A JCPOA 2.0 will secure Iran as a threshold state but move it away from a bomb
President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian declared during his campaign that he intends to work to lift US sanctions on Iran. It is clear that the removal of sanctions on critical sectors of the Iranian economy, such as the energy sector, requires a new agreement with the West regarding the country’s nuclear program. But Pezeshkian wasn’t the only one who discussed the need to return to a nuclear deal. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi also spoke about the need to find a replacement for the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), to which no one is adhering. But given the recent dynamics on the world stage—the Ukraine war, the Women, Life, Freedom uprising, and the October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel—and the fact that Iran has been mostly unchecked, can a new nuclear deal be signed between Iran and the five world powers (the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States) plus Germany?
Looking at the current status of talks that could potentially lead to the return to the JCPOA—from which the United States under Donald Trump withdrew in 2018, reimposing unilateral sanctions despite Tehran not violating the deal—there has been little to no progress. This failure and the fact that most restrictions on Iran, as determined in the nuclear agreement, will be removed by the October 2025 deadline—the last date the West is able to apply “snapback” sanctions—make it highly unlikely that a return to the JCPOA is on the agenda anymore, despite Grossi’s claims.
Even so, in light of the parties’ urgent desire to avoid uncontrolled deterioration and escalation, they have continued their discourse in Oman to prevent a regional escalation in the post-October 7, 2023, world. In any case, returning to the JCPOA will be back on the table after the US presidential election in November, especially in light of Pezeshkian’s win in Iran and the October 2025 deadline.
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Therefore, Tehran and the relevant world powers will need to discuss the possibility of a new political framework for the Iranian nuclear issue; otherwise, the likelihood of unprecedented crises between the United States and Iran will rise dramatically. But, given the failure of the parties to return to the JCPOA—and in light of the deep historical mistrust between them—the question arises as to what type of agreement can be reached when the situation of Iran’s nuclear program is dramatically different from what it was when the original deal was signed in 2015.
Tehran has made significant progress in its enrichment capacity. Today, it is enriching at 60 percent using highly advanced centrifuges and has a vast enriched uranium stockpile. It is necessary to make substantial adjustments regarding expectations of what a future agreement will cost Iran’s nuclear program. Still, its decision to expand the Fordow enrichment facility, in response to the IAEA Board of Governors’ May decision to condemn Iran for not working with the IAEA to solve open issues, highlights the danger if no agreement is found.
Any negotiations will be complex and challenging, but a new agreement can be within reach given the understanding regarding the looming alternatives. Without a new deal, and with the continued progression of its nuclear program, the likelihood of a conflict between Iran and the West—the United States, in particular—increases exponentially.
As mentioned, it is essential to be realistic when approaching the discussions regarding a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the powers, and to understand what will not be included.
From a technological point of view, the target set in the previous JCPOA to keep the country at a one-year breakout time is technologically irrelevant due to Iran’s unprecedented progress in enrichment, making this goal practically impossible to implement. Iran crossed the threshold of enriching to 60 percent while using highly advanced centrifuges, and no country or entity will be able to delete its know-how of doing so, even if most of the infrastructure is dismantled.
Moreover, the future nuclear agreement will only limit Iran’s nuclear capability—and not its progress in the conventional field or its regional activities—because the original deal focused solely on the nuclear file. This is Iran’s definite position, and the ability to change it is almost nonexistent. Moreover, in light of the lack of trust in the West, which only intensified after the US withdrawal in 2018, the likelihood that Tehran will agree to a significant dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure is extremely low. This does not mean that Iran will not be ready to dismantle centrifuges. However, it isn’t very likely that Iran will agree to mass dismantling, especially if the centrifuges’ storage is far from the nuclear facility.
Despite these things, it seems Iran and the United States can agree in several areas: first and foremost, ensuring a long-term inspection regime. Even recently, the IAEA director general claimed numerous times that Iran is barring some of the United Nations nuclear watchdog’s most experienced and expert inspectors and preventing inspections at its centrifuges production site. (Tehran cooperates with IAEA inspectors so that they can verify the nature of its program for an extended period.) Moreover, Iran is ready to dilute some of its nuclear material even though the United States left the JCPOA, highlighting that, as long as the centrifuges are rotating, the accumulation of the material is debatable in Iranian eyes. Iran will probably insist on continuing the research and development of civil nuclear facilities. Still, it will likely be prepared to leave the status of the nuclear facilities as they are, with no significant change.
With this in mind, building a nuclear bomb requires fissile material as well as the ability to take this material and craft it into a nuclear device. Iran is highly advanced in enrichment and can have fissile material quickly, but it needs dedicated scientists to build a device. The JCPOA was focused on limiting Iran’s enrichment capabilities but was less focused on the steps Iran must take to achieve weaponization. This issue was touched upon in the previous agreement but not enough, given the emphasis on Iran’s enrichment activity. In light of Iran’s claim that it has no intention of producing nuclear weapons, it will likely be possible to build closer supervision of potential weaponization.
Assuming that the parties can reach an agreement based on these starting assumptions, the West will receive the ability to supervise the Iranian nuclear program (from mining through the production of centrifuges to the enrichment itself) for many years. This agreement secures Iran as a threshold state when it comes to enrichment. Still, it will move Tehran a few months away from reaching 90 percent. The ability to monitor Iran’s progress toward weaponization will improve significantly. In exchange for this, Iran will receive a complete removal of sanctions on its energy sector and a broad and deep research and development program, to which, given the US withdrawal from the nuclear accord, Iran will be able to return easily and relatively quickly.
A JCPOA 2.0 will not be a perfect agreement, but it will significantly improve the West’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and ensure that it is limited to peaceful purposes. The price of lifting the sanctions will be highly significant. From the beginning, the United States wanted to preserve the sanctions as a whip that could be waived in exchange for Iranian fulfillment of the nuclear agreement.
However, as long as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei lives—and it is possible that an agreement can only be made with him, and not with any other leader—he will ensure that any accord does not allow the trickling down of Western ideas to the Iranian population. Additionally, Iran will not stop its conventional force buildups, such as ballistic missiles and drones, and will not be ready to discuss its cooperation with its proxies in the Middle East. Any international interference in these issues has a red line, and Iran won’t accept any limitations on its connection with any proxy within any deal. Iran’s strategy was clear from day one: limitation to what it describes as a “peaceful” nuclear deal, in return for sanctions relief and nothing else.
It is worth noting that, even if world powers accept these principles, reaching an agreement will not be easy. The suspicion between Washington and Tehran will continue regardless of who is in office in both countries. However, there may be an understanding that, without the creation of another long-term agreement framework, the conflict regarding Iran’s nuclear program is almost inevitable. Through painful compromises on both sides, the desire to avoid a broad escalation can increase the likelihood of reaching a JCPOA 2.0, which is in the interest of both the Middle East and the international community.
Danny Citrinowicz served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on X: @citrinowicz.
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Image: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi speaks during a joint press conference with Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Eslami in Isfahan, Iran, May 7, 2024. Iran's Atomic Energy Organization/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS