease the global food crisis but also the Montreux regime—which grants commercial ships unrestricted access to the Turkish straits.

The grain deal, which allowed some agricultural exports from Ukrainian seaports when no other options were available, was certainly a success in the early months of invasion. However, now it is in a semi-defunct state and has given Moscow a de facto veto over the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, turning the sea into a “Russian lake”—something Erdoğan had warned about long ago. One year into the war, it is time to address the root cause of the problem—which is Russian control of maritime routes—instead of focusing on technicalities of how to keep the deal alive. “If Russia won’t respond to diplomacy, then it is time for NATO to put a meaningful defensive naval presence into the Black Sea to protect merchant traffic going to and from Ukrainian ports,” says Yörük Işık from the Bosphorus Observer. This would not only emphasize Turkey’s role as a key NATO member in the Black Sea but also help to address a bigger problem: maintaining freedom of navigation and easing the food crisis in the Global South.

Time for Turkey to demonstrate regional leadership

Turkey has already benefited from Russia’s major failures in Ukraine. It has started to squeeze Russia out of the South Caucasus and gradually replace it as a security partner of the Turkic republics in Central Asia.

The defeat of Russia and emergence of a strong Ukraine with a well-trained, modern army would help deter Russian presence in the Black Sea without expanding permanent NATO presence. This strategic shift would also tilt the military balance in Ankara’s favor in Syria and the Mediterranean, where Russia has also been Turkey’s strategic rival.

Moscow’s overall weakening grip over the Turkic world, “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,” presents multiple opportunities for Turkey, which significantly exceed the benefits of situational—and highly risky—commercial deals with a declining Russian regime under Western sanctions. Unlike in the early 1990s, Ankara has now shifted the focus of its regional cooperation from broad Pan-Turkic ideas to pragmatic infrastructural and energy projects. Given the EU’s goal to bypass Russia in oil, gas, and transport corridors, Turkey’s regional activism would likely be welcomed by the EU and United States.

As the country continues to need substantial foreign investments and reconstruction aid in the wake of devastating earthquakes, it would be a good time for Turkey to mend ties with the West.

The ability to maintain momentum in a positive bilateral agenda with the United States, which was highlighted during US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to Turkey, will among other things depend on Turkey’s readiness to recognize Russia as the major security threat and to step up efforts to prevent exports of dual-use products that could be used by Russian defense industries. During Blinken’s visit, Turkey’s chief diplomat publicly confirmed Ankara’s intent to cooperate as such.

A year ago, Turkey had the strategic vision to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons when some other countries were limiting their support to humanitarian aid and helmets. Turkey’s early leadership, among other factors, helped prevent Kyiv’s defeat. 

Now, it is time for Turkey to develop a strategic vision for the region after Ukraine’s victory—when, ideally, rather than meeting with Putin, world leaders would watch him face trial for war crimes.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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Defne Arslan: Blinken signals that Turkey is a key NATO ally and regional hub

Rich Outzen: The visit presents an opportunity to re-engage Turkey

Katerina Sokou: The US sees Greece as key to regional stability

Thomas S. Warrick: The US should help Turkey redesign its infrastructure

Blinken signals that Turkey is a key NATO ally and regional hub

In the aftermath of one of the worst natural disasters in the history of Turkey, Blinken’s visit was necessary and important. Since the tragedy, the United States has been engaged at the highest levels and quickly delivered relief aid. It’s worth noting that this trip, Blinken’s first to Turkey in his two years as secretary of state, was pre-planned before the earthquake, but his messages mostly focused on US assistance to a close ally and friend at a time of need.

The devastation facing the country is monumental. The death toll has is still rising and an estimated 85,000 buildings have collapsed or been severely damaged in an area affecting a population close to 18 million, almost equal to one-fifth of Turkey’s population. Blinken’s promise of an additional $100 million in US humanitarian assistance, on the top of the $85 million announced in the immediate aftermath for both Turkey and Syria, is a positive step. In all, $185 million is a total much higher than the amount the United States provided to Turkey after its 1999 earthquake, which struck the Marmara region.

Blinken delivered a clear message that Turkey matters a lot for the United States and NATO alliance despite differences over several issues. His remarks underlined and praised the role Turkey played in the Ukraine war, including brokering the grain deal, implementing the Montreux convention to deter “naval escalation in the Black Sea,” and supplying energy generators and drones to Ukraine that were critical in the fight against Russia. Blinken also called Turkey an important NATO ally on the southern flank playing a critical role for NATO’s security, while also serving as an important energy hub for the energy security of Europe.

The secretary of state also explained why modernization of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jets is in the US interest. He noted that Turkey and the United States still share very close defense cooperation, and F-16 modernization will contribute to NATO’s airpower, adding that it is important for Turkey to stay compatible with NATO’s higher standards. These were all critically important messages by Blinken. Only one additional point that he should keep in mind is that Turkey’s southern boarder is actually NATO’s southern border, and the United States’ current policy there supporting the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) is also an indirect threat to NATO, given their ties to the terrorist-designated Kudistan Workers Party (PKK).

Overall, this was an encouraging and timely trip with the right messages. It is also important to underline that this is an opportunity that needs to be seized by Turkey.

—Defne Arslan is the senior director at the Center for Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and Turkey Programs. Follow her on Twitter @defnesadiklar.

The visit presents an opportunity to re-engage Turkey

Blinken’s travel to Turkey and Greece was planned before the earthquake, but quite naturally focused on a show of solidarity and aid in the aftermath. In addition to Blinken announcing $100 million in new US refugee and humanitarian assistance, he and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu presented a welcome image of shared concern as they conducted an aerial tour of the Hatay region and spoke with US and Turkish military members at Incirlik Air Base. The later visit to Ankara provided a venue to discuss NATO enlargement—which Blinken pointedly said is not a bilateral issue between the United States and Turkey—regional tensions, the war in Ukraine, trade goals, and other items.

As US Assistant Secretary of State Karen Donfried noted to reporters, the neighborly spirit shown by Ankara and Athens over the past two weeks reflects some of the alliance spirit that Washington hopes becomes a norm in the region, rather than recriminations and tensions that have marked Greek-Turkish relations in recent years. The Blinken visit does not suffice to reset US-Turkish or Greek-Turkish relations, but it reflects a moment of possibility prompted by a terrible human tragedy that took more than 46,000 lives. For Washington, it presents an opportunity to re-engage Turkey on a positive agenda of increased trade, enhanced security cooperation, and more effective coordination on Syria—especially on the issue of refugees—after two years in which the Biden administration afforded light and episodic attention to bilateral relations.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

The US sees Greece as key to regional stability

Monday’s warm meeting between Blinken and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis should come as no surprise. In Athens and Washington, it has become commonplace to describe US-Greece relations as the strongest they have ever been. The marked improvement is supported by a strategic dialogue, now on its fourth round, that Blinken led, together with his Greek counterpart. The high-level dialogue has helped advance shared priorities in a range of areas in the bilateral agenda: defense and security, energy and environment, trade and investment, law enforcement and counterterrorism.

And, importantly, regional cooperation. Greece is increasingly seen as a leader that promotes stability, economic development, and regional integration in a geopolitically volatile area. Ahead of the visit, the State Department noted that the United States supports Greece’s role in diversifying Europe’s energy supplies, its diplomatic efforts to promote the European Union ambitions of the Western Balkans, and contribution to dialogue and economic development in the Eastern Mediterranean, through multilateral initiatives such as the “3+1,” made up of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, plus the United States.

In the past year, Greece has also won strategic points for unequivocally supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, with the Alexandroupolis port providing critical logistical support to NATO’s eastern flank. It also responded promptly to the earthquake in Turkey, sending the first international search and rescue team, while the Greek prime minister expressed his dedication, together with the US secretary of state, to support those impacted. Blinken expressed his hopes that the goodwill created between the two neighboring countries will last, helping his balancing act of continuing to build on the strategic momentum with Greece, while successfully reengaging Turkey.

—Katerina Sokou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a Theodore Couloumbis Fellow on Greek-American Relations at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Follow her on Twitter @KaterinaSokou.

The US should help Turkey redesign its infrastructure

Blinken’s visit to Turkey saw the announcement of more than $100 million in urgently needed humanitarian aid, on top of more than $85 million the United States has already provided. There is another way the United States can help, too. Turkish leaders often remind their US counterparts that Turkey lives in a dangerous neighborhood—recent events have proven the danger extends beyond the geopolitical to the geological. Over the millennia of the civilizations that have lived on what is modern Turkey, earthquakes have frequently shaped the history of the land and its hardy peoples. Beyond just the emergency crews needed to try to rescue any survivors and clear blocked roadways, the United States should offer help to Turkey to rebuild its infrastructure to be more resilient against earthquakes.

The United States and Japan have some of the world’s most sophisticated engineers and experts to design buildings, roadways, and public works to be endure seismic shocks. Turkey continues to see aftershocks from February’s earthquakes, and until science is able to predict earthquakes with specificity, the best way to prevent future loss of life is in the design and construction of resilient infrastructure. Helping Turkey rebuild a more resilient infrastructure should be a top priority for both the United States and Turkey going forward.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @TomWarrickAC.

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To learn more about Turkey’s position in the war on the eve of the invasion’s anniversary, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Associate Director Grady Wilson conducted an in-depth interview with Yevgeniya Gaber, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. They discussed recent developments, the future of the conflict, Ukraine’s perspective on Turkey, and Turkey’s regional interests.

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US President Joe Biden swiftly expressed condolences to Turkey and promised aid coordinated through United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Disaster Assistance Response Team. This was, of course, the right thing to do. It is also the smart thing to do. Amid the horrific scenes of devastation emerging from the regions hit by the earthquakes, sensitive and sensible disaster diplomacy can open new pathways for dialogue and create fresh goodwill for the United States in its otherwise troubled relations with Turkey.

Already, there is evidence of countries setting aside their traditional differences and tensions with Turkey to offer help.

Seventy-four countries have sent rescue teams, equipment, and more. More than 1,400 personnel have been deployed from twenty NATO countries, including prospective members Finland and Sweden. The European Union has announced it will hold a donors’ conference to mobilize funds for affected communities in Turkey and Syria next month.

The full list of countries providing support is too long to detail but notable among them are Armenia, with whom Turkey does not even have formal relations; Greece, with whom bilateral relations are markedly troubled; Israel, with whom Turkey recently reconciled after a long rupture in relations; and Sweden, whose accession to NATO is in question after Turkey indicated it is not ready to approve the prospective member.

In a way, the international community’s rush to Turkey’s aid completes a circle. According to the Development Initiatives’ Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, Turkey’s outgoing humanitarian aid totaled $5.5 billion in 2021, second only to the United States in real terms. Comparing this aid as a percentage of gross national income, Turkey came in first at 0.86 percent while the next closest, the United Arab Emirates, came in at 0.21 percent—although the report adds that Turkey’s numbers are not exactly comparable to other countries because when Ankara reports its assistance, it includes funds spent on hosting refugees within Turkey’s borders.

Nevertheless, the aid and shelter Turkey has provided to millions of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and more—making Turkey the world’s largest refugee-hosting country since 2015—should not be overlooked. Also, since the outbreak of COVID-19, Turkey has provided aid in the form of vaccines, medical equipment, cash, and export permits to 160 countries worldwide.

There are many reasons behind Turkey’s outsized humanitarian aid, but one is that Ankara can relate to countries facing natural disasters because Turkey has faced many of its own. The same geography that elevates Turkey in the minds of geopolitical strategists (as well as tourists) also leaves the country tragically vulnerable to a range of natural disasters. In the summer, the hot, dry southern countryside is at risk of wildfires, while in the north, the wet Black Sea coast is prone to flooding. Finally, straddling two continents, Turkey sits on seismic faults that are hotbeds for earthquakes. In short, the Turkish people are no strangers to mother nature’s powers of destruction.

Turkey’s stance is as pragmatic as it is principled. Aid means more than charity. Turkish humanitarian assistance abroad is an extension of its foreign policy, similar to the United States’ through USAID. Turkey founded its development-assistance body, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), while the Soviet Union was crumbling primarily as a means to engage the newly independent Turkic republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Foreign aid has been a cornerstone of Turkey’s expanding engagement with Africa, where its diplomatic missions have increased: In 2002, Turkey had embassies in only twelve African countries, but that number has since grown to forty-four.

And, critically, Turkey has used disaster diplomacy on several notable occasions to establish diplomatic breakthroughs. For example, in 1999, earthquakes struck Turkey (close to Istanbul) and Greece (near Athens) less than a month apart. The shared tragedy ushered in a positive atmosphere and an era of unprecedented calm in bilateral relations only three years after the two sides were on the brink of war in the Imia/Kardak crisis. In the aftermath of Turkey’s tragedy this year, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis held a phone call, their first in almost a year as tensions have been running high in the Aegean. Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias also visited the affected region over the weekend, one of the highest-level foreign officials to visit so far.

It isn’t easy to create positive narratives in bilateral relations between countries with historic animosity (as in the case of Turkey and Greece) or mistrust (as in the case of Turkey and the United States). Tragic as the earthquake is—and words don’t do justice to how bad it is—this is a historic opportunity for the United States and other countries to engage with Turkey and the Turkish people and prove that despite numerous differences, they are allies and partners. In this moment, Turkey’s partners have shown they are ready and willing to help when in need, but more can still be done.

Nothing transcends bilateral differences as much as loss. Many in Turkey (at least those old enough) still remember when then US President Bill Clinton visited Turkey and met with those affected by the 1999 earthquake.

Disaster diplomacy won’t comprehensively solve US-Turkey relations. In fact, it won’t solve any specific issues in their relationship, which are many. However, it will create new room for dialogue. Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy are often closely linked and this is all the more true in an election year. Therefore, the opportunity to demonstrate the United States’ friendship to the Turkish people is significant.

The United States is providing and will continue to provide significant support. Officials across the Biden administration, from the president to the secretaries of state and defense, are engaged. The United States could take another positive step by passing a congressional resolution of condolence. In October 1999, the US Senate passed a resolution expressing sympathy for those killed and injured in that year’s earthquakes in Turkey and Greece. A co-sponsor of that resolution was Biden, then a senator. Last week, a resolution was introduced in the US House of Representatives and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In the words of State Department Spokesperson Ned Price, Turkey “has so often contributed its own humanitarian rescue experts to so many other countries in the past.” Thus, the international community must come together in this moment to support Turkey.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Follow him on Twitter @GradysWilson.

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A 7.8-magnitude earthquake in southeastern Turkey on Monday, followed by a large aftershock, killed thousands and caused widespread devastation in both Turkey and Syria. As locals pick up the pieces and aid groups rush in, how can the international community help? What will the impact be for a region already reeling from a decade-long war and refugee crisis? Our experts on Turkey and the wider region deliver the answers. 

Yevgeniya Gaber: Watch out for political manipulation of the tragedy

Borzou Daragahi: The widespread damage could have been avoided

Rich Outzen: With global help needed to rescue trapped people, regional tensions could ease

Eser Özdil: Aid contributions will help build diplomatic ties

Watch out for political manipulation of the tragedy

The tragedy has mobilized Turkey’s allies to join together in solidarity. More than forty-five countries have already extended their condolences and offered help to Turkey. In Ukraine, where people know well how it feels to wake up to the shouts of those trapped under the rubble of leveled buildings, many have joined a campaign to garner assistance to those affected in the devastating earthquake, while political leadership expressed readiness to send a large group of rescue workers to Turkey to assist in the crisis response. Ukrainians’ hearts and prayers have been with Turkey today.

With so much happening in the region, it is important to make sure that the cost of human lives is not depreciated, people’s deaths do not become mere figures in statistics, and necessary lessons are learned. There is also a risk that the devastating consequences of the earthquake, just months ahead of critical elections, will be used for political manipulations and information operations—both internally and externally. Just hours after the tragedy, Russian Telegram channels and think tanks have published similar messages urging Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to take this opportunity to renew direct talks with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, claiming this would be a good time for a coordinated Turkish-Russian-Syria response. This was followed by a phone conversation between Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. At the same time, there are an increasing number of social media posts sharing conspiracy theories on the possible “man-made” character of the catastrophe, allegedly aimed at weakening Turkey after rising tensions with its Western allies. These malign efforts to influence public perception about the tragedy should be taken seriously.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Previously she was a foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The widespread damage could have been avoided

If just one building collapses in a known earthquake zone, it is a tragedy. If dozens across several major cities collapse, it signals a preventable tragedy. Turkey vowed to implement changes to its building practices following the tragic 1999 Kocaeli province earthquake that left seventeen thousand dead. It instituted new construction rules and implemented mandatory earthquake insurance for all buildings. Architects and urban planners have been warning for years that the rules are not being followed strictly enough. This is an issue that cuts across Turkey’s partisan divide and needs much greater public scrutiny ahead of the May 14 elections.

—Borzou Daragahi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and an Istanbul-based journalist writing for the Independent.

With global help needed to rescue trapped people, regional tensions could ease

These devastating earthquakes have killed at least two thousand people and injured over eight thousand according to Monday’s reporting, with totals likely to rise. Turkey, unfortunately, has experience with severe earthquakes and has sophisticated emergency-response mechanisms. Yet there will be a need for technical assistance from neighbors and allies for time-sensitive tasks such as extricating people trapped under damaged and collapsed buildings. Azerbaijan, Israel, many European countries, and others have offered the rapid deployment of teams for this sort of work. It is worth remembering that millions of Syrian refugees live in southern Turkey, and there is a role for European donors as well as the Turkish government to help Syrians who live alongside Turkish neighbors in the affected area, but also across the border in northern Syria, which has also seen widespread destruction.

Sympathetic and supportive messages from across the region, including Athens, remind us that tragedies can also create a sense of solidarity in times of crisis. There may be some softening of heretofore tense regional relations in the aftermath and during the recovery process. 

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

Aid contributions will help build diplomatic ties

Turkey is once again faced with the devastating effects of an earthquake, this time epicentered on Kahramanmaraş, in the southeastern region of the country. The earthquake also affected highly populated cities including Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Antakya, Adana, and Malatya. It is cold in the region at the moment, and all kinds of humanitarian aid are needed. Although Turkey has extensive experience in dealing with similar natural disasters, any support from other countries will make a difference in the field. History has shown us many times that a common struggle in natural disasters such as earthquakes can make positive contributions to the development of relations between countries. I think that countries that show solidarity with Turkey will also improve their bilateral relations.

—Eser Özdil is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and the founder and managing director of GLOCAL Group Consulting, Investment, and Trade. 

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Indeed, the Kremlin effectively implemented hybrid warfare in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and continues to use similar tactics to influence political outcomes in Moscow’s favor. Hybrid warfare, which includes cyberwar and malign influence, allows states and non-state actors to impact the political stability of adversaries with limited or no use of conventional military forces. This is significant as it gives states, as well as terrorist and criminal organizations, a low-cost method to influence the politics and policies of other states or even capture territory.

An important aspect of hybrid warfare is the ability to attack and disrupt civilian infrastructure—in particular the power grid and fuel distribution systems that form the backbone of a country’s energy sector. One only has to remember the persistent Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, starting with the December 2015 cyberattack using the BlackPower malware. More recently, the Colonial Pipeline ransomware hack in the United States in May 2021 also served as a glaring example of this phenomenon.

The battlefield setbacks in Ukraine notwithstanding, Russia’s cyber-military dominance looms over the wider Black Sea region, particularly among the smaller states of NATO and its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program that have limited resources and vulnerable energy infrastructures. The Russian war in Ukraine has created conditions that demand greater NATO attention to this dynamic, particularly in what is called operational energy—the energy needed to perform military operations.

It is imperative that national security experts continue to analyze this vital field and concentrate on developing NATO’s operational energy capabilities, resilience, and interoperability.

• Capability refers to the requirements NATO must focus on to meet its objectives and operate more effectively and efficiently in an energy-constrained environment. Enhanced capabilities can take the form of strengthening NATO’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as its cyber defense. This includes advanced warning technologies and streamlined strategic communications. This concept aligns closely with the NATO Defense Planning Process, an analytic framework that matches capabilities to mission requirements.
• Resilience is the ability of NATO member states collectively or individually to deter, detect, withstand, and recover from a variety of hybrid tactics launched against their energy infrastructure. Greater resilience would allow NATO members to take a blow to the energy sector and recover in a timely manner. They should consider hardening energy sector assets as much as possible, as well as creating alternate supply chains. Additionally, this should entail a deeper assessment of malign influence in the energy sector.
• Interoperability permits member states to interact seamlessly in different environments, conditions, and platforms. It allows member states to work more efficiently together and operate under an agreed set of NATO standards, with the aim of building familiarity and a common operating picture. This is accomplished through continual interaction between Alliance members and PfP members, notably through joint exercises and NATO/PfP engagement.

Preparing for the future

In October, the NATO Science and Technology Board authorized the formation of Systems Analysis and Studies (SAS)-183, entitled “Energy Security and Building Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.” I serve as chair of this effort. It is a continuation of the predecessor study, SAS-163, “Energy Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare,” which concluded in December. The new study, scheduled to commence this month, will concentrate on cross-cutting analyses highlighting the themes of capability, resilience, and interoperability with a focus on the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and Arctic Sea. Attention will be particularly devoted to the Black Sea, which is at the center of the current military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, and which deserves priority focus.

Another area of concentration in SAS-183 is advanced early warning cyber defense, whereby the study’s cyber team will create a prototype to improve maritime security by protecting critical energy infrastructure from cyberattacks. The study will integrate exercise results into its final analysis. The study’s authors recognize the importance of exercises as cost-effective ways to prepare for and respond to a variety of kinetic and non-kinetic contingencies, and for this reason, we anticipate more reliance on exercise results. For instance, in the previous study, SAS-163, team members contributed to several NATO and PfP member state exercises, and those of us working on SAS-183 anticipate continuing this activity.  

SAS-183 will include numerous subject matter experts representing nearly a dozen NATO members, PfP states, and organizations, indicating the importance with which the Alliance and its partners view the growing challenge. Ultimately, the study will provide enhanced regional analysis, greater insight into cyber early-warning technologies, and a deeper assessment of the continued threat posed to NATO member state security by the threat of hybrid warfare on the energy sector.

As the Kremlin and other NATO foes look to evolve their hybrid warfare practices, especially given the Alliance’s superior capabilities in the traditional military sphere, such forward-looking research is vital. Russia’s shifting tactics in Ukraine, as seen by its deliberate attacks on energy infrastructure, offer a window to the future of warfare. NATO must stay several steps ahead.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability.”

The post How NATO can keep pace with hybrid threats in the Black Sea region and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent remarks on the establishment of a gas hub in Turkey have sparked a big public debate both in Turkey and in Europe about the essence of the proposal. Putin had made a similar statement during the construction of the TurkStream pipeline back in 2018, a second string of the project designed as a transit line to bypass Turkey, in addition to the fact that purchasers with offtake agreements from the first string had no right to re-export the gas. The main parameters of a developed gas hub are liquidity, gas-on-gas competition, and the import and export of gas molecules without any barriers. Since TurkStream did not meet these parameters, the project did not contribute much to Turkey’s goal of becoming a hub.

Even as Turkey balances its relations with the West and Ukraine on the one hand and Russia on the other, it would do well to remember that ultimately, the most important factors that determine the reliability and depth of hubs are liberal market principles and not interventions from politicians.

Natural gas should be freely imported, traded, or exported by dozens of companies. That kind of trading structure can generate a reference price without any government intervention and turn a country into a hub. Henry Hub in Louisiana, National Balance Point (NBP) in the United Kingdom, and Title Transfer Facility (TTF) in the Netherlands are good examples of this.

Turkey’s hub dream

In Turkey the gas hub concept is a rare issue that state institutions and the private sector agree on, at least in principle. Negative impacts of the pandemic on energy markets, followed by skyrocketing gas prices due to Russia’s war in Ukraine as well as a lack of investments in upstream activities, caused the hub concept to lose its former popularity in the country. However, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s warm welcome of Putin’s statements, Energy Minister Fatih Dönmez stated that the proposal should be studied. A few weeks later Dönmez said that a gas hub roadmap would be completed by the end of the year and that an international conference will be held in Turkey early next year, bringing all stakeholders together.

In fact, the idea of a hub is one that has been talked about and studied for a long time by the stakeholders of the Turkish natural gas market. When I was the general secretary of PETFORM, which is one of the largest energy NGOs in Turkey, we carried out in-depth studies on the establishment of a gas hub in Turkey compared to developed Western hubs such as NBP, TTF, and Henry Hub. Between 2013 and 2020, PETFORM prepared detailed proposals and presented those to decisionmakers. Some of these proposals have been realized, and some are waiting to be realized. They can be summarized under four key themes.

1. Infrastructure

Infrastructure investments are the first and the most important issue. In 2013, Turkish daily send-out capacities of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals was 36 million cubic meters (mcm) per day, and its overall gas injection capacity to grid was 185 mcm/day, not allowing for the coverage of peak demand in winter. This changed dramatically after a Turkish Air Force plane downed a Russian fighter jet in November 2015. Back then, Russia was supplying almost 55 percent of Turkey’s gas demand, and Russia’s share was reaching as much as 65 percent during wintertime peaks. But the fighter jet incident led to strained political relations, and thus increased supply security concerns among Turkish decisionmakers, who started investing in diversification and flexibility—and LNG emerged as the fastest and most appropriate solution. Since then, Turkey’s LNG re-gas capacity has reached 131 mcm/day, and soon it will rise to 156 mcm/day after a new floating gas terminal in the Gulf of Saros is commissioned.

With ongoing underground storage investments (Tuz Gölü and Silivri), Turkey’s total withdrawal capacity will increase by around 150 mcm/day in 2023. In the meantime 10 mcm/day will start flowing in from the Sakarya Gas Field in March 2023, a volume that is expected to reach 40 mcm/day in 2025-2026. When we also count pipelines in, Turkey’s gas import capacity will exceed 500 mcm/day soon—unmatched by any other country in Southeastern Europe.

Considering all these investments, as of 2023, Turkey will have enough flexibility to supply gas to Southeastern European countries—even in the coldest days of the winter—where a lack of infrastructure is the main problem. For this, signing interconnection agreements with neighboring countries and opening key infrastructure such as LNG terminals and underground storage to third parties and enabling their use based on liberal market principles may boost cross-border gas trade and empower Turkey’s role as a gas hub.   

2. Regulations

Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority has been proactive in completing the legislative processes that could help the country emerge as a gas hub. These include measures ranging from spot imports to the establishment of continuous gas trading platforms, and from simplifying import licensing processes to the establishment of spot and futures markets. Further steps might be taken to decrease the market share of BOTAS in imports and domestic sales based on the gas market law as well as the implementation of regulations on opening LNG terminals to third parties. These measures will attract more traders to sell their gas as well as consumers to manage their risk via various contracts and financial tools, eventually increasing the depth and liquidity of a Turkish gas hub.  

3. Independence

The fact that BOTAS is not only the largest importer and wholesaler of gas in Turkey, but also is the sole transmission system operator, is problematic. Just like developed hubs, Turkey needs the transmission system operator to be an independent company. Ownership unbundling would be the most appropriate structure, serving all parties under the commercial confidentiality conditions. Thus, the transmission system operator needs to be separated from the existing structure of BOTAS and become independent.

4. Commercial woes

Although the natural gas market law that came into force in 2001 sets clear targets for the liberalization of the market, very few of them have been achieved so far. More than 90 percent of the imports and domestic sales of Turkey are carried out by BOTAS.

Mass subsidization—which is carried out from time to time for various purposes such as supporting exports, lowering electricity prices, or protecting residential consumers—completely disrupts the price formation in the market. The de-facto closure of LNG terminals to third parties, the closure of Greece and Bulgaria interconnections for exports, and BOTAS’s dominant role restrict liquidity.

This in turn reduces transactions and prevents the formation of a reference price—the biggest obstacle to Turkey becoming a hub. Once trade barriers are eliminated, a long-term gas reference price could be formed and Turkey would rapidly move on its way to becoming a hub.

Putin’s proposal

Putin said Russia would consider building another gas pipeline and “creating a gas hub in Turkey for sales to third countries, especially, of course, the European ones, if they are interested in this.” I don’t think that he meant a gas hub similar to TTF, NBP, or Henry Hub where gas-on-gas competition and the free import and export of gas are ensured.

It is highly probable that after the South Stream project—meant to take Russian gas to Bulgaria and Serbia through the Black Sea—was canceled in 2014 due to pressure from the European Commission, the TurkStream Project came to the fore. TurkStream was built as a pipeline that bypassed Turkey and directly sold Gazprom’s gas to European consumers. Turkey would do well to remember that Putin’s motivations might once again lie in revitalizing the legacy of the South Stream project—and not in developing Turkey into a hub.

In other words, while Turkish decisionmakers aim to establish a fully fledged hub, Russians might just be looking for a new route to Europe. Yet even if Russia’s perspective aligned with Turkey’s, challenges tied to accessing the needed material, technology, and financial resources could limit the supply of Russian gas to a Turkish gas hub in the short term.

Still, that pales in comparison to the biggest consideration that Turkish policymakers must keep in mind: They need to remember that liquid and reliable energy hubs are established by the market. The role of politicians here is simply to level the playing field.

Eser Özdil is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. He is the founder of GLOCAL Group Consulting, Investment, and Trade, where he advises energy companies on issues that include public policy, government relations, and commercial diplomacy. Follow him on Twitter @eserozdil.

The post To realize its gas hub dreams, Turkey needs to follow liberal market principles appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a recent interview, Turkish Energy Minister Fatih Dönmez doubled down on Ankara’s ambition, stating that it would “lay out a road map by the end of this year” when it “may hold a conference for suppliers and buyers.”

Turkey’s desire to play a major role in regional energy infrastructure is not only geopolitically driven but also economically and technically feasible. The country’s location at the intersection of multiple hydrocarbon pipelines as well as its gas storage capacity can indeed help it shape the energy landscape for the region. However, for it to suceeed as an energy hub, Russian gas can’t be a key part of the plan.

The core philosophy of any “energy hub” is based on several pillars: diversification of existing routes and suppliers, independence in decisionmaking through an independent institution, market demand and supply that determine prices, and political will of potential partners to get involved in the projects. The Russian proposal ticks none of these boxes.

On the contrary, Putin’s idea of making Turkey a Russian gas hub could increase Ankara’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels, deepen its strategic dependence on Moscow in areas far from energy, and further damage Turkey’s already complex relations with the West.

Cheap gas at a high political cost

Turkey has made progress in reducing its gas purchases from Russia in recent years, due to the increased share of liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, as well as diversifying its energy mix by incorporating more renewables. However, it still remains heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies: Gazprom provided 44.9 percent of Turkish domestic gas demand in 2021. Turkey also imports between 10 percent and a third of its crude oil from Russia each year. Turkish imports of Russian oil have grown significantly since the February invasion of Ukraine, doubling in August. According to a new report by the Ukrainian Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies, Turkey became the leading Russian crude oil importer in October, followed by Italy and Greece.       

Meanwhile, Rosatom is building the Akkuyu nuclear power plant on a build-own-operate model in the Mediterranean province of Mersin. There are reasonable fears that this strategic facility—which is constructed and owned by the Russian state enterprise, will be run by Russian operators in a NATO-member country, and is located close to Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base and the Russian military build-up in Tartus, Syria—may become the next bargaining chip in Moscow’s nuclear blackmail. At the same time, talks on a possible new deal to build a four-reactor plant in Sinop on the Black Sea coast, just across from Ukraine’s Russian-occupied Crimean peninsula are also raising eyebrows.

Experts are warning that this mounting dependence on Russian oil, nuclear technologies, and gas leaves Turkey vulnerable to energy blackmail of the kind Europe has experienced through Russian gas cuts.

In fact, Turkey is familiar with Moscow weaponizing gas. By building TurkStream—a gas pipeline that connects Russia to Turkey, bypassing Ukraine—as a geopolitical rather than an economic project, Gazprom deepened Ankara’s reliance on Moscow and caused tensions in Turkey’s relations with Ukraine.

Earlier this year, Russia declared a ten-day maintenance shutdown of the Blue Stream pipeline, which carries around 60 percent of Turkey’s Russian gas imports, with just a two-day notice. Experts say that occasional maintenance shutdowns of TurkStream, which delivers the rest of the Russian gas to Turkey, as well as Putin’s unjustified allegations about expected terror acts on the TurkStream pipeline, may signal trying times for Ankara ahead of this winter, and parliamentary and presidential elections planned for 2023.

Finally, growing energy collaboration between Turkey and Russia exposes Ankara to more pressure from the EU and United States over increasing concerns that Russia could use this collaboration to circumvent sanctions. Just a week after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Putin discussed the “energy hub” idea and Turkey’s Treasury and Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati reiterated his request for a discount on Russian gas and deferral of payments for its supplies, a US Treasury delegation led by Elizabeth Rosenberg, assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, visited Turkey. According to the US Treasury, the topics covered during the meetings with her counterparts in the Turkish government as well as the business community included “the sanctions and export controls imposed on Russia… energy security, anti-money laundering policy, and countering the financing of terrorism.”

Can Turkey become a Russian gas hub?

There are also technical questions, which make realization of the deal with Russia problematic. Despite the promising rhetoric of both country’s leaders, it is difficult for Turkey to import much more Russian gas.

Firstly, the existing capacity of BlueStream—16 billion cubic meters (bcm)—is used to pump gas to cover Turkey’s own domestic demands. Another gas pipeline connecting Turkey to Russia, TurkStream, has a total capacity of 31.5 bcm. The first line, with a capacity of 15.75 bcm, is designated for supplies to Turkey’s domestic customers, while the second line, with the same capacity, carries Russian gas further to Europe through Bulgaria.

These capacities cannot come close to replacing the 110 bcm of the two Nord Streams. Besides, this route can—even in theory—only feed the small Southern European market of Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary, whereas the major consumers of Russian gas, such as Germany, remain in the north.

Secondly, construction of new pipelines in the Black Sea, currently a war zone, demands physical safety and security, significant investments, advanced deep-water offshore construction technologies, and pipelaying vessels—all potential targets for new EU sanctions. Russia can’t guarantee the security of such projects, and Western companies will be reluctant to provide investments, technology, and insurance. Another big question: How does one bring additional volumes of gas from the deposits to the Russian Black Sea coast?

Thirdly, the EU, which is now undergoing a major decarbonization transition and is disillusioned with Moscow as a credible partner, has little appetite for more Russian gas, whoever the seller might be. Since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine, the EU has reduced Russia’s share of its gas imports to 7.5 percent from 43.5 percent in 2021, according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. During her July visit to Baku where she signed a deal to double gas imports from Azerbaijan, she noted that “the European Union has decided to diversify away from Russia and to turn toward more reliable, trustworthy partners.” There is little likelihood that any new pipeline carrying Russian gas to EU borders will get a green light from Brussels. Instead, it would be doomed to the fate of the South Stream pipeline, which was to transport gas from Russia to several European nations via Bulgaria but had to be canceled following EU objections.

Can Turkey still become an energy hub without Russia?

Turkey can still take on the role of a major energy player in the region and offer Europe alternative fossil fuels to fill the Russian gas gap.

However, for that, Ankara will have to make a political decision to decouple itself from Moscow and turn to alternative suppliers. Turkey could look to enhance capacities of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Southern Gas Corridor to pump in more Azerbaijani and, potentially, Turkmen gas. The current transmission capacity of TANAP is 16 bcm, with 10 bcm allocated for Europe and 6 bcm staying for Turkey’s domestic market. A recent deal signed between the European Commission and Azerbaijan will allow this number to double to 32-33 bcm in the next five years. If Turkmenistan steps in to join the project, further diversification of gas supplies will benefit both Turkey’s own energy security and its relations with Europe, decreasing countries’ dependence on Russia. The upcoming Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan summit in Awaza may bring new positive developments in this direction.

Besides, Turkey could tap into Eastern Mediterranean gas resources by accelerating efforts to reach a deal with Israel; revive the idea of a Trans-Balkan corridor with Ukraine; explore opportunities to bring Kurdish gas from Northern Iraq; and increase cooperation on LNG with the United States, Qatar, and Algeria. These would diversify its energy supplies, bolster Turkey’s position against Russia and help mend ties with the West. Despite the legal, political, and technical challenges—which accompany any such project—these options might be well worth trying.

The exploration of Turkey’s own Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea can potentially supply up to 25 percent of domestic demand after it becomes operational in 2023, with an estimated ten million cubic meters per day. Finally, developing national energy infrastructure—from building new LNG terminals and regasification facilities to further enhancing underground gas storage capacities—will significantly bolster Turkey’s own energy security and its stance vis-à-vis an increasingly unpredictable Russia.   

To achieve these targets, Turkey will need to obtain capital investments from international financial institutions, technical assistance from Western companies, and political support from NATO and the EU. The European sanctions for increased cooperation with Russia are unlikely to work if not complemented with viable and attractive alternatives. The economic and political benefits of being part of the European energy market should be made clear to Turkey by its Western partners. Keeping Ankara engaged within the EU’s regional energy projects and providing investment opportunities for developing its energy infrastructure, based on clear conditionality, could make Russia’s “hub” proposals less attractive. 

On its part, Turkey should wake up to the new realities. Both commercial logic and political wisdom dictate that Europe will no longer be a major market for Russian gas. Exploring phantom opportunities of energy cooperation with Russia at the expense of real risks of getting exposed to US and EU sanctions will not transform Turkey into an energy hub. Quite the opposite, it would spell the end of this dream.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. She was previously a foreign-policy adviser to the prime minister of Ukraine. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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A major new operation has been referenced by Erdogan since at least June of this year, but he has consistently emphasized that the timing will be of his choosing: “suddenly in the middle of the night.” Preparations for the ground operation appear nearly complete, so the clock could strike proverbial midnight within days.

The new escalation was prompted by a deadly November 13 bombing on Istanbul’s iconic and crowded Istiklal street that killed six people. Turkey has carried out arrests and interrogations identifying the bomber and her support network, and has detailed alleged ties to the PKK’s Syrian branch, the so-called People’s Defense Units or YPG. PKK affiliates including the YPG have conducted attacks in Turkey and against Turkish targets in Syria both before and since the beginning of Claw-Sword, so in Ankara’s view the particulars of the bombing are secondary. More important is Erdogan’s commitment to removing the YPG from within thirty kilometers (18.6 miles) of the Turkish border, at least west of the Euphrates River. This likely means an operation against Tel Rifaat and Manbij, areas jointly controlled by the YPG and forces of Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime, from which Turkish forces and their Syrian National Army partners have been attacked.

The prospective operation may be causing heartburn in Washington, but it could present an opportunity for the United States and Turkey to find an elusive end game to the Syria conflict—if they can overcome their mistrust.

Where Claw-Sword fits

Claw-Sword is the latest in a decades-long series of anti-PKK operations in northern Iraq and Syria. Since its launch on November 20, it has consisted mostly of sustained air and artillery strikes, with manned and unmanned (drone) aircraft in the lead. Expectations of a ground operation have prompted urgent outreach from Washington and Moscow to prevent or limit the scope of the ground offensive, but Turkish official statements and past operations leave little doubt that it will occur.

Ankara’s motive in Claw-Sword entails revenge for the November 13 Istiklal attack, but it ultimately focuses on completing a “safe zone” to remove PKK-aligned forces from sensitive border areas, enable refugee returns, and ensure Turkish influence over eventual political arrangements to end the war in Syria. With the YPG out of Manbij and Tel Rifaat, the group’s post-2015 territorial gains in predominantly Arab northwest Syria—which the Turks believe were enabled by the West—will be reversed. The coalition of anti-Erdogan political opposition parties (the “Table of Six”) has signaled support for military action to secure the border areas, while Turkish public opinion has generally backed cross-border operations against the PKK.

Neither the United States nor Russia is positioned to stop a ground operation from beginning, though they will doubtless apply pressure to end it once it does. Both countries’ intelligence chiefs were likely briefed during recent visits to Ankara, and the betting line in Ankara is that ground operations west of the Euphrates will be tacitly tolerated if modest in scope and careful in execution. This might be the last ground operation Ankara views as necessary to declare success in establishing its “safe zone” in northern Syria. Ground operations will almost certainly avoid Kobane, east of the Euphrates, for a number of reasons: Its population is overwhelmingly Kurdish and generally pro-PKK, it would be far more daunting to seize or administer, and it abuts areas where US forces are conducting counter-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) operations in northeast Syria.  

Why now, what after?

A number of considerations beyond the Istiklal attack likely have informed the timing of Claw-Sword. The short list includes:

• The war in Ukraine has bolstered Turkey’s diplomatic leverage, weakened Russia’s military credibility and resources, and made multilateral pressure far less plausible.
• Regional diplomatic rapprochement has reduced the number of neighboring countries inclined to vigorously oppose Turkish anti-PKK operations.
• Escalating Iranian provocations against US forces and interests in Iraq and Syria cast Turkey’s role in those countries in a different light. The United States is increasingly likely to need Turkish cooperation to achieve counterterrorism goals and other regional aims in the coming years, including the protection of Iraq’s Kurdistan region from Iranian subversion.
• Turkish elections are scheduled for June 2023, and Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party has an imperative to fulfill its pledges related to Turkish interests in Syria.

Turkish ground operations may prompt calls in Washington to protect the current status quo in northeast Syria through threats and sanctions, such as invoking provisions of 2019’s Executive Order 13894 to block the assets of Turkish officials and ministries. But such threats have not deterred Turkish operations in the past, though they may hasten the conclusion of specific operations.

Sanctions run the risk of ramping up nationalist and anti-US sentiments in Turkey or imperiling other Western interests related to Ukraine, Iran, and NATO enlargement. It is unlikely that Washington, or other Western capitals, will enter that sort of leverage game over a ground operation that has been signaled, delimited, and meticulously prepared.

The US military remains in Syria explicitly to suppress the remnants of ISIS and implicitly to deter the expansion of malign Iranian activities. Turkish ground operations may prompt the YPG to suspend cooperation against ISIS, but this would likely be temporary as such operations are the sine qua non of US support to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of which the YPG is the primary component. As during the last major Turkish operation in northern Syria—Operation Peace Spring in 2019—Ankara will likely maintain clear limits on the scope of its ground operation and scrupulously avoid areas near US troops in order to firewall Turkey’s war against the PKK in Syria from the campaign by the United States and SDF against ISIS remnants. The latter may be interrupted, but will likely resume after a short delay.

Ankara and Washington have been talking past one another on northern Syria since the United States aligned with the YPG in late 2014, but in the wake of the coming operation, there may be a fleeting opportunity to address a mutually acceptable end game to the Syrian conflict.

Erdogan has contemplated re-establishing relations with Assad, though he is unlikely to make any deals that do not protect the Syrian opposition and Turkish security interests. Washington, for its part, seems to have accepted the proposition that Assad will likely remain in power, though he must be pressured into acceptable treatment of his country and people in post-conflict arrangements.

The two players with the strongest cards to extract concessions from Assad are Turkey and the United States; the obstacle to their collaboration is Turkish concern over the presence of the YPG near its border. A carefully controlled and delimited operation may reduce the Turkish threat perception without fatally wounding either the SDF or the campaign against ISIS.

Neither side benefits from the current chasm on Syria policy, and if the ground operation is unavoidable, the possibility remains that its swift conclusion might lead to more serious attempts at forging a common approach. That may be overly optimistic given the deep mutual mistrust and misaligned priorities, but the alternative—continued division that leads to separate bad deals in the Syrian end game—is worse.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

The post The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After the Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara aid ship going to Gaza in 2010, which resulted in the death of ten Turkish citizens, relations entered a very difficult period and diplomatic relations were severed. Despite the restoration of relations through the mediation of then US President Barack Obama in 2016, the killing of at least sixty Palestinians during protests in the Gaza strip in 2018 led Turkey to withdraw its ambassador from Tel Aviv and expel Israel’s from Ankara.

The normalization process started this year with Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s visit to Turkey in March. Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoğlu and the country’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Dönmez traveled to Israel in May. Israel’s then Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Turkey in June. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met Lapid, by then the prime minister of Israel, in New York in September. That was followed by a visit by Israeli Minister of Economy and Industry Orna Barbivai to Turkey in October. The two countries reappointed their ambassadors and finally, at the end of October, Gantz met both Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and Erdoğan.

“For over a decade, there were no formal security ties,” Gantz said during his trip, adding that this was changing “in a responsible and gradual process that serves Israel’s interests.”

So what are the short-, middle-, and long-term Israeli security interests that may have brought Gantz to Turkey?

The Syria problem

Let’s start with Hamas and Syria. Hamas’ presence and activity in Turkey are traditionally among the main obstacles to close Turkish-Israeli relations. According to news reports, during his meeting with Erdoğan, Gantz “accused Hamas leaders in Turkey of coordinating and funding terror attacks on the West Bank” and asked the Turkish president to expel them. That itself is now new. During the recent rocky years in bilateral ties, Israeli leaders have previously gone as far as to accuse Turkey of supporting Hamas.

What is new is the normalization of relations between Hamas and the Syrian regime, which is interpreted by many as a reaction to Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel. In September, the group announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Syrian government with Iran’s mediation. Nine days before Gantz’s visit to Turkey, a delegation from Hamas paid a visit to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This provoked comments on the possibility that Hamas might join the Iran-led “axis of resistance” against Israel together with Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah terror group, and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. Since Gantz’s visit  there were rumors about the deportation of Hamas leaders from Turkey, but Çavuşoğlu said Tuesday that Turkey had rejected Israel’s request for deportations “because we do not perceive Hamas as a terror group.” We will see in the coming months whether any changes happen in Turkey’s policy regarding Hamas, but if they do, we can expect more defense cooperation between Turkey and Israel.

For Turkey, a resolution between Israelis and Palestinians is of vital importance. According to Akar, Turkey evaluates that enhanced bilateral cooperation and dialogue would also “facilitate the resolution of some issues on which” they have “disagreements, especially on Palestine.” As Gantz said, Israel understands “the need and the support Palestinians would like to get, definitely on the economic and humanitarian issue.”

The impact of the war in Ukarine on the situation in Syria is another major topic of interest for both Israel and Turkey. Throughout the Syrian war, Israel carried out or supported several strikes targeted at Iran’s efforts to strengthen its presence in that country through loyal militias, especially those close to Israel’s northeastern border.

However, Russia’s alleged removal of S-300 missle defense systems from Syria and its overall reduced footprint in the country to concentrate on Ukraine may create space for Iran to increase its influence in Syria.

At the same time, increasing Iranian support to Russia, such as its supply of deadly drones, might push Israel to reconsider its largely neutral stance toward the war in Ukraine. Since the war started, apart from rhetorically standing with Ukraine, the West, and NATO, Israel has refrained from providing military support to Ukraine, fearing damage to its understanding and coordination with Russia in Syria, namely the “so-called deconfliction mechanism” that helps to coordinate Israeli and Russian forces’ operations to prevent overlap and clashes. Now, Israel might be tempted to reconsider that position on providing military support to Ukraine amid increasing public complaints by Ukrainian officials including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself.

Preventing smuggling of weaponry from Iran through Syria to Hezbollah is of prime importance for Israel. Gantz reportedly asked Erdoğan to transmit the message to Iran that Israel “will not tolerate the smuggling of weapons through Syria to its proxies in the region, particularly to the Lebanon-based Hezbollah terrorist group.”

Turkey and Iran, meanwhile, have tensions of their own related to Syria and Iraq—where Ankara and Tehran have taken opposing sides in long-running conflicts and battles for influence as they seek to secure their interests in neighboring nations. Another flashpoint is the recently reported alliance in Iraq between Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a US-designated terrorist organization that Turkey has been fighting for the past forty years.

The emergence of potential difficulties between Russia and Israel as well as the risk of increasing Iranian influence in Syria and Iraq necessitate close security cooperation between Israel and Turkey on Syria.

Caucusus cooperation

The Caucusus is another region that could spark potential middle- to long-term Israeli interest in closer relations with Turkey. With the 2020 peace deal that Azerbaijan and Armenia signed following the war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Armenia committed to the opening of transportation corridors. The proposed Zangezur project would link Baku to Istanbul, connecting Europe to Central Asia and China through Azerbaijan and Turkey. If this happens, Azerbaijan won’t need to pass through Iran to reach out to Nakchivan, a landlocked enclave separated from the rest of the country.

The route runs along Iran’s border with Armenia. There are serious concerns in Iran that Azerbaijan could use the route to block Iran’s only land opening for trade and transit to the northern Caucasus. Given the close political relations and defense cooperation that both Turkey and Israel enjoy with Azerbaijan, Iran’s worries are hardly surprising.

In fact, the recent clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia have been interpreted by some observers as representing Azerbaijan’s efforts to pressure Armenia to open this corridor. The European Union decided to deploy up to forty monitoring experts along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan. On October 17, the Iranian military started a massive drill along its border with Azerbaijan. Meanwhile an Iranian state TV channel recently used a music video to threaten Israel and Azerbaijan with “destruction.”

At the same time, some reports suggest that Azerbaijan helped mediate the Gantz visit to Turkey. Other reports indicate that Azerbaijan might open an embassy in Israel. One can imagine Iran’s alarm at the prospect of being encircled in the north.

This new alignment of interests in the Caucusus could add to the ways in which the Abraham Accords and Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have contributed to balancing Iran in different regions.

Against this backdrop, it is clear that the normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations carries strategic benefits to both nations that are independent of party politics. To be sure, if former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu succeeds in forming a majority government with the far right’s help—as is widely expected after Israel’s elections on November 1—that might force Turkey to dial down on political dialogue and mutual visits.

However, diplomatic contact in the background over security interests between defense and intelligence officials can continue. Erdoğan underlined as much in a TV interview in early November, stating that Turkey is committed to improving relations with Israel irrespective of who leads the next government, so that the nations can work on their “common interests.” After all, across the region, those interests are only growing.

Pinar Dost is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

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But as Russia’s invasion has evolved into a genocidal war against civilians, Ankara’s attempt to cast itself as a neutral power broker between the two sides has left many supporters of Turkey in Ukraine deeply disappointed. Ankara’s growing economic ties with Russian companies, Russia’s illegal trade in looted Ukrainian grain via Turkish ports, and Turkey’s alleged facilitation of sanctions evasion for Russian businesses have all fueled claims that Ankara is more interested in salvaging its relationship with Moscow than standing up for Ukraine.

While for Russia the benefits of such cooperation are obvious, it is difficult to say the same for Turkey. In case of further economic and political engagement with Moscow, Ankara could end up even more dependent on Russia—and therefore further estranged from the West.

Now, six months into the war, Russia—amid military losses in Ukraine—may be pushing its partner to talk Ukraine into a ceasefire. At least that seemed to be the motivation behind Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Lviv last month, where he met his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Since Russia holds the key to Turkey’s own domestic and economic stability less than a year before Turkish presidential elections, there were few doubts that Vladimir Putin’s increasingly isolated regime would seize this opportunity.

Turkey’s leadership has been keen to capitalize on its previous diplomatic success with the grain deal by presenting that agreement as only the first step toward a permanent peace. Some Turkish officials even suggested that the Joint Coordination Center established in Istanbul could function as a confidence-building measure between Ukrainians and Russians. While this may be music to the ears of Turkish voters—73 percent of whom want their government to remain neutral—calls for peace with Putin’s regime evoke the same feelings in Ukrainians as calls for peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorist organization would among Turks. Zelenskyy himself perhaps said it best in Lviv: “They can’t actually want peace if they’re bombing our cities and killing our people.”

This is why Turkey’s efforts to push for peace talks will be nothing but counterproductive, at least until basic preconditions are secured. For any meaningful negotiations, Russia needs to be defeated on the battlefield (and in this regard Turkish Bayraktar drones have done more for peace in Ukraine than Ankara’s shuttle diplomacy between Kyiv and Moscow). Until peace is made possible, there is still plenty of space for Ankara to play a constructive role in the conflict to serve both Ukraine’s and its own interests. Here’s how:

• Step up military assistance to Ukraine. Turkey’s arms supplies remain significant for Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. Turkish drones have played an important role in deterring Russian assault, and the recently delivered “Kirpi” mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles (MRAP) are crucial in maintaining control of terrain. Experts agree that supplying new batches of MRAPs, “Akinci” combat drones, and Turkish multi-launch rocket systems with heavy firepower capabilities (such as the TRG-230 Kaplan and TRG-300 Kasirga) will be of crucial assistance to the Ukrainian military. Additionally, much more could be done to train Ukrainian personnel. After all, Turkish contributions to Kyiv’s military are direct investments into Ankara’s own national and regional security, since Ukraine plays a critical role in deterring not only Russian aggression in the Black Sea but also its power projection to the Mediterranean.
• Secure strict adherence to the Montreux Convention. Turkey has always paid special attention to full compliance with the 1936 convention, which guarantees free movement throughout the Turkish Straits for civilian vessels, and closed the area to Russian warships in the early days of the war to prevent further escalation. But there have been occasional reports of Russia’s violation of the Montreux provisions by using commercial vessels to supply logistics to its military operations in Syria and Ukraine. Most recently, the Turkish ambassador to Ukraine was summoned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to answer for the alleged transportation of S-300 missile systems from Syria to Russia via the Bosphorus Strait by a Russian Defense Ministry-chartered ship. Such cases not only undermine Turkey’s image as a country respecting international law but also create dangerous loopholes that can lead to the erosion of the Montreux regime in the future. Ankara must take all necessary measures to thoroughly inspect cargo on the Russian ships passing through the Straits and put an end to any violations.
• Crack down on sanctions evasion. While Turkey hasn’t joined the Western sanctions regime against Russia, it should not allow itself to turn into a hub for Russian efforts to circumvent the measures, especially in sensitive and dual-purpose goods. The US Treasury has already warned Turkey’s largest business group, TUSIAD, and officials that the country will face secondary sanctions if its concerns are grounded in reality. Having $178.6 billion in trade with the European Union, Ankara’s largest trade partner, and only $35 billion with Russia, it is not a moral obligation but simple economic expedience that demands prioritizing economic ties with the West.
• Help expand Ukrainian exports. While the Black Sea Grain Initiative has helped ease the food crisis, it has not fully restored freedom of navigation—which remains a cornerstone of international law (and of Turkey’s own interests in the region). The next tactical aim should be to gradually expand the scope of the grain deal to include other Ukrainian seaports, such as Mykolayiv and Kherson, and to other Ukrainian exports, such as critical raw materials and metals. At the same time, increasing Ukrainian military capacity to put an end to Russian blockades of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov shall remain a key strategic objective for Ukraine and its allies.
• Cooperate with Ukraine on nuclear safety and security. Russian nuclear blackmailing at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant demands an adequate response. Turkey can play a constructive role in boosting diplomatic efforts to stop Russia’s shelling of the plant and facilitate greater continued access for international monitors. The hands-on experience in safety and security measures will be useful for Turkish specialists once the Russian state nuclear power company Rosatom completes construction of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, Akkuyu.
• Mediate on humanitarian issues. Turkey should take the lead in facilitating exchanges of Ukrainian prisoners of war and the bodies of deceased soldiers. Here, it already has experience: Ankara successfully facilitated the release to Ukraine of Crimean Tatar political prisoners Akhtem Chiygoz and Ilmi Umerov in 2017. Its diplomatic efforts may be highly sought after as the Kremlin prepares its illegitimate tribunals of captured Ukrainian troops from Mariupol.
• Take part in postwar reconstruction. Following up on its participation in the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano, Switzerland, and the conclusion in Lviv of a memorandum of understanding on rebuilding Ukraine’s damaged or destroyed infrastructure, Turkey should seek a greater role in this process. The Ukrainian Presidential Office said it expects the Turkish government and businesses to develop “special recovery projects” and provide technical and consulting services as part of the deal. While its current financial situation may not allow Turkey to become a major donor to Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction on its own, it could pool its resources with those of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, which would benefit all sides. By helping Ukraine restore its critical infrastructure, Turkey can boost its own economy in a more transparent way by relying on construction contracts rather than shady Russian money transfers.
• Help ensure regional energy security. More broadly, Turkey should step up its efforts to diversify gas supplies to domestic and European markets. For its part, Europe should strengthen its cooperation with Turkey to increase Azerbaijani gas supplies via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline and double down on diplomatic efforts to ease tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It should also support Turkey’s bid to reduce reliance on fossil fuels from Russia by facilitating international loans for liquefied natural gas imports and the exploration of Turkey’s own Black Sea gas reserves. The Western policy of using sanctions as “a stick” against Ankara has hardly been an efficient way to decrease Turkish dependence on Russian “carrots.”

If there is any silver lining in the war, it is in Turkey’s opportunity to take a stronger stance on Russia and showcase its strategic autonomy—not by questioning the Western resolve to defeat the aggressor, but by taking a lead in the process. Erdogan’s decisive remarks at the Second Crimea Platform Summit denouncing the Russian annexation of Crimea as “illegal and illegitimate” and advocating for the “return of Crimea to Ukraine” show Turkey’s unwavering support to the full de-occupation of Ukraine. But it must follow up with sound policy.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The post How Turkey can play a more constructive role in Russia’s war on Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This wasn’t always the case. The early post-Cold War era could be seen as a “golden age” of US-Black Sea engagement, when Washington’s support for the newly independent former Soviet states of the region included promoting democratic transition, non-proliferation, demilitarization, and free market reforms. Perhaps the most effective display of its determination during this period was helping Azerbaijan, a major regional oil and gas producer, to become independent of the Russian energy infrastructure by facilitating the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Those provided Europe with non-Russian oil and gas while allowing Azerbaijan and transit nations Georgia and Turkey to benefit.

But those days are long gone. Recently, a retired diplomat from the region privately lamented to me that the United States is now “invisible” in the Black Sea. Similar sentiments have been expressed by other leaders and regional experts. Arguably, Washington’s abandonment began after the September 11 attacks, while others claim the US “pivot to Asia” distracted its attention. Regardless of the blame—which transcends both political parties—greater US-led pushback to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 could have deterred President Vladimir Putin from his most recent Ukrainian adventure.

The result for the Black Sea region is a vacuum that Russia, China, and Iran have been happy to fill. While Russia’s historical dominance is more deeply entrenched, Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to challenge Moscow’s status there. Iran, although the weaker of the three, leverages both overt and covert means to play a greater role at the expense of the United States and broader regional security. All this erodes Washington’s longstanding role as Europe’s primary security guarantor.

Today, however, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents an opportunity for Washington to reengage and redirect its focus in the region. For instance, a post-war Ukraine will need to be rebuilt, while other Eastern European countries shaken by the Russian invasion will spend big on defense and related infrastructure. US leadership should include the application of both soft and hard power; the latter in the form of weapons sales, joint exercises, and military-to-military exchanges, and the former through ever-stronger sanctions against Russia as well as commercial ventures with Black Sea nations. These ventures could include loan guarantees and lines of credit to rebuild, expand, and strengthen infrastructure.

But for any successful re-engagement effort, the United States will need tacit Turkish cooperation that will require Washington to repair relations with Ankara. Having simmered for years, these tensions are complex and rooted in Turkey’s frustration with US support for Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) militants fighting the Islamic State and arms embargoes over the purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense systems. Ankara’s acquisition of the latter led to its expulsion from the F-35 fighter jet program, while US reluctance to sell and upgrade F-16s for Turkey has further inflamed tensions. For its part, Washington is concerned by Turkey’s illiberal drift and its operations in Syria against the YPG.

Central to any US-Turkish rapprochement will be to focus on areas of common interest—notably the central theme of regional stability and both nations’ respective roles in securing it. Washington should make clear that its wider re-engagement in the Black Sea will complement Turkey’s regional aspirations, not be seen as challenging them. The war in Ukraine has reinforced Turkey’s geostrategic importance, and Ankara has re-emerged as a natural counterbalance to Russian power in the region. A cornerstone of this dynamic is Turkey’s continued engagement with NATO, which has benefited from its membership in the Alliance and reinforced its own security. Indeed, a Turkey firmly embedded in NATO, working in cooperation with the United States operating as an honest broker, is vital to long-term regional stability. Ultimately, both parties must recognize that neither side will get exactly what it wants and move forward with what it can secure.

A wider Black Sea region under pressure from Russia, China, and Iran can only lead to greater instability on Europe’s southeastern flank, further jeopardizing Washington’s broader strategic goals. US support to Ukraine has been positive—but was slow in getting started and still falls short of what Kyiv needs. Now that Ukraine has demonstrated the battlefield prowess to stop and push back the Russian forces, military and economic aid should be accelerated and enhanced. US support to Ukraine should be the impetus for even greater regional engagement. Washington must recognize that redirecting attention to the Indo-Pacific cannot be accomplished at the expense of its traditional transatlantic relationship. In the Black Sea, it has not had a long-term regional vision for nearly two decades, but it must finally wake up to the challenge.

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and Chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability”.

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The conflict between Turkey and Israel, which surfaced in 2010, was exceptional in international relations since the two sides have few bilateral disputes: They do not share borders and have no conflicts over issues such as resources or refugees. All disputes between the countries are connected to symbolic issues and policies toward third parties, mainly the Palestinians and Greece and Cyprus. In addition, the dynamics of the Israeli-Turkey conflict were more significantly shaped by developments in each state’s domestic political arena than by their foreign relations.

Accordingly, the conflict itself was largely on the rhetorical level and was never as deep as it appeared. However, the dispute essentially ended military cooperation between the two sides and halted arms sales from Israel to Turkey. Still, the two worked together on anti-terror and other select security issues during this period.

Trade between the two countries did not suffer from the crisis, and actually grew exponentially during it. Turkish companies not only sold goods, but won tenders to build major infrastructure projects in Israel, including power plants. Today, Tel Aviv is tied with Munich and Frankfurt for the top number of daily flights on Turkish Airlines from Istanbul (continuing a trend that held throughout the crisis). During the Netanyahu period, the two countries established a bilateral energy dialogue. Turkey and Israel are also likely to renew this dialogue and discuss Israeli natural-gas exports to Turkey, or via Turkey to Europe. But just as energy was not a factor in the relations between the two during those golden years of cooperation, it was not a major motivating factor in the current renewal of normal relations.

Regional implications

The return of normal diplomatic ties should not be viewed as a threat to the security of Greece and Cyprus, and is actually likely to help lower tensions over the issue. Relations with Greece and Turkey are not zero-sum; in fact, Athens and Ankara maintain regular diplomatic relations. Most countries maintain good relations with both. Thus, there is no need for Israel to forgo full formal ties with Turkey. Better ties between Turkey and Israel is also likely to lower bloc-based behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean and thus contribute to lowering the likelihood of military confrontations between US allies in the region.

For its part, Washington stands to gain by having two of its regional allies end a years-long discord in the strategically important East Mediterranean basin, which is a flashpoint of strategic competition between the United States and Russia. Most of the countries around the East Mediterranean basin are US allies, and thus it is in Washington’s strategic interest when its allies work together. Reduced tensions between Turkey and Israel also mean and that Washington does not need to waste time mitigating a conflict between its allies.

The change in relations between Turkey and Israel is also likely to project onto the situation in Syria—where both seek stability given their borders with that country. Both Israel and Ankara would like to see Iranian military units removed from Syria, or at least a reduced presence.

Iran is clearly unhappy about the open cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Tehran will likely increase its attempts to strike Jewish and Israeli targets in Turkey, as well as other actions aimed to disrupt the normalization process.

In contrast, Azerbaijan’s strategic situation is greatly improved by the reconciliation of its two closest allies. President Ilham Aliyev played a major role in the normalization process. Turkish-Israeli cooperation before and during the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war also contributed to the return of cooperative relations between Ankara and Jerusalem. Azerbaijan’s triumph in the war represented a knockout victory for Western arms technology in the clash between Russian-produced systems used by Armenia, on one hand, and those of NATO member Turkey and US ally Israel, on the other. The success of Turkish and Israeli armaments and their battlefield integration in that war has led to increased commercial interest globally in both defense industries. This is likely to encourage Turkey and Israel to return to mutual developments in that sector.

The road ahead will not be entirely smooth. During elections in Israel (November 2022) and Turkey (June 2023), opposition forces will likely attack Lapid and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan for their respective decisions to restore relations. Meanwhile, flare-ups of conflict in the Gaza Strip or with Hezbollah may spur Erdogan to harshly criticize Israel. For its part, Iran will do anything in its power to disrupt the improving ties between Israel and Turkey.

However, the stakes for security in the region are incredibly high, given the Russian invasion of Ukraine, increasing Iranian-sponsored terrorism directed at Turkey and Israel, as well as potential regional instability due to economic challenges such as rising energy and food shortages. Accordingly, cooperation between Israel and Turkey is more necessary than ever.

Brenda Shaffer is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and a senior advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. She is the author of Energy Politics, which is used as a textbook on the geopolitics of energy in over two hundred universities. Follow her on Twitter @ProfBShaffer.

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The grain deal, which UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres called “a beacon of hope, possibility, and relief,” has raised mixed feelings among experts and officials. Either way, the entire affair has become a major diplomatic victory for Turkey—whose president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, largely made the deal possible through his months-long shuttle diplomacy between the Ukrainian and Russian leaders to eventually bring the two belligerent parties together.

Turkey is also expected to play a key role implementing the agreements. A Joint Coordination Center is to be established in Istanbul, and merchant vessels are to be inspected in the harbors determined by Turkey at the entry to and exit from the Turkish Straits. Had all sides stuck to their commitments, Ankara would have had multiple reasons to celebrate: renewed food supplies for re-export to the Middle East and Africa, increased “soft power” in the region, an improved image in Western capitals, and strengthened domestic support for the current leadership.

But apparently, none of this interested Russia. Less than twenty-four hours after the Istanbul meeting, the Kremlin cast a shadow on the future of the agreements through a missile strike on port facilities in Odesa, drawing instant condemnation from Ukraine. This is not the only malfeasance Moscow has committed: Convoys of Russian vessels with looted Ukrainian grain, widely documented heading to Turkish ports, have never stopped. While Ankara may be powerless to stop Kremlin missiles from raining down on Ukraine, it can put an end to this illicit practice. The good-faith image it helped build throughout the grain negotiations depends on it.

A shadowy scheme

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year, there has been mounting evidence of the burgeoning illegal trade in Ukrainian wheat shipped by Russia from the occupied territories, including Crimea, mainly to Syria and Turkey. The Turkish foreign ministry has denied Ukraine’s claims that this is happening, citing the absence of proof that the grain has Ukrainian origin. Legally, providing such proof is a challenge: The ships use false documents showing Russian cities as the ports of load and go dark by switching off AIS systems. But satellite photos and other detailed information provided to Turkish authorities by the Ukrainian side suggest a lack of political will, not of formal testimony, is halting the investigation process. 

Turkish officials explain their inaction by citing the risk of setting a dangerous precedent if they detain a commercial vessel without sufficient evidence. Another problem lies in the loopholes of the sanctions regime. The package of sanctions announced by the US Treasury in April targeted the Russian state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation; but one of its subsidiaries, the Southern Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Center, as well as its own subsidiary, Crane Marine Contractor, have not been included in the list; and according to the “Equasis” shipping database, ships owned by the latter are often seen in the smuggling supply chains.

At the same time, there might be less obvious reasons that explain Ankara’s reluctance to deal with the issue.

On one hand, there is a general consensus in Turkey that Russia cannot be trusted but needs to be accommodated to avoid shocks to the domestic market. The June inflation rate hit a twenty-four-year high, nearing 80 percent just a year before the presidential election. A recent report from the US Department of Agriculture found that Turkish farmers are facing increasing input costs, including fertilizer and fuel, due to a “weaker Turkish Lira, rising international commodity prices, supply chain issues, and more recently because of the war in Ukraine.” The government may need to restrict agricultural exports—meaning reduced revenue for its budget. The situation with sunflower seeds and other agricultural products is even more worrying, given the skyrocketing retail prices.

On the other hand, there is an urgent need to stabilize international markets in order to mitigate economic and social grievances in the countries affected by the food crisis. Turkey has already hosted more than five million refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, and maintaining grain exports is crucial to avoid new waves of migrants who are fleeing a food crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has come at a high price for the Turkish economy, and Ankara’s efforts to restore the disrupted supply chains in the Black Sea deserve praise. But Russian attempts to halt the process and continue shipments of looted grain from Ukraine may have even higher side costs for Turkey—which cannot afford to let it happen.

First, accepting Russian ships with stolen Ukrainian grain even after the Russian attacks on Ukrainian seaport infrastructure may raise questions about Ankara’s credibility as an unbiased facilitator in negotiations to unblock Ukrainian exports. Turkey’s earlier calls to simultaneously enable Russia to export grain and fertilizers to global markets raised concerns in Ukraine but were largely perceived as a bargaining chip to bring Russians to the table. Now that Russia has been granted “unimpeded global access” to the markets for its own agricultural products, any commercial deals with Russian companies that do not abide by legal procedures and ship Ukrainian wheat and corn are likely to become a major spoiler in the Ankara-brokered grain deal.

Second, such cooperation could more broadly undermine Turkey’s role as a constructive and trustworthy actor in other formats to resolve regional conflicts—such as the Astana Platform in Syria, the political process in Libya, and the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Erdogan’s recent diplomatic initiatives were largely driven by his desire to expand his country’s “soft” political footprint in the region; the current issue might throw this into question in both Western and non-Western capitals.

Third, by dragging Turkish ports into its shady smuggling schemes, Russia is hoping to upend the well-established Turkish-Ukrainian partnership. As recently stated by the Ukrainian ambassador to Turkey, strategic ties between the two countries remain—but public opinion in Ukraine has been increasingly unhappy with Ankara’s occasional cooperation with Moscow. The impacts of Turkey’s grey cooperation with Russia reached the level of official dialogue when the Turkish envoy to Ukraine was summoned to Kyiv’s foreign ministry over Turkey’s refusal to stop the Russian-flagged Zhybek Zholu ship from leaving a Turkish port despite official requests from Kyiv to investigate the case.

Fourth, Turkey risks facing new problems in its relations with the West, just as hopes for renewing military cooperation with NATO started to grow following Ankara’s constructive stance on Sweden and Finland’s membership bid. The fact that the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has included Turkey in its list of eighteen countries that serve to bypass sanctions on Russia and Belarus—putting it in the company of Armenia, China, and Nicaragua—is an alarming signal. 

Fifth, the long-term Russian objective of expanding its ghost fleet traveling from the occupied ports of Ukraine to Turkey effectively legitimizes Crimea’s illegal annexation. Apart from grain, Russia also smuggles corn, sunflower products, and, more recently, steel and metal from Mariupol and Berdyansk—suggesting the scope of illicit trade could expand even further. For its part, Turkey has never recognized the illegal annexation of Crimea, and a 2017 directive by the Turkish Chamber of Shipping orders ports to turn away ships from the occupied peninsula. By accepting them now, Turkish seaport officials not only disregard national regulations but also earn their country the reputation of a troublemaker that violates international law and indirectly legitimizes foreign trade with occupied Crimea.

Lastly, Turkish businesses might suffer direct financial losses. Turkish farmers have been cultivating thousands of hectares by leasing agricultural lands in the southern regions of Ukraine, which are now occupied by Russian forces. It is, thus, highly likely that some of the Russian vessels that are shipping stolen wheat and sunflower products have some “Turkish” crops onboard. Besides, the companies that are now involved in Russian grey-zone activities might face serious problems in making their way back to the Ukrainian market when the war ends and the recently signed free-trade agreement between Ukraine and Turkey enters into its full force.

It remains to be seen whether the mechanisms embedded in the Istanbul grain deal will actually be implemented. But whatever ultimately happens, there is little doubt that Russia will continue shipping supplies of stolen goods to Turkey. There is still an expectation in Ukraine that Ankara will not accept them—if not because of its commitment to the strategic partnership with Kyiv, then at least out of sober pragmatism. Ultimately, the grain drain from occupied Ukrainian territories is squarely in Russia’s interest. Turkey has nothing to win in this game, and too much to lose.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

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In 2018, President Erdogan pointed the finger at the Saudi royal family and accused the Crown Prince—without naming him—for the murder of Saudi dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. Turkey helped the United Nations-led investigation by sharing evidence and opened a trial against plotters, while the US intelligence community accused MBS of directing the murder.

Four years later, first President Erdogan paid a visit to Riyadh in April to meet the Crown Prince and, on June 22, MBS’s visit to Turkey was his first since Khashoggi’s murder, following which diplomatic ties were severed.

The Turkey-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is part of a broader normalization strategy by Turkey with countries in the region, which became possible after the end of the Gulf rift. Turkey first restored relations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2021, then Israel this year, and now Saudi Arabia, while talks aimed at normalizing relations with Egypt are also progressing.

The rapprochement with all these countries is primarily an attempt by Turkey to be included in the regional calculus and end its regional isolation. The country was isolated in the East Mediterranean starting during the Donald Trump era, when Greece, Egypt, Cyprus, and Israel formed a platform to cooperate on the exploitation of gas, for which Saudi Arabia and the UAE also gave their support. Mending ties with Saudi Arabia would also help Turkish relations with other Arab countries, especially with Egypt.

From Turkey’s perspective, there are important economic interests at play, given the problems the Turkish economy, such as high inflation and the depreciation of Turkey’s national currency, the lira. Improving economic relations with Saudi Arabia is expected to contribute to easing the economic pressure on Turkey. Bilateral trade and tourism were severely affected in the last few years and this normalization is expected to bolster both trade and tourism between the two countries. The official end to the unofficial boycott imposed by Saudi Arabia on Turkish goods, which began in 2020; Saudi Arabia resuming flights to Turkey after a two-year pause in May; and the recent end of a ban on travel to Turkey; are promising developments on that front. As a result of this rapprochement, much-needed Saudi investment is expected in Turkey and, in the future, Riyadh may join other Gulf governments in currency swaps with Ankara.

For Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to restore better ties with Turkey is almost certainly perceived by Riyadh as having little downside. It is very likely that Riyadh views the strain in relations as hurting Ankara far more than it damaged Saudi Arabia. For all intents and purposes, the trip probably reflects MBS’s view that Saudi Arabia “won” the long-running standoff with Turkey and that the rapprochement, along with US President Joe Biden’s upcoming visit, will help the Crown Prince restore his global image.

Ultimately, the decision by Ankara, per Saudi request, to transfer the case against those accused of murdering Khashoggi, in April of this year, provided the opening for relations to be restored. Saudi Arabia has been at odds with much of Turkey’s foreign policy for the last decade. Riyadh’s decision in 2013 to support the coup d’etat that installed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, while deposing the Muslim Brotherhood-linked President Mohamed Morsi, caused immediate tensions given Ankara’s support for Morsi. So too did various events later in the decade, including Erdogan’s decision to side with Qatar during the Gulf rift; Turkey’s fluctuating engagement with Iran; and Ankara’s position in support of the Libyan Government of National Accord, in contrast to Riyadh’s support for Libyan army chief Khalifa Haftar.

Riyadh is almost certainly not viewing this rapprochement as the beginning of a new strategic alliance but rather the restoration of a transactional relationship that has the potential to benefit both Ankara and Riyadh. By restoring ties, MBS is providing a path for Ankara to reengage in the region more fully—an opportunity the Crown Prince probably believes he can also take away in the future, if needed. With the Turkish lira having lost over half its value since 2021, inflation over 60 percent, and presidential elections set for next year, MBS probably judges that Erdogan needs him more than he needs Erdogan.

For MBS, his visit to Ankara could enable Turkey to contribute to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to create its own drone revolution in the context of Vision 2030, which puts emphasis on technology for economic growth and diversification. Recently, for instance, two Saudi manufacturers have started co-producing a Turkish-made medium-altitude, long-endurance drone named Vestel Karayel, reflecting the potential for tighter economic and defense ties, despite the myriad of other suppliers upon which the Saudis also rely on.

But, for Saudi Arabia, no benefit of rapprochement is more meaningful to Riyadh than the opportunity to mitigate threats associated with its fundamental security concern: Iran. Riyadh is probably hoping to be able to leverage the dynamics of its newly improved relationship with Ankara to cajole Turkey to be more neutral than it was during the Gulf rift. Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini isolation of Qatar during the rift drove Turkey and Iran closer together, as both supported and sought to serve as alternative economic outlets for Doha. This, despite Turkey and Iran being at odds over critical regional issues—such as in Syria, where Iran has been Bashar al-Assad’s most aggressive supporter—while the Turks have backed the Syrian opposition, evidencing the oft-repeated idiom that Turkey and Iran are ‘occasional allies, enduring rivals’.  

It isn’t a coincidence that this rapprochement is happening at a time when Turkey-Iran tensions are growing both in Iraq and Syria. Turkey’s role in different regional conflicts over the last decade—in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine—demonstrates the counterbalance that Turkey, along with other regional countries, can provide against Iranian influence.

So far, Riyadh’s goals may be coming to fruition. In recent months, pro-Iran news and media outlets warned against rapprochement between Turkey-Israel and Turkey-Saudi Arabia, to no avail. Then, in June, Israeli tourists visiting Turkey were targeted by Iranian-sponsored terrorists, resulting in close cooperation between the Turkish-Israeli governments to prevent any attack. Combined with Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement now, Tehran is probably right to be concerned that Ankara will choose a path of neutrality in the growing hostilities between Iran and most of the region in the short term. It’s an open question as to whether Turkish-Saudi rapprochement can last in the long term, but, if it does, that’s likely to be bad news for Iran and good news for the rest of the region.

Pinar Dost is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Program. Follow her on Twitter @pdosting.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and the former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East.

The post Time heals all wounds. But will that work with Saudi Arabia and Turkey? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration.

Jump to an expert reaction

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan: A victory for NATO unity and cohesion

Ian Brzezinski: Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia

Rich Outzen: The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore

A victory for NATO unity and cohesion

The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family.

The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance.

It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus.

It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members.

The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests.

In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade.

The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies.

The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term.

—Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is the president of Ankara Policy Center and previously served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO.

Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia

At their summit in Madrid, NATO leaders decided to “invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO, and agreed to sign the accession protocols.” This was an important breakthrough. Until now, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had held up the protocols on the grounds that the two Nordic nations had embargoed his nation from defense sales and refused to extradite alleged Kurdish terrorists.

Consensus was facilitated by a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Erdogan—a bilateral long sought by the Turkish leader—and memorialized via a trilateral Turkey-Sweden-Finland memorandum in which the latter two agreed to lift the embargoes, condemn the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, “address” Turkey’s pending extradition requests, and support Turkey’s involvement in European Union defense initiatives.

The breakthrough underscored the influence and leadership of the United States in NATO. There is no way Erdogan would have lifted his veto solely due to European pressure.  It also reflects Erdogan’s recognition that NATO brings Turkey far more geopolitical value than Russia, which would savor seeing this Nordic bid for NATO membership fail.  

Consensus on Finland and Sweden’s applications also demonstrated the Alliance’s unity in the face of Russia’s aggression and the difficulty Moscow still has when it comes to fully peeling Erdogan away from the transatlantic community. Once again, Putin’s strongest relationship in the Black Sea region has proven to be far more transactional than strategic.

With that said, Turkey, like all the other NATO allies, still has to ratify these accession protocols. There remains ample opportunity for Erdogan to introduce additional negotiations with the rest of NATO. I am optimistic that Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, but it is still too early to say this round of NATO enlargement is a done deal.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore

The summit was a great success for Ankara for three distinct reasons. The first is the content of the trilateral memorandum signed with Sweden and Finland: No arms embargo on Turkey, an affirmed commitment to address Turkish security concerns, no aid to the PKK or (significantly) the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Gulen movement mentioned as a terror concern, collaboration on the defense industry, working groups to follow—it’s hard to see what they missed. Of course, these are statements of principle, and execution or a final commitment will play out over time. But that is as true for Ankara approving accession as it is for the specified cooperation. 

The second reason is the ringing endorsement from the White House not only for the trilateral memorandum, but for the strengthening of Turkish air power and specifically a commitment to press Congress to approve F-16 fighter jet sales and upgrades. Notably, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already weighed in with a strong endorsement of the deal. The in-person meeting of presidents Biden and Erdogan was notable, too.

The third reason is more subtle: the inclusion in the new, slimmed-down Strategic Concept of language on countering terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.” This language, and the prominence given both terror concerns and the Russian military threat, address Turkish concerns and highlight the value Turkey adds to the Alliance. 

—Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of US government service both in uniform and as a civilian.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Ankara wants Helsinki and Stockholm to stop harboring and supporting individuals affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which it considers to be a terrorist organization (and is recognized as such by both the United States and the European Union). It also demands an end to the arms embargoes imposed by these countries after Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria in 2019. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has made it clear that nothing short of concrete steps will be enough to reverse Turkey’s stance. 

Turkey’s concerns are serious and, as stated by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, they are “legitimate.” Yet Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the belated manner in which Ankara has publicly raised its concerns have muddled that important reality, tainting Turkey and its role in the Alliance. 

Frustrations with Ankara are leading to all types of reactions, ranging from scathing criticism of its policies to nonsensical suggestions like kicking Turkey out of NATO. A reciprocal, equally loaded debate is taking place in Turkey, where grudges against allies deemed to be insensitive to the country’s security concerns have been aggravated. Some influential political actors have even voiced similarly misguided suggestions like leaving NATO.

The noise emerging from this mutual sense of disenchantment is considerable and could drown out sober thinking about the true value of Turkey’s presence in NATO. The reality is simple: Both Turkey and NATO are stronger together. Irritants that have weighed down this relationship must be addressed sooner than later.

Going both ways 

With seventy years under its belt, Turkey is among NATO’s older members. It boasts a strong legacy, having been a bulwark against communism during the Cold War and a frontline player in many regional crises that erupted later, including in the South Caucasus, Balkans, Iraq, and, most recently, Syria. In contrast to most other Alliance members, this incessant state of conflict around its borders has denied Turkey any peace dividend. 

Turkey’s formidable military capacity and growing expeditionary capabilities, together with its expanding defense industry (particularly in drone technologies) are all critical enablers for NATO. Even as priorities change and global attention shifts to the east, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has proven that building sustainable security in the Euro-Atlantic area is unfinished business. Much to the delight of Turkish officials, this has corroborated Ankara’s continuing geopolitical relevance—something it is betting on, maybe excessively so, in making its demands of Finland and Sweden. 

But Turkey has also benefitted immensely from its membership in NATO, a reality that is often lost on (or conveniently disregarded) by ideologically driven Turkish critics of the Alliance. The country’s influence as a regional actor, both during and after the Cold War, has always been augmented by its NATO identity. Meanwhile, being embedded in the Alliance’s security network has made Turkey safer by bolstering its deterrence and defense, thereby contributing to its sense of security. 

The strategic value of being a member of the world’s strongest military alliance cannot be overstated, and anyone who has doubts need not look any further than Ukraine. Finland and Sweden get it, which is why they have taken the historic decision of trashing age-old policies of non-alignment in favor of becoming NATO members. 

Restoring the balance

But serious thorns remain in Turkey’s relations with certain allies, and the estrangement risks undermining NATO’s resilience at a critical juncture.

For one, Turkey is deeply irritated that the United States and others are partnering with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the PKK, in the fight against the Islamic State. It is also frustrated at the imposition of arms embargoes—or covert restrictions on arms sales—by its allies over issues like Ankara’s purchase of Russian-made S-400 air-defense systems, its Syria policy, and its support for Azerbaijan in the 2020 war against Armenia. These differences have led to a mutual erosion of trust between Turkey and its allies, sometimes making consensus-building on critical matters difficult.

The Syria issue has, over time, become the most harmful one, pushing Turkey to the extreme on a matter it considers to be of existential nature: fighting terrorism. The first public manifestation of this deepening discord came before NATO leaders met in London in 2019—where Turkey held out until the last minute before begrudgingly endorsing Poland’s and the Baltic states’ defense plans. Ankara was reacting to a hold that had previously been placed on its own defense plans at the behest of the United States, rooted in disagreement about how to refer to the YPG. 

Turkey’s position in its demands to Finland and Sweden is similar: In Ankara’s view, it is about holding the enemies of an ally accountable. The restrictions on arms sales are of secondary importance. What’s at stake for Turkey is bigger than the immediate spat over Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO; it is a deep-seated problem to which Ankara has long sought to draw its allies’ attention. Any potential agreement reached with Finland and Sweden won’t turn the tide on these issues, but it could be a helpful point of reference for the future.

For instance, a written recognition by Helsinki and Stockholm of Turkey’s legitimate security concerns in the fight against terrorism, and their commitment as prospective allies to act in full solidarity with Ankara—including against challenges emanating from Syria—might be a template the Turkish government finds politically meaningful. It is through incremental, mutual steps like this that confidence between Turkey and its allies can be restored. Perhaps Finland and Sweden can help pave the way.

Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow within the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former director general for international-security affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Follow him on Twitter: @iacoskun.

The post Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the same time, the war has given Turkish leadership a chance to turn the challenges of this shaky equilibrium into an opportunity by positioning Ankara as a potential mediator between Moscow and Kyiv.

While brokering a quick peace or even a ceasefire in this war is highly unlikely in the short term, Turkey nonetheless had a unique opportunity to mend its shattered relations with the West.

However, nearly four months into the war, hopes for such a rapprochement are starting to fade, as Turkey’s balancing act gives way to a tilt toward Moscow. If Turkey wants to use the crisis to build bridges with the West, its time is running out.

Promising start

Prior to Russia’s invasion, Turkey and Ukraine had begun to develop a defense industry partnership that served as a security boost for both nations. It also drew praise for anchoring Turkey in the West, seemingly at the cost of deeper military ties between Ankara and Moscow.

Turkey has been firm in its political support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and has consistently refused to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. Over the past few months, it has dismissed Russian criticism to deliver “Bayraktar” drones to Ukraine. In the early stages of the war, it closed off the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to Russian ships, further raising hopes that it would align with the rest of NATO in Ukraine’s defense.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s active diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution of the conflict have also garnered public praise from its NATO allies—something Turkish leadership highly appreciated after years of frosty relations with the West and with national elections looming in 2023. Senior American diplomats have made several visits to Turkey since the April launch of a new US-Turkey Strategic Mechanism aimed at normalizing bilateral relations. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has traveled to the United States to meet Secretary of State Antony Blinken in the first bilateral meeting of cabinet officials since President Joe Biden took office. 

For the first time in a while, Turkey was not only acting in line with transatlantic allies but also taking a lead in the region in a way that has bolstered its importance as a key NATO member. US officials have gone as far as to suggest that Turkey transfer its S-400 missile-defense systems to Ukraine in a bid to finally solve the problem of Russian air defense systems stationed in a NATO member state and the consequent Western sanctions imposed on Ankara.

Turkey has bluntly rejected that proposal.

Instead, it has slowly allowed domestic problems, regional geopolitics, and pragmatism to dictate its approach to the war. As a result, Turkish leadership once again appears eager to continue business as usual with an increasingly isolated Russia.

Shifting winds

Though only obliged to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits for the naval ships of states at war under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, Ankara has denied access to non-littoral NATO states as well. Turkey’s fears of losing out to the West in its ambitions for a kind of regional ownership of the Black Sea prevailed over the security threats posed by Russia.

Turkey’s desire to limit the presence of NATO vessels in the Black Sea, which might lead to further escalation with Russia, is understandable—even if not in line with the Alliance’s objectives. It is harder to justify the statements of Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar wondering whether mines discovered in the Black Sea had been laid there deliberately to create an excuse for NATO minesweepers to enter those waters.

Turkey is also blocking the quick addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO, trying to use the situation to solve its own problems and voice its own security concerns. It is highly unlikely that Turkish leadership will block the membership of the two Nordic countries in the long term. Nevertheless, its current diplomatic bargaining has revealed major differences in threat perceptions as seen from Ankara and other capitals. While for most of the European states, the major threat on NATO’s eastern borders is a revisionist Russia, for Turkey it is Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) fighters operating in Syria and allegedly finding a safe haven in Finland and Sweden.

Obviously, skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war, polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks.

Populist rhetoric, burgeoning ahead of next year’s elections, as well as massive anti-Western propaganda on Turkish media mostly featuring retired generals, nationalist pundits, and (pro-)Russian experts with a strong Eurasianist agenda, do not help either.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s economic and strategic agendas also depend on close coordination with Moscow. Russia supplies almost half of Turkish domestic gas demand, provides technology for the country’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, and serves as the source of more than five million tourists annually. The Kremlin’s support is also vital for Turkey to maintain its presence in the South Caucasus and Middle East.

The recent meeting of Çavuşoğlu with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov in Ankara clearly showed that Turkey is keen to stick to mechanisms for cooperation with Russia, like the Astana Platform in Syria or the 3+3 format in the South Caucuses (which also involves Iran, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). Instead of using this crisis as a chance to decrease its strategic dependence on Russia, Turkey seems eager to bind itself even more to Moscow within new formats.

Money matters

Ukraine has so far largely respected Turkey’s sensitivities and not pushed too hard on sanctions, instead focusing on arms supplies and Ankara’s mediator role. However, that dynamic is coming under stress with Russian oligarchs using Turkey as a safe haven to bypass European Union restrictions. 

According to Lavrov’s recent statements, Russia-Turkey bilateral trade doubled in the first quarter of 2022, and there are now ongoing talks on expanding the use of Russia’s MIR payments system in Turkey. In March, Erdoğan suggested to Putin that their countries switch to national currencies or gold in commercial deals instead of the dollar or euro. Izzet Ekmekcibashi, the head of the Turkish-Russian Business Council (DEIK), said that more than one thousand new Russian companies opened in Turkey in March alone. Most recently, a well-connected Turkish journalist reported on a Russian-Turkish agreement to move the European headquarters of forty-three leading Russian companies including Gazprom to Turkey.  

Turkish-Russian cooperation in tourism has also quickly developed. Turkish media outlets have reported that Turkish carriers are operating 438 flights per week to Russia this summer at a time when sanctions have made it difficult for Moscow to arrange flights. According to the pro-government Sabah newspaper, Turkish Airlines has signed a deal to bring 1.5 million Russian tourists over in 2022. The newspaper’s report suggests that Ankara also plans to issue loans under state guarantees to support Turkish travel companies working with Russian tourists and back a new airline with the specific mandate of transporting Russian tourists to Turkey.

Ankara, which earlier called on Moscow to end its blockade of Ukrainian ports so grain exports could restart, is now taking a more pro-Russia position, advocating for the international community to help unblock not only Ukraine’s but also Russia’s trade in grain and fertilizers through safe logistics, ship insurance, and a return of Russian banks to the SWIFT system. During Lavrov’s recent visit to Turkey, Çavuşoğlu said that Turkey considered Moscow’s demands “reasonable” and “feasible” and backed easing Western sanctions against Russia.

There is also ample evidence of Ankara’s involvement in the illegal shipment and trade of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russian forces to the Middle East via the Turkish ports of Samsun, Derince, Bandırma, and Iskenderun. So far, despite strong evidence of Russian crimes and official appeals from Ukraine, Turkish authorities have remained silent on these cases.   

These moves by Turkey don’t just undermine its credibility as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia but also raise questions about Ankara’s geopolitical choices in a broader regional and transatlantic framework. As it leans toward Russia in a bid for stability at home, Turkey risks finding itself estranged from the West and aligned with a pariah state on the international arena. The Ukrainian case will become a major test for Turkey. Whether Ankara prefers to use it to bridge the gaps with the West or to burn the bridges remains to be seen.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at the Center in Modern Turkish Studies, Carleton University. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The post Turkey’s wartime bridge to the West is collapsing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet food isn’t the only item on the menu during the Lavrov-Çavuşoğlu talks. The Russian foreign minister will arrive with a sizeable military delegation in tow, and the countries are likely to discuss Turkey’s stated intent to carry out a new operation against forces linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Syria. Lavrov recently indicated understanding for Turkish security concerns along the Syrian border, attributing them to Kurdish separatism underwritten by the United States—interpreted by analysts in Ankara as tacit approval of a limited Turkish operation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has scoped the operation as focused on the forces of the PKK-aligned People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia, which hold two militarily significant towns west of the Euphrates, Tel Rifaat and Manbij. 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan have reportedly cautioned their Turkish counterparts against any such military action, but Erdogan and his minister of defense, Hulusi Akar, have publicly committed to the operation. Since Russia and Iran are engaged in a long-term competition for military and commercial primacy in post-war Syria, Turkish analysts believe Moscow would prefer Ankara’s forces in northern Syria rather than Iranian soldiers, who in some cases have reportedly replaced Russian troops in that country as they’ve been shifted to Ukraine. The Russians see Turkey as open to an understanding with the Assad regime—Moscow’s ally—in the future, as long as Ankara retains the ability to strike PKK forces per the 1998 Adana Agreement. 

The Russians likely see multiple benefits from Turkish military pressure against the YPG: A weakened militia undermines the basis for a long-term US military presence in Syria and hastens the group’s subordination to the Assad regime, all while preventing Iran-backed forces from consolidating control in the north. 

Why now? 

To understand the rationale and timing of the planned Turkish military operations in northern Syria, it’s important to acknowledge some complex and inconvenient realities—including the fact that the United States and the Assad regime effectively share allies. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), US partners in that country, are led by the YPG, whose leadership in turn is dominated by the PKK. The latter has never renounced its war against the Turkish state, which has included car bombings and other terrorist attacks in Turkey and Syria. The YPG, which Erdogan wants to target, declared its separation from the PKK in 2003 but retains its methods and ideology, as well as command relationships. With deep roots in Syria, the PKK is involved in a long-term tacit alliance with the Assad regime against Turkey, the Syrian opposition, and non-PKK Kurds. 

Against this backdrop, Turkish action now to consolidate its 19-mile deep “safe zone” along the Syrian border would strengthen Erdogan’s negotiating position for eventual peace agreements to end the Syrian civil war. It would also give him leverage to protect his Syrian allies, create a stable area for refugee returns, and deny Assad or the PKK access to launching pads for renewed attacks into Turkey when the United States ultimately departs. Each of the previous Turkish military operations in Syria—Euphrates Shield (2016), Olive Branch (2018), Peace Spring (2019), and Spring Shield (2020)—was aimed at establishing and protecting this zone. Attempts to explain the operations in terms of Turkish election cycles, broad anti-Kurdish sentiment, or Erdogan’s supposed pathologies ignore this central and consistently pronounced logic. 

From Turkey’s perspective, a confluence of factors favors a new, though limited, operation. The first is Moscow’s military troubles in Ukraine, which have greatly diminished Russia’s ability to thwart Turkish operations in Syria. The second is Ankara’s growing military capability vis-à-vis other regional actors, including the PKK, as evidenced in a series of successful drone-enabled campaigns in Libya, Syria, the South Caucasus, and now Ukraine. The third is that Washington has too much on its plate to effectively deter or punish potential Turkish action (and has little leverage to do so). 

A fourth and final factor is enhanced Turkish leverage related to the war in Ukraine, due to its effective support for Kyiv, its role as a mediator, and its sway over NATO accession for Sweden and Finland. 

US response

Whether or not Lavrov and his team give explicit approval for a new Turkish operation, they are unlikely to seek or achieve a stand-down. Erdogan’s record of following up on threats in Syria has been solid since 2016. For its part, the United States faces the challenge of protecting its own interests in Syria, where it still has nearly one thousand troops in the country’s northeast. So what must it do?

Bluster and threats offer dim prospects. Despite some calls to suspend or expel Turkey from NATO, there is no mechanism to do so, and the result would be a badly weakened Alliance. Economic sanctions did not deter previous operations (Peace Spring), and an arms embargo is more or less already in place. There is no US military option to stop an operation that Erdogan approves. 

There is a possibility—and even a precedent—for the United States to delimit any operation by conceding limited Turkish gains while insisting on clear limits and conditions. Such an approach, coupled with very senior-level American engagement (including a visit by the vice president, secretary of state, and national security advisor) obtained a halt to Peace Spring in November 2019 in exchange for US recognition of Turkish and Syrian opposition control in a part of the claimed safe zone. That lowered the risk to US forces and preserved cooperation with YPG forces against ISIS outside the Turkish zone. Repeating that approach might be the best bet for the United States in 2022. 

US-Turkish relations regarding Syria remain a story of managing divergence and tensions, not forging a common path—which is rendered impossible by Washington’s partnership with the YPG. In some sense, the Russians are in the same boat, and Lavrov’s visit provides Moscow a vehicle through which to seek the least disruptive outcome to Russian interests from an operation Ankara is all but certain to launch. The United States (and the West) should similarly engage at the most senior levels not just to “warn” or “caution” Turkey, but to seek mutually acceptable conditions or limits on the operation. The hands-off approach hasn’t worked in past, and is unlikely to do so now. 

Col. Rich Outzen (ret.) is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. He is a PhD candidate at George Mason University and writes frequently on military affairs, policy, and the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

The post With Lavrov in Turkey, a different war may dominate talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the start of the war, NATO has positioned additional forces in the region, notably in Romania and Bulgaria, to thwart Russian aggression. While these reinforcements have enhanced Alliance capabilities and sent strong messages to friend and foe alike, it is unclear whether the energy systems of these host nations can accommodate an even greater influx of personnel and equipment. Local grids support critical infrastructure upon which the Alliance depends for everyday operations. Furthermore, what happens if these power sources were to come under attack? To address the Black Sea region’s energy security vulnerabilities, NATO must prepare a coordinated response at the political and joint military operational levels. The Alliance’s focus on its southeastern flank at the moment presents an opportune time to look for answers.

This isn’t just about the energy security of NATO members along the Black Sea. Europe’s NATO members are systemically dependent on Russian energy: Roughly 40 percent of all hydrocarbons they use are imported from Russia. Relying on a hostile source of energy has clear national security and military operational ramifications. A recent and clear example of energy coercion is Russia’s April 27 decision to stop gas shipments to Poland and Bulgaria for failing to pay in rubles—a wartime demand designed to skirt sanctions and split European Union solidarity against the Kremlin. Still, Russian energy exports to the rest of Europe continue, generating revenue to support the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. Ensuring alternative, affordable energy supplies to NATO’s European member states is an impossibility without considering the Black Sea region’s unique geopolitical and geographic attributes.

In addition to seeking out non-Russian fossil fuels abroad, regional member states are expanding domestic production of hydrocarbons. Romania and Turkey are developing offshore Black Sea reserves, yet are encountering harsh conditions there. Romania is particularly vulnerable to Russian coercion and is seeking Western partners to reconstitute its land-based and offshore reserves. For instance, Romania’s older wells need advanced technologies to keep them in production. Turkey is an example of a successful energy diversification effort; Ankara has expanded domestic production of fossil fuels in the Black Sea but is also aggressively enhancing its energy infrastructure to include growing its nuclear power generation. Other regional solutions should include unconventional extraction, such as hydraulic fracturing; nuclear power, including from small modular reactors; renewables; and hydro power for a reasonable blend of sources.

At the same time, regional states must be willing to expand energy infrastructure and improve the resilience of the critical pipeline network, most of which supplies both civilian and military customers. For example, the NATO Pipeline System, which has existed since the early Cold War days and delivers petroleum products, should be expanded to support forward-deployed assets. For NATO’s Black Sea security posture, the Northern Italian Pipeline Systems and Turkish Pipeline System need to be modernized with more, hardened storage facilities. Finally, alternate routes and transportation modes, including by road, rail, and barge must also be devised and undergo proof of concept testing. It should be noted that the Three Seas Initiative has proven to be an important multinational venue, outside of NATO, with which to address broader energy security issues on Europe’s eastern tier. 

NATO’s military options to source and distribute operational energy in the Black Sea region are limited. Supply-chain disruptions, changing tactics, evolving force structures, and energy-hungry weapons systems add further stresses to the Alliance’s energy needs. The Russia-Ukraine war has underscored how NATO can no longer assume energy on demand in a vast battlespace against an adversary with advanced anti-access/area denial capabilities. Indeed, NATO’s military logistics and supply-chain systems are now potentially challenged like never before.

Modern militaries that effectively manage operational energy will be rewarded with success. This not only requires better joint command and control of liquid fuels, but power generation and distribution, and the ability to leverage these assets into enhanced capabilities. The Aegis Ashore facility in Deveselu, Romania, which provides critical integrated missile defense but also needs an uninterrupted power supply, is an example.

An attack in the Black Sea region could have unexpected political or military consequences and simultaneously disrupt member-state energy flows and weaken joint operational capabilities just when the Alliance needs them the most. While NATO’s political leaders must address supply constraints through realistic energy policies, its military leaders must also recognize the evolution of the modern battlespace because of operational energy considerations in time to limit the impact on capabilities.  

Arnold C. Dupuy is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and Chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s SAS-183, “Energy Security Capabilities, Resilience and Interoperability”.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Mar 10, 2022

Why Turkey is vital for Ukraine, as it balances both sides in Russia conflict

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

The Atlantic Council IN TURKEY discusses Turkey’s importance for Ukraine, Turkey’s stance towards the war between Russia and Ukraine and its efforts towards mediation with Yevgeniya Gaber.

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

TURKEYSource Feb 17, 2022

Turkey’s Russia-crisis strategy rests on one fact: It has too much to lose

By Grady Wilson

Turkey’s approach underlines the significant risks a conflict poses to the delicate balance between its diplomatic and economic relationships, and security concerns around the region.

Conflict Defense Industry

The post Energy security is critical to NATO’s Black Sea future appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the war in Ukraine has unfolded, Turkey has positioned itself as a mediator based on its ties with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey heralded this week’s talks as a testament to it’s balanced approach and diplomatic efforts.

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the latest round of talks in Istanbul, what it means for the war in Ukraine, and its implications for Turkey.

Jump to an expert reaction

Tacan Ildem: A “cautious optimism” for peace

Defne Arslan: Why Turkey is “perfectly situated” to mediate

John Herbst: There’s still time for the talks to become significant

Dimitar Bechev: Moscow’s suddenly positive signs on Ukraine’s concessions

Ariel Cohen: How Moscow used the negotiations

A “cautious optimism” for peace

Since the start of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, Turkey’s stand has been clear and consistent. Considering that the invasion is a blatant violation of international law and a heavy blow to peace and stability in the region, Turkey declared Russian aggression in Ukraine unacceptable and rejected it. Being a NATO ally, Turkey also took part in the decisions that the Alliance made in bolstering its deterrence and defense in the face of the unfolding crisis.

On the other hand, Turkey, having good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and cognizant of regional sensitivities, has been actively pursuing a diplomatic solution to bring an end to the conflict which, if not stopped, could lead to serious ramifications for the stability of the region and beyond. Turkey’s facilitation of the meeting between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on the margins of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on March 10, was an important first step to ensure that sides engage with each other at a high level and pave the way for settling the conflict. The recent round of negotiations in Istanbul this week, with Russia’s offer to fundamentally cut back its military operations around Kyiv and the northern city Chernihiv, sparked cautious optimism for a potential peace deal. Those who have been critical of Turkey’s engagement with Russia in the past—by questioning whether Turkey has been shifting its axis—should try to better understand the dynamics of the complex and, in most cases, compartmentalized “competitive cooperation” between the two countries; these critics should support Turkey’s diplomatic efforts. In any case, a diplomatic settlement would not only serve the interests of the international community but certainly those of Turkey, as it is economically strained and senses the security risks of a prolonged and expanded conflict on its borders in the Black Sea.

—Tacan İldem is a retired Turkish ambassador and former assistant secretary general of NATO. He is the chairman of the Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM).

Why Turkey is “perfectly situated” to mediate

Turkey’s efforts to continue to mediate are worthy of applause. Turkey is making the right move by giving full support to Ukraine. Turkey also has indispensable business relationships ( in trade, construction, and tourism) with Russia. So, Turkey is perfectly situated undertake this mediation. While noting this, Russia’s continued attacks playing down the peace talks give an impression that Russia is using the peace talks in Turkey as a showcase. And yesterday, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand that buyers of Russian gas open accounts in Russian banks indicated to me that he will not give up unless he is assured that sanctions will be removed.

—Defne Arslan is the senior director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Program and the Council’s regional representative with a specific focus on Turkey.

There’s still time for the talks to become significant

The talks in Istanbul are interesting but not significant—yet. There is only one decisionmaker in Russia: Putin. And he thus far has neither endorsed the peace talks nor said anything suggesting that he has changed his maximalist objectives in Ukraine. The same is true of the talks weeks ago between Kuleba and Lavrov.

We know that Putin has failed in his original war goals—to seize Kyiv and topple the Zelenskyy government. And the Russian offensive more broadly has failed, as it has only managed to seize the two cities Berdyansk and Kherson. We know too that only lesser Russian figures have suggested more limited war aims: the negotiators, defense officials, and senior soldiers.

The negotiations and the statements of new, more limited war aims give Putin some flexibility as he ponders his current predicament; but they commit him to nothing. If he decides that he cannot achieve the domination of Ukraine that he seeks, these developments may be indicators of changes in future Russian policy—and the negotiations may become significant. Alternatively, these developments may simply buy Putin some time to double down on his original intent.

—John Herbst is the senior director of the Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Moscow’s suddenly positive signs on Ukraine’s concessions

The round of negotiations in Istanbul is a step forward in the right direction. Though it is hard to tell how much progress the two delegations made, there are positive signs coming from Moscow. Russia’s chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky and Lavrov reacted positively as Kyiv agreed to drop its aspirations to join NATO and settle for a neutral status. That, of course, is no real concession. NATO accession was never in the cards, and it was only the Kremlin’s own propaganda that gave it prominence, largely as a pretext for invading Ukraine. Remarkably, Medinsky spoke positively of Kyiv’s consent to renounce nuclear weapons—another fine example of non-concessionary concession. Such statements indicate that Russia is looking for excuses to brand its “special operation” a success, despite the plentiful evidence to the contrary. In the best-case scenario, this rhetorical ploy creates a pretext for a scale-down of Russia’s military campaign—in line with its Defense Ministry’s statement that they will be turning the heat down on Kyiv and Chernihiv.

To be sure, there is a less benign interpretation. Russia could be playing hot and cold to gain time, regroup, and resupply its forces before mounting a fresh offensive. A parallel with Syria is pertinent. There, Putin made “mission accomplished” announcements on several occasions—only to authorize new campaigns against the Assad regime’s opponents. We are not yet at a point that the war would turn into a “frozen conflict,” much less a durable political settlement.  

A deal will have to address Crimea as well as the separatist republics in the Donbas. Lavrov is now saying the gap between Russia and Ukraine on those issues is getting narrower. But we don’t know that for sure. It will take many more rounds of negotiations to forge a compromise. And the fighting is sure to continue in the meantime.

This has implications for Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has scored symbolic points with the talks in Istanbul, following the meeting between Lavrov and Kuleba earlier in March. But reaching a political deal will be a hard slog. Working out a compromise on the territorial disputes will be an even more daunting task. To make a substantive difference, Turkey will have to redouble efforts and show diplomatic creativity. And it will need to work with the rest of NATO and with the European Union in order to reassure Ukraine and provide guarantees. That is not an easy feat by any measure.

—Dimitar Bechev is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria.

How Moscow used the negotiations

It appears that the negotiations in Istanbul may have been used by Moscow to get a respite and regroup. While Russia (and Ukraine) suffered great losses in a high-intensity conflict, there is little to suggest that Russian society understands the extent of the failure of Moscow’s war aims. Reportedly, oligarch Roman Abramovich delivered Putin a handwritten note from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy outlining an end to the war, and Putin reacted by saying, “tell him I will trash them.” Putin appears to be willing to continue the war as Russia has more resources than Ukraine. The “hawks” like the Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov appear to articulate the real Russian position.

Moreover, Ukraine already offered neutrality, which would prevent it from joining military alliances like NATO, but Kyiv cannot just capitulate after over a month of warfare, massive casualties, and destruction. Zelenskyy, a democratically elected leader, cannot accept Putin’s terms. He cannot cede Crimea and the Donbas region to Russia so easily. He cannot agree to a settlement without Western security guarantees.

Turkey has many reasons to offer to settle the conflict to its north, including that the war is corrosive to Turkey’s relationship with Russia, has already inflicted a massive economic price, and, if Russia emerges victorious, will threaten Turkey’s national security. But the negotiations are still covered in the fog of war and appear gloomy. 

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and program director and senior fellow of the International Tax and Investment Center.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To learn more about Turkey’s importance to Ukraine, Turkey’s stance towards the conflict and its efforts towards mediation, Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Associate Director Grady Wilson conducted an in-depth interview with Yevgeniya Gaber, a nonresident senior fellow at the Carleton University Centre in Modern Turkish Studies.

Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at Carleton University’s Centre in Modern Turkish Studies and a former foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Ukraine. Follow her on Twitter @GaberYevgeniya.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Why Turkey is vital for Ukraine, as it balances both sides in Russia conflict appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts to comment on the significance of the visit, each side’s expectations regarding the rapprochement, and repercussions on Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, as well as what this visit means for the regional power balance.

Brenda Shaffer: The non-zero-sum option for Israel

Gabriel Mitchell: What Israel really wants from Turkey

Karel Valansi: Watch for the thaw in ‘frosty’ Israel-Turkey relations

The non-zero-sum option for Israel

Herzog’s visit is extremely significant. It is not the beginning of a process but actually symbolizes a process of improving of relations between Turkey and Israel that is already taking place.

In both energy and security relationships, the Eastern Mediterranean doesn’t have to be a zero-sum basin, and an improvement between Israel and Turkey should not mean a downgrade in Israel’s relations with Greece—on the contrary, it is better for all if there is a cooperation. The prime minister of Greece is expected to visit Turkey next week, and it seems as though these countries as well will improve their relations. Most of the countries around the basin are US allies—and of course, it is good for the United States when its allies are cooperating and working together.

The US decision to withdraw support for the proposed EastMed pipeline—which would bring Israeli gas to Europe via Greece—doesn’t really matter because the pipeline never had any serious commercial support. It wasn’t really an option;  exporting Israeli gas to Europe will require going through Turkey. Even during the period of estrangement between Turkey and Israel, the energy dialogue was very helpful: Although it didn’t produce a concrete pipeline or investments, it left open an important channel. I hope a similar channel will be reopened between Turkey and Israel.

The energy crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a wake-up call for Europe, the United States, and others to rethink their energy policies. I think there are errors including in the camp against fossil fuels. I believe it was a mistake for these countries to craft policies that treat natural gas the same way that they threat coal and oil. It’s not like spending more money on renewables somehow creates the energy intensity, today or anytime soon, to replace natural gas and even other fossil fuels. The Southern Gas Corridor, which includes the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline, is the easiest way to bring new gas volumes into Europe—it already exists and is operational, and doesn’t have go to through permitting in Europe.

For more, watch Brenda Shaffer’s full interview on President Herzog’s visit and Israel-Turkey relations with Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Deputy Director Pinar Dost:

Prof. Brenda Shaffer is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a faculty member of the US Naval Postgraduate School, and a senior advisor for Energy at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. She is the author of Energy Politics, which is used as a textbook on the geopolitics of energy in over two hundred universities. Follow her on Twitter @ProfBShaffer.

What Israel really wants from Turkey

After a decade’s worth of dysfunctional bilateral relations with Turkey, Israeli expectations for rapprochement—and Herzog’s visit to Ankara—are understandably modest. The previous normalization efforts in 2016 were quickly undone, and there is a hesitation to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan an easy victory without something meaningful in exchange.

What does Israel want? Unlike Erdoğan, whose press conference address specifically articulated the economic benefits of rapprochement, Herzog expressed hope that Ankara would once again become a reliable partner that engages in a cooperative, predictable relationship with Jerusalem.

In order to reach that goal, however, confidence-building measures that reset diplomatic relations are essential. This week’s meeting between Herzog and Erdoğan is a positive first step. It must later be accompanied by face-to-face meetings between Israeli and Turkish heads of state, and the exchange of ambassadors in the near future. Some Israeli officials would like Ankara to abandon its support for Hamas as a demonstration of its earnest commitment to normalizing diplomatic ties. Others hope that new initiatives addressing climate change, the secure transfer of natural gas to Europe, or other security matters could help bridge the gaps between the two sides.

Despite the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the conditions for restoring Israel-Turkey relations have never been more agreeable. But building back a lost partnership requires time and commitment. For Israel-Turkey ties to be successful in the long term, the parties must commit to a robust process that can withstand future challenges—including the real possibility of violence between Israelis and Palestinians—and identify bilateral and multilateral initiatives that will reframe relations in the coming decade.

Gabriel Mitchell is an expert on Eastern Mediterranean energy politics, the director of undergraduate studies at The University of Notre Dame at Tantur, and a policy fellow at the Mitvim Institute. Follow him on Twitter @GabiAMitchell.

Watch for the thaw in ‘frosty’ Israel-Turkey relations

Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Turkey after his father, former Israeli President Chaim Herzog, did the same in 1992. Back then, Chaim’s visit to Turkey was the first of any Israeli president, and this week’s visit is just as important. Relations between the two governments have been frosty for the past decade—but they never broke. Turkey is trying to dig itself out of diplomatic isolation abroad and economic crisis at home. Israel is expressing cautious optimism about improving bilateral ties, but it has some demands for Turkey—and doubts about the odds that the ties will improve. For example in recent years, Israel has intensified its diplomatic and security campaigns against Hamas, while Turkey has hosted senior Hamas members recently even though Western countries including the United States designated Hamas as a terrorist group. For many years, Israel has called upon Turkey to close Hamas’s offices in Turkey.

Ending a decade of political unease with a major power like Turkey is very important for Israel. However, Israel also wants to continue to advance its good relations with Greece and Cyprus. The three countries have already held joint military exercises, and Herzog himself called these relations as alliance of stability in the Mediterranean. But one cannot forget Herzog is a head of state but not of the government. All decisions are made by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and his coalition.

Turkey is trying to dig itself out of diplomatic isolation, wants to create a problem-free circle around itself, and made several statements about possible cooperation with Israel (but also cooperation with Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Armenia, and others. Normalizing relations with Israel is only part of the new foreign-policy direction that Ankara has decided to pursue. Various forms of attacks on Emirati and Turkish targets by Iran-linked groups following the UAE’s and Turkey’s respective normalization steps with Israel are unlikely to be just coincidence. But I believe that, more than contributing to the consolidation of the anti-Iran camp, the energy rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean is a major driver in Turkey’s quest for normalization with Israel.

For more, watch Karel Valansi’s full interview on President Herzog’s visit and Israel-Turkey relations with Atlantic Council IN TURKEY Deputy Director Pinar Dost:

Karel Valansi is a political columnist for T24 and Salom focused on the Middle East. She is a lecturer at Istanbul Kültür University, PhD candidate at Kadir Has University, and the author of The Crescent Moon and the Magen David, Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Public. Follow her on Twitter @karelvalansi.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post With the Israeli president’s visit, are Israel-Turkey relations back on track? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the decade since the Arab Spring, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been locked in a rivalry, taking diverging positions on Egypt, Libya, and Qatar, to name just a few issues. The political tension greatly impacted their economic ties and reduced investment activity. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s February 14 visit to the UAE—during which the two countries signed thirteen agreements in defense, trade, technology, agriculture, and other sectors—indicates that rapprochement is well underway. Strategic and economic factors are behind this shift and many benefits can come from closer ties.

Strategic and economic factors are bringing Turkey and the UAE closer

From a strategic perspective, the transition in US policy in the Middle East to a more practical, less assertive approach with less ambitious objectives has impacted Turkish-UAE relations. The US policy shift isn’t new and has played out in various degrees in consecutive administrations, culminating in the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The intent is to focus on stability—as opposed to democracy promotion—because the United States wants and needs to focus on other issues, such as China, Russia, and domestic challenges like the economy. The United States also supports improving Turkish-UAE relations, which only helps incentivize both sides.

As for the UAE, part of its strategic calculation is a desire to expand alliances and not rely solely on the United States. Thus, we are seeing more attempts by the UAE and other Middle East governments to promote regional diplomacy over conflict and increase trade and economic ties to bolster the region’s position as a whole vis-à-vis large players like China. 

Similarly, over the past year, Turkey has pursued broad diplomatic efforts to normalize its relations with countries around the region—including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Armenia, and the UAE—in response to the changing geopolitical landscape. So far, efforts with the UAE have progressed the furthest, with reciprocal head of state visits to both capitals.

Domestic issues are also a salient force behind the warming of Turkish-UAE relations. The pandemic created and exposed economic issues that must be addressed and both countries understandably want to focus inward to resolve these.

Turkey’s recent economic issues—including the precipitous drop of the Turkish lira’s value—stem from the erratic economic policy shift in the country and have been exacerbated by global inflation and the prospect of rate increases in the United States. Unemployment is also a challenge in Turkey, which stands at 11.2 percent. However, the recently released economic growth numbers for 2021, if sustainable, raises hopes that the Turkish economy will start creating employment again. On the other hand, the recent Ukraine-Russia conflict is expected to create a new shadow on the Turkish economy by decreasing its tourism revenue. Turkey will hold elections in 2023, so President Erdogan wants to make tangible progress on economic issues before then and also point to his progress in improving international relations, since Turkey needs foreign investments to grow and create employment.

The UAE recognized long ago that diversification is vital for its long-term survival, given the decline in oil prices and resources. For this reason, the UAE has enacted dynamic policies that have attracted companies and entrepreneurs to prepare for a post-oil economic future, where the most valuable asset is human talent driving innovation and technology. During the pandemic, the country accelerated reforms to maintain its regional hub and fend off a resurgent Saudi Arabia. Turkey fits nicely into the UAE’s diversification goals as one of the largest regional markets. with a large, educated population and strategic location.

A significant history of trade ties, despite tensions

Turkey and the UAE shared significant economic ties in the past two decades. Despite political conflicts over disagreements in Egypt and Libya (to name a few), the UAE was an investor in Turkey and the country benefited from the UAE’s rise as a regional hub, with Turkish companies participating in construction, real estate, hospitality, and logistics.

In fact, the Gulf region was the most dependable and aggressive investor in Turkey over the last few decades because of the opportunities in the financial sector, technology sector, industrial sector, and construction and real estate sectors. In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), the Gulf represents 7 percent of Turkey’s FDI today. In comparison, the United States—a much larger economy—represents a similar amount: 8 percent of Turkey’s FDI. While the political disagreements impacted FDI, the overall impact was not severe, as Qatar increased its investments in Turkey during this period, somewhat blunting the decline from the UAE. The UAE’s recent investments have given the green light to private sector companies eager to reengage in Turkey’s vast economy.

Looking to the future

The pandemic was a wake-up call for the region to reduce tensions, accelerate cooperation, and increase economic integration for mutual benefit. Countries grappling with increasing debt, inflation, rising interest rates, currency volatility, broken supply chains, and global uncertainty— given great power conflict between the United States and China—are looking inward to strengthen their economic resilience and growth.

This rapprochement can be a catalyst for positive change and may lead to interesting spillover benefits, namely:

1. The renewed engagement between Turkey and the UAE may set the stage for further economic cooperation across the region. Turkey and the UAE should work to bring large economies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, into regional economic integration efforts. By doing so, the countries create a massive bloc to counter China’s increased activity in the region and provide trade and economic benefits to the region as a whole.
   
   
2. Now that official relations between Turkey and the UAE are improving, the private sector needs to reengage in dialogue to ensure that they can take advantage of the political stability that will come out of these agreements. There is pent-up demand to increase investment and business activity on both sides that should be unleashed given this new détente.
   
   
3. Saudi Arabia’s economic awakening and its planned transition in the next decade—through its Vision 2030 framework—represents tremendous opportunity for Turkish construction, real estate, and tourism firms. Turkey’s size and rich talent pool of leadership, management, and skilled workers would be a boon for the Gulf states.
   
   
4. The renewed support and investment from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) may help stabilize the Turkish lira, given that Turkey implements the right economic policies. GCC support may influence positive policy changes that will help to increase Turkey’s FDI.  
   

Amjad Ahmad is Director and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME Initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. Amjad is also managing partner of the venture capital firm Precinct Partners and serves on the boards of Homzmart, Tapal Tea, RSA Global, Mr. Usta, and The Luxury Closet. Follow him @AmjadAhmadVC

Defne Arslan is Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Atlantic Council IN TURKEY & Turkey programs. She was formerly a Chief Turkey economist and senior energy expert on regional policies at the U.S. State Department working through US Embassy Ankara as well as the founding project finance coordinator of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency. Follow her @defnesadiklar

The post Turkey and the UAE are getting close again. But why now? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on Turkey’s stance and reaction to the conflict, as well as the role of the Turkish Straits and effects of the conflict on Turkish and European energy security.

James F. Jeffrey: Turkey’s diplomatic support is crucial for NATO in this crisis

Mitat Çelikpala: Ankara weighs a request to close the Turkish straits

Matthew J. Bryza: Turkey is positioned to play a meaningful mediation role

Debra Cagan: Russian gas flows to Turkey amid a global shortage that may spark development

Turkey’s diplomatic support is crucial for NATO in this crisis

Turkey has reacted strongly throughout the Ukraine crisis. Once fighting started, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated, “We find military action unacceptable and reject it. This step, which we see as contrary to international law, is a heavy blow to the peace, tranquility, and stability of the region.” All parties in the Turkish Parliament agreed formally that Russia’s military operation against Ukraine is wrong, and that Ukraine’s territorial integrity should be ensured, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official statement begins: “We consider the military operation launched by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against Ukraine unacceptable and reject it.”

This response is not unexpected. Turkey is by far the strongest of the six NATO frontline countries facing Russia and has major geostrategic interests at risk. Ukraine, with its territory across the Black Sea and significant armed forces, was a “buffer” between Turkey and Russia. That buffer may now be gone. Turkey has extraordinary diplomatic, military, and economic strengths that make it a key NATO member in this challenging situation. But its dependence on Russian gas and other trade raise questions about how Turkey may respond if placed under pressure by Vladimir Putin. In any case, it is hard to imagine success for NATO in this crisis without at least diplomatic support from Turkey.

Given that situation, it is Washington’s responsibility to coordinate closely and creatively with Turkey. The United States and Turkey have been at loggerheads on secondary issues for years, and that has had a negative impact on relations, especially at high levels. Now, in the midst of this truly dramatic challenge to the Alliance, where Turkish interests and policy are aligned closely with Washington’s, it is time to put aside these ultimately minor problems. The United States should strengthen Turkey’s military, beginning with its recent F-16 request, and develop common diplomatic-security approaches for NATO’s southeastern flank.

—James F. Jeffrey is chair of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, and former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey and former Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS

Ankara weighs a request to close the Turkish straits

Turkey’s initial reaction to Russia’s attack on Ukraine was that Moscow’s decision and stance were unacceptable and rejected. In a phone call with President Volodymyr  Zelenskyy, President Erdoğan said that “Turkey stands against any decision targeting Ukraine’s sovereignty,” and conveyed a message of support to Kyiv. Subsequently, Ankara received Ukraine’s official request to close the Turkish straits to Russian ships.

The Montreux Straits Convention of 1936 regulates the passage of warships through the straits and gives Turkey complete control. The convention includes a number of foundational regulations on the transition of riparian or littoral and nonriparian countries during times of peace and war. In this context, Turkey has the right to close the straits or limit crossings if it feels threatened by war or is a party to the war. The agreement also includes provisions for closing the straits to ships of warring states in the event of war. In cases where Turkey is not a warring country, the crossing will be closed to the vessels of the warring states, whether they are riparian or not. The exception is the return of ships to their main ports and the passage of ships tasked with implementing aid and coercion measures.

Taking Kyiv’s request into account within this framework, Turkey may decide to close the straits to Russian ships. This decision would obviously disturb Russia politically. Although Russia already has an effective force in the Black Sea, including submarines, it would see a future shutdown decision as evidence of Turkey’s negative attitude toward Russia. In this circumstance, Russia can take a wide range of actions, from discussing the Montreux agreement to taking initiatives to annul it. This situation would be a serious problem for Turkey, which sees the convention as a basic founding agreement and a kind of safety valve. It can be argued that Ankara will want to avoid this. My guess is that given the relatively weak responses from Western actors, Ankara will announce its decision by waiting a while longer to follow the developments of the process.

However, even if Turkey decides to close the straits to Russian ships, this would not affect NATO warships. First, NATO is not belligerent; second, Romania and Bulgaria are littoral states, so they can’t be limited. Let’s not forget that nonriparian states are subject to a different limitation. Therefore, a total closure of the straits is not possible, the closure would only affect Russia and Ukraine, but Ukraine has no ships. On top of all of these, there is no formal declaration of war so far, and even if there was, I don’t believe Turkey would interpret the Montreux Convention in that way.

—Mitat Çelikpala, professor of international relations and dean of the Faculty of Economics, Administrative, and Social Sciences at Kadir Has University in Istanbul

Turkey is positioned to play a meaningful mediation role

For several weeks, President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu have been offering Turkey as a potential mediator between Russia and Ukraine. President Zelenskyy consistently welcomed this offer as part of his increasingly desperate search for any way to derail President Putin’s planned invasion. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitriy Peskov (a Turkey specialist who began his diplomatic career in Ankara) initially rejected the offer, the Kremlin subsequently reversed course and said Turkey’s mediation might be useful if it resulted in Ukraine coming into compliance with the Minsk Protocol (despite Russia being in serious breach of the same agreement). Putin, however, clearly favored military escalation rather than mediation, consigning the Minsk agreement to the dustbin of failed European diplomacy.  

Unlike Germany and France, co-leaders of the Minsk process, however, Turkey has a centuries-old history of confronting and cooperating with Russia. Ankara has been an outspoken supporter of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and a critic of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and developed a significant program of cooperation with Kyiv on military technology, while also retaining effective relations with Russia on energy, agricultural trade, and tourism as well as some key defense technologies (e.g., S-400 air defense systems). It is therefore possible Turkey could have a meaningful mediation role to play once Putin finishes his illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, which the Russian president will use to strengthen Russia’s position in the political negotiations that will come at the end of this war in Ukraine, as happens with all military conflicts.

—Matthew J. Bryza is a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council’s IN TURKEY program, the Global Energy Center, and Eurasia Center. He is also a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and former deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia.

Russian gas flows to Turkey amid a global shortage that may spark development

Russian gas to Turkey, unlike the slowdown of gas through Nord Stream 1, continues unabated. Neither the gas nor the price has been affected as yet by Russia’s invasion on Ukraine because it is part of a long-term, recently concluded contract between Russia and Turkey. However, Erdoğan’s very strong statement on Ukraine may give pause to Putin. Turkey is one of the very few NATO countries with the military wherewithal to pose a threat to Russian operations in the Black Sea. Were Turkey to decide to play a more significant naval role, this accommodation with Russia may change.

There are some limited alternatives in the short term, in the midst of a global gas shortage, but longer-term expansion of the southern gas corridor and exploiting assets in the Eastern Mediterranean may have renewed interest. The last few years saw little inclination to develop these resources because interest in developing new gas finds and extending the reach of older ones was limited by expectations that the transition to renewables would occur much faster. Now that gas is being widely accepted as a longer-term transition fuel, pursuing these other options makes more sense. However, until Turkey and the other countries in the East Mediterranean come to some agreement on the boundaries of exclusive economic zones, companies will avoid investment in projects that may be subject to boundary disputes. 

—Debra Cagan, distinguished energy fellow, Mediterranean Basin, Middle East, and Gulf Initiative of the Transatlantic Leadership Network

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey has so much at risk because it isn’t just balancing its strategic partnership with Ukraine and its complex (but significant) relations with Russia; it is also walking a tightrope to balance its NATO commitments and its security concerns in the region. For example, Russia’s regional assertiveness has grown steadily since the country’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, resulting in its intervention in Syria. Turkey has pushed back against Russian allies and proxies in Syria, Libya, and the South Caucasus, all while maintaining an important economic partnership with Russia and continuing to rely heavily on Russian natural gas to meet its energy needs.

However, Turkey’s balancing act risks becoming unraveled in Ukraine, an arena of existential importance to Russia and the Kremlin. Since the 2014 Maidan revolution, Turkey and Ukraine have developed a close strategic partnership based around defense cooperation—a fact that hasn’t sat well with Russia. For example, Russia harshly objected to Turkey’s decision to sell drones to Ukraine, arguing that a Ukrainian military equipped with the drone technology can wreak havoc on the Russian-backed separatist troops in the Donbas.

With his February visit to Kyiv, Erdoğan intended to send a message that Turkey will not be pressured into curtailing its relationship with Ukraine. The two presidents signed a series of new agreements including a long-awaited free trade agreement aimed at boosting annual bilateral trade from $7.5 billion to $10 billion and, crucially, an agreement to jointly manufacture drones in Ukraine using Ukrainian engines.

While recommitting and bolstering its strategic partnership with Ukraine, Turkey has taken a balanced approach to the rising tensions in Eastern Europe, repeatedly calling for restraint and dialogue on all sides. In this vein, Erdoğan’s visit to Kyiv allowed the president to reiterate his desire to host and mediate talks between Ukraine and Russia in Turkey, an idea welcomed by Ukraine but currently deflected by Russia, which sees the United States as the key interlocutor instead.

Erdoğan’s visit was preceded and followed by a series of chats between Turkish and US officials. A meeting between US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Turkish Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın on February 1 underscored the United States’ and Turkey’s differing approaches to the crisis over Ukraine. While the White House readout after the meeting underlined the two countries’ joint commitment to “deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine,” Turkish state broadcaster TRT quoted Kalın as saying that Turkey would provide “all forms of support” in resolving the crisis and that Erdoğan’s visit is one way it’s “solving the issue with diplomacy.” While subtly different, the United States’ and Turkey’s approaches to this crisis are complementary and consistent as both sides share a commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a desire to avoid serious conflict.

Turkey’s economic position also affects its calculus in pushing for mediation. The Turkish economy came to the brink of a crisis in late 2021 and remains on unstable ground, especially with rising global energy prices and natural gas supply disruptions. But should this crisis devolve into conflict, resulting disruptions in trade, harsh Western sanctions against Russia, and rising commodity prices could seriously complicate Turkey’s economic wellbeing as a major trading partner with Russia. A serious conflict would also put a damper on the spring and summer tourism season, and with Russian tourists making up nearly a fifth of monthly visitors to Turkey, the country may miss out on replenishing its hard-currency reserves as it had hoped. Meanwhile, Turkey is reportedly the largest foreign investor in the Ukrainian economy, and Ukraine’s defense sector, an area of burgeoning bilateral cooperation, would likely be a prime target for Russia in the event of conflict.

Turkey’s diplomatic efforts will be on center stage again when it hosts Russian President Vladimir Putin later this month at a yet-to-be-announced date. That visit will provide a test of whether Turkey’s diplomatic methods in the face of rising tensions can bear fruit—that is, of course, if Russia hasn’t already invaded by then.

Grady Wilson is associate director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Dec 16, 2021

Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff

By Matthew Bryza, Grady Wilson

Turkey is doubling down on defense cooperation with Ukraine via drone sales, while retaining cordial relations with Russia. How can Ankara’s diplomacy play a role in this simmering conflict?

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Nov 17, 2021

Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever

By Can Kasapoglu and Sine Ozkarasahin

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and disagreements over defense policy with the United States are pushing transatlantic ties with Turkey to the brink with potentially seismic changes to Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity and major implications for the NATO alliance.

Conflict Defense Technologies

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By Grady Wilson

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Conflict International Organizations

The post Turkey’s Russia-crisis strategy rests on one fact: It has too much to lose appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey continues to grapple with this problem a decade after seeking to bolster its defenses. In 2012, Syria shot down a Turkish jet, causing tensions to increase with Russia, the principal backer of the Bashar al-Assad regime. NATO members responded by deploying defense systems on the border with Syria. In October 2015, however, the United States (followed by other allies) started withdrawing Patriot missile-defense batteries, which the Turks saw as their first line of defense against Russian harassments. The United States did not plan to renew the deployment, but reassured Turkey of the capability to come back within a week, if needed. The Turks felt abandoned by NATO amid Russian aggression, given that the raison d’être of NATO is joint defense.

Engaging with Putin

Seventeen seconds prompted a rethink in Ankara. That’s how long a Russian jet spent in Turkish airspace in November 2015—before the Turks shot it down. Would a clash between Russia and Turkey ensue? NATO did not want to be dragged into a war with Russia. Sensing a lack of Western backup, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hedged his bet. He engaged with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and negotiations calmed tensions. Another factor in this shift: his growing suspicion that American allies were bolstering the People’s Protection Units (YPG), long regarded by the Turkish government as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, its archenemy.

In the summer of 2016, the Turkish incursion into northern Syria met no real resistance from Russia. A few months later, Erdogan and Putin announced that Turkey would buy the S-400. The deal raised eyebrows in Washington and Western European capitals, leading the United States to remove Turkey from its F-35 program. The rationale: protecting the highly advanced technology of the fighter jet from being captured by Russia. Tensions between the two NATO allies escalated as the United States cultivated Turkey’s neighbor and rival, Greece.

Turkey is nonetheless a natural ally for the United States and the West, and vice versa. Turkey can counterbalance Russia in the Middle East as well as in Central Asia. Turkey is at odds with Russia in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus. In private conversations, Turkish politicians assured their Western counterparts that the S-400 would remain in boxes, a German official told me on condition of anonymity. Yet as tensions increased with the United States, especially over support for the YPG, Erdogan played the S-400 card. During his US visit in September, he talked about buying a new tranche of the missile-defense system. The Turks, however, realize this point of pressure comes with a high political cost.

Face-saving solution

Erdogan needs to accommodate Putin to some extent. Given that they are on opposite sides in several conflicts, Turkey needs to make sure to avoid an open war with Russia. If Turkey suddenly dropped the S-400 for US systems, the Russian bear would be offended. Therefore, the Siper, as a Turkish weapon, comes as a political face-saving exit for Erdogan: He would not have to say he gave up the Russian weapons for US weapons, and the entire S-400 sale would not appear to be a farce to lure the United States into selling Patriots to Turkey. Ankara’s best argument is to push its own defense production. The timing is also right. Russia and NATO are in a heated standoff in Eastern Europe, with Russia threatening to invade Ukraine. Washington needs Ankara, which has armed Kyiv with drones, on its side more than ever.

The United States has an opportunity to help Turkey accelerate the Siper’s development. In the meantime, Patriots could be deployed during the Turkish system’s development. In order not to upset the Russians, Ankara should explain that the deployment is only temporary. Washington could insert a clause in the development agreement to block Siper sales to countries at odds with the United States.

The Siper solution saves face all around. Most importantly, this solution would remove the main hurdle standing in the way of a strategic relationship between the United States and Turkey.

Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib is a specialist in US-Arab relations with a focus on lobbying. She is a member of the steering committee of the National Agenda of the Future of Syria, and an advocacy consultant for the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. She is co-founder of the Research Center for Cooperation and Peace Building, a Lebanese nongovernmental organization focused on Track II diplomacy. 

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Dec 16, 2021

Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff

By Matthew Bryza, Grady Wilson

Turkey is doubling down on defense cooperation with Ukraine via drone sales, while retaining cordial relations with Russia. How can Ankara’s diplomacy play a role in this simmering conflict?

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Nov 17, 2021

Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever

By Can Kasapoglu and Sine Ozkarasahin

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and disagreements over defense policy with the United States are pushing transatlantic ties with Turkey to the brink with potentially seismic changes to Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity and major implications for the NATO alliance.

Conflict Defense Technologies

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

The post Why a new missile system could solve Turkey’s US-Russia conundrum appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The island of Cyprus has been divided since 1974, when Greece attempted a coup in Nicosia to annex the island and was met with Turkish intervention in the north. Today, the two communities remain separated by a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force on the “green line,” with no long-term solution in sight. The discovery of hydrocarbons in Cypriot offshore fields has only exacerbated tensions throughout the region by pulling international actors into the dispute. Although there has been much hype about the monetization of gas deposits around Cyprus, the window of opportunity is closing fast—if it’s not already sealed. Project proposals that leave Turkey and Turkish Cypriots out are unlikely to achieve expected benefits, mainly due to political, market, and financial risks in a rapidly changing energy landscape.

On December 10, the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) granted the consortium of Qatar Energy-ExxonMobil (QE-EM) an exploration license for oil and gas drilling in marine Block 5, located off the southwest side of the de facto divided island. The ROC—which has effective control of the southern two-thirds of the island, consisting mostly of the Greek Cypriot community—had passed a law in 2004 defining and regulating its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in which thirteen sub-zones, or “blocks,” can be auctioned for concession agreements to energy companies. QE-EM already possesses licenses to operate Block 10, where the group discovered a mid-size gas reservoir at the Glaucus-1 well in 2019, raising the prospects of joint off-shore gas development, extraction, and monetization.

Meanwhile, tensions in the region have been high since 2011, when the Noble Energy-Delek-Shell consortium initiated exploratory drilling in the Aphrodite well of Block 12—prompting Turkey to respond in kind by conducting seismic research and sending naval escorts on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community in the north. The existing standoff over energy rights exacerbated the island’s political conflict and turned it into a multilateral issue with many moving dimensions. Not only do Turkish Cypriots claim equal rights to the island’s resources, but the Greek Cypriot EEZ overlaps the area Turkey claims as its own EEZ in five of the thirteen offshore research blocks to the west and southwest of the island.

As the coronavirus-induced economic downturn loses momentum, international oil companies are back on the scene to reassess productive assets in their portfolios and prioritize the most profitable ones. Many producers, including Exxon, made drastic cuts in their budgets to bear the headwinds of reduced demand amid the shock in 2020. Experts say the global energy transition to renewables means scarcer capital in the long term and risky projects in the East Med.

For one, the European Union (EU) has no appetite for greenfield projects such as the much-debated East Med natural gas pipeline, and the QE-EM consortium’s recent move should be viewed through this lens. The Biden administration reportedly expressed reservations to Athens regarding “issues of [the pipeline’s] economic viability and environmental [impact].” This is unsurprising, since US Ambassador to Greece Geoffrey R. Pyatt highlighted at a web conference by the Center for European Policy Analysis in 2021 that “it’s important to recognize how quickly the ground is shifting underneath some of these traditional disagreements over things like gas and oil resources on the sea floor. Many of those resources will never be extracted in the current economic and investment environment… More attention should be given to how that changing energy conversation also promises to shift the geopolitics.” The United States also wants to sell its own liquefied natural gas as a transition fuel to the region and has less interest in sponsoring a competing pipeline project. In the interest of moving on high-return, quick-turnaround projects, the QE-EM partners started an appraisal drilling in the Glaucus-1 field inside Block 10 as a priority to gain a clearer picture of the reservoir’s resource potential—and only then move to Block 5 if there’s promise. Early results from the drill in Block 10 are expected toward the end of the first quarter of this year.

The challenge is that Turkey’s continental shelf, as it declared to the UN in 2020, overlaps with roughly 40 percent of Block 5. One expert notes that the disputed area “has less hydrocarbon-presence potential, so ExxonMobil is unlikely to venture that far.” Indeed, Turkey’s exploratory drills in the East Med have yet to bear positive results despite trial runs in multiple locations around Cyprus. Instead, it has focused its attention on the Black Sea since 2019, while its quest to tap into offshore energy deposits in the East Med turned out to be more about geopolitical posturing, desire for status, and national prestige than economic rationality.

In this context, the lack of Turkey’s typically high-profile reaction to Greek Cypriot brinkmanship is noteworthy. It appears that, contrary to popular conviction, Ankara is no longer interested in taking a confrontational approach purely for offshore energy rights in disputed zones around Cyprus. With a bleak future for hydrocarbons in the energy mix, as well as high costs against a looming potential supply glut by 2024-25, other experts go even further to suggest that frictions over East Med oil and gas are an “outdated discussion.”

Energy markets aside and facing a severe economic crisis amid a tumbling lira, Turkish officials are scrambling to mend ties with friends and foes alike, from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to Israel and Saudi Arabia. “Turkey agreed to [the QE-EM license] in the hope that Qatar can help push for a rapprochement with Egypt,” one analyst told Al-Monitor last month. In 2020, Egypt and Greece inked an agreement to establish a joint EEZ for East Med resource exploration, which clashed with claims made by Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in Libya in their own 2019 EEZ agreement. Ankara needs Cairo’s support to end its regional isolation, establish the remaining parts of its EEZ in the East Med (left over from only a partial demarcation with Libya in 2019), and maybe even overturn the 2020 Greek agreement with a much more advantageous package deal with Cairo.

This doesn’t mean that Ankara has taken a hands-off approach toward the East Med, or, as the Greek side would hope, that it has dropped its assertive maritime policy of “blue homeland.” The basic essence of the concept remains the same, and instead of an on-and-off approach, there are gradations of this strategy. The Turkish government employs strategic ambiguity at times to soften its tone, take a conciliatory approach, make symbolic gestures, and engage in exploratory talks to alleviate Western criticism of its assertive foreign policy—while continuing to seek alternative means to achieve its geopolitical goals. A senior Turkish diplomatic source in Ankara, who requested anonymity to speak about contentious issues, highlighted that “Turkey will not allow any unauthorized hydrocarbon and drilling operation of third countries in its continental shelf and will continue to protect its rights as well as equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots over off-shore resources of the island.”

In any case, it’s unlikely that QE-EM will operate in the parts of Block 5 overlapping the Turkish continental shelf, since Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu recently said “the United States and Qatar have guaranteed that they will not enter our continental shelf.” If they do, the Turkish source in Ankara added, “Turkish Cypriots will re-commence their off-shore survey and drilling activities in license blocks that they granted to Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) in 2011.” These exploration zones on the island’s south, east, and north overlap with ten blocks in the Greek Cypriot EEZ. TPAO has conducted several seismic surveys and drills in the designated area since 2017, but briefly paused activities as it shifted focus to more promising fields in the Black Sea. The source also reiterated Turkey’s support for a “cooperation mechanism” between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on oil and gas exploration, and “an inclusive East Med Conference” on these issues.

The ROC government often leverages the EU and the United States to balance Turkey’s presence in the region, and it may have hoped that the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet would come to its assistance if the Turkish navy intervenes in Block 5. But the likelihood of such a confrontation is very low—if not zero. Despite all the talk of oil and gas licensing around Cyprus, there’s nothing new when it comes to geopolitical arm-wrestling in the East Med.

Serhat S. Cubukcuoglu is a doctoral candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter at @suhac.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Dec 16, 2021

Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff

By Matthew Bryza, Grady Wilson

Turkey is doubling down on defense cooperation with Ukraine via drone sales, while retaining cordial relations with Russia. How can Ankara’s diplomacy play a role in this simmering conflict?

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Nov 17, 2021

Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever

By Can Kasapoglu and Sine Ozkarasahin

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and disagreements over defense policy with the United States are pushing transatlantic ties with Turkey to the brink with potentially seismic changes to Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity and major implications for the NATO alliance.

Conflict Defense Technologies

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

The post Turkey’s muted response to Cyprus’ offshore drilling reflects a new diplomatic reality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Now, Ankara is raising the stakes by doubling down on its defense cooperation with Kyiv and recommitting itself to the continued sale of dozens of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), much to Russia’s ire.

This may come as a surprise to anyone who has watched Turkey seemingly drift toward Russia—and away from NATO—in recent years. In 2017, Ankara signed a deal to purchase the highly sophisticated Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system, to which the United States responded by banishing Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program and eventually sanctioning the country under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). Years earlier, Turkey had joined Russia and Iran as a co-chair of the so-called Astana Process, an alternative to the United Nations-led effort to mediate the Syrian civil war.

But in reality, Turkish-Russian relations are complex and characterized by both competition and cooperation across multiple theaters and dimensions. Looming in the background are centuries of diplomatic antagonism and military conflict often centered on the Black Sea region—a balancing act that’s playing out again now. Despite Turkey’s shared economic interests with Russia in energy, tourism, construction, and agricultural exports, Ankara joined its NATO allies in rejecting Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and reaffirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity. That stance, which has hardened over time, was partially explained by its historical anger over ethnically Turkic Crimean Tatars falling under Russian rule again.

Even more compelling is Turkey’s growing concern over an expansionist (and revanchist) Russia near its borders in the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions. Ankara has responded to Moscow’s aggression by becoming one of the strongest proponents of enlarging NATO membership to include both Ukraine and Georgia—even while offering to mediate the conflict in Ukraine. Ankara has simultaneously pursued a strategic partnership with Kyiv based largely on defense industry cooperation, which apart from drones also includes the sales of naval ships with stealth capabilities and the joint development of a jet engine for military aircraft.

But Turkey’s drone sale, which came five years after Israel balked at selling its own models to Ukraine for fear of antagonizing Russia, is particularly significant.

Having witnessed the devastating impact of Turkey’s innovative drone-based tactics— combining the UAV’s battlefield intelligence and precision rocket strikes with closely coordinated standoff artillery assaults aimed at neutralizing defenses and capitalizing on air superiority—Russia has plenty of reason to worry. Such attacks fought Russian and Syrian government forces to a standstill in Syria’s Idlib province in March 2020 and prompted Russia to recommit to its previous agreement with Turkey to protect Idlib as a “safe zone.” Just months later, Turkey reversed an offensive by Russian mercenaries and Libyan fighters that had already reached the outskirts of Tripoli.

And during last year’s Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Azerbaijani military—another early purchaser of Turkish drones—employed the same tactical approach to neutralize Armenia’s advanced Russian weaponry, including air defense systems and armor, with startling precision and speed.

That’s why Russia has signaled its concern about Turkish UAVs on numerous occasions, most recently when Russian President Vladimir Putin warned his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during a December 3 phone call that the drones helped enable “destructive” behavior by Ukraine. Ankara responded the next day by affirming that drone deliveries to Ukraine would continue—then, days later, sought to restore the diplomatic balance by offering its mediation efforts. Though Moscow did not take up this offer, it has been careful to avoid incendiary rhetoric toward Ankara.

Turkey’s combination of military firmness and diplomatic sobriety offers important capabilities for NATO as it struggles to deter further Russian aggression against Ukraine. As scholar Francis Fukuyama recently observed, Ukraine’s use of Turkish UAVs could be a “complete game-changer,” while analysts at the Royal United Services Institute think tank believe Turkey’s massed drone and artillery strikes could even render the battle tank obsolete.

Moscow, for its part, has also been careful not to alienate Ankara—perhaps because of mutual economic interests, or because it simply wants to deepen the wedge between Ankara and its NATO allies. Whatever the Kremlin’s motivation, the United States and NATO would be wise to make use of the assets which the Alliance’s second-largest military brings to the table—especially the diplomatic wisdom gained from managing centuries of conflict and cooperation with Russia.

Matthew Bryza is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, Eurasia Center, and Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program. He served as a US diplomat for more than two decades, including as US ambassador to Azerbaijan, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, and director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council staff. He is also the CEO of Lamor Turkey, a Finnish-Turkish joint venture providing environmental solutions, and a board member of Turcas Petrol, a publicly traded Turkish energy company.

Grady Wilson is assistant director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Dec 16, 2021

Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff

By Matthew Bryza, Grady Wilson

Turkey is doubling down on defense cooperation with Ukraine via drone sales, while retaining cordial relations with Russia. How can Ankara’s diplomacy play a role in this simmering conflict?

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Nov 17, 2021

Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever

By Can Kasapoglu and Sine Ozkarasahin

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and disagreements over defense policy with the United States are pushing transatlantic ties with Turkey to the brink with potentially seismic changes to Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity and major implications for the NATO alliance.

Conflict Defense Technologies

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

The post Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To put it bluntly, the Turkey you know might be gone forever. Here’s why: 

The ‘French touch’ that changed everything

The best defense against a large-scale war between Ankara and Athens has been the transatlantic security architecture provided by NATO. Perhaps unintentionally, France and Greece may have torpedoed this mechanism for good with their recent flamboyant defense pact, in which the countries vow to come to each other’s aid in the event of an armed attack. In the eyes of the Turkish elite, the pact is aimed at containing Turkey and should be responded to in kind. 

The Turkish-Greek rivalry manifested itself in recent disagreements on maritime borders and rights to the oil and natural gas bonanza in the Eastern Mediterranean. But tensions between the two NATO members aren’t new; they even found themselves on the brink of war back in the 1990s before Washington prevented further escalation. Now, the “French touch” has added a new arms race to these disputes and an alternative collective defense guaranteefor Athens (apart from NATO’s Article 5).

Another key aspect of the Franco-Greek deal is its declared objective to boost European strategic autonomy—which might do more harm than good because of the deal’s bilateral nature and its ostensible positioning against a key NATO ally.

If the larger military Alliance takes a back seat, any flare-up between Turkey and Greece would be far more dangerous than in the past. From a military standpoint, the greatest danger is the unpredictability: Just imagine two armed forces facing each other in land warfare along the Thracian lowlands and in an air-sea battle in the Aegean Sea. Such an escalation could also drag in nearby Cyprus. And you could kiss NATO goodbye if two of its members went to war against each other. Picture the Baltic countries sitting on Russia’s doorstep and watching two NATO allies fiercely fighting each other. Not only would such a war be a regional catastrophe in the Eastern Mediterranean, but it would also create a larger crisis for NATO’s allied coherence in the face of Russian aggression.

Despite the war cries by hardliners on both sides, a Turkish-Greek escalation should be avoided at all costs.

The fighter jet that can transform Turkey’s strategic orientation

Given the technological troubles with its arsenal of aging, fourth-generation F-16 combat fighters—and following its exodus from the US F-35 program over its acquisition of Russian-made S-400 strategic surface-to-air missiles—Ankara is hoping to secure a stopgap deal for the advanced F-16 Viper (F-16V).

Although it had seemed like a done deal at the outset, a growing number of US lawmakers have expressed their objections about the F-16V sales, citing the S-400 deal among other concerns about Turkey’s government.

If Turkey finds itself left out in the cold in its quest for an alternative to the F-35, Russia will probably offer a charm offensive in the form of a defense procurement package to snatch up the Turkish weapons market from the West—including Russia’s Su-35 air superiority fighters, the second batch of the S-400s, and even engines for Turkey’s own national combat aircraft development project. Any such transaction would be more than enough to trigger another round of US sanctions, which in turn would lead to an inevitable rupture of Turkish-American bilateral military ties.

What’s next?

Turkish defense planners will need to incorporate a European military alliance on their doorstep—bizarrely, one that includes two NATO allies. Besides, the Turkish Air Force finds its only feasible air warfare stopgap plan being questioned in the US Congress.

Ankara is not totally victimized here. After all, the S-400 acquisition—which occurred in the aftermath of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea—was a sovereign decision taken by the incumbent administration. That’s why it shouldn’t be surprised about being excluded from the F-35 program or by congressional hesitancy over the F-16V sale.

But fundamentally altering the political-military parameters in the Aegean, or cutting off the Turkish air deterrent from American-made solutions like the F-16V, are geopolitical moves that could leave consequences for decades. Unchecked, they can lead to a tectonic shift in Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity. Although this kind of shift remains a low-probability (but high-impact) scenario for now, such drastic changes cannot be reversed overnight by hard-working diplomats or new governments in NATO capitals.

Can Kasapoglu is the director of the Security and Defense Program at the Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) in Istanbul.

Sine Ozkarasahin is an analyst at the Security and Defense Program at EDAM.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Dec 16, 2021

Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff

By Matthew Bryza, Grady Wilson

Turkey is doubling down on defense cooperation with Ukraine via drone sales, while retaining cordial relations with Russia. How can Ankara’s diplomacy play a role in this simmering conflict?

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Nov 17, 2021

Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever

By Can Kasapoglu and Sine Ozkarasahin

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and disagreements over defense policy with the United States are pushing transatlantic ties with Turkey to the brink with potentially seismic changes to Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity and major implications for the NATO alliance.

Conflict Defense Technologies

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

The post Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Last month, Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Önal hosted his Egyptian counterpart in Ankara for rapprochement talks focusing on regional issues. The latest talks follow a first-round visit to Cairo in May, where Turkey and Egypt hashed out bilateral concerns. It’s a remarkable moment, since these visits marked the first high-level political consultations between the two powers since the 2013 military coup in Egypt, an event that led to a rapid deterioration in Cairo’s relationship with Ankara.

But the recalibration isn’t just with Egypt. For several months now, Ankara has taken steps to normalize regional relationships that had been fraught with problems. It has reached out to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to end hostility. It looks like Ankara is trying to arrange a modus vivendi with these countries to end Turkey’s isolation in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

But it’ll take more than friendship-building and conciliations to bridge the gap between Turkey and other Middle East states.

What’s behind the meetings’ doors

Over the past two decades, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) dramatically transformed Turkish foreign policy. In the 2000s, the AKP focused its foreign policy on fostering interdependence and promoting inter-regional relationships. The AKP aimed to pivot toward the Middle East, which Ankara had previously neglected. The AKP also intended to reach the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, where Ankara’s contacts have been rather limited. Back then, Ankara adopted a more proactive role and aimed to use its strategic location at the intersection of all these regions as well as its cultural and historical ties with its neighbors to become an influential global actor. It relied on interdependence and multilateralism to achieve this aim.

At the time, the AKP’s agenda wasn’t yet the revisionist example seen in recent years. When former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu was Turkey’s foreign minister, he preached a policy of having “zero problems towards neighbors,” relying on political dialogue and on Ankara playing a role as a mediator—as it did when it mediated peace talks between Syria and Israel as early as 2007. This philosophy also showed that Turkey regarded its soft power as important and intended to maintain the status quo in its relationships. During that time, Ankara had started negotiations for European Union (EU) membership, and Western allies hailed Turkey as a model of democracy in the Middle East. The AKP’s foreign policy in the 2000s was also in line with Turkey’s domestic politics, which emphasized cultural harmony and economic development instead of the identity politics that reigned during the 2010s.

The Arab Spring that began in 2010 marked a turning point in Turkey’s foreign policy. While long-seated dictatorships in the Middle East shattered, Ankara embraced the uprisings and even supported the Muslim Brotherhood. And after the Arab Spring shook neighboring Syria by igniting a devastating civil war, Turkey engaged militarily. This period marked the end of Turkey’s previous nonintervention policy in the Middle East. In recent years, Turkey extended its military posture beyond its own borders with its Mavi Vatan (or Blue Homeland) concept that sets Turkey’s sights on neighboring waters; cross-border campaigns into Syria, Libya, and northern Iraq; and relatively new military bases in Qatar and Somalia.

In 2013, the counter-revolution in Egypt saw the army oust the Muslim Brotherhood-led government and then President Mohamed Morsi. The incident was alarming to Erdoğan and the AKP. Since coming to power, he had feared that Turkey’s secular military would seek to remove him from power—as it had done to several previous Turkish leaders—possibly in coordination with popular street protests. The developments in Egypt coincided with the most severe domestic challenge to the AKP since coming to power in 2002. The AKP’s plans to transform Istanbul’s Gezi Park into a replica of the Taksim Military Barracks from the Ottoman Empire and a shopping mall erupted in mass protests that quickly spread across Turkey and met police crackdowns.

Turkey became one of the most vocal opponents of the Egyptian coup, and it refused to accept new President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s legitimacy. Events within Turkey also stirred the pot: The AKP adopted a four-finger hand gesture that was used by Muslim Brotherhood supporters and protesting crowds in Egypt—though the AKP argued the gesture had a slightly different meaning to them. Erdoğan also lodged verbal attacks against al-Sisi for domestic audiences. Turkey-Egypt relations spiraled downward.

Diplomatic shots fired elsewhere

Turkey’s relations soured with countries that saw the Arab Spring’s popular demonstrations as an existential threat to their rule. Since then, Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become embittered. This rift gave way to a battle of ideologies: Turkey and Qatar aligned themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood, while Egypt and the other Gulf countries got closer to Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, with some holding military drills together and expanding cooperation in the energy sector.

Journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 added fuel to the fire. It led to Ankara’s unprecedented denouncement of the Saudi government following the killing that occurred in Istanbul, pointing out Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman specifically. In return, Saudi Arabia imposed an informal boycott on Turkish products. Their rivalry due to their regional aspirations and Ankara’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood extended with their support of opposing groups in the Syrian conflict.

Additionally, Turkey’s military involvement in the Libya conflict angered Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Saudi Arabia perceived that involvement as a threat to regional security and interference in the internal affairs of an Arab country. Egypt and Turkey supported opposing parties in the Libyan conflict. Turkey’s military and intelligence assistance to the Government of National Accord reversed the military balance in Libya, forcing all actors involved in the conflict—including Egypt—to rethink their military and political strategies. Additionally, Egypt was alarmed with the deal reached between Ankara and Libya’s internationally recognized government on maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean that could complicate energy explorations in the area and the East Mediterranean Gas Forum’s efforts to export gas to Europe.

Turkey’s relations also entered a prolonged political stalemate with Israel when Israel stopped Mavi Marmara, a ship that attempted to breach the Gaza Strip blockade. Israeli commandos killed ten Turkish activists on board. The May 31, 2010, incident resulted in a six-year diplomatic rift between Turkey and Israel that saw diplomatic relations downgraded, and military and intelligence cooperation—which had been the linchpin of bilateral relations—reduced. In 2016 the two countries agreed to normalize their relations. However, just two years later, in May 2018, Turkey and Israel expelled each other’s ambassadors following deadly clashes on the Israel-Gaza border during the “Great March of Return” protests, around the time when the United States recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and decided to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Turkey still does not have ambassadors in Syria, Egypt, or Israel. But in the meantime, it has been recalibrating its foreign-policy strategy, as shown by Ankara’s use of conciliatory language and messages of goodwill to repair its problematic relationships with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

Missed train to normalization

As Turkey moved away from political dialogue, a mediator role, and its noninterference policy, Davuoğlu’s “zero problems towards neighbors” strategy became “precious loneliness,” as described by Erdoğan’s chief policy adviser, Ibrahim Kalın. Turkey had few regional allies—and fewer neighbors that did not have problems with Ankara. Turkey’s neo-Ottoman discourse, anti-Western statements, gunboat diplomacy, and domestically fueled foreign-policy moves alienated most of Turkey’s previous allies. The country also notably lost a chance at EU membership as it faced a huge influx of refugees whom European nations didn’t want to have free passage into their borders. EU-Turkish relations began to be viewed almost exclusively within the framework of the refugee deal reached in 2016. Additionally, Turkey’s membership in NATO has been questioned following its purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems.

In the Middle East, on the other hand, 2020 was a remarkable year for normalizing relationships. Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain signed a normalization pact brokered by the United States on September 15, 2020. Then, Sudan and Morocco filled out the Abraham Accords peace quartet. The spree increased the number of Arab countries that recognize Israel from just two: Egypt, which had entered a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan, which did the same in 1994.

Plus, the region is moving forward­—even without Turkey. In September 2020, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority turned the East Mediterranean Gas Forum into a regional, intergovernmental organization with headquarters in Cairo. Turkey was noticeably absent.  

Additionally, Gulf Cooperation Council countries signed the al-Ula Declaration in January, marking an end to a three-year blockade against Qatar by Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This development also meant that Qatar-Turkey relations were no longer exclusive. It opened a door for Turkey to reach out to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries—of course, depending on Qatar’s mediation.

The Middle East is also evolving at the hands of major international players. There’s now pressure on all regional actors to look for new allies and new opportunities for collaboration as the Biden administration pulls the United States back from the Middle East. And while Turkey is starting to gravitate closer to Israel, Egypt, and the Gulf countries, Russia and China are increasing their presence in the region, with possibly monumental effects.

Finally, COVID-19 acutely hit Middle East economies. Reeling from the blow, Turkey now needs to attract foreign investment after spending heavily on a militarized foreign policy. To do that, Ankara hopes that its attempts to acquire new allies and issue conciliatory statements will appeal to foreign investors—and that these attempts may also help boost trade relationships. Since the pandemic, most of the region’s economies have felt similar blows and are therefore itching to find similar remedies, signaling opportune timing for Turkey.

Erdoğan’s calling campaign

As regional dynamics change, Turkey is making overtures suggesting that it’ll work harder to end its isolation and to become part of the economic and energy leadership in the region.

Erdoğan and Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz have discussed bilateral ties by telephone, notably just before the November 2020 Group of Twenty summit. They agreed to settle disagreements through dialogue rather than escalate them with foreign-policy jabs. And after five years of low engagement, the foreign ministers of Turkey and the UAE had a phone call, followed by an Ankara visit from the UAE’s national security advisor and an August telephone exchange between Erdoğan and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed. Finally, energy officials from Turkey and Qatar attended the Gastech conference in Dubai last month, yet another sign of easing tensions.

Turkey’s relations with Egypt have been improving as well, as demonstrated by the May and September consultations. As for Israel, the possibility of normalization has been hotly debated in recent years. In July this debate gained momentum when Erdoğan called newly elected Israeli President Isaac Herzog to congratulate him and reemphasize the importance that Turkey-Israel ties hold in the region. During the opening of a Turkish exhibition in Jerusalem, Herzog returned the gesture by saying, in reference to meeting with Erdoğan, “I am sure that when we gather around a table with coffee, we can carry our whole region to a better future with cultural and other cooperation.”

But where’s the real change?

For now, Ankara’s steps and conciliatory approach have paid off for its overall mission to improve its international standing and become an economic and energy leader in the region. It seems that all parties in the Middle East support gradual de-escalation with Turkey. However, the gaps formed during the prolonged political stalemate of the 2000s are still significant, and some bilateral ties are still weak.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE still cringe over Turkey’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood, while Israel points to Turkey’s support of Hamas—originally an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. These countries wonder how much Turkey could actually compromise, since its support of these groups is ideological in nature. Turkish military presence in the region, especially Libya, is another crucial issue, particularly for Egypt.

Among these countries, there is also doubt about Turkey’s rapprochement motives. It is worth wondering whether Ankara is sincere or whether its conciliatory actions are a new tactic to break the alliance created by the energy cooperation among East Mediterranean Gas Forum members excluding Turkey.

Turkey, on the other hand, is trying to reach out to these countries to break its ring of isolation. Even as doubts and distrust remain between Ankara and its regional neighbors, there are certainly some opportunities for cooperation and to arrange a modus vivendi.

Karel Valansi is a political columnist for T24 and Salom focused on the Middle East. She is a lecturer at Istanbul Kültür University, PhD candidate at Kadir Has University, and the author of The Crescent Moon and the Magen David, Turkish-Israeli Relations Through the Lens of the Turkish Public. Follow her on Twitter @karelvalansi.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Dec 16, 2021

Turkey could tip the balance in the Ukraine-Russia standoff

By Matthew Bryza, Grady Wilson

Turkey is doubling down on defense cooperation with Ukraine via drone sales, while retaining cordial relations with Russia. How can Ankara’s diplomacy play a role in this simmering conflict?

Conflict Defense Industry

TURKEYSource Nov 17, 2021

Why Turkey’s transatlantic identity could change forever

By Can Kasapoglu and Sine Ozkarasahin

Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and disagreements over defense policy with the United States are pushing transatlantic ties with Turkey to the brink with potentially seismic changes to Turkey’s strategic orientation and identity and major implications for the NATO alliance.

Conflict Defense Technologies

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

The post Turkey has flipped the script on its regional isolation. But will it amount to real change? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As these two regional heavyweights navigate their thorny relationship, Atlantic Council experts weigh in on the implications of the meeting:

Mark N. Katz: Putin’s balancing act continues

James F. Jeffrey: Absent US support, Turkey’s position in Syria is under threat

Matthew J. Bryza: Putin’s orbit play: Push from NATO, pull toward Moscow

Julia Friedlander: A frank reminder: “There’s no winning here”

Putin’s balancing act continues

The Putin-Erdoğan meeting in Sochi did not resolve Russian-Turkish differences over Syria, but did seem to prevent them from getting any worse. For Putin, relations with Erdoğan have long amounted to a balancing act between opposing Turkish moves that threaten Russian interests in Syria, Libya, the Armenia-Azerbaijan arena, and Ukraine on the one hand and avoiding inducing Erdoğan to reverse his hostility toward America and Europe (which Putin wants to encourage) on the other.

Instead, this meeting seemed to indicate that Putin now sees the process of deteriorating relations between Ankara and the West as having progressed to such an extent that Moscow no longer needs to make any significant concessions to Turkey in Syria or elsewhere. Indeed, Erdoğan’s determination to purchase more Russian S-400s—and perhaps other Russian weapons systems, despite the likely application of US sanctions as a result—has reduced Putin’s need to accommodate Turkish interests in Syria.

Now, the danger for Putin is that he might become overconfident in his belief that Erdoğan needs him more than he needs Erdoğan. After all, Erdoğan is capable of harming Russian interests despite his estrangement from the West. Two recent factors of Erdoğan doing so were Ankara’s support for the official government in Libya against the Russian-backed forces of General Khalifa Haftar, and its support for Azerbaijan in that country’s war against Armenia. Stoking Erdoğan’s ego by meeting him—when Biden would not at this month’s UN General Assembly—is definitely worthwhile for Putin.

—Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a professor of government and politics at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government.

Absent US support, Turkey’s position in Syria is under threat

The September 29 Sochi meeting between presidents Erdoğan and Putin is the latest in a series of bilateral meetings particularly focused on Syria. The key issue was the northwest Syrian enclave of Idlib, home to more than three million Syrians fleeing President Bashar al-Assad, Syrian opposition forces, the terrorist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Turkish forces, all sharing the goal of keeping Assad’s forces out. There has been, apart from a breakdown in 2020, a ceasefire in Idlib since mid-2018, the centerpiece of the freezing of the Syrian conflict since then. But Turkish leaders made clear they feared this Sochi meeting would be different, with Russia pushing for either a Turkish and opposition withdrawal from southern Idlib, or a new Russian-supported Assad offensive.

The two sides’ bland post-meeting comments do not document anything so dramatic, but what was new in this meeting is the role of the United States. The Idlib ceasefire resulted from US diplomacy supporting Turkey’s and Israel’s military actions in Syria, and keeping US troops there, to pressure Russia and Assad for a comprehensive compromise settlement of the conflict. But the Biden administration, while supposedly still “reviewing” Syria policy, prioritizes a minimalist approach focused on fighting the Islamic State and humanitarian assistance. Russia appears to have a green light, as seen with the collapse of another ceasefire in Dara’a in the southwest, to pursue its goals no longer restrained by Washington. The next weeks could see dramatic change in Syria—and not for the better.

—James F. Jeffrey is chair of the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program. Previously he has served as US Ambassador to Turkey, US special representative for Syria engagement, and special envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

Putin’s orbit play: Push from NATO, pull toward Moscow

The September 29 meeting between Erdoğan and Putin occurred amidst significant tension between Turkey and Russia on several security matters. In Syria’s Idlib province, Turkish drone and artillery strikes brought Russian- and Assad-regime troops to a standstill in March 2020, and then did the same in Libya two months later. Moscow and Damascus may now be planning to resume their offensive, which could generate new flows of refugees toward Turkey, where four million refugees, mostly Syrian, have already found shelter. Meanwhile, Moscow has been expressing dismay with Ankara’s growing cooperation with Ukraine on military technologies.

Putin and Erdoğan avoided public comment on these differences in Sochi, highlighting economic cooperation instead. Putin announced that bilateral trade between Russia and Turkey had increased 55 percent during the first nine months of 2021. He also underscored the reliability of Russian natural-gas shipments to Turkey. Erdoğan, meanwhile, hailed next year’s opening of a Russian-built nuclear-power plant in Turkey.

Underlying this economic cooperation, of course, is Putin’s desire to drive a strategic wedge between Turkey and its NATO Allies, especially the United States, as evidenced by Moscow’s sale of S-400 surface-to-air systems to Ankara.

But Turkey can only drift so far, relying heavily on NATO to deter aggression by the country against which it has fought more wars than any other country dating back to the Ottoman Empire.

Still, the announcement in Sochi that Russia and Turkey will collaborate in developing submarine and jet-engine technologies is significant, especially for Black Sea security. Whether Erdoğan views this new area of military technological cooperation with Russia as a means to balance Turkey’s similar collaboration with Ukraine or whether it marks a more significant shift in Ankara’s strategic calculus remains to be seen.

—Matthew J. Bryza is a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council’s IN TURKEY program, the Global Energy Center, and Eurasia Center. He is also a former US ambassador to Azerbaijan and former deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia.

A frank reminder: “There’s no winning here”

The threat of congressionally mandated sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act failed to deter Erdoğan from procuring S-400 systems for two main reasons. The first was the disconnect between congressional policy, which sought to deter the purchase and then punish the sale, and the Trump administration’s botched efforts to cajole Ankara to reconsider the move by making side deals. The chest thumping of the Hill stood in stark contrast to Trump’s freeform rejection of sanctions he thought were designed to box him in (primarily on Russia). His message to Erdoğan was not to mind all that. And in the middle stood everyone else, trying to avoid sanctions against a NATO Ally but fully cognizant what the S-400 meant for the F-35 program.

The second is a more academic and frank question about whether financial sanctions writ large can deter a military sale of such strategic importance to the buyer, who faces an unstable Syria, a strengthened Assad, and an unfettered Iran—to a large extent at the hands of the United States. Short of sanctioning Erdoğan himself, congressional policymakers have not internalized the limits of financial-asset freezeson an autocracy determined to test Washington’s ire.

The current US administration’s warning that further acquisition of Russian materiel would trigger sanctions shows Washington’s hands as tied: It’s not good policy, but we’ll do it anyway for lack of alternative. Carefully crafted export-control restrictions limit Turkey’s access to select equipment and protect US and European military and intelligence equities but make Russian contracts even more appealing. Further limiting Turkey’s access to US dollars via swap lines or other measures makes Ankara further dependent on the Gulf countries. There is no winning here.

—Julia Friedlander is the C. Boyden Gray senior fellow and deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Experts react: The key takeaways from the Erdoğan-Putin meeting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the myriad of challenges facing Turkey as a result of the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.

Alper Coşkun: Turkey’s window of opportunity to keep the Taliban accountable

Can Kasapoğlu: Why rising terrorist threats are bad news for Turkey

Başak Yavcan: The EU and Turkey will need to work harder to collaborate on migration

Turkey’s window of opportunity to keep the Taliban accountable

Looking into the future, I think it’s important for Turkey, as a responsible member of the international community and as a NATO ally that has made very significant contributions to the efforts in Afghanistan, to act together with its allies and partners. It seems that the international community, particularly the West, will try to hold the Taliban accountable. And the carrot that is being presented to the Taliban is in the form of potential recognition and also economic aid.

But I see a weakness there which I am sure the Taliban has also noticed. Until recently, the argument, made particularly by the United States and Western allies about the Taliban before it overran the country, was that any taking over of the country by force would result in non-recognition. Now that goalpost seems to have moved. The international community is giving the subtle message that the Taliban may be recognized if it abides by the international standards that the West and the international community expect. That in itself, in my opinion, is a sign of weakness, and it shows the challenge that the international community is up against in its dealings with the Taliban.

Turkey has a long history of affinity with Afghanistan. That has been the basis of its significant undertaking in the country for years. Its Muslim identity is also a positive. Turkey has made the point throughout its engagement in Afghanistan not to actively engage in combat operations. The Taliban seems to be taking a comparatively positive approach towards Turkey. This may enable Turkey to find a window of opportunity to contribute to international efforts that’ll help encourage the Taliban to stand up to international standards and be responsible in its behavior.

—Alper Coşkun is a former ambassador and director general for international security affairs at Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Why rising terrorist threats are bad news for Turkey

We have two major problems emanating from the Taliban takeover. First, the organic ties between this radical “Afghan horde” and de-territorial Salafi-jihadism—pioneered by al-Qaeda—have never ceased to exist. In fact, these dangerous ties are truly symbiotic in nature.

Over two decades, amidst the overwhelming pressure imposed by the US war on terror, al-Qaeda leadership has shifted its political-military focus and resource allocation from running global operations to supporting regional affiliates. With Taliban rule, now is the time for the new generation of al-Qaeda leadership to bear the fruits in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, Western efforts to encourage a divorce between the Taliban and al-Qaeda remain highly unrealistic, if not fully naïve. 

The second problem is that the Taliban takeover can lead the way into a Salafi-jihadist spillover into Central Asia. This would mean bad news for Turkey. The ISIS-K branch, which even had problematic relations with the Taliban so far, deserves utmost attention in this respect.

One should not overlook the fact that, to date, the perpetrators of the most startling ISIS terrorist attacks in Turkey—the Atatürk Airport attack back in June 2016 and the 2017 Istanbul nightclub massacre on New Year’s Eve—hailed from Central Asia and the Caucasus. Open-source intelligence works suggest that ISIS-K, the dominant “franchise” of the terrorist network in Afghanistan, has been very active in the Central Asian digital information environment, harvesting militia from the indigenous youth populace of the Turkic region. With the August 26 terror plot in Kabul, the threat is way more imminent and dangerous than ever.

Overall, geopolitically, the “Taliban effect” is not limited to Afghanistan. Salafi-jihadism is an ecosystem in which various actors, with different and distinctive features, operate. The Taliban takeover bears the potential to introduce a reloaded abiogenesis to the Salafi-jihadist terrorism ecosystem. This is bad news for Turkey, for Central Asia, for the West, and for the world.

—Can Kasapoğlu is the director of defense research at the Istanbul-based think-tank EDAM (The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) and a fellow on Euroasian military affairs at Jamestown Foundation

The EU and Turkey will need to work harder to collaborate on migration

Both as a country of destination and transit, Turkey has been at the crossroads of various large migration waves in the last century. The country hosts the largest number of refugees in the world at the moment, including 3.6 million Syrian refugees. The country is also at the heart of the irregular migration routes mostly connecting to Europe. Until the Taliban took over Kabul, those irregularly entering the country, when caught, could be deported to Afghanistan thanks to a cooperation arrangement between the two countries. This also kept the number of irregular Afghan migrants and illegal crossings to Europe low.

However, this arrangement is neither operationally nor ethically feasible anymore. Viral videos of large groups of migrants arriving in Turkey preceding the Taliban takeover have created a major outburst among the public with cries for stricter border security. Coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic and economic tightening, this event lit up anti-refugee sentiments among the host community. These negative attitudes were already exacerbated by poor public diplomacy to make the public aware of the rights of Syrians or of the funds allocated by the EU—as political discourse usually blames the EU for not keeping its commitments about funding for supporting refugees and Syrian refugees for integrating poorly into the formal labor market. In addition to this discourse, recent attacks by political figures in the opposition have contributed to the spread of disinformation in the hopes of electoral gains.

Unfortunately, all this leads to higher tensions between the public and refugees and sometimes even deadly conflicts as demonstrated in clashes in the Altındağ district of Ankara recently. When the future of EU-Turkey cooperation on migration is considered, it is clear that the relatively welcoming attitude of the Turkish public in the past should no longer be assumed, and EU-Turkey cooperation should help support refugees attain formal employment and social cohesion. Considering the existence of several other refugee groups, EU Emergency Social Safety Net funds should also cover their needs. This cooperation should be far-sighted and not solely focused on further externalization of the EU migration policy and stricter border security. It should also consider sustainable solutions which would support both the refugee and host communities in Turkey. This time, these channels of cooperation should be made clear, disseminated among the public. Last but not least, other countries should actively participate in burden-sharing by both supporting integration in the countries of first asylum and establishing higher resettlement quotas.

—Başak Yavcan is an associate professor and vice chair of the Center for Social Policy Research at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the TOBB University of Economics and Technology and also a senior researcher at the HUGO Observatory of Environment, Migration and Politics at the University of Liège

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Expert react: What the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan means for Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Coşkun also speaks about the opportunities and challenges regarding Turkey’s engagement and relations with the new Afghan administration and the potential role Turkey, in conjunction with the international community, can play in ensuring the Taliban lives up to the inclusive and conciliatory rhetoric the group put forth in the wake of its takeover.

Amb. Alper Coşkun, Former Director General for International Security Affairs at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016-2019)

Ambassador Coşkun is a retired Turkish career diplomat of thirty-two years with extensive experience in both bilateral and multilateral settings. He was the director general for international security affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016-2019), covering NATO and transatlantic relations, as well as Euro-Atlantic security/defense and arms control/disarmament matters. Before that, he was posted to Baku as ambassador to Azerbaijan (2012-2016), where he oversaw one of Turkey’s most active and largest diplomatic missions, with a wide multi-agency composition. He held positions within the foreign ministry on issues related to maritime jurisdiction, counter terrorism/intelligence and NATO/Euro-Atlantic security. He has served in the cabinets of both the minister of foreign affairs and the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His foreign assignments include Turkish missions in Moscow, Athens, and the United Nations, as well as NATO, where he was the deputy permanent representative. Previously, he was a faculty member at the NATO Defense College in Rome, where he also acted as the Turkish national representative. Ambassador Coşkun is married and has two daughters aged 10 and 11.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

TURKEYSource Jul 1, 2021

Can energy be the key to Turkish-US relations in the Biden era?

By Eser Özdil

In spite of ups and downs in the political relationship, the United States and Turkey have always shared mutual interests on energy including through the Southern Gas Corridor and emerging LNG trade. Shared priorities on developing renewables and cooperation to strengthen the energy security of Eastern Europe are now emerging areas of cooperation.

Climate Change & Climate Action Economy & Business

TURKEYSource Jun 29, 2021

Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw

By Grady Wilson

Biden and Erdogan emerged from a long meeting on the sidelines of the June 14 NATO summit upbeat and positive, setting the stage for dialogue and progress in bilateral relations. Turkey and the United States share an expansive list of disagreements and tensions points as well as mutual interests and opportunities. Both sides are unanimous on the importance of bilateral relations but it remains to be seen how the two countries will manage their current challenges.

Conflict International Organizations

TURKEYSource Jun 14, 2021

Expert React: The key takeaways from the Biden-Erdoğan Meeting

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

US President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Brussels on June 14 for the first time since Biden’s election. Atlantic Council experts offer their reactions on the meeting and its key takeaways.

Conflict Defense Technologies

The post What Afghanistan’s fall means for the future of NATO and Turkey appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Although Turkish-US relations have gone through ups and downs in recent years, the countries’ approaches toward energy projects have been shaped by long-term interests. Now the two countries’ shifting energy policies in favor of renewables and clean-energy technologies—coupled with regional developments, such as the need of Eastern European countries to diversify their gas imports as well as ongoing exploration activities in the Black Sea and Eastern Europe—can help bring them closer at a tumultuous time for global politics and a critical moment for the climate.

Renewables all the rage

The two nations’ policies to combat climate change and transition to a carbon-free economy are incentivizing investments in renewable energy and clean-energy technologies, which have seen project development costs decrease. While overall investments in the energy sector decreased in 2020 due to the effect of COVID-19, investments in renewable energy projects exceeded three hundred and fifty billion dollars globally, including about three hundred billion dollars on solar and wind.

Although Turkey uses fossil fuels to meet most of its energy demand, its “2019-2023 Strategic Plan” for energy concentrates on renewable energy projects to reduce its emissions and current account deficit by increasing the share of domestic renewables in electricity generation. The 1,000-megawatt solar and wind Renewable Energy Resource Areas (YEKA in Turkish) tenders held in 2016 and 2017, in which global energy firms bid for the right to develop renewable power plants, made technology transfer possible with the obligation to produce solar and wind power-plant components locally. These tenders paved the way for a significant renewable energy capacity.

As of April 2021, Turkey’s installed generation capacity reached 9,500 megawatts of wind and 7,000 megawatts of solar. Another 1,000 megawatts of solar and 2,000 megawatts of wind will be completed by the end of the year, thanks to new mini YEKA tenders. Turkey’s Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism incentives were meant to expire this year, but the government has now extended the program until the end of 2025. According to a recent International Energy Agency (IEA) report, Turkey has realized very little of its renewables potential so far.

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden’s election has transformed US energy policy. Biden rejoined the Paris climate accords on his first day in office, serving as just one example of where climate change, which was not among former President Donald Trump’s priorities, ranks on Biden’s agenda.

Biden’s top energy officials reflect this climate focus. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm defines herself as “Obsessed with solving climate change and creating good-paying clean energy jobs” on her Twitter account. Her deputy, David Turk, was most recently driving the IEA clean energy program as the group’s deputy executive director.

Biden’s far-reaching energy goal is net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. In order to achieve this, the Department of Energy plans to build out 30 gigawatts of offshore wind and to reduce the cost of solar energy by 60 percent by the end of the decade. The department plans to hand out up to three billion dollars in loan guarantees for renewable energy projects that help reach these targets.

The renewable energy policies of the United States and Turkey are in harmony, encouraging private-sector investment. Several leading US energy companies have local collaborations in Turkey that date back for many years. For example, General Electric is both an important wind turbine supplier and manufacturer in Turkey. In addition, many renewable energy investors who have launched successful projects in Turkey are also considering developing projects abroad; it wouldn’t be surprising to see these companies pursue projects in the United States as well. There are significant opportunities for Turkish and American companies in both power-plant investments and joint technology development.

An uncertain fossil future

Although both countries focus on renewable energy investments, hydrocarbons continue to be the largest energy source for both. The United States is currently the largest oil and gas producer and consumer in the world. In Turkey, the increasing demand for energy from industrial production and population growth since the 1990s has mainly been met with oil and gas, which currently compose 60 percent of its energy mix. Turkey covers 95 percent of its oil and 99 percent of its natural gas needs with imports. Though Turkey made the world’s biggest offshore natural gas discovery of 2020 with the Sakarya Gas Field in the Black Sea, it will continue to import a significant amount of gas for the foreseeable future.

The share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Turkey’s supply has been steadily increasing, from 15 percent of total gas imports in 2014 to 31 percent last year.

Source: EMRA Annual Gas Market Report 2020

In addition to a growing number of LNG suppliers in the world, Turkey’s investments in the past five years to improve its LNG infrastructure have powered this increase. There is also a geopolitical motivation: Turkish-Russian tensions after the downing of a Russian jet that violated the Turkish border in 2015 motivated Turkey to strengthen the security of its gas supply. In this context, Turkey, which has increased its LNG regasification capacity from 37 million cubic meters per day to 117 million cubic meters per day, now boasts the largest LNG infrastructure in Eastern Europe.

LNG trade between Turkey and the United States is on the rise. According to data from Turkey’s Energy Market Regulatory Authority, Turkey imported around 3 billion cubic meters of LNG from the United States in 2020 with spot contracts. Since February 2016, when the United States first started exporting LNG, Turkey ranks fourth in Europe and eleventh in the world among US LNG export markets.

And there’s serious room for growth. Turkey’s long-term gas import contracts are beginning to expire this year. LNG is becoming an important option to purchase gas with flexible contracts and competitive prices. US and Turkish companies can develop partnerships from exploration and production to transportation and trade.

A regional fulcrum

Turkey’s robust LNG infrastructure will enable neighboring countries to diversify their gas supply—and the United States could become a key regional supplier. In addition, the newly discovered 540-billion-cubic-meter Sakarya Gas Field (including the recently announced Amasra-1 discovery) could be a regional game-changer, and ongoing studies could reveal even more gas discoveries in the Black Sea. The Turkish state-owned oil company TPAO cooperates with US firms in its exploration activities, and further partnerships are possible.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, monetizing energy resources has proven difficult, with political problems rather than common economic interests complicating development. If the United States plays a mediator role in these ongoing disputes, this may speed up rapprochement between littoral states and monetization of hydrocarbon sources.   

Although trade between Turkey and the United States exceeded twenty billion dollars in 2019, it is obvious that the potential is far greater—and energy offers important economic cooperation opportunities. Improving the economic dimension of the two countries’ relations will also reduce their political disagreements. In this context, joint efforts in the energy sector are ripe for exploration.

Eser Özdil is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. He is the founder of GLOCAL Group Consulting, Investment, and Trade, where he advises energy companies on issues that include public policy, government relations, and commercial diplomacy. He is also a volunteer member of the LNG Task Force at the Turkey-US Business Council, an arm of the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey, which operates under the Turkish Ministry of Trade.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Can energy be the key to Turkish-US relations in the Biden era? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In separate press conferences, Biden and Erdoğan both called the meeting “productive” and expressed confidence in the potential to make progress in bilateral relations. The dialogue is an important and necessary step on the road to revitalizing the US-Turkey relationship. Without political will in both capitals, the two sides will never be able to sort through their myriad challenges.

Nevertheless, this is only one step toward solving those challenges and developing mutually beneficial cooperation. Neither president shared any substantive details about the meeting. Erdoğan only indicated that negotiations on some outstanding issues would continue through the two countries’ foreign and defense ministers.

On points of contention, the Biden administration has communicated concerns over Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system—which led the outgoing Trump administration to levy sanctions in December—as well as the state of democracy in Turkey. Turkey has its own list of grievances, which begins with US support to the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG), a group linked to the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Turkey is also protesting its removal from the F-35 joint strike fighter program, in which it had reportedly invested $1.5 billion, as a consequence for purchasing the S-400s. Turkey is also disappointed by the lack of action regarding its extradition request for longtime US resident Fethullah Gülen, whom Turkey accuses of masterminding the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan.

But the mutual interests and opportunities for Turkey and the United States are as expansive as their disagreements. More than any other NATO member, Turkey has taken concrete steps to push back against Russia throughout the region, from Ukraine and the South Caucasus to Libya and Syria. Afghanistan has emerged as another topic of potential bilateral cooperation after Turkey offered to assume security of the Kabul airport under certain conditions following American troops’ exit from the country. Turkey and the United States also share an important and growing economic partnership, which both leaders hope will blossom.

A flurry of diplomatic activity preceded the June 14 meeting, with high-level visits to Turkey by US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield.

One emerging challenge the United States and Turkey need to face is in Syria, where, despite the two sides’ well-documented disagreements, they share many common goals and interests, including Syria’s territorial integrity and opposition to the Assad regime. The latest issue of mutual concern is Russia’s threat to veto the reauthorization of the only humanitarian aid corridor from Turkey into northwest Syria at an upcoming UN Security Council meeting on July 10. This topic was the reason behind Thomas-Greenfield’s visit to Turkey and will require Turkey-US collaboration regardless of the decision on July 10.

After the meeting, Erdoğan also announced that he had invited Biden to Turkey, an invitation that he said Biden was open to accepting. Indeed, one of the most significant takeaways from the meeting could be the re-establishment of a leader-to-leader dialogue channel to help mitigate future crises as they occur. Despite frequent press commentary that Erdoğan is not a reliable partner, he remains a pragmatic leader who has made bold and significant agreements, including compromises, when they are in his and Turkey’s interests. One example came in Turkey’s 2016 normalization of relations with Russia less than a year after Turkish forces shot down a Russian jet that violated Turkish airspace during an airstrike in northern Syria. One can also look to Turkey’s ongoing rapprochement with Egypt, with which it has been strongly at odds since the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, as well as efforts to rebuild relations with Gulf countries.

In the meantime, another important step in the relationship is to enhance and bolster institutional and bureaucratic ties. Biden has demonstrated a desire to return to a more traditional foreign policy. He is less singularly focused than his predecessor on personality and contact between leaders. Therefore, repairing the institutional framework between the United States and Turkey will be the next step toward putting bilateral relations back on solid ground.

Turkey and the United States can translate the momentum and positive atmosphere achieved on June 14 into a stronger and healthier relationship. Whether or not all the outstanding disagreements can be solved, the United States and Turkey are important partners with many opportunities to cooperate and should come to an understanding to take full advantage of the alliance.

Grady Wilson is assistant director at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Biden-Erdoğan icebreaker could set the stage for a bilateral thaw appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Speaking after its conclusion, Erdoğan described the meeting as “fruitful and sincere,” saying the two leaders discussed the differences between the two countries as well as areas of cooperation. The topics covered reportedly ranged from Afghanistan and Syria to defense issues and bilateral trade.

Below, Atlantic Council experts offer their take on the significance of the meeting and what it signals about where US-Turkey relations are headed next.

Defne Arslan: A dialogue channel has officially been opened

Matthew Bryza: Personal dynamics can provide a basis for bilateral breakthroughs

Jomana Qaddour: Fundamental disagreements remain, but don’t miss the signals of a desire for improved relations

Irfan Nooruddin: The US can’t go back to business as usual with its partners

A dialogue channel has officially been opened

Today’s meeting between President Biden and President Erdoğan is a positive first step and a sign that the leaders of both countries understand the importance of the bilateral relationship.

I am very encouraged by President Erdoğan’s remarks following his meeting with President Biden. It looks like they had the opportunity to discuss topics of mutual interest as well as issues of disagreement. The most important outcome of this meeting is that a dialogue channel has been opened, and both sides reiterated their mutual dependence on each other as NATO allies. 

The United States is a global superpower and Turkey’s most important ally, while Turkey is an increasingly important regional player and the only NATO ally in the Middle East that is also pushing back against Russian influence and adventurism across the region.

If the US and Turkey can come to an understanding or set aside their complicated differences, including on the S-400 missile system and F-35 program, it can open the door for deepening cooperation on Iran, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan—and on enhancing their economic partnership, from investment and trade to energy.

— Defne Arslan, director of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program

Personal dynamics can provide a basis for bilateral breakthroughs

Rather than yielding breakthroughs on specific disputes, this initial meeting between Presidents Biden and Erdoğan was instead a chance to establish personal chemistry. 

This is no small achievement. Personal chemistry between national leaders can prove crucial in cutting through long-entrenched bureaucratic and political positions to generate new and positive momentum in bilateral relations.

Hopefully, the revitalized personal connection between Biden and Erdoğan will now facilitate progress on issues such as maritime boundary disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean; bolstering Ukraine’s defenses; deterring further Russian military adventurism from Libya and Syria to the Black Sea and South Caucasus; and Afghanistan. 

And after generating positive momentum on these issues, maybe Erdoğan and Biden can return to more intractable issues, such as Turkey’s purchase of Russia S-400 air defense systems and US partnership with the YPG militia in Syria.

Granted, even after this positive personal meeting with his Turkish counterpart, President Biden will initially face strong political opposition in Washington to embracing Turkey again as a strategic partner. 

But if President Erdoğan can contain his disappointment should President Biden not YET be ready to declare a “new era in Turkey-US relations,” warmer personal relations between the two national leaders can lay the foundation for serious diplomatic work in a new spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation.

— Amb. Matthew J. Bryza, nonresident senior fellow at the Global Energy Center, Eurasia Center, and Atlantic Council IN TURKEY program; former US ambassador to Azerbaijan; former deputy assistant secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia

Fundamental disagreements remain, but don’t miss the signals of a desire for improved relations

The June 14 meeting between Presidents Biden and Erdoğan has not dramatically altered the nature of the Turkish-American relationship, which remains strained on a number of important files. However, in recent months, signals on both sides seem to indicate a desire to find a less combative path forward. 

In late May, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman became the highest-level Biden administration official to travel to Turkey, visiting in advance of NATO talks to lay the groundwork for the Biden-Erdoğan meeting. In early June, US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited the Turkish-Syrian border, praising Turkey for hosting 6 million refugees and making clear that Turkey and the United States were mutually committed to ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid from Turkey to 3.5 million people in Idlib, Syria even if Russia vetoes reauthorization of the only remaining UN aid corridor into Syria through Turkey at the UN Security Council this July.

The impetus for improved relations also lies in the fact that the United States is in search of a reliable and strong crisis-management partner in the region that is able to exert influence in troubling contexts—a role that Turkey may be poised to play in theatres such as Ukraine, Libya, and Syria.

Unfortunately there are many outstanding issues that will continue to create unease for the relationship, including the fact that US support for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remains at odds with Turkish national-security concerns given Turkey’s allegations of SDF-PKK ties.

It will take time, creative engineering, and a genuine willingness from both sides to move the Turkish-American relationship to a more positive place. Even then, however, it is not clear that the relationship will revert back to what the United States and Turkey have historically shared.  

— Jomana Qaddour, nonresident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs

The US can’t go back to business as usual with its partners

Biden’s bilateral meeting with Turkey’s Erdoğan on Monday made plain just how much damage Donald Trump had on American foreign influence. Biden’s mantra might be that America is back at the table. But, like an estranged relative finally returning to Thanksgiving dinner after years of rude behavior, America is realizing that time didn’t stand still and that offering former partners a black-and-white choice between it and its old-new enemies (Russia and China) won’t fly. Biden has limited tools with which to induce a change of heart in this NATO partner. It’s smarter to abandon the pretense, to focus instead on engaging Turkey so that it is a responsible partner in supporting NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, and to encourage Ankara to use its regional influence to stimulate economic and infrastructural connectivity through Central and South Asia. A stable and economically prosperous neighborhood for Turkey should not be a zero-sum prospect for Washington.

— Irfan Nooruddin, director of the South Asia Center

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Expert React: The key takeaways from the Biden-Erdoğan Meeting appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After receiving a number of European leaders and dignitaries since he was sworn in in mid-March, interim Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibeh embarked on several trips abroad, including to the Gulf, Turkey, and Russia. In so doing, Dbeibeh conveyed a clear message to the international community: Europeans should come here to talk to us; however, we are going to Abu Dhabi, Ankara, and Moscow to talk with the real kingmakers of the new, yet still fragile, Libyan order.

Dbeibeh’s trip to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a clear sign that the Emiratis remain crucial to Libya’s balance. In fact, even though their protégé Khalifa Haftar, the eastern Libyan warlord, has been defeated militarily and partially marginalized politically, it would be a mistake to ignore him, as he is down but not out. The UAE pledged to support the Dbeibeh government, even though it continued to help Haftar in several ways after his defeat. After Turkey, Dbeibeh flew to Moscow, accompanied by his ministers of foreign affairs and oil and gas, along with Libya’s chief of the general staff, Lt. Gen. Mohammed al-Haddad, a clear indication of the priorities shaping the relationship.

But the most pivotal partner to this emerging Libya is Turkey, as was made clear from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s over-the-top welcome of the new Libyan leader. Officially, Dbeibeh went to Turkey for the first meeting of the joint Strategic Cooperation Council, in what media sources close to the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) defined as a “critical” visit. It is evident, however, that Turkey wanted to send a message that despite the change of government in Libya, its relationship with Tripoli remains special.

The unusually high-level Libyan delegation included five deputy prime ministers and fourteen ministers, among them the ministers of foreign affairs, finance, and economy and trade. The new Libyan foreign minister, Najla Mangoush, also had a bilateral meeting with her Turkish counterpart, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

In this meeting, the two countries reiterated the significance of their 2019 maritime memorandum of understanding (MoU). This development is even more remarkable in the wake of the April 14 announcement that Greece and Libya agreed to resume talks on defining maritime boundaries. So far, the new Libyan government seems to be willing, in words, to accommodate its neighbors’ requests, but actual policy remains unsettled.

The Libyan and Turkish delegations also agreed on five new MoUs, which included projects in education, energy, media, and reconstruction. While many thought that the end of the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj also meant a reduction of Ankara’s influence over Tripoli, the truth is to the contrary, as these agreements show.

Military cooperation is set to remain a central, yet slightly controversial, issue in relations between Ankara and Tripoli. As the political transition in Libya moves forward, “all foreign troops and mercenaries” should also leave the country, as per the ceasefire agreement and United Nations resolutions. The goal should be to help Libyans build reliable and effective national security forces with no permanent presence of foreign troops.

Turkey’s regional rivals hope that its forces withdraw soon from Libya, but they are likely to be frustrated in the short term. Turkey has stressed that it remains committed to providing training to Libyan forces in fulfilment of its agreements. Yasin Aktay, a deputy chairman of the AK Party and one of Erdoğan’s top aides, made it clear that Turkey has no plans to leave and that it believes its presence serves to stabilize the situation.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense, while announcing a training on “underwater defense,” stressed that the two countries share “500 years of common history.” This passage is extremely important to understand Ankara’s point of view on Libya, although it must be put into context. History is indeed important, but Turkey did not intervene in Libya for its neo-Ottoman links or to revive any imperial ambition.

Turkey has helped the GNA fend off Haftar’s military offensive since it began in April 2019.  Yet the deepening of these relations—a structural shift in their quality and intensity—came as the Turks were partially de-escalating in the fall 2019 when they were unhappy with the GNA and increasingly concerned about Syria.

The November 27, 2019, MoU was thus a turning point, and it was paradoxically the product of two weaknesses: the mounting isolation Turkey was facing in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the GNA perception that mercenaries from the Russia-linked Wagner Group would tilt the balance of the conflict in favor of Haftar’s forces.

The two nations’ agreements on maritime borders and the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones were born out of these dynamics and essentially became the price of Turkey’s military rescue. The fact that Turkey immediately pushed the new Libyan interim government to renew its commitment to these agreements shows how significant they are.

For many in Europe, Turkey’s rise as the main protector of Tripoli came as a shock. But while the Turkish role has increased in importance over the past ten years, the Turks see their presence in Libya as natural. In the perception of the Turkish leadership, this return marks the end of the order established by the 1912 Treaty of Ouchy, when the Ottomans were kicked out of Libya. While this treaty might not be as significant as more painful diplomatic treaties in Turkish history, such as those of Karlowitz, Küçük Kaynarca, and Sèvres, it still formally marked the end of the Turkish presence in North Africa.

Turkey has little incentive to dismantle its military presence in Libya anytime soon, particularly if the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which pits Turkey against Greece and Cyprus, and tensions with countries such as Egypt and the UAE continue to represent a significant strategic concern and a diplomatic headache for Ankara. From this point of view, the recent rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo that will likely result in an official visit in May, and the Ramadan phone call on April 22 between Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu and his UAE counterpart, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, are steps in the right direction to create the conditions for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Libya.

The international community’s demand that all foreign forces and mercenaries leave Libya, as per the April 16 UN Security Council resolution 2570, should be qualified. In the specific case of Turkey, its forces were called in by the legitimate government in Tripoli—a call that was unanswered by other countries—to defend it from a rogue attack by mostly foreign irregular forces operating under Haftar’s orders. So far, the Turks have done a good job in quietly helping restructure the Libyan army and police forces, and they are playing a reassuring role with the otherwise riotous Tripoli militias. All of this is reinforced by the latest events in Benghazi, which saw Haftar’s militias refusing to allow the prime minister’s security team to land unless Dbeibeh was willing to go to Haftar’s headquarters and pay homage to his authority, according to a high-level Libyan source who asked to remain anonymous. Instead, Dbeibeh canceled the trip. This incident proves the importance of keeping Turkish forces in support of the legitimate UN-backed government to deter Haftar’s eventual rogue actions.

For Ankara, this military presence helps safeguard broader strategic goals in the Mediterranean and the Gulf. If the ongoing diplomatic rapprochement with Egypt and the UAE is successful, Turkey will see little value in supporting a permanent military presence in Libya, particularly in times of economic trouble. If this diplomatic dialogue fails, Turkey will have a greater incentive to stay.

It is thus in the interests of all the actors involved to build on this early diplomacy and create more fruitful cooperation across the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, while allowing Libyans to regain control of their destiny.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and a senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Dario Cristiani is the IAI/GMF senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Istituto Affari Internazionali.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Further reading

New Atlanticist Jun 24, 2022

Turkey and NATO are stronger with each other. They must de-thorn their relationship.

By Alper Coşkun

Irritants that have weighed down the relationship between Ankara and its allies must be addressed sooner than later.

Defense Policy European Union

TURKEYSource Apr 1, 2022

Experts react: After Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul, is an end to war imminent?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asks experts for their perspectives on the talks and what they mean for Turkey.

Conflict Politics & Diplomacy

TURKEYSource Feb 25, 2022

Experts react: What does the Russia-Ukraine conflict mean for Turkey?

By Atlantic Council IN TURKEY

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine marks an inflection point in global affairs. Among the countries most affected, strategically, diplomatically and economically, is Turkey to the South across the Black Sea. We asked experts for their take on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its implications for Turkey.

Conflict Geopolitics & Energy Security

The post Turkey and the new Libyan government: continuity, change, and new opportunities appeared first on Atlantic Council.