The Reuters article also quoted European intelligence sources as stating that “dozens” of Russian military personnel were being trained in Iran on Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles, which are said to have a maximum range of 120 kilometers (75 miles). These intelligence sources also stated that delivery of these Iranian Fath-360s is expected “soon.” According to one source, the Fath-360 is based on the Fateh-100 design but is considerably smaller, and its launcher can be camouflaged as a civilian truck.

In addition, former Russian Defense Minister and current Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu was in Tehran on August 5, where he met with several officials, including Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. During their meeting, Pezeshkian reportedly told Shoigu that Iran was “determined to expand relations” with its “strategic partner Russia.” Various media sources indicate that Tehran has renewed its requests for Russian deliveries of advanced air-defense systems and that Moscow might have delivered radars, Iskander missiles, and other items, but these have not been verified.

The reports come at a time when Moscow and Tehran have experienced embarrassing setbacks. Israeli forces killed Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah commander in Lebanon—something Israel has admitted. Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was then killed in Tehran, for which Israel has not claimed responsibility but which it is widely believed to have been behind. Additionally, Moscow was unable to prevent an armed incursion by Ukrainian forces into a sizeable segment of Russian territory in the vicinity of Kursk near the Russian-Ukrainian border.

While the expansion of Russian-Iranian military cooperation might have already been in the works, these setbacks that Moscow and Tehran have experienced at the hands of US-backed Ukraine and Israel may only serve to increase it. Still, the policies pursued by Russia and Iran are not completely in harmony.

While Tehran has vowed to retaliate against Israel for the killing of Haniyeh in particular, Moscow has called for “all parties”—which presumably includes Iran—to refrain from taking steps that could lead to a wider war in the region.

Further, Tehran cannot be pleased by recent news reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin dropped plans to provide missiles to the Iran-backed Houthis at the request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It is unclear how accurate these reports are, as different intelligence sources on which they are based were not in complete agreement with one another. It was a reminder that even while Moscow’s relations with Iran’s adversary, Israel, may have soured after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on the Jewish state, Russia’s ties to Iran’s Sunni Arab adversaries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have not.

According to other reports, the Su-35 fighter aircraft Russia reportedly agreed to send to Iran have still not been delivered. An agreement on a new twenty-year Russian-Iranian cooperation agreement has yet to be finalized—with Russian sources pointing to Tehran as the reason.

Despite their differences, Russian-Iranian military cooperation will likely continue—and increase. But with both now on the back foot, the question is just how useful their cooperation is. Moscow is urging Iranian restraint in responding to Israel over the death of Haniyeh in Tehran not because of any inherent peace-loving nature, but because the Kremlin understands that, with its forces tied down in Ukraine, it is not in a position to do much to protect Iran in a wider conflict with Israel—especially if the Jewish state receives US military support. And it might have occurred to the Islamic Republic’s leaders that Iranian drones and ballistic missiles sent to Russia are no longer available for use against Israel or US forces in the Middle East.

However, while military assistance that Moscow and Tehran receive from one another has not allowed either Russia to prevail against Ukraine or Iran to prevail against Israel and the United States in the Middle East, it allows each to continue prosecuting these conflicts—something which leaders in Russia and Iran are clearly determined to do. Absent being able to somehow bring about an end to either conflict, the United States and its partners in Europe and the Middle East do not appear to have a viable means of forcing or persuading either Moscow or Tehran to reduce their military cooperation. 

Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

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Shukr’s killing has put Hezbollah in a bind. The group has been hesitant to provoke Israel since Lebanon’s economy collapsed almost five years ago—recognizing that every altercation could spiral into an undesired conflagration and not wanting to be blamed by the Lebanese for compounding their economic miseries with a war from which the country may not recover. After Hamas spearheaded the October 7, 2023 attack against Israel, however, Hezbollah joined in the next day to support its Gaza-based allies—both expecting a short conflict and feeling secure that their intervention would not spark a war since the Israelis were too preoccupied with operations in the Gaza Strip and restrained by American opposition to the conflict’s expansion into Lebanon. The group split the difference with a war of attrition, as Nasrallah noted in his latest speech that “we have been balancing between the support front [for Gaza] and the conditions in our country.” But as that conflict dragged on, a fatal mistake was inevitable.

That came on July 27, when an errant Hezbollah missile struck a soccer field in Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights, killing twelve Israeli children. Notwithstanding the group’s ongoing and desperate denials of responsibility, Israel had to exact a painful price on the group by killing Shukr in Hezbollah’s stronghold in the capital, Beirut. This wasn’t the first time the Israelis had assassinated such a high-ranking Hezbollah commander. In 2008, in a joint operation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Israel assassinated Imad Mughniyeh, then Hezbollah’s commander-in-chief and most storied military commander in Damascus, Syria. Eight years later, in 2016, the Israelis eliminated his successor Mustafa Badreddine in Syria.

Either of those assassinations should have also warranted serious responses from Hezbollah. However, both occurred outside of Lebanon, during periods of quiet with Israel and during sensitive periods for the group. Mughniyeh was assassinated amidst a political crisis in Lebanon that began in December 2006—mere months after Hezbollah’s war with Israel that summer—and only ended in May 2008. Meanwhile, Badreddine was killed while Hezbollah was fully engaged in Syria’s civil war, perhaps the most existential battle in the group’s history, and could ill afford to open a second front with a foe as powerful as Israel. Yet Israeli silence in both instances allowed Hezbollah to quietly absorb the blows—even blaming Sunni Islamist militants in the case of Badreddine—and focus on more pressing matters.  

Shukr’s assassination is fundamentally different. The location alone—Beirut—violated a serious red line for the group. Coupled with his stature and the fact that the Israelis claimed the attack amidst an ongoing confrontation, the strike denied Hezbollah an off-ramp. The group must now respond, but a routine retaliation, akin to the ones it has been conducting for killings of lower-level commanders in south Lebanon, will not suffice given Shukr’s stature and the location of his killing. To avoid looking weak and permitting Israel to set the redlines of the conflict, Hezbollah must mount a more severe response—but this risks an escalation the group would prefer to avoid right now. Hence the group’s dilemma.

Enter Nasrallah. True to form over the past five years, the talkative secretary-general sought to cover his group’s exposed vulnerability with propaganda. Highlighting Hezbollah’s very real destructive power—the group has amassed 200,000 projectiles of different levels of sophistication, after all—he inevitably veered into exaggeration by claiming it could wipe out most of northern Israel’s vital infrastructure “in one hour, half an hour.” He also stressed just how much Hezbollah had established an equilibrium of pain with the Israelis. “Airlines stop arriving in Beirut and Tel Aviv, foreigners flee Lebanon and the entity alike, the villagers of the south and the colonizers of northern Palestine are both displaced, their homes are destroyed like our homes, their factories burn like ours, and their people fear just like ours,” Nasrallah said.

He also stressed the need for Hezbollah to have entered the conflict to prevent an Israeli victory over Gaza. If that occurred, Nasrallah claimed, the Israelis would be so emboldened that “there will be no Palestine, there will be no Palestinian people, there will be no Palestinian refugees—meaning they will be naturalized—and there will be no holy sites [in Jerusalem],” he claimed, stressing that both “Al-Aqsa Mosque will be in grave danger” of being brought down “by one bomb”—as would the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

Then he vacillated between talking points from this conflict. Nasrallah’s oft-repeated claim is that the Israeli army, which defeated several Arab armies in mere days, had become too weak to defeat Hamas over months, overlooking the differences in Israeli objectives and the added complexity of defeating a guerilla organization embedded in civilian areas. Namely, that Israel was “standing on a leg and a half” in anticipation of Hezbollah’s retaliation—and that “this Israeli anticipation for a week is part of the punishment, response, and battle, because the battle is psychological, one of morale and nerves and brains, [not just] weapons and blood.”

Here, Nasrallah was harking back to the last time the Israelis had flagrantly violated a Hezbollah redline by killing one of their fighters, Ali Kamel Mohsen, in Damascus in July 2020. “If you kill our fighters in Syria, we will kill you from Lebanon,” Nasrallah had thundered in August 2019. But when Mohsen was killed, with the COVID-19 pandemic further burdening Lebanon’s battered economy—which had practically imploded in October 2019—Hezbollah failed to act on its threats, quickly covering up their inaction by claiming that Israel’s fear of a response was, in and of itself, the punishment for Mohsen’s death.

But propaganda alone will not suffice now. Hezbollah will have to respond, and their responsibility must be obvious. Nasrallah promised—in his August 1 speech as with his last—that “our response is coming, God willing…precious blood [has been shed], and the resistance cannot, no matter the consequences, remain idle….our response will be strong, impactful, and effective,” without elaborating more.

It is quite possible the Israelis have crossed one of Hezbollah’s irreversible redlines, and the group, either alongside the rest of the Iran-backed Resistance Axis or separately, has decided to go to war or to undertake a retaliatory response that bears a high chance of leading to war—“no matter the consequences” for Lebanon. Nasrallah certainly hinted at that in his speech, both by detailing the alleged threat posed to the region by an Israeli victory in Gaza and by stressing, “No one can ask, in Lebanon or outside, that we deal with the aggression that happened last Tuesday [i.e., Shukr’s assassination] as if it was an ordinary aggression as part of the battle ongoing for ten months.”

But it’s likelier that Hezbollah is planning a more limited response. It’s not that the group does not desire a full war with Israel, one it hopes will bring about the Jewish state’s destruction, but it seeks to wage that war under optimal conditions that maximize its chances of success: when its arsenal is stronger and larger, Lebanon’s domestic conditions have improved, its regional partners are similarly positioned, and—preferably—when Iran can provide them with a nuclear umbrella. Indeed, Nasrallah indicated these conditions had not ripened by noting, “the objective of the current battle is not destroying Israel, but denying it victory and the ability to destroy the Palestinian resistance.” This was echoed the same day by Ibrahim al-Amine, Nasrallah insider and editor-in-chief of the secular left-leaning pro-Hezbollah daily Al-Akhbar. Al-Amine wrote that, whatever the nature of the retaliation against Israel, its effect on the central goal of the ongoing battle—“stopping the aggression against Gaza”—will remain the core consideration.

Therefore, Hezbollah and the Resistance Axis will not likely undertake any action that would complicate achieving a ceasefire in Gaza, the surest and quickest way to halt the Israeli campaign there.

Hezbollah could be planning a one-time, intense, individual retaliation. This would be the riskiest option for the group. It would carefully have to thread the needle between a retaliatory attack sufficiently painful to settle the score for Shukr while remaining below the threshold, which could lead to a spiral of escalation. Alternatively, the group could plan to participate in a one-time retaliatory strike alongside Iran and the remainder of the Resistance Axis. This would be more advantageous for Hezbollah, allowing the group to strike Israel with more intensity in that one instance but leaving it less exposed to individual consequences by blending its attack into the rest of the Resistance Axis retaliation.

Hezbollah could also be planning to overall permanently escalate the intensity, frequency, and depth of its attacks against Israel—but keep them limited below the threshold that would justify war. This could occur only on the Lebanon front or across all “support fronts” opened by the Resistance Axis.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

This page will be subsequently updated with a Persian translation of the post. 

Background

Despite the numerous sanctions issued against individuals linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran, an “illicit global network of shell companies, banks, and exchange houses” allows many of them to evade the consequences. This is partly due to the complications involved in identifying the true owner of an asset, the “beneficial owner.” A beneficial owner is a natural person—i.e., an individual, as opposed to a legal person or entity—who actually owns or controls a legal entity. 

Why is transparency over beneficial ownership important?

Targeted sanctions generally—though not always—involve freezing the assets of designated individuals or entities. Identifying property, including legal entities, they own or control is, therefore, a key component of sanctions enforcement. 

Increased transparency over beneficial ownership, as well as leaked documents, have yielded examples that highlight why beneficial ownership information is critical for sanctions enforcement. Leaked documents show that Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich changed the beneficial ownership of trusts shortly after the start of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine—seemingly to avoid asset freezes. His seven children are now the beneficial owners of at least $7 billion. When Luxembourg established a public database of beneficial ownership in 2019, investigators used it to map the local activity and businesses of Calabrian crime group ‘Ndrangheta; uncover additional evidence of allegedly corrupt dealings undertaken by former-Argentinian President Mauricio Macri’s family while he was in office; and identify the beneficial owners of properties throughout Europe bought by companies registered in Luxembourg, such as those of an Indonesian businessman accused of human rights abuses and tax evasion.

Such transparency can help investigators identify Iranian-linked assets globally, but especially in jurisdictions where they are known to have traveled. While there are critical privacy considerations that must be taken into account,  obstacles to accessing the information must be limited to ensure as much transparency as possible. This can ultimately increase the effectiveness of targeted sanctions through the identification of all relevant assets which can be promptly frozen, and, where the appropriate legal standards are met, seized.

When do jurisdictions restrict the legal entities of designated persons?

Asset freezes vary depending on the jurisdiction, but they generally prevent designated persons from accessing their property, such as bank accounts, real estate, and other real property, and ban others from engaging in financial transactions with those designated persons. When it comes to legal entities—which may have multiple owners and stakeholders, only some of whom are designated—jurisdictions generally require that designated persons’ ownership or control reaches a certain threshold.

• Australia: The Australian government prohibits dealing with “controlled assets,” which are those owned or controlled by a designated person or entity, but there does not appear to be public guidance or a definition for determining ownership or control.
• Canada: When a property is deemed controlled by a designated person, Canadian persons are prohibited from “dealing in” it. In 2023, Canada amended its Special Economic Measures Act and Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act to include provisions under which a designated person is considered to control an entity when it meets one of three criteria: if they have at least 50 percent ownership or voting rights; they have the direct or indirect ability to “change the composition or powers of the entity’s board of directors”; or, it “is reasonable to conclude” that they are directly or indirectly able to direct the entity’s activities. 
• European Union: If an entity is owned or controlled by a designated person, then the funds and economic resources of that entity must also be frozen. Ownership involves possession of over 50 percent “proprietary rights” or a majority interest. Control is determined according to a non-exhaustive list of criteria, which includes the right or exercise of power “to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body”; the right to use all or part of the entity’s assets; and the sharing of financial liabilities of the entity, or guaranteeing those liabilities. 
• United Kingdom: An entity is subject to an asset freeze and restrictions on “some financial services” when it is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated person. Like Canada, the United Kingdom requires one of three criteria to be met to establish ownership or control: when the person directly or indirectly holds more than 50 percent of the shares or voting rights; when they have the right to directly or indirectly appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors; or when it’s “reasonable to expect” the person would be able to “ensure the affairs of the entity are conducted in accordance with the person’s wishes.”
• United States: The US government uses the “50 Percent Rule”: when one or more “blocked” (i.e., designated) persons own an entity “by 50 percent or more in the aggregate,” then that entity is itself considered blocked. While the United States does not evaluate control under this rule, it may designate the entity itself if it is determined to be controlled by a designated person.

How are jurisdictions changing beneficial ownership frameworks?

To prevent designated persons from hiding their ownership of assets, jurisdictions have strengthened corporate transparency and reporting requirements on beneficial ownership. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental organization tasked with combatting money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing—released updated guidance on beneficial ownership in 2023. It recommended that countries establish a beneficial ownership register or alternative mechanism to document ownership information. 

• Australia: The Australian government has committed to beneficial ownership reform between January 2024 and December 2025 as part of its Third Open Government Partnership National Action Plan. This will include implementing a public beneficial ownership register, for which the Treasury previously undertook a consultation process in 2022.
• Canada: As of January 22, 2024, all corporations governed by the Canada Business Corporations Act are required to file beneficial ownership (or “individuals with significant control,” or ISC) information. Businesses have been required to maintain their own ISC registers since June 2019 but were not previously required to file them with the government. Some of the information in the filings—such as full legal names, the description of the significant control, the dates of significant control, and certain addresses—will be available through an online search on Corporations Canada, the country’s federal corporate regulator.
• European Union: The EU uses the Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System (BORIS) to link the national registers of member states Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. This was set up in line with a 2015 European Parliament and Council directive, as amended in 2018. Access to some information is restricted according to national laws. In November 2022, the Court of Justice of the European Union annulled provisions of a directive that granted public access to beneficial ownership information. A new version of the directive would instead grant access to the register to persons with a “legitimate interest” in the beneficial ownership information, like journalists or civil society. In January 2024, the European Council and Parliament reached a provisional agreement that includes provisions to make beneficial ownership rules “more harmonised and transparent,” for example, by clarifying rules to prevent beneficial owners from “hiding behind multiple layers of ownership of companies.” Notably, the beneficial ownership threshold was set at 25 percent.
• United Kingdom: The UK has three registers: for “people with significant control,” for trusts, and for overseas entities. Overseas entities were required to register with Companies House, the country’s corporate regulator, and tell them who the beneficial owners or managing officers were by January 21, 2023. Still, in February 2023, it was reported that almost half the companies required to do so had not. An act in the final stages of legislative approval will include reforms to Companies House, such as identity verification for certain personnel, more effective investigation and enforcement powers, and enhanced personal privacy protections.
• United States: Effective January 1, 2024, as required under the 2021 Corporate Transparency Act, certain “reporting companies”—including US-based corporations and limited liability companies, as well as foreign companies registered to do business in the US—must report information about their beneficial owners to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). This information will be stored in the Beneficial Ownership Information database. The Department of the Treasury issued a final rule that makes money services businesses, casinos, and “other non-bank financial institutions that have anti-money laundering obligations” eligible for access to the beneficial ownership registry. 

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: What is ‘beneficial ownership’ and how does it relate to targeted sanctions? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“The Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported the resistance of the people in the region against the illegitimate Zionist regime,” Pezeshkian wrote. “Supporting the resistance is rooted in the fundamental policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and will continue with strength.”

In response to these comments, an Israeli researcher posted on her X account, “If anyone here dreamed that the new Iranian president Pezeshkian would bring about a change in the militant policy of the Iranian regime that strives to destroy Israel, this letter is for you.”

While the Israeli response to Pezeshkian’s election was understandably skeptical, the global reaction might differ. The international community, notably the West, is in no hurry to lay its trust and optimism in the incoming Iranian president, considering previous disappointments with Iranian behavior under earlier pragmatic presidents. For example, both the nuclear and ballistic missile programs saw significant progress under President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Iran’s supported regional network of non-state groups was also expanded under pragmatist President Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021). Nonetheless, the new president will likely be given a chance.

The possible appointment of Abbas Araghchi, a former nuclear negotiator and deputy foreign minister, as Pezeshkian’s foreign minister has already raised some hopes for re-engaging Iran in diplomatic dialogue with the West to find a political solution to the nuclear issue—or even to the growing tension between Iran and the United States in the Middle East. On the other hand, the election of contender Saeed Jalili, the most extremist candidate in the presidential elections, could have helped Israel persuade the world community that there is no purpose in engaging with Iran and that additional pressure should be used against the Islamic Republic.

It is indeed highly improbable that the incoming Iranian president can or will change the Islamic Republic’s attitude toward Israel or its backing of its network of regional proxies. Not only are the president’s powers largely confined to domestic affairs, but the engagement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—particularly the Quds Force—in regional affairs significantly inhibits the president’s capacity to intercede. It is, therefore, not surprising that President Rouhani’s term was marked by rivalries and tensions between his government and the IRGC.

In a leaked audiotape released shortly before the end of Rouhani’s term in 2021, then Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said the IRGC calls the shots, overruling many government decisions and ignoring advice. “In the Islamic Republic, the battlefield rules,” Zarif said in a three-hour taped conversation that was part of an oral history project documenting the current administration’s work. “I have sacrificed diplomacy for the battlefield rather than the field servicing diplomacy.”

With that in mind, Pezeshkian’s views on Israel mirror the current consensus among Iranian decision-makers. After voting in the first round of the presidential election, the reformist candidate told journalists he hoped his country would try to have friendly relations “with all countries except for Israel.”

Israel’s attitude toward Iran: from skeptical hope to complete distrust

Twenty-seven years ago, the election of a reformist president in Iran raised significant expectations in Israel. At a discussion held in the Knesset on May 28, 1997, then Foreign Minister David Levy responded to Khatami’s election as president, stating that a momentous transition was taking place in Iran that needed to be followed closely. Levy emphasized that Iran’s foreign policy was largely dictated by the supreme leader, who opposed relations with the West, but also expressed hope that the long-awaited change would soon be felt thanks to Khatami, who was “a person with education and knowledge in various fields who is familiar with the Western world.”

He concluded, “We would be very happy to see Iran join the regional effort to reduce tensions, stop terrorism, and seek ways of cooperation and peace…Perhaps we will soon see the change that we all expect.”

However, during the last three decades, it has become evident that an Iranian president, no matter how reformist or pragmatic, has limited capacity to alter Iranian policy on issues concerning Israel’s national security. Furthermore, the confrontation between the two countries has escalated significantly. Iran’s nuclear progress, its development of sophisticated weapons systems such as long-range missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), its growing regional involvement, and its continued support for terrorist organizations—including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—all pose a strategic threat to Israel’s national security.

As a result, Israel, particularly under Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership, has increased its efforts to rally the international community against the Islamic Republic. Under these conditions, hardline presidents like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ebrahim Raisi, who openly called for Israel’s destruction, became assets to Israel. In contrast, more pragmatic presidents were viewed as a burden and a challenge that could make it more difficult to persuade the rest of the world to join the campaign against Iran and to avoid pursuing diplomacy with Tehran.

It is, therefore, no surprise that Prime Minister Netanyahu was quick to denounce President Rouhani shortly after his election in the summer of 2013. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 2013, Netanyahu dismissed the new Iranian president’s charm offensive, saying, “Rouhani doesn’t sound like Ahmadinejad, but when it comes to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the only difference between them is this: Ahmadinejad was a wolf in wolf’s clothing; Rouhani is a wolf in sheep’s clothing.”

Where do things go from here?

Pezeshkian’s election comes at a time of rising concern in Israel about Iran. Israel’s hawkish opposition, Knesset member Avigdor Lieberman, argued on June 5 that Iran is planning a holocaust for Israel in the next two years. “We are in the midst of an Iranian extermination program,” the Yisrael Beytenu party chairman said, arguing that if Iran is allowed to create a “nuclear umbrella,” it will use the deterrence it has obtained to launch a devastating strike. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was quoted in Ha’aretz in mid-June warning that, in six months to a year, Iran will launch a multifront war of attrition against Israel aimed at its collapse and then annihilation. These statements come against the background of Iran’s continued implementation of the “unification of the arenas” strategy against Israel since October 7, 2023, as well as reports of alarming progress in its nuclear program.

Senior Iranian officials, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, have recently stated that the end of Israel is near, adding to Israel’s rising concerns about Iran’s intentions. At the anniversary ceremony commemorating the death of the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s leader stated that the Hamas attack against Israel on October 7, 2023, dealt a decisive blow to the “Zionist regime,” a blow from which there is no recovery. In a meeting with Hamas’s leader on the sidelines of President Raisi’s funeral, Khamenei said, “The divine promise to eliminate the Zionist entity will be fulfilled, and we will see the day when Palestine will rise from the river to the sea.”

These statements are interpreted in Israel as an expression of a shift in Iran’s mindset, as well as a possible indication that the Iranian leadership believes the ongoing campaign in Gaza and Israel’s weakening have created ripe conditions for the realization of its ideological vision of Israel’s destruction. Under these circumstances, the world might be willing to give the next president a chance, but Israel may be more anxious about the potential of needing to confront the Iranian menace alone.

Raz Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.

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Looking at the current status of talks that could potentially lead to the return to the JCPOA—from which the United States under Donald Trump withdrew in 2018, reimposing unilateral sanctions despite Tehran not violating the deal—there has been little to no progress. This failure and the fact that most restrictions on Iran, as determined in the nuclear agreement, will be removed by the October 2025 deadline—the last date the West is able to apply “snapback” sanctions—make it highly unlikely that a return to the JCPOA is on the agenda anymore, despite Grossi’s claims.

Even so, in light of the parties’ urgent desire to avoid uncontrolled deterioration and escalation, they have continued their discourse in Oman to prevent a regional escalation in the post-October 7, 2023, world. In any case, returning to the JCPOA will be back on the table after the US presidential election in November, especially in light of Pezeshkian’s win in Iran and the October 2025 deadline.

Therefore, Tehran and the relevant world powers will need to discuss the possibility of a new political framework for the Iranian nuclear issue; otherwise, the likelihood of unprecedented crises between the United States and Iran will rise dramatically. But, given the failure of the parties to return to the JCPOA—and in light of the deep historical mistrust between them—the question arises as to what type of agreement can be reached when the situation of Iran’s nuclear program is dramatically different from what it was when the original deal was signed in 2015.

Tehran has made significant progress in its enrichment capacity. Today, it is enriching at 60 percent using highly advanced centrifuges and has a vast enriched uranium stockpile. It is necessary to make substantial adjustments regarding expectations of what a future agreement will cost Iran’s nuclear program. Still, its decision to expand the Fordow enrichment facility, in response to the IAEA Board of Governors’ May decision to condemn Iran for not working with the IAEA to solve open issues, highlights the danger if no agreement is found. 

Any negotiations will be complex and challenging, but a new agreement can be within reach given the understanding regarding the looming alternatives. Without a new deal, and with the continued progression of its nuclear program, the likelihood of a conflict between Iran and the West—the United States, in particular—increases exponentially.

As mentioned, it is essential to be realistic when approaching the discussions regarding a new nuclear agreement between Iran and the powers, and to understand what will not be included.

From a technological point of view, the target set in the previous JCPOA to keep the country at a one-year breakout time is technologically irrelevant due to Iran’s unprecedented progress in enrichment, making this goal practically impossible to implement. Iran crossed the threshold of enriching to 60 percent while using highly advanced centrifuges, and no country or entity will be able to delete its know-how of doing so, even if most of the infrastructure is dismantled. 

Moreover, the future nuclear agreement will only limit Iran’s nuclear capability—and not its progress in the conventional field or its regional activities—because the original deal focused solely on the nuclear file. This is Iran’s definite position, and the ability to change it is almost nonexistent. Moreover, in light of the lack of trust in the West, which only intensified after the US withdrawal in 2018, the likelihood that Tehran will agree to a significant dismantling of its nuclear infrastructure is extremely low. This does not mean that Iran will not be ready to dismantle centrifuges. However, it isn’t very likely that Iran will agree to mass dismantling, especially if the centrifuges’ storage is far from the nuclear facility.

Despite these things, it seems Iran and the United States can agree in several areas: first and foremost, ensuring a long-term inspection regime. Even recently, the IAEA director general claimed numerous times that Iran is barring some of the United Nations nuclear watchdog’s most experienced and expert inspectors and preventing inspections at its centrifuges production site. (Tehran cooperates with IAEA inspectors so that they can verify the nature of its program for an extended period.) Moreover, ​Iran is ready to dilute some of its nuclear material even though the United States left the JCPOA, highlighting that, as long as the centrifuges are rotating, the accumulation of the material is debatable in Iranian eyes. Iran will probably insist on continuing the research and development of civil nuclear facilities. Still, it will likely be prepared to leave the status of the nuclear facilities as they are, with no significant change.

With this in mind, building a nuclear bomb requires fissile material as well as the ability to take this material and craft it into a nuclear device. Iran is highly advanced in enrichment and can have fissile material quickly, but it needs dedicated scientists to build a device. The JCPOA was focused on limiting Iran’s enrichment capabilities but was less focused on the steps Iran must take to achieve weaponization. This issue was touched upon in the previous agreement but not enough, given the emphasis on Iran’s enrichment activity. In light of Iran’s claim that it has no intention of producing nuclear weapons, it will likely be possible to build closer supervision of potential weaponization.

Assuming that the parties can reach an agreement based on these starting assumptions, the West will receive the ability to supervise the Iranian nuclear program (from mining through the production of centrifuges to the enrichment itself) for many years. This agreement secures Iran as a threshold state when it comes to enrichment. Still, it will move Tehran a few months away from reaching 90 percent. The ability to monitor Iran’s progress toward weaponization will improve significantly. In exchange for this, Iran will receive a complete removal of sanctions on its energy sector and a broad and deep research and development program, to which, given the US withdrawal from the nuclear accord, Iran will be able to return easily and relatively quickly.

A JCPOA 2.0 will not be a perfect agreement, but it will significantly improve the West’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program and ensure that it is limited to peaceful purposes. The price of lifting the sanctions will be highly significant. From the beginning, the United States wanted to preserve the sanctions as a whip that could be waived in exchange for Iranian fulfillment of the nuclear agreement.

However, as long as Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei lives—and it is possible that an agreement can only be made with him, and not with any other leader—he will ensure that any accord does not allow the trickling down of Western ideas to the Iranian population. Additionally, Iran will not stop its conventional force buildups, such as ballistic missiles and drones, and will not be ready to discuss its cooperation with its proxies in the Middle East. Any international interference in these issues has a red line, and Iran won’t accept any limitations on its connection with any proxy within any deal. Iran’s strategy was clear from day one: limitation to what it describes as a “peaceful” nuclear deal, in return for sanctions relief and nothing else.  

It is worth noting that, even if world powers accept these principles, reaching an agreement will not be easy. The suspicion between Washington and Tehran will continue regardless of who is in office in both countries. However, there may be an understanding that, without the creation of another long-term agreement framework, the conflict regarding Iran’s nuclear program is almost inevitable. Through painful compromises on both sides, the desire to avoid a broad escalation can increase the likelihood of reaching a JCPOA 2.0, which is in the interest of both the Middle East and the international community.

Danny Citrinowicz served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on X: @citrinowicz.

The post A JCPOA 2.0 will secure Iran as a threshold state but move it away from a bomb appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On June 15, Hamid Noury, an Iranian national who Swedish courts sentenced to life in prison for war crimes and murder, was released and returned to Iran. This marked the first and only universal jurisdiction case related to atrocity crimes in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Noury was arrested in November 2019 at Arlanda Airport in Sweden, and was subsequently tried by the Stockholm District Court over ninety sessions held in 2021–2022. He was found guilty for his role in the massacre of thousands of political prisoners in Iran in the summer of 1988, in what became known as the 1988 massacre, and the appeals court confirmed his sentence in December 2023. Noury’s release was arranged as part of a prisoner swap, during which Iranian authorities freed two Swedish nationals who had been held hostage, according to the unofficial admission of Iranian authorities.

There have been other incidents in which the foreign accused were returned to where they committed crimes for trial purposes.

Rwanda’s requests to European governments for the return of genocide suspects so they can be brought to justice are an example. There have also been numerous cases of foreign hostages being used as pawns to free individuals detained for or convicted of terrorism, narcotics, or other offenses. However, this was the first time someone convicted of core international crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression—in a case of universal jurisdiction was transferred back to the same country where they previously enjoyed absolute impunity, only to enjoy it again.

This troubling move was a reaction by the Swedish government to the Islamic Republic’s policy of detaining foreign or Iranian dual nationals and using them as pawns to gain leverage in its dealings with Western countries. Not only was it a slap in the face to the victims, but it also created dangerous precedents that will have a long-lasting, damaging impact on the core purpose of the universal jurisdiction principle—and, more importantly, on the expansion and frequency of its application.

Rooted in the post-World War II trials and recognized by multiple treaties—including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1984 Convention against Torture—the principle of universal jurisdiction is increasingly codified in national legislation. Given the horrific nature of these crimes, humanity as a whole cannot tolerate their remaining unadjudicated. The principle of universal jurisdiction enables national courts in third countries to address atrocity crimes committed abroad, holding perpetrators criminally liable and helping to prevent impunity. One of the most essential purposes of applying the principle of universal jurisdiction is to prosecute those who enjoy impunity in countries where the crimes occurred.

It should be noted that international crimes are often committed by state actors under state policies or plans, meaning that victims cannot expect proper accountability as long as the state in question remains in power. In other words, if the state where the crimes were committed is able or willing to exercise its jurisdiction, other countries generally do not invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators. Similarly, if a person is convicted under universal jurisdiction, and the country where the crime occurred later undergoes a democratic transition, that person can be extradited to the country where the crime was committed to continue serving their sentence. Noury’s return to Tehran was met with a warm welcome by officials, featuring a red carpet, numerous flowers, and a press conference—nothing similar to the reception typically given to a convicted individual who is supposed to serve life in prison.

Setting aside the question of why Sweden pursued universal jurisdiction in the first place if there was no confidence that it would not retreat after facing backlash, it appears Sweden utilized an article (Chapter 12, Article 9) in its constitution that allows the government, “by exercising clemency, to remit or reduce a penal sanction.” Many other countries have similar laws or legislation permitting the transfer of foreign convicted criminals to serve their sentences in their home countries. The Swedish authorities’ decision to use this legislation after a long and costly criminal proceeding, which resulted in a conviction for atrocity crimes, could set a precedent for future cases concerning crimes committed not only in Iran, but in other countries. This approach could jeopardize the very essence of universal jurisdiction and significantly demotivate prosecutors from investigating crimes committed in countries such as Iran, Russia, and China, which have active hostage policies. What would be the point of initiating criminal proceedings and investing millions of taxpayer money if the outcome could potentially leave citizens in dreadful custody situations for months or even years, result in a diplomatic catastrophe, and ultimately deliver an international criminal back to a state that welcomes them warmly?

The international community has correctly identified immunity as a significant obstacle in the fight against impunity, and has moved toward prohibiting or limiting its application in cases involving atrocity crimes. In the same vein, amnesty provisions are considered to “be interpreted as contrary to states’ commitments under international law” in relation to core international crimes. The practice of transferring foreign convicted criminals who have committed atrocity crimes to their home countries, knowing they will be granted some form of clemency or otherwise released from the remainder of their sentences, should also be recognized as a major barrier to accountability.

There is a significant risk that the transfer of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury could lead to similar cases unless the international community addresses its detonating effects on the universal jurisdiction project. The only way to prevent such a paralyzing, contagious impact is to prohibit the transfer of those convicted of atrocity crimes to governments that have previously failed to prosecute them and are unlikely to enforce the sentences properly.

Shadi Sadr is a human rights lawyer and a member of the panel of judges at the International People’s Tribunals on Indonesia, Myanmar, and China. She co-founded and directed Justice for Iran, one of the organizers of the Iran Atrocities’ (Aban) Tribunal. Follow her on X: @shadisadr.

The post An Iranian war criminal’s freedom has a detonating impact on the universal jurisdiction project appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This exchange has been an agonizing personal blow. Since 1981, when my brother Bijan Bazargan, a college student, was arrested, my family fought tirelessly for his release, clinging to the belief that supporting a political group or distributing pamphlets should not merit a ten-year sentence. In the summer of 1988, my brother was secretly executed, and his body was never returned—making him one of the countless forcibly disappeared.

After years of activism, conferences, and gatherings to expose the horrors of the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, Noury’s arrest felt like the hard work of those decades had finally paid off. It was the first time a perpetrator had been held accountable, and this opened a small window of hope. But when the Swedish government pardoned Noury, I was overwhelmed by a sense of betrayal and fury.

Although this decision saved two innocent people from Iranian jails, it was a mockery of justice. It emboldened a terrorist regime that uses hostage diplomacy to achieve its goals. Noury returned to a hero’s welcome in Iran, with flowers and a red carpet, surrounded by dozens of reporters. He mocked the families of the victims on television, laughing at our pain and the entire justice system. This prisoner swap deeply undermines trust in the international justice system, promotes the desire for revenge and vengeance, and breeds chaos and despair.

While Noury committed war crimes and murder, Floderus had merely traveled to Iran to visit friends and sightsee, and Azizi had gone to Iran to take care of his property’s water leakage. The gross imbalance in this exchange is alarming. How can a state justify swapping individuals detained under dubious circumstances for a man convicted of heinous crimes against humanity?

The case against Hamid Noury

Noury was convicted of war crimes and murder for his role in the 1988 massacre of political prisoners; he was assistant to the deputy prosecutor of Gohardasht prison in Karaj near Tehran. This event saw thousands extrajudicially executed on the orders of founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini’s fatwa ordered the executors to make decisions “based on prison records and [the] simple question, whether prisoners believed in the Islamic regime or not.” He also instructed them “not to hesitate or show any doubt or be concerned with details…and be most ferocious against infidels,” a reference to political prisoners who did not want to repent and accept the regime’s version of religion and ideology.

On November 9, 2019, during his visit to Sweden, Noury was arrested at Stockholm Airport under the principle of universal jurisdiction. His trial was significant because it was one of the first times someone was held accountable for the 1988 massacre.

Survivors and victims’ families endured an arduous legal battle, participating in ninety-three district court sessions and twenty-two appellate court sessions, while facing constant lies and ridicule from Noury. Throughout the trial, the former official frequently turned his back on the plaintiffs, mocked them, and used derogatory language to demean them. His family exacerbated the situation by filming the plaintiffs and labeling them terrorists who deserved to die.

In 2022, Noury was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in the 1988 massacre. At the time, his trial and subsequent conviction in Sweden were celebrated as significant steps for international justice.

However, his return to Iran in a political exchange undermines these achievements, and potentially emboldens other rogue regimes globally.

Injustice is served

On May 29, the Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson proposed a draft law to the Legislative Council to expedite the transfer of prison sentences to and from Sweden, aiming to increase the number of convicts serving sentences in their home countries. Plaintiffs were alarmed by this development and began strategizing ways to oppose the amendment, which is set to take effect on July 1, 2025. While preparing for that fight, they were blindsided by the sudden pardon and release of Noury, who was sent back to Iran.

Sweden’s decision to use an existing law to pardon Noury and send him back to Iran raises several legal and ethical questions. The law allows the government to pardon or mitigate a criminal penalty for “exceptional reasons.” However, the legality of applying this law to someone convicted of war crimes is highly dubious. International norms and laws suggest that individuals accused of war crimes should not be eligible for pardons. War crimes are generally considered so egregious that they fall outside the scope of typical criminal acts that might be mitigated or pardoned under domestic laws.

Additionally, as part of his conviction, the Swedish court had ordered Noury to pay reparations to the plaintiffs. Although the amount was symbolic, it represented a debt owed to the victims—some of whom are Swedish citizens. The government should have considered this obligation before deciding to release Noury. Ignoring this debt disregards the justice system’s recognition of the harm caused to the victims and their families.

The public reaction to Noury’s release has been overwhelmingly negative. His release has also created profound disappointment among Iranians and disbelief in international norms and human rights laws. It was already challenging to discuss justice, accountability, and transitional justice, given the Islamic Republic’s forty-six-year history of committing atrocities. These include the chain murders of intellectuals and writers inside Iran during the 1990s, the crushing of the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, the killing of a reported 1,500 protesters during November 2019 (known as “Bloody November”), the killing, blinding, arresting, and torturing of protesters during the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and continued transnational repression. The Swedish government’s decision adds to the demands of victims’ family members for retribution and revenge.

This decision—which undermines the principles of accountability and justice the international community has strived to uphold—sends a dangerous message that even those convicted of the most grave human rights abuses can evade justice through political maneuvering.

It also potentially encourages the hostage-taking policies of Russia, Venezuela, and terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah, and leaves behind numerous foreigners and dual citizens, including at least three Swedish nationals. Hostage diplomacy gives brutal regimes political leverage, allowing them to extract concessions, sanctions relief, or the release of their own imprisoned nationals. Each successful negotiation sets a precedent, suggesting that detaining foreigners can lead to diplomatic engagement and tangible benefits, thereby encouraging the continuation and expansion of these tactics.

This release has left numerous foreigners and dual citizens in imminent danger of execution in Iran—including Swedish national Ahmadreza Jalali, whose death sentence has already been issued. Excluding them from these negotiations sent a clear message that they are not as important as a European diplomat. This decision underscores the need for a more comprehensive approach to international hostage negotiations that value all human lives equally.

Noury’s pardon despite his war crimes conviction risks further emboldening the Islamic Republic. It undermines the independent judiciary system, signaling to other regimes that such serious crimes might not face significant consequences. The Swedish government must be transparent and explain why it made such a decision.

The fight for justice is far from over, and the families of the victims of the Islamic Republic’s atrocities, along with human rights advocates worldwide, continue to call for accountability and the end of impunity for crimes against humanity. The global community must stand firm in this endeavor, ensuring that justice prevails and that the security and dignity of all individuals are upheld.

Lawdan Bazargan is a former political prisoner, human rights activist, and family member of one of the victims of the 1988 prison massacre in Iran. As a member of Victims’ Families for Transitional Justice, she advocates for justice and explores the profound grief of those seeking accountability for the atrocities committed.

The post The pardoning and release of a convicted Iranian war criminal is a crime appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2022, a Stockholm court sentenced Noury, an Iranian official, to life in prison for his role in the 1988 prison massacre. According to Amnesty International, between July and September 1988, the Islamic Republic “forcibly disappeared and extrajudicially executed thousands of imprisoned political dissidents in secret and dumped their bodies, mostly in unmarked mass graves.”

Amnesty International had celebrated Noury’s sentencing, calling it an “unprecedented step towards justice for crimes committed in Iran” and saying it sent an “unequivocal, and long overdue, message to the Iranian authorities that those responsible for crimes against humanity in Iran will not escape justice.” But Noury has escaped justice—at least for now.

Taking hostages has been the Islamic Republic’s vehicle of choice for exfiltrating its agents of terror arrested in Europe and elsewhere. In 2022, BBC Persian’s lead investigative journalist, Hossein Bastani, produced an in-depth report titled “Exfiltrating Regime Agents from Europe.” The report detailed how the Islamic Republic and its proxies wreaked havoc across Europe, and manipulated presidential candidates and election results in France, to strong-arm European governments and secure the release of agents responsible for the assassination of dissidents.

Reacting to Noury’s release, Bastani reshared the report, calling on Iranian activists to revise how they perceive Western powers’ “human rights redlines.”

In the eyes of the Islamic Republic, hostage deals lead to a simple conclusion: “By taking their citizens hostage, it is possible to force Western politicians to do things they claim they would never do, especially since decisions of politicians can be swayed by [public pressure and] election contests. This is while the [Western governments] are dealing with a regime whose policies in this regard are not bound by public opinion”—and it can act with absolute impunity.

Top Islamic Republic officials have never shied away from threatening the world with hostage taking. For instance, while running for president in 2021, Mohsen Rezai, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), said, “As a soldier, I vow if the United States even just look at Iran as a military target we will take hostage 1,000 Americans and they will have to pay billions of dollars for releasing each of them.”

Former hostages speak up

Barry Rosen was the press attaché at the US embassy in Tehran when Islamist militants stormed the compound on November 4, 1979. Along with dozens of other Americans, he was held hostage for 444 days until their release in January 1981. The rise of the Islamic Republic in 1979 had heralded a new age of state-sponsored terrorism, and Rosen was among its first victims.

“I refuse to call the release of Hamid Noury a ‘prisoner exchange,’” he told me. “This was an absolute disgrace, especially since the Swedish government did not push for the release of Ahmad Reza Jalali,” a Swedish-Iranian scientist who was arrested in April 2016 while visiting Iran for an academic conference. Falsely charged with espionage, Jalali has been sentenced to death.

Kylie Moore-Gilbert, an Australian-British academic, was invited to a conference in Iran in 2018. When she was leaving the country, Moore-Gilbert was detained by security forces, falsely charged with espionage, and held hostage for two years until November 2020. She was released in exchange for three Iranian nationals convicted of terrorism in Thailand in connection with the 2012 Bangkok bomb plot, as part of a simultaneous terror campaign targeting Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia.

“Anyone in the Iranian opposition who continues to expect that the West will come to their aid in their quest to shake off the Islamic Republic’s decades-long repression is buying into an illusion,” Moore-Gilbert told me. “As these hostage deals have shown, the West is largely impotent in the face of the regime’s malign behavior. Iranians have nobody to rely on other than themselves.”

Rage and resilience

Those who had lost loved ones in the 1988 massacre were angered and heartbroken at the news of Nouri’s release. Others pointed out the false “moralistic” pontification of observers who censured Iranians for celebrating the death in a helicopter crash of President Ebrahim Raisi, nicknamed the “Butcher of Tehran” for his role in the mass executions of the 1980s.

“Human rights is a circus in the West, and we are the exotic clowns. Western governments will clap us on when it suits them, but when the music dies, it’s business as usual,” an Iranian woman who has dedicated the past five decades of her life to the realization of human rights in Iran told me. She preferred to remain anonymous to protect her safety.

This frustration was echoed by Fariba Balouch, a human rights defender focused on the persecution of the Baluch ethnic minority in Iran. “The Islamic Republic has been in the business of hostage taking for four decades, and the primary target has been the people in Iran,” she told me. “We have been arrested, tortured, and executed; our families taken hostage to silence us. However, we are still standing.”

Despite showing resilience in the face of oppression and threats against Balouch and her family, she also voiced frustration at the international community appeasing the Islamic Republic “through bending backward in the face of their hostage taking,” highlighting how Western powers and the United Nations even offered condolence messages for the death of President Raisi, despite his role in the 1988 massacre.

Balouch said, “The Islamic Republic’s increased hubris and impunity manifest in the plots it has hatched assassination and abduction of journalists and human rights defenders in Europe and the US.”

She warned Western powers that “if the international community does not act now, this regime’s empire of terror will affect more innocent people around the world.”

While voicing frustration, most human right defenders and legal minds working on Iran still believe in their path and the struggle.

Leading human rights lawyer Mehrangiz Kar told me, “Hamid Noury is nothing but a dead man walking. Yes, his release and repatriation have marred the face of justice. However, it was not only him who was convicted in court. Thanks to the efforts of Iranians and the independent Swedish court system, his fair trial also unveiled the Islamic Republic’s war crimes.”

While prominent Iranian human rights defender Atena Daemi told me, “This was not the first time that Western governments prioritized short-term interests over human rights and justice. This is not the first time that they have indulged in appeasement when facing the Islamic Republic’s extortion, coercion, and hostage taking. In light of this reality, the people in Iran, who are fighting for freedom, who have time and again suffered from false promises of Western governments, have realized that they should not hope for Western support for the liberation of Iran.”

The staff attorney at the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), who prefers to remain anonymous to protect their security, also believes there is no time for despair.

“The release of convicted war criminal Hamid Noury is terrible,” she said, “but we should not see it as a devastating defeat for accountability.”

She added, “Noury’s trial was a significant victory, as it established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the occurrence of war crimes by the regime for the first time. Feeling frustrated and defeated is easy but not productive. Persistence pays. We need to strategize for future cases and learn valuable lessons here.”

Frontline defender and teacher Diako Alavi, who left Iran recently after facing persecution for his involvement in the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, argues that a missing piece in overthrowing the Islamic Republic and putting an end to its terror and hostage taking is “establishing institutions that can replace the regime when it is toppled. The onus is on democratic forces that aim to topple this oppressive regime. Before that certain day arrives, we need institutions that would preserve and protect the flow of life post-Islamic Republic.”

Gissou Nia, founder and director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council, argued that it would be a mistake rooted in shortsightedness for countries to see Noury’s release as a reason not to undertake more robust accountability efforts. “They should instead invest better in the rule of law and establish mechanisms for holding hostage takers accountable,” she said. “There is a lack of understanding over what the problem is and how to best deal with it. The hostage situations are being treated as an ad hoc piecemeal problem when in reality it is part of a much larger pattern.”

Fighting the Islamic Republic is an uphill battle. Those who are on the frontlines and gaze into the darkness of this regime’s terror and oppression need to constantly fortify their spirits against both despair and false hope. Yes, world powers will continue negotiating with the Islamic Republic and make shortsighted concessions that will endanger not only the future of Iran but also global security. However, the fight for the liberation of Iran is not over—at least for Iranians.
Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post Sweden released an Iranian war criminal. Here’s how activists and rights defenders reacted. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The reformist faction has controlled major power centers in Iran, such as the presidency and parliament. However, despite their promises of “reform” and increased civil liberties, their rule was marked by bloody crackdowns, and Iranians are no longer fooled by such undeliverable and false promises.

Just months prior to Raisi’s death, Khatami—whose name and face have been blacked out from appearing in state media for supporting the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement—boycotted the March parliamentary election. That election was described by the Iranian Reformist Front, a coalition of reformist factions, as “meaningless, noncompetitive, and ineffective” because all reformists had effectively been disqualified. Yet, Khatami, the face of the bygone reformist era that aimed to democratize the country, still placed faith in a system and role he once described as no more than a “footman” to maintain the status quo that most Iranians—especially Iranian Gen Z—are disillusioned by and want gone, as evidenced by a poll conducted by Netherlands-based GAMAAN in February.

The reformist movement in the Islamic Republic has long been dead. Activist Bahareh Hedayat, who spent her life advocating for gradual change, confirmed it in a letter from Evin prison—where she continues to languish—at the height of the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated in a March audio leak that the clerical establishment sought the movement’s “erasure.” (Despite his leaked comments, Zarif has now joined Pezeshkian’s campaign team because he believes in overriding loyalty to the Islamic Republic.)

The trajectory of the Islamic Republic in recent years makes it abundantly clear that there is no room for reform under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, with principalists—up until Raisi’s death—leading all government branches: the presidency, parliament, and judiciary. This was no accident and engineered by Khamenei, who, with the help of the Guardian Council—a twelve-member vetting body in which six are appointed by him directly—is making every calculation with the Islamic Republic post-mortem in mind. The supreme leader’s vision is an Islamic Revolution 2.0, in which relatively young ultraconservatives take the helm of the country—a new cohort nicknamed the “super revolutionaries.” 

The Islamic Republic had two historically low-turnout elections: the 2021 presidential election—or “selection,” as many described it at the time—which was engineered to hand the presidency to Raisi with 48.8 percent turnout and the March 2024 parliamentary election, which gave 233 out of 290 seats to the principalists with 41 percent turnout, an outcome not much different from the 2020 election. Khamenei has always emphasized that the regime’s legitimacy stemmed from its popularity and always encourages citizens to vote to show that popular support.

Since the December 2017–January 2018 protests, protesters have vocalized that all factions are irredeemable, as evident by the chant: “Reformists, principalists, the game is over.” This is likely why one reformist was allowed to run: to stimulate a higher voter turnout to give the clerical establishment legitimacy, which it lacks domestically. However, the Islamic Republic does not lack legitimacy on the international stage, as it recommenced ties with its Persian Gulf Arab neighbors including Saudi Arabia, has joined the economic grouping known as BRICS and the more security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and has continued to attend international conferences such as the World Economic Forum in Davos.

Iranian elections are unpredictable, though Pezeshkian could slightly move the election needle, leading to a second round. Still, the average Iranian is not stirred by a man who uses Khamenei’s formal title and claims that he intends to follow “the general policies of the exalted supreme leader” —language not commonly used by reformists.

And while he seems to be hitting all the buzz-worthy topics such as reviving the defunct nuclear deal and speaking out against the so-called morality police’s latest crackdown on women and girls, the Nour initiative, Pezeshkian has not moved the public, as evidenced by one interview that was described as “boring.”

Pezeshkian has also co-opted the de facto Women, Life, Freedom protest anthem “Baraye” (For the sake of) by singer Shervin Hajipour in his campaign, using “For the sake of wanting a normal life” in an election poster and “For the sake of Iran” as a campaign hashtag. The song reference has angered many Iranians who haven’t forgotten how more than 550 protesters—including sixty-eight children—were killed during the uprising (and the more than 1,500 others in previous protests), as shown by the slogan, “A sea of blood divides us,” referring to the people and the clerical establishment. To many, Pezeshkian and other candidates are merely puppets, which was best highlighted by a viral meme of candidates’ faces superimposed on Khamenei. I’ve been repeatedly told that Iranians are so unenthusiastic about the upcoming election that boycotting is not even a serious topic of conversation, because many assume that is what the majority will do. Even a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) noted that 73 percent of Iranians didn’t follow the first presidential debate.

Elections aside, Iranians are drowning in hopelessness, prompted by multiple unsuccessful cycles of protests aimed at ending the Islamic Republic; a dire economic situation caused by systemic mismanagement, corruption, and, in part, US sanctions; and the brutal clampdowns on dissent. The June 15 prisoner swap of two Swedish nationals for Hamid Nouri, an Iranian official who was convicted of war crimes for his role in the 1988 massacre of five thousand political prisoners, was just another instance that demonstrated to Iranians that they could not rely on the West to hold the Islamic Republic accountable. The only way out of this conundrum is if Iranians take their destiny into their own hands. And if one thing is certain, it’s that their destinies will not be determined by the ballot box.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

The post Don’t be fooled by the ‘reformist.’ Iran’s presidential election won’t bring fundamental change. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

There have been two key trends in the Islamic Republic’s elections. Inside Iran, one is known as shol kon, seft kon (loosen, tighten). It refers to eight-year intervals of conservative administration followed by eight years of a reformist or pragmatist one. For eight years, the regime increases domestic oppression and hostility toward the free world to rally its conservative base. For the next eight years, marginal social freedoms would give hope for gradual reform, and rhetorical softening of foreign policy would release foreign pressure, through sanctions relief. Until recently, this policy recovered the political capital the regime had spent at home and abroad during the previous eight years of conservative administrations.

This has been the norm since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the supreme leader, with conservative Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) followed by reformist Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), pragmatist Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), and conservative Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024).

Raisi’s sudden death in a helicopter crash nearly three years into the job broke this trend. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic feels less of a need to play the same game. Domestically, reformists and moderates cannot rally the people any longer. On the international stage, it’s well-known that the presidency is not a policymaking office. Also, Democratic US administrations give the regime breathing room even if there is a conservative in office—the nuclear negotiations began when Barack Obama and Ahmadinejad were in office in March 2013—and Republicans will increase pressure even if a moderate governs—the Donald Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” strategy began under Rouhani’s presidency in 2018.

The second trend has been that known commodities never get the presidential job. The last president widely known inside and outside Iran was Rafsanjani, who was a prominent revolutionary and the commander in chief of the armed forces during the Iran–Iraq War. Khatami, Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Raisi became famous after running for president. The Islamic Republic limits presidents to two consecutive terms. Rafsanjani made two further attempts, but both failed—he lost in 2005, likely because of election fraud, and was disqualified during his 2013 run. Reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister and already a prominent figure, was also cheated out of office during the 2009 election, which prompted the post-election protests known as the Green Movement.

Khamenei worries that established figures can create movements within the regime structure that, combined with their knowledge of how the system works, can challenge him. Therefore, he has preferred unknown, uncharismatic figures, especially when it comes to reformists. Indeed, Ahmadinejad proved to be a formidable foe who freelanced too much. This was due, in part, to the fraudulent outcome of the 2009 election and the subsequent Green Movement. The widespread protests rallied the regime’s base behind Ahmadinejad as almost a martyr, metaphorically speaking. This elevated his stature to unprecedented heights and provided him with immunity from Khamenei’s wrath, which protects him to this day.

The president’s function

Elected offices in the Islamic Republic could be compared to the US civil service. In Iran, things are upside down. The policymaking class is unelected and forms the permanent state, while bureaucrats run in elections to implement this permanent state’s policies. Khatami once described his office as “the system’s footman.” Like all bureaucrats, elected officials can cause headaches for the policymakers through incompetence or mischief. Presidents can also use their bully pulpit to promote a cause. In Ahmadinejad’s case, that cause was himself, a mistake that can never be repeated in Khamenei’s eyes.

Khamenei needs an economic manager to address the economic crisis that ails the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s hand is relatively light in economics. Sanctions have taught him that he needs self-sufficiency, or economic nationalism, wherein everything is produced at home and science and research are elevated, a concept he termed a “resistance economy.” He also ensures wealth is distributed among all important regime subsidiaries—particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Beyond that, he leaves the details to his elected bureaucrats to figure out. More than ever, Khamenei needs a president who executes this imperative. Whether this is possible is a different question, but Raisi failed to satisfy the need.

Perhaps more than competence, Khamenei needs someone to rally his conservative base. Economic indicators, support for the system, confidence in institutions, and all other measurable and immeasurable political values in Iran are in decline. The supreme leader is not someone who fires up the base. He needs a president who can boost morale among the hardliner youth and motivate them ideologically to beat up protesters in the streets and fight in Syria and Iraq—and elsewhere if Iran expands its direct presence.

Considering these different trends and necessities, the six approved candidates require further scrutiny.

Candidate gallery

The only reformist among the six candidates is the amusingly named Masoud Pezeshkian—his last name means “of physician lineage,” and he lives up to his name as a surgeon and former health minister. Pezeshkian was Khatami’s health minister during his second term and has been a member of parliament since 2008. While there once were sincere reformists in Iran, many rounds of purges and eliminations have left only the insincere and slavish ones in office, including Pezeshkian. However, he checks an essential box for Khamenei: he has no charisma, popular base, or following within the regime structure. His competence and economic management are untested, but he will not rally any base for anyone. That Khamenei has yet to send a signal of support to rally the security forces behind a conservative is potentially a tacit sign that he favors Pezeshkian.

The second category of candidates is the fringe conservative. Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi is one of the dozen vice presidents—better described as deputy presidents—and oversees the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans portfolio. It is a fairly obscure position that oversees benefits for veterans and the families of war casualties. Despite its obscurity, this is an important position. The beneficiaries have been the regime’s foot soldiers, on whose shoulders it has stood for decades, but they are increasingly abandoning the regime. In his current role, Ghazizadeh Hashemi is tasked with using ideological and financial incentives to mobilize veterans. With his experience as the incumbent food distributor among the regime’s base, combined with his hardline politics, Ghazizadeh Hashemi could be the wildcard in this race for his capacity to rally support.

Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani is the other member of the fringe-conservative category and a former member of parliament. He has a low profile and provides no value to Khamenei’s needs. Zakani is the typical supporting character who will be forgotten as a candidate, so a detailed look is unnecessary.

The last category is the known conservative. Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf is a former IRGC unit commander and mayor of Tehran, and is currently the speaker of parliament. He is always a feature of presidential elections, but never a threat. He is also uncharismatic and not particularly popular among the regime’s base. Ghalibaf’s extreme corruption came to light in recent years, which makes him unappealing among the regime’s populist base. But he clears one box: loyalty to Khamenei. He could even be credibly accused of competence, which the regime needs in a president more than ever. But he has been around for too long and is a known commodity—not something Khamenei typically wants. If Khamenei opts to support him, it will be due to the extraordinary circumstances under which this election is being held, and the fact that there has not been enough time to choose and elevate a lesser-known figure.

Saeed Jalili is the other member of the known-conservative category. A war veteran with a missing leg, and as ideologically rigid as they come, he has the bragging right that he did not give an inch when he was the nuclear negotiator. The base loves him already, but he is the one candidate who could be another Ahmadinejad. It is also a problem that his ideological rigidity comes at the cost of competence. His understanding of politics could be summarized as, “Everything will work out if people pray harder and believe more in the system.” Unlike Raisi, who had the wisdom to avoid fiery statements about foreign matters, Jalili carries the risk of public remarks that would jeopardize the current loosening of sanctions. Like Ahmadinejad, he is a candidate who comes with significant risks but potentially big rewards.

The last candidate is Mostafa Pourmohammadi. Raisi was infamous for the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, and Pourmohammadi was a key actor in it. Though Raisi kept somewhat of a low profile after 1988 until he ran for president in 2017, Pourmohammadi has been a feature of every oppression campaign as a member of the security apparatus with close ties to the IRGC. As Ahmadinejad’s interior minister responsible for law enforcement, he set up the morality police and enforced an extreme religious code in public, and occasionally in private. Ahmadinejad sacked him in 2008 for being Khamenei’s mole in his cabinet. He returned to the security apparatus and played a leading role in cracking down on the 2009 protests. As Rouhani’s justice minister, he oversaw a spike in executions. He might prove to be a better economic manager than Raisi, can rally the base, and is not a risk to abuse the bully pulpit against Khamenei or sabotage sanctions relief.

Pourmohammadi is the ideal candidate except for two issues. First, he is a known commodity, which Khamenei does not like. He has been a prominent figure within the system and is shrewd enough to get his way. Second, he is the only cleric in the field. So far, Khamenei’s only civilian president has been Ahmadinejad, which gives Pourmohammadi another advantage. However, a hardliner cleric could immediately become a contender for supreme leadership, which might raise objections from Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, who is allegedly gearing up for the position.

Pourmohammadi’s work at the security apparatus in intelligence, secret-police, law-enforcement, and prosecution capacities means that he is in a perfect position to challenge Khamenei from within, but this does not mean that he will. Unlike Ahmadinejad, the cautionary tale, Pourmohammadi has known Khamenei since the 1980s. This could mean that the supreme leader knows the candidate enough to trust him—or enough not to. But if the elder Khamenei finds him trustworthy, Pourmohammadi is his ideal president, even though the younger Khamenei might object.

The question of Iran’s next president has swung from one misunderstanding to another in Washington. Once upon a time, Americans hoped that a new president would effect reform and change. Now, they ignore elections as entirely irrelevant.

The president of Iran matters in two ways. First, like the US civil service, the Islamic Republic’s administrations cannot make policies, but they have nontrivial influence in implementing them. Whether due to incompetence, disagreement, or corruption, the president can become an obstacle to the permanent state. Second, who Khamenei wants to become president tells us about the internal state of the system and what Khamenei believes to be his regime’s vulnerabilities for a new president to address.

Many crises consume the Islamic Republic, and most of these candidates are a patch for some of these problems. Whoever becomes president will be a hint as to which of these crises Khamenei believes to be the most urgent. It also will tell us where he wants to take Iran next.

Shay Khatiri is the vice president of development and a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

The post There are several Iranian presidential candidates, but only one Khamenei might want appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Masoud Pezeshkian was born on September 29, 1954, in Mahabad, a city in West Azerbaijan province known for having a large population from the Azeri and Kurdish ethnic minorities. Despite being part of the 2 percent Azeri-speaking minority in a predominantly Sunni Kurdish city, Pezeshkian has always been proud of his Azeri heritage.

At nineteen, during Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s reign, he served his conscription duty in Zabul, one of the most deprived cities in Sistan and Baluchistan province. After completing his service, he returned to his home province, where he entered medical school and graduated with a degree in general medicine.

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Pezeshkian frequently visited the front lines, where he was responsible for sending medical teams and working as a fighter and doctor. After the war, he continued his education, specializing in general surgery at Tabriz University of Medical Sciences. He later became a specialist in heart surgery, leading him to become president of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences in 1994, a position he held for five years.

That same year, Pezeshkian lost his wife and one of his children in a car accident. He raised his remaining two sons and daughter alone and has never remarried. This personal story of loss and dedication has garnered sympathy and respect from many in Iranian society who view him as a compassionate and resilient figure.

Years later, Pezeshkian’s political journey began when he joined reformist Mohammad Khatami’s administration as deputy health minister in 1997. He was appointed health minister four years later, serving from 2001 to 2005. Since then, he has been elected to the Iranian parliament five times, representing Tabriz, and served as the first vice president of the parliament from 2016 to 2020.

Known for his reformist stance, Pezeshkian has criticized the government’s handling of political dissent. After the controversial 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, he delivered a speech in parliament criticizing the security forces’ brutal response. This speech caused significant tension from conservative members, who attempted to interrupt.

During pragmatist Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, Pezeshkian strongly supported the 2015 nuclear deal, frequently speaking in its favor in parliament. In a rare state television interview during the nationwide anti-establishment protests following Mahsa Jina Amini’s death at the hands of the so-called morality police, Pezeshkian questioned the official narrative, citing his medical background when disputing the government’s explanation of her death. His call for an independent evaluation team highlighted his commitment to transparency and accountability.

Pezeshkian’s candidacy is significant for several reasons. Unlike many Iranian politicians, he did not rise to power through influential family connections or corruption. His unblemished record and tragic personal history distinguish him from his rivals. Moreover, he has the potential to attract votes from supporters of populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad due to his simple Persian language and anti-corruption stance.

Despite these strengths, Pezeshkian faces significant challenges. He lacks clear and documented plans for running the country, particularly in foreign policy, where he defers to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. When mentioning Khamenei, he uses the respectful title “exalted supreme leader,” which is common among conservatives, while reformists prefer to address him with the title of “leader.” Pezeshkian’s loyalty to Khamenei may have secured his candidacy, but it might not be sufficient to win over the electorate, especially the middle class yearning for change.

Pezeshkian has been endorsed by the reformists, including former President Mohammad Khatami. The parties and key figures of this political faction have mobilized their efforts to ensure Pezeshkian’s victory in the presidential election. Additionally, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister, has been chosen as Pezeshkian’s foreign policy adviser and is actively participating in his election campaign.

His ability to appeal to ethnic minorities, particularly Azeris, could be a crucial factor in Pezeshkian’s campaign. Azeris form the majority population in the provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan. According to the last census in 2016, the combined population of these provinces is less than ten million, representing about one-eighth of Iran’s total population. His hometown of Mahabad, with its mixed Kurdish and Azeri population, and his advocacy for minority rights position him as a unifying figure.

At the same time, this issue could become his Achilles’ heel. Pezeshkian’s strong emphasis on supporting minority rights in the country has raised concerns among some about the potential rise and expansion of pan-Azeri sentiments in Iran.

In the first election debate, held on June 17, Pezeshkian struggled to persuade undecided voters to participate. Some social media users argued that Mostafa Pourmohammadi, a moderate cleric with decades of experience in security, was more effective at influencing public opinion than Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian has the potential to be a game changer in the upcoming presidential election, but he faces significant hurdles. To succeed, he must address the concerns of reformists and the broader electorate, who are still disillusioned and angry about the suppression of protests and the current state of the Islamic Republic. His record of public service, personal resilience, and advocacy for transparency and accountability will be key factors in his campaign.

Although many are still unsure how the Guardian Council allowed him to participate in the election, it is widely believed that the council was confident Pezeshkian would not win. By approving his candidacy, it appears that the council aimed to boost voter turnout.

Pezeshkian’s candidacy offers a glimmer of hope for those seeking change in Iran, but his path to victory is fraught with challenges. To truly change the game in the 2024 presidential election, he must navigate the complex political landscape, appeal to a diverse electorate, and present a clear vision for the future.

Saeid Jafari is a Middle East analyst based in Europe. Follow him on X: @jafariysaeid.

The post Masoud Pezeshkian is a possible game changer in the upcoming Iranian presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Saeed Jalili

Saeed Jalili (born 1965) is the son of a high school teacher. At 21, he lost his right leg in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and served as a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). He joined the foreign ministry in 1987, eventually becoming the deputy head of the Europe and America Bureau. In 2002, he earned a doctorate in political science from Imam Sadiq University, a training ground for the political elite of the Islamic Republic. Jalili has held several significant positions, including being a member of the Office of the Supreme Leader (2000-2007), Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator (2007-2013). Known for lacking a charismatic personality, Jalili’s tirades during the nuclear talks significantly contributed to the impasse in the negotiations. He has also served since 2013 on the Expediency Council, a body comprising three dozen senior regime members that is the final arbiter between the Guardian Council and the parliament. In the 2013 presidential elections, he finished third with 11 percent of the vote. Disputes with other conservatives led him to sit out the 2017 presidential race. Although he was one of the seven candidates approved by the Guardian Council for the 2021 presidential election, he withdrew two days before the election in favor of Raisi, the eventual winner. Jalili is reportedly close to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his brother, Vahid Jalili, has served as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting Organization (IRIB) chief for cultural affairs and policy evolution.

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf (born 1961) has held several prominent positions in Iran, including commander of Khatam al-Anbia construction headquarters (1994-1997), commander of the IRGC air force (1997-2000), chief of law enforcement forces (2000-2005), mayor of Tehran (2005-2017), member of the Expediency Council (2017-present), and speaker of parliament (2020-present). The son of a baker, Ghalibaf joined the IRGC at 19, trained as a pilot, became a brigadier general, lost a brother in the Iran-Iraq War, and earned a doctorate in geography. In July 1999, he played a significant role in suppressing the student uprising in Tehran and contributed to drafting a threatening ultimatum letter. This letter, signed by 24 high-ranking IRGC commanders, was addressed to President Mohammad Khatami, demanding a decisive response to the protests. Accusations of financial impropriety have followed him from his tenure as Tehran’s longest-serving mayor. Ghalibaf ran for president in the 2005 elections, finishing fourth with 14 percent of the vote. In the 2013 election, he was the first runner-up with 16.5 percent of the votes. In the 2017 presidential election, he was approved by the Guardian Council as one of the six candidates positively vetted but withdrew a few days before election day in favor of Raisi. For the upcoming 2024 presidential election, Ghalibaf has hired Ali Nikzad, who managed Raisi’s 2017 and successful 2021 campaigns, as his campaign manager. Many in Iran believe that the 2024 presidential election is Ghalibaf’s to lose, given his extensive political experience.

Amirhossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi

Amirhossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi (born 1971) was born in Khorasan Razavi province, which is also the birthplace of Ayatollah Khamenei. He hails from a politically prominent family, with brothers and cousins who have served as members of parliament or ministers. He was wounded in the Iran-Iraq War and became an ear, nose, and throat surgeon in 2002. Ghazizadeh Hashemi has also been a faculty member and university rector and served as a four-term member of parliament (2008-2021). In the 2021 presidential election, he finished fourth with 3.5 percent of the vote. President-elect Raisi appointed him Vice President and Head of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs (2021-2024). Ghazizadeh Hashemi is the youngest of the six candidates competing.

Masoud Pezeshkiyan

Masoud Pezeshkiyan (born 1954) is the oldest of the six candidates at 70 years of age. Born into a civil servant family in West Azerbaijan, he is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. Pezeshkiyan trained as a heart surgeon at Tabriz and Tehran universities and has held several prominent positions. He was the dean of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences (1994-2000), deputy health minister (2000-2001), minister of health under reformist president Mohammad Khatami (2001-2005), a member of the High Council for Cultural Revolution, and a five-term member of parliament (2008-present), also serving as its deputy speaker for one term. Pezeshkiyan registered to run in the 2013 presidential election but withdrew from the race. In 2021, the Guardian Council disqualified him from running in the presidential election. As the only Azeri in the race and the candidate closest to the reformist-moderate camp, Pezeshkiyan has the potential to garner substantial votes and finish strongly.

Mostafa Pourmohammadi

Mostafa Pourmohammadi (born 1960) is the only clerical candidate among the six and the second oldest (64). Son of a tailor, he underwent theological training at the Qom Seminary and became a revolutionary prosecutor at the age of twenty. During his tenure as head of the counterintelligence directorate of the ministry of intelligence and its representative in the notorious Evin Pison (1987-1990), Pourmohammadi was a member of a committee nicknamed the “death committee” that oversaw the extrajudicial execution of thousands of political prisoners following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s edict in 1988, which became known as the 1988 massacre. He was head of the social-political bureau in the Office of the Supreme Leader (2002-2005), interior minister (2005-2008), head of the state general inspectorate organization (2008-2013), and justice minister (2013-2017). Pourmohammadi has been the secretary-general of the conservative Society of Combatant Clergy since 2018. He declared his candidacy for the 2013 presidential election but did not actually run. He was disqualified by the Guardian Council from running in the 2015 elections for the Assembly of Experts.

Alireza Zakani

Alireza Zakani (born 1965) is the son of an athlete and wrestling referee from Tehran province. He joined the Iran-Iraq War at the age of 15, serving for sixty-two months, and sustained injuries in battle. Zakani earned his MD from Tehran University of Medical Sciences in 1997 and trained in nuclear medicine there. He has held several significant roles, including nationwide director of the student Basij (affiliated with the IRGC), proprietor of the conservative website Jahan News, and secretary-general of the conservative Jameyat-e Rahpoyan-e Enqelab Islami (Alliance of the Wayfarers of the Islamic Revolution) formed in 2008. Zakani served as a four-term member of parliament (2004-2016; 2020-2021) and is currently the mayor of Tehran (2021-present). Although disqualified from running in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, he was among the final seven candidates approved for the 2021 presidential election. However, he withdrew a few days before the election in support of Raisi.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi is Vice Provost and Dean of the College of Arts, Sciences, and Education at Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is the author of Iranian Intellectuals and the West: Tormented Triumph of Nativism, and co-author of Post-revolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook.

The post Everything you need to know about the six candidates in Iran’s presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Earlier this month, Bahrain formally requested that Russia facilitate its renormalization with Iran. This is significant given the extent to which Bahrain’s ruling order has perceived a grave Iranian threat since the 1979 revolution. On April 8, King Hamad pardoned 1,584 prisoners—many of whom were detained for their Arab Spring activism in 2011. Then Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani attended President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral on May 22 after King Hamad sent his condolences to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. These moves earned the Arab monarchy goodwill in Tehran.

Reduced tensions in Bahraini-Iranian affairs, and Manama and Tehran’s greater willingness to engage the other, are best understood within the context of regional developments in the past several years. Lower temperatures in the Persian Gulf—specifically, improvements in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) relations with Iran—have created an environment for more tempered ties between Manama and Tehran.

In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran renormalized diplomatic relations with Omani and Iraqi help through a China-mediated agreement following seven years and two months of severed diplomatic ties. The UAE and Iran restored full-fledged diplomatic relations in 2022, following Abu Dhabi’s downgrading of bilateral ties with Tehran in 2016. Saudi Arabia and the UAE determined that more dialogue with Iran would advance their security and economic interests with both Persian Gulf states focused on internal development and economic diversification. For Iran, better relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members factored into the Raisi administration’s “Neighbors First” strategy, which sought to decrease Tehran’s regional isolation as a means of countering the impact of Western sanctions.

For Bahrain, which takes its foreign policy directives from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, following in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s footsteps vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic is logical. Nonetheless, even if Bahrain and Iran renormalize this year, distrust and suspicions will probably continue shaping their relations.

Historic threat perceptions of Tehran

Understanding why Bahrain’s royal family sees the Islamic Republic as a predatory state requires going back to the chaotic period in the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 revolution. With Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his loyalists calling for exporting their Islamic revolution to foreign countries, the Sunni authorities in Shia-majority Bahrain felt particularly vulnerable to Iran’s extremely ideological foreign policy, which was gripped with revolutionary fervor in the 1980s.

Bahraini officials were not paranoid. There was the failed coup plot of 1981, which entailed the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) trying to create a “free Islamic order” and eject the US military presence from the Persian Gulf archipelago. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi al-Modarresi established the IFLB in Iran, and the group’s attempt to oust the Al Khalifa family in Bahrain greatly informed GCC state officials’ perceptions of the proxy threat posed by the Islamic Republic. Then, in 1996, authorities in Manama once again accused Iran of attempting to stage another coup in Bahrain.

In 2011, a Shia-dominated Arab Spring uprising erupted in Bahrain, raising concerns about regime stability and even survival. Whether Iran was directly involved is a question for another article. But Tehran gave moral support—if nothing else—to Bahrainis demanding major change. Manama and other GCC states saw an Iranian hand in Bahrain’s Arab Spring movement and intervened militarily to suppress the protestors.

Since 2011, some hardline Bahraini Shia factions—such as Saraya al-Mukhtar, also known as the Bahraini Islamic Resistance—have waged violence in Bahrain. Founded in 2013, Saraya al-Mukhtar receives logistical support from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), according to Washington. Perceiving this group as a threat to US interests, the State Department designated it a terrorist entity in 2020, and did the same with another Iran-backed Bahraini Shia group, the al-Ashtar Brigades, in 2018.

Beyond sectarian and ideological factors, Iranian officials, before and after 1979, have made territorial claims to Bahrain based on the history of Persian control of the archipelago dating back to ancient times. In 1957, the Iranian parliament under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi passed a bill recognizing Bahrain as Iran’s fourteenth province (Mishmahig), which heightened concerns in Arab capitals and London about the shah’s hegemonic aspirations. However, by 1970, Tehran recognized Bahrain’s independence in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 278.

Yet, in 1980, Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani said that Tehran’s recognition of Bahrain’s independence a decade earlier was invalid because it occurred under the shah’s rule. By the early 1980s, Iranian officials were discussing the oppression of Shia Muslims in the Gulf Arab kingdom, and Khomeini’s revolutionary agenda inspired segments of Bahrain’s Shia population to stage pro-Iranian demonstrations.

 At least until recently, Iranian state media have continued advancing narratives about Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain. This has often been a way of keeping the leadership in Manama on edge amid rising tensions between the kingdom and Tehran, especially in the aftermath of Bahraini-Israeli normalization in 2020, which Iran found particularly disturbing.

What’s next?

Bahrain was one of the Arab states to fully sever diplomatic relations with Iran after mobs stormed the Saudi missions in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016 in response to Riyadh executing Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. While heavily dependent on Saudi financial and security assistance, Bahrain unsurprisingly showed solidarity with Riyadh during that episode. It committed itself to backing Saudi-led Arab efforts to intensify pressure on Iran following the attacks.

Nonetheless, with Saudi Arabia and Iran restoring diplomatic relations in March 2023, Saudi pressure on Bahrain to maintain its hardline stance against Iran has dramatically eased. Similarly, Sudan—another country that depended on Riyadh and Abu Dhabi financially—cut off relations with Iran amid the 2016 Saudi-Iranian crisis only to renormalize ties with the country seven months after Riyadh and Tehran signed their diplomatic agreement in Beijing. Similarly, the Saudi-Iranian détente has opened the door to improved relations between Egypt and Iran.

It’s worth noting that Oman has been a critical bridge between Bahrain and Iran, as Muscat has long been between other Arab and Western states, on one side, and Tehran, on the other. Last year, Sultan Haitham visited Manama to discuss the process of mending fences between the neighbors.

Of the five GCC states that took diplomatic action against Iran in 2016, Bahrain remains the only one that, as of writing, has not reversed its move against Iran amid that crisis. Bahrain’s renormalizing relations with Iran would mark the final step in the process of moving past the overall GCC-Iran break from early 2016. Similarly, it was Bahrain, of all Arab states in what was an anti-Qatar bloc, that reconciled last with Doha after the 2017–2021 blockade was lifted at the al-Ula summit in 2021.

Whereas other GCC states tend to perceive an Iranian threat as one that mostly pertains to the regional balance of power, to Bahrain’s ruling elites the Islamic Republic represents nothing less than an existential threat to the country’s national security and the Manama regime’s survival. Therefore, it is understandable why Bahrain has moved toward renormalization with Tehran at the slowest tempo of any GCC member.

Given Bahrain’s internal dynamics, it is reasonable to expect any Bahraini-Iranian détente to have less depth than the Saudi and Emirati détentes with Tehran. A renormalization of Bahrain and Iran’s relationship could lack significant substance, and would mostly be about restraint in rhetoric.

A real marker of progress would be Iranian state-linked media outlets ceasing to challenge Bahrain’s territorial integrity and independence. Another would be Tehran cutting off relations with hardline and militant Bahraini factions. Without Iran making such changes, there is good reason to question what a renormalization of diplomatic relations could achieve from the Bahraini government’s perspective.

On the Iranian side, Bahrain’s relationships with the United States and Israel leave Tehran feeling extremely vulnerable. While it is doubtful that Bahrain would either stop hosting the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet or abrogate its normalization accord with Tel Aviv, Bahrain could take steps to signal its commitment to better relations with Tehran by ensuring that Bahraini territory will not be used by any foreign power for purposes of military action against Iran or its regional allies. Bahrain’s government becoming more tolerant of moderate elements within the Shia opposition and releasing more political prisoners would also bode well for better relations with Iran.

Perhaps it’s difficult to imagine both sides taking these steps. But it’s not impossible.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

The post Will Bahrain and Iran turn a new page? There’s been talk of it. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Just a week before his Cannes debut, the internationally acclaimed filmmaker fled Iran on foot after being handed an eight-year sentence and other judgments for clandestinely making his latest movie, The Seed of the Sacred Fig. That film, which defies mandatory hijab restrictions and uses the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising as a backdrop, went on to win the Special Jury Prize at the 2024 Cannes Film Festival.

In recent weeks, the Iranian government’s unprecedented punitive measures against Rasoulof and dissident rapper Toomaj, as he is known to his followers, have ignited widespread controversy, sparking condemnations from civil rights and human rights bodies alike.

These recent decisions have set new precedents in the history of a regime notorious for its draconian punishments.

Rasoulof’s sentencing was the harshest ever imposed on a filmmaker in the history of the Islamic Republic, topping the six years given to fellow director Jafar Panahi. Meanwhile, the death sentence issued by Iran’s judiciary for Toomaj marks an unprecedented decision against a singer.

Open criticism of the regime is what both artists have in common.

To observers, the Islamic Republic’s generic enmity toward artists is now an open secret. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, and his coterie firmly believed from the start that to cement theocratic governance, cultural reform is indispensable. Soon after, artists faced bans and expulsions over the “un-Islamic” nature of their profession and any open disapproval of the new order.  

The censorship hit the music and film communities particularly hard. Before the revolution, these industries had flourished in Iran’s liberal climate during the 1960s and 1970s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

For more than four decades, artists in these fields have been under renewed pressure. At least two prominent directors died suspiciously: Kiyumars Pourahmad in April 2023 and Dariush Mehrjui and his spouse, Vahideh Mohammadifar, in October of the same year. There have also been reports of artists diagnosed with autoimmune diseases after prison release, such as actress Taraneh Alidoosti and filmmaker Mostafa al-Ahmad. Combined with the handing down of exceptionally long terms or capital punishment to artists in the past year, this translates into an anti-art revenge campaign in response to the Women, Life, Freedom uprising.

The sustained support from film-industry professionals and musicians during popular uprisings in Iran—notably during the disputed 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement and throughout the Women, Life, Freedom movement—has positioned artists and celebrities as a thorn in the side of the regime, something intelligence agents and authorities have shown they will not tolerate.

According to reformist newspaper Shargh, within just two months after the Women, Life, Freedom uprising kicked off in 2022, nearly one hundred artists were sentenced or banned from working and leaving the country because of comments in support of the protests and defiance of mandatory hijab rules.

In October 2023, the Ministry of Guidance and Islamic Culture imposed acting bans on at least twenty prominent actresses, including Alidoosti, the star of Asghar Farhadi’s Oscar-winning film The Salesman. The women had either posed without hijab on social media or openly supported the protests.

Exile and boycott

The Women, Life, Freedom uprising marked the culmination of a long-running regime face-off with artists, with the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and intelligence authorities spearheading the confrontation.

The escalating repression has led to many artists choosing self-exile, with Rasoulof a recent example. Indeed, of the twenty-person ban list, nearly half now reside outside Iran. This trend is part of an ongoing exodus of artists fleeing widespread censorship since the 1979 revolution.

Many independent artists who remain in Iran have suspended their activities due to working bans or personal reluctance to engage in the current oppressive political climate, which has only gotten worse since the popular uprisings began in September 2022.

The artistic community’s concerted boycott of the state-sponsored Fajr Artistic Festivals—annually held by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance to commemorate the anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution—over the past two years highlights that these artists might never return to the scene as long as stifling cultural policies and hijab restrictions remain.

Oscar-winning filmmaker Farhadi’s refusal to make a movie in Iran under mandatory hijab in cinema indicates this decisive shift. He revealed the decision in an interview with French newspaper Le Monde in early 2024.

Despite this, artistic productions have not come to a standstill in Iran. Pro-regime artists and those who have never questioned authorities continue to work.

Such projects are often funded by two major media producers in Iran: the state broadcaster known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) and the Owj Arts and Media Organization, the arts and production body of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). These state-owned entities currently monopolize hundreds of smaller media outlets and production firms, and also monitor the activities of independent media companies. IRIB and Owj productions are primarily used to spread regime propaganda.

The Owj Arts and Media Organization has strategically taken over Iran’s media-production landscape through an expanded and intricate network of connections with broadcaster IRIB and security and cultural authorities. With an estimated budget of $2 million in 2024, it funnels cultural money into various visual genres. High-profile and controversial Owj productions include the television spy series Gando, an Iranian version of the Israeli show Fauda, and musical theater Esfandiyar’s Seven Labors, based on the seminal Persian epic poem the Shahnameh.

Breaking free of long-standing taboos

Amid the boycotting of state-sponsored art by independent artists and the funneling of cultural budgets to state propaganda, a small yet burgeoning group of independent artists have pushed the boundaries of moviemaking from inside Iran.

Showing women without hijab and physical contact between men and women have been unbreakable taboos in post-revolution Iranian cinema. Yet, in the wake of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, a batch of Iranian movies—made inside Iran without observing mandatory hijab and other restrictions and without obtaining a license from the authorities—were screened at the 2023 Cannes Film Festival, and received acclaim from Iranian and international audiences. Me, Maryam, the Children and 26 Others by Farshad Hashemi and Terrestrial Verses by Ali Agari and Alireza Khatami received overwhelmingly positive reviews.

Since then, other internationally acclaimed dramas, such as My Favorite Cake directed by Maryam Moghaddam and Behtash Sanaeeha, and Rasoulof’s The Seed of the Sacred Fig, have openly traversed the Islamic Republic’s long-standing red lines and strict dress codes.

The homegrown push could be seen as an evolution of underground art, a method of creation long used to depict prohibited subjects within Iran. However, it has never been as public and transgressive as it has now become.

It could be argued that the independent artists’ intentional disengagement from all forms of state-related art, powered by the emergence of a new generation of taboo breakers in Iranian cinema, exposes the failure of regime strategies to threaten and impede Iran-based dissident artists.

Unsurprisingly, the Islamic Republic’s restrictive measures have only spurred Iranian artists to resist pressure, open radical fronts, and fundamentally subvert the ideological restrictions on artistic independence and creation that have been enforced since the 1979 revolution.

Shekufe Bar is a journalist who writes about art, culture, and society.

The post The high price of dissident art in Iran: Silence or exile appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In March, the presence of at least twenty thousand Afghan migrants at a state-run event in Tehran to commemorate the birth of the third Shia saint, Imam Hassan—and support the Resistance Axis—caused a significant stir among Iranians.

Some Iranians have also ridiculed the Islamic Republic’s reliance on Afghan migrants to pack Tehran’s eighty-thousand-seat Azadi stadium at a state-run ideological parade, mocking the move as further evidence of the regime’s shrinking support base.

The topic of mass Afghan migration is virtually unavoidable on Iranian streets. The past year has seen a significant influx of Shia Afghans to Iran—something that is visible across every city and even in the most obscure rural areas, such as Khomein, the hometown of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

On the surface, there appear to be two explanations for this sudden surge in migration from Iran’s eastern border: the Taliban takeover in 2021, which caused mass displacement, and the fact that Iran has lost control over its borders—with an Afghan refugee increase of 338 percent since 2021, equivalent to 3.41 million people in just three years.

But the unusual pace with which Afghan refugees have been legally incorporated into Iranian society, despite severe backlash, suggests something greater and more coordinated is at play.

Historically, Afghans have faced state and societal discrimination in Iran. This discrimination prevented Afghans from owning homes, opening bank accounts, or buying cell phones, and Afghans also faced marriage restrictions. However, multiple reports have recently revealed that Afghan refugees en masse have been granted Iranian passports, national identity cards, and full citizenship rights—including the rights to work, vote, and own homes.

While many Afghans have used this avenue, others have taken advantage of recent changes to Iran’s migration laws, which grant immediate “special permanent residence” to foreign nationals “interested in the Islamic Revolution” or who support “the ideals and securing the interests of the Islamic Republic.”

In recent months, the mass participation of Shia Afghans at regime-organized events—including speeches made by the president and supreme leader, state-run Shia Islamist processions, and even rubber-stamp “elections”—sheds light on how the Islamic Republic is proactively using Afghan migrants to foster a loyal constituency and fill the widening gap between the state and Iranian society. As one Shia Afghan migrant declared on state television during the highly engineered March parliamentary elections, which were boycotted overwhelmingly by the Iranian population, “It’s my great honor to come to the ballot box and vote for the Islamic Republic.”

This resembles the clerical establishment’s demographic engineering abroad—repopulating Sunni and Christian neighborhoods in places like Syria and Iraq—where Shia migration, mainly from Afghanistan, has been used to facilitate Tehran’s ideological and security needs. This model not only consolidates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) suppressive security apparatus but serves to Islamize societies and change their identities according to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s grand ideological project.   

Against this backdrop, the pace at which Afghan Shia migrants have been incorporated into the Islamic Republic’s ideological and propaganda pillars raises serious questions. Is the regime deliberately manufacturing demographic changes in Iran through migration to engineer the supreme leader’s long-held objective of achieving a so-called “Islamic society”?    

As Khamenei has repeatedly argued, creating an “Islamic society” can only be achieved after creating a “true” Islamic government. The de facto appointment of hardline Islamist cleric and Khamenei protégé Ebrahim Raisi in the 2021 presidential elections was designed to complete that first step so the regime could move toward an Islamic society, as noted by the supreme leader’s representative to the IRGC.

From the start of the revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic has taken two approaches to Islamizing Iranian society: from above, through top-down imposition, and from below, focusing on grassroots projects such as establishing Basij militias and mosques in every neighborhood.

Despite all these efforts, Iranian society today is anything but Islamic. A leaked poll conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance from 2023 revealed that 73 percent of Iranians seek a secular state, contrary to regime propaganda. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising in 2022 following the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini for “improper hijab” brought these data to life.

Videos of women and men burning the compulsory Islamic veil and the Quran, the torching of mosques and Shia eulogy centers, and the new trend of “turban tossing” to mock the Shia clergy revealed the extent of secularization in Iranian society.

In many ways, the uprising was the final nail in the coffin for Khamenei and his hardline followers’ attempts to achieve an Islamic society among Iranians.

Having tried and failed to Islamize society from above and below, the clerical establishment and the IRGC adopted a new approach to the creation of their ideal Islamic society—Islamization from outside.

Migrants from Afghanistan and other shia communities are, in many ways, the perfect candidates for Khamenei to exploit to implement his project of Islamization. The Shia Afghan community is undoubtedly more religiously conservative and observant than the increasingly secular Iranian population—and Tehran is awarding full privileges to committed Shias from Afghanistan.

The current migration figures from Afghanistan underscore that engineering demographic changes in Iran is not a pipe dream for the supreme leader, but a genuine possibility that is within reach.

These figures reveal that there are as many as 6 million Afghan migrants in Iran. However, according to Seyed Hadi Kasai-Zadeh, editor of the journal Meydan-e Azad, if the current trajectory of migration continues, this figure could increase to “20 million in the next three years.” Today, as many as ten thousand Shia Afghans are crossing the border into Iran. These numbers, coupled with mass Iranian emigration—with as many as 2.2 million Iranians leaving the country in 2023 alone—and the country’s historically low birthrate reveal its population will be very different in the coming years.

Iran’s birthrate—which has dropped from 6.4 percent in 1980 to 1.66 percent in 2022—has been a significant cause of concern for the aging ayatollah. In 2013, the supreme leader demanded that Iran’s population increase to 150 million—which he deemed necessary for the establishment of a new Islamic civilization. To achieve this, the regime has employed both incentives for “baby making”—such as providing free housing or high-speed internet to married couples—and forced impositions, such as banning contraception for men and women. An anonymous IRGC official told us that all members of the IRGC must have at least two children or provide medical reasons why they cannot.

In the conspiratorial worldview of Khamenei and the clerical establishment, Iran’s low birthrate is part of a Western plot to decrease the global Shia population and incapacitate the workforce the regime needs to establish its new Islamic civilization. Many in Iran have interpreted the influx of Shia Afghan migrants as Khamenei’s attempt to remedy this. In 2023, the state-run Islamic Republic newspaper reported that, in the fall of 2022, out of 300 births in a hospital in Fars province, 294 were Afghan. These statistics simply cannot be ignored.

But how will Shia Afghan migrants contribute toward achieving Khamenei’s so-called ideal “Islamic society”? One way relates to Islamizing public life in Iran. The regime has long sought to increase attendance at mosques, Shia Islamist eulogy centers (heyats), and public ideological processions—attendance which has been significantly declining among Iranians. For example, during this year’s Nowruz holiday, while large numbers of Iranians opted to celebrate New Year festivities at pre-Islamic, secular historical sites, a reported  thirty thousand foreign migrants—the overwhelming majority of whom were Afghan—gathered in Mashhad at the holy shrine of eighth Shia saint, Imam Reza.

Islamic morality policing is another example. As more and more Iranian women and men resist Islamic dress codes, the regime is seeking to actively incorporate Shia Afghan migrants in its efforts to enforce its Islamist “enjoining good, forbidding evil” doctrine, which underpins its morality policing codes.  

The final—and perhaps most important—example relates to bolstering the IRGC’s security and paramilitary apparatus. Reports have revealed that the IRGC has been encouraging Shia Afghan migration in Iran to bolster its Shia Afghan proxy, the Fatemiyoun Brigade. This paramilitary force—known as the IRGC’s Afghan Hezbollah—is actively participating in the Iranian regime’s militancy and terrorism abroad, including against Israel and US forces. Regime affiliates have also alluded to using Afghan migrants to suppress future anti-regime protests in Iran. 

In the short term, Khamenei might be able to use Islamization from outside to fill the increasing gap between the regime and its people, and to expand his shrinking social constituency. In the medium to long term, however, such demographic manufacturing will inevitably inflame domestic tensions in Iran, further increasing the gap between the Iranian people and the regime and resulting in societal conflict between Iranians and Afghan migrants.

If Khamenei and the IRGC can control this, then they will have a better chance of preserving the Islamic Republic, undercutting the widely held belief that the modernization and secularization of society will inevitably lead to the collapse of the regime. On the other hand, if the regime’s project unravels, it could increase the frequency of mass protests and violent resistance against the regime’s suppression. Either way, domestic instability in Iran is about to get a lot worse.

Saeid Golkar is a senior adviser at United Against Nuclear Iran and UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

Kasra Aarabi is the director of IRGC research at United Against Nuclear Iran. Follow him on X: @KasraAarabi.

The post Shia Afghans are being brought to Iran to make up for the lack of religious Iranians appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Although somewhat media shy, Bagheri Kani is not an unknown face to the Iranian public or Western diplomats. When Raisi was elected president in 2021, Bagheri Kani was one of the top names bandied about as a possible foreign minister. Ultimately, the job went to Amir-Abdollahian, with Bagheri Kani serving as his top deputy and heading the crucial political department in the foreign ministry. In this capacity, Bagheri Kani has been Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, engaging in several rounds of direct talks with the European Union in Vienna and clandestine talks with the United States in Muscat. On May 19, shortly before Raisi’s crash, Iran confirmed the discussions with the United States.

Speaking at the funeral of Amir-Abdollahian, Bagheri Kani affirmed that he would follow the policies of his predecessor. In his interviews since, he has talked less about the sensitive talks with the United States and the West and more about upgrading Iran’s diplomatic ties with some regional countries—chiefly Saudi Arabia—which took place during the Raisi administration. Tehran-Riyadh relations are still patchy, as evidenced by the recent expulsion of an Iranian media delegation from Saudi Arabia. But, according to Iran, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has accepted an invitation to visit Tehran—something that would have been unthinkable not that long ago.

Bagheri Kani has had a stormy first week on the job, holding phone conversations with many of his counterparts, including those from Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In person, he hosted Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on his first-ever trip to Tehran, as well as Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas and other Palestinian armed factions, both of whom were in Iran to attend the state funeral.

But who is Bagheri Kani? And if he were to stay on the job, what kind of foreign minister would he be?

The school of Imam Sadeq

Born in Tehran in 1967, Bagheri Kani hails from an influential clerical family that firmly belongs to the conservative side of the Islamic Republic’s faction politics. His father spent years serving in the Assembly of Experts, an eighty-eight-member clerical body tasked with dismissing and choosing the supreme leader, before losing his seat in 2016 as a list of centrist challengers backed by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani performed particularly well. Bagheri Kani’s brother, Mesbah al-Hoda, is married to the youngest daughter of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, making him one of many regime officials related to the head of state.

His uncle, Mohammadreza Mahdavi Kani, was among the Islamic Republic’s founding fathers, serving as interior minister and interim prime minister in the early days of the regime. Mahdavi Bagheri Kani’s landmark project was the founding of Imam Sadeq University, built after the regime expropriated a Harvard-affiliated institution. Named after a Shia imam, the university has long been the Islamic Republic’s main cadre-building factory.

Bagheri Kani studied economics at the university his uncle founded and, like several of his relatives, also taught there for a while. In the 1990s, Imam Sadeq graduates started filling up governmental bodies of the Islamic Republic, and Ali was among them.

For a short time, Bagheri Kani worked at the state broadcaster, already serving as the head of political news at national radio in 1994, a rapid rise that probably had something to do with his strong familial ties to the regime’s establishment. Bagheri Kani soon left for the foreign ministry, serving as a Middle East specialist. He married his first cousin once removed in 1997 and has two daughters.

In the foreign ministry, Bagheri Kani became close to hardliner Saeed Jalili, another Imam Sadeq graduate whose star was in the ascendency when reformist President Mohammad Khatami gave way to hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005. In 2007, when the European-American department of the foreign ministry was split into two, Bagheri Kani headed the European department.

However, in 2008, Iran started a new round of nuclear negotiations with the West, which was then headed by the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Jalili led the talks as SNSC secretary. During negotiations, Bagheri Kani left the foreign ministry to serve as Jalili’s top deputy. The talks during the Jalili era were not really negotiations, as Jalili and his entourage often lectured their Western counterparts about imperialism and the “crimes” committed by the United States, without making meaningful progress.

The failure of these talks provided the background to the 2013 presidential elections, in which the centrist Hassan Rouhani was backed by reformists pitted against four conservative candidates, including Jalili. Rouhani ran explicitly on a platform of getting a nuclear deal with the West that could ease the sanctions on the Iranian economy. In contrast, Jalili championed his track record at the talks. Bagheri Kani led Jalili’s 2013 electoral campaign and held a debate on foreign policy with Mahmud Vaezi, Rouhani’s chief of staff, in which the latter accused Jalili of having a Taliban-like foreign policy. Rouhani won the election with 50.7 percent, while Jalili finished third with 11.4 percent.

When Rouhani and his foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, led the nuclear talks, Bagheri Kani was a major critic who often spoke against them in the parliament, both before and after the 2015 deal. He also wrote several op-eds against Rouhani’s pursuit of the agreement. Bagheri Kani went as far as claiming that Khamenei wasn’t truly in favor of the deal, although he publicly supported it. In 2023, Bagheri Kani wrote a foreword to the unauthorized Persian translation of Not for the Faint of Heart, a memoir by Wendy Sherman, a leading US diplomat and a key negotiator of the 2015 deal. Translated by one of Raisi’s top aides, the book is riddled with deliberate mistranslations, as first revealed by IranWire, that aim to portray Sherman in conspiratorial colors. In the foreword, Bagheri Kani clarified his position by calling Iran’s talks with the United States “a bitter historical experience.”

In 2020, in the final years of the Rouhani administration, Bagheri Kani went to the judiciary, which was then headed by Raisi. Bagheri Kani headed the judiciary’s High Council of Human Rights, which was founded in 2005 to overcome the massive international pressure on Iran over its dismal human rights situation. Its main job is denouncing United Nations human rights procedures, with which Iran doesn’t collaborate.

The new Bagheri Kani?

When Raisi became president in 2021 after an engineered presidential election, Bagheri Kani went back to the foreign ministry, heading the talks aimed at renewing the very deal he had so bitterly critiqued. Unlike his predecessor, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Bagheri Kani wasn’t that media friendly. But in a speech for the faculty of a teacher-training university in Tehran in 2023, he shocked some by criticizing “those who, under the cover of defending values, want to portray any negotiations as opposed to values.” In regime speak, this counted as a turnaround. The centrist and reformist press even started speaking of a “new Bagheri Kani” who now understood the importance of diplomatic talks with the West. On May 25, a former diplomat told reformist daily Etemad that Bagheri Kani’s position had changed when he saw the difficulties of engaging in the talks compared to safely critiquing them from the sidelines.

Bagheri Kani’s intense negotiations with the European Union—which was also acting on behalf of the United States—resulted in a text publicly defended in 2022 by European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. But Tehran rejected the text. A month later, the eruption of the Women, Life, Freedom anti-regime protests made any talks with Tehran radioactive for the West. With the movement in retreat and the region in turmoil following Hamas’s attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, the talks have been ongoing again, if often clandestinely, now covering regional issues as well as the nuclear file. Bagheri Kani has reportedly led many of these talks. Yet, some reports allege that the nuclear file is now led by Ali Shamkhani, Iran’s secretary of the SNSC until his dismissal last year. Bagheri Kani, however, has neither confirmed nor denied these reports. At the same time, Rouhani insiders such as Vaezi and Zarif have vociferously criticized Shamkhani, claiming that he was an obstacle to the nuclear talks. Whomever is Iran’s next president and foreign minister would need to navigate these difficult domestic and international dynamics in pursuit of any diplomatic talks with the West.

Bagheri Kani seems to be aware of the stakes. Speaking at the memorial of his boss, he highlighted how difficult the job of a top diplomat was and said, “It won’t be an easy job for whoever becomes the next foreign minister.” He was seen smiling, surely thinking that someone might very well be himself.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar. He is the author of The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions and What Iranians Want. Follow him on X: @arash_tehran.

The post A nuclear negotiator takes the helm of Iran’s foreign ministry. So what’s next? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Fast-forward to May 20. Millions in and out of Iran, including in Syria and the Gaza Strip, publicly rejoiced when President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and several provincial officials.

Since news emerged of Raisi’s helicopter crashing in Iran’s East Azerbaijan province on May 19, people from different backgrounds were glued to their smartphones, anxiously waiting for hours to hear official confirmation of his death, which finally arrived almost fourteen hours later. As Iranians waited, social media were flooded with memes and jokes, and people dancing and drinking in celebration.

A horrible public speaker with a Persian-language Wikipedia page dedicated to his spoonerisms, sixty-three-year-old Raisi never received a proper academic education beyond the sixth grade and was a low-ranking cleric with no charisma. However, after winning the engineered 2021 presidential race that recorded the lowest participation rate in the Islamic Republic’s history, Raisi was promoted overnight to an “ayatollah doctor” by the state media.

His star began rising in 1979. Soon after the Islamic Revolution, when he was nineteen, Raisi was appointed prosecutor of two major cities, Karaj and Hamedan. He was later transferred to Tehran and assigned to the “death commission” that in 1988 extrajudicially executed thousands of political prisoners and dumped their bodies in unmarked mass graves. His role in the mass executions earned him the nickname “the Butcher of Tehran.”

A yes-man with blood on his hands, Raisi married Jamileh, the daughter of influential cleric Ahmad Alamolhoda, a close ally of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. At the same time, his absolute loyalty was rewarded with wealth. He was appointed as head of Astan Quds Razavi, a corrupt and currently sanctioned financial empire in charge of preserving the gilded shrine of the eighth Shia saint Imam Reza in Mashhad, the second most populated city in Iran.

In 2019, Khamenei appointed Raisi as judiciary chief, a role in which he oversaw a violent crackdown, including the arbitrary arrests of hundreds of peaceful dissidents and rights defenders. Amnesty International has documented that the judiciary under his watch granted “blanket impunity” to security forces to unlawfully kill hundreds of men, women, and children and subject thousands of people to mass arrests and torture during nationwide protests in November 2019.

During Raisi’s short-lived presidency, the Islamic Republic faced the gravest domestic existential threat in its history: the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that rocked the country for months and shocked the supreme leader. The regime, with Raisi’s full support, responded to the uprising with brute force, killing hundreds, arresting tens of thousands, and executing at least nine. According to the United Nations, the response amounted to crimes against humanity.

Despite his role in crimes against humanity, Raisi’s celebrated death will have no bearing on the Islamic Republic’s policy. Other than rubber-stamping death and destruction for his own gain, as an absolute opportunist who threw his lot with Khamenei, Raisi’s political life amounted to nothing.

Rubber-stamp president

Since ascending to the throne as supreme leader in 1989, Khamenei has fended off rivals, including former presidents, with house arrest, media silence, banishment from elections, and even alleged assassination. In Raisi, he found an under-educated conformist who practiced absolute subservience, allowing the ayatollah to consolidate his control over all branches of power and secure his legacy with zero resistance.

In Iran, the office of the presidency amounts to nothing but being a “footman,” in the words of two-term former President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). Unlike his predecessors, Raisi had no say over Iran’s foreign policy, regional expansionism, or nuclear program. With his death, the supreme leader’s hand will keep the regime on course toward acquiring a nuclear weapon and exporting terror abroad. There will also be no change in the oppression of women and other marginalized groups.

As per the Islamic Republic’s constitution, a presidential election must be held fifty days after Raisi’s death. The interior ministry has already announced June 28 as election day. Raisi assumed office as president in 2021 and was expected to bag an easy reelection in 2025. The rushed race for his seat will create infighting, and possibly put the Islamic Republic on its back foot.

However, even that would not impact the regime’s foreign and nuclear policy, which the supreme leader tightly controls. The Islamic Republic has historically responded to periods of chaos and uncertainty by projecting power abroad. A shift in nuclear policy, a deal with the United States, or a détente between Israel and Hamas would not serve that purpose.

Furthermore, Khamenei has already signaled that he is determined to stay course despite Raisi’s death. During a speech hours before official confirmation of Raisi’s death on May 20, Khamenei calmy proclaimed, “Be reassured people that there will be no disruption in works of the nation.”

At the same time, Raisi’s death has removed a potential contender for inheriting the mantle of supreme leadership after the expected demise of eighty-five-year-old Khamenei. As per the constitution, the Assembly of Experts will fill the position, which again is tightly controlled by Khamenei. According to Reuters, Raisi’s name was already crossed off as a contender some six months ago in light of his incompetence and sagging popularity, reconfirming warnings that the future leader can’t be accurately predicted—that the contenders list is constantly shifting, and the game is far from over.

Hope for change

While regime insiders fight over Raisi’s blood-soaked inheritance and “tear each other limb from limb,” the festivities continue among the people.

Afsaneh Yousefi, whose son Pejman Fatehi was executed alongside three other political prisoners in January, danced to Kurdish music.

Sisters Mahsa and Roya Piraei, whose mother was killed by security forces during the 2021 uprising, clinked drink glasses with smiles sparkling in their eyes.

Clad in a white and blue dress, Mansoureh Behkish, who lost six family members during the 1988 executions, danced with her hair flying in silver tufts.

Esmat Vatan Parast, who lost eleven members of her family in 1980s executions, told Radio Farda, “Yes, the Islamic Republic is still in power, but I wish that the remaining [officials meet a similar fate] so people of Iran can breathe. I wish for a day that the Islamic Republic becomes a thing of the past, that our land is wiped of any sign of these monsters…have faith, our Iran will be liberated.”

And in Raisi’s home city of Mashhad, a young woman with her hair flying free, in defiance of mandatory hijab rules, scribbled on a wall with spray paint,  “Khamenei will be next.”

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post The ‘Butcher of Tehran’ is dead. It won’t change a thing. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 24, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s X (formerly Twitter) English-language page already opined, “They say, ‘Why are you supporting Palestine?’ Today, the entire world is supporting Palestine. People are supporting Palestine in the streets of Europe, in Washington, and in New York.” In a speech on Teachers’ Day, Khamenei said the US attack on “non-violent and non-destructive” student protests “shows that the US is an accomplice to the Zionists.”

With a well-known knack for making comical claims, Iranian authorities went on to declare that suspended students in the United States could come to Iran and study on government-sponsored scholarships. “Iran’s universities are in a good place in international rankings and expelled American students in any field could come and use them,” a deputy science minister said.

An editorial in Javan, a mouthpiece for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), opined that the protests showed that “the American democracy is only a lie.” The editorial went on to claim that the US police response to the protests has been much worse than the Iranian police response to the 1999 pro-democracy student uprising—without mentioning the fact that at least seven students were killed by security forces there. 

Iranic TV, an outlet tasked with monitoring Western outlets and producing clips that can be used for propaganda purposes, highlights alleged differences in how US media covers student protests in the United States and those in Iran.

The sheer volume of these productions is quite something. Dansehjoo, an outlet run by a student wing of the IRGC, has produced dozens of news reports and video clips on police actions at various US universities under the general label “the American Student Uprising” and with headlines such as “the violence of US military against students.” Telegram channels linked to the IRGC then help spread such clips widely.

Ironically, when opponents of student protests in the United States link them to Tehran, the regime tries to use that to its benefit. Thus, when Anti-Defamation League Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Jonathan Greenblatt claimed that some student groups were “campus proxies” of Tehran, his remarks were widely featured in Iranian state media.

Taking the argument further, another IRGC outlet claimed that the protests of today were taking place thanks to an open letter Khamenei published in 2015, addressing “the Youth in Europe and North America” following the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris.

But whatever claims the Iranian leadership makes, they are unlikely to be accepted by many Iranians who are well aware of the persistent repression meted out by the regime against students, women, and other Iranians. In fact, while Iranians disagree among themselves about the precise position to be taken in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many seem to be united in ridiculing Tehran’s unlikely claims in favor of students.

Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor of political science at the University of Tehran, put a simple question to the “hardline outlets” that are writing about the US protests: “How many Iranian protesters have been killed and many how had their eyes hit by shot shells?”

The Islamic Republic’s behavior is especially jarring because the past few weeks have seen an uptick in repression. Units of the so-called morality police have an increased presence in Tehran and other cities, brutally arresting many women on accusations of improper veiling and closing down cafes where mandatory veiling rules are not observed.

Mostafa Faghiqi, a senior journalist who runs a centrist news outlet in Tehran, noted the closure of four such cafes in front of a university in Tehran and satirically wrote, “Now that these cafes are closed, the university management can comfortably focus on the illusion of getting protesting American students to come study here. For now, our own Iranian students can sit on the steps or on the ground in front of their university.”

To remind the regime of its brutality, many Iranians have been sharing images on social media of the brutal arrests of students during the 1999 movement. One of the major organizers of that attack was Baqer Qalibaf, then with the IRGC, who is now the speaker of parliament. Some users recounted how students were defenestrated out of their dormitories in an act of brutal violence. An X user said the fact that perpetrators of 1999 crimes would now speak of “worry for American students” was “the joke of the century.”

An Iranian feminist activist expressed her disbelief at the flag of Lebanon’s Iran-backed militia Hezbollah being used by a US student, remembering that in 1999 “our students were taken from their dormitories.” Another user recounted more recent crimes of the Islamic Republic toward students: blinding medical student Mohsen Jamali; imprisoning Said Madani, chair of the University of Tehran’s sociology department and Bahareh Hedayat, a leading student activist; and firing Ali Sharifi Zarchi, a professor at Tehran’s elite Sharif University who was critical of the regime.

Conversely, the regime’s hardline position against Israel and its backing of Palestinian terror groups seem to have little support among the Iranian people, least of all among youth and students. On May 6, when regime supporters tried to raise the Palestinian flag in a football stadium in northern Iran, fans responded with the vulgar chant: “Take that Palestinian flag and shove it up your a–.” A similar slogan was chanted during a game in October 2023, right after Hamas’s attacks on Israel. Even anti-regime activists who are pro-Palestinian have complained about how little activity there is in support of Palestine in Iranian universities. While there have been solidarity protests in support of US students in various countries around the world, such regime-staged efforts in Iran have produced meager results. Pictures published from such gatherings around Iran show that most consist of only a dozen people, some of whom appear to be university administrators rather than students.

The Islamic Republic will surely try to use the shocking images coming out of US universities to its benefit, but few Iranians will fall for its stale propaganda. No matter what the state-run hardline outlets publish or broadcast in Iran, Iranians remember the domestic repression they’ve seen with their own eyes—not just in 1999, but over the decades.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar. He is the author of The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions and What Iranians Want. Follow him on X: @arash_tehran.

The post The Islamic Republic claims to support US student protests, but it crushed its own student uprising appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a 2012 interview with local magazine Mehrnameh, Rouhani recounted the 2004 talks with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and claimed that he told them that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “has issued a fatwa and declared it forbidden to acquire a bomb. This fatwa is more important for us than the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the additional protocol. It is more important to us than any law.”

Rouhani added that he was referencing comments made by the supreme leader ahead of Friday prayers in Tehran a week prior, when Khamenei said, “No, we aren’t thinking about nuclear weapons. I have said many times that our nuclear weapon is this nation. Our nuclear weapons are these youths. We don’t want nuclear weapons. A state that has so many young believers and this unified nation doesn’t need nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, their production, storage, and use, each has a problem. We have also expressed our religious opinion, which is clear, and everyone knows it.”

However, Khamenei’s “religious opinion” about nuclear arms has always been a carefully crafted message concocted and repeated by him—never in writing but only in speeches—in which he has exclusively called the “use” of nuclear arms “haram” (forbidden).

The campaign of deceit was initiated when the Islamic Republic saw its survival at imminent risk. In a speech the day after the March 20, 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Khamenei said, “We don’t want a nuclear bomb. We are even opposed to having chemical weapons…These things don’t agree with our principles.”

Over the years, Khamenei and other high-ranking officials have repeated this line while Iranian scientists were busy developing “all necessary components” for the development of a nuclear weapon— and the supreme leader has consistently celebrated these scientists.

Tracking Khamenei’s comments over the past two decades demonstrates that he never issued a fatwa against building a nuclear weapon, and only tentatively and revocably spoke against the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The “fatwa”

What eventually became a staple talking point of Iranian diplomats was sold to world powers as the supreme leader’s “fatwa” prohibiting nuclear arms. In reality, it was the last paragraph of his message to the first iteration of the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, which Tehran hosted in 2010.

The segment of the message marketed by the Iranian diplomatic missions as a “fatwa” reads, “We believe that adding to nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and biological weapons, are a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation, which itself is a victim of the use of chemical weapons, feels more than other nations the danger of the production and accumulation of such weapons and is ready to put all its resources in the way of dealing with it. We consider the use of these weapons to be haram (forbidden), and the effort to protect mankind from this great disaster is everyone’s duty.”

The supreme leader’s official website includes several pages dedicated to explaining his stance on nuclear arms, with one listing all comments he has made about them. Among the eighty-five quotes, the word “haram” is used only three times and exclusively about the “use of nuclear weapons,” not their production or stockpiling. He has also twice called the “use” of weapons of mass destruction a “great sin.”

On the same page, the only quote that includes the term “fatwa” comes from a 2015 speech and reads, “We don’t want a nuclear weapon. Not because of what they say, but because of ourselves, because of our religion, because of our rational reasons. This is both our religious fatwa and our rational fatwa. Our rational fatwa is that we don’t need nuclear weapons today, tomorrow, or ever. Nuclear weapons are a source of trouble for a country like ours.”

In sharia law, all acts fall into five categories: wajib (obligatory), mustahab (recommended), mubah (neutral), makruh (disapproved), and haram (forbidden). In the case of nuclear weapons, the supreme leader clearly, and presumably intentionally, has avoided labeling the “production and storage” of nuclear arms with a religious label, leaving room for a nuclear weapons program.

In addition to beguiling world powers with a false narrative about the nonexistent fatwa, the double-speak commentary by the supreme leader gives powerful factions within the regime enough ammunition to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, a point of pride for Shia Muslims is that fatwas are not inherently permanent, and Islamic jurists can—and often do—reinterpret the scripture “in accord with the needs of time.” Throughout the history of political Islam, Shia ayatollahs have used fatwas as a political tool against adversaries. For example, in the 1890s, Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi issued a fatwa during nationwide protests after the ruling Qajar Dynasty granted a British merchant a monopoly on the growth, sale, and export of tobacco in Iran. This forced the king to revoke the monopoly; after it served its political purpose, the fatwa was also removed.

A “cornered cat”

Iranian officials have consistently warned that, if push comes to shove, they might openly seek nuclear weapons.

In 2021, then Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi told state television, “The Supreme Leader has explicitly said in his fatwa that nuclear weapons are against sharia law and the Islamic Republic sees them as religiously forbidden and does not pursue them. But a cornered cat may behave differently from when the cat is free. And if [Western states] push Iran in that direction, then it’s no longer Iran’s fault.”

In June 2023, Khamenei warned world powers that they “cannot stop” his regime if it desires to build nuclear weapons—a threat echoed by Iran’s former nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi. In February, Salehi boasted that the regime has “all components” necessary for building a bomb.

With heightened tensions in the Middle East, and amid the Islamic Republic’s four-decade war with Israel creeping out of the shadows and into the open, the clerical establishment has been testing the waters for openly announcing its nuclear aspirations.

In a March speech at a Quran exhibition, Hojatolislam Mohammad Fuker Meibodi said that the Muslim holy book orders believers to amass weapons that would “sow fear in the heart of the enemies.” He argued that weapons of the past—namely swords and cannons—will not achieve that aim and “therefore, maybe we should acquire nuclear weapons.”

Iranian nuclear scientist Mahmoud Reza Aghamiri—who has ties to the supreme leader’s office and currently serves as dean of Shahid Beheshti University—said on state television on April 7 that the supreme leader “can tomorrow change his stance” on building nuclear weapons and that his regime “has the capability” to make the leap because building the bomb is “not complicated.”

Aghamiri is among the top Iranian officials who have publicly endorsed the development of a nuclear bomb. In 2022, he said that Tehran can speed up uranium enrichment to 99 percent, build a nuclear warhead, and use it as both “deterrence” and a bargaining chip in interactions with the West “like North Korea,” which, according to him, gets away with “bullying” the world.

Such rhetoric has only intensified in Iran following the April 13 attack against Israel in retaliation for the April 1 killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders in Syria. Anticipating a response from Israel, which eventually arrived on April 19, Iranian officials warned against the targeting of nuclear facilities in the country.

On April 18, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of nuclear security, said, “If the false Zionist regime decides to exploit the threat of attacking our country’s nuclear sites to pressure Iran, revision of Islamic Republic’s nuclear policies and doctrine and dropping of previously announced considerations in possible and perceivable.” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported his comments, sharing a video of him pronouncing the nuclear threat.

Javan, an influential daily close to the IRGC, wrote on the same day that it was the “first time a senior IRGC official” issued such a threat, and noted that state media were forcefully highlighting the comments, signaling “coordination with top decision-making bodies.”

The daily argued that every state’s primary goal is “survival no matter the cost” and that, before launching the April 13 attack against the “nuclear armed” Israel, Tehran had “prepared itself for engagement at highest level or at least is seeking to establish a new equilibrium.”

Javan warned “Israel to take the warning serious” because “all technical hurdles have been removed and with a wave of the hand from Imam Khamenei” and the regime “can” build a nuclear bomb.

Pro-reform daily Hammihan wrote on April 20 that the Islamic Republic’s attack against Israel from Iranian soil has “created a new norm of confrontation” between the two nations. According to the daily, in this new context, proxy forces “cannot provide the deterrence Iran needs.” The daily argued that if “Iran is pushed towards acquiring a nuclear weapon or adopting nuclear ambiguity, it would benefit from increased deterrence.”

On April 22, a member of the National Security Commission of the parliament, Javad Karimi Ghodousi, wrote on X (formerly Twitter), “If [supreme leader] issues permission, we would be a week away from testing the first [nuclear bomb].”

As an officer of the IRGC, Ghodousi has high security clearance. Through his key position in the parliament, he is privy to military decisions made at the top of the food chain. This attracted much attention when, ahead of the April 13 strike against Israel, he tweeted that the attack was happening “in a matter of hours.”

In an apparent effort to soften heightened rhetoric, on April 22, the spokesperson of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Naser Kanani said, “Nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defense and military strategy.”

Iran-based security analyst Alireza Taghavinia, a frequent guest of state television, reacted to the mixed signals out of Tehran, writing on X, “General Haghtalab has fulfilled his assigned duty. [MP] Karimi Qudousi has sent the necessary pulse. The Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson has also fulfilled his inherent duty. Politics has complexities and subtleties that not everyone can understand.”

Ghodousi doubled down on the comments on April 23, in a video saying that the International Atomic Energy Agency is aware that the Islamic Republic “needs half a day or maximum a week to build a nuclear warhead.”

The nuclear threat has been echoed by people privy to the supreme leader’s thinking as well. On May 9, Khamenei’s top foreign policy advisor Kamal Kharrazi warned that if Israel threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic, Tehran will change its nuclear doctrine. “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will have no choice but to change our military doctrine,” Kharrazi told Al Jazeera Mubasher.

A Persian proverb advises that, before shouting an insult, it is best to first murmur it to test the waters. The crescendoing chorus of Iranian officials, from IRGC generals to members of parliament to scientists advocating for the development of a nuclear weapon as “deterrent” is another sign of how a nuclear weapons program may emerge from the shadows. Unsurprisingly, all Iranian officials signaling this possible change in policy have pointed to the so-called “fatwa” and its impermanent nature—another sign of the move being orchestrated by the upper echelons of the clerical establishment.

Eyeing tectonic shifts in global power dynamics, the eighty-five-year-old Khamenei, who has unchecked powers and delusions about divine intervention on his behalf, is besieged by crises at every corner. In response, he appears to be shedding his decades-old habit of being a cautious gambler. Now a “cornered cat,” the ailing ayatollah, in a rush to solidify his legacy, is more likely than ever to embark on a path toward a nuclear weapon to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post The nuclear fatwa that wasn’t—how Iran sold the world a false narrative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“Spreading corruption on the Earth” is a charge revolutionary courts in Iran have historically used against dissidents, including those extrajudicially killed during mass executions of the 1980s—known as the 1988 massacre—and people who were arrested in relation to the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.

Salehi is best known for creating protest songs that spoke out against the oppressive Islamic Republic policies that were the focus of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising prompted by the death in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022.

The open-source information identified below has been preserved and analyzed through the ​​Iranian Archive, a joint effort led by the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) and Mnemonic, and a coalition of open-source investigation experts at the Promise Institute for Human Rights at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law, UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, and the Azadi Archive. The archive forensically preserved more than two million pieces of digital evidence recording serious human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran against Woman, Life, Freedom movement protesters to support future accountability efforts related to human rights violations in Iran.  

Below is a summary of the open-source investigation about Salehi, which is part of a broader report being carried out through the SLP, Iranian Archive, and UC Berkeley’s Human Rights Center. The report analyzes key incidents of violence carried out by the Islamic Republic during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and is due out this fall. 

Salehi’s arbitrary arrest and detention were highlighted in the detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), a United Nations-mandated body tasked with investigating alleged human rights violations committed in the context of the protests that began on September 16, 2022. His arrest was identified as a key incident of large-scale repressive measures taken by the Islamic Republic authorities to silence artists and writers during the protests. 

Importantly, the FFMI found that such arrests and imprisonment are happening as part of a widespread and systematic attack against civilians in Iran and amount to crimes against humanity. While Salehi’s case is highlighted, it is important to remember that this is happening all over Iran and continuing to harm lives to this day.  

The following is a timeline detailing the persecution of Salehi for the crime of defying the Islamic Republic’s authoritarian rule in a peaceful manner through his art. The document is based on open-source research with a focus on material published by Iranian state media, including forced confessions of Salehi aired by state television. Although the material is laced with state propaganda and false accusations against Salehi, the details can be used to display the violence he endured and the illegality of judicial procedures.

Arrest—October 30, 2022

Iran’s state broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), reported on October 30, 2022, that Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi was arrested. The same day, in a video report shared by the judiciary’s official outlet, Mizan News Agency, Salehi was accused of “planning and organizing” protests in collaboration with “diaspora leaders” and “threatening” security forces. The video included a collage of Salehi’s social media posts and a photo purporting to show him in daylight after his arrest, blindfolded and in a vehicle.

The video report was produced by IRIB “interrogator journalist” Ameneh Sadat Zabihpour, who was sanctioned by the United States for her role in soliciting and broadcasting “hundreds of forced confessions of Iranian, dual national, and international detainees in Iran.”

First video

On November 2, 2022, the Young Journalists Club (YJC), a media body affiliated with the IRIB, released a short clip showing Salehi sitting on the ground, blindfolded and with a swollen face, saying: “[I’m] Toomaj Salehi. I said that I’m sorry. I said that I tell ‘you as a friend that you should run away.’” The video starts with a short clip of an already-deleted social media post by Salehi in which he tells security forces to desert their posts and “run away” instead of oppressing people.

IRIB later used the video in a report that described Salehi as “one of the leaders of recent riots” and “instigating sedition online.” The report was broadcast on November 2, 2022, and was posted on the IRIB website two days later. IRIB reporter Atefeh Godini produced the report.

• The video shows Toomaj Salehi sitting on the ground, blindfolded and with a swollen face.
• He touches the side of his head as if in pain. 
• Apparently anticipating more beatings, he raises his hand in front of his face.
• The location is not clear. The video is recorded in the open and during dark hours. A tree can be seen in the background.

Second video

On December 6, 2022, Iranian state media including the government-run daily Iran published a new video titled “Toomaj Salehi: I apologize to the society for the violence I caused.”

The video opens with doctored segments of a music video of a rap song by Salehi published in October 2022, in which he criticized the regime for its corruption and oppression. In the track, Toomaj says that he “rises up from the bottom” of society and is defying the “head of the pyramid” responsible for the oppression. The video released by state media includes three segments in which Salehi speaks.

The first segment shows a part of Salehi’s face with him saying, “I wrote that. There is a copy of its text,” an apparent reference to the lyrics.

Then, overlaid on muted videos of him, a voice similar to Salehi’s can be heard saying, “Music can beget violence.”

In the third segment, Salehi appears to say, “This was my mistake. I apologize to you for that,” pointing to the interrogator/interviewer in the room, “and to society for producing violence. I wish I could…I can only apologize now. I wish I could produce the counterpoint to [the music].”

The video released by state media heavily references Salehi’s October 2022 music video “Faal [Fortune].” 

The video released by state media is recorded from multiple angles with the camera moving, apparently using a camera trolley. Shots recorded from above imply that the video was produced in a professionally equipped studio, and the cuts and edits also suggest that it was made through a long production process.

Video released by state media

The hand of a man adorned with an Aqeeq ring pushes a paper toward Salehi. The markings on the paper are similar to those on papers used for writing confessions.

Faal music video

In the music video, Salehi gives the other person a piece of paper to take notes on what he is saying and, he raps, to “pass them up.”

In the video released by state media, Salehi is shown drinking from a white cup similar to the one shown in the music video.

In the music video, Salehi reads the regime’s coffee-cup fortune (“Faal” in Persian).

The video released by state media even mimics the camera motions used in Salehi’s music video.

The steady camera motions in the video published by state media suggest the use of a camera trolley.

The video published by state media also includes overhead shots, implying that the video was produced in a professionally equipped studio.

All the cinematic techniques used imply that the video was recorded over a long process in which Salehi might have been forced to repeat dictated lines. The long production process and heavily doctored material also indicate that he could have been asked questions unrelated to the case, and his responses were manipulated and edited to convey a message that the regime prefers.

Statement after release

Toomaj Salehi was released from Isfahan Central Prison on November 18, 2023, on bail. On April 21, 2023, judiciary spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi confirmed he was released on bail and added that Salehi’s sentence was being reviewed per an order from the Supreme Court.

On November 27, 2023, the YouTube account that releases music produced by Toomaj Salehi posted a video of him after his release from jail. The channel has been releasing Salehi’s music as early as October 18, 2020, based on the oldest post available on the account published on that day.

In the fourteen-and-a-half-minute video, Salehi describes his time in custody and explains his forced confession. His description of his ordeal includes, but is not limited to, the following statements.

• Malign actors are trying to “assassinate [his] character.” Salehi pointed to state media reports that he “confessed” and “snitched” on others. “Whom did I have to snitch on? What did I have to confess to? Everything I’ve done has been on your phones [and public]. I wasn’t hiding anything to confess to.”
• “I was severely tortured at the time of my arrest. They broke my arms and my legs. They were hitting my face and my head, so at first I tried to cover myself with my hands, and they broke my fingers.”
• Salehi also says that he was given a shot in the neck at the time of his arrest. “One of the other political prisoners told me that the injection they gave me in my neck was most likely adrenaline so I wouldn’t pass out so that I would be conscious during the time they were torturing me so I would feel the pain fully.”
• “About confessions, I didn’t even hand over [access to] my social media accounts.”
• Salehi points out that during his detention, whenever he raised the issue of the illegality of the security officers’ behavior, “they would laugh and say ‘what law? We can and we do whatever [we want].’”
• Before Salehi’s release from jail, the judge, Morteza Barati, and his case officer met with him demanding access to his social media accounts, which he refused. (Security forces often seize social media accounts of political prisoners before their release and condition their release on bail on their not using social media.)
• Some anonymous social media accounts with apparent ties to the state pointed to his apparent physical health after his release on bail, arguing that his being tortured was “fake news.” Reacting to those comments, Salehi said, “Four months ago, when I was transferred from [detention center of the] Intelligence [Ministry] to prison, they wouldn’t say that. My bones were broken a year and a month ago. They have naturally healed by now.”
• In the video, Salehi points out that he did not receive proper medical care for the broken bones, that he cannot walk properly and limps, and that walking is sometimes painful for him. He also complained about chronic pain in his hands.
• “The Intelligence Ministry has produced and released a video in which it appears that I am apologizing to the interrogator. I didn’t say that. I wasn’t talking to the interrogator. I was interviewed there for nine hours. I have made one or two gaffes. The person asked me a question, for example asking me ‘If right now, the mother of such and such person who went out [to protest] because of you and is now in prison, was sitting before you, what would you tell her?’ And they have edited [my response] in a manner that it appears that I am apologizing to him, which is ridiculous.”
• Salehi says that he has filed a complaint about the torture he endured during his detention.
• In the video, Salehi says that he was held in “solitary confinement for 8–9 months” and subjected to “white torture” on top of the “physical torture in the beginning” after his arrest. (White torture is sensory deprivation.)
• He also said that the Intelligence Ministry had “ordered the prison chief to make conditions worse” for him because he had “filed a complaint against them.”

Timeline

Toomaj Salehi was born December 3, 1990. He is from Iran’s Bakhtiari ethnic minority. His father was a political prisoner for eight years.

Previous Arrest—September 13, 2021

Toomaj Salehi was arrested on September 13, 2021, at his home. He was charged with “insulting the Supreme Leader,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and “propaganda against the regime,” under Articles 514 and 500 of the Islamic Penal Code. The BBC’s Persian service reported at the time that he was sentenced to six months in jail and an unreported fine. The court suspended the sentence for one year. On September 21, 2021, Salehi was released on bail.

Arrest—October 30, 2022

Salehi was arrested again on October 30, 2022. In an interview with Mizan News Agency, the official outlet of Iran’s judiciary, Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Isfahan Seyed Mohammad Mousavian listed Salehi’s charges as “propaganda against the regime, cooperation with hostile states, and establishing an illegal group with the intention of disrupting national security.” Mousavian added, “The accused played a key role in instigating riots and inviting and encouraging the recent mayhem and riots in Isfahan Province and in the city of Shahinshahr.”

Charges—November 27, 2022

Chief Justice of Isfahan Province Asadollah Jafari told Mizan: “Toomaj Salehi has been charged with spreading corruption on the Earth by spreading lies in a way causing major losses, propaganda against the regime, establishing and managing illegal groups with the intention of disrupting national security, cooperating with a hostile government against the Islamic Republic, spreading lies and disturbing the public mind through cyberspace, and inciting and encouraging people to commit violent acts.”

Alleged death sentence—July 5, 2023

The semi-official Tasnim News Agency reported that Salehi “had been sentenced to death, but his sentence was reduced to imprisonment.”

The alleged sentence was not announced by the judiciary—as is customary—or Salehi’s lawyer. At the time, it raised questions about the credibility of Tasnim’s report and whether the news was part of the regime’s psychological warfare against protesters.

Prison sentence—July 12, 2023

Jafari said that Salehi was sentenced to seventy-five months (six years and three months) in prison. He also received a two-year ban on leaving the country, a two-year ban on music-related activities, and a requirement to attend “workshops, courses and life skills classes” held by the judiciary’s crime-prevention department. Jafari added that Salehi’s pending six-month jail sentence from 2021 will also be implemented.

Torture complaint—October 29, 2023

On October 29, 2023, Salehi’s account on X (formerly Twitter), which is run by his social media manager from outside Iran, wrote that he had filed a complaint against the director of the Intelligence Ministry’s branch in Isfahan province and the officers responsible for his case over “torture and illegal behavior during [his] illegal detention.”

The complaint lists the illegal conduct of security officers, including the following.

• Salehi’s place of residence was illegally raided. Security officers climbed the wall and did not provide an arrest warrant. Two other residents of the building were also arrested without a warrant. The personal vehicle of Salehi’s father was seized without a warrant.
• “Violent arrest, beating, torture, and verbal abuse for twelve hours (from 3:00 AM on October 30, 2022 to 3:00 PM of the same day) in a place outside the city while blindfolded and even filming these inhumane actions, some of which were broadcasted by IRIB.”
• Beating leading to
  • a fracture of the right leg;
  • a fracture of the fourth finger on the left hand;
  • severe damage to both eyes; and
  • fractured ribs.
• Officers failed to transfer Salehi to the prosecutor’s office within the legal timeframe or hand him over to the detention center, and failed to provide medical care in time.

The statement also adds that Salehi was arrested in Gerd Bisheh, a village in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari province by officers of the  Isfahan branch of the Intelligence Ministry.

Salehi’s lawyer, Amir Raeisian, posted a photo of the official complaint on Instagram on December 2, 2023.

Release on bail—November 18, 2023

Salehi was eventually released from prison on November 18, 2023 on bail. Judiciary spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi confirmed on April 21, 2023, that Salehi has been released on bail and added that the Supreme Court had called for his sentence to be amended as well.

Arrest—November 30, 2023

The government-run IRNA news agency reported that Salehi was arrested again on November 30, 2023, in the northern city of Babol in Mazandaran province. 

The judiciary’s Mizan also wrote, “Toomaj Salehi was arrested on the charge of publishing lies and disturbing the public mind after publishing some false and undocumented comments online.” 

Isfahan Chief Justice Jafari told Mizan that, in the case of Salehi, “all procedures, including arrest, interrogation, and investigation, have been carried out according to the law.”

Death sentence—April 24, 2024 

On April 24, 2024, Salehi’s lawyer, Amir Raeisian, told the Tehran-based Shargh Daily, “Branch One of Isfahan Revolutionary Court, in an unprecedented move, has not implemented the Supreme Court’s ruling on the 2022 case of Toomaj Salehi.”

According to Raeisian, Branch One of Revolutionary Court of Isfahan has called the Supreme Court “ruling ‘advisory’ and emphasizing the independence of the lower court has accused Toomaj Salehi of ‘spreading corruption on the Earth’ and sentenced him to the highest punishment, death.”

This ruling is unprecedented. The recent ruling of the lower court is in direct conflict with an earlier ruling from the same court, as per directions from the Supreme Court. Amid reports of Salehi being sentenced to death in July 2023, the case was initially appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court called on the lower court to drop some of the initial charges. This led to Salehi being sentenced to seventy-five months in prison and his release on bail in November 2023. 

Recently, the lower court re-assumed jurisdiction and, despite the prior ruling, Salehi was sentenced to death. This court, a “revolutionary court” with deep ties to the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus, determined that Salehi was responsible for the “extensive spread of corruption on the Earth,” and thus, death was appropriate.

Salehi’s lawyer also noted that the current ruling, along with the death sentence, has designated “additional punishments” for Salehi, including a two-year ban on traveling abroad and producing music.

Raeisian also noted that the Supreme Court had ruled that Salehi should benefit from “amnesty.”

On the same day, semi-official Mehr News, which is linked to the state-run Islamic Propagation Organization, confirmed that Salehi has been “sentenced to death for spreading corruption on the Earth.” It added that the sentence can be decreased to “long imprisonment and additional sentences” if Salehi and his lawyers appeal. There has been no accountability for the arbitrary detention and forced confession of rapper Toomaj Salehi. 

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

Andrea Richardson is the senior legal researcher for investigations at the Human Rights Center. 

The post Everything you need to know about Iranian rapper Toomaj Salehi and his death sentence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi at the Iranian embassy complex in Damascus on April 1 was the final straw. Zahedi joined a long list of Iranian officers killed in Syria by Israel since December 2023, including Sayyed Razi Mousavi, a senior IRGC officer assassinated on December 25, 2023, in Damascus. Despite threats by senior Iranians that the Islamic Republic would respond harshly to Israel’s assassinations, Iran ultimately took limited action. On January 17, the IRGC-Navy launched an attack on two Israeli-owned ships in the Indian Ocean, and another attack targeted a building identified by Iran as the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad’s headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Following Mousavi’s assassination, voices in Iran calling for a rethinking of Iran’s “strategic patience” policy toward Israel grew louder in an effort to reestablish deterrence. The Tabnak news agency claimed that Israel’s recent actions represent an unprecedented surge in the “level of Zionist arrogance” and that Iran’s failure to respond to Israeli attacks may reveal its weakness. The conservative website Alef asserted that the concept of strategic patience had been misinterpreted as apathy and lack of response, resulting in the series of assassinations carried out by Israel. The website cautioned that continuing the existing policy will expose senior commanders to threats and undermine Iranian deterrence.

The attack in Damascus does not necessarily signify a shift in Iran’s strategy geared at avoiding a full-fledged direct military confrontation with Israel, let alone the United States. Some claim that Iran’s April 14 strike on Israel conflicted with the perception that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was “cautious” and would never order an attack, suggesting that this perception now requires study and reevaluation. However, this is not necessarily the case. It seems more likely that Zahedi’s assassination at a building adjacent to the Iranian consulate in Damascus was deemed one step too far, altering the Iranian calculus. Despite the extensive messages sent to Tehran in the days preceding the attack, urging it to refrain from a direct response against Israel, the Iranian leadership chose to abandon its containment policy. Instead, it sought to restore its deterrence against Israel, even at the cost of a potential military escalation.

The first direct Iranian attack on Israel marks a new phase in the two countries’ strategic rivalry. For years, Iran has opted to act against Israel through its regional network of partners and proxies to retain deniability and minimize the risk of political or military consequences for its actions. However, the civil war in Syria that began in 2011 led to increased Iranian efforts to use its presence in Syria to militarily entrench itself in the country, eventually leading to Iran and Israel’s first direct military engagement on Syrian soil. Concurrently, starting in 2010, a shadow war emerged between Iran and Israel over Israel’s efforts to hinder Iran’s nuclear program and military buildup through espionage, targeted assassinations, sabotage, and cyberattacks.  

Iran’s attack on Israel has shifted from the use of proxies and engagement with Israel in Syria to include direct military confrontation. For the first time since the 1991 Gulf War, Israel faced a state-launched missile attack, which Iran portrayed as a significant accomplishment despite Israel and its allies successfully intercepting the vast majority of the barrage. Following the attack on Israel, IRGC commander Hossein Salami said that Iran had formed a new approach toward the “Zionist regime” and would directly counterattack Israel henceforth. The Kayhan newspaper, affiliated with the supreme leader, described the attack as the most severe military reaction against Israel since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, claiming that Iran was able to penetrate Israel’s multilayered defense envelope and inflict damage even though it was not a secret or surprise attack.

These professions of satisfaction could indicate an assessment that the Islamic Republic is heading toward a strategic equilibrium with Israel despite Israel’s continued aerial, technological, and intelligence supremacy. The Iranian leadership appears to have concluded that the country’s geo-strategic situation is steadily improving thanks to better strategic military capabilities, a network of proxies, and the support of Russia and China, two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

During a memorial ceremony for Mahdavi, Yahya Rahim Safavi, the supreme leader’s senior military adviser, expressed confidence in the victory of the Resistance Axis led by Iran and declared that a new Middle East is emerging with Iran at its heart. According to Safavi, the victory of the Resistance Axis is certain because Israel has lost international support, faces domestic rivalries, and has lost the Gaza war. A few days later, IRGC-affiliated hardline daily Javan asserted that the Iranian attack on Israel marks a watershed moment and that a new order will be established in the region, with Iran as its architect. These might seem like empty phrases and expressions of the regime’s propaganda, but they may reflect an authentic—if slightly exaggerated—assessment on the part of the Iranian leadership, which is now totally dominated by conservative and extreme hawks after more pragmatic individuals have been excluded from positions of power over the years.

Israel’s measured response to Iran’s April 19 attack allowed the two countries to temporarily close their current round of conflict. Iranian officials have downplayed and ridiculed Israel’s response, demonstrating their willingness to avoid further escalation. However, the continuous campaign between the foes is unlikely to end, and the precedent set by their direct military engagement has become another option on the confrontation table. It is unclear whether Tehran received the message Israel intended to convey with its reaction attack, which indicated its refusal to comply with the new Iranian equation.

The transition of the Israeli-Iranian confrontation into a new phase is risky. The dramatic escalation between the two countries in recent weeks highlights the high potential for miscalculation in the lack of direct communication channels. This danger will get even more serious if Iran decides to abandon its status as a nuclear-threshold state and turns its policy toward attaining nuclear weapons. Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of nuclear security in Iran, was quoted as saying that the Israeli threats could push Iran to reconsider its nuclear doctrine and deviate from its previous considerations. The escalating conflict between Israel and Iran, the transition from indirect to direct conflict, and Iran’s nuclear-threshold status necessitate an ongoing and unrelenting exploration of the possibility of establishing future communication channels—even if covert and indirect—between the two countries to convey messages and de-escalate tensions.

These developments should also require Israel to review and adopt a comprehensive, updated policy for Iran, allowing it to respond more effectively to the threats the Islamic Republic poses to its national security, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, military buildup, and regional activities. Dealing with Iran will necessitate Israel working with both the United States and Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates. In contrast to Iran’s New Middle East vision, it should pursue an alternative approach—one centered on establishing a new regional architecture, deepening connections with the United States, and pursuing normalization processes with the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Raz Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.

The post This round of Iran-Israel escalation is over, but the next could be just around the corner appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The direct Iranian air attack on Israeli soil was a watershed moment in the region’s steadily deteriorating security status quo. It revealed nothing new about Iran’s military capabilities. But it suggested the alarming potential for Iran to exploit Israel’s lack of strategic depth and showed a frightening willingness on the part of Tehran’s leadership to outmatch Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recklessness. It was the first time any nation directly targeted Israel since Iraq’s Saddam Hussein launched Scud missiles against the country in 1991.

While it is highly unlikely that this attack will deter future Israeli actions against Iranian assets, it will prompt defense strategists in Washington and Israel to revise their calculations about the limits of Iran’s risk tolerance and capabilities. That, combined with pressure from the White House, may have reigned in the magnitude of Israel’s response, which came on April 19 in a series of attacks on central Esfahan province.

Some foreign policy hands described Iran’s attack on Israel as a miscalculation, a strategically and diplomatically counterproductive response to the deadly April 1 Israeli attack on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria, which killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi, seven other officers, and two civilians. Iran’s counterattack, some said, will rally world opinion around Israel just as it was coming under pressure over its conduct in the unfolding six-month offensive against Hamas in Gaza.

But the Islamic Republic and its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei see the world through a different prism. In numerous public statements, Tehran celebrated the multipronged attack on Israel as a resounding success. “We carried out a limited operation, which was commensurate with the Zionist regime’s evil acts,” IRGC commander Major General Hossein Salami said in comments reported by IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency. “It could have been more widespread, but we confined the operation to that section of the Zionist regime’s facilities that had been used for attacking our embassy.”

At such moments, Iranian officials are often full of rhetoric that fails to live up to the facts. Indeed, none of the drones or missiles managed to evade Israel’s air defenses—which were assisted by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Jordan—or inflict significant infrastructural damage.

But that may have well been by design. Israel and the United States, through European and Middle Eastern intermediaries, had warnings that the attack was coming, giving them crucial hours or days to ready air defenses. 

Iran considers itself surrounded by enemies and threats, some of an existential caliber. When backed into what it perceives as a corner, as it was after the United Nations refused to condemn the attack on its Damascus embassy, it almost always favors escalation over compromise, provoking fear and uncertainty over conventional diplomacy. 

In any case, none of the countries it considers friendly will punish Tehran for the attack. China, Iran’s most important patron, referred to the drone and rocket barrage as “spillover from the Gaza conflict.” Russia, too, focused on “numerous unresolved crises in the Middle East, primarily in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” and made an unsubtle dig at Netanyahu by describing the Damascus attack as “irresponsible” and “provocative.” Beijing and Moscow will likely lead the way in watering down or vetoing any United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that singles out Iran, which has turned even more strongly away from its Eurasian partners since the breakdown of the nuclear deal after the US withdrawal in 2018.

Khamenei publicly ordered retaliation after characterizing the consulate attack as an Israeli attack on Iranian soil—and thus equivalent to an attack within Iran’s borders—a proposition that is debatable at best. It is also likely that the Iranians had already designed some version of the attack that unfolded and that leadership of the IRGC and the Supreme National Security Council was eagerly looking forward to an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to shatter Israel’s sense of calm.

According to unnamed Israeli officials cited by the New York Times, the late-night attack involved 185 drones, thirty-six cruise missiles, and 110 surface-to-surface missiles launched mainly from Iran, but also from Iraq and Yemen. The attack closed schools, throttled commerce, and brought the country to a standstill during the first day of its workweek. While air defenses prevented the attack from damaging targets, one can easily imagine the impact of such a barrage if three thousand or thirty thousand weapons were launched without the benefit of a seventy-two-hour warning. Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iran’s staunchest ally, reportedly wields an arsenal of 150,000 rockets and missiles.

Air power has been Iran’s security Achilles heel since the eight-year Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), when Saddam Hussein bombed Iranian cities, including the capital, in a series of campaigns that traumatized a generation of Iranians. Following that war, Iran struggled to build air power and instead invested the bulk of its resources in building a ballistic missile program. Iran’s cheap combat drones were first deployed in clandestine attacks by proxies in Yemen against Saudi Arabia, and in Syria and Iraq against US forces. 

Even as its militias and proxies extend Iran’s influence throughout the region, Iran has struggled to gain traction in the air, in part, due to sanctions. It wrangled with Russia for years to finally deliver and install $800 million worth of S-300 mobile anti-aircraft defense systems. Iran has been even more frustrated in its efforts to update a rickety fleet of planes consisting of a few dozen MiG-29s that it appropriated from Iraq ahead of the first US war, and a couple of dozen dilapidated 1970s F-14s Tomcats maintained with black-market parts.

Iran recently made progress on acquiring some modern aircraft, including Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, but it will take years before it can train pilots and field such a force. Facing years of UNSC restrictions on transfers of most weapons, it has steadily expanded both the range and accuracy of its missile and drone programs.

In a prophetic essay published last year in the journal ​​Aether, US Air Force Major Joshua Dryden described the core of the Iran-Israel conflict “as one in which Iran seeks to deny Israel freedom of action in the air, while Israel attempts to counter these efforts.”

While Israel has largely been successful at stalling Iran’s advances, “the broader trend toward a more contested environment is one Israeli political leaders must now consider.”

Though it is difficult to glean the regime’s calculations in ordering the scale and nature of the attack, it likely considered the domestic cost and damaged morale of failing to retaliate to a strike that killed several senior security officials. Khamenei and his advisers may have felt compelled to deliver a response that would be at least as disruptive, headline grabbing, and potentially deterrent as the cruise missiles Iran launched against a US military base in western Iraq after the 2020 assassination of IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. While much of the discussion of the Iran-Israel conflict has been focused on proxy ground attacks, clandestine operations, and cyberwarfare, April 14 marks a new and dangerous escalation in the skies. 

Borzou Daragahi is a journalist who has covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe for US and UK news outlets since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on X: @borzou.

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When I got to work at my information technology (IT) job that day, I read news about the protests that became known as the Green Movement, prompted by the sham reelection of hardliner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For weeks, Iranians poured into the streets of major cities wearing green—the color of reformist candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi—and chanting and holding signs that read, “Where is my vote?”

At the time, the Atlantic called it “the first major world event broadcast almost entirely via social media.” Caught by surprise, the clerical establishment scrambled to censor the internet by blocking websites or deliberately slowing connection speed. It was a historical moment and showed that the internet could be a medium of hope for dramatic social and political change.

As a young Iranian-American man struggling with his half-Iranian identity after growing up with the anti-Iranian hate crimes and discrimination of the 1980s, the protests were a lightning bolt to my heart. People who looked like me were not chanting, “Death to America,” but instead calling for democratic values that I held dear—ones that were in my Iranian immigrant father’s heart as he fled to the United States after the 1979 revolution with my pregnant American mother. The Green Movement changed how I saw myself, and I felt a deep call to get involved in the Iranian people’s quest for freedom. That is why in 2009 I helped co-found Access Now, one of the largest human rights organizations dedicated to defending digital rights. 

During the Green Movement, I quickly learned how to develop and distribute proxy servers to allow Iranians uncensored internet access to tell their stories. This work gathered a group of young activists to support the protestors with whatever tools and expertise they needed, and required shifts of eighteen hours per day. The servers were used by tens of thousands of Iranians daily, and websites that were defended from being taken down by the regime—reaching five million Iranians per day, or more than 25 percent of the entire country’s internet users—were the main news sources for Western media outlets covering the ongoing protests. Tools were developed to defend hundreds of key journalists and activists inside Iran sharing news and video. These elements became the foundations of Access Now.

But one project stayed close to my heart: video archiving. The clerical establishment was trying to erase protest videos, while activists were removing videos for fear of persecution. History was being erased as quickly as it was being made. In response, I downloaded thousands of videos filled with violence, hope, tears, and joy, which were converted to mobile formats and redistributed across the country, where they were downloaded by more than three million Iranians.

In 2022, when Mahsa Amini was murdered by the so-called morality police for “violating” mandatory hijab rules, I gathered a small group of colleagues and friends and together we downloaded thousands of videos to ensure that the Women, Life, Freedom uprising led by women would not be erased. This became the Azadi (freedom) Archive, created in September 2022 and later joined by an international archival coalition led by the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project and Mnemonic, with the Promise Institute for Human Rights at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Law, the University of California, Berkeley’s Human Rights Center, Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps, and the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center.

The newly renamed Iranian Archive now holds more than one million videos and contributed to the investigation carried out by the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI), which unveiled a report in March detailing how the Islamic Republic committed crimes against humanity and other serious human rights violations against Woman, Life, Freedom protesters. On March 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted to renew the mandate of the FFMI, giving it more time to strengthen its significant findings and ensure the effective preservation of evidence for use in legal proceedings, including the significant photo and video shared throughout the protests.

The world’s tragedies deserve justice and to be remembered. Iranians who risked their lives to share images of protest violence did so with the hope that information would get out and the world would respond to the Islamic Republic’s atrocious human rights violations. Even now, thousands of videos are uploaded by brave activists from around the globe every day—but without a systematic and funded approach to preservation, the opportunities for accountability, remembering, research, and memorialization are lost.

The global coalition of universities, nonprofits, and companies committed to archiving and preserving videos is making that vision a reality by working together through the nonprofit Iranian Archive to preemptively capture, store, catalog, and tag digital content in a way that can be used by researchers, lawyers, and human rights defenders in the future.   

The birth of this global archival coalition signals to Iranian activists and citizen journalists that their sacrifice to share information with the world will not be erased online. It also upholds the best that the internet has to offer, despite increasing “enshittification,” and makes a meaningful contribution to social justice and human rights online and offline. 

It’s been fifteen years since the international community realized the importance of digital activism due to the 2009 Green Movement. It must not wait another fifteen years before it develops a robust and comprehensive approach to archiving and preserving video to support justice and human rights movements across the world.

Cameran Ashraf is co-founder of international human rights and technology organization AccessNow, human rights scholar, and NGO human rights leader.

The post Iranians sacrificed their lives to share videos of regime violence. Now there’s an online archive for the world to see.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 1, an Israeli airstrike targeted the building of the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus, killing several senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, including Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the commander for Lebanon and Syria, and his deputy, Mohammad Hadi Haj Rahimi. As expected, Iranian officials vowed to take revenge against Israel.

“The evil Zionist regime will be punished at the hands of our brave men. We will make them regret this crime and the other ones,” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a statement published on his official website on April 2.

On the same day, President Ebrahim Raisi emphasized that Israel’s action would not go unanswered. In Tehran’s Palestine Square, a billboard of Zahedi has been hung on the wall of a building with Persian and Hebrew versions of the phrase: “You will be punished, and we will make you regret it.” Since April 1, such comments have been featured in state media outlets and made by other ranking Iranian officials.

Bracing for retaliation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have taken into account the possibility of an Iranian response. The IDF announced on April 4 that they were suspending leave for all combat units, a day after they announced they were mobilizing more troops. Israel has reportedly also scrambled its Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking across the country to confuse targeting systems, and even evacuated ambassadors and staff at various embassies.

However, contrary to the rhetoric coming from Tehran, it seems that Iran doesn’t have the capabilities to respond to Israel directly.

Shifting balances

Since the beginning of the conflict between Hamas and Israel, the regional balance in the Middle East has significantly shifted in favor of Iran and to the detriment of Israel.

Hamidreza Azizi, an Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, told me, “During this time, Iran has endeavored to engage its proxy groups with Israel within the grey zone conflict framework, keeping Israel preoccupied without directly engaging in war and thus inflicting damage upon its adversary without bearing the direct costs of war with Israel.”

The greatest advantage of this strategy for Iran is plausible deniability. It allows Tehran to shirk responsibility for its actions within the proxy war context and allows its adversaries not to attribute these actions directly to Iran, thereby avoiding direct retaliation against Israel. For example, during this period, proxy groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon repeatedly targeted positions in Israel, and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria attacked US bases in the region.

Before October 7, 2023, Iran and Israel had been engaged in a shadow war in which Israel targeted Iranian assets in Syria, specifically weapon shipments or military and logistical warehouses belonging to the Quds Force. While Israel had previously avoided targeting Iranian forces in its operations for a long time, it has shifted gears since the Gaza war began and changed its policy, as signified by the killing of Razi Mousavi, the logistics coordinator for the IRGC’s Quds Force on December 25, 2023. Since then, Israel has killed at least five senior commanders of the IRGC in Syria.

Despite comments by Iranian officials in the wake of the April 1 attack, since October 7, 2023, Iranian military and political officials have repeatedly emphasized that they are not seeking a broader confrontation in the region. This is also evident in the case of Israeli ground operations in Gaza, which Iranian officials initially identified as Tehran’s red line.

Highlighting the country’s inability to respond directly, Azizi explained to me, “Iran’s defense doctrine is fundamentally based on asymmetric defense, part of which is focused on missile and drone industries, and the other part is entrusted to proxy groups.”

Iran has little room for effective maneuvering outside the grey zone and faces significant limitations both in terms of global support and the required military capabilities for conventional warfare.

Revenge rings hollow

Iran is neither technologically competitive with Israel in terms of weaponry nor comforted by the support of a powerful ally like the United States, while Israel has such capacity.

Though Iran can respond to Israel’s actions on multiple levels, each of which has its limitations, if Tehran seeks to reciprocate, it must carry out an operation at the same level as the one that resulted in the killing of a senior IRGC commander. However, Iran lacks such capabilities, in terms of both intelligence and military power.

After the US assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020, Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened revenge. Tehran responded by firing ballistic missiles at bases housing US troops in Iraq, giving brain injuries to more than one hundred troops. It has also repeatedly threatened to assassinate former Donald Trump administration officials who were involved in the decision-making process regarding the assassination, all of whom now travel with a security detail.

The next option is to take action in a third country, like what happened in IRGC missile attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan or targeting Israeli positions in other countries. However, past experiences show Iran has not succeeded in this area either. The unsuccessful bombings in India, Georgia, and Thailand in 2012, which was designed to target Israel, not only failed to achieve any results for Iran, but also cost Tehran politically, making it once again known as an actor that designs terrorist operations in other countries.

Moreover, Iran recognizes the possible ramifications of engaging in direct conflict with Israel. Such an altercation could swiftly spiral into a full-fledged war, resulting in dire consequences for both parties. If Tehran were to respond directly, the international community would be inclined to denounce Iran. This condemnation could exacerbate Tehran’s isolation and complicate its pursuit of regional objectives.

But Iran’s capabilities aren’t weak only in terms of the military. The country is grappling with various internal hurdles, such as a significant economic downturn and widespread social and political dissatisfaction. These challenges have constrained the government’s capacity to prioritize foreign policy matters, even though the lack of direct response disappoints and disheartens the regime’s supporters and its proxy groups across the region.  

There is no doubt that Tehran will respond in some capacity. However, the main issue is that Iran cannot provide an effective and equivalent response. Despite Tehran’s calls for revenge, it doesn’t possess the necessary power, willingness, and ability to engage in a conflict with the potential to escalate into a full-scale regional war with Israel.

Saeid Jafari is a Middle East analyst based in Europe. Follow him on X: @jafariysaeid.

The post Iran talks a big game. But it’s limited in its ability to respond to Israel.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

After the US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill on March 13 that could lead to a nationwide ban against the Chinese social media platform TikTok, old conspiracy theories sprouted back to life, with one using Greenblatt’s comments to explicitly pin the blame for the possible ban on Israel. Not surprisingly, the Islamic Republic reveled in the story involving its archenemies, the United States and Israel, along with its strategic ally, China.

It appears that the primary source of the recording is an article titled “American Youth Break Free from Zionist Yokes,” posted in November 2023 by the Tehran Times, an English daily published in Tehran by Mehr News Agency, an arm of the Islamic Propagation Organization (IPO), whose director is directly appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The organization is a key element of the Islamic Republic’s foreign-facing propaganda machine.

On March 20, the ADL issued a statement confirming the authenticity of the recording. The statement adds that the comments were made “during a public Zoom call.” The ADL and Greenblatt himself have previously called on social media platforms to introduce more robust mechanisms for countering hate and harassment. The recent statement from the organization concludes, “These calls-to-action have not included an outright ban of the platform.”

After the recording went viral in March, Tehran Times editor in chief Mohammad Sarfi boasted on X (formerly Twitter) that it was released “exclusively by Tehran Times” in November 2023, arguing that it shows that his daily is “ahead of world developments.”

The conspiracy theory blaming Israel for the proposed TikTok ban has been repeated by the state media in Iran. Hassan Abedini, the top presenter of the state broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), also alleged that the ADL was behind the TikTok ban and wrote on X, “Zionists control freedom of speech in the West.”

Iran’s Young Journalists Club News Agency, run by the state broadcaster, called the possible ban an “assault on freedom of speech.” Ultraconservative Raja News called the 2023 TikTok hearing an “outright inquisition.” Still, it continued using the possible TikTok ban to justify online censorship in Iran, arguing that access to “cyberspace is a security matter.”

China and Iran, bastions of free speech

With the possible US TikTok ban generating buzz around the globe, the United States’ free-speech credentials have come under fire from states infamous for their oppression of domestic free speech, Iran and China.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has released a 3,600-word statement that “expose[s] what ‘free speech’ is according to the United States” and concludes by accusing the US of “[relying] on lies to weave ‘the emperor’s new clothes,’ and how it smears others to maintain its hegemony.”

Unsurprisingly, the statement fails to mention that Beijing has imposed draconian restrictions on the country’s 900 million internet users, pervasive state surveillance, and other abhorrent human rights violations, from suppressing freedom of speech and assembly to committing genocide against the Muslim-majority Uyghur ethnic group.

The statement also doesn’t mention China’s record on upholding freedom of expression at home. Through the Golden Shield Project—launched in 1998 and often called the “great firewall of China”—the regime’s Ministry of Public Security has restricted what content people can access in the country. The regime currently blocks almost all major online platforms, including Google, YouTube, X, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook.

The Tehran Times has also been very concerned about “violations” of free speech in the United States. It has celebrated the “myth of online freedom in [the] US” fading and has accused the United States of waging “social media warfare” and a “propaganda war” against the Islamic Republic.

However, the same outlet has vehemently justified Iran’s weeks-long state-imposed internet shutdown in 2019, which came in response to nationwide protests that were used as cover for security forces to kill 1,500 protesters. It has argued that the government was left with no option but to fully cut people in Iran off from the world to prevent “misuse of the Internet by the outside agencies who [sought] instability in the country” and were “engineering a crisis in Iran.”

The paper’s parent agency, Mehr News, has also actively defended online censorship in Iran, arguing that “online spaces are controlled in developed countries,” has cheered on security forces for cracking down on “networks promoting corruption” (referring to content on modeling or modern lifestyles), and also justified the too-common mass arrest of citizens for defying sharia laws and exercising their basic rights.

The news agency has also been on the frontline of promoting propaganda from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), calling social media the “primary venue of infiltration by the enemies,” presumably the United States and its allies. Furthermore, Mehr has celebrated the Islamic Republic’s troll farms and social media influence campaigns operating in conjunction with IRGC digital operations and hacking campaigns by the likes of Charming Kitten and the IRGC’s Cyber Army.

Iron veil and enlightenment jihad

While the Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine criticizes the United States for its “violations” of free speech online, the clerical establishment has shown time and again that the Internet has no place in Khamenei’s vision for the country. The regime’s response to the age of information has been an iron veil.

The eighty-four-year-old ayatollah has repeatedly described social media as a “weapon” and consistently voiced opposition to Iranians having “unbridled” access to the Internet. Over the years, his regime has also repeatedly used internet shutdowns to quell protests. Currently, all major social media platforms are banned in Iran, including YouTube, X, Instagram, WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok.

Freedom of press and freedom of expression receive similar treatment, as the regime is one of the world’s leading jailers of journalists. During the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, the regime arrested at least eighty journalists and twenty-two thousand protesters.

The clerical establishment’s war on freedom of speech has intensified since February 2022, months before the nationwide protests that shook the foundations of the Islamic Republic. At that time, Khamenei declared “enlightenment jihad” against the “enemy”—presumably the United States and its allies. He argued that the adversaries are waging “hybrid warfare” against “Islam and the Islamic Republic,” deploying their “media empire” and social media in an “onslaught to distort and destroy” the clerical establishment in Iran. He argued that the Islamic Republic must take the war to the “enemy” through “enlightenment jihad.” Heeding Khamenei’s direct order, the regime has flooded the internet with bots, trolls, and sock puppets, targeting dissenting voices and taking its colorful influence campaigns at home and abroad to another level.

Interestingly, TikTok has been one of the platforms of choice for the Iranian clerical establishment to export its poison. An account named jahadtabiin2 (“enlightenment jihad” in Persian) with twenty-one thousand followers posts tacky videos promoting the Islamic Republic’s ideology, speeches by the supreme leader, and propaganda against Iranian dissidents. The regime has also recruited TikTokers glorifying the clerical establishment and its top men, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, who was killed four years earlier via a US drone strike in Iraq.

While it imposes an iron veil separating people in Iran from the rest of the world, the regime is quick to cry wolf when its top officials face the slightest setback on social media for violating platform guidelines.

In February, Meta banned Khamenei from Instagram and Facebook over his repeated violations of Meta’s “dangerous organizations and individuals policy,” which includes promoting organizations backlisted by the United States, including the terrorist group Hamas.

In response, Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, a member of the powerful Guardian Council, which is controlled by the supreme leader and has veto power over the parliament, wrote on X that the move “reveals [the] true face of so-called advocates of freedom of expression,” a right that, according to him, “has been taken hostage by [the] West.”

Ironically, all three leading social media platforms—Facebook, Instagram, and X—are banned in Iran for everyone except regime supporters and officials, who have been given access to an uncensored Internet.

Khamenei maintains an active presence on X, sharing Holocaust denial to his one million followers on the platform and calling for a “final solution” against Israel.

Ayatollah’s TikTok solution

Iran bans the use of all internationally popular social media platforms. However, the ban against TikTok was presumably enforced with help from the Chinese-owned service, at least until September 2023.

Unlike other social media platforms, people in Iran could not access TikTok even using censorship-circumvention tools (like virtual private networks) as long as they had an Iranian SIM card in their phones. This restriction has apparently been removed.

This implies that TikTok actively identified Iranian SIM cards and banned users. Both the restriction and its apparent end do not bode well for people’s rights to freedom of speech and privacy in sight of the Islamic Republic’s preexisting collaboration with China in fields of surveillance and censorship, which is opaquely listed as part of the twenty-five-year Iran-China deal signed in 2021.

However, people in Iran, especially Generation Z, are tech savvy and resourceful when circumventing restrictions. That is why there have always been TikTokers inside the country. To use the service, some removed their SIM cards before opening the app or had a second device (a smartphone or tablet) without a SIM. They then masked their Internet Protocol (IP) address and location with circumvention tools to get on TikTok.

The second group used unofficial TikTok “forks,” modified versions of the original app released by unknown programmers. The TikTok forks used in Iran are suspiciously named TikToker_IR, a naming style popular with state-affiliated tech companies. In the past, Iranian security forces have developed and published forks of popular banned applications like Telegram, embedding surveillance capabilities in the apps and breaching users’ privacy.

However, in September 2023, TikTokers in Iran observed a change in the enforcement of the ban. Since then, users have been able to access the app without removing their SIM, and only need to use a VPN. This can also be part of the regime’s recent shift to introducing more alternatives to “Western” social media platforms by either curbing limits on apps owned by Tehran’s allies or—as was proposed by the powerful Supreme Council of Cyberspace, controlled by Khamenei—introducing forks for popular banned apps like Instagram with embedded surveillance and censorship capabilities.

From behind the digital iron veil in Iran and the great firewall of China, the two regimes have joined forces, weaving a web of propaganda and conspiracy theories to fight against TikTok regulation in the United States. But for now, with other Western powers such as Canada and the United Kingdom possibly following suit, the fate of the app is in balance around the globe.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post Tehran cooked up a conspiracy theory blaming Israel for US TikTok ban appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Iran’s record-setting proliferation of attack UAVs did not happen overnight. Although the solution to stop the spread of Iranian drones is complex, it is important to note that there were plenty of warnings and time for the United States to prepare its defenses. In 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin delivered remarks at the annual Manama Dialogue to reassure the region of US security commitments, as the dialogue occurred only three months after the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The remarks also occurred after the United States began its Global Posture Review and the Department of Defense (DOD) had already withdrawn a significant portion of its defense capability from the region. Austin had good reason to assuage regional leaders’ doubts about US credibility and commitment to the region. Notably, the remarks underscored another area in which the United States must reconsider its approach.

By the time of the Manama Dialogue speech, Iran had proven its ability to regularly transfer sufficient quantities of drone components to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, resulting in the launch of hundreds of UAV and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia. Iran’s proliferation of UAVs to its regional proxies began in earnest several years earlier. In 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Iran Military Power Study noted that Iran was pursuing more and increasingly capable UAVs. The study also indicated that Iran was proliferating these systems to the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militia groups in Iraq and Syria. In his Manama remarks, Austin congratulated the Saudis for defeating nearly 90 percent of UAVs and missiles fired from Yemen, and promised to work with the Saudis to provide 100 percent coverage against attack. 

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provided a new opening for Iran—this time to supply Russia with lethal drones. With the UAV transfers first reported in mid-2022 and with more than one thousand UAVs reportedly delivered, Iran’s assistance to Russia appears to have ushered in a new period of strategic partnership between the two countries. Although the Iran-Russia partnership creates long-term security complications, the more immediate effects of Iranian drones were to come from Yemen. Following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping and subsequent diversion of maritime traffic necessitated the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian and multiple rounds of US and allied strikes, as well as the predictable Houthi response attacks. Prior to the Houthis’ partial closure of Red Sea Shipping, the US government took several proactive steps.

It is just as important to disrupt the supply chain to limit UAV proliferation and attacks as it is to mount an adequate defense. In the case of Iran, the US government has identified and sanctioned the various suppliers of Iran’s UAV production enterprise. This effort included US Treasury designations of front companies in China, Russia, Turkey, and Germany. Because sanctions alone are ineffective, there has also been an international effort to interdict Iranian supply routes. Even before the advent of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the United States and allied nations, like the United Kingdom and France, conducted regular interdictions and seizures of Iranian smuggled material. However, these designations and interdictions were not enough. Even after the October 7, 2023 attacks caused the United States to reestablish a more robust naval presence in the Middle East, comprehensive interdiction of Iranian smuggled lethal assistance proved elusive. As much as stopping maritime smuggling remains a challenge, interdicting overland smuggling from Iran to militia groups in Iraq and Syria reportedly represents an even greater challenge.

Another potential option would be to destroy Iran’s production facilities. However, US administrations have avoided attacking drone production facilities inside Iran due to the risk of regional escalation. The most practical option has been to upgrade US defenses against UAVs. Since both the 2019 DIA Iran Power Study and Secretary Austin’s 2021 Manama Dialogue remarks indicated an appreciation for Iran’s UAV and missile-proliferation capability, this effort should already be well underway. However, the DOD’s institutional and executive-level recognition of the Iranian threat has yet to fully translate into a reallocation of resources in the DOD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. 

While the armed services have authority over major acquisitions, none of the services have wanted to devote a significant portion of their budget away from higher-priority Indo-Pacific and Eurasia based threats articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The Pentagon created a Joint Counter Unmanned Aerial System Office, but without the authority to direct major, service-level acquisitions, it focused on testing, training, and doctrine. In the $849.8-billion 2025 fiscal year budget request, the US Army has a $299.8 million line-item request for counter-UAV systems. In the US Central Command (CENTCOM) region, where there has been a clear threat for years, CENTCOM requested $17.1 billion in the budget. The 2025 fiscal year budget amount was $3.8 billion less than that for 2024. Although these CENTCOM funds go toward operational expenses, a fraction of the funds would go toward acquiring counter-UAV systems like the Coyote launcher system. Because CENTCOM also does not have authority over major program acquisitions, the systems it is acquiring do not have the validation of a service-level acquisition and haven’t been integrated across the military.  

With recent annual defense budgets ranging from $700 billion to more than $800 billion, it is not clear why the Pentagon did not devote more resources to low-cost, plentiful defenses against an ever-growing threat. In addition to his description of how Iran uses its missiles and UAVs, a testimony by General Michael Kurilla clarified that US and coalition forces have experienced 175 Iran-supported attacks in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan since October 7, 2023. These attacks only span five months and do not include a number of previous attacks, including one that killed a US contractor in 2023. Additionally, senior Pentagon officials recently indicated that US Navy forces in the Red Sea have defended against almost one hundred Houthi attacks, with almost every attack involving a variety of Iranian-supplied drones and missiles. Based on the cost of the defensive missiles fired from a US Navy warship, destroying these Houthi attacks has already led to $1 billion of unbudgeted expenses. Iranian proxies are proving their ability to deplete the US military’s stores of its long-range and expensive air defense missiles.  

However, unplanned expenses are not the worst part about mounting an adequate defense against drones and missiles, whether they originate from Iran or some other malign actor. One of the attacks mentioned in the CENTCOM posture testimony was an attack that led to the deaths of three US service members. Although death is not entirely preventable in conflict, the threat trend from Iran had been clear. The Pentagon could have done more to prepare for Iranian UAV proliferation and the range of opportunistic attacks that Kurilla described. At the same time that Secretary Austin had congratulated the Saudis for defending against Iranian-supplied Houthi attacks, the Pentagon should have undertaken a comprehensive effort, similar to the 2022 Foreign Military Sales Tiger Team, to improve US defenses against the mounting numbers of low-cost, widely proliferated UAVs and missiles from Iran. Whether doing so would have saved lives is unknown, but the effort and funds expended would not have been wasted.

Daniel E. Mouton is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. 

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An audio file of a private conversation with Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former foreign minister of the Islamic Republic, surfaced on March 14. The leaked audio, which IranWire published and transcribed, centers around the recent parliamentary and assembly of experts elections on March 1, and sheds much light on the political evolution of the last three decades. It should also inform the US government in its Iran policy moving forward. Crucially, it confirms that, despite accusations by some US policymakers that Iranian moderates were disingenuous, there was, in fact, a sincere reform movement in the 1990s, and now that movement is dead.

The leaked conversation—which is partially erased, and only sixteen minutes of it are available—is between Zarif and a small group of men, but their voices are altered to protect their identities. The career diplomat does most of the talking, but the audience chimes in and comments occasionally. It is the second prominent leak involving Zarif, following a three-hour interview of him in 2021 that was likely a reaction to his being prevented from becoming a presidential candidate that year.

It is uncertain why the perpetrator recorded the meeting. He is likely a secret dissident because he sent the recording to IranWire, a prominent foreign-based and anti-regime website that has been a popular destination for insider leaks.

Contextualizing the publication of the audio recording leads one to believe that this was a private citizen’s act of dissent rather than an insider leak. The substance of the conversation, especially Zarif’s remarks, provides a window into the evolution of the Islamic Republic’s totalitarianism, elevates the reformists of the 1990s, and discredits the moderates of today.

How the reform movement died

In the leaked audio, Zarif is a critic of the reformists of the 1990s. According to the former foreign minister, the reform movement sought “erasure.” Erasure of what is unclear, but the context makes it obvious that he is referring to either the role of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or the entirety of the system. He claims that the movement sought constitutional reform of the clerical establishment. In his view, it is evident that the threat to the political establishment posed by the reformists would lead to the solidification of Khamenei’s camp’s power; that is, the hardliners.

The reformist movement kicked off in 1997 when reformist Mohammad Khatami became president with 69 percent of the vote. However, after eight years as head of state, Khamenei was still not the biggest political force in Iran’s informal politics. President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom Khatami succeeded, was the lead character in the show. In his memoirs, Rafsanjani claimed that he ensured that there would be no cheating, and Khamenei lacked the power to override Rafsanjani’s will. This was the first triumph for reformers.

Reformists sought to curb the supreme leader’s power. The revolution had succeeded in 1979 by falsely promising that the supreme leader would simply be a moral guide residing in Qom, not an assertive politician in Tehran. In the 1990s, the revolution was only in its second decade of life, and many reformists remembered this promise and sought to realize it. Khamenei, chosen for his perceived ineptitude at the time, did not appear to be an intimidating bulwark against liberalization like the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Rather, people looked at Rafsanjani as the real obstacle to change.

Furthermore, many reformists were personally loyal to Khomeini and accepted his absolute power, but there was no such personal allegiance to Khamenei. Rafsanjani’s departure from the presidency was an opportunity to change the regime’s structure, beginning with reducing the position of the supreme leader to what had been promised in 1979. This meant clipping Khamenei’s wings.

At the time, the reformist movement energized the youth. Demands for change grew in intensity and climaxed in the summer of 1999 at the campus of Tehran University. Known as the 1999 student uprising, this was the first serious, popular challenge to the clerical establishment and Khamenei’s power as supreme leader, and it resulted in violent suppression and mass arrests. In response, Zarif claims, Khamenei began appearing in public wearing keffiyeh to solidify support among the regime’s base. As a personal anecdote, Zarif mentions that the official portraits of Khamenei in government offices up until that point showed the leader without a kaffiyeh, but authorities replaced them with new portraits showing him with the scarf after the 1999 uprising. Khamenei began wearing it as a signal that he was also resisting the reformists, adding an accusation that they were agents of “the soft war,” his term for the United States’ ideological appeal. This began a project to elevate Khamenei to fill the charismatic and ideological leadership vacuum that Khomeini had left.

There was also an electoral challenge. Months after the protests, with Khamenei still too weak to force his will, reformists dominated the legislature. The Second of Khordad Front—the name reflects the date of Khatami’s victory and shows the movement’s high morale—won 222 out of the 290 seats in parliament. However, most of the bills that the sixth parliament passed were struck down by the twelve-member Guardian Council—a vetting body appointed by Khamenei that, de jure, decides who makes electoral ballots and whether a bill passed by the parliament is consistent with the constitution and Islamic laws. But through budgeting and public statements, the reformists were making small inroads toward change.

Khatami would win reelection in 2001, but most reformist parliamentary candidates were disqualified by the Guardian Council, creating space for Khamenei loyalists to make their comeback. Years later, in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a mostly unknown hardline candidate favored by the security forces, won the presidency amid suspicions of fraud. During Khatami’s eight years, the supreme leader created a parallel security apparatus within the official security organizations. A new secret police division in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), known as the parallel intelligence agency, sidelined the intelligence ministry. Khamenei also expanded counterintelligence divisions within the armed forces to identify loyalists and doubters. In Iran’s informal government culture, all these offices were directly responsible to him, not to their immediate supervisors. After Ahmadinejad became president, he added to the IRGC’s power and budget at the cost of Iran’s electoral institutions.

As Zarif argues, these actions by Khamenei were a reaction to the reformists’ threats to his power. Another possible explanation is that Khamenei’s solidifying power would happen regardless of circumstances, consistent with autocratic conduct in history. Using his legal powers, and with his rival Rafsanjani out of the way, Khamenei was always going to fill the military and civilian establishments with his loyalists and purge the rest. Nonetheless, if the career diplomat’s story is to be believed, the reform movement was sincere in its intentions, and it would be a mistake to dismiss it as dishonest or just for show. Unfortunately, sincere or not, it is dead—especially after the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement.

In 2009, reformists bid for a comeback, but systemic fraud led to the reelection of Ahmadinejad. Nearly a year of mass protests followed, marking the first existential crisis for the Islamic Republic since the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). The regime succeeded in putting down the protests, but the lesson it learned was that such protests could never happen again. The rest of Zarif’s story confirms this.

The Green Movement provided a golden opportunity to eliminate the honest reformists. Its leaders, Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karoubi, have been under house arrest since 2011 and forgotten. Khatami, too, has been banned from public appearances and even boycotted the March 1 elections. His brother, Mohammad Reza, known to have been more forceful in seeking change, was the first to be arrested in 2009 and is entirely sidelined. His wife, the granddaughter of Khomeini, who is known for her socially liberal views within the Islamic Republic context, has experienced a similar fate. Military commanders who expressed sympathies with the public during the Green Movement were also eliminated via assassination, forced retirement, or purges—some others voluntarily retired in disgust. What was left was a homogeneous leadership dedicated to preserving the system in its current form.

Zarif on elections

As mentioned above, Iran’s ballot qualifications are constitutionally determined by the Guardian Council. In the audio leak, Zarif mentions that, despite the formal process, two men outside the council approve the final list. They are Ali Jafari, the former commander in chief of the IRGC, and Hossein Taeb, the former IRGC intelligence chief and the former commander of its student militia wing, the Basij. They are the most powerful men in the regime’s election schemes.

The regime has walked away from fraud to avoid repeating another 2009 scenario. Instead, Jafari and Taeb fix the list of candidates who qualify for the ballot and disqualify reformists who could win. On one occasion, Zarif admits that an intelligence organization, likely IRGC’s parallel intelligence agency, summoned him to explain whether he would register as a candidate, and added later that he would have been disqualified if he had. In sum, it is already a draconian process in which Khamenei has enormous influence, and an informal parallel scheme still circumvents the constitution mandates.

Zarif concludes that the regime ensures that the reformists and centrists who make the ballot are too uncharismatic or unknown to win—or even if they win, too slavish to pose a threat to the system.

There is a logical sequence in Zarif’s analysis. The reform movement was sincere, and it was cracked down on because it challenged the Islamic Republic and Khamenei. Therefore, the remaining reformists and moderates are either disingenuous or too weak to effect change. It is possible that the United States could have used its resources to help the movement succeed in 2009, but its leaders declined the offer, fearing that such help would be a license for the regime to crack down on protesters. They were wrong to decline the offer, as Khamenei and the security services killed the movement. Its leaders and those sympathetic to it have been subjected to house arrest, political purge, and assassination. Given this context, US policymakers should accept that the regime has become reform-proof, and that the only moderates and centrists who have been elevated to senior positions since 2009 have executed the policies of the hardliners. This will remain the case for the foreseeable future.

Shay Khatiri is the vice president of development and a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.

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In recent years, the Palestinian arena has been emphasized even more strongly as a central struggle of the pro-Iranian axis in the framework of this concept. In Iran’s view, the normalization process between Israel and the Arab countries created an opportunity for increased coordination between the terrorist organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the other elements in the axis around the struggle against Israel as their common enemy. As part of realizing this strategy, Tehran decided to establish a joint operations room, which will be responsible for the coordination and overall military, logistical, and intelligence planning among the network of partners and proxies Iran established in the region. However, the activation of the network at Iran’s initiative and at a time convenient for the Islamic Republic was intended, first and foremost, to serve Iranian interests—primarily, to deter Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear targets or its main ally, Hezbollah.

The initiation of the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas, which triggered a region-wide war, surprised Iran, especially the timing of the attacks. This presented Tehran with an increasingly difficult dilemma: how to preserve the cohesion of the pro-Iranian axis without being drawn into a direct military conflict with Israel and the United States. It is no surprise that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei expressed dissatisfaction with the timing of the attacks. According to a Reuters report, Khamenei told Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during their November 2023 meeting that Iran would not directly intervene in the war because it was caught off guard by October 7. He also urged to silence the voices within Hamas that publicly called for Iran and Hezbollah to join the campaign against Israel in full force.

A prominent manifestation of Iran’s growing fear of being dragged into a direct military conflict can be observed in the events that followed the drone attack carried out by the Iraqi Shia militias on the US logistics support base in northeastern Jordan on January 28. A few hours after the attack, which resulted in the deaths of three US soldiers, Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, arrived in Baghdad and instructed the leaders of the Iraqi militias to cease their attacks against US forces in Syria and Iraq. According to one report, Qaani emphasized that the militias must maintain a low profile to prevent US retaliatory strikes, including against Iran. He stated that the militias had crossed a red line and that Iran could not afford military actions that might provoke the United States or Israel into starting a war. Indeed, shortly after he arrived in Baghdad, the secretary general of the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades militia announced the suspension of military activities against US forces in the region.

Qaani’s success in de-escalating tensions in the Iraqi arena may strengthen the assessment that Iran retains the ability to significantly influence its partners and proxies throughout the Middle East. However, Tehran’s ability to ensure complete control over the elements of the Resistance Axis should not be overestimated. The axis does not function as a hierarchy with direct Iranian command and control, but as a loose network of interconnected components driven by common interests and a shared ideological vision. Furthermore, in recent years—mainly since the assassination of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in 2020—Iran has managed its proxies in a more decentralized way than before. While it continues to have substantial influence within the network, it does not necessarily enjoy complete control over each component. The transformation of the axis into a decentralized network has provided Iran with greater flexibility, the ability to deny involvement, and the option to distance itself from provocative actions by its partners. However, it also carries risks because the weakening of Iranian control could lead to uncoordinated actions by its partners that endanger Iranian interests.

In this context, it is possible to understand the Reuters report on March 15, which suggests that Iran and Hezbollah are well aware of the risks associated with an Israeli attack on Hezbollah, including the potential escalation to attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. According to the report, during a meeting in Tehran in February—attended by the commander of the IRGC, the commander of the IRGC Quds Force, and representatives from the Resistance Axis in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq—all participants agreed that Israel aims to widen the conflict and that efforts should be made to avoid falling into this trap. This is because such escalation could lead to the presence of additional US soldiers in the region. A few days later, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah conveyed to the commander of the Quds Force that, in the event of a war with Israel, Hezbollah would take on the fight itself because it has no interest in Iran being dragged into a conflict with Israel or the United States.

In conclusion, Iran developed the “unification of the arenas” strategy to deter Israel from initiating a war against it or Hezbollah. However, Hamas’s decision to start a war at a time not determined by Iran created a situation of escalating risks. The unification strategy, which was designed to provide deterrence against Israel, could potentially drag Iran into an unwanted military conflict. As time passes, it becomes evident that Iran fears the possibility of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah, and perhaps even Israel taking advantage of the opportunity to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. According to a New York Times report, Khamenei even instructed his army commanders to adopt a policy of “strategic patience” and to avoid any actions that could lead to a significant escalation, thus avoiding direct military confrontation with Israel or the United States. The day after the war, the Islamic Republic will also be required to reassess its security strategies and examine whether their benefits still outweigh the risks involved.

Dr. Raz Zimmt is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.

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The United Nations Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) response to allegations of rights abuses emerging from the country less than two months into the protests, the forming of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (FFMI) in November 2022, marked a significant step towards holding violators accountable and providing a voice to those silenced by the government. The council tasked the FFMI to specifically investigate allegations of human rights abuses perpetuated during protests that escalated following Amini’s death by examining evidence and documenting potential human rights violations to ensure accountability.

On March 18, the FFMI presented its current findings, revealing the extent of the atrocities and confirming fears that these were not isolated incidents but crimes against humanity executed under a veil of impunity at the highest levels of the Iranian state. The FFMI’s investigations revealed that Amini’s arrest was not only arbitrary but also led to her death due to physical violence while in custody. This pointed to a clear violation of her right to liberty and personal security, squarely placing the responsibility on the state for her demise. The authorities’ failure to conduct a timely, effective, and transparent investigation into Amini’s death, coupled with their concerted efforts to distort the truth, further underscored the systemic disregard for international human rights norms.

With 551 confirmed deaths and countless crimes, the FFMI’s report revealed systematic rights violations of liberty and physical security, painting a stark picture of indiscriminate arrests and detentions. The comprehensive suppression extended to extreme measures, including the torturing of protesters being held in detention facilities where acts of barbarity indicative of systematic abuse were sanctioned at the highest levels. Amidst this grim scenario, gender persecution stood out, with Iran targeting women, girls, and gender equality advocates, constituting a particularly vile form of these crimes and abuses. The harrowing accounts of sexual and gender-based violence being wielded as tools of repression illustrate a chilling disregard for human dignity and fundamental rights. Such practices, especially the targeted abuse of children and vulnerable groups like LGBTQI individuals, further highlight the government’s exploitation of societal prejudices to compound the suffering of its victims. Additionally, the FFMI’s report underlines that a significant number of these atrocities occurred in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic and religious minorities, thus highlighting the disproportionate impact on these communities.

Further to this, investigators established that executions of several protesters following summary proceedings without fair trial and due process guarantees violated the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment and amount to unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of their right to life. They concluded that prosecutors and judges, “particularly in the revolutionary courts,” were responsible for myriad violations, including prosecutions for violations of discriminatory laws, in particular mandatory hijab laws, the conviction of protesters on vaguely formulated charges, and sentences to corporal punishments (lashings) and death for acts not considered to be either crimes or capital offenses under international law. The absence of fair trial guarantees—including the right to defense, the right to be heard by an impartial tribunal, and the prohibition of the use of coerced confessions—reveals a legal system weaponized against perceived enemies of the state. Furthermore, the treatment of these individuals before their executions, marked by documented cases of torture and denial of access to family or legal representation, exacerbates the gravity of these human rights abuses. Additionally, the FFMI’s revelations about the state’s actions to obscure the truth, intimidate and punish defense lawyers, and unjustly target journalists and media workers also underscore a deliberate strategy to suppress dissent and silence any voices that dare to speak out against the government’s conduct.           

The FFMI explicitly links serious human rights violations to specific state institutions and actors, deepening the accountability landscape within Iran’s governmental structure. It asserts that “various branches of the [s]tate’s security forces participated in the unnecessary and disproportionate use of force, resulting in unlawful killings and injuries, most notably by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij forces, and the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Faraja), including its special forces (yegan-e vijeh).” Notably, the FFMI also confirms that high-level authorities “encouraged, sanctioned, and endorsed violations of human rights” through statements justifying the acts and conduct of the security forces engaged in a disinformation campaign” against protesters. They find that “authorities at the highest level of the [s]tate participated in, aided and abetted, or otherwise contributed to the violations, or knew or consciously disregarded information about their commission and failed to prevent and punish them”: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, of the Basij forces, of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the head of the judiciary, and many others.  

This damning indictment against such a broad swath of Iran’s security apparatus and judicial system underscores the systemic nature of the human rights abuses reported. By detailing the specific roles played by various state institutions and actors, the FFMI highlights the widespread and coordinated efforts to crush dissent and spread fear among the populace. The clarity with which the FFMI outlines the direct involvement of security forces and intelligence agencies in human rights violations signals an unambiguous call for accountability, emphasizing the need for a global response to address these grave breaches of international law.

While these revelations are critical, they represent only the surface of a deep-seated crisis that continues to unravel. However, the FFMI’s current findings are merely the inception of a long, intricate justice and reform process. The council is now faced with a pivotal decision—whether or not to extend the FFMI’s mandate for an additional year.

The case for extension

The need for the FFMI’s mandate to be extended for an additional year lies in the gravity and scope of these findings and the ongoing and escalating atrocities documented since the initial report. With human rights violations persisting unabated, the extension is imperative for several reasons:

• Sustained documentation and accountability: An extended mandate would enable the FFMI to continue systematically establishing the facts about the events that took place during the surge of protests that unfolded in 2022, reinforcing the international community’s commitment to accountability and justice.
• Comprehensive investigation: With more time, the FFMI can conduct further in-depth investigations, particularly into events that have occurred beyond the scope of the initial report. A detailed and comprehensive understanding is crucial for formulating effective international responses and support mechanisms for the victims.
• Engagement with a broader stakeholder base: Extending the mandate would allow the FFMI to engage with a wider range of stakeholders, including civil society organizations, victims and their families, and defectors. This would ensure a more inclusive and accurate portrayal of the violations and their impact.
• Overcoming challenges: The FFMI’s work has been hampered by challenges in accessing information and a lack of cooperation from the Iranian government. An additional year could provide strategic avenues to overcome these obstacles, possibly opening new channels for dialogue and investigation.
• Global human rights commitment: Extending the FFMI’s mandate affirms the global commitment to human rights. It sends a clear message that the international community stands in solidarity with the victims and will persist in holding perpetrators accountable.

Critics of the FFMI’s extension might cite financial constraints, diplomatic tensions, or potential infringements on sovereignty. However, these arguments falter when weighed against the imperative of upholding fundamental human rights and ensuring accountability for crimes against humanity. The cost of inaction—measured in human lives and the erosion of international legal norms—far exceeds the logistical and diplomatic challenges presented.

The FFMI’s groundbreaking work has peeled back the layers of repression and impunity that have long shielded perpetrators of human rights violations in Iran. Extending its mandate is not just a strategic necessity but a moral imperative. In the face of systemic injustice, the international community must reaffirm its commitment to human rights, justice, and accountability. The victims of Iran’s oppressive government deserve no less than a concerted effort to continue the pursuit of justice, leveraging every tool at our disposal to ensure their stories are told, their dignity restored, and their oppressors held to account.

Rose Parris Richter is the executive director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

Azadeh Pourzand is the spokesperson and community director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

The post It’s morally imperative that the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran be extended. Here’s why. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

Since Mahsa Jina Amini’s death in 2022 and the resulting protests, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been one of the main perpetrators of human rights violations in Iran. The IRGC is a security force of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) headed by the commander-in-chief of the Iranian Armed Forces, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It has been responsible for countless violations across a variety of contexts and has significant influence over domestic matters in Iran. In addition to the various sanctions that have been issued against the IRGC for human rights violations, there have been repeated calls for governments across the world to list it as a terrorist organization. This post looks at how terrorist organization listings are decided, the consequences, and how these are related to targeted human rights sanctions.

Which countries have listed the IRGC as a terrorist organization?

Of the main jurisdictions featured in this series—Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)—only the US has listed the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization (April 15, 2019). The Canadian government recently announced it is “looking at ways to ‘responsibly’ designate” the IRGC but has so far only listed a subsidiary of the IRGC, the Quds Force (December 17, 2012). Other countries that have listed the IRGC as a terrorist organization include Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

What does a ‘terrorist organization’ listing mean and how does it compare to sanctions?

While each country has its definition, usually, this listing means the designated group is seen as being involved in terrorism in some way. A terrorist organization listing is similar to a targeted sanctions designation but involves different legal bases, processes, and consequences. As with targeted sanctions, these differ depending on the country making the listing and are detailed below for the main jurisdictions. Similarly, each of the main jurisdictions also has protections in place to uphold due process and other rights of the listed organizations and their members. In particular, each jurisdiction has policies mandating periodic reviews of listings and/or other de-listing or revocation processes. Unlike targeted sanctions, a terrorist organization listing opens the door for prosecutors to bring certain criminal charges for terrorism-related offenses against the organization’s members and associates, such as for the crime of membership in a terrorist organization.

What is the process for adding an organization?

As with targeted sanctions, the process for terrorist organization designations for all the main jurisdictions is mainly a discretionary decision by senior government officials. However, different criteria and different government agencies and officials are involved.

Australia: The minister for home affairs evaluates whether the criteria required in the Criminal Code Act 1995, Division 102 have been met and arranges a briefing for the leader of the opposition. The minister also seeks the agreement of the state/territory first ministers and advises the prime minister on the matter. Once this is complete, the governor-general “may make regulations to list” the organization.

Canada: Under the Anti-terrorism Act, once it has been established that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that an entity was sufficiently involved in the terrorist activity, reports are submitted to the minister for public safety, who, if they are satisfied the “reasonable grounds” standard is met, may recommend that the governor in council place the entity on the list.

European Union: The EU has the most complex process as a multilateral organization. For the EU, there must first be a “decision” by a “competent authority” concerning “a terrorist attack, an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence or clues.” A “competent authority” could be “a judicial authority, or, where judicial authorities have no competence… an equivalent competent authority in that area.” Those identified by the United Nations Security Council “as being related to terrorism and against whom it has ordered sanctions” may also be included.

According to the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU, administrative authorities could also be considered competent authorities so long as their decisions are subject to judicial review. This indicates that a sanctions designation by certain countries could be sufficient if adequate due process considerations are guaranteed.

Once a competent authority has made a decision, a member state of the EU or the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy (HR) can submit a proposal to be reviewed by the Working Party on restrictive measures to combat terrorism (COMET). After reviews and consultations, COMET then recommends the listing, or not, to the EU Council for adoption.

United Kingdom: The organization must first meet the proscription requirements in the Terrorism Act 2000. Then, the home secretary uses their discretion to determine if proscription would be “proportionate,” looking at factors including the “nature and scale of an organisation’s activities”; “the specific threat that it poses to the UK”; “the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas”; “the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK”; and “the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.” If the secretary believes the requirements are met and it would be proportional, they may add the organizations to the list of Proscribed Terrorist Groups or Organisations.

United States: Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 219, the US Department of State can designate groups as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO). This is based on three criteria: the group must be a foreign organization, must engage in “terrorist activity,” and that activity must threaten either the security of US nationals or US national security. To recommend a designation, the Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism prepares an “administrative record” of information about a proposed foreign terrorist organization. The secretary of state consults with the attorney general and the treasury secretary in deciding whether to make a designation. The secretary of state, and barring any action to block the designation over a seven-day waiting period, the designation takes effect.

In a similar process under Executive Order 13224, both the State and Treasury departments, in consultation with the Department of Justice, can list, as a targeted sanction, “specially designated global terrorists” (SDGT). These designations cover a wider range of individuals and entities than are allowed under the foreign terrorist organization listing. Still, its effects are limited to those of targeted sanctions (in this case, freezing assets and prohibiting transactions). Unlike a designation as an FTO under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a designation as an SDGT under Executive Order 13224 cannot, for example, give rise to certain civil and criminal offenses related to terrorism. However, an SDGT designation may have other benefits compared to an FTO designation, such as better allowing the US government to engage in diplomacy with the organization.

What are the consequences of being designated as a terrorist organization, and why should the IRGC be listed?

In addition to the symbolic gesture, one of the main consequences of a “terrorist organization” listing is the availability of terrorism-related prosecutions both against members of the organization and against those supporting it. The specific crimes that involve terrorist organizations vary by jurisdiction but often include membership and supplying resources.

This means that, for example, an IRGC official arrested in an EU country could be prosecuted not just for atrocities committed in Iran—for example, torture and crimes against humanity—but also for membership in a terrorist organization. While there are policy reasons why it is important for prosecutors to try to bring atrocity-related charges, it can be difficult to establish the link between high-level officials and the relevant offenses and so terrorism-related charges may be easier to prove.

Further, some jurisdictions also allow for cumulative charges, which means they can bring different charges for the same underlying act. For example, if someone provided weapons used in an attack by the IRGC, they could be charged both with indirect liability—such as aiding and abetting—for atrocity crimes and could be simultaneously charged with “supporting” a terrorist organization. This increases the likelihood of conviction on at least one charge and, if both result in convictions, of a longer overall sentence. Additionally, for some countries—such as the US—there may be “less inhibition on exercising universal jurisdiction” over those supporting terrorist organizations as opposed to those committing other crimes.

Finally, the US requires financial institutions to “retain possession of or control over” the funds of a foreign terrorist organization or its “agent” and report the funds to the US government. It also prohibits entry to “[r]epresentatives and members” of the organization “if they are aliens.” In the EU, “EU external terrorist” organizations have their funds and financial assets frozen, and funds, financial assets, and economic resources cannot be made available to them directly or indirectly. In Canada, a listed entity’s property “can be the subject of seizure/restraint and/or forfeiture.” Neither the UK nor Australia implements asset freezes for domestic terrorist organization listings.

What are the arguments against listing the IRGC?

First, as with sanctions—targeted and otherwise—an IRGC listing risks imposing a burden on civilians through over-compliance and negative impacts on the Iranian economy without guaranteeing constraints on the IRGC’s behavior or significant effects on the “political elite.”

In addition, even with the domestic pressure to list the IRGC as a terrorist organization, leaders have voiced hesitation in taking that step. The UK, for instance, appeared willing to list the IRGC in early 2023 but has since indicated that it will instead expand the criteria for targeted sanctions to include violations that occurred inside the UK. It was reported that the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office worried that a terrorist designation would trigger the expulsion of the UK ambassador to Iran and that it knew that the EU was unlikely to make a parallel terrorist designation. It was also reported in February 2023 that US diplomats were urging the UK not to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization, though the spokesperson for the US Department of State responded that such an approach by the US didn’t “ring true” to him and by October 2023 there were reports indicating the Joe Biden administration was urging the UK to make the designation.

Notably, the IRGC is distinct from most other listed terrorist organizations as it is a state military organization and is “constitutionally mandated.” In the United States, for example, no other country has military components which have been designated as FTOs.

Finally, Iran has compulsory military service, and conscripts were historically randomly assigned to branches—including the IRGC—which has impacted immigration for those who were conscripted decades ago. However, since 2010, about 80 percent of the IRGC’s conscripts actively choose to join the IRGC. There are further reports that conscripts can use bribes, “privileges,” and connections to avoid combat and that the IRGC, in particular, is “very corrupt.” Since 2010, over 70 percent of IRGC conscripts were already members of the Basij Resistance Force—a “volunteer paramilitary organization operating under” the IRGC—because the IRGC recognizes Basij training (reducing the total length of military service) and because Basij members are viewed as “more loyal” to the regime. Of the remaining 30 percent, some have postgraduate degrees with a “personal choice” of desk jobs due to their specialization. Finally, a “maximum 20 percent” are distributed to the IRGC “in some unprivileged and poor areas, due to the number of Basij members being insufficient.” Determining who falls into this category could be achieved through “filtering and determining [with] a special degree of scrutiny[…] on a case-by-case basis.” 

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Khamenei proclaimed his connection to the “divine” on December 31, 2023, during a meeting with the family of his slain spymaster, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, who was killed four years earlier via a US drone strike in Iraq. The supreme leader was retelling the story of what he described as a “fiery and catchy speech” he gave two decades ago.

The comments sent shockwaves through Iran. The Islamic Republic had always portrayed Khamenei as the “implementer of God’s orders” and the “leader of Muslims of the world.” However, this was the first time the supreme leader claimed to be God’s “tongue” and delivered what can only be described as revelations and prophecy. Critics described the comments as Khamenei “claiming to be God.”

Khamenei’s claim was so outlandish that state media outlets had to rush in and justify the commentary by weaving a web of propaganda masquerading as theology. This effort went as far as the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency publishing an op-ed titled, “The Monotheistic Basis of ‘My Tongue, but Words of God’” by Ali Reza Molla-Ahmadi, a cleric affiliated with the Office of the Supreme Leader.

But Khamenei did not arrive at this watershed moment overnight. When the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, died in 1989, a decade after the revolution, Khamenei was not the most senior political or religious figure in Iran, or even an ayatollah. Yet, he ascended to the clerical throne in a conniving political maneuver facilitated by his then ally and later archnemesis, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Ever since, clerics, state media, and security apparatuses have sanctified Khamenei’s image and attributed “divine infallibility” to him while harshly silencing all critics. Furthermore, the regime’s iron fist has quashed all authoritative religious voices that could challenge Khamenei’s step-by-step ascension.

The last two ayatollahs who challenged the authority of a supreme leader in Iran were Hussein-Ali Montazeri and Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari. Both men were discredited by the clerical establishment and put under house arrest until they drew their last breath. But the purge did not end with prominent ayatollahs. Khamenei has been seeking to turn the clerical establishment and foundations into a monolith that supports him with no questions asked.

In 2019, Khamenei warned the “youth and elders” that the “enemies” had sent “agents to infiltrate” the holy city of Qom in central Iran, which, along with Najaf in Iraq, are the two equivalents of Vatican City in the Shia world. (Qom is the main religious bastion of the Islamic Republic, along with the northeastern city of Mashhad, where the eighth Shia saint, Imam Reza, is buried.) The call for “purging the revolution” and religious spaces has been echoed by sycophant clerics close to Khamenei over the years. In addition to “cleansing” religious spaces, Khamenei and the Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine have been running a tireless campaign to add a halo to his image.

Despite all these efforts, a recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has revealed that people in Iran have distanced themselves from religion and religious institutions, are opposed to mandatory hijab rules, and increasingly support secularism. All these changes have been evident in reoccurring, and increasingly frequent, protests against the clerical establishment, especially the 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.

Khamenei the gambler

In any normal context, if an octogenarian claimed that God speaks through them, there would be concerns about their mental health. But in the case of Khamenei, the sycophants who pack the ranks of his inner circle not only cheer him on, but also justify his words.

As supreme leader, the geriatric ayatollah has the final say over all matters of security and policy in Iran. He is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and appoints all top military commanders, including to key posts at the elite IRGC, which exports terror around the globe and quashes protests at home—again, under direct orders from Khamenei.

In practice, he oversees and controls the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, nuclear activity, and military operations. He decides who can run in elections and how voting should be engineered, as evidenced by the March 1 elections, which were hardline led as part of his Islamic Revolution 2.0 program. The ayatollah’s obsession with absolute control has gone as far as him setting a two thousand-kilometer cap for the country’s ballistic missiles—a decision that in most countries would be made by strategists and generals. (The cap leaves the United States out of range, but allows Tehran to hit much of the Middle East, including regional US military facilities and Israel.)

Over the years, garnering absolute power and religious authority has turned Khamenei into a vehicle of death and destruction at home and abroad. What makes him even more dangerous is that, at his core, he is nothing but a gambler playing with human lives through his decision-making.

In 2020, after the United States killed Soleimani in Iraq, Khamenei vowed “severe revenge.” A few days later, the IRGC hit a US base in Iraq as retaliation, but the base had already been evacuated. This was a show of force by Tehran to satisfy Khamenei’s base of zealots without any fatalities, but more than a hundred US soldiers sustained brain injuries.

At the time, a US official told Fox News that Iran had warned Iraq before the attacks, and Baghdad had passed that information to the United States. However, afraid of a possible US response, the Islamic Republic intentionally kept Iran’s airspace open during the attack, using civilians as human shields. This led to the IRGC downing Ukraine International Airlines Flight (PS752), killing all 176 passengers and crew. The tragedy created a pause in tensions and possibly prevented a direct confrontation between Iran and the United States. Evidence recently coming to light has shown that the supreme leader was directly involved in all decisions related to the plane’s downing and the regime’s subsequent cover-up.

This was not the first time that Khamenei brought tensions a split second away from an explosion. He used the same approach with Iran’s nuclear program, setting the Islamic Republic on course for a head-to-head collision with the West, changing direction under the auspices of “heroic flexibility,” and permitting the fruition of the nuclear deal in 2015 only when Iran was crumbling under sanctions and the shadow of war was looming large on the horizon.

Sanctified madness

Overconfident of divine intervention on his behalf, Khamenei is playing his hand more and more brazenly. He has once again set the Islamic Republic on course for acquiring nuclear arms, warning world powers in June 2023 that they “cannot stop” his regime if it desires to build the bomb. The Islamic Republic has been ramping up its production of highly enriched uranium, with Iran’s former nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, boasting in February that the regime has “all components” necessary for building a bomb.

When it comes to internal change, Khamenei has only conceded to “reforms” that can boost the effectiveness of the regime’s oppression, enhance its propaganda, expand its financial resources, reduce divisions within the establishment, and curb internal and external threats. Furthermore, his response to public dissent and popular demand for the democratization of power and realization of human rights has also been consistent throughout his almost four-decade rule. “Mow them like weeds,” he was quoted as saying in reference to dissent.

Over the decades, Khamenei has weaved an elaborate web, with himself sitting at the center and controlling all power structures in Iran. With his eventual death, this intricate web will collapse, creating a power vacuum and pitting different factions of the Islamic Republic with competing interests—especially the upper echelons of the IRGC—at each other’s throats. This watershed moment will provide people inside Iran and the diaspora with a historic chance to make a foray into fundamental change in the country. Preparations for the big day must start today. Petty infighting among the Iranian diaspora must become a thing of the past, and alliances must be built with Iranians and the international community for that faithful day. With that in mind, one thing is certain: For meaningful change in Iran, Khamenei has got to go.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

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Iran re-opened its embassy in Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic operations in Tehran in June and August 2023, respectively. In September 2023, the new Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, arrived in Riyadh on the same day the kingdom’s new envoy to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, began his diplomatic duties in Tehran. 

Given how hostile Iranian-Saudi relations were in the years leading up to the March 2023 agreement, such restoration of diplomatic ties was significant. Until a year ago, there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries since Riyadh severed ties with Tehran in January 2016, in response to attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad following the execution of Shia cleric Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. The Saudi state’s killing of this cleric raised sectarian temperatures in the Middle East. It drastically heightened friction in Tehran-Riyadh relations, which had steadily deteriorated against the backdrop of armed conflicts and political crises in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. 

The “Neighbors First” foreign policy strategy of the Ebrahim Raisi administration seeks to lessen the impact of Western pressure on Tehran by improving its relationships with surrounding countries. Within this context, Tehran’s leadership is focused on overcoming problems with some members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), including the United Arab Emirates (UAE). To show solidarity with Riyadh, the UAE downgraded its relations with Tehran amid the 2016 Iranian-Saudi crisis. But by 2019, Abu Dhabi began cautiously engaging Iran diplomatically due to the ways in which Iran’s “maximum resistance” to Washington’s maximum pressure policy left the UAE vulnerable due to “sabotage operations” off the Emirati coast. Then, in 2022, there was a formal restoration of ties after Abu Dhabi’s assessment that long-term peace and security in the Persian Gulf would require dialogue.

As Tehran sees it, better relations with GCC states—particularly a major player in the Arab and Islamic world, such as Saudi Arabia—could, to some extent, help Iran emerge from isolation. 

Reduced tensions with Iran offer Saudi Arabia opportunities to achieve the stability and security necessary for the kingdom to reach its internal development goals. Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia’s grandiose plan for economic diversification away from oil, requires massive levels of investment in various non-oil sectors such as tourism, logistics, ports, entertainment, culture, and defense.  

When Iran and Saudi Arabia had no diplomatic ties, economic relations between the two Persian Gulf countries were basically nonexistent. Yet, just five weeks after the recommencement of ties, a director at Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization expressed optimism about bilateral trade reaching $1 billion in the short term, and twice that much in the medium term, through Saudi and Iranian exports. As of April 2023, Iran had exported $14 million worth of steel to Saudi Arabia throughout the preceding three months. Realistically, however, US sanctions on Tehran will limit the potential for Iranian-Saudi bilateral trade to grow, even if both sides would like a fruitful economic relationship built on the détente.

The Saudi leadership understands that Iran and Tehran-backed non-state actors in the region can threaten the kingdom’s national security in ways that greatly reduce Vision 2030’s chances of success. For starters, there were drone and missile strikes against the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in September 2019. Those attacks, which Riyadh blamed on Tehran, reduced Saudi Arabia’s oil production by 50 percent. Additionally, it’s difficult to forget the 2022 Houthi rebel missile strike against a fuel depot in Jeddah during the Formula One Grand Prix at a time that was important to Riyadh’s efforts to present Saudi Arabia to the world as a stable country with up-and-coming sports and entertainment industries.

The March 2023 agreement has reportedly led Tehran and Riyadh to make concessions. Iran apparently agreed to stop encouraging Houthi rebel attacks against Saudi Arabia though Tehran has not been able to control their decision-making in the war. Iran called on Saudi Arabia to cut off its alleged funding to Iran International. The London-based Persian-language television channel—which provided day-to-day news coverage of Iranian authorities’ human-rights violations following Mahsa Amini’s September 2022 death in police custody and the anti-establishment protests it prompted—became an issue in Iran-Saudi relations due to its ties to a Saudi businessman. Iran also asked Saudi Arabia to stop supporting militant Sunni groups operating in its Sistan and Baluchestan province, such as Jaish al-Adl, ethnic Arab separatist forces in Khuzestan, and the Mujahedin-e Khalq. By May 2023, Saudi Arabia renormalized diplomatic relations with the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria, a move that was possibly related to the diplomatic deal with Iran. 

The Gaza war factor

Pragmatism, not love, drove Iran and Saudi Arabia to recommence diplomatic relations a year ago. Tehran and Riyadh saw dialogue as the only viable way to reduce tensions, and realized that further escalating hostilities would not advance either’s national interest. 

Despite the March 2023 agreement, there is no denying that Tehran and Riyadh remain extremely suspicious of each other. The Islamic Republic still views the Saudi-US partnership as a grave threat to Iran. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime’s revolutionary ideology and Tehran’s ability to challenge the regional status quo through its networks of non-state actors across multiple Arab countries continue to concern Riyadh. Within this context, détente, not rapprochement, most accurately describes the current period in Iranian-Saudi relations. 

The five-month-old Gaza war has reverberations in Lebanon, Yemen, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, which subjects the Middle East to much danger. Nonetheless, this war’s regionalization has not derailed the Iranian-Saudi détente. On the contrary, Tehran and Riyadh have taken steps to ensure that their dialogue continues without the March 2023 diplomatic deal becoming another victim of the Gaza war. That the détente has weathered the Israel-Hamas conflict since October 7, 2023 suggests that there is far more depth to it than some analysts might have suspected a year ago. 

To some extent, the Gaza war has brought about a degree of Iranian-Saudi alignment while pushing the two countries toward deeper diplomatic engagement. Four days into the war, Iranian President Raisi and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman had their first phone conversation since their countries restored diplomatic ties. In the call, they agreed on the “need to end war crimes against Palestine” and promote stronger Islamic unity. Then, on November 11, 2023, Raisi came to Riyadh to address the joint Arab League-Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) emergency summit on Gaza, making him the first Iranian president to visit Saudi Arabia since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended the 2012 OIC summit in Mecca.  

Opportunities that may be lost

For Iran, the region’s post-October 7, 2023 crises have represented opportunities to build on Tehran’s détente with Riyadh, convince the Saudis to end any consideration of joining the Abraham Accords, and advance a narrative about Iran possessing much influence throughout the Islamic world while aligning with its Arab neighbors against Israel. 

Saudi officials have been keen to avoid any actions amid the Gaza war and its regionalization that could harm the détente with Iran. This contributes to Riyadh’s absence from Operation Prosperity Guardian and its concerns about US-United Kingdom (UK) military strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. Saudi Arabia also appears to be among the Arab states that has reportedly started restricting the US military’s ability to wage operations against Iran-backed militias in the Middle East from its soil, according to Al-Monitor. 

Looking ahead into the Iranian-Saudi détente’s second year, Tehran and Riyadh will be keen to find ways to build on what is essentially a non-aggression pact. Although it is practically impossible to imagine Iranian-Saudi relations being free of deep-rooted suspicions and high levels of distrust, Tehran and Riyadh can find ways to responsibly “share” the neighborhood, as then President Barack Obama put it eight years ago. 

Nonetheless, as the Gaza war continues, Saudi officials will remain nervous about how Iran-backed groups in the region might act toward the kingdom. This risk adds to Riyadh’s unease about Israel continuing its war on Gaza and Saudi Arabia’s frustration with the United States for refusing to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government into accepting a ceasefire. If regional tensions spiral further out of control, and Saudi Arabia becomes caught up in the crossfire, the nascent détente could come into question. 

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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Electoral politics in the Islamic Republic have always been limited to various wings of the ruling regime, which, since the late 1990s, has been divided into two general camps: reformists (Eslahtalabs), who supported the presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) and advocated for varying degrees of democratization, and conservatives or principlists (Osoolgerayan) who opposed them and supported the authoritarian rule of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

This time around, much like in the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections—but on an even more drastic scale—the vast majority of reformists are disqualified from running, and many centrist conservatives have also not been allowed to run. While around eighty sitting members of parliament (MPs) had already been disqualified in 2020, in this election, twenty-six additional sitting MPs were barred from running. Also disqualified was the former head of the parliament’s foreign policy committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, who is known for his criticisms of Iran’s arming of Russia against Ukraine.

The disqualifications reached even more farcical proportions for the Assembly of Experts. Sitting assembly members whose candidacies were thrown out include former President Hassan Rouhani, who previously held many key military and security positions, and Mahmoud Alavi and Heydar Moslehi, both of whom are former intelligence ministers. In almost all provinces, the election result is already known. Of the 144 approved candidates, none are reformists, and only three are pro-Rouhani centrists.

This widespread disenfranchisement reflects the rule of Khamenei through the Guardian Council, the body that decides who runs in elections. Half of its twelve members are appointed directly by supreme leader, while the other half are selected by the Khamenei-appointed head of the judiciary. This important vehicle has helped Khamenei fill all institutions with only his most ardent supporters. As if this is not enough, Khamenei also keeps building parallel institutions. In recent years, a series of “high councils,” often appointed by Khamenei, have taken over many legislative functions from the parliament. At almost eighty-five years of age, the supreme leader is not getting any younger and is preparing the ground for the eventual succession crisis by leaving power in the hands of loyalists. 

Not surprisingly, these super-restricted elections are expected to have historically low turnout—lower than in previous elections—with a recent official poll putting the likely national turnout at 35 percent and only 18 percent for Tehran. With widespread disillusionment with the Islamic Republic and its unrepresentative institutions, few people care to take part in these elections.

Reformists divided

Predictably, the elections have been boycotted by political organizations opposed to the Islamic Republic, such as the National Front of Iran, Left Party of Iran, and Iran Transition Council. Former political prisoner Kamal Jafari Yazdi and Gohar Eshghi, mother of a blogger who was killed under torture in 2012, issued a joint statement decrying the “sham” elections, joining dozens of other opponents who are boycotting the polls.  

But the boycotts aren’t limited to the regime’s opponents. Faced with widespread disqualifications, the Iranian Reformist Front (IRF), a coalition of thirty-one reformist parties representing this political community’s leading opinion, has declared that it won’t participate in the elections. The Freedom Movement of Iran, an influential liberal Islamist party, has also declared it won’t participate in the polls.

Even the Assembly of Qom Seminary Instructors and Scholars, an association that brings together pro-reform clerics, has taken a similar position and declared that it is not backing any candidates in the elections. Saeed Hajjarian, the leading theoretician of reformists, and Abbas Abdi, among the leading reformist lights, have also said they won’t vote.

From inside the Evin prison, Mostafa Tajzadeh has joined the boycott. In a letter, the former deputy interior minister under President Mohammad Khatami accused Khamenei of lacking “political foresight and moral courage” and called for the establishment of ties with the United States, ending compulsory veiling, and holding free elections. Following the publication of the letter, Tajzadeh’s visitation and telephone rights have been curtailed, and he is now in solitary confinement.

However, not all reformists agree with the call for a boycott.

On February 12, 110 prominent Iranians issued a joint statement calling on people to participate in the elections and vote for the few reformist candidates allowed to run, as well as those who are “centrist” or “pro-development.” The call’s signatories include former Tehran Mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi, well-known sociologists Maqsud Ferasatkhah and Hamidreza Jalayipour, and several members of former Speaker Mehdi Karroubi’s National Trust Party (NTP). While Karroubi himself has remained under house arrest since 2011 due to the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, his party has not been banned, unlike some other reformist organizations. The letter has also been supported by Mohammad Qoochani, a leading journalist historically close to Karoubi and Rouhani, who has vociferously criticized IRF for its position.

As only a few dozen reformist candidates have been allowed to run nationally—out of fifteen thousand total candidates—the signatories know that they can’t aim to win a majority. Instead, they are calling for the formation of a solid minority block of anti-hardliners in the parliament.

Making a similar gambit is Ali Motahhari, a centrist former MP who was disqualified in 2020 but was surprisingly allowed to run this time around. Despite being nominally a conservative, Motahhari is seen as an ally of reformists due to his anti-hardliner positions. Yet, reformists also acknowledge his regressive social positions. In 2014, for instance, he caused controversy by bringing pictures of women in leggings to the parliament and expressing concern about their prevalence. Motahhari, the deputy parliament speaker from 2016 to 2019, is heading a slate called Voice of the Nation in Tehran, which will likely be backed by those reformists who decide to vote. The slate includes at least two NTP members and Mohammad Bathaei, education minister under Rouhani. Not surprisingly, the slate has been openly backed by Maziar Balayi, an NTP central council member, and Mohammad-Sadeq Javadihesar, the party’s spokesperson. It also includes conservatives such as Berkeley-educated former MP Ali Abbaspour Tehrani, who was once a leading member of the Islamic Coalition Party, a key conservative party. Backing candidates in twenty-two out of Iran’s thirty-one provinces, NTP is therefore breaking with the electoral boycott despite affirming that it continues to be a member of IRF.

Despite his being disqualified, Rouhani called on people to cast a “protest vote,” and his Moderation and Development Party (MDP) is backing Motahhari’s list in Tehran, as well as some candidates in twenty-seven out of thirty-one provinces of the country. The party’s leader, Mohammad Baqer Nobakht, a vice president under Rouhani, is also running in the northern city of Rasht, where he has a real chance of being elected as one of the city’s three MPs, who currently all belong to the leading conservative organization, Coalition Council of the Forces of the Islamic Revolution (CCFIR). This time around, conservative divisions might lead to a victory for Nobakht. Notably, he has also been endorsed by Ali Larijani, a conservative former speaker of the parliament, who issued a video in his support.

In fact, those reformists who favor participation in the election are putting much hope in the provinces, where they often have a better chance.

The pattern of elections in provinces outside Tehran is entirely different from that in the capital, as regional concerns and local issues—rather than national political divisions—often dominate the vote. Elections in provinces also usually have higher turnout. In the 2020 elections, for instance, ten out of thirty-one provinces had turnout higher than 50 percent, reaching 70.66 percent in the small Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad province in southwestern Iran. One reason is that, even if they cannot wield much political power, MPs can fulfill a clientelist function by delivering specific projects to their province.

One province where reformists maintain some hope is the southern Kerman province. Known as the home province of slain Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Qasem Soleimani, the province was also home to the late Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a powerful regime founder and a leading centrist president (1989–1997) who died suspiciously in 2017. Rafsanjani’s legacy is continued by the Executives of Construction Party (ECP), a party formed by his political associates and currently headed by Hossein Marashi, a former MP and Kerman governor and a cousin of Rafsanjani’s wife. According to Marashi, enough reformists have been allowed to run in Kerman that there is “real competition” for nine of the province’s ten seats. Currently, eight out of the ten seats belong to CCFIR, with the other two belonging to a reformist and an independent. Therefore, any advance for reformists would be notable. Marashi also said his party had helped put together Motahhari’s slate.

Northwestern Tabriz, the political capital of Iran’s Turkic ethnic minority, saw a rare case of a reformist MP topping the polls in 2020. Masoud Pezeshkian, health minister under Khatami (2001–2005) and a pro-Rouhani deputy speaker of parliament (2016–2020), is running again and will likely be a leading reformist voice in the coming Majlis. MDP, NTP, and ECP have also endorsed him.

Another reformist candidate with some hope is ECP’s Nahid Tajeddin, a former Isfahan MP (2016–2020) who was also allowed to run in 2020 but lost after coming in ninth place (the city elects five MPs). Tajeddin was initially rumored to be running in Tehran as part of Motahhari’s list, but opted to return to her hometown. With all the city’s five MPs currently belonging to CCFIR, reformists hope Tajeddin can gain enough votes in this crucial central city to return to parliament.

Hardliner domination

With the vast disqualification of reformists and centrists, many of the elections have been reduced to competitions between various conservative and hardliner factions.

In the days leading to the elections, CCFIR has had to deal with a lot of conservative infighting. It was able to declare its full slate for Tehran only on February 25, less than a week before the elections. The list will be headed by Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, the current speaker of the parliament. The more hardline Resistance Front (RF)ultimately agreed to running a joint slate with CCFIR, although its officials claim the front’s top figure, MP Morteza Aqatehrani, is effectively a co-head of the list and is not subordinate to Ghalibaf. But not all conservative groups have accepted working with Ghalibaf. The Unity Council of Forces of the Islamic Revolution (UCFIR), a 2020 split from CCFIR, introduced its Tehran slate without Ghalibaf. Manochehr Motakki, a former foreign minister under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, heads it.

More consequentially, Ghalibaf is strongly contested by a new generation of hardliners who are hard at work trying to dislodge him. These efforts have intensified since a scandal broke out on February 13. As first revealed by London-based outlet Iran International, Ghalibaf’s son is known to have had his request for immigration to Canada rejected. The leaked files show him owning at least two apartments in Australia and a Tehran bank account with around $300,000 in savings.

Another recent scandal to hit CCFIR alleged that one of its Tehran MPs, Mohsen Dehnavi, received a bribe from a factory manager in exchange for helping them with a bank loan. Dehnavi previously made news in 2017 after the United States refused him entry when he tried going there for a medical postdoctoral program at Harvard. Some hardliners now wish to distance themselves from him. On February 24, Malek Shariati, a Tehran MP and head of the small hardliner party, declared that he would refuse a space on the CCFIR slate if Dehnavi were also on the ballot. A day later, Dehnavi said he was resigning from the slate so as to preserve unity. The final joint slate by CCFIR and RF includes Shariati but not Dehnavi.

However, some hardliners are putting up a more systematic challenge to Ghalibaf. Chief among them is the newly formed Dawn Front of Iran (DFI) headed by Ali Akbar Raefipour, a fiery populist best known for concocting conspiracy theories (he heads an organization dedicated to “struggle against Zionism, Humanism, and Masonry”). DFI’s other notable founding member is Saeed Mohammad, an IRGC commander who led the militia’s engineering behemoth for years.

Mohammad represents a generation of IRGC commanders who are already eyeing the post-Khamenei landscape in Iran as they plot their political future. His candidacy for president was disqualified in 2021, after which he endorsed Ebrahim Raisi. He served under Raisi for a year, then was dismissed in 2022 and has thus acquired more of an oppositional position. Former hardline MP Hamid Rasai is also heading another rival conservative list, known as the Popular Coalition of the Forces of the Islamic Republic (PCFIR), ending speculation that he, too, might unite with Raefipour.

If enough voters turn out for slates headed by Motakki, Motahhari, Rasaei, or Raefipour on opposite sides of the political spectrum, Ghalibaf might lose his spot as the top Tehran MP—which could presumably lead to him losing his position as the parliamentary speaker. But because Tehranis have little enthusiasm for these elections, this remains a very tall order. Still, if Raefipour and Mohammad manage to form a durable new faction in Iranian hardliner politics, they might go on to play a role in the tumultuous days that are sure to come in what is expected to be the Islamic Republic’s lowest-turnout election.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions” and “What Iranians Want.” Follow him on X: @arash_tehran.

The post March 1 is the upcoming Iranian elections. The terrain looks more divided than ever. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This policy has clearly failed. The Islamic Republic has become increasingly confident in its international behavior and domestic repression, bolstered by the belief that the West—especially the United States—is too weak to stop it. The result is that Iran today is a significant threat to stability, peace, and human rights in the Middle East. The October 7, 2023, attack by Iran’s client Hamas on Israel and subsequent attacks on shipping by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen underscore two important realities: first, the crucial importance of Middle Eastern stability to global affairs; second, a dire need for the United States to overhaul its Iran policy. If the United States does not change its approach to Iran, the Islamic Republic’s behavior and regional stability will only worsen.

The time is ripe for policy change. Despite harsh international sanctions, the clerical establishment has not moderated its behavior and flouts those sanctions, such as when it sells oil to China. Limited US engagement with Iran has also failed to rein in Tehran’s worst impulses. Despite the successful signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, the unilateral US withdrawal from that agreement during the Donald Trump administration incentivized Iran to continue enriching uranium. The lack of consistency between US administrations makes a successful return to the negotiating table on nuclear issues unlikely. Meanwhile, Iran continues to engage in hostage diplomacy and flagrantly violates the human rights of its people. Its missile strikes against Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan on January 15 and January 16 also indicate the regime’s increasing willingness to use military force against its neighbors and project power outside its borders, which risks further destabilizing an already unstable region.

The world has changed since US policy on Iran was last set. An influential bloc of countries—led by Russia and China—has arisen to challenge the US-led international order. Iran has gained important allies by joining this bloc. Tehran’s growing partnerships with Moscow and Beijing provide it with diplomatic support, an economic lifeline, and increasing military prestige through its aid to Russia in the Ukraine war. Quite simply, the world today is far less united in its condemnation of Iran’s behavior—and its support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—than in previous decades. US policy must adapt to account for this geopolitical shift.

Yet Iran’s domestic situation has also changed dramatically in a way that could benefit US policy objectives. While Iran faced multiple waves of popular protest over the past two decades, the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that began in September 2022 distinctly differs from earlier protests. While previous protests called for reform, many Iranians now declared that reforming the Islamic Republic is impossible. The current movement calls for nothing less than the end of the clerical establishment and the creation of a secular democracy. US policymakers should take note of this critical shift. Should a democratic Iran develop, it would solve most of the problems with Iran’s current behavior. A stable, democratic Iran would be greatly in the US national interest.

While the mass protests of 2022–2023 have died down, Iranian citizens, especially women, continue to defy the regime. The Iranian people are not likely to change their views on the theocracy, and the regime cannot survive in the long term in the face of such widespread domestic opposition. After four decades of an oppressive, corrupt, ineffective government, there is not much more for the Iranian people to lose but much to be gained by seeking radical change. However, the regime’s brutally violent crackdown on protesters and anyone who expresses the slightest hint of anti-regime sentiment indicates that mass protests alone will be insufficient to topple the government—the tactics of 1979 are not enough in the 2020s. Additional strategies are necessary, and international support will be critical to ensuring the success of any mass democratic movement in Iran.

The United States should, therefore, develop a new policy aimed at supporting the Iranian people in changing their government system. This must not be a policy of regime change in the traditional sense. While the United States has historically had success in overtly or covertly overthrowing foreign governments—including ousting Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953—it has been bad at managing the long-term consequences of such actions. The outcomes of the post-9/11 US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are but the most recent examples.

Iranian history also proves that regime change cannot come from the outside. Any government imposed by a foreign power—or that even appears to be—will lack domestic legitimacy. Ever since Iran’s constitutional revolution in 1905–1911, ending foreign influence over Iran’s leaders has been a major reason why Iranians opposed—and toppled—previous governments, including the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979. Thus, any government that replaces the Islamic Republic must be understood by the Iranian people as entirely indigenous in origin. It can have foreign alliances, but cannot be installed by foreign intervention. The traditional US approach of using military intervention or a coup to accomplish regime change would irredeemably taint whichever government replaces the current theocracy.

Instead of traditional regime change, the United States should adopt a two-pronged approach to assist the Iranian people in their pursuit of democratic change. In the short term, US policymakers should continue to engage in difficult diplomacy and deterrence with the Islamic Republic to try to reduce Iran’s bad behavior as much as possible, while keeping in mind that genuine détente with the regime is not possible given its ideology, in which anti-Americanism is a core element.

In the long term, the United States should implement a policy of overtly and covertly helping the Iranian people create the conditions to build and sustain a successful mass movement to democratize Iran and align its behavior with global norms and the rule of law, especially regarding human rights. To achieve this long-term goal, US policymakers must resist the urge to take the lead; they must instead listen to anti-regime Iranians in the country, especially experienced women’s rights activists, and dissidents in exile, and help the Iranian people empower themselves to lead the change in their country.

Such a policy approach is rare in US history. Yet there are precedents when Americans supported positive change abroad by adopting a supportive role and genuine commitment to democracy and human rights that successfully secured US objectives and international security. Rather than direct intervention, subtle forms of US support for anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe during the late Cold War, especially the Solidarity Movement in Poland, helped those movements ultimately overthrow their communist governments on their own, build nascent democratic systems, and end the Cold War in 1989–1991. While the US government hesitated for decades to condemn the South African apartheid regime, the US public’s vocal support for the anti-apartheid movement and active participation in divestment helped the South African people end racial apartheid and build an inclusive democratic government led by Nelson Mandela in 1994. Updating these approaches for the twenty-first century could go a long way toward helping Iranians build an Iran that is no longer a threat to its own people or regional stability.

US policymakers could deploy various tools on multiple fronts to accomplish this objective, and the United States would need to do this in partnership with its democratic allies. Countries with no problematic history of dominating Iran—such as Ireland, South Africa, Mauritius, New Zealand, or Japan—would be best suited to this work. In essence, dissident Iranians need space, resources, meaningful international support, and a measure of protection to organize a powerful opposition movement. US policy would serve to support these suppressed voices in Iran.

To implement this policy, the United States would work covertly with Iranians and overtly to marshal international support for the Iranian people. In Iran, US policymakers should identify as many key in-country individuals with whom to work as possible. Ideally, these should be people with local or national influence who can get things done, show leadership potential, bring diverse perspectives to the table, and have clear ideas for what a post-Islamic Republic Iran should look like. Iran’s prisons are full of such leaders; many more are emerging across the country. The United States would work with this cohort to help create and run workshops for Iranians on democratic capacity building, strategic planning, governance best practices, and help with ideas for economic support for movement participants, as well as connect these Iranians with activists abroad with relevant experience. The United States should also find a way to provide reliable, safe internet access that is not easy for the regime to hack or trace, which will be essential for movement organizing and education efforts.

Along the way, US policymakers must resist the urge to anoint a particular opposition leader, avoiding another Ahmed Chalabi situation. The Iranian people will choose their leaders in a post-Islamic Republic future, which is as it should be.

The United States could, however, attempt to unify the Iranian diaspora. The unprecedented coming together of the diaspora in support of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement provided protesters on the ground with much-needed moral support and international amplification of their voices. When the coalition of diasporic leaders collapsed by late spring 2023, it was a major blow to the movement on the ground in Iran. Building solidarity and unity within the long-factionalized diaspora will be difficult. Still, a unified diasporic voice—and funding—supporting the opposition movement in Iran will be a key component in such a movement’s ultimate success.

At the international level, the United States and its allies must keep the world’s attention on Iran. There is already significant support for Iranians among the global public, as evidenced by the many worldwide solidarity protests during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. Governments must align with this global public opinion. Just as the United States and its allies did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the international community must consistently and loudly condemn all human rights violations and political repression by the Islamic Republic. International condemnation of Iran’s behavior through unified statements by a coalition of anti-regime—preferably, democratic—governments, as well as unified rejection of Iran holding influential human rights-related positions in the United Nations or its representation at legitimizing international forums like the World Economic Forum in Davos, would help maintain international pressure on the Islamic Republic.

The regime is not immune to global pressure to moderate its behavior. US policymakers could also do much to encourage enhanced US public support for the people of Iran. International media, US policymakers, and democratic allies can use knowledge and truth as weapons; the Islamic Republic relies on lies and deception. Shining a harsh light on those lies and countering them with truth will be a valuable approach to combatting autocracy and oppression. Propaganda efforts to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, as well as undermine its support by the rank-and-file within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and military, would also help weaken the regime.

If, as President Joe Biden has insisted, the greatest global challenge today is the war between autocracy and democracy, then Iran is a major front in that war. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the most consequential mass democratic movement in the world today. Supporting the growth, maturation, and ultimate success of this movement is not only morally right, but a strategically logical position for the United States to take. This policy will require years of commitment and a redefinition of what regime change policy looks like, but helping the Iranian people end the Islamic Republic’s bad behavior would be a major victory for democracy, human rights, and, ultimately, global stability. Iranians have the will and capacity to create a brighter future. Will US policymakers choose to help?

Dr. Kelly J. Shannon is a 2023–2024 W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell national fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and associate professor of history at Florida Atlantic University.

The post The United States needs a new Iran policy—and it involves regime change, but not the traditional kind appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meet Sadegh Booghi—or “Amoo Booghi” (Uncle Booghi) as he has come to be known—an elderly fishmonger from a small northern Iranian town, who was detained by authorities after videos of him singing and dancing went viral on Instagram—the most popular social media platform in Iran and one that also happens to be blocked (Iranians use circumvention tools to bypass censorship). The pensioner’s Instagram page was suspended. It was reactivated after mass pressure, although a case against Booghi is still open.  

What was Booghi’s crime? Spreading joy across the country—and much of the world.

As Amoo Booghi’s singing and dancing went viral—from Tanzania to Thailand—the key question on everyone’s mind is: why is the regime punishing an old man for spreading happiness at a time when the situation inside Iran is so dire? Surely it would make more sense for the clerical establishment to alleviate pressure on the population, rather than double down? 

On the surface, the obvious answer to this relates to the regime’s ideology. The hardline Islamist worldview of the Islamic Republic, and its small but powerful constituency, subscribes to outlawing public dancing and singing as “un-Islamic” practices. In recent years, there’s no doubt that the regime has become more ideological and extremist—all of which is based on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s forty-year manifesto aimed at “purifying” what he calls the “holy system” (nezam-e moghadas).  

But while ideology is undoubtedly the underlying foundation of Booghi’s practices being deemed “un-Islamic,” the regime’s response is far from a knee-jerk ideological reaction—something all observers have so far overlooked.  

For forty-five years, the clerical regime in Iran has worked tirelessly to achieve totalitarian status, combining its hardline Islamist zeal with its doctrines of suppression to control every aspect of the Iranian population. The Shia Islamists in Iran deem this necessary to achieve their ideological utopia and facilitate the return of the messianic so-called Hidden Imam, Mahdi.  

To attain this utopia, the regime has worked tirelessly to strategize and doctrinize control of Iranians’ minds and bodies. The former relates to the regime’s systematic effort to radicalize the masses to exert control over their minds, while the latter refers to its efforts to physically—and often violently—enforce an ideological order on the Iranian people, enabling control over their bodies. The murder of twenty-two-year-old girl Mahsa Jina Amini by the so-called “morality police” for violating mandatory hijab rules, and the regime’s subsequent religious justifications were propagandized for her killing, best exemplifies this approach.  

This approach, however, has had an effect opposite of the regime’s goals; it has secularized and liberalized the Iranian people en masse. The more the regime has pushed, the more the gap between the state and society has increased, resulting in greater and more extreme suppression.   

Based on the Islamic Republic’s calculations, the threat from within—namely, a popular revolution—is far greater than outside threats. 

Much of this is unsurprising.  

However, while there has been a lot of global and domestic attention on the suppression of bodies and minds, another aspect of the regime’s efforts to control Iranian society has been completely overlooked: its manipulation of emotions. Emotion manipulation refers to the state’s concerted efforts to engineer the masses’ emotions to incapacitate potential upheaval or uprising, and to maintain the political status quo. 

Engineering control over the population’s emotions by the state is certainly not unique to the clerical establishment in Iran. The “politics of hate,” whereby political elites nurture emotional hatred toward inside or outside social groups as a means to exert political control, is a prime example. Another example—prevalent across authoritarian regimes—is the so-called “glue of fear,” in which dictatorial systems invoke emotional fear in the masses to preserve their status quo power.  

In the context of Iran, however, the regime has sought to engineer another form of emotional manipulation over the Iranian population—namely, manufacturing mass psychological depression and hopelessness, otherwise known as the “politics of sadness and grief” (siasat-e gham-o ghoseh). The “politics of sadness and grief” refers to the regime’s strategized and coordinated efforts to depress the Iranian population to invoke mass hopelessness and despair and, thereby, psychologically paralyze belief in change. Through this strategy, the Islamic Republic has promoted gloom and hopelessness to the extent that citizens become paralyzed and incapable of challenging the political status quo. The result has simultaneously satisfied the Islamist and religious parts of society and suppressed its more progressive social spheres.   

The idea that the regime has “taken hope away from us” (omid ra az ma gerftan) has become ubiquitous across every corner of the Iranian streets and the data support this. In 2022, the World Happiness Index ranked Iran the 110th-happiest country out of 156 in the world. In other words, Iran is the forty-fourth unhappiest place in the world. The country has also consistently experienced high levels of brain drain, with a 2019 study placing it among the nations with the highest levels of brain drain. This year, a medical report conducted inside Iran revealed that one out of every five medical prescriptions in Iran is for antidepressants. The surge in recreational drugs—especially among Iranian youth—is also directly correlated to mass depression and hopelessness within Iranian society.   

While sociologists have sought to portray depression and sadness as features of Iranian and Shia identity, they have overlooked the concerted regime strategy to deliberately engineer this state of depression as a suppression mechanism.   

The regime’s Shia Islamist ideology, of course, provides the perfect foundation and infrastructure to enable this suppression doctrine. The founder of the Islamic Republic, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, always insisted that fun had no place in Islam and that “we are the nation of political crying”—placing great emphasis on the necessity of mourning (azadari) to preserve the Islamic Revolution. His successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—who has had to rely on suppression to maintain authority—has only doubled down on this notion. 

The exponential growth in the number of official state-enforced Shia mourning and self-flagellation processions, as well as state resources to facilitate them, is one mechanism to precisely engineer the society’s emotions and invoke a consistent politics of sadness and grief. While Shia mourning processions took place before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, they were limited to a few days in Muharram for the martyrdom of Imam Hussain, one of the Shia saints killed in the Battle of Karbala in 680. In the past four decades, however, the regime has continuously expanded the number and frequency of enforced mourning ceremonies, de facto covering all twelve Shia imams, their offspring, and key regime figures—from Khomeini to assassinated Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. What is particularly noteworthy is the Islamic Republic’s decision to replace the celebration of the birthday of Imam Reza—the eighth Shia saint—as a national holiday with one that marks his martyrdom and death. Another example is commemorating the death of Fatimeh, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammad. Before the 2000s, Fatimeh’s death was not publicly commemorated, but it was later added to the national calendar and the mourning period was extended to two ten-day periods. Along with national mourning ceremonies, many weekly mourning recitations are held across schools, universities, and government-sector offices.  

Another means through which the regime has sought to manipulate the emotions of Iranians and psychologically depress Iranian society is through manufacturing the appearance of public spaces in towns and cities across the country. Covering city walls with murals of “martyrs,” the regime has sought to remove color from public spaces and instead darken them with mourning. In Tehran, for example, the city council announced it had erected more than 11,000 black flags and inscriptions across the city.   

In recent years, Khamenei has also significantly expanded the presence and authority of heyats, radical pro-regime Shia eulogy centers, all of which are connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Basij paramilitary. Whereas mosques are multipurpose in their use, heyats have one purpose: manipulating emotions through pro-regime eulogies and self-flagellation sessions, akin to a form of group radicalization. 

Unlike clerics, the eulogists (maddahs) who lead the heyats are not required to have any seminary qualifications, and are usually selected due to charisma, ability to radicalize, and, most importantly, connections to the regime. Since 2009, Khamenei has rapidly expanded and consolidated the heyati network, which makes up Khamenei’s most radical and extremist support base. The latest statistics indicate that there are almost two hundred thousand maddahs. The apocalyptic doctrine of Mahdism—a Shia belief—is the most important pillar of the heyati culture, meaning their worldview heavily fetishizes death, the apocalypse, and the end of times. In other words, exporting doom and gloom across society is at the crux of this cult-like group.  

In its attempts to manufacture a state of depression, the Islamic Republic has also sought to outlaw happy festivals and events in Iran. The regime has denounced Chaharshanbe Suri (the festival of fire) and Shabeh Yalda (winter solstice), two ancient Zoroastrian festivals that have historically involved jubilant celebrations. Other international and universal festivals of joy, such as Valentine’s Day, have been outlawed, with costly penalties for those indulging in the celebration of love. It should be noted, however, that the Iranian people have only doubled down in celebrating non-Islamic, secular, and Iranian festivals in defiance of the regime.

The targeting of Sadegh Booghi—and viral music before him, such as Pharell Williams’ “Happy”—is a product of the regime’s precise manipulation of the emotions doctrine. However, it has had the opposite effect of that desired by the regime, as evidenced by the wave of videos inspired by the singing and dancing, with happiness and joy emerging as an act of resistance against the regime. This follows a continuous forty-five-year trend in Iran, whereby the more the regime has sought to control its people—their minds, bodies, and emotions—the more it pushes people away. There’s a spirit of resistance against the Islamic Republic that remains very much alive more than a year after the Mahsa Amini anti-regime protests. Will light prevail over darkness? The history of Iran suggests so—and this could be enough to sustain hope and overturn the regime’s manipulation of emotions.   

Saeid Golkar is a senior adviser at United Against Nuclear Iran and UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

Kasra Aarabi is the director of IRGC research at United Against Nuclear Iran and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X: @KasraAarabi.

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In recent years, and even more so in the last year alone, Iran has been increasing the pace of its sales and transfers of UAVs to various parts of the globe, including Ethiopia, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Western Sahara’s Polisario Front. Iran is well on its way to becoming a leading arms exporter globally, especially since additional countries are interested in buying these capabilities. 

The economic profit Iran receives in this regard is clear. It is estimated that the cost of the popular Shahed-136 is $20,000-$40,000 for one unit. This fact, together with the reports that Iran sold more than two thousand drones to Russia alone, makes it clear that Tehran earns millions of dollars from these transactions. However, Iran obtains more than financial gains from this dynamic, as it also deepens the Islamic Republic’s political foothold in these countries, creating dependence on the former and its products. 

In this context, Iran has significant advantages compared to countries like the United Kingdom, Israel, or the United States, which export similar capabilities worldwide. Iran’s drones and other military capabilities, such as Fateh-110 short-range missiles, are cheaper than its Western competitors. On top of that, Iran has no political or legal restrictions that prevent it from selling these weapons around the world; it is apparently not afraid that these products will fall into the hands of dangerous foreign parties. 

Most importantly, Iran’s products have been proven on the battlefield, whether it has been through Russia’s use of them in the war against Ukraine or the terrorist organizations’ use of them under Iran’s auspices, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, or the Shia militias in Iraq. The potency of these weapons in the hands of the latter category of actors was evidenced in the January 28 attack on a base in northeastern Jordan, which killed three service members, as well as the start of the “Iron Swords” campaign, when Israel was viciously attacked by the terrorist group Hamas on October 7, 2023.

This situation has allowed Iran to dramatically increase its sales to many countries worldwide, especially to those to which the West has difficulty transferring weapons, such as countries involved in military conflicts or civil wars.

Another relevant factor in this equation is the position of Russia, which was once a leading weapons exporter before experiencing difficulty maintaining its position as a major power after invading Ukraine. The resulting war has consumed vast Russian resources and provoked an array of sanctions, producing a vacuum in the world of arms sales and military equipment in a time of global instability. 

As a result, Iran has become more dominant and attractive in the eyes of countries that previously depended on Russia’s supply of military equipment. Furthermore, the current situation can create a joint venture between Iran and Russia that may increase their conventional mutual arms sales due to their high production capabilities. 

Iran’s recent activities in this regard are a clear warning of what will happen if it increases its weapons exports. On top of the other problems this trend creates, it must be remembered that giving strategic capabilities to those with problematic decision-making mechanisms/processes may lead to the misuse of said capabilities, which can significantly destabilize various areas of the world.

The recent events in the Bab al-Mandab Strait are an example of these alarming developments; that the Houthis can threaten the maritime routes in the Red Sea and beyond is driven by the fact that they received strategic capabilities, including drones and Coastal Defense Cruise Missiles (CDCMs), from Iran. If Iran increases the spread of these capabilities, it will probably duplicate the situation in the Red Sea in other places around the world. 

For this reason alone, the US government should understand the seriousness of these developments.  Ignoring this trend could lead to an irreversible situation that might make Iran the leading arms exporter in the world. 

There are multiple actions the Joe Biden administration needs to take to prevent this from happening. First, it must significantly increase pressure on Iran’s drone industry by placing more sanctions on relevant entities, thereby preventing companies from sending dual-use components that could be used in the Iranian drone industry and so forth. Such a measure would make it much more complicated and much more expensive to produce these drones.

Imposing economic and political sanctions on any country that acquires military capabilities from Iran or conducts joint military ventures with it, like Tajikistan, will present hefty trade-offs that could act as a deterrent.

At the same time, the Biden administration needs to consider how to facilitate and speed up its own selling capabilities in order to block the infiltration of Iranian weapons into different countries. As the Sudan case proves, states in need will turn to Iran for help even if a diplomatic rift exists (i.e., Sudan angered Iran by deciding to join the normalization process with Israel). In that regard, the United States can consider selling a version of conventional capabilities with a lower classification, including less sensitive technology, with the understanding that selling weapons to different countries strengthens their stability and increases their dependence on the US.

As mentioned before, the perceived effectiveness of Iran’s drones is bolstered by their use in various combat arenas around the world. The recent tragic event in Jordan, where Kataib Hezbollah wielded an Iranian Shahed drone, further highlights the need to increase the focus on Iran’s UAV industry and its distribution around the Middle East, especially its proxies, in order to prevent these weapons from becoming attractive to countries and organizations that will use them to harm US interests around the globe. 

The Biden administration must build a plan aimed at undermining this perception. For example, the Pentagon claimed that the missiles fired from Iran toward Syria on January 15th were inaccurate. If the credibility of Iran’s drones is damaged, it will cause countries to question the benefit of buying from Tehran.

The worst thing the Biden administration can do is ignore the disturbing development of Iran’s weapons transfers in favor of focusing on other negative features of its activities, be it its nuclear program or regional proxies. The US must understand the seriousness of the situation: without active measures, it will be extremely tough to stop Tehran from becoming a world leader in arms sales, not to mention all the negative implications for international stability that would accompany such a reality.

Danny Citrinowicz served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI), including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen civil society organizations focused on promoting respect for human rights in the country, was joined by several international advocates to communicate their concerns in an open letter dated January 29 to Deputy High Commissioner Nada Al-Nashif. While they value the importance of diplomatic engagement and recognize the critical role of her office in addressing human rights, they raise concerns about the visit’s timing. Notably, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is set to convene in mid-March to scrutinize Iran’s human rights record, a session that follows closely on the heels of the high commissioner’s visit. The group fears that the visit might lend an unwarranted veneer of acceptability to Iran’s human rights record, thereby weakening the UN’s ability to hold the country accountable.

The UNHRC’s upcoming session is poised to be a pivotal moment in international human rights advocacy, as it will feature a report from the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran that will present its findings. Tasked with a rigorous independent inquiry into the alleged human rights violations related to protests and civil unrest that erupted across Iran in 2022 following news of the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini while in the custody of the country’s so-called “morality police,” the mission aims to articulate the scope and scale of violations and create a repository of evidence that could be instrumental in holding perpetrators accountable in international legal frameworks. Thus, the UNHRC braces for presentations that may profoundly influence the course of justice and shape its strategy in advocating for the protection and promotion of human rights in Iran.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Javaid Rehman, will present his findings in concert with their report. His report, informed by thorough investigations and eyewitness accounts, will shed light on the current situation and evaluate Iran’s adherence to its international human rights obligations. The rapporteur’s insights support the global community’s understanding and response to Iran’s human rights challenges.

The UNHRC will also select a new special rapporteur to monitor Iran in the late spring. Established in 2011, this mechanism is tasked with the painstaking monitoring of Iran’s adherence to human rights norms. Yet, the Islamic Republic has consistently resisted cooperation with the UN in this capacity, denying entry to three previous mandate holders despite the worsening human rights situation within the country. The deputy high commissioner’s visit offers a timely opportunity to broach the subject of increased cooperation with the Iranian authorities. Al-Nashif could leverage the meeting to negotiate terms that may foster a more collaborative relationship with the forthcoming mandate holder, thereby influencing the council’s decision-making process regarding who is best suited to fulfill this sensitive and pivotal role effectively.

In light of this, the deputy high commissioner’s visit will likely be scrutinized by the international human rights community during and after her trip, as the rights advocates anxiously await to see how her engagement may impact the council’s critical decisions in the coming weeks and months. This is especially the case since the recent surge in executions in the country, including the execution of four ethnic Kurds who were hanged for alleged espionage after trials that were purportedly conducted without proper due process. The execution of individuals under the age of thirty, accused of plotting a bomb attack, has sparked widespread condemnation and drawn attention to the lack of fair trials and allegations of torture. The secretive nature of the judicial process and reports of physical assaults and suppression of information by security forces following the executions have raised alarm about the treatment of political prisoners.

Articulating a deep-seated unease about the visit’s potential impact, particularly in light of escalating executions and the suppression of women’s movements, the coalition led by Impact Iran warns of the possibility that the visit could serve as a tool of propaganda for the Iranian authorities, potentially undermining the UN’s unwavering commitment to human rights in Iran. Renowned figures like Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi have also called on the deputy high commissioner to align with the victims and protestors by either reconsidering her visit or assuming symbolic gestures of protest, such as forgoing the headscarf. They urge her to engage with groups beyond government officials, including individuals and families directly impacted by the regime’s draconian policies. However, civil society advocates are also careful to point out that they aren’t pushing for non-engagement but for a strategic reassessment of the visit’s timing and scope, advocating for thorough monitoring measures and unfettered access to individuals in detention.

Some note, for example, that scheduling the visit after the UNHRC session allows for a more strategic and impactful engagement. This timing would enable the Deputy High Commissioner Al-Nashif to discuss the findings of the council’s mechanisms with Iranian officials, armed with the most up-to-date information and evaluations from the UN special rapporteur and the UN fact-finding mission. Such synchronization would also ensure that the engagement is informed by the council’s discussions and resolutions, further equipping the deputy high commissioner to address Iranian authorities with clear international expectations in mind.

Moreover, the scheduled visit has stirred a broader discourse about the consistency and coherency of the UN’s strategy for promoting and protecting human rights in Iran. Critics argue that while such high-profile visits could elevate awareness, their ill-timed execution could undercut the momentum of other UN bodies and efforts. Scheduled ahead of the UNHRC’s critical evaluation, including the fact-finding mission, the visit risks sending mixed signals about the United Nation’s stance on human rights in Iran.

For the UN to maintain the efficacy and integrity of its human rights advocacy, it’s imperative to harmonize its various mechanisms to avoid providing inadvertent avenues for violators to evade their obligations. When UN bodies operate in isolation, without a cohesive strategy, their actions can be counterproductive. High-profile visits, such as that of the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Al-Nashif, should be intricately coordinated with ongoing investigations and diplomatic initiatives to avoid any semblance of legitimizing or endorsing a state’s actions prematurely.

It is critical for the various arms of the United Nations to conduct their work in a manner that is synchronized, reinforcing each other’s efforts, to ensure there are no mixed messages that could bolster a violator’s resolve. This coordination is essential to present a unified front that stands up to scrutiny and holds violators accountable with tenacity and unequivocal clarity. To maintain the integrity and effectiveness of its human rights advocacy, the UN must send a clear and consistent message: cooperation on one front does not negate accountability on another.

Rose Parris Richter is the executive director of Impact Iran, a coalition of nineteen human rights organizations committed to advocating for human rights in the country.

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The IRGC offensive evoked euphoria among Iran’s supporters at home and abroad and Iranian officials who bragged about their country’s military capabilities. Although Iran has previously targeted Iraq and Syria, this is the first time they have openly engaged in hostile military action against nuclear-armed Pakistan. The attack placed Pakistan’s armed forces in a critical situation. Lately, Pakistan’s military has been involved in an internal power struggle to keep a tight grip over the political elite, which has undermined the regional position and influence of the country. A lack of a response to the Iranian attacks would have signaled a weak Pakistan and, thus, encouraged rivals to challenge it. Indeed, following the Iranian assaults, India—which shares extensive ties with Iran and Russia—issued a statement supportive of Tehran, increasing pressure on Islamabad to respond.

However, the euphoria did not last long. In the early morning of January 18, Pakistan’s air force conducted well-measured attacks in Sistan and Baluchistan province against alleged sites of the Balochistan Liberation Army, an insurgent group, killing several civilians, including children. The attacks left Tehran dazed and shocked, as this was the first time since the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) that a country had bombed targets inside Iran. Pakistan’s decisive retaliation reminded Tehran of its place and put the ball in the latter’s court. An Iranian decision to escalate with Pakistan would humiliate the Islamic Republic’s outdated conventional armed forces, which date back to pre-1979 and are no match for their Pakistani counterparts. Pakistan has historically received advanced military equipment and technology from various sources, including the United States and China, and has developed its forces with a strong focus on conventional warfare to counter India. Realizing this, Iranian officials had to reluctantly accept a de-escalation.

Iran’s recent military attacks, as seen through its missile and drone strikes in neighboring countries, reveal a complex blend of strategic intentions and miscalculations. These assaults, while initially intended to assert Iran’s regional power and retaliate against perceived threats, have simultaneously exposed its vulnerabilities and provoked significant backlash from both regional players and the international community.

First, Iran’s actions have heightened regional tensions, potentially destabilizing an already volatile Middle East. Iran probably assumed that having leverage over Iraq and Syria, as well as increasingly good ties with Pakistan, could allow it to get away with the attacks. However, striking within the sovereign territories of neighboring countries has been perceived as an act of aggression, undermining Iran’s relations with these states. Tehran’s decision was a gamble that risked an escalation into broader conflicts, drawing in more regional and international players.

Second, while Iran aimed to showcase its military capabilities and resolve, the strikes inadvertently highlighted its vulnerabilities. Pakistan’s response called into question the effectiveness of Iran’s deterrence strategy and demonstrated that Iran’s defensive systems are not as robust as Tehran claims, since Pakistan was able to infiltrate Iranian air space with ease. Iran’s assumption of regional military dominance was challenged, showing that its aggressive postures could be met with equally forceful responses, even from neighbors not posing themselves as rivals or enemies to Iran. This realization could embolden other regional adversaries—such as Israel—to undermine the narrative of a strong and impenetrable Iran.

Third, Iran’s focus on external military engagements has raised questions about its internal stability and governance. The Islamic Republic faces domestic pressure and criticism, and its external military actions may be partly an attempt to divert attention from these issues. Moreover, during the last few years, Iran has been subjected to numerous assassinations—mostly by Israel—that have targeted its scientists and military commanders, thus, unveiling a weak security apparatus. However, shifting focus to “foreign enemies” to unify the internal front and distract from internal challenges has ended up introducing a new internal discussion on Iran’s ability to protect its citizens, ironically exacerbating internal discontent.

Fourth, the Islamic Republic pays a lot of attention to its image in the Muslim world in order to legitimize its influence, facilitate its expansive agenda, and recruit both proxy members and supporters. This effort was damaged due to its role in Syria and Iraq following the eruption of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Israel’s intervention in Gaza in October 2023 provided Iran with an opportunity to fix its public perception and rebrand itself as a “resistance” actor. However, the Pakistani retaliation exposed the Iranian bluff on that front; Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, asserted that Iran’s inability or unwillingness to confront Israel led it to direct its aggression towards its neighboring countries. As a result, the gains the Islamic Republic achieved following the start of the Gaza war have been reversed.

For example, the Iranian aggression triggered anti-Iran sentiments in Iraqi society, driving civil society to call for the boycott of Iranian products. Additionally, the Syrian opposition condemned Tehran, reminding the international community of Iran’s crimes in Syria, as well as the fertile ground that the Iran-supported Bashar al-Assad regime creates for terrorist organizations to emerge and thrive. Overall, Iran’s actions were widely viewed in the Arab and Muslim worlds as an unwelcome distraction and a diversion from the Gaza war.

The global community’s reaction, including restraint calls from China and condemnation from the United States, further isolated Iran. These reactions indicate growing concern about Tehran’s regional policies and their potential to further destabilize the Middle East. Accordingly, Iran’s actions also reflect a broader strategic dilemma. On the one hand, Iran seeks to assert its regional dominance. On the other, it must navigate the complex dynamics of its relationships with neighboring countries, which are crucial for its security and economic interests. Striking a balance between these objectives has proven challenging.

Moreover, while the Islamic Republic strives to promote an image of itself as a rational and responsible actor, especially while addressing concerns from Western countries, its actions portray a very different picture of a reckless and irresponsible regional player. In conclusion, Iran’s recent military strikes, while intended to underscore its growing far-reaching capabilities and resolve, also reveal significant strategic miscalculations. These actions have heightened regional tensions, exposed vulnerabilities, and complicated its relationships with neighboring countries. It’s worth noting that this is not the first time Iran has miscalculated; in 2006, its miscalculation led to a destructive Israeli war on Lebanon.

Similarly, in 2019, Tehran miscalculated when it assumed that its escalation campaign in the Gulf against US and allied targets would not be met by retaliation. This ultimately led to the killing of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani via a US drone strike. Now, Iran has overplayed its hand with Pakistan and was reminded of its proper place. In all these cases, Iran was forced to swallow its pride, offering no retaliation. Whether Tehran can learn from this and avoid another critical miscalculation in the future remains to be seen.

Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. 

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During Iran’s population surge—ten to over eighty-five million over the course of a century—its renewable water resources have gone from 130 BCM to 80-85 BCM. Projections indicate a potential halving of resources by 2041, raising concerns as Iran’s population is expected to surpass 100 million. Per capita water availability for Iranians may drop below 500 cubic meters, marking absolute scarcity. Once adept at groundwater management, Iran now faces consequences like land subsidence due to depleting groundwater, which affects food self-sufficiency. This has led to farmers abandoning lands, causing an influx of ten million people into the outskirts and shanty towns since 2013—ten times the number of Syrian villagers migrating during the 2006-2009 drought in the Hasakah governorate. Many researchers have linked the Syrian conflict to this drought.

Regardless of the numerous opportunities to enhance its water management policies, the government persistently adheres to the path of Iran’s “Water Mafia”—a non-official alliance that comprises the energy ministry, executives, academics, consulting engineers, influential contractors, and a cadre of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders overseeing the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. Disturbingly, if this group opts to construct a dam like Gotvand—where a multimillion-ton mass of salt became a part of the reservoir despite many warnings about this possibility due to nearby saline geological formations—there seems to be no governing authority capable of halting their actions.

The concept of top-down decision-making in Iran is not novel; Iranians have been acquainted with such a system for centuries. However, the adverse effects of water mismanagement have never wrought such devastation on the land and its water resources (the latter of which are steadily diminishing). Since the 1980s, when President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s post-war reconstruction plans garnered substantial attention, the landscape of Iran has been transformed by the construction of numerous dams along rivers, absorbing considerable financial resources over time.

In the late 1980s, the establishment of two key organizations—the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, equipped with significant machinery and war-acquired experience, and the Iran Water & Power Resources Development Company (IWPC)—resulted in an enduring business alliance. IWPC was founded by a group of engineers, mainly consisting of the students who occupied the US Embassy in Tehran. During Rafsanjani’s era and beyond, those entrusted with managing water and agriculture, despite warnings from experts, advertised that constructing dams and transferring water between watersheds would guarantee self-sufficiency. However, these decisions, made without consultation with independent and qualified experts, led to a decline in lakes, wetlands, rivers, and groundwater sources.

Social impact

In 2016, many believed that a successful nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions would allow the Islamic Republic to address its financial challenges, solve the water crisis, and rehabilitate its endangered lakes and rivers. The Center for Naval Analysis, an institute in Washington, later warned the US government of escalating and enduring water tensions that could lead to local protests, potentially sparking violence worldwide and undermining US national interests. The report also highlighted the possibility of global terrorism and civil war over shared resources. This warning gained attention in December 2017-January 2018 during an unexpected uprising in Iran that reverberated across the nation—the largest at the time since the 1979 revolution. Thousands protested, leading to swift intervention from security forces. Official reports acknowledged over twenty casualties, with unofficial sources suggesting the death toll exceeded fifty. The critical aspect was that protestors lost their lives in towns that were struggling with the harsh impacts of water scarcity.

In 2019, the nation witnessed another widespread uprising, with reports indicating that over 1,500 protestors lost their lives at the hands of security forces. In Mahshahr, a town in the Khuzestan province in southern Iran, and other towns, individuals affected by the regime’s detrimental water policies were fatally shot. The unrest persisted into 2020 and 2021, as people in Khuzestan clashed with security forces over water-related issues, resulting in further loss of lives. Despite being considered a water-rich province, with major rivers like Karun, Karkheh, and Jarrahi, and possessing vast oil and gas reserves, Khuzestan has tragically become a victim of poor water management. Many rivers and marshes in the region have dried up due to the water management schemes implemented by the government and the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters.

Amidst the desiccation of wetland areas—exemplified by Hoor-al-Azim in Khuzestan—intricate sediment deposits have become susceptible to the elements. With even the faintest breeze, these minuscule particles ascend into the air, launching as dust storms that target the cities within the province. This matter has engendered a noteworthy deterioration in air quality across various sectors of Khuzestan, concurrently fostering the widespread illness of thousands of residents in the province.

Inequities in Iranians’ access to water

Iran’s uneven water rights approach disproportionately impacts citizens in marginalized provinces, causing severe water scarcity. Provinces like Sistan and Baluchistan, Kerman, Fars, Isfahan, Southern Khorasan, Hamedan, Yazd, Khorasan-e Razavi, and Semnan face widespread water poverty due to disappearing lakes, groundwater depletion, and contamination. Projects like the Karun-3 dam and the Khersan-3 dam, as well as water allocation, displace residents, resulting in enduring hardships. On top of this, climate change and vanishing glaciers intensify water losses in different river basins. Inter-basin water transfers fuel further tension, benefiting lobbyists and the Water Mafia while simultaneously exacerbating environmental injustice against marginalized populations. Despite government assurances, residents of Zayandeh Rud basin resort to illegal well pumping, causing groundwater depletion, land subsidence, and health issues, threatening Isfahan’s existence. In northern Iran, Lake Urmia has dried up due to dam construction and unsustainable farming, leaving behind a saline desert filled with residues and particles contaminated by industrial and human wastewater and chemical fertilizers. Strong winds disperse these toxic particles, harming millions in nearby areas.

Despite the evidence of human and environmental damage from expensive water management projects, it has been empirically proven that, in many regions of Iran, nature-based solutions—unlike dam constructions and inter-basin water transfers—are more efficient and cost-effective. But Iran’s Water Mafia consistently opposes projects prioritizing efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as these initiatives undermine their ability to extract commission money.

Nowadays, IRGC generals and water executives have fallen in love with seawater desalination, a technology practiced mainly by Israel and nations in the Persian Gulf region. As FAO’s Slim Zekri told me, the production cost of one cubic meter of freshwater in the Persian Gulf is approximately $1. However, an insider in Iran revealed to me that the actual cost of freshwater production in the country exceeds $1.5. This is influenced, in part, by sanctions and the absence of a direct business relationship with Israel, which is the proprietor of Reverse Osmosis (RO) technology and the primary manufacturer of RO filters. The expense of transporting this water through a pipeline to central Iran, nevertheless, significantly escalates the overall cost to almost $5 per cubic meter.

The harmful impact of desalination plants is not often disclosed to the Iranian public. The hot brine is disposed of in the shallow Persian Gulf, leading to an environmental massacre. Many fish species have migrated from the extremely saline waters and coral reefs are experiencing bleaching and dying. In some circles, it has been said that the price tag of establishing this infrastructure and its pipelines is over $8 billion, and that it would produce a minimal amount of freshwater—approximately 4 BCM per year in 2044.

Iranian experts have developed cost-effective methods to manage flash floods and recharge aquifers by storing water underground, potentially saving at least 30 BCM annually at a cost of less than $8 billion. With an anticipated cost of nearly $500 per hectare for implementation, the execution of this project over a 14-million-hectare area would result in an expenditure of approximately $7 billion. Additionally, the resulting annual water storage capacity would surpass 40 billion cubic meters, even in a dry year. This approach would inspire a reverse migration among farmers and the reclamation of ancestral lands. Surveys suggest it can be implemented on nearly 8 percent of Iran’s land, providing water savings and flood protection while positively impacting microclimates.

Empowering farmers to establish floodwater management co-ops safeguards resources, mitigates destructive floods, and ensures water storage. The positive environmental impact of artificial recharge and spate irrigation, which would provide an extra 50 percent to Iran’s annual renewable water resources, stands in contrast to desalination’s minimal water addition and environmental drawbacks. Despite viable alternatives, regime insiders choose to sacrifice natural resources for a slight commission increase from an $8 billion project.

How can the United States help?

Compelling data underscores the dire situation facing millions of rural Iranians, pushing them to abandon their ancestral lands due to a substantial decline in groundwater resources. Projecting forward, if current climate conditions persist and water management remains inadequate, a mass exodus appears imminent. This demographic shift could significantly impact the United States’ interests and security concerns in the Middle East and beyond. In recognizing Iranians as potential allies, the United States could prioritize their well-being in alignment with its national interests. Transforming Iran’s water situation necessitates a fundamental shift towards a democratic system that values knowledge and encourages active public participation, departing from the prevailing top-down decision-making model.

The United States can help Iranians through technical assistance and knowledge transfer, capacity building and training, and supporting civil society as well as promoting climate change adaptation.

For Iranians, learning from Israeli water experts and the authorities who established Israel’s national water company (Mekorot) in 1937—a centralized body predating the nation’s formation by eleven years—is imperative. Such an entity should possess the capability to address the challenges posed by a changing climate, fostering resilience in Iran while concurrently navigating diplomatic intricacies related to shared water resources with neighboring nations. This approach aims to alleviate tensions and initiate regional cooperation within the Middle East and North Africa region. The United States has the ability to financially support the establishment of an organization like Mekorot situated outside of Iran. This organization, once operational, could initiate the implementation of modified water management methods, effectively alleviating damages resulting from the mismanagement of the Islamic Republic. Strategic intervention of this nature can contribute to achieving a state of relative stability following the possible decline of the Islamic Republic.

The pursuit of sustainable improvements in Iran’s water management requires a concerted effort toward capacity building in civil society and water-dependent sectors. American institutions, drawing on successful initiatives predating 1979, are well-positioned to play a pivotal role in this regard. Despite historical criticisms of Truman’s Point 4 Program and Iran’s adoption of the American “Hydraulic Mission,” a tailored sustainable development approach is crucial. Oversight by Iranian-American academics, who are well-versed in Iran’s environmental challenges, can ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives. Renowned figures in the agricultural and water sectors within the Iranian community can serve as exemplars, showcasing successful practices applicable to diverse regions in Iran. Disseminating knowledge through online training courses, television programs, and instructional animations demonstrating sustainable solutions can help diminish reliance on the authoritarian governance of the Islamic Republic. Foreseeing potential uprisings in Iran, particularly arising from water and environmental crises, emphasizes the need to promote democratic practices in the agricultural and environmental sectors. In early 2024, severe air pollution led to school closures in major cities, prompting protests in Ardekan and Arak against regional pollution linked to local and national industrial policies. The substantial decline in rainfall and snowfall heightens the imminent risk of severe water shortages in the upcoming spring and summer, which suggest a likely escalation in protests and instability based on historical trends.

The prevailing patriarchal system in Iran has hindered genuine democratic experiences, impeding accountability for officials and elites. In contrast, the US environmental management evolution, driven by civil society activism, led to the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency and pivotal legislation like the Clean Water Act. This empowered communities to influence projects, challenging top-down decision-making. The evolving social landscape in Iran provides an opportunity to transmit the experiences of American groups effectively. This would enable Iranians to envision impactful changes through civil means in their protests, aligning with the democratic values witnessed in US environmental governance.

Sharing knowledge builds trust and fosters cooperation and partnership between Iranians and Americans in alignment with US national interests, especially in the Persian Gulf region. While US institutions have shared rainfall and groundwater data with Iranian scientists, expanding these efforts is crucial. Disseminating valuable information to farmers, stakeholders, and shareholders in Iran is vital for informed decision-making and sustainable practices in water and environmental management.  Addressing financial constraints for talented Iranian students is essential and would empower them to study under top Iranian-American academics, facilitating knowledge exchange on updated water management methods. This collaborative effort within academia has the potential to significantly impact water and environmental management in Iran, contributing to the preservation of natural resources.

In a warming climate with a deteriorating water situation, Iran confronts declining livelihoods due to the Islamic Republic’s poor management, prompting potential mass migration and instability. Despite Iranians’ inclination to engage with the United States, a human-made drought affects them. In the post-Islamic Republic era, Iranians require the United States to be a reliable partner to navigate challenges while respecting integrity and choices. This partnership, which is crucial for US national security, should begin sooner rather than later. Iranian experts are prepared to establish their Mekorot today and initiate planning for a new environmental system to address resource mismanagement.

Nik Kowsar is an Iranian-Canadian water issues analyst. He produces and hosts a weekly TV show addressing Iran’s water situation, broadcast on several satellite TV channels. Follow him on X: @nikahang.

The post A thirsty reality: Iran’s dire water situation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Baba died forty days after Iran’s morality police killed Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, an incident that provoked months of nationwide anti-government protests. After years in jail as a political prisoner, losing almost all his friends to a political purge, executions, and soul-shattering isolation, when Iran was tinted red with the blood of its youth, my father’s heart couldn’t take more. He passed away.

I couldn’t even hold his cold hands for one final moment, lie to maman that everything would be alright, and touch the warm earth that embraced baba for the last time. Months later, my mother brought me a fistful of soil from his grave. My share of Iran—where I left my heart.

Days after Amini was killed, Iran-based singer Shervin Hajipour released a hit song, Baraye (“For the sake of”), based on actual tweets written by Iranians. The song captivated the nation and became the de facto anthem of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising—a love letter to Iran.

Hajipour captured the nation’s heart, and for that crime, he was arrested on September 29, 2022 and accused of “propaganda against the regime” and “inciting violence.” Almost a week after his arrest, he was released on bail as “his case went through the legal process,” according to a state prosecutor. He may have been released from jail, but, in reality, he was placed in a bigger cage and intimidated into silence.

In the following months, people watched him swallow bitter tears while standing tall and unbroken. Many Iranians felt seen by the world and found joy when he won a Grammy award for Best Song For Social Change. But Iranians’ hearts wrenched when he wrote on X, formerly known as Twitter, “I feel that I am done with this world.” Then hope rekindled in the hearts of Iranians when he wrote a little over a month later, “It took me some time, but I will be back.”

Hajipour delivered on his promise on January 12 with a new hit song that soared high in a few hours. Ashghal (“Trash”) received thirty million views and 1.7 million likes on Instagram—an extremely popular social media platform that is blocked and requires circumvention tools to access in Iran—in less than twenty-four hours after its release.

The track starts with bitter notes of solitude. “I am trash, trash who had no one to even post bail for him.” It continues with reflections on “hearts bleeding,” cut by the hollowness of prominent figures we looked up to and who didn’t show up. Then he lists the ordeal he has endured since his arrest: he has been sidelined and marginalized; refused permission to sing by authorities; and stranded in limbo between courts. But Hajipour follows this up by weaving a new path, thanking friends and family who did not leave his mother alone while he was incarcerated.

Hajipour sings of isolation, of being “thrown away like trash… Yes, we are not the same. But I am staying so you won’t stand alone. I am staying so you wouldn’t say that I bolted. I’m fine with the isolation.”

Hajipour became a star last year, chanting all of the reasons Iranians must stand up against the clerical establishment, resulting in him being labeled as an “outsider,” “enemy,” and less than “trash.” He sings, “I just wanted my town to brim with joy. I just wanted those who see us as enemies to see us as friends. No one loves us here, but God loves everyone, even trash like us.”

He wraps up the song: “Don’t tell me that I should leave my homeland. Wherever I go, my heart will remain here. I stand by my words. The son of Iran stands by his words… I’m trash, but the day you all leave, I will still be here rebuilding my town.”    

‘Ordinary’ people brewing a storm

Hajipour’s 2022 hit song, Baraye, was a tapestry weaved from the dreams and pains of ordinary people posted on Twitter, now known as X, during the early days of the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising and under the Persian language hashtag “For the sake of” (برای#).

Posting Ashghal to his Instagram on January 12, Hajipour wrote that, while writing the earlier track, he didn’t care about the background of people being choked with air pollution, in whose pocket poverty lives rent-free, or who mourns Iran’s ecological collapse more. He continued, “But I knew that ordinary people are the only victims of factional extremism. I knew protest is necessary for evolution; that it is impossible to solve a problem without laying it bare. I knew that we, the ordinary people, also have the right to love our homeland.”

Hajipour continues by taking a jab at political factions who think they have a “monopoly over [our] homeland”—power-hungry politicians so engrossed in petty fights with no care for Iran and its survival; factions who have been at each other’s throats with no care for the lives they trample.

Like his 2022 hit, Hajipour’s latest sensation echoes the pain throbbing in the heart of every “ordinary” person who loves Iran. It also rebirths the hope that “ordinary” people can brew a storm.

Days before Hajipour dropped his new track, Iranian-Kurdish activist Roya Heshmati walked into a security facility with her jet-black hair not covered by the mandatory hijab. Despite pressure from officers, she refused to wear a hijab until she was violently handcuffed and a headscarf was wrapped around her head. She was then administered the lashes.

Under torture, she sang a revolutionary anthem by students from the Tehran University of Art: “In the name of woman, in the name of life, clothes of slavery have been torn, our black night shall lead to dawn, all whips will turn into axes [shattering the throne of oppression].”

Days later, another woman, Sepideh Rashnu, wrote on Instagram about life under gender apartheid, rebellion, loss, and reconciliation with her religious father in their small home village.

Months before the morality police killed Amini, Rashnu was arrested by security forces after a video of her went viral, which showed her resisting a plainclothes hijab enforcer. After arrest, her tortured body was dragged before state television cameras to make a forced confession against herself. Rashnu was subsequently sentenced to three years and eleven months in prison and deprived of the right to an education.

Despite her ordeal, Rashnu has remained defiant. Posting a photo of herself basking in the sunlight with a bright smile, she wrote that “nothing will stop her” and that she is the same person who left her village “sprinting towards the holy land of individuality”; the same person who decided to pay the exorbitant price of rebellion rather than letting her “life turn into a lifeless husk.”

Rashnu concluded that she had returned to her village but had “embraced truth,” which she would “hide from no one,” with “no more running [and] no more fear of confrontation.” She has returned to proclaim, “Glory to gates being broken, and glory to people who break them.”

Defiance trumps fear

In the face of defiance and the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, the Islamic Republic has used every trick in the book to suppress all signs of dissent, from killing hundreds of unarmed protesters on the streets to arresting over twenty-two thousand people, including at least eighty journalists. The long list of detainees, in addition to women defying gender apartheid, consists of other artists, such as musician Mehdi Yarrahi, who has been sentenced to jail and flogging for singing against mandatory hijab, and Saman Yassin, a Kurdish rapper facing charges punishable by death for criticizing the state for its oppressive policies. Dissident rapper Toomaj Salehi is also in prison for his support of protests and for shedding light on torture and abuse in the prisons of the Islamic Republic.

In a message from prison, Toomaj wrote about forcing his broken body off the floor of his prison cell and exercising. “You shouldn’t let them wear you down. I am still alive. I must live! Even if I die, I must live on! I owe this to all who put their trust in me, for the sake of Iran. I have a dream. I must survive.”

According to Amnesty International, at least eight have been “arbitrarily executed following grossly unfair sham trials.” Currently, at least five more are facing death sentences in connection with the 2022 protests, while at least fifteen others are at risk of the death penalty.

The violence has wiped the smiles off the face of society and threatened to extinguish its hope, with many Iranians considering exile and immigration. However, people like Hajipour, Rashnu, and Salehi have rekindled hope within the people.

I left Iran in 2021 and also left my heart behind.  Listening to Ashghal, I molded myself a new heart—mixing that fistful of soil from my father’s grave, love for my homeland, and the hope that inspiring Iranians have rekindled in me. I’m “trash,” but I love Iran.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post Yes, I’m ‘Trash,’ but I love Iran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For years, the political elite of the clerical establishment have argued that ISIS was a creation of the United States and Israel. In 2014, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, then a deputy foreign minister, charged (without evidence) that ISIS was a creation of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency. That same year, former Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi called ISIS a “triangle of Mossad, MI6, and the CIA.” Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself maintained publicly that “wicked” Britain and the United States had created the terror organization.

This conspiratorial mindset, which starts at the top, reinforces the Islamic Republic’s need to maintain an enmity with the United States and Israel despite ISIS being a threat to not only Washington and Jerusalem but also Tehran. It was, therefore, unsurprising that, soon after the explosions in Kerman, some Iranian officials started to shift the blame to the US and Israeli governments. President Ebrahim Raisi’s deputy chief of staff tweeted, “Washington says USA and Israel had no role in terrorist attack in Kerman, Iran. Really? A fox smells its own lair first.” At the funeral of the victims of the terror attack, Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hossein Salami, made sure to mention that ISIS jihadists “only act as mercenaries for US and Israeli interests.”

US intelligence later assessed that ISIS’s Afghanistan-based branch executed the Kerman bombings. Iranian leaders themselves likely believe that ISIS was behind the Kerman bombings. After all, Iran’s Intelligence Ministry on January 5 acknowledged as such, declaring that “in a short time after the fatal incident, the anonymous soldiers of Imam Zaman discovered the first traces of ISIS terrorist agents.”

But weaponizing the attack against the United States and Israel serves the interests of the Islamic Republic at this sensitive moment in the region. It seeks to capitalize on the slaughter to score propaganda points against the US and Israeli governments at a time when both are under international criticism for the Gaza war. It is also an attempt to bolster the perception of Israel and the United States as enemies of the nation at a time when Iranians have been expressing sympathy for Israel after the October 7, 2023 attack (waning support for the Palestinian cause in Iran is likewise a factor). Additionally, the Islamic Republic’s narrative further serves to fan the flames of hatred towards Israel around the world. This is a conscious decision. The New York Times, according to reporting sourced from IRGC internal deliberations, wrote that, even if a militant group took responsibility for the Kerman attack, Tehran would still publicly hold Israel responsible.

Despite Iran’s bombastic rhetoric, however, its response against ISIS assets will likely be limited. After the 2017 ISIS attack on the Islamic Republic’s parliament and the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Salami—then a deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC—claimed that “the joint Saudi-Israel-US project was aimed at striking a blow at Iran’s political and security power.” But days later, the IRGC launched missiles solely at ISIS positions in Syria in Operation Laylat al-Qadr.

Fast forward to 2018 and ISIS claimed credit for an attack on a military parade in Ahvaz. There were also regime suggestions that groups like the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz were involved, but the group later denied any role. Then Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted that “terrorists recruited, trained, armed, and paid by a foreign regime have attacked Ahvaz. Children and journos among casualties. Iran holds regional terror sponsors and their US masters accountable for such attacks. Iran will respond swiftly and decisively in defense of Iranian lives.” However, despite Iranian charges that it would hold Washington and other governments accountable, the Iranian response was narrowly tailored and focused on ISIS. In Operation Strike of Muharram, the IRGC launched drones and missiles at ISIS targets in Syria.

In the current context, Iran can be expected to mount a similar mixture of fiery speeches—promising revenge against foreign government-sponsored operations in Iran for propaganda purposes—coupled with military action against ISIS targets in the region, potentially even in Afghanistan. If some Iranian decision-makers truly believe in American or Israeli complicity with ISIS, Tehran could also strike targets as it did in 2022 against what it said was a Mossad site in Erbil, putting forth rationales about the alleged existence of Israeli intelligence strategic centers there, which did not result in any costs for Iran. The continued Iranian proxy attacks against US and Israeli interests in the Middle East in the context of the war in Gaza also provide the Islamic Republic an outlet.

These would all be safe responses for Tehran to avoid a decisive American or Israeli retaliation while allowing for it to save face publicly after years of telling its support base that Washington and Jerusalem birthed ISIS. A number of voices in the clerical establishment have been arguing that deterrence has been eroded in recent years given the lack of sufficient responses to Israeli operations—real and imagined—and that a stronger one is required. However, given Khamenei’s modus operandi of carefully calibrated escalation to avoid reprisals on Iranian soil and triggering a direct war with the United States and Israel, which could destabilize his regime, he will likely proceed cautiously in the weeks ahead.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. Follow him on X: @JasonMBrodsky.

The post ISIS was behind the Kerman attack. Iran still blames Israel and the United States, though. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

Every perpetrator designated by a jurisdiction for targeted sanctions generally faces the same consequences: the freezing of any assets in that jurisdiction, a ban on future financial transactions with persons in that jurisdiction, and, for individuals—as opposed to entities—a ban on entering that jurisdiction. However, the exact reasons governments can designate perpetrators differ by jurisdiction.  

Sanctions programs are developed through legal authorities—meaning legislation, implementing regulations, executive orders, and other legal documents that allow the relevant government to take action. Within these authorities, certain provisions outline violations that can lead to a designation. These provisions are often grouped thematically or geographically to create “regimes” such as “the global human rights sanctions regime.”

Why the targeted sanctions regimes matter

The United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), Australia, and Canada (hereinafter referred to as “the leading jurisdictions”) all have Global Magnitsky-style regimes that cover human rights violations and, sometimes, corruption. These sanctions can be used for acts committed in any country by a perpetrator of any nationality—except for the country of and the nationality of the jurisdiction issuing the designation. The violations covered by these regimes are mostly parallel across the five jurisdictions. For example, most include violations of the rights to life, to be free from torture, and to be free from slavery. However, some include additional violations, such as violations of the right to be free from arbitrary detention or add restrictions, such as requiring that the victims be whistleblowers or human rights defenders.

The leading jurisdictions also have country-specific regimes, including those focused on Iran. They also all have regimes dedicated to or including human rights violations committed against Iranian citizens in Iran. These regimes tend to include more, and more precise, violations than do Global Magnitsky-style regimes. In the UK, for instance, the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations only cover violations of three rights: the rights to life; to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDTP); or to be free from slavery or servitude. In contrast, the Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023, which apply to the Islamic Republic and its associates, cover violations such as those of the rights to liberty and security; to a fair trial; to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly; and to enjoy human rights without discrimination.

For those looking to investigate, document, and submit evidence related to any given perpetrator, understanding which authority to reference—and the specific abuses covered—can help tailor the information gathered and submitted to better support a request that someone be designated. For example, violations such as state-sponsored hostage-taking could fall under the violation of the right to be free from torture. However, while there may be policy and advocacy reasons for making that argument, it is far simpler to prove that it constitutes violations of the rights to liberty and security and a fair trial. Further, jurisdictions will often default to using country-specific regimes where they are available, though civil society actors can request sanctions under more than one regime.

The following list details the leading jurisdictions’ regimes that apply to human rights abuses committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) authorities. It is not an exhaustive list because human rights abuses could be considered applicable to other regimes—for example, nuclear proliferation and cyber activities—but it encapsulates the regimes most likely to be applicable. Of course, in order to sanction a person or entity for these acts, the relevant government must have enough evidence to meet the legal threshold for designation within that jurisdiction. Governments also maintain significant discretion and may decline to make a designation even when that threshold is met.

United Kingdom

The UK has the power to levy targeted sanctions under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. Based on that, it has developed regimes specific to thematic and geographic scopes.

• The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 cover violations of the rights to life; to not be subjected to torture or CIDTP; and to “be free from slavery, not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour, whether or not the activity is carried out by or on behalf of a State.”
• The Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 replaced the Iran Human Rights (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 in December 2023. They cover:
  • Respect for the life of persons in Iran, “for example by refraining from the execution of juvenile offenders in all circumstances.”
  • Respect for the right to not be subjected to torture or CIDTP in Iran, which includes torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment “with a view to extracting information from detained persons”; “inhuman and degrading conditions in prisons”; and “forms of punishment such as flogging and amputation.”
  • Respect for the right to liberty and security including “refraining from the arbitrary arrest and detention of persons in Iran.”
  • Provision of the right to a fair trial to persons in Iran charged with criminal offenses.
  • Provision of the right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly to journalists, human rights defenders, and other persons in Iran.
  • Security of “the human rights of persons in Iran without discrimination, including on the basis of a person’s sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

The European Union

The EU may issue targeted sanctions under its autonomous sanctions regimes, both thematic and country-specific.

• Under Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 (December 7, 2020) and Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 (December 7, 2020), the EU can designate individuals for “serious human rights violations and abuses.” This “applies to”:
  • Genocide and crimes against humanity.
  • The “serious human rights violations or abuses” of torture and CIDTP; slavery; “extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings”; enforced disappearances; and arbitrary arrests or detentions.
  • “[O]ther human rights violations or abuses,” when they are “widespread, systematic, or are otherwise of serious concerns as regards the objectives of the common foreign and security policy” as laid out in Article 21 of the Treaty of the European Union. These may include, but are not limited to, “trafficking in human beings” and “abuses of human rights by migrant smugglers”; sexual and gender-based violence; and violations or abuses of the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, opinion and expression, and religion or belief.
• Under Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP (April 12, 2011) and Regulation (EU) 359/2011 (April 12, 2011), the EU can designate individuals for “serious human rights violations in Iran.” These are not enumerated, nor are there examples. However, “Implementing Regulations”—which add individuals and entities to the EU’s list of designated perpetrators—include reasons each perpetrator has been designated and offer some guidance.

Canada

Canada’s regimes are predominantly geographic-based but it has two authorities to designate individuals for human rights violations.

• Under the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA), Canada can designate foreign officials but not entities for “extrajudicial killings, torture or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” when they are committed against individuals seeking “to expose illegal activity carried out by foreign officials” or “to obtain, exercise, defend or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.” These human rights and freedoms may include “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, peaceful assembly and association, and the right to a fair trial and democratic elections.”
• Under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), Canada can designate individuals or entities when, inter alia, “a grave breach of international peace and security has occurred that has resulted in or is likely to result in a serious international crisis” or “gross and systematic human rights violations have been committed in a foreign state.” Canada enacted the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations under SEMA. Under these regulations, Canada can designate perpetrators for nuclear proliferation but can also designate them for “gross and systematic human rights violations in Iran” or for being a “former or current senior official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps” (IRGC).

Australia

Under its Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011, Australia passed its Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, which allow it to designate individuals and entities under geographic or thematic regimes.

• The human rights regime covers acts that constitute “a serious violation or serious abuse” of the rights to life; to not be subjected to torture or CIDTP; or “to be held in slavery or servitude” or “not to be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.”
• The Iran-specific regime covers “the oppression of women and girls in Iran”; “the general oppression of people in Iran”; and “undermining good governance or the rule of law in Iran.”

United States

Like its counterparts, the United States has many different thematic and geographic targeted sanctions regimes, though they are usually referred to as programs instead. These include a number of country-specific sanctions programs related to Iran. However, whereas targeted sanctions regimes in the other leading jurisdictions are narrowly defined, with the relevant provisions contained mainly within one or two legal authorities, the US has many authorities related to Iran—with ninety domestic authorities related to Iran sanctions broadly including targeted, comprehensive, and other sanctions. These all address different violations—and often include violations beyond those related to human rights, such as corruption. Especially as there is overlap among the authorities, they are not easily grouped into clearly defined sub-programs. While the number of options and variety among the authorities make finding provisions relevant to specific actions easier, they also create a more complicated system. Additionally, many authorities—including those related to human rights in Iran—allow for secondary sanctions, which target non-US people and entities who do business with certain designated individuals and entities.

The following programs address—but are not always limited to—human rights abuses.

• The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, as implemented through Executive Order 13818, covers serious human rights abuses and corruption. Notably, the violations listed differ between the act and the executive order, and the latter is considered to have broadened the scope of what violations may be sanctioned. Executive Order 13818, therefore, covers “serious human rights abuse.” This is not explicitly defined but generally refers to crimes that “entail corporeal violence against victims” and certain deprivations of liberty.
• § 7031(c) of the Annual Department of State Appropriations Act (“§ 7031(c)”) covers “gross violation[s] of human rights.” However, it exclusively applies to officials of foreign governments and their immediate family members and only results in a visa ban (and so does not freeze their assets). “Gross violations” of human rights is a narrower category than “serious abuses.” The term is defined elsewhere in US law and includes torture or CIDTP; “prolonged detention without charges and trial”; “causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons”; and “other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of the person.”
• The (Jamal) Khashoggi Ban, implemented pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(c), covers “serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident activities, including those that suppress, harass, surveil, threaten, or harm journalists, activists, or other persons perceived to be dissidents for their work,” or the families or close associates of those persons. As with § 7031(c), it only includes a visa ban and can extend to perpetrators’ family members. However, unlike § 7031(c), those designated under the Khashoggi Ban cannot be publicly named.
• The Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act, known as the Levinson Act, as implemented through Executive Order 14078, covers “the hostage-taking of a United States national or the wrongful detention of a United States national abroad.” The Levinson Act defines “United States national” as it is defined in 8 US Code § 1101(a)(22) and 8 US Code § 1408 or as “a lawful permanent resident alien with significant ties to the United States.”
• Executive Order 13553 covers “serious human rights abuses against persons in Iran or Iranian citizens or residents, or the family members of the foregoing, on or after June 12, 2009, regardless of whether such abuses occurred in Iran.”
• Executive Order 13846 covers “censorship or other activities with respect to Iran on or after June 12, 2009, that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Iran, or that limit access to print or broadcast media, including the facilitation or support of intentional frequency manipulation by the Government of Iran or an entity owned or controlled by the Government of Iran that would jam or restrict an international signal.” It also covers certain acts of corruption.
• Executive Order 13606 covers the operation of, or the direction to operate, “information and communications technology that facilitates computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria.” It also covers the sale, lease, or other provision, directly or indirectly, of “goods, services, or technology to Iran or Syria likely to be used to facilitate” such disruption, monitoring, or tracking.
• Executive Order 13876 covers the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and the Office of the Supreme Leader (SLO), as well as those appointed by the Supreme Leader, the SLO, or any person appointed by the Supreme Leader or the SLO to “a position as a state official of Iran, or as the head of any entity located in Iran or any entity located outside of Iran that is owned or controlled by one or more entities in Iran.”
• Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) § 106 covers “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against individuals in Iran” seeking to expose the illegal activity of Iranian officials or “to obtain, exercise, defend, or promote internationally recognized human rights and freedoms, such as the freedoms of religion, expression, association, and assembly, and the rights to a fair trial and democratic elections.”

Civil society’s role

First and foremost, civil society is welcome to submit packages to the leading jurisdictions to request designations, with the exception that Australia has not yet announced an official process for this. The US also accepts tips through its Rewards for Justice program, particularly information regarding the IRGC on the basis of counterterrorism-related sanctions programs. The process of submitting information will be addressed in a later post.

However, familiarity with the regimes can also offer some insight into a government’s priorities and where additional advocacy is needed. The abuses covered are often broad enough to encompass emerging tactics—for example, blinding protesters and internet shutdowns could be considered violations of peaceful assembly—but civil society can push governments to amend their country-specific regimes to better address the specific ongoing practices. Iranian civil society is best placed to inform governments of the exact abuses that should be covered and trends to be monitored. When governments then incorporate these abuses into the regimes, it makes it easier for lawyers and activists to submit information requesting designations and serves to officially condemn the practice at hand.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post Iran targeted human rights sanctions series: Why are people and entities sanctioned for human rights abuses? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Resistance Axis’s perception of Israel is filtered through its worldview—a mixture of anti-colonialism and political Islam. The anti-colonial element explains Israel as a settler colonial entity artificially implanted by the West, particularly the United States, in the region and, therefore, inherently brittle or weaker than a spider’s web, in Resistance Axis parlance.

Israel, they claim, is not a real country but an American forward military base—a tool to carry out Washington’s regional designs. In addition, the Axis doesn’t view Jews as real people but as a mere religious group, and, therefore, sees Israeli Jews as lacking a genuine connection to each other and the land of Israel, which stands in contrast to the “indigenous” Palestinian—the rightful owners and natives of historical Palestine.

According to the Resistance Axis, the Zionists—aware of their alienness from the land and their “entity’s” artificiality—perceive the State of Israel as an exchangeable country and, thus, all have second passports and packed bags, ready to “return” to their real countries under the slightest pressure. To the Resistance Axis, a society aware of its unlawful presence in a land will not fight to remain as hard as the natives.

At this point, classical Islamic anti-Judaism steps in to describe the character of this society’s constituent components: individual Jews. Classical Islam portrayed Jews as fickle, scheming, wretched and abased, and—most significantly—cowards who will only fight “in fortified townships, or from behind walls,” if they fight at all. This ignominy—transferred into the Resistance Axis portrayals of Jews—contrasts with inherent Muslim heroism.

Thus, in a 2018 interview, Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah reiterated a longstanding claim: that the Israeli army is comprised of “defeated and cowardly” weaklings who “[lack] the will to fight” and will not even “take a step forward” unless cocooned by armor, ambulances, and airpower—a sharp contrast, he said, to the much braver Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) fighters. In the Resistance Axis’s view, brittle Israel is sustained by two things: American support and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF’s) brutality—in contradistinction to military prowess—which provides Israeli society with a false sense of security.

The narrative’s utility

For the Resistance Axis, portraying Israel as a temporary entity comprised of cowards that will inevitably melt away—either under the alliance’s pressure or the weight of its internal contradictions—has an obvious utility, and is one that furthers the Axis goal of destroying the Jewish state.

Peace, the Resistance Axis claims, cannot be achieved with the inexorably evil Israel. “Resistance”—as a principle and conduct—is the only response to this rapacious, expansionist, and aggressive entity, whose raison d’etre is the murder of Arabs in the conquest of their lands—and whose mere existence is, therefore, inherently threatening to its neighbors. Resistance is the only way to regain Arab dignity and lands unjustly taken by the “usurper entity,” including all of Palestine “from the river to the sea,” per Nasrallah, which must be liberated and “restored to its rightful people” to correct history’s greatest moral wrong.

In this narrative, while neither conciliation nor even capitulation can quench Israel’s supposed voracious appetite for Arab blood or land, “resistance” works. To prove that, the Resistance Axis has redefined the very concept of victory to make its defeat impossible and insists that—since its inception as a military force rather than a mere principle—“the resistance” has been constantly and consistently victorious against Israel on a macro and micro level, moving inexorably toward Israel’s destruction through a thousand paper cuts until it can eventually deliver the final, mortal blow.

This narrative, which attracts massive support for “resistance” movements, would crumble if Resistance Axis supporters believed Israel to be a durable country, one whose citizenry—for all their differences—are a people with a genuine historical and irreplaceable connection to the Land of Israel. 

Perhaps more than mere propaganda for the masses

Two pieces of increasingly conventional wisdom must be rebutted to understand how the dynamics of the October 7 attack suggest this perception of Israel—seemingly propaganda for the Resistance Axis base’s consumption—and how this infected the alliance’s military planning.

First, Al-Aqsa Flood was a collective Resistance Axis initiative, not a rogue Hamas operation. The attack unfolded exactly like Hezbollah’s long-standing threat to “liberate the Galilee”—a territorially limited incursion targeting border military installations and towns to kidnap and kill as many Israelis as possible and create a perception of victory—rather than conquer territory. This suggests that the Shia organization helped develop its operational blueprint. Credible reporting also indicates Iran provided approval, assistance, training, and oversight for the October 7 assault—most of which occurred in Lebanon, where Hezbollah, Iran’s longstanding conduit to Palestinian factions of the Resistance Axis, is dominant.

Hamas concealed the operation’s zero hour—compartmentalization, standard operational security in warfare—not to conceal the plan’s existence from Iran, Hezbollah, nor other Palestinian factions in Gaza, but more likely to deceive Israel regarding its timing.

Hamas barely succeeded at that, making it hardly plausible that it could have entirely excluded its intimate partners Iran and Hezbollah from knowing about the size and scale of Al-Aqsa Flood, whose plans were finalized by October 2022. The planning involved extensive intelligence gathering and at least two years of training, which was envisioned and unfolded as a disciplined and coordinated assault by fighters from several Palestinian Resistance Axis factions. Critically, this included Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which, though a Sunni group, is deeply loyal to Iran and subscribes to its ordering principle of Velayat-e Faqih, making the notion of total Iranian ignorance even less conceivable.

The second notion is that Hamas was “surprised by its own success” on October 7. Evidence collected from the bodies of the assailants, the sheer number of fighters who broke through the Israeli border, and the amount and type of gear they were carrying suggests, if anything, that the October 7 attackers had intended a deeper incursion into Israel. Many were even carrying water-filled packs, which is unnecessary weight for a short incursion.

But the attack was supposed to serve converging Palestinian-Resistance Axis interests: torpedoing Saudi-Israeli normalization—a more dangerous undertaking than the Abraham Accords because it threatened to liquidate Palestinian maximalism gradually and, with it, Iran’s last avenue of establishing its desired preeminence over the majority non-Persian and non-Shia “Muslim world.” Simultaneously, since it’s unlikely the Resistance Axis sought to invite partial self-destruction, it’s more plausible they vastly underestimated the response of Israel’s military and its society.

On October 7, Israel had been in the throes of an unprecedented five-year political crisis, exacerbated by the Benjamin Netanyahu government’s judicial overhaul in 2022. The crisis had seemingly reopened every Israeli social fault line: Ashkenazim against Sephardim; religious against secular; Jews against Arabs; “First Israel” against “Second Israel”; etc. This induced critical numbers of IDF reservists and soldiers to refuse service and large numbers of Israelis to consider emigration, and eviscerated Israeli society’s confidence in Netanyahu’s leadership, even among Likud voters. One Kan Channel 11 commentator remarked how on Yom Kippur—a mere two weeks before the war’s outbreak—secular and religious Israeli Jews brawled in the streets of Tel Aviv’s Dizengoff Square over the placement of a mechitzah, the gender partition required by Jewish law during prayer.

It would seem the Resistance Axis genuinely read this upheaval as a manifestation of Israel’s inherent artificiality and the Israeli collapse they had long been predicting. Here, then, was their opportunity to accelerate Israel’s self-destruction by dealing the Jewish state a massive blow that would torpedo its last gasp at regional normalcy and destroy Israeli society’s sense of security by irreparably damaging the credibility of the IDF (their last consensus body)—all without incurring a commensurate cost.

This expectation only makes sense if the Resistance Axis believed Israeli society to be an artificial construct, with ties that bind no deeper than a superficial and waning commitment to unfounded Zionism. For only such a society could fail to muster the unity necessary to respond to an attack on the scale of Al-Aqsa Flood. Its inherent weakness would be compounded by the kidnapping of hundreds of hostages, putting this innately discordant society in the untenable position of trusting its reputationally battered leadership to both fight a costly war and make the tough moral choices regarding the hostages. The attack wouldn’t have caused Israel to collapse but to withdraw to proverbially lick its wounds after a brief military retaliation.

The anatomy of a misconception

Had the Resistance Axis accounted for the true nature of Israeli society and its national psyche, they may have expected Israelis to rally around the flag—even if temporarily—to destroy Hamas. For an alliance like the Resistance Axis, which boasts of its alleged intimate knowledge of Israeli society, this blindness appears perplexing. But this failure to understand an adversary’s society—consider the 2003 US invasion of Iraq or the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon—is not so uncommon and, for all their bluster, the intelligence gathering apparatuses and methods of the Resistance Axis are much weaker than those of the United States or Israel.

Two factors likely underpinned this blindness. The first is that the Resistance Axis, being authoritarian, could not conceptualize domestic disagreement—irrespective of its intensity— through the lens of a democratic society like Israel. The inherent cacophony of democracy, viewed from Tehran, Dahiyeh, or Gaza City, could be confused for a society being pulled apart by its centrifugal forces. Thus, raucous domestic debate, even on historical inflection points, which is seen from a democratic society’s perspective as a sign of a society’s vibrancy and vitality, would easily be interpreted as an existential crisis and weakness from an authoritarian lens.

The second factor appears to stem from the Resistance Axis’ confusion between knowing their enemy and their motivations for loving them. As such, they do not interact with Israeli Jews and understand Israeli society through secondary means, instead selectively monitoring Hebrew media or gathering intelligence through sources of dubious reliability before plugging that information into a rigid ideological paradigm.

Confronted with such a colossal misreading of Israeli intentions after the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War, Nasrallah uttered his now infamous “had I but known…” mea culpa. Perhaps the Resistance Axis—particularly its Palestinian franchises—are currently engaged in a similar reckoning.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focusing on Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Israel.

The post Does the Resistance Axis believe its propaganda about Israel? The October 7 attack seems to suggest so. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Since the end of the peak of the protests in January, official state-backed data indicates that at least seventy university professors in Iran have been suspended or fired—though the real figure is closer to around 110. This war on academic staff coincided with the nationwide expulsion and suspension of thousands of students during the post-protest period.

The murder of twenty-two-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini, who was killed by the so-called morality police for “violating” mandatory hijab rules—not surprising, given its history with protests—would make universities in Iran one of the main pillars of protest against the clerical establishment.

While students spearheaded anti-regime demonstrations across campuses—including hosting rallies and sit-ins—university professors and academic staff initially held back from joining this charge. Their silence, however, was soon broken after students called out their hypocrisy, pleading with them to join the revolutionary movement. “Professors, professors, speak out, don’t be afraid” and “our professors are disgraced and accept humiliation,” students chanted. It would not be long before a flurry of academics across Iranian universities endorsed supporting the Women, Life, Freedom revolution.

Of course, this would not be without its consequences. The regime’s suppressive machinery waited until after the surge in protests to fully inflict revenge on dissenting Iranian students and academics alike.

Verified videos showing regime forces—mostly from the Basij—raiding university campuses, attacking students, and, in some cases, even opening fire on them have been widely circulated since the protests erupted in the fall of 2022. By January—a mere three months since the outbreak of protests—hundreds had been arrested, tortured, and sentenced to multiple years in prison.

The Islamic Republic has used various institutions to suppress and silence dissent across universities in Iran, including the Harasat, a branch of the intelligence ministry, and the IRGC’s Student Basij Organization, sanctioned by the European Union in May. Still, while the Herasat and SBO have primarily focused their efforts on targeting students, another shadowy organization, which, until now, has been ignored by Western nations, has been active in repressing and forcefully silencing dissenting academic staff: the PBO.

Formed in early 2001, the PBO was established as one of the special branches of the IRGC’s civil militia, the Basij, with the strong support of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He said in a speech that year, “I advise developing the Basiji professors group. Pious brothers, sisters, and thank God there are many pious professors in our universities today, introduce them, recognize them, recruit them in one organization.” ​

Structurally, the PBO operates as a sub-branch of the IRGC, with its commanders always being an IRGC commander appointed by the head of the Basij. Its top-down structure can be broken down into three layers: the PBO headquarters, comprising of commanders from the IRGC’s Imam Hossein University in Tehran; the PBO centers, which are present across Iran’s leading universities and made up of university staff who are all active Basij members; and the PBO clubs that are spread across all other universities in Iran in accordance with the law.

The PBO was initially created to organize pro-regime professors nationwide and infiltrate all universities, operating as the IRGC’s eyes and ears across campus. The organization was significantly boosted after hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005. Ahmadinejad, himself a PBO member, would open the door for other members to serve in government, not least across Iran’s higher education ministry and other elements of the state bureaucracy. For example, Mohammad Mehdi Zahedi and Kamran Danshjoo were Ahmadinejad’s ministers of higher education in his first and second administrations, and Kamran Bagheri Lankarani, the minister of health and medical education, were all PBO affiliates.

As the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement erupted, the PBO intensified its suppressive activities. PBO members began actively controlling and cracking down on students, most of whom opposed Ahmadinejad and viewed his “election” as fraudulent. One student at the time recalled this experience: “A professor from the Basij told me not to attend his class, citing my support for the 2009 protests. He said he’d ensure that ‘trash’ like me wouldn’t be allowed to attend the university.”

After a surge during the Ahmadinejad years, the PBO’s power would decrease from 2013 to 2021 under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani. In contrast, Rouhani gradually removed PBO members from the state bureaucracy and sidelined them from the university’s management—mainly because of factional rivalries and personal feuds with the IRGC.

This status quo would completely reverse with the de facto appointment of hardline cleric Ebrahim Raisi as president in 2021. Raisi’s presidency has turbocharged the PBO’s activities to unprecedented levels. The PBO supported Raisi’s presidential campaign and many of its members joined his administration when he formed his cabinet, much like the IRGC and the Basij. For example, Iran’s current higher education minister and minister for health and medical education are members of the PBO, as is Ali Zolfigol, Minister for Science, Technology, and Research, who vowed to “ensure the Islamization of universities…in this administration.” Having occupied the higher education and medical education ministries, the PBO members have been appointed as heads of universities and college deans. 

For example, Dr. Mohammad Moqimi, a member of the PBO, has been appointed as the head of Tehran University. Consequently, Moqimi has appointed PBO members as college dean heads. Mohammadreza Hosnaei, the head of the art university PBO club, has become the dean of the arts college of Tehran University. Similarly, Abdolreza Saif, the PBO head of Tehran University, has now become the college dean of literature and humanities there.  

It is worth noting that Iranian universities are not autonomous and are under complete state control (even so-called private ones). The Khamenei-run Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution (SCCR)—the highest authority over education and culture—directly appoints all university heads. As a result, PBO members have been appointed across senior managerial positions in state and semi-private universities nationwide. Naturally, this has resulted in a trickle-down effect. PBO university heads appointing other PBO affiliates to other managerial positions, including college deans and department heads, have been picked from the Professor Basij Organization. These individuals usually lack the necessary academic credentials or experiences but are awarded such positions due to their support for the regime’s Islamization of academia.

But what exactly is expected from PBO members? The suppressive activities of the PBO can roughly be broken down into three categories. The first relates to conducting surveillance against professors and students to identify dissenting voices. This was witnessed en masse during the Women, Life, Freedom protests.

According to students we interviewed studying at Allameh Tabataba’i University in Tehran, PBO professors deliberately held their university lectures on days and times when protests were planned to identify all absentees who would later be suspended or failed in class. PBO members also operated as informal agents for so-called “morality policing.”

Secondly, in tandem with these surveillance operations, PBO members sit on university administrative committees, abusing their authoritative positions to punish academic staff and students critical of the regime and reward those who support the regime.

Finally, alongside these activities, like every other branch of the Basij, PBO members are expected to use their positions to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize students and academic staff for the regime’s suppressive apparatus.

Of course, lucrative incentives are offered to PBO members to reward them for their service. As well as getting fast-tracked for senior university positions, Basji professors are also prioritized for state-funded scholarships to study abroad, not least at prestigious universities in Europe and the United States. Those who reap the rewards of such scholarships are expected to use their fast-tracked admissions to Western universities to infiltrate and penetrate academic institutions in the West on behalf of the regime. Such incentives are simultaneously coupled with compulsory ideological indoctrination for all PBO members to ensure that they are genuinely committed to the ideological cause of the regime and not simply materially driven. This official program of indoctrination—for example, one was titled, “The Plan of Guardianship of the Professors”—is overseen by the son of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, the ideological godfather of the IRGC.

Having slipped under the radar of the West’s security agencies, the PBO has rapidly expanded its suppressive activities in the past few months. On behalf of the IRGC, it is in the process of waging what experts—both inside and outside of Iran—are referring to as the regime’s “Third Cultural Revolution” across universities nationwide. This major operation is resulting in the suspension, expulsion, and even detainment of Iranian professors and students who have criticized the regime or promoted “non-Islamic” ideals.

As part of this plan to “purify” universities, radical Basij members with virtually no academic experience or credentials have been appointed university lecturers. This includes Saeid Haddiyan, a Shia Islamist eulogist close to Khamenei, who has been teaching postgraduate classes at the College of Literature and Humanities at Tehran University, where Saif—the head of Tehran University PBO—has become the college dean.   

For too long, the PBO has been ignored by the West. While the activities and operations of the PBO are inextricably tied to the IRGC and the Student Basij Organization—both sanctioned entities—it has yet to be designated by the United States or Europe. So long as this status quo exists, its war on innocent, pro-democracy Iranian professors and students will continue without any consequences.

Saeid Golkar is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and a senior fellow on Middle East Policy at The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change in the UK.

Kasra Aarabi is the director of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and is a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X: @KasraAarabi.

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Despite the Joe Biden administration’s efforts to prevent a further escalation and the expansion of the Israel-Hamas war in the region, Iran-backed militia groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen continue to challenge US forces. This is particularly evident in Iraq, where Tehran controls most of the power after the Shia Coordination Framework, which it backs, took control of the government. This shadow war began in the 1980s after the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon, allowing Iran to avoid direct confrontation with the United States and Israel, especially since the Gaza war began. While Iran has successfully implemented this policy for an extended period, the new developments in the Israel-Hamas war may alter the status quo.

If these attacks continue, the United States might need to adjust its response. This change may involve either combating militia groups inside Iraq or directly confronting Iran. Another response potentially necessitates the evacuation of the US embassy in Baghdad and the withdrawal of its remaining 2,500 troops. If this happens, it could set a precedent for other countries to follow suit. This is where Iraq could face security and political crises, potentially leading to a civil war between rival Shia groups: the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and its political allies; the Shia Coordination Framework; and their rival, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Additionally, other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), could exploit the situation to regain power. The repercussions of this situation could spill over to other countries, possibly plunging the entire region into turmoil in the aftermath of the Gaza war.

The Gaza war erupted amid the United States’ attempt to reach an agreement with Iran to stop the latter’s provision of drones and missiles to Russia (for use against Ukraine) and to halt Iran’s nuclear program. This initiative followed the first concluded deal, which involved the release of five American hostages in exchange for the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian funds frozen in South Korean banks. Dealing with Iran’s policy, which involves supporting proxy groups and suppressing ongoing anti-establishment protests within Iran, was not a priority for the United States and Europe in recent years. This myopic policy of the White House has even strained the US’s relationship with its regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

However, Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7 drew global attention to Iran’s support for proxy groups in the Middle East. It raised concerns about the potential expansion of the conflict based on Tehran’s calculations. This critical situation in the region underscores that the nuclear program should not be the sole issue of concern when dealing with Iran. Iran-backed proxy groups have the potential to escalate conflicts similar to what occurred after Hamas attacked Israel and can also lead to energy security issues, migration crises, and humanitarian disasters.

Moreover, the Gaza war is the first significant test for Iran in the post-Qasem Soleimani era. The assassinated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander was a key figure in creating, controlling, and coordinating militia groups in the Middle East and empowering Iranian influence through these proxies in the region. Iran’s current policy of rejecting any involvement in Hamas’ attack on Israel, as well as attempts to avoid any expansion of the war on Iran, has forced the clerical establishment to offer only verbal support to Hamas—one of its Palestinian wings in the fight against Israel—risking losing credibility and influence in the region.

The failure of Lebanese Hezbollah to assist Hamas and prevent its loss of power in Gaza could further damage trust and relationships within Iran and its proxy network. During his speech on November 3, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah disappointed his supporters, who were eagerly awaiting his declaration of war against Israel. Instead, he stated that they have been in a state of war with Israel since October 8, indicating that Hezbollah’s current strategy involves continued skirmish attacks and not an escalation to a full-scale war. Given that Hezbollah is an Iran-created group that receives orders from Tehran, its lack of response reflects the clerical establishment’s stance for the time being.

Moreover, Iran’s inability to organize protests within the country in support of Palestinians—despite its sizable Muslim population of over 80 million—raises questions. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian posted images of protests in Indonesia supporting Gaza, while Iran did not see similar, sizeable demonstrations. This could be attributed to two primary reasons. First, the regime may be struggling to mobilize large numbers of people to rally in support of Gaza. Second, the regime might perceive the potential for large protests as a threat to its control, particularly in the wake of the brutal crackdown on the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom uprising.

Iranians have consistently seized every opportunity to express their disagreement with their government’s policy of supporting Palestinian groups against Israel by utilizing Iranian resources and wealth. The chant, “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I will sacrifice my life for Iran,” started with anti-government protesters on Quds Day (Jerusalem Day) in 2009 as a response to government-sponsored demonstrations in support of Palestine. This sentiment persisted in subsequent protests in 2017, 2019, and 2022–2023 and will continue reverberating across Iran.

The ongoing situation in the Gaza war, coupled with the uncertainty about Iran’s potential decisions and orders to its proxy groups, highlights the urgency for the US to reassess its policy toward Iran. It is imperative to acknowledge and address the increasing influence of Iran-backed proxy groups in the region, facilitated by Tehran’s support. A critical first step should involve devising strategies to sever the link between Iran’s provision of support and funding for these proxy groups, thereby reshaping the geopolitical dynamics and mitigating potential regional crises.

Shukriya Bradost is a PhD student and researcher in international security at Virginia Tech University, specializing in Middle Eastern geopolitics.

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Iran, which views Hamas as a Palestinian proxy and supports it militarily and economically, is working to achieve two primary goals. First, for the international community to reach a ceasefire that preserves Hamas’s rule in the Gaza Strip and, thus, prevents Israel from achieving its goal in the war: eliminating Hamas’s military and political capabilities. Second, to “encourage” its proxies (led by Lebanese Hezbollah) to attack Israel just below a threshold of escalation to stop Israeli military efforts and prevent it from eradicating Hamas. 

Iran is currently refraining from attacking the United States—with the exception of its militias attacking US forces in Iraq and Syria—to avoid an escalation, and has been careful not to be directly involved and threatens to respond only if attacked. With that in mind, one of the main questions is whether and how Israel’s conflict in Gaza will impact Tehran’s nuclear strategy.

As of today, Iran is enriching to 60 percent and has been careful not to cross the 90 percent military-grade enrichment threshold. In August, just weeks before the Gaza war, it also reached an understanding for broader talks with the United States—the result of which was Iran’s willingness to decrease enriched uranium in exchange for economic relief in the form of unfreezing Iranian funds around the world. Furthermore, these developments led to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly giving his blessing in September to the Iranian nuclear negotiation team to meet directly with their US counterparts in Oman.

Nevertheless, the campaign in Gaza should not change Iran’s nuclear strategy. For now, Iranian deterrence is working, since Tehran is not paying any price for its proxy activity with the Houthis in Yemen, Shia militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, given the fact that the United States is careful not to attack Iran for fear of escalation (despite being attacked by these proxies in Iraq and Syria). In many ways, Iran may even think that its conventional deterrence—together with a robust nuclear program—is enough, and that there is no point in crossing the nuclear Rubicon.

The fact that the United States is making minor responses against attacks in Syria and Iraq can only strengthen this understanding in Tehran, as does the fact that the United States military no longer surrounds Iran in Afghanistan and Iraq (except for a limited presence that mainly serves the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and el-Sham and the training of local Iraqi forces).

On the other hand, despite the profound erosion of Israel’s deterrence after the tragic events of October 7, the US’s willingness to stand by Israel’s side—including its willingness to deploy troops and capabilities in the Middle East—is demonstrating to Iran that, in extreme cases, such as an Iranian nuclear breakout, the United States will not hesitate to exercise force against Iran. 

The main problem in this context concerns the ability of the international community—especially the United States—to reach an agreement that would limit Iran’s nuclear activities. This was also evident in October when snapback sanctions were not imposed in response to the expiration of the United Nations ban on Iran’s ballistic missile program per UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The tension between Iran and the United States—influenced by Iran’s proxies attacking US forces, support for Hamas, and strengthening relationship with Moscow—is making it almost impossible for Washington to preserve a line of diplomacy with Tehran. 

On top of that, the 2024 US presidential election and disapproving voices in Congress regarding the Joe Biden administration’s policy towards Iran will make it very difficult to approve any agreement with Tehran, assuming one is even reached. Moreover, Khamenei lost his limited trust in the United States after President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. In light of this fact, the Biden administration’s attempt to go back on its hostage swap agreement, which allowed Iran to receive $6 billion in frozen assets in South Korean banks via Qatar to be used for a humanitarian trade channel, sharpens the futility of Tehran achieving long-term agreements with Washington. 

Even if Iran does not make significant progress in its nuclear program, the political and economic pressure that is expected as a result of Tehran’s support for Hamas and the weakening relationship between Iran and the United States will increase the likelihood that the country will deepen and expand its nuclear program without crossing the 90 percent Rubicon. Iran will have no incentive to limit its nuclear program, given the pressure exerted on it from the West and the United States and the low probability of an agreement that will lift sanctions. 

If pressure exerted on Iran is added via other means—sanctions on ballistic missiles and actions against Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors—Tehran will not hesitate to take steps related to its nuclear program, such as limiting nuclear inspections as it has done in the past. Considering this option, the coming year may be characterized by an increase in tensions between the West and Iran over the latter’s advanced nuclear program, which may push Tehran towards 90 percent enrichment—not as a benchmark on its way to building a nuclear bomb, but as a move designed to discourage the international community from continuing to exert pressure.

The bottom line is that the Gaza war undermined the delicate relationship built between the United States and Iran in the last few months to probably an irreversible degree. This fact will have a significant impact on the prospect of an agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear file and introduces a severe instability dimension regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. 

It is likely that Tehran still understands the serious price it may pay if it moves towards a nuclear bomb, and the increased presence of the United States in the Middle East is terrible news for it. However, the immunity that Iran enjoys will only strengthen its assessment that, at present, there is no tangible threat to the regime and, thus, its nuclear program. 
Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

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Amir-Abdollahian’s statement could serve as a reminder of how senior Iranian officials publicly justified their country’s involvement in the Syrian civil war after the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and el-Sham (ISIS). At a 2015 meeting with families of Iranian soldiers who died fighting in Syria and Iraq, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly said, “They went to fight the enemy, and if they did not fight, this enemy would be inside the country… If they were not stopped, we would have to fight them in Kermanshah and Hamedan,” referring to provinces in western Iran.

For years, Iran has considered itself to be located in a very problematic environment, where it is surrounded by failed or weak states and faces a foreign presence that could pose a threat to its national security. Historical experience has contributed to Iran’s security considerations. The most recent historical trauma embedded in the Iranian national memory is its bloody eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988).

It was Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein who started the war against the nascent Islamic Republic and initiated the use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, against targets in Iran. Yet, most countries in the world, including most of the Arab countries, supported Iraq. This reality strengthened the determination of the clerical establishment to do everything they could to ensure that this trauma would not happen again.

The desire to ensure the survival of the regime against threats from home and abroad is the first objective of the Islamic Republic that shapes its concept of security, with its first line of defense in that context being the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2011 civil war in Syria, and the 2014 rise of ISIS have only heightened Iran’s concerns in the last two decades. These events laid the foundation for establishing the “Resistance Axis,” which is a significant tool for Iran to deter its enemies and expand its influence and power beyond its borders. This regional bloc, under its leadership, also includes the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

This development can be seen as an expression of the concept that has taken root in the Iranian political and security elite over the past two decades: an increasing importance on expanding Iran’s activities and influence far beyond its political and geographical borders to enhance its ability to deal with external threats.

As an expression of the desire to neutralize threats as early as possible, Iran adopted the “forward defense” strategy (also known as the “offensive defense” strategy) in the last decade; it’s based on containing threats to Iran’s national security by dealing with its enemies as far away from its borders as possible. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Masoud Jazaeri, explained the need for the concept of forward defense by pointing out that Iran’s enemies, which are led by the United States, have adopted a military strategy based on imposing a “siege” on the Islamic Republic. As a result, it is incumbent upon Iran to break through this siege wherever it exists. He claimed that one of the methods used by the Americans and the “enemies of the revolution” was to increase their presence in Iran’s neighboring countries. If Iranians do not fight outside the borders of their country, they will be forced to fight within its borders. It is impossible to wait for the enemies and then deal with them; they must be stopped halfway.

The forward defense concept is closely intertwined with the “strategic depth” concept, which constitutes an essential element of Iran’s strategy and serves to compensate for its limited conventional military capabilities. Although this concept is not new, its significance has heightened over the past decade due to the regional upheaval following the 2011 Arab Spring.

Establishing the Resistance Axis has enhanced Iran’s capacity to extend its regional strategic depth. This involves strengthening groups that are loyal to Iran and committed to its anti-Zionist and anti-American ideology and strategy, establishing military bases for Resistance Axis groups and forging alliances with like-minded countries. The aim of achieving strategic depth is to enable Iran to broaden the battleground against its enemies beyond its territorial borders, creating defensive lines far from its borders. This strategy seeks to diminish Iran’s strategic isolation, act as a deterrent against potential attacks from Israel and the United States, and provide Tehran with the capability for a second strike in the event of an attack against it.

The Gaza war presents the first significant test of the level of cooperation present among the elements of the Iran-led Resistance Axis. This is not the first time that the degree of mutual commitment between the front members has been tested. The escalating events at Israel’s borders in Passover in April—particularly the tensions on the Temple Mount and the activation of the Gaza, Lebanon, and Golan Heights arenas by Hamas—were effectively leveraged by Iran and its proxies as an opportunity to promote the concept of the “convergence of the arenas” and to enhance the balance of deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. However, for the first time, the Gaza war now poses a major threat to one of the main components of the Resistance Axis. Therefore, it represents a significant test of its ability to deter Israel.

Since the outbreak of the war on October 7, Iran has intensified its threats towards Israel. However, Iran appears to be hesitant to open a full-scale front between Hezbollah and Israel, as this could exact a heavy toll on Hezbollah and perhaps even Iran itself. It could also potentially lead to American military intervention. Statements by senior Iranian officials indicate that Iran does not necessarily view deploying Hezbollah into an all-out campaign against Israel as the sole and immediate response option. At this stage, Iran seems to prefer taking action against Israel through pro-Iranian Shia militias from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

Nevertheless, Tehran’s assessments and considerations may evolve as the Gaza war continues, especially in the event of Israeli military successes that could threaten the survival of Hamas or its ability to maintain effective control over the Gaza Strip. The dilemma facing Iran is not a simple one. On the one hand, there is the fear of sacrificing Hezbollah’s strategic capabilities and risking a confrontation with the United States. On the other hand, there is the fear of the collapse of Hamas and a shift in the regional balance of power to the detriment of Iran and the Resistance Axis.

Whether Iran decides to escalate the war or not, the conflict in Gaza represents a seismic event, with strategic implications for Gaza and the entire Middle East. Neutralizing Hamas’ capabilities may impact not only the power dynamic between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, but also the future balance of power in the Middle East, which is contested by the Iran-led Resistance Axis and a coalition of more moderate international and regional forces.

At this juncture, Iran may find satisfaction in the achievements of Hamas and present them as another manifestation of Israel’s weakness and the strength of the Resistance Axis. Iranian officials also emphasize reports regarding the freezing of contacts for normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel as further evidence of the success of efforts to thwart this development. However, Iran is also aware that a potential military achievement for Israel and the defeat of Hamas could lead to the emergence of a new political reality on the day after the war, potentially undermining Iran’s regional position.

While Iran might be able to maintain its position even without Hamas in control of Gaza, in the aftermath of the conflict, Iran may realize that Hezbollah (considered Tehran’s preferred strategic arm in the region) could also face repercussions, even if the latter refrains from engaging in an all-out confrontation with Israel and manages to preserve its arsenal of rockets and missiles.

There are already voices in Israel advocating for a change in the security situation vis-à-vis Hezbollah in the aftermath of the war. For example, Israel Beytenu party leader Avigdor Liberman urged more decisive action against Hezbollah in Lebanon. “We can’t finish a war without tossing Hezbollah beyond the Litani [River],” the hawkish former defense minister said, adding that “no one will return to those villages” near the border with Israel, which has now largely been evacuated by the Lebanese. The Israeli Defense Forces, which are currently focused on the fighting in the Gaza Strip, have already killed dozens of Hezbollah fighters since the outbreak of the war and caused considerable damage to Hezbollah positions along the border and its military installations.

After the war, Iran will need to ask itself whether a more limited and restrained network of its proxies is sufficient to safeguard its essential security interests in a changing regional reality. If the answer to this question is negative, Iran may reevaluate another strategic measure it has developed in recent decades to deter its enemies and ensure its survival: the nuclear option. Khamenei has considered a military nuclear threshold capability to provide Iran with an effective deterrent against its enemies and serve as insurance for the continued survival of the regime.

So far, Iran has not decided to accelerate to nuclear weapons. However, the heightened sense of threat may prompt a shift in Iran’s nuclear strategy based on the assessment that it can no longer solely rely on its proxies nor be content with the nuclear threshold for deterring its enemies. Since President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Tehran’s violation of its commitments to the deal has led to notable progress in the Iranian nuclear program, bringing Iran closer to the threshold of nuclear weapons capability. Iran has already changed its nuclear strategy in the past. It could do so again.

Dr. Raz Zimmt is a research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is also a veteran Iran watcher in the Israeli Defense Forces. Follow him on X: @RZimmt.

The post The Gaza war raises questions about the future of Iran’s Resistance Axis appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As proof, he pointed to Hamas’s seeming indifference to Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) “pleas for help”—as he put it—when PIJ clashed with Israel in August 2022 and May of this year. “Hamas decided to remain outside the battle,” Hanegbi said. Though accurate on a technical level, Israel’s analysis of Hamas’s intentions, as reflected in Hanegbi’s statement, demonstrates a fundamental failure in understanding how Iran and its proxy forces operate, cooperate, and make war.

Iran’s proxies have long ceased to work as geographically contained entities or in isolation. Particularly with the onset of the Syrian civil war, Tehran has worked on integrating its various extensions and proxies into a mutually reinforcing and symbiotic regional alliance—a true “Axis of Resistance.” This also applies to Hamas, both within the Palestinian Territories and outside them.

Inside the Gaza Strip, the group has operated as a first among equals among the twelve-member Joint Operations Room of the Palestinian Resistance Factions since 2018, an umbrella organization coordinating the activities of all Gaza-based terror groups. More broadly, Hamas and this entire Gaza-based umbrella organization have become integrated into the regional, Iranian-led Axis of Resistance.

It is critical to understand how these forces symbiotically operate. First, to the extent that this is possible, they have set aside their differences. This was most evident with Hamas in the Syrian civil war. At the conflict’s outset, the group’s Sunni loyalties led it to oppose Bashar al-Assad’s brutal assault against his people. However, in time—circa mid-2017—Hamas became more agnostic on the Syrian conflict, neither fighting to save Assad like Iran’s other extensions nor commenting on the war at all. Indeed, from 2017 until Hamas reconciled with Damascus in 2022, the Syrian civil war did not exist as far as the group was concerned. The Axis of Resistance had decided to set aside these differences, which were dividing their forces and weakening them through infighting, and focus on their greater, shared goals: eroding American regional influence and the eventual destruction of the State of Israel.

The Axis of Resistance’s constituent organizations also cooperate militarily. In countries like Syria, they fought alongside each other. But their cooperation can take different forms, like sharing intelligence, military knowledge, and experience, joint planning and coordination, and, at times, the more experienced groups loaning forces or attaching advisors to more junior counterparts.

The final point relates to the tension between the desire of the Axis of Resistance to ceaselessly pursue its larger objectives and the constraints of reality that may prevent any of its constituent forces from acting freely at any given time. In a practical sense, this has meant that the Axis groups will figuratively pick up the slack for each other.

This is most relevant to Hanegbi’s observation that Hamas abstained from involvement in the two recent rounds of fighting between PIJ and Israel. Hamas had not been permanently nor temporarily deterred by Israel. Likelier, PIJ could simply afford to absorb the consequences of the clash at the time. Alternatively, Hamas had capabilities that the group and Iran wanted to preserve for a more critical date. Or Tehran and its Gaza-based proxies wanted to keep the round of fighting limited, which was possible if PIJ alone entered the fray—not if Hamas joined.

The Axis of Resistance has adopted this approach in other arenas where it holds sway—most noticeably in Lebanon. There, the country’s ongoing and worsening economic crisis has constrained Hezbollah’s ability to directly attack Israel over the last four years. Out of concern for eroding its public support or making itself the focal point of Lebanese anger, the group cannot be seen to compound Lebanon’s dire economic straits with a security conflagration or war (particularly since recovery aid will likely not be forthcoming once the war concludes). Rather than halt or suspend its ideologically motivated fight against Israel, Hezbollah has transferred the battle to its Palestinian partners, both inside Lebanon and Israel, more capable of absorbing Israeli retaliation.

Iran’s relationship with its proxies is a top-down hierarchy. But Tehran does take into account the input, local conditions, and needs of its proxies. In that manner, the overall objective of the Axis of Resistance—to destroy Israel—can continue to be pursued without endangering or risking the destruction of one of its constituent forces, especially if it has been made particularly vulnerable by its current circumstances.

Understanding this can help predict—to whatever extent that is possible—Hezbollah’s, Iran’s, and the broader Axis of Resistance’s next steps as the war between Israel and the Gaza-based factions unfolds. And here, so far, the Axis, but particularly Hezbollah, have been sending contradictory messages.

While Hezbollah’s typically loquacious Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has been unusually silent since the war’s outbreak, Iran has taken point on the Axis of Resistance’s messaging. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian—expectedly, from Beirut, which has become a hub of the regional alliance’s meetings and decision-making—has now twice threatened broader Axis intervention, promising “a very likely preemptive strike by the Resistance within the next few hours” on October 16, which never materialized. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conveyed a similar message the following day.

It is important, however, to distinguish between the Axis’s bellicose bluster and genuine threats and the form they will take. Amir-Abdollahian’s second, more jingoistic, statement occurred three days after his October 13 meeting with Nasrallah, where the two undoubtedly discussed Hezbollah’s ability to intervene and the limitations that local circumstances placed on the group’s freedom of action. This includes, as noted, Lebanon’s economic collapse, the improbability of post-war economic recovery aid, especially if hostilities are initiated by Hezbollah, and the inevitable Lebanese public backlash against the group after the war.

Indeed, Hezbollah promised Lebanese officials—to the extent it can be taken at its word—to avoid involvement in the war unless Israel “harasses” Lebanon. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Najib Miqati has been conducting ongoing “contacts domestically,” referring to Hezbollah, “and externally” to keep Lebanon outside of the war, stressing “the adventurism of opening a new front [against Israel] from south Lebanon is in no one’s interest because the Lebanese cannot bear [the consequences].”

Caught between its obligations to Tehran and its interest in quite literally not burning the ground under its feet, Hezbollah has so far chosen a now-familiar middle ground: facilitating attacks by Palestinian groups. This allows Hezbollah to continue bleeding Israel while providing it enough plausible deniability to avoid the full consequences of Israeli retaliation and very limited direct harassment.

Admittedly, Hezbollah has exploited Israel’s concentration on the Gaza Strip to carry out more severe and daring attacks that recall the group’s pre-October-2019 posture—some of which have even resulted in Israeli military casualties—but even these have occurred within its established “rules of engagement” with Israel. Most of the attacks have been directed at the Shebaa Farms—long accepted by both sides as a permissible arena for fighting—while Hezbollah conveyed to Al-Araby al-Jadeed that, for the time being, it was reverting to its old equation of “no war, but blood for blood.”

Unaltered, Hezbollah’s current approach would force Israel to split its efforts between the north and Gaza rather than focusing undivided attention on the coastal enclave. This would slow the pace of an Israeli incursion into the Gaza Strip, buying time that the Axis of Resistance could be hoping would result in a premature ceasefire. This would allow Hamas, PIJ, and their other terrorist allies to live to fight another day. Meanwhile, Hezbollah can leverage its threats of entering the conflict to prompt the creation of lifelines for its Gazan allies, buying them more time.

However, an element of uncertainty remains attached to the seriousness of Iran and the Axis’ threats to intervene, if and when Israel’s war evolves into a ground invasion that threatens the existence of the Gaza-based militant groups.

Iran—through Hezbollah—has spent almost two decades and considerable effort and funds building the Gaza Strip into the Axis of Resistance’s Southern Front against Israel. It has spent even more time and energy propping up Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian proxies. On October 7, the Axis leveraged this build-up to launch the meticulously planned “Al-Aqsa Flood” attack (likely to torpedo Saudi-Israeli normalization talks). Indeed, as far as can be deduced, the Axis planned the massacre to be even bloodier, judging from the size of the force (1,500 alone were killed inside Israel, which is roughly equivalent to two battalions) and the quantity and quality of weapons they were carrying.

The groups seriously underestimated the intensity of Israel’s response, perhaps assuming the Jewish state’s internal divisions over the past year would blunt its response or even bought into their own propaganda regarding Israeli society’s fragility. And now the Axis of Resistance could stand to risk losing its Southern Front in the face of a determined Israeli onslaught.

Iran’s next steps would then depend on the importance it places on preserving its Gaza-based proxies and military investment in the coastal enclave, particularly if alternatives to ordering Hezbollah to directly enter the fray—like igniting fighting between Palestinian factions and the IDF in the West Bank or stoking Jewish-Arab tensions into violence inside Israel—fail to achieve their desired results. Non-intervention could risk not only the Southern Front’s demise, but also damage Iran’s credibility on the Palestinian question. On the other hand, ordering Hezbollah to intervene puts the brightest star in Tehran’s constellation of regional forces—and its most loyal extension—at risk of direct harm from Israeli military retaliation, not to mention postbellum Lebanese ire. And of all of this would be to save its militarily inferior proxies whose loyalty to the Iranian regime is relatively more questionable.

David Daoud is the director of Israel, Lebanon, and Syria Research at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The post Israel misread Iran’s way of war. A proper understanding could help predict Hezbollah’s next moves. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On that very day, Iranian officials took turns declaring open support for the attacks on Israel. Tehran’s Valiasr Square, used for years for in-your-face propaganda posters by the regime, soon featured a fading flag of Israel, supposedly representing the coming destruction of the Jewish State. But before long, on October 10, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denied having had a direct operational role.

Ordinary Iranians are raised with this anti-Israel and antisemitic content, which fills television and radio broadcasts and even school textbooks. Yet, anyone familiar with Iranian society knows that anti-Israel attitudes have mostly failed to go beyond the most vociferous supporters of the regime despite years of attempted indoctrination.

On October 8, the day after the attacks, as Tehran’s Persepolis FC faced Gol Gohar in the city’s iconic Azadi soccer stadium, some pro-government figures tried to raise the Palestinian flag from the stands. The backlash they faced was immediate. Thousands of fans started shouting a slogan formulated in the rowdy and rude tone of soccer fans everywhere: “Shove the Palestinian flag up your a–.”

Many notable Iranians joined in condemning Hamas’s attacks. Taking to X, formerly known as Twitter, human rights activist Atena Daemi wrote: “We see videos of attacks on Israel and massacre and hostage-taking of civilians by the grouplet Hamas, and this has added to our pains.”

Daemi was quick to add that the crimes of Hamas should not be attributed to the Palestinian people as a whole.

Sadegh Zibakalam, a political scientist at Tehran University and one of the country’s best-known public intellectuals, criticized Tehran’s backing of the attacks. Writing on X, Zibakalam said: “Officials of Iran, including MPs, are offering open and clear support for the attacks of Hamas. I wish the authorities who are showing such official support for the attacks could explain to the Iranian people: How will these attacks help the national interests of the Iranian people?”

Having been an Islamist political prisoner under the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Zibakalam is among the founding generation of the Islamic Republic. However, he has gone on to severely criticize its foreign policy, particularly Tehran’s anti-Israel and antisemitic policies that he sees as harmful to national interests. He has gone out of his way to make this point. In 2016, when invited to a debate at a university in Mashhad, he held on to the sidebars of a stairwell to avoid walking over the flags of Israel and the United States, which had been painted on the ground to be walked over as an insult. When pro-regime media attacked him, Zibakalam doubled down and quipped: “To trample upon and to burn the flag of any country is wrong.”

He again showed his moral consistency in his response to the attacks. Taking to X, Zibakalam wrote: “Cutting water, electricity, medicine, food, fuel, and primary aid to 2,200,000 residents of Gaza is as inhumane, immoral, and condemnable as Hamas’s massacring of Israeli youth who were taking part in a concert.”

Daemi and Zibakalam, like soccer fans, live in Iran and show tremendous courage by taking such positions. Positions deemed friendly to Israel can lead to severe retaliation by the regime.

This is not to suggest that there is homogenous support for Israel among Iranians. Mohammad Khatami, a former reformist president of the Islamic Republic, praised the Hamas attacks as “a great achievement for the people of Palestine.”

The diaspora response

Not only is there minimal sympathy for Hamas among the Iranian diaspora, but many openly back Israel. Whatever their differences, opposition figures such as former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, women’s rights activist and journalist Masih Alinejad, and former spokesman for the families of PS752 Hamed Esmaeilion, have all unequivocally condemned the attacks by Hamas, with Esmaeilion also criticizing Israel’s killing of civilians.

In a show on October 10, popular comedian Max Amini departed from his usual repertoire of jokes by offering a monologue on peace and co-existence. He harshly condemned Hamas’s attacks and linked them to the Islamic Republic’s support. Some Iranian protesters also joined their Israeli counterparts in anti-Hamas demonstrations in Paris, London, and Toronto.  

While many left-wing groups in the region and beyond are severely anti-Israel, the Iranian left is mostly an exception. In response to recent events, Hamid Taqvaee, leader of the Worker-Communist Party of Iran—the most organized Marxist group in the diaspora—criticized the Israeli government but harshly attacked Hamas. Like almost all its fellow left-wing Iranian groups, his party is for a two-state solution.

Similar to elsewhere in the world, the Iranian intellectual and media class includes many harsh anti-Israel voices. But even the internal politics of academia shows how markedly different Iranians are from many of their counterparts. Iranian student associations inside the country have often published statements condemning Hamas, putting themselves at heavy risk. This shows itself in the Western academe, too. While the Middle Eastern Studies Association of North America has adopted a policy of boycotting Israel, the Association of Iranian Studies, which includes thousands of Iran-focused scholars around the world, usually takes much more balanced positions on the Israel-Palestinian conflict and condemns Hamas’s targeting of civilians.

In its last conference in Salamanca in August 2022, a top book award went to Liora Hendelman, an Israeli historian and the director of the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University.

Why is there solidarity?

On the societal level, there are dozens of Iranian and Israeli fraternization examples. Iranian and Israeli filmmakers conduct joint projects while Iranian athletes have repeatedly stood up to the regime’s ban on competing with their Israeli counterparts, often paying a heavy price. This past August, weightlifter Mostafa Rajayi was banned for life because he had shaken hands and taken a picture with an Israeli athlete he competed against in Poland.

 In June, Mehdi Mousavi, a prominent Iranian progressive poet living in exile, went on a tour in Israel, which was warmly hosted by the Israeli literary community. As the ongoing anti-regime protests shook the clerical establishment last year, many Israelis have come to show support by staging demonstrations and organizing an art show in Jerusalem.

What explains this warm relationship? Firstly, Iranians oppose the Islamic Republic’s destructive policy against Israel, just like they oppose its other interventionist goals. They are asking a basic question: why waste Iranian resources on terror groups in the region, which has also resulted in more international isolation for Iran with severe consequences for Iranian livelihoods? In many protests during the past decades, Iranian workers, pensioners, and students have been chanting, “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I give my life for Iran” and “Leave Syria, do something for us.”

Second, unlike the Arab world, Iran has no history of widespread antagonism to Israel. Before 1979, Tehran and Tel Aviv held close relations (while the Shah also cultivated ties with Arabs and vociferously condemned the occupation of Palestinian territories by Israel). Tens of thousands of Israelis are of Iranian descent, with some Iranian-Israelis being prominent figures in the Iranian diaspora, such as Tehran-born singer Rita, who is widely loved for her covers of popular Persian ballads, and Liraz Charhi, known widely for her racy music videos and her star role in the Israeli television series, Tehran (she also happens to be Rita’s niece).

At least one Iranian-Israeli is reportedly among those Hamas took hostage: Rumi, a twenty-three-year-old girl named after the famed Persian poet of the thirteenth century. Her grandmother spoke to Iran International about her plight, pleading for her in fluent Persian, spoken by many in Israel.

In the coming weeks, the threat of a direct confrontation between Israel and the Islamic Republic will no doubt cast a shadow over the region. Those who want to work hard to avoid it should remind the world of the enduring ties between the two nations. Most Iranians do not share the murderous anti-Israel obsessions of Supreme Leader Khamenei and his acolytes.

Dr. Arash Azizi is a senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University. His new book, What Iranians Want: Women, Life, Freedom, will be published in January 2024. Follow him on X: @arash_tehran.

The post What do Iranians think of Israel? Their views might surprise you appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On September 19, Saudi league Al Nassr—which signed Ronaldo in December 2022 for an estimated $220 million contract—won 2-0 against Iranian club Persepolis in the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Champions League. The match was played inside an empty Azadi Stadium due to a ban by the AFC regarding an offensive social media post by Persepolis. In 2021, the Iranian club cited Nader Shah of Persia’s invasion of India in the eighteenth century to encourage their team prior to a match against Indian club Goa.

Although the stadium Ronaldo played in was quiet and empty, nothing about Ronaldo’s first trip to Iran was silent.

Upon arrival to the capital, Tehran, on September 18, large crowds of fans chased Al Nassr’s bus to try and get a glimpse of Ronaldo. If these chaotic scenes were not enough evidence of his popularity, the bus driver reportedly gained 150,000 followers on social media just a few hours after Ronaldo’s arrival. Furthermore, the soccer star’s Instagram page was filled with comments from Iranians who used circumvention tools to access the blocked photo-sharing application.

When the bus finally arrived at the hotel, the scenes were even more spectacular, as fans were seen climbing hills where the hotel was located to see Ronaldo. Social media jokingly claimed that his fans took over the Espinas International Hotel, where Al Nassr was staying at, by chanting his name for hours in the lobby. These scenes were so massive that Al Nassr was forced to cancel their practice due to the huge crowds. The hotel later unveiled in their lobby a wax statue of the soccer star in his memory.

However, the timing of the match is what stood out the most, as it took place two days after the one-year anniversary of twenty-two-year-old Mahsa Jina Amini’s death in custody. Her murder prompted ongoing anti-establishment protests against the Islamic Republic.

The significance of Ronaldo’s visit

As recent as a few months ago, a match between a Saudi and Iranian soccer club would have had to be played in a neutral site. This was because Saudi Arabia had severed diplomatic ties with Iran in 2016 after hardliners stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran and the consulate in Mashhad over the execution of Saudi Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. After seven years, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to resume diplomatic ties in a deal brokered by China in March. In early September, the countries exchanged ambassadors, cementing the restoration of relations.

All of this paved the way for the country’s soccer federations to agree to resume games against each other in their respective nations. While Ronaldo’s first visit to Iran was historic for many reasons, the Al Nassr versus Persepolis match was the first played between these two countries in a non-neutral site since ties ended.

Apart from the large crowds gathering to see Ronaldo, his historic visit to Tehran contained many wholesome storylines that depicted the joyful mood his visit elicited, as visits from high-profile soccer players are rare.

Upon arrival, Persepolis greeted Ronaldo and gifted him a traditional Persian rug. The soccer champion was also greeted by large banners across the city that had his face plastered on them. Ronaldo used his time to meet with a disabled painter who used her foot to create paintings of him. One video of a crying young fan went viral, prompting Al Nassr to fulfill the young boy’s dream to meet with Ronaldo and get his signed jersey.

Nevertheless, while Ronaldo’s visit may have brought joy to many Iranians, the timing was sensitive, given the ongoing anniversary protests. It’s worth noting that professional Iranian soccer player, Amir Nasr-Azadani of the Tractor team, and former player, Voria Ghafouri of the Iranian national team, better known as Team Melli, were both arrested in November 2022 for supporting these demonstrations. Amidst such controversies, FIFA President Gianni Infantino made headlines on September 20 when he met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in New York on the sidelines of the annual United Nations General Assembly. Infantino even praised “progress [Iran had] made” despite women continuing to be mostly banned from attending soccer stadiums and the announcement of parliament passing a “chastity and hijab bill” that would, among other things, hand up to ten-year sentences to women “violating” mandatory hijab rules.

Who is coming next to the region?

Fans from across the Middle East and Asia who grew up idolizing soccer stars like Cristiano Ronaldo could have only dreamt of seeing their heroes visit their cities. Thanks to the Saudi Pro League and the Asian Champions League Cup, these fans now have a chance to witness some of soccer’s biggest names in the flesh. However, like Iran, Saudi Arabia is also experiencing a fraught time regarding human rights concerns from the international community. Similarly, Riyadh faces accusations of sportswashing by signing soccer greats as part of their recent transformation of the Saudi Pro League.

Ronaldo is just one of many soccer stars who play for Saudi Arabia and are scheduled to play in Iran. Karim Benzema, the French Ballon d’Or winner who plays for Saudi’s Al-Ittihad, and  Neymar da Silva Santos Júnior (better known by his first name Neymar), the all-time leading men’s Brazilian goal scorer who plays for Saudi’s Al Hilal, will feature in Iran in October. In addition to Iran, these soccer stars are going to other countries they have never played in before, with Benzema heading to Iraq and Neymar to India. These players are expected to receive massive receptions in all countries, as their populations have historically only seen these prominent stars play in Europe.

From Europe’s most prominent venues to major cities in the Middle East and Asia, the newest stars of the Saudi Pro League will continue to bring joy and excitement to countless young and old fans. While soccer has the power to inspire fans from all over the world, for some—but particularly those in Iran—it serves as a temporary reprieve from the harsh realities faced on the ground.

Hezha Barzani is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative. Follow him on X: @HezhaFB.

The post Ronaldo’s visit to Iran was a temporary reprieve from the realities on the ground appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

Just days before the first anniversary of Mahsa Jina Amini’s death and the massive protests it sparked in Iran, the US House of Representatives passed the Mahsa Amini Human Rights and Security Accountability Act (the “MAHSA Act” or bill), a bipartisan measure which received a nearly unanimous vote. The MAHSA Act—which focuses on targeted sanctions—will have to be approved by the Senate and signed by the president to become law.

Background

On January 27, Representative Jim Banks (R-IN) introduced the MAHSA Act to the House with eighteen cosponsors. The bill has since received broad bipartisan support and currently has 128 cosponsors: sixty-eight Republicans and sixty Democrats. In short, the proposed bill sought to heighten the president’s obligations around targeted sanctions. It required that he review certain categories of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) officials and entities and pursue sanctions designations where applicable.

The House sent the bill to the Committee on Foreign Affairs (HFAC), Judiciary Committee, Financial Services Committee, and Committee on Ways and Means upon its introduction, and the HFAC produced an amended version on June 22. On July 27, Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Alex Padilla (D-CA) introduced a revised version of the bill to the Senate, which in turn referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations (SFRC).

The MAHSA Act was one of several bills introduced in the months following Amini’s suspicious death in custody in mid-September 2022 and the subsequent anti-establishment protests that followed, which were met with state-sponsored repression. Other bills included the Support for Iranian Political Prisoners Act (passed into law on December 23, 2022), the Masih Alinejad HUNT Act of 2022 (which was initially introduced in 2021 and re-introduced and adopted in 2023), the PUNISH Act of 2022, the SEVER Act of 2022, the INFO Act of 2022, and the REGIME Act of 2022.

What the MAHSA Act seeks to do

The text introduced to the Senate, and the revised text produced by the HFAC are substantively the same, though the former omits a list of factual findings that provides context for the bill’s introduction. All language quoted in this section is identical in these two versions.

First, both versions require that within ninety days of the bill’s passing, and annually after that, the president must review a list of legal persons (i.e., individuals and entities) associated with the IRI to determine whether they meet the criteria for targeted sanctions under a list of applicable authorities.

The applicable sanctions authorities are:

• Section 105(c) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“Section 105(c)”)
• Executive Order 13553 relating to blocking property of certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Islamic Republic (“EO 13553”)
• Executive Order 13224 relating to blocking property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit or support terrorism (“EO 13224”)
• Executive Order 13818 relating to blocking the property of persons involved in serious human rights abuse or corruption (“EO 13818”)
• Executive Order 13876 relating to imposing sanctions with respect to Iran (“EO 13876”)
• Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (“Section 7031(c)”)

With these authorities in mind, the president must then review the following:

• (1) The Supreme Leader of Iran and any official in the Office of the Supreme Leader (OSL).
• (2) The president of Iran and any official in the Office of the President of Iran (OPI) or the President’s cabinet, “including cabinet ministers and executive vice presidents.”
• (3) Any entity that the OSL oversees and that is “complicit in financing or resourcing of human rights abuses or support for terrorism.”
• (4) Any official of an entity owned or controlled by the Supreme Leader or the OSL.
• (5) “Any person determined by the President” to be one of the following:
  • Appointed by the Supreme Leader, OSL, the president of Iran, or the OPI “to a position as a state official of Iran, or as the head of any entity located in Iran or any entity located outside of Iran that is owned or controlled by one or more entities in Iran.”
  • “[M]aterially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of,” any person or entity sanctioned under Section 105(c), EOs 13553, 13224, 13818, or 13876.
  • “[O]wned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly,” any person or entity sanctioned under Section 105(c), EOs 13553, 13224, 13818, or 13876.
  • “[A] member of the board of directors or a senior executive officer” of any entity sanctioned under Section 105(c), EOs 13553, 13224, 13818, or 13876.

Upon the president’s review, should any of the people or entities in the list meet the requirements under Section 105(c) or Section 7031(c), the president must “impose sanctions,” and should any of the individuals meet the requirements under the Executive Orders, the president must “pursue applicable sanctions.” This suggests that the president can directly impose designations under Section 105(c) and Section 7031(c), but must work with the relevant officials listed in the EOs to request their action. Further, for the fifth category of people and entities, a chairman or ranking member of the SFRC or HFAC can request that the president determine within sixty days whether a specific person or entity meets the criteria and whether the president intends to impose sanctions under any applicable authorities.

Finally, the president must submit an unclassified report to the SFRC and the HFAC. This must include a list of all the people and entities under the five categories who meet the criteria for sanctions under at least one of the sanctions authorities, which authorities apply to each actor, and under which authorities sanctions have been or will be imposed within thirty days of the report. As part of the report, if a person or entity meets the criteria for sanctions, but they will not be imposed, the president must lay out (if necessary, in a separate classified annex) “a complete justification of the decision to waive or otherwise not apply the sanctions.”

Why the MAHSA Act is significant

Logistically, the MAHSA Act shifts responsibility for sanctions determinations. Section 105(c), like the MAHSA Act, makes the president responsible for developing a list of perpetrators for Congress. However, the EOs task the secretary of the treasury, the secretary of state, and (for some) the attorney general to make determinations, and Section 7031(c) tasks the secretary of state with making the determinations.

Substantively, the MAHSA Act—if fully implemented as currently written—demands that more officials be reviewed. Like the MAHSA Act, Section 105(c) requires the president to submit to certain congressional committees a list of IRI government officials or persons acting on their behalf whom the president has determined based on credible evidence “are responsible for or complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses” against Iranians and their families since June 12, 2009 (regardless of where such abuses took place). He also must impose targeted sanctions on these individuals or entities. However, the requirement to submit a list of persons under Section 105(c) is significantly narrower than the one under the MAHSA Act. It does not require that the president review each actor within the broader categories nor that the president sanction or pursue sanctions on all who qualify (or submit a basis for declining to do so).

The MAHSA Act is also more comprehensive. For example, several categories of perpetrators are not covered by Section 105(c) that are covered by the other four authorities listed above. However, unlike Section 105(c), these other five authorities do not require reviews of all actors falling under certain categories, except EO 13876, which mandates sanctions on the Supreme Leader and the OSL. This means that there may be actors who meet the criteria for designation under Section 7031(c) or EOs 13553, 13224, 13818, or 13876, and who would fall under the five categories provided in the MAHSA Act, whom the US government has not yet reviewed. Specifically, Section 105(c) does not cover acts of corruption (which are included in EO 13818 and Section 7031(c)), acts of terrorism (which are included in EO 13224), designations of entities (which are included in all four EOs), and modes of liability such as materially assisting, sponsoring, or providing support (which are included in all four EOs).

Given the confidential nature of the US government’s review of potential targeted sanctions designations, it cannot publicly be known whether the MAHSA Act will, in fact, result in the review of more actors and the issuance of more designations. It is possible that all people and entities under all five categories of people have been thoroughly examined, and all possible targeted sanctions have been issued. However, by mandating the annual review and requiring an explanation for any decision not to designate an actor who meets the relevant criteria, the MAHSA Act may increase designations and will offer a guarantee that the US is taking these actions.

How civil society successfully lobbied for the MAHSA Act

The Iranian-American community has historically exercised little lobbying power in support of human rights. The effort to pass the MAHSA Act set a new precedent for how grassroots advocacy can propel the community to have their voices heard on Capitol Hill.

The MAHSA Act was not initially introduced in a firmly bipartisan manner—the representative who introduced it and fifteen of the eighteen initial listed co-sponsors were Republican lawmakers. Iranian-Americans sought to address that by calling and emailing their representatives in Democratic districts, with the warning that they would not vote for them next term if they did not support the MAHSA Act. The community organized rallies in Congressional districts where a representative was reluctant to sign on and demanded answers in person and over social media. This even spawned the creation of an active online group self-styled as the “Mahsa Act army” with a viral #MahsaAct hashtag used on both X, formerly known as Twitter, and Instagram since the introduction of the bill. Daily posts with call sheets for Congressional offices and a reminder to call along with motivational mantras powered this legislation into passage.

This public mobilization effort can serve as a blueprint for further advocacy in the coming months, including in support of the passage of a crimes against humanity bill that would provide additional prosecutorial tools against Iranian officials responsible for atrocity crimes.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Gissou Nia is the director of the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

The post The House passed the MAHSA Act. Now what? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Based on her work, Ebadi founded two non-governmental organizations: the Society for Protecting the Rights of the Child in 1994 and the Defenders of Human Rights Center in 2001. Ebadi is a published author with numerous books and, in 2003, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—the first woman in the Muslim world. Since then, she has continued her work with various international and domestic human rights groups and efforts and is currently involved with the Women, Life, Freedom movement. Earlier this year, Ebadi was one of the eight prominent Iranian opposition figures part of what became known as the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) before the coalition dissolved.

Our IranSource editor, Holly Dagres, had the pleasure of sitting down with the Nobel laureate on September 14 to discuss the ongoing protests in Iran, the AFDI, and where she thinks the country is heading.

IRANSOURCE: It’s been one year since Mahsa Jina Amini’s murder at the hands of the so-called morality police, which prompted the ongoing anti-establishment protests. Where do you think these protests are going? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: The murder of Mahsa Amini was like striking a match on dynamite. In over one hundred cities, demonstrations started, and they still continue. So, from my perspective, this is a revolution. This is a process. What I mean is that it takes time.

Look at it like a train. A train will get to its last station one day, but there are many stations that the train will stop at to let passengers out, let them in, or for many other reasons. I know that the last station is the toppling of the regime, and I know that we will get there, but I do not know when we will get there. 

IRANSOURCE: You lived through the 1979 revolution. When you look at the current ongoing protests which are, in your words and the protestors’ words, a “revolution,” what are some lessons? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: Fortunately, there are no commonalities there. In 1979 we had a leader—one leader. And, unfortunately, the culture in that area is such that the leader then becomes a dictator. In order to avoid dictatorship, people are now working in different groups. And there are different leaders in different groups. And if there is a democratic election, people will elect leaders who are working in these groups. The 1979 revolution was a religious revolution, but, here, what people want is a secular democratic government.

IRANSOURCE: We’re here in Washington, and there’s a lot of skepticism about the protests and whether they will lead to any meaningful change. Why do you think that is?

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: Because [the West] looks at it from a short-term point of view. They think that if people take to the streets, in six months, things will change. That’s not true. It takes time. Revolutions take time. 

IRANSOURCE: How can the international community help Iran’s protestors? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: The international community, meaning nongovernmental organizations and the media, can play a huge role. That is bringing the voice of the people of Iran to the world. 

IRANSOURCE: I’ve heard you mention the Islamic Republic is a gender apartheid regime. Can you unpack what that means?

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: Apartheid is a term that is used in international law, and it has been used for the situation in South Africa. At that time, it was mostly racial, meaning the government, which was a white government, did not count Black people and their rights were not recognized. They killed them and did not recognize any rights for them, and the result they had in mind—or their goal—was to cleanse them so that no one else would revolt.

Now, I think we are dealing with gender apartheid. There are now groups and governments who do not recognize the identity of women. I’m not saying they will hold a gun and kill women directly, but what I’m trying to say is that they separate women to the extent that it calls for their annihilation.

In the laws of the Islamic Republic, for example, it is written that the life of a woman is worth half of the life of a man or that the testimony of two women equals the testimony of one man. This means that they do not recognize women as complete human beings. Or, when laws take away rights from women, what they are doing is not recognizing the humanity and identity of a woman. Therefore, there are no differences between what I’m saying right now and the experiences of people of color in South Africa. I do not think there is a difference. If the expression of apartheid is used in racial issues, why should it not be used in gender issues?

I hope that one day, when I look at the situation of women in the world, I see that gender apartheid has become a crime against humanity. In many countries, there are different campaigns. I hope that they get together and coordinate their efforts so that they can work better on gender apartheid. 

IRANSOURCE: We now know the news of the hostage deal between Tehran and Washington. What are your thoughts on that?

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: The fact that $6 billion was released in exchange for hostages… I think it is wrong diplomacy and results in taking more hostages. Whenever the Islamic Republic wants something, it will throw a few innocent people in prison.

I cannot believe why the Joe Biden administration does not want to accept this fact. They do say that the two issues have nothing to do with each other, but we all know what the story is. The Islamic Republic has been able to take hostages from the beginning of its formation and ask for its demands to be met.

IRANSOURCE: So how should the international community respond to the Islamic Republic? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: The international community should not strengthen the government through transactions with the Islamic Republic. Unfortunately, the US government talks about human rights, but, when they are signing a financial agreement, what they forget about are human rights. 

IRANSOURCE: Let’s talk about the Iranian opposition coalition: the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran. Why did the group not succeed?  

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: I think that we talked about the coalition too early. We should have been better organized before we talked about it. I want to talk about why it is that Iranians do not unite. Among the opposition, of course, there are a lot of differences, but there are two important issues. One is for a monarchy and the other is for a republic. And the other issue is the difference between extreme nationalists and extreme ethnic groups. If we can resolve these two issues, then we can unite people and topple the regime.

The coalition was based on partners that tried to resolve these issues. The charter was based on resolving these two issues. So, on one hand, we have [former Crown Prince] Reza Pahlavi, who was the representative of the monarchy, and three other people who were for a republic. There was a big change when they signed a specific statement that they agreed together [the Mahsa Charter]. Also, the nationalists were represented by Reza Pahlavi and Abdullah Mohtadi, who is the chair of the Komala Party [of Iranian Kurdistan]. They came together.

The [Mahsa Charter] was the minimum that each could accept. I think that it was a very good agreement. Some groups were against it. I could name the extremists on all sides: the monarchists, republicans, other groups, and the leftists. There were some who had influence and infiltrated from the Islamic Republic and through its cyber army. They all participated in increasing the level of differences.

On the other hand, as I said earlier, we were not organized, and we should not have talked about the coalition that early. So, all of these together resulted in the extremists. I still think the charter that I signed, the Mahsa Charter, was a good one. I’m glad that I signed it. 

IRANSOURCE: You mentioned some lessons from your coalition experience. Are there any other ones that you’ve come across since you parted ways? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: I say for the second time, many times, that if we do not get together—if we do not unite—we will not be able to topple the Islamic Republic. 

IRANSOURCE: For the first time ever, we are seeing the diaspora unite against the Islamic Republic. Why is that? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: Yes, that’s true. They may be against the Islamic Republic but if they keep silent or just wish for the toppling of the regime—or even if they take to the streets and demonstrate—that is not going to get us anywhere. We need to work together.

In order to do that, we need to unite together. We will unite one day. Everyone thinks that this has to happen.

Once we have toppled the regime, we are going to elect the government and, through the ballot, we can decide who we want. This is what the people of Iran—the ones who are in Iran—want. People in Iran have different opinions too, but they are working together against the government. The diaspora should learn from the people inside of Iran. 

IRANSOURCE: Tell us more about your latest Iran-related projects? 

DR. SHIRIN EBADI: The most important issue that Iran has at this time is access to information and the Internet. Not only do [authorities] filter information, but if there are protests going on, they are going to shut down the Internet. So, one of the things that I do is work in this regard.

My other activity is teaching rights online, meaning the rights that people have and that the government is taking away from them. There are four languages spoken in Iran: Arabic, Baluchi, Kurdish, and Turkish. Many people think, “Why is it that attention is not paid to their languages?”

We were talking about unity before. In order to unite, we have to bring ethnic groups together so that we can work together. So, what I do is—maybe I’m the first one to do this—on top of Persian, which is the official language in Iran, I write and publish in these four languages. Our educational books are, in reality, published in five languages so that the person who is in Sistan and Baluchistan province does not come up with the idea that he or she has not been seen or that a Kurdish person does not think that we are disrespecting that person. It is one country and Iran belongs to all of us, and we have to prove that. This is one step in order to reach that.

For example, look at this defendant’s rights manual (points to a PDF on her cell phone). What I mean by the defendant’s rights is that if the police arrest you, you know what to do in the Baluchi language.

These books can be very useful for some of these ethnic people that live very far distances from the capital or main cities because some of them do not even speak Persian. I have also done podcasts for them, and I hope that we will be able to send them some less expensive mobiles so that they can listen to them.*

*Mobile phones are more prevalent than computers in some parts of the country.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

The post Nobel laureate Shirin Ebadi: ‘If we don’t unite—we won’t be able to topple the Islamic Republic’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Here are three open letters from women in Iran who have risked arrest, torture, and even jail to share their vision of a better future for their motherland. Their first names have been changed out of consideration for their safety.

From the day Jina was killed, the Kurdish city of Saqqez [her hometown in northwestern Iran] was brimming with rage. The city was blanketed with the smell of fire and blood, but hope was also galloping among us. A year has passed since those days—a year in which we shed tears of blood over the killing of our people and died with each of them.

I was among the sea of protesters the day my people marked the fortieth day since Jina’s passing—a day that I will never forget; a day I felt freedom closest to home; a day when security forces blocked the roads on our land but were waved aside with the glory of unity. I expect a day as glorious as that on the anniversary of Jina’s killing, but this time everywhere in Iran.

Only a few days are left until the anniversary—a day we chanted “Woman, Life, Freedom”; a day that I vowed to be a daughter of Jina’s revolution.

To me, Jina’s anniversary is a day of hope—a day when I can tell myself, “the suffering will be over soon.”

I won’t forget the days when everything was painted in colors of revolution; when headscarves were burning in bonfires; when walls of the city were scribbled with slogans; when the rage that we had swallowed for years turned into chants of Woman, Life, Freedom from every corner of Iran; and, yes, when families waited outside regime jails—a pain that continues until this day.

But we are no longer afraid. It is them [the regime] who are afraid—fearful of Jina’s anniversary, of us, and of the faithful day of liberty. They know well that there will be no turning back. There will be no way to undo the changes sowed. We will not forget our martyred youth, our friends who still breathe, and the suffering of our people.

The regime is afraid of the spark of hope we have preserved in our chests. And, yes, as a Kurdish woman, I have not lost hope despite all the distress I have suffered and all the loved ones I have lost. We will never put back on the headscarves we burnt. We will keep fighting for all the dreams they took from us.

—Hataw, twenty-one-year-old, a Kurdish woman from northwestern Kurdistan province

A clear memory from my early childhood is watching the news about the suppression of the 2009 [post-election protests known as the] Green Movement on satellite television. Last year, I was on the streets participating in the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, experiencing the crackdown firsthand and feeling the pain of oppression in my bones.

I participated in the protests, hoping that, after the Islamic Republic’s fall, I would no longer have to risk arrest and torture and fear for my life just for being a trans activist.

I participated in the protests to end the economy’s collapse, so I would no longer struggle to make ends meet. I participated in the protests, dreaming of a tomorrow where I could freely fight for my rights and the rights of my people.

But we faced a violent crackdown, and now we are being suffocated by regime oppression, economic collapse, and cultural strife, including rampant queerphobia.

I am writing this to you while most online censorship circumvention tools (VPNs) have been rendered useless thanks to a regime crackdown. On multiple occasions over the past year, we have even faced total internet shutdowns, which is all part of the Islamic Republic’s strategy to cut access to the Internet.

Over the past years, whenever street protests have surged, the regime has imposed total internet shutdowns, cutting all links between people within Iran’s borders and the outside world. Internet shutdowns deprive the people of the right to tell the story of their lives under the Islamic Republic’s oppression and document the extent of regime suppression.

Marginalized people like me—including women, transgender people, religious minorities especially followers of the Baha’i faith, disabled members of the LGBTQI community, oppressed ethnic groups, dissidents, and environmental activists—are affected even worse by Internet shutdowns when compared to the rest of the society, since online spaces are the last pockets of freedom that we have access to—pockets of freedom where we can express ourselves and participate in political and social discourse.

Following the protests, the Islamic Republic has imposed absolute political repression. It has jailed all critics, protestors, and dissidents, keeping them in conditions in stark violation of basic human rights.

Over the past year alone, many people have died in regime detention due to inhumane prison conditions, dozens of children and teenagers have been killed in the streets, and hundreds of activists and journalists have been arrested and imprisoned multiple times.

At the same time, discriminatory policies are being implemented in the fields of gender, ecology, and economics, which cause serious and sometimes irreversible damage.

All of this shows how urgently voices from Iran need to be heard by the international community. Under the harshest conditions and facing violent suppression, people in Iran have not relented and are still fighting against the Islamic Republic. With eyes set on equality and liberty, we are preserving the flame of hope for a better future after the regime’s fall.

As a member of this community struggling with political suffocation and as a trans woman fighting against trans misogyny, I proclaim to the world that this regime is as illegitimate as any other totalitarian regime.

The people of Iran want to overthrow this regime. If you believe in freedom, equality, and human rights, remember that this regime stands against these values.

Any negotiation with the leaders of this regime is a negotiation with our murderers and jailers. Hear the voice of the Iranian people.

—Darya, twenty-five-year-old, a trans woman from southwest Fars province

I wasn’t much older than Mahsa Jina Amini when I was violently arrested by the morality police and threatened with rape by prison guards just because I wore a long skirt. I could easily imagine the same thing happening to me the day Jina was killed.

I, just like millions of others in Iran, have decided to stand for Woman, Life, Freedom.

It’s been almost a year since the first protest on Jina’s burial day on September 17. And we are still standing for what we believe are our innate rights.

The young population of Iran is not even close to what the state wants us to be: we are loud and fearless and demand equality, freedom, secularism, and democracy.

We leave our headscarves at home in closets where they belong. We dance on the streets. We kiss our partners in public. We enjoy each other’s company regardless of gender, sexual orientation, race, religion, and beliefs. And we cry and care for the ecosystem, which Mullahs are destroying every day.

During the protests, I was beaten up and arrested by police forces almost a year ago just because they didn’t like the way I looked at them. In detention, I witnessed what happens behind the closed doors of the regime’s prisons and how powerful and fearless my people are behind those doors.

I saw kids as young as twelve being tortured for singing “Baraye” (For the sake of)—a song by [Iran-based singer] Shervin Hajipour that has turned into the anthem of the protests—on the streets. I saw jailed women almost dying because they were denied medical care. But, even in those situations, they were dancing and singing “Bella Ciao” [the Italian anti-fascist song]—a hymn to our certain victory.

I strongly believe that the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic. We, the young population of Iran, have had a taste of a free and fair world. By no means are we going to stand back and surrender. We will be victorious.

—Dorsa, twenty-six-year-old, a woman from north-central Qom province

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

The post Letters from women protesters inside Iran: One year after #MahsaAmini’s death  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to official numbers, thus far, over five hundred people have been killed, including seventy children, while thousands have been severely injured, including those who have been blinded or otherwise disabled. Additionally, tens of thousands have been detained, tortured, or enforcedly disappeared. Since the beginning of the year, the Islamic Republic has employed various tactics, such as the deliberate poisoning of schoolgirls and an increased use of the death penalty, to instill terror in the entire nation.

The moment the protests kicked off, the people of Iran asked for action from other states, particularly Western democracies. Although infighting and disagreements are rife within the Iranian community, they have been united in their demands for the West to cut diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic.

What can the West do and continue to do in such a situation? From the perspective of those residing in Western democracies, the West has already fulfilled its role in addressing the aftermath of Amini’s death and the brutal crackdown on peaceful protests by imposing sanctions, travel bans, and freezing assets.

However, there are two further approaches the West can take short of military interference. The first is to take actions that incentivize a change of behavior. These would include, but are not limited to, human rights sanctions and United Nations (UN) mechanisms. The other, more impactful, approach would be to gradually delegitimize the oppressive government by cutting off diplomatic ties or boycotting them from political, sporting, and cultural events.

In the first few months of the protests, Iranians rejoiced over the fact that Western democracies were finally acknowledging their struggles. Germany pushed the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) to reactivate their policies of human rights sanctions involving travel bans and asset freezes against perpetrators. Canada and Australia adopted human rights sanctions for the first time and the United States extended its sanctions lists. The UN Human Rights Council held a special session; with Germany and Iceland’s initiative, a UN Fact Finding Mechanism was established to investigate human rights violations relating to the protests, with special regard to women and children.

In October 2022, the German government updated its policy on Iran, cutting all business, cultural, and educational ties with the Islamic Republic. This was a step towards delegitimizing the clerical establishment. In the same vein, the EU and US suspended nuclear talks and Iran was removed from the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW). However, after global media lost interest in Iran’s protests when regime suppression suffocated local outcry, Western governments had no incentive to act.

No other country emulated Germany’s trailblazing policy, and the West has since stopped progressing toward delegitimization. Calls to close Iran’s embassies abroad and designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization by the EU and UK have been left unanswered. Western countries, especially those whose nationals were taken hostage in Iran—such as Sweden and Belgium—were pressured by the Islamic government to maintain diplomatic relations.

News of the exchange of a former Iranian diplomat, Assadollah Assadi, with a Belgian aid worker, whom the IRGC intelligence arm had detained, was a blow to those who risked their lives for freedom. Assadollah Assadi was sentenced to twenty years by a Belgian court for plotting terrorism on European soil. Following that, there were secret talks between the United States and Iran, which resulted in an agreement to release five Americans held in Iran in exchange for the US releasing billions of dollars in frozen Iranian assets. The manipulation of the UN system by the Islamic Republic, leading to its appointment to leadership roles in UN human rights mechanisms, while the international community remained largely stunned, inflicted another severe blow on the protestors.

Thus, it can be concluded that the West’s actions have been neither sufficient nor effective in changing the regime’s behavior.

Despite the odds, Iranian women and girls continue to fight at the forefront of a battle for bodily autonomy and freedom of choice. These courageous women and girls defy oppressive rules, enduring humiliation, verbal and physical attacks, expulsion from educational institutions and workplaces, and exclusion from various public spaces. They are denied access to public services, such as transportation, and businesses serving women without hijab can be fined or forced into closing.

The next wave of protests is on the horizon and will erupt sooner or later. It is the international community’s responsibility to support Iran’s people in their struggle and to remove the tyrannical regime that has ruled for over four decades once and for all. The international community must cease treating the Islamic Republic as a normal state and acknowledge it for what it truly is: a gender apartheid regime that neither can nor should represent the people of Iran when it actively discriminates, segregates, and persecutes women. This recognition comes with responsibilities similar to those embraced during the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

The success of the Woman, Life, Freedom revolution relies on increasing the crackdown costs until the Islamic Republic’s grip on power falters, ultimately leading to its effective demise. Unlike what many think, the younger generation—Generation Z—who have been the leaders of this revolution are not asking for war or military interference. They only seek a total abandonment of all diplomatic ties with the Iranian government. Only through this approach will the West be able to gain the trust of the Iranian people and foster future relations in a democratic Iran. Meanwhile, it will serve as a deterrent against potential terrorist attacks on Western soil, considering the Islamic Republic’s well-documented propensity for such actions.

The people of Iran are ready. The ball is now in the court of the international community.

Shadi Sadr is a human rights lawyer and a member of the panel of judges at the International People’s Tribunals on Indonesia, Myanmar, and China. She co-founded and directed Justice for Iran, one of the organizers of the Iran Atrocities’ (Aban) Tribunal. Follow her on Twitter: @shadisadr.

The post If the West wants to support Iranian women, it must cut diplomatic ties with Tehran appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While some argue that the ongoing anti-establishment protests began in mid-September 2022 after the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in police custody—Iran’s Mohamed Bouazizi moment—the reality is that Iranians have been defying the regime en masse for years. This durable resistance signals why Iran cannot go back to the way it was.

Over its four-decade history, there have been many cracks in the nezam (system)—the 1999 student uprising and 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, for instance—but one of the most considerable fissures arguably began in December 2017. Ironically, the protests of that winter were ignited by hardliners in the northeastern city of Mashhad, who turned out in numbers to protest then-President Hassan Rouhani’s economic policies on December 28, 2017. This event coincided—just a day before—with the beginning of the “Girls of Revolution Street” movement, where women took off their mandatory hijab on Enghelab (Revolution) Street in the capital, Tehran.

Before long, the fire started by hardliners became one that could no longer be put out. The chant, “reformists, hardliners, the game is over,” became the battle cry of the December 2017-January 2018 protests—at the time, known as the largest in terms of geography since the 1979 revolution—and part of protests thereafter.

That moment penetrated the clerical establishment’s veneer of reform and permanently exposed it for what it was: an irredeemable regime that is systemically corrupt, mismanaged, and repressive.

While protests have become normalized since December 2017-January 2018—with students, teachers, truckers, and workers leading the way in strikes and demonstrations thereafter—one specific protest, the Aban Khoonin (Bloody Aban), or November 2019 protests, which was prompted by a fuel hike, ossified the views of the people of Iran.

Deliberately using an Internet shutdown as cover, security forces brutally killed 1,500 protesters, per Reuters reporting, which shook many Iranians to their core. It’s in this atmosphere that Iranian Generation Z came of age, as teenagers saw what the Islamic Republic was capable of, including killing at least twenty-three of their own under the age of eighteen.

Other events have also contributed to the inability of Iranians to trust their government. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) shootdown of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 (PS752) on January 8, 2020, which killed all 176 on board, was especially damaging to the little credibility the clerical establishment had left. It would take several days—only with the pressure of the international community, specifically Canada—for authorities to admit some role in the downing of PS752. They would later harass, intimidate, and even mix the remains of victims and use their bodies for propaganda purposes. To this day, no high-ranking authority has been held responsible for shooting down the passenger airliner during heightened tensions with the United States.

That very year, the coronavirus pandemic would hit the world and Iran would have the highest number of deaths and cases in the Middle East. In January 2021, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei banned US and UK vaccines from entering the country. The embargo prompted the viral hashtag #SOSIran, as many Iranians begged the international community to pay attention to the dire situation and help end the prohibition of vaccines.

Then there was the engineering of the 2020 parliamentary election and 2021 presidential election to hand hardliners a win as part of Khamenei’s Islamic Revolution 2.0, in which he envisions a country led by the pious and relatively young post-mortem. Additionally, a long list of unmet complaints also prompted Iranians to lose faith—as evident by the 2021 election having the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history—in what was always an election determined by a vetting body: the Guardian Council. This is coupled with Iranians who have been able to watch in real-time—albeit with hurdles due to online censorship—the hypocrisy and double standards of the upper echelons of the clerical establishment; they live in wealth, travel, and even send their children to live or study in the West—a place they so vocally proclaim to despise.

Other events and incidents have been permanently etched in the minds of Iranians, including the 2020 attempted execution of protesters that was put on hold after a national outcry, followed by the secret execution of wrestler Navid Afkari. Similarly, the May 2022 collapse of the Metropol complex in southwestern Khuzestan province and other incidents, including most recently in south Tehran in August, were both prompted by mismanagement and corruption. Those systemic symptoms have also contributed to the dire water crisis and the death of a critically endangered Asiatic Cheetah cub born in captivity, which had become the country’s hope at a dark time.

As time passes, the list of grievances against the clerical establishment grows. Over 537 people have been killed by security forces and more than twenty-two thousand arrested since mid-September 2022 (though human rights groups believe that number to be much higher). The killing of at least seventy children, which includes the disappearing of bodies and cover-ups like that of sixteen-year-old Nika Shakarami, has raised the ire of Iranians and Westerners alike. This is coupled with the stories of rape and torture and the rise in executions in the past year, including those of protesters, such as national karate champion Mohammad Mehdi Karimi. Now, with the anniversary coming up, the stories of the detention and intimidation of activists and the families of slain protesters make rounds on group chats and social media, including, most recently, the arrest of Agha Mashallah, the father of Mohammad Mehdi, and the arrest of singer Mehdi Yarrahi for his viral anti-mandatory hijab song, “Roosarito” (Your headscarf).

While some maintain skepticism by pointing to the small numbers in the streets, the vigor of protests shouldn’t be based solely on how many individuals gather in a public space. Every day, Iranian women protest by not abiding by mandatory hijab despite the threat of arrest, having their vehicle confiscated, losing their jobs, and even the possibility of washing corpses in a morgue as a punishment. Iranian Gen Z participates in civil disobedience by expressing themselves in the most ordinary ways. Anti-regime graffiti, such as “Iran is drowning in revolution,” is scrawled on the walls of various cities and towns, and chants of “Khamenei is a murderer, his guardianship is invalid” are heard from rooftops and windows. In parts of the country dominated by neglected ethnic minorities, such as Sistan and Baluchistan province, protests continue every Friday after prayer.

Historian Ali Ansari told me that the ongoing protests are in a “pre-revolutionary phase,” meaning “within a phase when revolution becomes possible.” He notes that the country “now faces a perfect storm of crises: political, economic, and ecological, reinforced by international misjudgments—such as its siding with Russia—with an ideological inability to react in ways that might ameliorate the situation.” This does not discount the fact that protesters already see this as their revolution. Additionally, what separates these protests from previous ones is their continuity since Amini’s death. Never have protests taken place day in and day out.

In essence, this ongoing anti-establishment protest movement calling for the downfall of the clerical establishment was the regime’s own making: the Islamic Republic hoped to retain its grip on power by sowing seeds of fear, but now it’s blooming tulips of change. While the embers of this uprising burn below the surface, it’s only a matter of time before another major event prompted by the incompetence or repressive nature of the Islamic Republic pushes large amounts of people into the streets. It is inevitable.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

The post Iran will never go back to the way it was appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The ongoing protests inspired workers to strike and were only damped by severe repression, with hundreds of protestors killed and thousands arrested.

Today, the regime and protestors are in a struggle for the soul of the nation. The regime depicts the protestors as dangerous and treacherous rioters whom the West has manipulated in a plot to destabilize Iran. They are accused of planning one-year anniversary protests not simply to commemorate Amini, but to use demonstrations to undermine and disrupt the March 2024 parliamentary elections. That, the regime claims, is their real goal.

The protestors, in contrast, claim to be expressing the authentic will and voice of the Iranian people, who are tired of the unfair repression of women, the intrusive and petty “morality police,” and the strained, warped economy driven by hostility to the West, with only the military, clerical leaders, and their cronies benefiting.

The question is whether a new round of protests could, this time, prove a real threat to the regime, leading to a revolution and regime change, as happened in Tunisia in 2010 and Egypt in 2011. It’s unlikely, given the asymmetry in organization and clear leadership between the government and the protestors. However, events and actions by both sides could still lead to a revolutionary outcome.

The regime has mainly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Basij militia on its side, which are well-organized, well-funded, and, so far, willing to be ruthless in their support of the regime. The protestors have mainly young and urban women on theirs.

Though they have been enormously brave and creative in using social media and have evoked widespread sympathy, the protests have no clear leader, are weakly organized, and tend to vacillate in their goals. These have ranged from improving respect and freedom for women, especially stopping their harassment for dress code infractions, to broader efforts to change the regime and even to restore the leadership of the Pahlavi family through former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.

As an expected new round of protests approaches, the Islamic Republic has been extremely proactive in seeking to limit it. The regime has arrested women it has identified as “activists,” as well as a pop singer for releasing a song calling for women to wear their hair uncovered. Protesters continue to be given long prison sentences for their involvement and families of slain protesters are being arrested ahead of the anniversary.

Somewhat more surprising is the regime’s determination to double down on the cause of the protests, announcing that headscarf rules will become stricter and even more rigorously enforced. 

In mid-2022 and earlier this year, as the regime focused its efforts on battling protestors who had taken to the streets, it withdrew the morality police from most neighborhoods. Women all over the country, especially in the major cities, began wearing their hijabs more loosely or not at all, while athletes and musicians publicly advocated standing up for women. Although all direct attacks on the government had been suppressed, it seemed that one positive outcome had arisen from the protests: women were going to defy the headscarf ban in such numbers so as to make a return to strict enforcement impossible.

Yet, starting in August, the regime has been signaling an intent to halt such defiance. A new bill being considered sets out harsh punishments, including hefty fines and imprisonment, for women not abiding by mandatory hijab. It even plans to fine businesses that allow improperly attired women on their premises. The bill also mandates a return to broader gender segregation in universities and other public spaces. These threats of stricter and more punitive enforcement risk fanning the flames of anti-regime anger that the government hoped to tamp down.

At present, the ties between the clerical leadership and the military are strong. For reasons of economic interest and nationalistic fervor, the military strongly supports the leadership of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It would likely take some shocking action by the clerical establishment to persuade military leaders and its Basij foot soldiers that the regime is no longer ruling in the nation’s interests. That might be a sudden revelation of corruption on a wholly unexpected scale. Or it might be a leadership crisis if Khamenei dies without a clear successor, producing a power struggle at the regime’s core. Or perhaps it might be a choice of a successor to Khamenei who is too extreme or too unskilled to maintain the military’s loyalty.

Any such event or action that shakes the military’s confidence in the existing leadership and leads it to believe that protecting the regime is no longer in the nation’s best interest—nor their own—could open the way for a new leader with a different outlook to emerge. That could be from within the parliament or government structure, or perhaps someone from the outside who rises to the head of popular support.

A second potential turning point is how the regime handles the coming parliamentary elections in March 2024. Despite the power of the Supreme Leader, Iran has always been able to channel and moderate political conflict through its elections, which—even with the Guardian Council’s control over candidates and questions about vote counting—have nonetheless been open and competitive enough to produce a range of outcomes. In the past, Iran has elected a pro-business president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997); a reform-minded president, Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005); a populist president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013); and a more diplomatic president, Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021) (several of them being surprise winners at the time).

Only in the 2021 presidential election did a true hardliner, President Ebrahim Raisi, win the presidency—in an engineered election guaranteeing his victory, to boot. Yet the landslide victory of Raisi, which happened with the lowest turnout in the Islamic Republic’s history, has raised questions as to whether future elections will provide the people of Iran with a voice in their government or simply be used by hardliners to pack the government with supporters. The looming parliamentary elections are a crucial test.

In August, the government announced that a record number of people had registered to become election candidates: almost forty-nine thousand. This is over three times as many as in the last election in 2020. Clearly, Iranians want to use parliament to impact policy. Yet, every candidate must be approved by the Guardian Council, a vetting body, which will announce their list of approved candidates in late October. A diverse list that includes a substantial number of reform candidates could divert popular energies from protests to campaigning for those candidates. However, a list that excludes most reformers and is overwhelmingly composed of hardliner candidates—as seen in the 2020 and 2021 elections—may elicit even greater protests, as that would suggest to many that the electoral process can no longer be used to influence the government or truly represent the Iranian people.

A third critical factor is whether the protests can expand their reach and provide a more compelling alternative to the current regime. While the protests drew on the enthusiasm of Iranian youth, the country is no longer as young as it once was. The birthrate fell in the wake of the Islamic revolution, dropping rapidly from almost six children per woman to just two today. As a result, the cohort of young people in their twenties is substantially smaller than the larger cohorts who are aged thirty to forty-five. This larger group—concerned for their jobs, families, and future—must be persuaded to risk protest. For that to occur, they must be convinced that the protestors have a plausible and compelling alternative to offer. Currently, the protests have a martyr in Amini, but they lack a leader with national visibility and stature. 

Even in exile or prison, leaders like Vladimir Lenin, Fidel Castro, Nelson Mandela, and even Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became known as dedicated champions of change who established themselves as national leaders through their writings, speeches, and sacrifices. There were no similar leaders in Tunisia and Egypt, but established organizations took that role with large followings. In Tunisia, it was the professional associations and unions of lawyers, teachers, and workers, while it was the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Without such well-organized and broadly supported groups at their head, these protests would likely not have succeeded in forcing out their rulers. To draw in the majority of Iranians, the protests need to have a leader or organization that people trust—one that offers an attractive alternative to the current leadership.

Finally, it remains to be seen whether the regime makes self-defeating decisions. It may be that the draconian new bill on hijab enforcement is toned down before it passes and is not enforced in such a way as to antagonize businesses and ordinary Iranians. But, if the regime truly follows through on its threats to create a surveillance state that punishes everyone in sight, including businesses with customers on the premises who do not conform to the regime’s Islamic ideal, then it may drive more and more Iranians into the opposition.

Economic grievances are another factor that provided fuel for the protests. It now seems that Iran’s dismal economy is improving slightly. Increased trade with China and Russia and possible gains from Iran’s inclusion in the newly expanded BRICS offer new prospects. Yet, if China or Russia suffers an economic meltdown that pulls down Iran, or if there is a new bout of runaway inflation, or Tehran’s aggression in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere spurs greater sanctions, then the regime may be seen as having undermined the economy, which may cost it popular support.

The current balance of power still favors Khamenei; a loyal military gives his regime the upper hand over weakly organized protestors that mobilize only a portion of Iran’s people. But revolutions are, by their nature, unpredictable. If a revolution should ever arise in the Islamic Republic, it will be because the regime has managed to alienate the military and antagonize the population. At the same time, protestors would have assembled a stronger organization and compelling leadership. Events in the next few months—the scale of the anniversary protests, the ferocity of the regime’s new hijab policies, and the screening of candidates for the parliamentary elections—will all bear watching. How the regime handles these issues will signal whether Iran is headed for greater confrontation and instability.

Jack A. Goldstone is the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel Jr. professor of public policy at George Mason University and a global policy fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is the author of Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World and Revolutions: A Very Short Introduction.

The post The protests in Iran are not a revolution—yet. These events must occur first. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Agha Mashallah, as he is known, got up before dawn on August 19 and walked over fifty-five miles (ninety kilometers) to get from his home to the cemetery where his son was buried. He recorded a video of himself during the journey. “Salute, dear people of my homeland. It’s almost five in the morning. I started walking to the cemetery at one…I just want Komar to know how much I love him,” he said, calling his son by his Kurdish name. “I just want him to know that I remember him, that his love is driving me to take every and each of these steps.”

Arriving at his son’s grave, Agha Mashallah kneeled on the ground and kissed the image of his son engraved on the white tombstone. On August 22, four days after the video of his journey went viral, security forces arrested Agha Mashallah. They also raided his home, confiscating mementos he had of his martyred son, including the gold medals Komar had won in karate competitions, which were all arranged in a display at his humble home—a shrine of love.

“I love you, dad. You have always had my back. You have never let my heart grow cold. You have never let us see your wounds,” an old Instagram post of Komar reads, accompanied by a photo of him with Agha Mashallah.

Agha Mashallah has not been the only target of state persecution over demanding justice for the killing of a loved one. With the anniversary of Mahsa Jina Amini’s state killing looming large on the horizon, over the past weeks, the regime has harassed, threatened, detained, and exiled relatives of the victims of state violence. Despite the relentless persecution, love and life have continued to move people to commemorate the brave fallen of the uprising.

Supreme Leader’s death cult

Over the past four decades, the clerical establishment in Iran—led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and, before him, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—has concocted an interpretation of Shia Islam that celebrates death above all.

This dogmatic ideology has helped the Islamic Republic establish its power, survive the eight-year Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, which claimed over one million lives, and quash any form of dissent through thousands of political executions and hundreds of gruesome assassinations. The regime has also been exporting its ideology through campaigns of terror and covert operations throughout the Middle East, upending the lives of hundreds of millions while sowing death and destruction through proxy wars over geopolitical power and natural resources. However, no despot has ever been able to permanently tame the greatest force on earth: the force of life. The clerical establishment in Iran has been no exception.

The Islamic Republic’s grip on power has been gradually loosening over the years. Despite many hurdles, thanks to the Internet, more people in Iran (especially the youth) are tearing the dark veil that has separated them from the world and their roots. They have shed the chains of the Supreme Leader’s death cult, refused the promised paradise after death, and demanded prosperity in life.

Perceiving this existential threat, the regime has deployed all its resources to bolster its ideological grip on society. In one effort, the state spent millions of dollars on a religious pop song, “Salute Commander,” to indoctrinate children. State-organized concerts were held across Iran, during which children performed the song, pledged their lives to the Supreme Leader, and vowed to even “sacrifice” their parents’ lives for the eighty-four-year-old Ayatollah.

As always, the Islamic Republic’s poison has not remained confined to Iran’s borders. Using the country’s scant and shrinking financial resources, the regime has sponsored and encouraged song performances in other countries, including Lebanon, Iraq, Russia, Pakistan, Myanmar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Bosnia, Nigeria, and even the US.

Additionally, over the past years, the regime has been promoting, facilitating, and organizing the annual Arbaeen pilgrimage, which marks the end of the forty-day mourning period for the anniversary of the death of Shia Saint Hossein, the grandson of the Prophet Mohammad. For the event, millions of Shia Muslims flock to the Iraqi city of Karbala every year, where Imam Hossein is buried. The event allows the regime to indoctrinate participants into its ideology of celebrating death in Allah’s way, positioning martyrdom as the “highest achievement” in life.

In recent weeks, as part of the regime’s efforts to display a return to “normalcy” after the recent uprising, the state has gloated over the fact that hundreds of thousands of Iranians have registered to participate in the pilgrimage. However, the sweetness of this presumed victory has turned into ashes in the mouth of the Supreme Leader.

A forest rises from the graves

When Amini was killed in the custody of the so-called morality police for allegedly “violating” mandatory hijab, her parents marked her grave with a short tribute in Kurdish: “Dear Jina, you shall never die. Your name will turn into a symbol.”

Indeed, her name turned into a banner under which people in Iran rose up and demanded the fall of the clerical establishment. In response, the regime, as always, unleashed brute force, arresting at least twenty-two thousand people and killing at least 537 more—dozens of children among them.

However, every person killed by the regime has turned into a seed, and from their grave, a glorious forest has been born, standing tall and defiant. People like Agha Mashallah have been tending to this forest. His love has not been limited to his lost son. It has grown to embrace others, including Mohammad Hosseini, a young man executed on the same day as Komar over the former’s role in protests. Since Hosseini has no living relatives, Agha Mashallah has embraced him as a son, cherishing his memory. Following Komar and Hossein’s executions, Agha Mashallah has been preparing food from his scant income and distributing it among the poor every week. Over the months, Agha Mashallah’s hands, which have become calloused from hard work, his soft voice, kind smile, and his indiscriminate love have earned him the title of the “nation’s father.”

On his pilgrimage to his son’s grave, Agha Mashallah addressed the nation: “I’m really grateful that you have always kept us in your thoughts, that you have held the memory of the boys dear. I am going on this pilgrimage on your behalf as well.”

Now, he is in prison along with many others who have demanded justice for loved ones lost to the regime’s brutality. Only time will tell if the people will pick up their mantel and finish their pilgrimage of love on the anniversary of the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post A pilgrimage of love: Mourning the dead in defiance of the Islamic Republic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

On August 8, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada designated Iranian officials, businesspeople, and entities under targeted sanctions frameworks for the provision of military supplies to Russia and Iranian security forces.

Background

Iranian protesters rallied behind Ukraine during the nationwide protest that began in mid-September 2022 after Mahsa Jina Amni’s arrest and death. However, since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine and its allies have confirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has been providing Russia with military equipment, particularly drones. The IRI has repeatedly denied these claims and has only admitted that it supplied such equipment before the full-scale invasion began.

Investigations have confirmed that the IRI has supplied drones to Russia as late as 2023. Further, the IRI sent drone trainers to Crimea in October 2022 and is now reportedly “helping” Russia, and potentially Belarus, build domestic drone factories. It has been shown that private companies have provided drones and “weapons and military components” sent to Russia, in addition to having supplied the IRI government forces with military equipment used to repress protests in Iran.

What the sanctions designations say

Under the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, Canada designated seven individuals who were “involved in activities that gravely threaten international peace and security.” The designations focused on “senior Iranian officials involved in entities that supply materials to Iran’s repressive national Law Enforcement Command [and] individuals who occupy senior positions in state-directed firms that produce lethal combat drones used by Iran’s armed forces to destabilize the region or that are exported to Russia for use in its illegal war against Ukraine.” These include:

• Ali Akbar Ahmadian, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council
• Brigadier General Abdolkarim Bani Tarafi, chairman of the Iran Aviation Industry Organization
• Two members of Imen Sanat Zaman Fara’s board of directors
• Three members of Quds Aviation Industries’ board of directors

The United States (US), European Union (EU), UK, and Australia have all designated Ahmadian, but none have designated Tarafi. The US, EU, Australia, and Canada have designated Quds Aviation Industries as an entity, and the UK designated its parent company, Iranian Aviation Industries Organization. Only the US, EU, and Canada had designated Imen Sanat Zaman Fara as an entity. No other jurisdiction has designated the same two members of Imen Sanat Zaman Fara’s board of directors as Canada, though the US, UK, and Australia designated the same three members of Quds Aviation Industries’ board of directors.

Under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the UK designated eight individuals and three entities who are Iranian or linked to Iran, all of whom are involved in “destabilising Ukraine or undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.” These include:

• The Paravar Pars Company and seven of its associates for “providing or making available technology that could contribute to” the destabilization.
• Two units within the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC)—the Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC-SSJO) and the Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC-ASF SSJO)—for “providing or making available technology that could contribute to” the destabilization.
• Brigadier General Ali Reza Balali of the IRGC Aerospace Force for involvement in the destabilization.

Paravar Pars and all seven associates were already designated in the US, EU, Canada, and Australia, with only two exceptions (Shamsabadi and Valagohar do not appear to have been designated by Canada). The IRGC-SSJO has been designated by the US, EU, and Australia, as well as by New Zealand and Switzerland. The IRGC-ASF SSJO has been designated by the US. Balali has been sanctioned in the EU and Switzerland for training Russian forces in Iran in using Iranian drones.

Why these designations are important

While these designations include government officials, they have a broader scope, incorporating others on the supply chain: namely, manufacturers of military equipment. This is particularly important—especially given the strong multilateral component of these designations—because such manufacturers in one country are often reliant—at least in some measure—on parts made in other countries. For example, Iranian drones found in Ukraine have included parts from China, the US, and elsewhere. Targeted sanctions help constrain these companies, preventing them from receiving these parts—or, at least, slowing and complicating the process while increasing the price.

Further, the US has interpreted targeted sanctions regulations to prohibit any transaction involving the US dollar. Because the dollar is often used in currency exchanges as an intermediary—for example, Iranian rials may first be converted to US dollars before then being converted to Russian rubles—this means that US designations are particularly effective at blocking business transactions.

Additionally, focusing on the extraterritorial actions of the IRI signals support for victims of drones and other equipment used in Ukraine while indicating a strong response against any country providing such resources to Russia.

What do the designations mean in practice?

Canada and UK sanctions regimes impose similar penalties on sanctioned people and entities. These penalties include asset freezes and immigration restrictions. But what do these restrictions entail? An asset freeze means monetary assets like bank accounts and non-monetary assets like property cannot be made available to the designated person or entity directly or indirectly, like through a third party (such as a business associate or family member). There are certain exceptions to this, like allowing access to funds necessary to cover basic needs (food, water, shelter, etc.). Additionally, Canadian and UK citizens are forbidden from making funds or assets available to their respective designated individuals and entities. This means that if designated individuals and entities have any assets in Canada or the UK, respectively, they cannot access them anymore, nor can they acquire any new assets there.

Immigration restrictions only apply to designated individuals—not to entities or to members of a designated entity, as these people would have to be individually sanctioned for penalties to apply to them. Essentially, these restrictions amount to a travel ban. Designated individuals cannot travel to, or even through, if transiting, the jurisdiction that has sanctioned them. If they already had some sort of permission to be in the country, it is revoked. This restriction would not apply to the Paravar Pars Company, the IRGC-SSJO, or the IRGC-AF SJJO, as they are entities, and only individual members that have themselves been designated would be subject to these restrictions.

What steps could come next?

In the immediate term, the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia should designate any of these individuals and entities whom they have not yet sanctioned. Financial institutions often abide by designations in other jurisdictions (for example, correspondent banks in the US would likely refuse to conduct transactions with an individual designated in the UK). However, jurisdictions should still push for multilateral coordination in order to provide a sound legal basis for such extraterritorial compliance and to signal widespread condemnation for Iran’s activities. They should also urge additional states—especially those known to shelter enablers of human rights violators—to adopt parallel targeted human rights sanctions regimes and designations. Additionally, all jurisdictions should continue mapping Iranian weapon development and sales, as well as swiftly designate involved entities and persons to further constrain the industry.

After issuing any sanctions, all jurisdictions should take care to check whether the designated individuals and entities—especially the businesses—hold any assets within their jurisdictions and should freeze any such assets accordingly. Especially if there are assets, authorities should prioritize enforcement (i.e. ensuring that the designated perpetrators cannot access them) and work to prevent sanctions evasion.

Finally, the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia should also pursue other appropriate legal avenues that become available. For example, they could provide relevant information to bodies such as Interpol, Europol, Eurojust, and, for member states and those providing evidence for investigations, the International Criminal Court.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post Iran and targeted human rights sanctions update: Providing military equipment to Iran security forces and Russia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While differing national interests contribute to these tensions, history also plays a role in Iran’s relationship with Russia, as well as the rest of the world. Iranians have a long historical memory, and Iran’s foreign policy is shaped in many ways by the nation’s history. It is important for US policymakers to understand how Iran sees the world through the lens of history and use this knowledge to advance US policy goals.

More than recent history—the 1979 revolution and the regime’s four decades of grievances against the United States—drives Iran’s worldview. Despite the Islamic Republic’s attempts to distance itself from the country’s pre-Islamic past and Pahlavi Iran, older historical impulses and experiences still drive Iran’s behavior, whether the regime acknowledges it or not. Three of these impulses are particularly important for US policy and the Iran-Russia relationship: Iran always fiercely resisted foreign domination; Iran often sought a benevolent ally from outside the region to support its quest for sovereignty; and Iran wished to be seen as a serious power deserving of respect.

First, Iran has never wanted to be a client state or dominated by foreign powers. Iranians have a long history of fighting for national sovereignty. As the once-powerful Iran, known then as Persia, grew weaker in the nineteenth century during the Qajar dynasty, it faced increasing pressure from Imperial Russia and Great Britain. Russia repeatedly seized Iranian territory. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay—in which Iran was forced to cede to Russia what is now Armenia, the country of Azerbaijan, and part of Turkey—remains a particularly sore memory. Qajar Iran also became deeply indebted to Russian and British banks, and the two imperial powers forced intensely unpopular concessions that allowed them to dominate Iranian oil, tobacco, and other industries.

The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, which the two powers negotiated without consulting Iranians, divided Iran into spheres of influence. Such imperial meddling was one of the leading causes of Iran’s first revolution: the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. Yet Iranians’ efforts to ensure true national sovereignty failed. Russian military intervention in 1911 ended the revolution.

Despite this defeat, Iranian resistance to foreign interference continued. Confronted with the Anglo-Soviet occupation during World War II that forced Reza Pahlavi’s abdication in 1941, Iran insisted upon an international agreement on Allied troop withdrawal. When the Soviet Union refused to withdraw from northern Iran and encouraged communist separatist movements in those provinces in 1946, the Iranian government successfully negotiated and leveraged international pressure to force a Soviet withdrawal. It then crushed the separatists and suppressed the communist Tudeh party as an agent of foreign influence.

In 1951, Iran nationalized its oil industry, a clear renunciation of ongoing British domination of Iranian oil. The resulting CIA- and MI6-backed coup d’etat succeeded in overthrowing Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, but the event enhanced Iranians’ resolve to resist foreign domination. Mosaddegh became a national hero and the coup laid the groundwork for popular anti-Westernism that grew through the 1970s. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi himself, who had been popular, partly lost legitimacy because of his role in the coup.

Ayatollah Khomeini later built his popular base by decrying Western influence and leading protests against the Shah in 1963; one issue was special legal protections granted to Americans in Iran. Even though many Iranians saw the Shah as a Western puppet after 1953, historians such as Roham Alvandi have demonstrated that the Shah also cherished Iranian sovereignty. He spent decades working to turn Iran into a true partner—not a client—of the United States.

The Islamic Republic continues this profoundly ingrained and historically conditioned struggle for Iranian independence. It views the West as irredeemably imperialistic. The long history of Western hegemony in Iran—and Iranians’ fierce resistance—explains a lot of the regime’s defiance of the West, even in the face of harsh sanctions. Its fears of counter-revolution plotted by an outside power may be paranoid—especially its insistence that the West is to blame for the massive anti-establishment protests that have rocked Iran since September 2022—but also appear reasonable to the regime given Iran’s historical experience of repeated foreign interventions.

When understood in this context, Amir-Abdollahian’s July 18 statement about Russia has deeper resonance. If President Vladimir Putin has indeed resurrected Russia’s imperial ambitions (as many pundits believe), Iran would appear to him as an important area to control and one that has historically been a Russian sphere of influence. While the Islamic Republic and Russia share interests, especially their mutual opposition to the US-dominated world order, Iran must still be wary of Russia’s intentions. Just as the Islamic Republic believes that history serves as a warning not to trust the United States, history also requires Iran to proceed with caution regarding Russia.

Second, in its quest for national sovereignty, Iran historically sought the help of a benevolent ally to shield it from Russian and British imperialism. Iran hoped the United States would play that role in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It, thus, invited US involvement in Iranian affairs multiple times from the mid-nineteenth century forward. The Americans’ declarations of friendship but reluctance to accept these invitations only made the United States more attractive. Iran also grew closer to Germany in the years before World War II for the same reason. When the war finally drew the United States meaningfully into Iranian affairs, its loud protestations against the Soviets during the 1946 crisis seemed to indicate that the United States was indeed Iran’s friend.

While the 1953 coup ultimately demonstrated that Iranians’ hopes for the United States were misplaced, the Islamic Republic of today is perhaps looking at China in the same light—a potential third force to balance Western pressure and Putin’s Russia. Just as the Middle East was not a traditional area of American influence before World War II, so too is the region not a traditional area of Chinese influence today.

China does not carry the historical baggage of Europe or Russia in Iranian eyes, and it has useful economic and diplomatic power. Unlike the West, China is also willing to overlook Iran’s human rights abuses against its people. However, China may be as disinterested in deep involvement in Iranian affairs as the United States was in earlier periods. China wants access to Iranian oil and has used its diplomatic influence in the Middle East for international prestige and self-interest. Yet China may end up declining to provide the robust support the Islamic Republic desires.

Third, modern Iran has always seen itself as the home of once-great empires and as a major regional power that should be treated as an equal by other world powers. This was a major motivating factor for the Shah’s foreign policy. His modernization programs, military build-up, and grand 1971 celebration in Persepolis were all intended to showcase Iran’s greatness. The Shah’s assertiveness with American policymakers by the 1970s indicated that he saw his country as an equal to the West.

The Islamic Republic is also motivated by this belief. It sees its theocracy as superior to other government models and wants the world to recognize Iran’s importance. Iran is increasingly confident in its foreign behavior because it sees itself as a serious global player. Its policies in the Middle East—meddling in the affairs of its neighbors to advance its interests, acting through proxies, intervening in Yemen’s and Syria’s civil wars, and improving its military technology and nuclear ambitions—are the policies of a regional or even aspiring global power. Other powers have acted similarly, including the United States and Russia.

Iran’s increasing use of cyberattacks, too, is a declaration of its power; this is the terrain of twenty-first-century great power competition. The Islamic Republic’s naval buildup and overtures to Latin America, including its unsuccessful 2021 naval venture in the Atlantic, indicate its aspirations.

Such a worldview also explains how Iran has tried to position itself as a partner—not a client—of Russia. Iran signaled its status as Russia’s equal by sending drones to help its ally in the war in Ukraine. Iran was the country providing military aid—not the one being aided. Furthermore, client states produce raw materials, not highly advanced military technology. The Islamic Republic also knows that the international community rarely punishes great powers for human rights violations; external strength allows it a free hand at home.

History thus shapes the Islamic Republic’s engagement with the world. And, yet, while it shares the same historical experiences with the Iranian people, their interpretation of this history differs from the regime’s. The Iranian people do share in the longer historical opposition to foreign domination. Still, many also resist the Islamic Republic’s use of history as a tool of domestic control and its characterization of the West as Iran’s enemy.

Iranians take pride in Iran’s pre-Islamic past, which the regime seeks to downplay. They seek to resurrect the histories of Iran’s women’s rights and democracy movements, dating back to the Constitutional Revolution. They also actively remember individual Americans who were Iran’s friends—from Howard Baskerville, who died fighting alongside Iranian constitutionalists in 1909, to the almost 1,800 Peace Corps volunteers who served in Iran. Unlike their government, many Iranians once again see the United States as a potential ally and hope it will be a friend to their current revolutionary movement. Consequently, Iran’s history can be both an obstacle and opportunity for US policy.

American policymakers should therefore use history wisely. The United States should encourage the Iranian people’s version of history. It should especially demonstrate that Iranians’ historical hopes for the United States are not misplaced by meaningfully supporting the current revolutionary movement, assisting with capacity building for democracy, and speaking out on behalf of Iranians’ human rights. In doing so, however, the US must be careful to allow the Iranian people to take the lead; Iranian history emphasizes that a foreign power must not install any post-Islamic Republic government for it to have domestic legitimacy.

The United States must also exploit Russia’s problematic history in Iran. By highlighting potential Russian designs on Iran, making it seem like Putin doesn’t see Iran as an equal, and emphasizing that Russia wants to dominate Iran like Imperial Russia sought to do in 1907, US propaganda may help enhance the already existing tensions between the Islamic Republic and Russia.

Finally, US policymakers should take Iran seriously as a regional power. The United States must respect Iran as a formidable adversary and devote resources to developing a long-term Iran policy that is consistent and proactive. Iran can no longer be seen as less important to American interests than other countries. Its ongoing domestic instability and vulnerability to its history should receive equal attention to other policy issues, such as Ukraine.

The Islamic Republic’s inability to provide what its people want—basic necessities and human rights—and its increasing confidence in its external behavior will be challenging to navigate. Nevertheless, remembering Iran’s deep desire for respect and influence on the one hand, and its historical experience with and hostility to foreign coercion or control on the other, is important when formulating policy. For both the Islamic Republic and the Iranian people, history matters. It should matter to US policymakers as well. The question is, whose historical memory will win out: the mullahs’ or the people’s? And which side of history will the US find itself on this time?

Kelly J. Shannon is associate professor of history at Florida Atlantic University and a 2023-2024 W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is the author of US Foreign Policy and Muslim Women’s Human Rights and is currently writing a book on US-Iran relations in the first half of the twentieth century.

The post This is how Iranian history shapes the Islamic Republic’s relationship with the world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hostage history

The Islamic Republic has engaged in hostage diplomacy since the birth of the Islamic revolution in 1979. Interestingly, Ali Khamenei, the country’s future supreme leader, did not anticipate the seizure of the US embassy and its personnel in 1979 at the outset. As recounted by Mehdi Khalaji in his new biography of Khamenei, which is entitled, The Regent of Allah: Ali Khamenei’s Political Evolution in Iran, Khamenei was on a Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia along with Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s future president, when the hostage crisis started.

Rafsanjani claimed the two men were surprised and said, “It was not our policy.” But ambition quickly changed his views, as well as the founder of the Islamic Republic’s, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who exploited the situation to consolidate power. As a deputy defense minister and member of parliament, Khamenei later visited the hostages at the height of the crisis for domestic propaganda, using a fake pretense of looking after their well-being. What was once “It was not our policy” quickly became state policy in the Islamic Republic.

Deals resulting in the unfreezing of Iranian assets in exchange for American hostages date back to the dawn of the Islamic Republic. The Algiers Accords of 1981, which secured the release of the seized fifty-two US embassy employees in Tehran after 444-days, stated, “the United States will restore the financial position of Iran, insofar as possible, to that which existed prior to Nov. 14, 1979.” This resulted in a decades-long vicious cycle of unfrozen funds begetting the freedom of Americans, which only incentivized the Islamic Republic to replenish its prisons by arresting Western nationals on bogus charges in search of further concessions, as its malign behavior increasingly threatened international peace and security. There have been a couple instances since 1979 where Americans were released without the use of funds, but they have been few and far between.

In 2016, the Barack Obama administration agreed to a $1.7 billion debt settlement over arms given to pre-revolutionary Iran to liberate another tranche of hostages. In 2022, the United Kingdom (UK) structured a similar arrangement to free Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Anousheh Ashoori to repay a £400 million tank debt, which would be ring-fenced for humanitarian purposes. However, neither of these episodes stopped further hostage-taking—even with conditions on how Iran could use the money. Only months after the hostages were welcomed home in the United States in January 2016, Tehran detained Xiyue Wang, a Princeton University graduate student, that August. Likewise, Europeans and Americans were imprisoned in Iran following the British agreement in 2022, and the Islamic Republic has plotted to kidnap UK-based individuals multiple times since then. Thus, the evidence shows that restrictions on the use of assets do not deter future hostage-taking by the Islamic Republic.

In fact, it makes things worse, as the US agreement to unfreeze around $6 billion in Iranian assets in South Korea represents a significant increase from the previous $1.7 billion deal in 2016. Money is fungible and this arrangement will reduce strains on the Iranian budget and free up additional resources to spend on repression and terrorism. Iran’s militias in Syria have already received a raise due to the lax enforcement of US sanctions, which continues amid reports of a broader nuclear understanding with Tehran. The Iranian government is witnessing once again that it pays to take US nationals hostage.

There is also a history of the Islamic Republic exploiting humanitarian exemptions under US law, as happened when the US government indicted Turkey’s Halkbank in 2019 for facilitating fraudulent food and medicine transactions. While the channel in the current agreement will be different, that experience is a reminder of the need for enhanced US vigilance.

What can be done?

The most acute issue remains the absence of a broader strategy to deter and prevent the Islamic Republic’s hostage policy model. When asked about what it has done to avoid future hostage-taking, the Joe Biden administration regularly showcases the new “D” travel risk indicator, which is used to denote a warning of the chance for wrongful detention, and the Canadian-driven Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, which the US government has joined. But much more can be done.

After the death of Otto Warmbier as a result of North Korean captivity in 2017, the US government banned travel to the country. Under these restrictions, all US passports are invalid for travel to, in, or through North Korea unless there is a special validation from the secretary of state. However, travel to Iran is not placed under those same set of restrictions. The Biden administration and Congress should consider changing that status. It will not offer a complete solution to the problem, as those with dual nationality could still use their Iranian passports instead of their American ones. However, it would reduce the number of Americans traveling to Iran and therefore cut off opportunities for the regime to replenish its prisons (once emptied).

The United States should also work with its European allies to implement similar restrictions, as this is a problem the latter face as well, with around thirty European nationals still being held hostage. Those with extenuating circumstances can apply for special authorization to travel there on a case-by-case basis.

Secondly, the United States should be working with its allies and partners to develop a menu of penalties that will automatically be triggered the moment the Islamic Republic takes the next hostage. This should include diplomatic and economic penalties. There are over ninety foreign embassies in Iran and over ninety Iranian embassies worldwide. On the diplomatic side, a discrete number of Iranian diplomats should be declared personae non grata; ambassadors to Iran should be recalled en masse; and travel by former and current regime officials to foreign capitals should be severely restricted. There should never be a situation where a former health minister can travel to Canada while the Islamic Republic detains Canadian nationals, as happened in August. The same applies to the family members of Iranian officials who live freely in the West while the regime imprisons its citizens.

On the economic side, a ready-made package of sanctions should be imposed beyond piecemeal designations of officials implicated in hostage-taking. This should include US-allied countries banning Iranian airliners from using their airports, as said airliners have been complicit in Tehran’s drone proliferation to Russia for use against Ukraine. The US government could also launch a campaign to recruit as many countries as possible to sanction the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—one of the primary instruments of Iran’s state hostage apparatus—as a terrorist organization.

The Biden administration claims the United States and Europe are realigned again on Iran after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But realignment must be applied to a policy end to have impact. Developing a transatlantic strategy to thwart hostage-taking is a tangible way for the US government to show that working with allies and partners can advance American interests.

Jason M. Brodsky is the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program. Follow him on X: @JasonMBrodsky.

The post Iran has a hostage-taking model. It’s long overdue that the US build a policy around it. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

Since Mahsa Jina Amini’s death in September 2022, and the resulting protests and brutal repression by the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), different national and regional authorities have issued hundreds of targeted sanctions designations against IRI officials. Despite their recent prevalence, reports announcing these designations often fail to mention what they are, how they work, and whether they are effective.

What are targeted sanctions?

Targeted sanctions are one type of economic sanctions, which restrict travel, trade, and financial relations. They are imposed by a country or multilateral organization, like the United Nations, on another country, entity, or individual. While there are many variations of economic sanctions, there are two main categories: those imposed on countries (“broad-based” or “comprehensive” sanctions) and those imposed on individuals or entities (“targeted” sanctions).

Broad-based sanctions, such as the United States (US) embargo on Cuba, are routinely criticized for their negative humanitarian impact and harm on the civilian population in the sanctioned country. In the last two decades, there has been a marked shift to instead use targeted sanctions, also called “smart” sanctions, which apply only to specific individuals or entities (such as companies, governmental departments, or military units).

The US, United Kingdom (UK), European Union (EU), Canada, and Australia, as well as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), have built robust, targeted sanctions programs. Countries such as Norway, Japan, and Switzerland have followed suit. These programs are generally divided into “regimes” that focus on violations related to specific thematic or geographic areas. For example, “Global Magnitsky-style” targeted sanctions regimes address human rights violations and corruption.

This series focuses on targeted sanctions regimes that can be applied to human rights violations committed in Iran. This series will primarily focus on the US, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia, hereafter referred to as the leading jurisdictions, because they have relevant regimes—unlike the UNSC—and are very active in sanctioning perpetrators for human rights violations in Iran. An upcoming post will detail the relevant regimes in each leading jurisdiction.

What is the process for designating perpetrators?

Every jurisdiction has a unique process for designating perpetrators under targeted sanctions, but the general principles remain broadly the same for the leading jurisdictions. Government officials gather information on potential perpetrators and conduct a legal analysis to see if the evidence meets the standard of proof necessary to show that the perpetrator was complicit in the relevant violations. The EU, as an intergovernmental agency, has a slightly different process.

Either the High Representation of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the EU’s chief coordinator of diplomacy and security matters) or a member state representative presents a proposed designation to the European Council, an executive body of the EU representing the highest level of political cooperation and composed of heads of state or government of the member states. The European Council must then unanimously vote in favor of the designation for it to be adopted. 

Notably, these processes do not include a criminal or civil trial. Without jail time or (usually) permanent asset seizure, fewer due process guarantees exist. However, there are still safeguards to ensure that the process is fair. Defendants must be granted certain rights, including to be informed, such as through notices, and to be heard, such as through appealing a designation.

There are additional safeguards in the EU and UK to ensure that sanctions do not violate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). For example, the UK requires that sanctions be “appropriate,” which involves analyzing the effects the targeted sanctions would have on the perpetrator’s rights under the ECHR.

What is civil society’s role in this process?

While Australia has not yet announced an official pathway for civil society to submit evidence, each of the other leading jurisdictions have developed one. A later post will include more information on the best practices for submission in different jurisdictions, but resources are available for those hoping to submit information. The EU released a guidance note on the implementation of its sanctions regime and the UK published an informational note for civil society. Human Rights First (HRF), a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in the US, has partnered with other organizations in the leading jurisdictions to create a coalition of NGOs interested in targeted sanctions submissions. HRF and its partners developed resources and provide pro bono support to civil society members in developing and submitting dossiers on sanctions for human rights violations under the US Global Magnitsky regime or US country-specific regimes that have human rights bases for issuing sanctions, like the Iran-specific regime.  

Jurisdictions also generally welcome additional information, such as on the existence of a designated perpetrators’ assets in that jurisdiction and sanctions violations.

What are the consequences and limits of targeted sanctions?

For targeted sanctions, the immediate effects generally include financial and immigration restrictions. The former include asset freezes, which make any bank accounts, properties, et cetera inaccessible in the jurisdiction issuing the sanction. While the Canadian government can then seize those assets in certain circumstances, no other government can seize assets based solely on targeted sanctions designations. However, the US has started, and the EU is exploring using sanctions violations penalties to confiscate and repurpose funds. While these efforts are currently focused on providing compensation to Ukraine, they create tools and set precedent that could lead to more global applications, including against Iranian perpetrators.

Additionally, financial restrictions generally prohibit nationals of the jurisdiction issuing the sanction from making funds available to or engaging in transactions with the designated individual or entity. The US has additionally interpreted this to mean that designated perpetrators cannot conduct transactions involving US currency at any time. Because of the comparatively wide use of the US dollar, many inter-currency exchanges use the US dollar as an intermediary—for example, if an Iranian company pays a British company in rials, it may first be converted to US dollars before then being converted to British pounds. If the US had sanctioned that Iranian company, this deal would be prohibited regardless of whether the UK had sanctioned it.

For immigration restrictions, any visas already offered to the perpetrator by the jurisdiction that designated them are revoked, and no new visas can be granted.

When an entity is sanctioned, individuals who are members of that entity are not themselves sanctioned. Any assets the entity owns in the jurisdiction would be frozen, but the members’ personal assets would not be, and members would still be able to keep or obtain a visa. However, legislation is often worded in ways that make it easier to designate leaders and members of an entity once that entity has been sanctioned.

There are, however, limits to the impact of these effects. While jurisdictions are often aligned and will, at times, coordinate their designations, a designation by any given jurisdiction exclusively applies to that jurisdiction—perpetrators are free to take their business elsewhere. Further, while sanctions evasion is illegal, enforcement is resource-intensive and often difficult, especially for wealthy perpetrators who can hide funds in shell companies and other schemes. In the EU, each member state is primarily responsible for its own enforcement, adding to circumvention difficulties. Finally, even when designations are made multilaterally and are enforced, they can have adverse side effects, such as preventing perpetrators from entering jurisdictions that may have otherwise been able to bring prosecutions for crimes committed in Iran under universal jurisdiction provisions.

Do targeted sanctions achieve their goals?

Jurisdictions implementing targeted sanctions usually cite behavior change as the intended goal. However, civil society, academics, and others have also highlighted additional goals, such as constraining (denying access to resources needed to carry out violations) and signaling (giving notice of international attention on perpetrators and, stigmatizing them, and providing international solidarity and recognition to victims). In short, results are mixed and depend on the situation studied, the goal measured, the information available, and other relevant factors.

A future post will discuss the success of these goals in more detail.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

The post What are ‘targeted human rights sanctions,’ and why are they used for Iran? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to reports, the US plans to release “several” detained Iranians in return, and will eventually allow the IRI to access about $6 billion in frozen Iranian oil revenue held in South Korean banks. The US government has not confirmed these details, though it has indicated that there would be restrictions on the use of funds if they were released.

The released hostages are victims of the IRI’s escalating practice of hostage-taking, and their return is undoubtedly welcome news to their families and loved ones. However, many have criticized the deal as constituting a ransom payment, incentivizing Tehran’s hostage-taking model. Furthermore, the State Department made it clear when discussing the deal that American citizens—as opposed to US permanent residents and US residents still detained in Iran—were the priority:

“But let me just be very clear about this so there is no confusion: Every US citizen wrongfully held in Iran has been released on house arrest as part of the news that we shared last week…What this is about, ultimately, though…is about bringing American citizens home. And…we hope that at the end of this process, these five American citizens will be able to come back to the United States, and that’s what we’re going to continue to work for.”

US special envoys for Iran have indicated they have a role in agreements related to US hostages in Iran. However, the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (SPEHA), the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell (HRFC), and the Hostage Response Group (HRG) generally handle hostage cases for US nationals and establish US policy on the matter. Their roles—and some of the tools at their disposal—were codified under the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act (“the Levinson Act”).

Who was Robert Levinson?

Robert Levinson was a retired Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) agent who was abducted in 2007, presumably by the IRI, after traveling to Iran’s Kish Island in the Persian Gulf for business. A US court found that “Iran’s kidnapping of Levinson qualifies as a hostage-taking,” with “the likelihood that Iran tortured him [at] ‘almost one hundred percent.’” The UN’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention likewise found that he had been arbitrarily detained and that it was “clearly impossible to invoke any legal basis justifying the deprivation of [his] liberty.” In March 2020, Levinson’s family announced that they received information indicating that he died in Iranian custody. In large part due to his family’s advocacy, the Levinson Act was signed into law in December 2020.

Why was the Levinson Act introduced?

In 2015, President Barack Obama called for a review of the US policy on hostage-taking. Based on this review, he published Executive Order 13698 (EO 13698) and Presidential Policy Directive 30 (PPD-30).

PPD-30 laid out the US approach to hostage-taking. EO 13698 also established the SPEHA, HRFC, and HRG. These were tasked with coordinating to better secure the release of hostages, support hostages’ families, secure criminal prosecutions of hostage-takers, and otherwise promote US national and security interests.

• The HRFC was created within the FBI to coordinate with agencies to “secure the safe recovery” of US nationals held hostage abroad and to coordinate the US response to other hostage-takings where the US has a “national interest.”
• The HRG was to be convened as necessary to help secure the release of “US nationals held abroad” and was tasked with identifying hostage recovery options and strategies and coordinating the development and implementation of policies, strategies, and procedures related to hostage recovery.
• The SPEHA was tasked with leading diplomatic engagement on US hostage policy and coordinating “diplomatic engagements and strategy in support of hostage recovery efforts.”

The Levinson Act was then introduced to establish a framework for determining what cases fall under the “unlawfully or wrongfully detained” (i.e., hostage) umbrella, as well as to codify the establishment of the SPEHA, HRFC, and HRG, and create the possibility of targeted sanctions for perpetrators of hostage-taking.

What does the Levinson Act do?

First, the Levinson Act lays out the criteria for which the secretary of state can determine whether nationals detained abroad are detained “unlawfully or wrongfully” by either a “foreign government or a non-governmental actor” based on “credible information.” This determination is crucial because the secretary of state can then “transfer responsibility for such case” from the Bureau of Consular Affairs to the SPEHA—if the “totality of the circumstances” indicates that a person has been detained unlawfully or wrongfully—ensuring the case receives the expertise and resources required.

Second, the act requires the secretary of state to provide an annual report to Congress on US nationals determined to be unlawfully or wrongfully detained. Additionally, the secretary of state must also supply “resources guidance in writing for government officials and families of unjustly or wrongfully detained individuals.”

Third, it codifies the establishment of the SPEHA, HRFC, and HRG. These largely mirror EO 13698, but slight changes exist, especially in further defining responsibilities to support hostages’ families.

Finally, the act provides that the president “may” impose targeted sanctions “on those responsible for or complicit in…the hostage-taking…or the unlawful or wrongful detention” of a US national abroad. President Joseph Biden implemented this provision, with minor changes, in Executive Order 14078 (EO 14078) in July 2022.

How has the Levinson Act been used so far?

Since 2020, families of hostages have reported that they have “increasingly benefitted from the US government’s 2015 policy reforms,” with “the Levinson Act… viewed as a substantial move in the right direction,” especially around improved prioritization of wrongful detention cases. The US has publicly indicated that the SPEHA was involved in the release of Brittney Griner and Trevor Reed from Russia, seven hostages in Venezuela, and Paul Rusesabagina from Rwanda. It also released its first and so far only sanctions designation under EO 13078 in April, designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), four IRGC-IO officials, and Russia’s Federal Security Service.

Despite these successes, former hostages and their families have also highlighted certain critiques. These include calls to use the term “hostage” instead of “wrongfully detained” individuals and concerns about the disorganization of the US system.

What comes next?

Despite the US’s efforts, the five released hostages are not the only US nationals held overseas, nor are they the only hostages in Iran. The James Foley Foundation lists fifty-nine publicly disclosed American hostage and wrongful detention cases. Hostage Aid Worldwide identified at least twenty hostages in Iran besides the five due to be released in last week’s deal. Between 2010 and 2022, the IRI detained sixty-six foreign and dual nationals, with forty arrested during the anti-establishment protests that followed Mahsa Jina Amini’s death in September 2022.

In fact, the IRI is holding at least three other hostages who may be considered nationals under the Levinson Act: Shahab Dalili, who holds a Green Card, Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani, a US permanent resident, and Jamshid Sharmahd, a US resident. The Levinson Act defines “United States national” as a US national as defined in 8 US Code § 1101(a)(22) and 8 US Code § 1408, or as “a lawful permanent resident alien with significant ties to the United States.” The US State Department has also confirmed this definition applies to non-US citizens.

Dalili and Vatani are therefore nationals under the act. Dalili’s lawyer, Jason Poblete, has made clear that Dalili also meets the criteria of a “wrongfully detained” person under the act despite the State Department’s failure to classify him as such. In Sharmahd’s case, Poblete has highlighted the US’s “duty” to secure his release, but the US has said it views it as a matter for Germany, as he is a German citizen. Regardless, Sharmahd’s case is especially dire, as he has been sentenced to execution. Inaction in the Sharmahd matter would set a concerning precedent for dissidents everywhere, since he was abducted from the United Arab Emirates and renditioned to Iran due to his exercise of protected political speech.

The Levinson Act provides the government with critical processes and resources. These not only ensure that hostages are returned home but also shape US policies around hostage-taking, support the loved ones of those taken hostage, and promote accountability. However, these tools are limited and imperfect and, unfortunately, much of the information on government decision-making is necessarily confidential.

As the use of state-sponsored hostage-taking by authoritarian states continues to increase, the US government—especially the SPEHA, HFRC, and HRG, but also the president and legislators—must protect current hostages and prevent the taking of others by using the avenues provided under the Levinson Act and by evaluating and revising their methods.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. The Strategic Litigation Project works on prevention and accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, human rights violations, and corruption offenses around the world.

The post The Levinson Act means all Americans must return home—not just citizens appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Unsurprisingly, Bisimchi called for her arrest, with the channel reporting that she was arrested on the same day by security forces for “desecrating sanctities.”

The incident came only days after Iran’s police officially announced on July 16 that the so-called morality police have returned to the streets. This was the same force responsible for the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, which triggered the nationwide Woman, Life, Freedom uprising.

The Islamic Republic has been a festering wound, exporting its poison through the Middle East with terror and asymmetric warfare campaigns. But it has always used the same tactics at home. Since early July, the Islamic Republic has been conducting a phased campaign of terror targeting women refusing to wear the mandatory hijab. But the regime had failed to anticipate the rise of an adversary capable of shattering its iron-clad grip on power: a decentralized resistance network that is not only fighting for political liberation, but life itself—life the way it is meant to be lived, free of shackles.

The terror campaign at home has included the violent arrest of women on the streets, pathologizing them as “hysteric” and “anti-social,” and handing them draconian and degrading sentences, including jail, flogging, and washing corpses in a morgue, according to Amnesty International. In addition to arrests, the regime has also targeted more than one million women with threats of “legal” persecution via text messages, while depriving countless women of access to basic services, such as education, banking, and public transport. Furthermore, hundreds of businesses have been forcibly shut down for not enforcing veiling.

As part of its campaign of enforcing hijab, the regime has also deployed mass surveillance technologies that it claims can identify unveiled women in public spaces while increasing its surveillance of social media. But it is facing resistance.

“We have given blood for shedding the hijab, our chains. We would never retreat from the path we have already traversed,” Leila Ziafar wrote on Twitter on July 19, posting a photo of herself without a headscarf in a Tehran subway station. Hours after the tweet went viral, Bisimchi Media praised her arrest, posting a video of her home being raided.

Over the past weeks, Bisimchi Media has been the primary online outlet publishing such videos, calling for the arrest of “hijab violators” and celebrating their detention, which it later reports in graphic language. In the past, the Telegram channel has published exclusive videos of police raids, leading to the assumption that it is linked to security forces.

Despite all these threats, women in Iran refuse to bend before the Islamic Republic’s enforced hijab campaign. But their resistance comes at a high price. “I don’t know why some people think that we are brave—that we are superhumans. We are just normal people. We are afraid, too. Sometimes, I just want to disappear in the void—to be invisible. But we can’t give up this last stronghold of resistance,” a Tehran-based woman in her early twenties tells me.

Despite many people showing patience and resistance in the face of the headwinds, many are also impatient to see immediate “results” on the ground. And, in most cases, the only win they see fit to be labeled as “victory” is the absolute downfall of the clerical establishment.

Demanding immediate justice and freedom has been a pillar of every liberation movement. Yet, that demand should not distort our understanding of the realities of the battlefield.

Over the past couple of months, this impatience has translated into some people—often foreign-based activists—falling for fake news, such as “cities being liberated” from the Islamic Republic forces or Elon Musk being on the brink of connecting Iranians to uncensored Internet. While the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising has pushed the Islamic Republic to the brink of collapse, there is still a long road ahead before Iran can achieve liberation.

That being said, many who seek to dismantle the regime have honed their patience like the edge of a blade forged in the fire of persecution. They see that every uprising is another link in a long chain that is pulling Iran out of the stark shadow of the Islamic Republic.

A forty-year-old woman tells me about the “itch” she initially felt after she stopped wearing a headscarf outdoors. “I never believed in hijab. I knew the itch was only a residue of the habit of having to wear a headscarf for decades,” she added. Speaking of her fear of the morality police and private citizens enforcing hijab, she said: “In the struggle for freedom, we can only succeed if we persevere. No matter how far and difficult the road is we must be patient and stay strong.”

A chant to break the spell of fear

While the Islamic Republic’s campaign of terror has creeped into people’s daily lives, women in Iran have refused to be crippled with fear. “There are moments during my daily commute to and from work that I feel tendrils of fear creeping [over] me,” a thirty-three-year-old woman from Tehran tells me. “When fear strikes, I start reciting the names of other brave women who have stood tall in the face of oppression: Sepideh Gholian, Nika Shakarami, Sarina Esmaeilzadeh“—the names of an imprisoned activist and two teenage girls slain by security forces, respectively.

The woman says that sometimes she even holds onto her keys or water bottle as weapons to defend herself in case she is attacked by hijab enforcers. Regardless, with her knuckles turning white from clasping the water bottle hard, she keeps walking with her hair waving in the wind and her gaze fixed on a future where the “cage” no longer exists. “I will not return to that cage. I will not bow before bondage,” she says, calling on others to join the resistance: “Together we are stronger than them.”

Another woman, a thirty-three-year-old from the capital, explains to me: “Too many have died because of the forced hijab. So, it was an easy choice when I decided to stop wearing the forced hijab.” Nevertheless, despite her determination, her stomach churns whenever she hears the heavy steps of a bearded man—a tell-tale sign of a regime supporter—or a motorbike approaching her on the streets of Tehran.

“I am constantly afraid they might assault me from behind or burn me by throwing acid in my face. These are all things that have happened in the past to other women seen as defiant,” she adds.

Yet, her courage has prevailed. She notes how she felt the wind blowing through her hair and how it felt. “The first time my hair got wet in the rain, it struck me that, over the past four decades, millions of women in Iran have gone through life deprived of these simple yet beautiful experiences.” The woman says that, initially, she used to have a headscarf in her backpack but stopped carrying one when the regime announced it was using artificial intelligence to identify women not wearing the hijab. “With fear and terror, they hope to force us to wear the hijab. I refuse to bow before terror.”

Despite malicious looks from regime supporters and religious fanatics, most people, according to her, react to her not wearing the hijab with smiles, cheers, and even chants of “Woman, Life, Freedom”—the de facto slogan of the recent uprising.

For life itself

The recent implementation of draconian measures to enforce hijab has once again shown that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his cronies see the forced veiling and subjugation of women as a pillar of their rule—a pilar as pivotal as their animosity towards the West.

At the same time, fearing another social explosion, the clerical establishment has been rolling out its forced hijab campaign in a phased manner to test the waters and see how far it can go with suppressing popular demand for change.

However, top officials, including President Ebrahim Raisi, have tried to distance themselves from the violent campaign, taking a page out of the regime’s asymmetric warfare tactics against its adversaries abroad, where deniability goes hand-in-hand with the Islamic Republic’s clandestine operations.

Yet the regime’s brute force aimed at crushing life has acted as a catalyst. Unlike the past cycles of protest movements in Iran, the current uprising has turned into a fire, forging different social and class groups into a mighty hammer pounding the regime’s clasp on power.

A new front has been born from the womb of this woman-led uprising, where women, men, ethnic and religious minorities, and the queer community are fighting hand-in-hand for not only political liberation, but life itself.

Khosro Sayeh Isfahani is an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community. 

The post Women in Iran fight to break Islamic Republic ‘cage’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putting an end to foreign interests—as reflected in the slogan of esteghlal or “independence”—and creating a moral society were advocated as the primary motivations of the 1979 revolution. However, despite the dwindling foreign presence in the nascent Islamic Republic post-1979, which preached a more ethically centered society, corruption has reached new heights and has been ubiquitous from the first days of the regime. The ever-increasing amounts of money and elaborate schemes that routinely involve the closest regime insiders dwarf any pre-1979 reports of corruption. 

So, just how bad is corruption in Iran today?

Corruption is a complex issue that exists in various forms and degrees in any society. It normally refers to the abuse of power for personal gains and the diversion of public resources for private use. As it is done behind closed doors, it is difficult to observe as it happens. Transparency International has developed the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a widely used measure that is based on how experts and the private sector perceive corruption in the public sector. It draws on data collected by leading organizations through a range of regular surveys and assessments of different sectors of society, including politics, the economy, and the judiciary.

While even the best performer, Denmark, achieves only a score of ninety out of one hundred, Iran hovers around twenty-five, which ranks it as 147th out of 180 countries in 2022. Interestingly, its score improved between 2013-2017—when Iran became relatively more open to the outside world—but has sunk sharply since and not improved after hardliners consolidated their power and control over all branches of the regime—thus, validating the saying, “absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

Consensus exists among governance experts that opaque power structures, lack of transparency and accountability, and a weak rule of law are the primary causes of the persistence of corruption in any country. These conditions exist in Iran and have been exacerbated by the decades-long efforts to circumvent international sanctions, even though some steps have been taken to address corruption.

Most notably, Iran signed and ratified the United Nations’ Convention against Corruption. Additionally, high-profile public-sector bribery or fraud cases receive ample media coverage, ranging from vast embezzlement in state-controlled enterprises, such as the $21 billion fraud in Mobarakeh Steel Complex, the $3 billion in Sarmayeh Bank, or in the intricate web of bribery and fraud in the judiciary, as in the case of Akbar Tabari, the deputy to the long-time head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Sadegh Larijani. These are just a few of the high-profile cases in recent years that have seen the light of day.

In one way or the other, all cases point to the prolific involvement of regime insiders. Some perpetrators have fled and now live comfortably in the West, like Bank Melli General Manager Mohammad Reza Khavari, who presumably embezzled $2.6 billion and reportedly lives in Canada. The perpetrators that were caught have received heavy sentences, while some were executed and others fled. In one instance, one faced a suspicious death in exile for fear of whistleblowing.

These cases have demonstrated the extent of power networks of patronage within the regime and its various factions, often linked to high-level clergy. The very big fish that were caught continue to benefit from protection—even inside prison. In late June, the head of Iran’s prisons revealed that, despite his thirty-one-year sentence, Tabari is no longer in prison and has been set free by the highest judicial authority.

Unfortunately, systemic corruption is likely to get worse. The fragility of the regime and the erosion of its supporters in the wake of the ongoing anti-establishment protests due to Mahsa Jina Amini’s murder, the shifting loyalties within the inner circles, and the uncertainty of the post-Ayatollah Ali Khamenei succession are among some of the factors that create an environment of instability in which those who have an opportunity to steal are likely to do so while they can.

Do sanctions promote corruption?

Some Iranians point fingers for the ever-deepening corruption at the layers and layers of economic sanctions that have been imposed on the country since 1979. Sanctions do create economic distortions that are meant to disrupt normal economic activity, mostly through blocking trade and financial channels. But according to Hashem Pesaran, a prominent Iranian economist, only 20 percent of the economic malaise over a thirty-year period was caused by sanctions, and eighty percent is due to domestic policies.

Nonetheless, efforts to bypass these barriers lead to the emergence of informal or black markets, where corruption can thrive as individuals seek alternative ways to bypass sanctions and obtain necessary goods or services. One such instance is the case of Babak Zanjani—a businessman who, with the consent of officials during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), was tasked to export Iranian oil by evading internationally imposed sanctions and, in the process, siphoned off vast amounts. When the winds of fortune turned, he was arrested for embezzlement. Though initially sentenced to death, he was commuted to a life sentence and there are reports that he had been quietly pardoned since.     

There is considerable debate about the role and effectiveness of international sanctions. Corruption and sanctions were among the topics discussed during an Atlantic Council panel on June 13. There are two opposing views. Some believe that more sanctions are needed to force the Islamic Republic to adopt acceptable behavior, be it in the realm of a nuclear deal, regional relations, human rights, or even bring about regime change. Others contend that regime insiders only benefit from sanctions—that they actually welcome it—while ordinary Iranians bear the brunt. There is evidence that sanction-busting mafias, known as sanction traders, derail any agreement with the West that may lead to sanctions relief as this would erode their economic interests.

Countries that impose sanctions insist that they are targeted toward specific individuals and activities and will not impact average citizens, particularly in the areas of food and medicine. However, the anemic economy combined with the difficulty of repatriating Iran’s foreign exchange earnings has resulted in an ever-weakening rial and high inflation, which Iranians feel daily.

Nevertheless, while there is a plethora of stories on how sanctions hurt the people, there are also daily examples of how sanctions have had little impact on limiting the access of officials to Western luxury goods and lifestyles. Sightings of officials with expensive watches, the latest iPhones, and designer clothes have become routine and questioned in the media. Indeed, a recent report argues that Iranian decision-makers have successfully shielded themselves from the adverse effects of sanctions. In reality, sanctions largely impact those that do not influence the regime’s actions.

Iranians inside and outside the country have long complained that foreign powers are not serious or consistent in applying sanctions. On the one hand, the average Iranian cannot open bank accounts abroad, and often many who opened accounts decades ago were asked to close them for fear of violating sanctions rules. On the other hand, visible trades, such as luxury goods (like a fleet of Porsches or Maseratis) and their payments, slip safely through the sanctions’ walls, and access to them is used as a reward for loyalty to the regime.

The inconsistency leads to suspicions that, contrary to oft-stated objectives that sanctions are not designed to hurt the people of Iran, the West not only knows what it is doing, but is, in fact, a facilitator for the regime against the people, as evident when a German IT firm helped the regime filter and block Internet during the height of the ongoing protests. Recently, it was reported that the infamous Hossein-Ali Nayyeri, one of the four judges who executed several thousand political prisoners in 1988—known as the 1988 massacre—was being treated at a leading neurological center in Germany. It is unimaginable to contend that German officials were unaware of who he is or through what channels the payment was made to cover his exorbitant treatment costs. The United States and Europe must do a better job of walking the talk to ensure that their maximum pressure measures are indeed punishing the ones whose decisions have caused the state in which Iranians find themselves.

A common thread

The frequently publicized cases of bribery, embezzlement, or diversion of funds have become routine. Hence, only the ever-increasing amounts of money and elaborate schemes can temporarily attract people’s attention until the next outrageous corruption case emerges.

A common thread among these cases is their link to the vast politically and ideologically loyal networks of patronage and rent-seeking interests, often including prominent members of the clergy. It is yet another area that the Islamic Republic has failed in making good on its promise of establishing an ethical society. The presence of an elaborate sanctions scheme does not seem to deter these networks. In fact, they seem to thrive more from the resulting opaqueness while the public at large suffers the consequences.

There is a considerable consensus among Iranians inside and outside the country that the regime must be punished for its egregious human rights conduct. Sanctions seem to be the only instrument in the toolbox to bring about behavioral change within the mullahcracy. There is a widely held view that the actions of the US and other Western governments have blocked the access of average Iranians. Yet, the door remains wide open for regime insiders to travel freely, access their oft ill-gotten funds with ease, and whose children live comfortably in the West. Sanctions need to be better targeted and better enforced instead of the West looking the other way.

Nadereh Chamlou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative and an international development advisor.

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The Supreme Leader celebrated his eighty-fourth birthday this year on April 19. Khamenei is known to suffer from several medical problems—chief among them prostate cancer—but, at present, he still heads the clerical establishment. Even so, rumors of a deterioration in Khamenei’s medical condition increase yearly, as do public discussions about his possible replacement.

While Khamenei has not appointed a successor, there are a number of leading candidates in the name exchange—his son Mojtaba chief among them, as well as Iran’s current president, Ebrahim Raisi. At the same time, Sadeq Larijani, former head of Iran’s judiciary, is also mentioned. However, his chances are low due to the regime’s further radicalization and Khamenei’s activity to strengthen the conservative wing within the Iranian leadership.

Whoever will be elected Supreme Leader must work hard to consolidate his position. The possible candidate will have to focus not only on the relevant religious institutions—hoping to upgrade his religious title to ayatollah to accept the religious justification for ruling—but also gain the support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In addition to these facts, there is an understanding that Khamenei will work to prevent someone he perceives as a moderate (which he sees as posing a danger to the regime’s future), such as former President Hassan Rouhani or former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, from being chosen as his replacement. This guarantees the election of a conservative leader from a more hardline school of thought.

Assuming this is the case, and considering the new leader’s need to accede to IRGC demands to please them, it seems that the initial moves of Iran’s future Supreme Leader won’t be able to satisfy the West.

It should be emphasized that Iran’s nuclear program has been in the most advanced states since its establishment. Iran has two protected enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, where it enriches uranium to 60 percent while using advanced IR6 centrifuges. Iran is now a step away from enrichment to a military-grade level (90 percent). It has not yet gone that far, apparently out of fear of the international community’s reaction—not because it is technologically incapable of reaching this level of enrichment. In other words, if Iran’s future leader wishes to demonstrate leadership in the nuclear context, he will only have a few steps left to graduate to military-grade enrichment.

In order to prevent Iran’s future Supreme Leader from making dramatic progress in the country’s nuclear program to appease its conservative wing, it is right to take advantage of Khamenei’s tenure to reach a series of understandings that will not allow any future leader to cross the Rubicon in the nuclear context. This claim may be a surprise because Khamenei sought to build a nuclear bomb known as the Amad plan to ensure Iran’s future in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, given the fact that Khamenei gave up his desire to obtain a nuclear weapon due to his fear of the price Iran would pay—especially the fear of an American invasion of Iran—it is possible that Tehran will not seek to obtain one during his tenure.

Moreover, over the past decade, and even more so between 2012 and 2013, Khamenei applied the term “heroic flexibility” to justify a direct dialogue between Iran and the United States that led to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which required Iran to roll back its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. From its implementation in 2016, Iran under Khamenei fully complied with the terms of the agreement until the US withdrew from it in 2018. Even after the “great betrayal” of the US in Iranian eyes, under Khamenei’s leadership, Tehran has not stopped looking for ways to return to the original nuclear agreement. Recently, it seems that Iran is also willing to settle for a temporary understanding in exchange for some economic relief.

Moreover, despite its proximity to 90 percent enrichment, Iran has been careful not to cross the Rubicon in the current context. It has even increased its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, the world’s leading intelligence agencies assess that Iran under Khamenei is not carrying out any actions that indicate that it seeks to produce nuclear weapons. This is apparently why Iran has stopped its enrichment from reaching military-grade.

These facts suggest that it is of the utmost importance to advance a long-term arrangement with Khamenei on the Iranian nuclear issue before his death.

Given the plausible assessment that any elected leader will find it challenging to present a compromising policy vis-à-vis the West, an arrangement with Khamenei is becoming a preferred option to ensure that, regardless of the change in the Iranian leadership, its nuclear program will not expand.

It should be emphasized that Khamenei currently enjoys a broad consensus in Iran, and it is doubtful whether anyone can challenge his will or determination on strategic issues, including the nuclear issue. As Supreme Leader for three decades, Khamenei has a unique status with no one questioning his decisions. With this in mind, likely any decision Khamenei makes in the context of Iran’s nuclear program will be accepted and approved by the authorized bodies in Tehran without question.

This does not mean it will be easy to reach an agreement with Khamenei, who seems interested in an agreement but demands long-term guarantees to prevent a situation in which the United States leaves again. However, it will be much more challenging to reach such a deal with any future leader, who will have to gain the trust of the Iranian leadership. Therefore, he will likely demonstrate dogmatic policies for this purpose, enabling him to have the IRGC on his side. Thus, the West and Israel must see Khamenei not only as a threat but also as an opportunity—with all the difficulties involved—and strive to reach a long-term arrangement with him on the nuclear issue in his lifetime, thereby minimizing the danger that his successor will turn Iran’s nuclear program from civilian to military.

The fact that Khamenei still appears to want to seek a deal, even after the US withdrew from the JCPOA, illustrates his commitment to solving the Iranian nuclear file with political means. Khamenei will not forgo Iran’s nuclear capabilities, but his policy from 2012 onwards sought to achieve a political resolution, while he was willing to limit the program in exchange for economic relief. This behavior indicates that Khamenei has made strategic decisions in this regard.

Obviously, it will not be easy, and the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement almost shut down this possibility and greatly strengthened elements in the Iranian leadership, such as current President Raisi, who seeks to rely on the East—China and Russia—rather than on the West—the latter of which they see as the enemy of the revolution. Still, despite the complexity and low probability, Khamenei may be the last chance to reach a long-term political solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Institute for National Security Studies in Israel. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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Targeted human rights sanctions are, in short, a tool governments use to freeze the assets of and deny visas to those complicit in human rights violations. While they are generally intended to prompt offenders to change their behavior, they have additional effects. For example, preventing perpetrators from obtaining the tools needed to continue abuses and showing support for victims. However, the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project (SLP) has heard from multiple sources that many people in affected communities—including the Iranian community—do not have sufficient information, especially in their native language, about these measures and what they mean.

Based on this feedback, this blog series was started to highlight important information about targeted human rights sanctions as they relate to the Islamic Republic of Iran; major updates on Iranian perpetrators who have been sanctioned for human rights abuses and why; and any other information that may be relevant to affected communities. Input is welcomed from readers, particularly in Iranian civil society, for questions and topics that should be addressed.

Background

The Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution (SCCR) is an unelected body that answers exclusively to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It not only designed and enacted policies to more heavily enforce compulsory hijab, but it also created the morality police and then ordered it to enforce these rules. Since the appointment of a new secretary, Abdol Hossein Khosrow Panah, in January, it has continued to increase surveillance and enforcement. On July 17, authorities announced that the morality police were “resuming public patrols to enforce” Iran’s dress code. By that evening, there were reports of morality police patrolling and arresting people.

What the sanctions designations say

The European Union (EU) designated the SCCR and Khosrow Panah on March 20, followed by the United Kingdom (UK) on July 6. The UK found that the SCCR was “responsible for” and “engag[ed] in, provid[ed] support for and promot[ed] violations of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression through determining and enforcing mandatory dress codes for women, including the use of unreasonable force against individuals they deem to be non-compliant.” It further found that Khosrow Panah was “responsible for” and “engag[ed] in, provid[ed] support for and promot[ed] violations of the right to freedom of expression, through his role as Secretary” of the SCCR. The president chairs the SCCR—currently President Ebrahim Raisi—but the secretary is elected from the body’s members and holds a leadership role within the institution.

The EU made a similar determination, stating that the SCCR “promoted several projects undermining the freedom of girls and women, setting limits on their clothing and education” and that “[i]ts decisions have also discriminated against minorities, such as the Baha’i.” It further found that the SCCR “is a vehicle for promoting the current regime’s policies.”

These findings are consistent with the SLP’s analysis of the SCCR’s and Khosrow Panah’s roles in human rights violations. Specifically, the SLP found that they were responsible for violating the right to freedom of expression. Additionally, the SLP found that, by instituting policies that they could have reasonably foreseen would be enforced by the morality police with excessive force, the SCCR—and, for violations subsequent to his appointment, Khosrow Panah—were also responsible for violations of the rights to life, to be free from torture, and not to be subjected to arbitrary detention.

Of the countries that regularly issue targeted sanctions for human rights violations in Iran, the United States (US), Canada, and Australia have not yet designated either the SCCR or Khosrow Panah.

Why these designations are important

Designating the SCCR shows that the EU and UK are gathering information on government bodies and the roles they play in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s different abuses. By looking at the broader picture of the regime’s organization—rather than focusing on discrete cases against a list of individuals—jurisdictions will better understand its overall machinery. They can then form a clear, thorough picture of the responsibilities of each entity and individual, as well as how they interact with one another.

In turn, this allows the EU and the UK to focus on perpetrators beyond those publicly at the forefront of the Iranian government’s repression—for example, those on the ground leading security forces—to those playing a critical but less obvious role, such as Khosrow Panah. These actors may be less likely to expect international attention on their actions due to the complex and opaque nature of the bodies on which they sit, despite playing a critical part in the overall apparatus of discrimination and abuse.

With this information, the EU and UK can then expand their efforts vertically—to include other members of the SCCR—or horizontally—to include other government bodies and institutions that work with the SCCR.

What do the designations mean in practice?

The EU and UK sanctions regimes impose similar penalties on sanctioned people and entities. These penalties include asset freezes and immigration restrictions. But what do these restrictions entail? An asset freeze means monetary assets like bank accounts and non-monetary assets like property cannot be made available to the designated person or entity directly or indirectly, like through a third party (such as a business associate or family member). There are certain exceptions to this, like allowing access to funds necessary to cover basic needs (food, water, shelter, etc.). Additionally, EU and UK citizens are forbidden from making funds or assets available to these designated individuals and entities. This means that if the SCCR, Khorow Panah, or any other designated individuals and entities have any assets in the UK or EU member states, they cannot access them anymore. They also cannot acquire any new assets in the UK or EU member states now that they have been sanctioned.

Immigration restrictions only apply to designated individuals—not to entities (or to members of a designated entity, as these people would have to be individually sanctioned for penalties to apply to them). Essentially, these restrictions amount to a travel ban. Designated individuals cannot travel to, or even through, if transiting, the jurisdiction that has sanctioned them. If they already had some sort of permission to be in the country, it is revoked. In this case, this restriction does not apply to the SCCR, as it is an entity, and only members of the SCCR that have themselves been individually designated, like Khosrow Panah, would be subject to these restrictions and banned from traveling to or through the UK and EU member states.

What steps could come next?

In the immediate term, Australia, Canada, the US, and other countries with targeted human rights sanctions regimes should designate the SCCR and Khosrow Panah. Without multilateral coordination between these jurisdictions, anyone designated can simply move their activities to other jurisdictions where they have not been sanctioned.

Additionally, the EU and UK should take care to check whether either the SCCR or Khosrow Panah hold assets within their jurisdictions. For example, Khosrow Panah’s predecessor, Seyed Saied Reza Ameli Renani, held a business interest in London until June 14, when he resigned as director. While no reason for the resignation is given, Canada had sanctioned Ameli Renani a few months earlier. Additionally, the UK sanctioned the SCCR and another organization with which Ameli Renani remains affiliated, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, less than a month after his resignation from the UK business.

Especially if there are assets, authorities should prioritize enforcement (i.e. ensuring that the SCCR and Khosrow Panah cannot access them). They should also pursue other appropriate legal avenues that become available.

Finally, both jurisdictions should use these designations to continue mapping the Iranian infrastructure and institutions developing and enshrining similar harmful policies. This will, first, help inform future designations against other Iranian government bodies. Second, such information can be provided to government bodies in other countries to launch domestic proceedings more swiftly should either designated individuals or their colleagues belonging to designated entities travel to allied countries where they are not yet sanctioned.

Celeste Kmiotek is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council.

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Shahbazi’s confession is quite detailed. He reveals his alleged chain of command and the name of the agent who recruited him. Shahbazi says that he was put in touch with several IRGC contacts in Cyprus who had taken part in assassination operations before (Israeli media have reported these to be Pakistani nationals.) According to his account, Shahbazi entered the island by flying from Turkey to Northern Cyprus (a breakaway state only recognized by Ankara) and then smuggled himself into the Greek-majority southern part of the island. In contact with his handlers in Iran via WhatsApp, Shahbazi was preparing to kill the target—reportedly an Israeli businessman—when he found out that the police were on his tail and was told to bury his weapons and flee. Shahbazi reportedly followed the instructions and made it to Tehran via Istanbul.

Mossad’s history in Iran

Unlikely as it may sound, it’s not the first time Mossad has claimed to have undertaken such an operation. In fact, this is the third such case in the last eighteen months. In April 2022, Israeli media reported on an alleged Mossad operation on Iranian territory. Israeli intelligence agents had reportedly detained and questioned Mansour Rasouly, a fifty-two-year-old IRGC agent, in his residence in Iran, where he had confessed to a plan to assassinate an Israeli diplomat in Turkey, an American general stationed in Germany, and a journalist in France. The Israeli media published an audio file of Rasouly’s confession without revealing their source.

Months later, in July 2022, London-based diaspora satellite channel Iran International claimed that Mossad had interrogated another IRGC official, Yadollah Khedmati, in Iran, publishing the footage of his confessions about the transfer of weaponry to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

In each of the three cases, the Islamic Republic has come back with a different form of denial. In the two cases from 2022, they confirmed that the interrogations had taken place and claimed that they were done by a group of local criminal thugs recruited by Mossad. But in the case of Rasouly, they declared he was a farmer in northwestern Iran with no military connection. However, in the case of Khedmati, they confirmed that he was an IRGC figure (without naming him) but said that he had been forced to confess to untruths under “torture and threats.”

With Shahbazi’s case, state media outlets have taken a different path. They claim that Mossad has fabricated the entire story to overcome its panic following the recent alleged busting of its networks in Iran. In late May, judicial officials had claimed to have nabbed fourteen members of a “terrorist team” with ties to Israel. Par for the course with such claims, no evidence was given to support the charge.

As proof of their allegations about Shahbazi, regime outlets published pictures of tickets and flight manifests that show him to have taken a flight from Tehran to Baku on May 15, implying that the confession was staged and not recorded in Iran. Claiming this to be a smoking gun makes no sense. Shahbazi would have had plenty of time since May 15 to have returned to Iran from Baku and could have traveled later to Cyprus.

The regime outlets also tied the Shahbazi affair to an incident in May, in which the capsizing of a boat in Lake Maggiore in Italy led to the death of Erez Shimony, a fifty-four-year-old former Mossad agent. They went as far as implying that Shimony’s death might have been revenge for another killing that had happened almost exactly a year before: the assassination of IRGC’s Colonel Hassan Seyed Khodaee right outside his home, which, according to a report by the New York Times, was done by Mossad.

But, just as the IRGC downplays Shahbazi’s confession, some sources claim that Iran is working hard for his release by Israelis. According to the London-based and Saudi-owned newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat, Iran is requesting a prisoner exchange from Israel: Shahbazi’s release in return for that of Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Russian-Israeli scholar who was kidnapped in Iraq in March by an Iran-backed Shia militia.

The ongoing shadow war

For years now, Iran and Israel have been engaged in a shadow war involving intelligence operations, assassinations, and attacks on land and sea. When facing Israel, Iran has the benefit of using its vast network of allied militias in the region. Alongside the operations, a war of narratives also rages on and there is no surprise that both sides employ a game of cloak and daggers.

Nevertheless, even if not all Israeli claims were to be believed, there is no doubt that the ease with which they operate inside Iranian territory is astonishing. Since 2009, Israelis have helped assassinate many officials linked to the IRGC or the country’s nuclear program. Its last major hit was the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading figure of the IRGC, in November 2020, which took place on a road using a robotic machine gun. Prior to that, in January 2018, Mossad was able to raid the Iranian nuclear archives in a village outside Tehran, gaining access to 55,000 pages of documents and 183 CDs.

On the other side, the Islamic Republic has never been able to retaliate on anything close to a similar scale. This was clearly evident in June of 2022, when Israel worked closely with Turkey to stop an Iranian plan to kill or abduct Israeli civilians in Turkey. Israel went as far as asking all of its thousands of citizens traveling in Turkey to stay in their hotel rooms and not even open the door for food delivery. In the same week, Hossein Taeb, the powerful head of IRGC’s Intelligence Department, was finally dismissed following years of controversy. Taeb had headed the organization from its very inception in 2009 and had come under increasing criticism for all the Israeli operations that kept happening under his watch. The leaking of the Turkey-related plans seems to have been the last straw.

Given the long list of operations that Israel has been able to conduct in Iranian territory, it’s pretty clear that the clerical establishment has failed in its basic task of defending the country. It’s not hard to see why that’s the case. The country’s security forces dedicate most of their energy to oppressing ordinary Iranians and taking random foreign citizens—artists, academics, and journalists—hostage in the hope of using them as bargaining chips. Extracting forced confessions by torture helps the regime with its propaganda purposes but is not a tool for effective counter-espionage.

This was on full display in 2019, when Maziar Ebrahimi, an Iranian businessman based in Iraqi Kurdistan, revealed how he had been tortured into confessing to a role in the assassination of nuclear scientists. Arrested in 2012, Ebrahimi had, under duress, even confessed to traveling to Israel to receive military training. When all of this later turned out to be false, he was released and left the country before sharing his story with BBC Persian.

The amateur methods used by the regime are often so buffoonish to be believable. In 2012, following the execution of Majid Jamali Fashi, an Iranian athlete charged alongside Ebrahimi, the Iranian state broadcaster published an image of his alleged Israeli passport. But journalist Fereshte Ghazi was quickly able to show the source of this image: a Wikipedia template of an Israeli passport had been used with Majid’s picture inserted into it. The basic information on the passport from the Wikipedia template was not even changed.

Thus, the track record of the Islamic Republic’s security apparatus is clear: they can frame and torture their citizens to extract forced confessions but cannot stop numerous Israeli operations on Iranian soil.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

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During the 2021 SCO summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave an opening speech in which he announced that the organization would “launch procedures to admit Iran as a member state.” Nearly two years later, this has come to pass. While it’s important not to overstate the geopolitical implications of the SCO itself, deeper coordination between Iran and other member states gives momentum to the China-centered illiberal order being promoted by Beijing.

The SCO started life as the Shanghai Five in 1996, consisting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Its effectiveness in dealing with territorial disputes that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union convinced its members to develop and expand the organization, rebranding it as the SCO in 2001 and admitting Uzbekistan. Several countries have joined as observer states and dialogue partners, but no new full members were admitted until India and Pakistan joined in 2017.

Despite its early post-Cold War successes, there has always been a gap between the SCO’s size and its impact. It is often given weight with big numbers: its member states encompass 40 percent of the world’s population, 60 percent of Eurasia’s landmass, and 20 percent of global GDP. However, the organization doesn’t actually do much. Security cooperation has been the notable outcome, animated by a shared concern with the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The SCO has institutionalized this through the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure and a Collective Security Treaty Organization. Nevertheless, efforts for deeper economic integration have been stalled for years, and the fact that its two most populous and wealthiest members—China and India—are bitter rivals makes political cooperation a challenge.

Still, for Iran, membership has its privileges. Beyond the status that comes with being part of a growing international organization, it also sends a message to the United States and European Union (EU) that “[Iran] can come out of isolation without revising the JCPOA.” Deeper coordination with China and Russia is another factor that cannot be overstated. Those two, along with Iran, are deeply dissatisfied with the norms of the Western-centered international order. In isolation, each of the three face limitations in projecting power and influence in the face of the US and its allies and partners. Together, however, they act as force multipliers. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley recently said, “[T]hose three countries working together are going to be problematic for many years to come.”

As a larger organization, however, the SCO is less than the sum of its parts. The admission of India as a full member dilutes Chinese and Russian influence. Furthermore, with American partners and allies—including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—joining as dialogue partners, it is less likely that the SCO will represent an anti-Western bloc. Differences between member states and weak institutional bureaucracy also contribute to an organization that lacks the capacity to act as more than a talking shop.

At the same time, the evolving shape of the SCO as it takes on new members may present normative challenges. An important insight from the late political scientist John Ruggie was that the international institutions established after World War II were shaped by an “embedded liberalism” that animated interactions within them. Free markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democracy, collective problem-solving, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law are all features of these institutions and are promoted through participation. This embedded liberalism has continued to privilege those countries that set the rules of those institutions and the broader order they support, and this remains a source of dissatisfaction for those whose political values are at odds with them.

The SCO represents something different: a large international organization based on embedded illiberalism. The organizing principles of Western-developed institutions often diverge from the preferences of governments in the SCO. Even India, the world’s largest democracy and a key US partner, has taken a decidedly illiberal turn under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The SCO could be a key platform for institutionalizing authoritarian cooperation and resilience.  

China has steadily been developing its homegrown alternatives to liberal norms, working to make “a world safe for autocracy,” in the pithy phrase of political scientist Jessica Chen Weiss. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has received much of the world’s attention, but, in recent years, China has been buttressing it with new offerings that will also appeal to authoritarian governments.

Xi rolled out the Global Development Initiative (GDI) in a 2021 speech at the United Nations General Assembly, calling for “global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated and inclusive growth” rather than that promoted by Western liberal values. In April 2022, Xi delivered another speech with another project, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), framed as another public good from Beijing that represents a normative alternative from unipolarity under the US in the post-Cold War era. This past March, the Global Civilization Initiative was introduced, calling for an approach to global politics that rejects universalist principles while asserting that countries must “refrain from imposing their own values or model on others.”

All three initiatives are vague and aspirational at this point—much like the BRI was for nearly the first two years of its existence. The release of the BRI white paper in March 2015 gave direction to what was initially dismissed as “a new slogan on stuff they’ve wanted to do for a long time.” Expect the same for these three. The ambiguity is the appeal at this point; by speaking in general terms about concerns shared by many countries of the Global South, Beijing is building momentum for “an increasingly comprehensive vision of a new global governance system” with China at the center.

For Iran, SCO membership is cementing its alignment with authoritarian states. This is entirely on-brand and not at all surprising. However, as the SCO continues to expand across Eurasia, the organization’s ability to promote Beijing’s preferred illiberal norms makes it a challenge that deserves more attention.

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and host of the China-MENA Podcast. He is also an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. Follow him on Twitter: @jonathandfulton.

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But the cohort of insiders that have reached this conclusion—mainly from the so-called “reformist” faction—believe there is still hope for the clerical system. During the peak of the anti-regime protests, Mohsen Ranai, a regime-affiliated economist close to the so-called reformist elites, wrote: “[In the absence of a] revolution from above… a revolution from below will naturally occur.” In other words, while the opportunity for “reform” has been lost, the possibility of a “revolution from above”—from the elites—still exists—so long as there’s not a people-led revolution from below. Such a “revolution,” they claim, would preserve the regime and limit bloodshed. 

But what does “revolution from above” mean in the Islamic Republic? For more than thirty years, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has held absolute power in the clerical establishment. During his reign, the Islamic Republic became more ideological, totalitarian, and repressive.

This cohort of elites, who are still committed to the clerical regime, believe Khamenei is the biggest impediment to a “revolution from above” and, therefore, are banking on his evermore likely successor: his son, Mojtaba.

All experts, inside and outside of Iran, point exclusively to two hardline Islamist clerics to succeed Khamenei: incumbent President Ebrahim Raisi and Mojtaba Khamenei.

While Raisi—infamously known as the “Butcher of Tehran” for his role in the mass execution of political prisoners in 1988—has a proven track record that underscores he is anything but a radical reformer, not least in his current role in brutally suppressing Mahsa Amini protests that begun in September 2022, less is known about Khamenei’s son, who operates in the shadows.

It is precisely for this reason that this cohort of regime elites hope Mojtaba Khamenei can emerge as the next radical modernizer in the Middle East, mimicking those on the other side of the Persian Gulf and transforming the Islamic Republic from above—a view that may have found some resonance outside of Iran, per conversations we’ve had with policymakers and fellow analysts.

The transformation of Arab monarchies at the behest of their young modernizing leaders—such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman—has revolutionized their countries, not least in the realms of cultural and societal liberalization. Even the sharpest critics of Arab monarchies would concede that the changes seen in the past few years have been akin to a “revolution from above.”

But can an ayatollah’s son do the same? The short answer is no. Three major indicators forecast why Mojtaba will be anything but a radical modernizer for Iran.

The first relates to Mojtaba’s background and personal experiences—factors that will have shaped his views and values. To be a transformational, modernizing leader, such an individual has to either have a modern education or, at the very least, be well-traveled and/or connected to the outside world. After all, one must experience the fruits of cultural and societal liberalization—and the modern world—to appreciate their worth.

Mojtaba Khamenei has done no such thing. The Supreme Leader’s son has not only had an extremely isolated and insular upbringing, but has yet to step outside Iran.

At seventeen, Mojtaba joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and fought in the bloody eight-year Iran-Iraq War as part of the 27th Mohammad Rasulullah Division—a notoriously ideological unit. This contingent was founded by the IRGC’s Ahmad Motevaselian, a profoundly anti-Semitic individual and one of the founders of Lebanese Hezbollah. Under Mohammad Kowsari’s command, Mojtaba fought as part of the Habib Battalion, which was made up of the most radical right Islamists, most of whom would later form the core of the regime’s security and intelligence bodies.

Almost a decade after the conflict, in 1999, Mojtaba began his traditional clerical studies at the deeply conservative Qom Shia Seminary. His studies there would be overseen by his father’s closest and most extremist clerics, such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi. A few years later, in 2002, Mesbah-Yazdi issued a fatwa calling for killings of Iranian youths who promoted “Western immorality” and engaged in extramarital affairs, which resulted in a string of murders by the IRGC’s paramilitary arm, the Basij, in the province of Kerman.

Following his studies in Qom, Mojtaba returned to Tehran to undertake a role at the Office of the Supreme Leader—the most powerful and securitized center of power in the Islamic Republic—under his father’s direct and close supervision. He even opted to take his father’s dars-e kharej class (Shia jurisprudence specialism classes) in the Office of Supreme Leader to become a mujtahid and achieve ayatollah clerical status. Over time, Khamenei, the elder, would train his son to lead his office—a role he maintains with an iron fist.

Mojtaba’s first taste of politics would come in 2005, when he led the electoral manipulation of the 2005 presidential elections in favor of hardline Basij member Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, despite complaints from other candidates. Since then, with his father’s full backing, Mojtaba has emerged as the man behind the curtain controlling the Office of the Supreme Leader, with heavy involvement in decision-making across the Islamic Republic.

Another indicator to consider relates to Mojtaba’s inner circle. As the old saying goes, “You can judge a man by the company he keeps”—this could not be clearer about Mojtaba. The inner ring of the Supreme Leader’s son includes the most ideologically extremist clerics among the next generation of regime elites, such as Mehdi Taeb, brother of the former IRGC Intelligence head who leads the hardline Ammar Headquarters; Alireza Panahian, an IRGC-affiliated extremist cleric who has a leading role in the IRGC’s indoctrination program; and Mohammad Qomi, head of the Islamic Propaganda Organization.

These extremist clerics and their militant followers have been at the forefront of the brutal violent crackdown against the grassroots cultural and societal liberalization of the Iranian population. They are also leading advocates of the militaristic doctrine of Mahdism, the most radical Islamist doctrine. Those who subscribe to this apocalyptic ideology believe the eradication of Israel will facilitate the return of the Twelfth divinely ordained Shia Imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, whom Shia Muslims believe went into occultation in 874 AD. If Mojtaba attains the mantle after his father’s death, this so-called “ideologically pure” clique will be rewarded with senior elite positions of power and will have the ear of the new Supreme Leader.

Finally, what vision can be pieced together from the ayatollah’s son? Mojtaba has been a man of few words and has preferred to operate in the shadows. Nevertheless, actions tend to speak louder than words.

A leaked IRGC intelligence report reveals that Mojtaba Khamenei had a crucial role in commanding the violent suppression of Iranian civilians in the recent anti-regime protests. This IRGC report claims that, while Mojtaba conveyed his “appreciation” towards the regime’s security forces for neutralizing the nationwide protests, he also criticized the Basij for ignoring his consistent calls to be better equipped to suppress those on the streets.

This report is consistent with Mojtaba’s direct commanding role in confronting past anti-regime protests in Iran. During the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, regime insiders indicated that Mojtaba took complete control over coordinating IRGC’s Basij crackdown on protesters that were demanding greater liberalization. Based on accounts from the so-called “reformist faction” during the 2009 suppression, national security meetings were relocated to the Office of the Supreme Leader to be personally supervised by Mojtaba. It was precisely Mojtaba’s direct role in the violent suppression of protesters that resulted in popular slogans being directed at him, such as, “Mojtaba, we hope you die, so you never see the supreme leadership.”

Beyond this, it is known, like his father, that Mojtaba belongs to the radical Shia Islamist faction that subscribes to absolute clerical guardianship and its two core principles: domestic Islamization and exporting the Islamic Revolution.

While this may disappoint the cohort of elites like Ranai, who are banking on a “revolution from above,” the idea that Mojtaba will emerge as the next radical modernizer in the region is nothing but wishful thinking. In fact, from what is known so far, the ayatollah’s son will continue his father’s path, but perhaps with even more youthful energy, given his age of 54 years.

With that in mind, the past ten months have demonstrated that this revolution from below is ongoing. Instead of hedging bets on Mojtaba—a bet doomed to fail—the international focus should be on supporting the Iranian people—the real changemakers in this dynamic.

Saeid Golkar is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Service at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and the author of Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran. Follow him on Twitter: @SaeidGolkar.

Kasra Aarabi is a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on Twitter: @KasraAarabi.

The post Why Khamenei’s son is not the next radical modernizer in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

IRANSOURCE: The Islamic Republic and the Taliban have been in high tensions recently since the militant group ceased power in Kabul. Both countries have a long-term dispute over shared transboundary waters, but what is different now?

FATEMEH AMAN: The difference this time was that two old issues—the dispute over shared water and clashes at the borders—coincided, which made the transboundary water issue more dramatic. First, let me explain the dispute over each country’s share of Helmand transboundary water.

Iran and Afghanistan’s water disputes have existed for over 150 years and go back to when Afghanistan was a British protectorate. Back then, a British officer drew the Iran-Afghan border along the main branch of the Helmand River. In 1939, serious discussions between the Iranian government of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the Afghan government of Mohammad Zahir Shah led to a treaty over water allocation to each country, which the Afghans never ratified. 

The dispute intensified in the 1950s when Afghanistan built two dams on the Helmand River.

Renegotiations continued until 1973, when the then-Iranian and Afghan prime ministers signed a treaty. In recent decades, and under different governments, the issue has taken a more dramatic turn. War, displacement of populations, lucrative dam buildings, disastrous water management, and the impact of climate change have all intensified the dispute. 

The good news is that there has been an agreement since 1973 known as the Helmand River Treaty. However, it needs to be reviewed and updated. Nevertheless, the prospect of both governments sitting down and finding a lasting solution is not very bright. 

Turning transboundary water rights into a political issue is a terrible idea. Both Tehran and Kabul use rhetoric rather than dialogue. Just recently, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warned the Taliban “to take the issue of [Helmand] water and Iran’s share of water seriously.” The Taliban hit back with their spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid stating that Iranian officials should present their request “using appropriate words.”

Besides the water dispute, there have been clashes at the border between Iran and Afghanistan. Tension and confrontation have happened frequently on the eastern border, including the most recent violent encounter in May, which occurred in Nimroz and Zabul, leaving several border guards from both sides dead. 

However, such clashes did not start with the Taliban government and have happened under previous governments as well. 

Both sides commonly blame each other for starting the fire, but eventually, Tehran and Kabul always calm down. The incidents are often called “mistakes” or “misunderstandings.” There are talks about forming a joint committee to quickly resolve the issues on the eastern border. However, I do not see any sign that the occasional clashes will end for good.

IRANSOURCE: Walk us through the Taliban’s relationship with Tehran. Is this the first time we’ve seen tension between the Islamic governments?

FATEMEH AMAN: Iran’s current relationship with Afghanistan has been chaotic since the Taliban took over in 2021. The Islamic Republic does not want to look like allies of the Taliban, as both view each other with mistrust. However, there are conflicting and somewhat confusing messages on the nature of the relationship.

Iran and the Taliban almost went to war in 1998 over a Taliban militant raid on the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, which left nine Iranians—eight diplomats and a journalist—dead. Iran deployed two hundred thousand army troops and seventy thousand members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to the border area, but ultimately decided not to enter Afghanistan’s soil.

Iran has always tried to keep its presence in Afghanistan due to its significant concerns: shared transboundary water, drug trafficking, and border security. Iran takes the possibility of infiltration of terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), into Iran from its eastern borders very seriously and firmly believes it is vulnerable from the eastern border it shares with Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Since the Taliban was ousted from power in 2001, Iran kept some ties with some Taliban factions. Later, when the Taliban’s presence became more visible, Iran-Taliban ties also grew.

The emergence of IS-K in Afghanistan in 2015, as well as Tehran’s conclusion that the Taliban’s participation in Afghanistan’s future government was inevitable, prompted Iran to get closer to the Taliban. Iran tried to increase their influence within the group. The extent of the Taliban’s ties with Iran was revealed when the group’s former leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, was killed in a US drone strike when returning to Pakistan from Iran in May 2016.

In 2018, Iran admitted to having hosted Taliban delegations in Iran. Iran was actively involved in the intra-Afghan dialogue, inviting Afghanistan’s opposing factions to Tehran for negotiations. At the time, a best-case scenario for Iran would have been an inclusive government with the participation of Iran-leaning factions. This did not happen. The Taliban took control of the government in 2021 and did not plan to form an inclusive government.

IRANSOURCE: Most governments do not recognize the Taliban. Does the Islamic Republic, and how does this impact discussions?

FATEMEH AMAN: No country has recognized the Taliban regime, as no country wants to be the first to recognize them. However, I think once one does, the others will follow.

Iran has not yet recognized the Taliban regime. However, the Afghan embassy in Tehran and the Afghan consulate in Mashhad have been taken over by the Taliban regime since 2021. Iran, like other countries, wants to use recognition as leverage. 

IRANSOURCE: Back to the dispute over shared water… The region has been going through a persistent drought. The Islamic Republic complains that Afghanistan is blocking the flow of water, and the Taliban claims there is not enough water to flow into Iran due to drought. How much is the drought in the southeast to blame on government mismanagement versus climate change?

FATEMEH AMAN: Several factors have contributed to the current situation, including the impact of climate change. Let us take the example of the Hamoun wetland drying up. The Lake Hamoun area is a transboundary wetland fed by the Helmand River.

Hamoun Lake, naturally fed by water flowing from the Helmand River, used to be the third-largest lake in Iran and played a vital role in the lives of people in southeastern Sistan and Baluchistan province. However, it has nearly dried up due to several factors, including the disruption of water flow from Afghanistan to Iran. Other factors include unsustainable and profit-driven dam constructions, extensive canal creation, diverting Helmand River water to four giant reservoirs in Sistan and Baluchistan province, construction of dikes on the Iran-Afghan border (on Helmand) to prevent drug traffickers from entering Iran, and the introduction of invasive fish species by the Fisheries Company in the 1980s, which destroyed the entire vegetation cover of Hamoun.

With the disruption of water flow from Helmand into Iran, I was referring to the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-e Sharif in 1998 and the subsequent conflict between Iran and the Taliban. This led to the Taliban closing the Kajaki Dam’s sluices, obstructing the water flow from Helmand River to Iran, which ultimately halted the water supply to Hamoun. So, there is never a single reason for a catastrophe.

Both countries took steps to revitalize the Hamoun wetland on the Iran-Afghanistan border in 2015 and 2016. However, the efforts were cut for several reasons, including economic sanctions imposed on Iran that restricted international funds.

IRANSOURCE: Anti-regime protests continue in some parts of Iran, particularly in the impoverished southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan. Some may interpret the dire water situation as the clerical establishment purposely punishing the population for participating in protests. What is your read on this?

FATEMEH AMAN: Sistan and Baluchistan province is the most deprived province in Iran. Yes, there has been an unbelievable level of discrimination by the Shia-centric government against the Sunni-majority province. Yes, there needs to be more investment to improve the livelihoods of millions in that region. There has been disastrous water mismanagement in many parts of Iran, including Sistan and Baluchistan. However, the province’s critical water issue is unrelated to recent protests. 

The Islamic Republic had four decades since the 1979 revolution to invest in water and ensure that the region’s drinking water would not be dependent on transboundary water. But they failed. Their failed policies are more comprehensive than those in Sistan and Baluchistan. Many parts of the country face critical water shortages due to ineffective policies.

IRANSOURCE: Iranian lawmakers recently said Sistan and Baluchistan province only have three months of water left before it runs out. How will it impact the neglected population there? 

FATEMEH AMAN: As I said, the Islamic Republic had over forty years to invest in improving the water management system. They missed all opportunities. Unfortunately, authorities not only ignored experts’ warnings for many years, but they also prosecuted and imprisoned environmental activists working on the issue. Unless Iran reaches a lasting agreement with the Afghans, I do not see how things can be improved or stopped from worsening. We will probably see mass migration and more conflict in the future due to water and climate change.

IRANSOURCE: How will this dispute impact Afghan refugees in Iran?

FATEMEH AMAN: Before the 2021 Taliban rule, Iranian authorities could blackmail the Afghan government by threatening to send back millions of refugees to Afghanistan. Right now, they do not have this luxury. The Taliban would not care about refugees being forcibly returned. The only leverage Tehran has is recognition of the Taliban, which Iran is not giving away without some concessions. Iran will continue the same approach if the situation does not change.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), since the Taliban regained power in August 2021, an estimated one million Afghans have sought refuge in Iran alone.

Unfortunately, refugees in many countries are used as scapegoats, and Afghan refugees in Iran are no exception. With the deepening dispute, the Afghans will experience more hardship in Iran. 

The post Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Helmand River. The water wars have no end in sight. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Prompted by Hezbollah’s recent brazen behavior, the Israeli security establishment seems fixated on detecting signals that indicate whether the group is readying for another direct war or security escalation with Israel. In March, Hezbollah deployed a thousand seemingly unarmed personnel along the border (four hundred were Hamas-affiliated Palestinians). Shortly afterward, the Shia organization facilitated two attacks against Israel but maintained a sufficient distance from their execution to avoid an Israeli reprisal or escalation. In late March, a Palestinian militant infiltrated from Lebanon and planted an explosive bearing the hallmark of Hezbollah manufacturing in Megiddo. Then, in early April, Hamas fired a barrage of thirty-four rockets from Lebanon into Israel.

Following this, Hezbollah staged a massive but relatively routine “war game” to commemorate Israel’s withdrawal from south Lebanon. On a smaller scale, it echoed Hezbollah’s ten thousand-man simulated invasion of the Galilee in August 2012, which commemorated its 2006 “victory” over Israel. This time, the group invited reporters to witness masked fighters training to destroy Israel by jumping through flaming hoops, firing from the backs of motorcycles, emerging through plumes of smoke, and blowing up Israeli flags posted on hills. The exhibition—useless as a battlefield exercise—was pure military theater intended to make headlines, produce images for Hezbollah’s martial music videos, and reinforce its supporters’ belief that Hezbollah can deter, defeat, and destroy Israel. It may also have covered Hezbollah’s infiltration of Israeli territory and installation of two outposts in Har Dov/Shebaa Farms—testing the limits of Israeli patience and gradually attempting to adjust the rules of engagement without incurring retaliation.

Critical as some developments may prove, they obscure a more dangerous Hezbollah initiative to establish a proxy foothold behind Israeli lines. Hezbollah has coveted such an option for decades, beginning—at least—after Israel expelled four hundred Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters to south Lebanon in 1992 and readmitted them a year later. These returnees served as a nucleus for Hezbollah and Iran to fight Israel from within—an effort that continued with direct armed assistance to Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafat’s Fatah (beginning in 1998), and then to several armed groups during the Second Intifada and afterward.

Since then, Hezbollah—working with Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) or separately—has spent considerable efforts to enlist Arab Israelis, Lebanese, nationals of Arab countries with foreign passports, and Palestinians to gather intelligence, recruit additional assets, or establish sleeper cells within Israel to plan terror attacks. To that end, the connections between Lebanese and Arab Israeli criminal networks have proven invaluable.

Statements from Hezbollah and Iranian officials—in addition to the group’s past and current behavior—betray a three-fold and ambitious objective that goes far beyond periodically igniting scattered chaos within Israel.

Part of Iran’s regional strategy is to develop its proxies’ domestic weapons production capabilities. The IRGC has achieved this outcome with Hezbollah in south Lebanon—relying on their Lebanese proxy—and with Yemen’s Houthis, as well as in the Gaza Strip. Sometime after the 2005 Israeli withdrawal and before his assassination in 2008, Hezbollah’s then-military commander Imad Mughniyeh spent months in the coastal enclave training Palestinian militants in rocket and launching pad production and tunnel and rocket warfare.

In line with that, Hezbollah and Iran appear set on replicating that outcome in the West Bank. IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami admitted as much in 2022, saying Iran’s goal was to arm the West Bank “the same way that Gaza is armed.” As he told Fars News, “When something is homegrown, it cannot be stopped.” Recent attempts to fire rockets from Jenin on June 26—claimed by a Hamas-affiliated group calling itself the “[Yahya] Ayyash Detachment – West of Jenin”—and the discovery of a launch pad in June in east Jerusalem, as well as weapons laboratories on July 3 in Jenin, indicate these efforts may have begun producing results.

A second and corollary objective, per Salami in 2014, is to “imminently transform the West Bank into an unbearable inferno and hell” for Israel. Iran outsourced the task to Hezbollah, whose Unit 133 had been recruiting and funding cells in the West Bank through Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s son, Jawad. According to Israeli police and the Shin Bet, Hezbollah’s continuous weapons smuggling into Israel and the West Bank has intensified significantly since 2021. This boost immediately preceded the ongoing upsurge of West Bank violence, which began in June 2021, with unrest spreading to cities long considered tranquil, such as Jericho.

As a result of these efforts, groups once thought defunct in the West Bank (ex. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or all across the region (ex. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB)) have experienced a resurgence. New armed groups have also sprung up, particularly in Jenin and Nablus. Fueled by coherent ideologies, some are affiliated with major organizations, like the PIJ Quds Brigades-linked Jenin Detachment and Nablus Detachment, and AAMB’s Hezam Al-Nar and Liwa al-Shuhada.

Others are motivated more by frustration, like the so-called Lion’s Den—a shadowy and diffuse entity centered in Nablus. This group emerged independently in August 2022, drawing on the disaffection of Palestinian youths through both the efficacy of the Palestinian Authority and negotiations with Israel. Here too, however, Iran has been fanning the flames. Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar recently noted that Tehran has been using online platforms to encourage recruitment, demonstrating the Islamic Republic’s exploitation of any available vector—ideological motivation or disillusionment—to stir up violence.

Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, Iran and Hezbollah have sought to exploit tensions between Arab and Jewish Israelis to establish what, in Resistance Axis jargon, has been called “the unification of the fronts.” To that end, Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem described Israel’s May 2021 inter-ethnic riots, which overlapped with the clash with Gaza-based Palestinian militants, as a “strategic change and historical inflection point.” West Bank, Gazan, and Jerusalemite Palestinians had become united with “’48 Arabs” in purpose, he said, whereby all Palestinians—not just the segment directly affected—would now collectively respond to any Israeli attack or encroachment.

Like Qassem, Hezbollah’s Executive Council Chairman Hashem Safieddine recently suggested that this development would allow the group to strike Israel from within. Fantasizing about the “united fronts” giving Hezbollah the ability to almost sow chaos at will within Israel, he said, “The day will come when the Resistance takes part in operations within [Israel’s] 1948 borders, something that Israel couldn’t imagine… this will cause the [Zionist] regime to crumble from within. Imagine what would happen if the Resistance enters the ‘48 territories.’ “

Establishing a front within Israel and the West Bank has immense utility for Hezbollah—now and during the group’s promised “comprehensive war” against the Jewish state. For now, it allows the group to continue bleeding Israel through proxies while maintaining plausible deniability. At a minimum, this will keep the IDF mired in combating low-level, albeit sustained, violence. At worst, Israel’s ongoing clashes with Palestinian militants increase the possibility of miscalculation or overreaction by one or both parties, potentially igniting a new intifada. Such an outcome appears increasingly plausible as a younger Palestinian generation—disillusioned both with their leadership and negotiations with Israel, and with no memory of the bloodiness of the Second Intifada—is increasingly skewing Palestinian society in support of returning to armed confrontation.

The future utility of Hezbollah’s “frontline” within Israel would come into effect during a war. Years into the future, Hezbollah could ignite that war during one of the religiously or nationalistically sensitive anniversaries cluttering the Israeli-Palestinian calendar. By timing a conflict to coincide with a period of heightened religious or nationalistic sentiment (on either or both the Palestinian and Jewish side), the group could activate the cells it has cultivated in the West Bank.

It could also tap affiliates among Arab Israeli criminal networks to carry out a nationalistically motivated attack on a Jewish target—a synagogue in a mixed Arab-Jewish Israeli city, for example. With this simple act, Hezbollah could exploit independently heightened inter-ethnic tensions to initiate a cycle of actions and reactions by Jewish and Arab extremists, just like in May 2021, which could spread to the rest of those communities and throughout the country. By creating disturbances on both sides of the Green Line, Hezbollah will force Israel to divert the attention of its government and security forces from other active fronts, including—most critically to the group’s survival—Lebanon, to confront a lethal threat behind its lines.

David Daoud is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

The post Hezbollah and Iran have opened a fourth battlefront: Inside Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Upon news of the Prigozhin-led rebellion, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Telegram channels quickly covered the breaking story. One viral screenshot of the IRGC’s main channel reposted a tweet by a pro-regime journalist emphasizing, “If necessary, just as we prevented the fall of [Bashar al-]Assad, we will prevent the fall of #Putin.”

The upper echelons of the Islamic Republic were quick to respond to the events. “The Islamic Republic of Iran supports the rule of law in the Russian Federation,” noted the Foreign Ministry spokesman on June 24 without any mention of Putin, adding that the mutiny was a “domestic affair.” Russian media reported that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spoke with Putin on the same day, but didn’t provide any details on what was discussed. Meanwhile, the Iranian foreign minister spoke with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov regarding “developments related to the situation in some regions of Russia”—a reference to the events in Bakhmut, where the rebellion came to a head. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said that Moscow would “pass this phase” and warned against “foreign interference.”

State media outlets gave a better sense of how the higher-ups interpreted the revolt. Nour News, closely tied to the Supreme National Security Council, tweeted that, although the Wagner Group could have “destructive psychological effects due to its involvement in the Ukraine war,” the group “lacks the necessary strength to challenge the Russian army.”

After the Wagner Group rebellion seemingly ended, on June 25, state media outlets covered the events with front-page headlines that mostly took jabs at the mercenary leader and his forces. Hardline daily Kayhan played into common conspiracy theories blaming the West and NATO. A headline for the hardline newspaper Javan read, “Treacherous dagger did not cut it,” referring to Prigozhin stabbing Putin in the back. Even pro-regime social media users made light of the events, with one posting a meme’d scene from Braveheart, with Ukraine and the United States watching gleefully as Wagner and Russian fighters are about to clash, only to see them kiss and make up.

Reformist papers took a slightly nuanced approach. Pro-reform Hammihan newspaper published an op-ed about how the rebellion may be an “alarm bell” for Tehran not to rely solely on the East—a reference to China and Russia. Similarly, a dissenting voice came from the former head of the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh. He argued that “it was naturally clear that Putin cannot have a stable future” and that Russia was heading “back to the [Boris] Yeltsin period.”

None of these reactions are much of a surprise. A pro-Russia angle was expected from the Islamic Republic, given that it is one of Moscow’s main military backers.

Since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Iran has been providing hundreds of attack drones to Russia and is currently delivering materials to build an Iranian unmanned-aerial-vehicle manufacturing plant east of Moscow. The two countries are also heavily relying on one another as part of a sanctions evasion axis, having reportedly conducted $4.9 billion in trade during 2022 (up 20 percent compared to 2021).

There’s a soft power element as well, with Russian tourists making Iran a top three tourist destination (after Turkey and India). Additionally, a historical drama series named Khatoon (“Once Upon a Time in Iran”), which portrays the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran during World War II, became a point of controversy in Iran for not depicting Moscow favorably.

Whereas official organs of the Islamic Republic attempted to downplay the events in Russia, many Iranians joked on social media about the possibility of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei getting “orphaned if Daddy Putin falls,” while one asked how much it cost to “rent the Wagner Group for a week” in order to take out Khamenei. Another Iranian quipped that it was as if the late IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and the Supreme Leader were going head-to-head and that the former was coming to take Tehran.

That last tweet was particularly reflective of the thoughts of a portion of Iranian society, as they pondered whether similar events could play out in Iran in the near future. For years, some Iranians have held on to the idea that when the Supreme Leader eventually passes away, the IRGC would take the helm of the country in the form of a social liberal military dictatorship—something that has only intensified in recent months due to the ongoing anti-establishment protests that began in September 2022. Separately, Pahlavi, a leading Western-based opposition figure to the Islamic Republic, has repeatedly called on IRGC members who have not committed atrocities to defect and join the people to overthrow the regime (hence the meme at the beginning of the piece).

While the IRGC is no monolith and has its own external operations arm—the Quds Force, which could arguably have parallels drawn between it and the Wagner Group (the former is also state-funded but has roles in conflicts such as Libya, Mali, and Ukraine), it is best to stay clear of such comparisons.  

The role of the IRGC since the 1980s was to protect the Islamic Republic from inside and outside threats, including mass uprisings, coup d’états, and foreign interventions. Consequently, the IRGC shares the ideology of the Velayat-e Faqih itself. Since Khamenei became Supreme Leader in 1989, the IRGC has played a larger role not just domestically—by controlling much of the Iranian economy, swaying elections, and crushing dissent—but also externally, with its involvement in countries in the region (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen). It is highly unlikely that the IRGC would defect in its entirety from the clerical establishment to overthrow its leadership.

What the IRGC continues to do is have its members occupy high positions in government, with the Raisi cabinet having the most positions occupied by the IRGC compared to past administrations. The Guards will continue to maintain a key role as the right hand of the next Supreme Leader whenever succession does occur.  

Given the news out of Russia, like much of the international community, the security and intelligence apparatus of the Islamic Republic was watching the events closely to see its outcome. Had Prigozhin followed through with his plans and succeeded at ousting Putin, Tehran’s calculations with one of its top allies would’ve had to adjust accordingly. However, an aborted attack on Moscow is merely seen by Tehran as a nuisance for Putin in the same way that the Russian president likely views the ongoing anti-regime protests in Iran as an annoyance for the clerical establishment. In November 2022, Raisi and Putin discussed deepening bilateral ties at the height of protests in Iran, and the Russian president reportedly didn’t even bring up the unrest.

For those betting on the IRGC, perhaps the lesson of the Wagner Group’s failed rebellion in Russia—which was about a personal vendetta against an authoritarian leader more than anything—is that only the people of Iran and Russia can control their destinies.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

The post Could the IRGC pull a Wagner Group move in Iran? That’s what some Iranians are hoping for.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Playing musical chairs with leadership positions like this provides Washington with opportunities to recalibrate and update its coercive economic measures, with the goal of punishing targets for past bad behavior in order to deter such behavior in the future. Ahmadian is already subject to US and international sanctions. However, there are other areas where the Joe Biden administration can levy targeted penalties against recently appointed but undesignated leaders of already sanctioned institutions in Iran.

The US Treasury has a history of blacklisting leaders for sanctions circumvention and terror finance. This practice should not stop, given that corrupt business practices on behalf of sanctions-busters, which are aimed at handicapping due-diligence efforts—by operating shell companies and fronts, changing company names, or transferring ownership—are also not stopping.

Unless there is a fundamental change of mission, something improbable in the Islamic Republic today, newly appointed individuals will be helping designated organizations further carry out sanctionable activities by simply showing up for work. Moreover, Tehran can use the introduction of fresh leadership to falsely suggest that their organizations are no longer conducting sanctionable activity, which is aimed at tricking the marketplace.

For Washington, holding such leaders accountable can help improve its position in what is likened to a perennial game of “whack-a-mole.” Beyond exercising good sanctions hygiene and keeping its targeting up to date, the move offers Washington several advantages.

First, it better allows the US to credibly signal that it has the capability and intent to enforce older sanctions, as long as a behavioral predicate for each penalty exists. Second, it allows Washington to incentivize prospective leadership candidates to self-select out of contention, as they might want to avoid being subject to restrictive or coercive measures, such as an asset freeze or travel prohibitions. Third, it offers the long-term possibility of bolstering the deterrent aspect of sanctions rather than its punitive side, which enables sanctions to be better leveraged as a threat in crisis bargaining or coercive diplomacy scenarios. Lastly, there is the economic impact, which, admittedly, is likely to be limited when applied to the individual. Nevertheless, it raises the risks of sanctions exposure for foreign financial institutions that may knowingly deal with such individuals.

Luckily for the Biden administration, they can take advantage of all of these benefits by targeting several low-hanging fruit.

For example, early this May, the IRGC’s engineering arm, known as Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA) construction headquarters—a massive economic conglomerate founded in 1989 linked to the IRGC—experienced a leadership shake-up. Following only a two-year stint, Hossein Housh Al-Sadat was removed from the governance of KAA on May 1 and replaced by Brigadier General Abdolreza Abed.

Washington last designated the head of KAA in 2010, when IRGC Brigadier General Rostam Qassemi led the organization. Since then, KAA has remained on the Treasury Department’s sanctions lists, subject to counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism penalties. Since Qassemi departed from KAA in 2011, multiple US administrations have missed the chance to target successive heads of the organization, rendering the likes of Abolqasem Mozafari-Shams, Ebadallah Abdollahi, Saeed Mohammad, and Hossein Housh Al-Sadat sanctions free. President Biden should not miss an opportunity to hold Abed, the latest in a line of IRGC-linked KAA chiefs, accountable.

Additionally, the Biden administration has yet to blacklist new industry leaders helping Iran illicitly sell its oil.

In September 2021, Iran’s energy minister appointed Mohsen Khojasteh-Mehr as the new managing director of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Khojasteh-Mehr previously served as deputy minister for planning in the Iranian oil ministry and had a leadership position in the sanctioned Tadbir Drilling Development Company, a subsidiary of a larger business network tied to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.  

Khojasteh-Mehr replaced Masoud Karbasian, who held the position since 2018. Karbasian was sanctioned by counter-terrorism authorities in 2020 for his leadership role in NIOC, which was assessed to be supporting the activities of Iran’s IRGC Quds-Force through illicit oil sales.

While NIOC was initially sanctioned by Washington in 2012 and determined to be “an agent or affiliate” of the IRGC, NIOC received limited economic relief under the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. In 2020, the NIOC was sanctioned in its entirety under an updated counter-terrorism authority by the Donald Trump administration.

Similarly, the Treasury Department noted in 2020 that the NIOC and the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) sold oil and tankers on behalf of the IRGC Quds Force, and that the NITC’s managing director had worked with Lebanese Hezbollah on delivering oil shipments to Syria. NITC and its then-head, Nasrollah Sardashti, were accordingly sanctioned under the same expanded counter-terrorism authority used by the Trump administration to target NIOC and Karbasian.

Fast forward to 2021, only two months after playing musical chairs at NIOC, Iran re-arranged the deck at NITC by swapping out Sardashti for Hossein Shiva as managing director of the National Iranian Tanker Company. Shiva previously served as deputy managing director of NITC, an oil ministry advisor, and secretary of an SNSC subcommittee on economics. To date, Shiva, like Khojasteh-Mehr, has not been designated.

Together, Khojasteh-Mehr, Shiva, and Abed function as essentially un-restricted agents of sanctioned institutions. While targeting this trio—or any other penalty-free actors in Tehran—is unlikely to yield the immediate results needed to crack down on Iran’s illicit oil exports, it would signal that Washington is willing to spend the requisite time and resources to better calibrate its sanctions based on fast-changing facts on the ground.

Beyond the potential deterrent dividends of the move, holding these leaders accountable makes US sanctions policy look more coherent. Furthermore, it would combat the narrative that a more permissive business environment is being fostered within the Islamic Republic—a sentiment regime elites like Khojasteh-Mehr, Shiva, and Abed are likely keen to foster and exploit.

Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington DC, where he contributes to its Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP).

The views expressed are his own.

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The culprit in the attack, according to US officials and tech professionals cited by The Washington Post, was a hacking group operating out of or at the direction of Iran—an increasingly powerful state actor in the world of cyber warfare. 

The Islamic Republic has been steadily improving and sharpening its cyber warfare, cyber espionage, and electronic sabotage abilities, staging complex operations that, while not always successful, show what experts in the field describe as devious inventiveness. 

In addition to its nuclear ambitions, its refining of missile technologies, and cultivation of armed ideologically motivated proxy paramilitary groups, Iran’s electronic warfare and intelligence operations are emerging as yet another worry about the country’s international posture. 

The cyber realm fits snugly into Iran’s security arsenal. It is characterized by the asymmetricity, clandestinity, and plausible deniability that complement the proxy and shadow operations that have long been Islamic Republic’s favored tools for decades. 

Iran’s most aggressive cyber realm actions are also powered by a sense of righteous grievance and resentment, emotional and ideological motivations that have long energized the clerical establishment. After all, it was US and Israeli spy agencies that, according to many experts, launched the era of cyber warfare by deploying the Stuxnet virus against the country’s controversial nuclear program in 2010, damaging hundreds of its centrifuges. Tehran is proud that its growing army of techies is catching up and, in some ways, surpassing the West at its own games. 

Iran’s cyber efforts have been steadily broadening. They range from attempting to hack into defense, civil society, and private systems abroad to harassment campaigns against opponents in the diaspora. Experts closely watching Iran’s Internet and electronic warfare activities have detected an escalation of its abilities and ambitions in recent months. In early May, Microsoft issued a warning about Iran’s increasingly aggressive and sophisticated tactics. 

“Iranian cyber actors have been at the forefront of cyber-enabled influence operations, in which they combine offensive cyber operations with multi-pronged influence operations to fuel geopolitical change in alignment with the regime’s objectives,” said the report by Microsoft’s Clint Watts, a former FBI cybersecurity expert. 

In particular, Iran appears to be building complex tactics that merge cyber and real world operations to lure people into kidnappings. This new form of transnational repression has alarmed security professionals and governments worldwide. 

“We’re seeing an evolution over time of this actor evolving and using their techniques in ever more complex ways,” Sherrod DeGrippo, a former head of threat research and detection at the cyber security firm Proofpoint told me in January. “Iran is seen in the big four of the main actors. It is really stepping onto the stage and evolving what it’s doing.”

One particularly nefarious tactic that they are using is creating fake personas in the form of researchers who approach targets and try to glean information or lure them out into the open for suspected kidnapping practices. Through my research in Turkey, we learned that it is quite possible Iranian intelligence operatives have infiltrated the Turkish mobile phone networks and are using the data to track dissidents in the country. In one instance, a vocal dissident journalist received a message identifying a cafe near her home that she walked past every day. She was so terrified that she refused to leave her home for months and wound up obtaining asylum in a Western country.

In another instance, a dissident living in Turkey received messages with photographs of recent tourist sites he had visited on a trip to Istanbul. The speculation is that Iran had managed to purchase or surreptitiously access tracking data for their phones and use it to intimidate them.

According to a December 2022 report by ProofPoint, Iran’s cyber activities have gone beyond anonymous hacks and phishing campaigns to include made-up personas meant to lure people out into the open and in at least one alleged attempt, a kidnapping attempt. Sometimes alleged Iranian operatives use US or Western phone numbers to register WhatsApp accounts which can obscure their identities. 

Last year, Israel’s domestic security service Shin Bet uncovered an alleged plot to use false identities with robust and complex legends to lure businessmen and scholars abroad in what security officials suspect were Iranian kidnapping plots. In one case, an operative pretending to be a prominent Swiss political scientist invited Israelis to a conference abroad. A number of Israelis were on the verge of traveling before the plot was exposed. 

Experts are also noticing that Iran is getting better and better at creating virtual honey traps. “They’re evolving their ability to create personas,” said DeGrippo, who has since moved to Microsoft. “They’ve used these personas that are mildly attractive. They like to use women’s names, as they have learned that they get a bit more interaction and success when they use female personas.”

The US and other Western countries are well aware of the threat posed by Iranian cyber operations and have taken steps to counter them. But Iran’s state-sponsored program continues to evolve. Tehran likely believes the cyber capabilities give it leverage to yield information without the messiness of a hostage crisis, the headlines of a boat seizure, the riskiness of a human intelligence operation, or the potential retribution of a missile strike.

In January, the London cyber security firm Secureworks published a report on the emergence of a new likely Iranian hacking collective called Abraham’s Ax, which aimed to use leaks and hacks to prevent the expansion of the Abraham Accords normalizing ties between Israel and some Arab states. The collective leaked allegedly stolen from the Saudi Ministry of the Interior and a recording said to be an intercepted phone conversation between Saudi ministers.

“There are clear political motivations behind this group with information operations designed to destabilize delicate Israeli-Saudi Arabian relations,” Rafe Pilling, a researcher at Secureworks, was quoted as saying.

Less than two months later, in March, Saudi Arabia signed a deal to resume ties with Iran rather than commence them with Israel, as many in Washington and Jerusalem were expecting.  

While Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hardline government and his rightwing policies likely played a major role in Saudi’s decision to hold off on joining the Abraham Accords, Riyadh’s hopes that it could rein Iran’s diverse array of threats—including its increasing cyber warfare capabilities—likely played a role in its decision to pen the China-brokered deal with Tehran. 

Iran invests in its cyber warfare program because it works.

Borzou Daragahi is an international correspondent for The Independent. He has covered the Middle East and North Africa since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on Twitter: @borzou.

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Even without knowledge of Persian, anyone can click “see translation” to read the frustration and slew of insults in the replies of the account with over 684,000 followers. Some might dismiss these comments as belonging to members of the diaspora or even bots, but many appear to be real Iranians living inside Iran.

Many Iranians, whether in the diaspora or inside the country, are angry and dissatisfied with the United States’ policy toward the Islamic Republic. Since taking office in January 2021—and particularly since the mid-September 2022 anti-establishment protests that occurred after the murder of Mahsa Jina Amini—the Biden administration has imposed countless sanctions, covering everything from terrorism to human rights abuses. Meanwhile, the State Department’s social media accounts—which are run by the Office of Iranian Affairs—have taken the safe route. They repost official US government statements and share Iranian holiday greetings. Most of all, they continue to make soft power gestures, such as posting messages about Women’s History Month and Space Diplomacy Week.

These messages are innocuous, but they don’t resonate with Iranians, as the content doesn’t match with what’s happening on the ground. It lacks empathy and misses the serious concerns of Iranians, who feel the world has forgotten their plight. The US State Department should adopt a new approach by overhauling its current messaging strategy.

Eighty-four percent of Iranians over the age of eighteen use social media and messaging apps—many of which have to be accessed through circumvention tools like Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). The photo-sharing app, Instagram, is the most popular among Iranians and one of their primary forms of information gathering. With that in mind, @usabehfarsi should not just focus on official US government statements but highlight the human rights situation on the ground, such as the alarming rise in executions across the country in recent weeks; ongoing mass poisonings of school girls; the plight of imprisoned dissidents like rapper Toomaj Salehi; and the families under pressure to remain silent after their children were murdered, like nine-year-old Kian Pirfalak, who was gunned down by security forces.

While the international news cycle focuses its attention elsewhere, the protests in Iran are not dead. In fact, they have been going on continuously since mid-September 2022. The clerical establishment is walking through a minefield of public anger and resentment, and it’s only a matter of time before it makes another wrong move and people pour back into the streets en masse. There’s no going back to the days when mass protests were a once-in-a-decade anomaly, such as the 1999 student uprisings or the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement. Iranians are fed up with the status quo and want the Islamic Republic gone, and their protests have become normalized as a result.

Some may raise concerns that the US government will be seen as meddling in Iranian affairs by turning its focus to the situation on the ground. But, regardless of what the United States does, it always gets the blame. Take Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Nowruz address on March 20, in which he dismissed the ongoing anti-establishment protests as “riots” that are part of a “global conspiracy” led by the United States. More importantly, the strength of the “meddling” narrative has long faded among many Iranians going back to the 2009 Green Movement, when protesters chanted, “Obama, Obama—either you’re with them [referring to the clerical establishment] or you’re with us.” It’s also worth noting that, at every opportune moment, Iranian officials have regularly weighed in on what’s happening in the United States, such as the Black Lives Matter movement.

Messaging doesn’t just pertain to social media. It’s also essential that the State Department has a representative that is regularly at the disposal of Western and Persian language diaspora media outlets to take questions and engage with Iranians of all stripes on social media and in the diaspora on an array of Iranian issues.

The mandate of Robert Malley, the US Special Envoy for Iran—which operates separately from the Office of Iranian Affairs—was to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that the Donald Trump administration withdrew from in May 2018 (despite Tehran not violating the multilateral nuclear deal at the time). But priorities and times have changed. The revival of the JCPOA hasn’t happened for an array of reasons, starting with Tehran not coming to the table since August 2022. It isn’t likely to happen, either, given Iran’s provision of armed drones to Russia for the Ukraine conflict and their brutal crackdown on anti-establishment protesters. It’s time that Malley be replaced with a fresh face—preferably someone who focuses on an array of issues beyond the nuclear file, that may also speak Persian, and whose reputation isn’t built on the revival of the JCPOA alone.

The Biden administration’s approach must be more forthright to demonstrate that they are hearing the people of Iran and won’t forget them. There are embers of anger burning in Iran and the last thing any US administration would want to do is suggest that they aren’t paying attention when it spreads like a wildfire again. The United States must be on the side of the people of Iran. Otherwise, Iranians won’t forget who was on the wrong side of history when change does come.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource blog. She is also the author of the “Iranians on #SocialMedia” report. Follow her on Twitter: @hdagres.

This article was updated on May 22, 2023 to clarify that the State Department’s Office of the Special Envoy would not have jurisdiction over Persian-language social media messaging, which is under the Office of Iranian Affairs.

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The most obvious objection to readmitting the Assad regime into the so-called Arab fold—and the halls of the Arab League—is a moral one. Assad’s crimes over the past decade set him apart from other living Middle Eastern autocrats. They demand that he remain a pariah—not be slowly renormalized as a legitimate international actor. After all, Assad emerged victorious in the Syrian Civil War by slaughtering hundreds of thousands of his people, wounding and torturing scores of others, and displacing millions more. His blood-bought victory has visited immeasurable pain upon the Syrian people and the effects of this could last for decades.

However, reality and history rarely allow for statecraft to be so morally neat. In formulating his concept of raison d’état, Cardinal de Richelieu, France’s chief minister from 1624-1642, declared that “Man is immortal, his salvation is hereafter. The state has no immortality, its salvation is now or never.” In other words, states receive neither credit nor reward in this life nor the next for making the morally correct choice. They are only rewarded for doing what is necessary.

To a degree, that holds true regarding Syria. Reality—and the outcome of the Syrian Civil War—presented the Arab world with two choices: the first is to permanently boycott Assad and allow Iran’s dominance over Syria to continue growing. In the interim, this diplomatic isolation—coupled with a financial siege in the form of US-led sanctions—would prevent Syria’s resurgence or reconstruction. The Syrian people would then continue to suffer from Assad’s dictatorial rule and the various shortages and deprivations brought about by his destructive war, which would be further compounded by sanctions. Alternatively—and that is the path being chosen by the Arab world—attempts could be made to lure this particular fly away from Tehran with honey, begrudgingly reestablishing ties with him to create a counter to unchecked Iranian influence.

However, the logic underpinning the second option—drawing Assad back into the Arab orbit—is unsound, founded on the faulty premise that there remains such a thing as an independent Syrian regime and Assad to woo back from Tehran.

The Syrian dictator can now be effectively considered the glorified “Mayor of Damascus,” merely ruling that fiefdom at Iran’s pleasure. No matter how much Arab backing he has, Assad cannot ask Iran to leave his country willingly. Ensuring Syria does not proverbially fall into enemy hands is an existential matter for Tehran. High-ranking Iranian officials have described Syria as Iran’s “Thirty-Fifth Province” to emphasize that they view anti-Iranian activity in Syria on par with domestic unrest. The Iranians simply don’t trust Assad to be able to hold the country without their presence and control.

Additionally, Iran has invested too much blood, treasure, and political capital in Syria to ever leave the country without a fight. Nor can Assad forcibly eject them, with his Syrian Arab Army having been decimated by defections during the civil war and fighting. As far back as 2016, Hezbollah and Iran’s other proxy militias bore the brunt of fighting opposition forces and assumed control on the ground. By contrast, the Syrian Arab Army assumed a symbolic and secondary role.

That is why this effort to cajole Assad back into the Arab fold—floated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as early as 2016, but now enthusiastically led by Saudi Arabia since late March 2023—is unlikely to succeed. There’s little left of an independent Syria to work with. Nor can Arab intervention in Syria remedy that shortcoming, since it is unlikely to be as deep nor as intrusive in the country’s internal affairs as Iran’s.

Recalling a 2021 conversation between myself and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on the matter, he said: “We don’t get involved in a country’s internal affairs.” But Iran does.

The Gulf States are, effectively, leading the Arab world into replicating their old approach to Syria’s neighbor, Lebanon, which has also failed to produce any results. This is despite Iran’s influence—through its proxy Hezbollah—being more diluted in Beirut than in Damascus, owing to the Byzantine nature of Lebanese politics. If anything, Hezbollah exploited the stability provided by the Gulf’s assistance to Beirut to grow inside Lebanon. Iran can be expected to do the same in Syria, particularly if reconstruction aid manages to enter the country.

Assad is likely acutely aware of this situation and unlikely to attempt to break away from Iran or undermine its interests willingly. Tehran’s history of dealing with rebellious subordinates is certain to deter him. Assad risks being liquidated for stepping out of line, with Tehran blaming his death on Israel—as Hezbollah did with Rafik Hariri’s—for failing to offer enough concessions. Or they could opt for the route chosen by Houthi proxies in regard to Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, where they declared him a traitor deserving of death.

Russia, the other actor with influence in Syria, cannot be relied on to erode Iran’s control over the country. Since Tehran will not leave the country willingly, that would require Moscow to relitigate the entire Syrian Civil War. But this time, they would have to fight against an adversary in Iran that is more formidable than the Syrian opposition. In fact, even prior to its entanglement in Ukraine, Russian forces repeatedly backed down in the face of Iran and its proxies in Syria, demonstrating who had the upper hand on Syrian soil. Moscow would have to embark upon this task even though its interests in Syria—Assad’s survival, Russia’s armed presence in Syria, and maintaining Damascus as a military client—have been secured.

The absurdity of betting on Russia to restore Assad’s independence from Iran is further compounded by the fact that, to do so, Moscow would have to divert its ground troops away from a war it views as existential in Ukraine—where the Russian army is now bogged down—to fight Iran, an actor that has been acting as its indispensable ally in that war.

Assad’s victory in the Syrian Civil War must not be his ticket to readmission into the family of civilized nations, including in the Arab world. He achieved his victory by mercilessly slaughtering hundreds of thousands of his people. Reestablishing ties with him will not alleviate the suffering of those Syrians who remain under his regime. The ultimate benefit will accrue not only to Assad, but to the power that controls and keeps him in the presidential palace: the Islamic Republic of Iran.

David Daoud is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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On February 10, a press conference hosted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security led to something many Iranians had waited to see for months: a show of unity between opposition figures.

This included Reza Pahlavi, the country’s former crown prince; Masih Alinejad, a women’s rights activist against compulsory hijab; Hamed Esmaeilion, writer and advocate for the families of those killed on a Ukrainian passenger airliner downed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in 2020; Shirin Ebadi, 2003 Nobel Peace laureate; Abdullah Mohtadi, once the founding leader of the Communist Party of Iran and now head of the left-wing Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan; Nazanin Boniadi and Golshifteh Farahani, two popular actresses based in the United States and France, respectively; and Ali Karimi, one of Iran’s best-known soccer legends, now an anti-regime activist based in Germany.

Speaking at the event, the group pledged unity and said they would publish a charter of demands within a month. However, when this document, known as the Mahsa Charter, was finally published on March 13, it had already lost the support of Karimi—a firm supporter of Pahlavi—and Farahani, who made no explanation for their absence. This was the beginning of a process of losing supporters that quickly led to the group’s disintegration.

Cracks were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around Pahlavi’s persona. Some in the Iranian opposition have been long skeptical of his ambition. While Pahlavi has attempted to espouse broadly liberal democratic politics, many of his right-wing supporters are said to be chauvinistic, aggressive, and opposed to working with others.

Within hours of the charter’s publication, many supporters of Pahlavi went on social media to attack the coalition, christened the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI), and its new charter. Much of their complaints ranged from vague to conspiratorial. Some complained that the phrase “the Iranian nation” had not been used even though the text spoke of “the people of Iran” and committed itself to the country’s territorial integrity. Some complained about the clenched fist logo used by ADFI, claiming it signaled a hidden leftist agenda.

On April 4, Pahlavi declared that he had asked his coalition partners to include new figures in the ADFI. Less than a week later, he claimed the group had failed to “come to a consensus” on the inclusion of these figures and added that he won’t “limit [himself] to one group.” Pahlavi seemingly, in effect, torpedoed the coalition with one tweet. Under the barrage of personal attacks launched by many Pahlavi supporters, Boniadi temporarily deactivated her Twitter account (she came back on May 1).

The group’s demise was confirmed on April 16 when Pahlavi declared a momentous trip to Israel, where he was hosted by Intelligence Minister Gila Gamliel. In Israel, Pahlavi met twice with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and once with President Isaac Herzog. He also took part in Israel’s Holocaust Memorial Day ceremonies at Yad Vashem, prayed at the Western Wall, visited the Baha’i gardens in Haifa, and also met with members of the Israeli-Iranian community.

The trip wasn’t necessarily controversial for many Iranians. Most major forces in the Iranian opposition—including center-left and far-left groups—advocate for the normalization of relations between Iran and Israel and oppose the regime’s anti-Israel and anti-Semitic policies. Alinejad openly supported the trip, and none of the ADFI figures opposed it. However, the fact that Pahlavi had gone on the trip solo showed (in addition to his previous tweets) that the sun was setting on a coalition that was only a few weeks old.

On April 21, Esmaeilion declared that he was leaving the coalition due to “pressures from outside, pressed via undemocratic methods.” Pahlavi had resisted demands for the formation of a more structured organization for ADFI, Esmaeilion said. On April 26, Alinejad, Mohtadi, Boniadi, and Ebadi effectively published the obituary of ADFI, declaring it had come to an end while pledging that they were committed to working together in future joint efforts. The new coalition, which had given hope to many, had come to an ignominious end in less than two months.

In media interviews, Esmaeilion insisted that Pahlavi’s trip to Israel had nothing to do with his decision to leave the ADFI. In fact, Esmaeilion said he had deliberately postponed leaving the group so that he could wait for Pahlavi’s trip to finish. As expected, pro-regime media in Iran salivated over the news of the coalition’s collapse and covered it widely. Mehdi Chamran, a conservative head of Tehran’s city council, gleefully declared that “their coalition [had] collapsed, which shows that non-believers in Islam will never reach any results.”

Diversity of the opposition

For as long as the Islamic Republic has existed, it has faced efforts to unseat it by opposition groups based abroad. In the 1980s, just as it massacred thousands of opposition supporters inside the country, the Islamic Republic assassinated dozens of opposition leaders around the world. The victims included leaders of all hues, including former regime loyalists, nationalists, and Marxists. In the decades to come, these opposition organizations remained small, divided, and without much significance to Iranian politics. While the Iranian diaspora has had an immense cultural and social influence on Iran, its political influence has been small. Instead, groups and activists inside Iran have driven change even at the cost of relentless repression by the regime.

In the past few years, with the total sidelining of even the meekest domestic political opposition, some hoped that the opposition abroad could break this pattern and lead to change inside the country. There were many odds in their favor. Millions of Iranians get much of their news from satellite stations based in London and Washington, which give an enviable platform to the opposition, who can benefit from a diaspora that boasts millions of young and talented Iranians around the world. Yet the opposition has repeatedly failed to build any significant political organization.

Beyond the failure of attempting to build a broad front like the ADFI, no single political camp has been able to organize its own supporters either. Most ‘political parties’ abroad consist of, at most, a few dozen people, usually above the age of fifty. As a result, any significant change will likely come from inside Iran.

That being said, there have been positive developments in the diaspora. On April 22, hundreds of Iranian leftists gathered in Germany for a meeting that signaled support for a Charter of Minimum Demands published by twenty organizations in Iran, including trade unions and feminist bodies. The meeting had been endorsed by dozens of organizations, ranging from socialist and communist groups to LGBTQ+ bodies and more than one thousand activists. It also heard solidarity messages from people inside Iran, such as Reza Shahabi, the leader of Tehran’s Bus Workers Union, who is currently in Evin prison. Such meetings show the diversity of the Iranian opposition scene abroad and its many links to those inside the country.

At the same time, an inspiring show of the persistent relevance and strength of domestic opposition was on display at a virtual meeting held on April 22 and 23, but it was covered much less widely than the ADFI and its dramas. Inspired by the call for fundamental change from Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi, the 2009 presidential candidate and former prime minister under house arrest since 2012, the Saving Iran summit brought together leading lights of civic movements inside the country and in exile.

Former member of parliament (MP) Alireza Rajayi called for structures that could give leadership to the movement. California-based sociologist Nayere Tohidi called for “national solidarity against the tyrannical government,” which should include a wide range of people, from Pahlavi to those like Mostafa Tajzadeh, former deputy interior minister under reformist President Mohammad Khatami, who has been in prison since before the protests began. From their prison cells in Tehran, Tajzadeh sent a message to the gathering, as did Faezeh Hashemi, a popular former MP and daughter of late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The latter is known for her outspoken critiques of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Underscoring the event’s influence, the regime quickly arrested three people who had spoken there.

Pahlavi at a crossroads

The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media. Esmaelion’s departure came after relentless abuse was hurled at him by some supporters of Pahlavi. Such behavior isn’t limited to cyberspace. In a recent demonstration in London on April 30, supporters of Pahlavi, some of them masked, attacked Esmaeilion with foul slogans.

Pahlavi represents a figure with many contradictions. In his public pronouncements, he espouses a tolerant and liberal view and claims Martin Luther King and Gene Sharp as role models. Addressing a leadership summit by the Anti-Defamation League in Washington DC on April 30, Pahlavi sounded like an inspiring statesman, as he recounted the oppression meted out by the regime to Iran’s religious minorities while also paying homage to those like Shia Muslim Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who resisted the tyranny of the regime.

Although Pahlavi’s trip to Israel came with its own risks, it brought him gravitas and wall-to-wall coverage. While Iran’s foreign ministry declared the trip unworthy of comment, state-backed media covered it relentlessly, attracting comments and attacks by state broadcasters and clerics, showing his continued relevance. 

However, critics say Pahlavi hasn’t done enough to distance himself from many of his chauvinistic supporters who don’t practice the liberal message he preaches. Some supporters predictably claim this to be a case of some “bad apples.” But the evidence doesn’t support this view.

This isn’t just about masked protesters and online trolls. Some of Pahlavi’s vocal supporters have repeatedly made divisive moves. His wife, Yasmine Pahlavi, once shocked many by sharing a message on her Instagram stories that wished “death” to “mullahs and leftists.” Some prominent supporters openly praise Parviz Sabeti, a notorious official of the Shah’s secret police, SAVAK, which was known for the gruesome torturing of opponents. Pahlavi speaks of a need for national reconciliation and even welcomes former members of the IRGC. Yet, some of his prominent supporters preach a far-right nationalism that is aggressively exclusionary to those they call the “1979ers,” which seems to include all of Iran’s leftists and republicans.

The collapse of the ADFI also showed Pahlavi’s difficulties in working with others inside an organized structure. This is more jarring when recalling his previously failed projects. In 2013, he launched the National Council of Iran with much fanfare. However, the organization withered on the vine and he resigned from its presidency in 2017. Pahlavi is, thus, at a crossroads. Does he want to be an inclusive national figure that brings together a broad coalition of pro-democracy forces against the Islamic Republic? If so, he needs to decisively break with the brewing far-right faction around him.

On the other hand, the recent troubles of the opposition and the collapse of the ADFI could also be a moment of crisis that leads to positive change. If—in political competition with Pahlavi and one another—opposition figures attempt to organize their supporters and build effective structures, Iranians will get some nascent practice at democratic politics, which they have been deprived of for years. In the absence of such organized efforts, it is unlikely that the Iranian opposition abroad can break out of its decades-long pattern of political irrelevance.

Arash Azizi is a writer and scholar based at New York University. He is the author of “The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran’s Global Ambitions.” Follow him on Twitter: @arash_tehran.

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The summit and recent visits by high-ranking Biden administration officials to Africa were the culmination of an effort led by the White House to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the African continent in a wide variety of aspects.

This approach by the Biden administration is quite different from the one adopted by the Donald Trump administration, which saw the continent as a playground for superpower rivalry between China, Russia, and the United States. As part of this great power competition, the Biden administration seeks to enhance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to block Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.

However, one area both administrations completely ignore is Iran’s growing influence on the continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action in Africa.

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979—and even more so following the heavy political pressure on Tehran—Africa has become an attractive continent for the Islamic Republic. Iran views the African continent as a “battleground” for influence, power, and territory against Saudi Arabia, and has also sought to counter Western influence—particularly that of the United States—within Africa, working with elements that are opposed to colonialism and seeking to chart a more independent course.

Moreover, Iran seeks to utilize their worldwide network of religious and cultural organizations, including universities and charities, to increase its influence over the vast Shia minorities in Africa, using them for political support, fundraising, and even to recruit to terrorist cells.

But Iranian terrorist activities in Africa are not the only problem. Iran is not hesitating to interfere in the internal affairs of many African countries to preserve its interests and protect the individuals who serve its policies. A prominent example is the unprecedented Iranian involvement in 2019 to free Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky from his detention in Nigeria, with Iran using its control on Hausa TV to push for his release.

The Iran-West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, which was held on March 7, is another indication that Iran is seeking to enhance its relations with African countries and strengthen its foothold, especially in the west of the continent. This is part of President Ebrahim Raisi’s vision regarding relations between West African countries and Iran, which was exemplified in his visit to Guinea-Biassau in August 2021, when he pledged to continue expanding ties between Iran and the continent. In many regards, this activity resembles the policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Africa, which sought to improve relations significantly.

Apart from Iran’s traditional interests in Africa, several new ones have emerged that must be considered in the context of preventing Iran from consolidating its interests in the continent.

First and foremost is the campaign that Tehran is waging against US allies in Africa that dared to take part in the normalization efforts with Israel: Sudan and Morocco. In order to achieve this goal, Iran has enhanced its military and diplomatic ties with Algiers and increased military aid to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. The latter contribution has improved the front’s ability to inflict severe damage on the Moroccan army and challenge Moroccan control over the territory. Iran is also working in Mauritania and sees this country as a priority zone for its influence schemes in the Sahara region, which is extremely important for Moroccan security.

In the case of Sudan, Iran’s bid to further its influence in the strategic Horn of Africa suffered after Khartoum joined the Abraham Accords. In order to change this negative trend, Iran is blaming Israel for causing political instability in Sudan’s domestic issues. Furthermore, Iran is still actively trying to spread its Shia doctrine in the country while conspiring to create a political vacuum in Sudan that will weaken the forces who agreed to sign a normalization agreement with Israel.

Through its actions, Tehran is demonstrating that there is a price for joining the Abraham Accords and that it can pose a direct or indirect threat to Sudan and Morocco. Iran is also conducting a powerful political campaign to prevent Israel from enhancing its relations with other African countries and improving its diplomatic presence in various African institutions, such as the African Union.

In addition to the illegal arms smuggling network that Iran managed to build in the Horn of Africa, which allows Tehran to smuggle weapons to the countries of the continent, it also appears to be planning to significantly increase its sales of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) to the African continent. Evidence of this can be seen in Iran’s involvement in the civil war in Ethiopia and the sale of Mohajer-6 UAVs to the Ethiopian army.

Against the background of Iranian involvement in Ukraine and Tehran’s desire to increase sales of its military equipment in the war in Ukraine, Africa is a natural continent for this desire, and the transfer of these capabilities to the Polisario Front constitutes another indication of that.

Third, there is a need to pay close attention to the plots that were revealed in several African countries after the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020—the foiled plot to assassinate the US ambassador in South Africa, chief among them. During the past year, several plans were discovered in which Iran sought to harm American or Israeli interests in Africa or use its presence in the continent to recruit terrorists.

In order to protect its allies in Africa and preserve its interests in the continent, the Biden administration cannot focus solely on the growing presence of China and Russia. It must also consider Tehran’s deepening foothold in Africa, which is a growing challenge to US policy on the continent. The administration must prepare an orderly work plan with the cooperation of African countries—and possibly Gulf countries—that are very disturbed by Iranian expansion. The goal of this would be to reduce Iranian influence in Africa and prevent Iran from using African countries to achieve its interests.

Looking to the future, Africa will continue to be an attractive target for Iranian policy under Raisi. Without a well-thought-out action plan, the US will have minimal ability to push Tehran out of Africa and prevent it from coordinating with China and Russia, with the latter having engaged in an unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran in recent months. Thus, countering Iran’s influence in Africa must become a priority for the Biden administration sooner rather than later.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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