That risk is due to a number of factors, but one glaring reason is the limited availability or mining of these minerals in the United States. That is increasingly problematic as demand for these minerals rises, considering the role they play in building a green economy globally.

In contrast, across the Atlantic, Africa is home to over 30 percent of the world’s known reserves of critical minerals. While international interest and investment in the African critical-minerals industry have been lagging, it is rapidly picking up; this is welcome news for resource-rich African nations.

But history shows that mining interest and investment—even if welcome—can have inadvertent negative effects. In recent years, mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and South Africa have been found to be polluting waterways, contributing to acid rain, and poisoning residents. Thus, the US public and private sectors should develop strategies surrounding mining projects that ensure African workers’ health is protected, the environment is not damaged, and the opinions of local communities are sought out, heard, and respected.

Acknowledge the checkered history of mining in Africa

It is important for mining companies and foreign governments to be cognizant of the historical context that surrounds the African mining industry.

For example, in South Africa in the nineteenth century, the discovery of diamonds and gold brought Africans and Europeans alike to mining areas such as the Witwatersrand and mining towns such as Kimberley. After the initial boom, the South African government passed the Natives Land Act in 1913, which restricted Black Africans from buying or occupying land outside of specified areas, except as employees. This policy restricted many Africans from benefiting from the proceeds of mining minerals, and for these people, their main access to any financial gain from the mines came only from working as miners.

While the legislation was repealed in 1991—and others like it are firmly in Africa’s past—it created the conditions for a variety of socioeconomic challenges, including poverty, inequality, and landlessness. Thus, as the US public and private sectors look to get more involved on the continent with mining projects, they should integrate into their strategies a plan for increasing economic opportunity for local communities.

The US government seems to be headed in this direction already with its support for and investment in the Lobito Corridor project, which aims to update the infrastructure along an economic route stretching from the DRC and Zambia to an Angolan port in order to improve the flow of mining-related trade and also to create jobs for local communities. Concerns still remain, but this form of holistic engagement is essential to ensuring mutual prosperity in mining projects.

Don’t exacerbate the “resource curse”

Many African countries have been associated with a “resource curse,” a term that refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to fully benefit from their natural resources.

For example, Cabo Delgado, a small province in Mozambique’s north, is one of the country’s poorest regions, despite the region’s many natural resources. This has led many in Cabo Delgado to feel marginalized and angry at the central government. A 2011 discovery of a massive natural gas field off the northeastern coast of Mozambique further exacerbated this dissatisfaction. Specifically, youth in the region felt sidelined as foreigners and Mozambicans from elsewhere in the country benefited from the jobs and wealth associated with the discovery.

As the government formalized the mining sector and centralized control of it, artisanal miners were displaced. A widely held sense of injustice gave rise to an Islamist militant group, Mozambique’s al-Shabaab, which took advantage of these grievances to gain popularity among youth in the region. The activities of various armed groups in Cabo Delgado have resulted in around five thousand deaths and the displacement of 582,000 people since 2017.  

In conducting mining projects on the continent, the US public and private sector should add to their strategies specific plans to ensure that the benefits of natural-resource endowment reach local communities.

Botswana provides a positive example. In recent years, the country—one of the world’s leading producers of diamonds and also among the least corrupt on the African continent—has developed a “pro-equity based extractive sector strategy,” taking revenues from extractive sectors and investing them in health and education infrastructure and also into long-term savings through an asset fund. There are also various mechanisms and institutions set up to prevent or catch corruption, such as a constitutionally independent body in charge of cases of corruption. Botswana shows that strong business and the fight against corruption are perfectly compatible.

As part of any strategy, US stakeholders should support African countries in their anti-corruption endeavors and empower human-rights organizations that risk much to protect the resources of these countries and ensure benefits from mining reach local communities. Doing so would encourage African countries to take corruption issues seriously and, in the long run, would create a more attractive environment for sustainable investments. That contradicts the naive belief of some people—such as Israeli businessman Dan Gertler, who was sanctioned by the Trump administration for what it called “corrupt mining and oil deals” in the DRC (he has denied wrongdoing)—that lifting sanctions would be a way to bring back foreign investors.

Strategize for stability

Over time, mismanaged mining projects have contributed to instability, violence, and conflict across Africa.

That dynamic can be seen not only in the Mozambique case but also in Kivu, a region in the DRC’s east. The DRC is central to the production of several critical minerals. For example, as much as 70 percent of global cobalt comes from the DRC. A conflict has gripped the region for almost three decades, and armed groups have wrestled control of mining areas to finance their operations. The DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and China have often put their interests ahead of those of the residents, who are hoping to see their quality of life improve. Currently, six million people are internally displaced within the DRC, and since the start of the conflict in 1996, six million people have been killed.

With this history in mind, US mining companies with projects on the continent must strategize on how to limit the role mining plays in exacerbating conflicts and tensions. They can do that by bringing more of the supply chain—specifically, value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing—to the continent.

Industrializing the mineral sector in Africa

Historically, mining in Africa has been exploited by foreign partners. China, for example, controls 80 percent of the world’s raw mineral refining and owns fifteen of the seventeen cobalt mining operations in the DRC.

But the US public and private sector can change this status quo by bringing more of the value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing to the African continent, rather than extracting the minerals and bringing them immediately overseas for processing. Not only would this appeal to local populations—as it would encourage industrialization—but employing this different strategy would offer the United States a comparative advantage over China.

A strategy that brings value-adding steps of the value chain to the continent should promote local job creation, prioritize environmental protection in areas with high floral and animal biodiversity, and protect workers’ health. It should also prioritize the deployment of cleaner mining techniques (including those mobilizing artificial intelligence) and encourage countries to adopt a tax that allows for a more fair and just distribution of revenues from mining.

Economic communities—such as the Southern African Development Community—should also play a role in promoting regional value chains. Through such groupings, countries should take advantage of opportunities to share information and data, build capacities, and harmonize legal frameworks.

Stakeholders from the United States must remember that this is about more than curbing Chinese and Russian influence on the continent; rather, it is about avoiding past wrongdoings on the continent, by supporting local communities and preventing mining operations from contributing to various forms of instability and conflict.  

But there’s also a bigger picture to keep in mind: By getting mining investment right, the United States can set a new precedent for its collaboration with African countries in other areas, such as in health, security, and technology.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

Sibi Nyaoga is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center where he supports the center’s work on critical minerals and migration. 

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While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027. 

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

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If the United States does not collaborate more with Africa on space-related activities, it risks not only losing strategic and geopolitical influence to China and Russia and missing out on a growing market but also hindering scientific and technological advancements. That would limit the contribution of space-based solutions to solving challenges, for example ones related to sustainability, climate change, and disaster management. A lack of collaboration would also leave behind an opportunity to shape space security and strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries.

Collaboration as it stands today

Following the US-Africa Leaders Summit in October last year, the US Departments of Commerce and State and the African Union organized the US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, to build multilateral space partnerships and foster space commerce. At the meeting, the African Union representatives highlighted the African Outer Space Programme—which looks to strengthen the African Union’s use of space—and the role it plays in realizing Africa’s Agenda 2063 and powering development. Meanwhile, the US Office of Space Commerce, tasked with protecting conditions for economic growth and technological innovation in space, outlined how African institutions can reach US space institutions to explore collaborations on capacity building, Earth observation, positioning and navigation, satellite communications, and more—although no clear plans for such collaboration were finalized.

Currently, the United States’ main space-related projects with Africa are SERVIR and Harvest. SERVIR, an initiative by NASA and the US Agency for International Development, helps countries use Earth observation data and geospatial technologies to improve environmental management and climate resilience. SERVIR West Africa, launched in 2016, gathers several science and research institutions in promoting the use of satellite imagery and geospatial tools to help stakeholders and decision makers across the Sahel make informed decisions about agriculture, water resources, the weather, the climate, and ecosystems. SERVIR Eastern and Southern Africa ran from 2008 to 2023 and developed geospatial services using Earth observations and NASA data to support resilient development.

NASA Harvest, led by researchers at the University of Maryland, aims to advance the use of satellite Earth observations to benefit food security, agriculture, and environmental resilience. The Harvest Africa initiative applies Earth observation-based data to agricultural monitoring and assessments conducted across East and Southern Africa. National and regional agencies work together to ensure a smooth transition to respective government agencies or partners. Projects include enhancing Tanzania’s agrometeorological services, developing Earth observation-based agricultural monitoring systems, and improving food security and resilience.

Skyrocketing opportunity

Out of approximately $4.7 billion in satellite contracts from Africa between 1998 and 2023, $1.396 billion went to China and Russia, while only $250 million went to US companies, according to a report by my analytics company, Space in Africa (based in Nigeria and Estonia). Furthermore, out of 187 space collaboration agreements with African institutions from 2001 to 2023, fifty-eight were with Chinese and Russian entities and only twenty-seven with US institutions. Additionally, Egypt and South Africa have joined the International Lunar Research Station mission led by Russia and China, with Ethiopia and Kenya recently signing memorandums of understanding to join as well.

Significant satellite communications infrastructures—such as NigComSat-1R for Nigeria, AngoSat-2 for Angola, and AlComSat-1 for Algeria—were developed by China or Russia. For instance, in addressing national security, Nigeria’s Defence Space Administration launched the DelSat-1 satellite, contracted and launched by China, with plans for five additional satellites.

But while many US foreign policies towards Africa aim to counter China and Russia’s influence, this approach should not extend to the space sector. Space cooperation offers the opportunity to achieve broader US foreign-policy goals independently.

Africa’s space industry presents the United States with economic opportunity. For example, according to the Space in Africa report, Africa’s space industry currently generates about $19 billion annually, with projections indicating growth to over $22.64 billion by 2026. US satellite communications companies such as ViaSat and Starlink—along with Earth observation data providers such as Maxar Technologies, Tomorrow.io, and Planet Labs, and geographic-information-system (GIS) software companies such as Esri—have found a robust market in Africa.

Africa offers significant opportunities for space diplomacy as well. For instance, Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group signed an agreement with Djibouti to build a launch site there, and Turkey announced a space program that would build a launch site in Somalia. The United States can similarly leverage these opportunities to foster mutual benefits including capacity development, technology transfer, and ecosystem development. African space programs, at both national and continental levels, often embrace nonaligned diplomacy, allowing them to cooperate with a variety of countries based on mutual interests. While the United States is taking some steps in the right direction and showing its willingness to collaborate with Africa on space issues—as US stakeholders did at the NewSpace Africa Conference, which my company and the African Union co-hosted—it is time for the United States to identify mutual interests with Africa to develop a robust space partnership.

The United States, as a global leader in the space sector, has an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries and the African Union (through the African Union’s African Space Agency). African countries have demonstrated their capability to contribute to critical technology development, supporting ambitious space missions and building satellite components for global markets. For example, South Africa provides tracking support for the Artemis mission, and Rwandan students have developed artificial-intelligence algorithms for onboard satellite image processing. The United States can capitalize on these developments to foster a mutually beneficial space partnership with Africa.

The United States can, for example, support African policies aligned with US best practices that promote space sustainability at the grassroots level, which can enhance US space diplomacy in select African countries. This support can help African nations establish standards for safe and responsible space activities, thereby promoting stability, security, and long-term sustainability in alignment with several US policies and strategies. Additionally, fostering US participation in African space innovation can build strategic partnerships, increase trade opportunities, facilitate technology transfer, and encourage US investments in the African space market, boosting its global competitiveness. Facilitating market and trade exposure for small to medium US businesses to engage with Africa, along with providing networking opportunities, can deepen relationships between US and African space enterprises—much in alignment with the broader US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa and the White House’s previous efforts to expand the US-Africa partnership.

While recent US engagements have advanced discussions on collaboration with Africa in space development, it is now time to implement clear actions backed by strong strategies.

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

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But, as entertainment and media experts from PwC warn, growth in Africa’s entertainment industries “will be distributed unevenly, with some sectors stagnating while others skyrocket.” African governments, international partners, and global investors can all play a strategic role in unlocking the commercial potential of overlooked markets and creative economies across the continent.

African music, for example, has witnessed a meteoric global rise, with the likes of Wizkid and Tems “reshaping the sound and texture of pop music,” according to Rolling Stone. Afrobeats artists were streamed over thirteen billion times on Spotify in 2022. Revenue from the music industry in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by 24 percent last year, the fastest growth globally. Between 2017 and 2023, royalties for South African artists on Spotify have increased by 500 percent; Tyla, a twenty-two-year-old who earlier this year referred to herself as a “Jozi girl living the dream,” won the first Best African Music Performance award at the 2024 Grammys. And major labels like Audiomack and Universal Music Group have opened offices on the continent, investing heavily in African talent.

Africa’s television and film industry is also reaching new global audiences. Showmax, a streaming platform headquartered in South Africa, is ramping up production on twenty-one new and original African shows. Since 2016, Netflix has invested more than $175 million in African films, including a multi-title deal with a Nigerian production company. The Nigerian movie The Black Book was watched by over twenty million people in its first weeks, becoming at one point the third most-streamed movie worldwide. African film companies have inked deals with the likes of Walt Disney Animation Studios for original productions released globally on services such as Disney+, including the animated Iwájú series, for which Disney collaborated with London-based African storytelling company Kugali Media. Nollywood, the world’s second-largest film industry by production volume, generates $1.2 billion in annual revenues.

With Africa’s population projected to nearly double to 2.5 billion people by 2050, the continent will host one-third of the planet’s young people and the fastest-growing consumer markets for the entertainment industry. Music streaming revenues in Africa are expected to rise from $92.9 million in 2021 to $314.6 million by 2026. Platforms like Spotify, Paramount+, and Netflix are vying for a share of this expanding market with compelling, locally produced content. Nigeria, poised to become one of the ten biggest economies in the world by 2050, generated $45.2 million in revenues from music, television, and film streaming in 2022—a 55 percent increase compared to the year before.

Other creative industries, like gaming, have significant growth potential in Africa but haven’t yet seen breakthrough moments comparable to music, television, and film. The continent is the fastest-growing global market for the gaming industry, expected to generate more than one billion dollars in 2024 for the first time ever, with the number of African gamers doubling over the past five years—mostly driven by youth gaming on their phones. But local game developers have yet to gain a strong foothold on the continent or beyond, despite the clear potential for new and culturally rich gaming experiences rooted in the African context. Innovators like Guzo Technologies (which has participated in programs backed by Meta, where one of the authors works) are developing innovative gaming and learning experiences harnessing virtual reality, but there remain significant barriers to access and use for many Africans.

Some African governments, international partners, and investors are striving to boost their creative industries to stimulate growth, attract investment, and create jobs. In April 2024, Côte d’Ivoire partnered with a venture capital firm and bank to create a fund for entertainment startups. In October 2023, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Sony collaborated to invest in Africa’s creative industries. In announcing the initiative, the IFC highlighted the African creative economy’s “significant, untapped potential . . . for boosting economic growth and improving employment opportunities for young people and women.” Zambia announced a $100-million investment plan to transform its film industry. Actor Idris Elba is backing new film studios in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Ghana, while Senegalese Director Mati Diop is opening a new film production house.

But African governments, their international partners, and investors can do more to ignite Africa’s creative industries. Artists have too often succeeded in spite of, not thanks to, the state—where regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and exacting tax regimes may inhibit the creative economy. Development finance institutions can follow the IFC’s lead by offering blended finance options to de-risk similar investments in other countries. The Democratic Republic of Congo—historically considered a regional cultural superpower, especially in music—shows significant growth potential, for example. Contemporary Congolese stars are yet to experience success akin to that of their Nigerian and South African peers; even Congolese icon Fally Ipupa has less than 7 percent of Nigerian artist Burna Boy’s monthly listeners on Spotify.

Beyond their remarkable economic impacts, Africa’s cultural entrepreneurs are reshaping global perceptions of the continent. As one African analyst noted, “historically, when we talk about global soft power, Africa has never really been top of mind.” But through television series and films set in Africa and written by Africans, artists are rewriting the infamous “single story” that has shaped international perceptions of a continent ravaged by war, poverty, and disease. One African-British journalist wrote about how “Afrobeats artists were the best [public relations] team we could ever have asked for—talented, arrogant, and unapologetically African.” The World Economic Forum has heralded a “rising Afro Wave inspired by the arts and cultural leaders of African and Afro diaspora . . . [empowering] nations to participate more actively in global conversations, enhancing their diplomatic influence, and forging connections that extend beyond geopolitical boundaries on key themes, issues, and business opportunities.”

Some caution that there are challenges presented by the rapid rise and commercialization of African cultural industries. Nollywood’s roots in the Yoruba people’s traveling theater tradition, with rapid recording and distribution networks, may become consigned to history as the local film industry transforms. Some African artists have also rejected the ubiquitous term “Afrobeats”—they argue it is a catchall term for an incredibly broad and diverse set of musical genres. Burna Boy, the first African artist to sell out a US stadium, said, “it’s not fair to just join everybody . . . It’s almost like joining hip-hop, R&B, and dancehall into one thing and [calling] it ‘Ameribeats.’ It doesn’t do justice to what’s really going on.”

African governments, international partners, and investors can all play a critical role in further unlocking the potential and impact of the continent’s creative industries. However, they must ensure that African artists and entrepreneurs retain ownership and creative control amid increasing international engagement and investment. Whether that is successfully done will determine whether Africa’s cultural economies benefit from the hard work of the artists and whether creative industries across the continent can build a new, better-informed international appreciation for Africa’s economic and cultural power.

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a 2023 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and Meta’s head of misinformation policy for Europe, Middle East, and Africa.

Josefina Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a Women in Africa laureate, La Caixa Foundation fellow, and lawyer at Withersworldwide.

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The higher demand for critical minerals is expected to cause a significant expansion in the extraction and production of an array of mineral resources. For example, the World Economic Forum projects that the production of minerals including graphite, cobalt, and lithium could increase by nearly 500 percent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean-energy technologies. Estimated to hold approximately 30 percent of the volume of critical-mineral reserves, the African continent is situated at the very center of the energy transition.

A considerable amount of minerals—for example, 25 percent of tin and 26 percent of tantalum production—is sourced by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM): low-tech, labor-intensive mining operations in which workers (largely unskilled labor) use rudimentary tools and techniques to access mineral ore. ASM is an important source of rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated ten million people in the region working as artisanal and small-scale miners—sourcing critical minerals but also other minerals such as gold. These workers are often driven to the sector by poverty. At least sixty million other individuals facilitate these informal supply chains.

However, many of these artisanal and small-scale miners work informally and face harsh conditions. Before critical-mineral production ramps up even further, African communities, stakeholders, and governments must take steps to formalize these workers—and the international community, including the United States, should help.

What is the problem?

In contrast with ASM, large-scale mining (LSM) is industrial and long-term, utilizing heavy machinery to extract resources. Furthermore, LSM has more geological information available to it and better access to capital and finance. Most importantly, LSM generally operates within the rules of law and adheres to international standards and regulations. It is accompanied by many challenges, however, including causing ecological and habitat damage; polluting the water, air, and soil; and threatening human health. Even where mining operations are conducted legally and formally, they still pose significant environmental and socioeconomic problems.

Although vastly different types of mining, ASM and LSM often take place in overlapping spaces, with ASM operations appearing on the periphery of larger industrial sites. Artisanal miners frequently live and work in areas earmarked for large-scale mining projects, blurring the line between the two. This is exemplified by the presence of illicit or licit networks of middlemen who transport ore from ASM sites to LSM companies and processing facilities. Middlemen often aggregate minerals from various sources, including both ASM and LSM operations, making it especially difficult to trace the origin of the minerals. The fragmented and opaque nature of the mineral supply chain complicates the traceability of products from upstream suppliers to downstream companies.  

There are many challenges associated with artisanal mining. At least 90 percent of artisanal miners work informally, without the necessary licenses or permits required by law. Securing permits improves miners’ access to services they are unable to access in the informal economy—such as microfinance credit, grants, and government loan facilities, which, in turn, place the miners in a better position to accumulate wealth. In many cases, ASM activities are found in regions that are out of reach of regulators, where the institutional presence of the government is weak. By operating outside of state recognition, it becomes impossible for the government to establish and enforce health and safety standards and regulations.

With informal mining operations flying under the radar of the government, either by the design of mining site owners or willful ignorance on the part of the government, workers are routinely exposed to poor labor conditions and dangerous situations. Artisanal miners often work without proper tools and protective gear in unsupported and poorly ventilated underground shafts where, as Amnesty International points out, temperatures can be extremely high. Exposure to the dust and mineral waste generated from these mines can lead to potentially fatal diseases and health conditions, and the dust and waste also contributes to pollution and environmental degradation in the area surrounding the mine.

Across the African continent, artisanal mining has been linked to human-rights violations, forced labor, crime, and conflict. These issues, compounded with artisanal miners’ lack of legal rights, exacerbates their vulnerability and the cycles of poverty and exploitation they face.

More at stake

The problems in ASM often present a significant barrier to sustainable foreign investment in African critical minerals. The aforementioned problems in the artisanal sector have made Western business interests hesitant to invest in Africa’s critical minerals. Poor labor practices and human rights violations associated with ASM could expose global companies to reputational and regulatory risks. These concerns—combined with pressure from non-governmental and human-rights organizations—make investment in ASM a complicated and risky proposition.

This barrier is present in artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt is a critical component of many lithium-ion batteries, including ones used to power electric vehicles, produce components for wind and solar energy technologies, and power portable electronic devices such as smartphones. The DRC accounts for more than 74 percent of global cobalt mining, and 20 to 30 percent of that is via ASM.

In some regions of the DRC, artisanal miners are exploited by armed groups that seek to control mining areas and siphon revenue to finance their operations, purchase weapons, and sustain conflicts. Militias have abducted and trafficked children to extract cobalt as well as copper, in a bid to fund their groups. In addition, some ASM cobalt operations employ children. It was once estimated that forty thousand children were mining for cobalt, working in life-threatening conditions and exposed to violence, extortion, and intimidation.

Such problems associated with informality, including the absence of regulatory standards and the occurrence of human-rights violations, make it difficult for potential investors to justify long-term investments. Without clear, enforceable laws, investors face a high-risk business environment and unpredictable changes in mining policies, which undermine investor confidence.

In addition to posing these immediate risks to artisanal miners and their communities, informal mining exacerbates economic and market instability on a macroeconomic level. Informal miners typically earn a meager and unstable income, which is subject to fluctuation based on the market prices and demand for cobalt. Miners’ economic instability translates into broader economic uncertainty for the sector and limits opportunities for community development. The presence of such substantial unregulated economic activity leads to significant tax revenue losses for the government, because these transactions primarily occur outside of official channels. This undermines the state’s capacity to invest money in necessary social programs, build infrastructure, and quell violence in other regions of the DRC. In spite of these challenging economic implications, African governments might resist formalization efforts, unwilling to disrupt the vital role ASM plays in the livelihoods of many individuals and communities across Africa.

While artisanal cobalt mining in the DRC provides a case study, some of these issues associated with informality are also prevalent in the mining of critical minerals in other African nations, such as lithium production in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Across the continent, the volatility of ASM creates a less attractive investment environment, given that investors seek dependable production to ensure stable supply chains and therefore profitability.

What might formalization look like?

Despite the complications associated with the informal production of many critical minerals, the solution is not to disengage from ASM; it employs 90 percent of the mining workforce. Rather, the solution lies in formalizing and legalizing ASM, which will help mitigate the risks inherent to these mining operations while fostering a more regulated and stable environment for international investment in Africa’s critical minerals.

Integrating the ASM sector into the formal economy would help improve local security, stabilize incomes, and ensure that safer and more environmentally sustainable practices are implemented. It would also help create national regulations and international standards, pressuring the ASM sector to improve practices to become compliant.

Formalization means that miners are registered with proper mining titles. Even in some countries where ASM is recognized by law, governments have not made it possible for miners to obtain the necessary permits and licenses. But in addition to these permits and licenses, formalization also includes—according to the Washington-based nonprofit Pact—efforts by the mining industry to enact chain of custody and supply chain transparency measures; health, safety, and environmental protections; security and human-rights protections; measures that improve access to finance; and requirements to use proper mining techniques. In addition, formalization includes sound industry policies, procedures, and due diligence systems, which should be in place throughout the life cycle of a mine. These components of formalization create a framework within which artisanal miners can operate safely and legally, contributing positively to community-wide and country-wide development goals and global supply chains.

Given the complexity of the informal economy, there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to formalization. We can, however, look for strategies that have been effective in other countries or industries and use them to guide the approach towards formalizing ASM. For example, Rwanda’s 2010 Land Tenure Reform Programme initiated a systematic registration effort to promote land access and address tenure insecurity. This program registered over ten million land parcels in less than five years and enabled landowners to use their property as collateral for loans, facilitating access to credit. The program has been widely regarded as successful in integrating the informal economy, particularly due to its simple registration process and involvement of community members and stakeholders in the reform. Transitioning ASM to the formal economy must also use an integrated whole-of-society approach, centering African communities, stakeholders, and governments. This might mean starting small at a grassroots level by engaging local communities in social dialogue, allowing informal miners to express their views and defend their interests. Their inclusion at an early stage of the formalization process will ensure that policies address informality efficiently and enhance the effectiveness of such measures.

There have been some efforts in recent years to support the formalization of ASM workers and improve social and environmental practices in the sector. For example, as the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) explains, international Fairtrade and Fairmined standards set minimum standards for responsible mining, which support formalization. Furthermore, chain of custody initiatives trace supply chains from mine to market to ensure that supply chains are not associated with any conflicts or human rights abuses and that they meet international regulations. These are certainly steps in the right direction but, as the IGF explains, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of these initiatives and whether they are reaching the most marginalized communities.

Formalization is a very complex but necessary process that can improve the lives of miners and address issues in the critical-mineral supply chain—and therefore attract more sustainable investment to the sector, contributing to the broader development goals of African countries.

How the international community can help

As mineral extraction in Africa is only expected to increase in the foreseeable future, it would be strategically unwise for the international community, and in particular the United States, to sit idly by on the issue of formalizing artisanal mining.

Going forward, the United States can focus on capacity building and simplifying trade processes and market access to help formalize artisanal mining in Africa, which could lead to increased global investment in critical minerals. To build the foundation for policies and programs that provide legal protection for ASM miners, the United States could fund and support training programs for artisanal miners, local authorities, and government officials on sustainable mining practices, health and safety standards, regulatory compliance, and business skills. By strengthening local and national institutions responsible for overseeing the ASM sector, governments would be better able to enforce regulations, protect the rights of artisanal miners, and formalize the sector.

The United States could also work with African governments and international organizations—such as the African Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—to simplify trade procedures, enabling miners to participate legally and more fully in global supply chains. In December 2022, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the DRC and Zambia to develop a productive electric-battery supply chain—from the extraction of minerals to the assembly line. The agreement also serves as a commitment to respect international standards and to prevent, detect, and fight corruption and build a sustainable industry in Africa that benefits workers and local communities, as well as the US private sector. At this time, it is more political than actionable, although it creates a framework for future negotiations and strengthened partnerships. Deepening ties with African nations and collaborating with international organizations can help leverage the resources, expertise, and global networks to ensure a more conducive environment for investment and sustainable growth. Increasing institutional capacity would also allow governments to strengthen tenure security and clarify property rights for ASM, particularly reducing the incidence of ASM-LSM conflict.

The creation of more legal channels for miners to sell their products could enhance supply chain transparency and promote more sustainable market practices. Implementing an international certification mechanism, similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), offers the ASM sector an opportunity for empowerment and a pathway towards legitimacy. Originally established to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, the KPCS mandates that member countries adhere to strict certification requirements, import and export controls, regular audits, and controlled trade. The principles of the Kimberly Process might be adapted to the extraction of critical minerals so as to increase the security of artisanal miners and their access to legal markets.

Not only would these policy actions benefit African countries in the context of the critical-minerals boom and improve the livelihoods of miners, but they would allow the United States to strengthen its economic and strategic partnerships with African countries. As critical minerals will continue to advance the clean-energy transition, decisive action is essential to make the future of mining a pathway for inclusive, sustainable development for the countries that supply minerals to the world.

Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

The post Integrating artisanal mining into the formal economy would benefit African miners and economies alike appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US elections are quickly approaching. But while there may be a shift in administrations, critical minerals are poised to remain a central theme in US policy: Deep bipartisan support for remaking global supply chains and reducing dependence on China’s current dominance in processing have virtually election-proofed focus on the issue.

Rich in minerals and with a strategic location, African countries should be benefiting from this growing US interest. But currently—due to the investment-intensive nature of greenfield projects, the United States’ and Europe’s increased focus on self-reliance, and competition from other countries with more established mining industries—African countries risk largely losing out on this historic opportunity to attract more investment in the minerals that will fuel future industries,

To ensure that supply chains are restructured to best advance both US and African strategic interests, the US government must accelerate an integrated approach that combines investment facilitation, technological innovation, and capacity building.

New mines take a long time and a large amount of capital to build. Such challenges have hindered non-Chinese capital flows into African markets for decades; but non-Chinese investors and governments are aware of the strategic role the continent could and should play in the global shift to cleaner energy sources. For example, 56 percent of global cobalt reserves, key to electrical vehicle manufacturing, can be found in African countries, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While investment in critical-mineral infrastructure has grown in recent decades, a significant financing gap persists, estimated to be up to $108 billion each year.

The United States and the European Union (EU) are unable to finance infrastructure projects through the government-to-government lending model that China typically employs; thus, the emphasis is put on the private sector to make large-scale investments that must be financed from the firms’ balance sheets or through the capital markets rather than from government coffers. Yet, many Western companies view Africa through a lens of risk, which could be attributed to persisting negative narratives about African markets and people and the heightened scrutiny of global brands by nongovernmental organizations. Western companies’ concerns about political risk and corruption often override their assessments of opportunities. This is in sharp contrast with companies, such as ones from China, the Middle East, or even Turkey, that seem to focus more steadily on the opportunity in African economies created by young populations, rapid digitalization, and wide diversification, motivating these companies to work to mitigate the risks as they encounter them.

Another challenge for African countries hoping to attract Western investment for mining is the growing onshoring focus of the United States and EU. Western countries have resurrected industrial policy in a big way in recent years, ramping up billions in financing and guarantees for mining projects as the strategic vulnerability posed by dependence on Chinese supply chains becomes clearer. African and Western governments are united in their goal to change the current supply chain.

In response to China’s approach to critical minerals, onshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring have proven a bipartisan priority in the United States. And, on both sides of the Atlantic, hundreds of billions of dollars are being pumped into this effort. This can be seen in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the US CHIPS and Science Act, and both the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act and its batteries regulation of 2023, which all seek to make progress toward net zero and reduce dependence on China’s role in critical-mineral supply chains. The expanded processing capacity that will result from IRA-incentivized investment in the United States will require more inputs and, therefore, a dramatic expansion in mining—over three hundred new mines will be needed to meet electric-vehicle battery demand alone by 2035.

African countries will be home to many of these new mines. Including them in US friendshoring efforts in the years ahead will require investment that is responsibly structured to overcome historical sins. The history of mining and colonialism in Africa—with its extractive, exploitative, and environmentally damaging legacy—has fostered a deeply emotional context for conversations about the future of the industry on the continent. But while mining was part of an ugly past, it is also a necessary part of a brighter and greener future. To advance this vision, Western governments, investors, and development partners must ensure that economic benefits are broadened to meaningfully include local communities, national companies, and environmental and academic groups.

Africa, as a region, has vast potential to build value-adding mining industry capabilities; but potential, if left untapped, won’t attain the economic growth African countries are searching for. Tangible economic progress will require billions of dollars of investment. Washington must invest in its partnership with African countries by derisking increased investment from the private sector and by encouraging the adoption of transparent, equitable, and sustainable practices.

If governments, investors, and development partners don’t make dramatic changes in the next five years (during this administration and the next one) African nations may miss this opportune moment to leverage historic levels of demand for critical minerals to fuel industrial growth, foreign-exchange generation, skills acquisition, and job creation—and the United States may fail to counter Chinese influence in the supply chains that are critical for sustained US global competitiveness and national security. 

Read more

Report

Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-founder of Insider and Tofino Capital.

The post Increasing investment in African mining should be a higher priority for the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2017, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Gertler, accusing him of “opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals” that cost the DRC more than $1.36 billion in revenues from 2010 to 2012 alone. Gertler has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and, through a representative, said that he would abide by sanctions. The news that the Biden administration may ease these sanctions should be viewed positively, as an indication that US sanctions can achieve both economic and geopolitical goals.

Eased sanctions, whether a formal delisting or the issuing of a general license to Gertler, would allow for the sale of currently sanctioned entities. Following the easing of sanctions in this case, US firms could gain access to new investment opportunities by investing in mining projects that currently have links to Gertler, leading to economic growth in the United States and the DRC. In addition, the DRC has an opportunity to showcase the improvements that the country is making in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. While some senior officials, human-rights defenders, and anticorruption fighters have valid concerns about easing sanctions on Gertler, the decision could be a win for the DRC and the United States.

The choice—and the history behind it

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have gone back and forth over the tightening and easing of sanctions on Gertler. That has drawn much attention, but what hasn’t is the fact that the United States has quietly used sanctions effectively in this case to get its way.

In 2019, The Sentry—an investigative organization that aims to hold to account predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—conducted a six-month-long study on the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study found that better strategies for achieving identified goals in each sanctions program must be developed if sanctions effectiveness was to improve. The Sentry study set the stage for the Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, which drew conclusions on how to modernize US sanctions and make them more effective. Treasury recommended a “structured policy framework” that “links sanctions to a clear policy objective.” The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to improve access to critical minerals, diversify its supply chains, and work with US partners to achieve those goals. Since 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output is owned by Chinese companies, US policymakers should be seeking ways to reduce barriers to entry in the DRC’s mining sector and to actively promote investment there. 

As the United States seeks to gain greater access to critical minerals and diversify its supply chains away from Chinese influence, Biden administration officials hope that granting Gertler a general license to sell his holdings in the DRC would increase US or Western firms’ willingness to invest in the country. That’s because those firms have been largely boxed out as Gertler, according to the US Treasury, used his closeness with government officials to secure below-market rates for mining concessions for his companies. Beyond Gertler, the business environment of the DRC ranks 183 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Easing sanctions, through a coordinated US government effort that seeks to maximize this move, could send an important signal to Western investors that the DRC is open for business. Western firms could lift their bottom lines while stimulating the DRC economy by paying market rates.

The potential delisting of Gertler and his companies is a good example of an instance in which sanctions—or, in this case, the easing of sanctions—are being used in support of a specific policy objective.

Delisting would be good—but more must be done

Building on a potential delisting, the Biden administration should work with Congress to expeditiously pass the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act—which helps the United States secure access to critical-mineral supply chains and sets human-rights and democracy benchmarks for strengthening the US-DRC relationship. These moves could be further timed or calculated to magnify the impact of ongoing foreign assistance programs led by the United States Agency for International Development or other US government agencies.

The United States should coordinate additional moves to support the DRC. In October 2022, the Financial Action Task Force, the standard-setting international organization that seeks to strengthen the global financial system, placed the DRC on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—also known as the “grey list”—for the country’s dismal record in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. While many African countries are on the grey list, the impact is considerable, as it limits capital inflows, makes investors wary of doing business, and leads to reputational damage and a reduction of correspondent banking relationships, among other consequences. The US Treasury should look to bolster the DRC government’s approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) by equipping the country with the knowledge, know-how, and capacity that it needs.  

Regardless of whether the delisting happens or whether the BRIDGE Act becomes law, the DRC must do more to help itself. News of a failed coup attempt in Kinshasa on May 19 certainly does not help, especially since—according to local reports—the assailants were linked to exiled DRC politician and US citizen Christian Malanga, who was killed by the country’s security forces in a firefight. Three US nationals were allegedly also involved in the attempt to overthrow the government of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The DRC must continue to take concrete steps to improve the business environment and reduce its political and economic risk factors. Since 2022, the DRC built on its high-level political commitments to improve its AML/CFT regime, finalize its three-year national AML/CFT strategy, and improve its macroeconomic performance—boosting its credit rating. The DRC has an opportunity to continue to make progress in its fight against corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing that threaten the stability of the country from Matadi on the Atlantic seaboard to Goma in the Great Rift Valley.

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A win in the heart of Africa

Delisting Gertler would not only help the United States get its way, but it would show that its sanctions policy in Africa can be effective; its industrial and national security policies can be successfully implemented; and that all of this can be done in a manner that can help an African partner generate greater economic growth, jobs, and the foreign investment it seeks.

The United States can’t do it alone. It must also partner with the DRC in a serious manner to help strengthen the DRC’s framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, improve Kinshasa’s image, and reduce barriers to investment such as perceived political and economic risk.

The DRC occupies a central role on the African continent and with its economic potential could serve as a future hub for transportation, logistics, mineral processing, and more. If the DRC wins, all of Africa benefits—as do the United States and the West.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

The post In a Congolese mining case, Biden can secure a win for US sanctions policy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.  

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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The post Sudan is an abject disaster. Is anyone listening? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He announced the launch of an international initiative to “enable the Sahel countries to have access to the Atlantic Ocean.” Landlocked Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso are at the center of the Moroccan plan, which involves making Morocco’s road, port, and rail infrastructure available to them and implementing large-scale development projects.

Even if it is not detailed yet, the Moroccan initiative comes after military regimes came to power by unconstitutional means or through coups d’état, which for three of these states resulted, at various points, in having sanctions imposed on them. For example, Niger was sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Notably, Malian army officers who collaborated with the Wagner Group or were suspected of crimes were sanctioned by the United States. And the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had sanctioned Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, lifted its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February this year, a month after the three Sahelian countries left the organization and soon after the countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Chad has not yet seen sanctions imposed after the undemocratic accession of its president following the death of his father. While the sanctions imposed on the three countries are intended to apply pressure on those who seized power by force or defied the constitution, in the hopes of restoring democratic systems, these sanctions also impact the populations.

The people in these countries are essentially penalized twice: On the one hand, they are led by governments that have revoked the right of the people to choose their leaders. On the other hand, these populations also suffer from the effects of sanctions, which cause them economic hardship, limit their access to essential goods, cut them off from the world, and deprive them of trade opportunities.

That creates a quandary for the democratic world: While sanctions are intended to target unconstitutional governments, it is the ordinary people in these countries who suffer the most from them.

Behind the initiative

Morocco’s efforts to cooperate with the states in the Sahel seem inspired by Morocco’s 2011 Constitution—mainly the preamble.

In this preamble, Morocco commits itself to supporting the Maghreb Union (which it says is a “strategic option”), deepening its bonds with the Arab-Islamic Ummah, intensifying cooperation with European countries around the Mediterranean, strengthening cooperation across Africa, and diversifying its relations with the rest of the world.

Specifically, when it comes to Africa, the preamble states that Morocco intends to “consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries.” This short sentence helps explain Morocco’s initiative. The Moroccan Constitution does not drown the Sahel in the mass of Africa, but on the contrary highlights it by mentioning it separately. In his November 6 speech, the king of Morocco even called the Sahelian countries “African sister countries.”

In addition, the Moroccan Constitution’s commitment to the Islamic world—each of the three sanctioned countries are majority Muslim—and its pledging solidarity with the “peoples and countries of Africa” help explain Morocco’s new initiative. By specifying that its solidarity goes to the countries as well as to the peoples, Morocco is distinguishing people from the regimes that govern them.

As for the content of the Atlantic initiative, it has been received well by the Sahelian states because it offers alternatives for growth and development—and indeed, even survival. For example, Niger (one of the poorest countries in the world) depended on international aid for its annual budget, which was slashed by 40 percent in 2023 due to donors and creditors withholding support. Following the coup, malnutrition skyrocketed, only compounded by the fact that the United Nations (UN) World Food Program’s cargos were getting blocked from reaching Niger due to border closures, with one UN coordinator saying that their goal—to deliver humanitarian aid to at least 80 percent of 4.4 million vulnerable people—was in jeopardy.

The success of this initiative is contingent on several factors: It will require funding, a robust regulatory framework, efforts to address challenges such as piracy, and harmonization with and between maritime governance actors. In addition, the economic activity this initiative would create could have benefits for the governments, as well as the people, in the sanctioned Sahelian countries. However, the focus of this initiative is on helping the people, who have continued to suffer for decades.

The Atlantic advantage

The initiative underscores the importance placed—across centuries—on accessing the Atlantic Ocean. For example, El Hadj Omar Tall (founder of the Toucouleur Empire) and Samori Ture (a leader of the Wassoulou Empire) each governed landlocked areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo chronicled how the two African heroes, facing the inevitable advance of European colonial conquest, hurried to “capture, before it was too late, the political initiative and keep it in African hands.” They both did that by directing their troops to the ocean. Eventually, however, their efforts to reach the sea were halted by the French.

The strategic importance of the Atlantic as taught by history resonates today.

Today, over one hundred countries border the Atlantic Ocean, and importantly those countries include the world’s leading power (the United States), other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (including the United Kingdom and France), Latin American powers (such as Argentina and Brazil), and African nations stretching from Morocco (which itself has a 1,800-mile coastline on the ocean) to South Africa.

For countries that have the means to take full advantage of their coasts, such as Morocco and Senegal, the Atlantic is a boon. Indeed, Africa’s twenty-three coastal nations are home to 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent of its trade. They also contain a large amount of natural resources, including oil.

But access alone won’t grant people in Sahelian countries access to the boon. Here is what is needed for this initiative to succeed:

• Defining common strategic priorities between the countries participating in this initiative and also their partners in order to focus on the most pressing issues.
• The integration of projects already underway such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project or the Great Green Wall. Their inclusion will bring a more holistic approach to the Moroccan initiative, which focuses on road, rail, and maritime infrastructure.
• The inclusion of the African Union (through the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy) as well as maritime governance mechanisms, specialized institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, African Port Management Associations, Union of African Shippers’ Councils, maritime training institutions, the UN, and the International Maritime Organization. This inclusion in discussions will help to harmonize the maritime rules and avoid double governance systems.
• Access to substantial financing, particularly via international partners such as in the private sector and development and financial institutions. Financing will be needed to support the blue economy and the modernization of road, rail, and port infrastructure.

Sahelian civilian populations have been suffering from the effects of a twenty-year war against jihadist attacks. These populations deserve peace and prosperity. After the security failures of so many domestic and foreign military interventions and the unfolding of the coups, this proposal offers a much-needed brighter perspective for these people.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Abdelhak Bassou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

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These condemnations sharply contrast with the past decade, which had largely been positive for Jerusalem on the global stage. Indeed, the Abraham Accords boosted Israel’s diplomacy and regional integration in the Middle East and North Africa, while the Jewish state’s expertise in technology, water, and irrigation was acclaimed worldwide. Israeli leaders were even among the few delegations to have been welcomed in Washington, Moscow, and New Delhi with warmth.

The war in Gaza has also affected African countries’ postures toward Israel, which had seen a sharp improvement in the past twenty years. Several nations on the continent, in addition to the African Union (AU), have directly criticized Israel for its actions in Gaza. However, as of now, most of these criticisms haven’t materialized into major diplomatic setbacks for Israel. It appears that the political, economic, and security dynamics that have been steadily developing since the early 2000s may be able to survive the public condemnation of Israel in several African capitals.

Impact of the war on Africa-Israel relations

Even though Jerusalem initially received wide international support following Hamas’s onslaught, numerous African countries soon voiced criticism as the number of Palestinian casualties swelled.

In South Africa, the criticism has echoed historical Palestinian support for the African National Congress. At the end of December 2023, South Africa filed a lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and Pretoria positioned itself as one of the major critics of the Jewish state globally. The president of the AU Commission, Chad’s Moussa Faki, publicly condemned Israel during the AU’s most recent summit in February. He called the Israeli offensive in Gaza “the most flagrant” violation of human rights. Comoros President Azali Assoumani went as far as denouncing “the genocide Israel is committing in Palestine under our nose.” Additionally, the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority was given a place of honor at the AU summit, while no Israeli delegation was invited. Finally, thirty-eight African countries voted in favor of a United Nations (UN) resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.

However, unlike with the Yom Kippur War (during which most African states suspended their diplomatic relations with Israel), the Second Intifada (during which Tunisia and Morocco cut ties with Israel), and the first Gaza War of 2009 (in response to which Mauritania told the Israeli ambassador to leave), African countries today have largely avoided drastic diplomatic steps against Israel.

Even Muslim-majority nations such as Morocco, Chad, and Sudan (the latter having had no official relations with Israel until a few years ago) have not gone beyond public condemnation of the war in Gaza. A number of Sub-Saharan nations—such as Togo, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, and South Sudan—abstained from voting for the UN ceasefire resolution. Kenya and Malawi agreed to send workers to Israel after Jerusalem stopped issuing work permits to Palestinians. Meanwhile, Ugandan Judge Julia Sebutinde was the only one at The Hague who opposed every single accusation leveled against Israel in South Africa’s case during preliminary hearings in January.

A long history of unique North-South cooperation

The refusal (at least thus far) of African nations to break ties with Israel over the Gaza war, despite deep and publicly articulated differences, is rooted in an old relationship that has survived previous ups and downs. 

Even before the creation of Israel, Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, expressed interest in the fate of Africa. One of the characters in his 1902 book Altneuland declares: “Once I have witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish also to assist in the redemption of the Africans.”

After Israel’s independence, cooperation developed spontaneously and at full speed with many African countries. The 1960s have even been called the “golden age” of Israel-Africa relations. At that time, Israel maintained thirty-three ambassadors in Africa and its development aid, in proportion to Israel’s population, exceeded that of most Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development members. Furthermore, Israel offered Africa a model of decolonization: It had managed to secure its self-determination from the British, win what is known in Israel as the war of independence against an alliance of armies from Middle East countries, and quickly overcome the challenges of self-sufficiency and development. Nelson Mandela himself took inspiration from Zionist paramilitary groups like the Irgun in leading the African National Congress’ armed wing.

Finally, the socialist model adopted by Israel’s first leaders established from the start a model of “egalitarian” cooperation with African countries, an approach which differed greatly from the one promoted by former European colonial powers.

However, as the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, Israel saw its relations with most Sub-Saharan African countries break down under the pressure exerted on the continent’s governments by the Arab League. Israel’s leaders felt deeply betrayed, which likely partly explains the absence of coherent reinvestment by Israel in Africa in the following decades. In the 1980s, African leaders expressed their frustration with Arab nations that had not kept their promises—in particular in the field of energy—in exchange for the break with Israel.

Following that frustration, and in the favorable context of the Oslo Accords, Israeli-African diplomatic relations were gradually re-established. From the mid-2000s onward, Avigdor Lieberman, while minister of foreign affairs from 2009 to 2012 and then from 2013 to 2015 , began a diversification of Israel’s diplomatic alliances and focused his efforts on African states. In 2016, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu followed with a historic visit to East Africa. Then in June 2017, the Economic Community of West African States invited Netanyahu to address its summit. The Israeli prime minister was back in Kenya in November 2017 to meet eleven African leaders for a discussion on security cooperation in the geostrategically important Horn of Africa.

New paradigms

Still, as of 2024, Israel lacks ambitious economic and diplomatic policies to develop its ties with Africa. While it had thirty-three ambassadors on the continent in the 1960s, the Jewish state has today only thirteen diplomatic missions, three economic representations, and a single military attaché in Africa. This can be attributed to some combination of a limited Israeli strategy, narrow resources dedicated to its relationship with Africa, or the fact that African countries have been focusing their efforts on developing links with other international actors. Israel also continues to approach its diplomatic relationship with the continent mostly through the lens of its relations with the Muslim world. As such, the normalizations with Morocco and Sudan as well as the resumption of diplomatic relations with Chad were celebrated in Jerusalem as diplomatic breakthroughs within the Middle East and its periphery.

At the same time, several dynamics that have emerged in the past two decades are fueling an impressive acceleration in Africa-Israel relations beyond the periphery of the Middle East.

First, the Abraham Accords significantly modified the paradigm that had prevented Israel from fully integrating into the region without a peace treaty with the Palestinians. In the wake of these agreements, Jerusalem was able to undertake normalization discussions with other countries, with reports indicating it had initial conversations with Somalia, Comoros, and Niger. Israel inaugurated a diplomatic mission in Rwanda and recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Malawi recently opened an embassy in Tel Aviv, while Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced their intention to do the same in Jerusalem. Israel has, in turn, committed to reopening a representation in Kinshasa after an absence of thirty years. In May 2022, the first diplomatic conference on Africa-Israel was organized in Paris by the Embassy of Israel in France and the American Jewish Committee. (The authors of this article were the organizers.) In January 2023, El Al, Israel’s national airline, commenced its first flights to West Africa, serving the Nigerian cities of Abuja and Lagos. Finally, the prospect of Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia, which is still being discussed behind closed doors despite the current war, could further accelerate normalization with Muslim-majority African nations such as Somalia, Niger, Comoros, Mauritania, or Djibouti.

Second, Israel has been active at the multilateral level so as to strengthen its position on the continent. The Jewish state initially regained its observer status at the African Union in 2021, which it had lost in 2002 under Libyan pressure. The decision was however overturned the following year in a dramatic move that Jerusalem blamed on South Africa and Algeria. Before the current crisis, Israel had also initiated a quiet campaign at the United Nations to convince specific African states to move away from the non-aligned movement. These efforts had initial signs of success before the current war brought them to a halt.

Third, after experiencing the influence of former colonial powers, Cold War competitors, and powerful petrostates, Africa’s countries are now polishing their fully independent foreign policies. Their economies are rapidly growing, the continent’s political influence is starting to be felt globally, and major powers are competing with each other to put in place local partnerships. As such, African nations today are arguably less vulnerable to the external pressure that led to the diplomatic shutdowns of the Yom Kippur War and the Second Intifada. Israel appears to many of them as a pragmatic partner whose know-how in fields such as agriculture, water, and technology is essential to development.

Surviving the war in Gaza

The current war in Gaza is certainly a major step back for Israel’s diplomatic standing worldwide, including in Africa. The international pressure on Jerusalem might also increase as the IDF gears up for an offensive in Rafah, or if Israel’s tit-for-tat exchange of direct attacks with Iran continues.

However, the public criticism of the war does not appear to lead to the diplomatic consequences that prevailed during previous crises in the Middle East. Israel can be a pivotal partner in addressing many of the continent’s foremost development challenges for the decades to come, and most African leaders today seem unwilling to sacrifice this partnership.

The Abraham Accords, cemented in mutual security, diplomatic, and economic interests between Israel and several Muslim countries, appear to be strong enough to survive the current war. They could, in the long term, open the door to cooperation between Israel, other countries in the Middle East, and Africa. For example, Jerusalem could benefit from Morocco’s diplomatic and economic networks in Africa—particularly in the areas of banking and infrastructure. Likewise, sovereign funds from Gulf states interested in African markets represent an extraordinary financing opportunity for innovative Israeli companies supporting economic development on the continent.

After the war in Gaza ends, a new, integrated architecture could play a significant role for the two regions as they seek a more prosperous and secure future.

Anne-Sophie Sebban-Bécache is the director of American Jewish Committee Paris (AJC Paris) and was formerly an attaché at the political chancellery of the French embassy in Israel and at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York. She holds a PhD in geopolitics focusing on Israel’s perceptions and politics towards the Horn of Africa.

Simon Seroussi is currently undertaking a mid-career master’s in public administration at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He previously served as the spokesperson of the Israeli embassy in France and the deputy chief of mission of the Israeli embassy in Cameroon.

The post Why Israel’s ties with Africa will survive the war in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Minerals often lie at the heart of this cooperation, and while the words the presidents said may have been similar, the meaning and context behind them couldn’t be more different.

Russia offers quid pro quo partnerships with promises of kinetic military, security, and political support—and assisted by faux anti-imperialist messaging. The United States, on the other hand, touts an approach that places emphasis on economic and community investment. There is a widening gulf emerging between the two models—and each model offers something that the other cannot.

Russia’s give—and take

Russia’s version of partnership has been aptly described as a “regime survival package,” in which the Russian government offers military and security assistance to struggling African governments; soon after come resource concessions for Russian companies.

This exchange has relied heavily on the Wagner Group, as the military company’s running operations allowed Moscow to distance itself via proxy. However, since the Wagner Group’s consolidation and rebranding into the Africa Corps (following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin), the exchange is arguably more direct and state-to-state, as Africa Corps activities are now reportedly being directed by the Russian state and managed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (the GRU) and the Kremlin. The Russian Defense Ministry, with the Africa Corps now reportedly in-house, is expanding its operations.

Russia’s offer of partnership has appealed particularly to governments in the Sahel. The Central African Republic is often viewed as the textbook case, with Wagner arriving in 2018 to push back rebels from the capital. Soon after, gold and diamond mining licenses were granted to a Russian-owned company that even the United Nations warns is “interconnected” with Wagner. And last year, Wagner helped Mali retake rebel-held areas in the north; in the months that followed, Russia and Mali signed agreements on gold refining and on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production.

More recently, a contingent of Africa Corps personnel arrived in Burkina Faso in January to, according to the group’s Telegram channel, “ensure the safety of the country’s leader Ibrahim Traore and the Burkinabe people.” Two months later, Burkina Faso’s minister of energy, mining, and quarries told Sputnik Africa that Russian companies can become “strategic partners” in the extraction of minerals—such as gold, zinc, manganese, copper, graphite, and lithium—from mines and quarries.

Russia’s offer is currently supplanting other forms of partnership in Niger. The junta halted military cooperation with both France and the United States—whose militaries were there to help improve the security situation for Niger’s previous democratic leadership—pushing French troops to leave the country late last year and propelling the United States to agree to withdraw its forces. Earlier this month, Russian forces and military advisors arrived in Niger, equipped with an air defense system and other security equipment—a choice reflecting the fact that US forces were allocated between two airbases, from which they used drones to target militants. Once again, resources seem to be on the table in exchange for Russia’s partnership.  

While there are some actual value-added projects being developed from Russia’s deals, such as the agreement with Mali on building a gold refinery, such deals are exceptions to the rule. A number of Russia’s grandiose economic promises to Africa have failed to fully materialize. The fact is that Russia’s economic potential for Africa cannot compete with that of the West. Russia contributes less than 1 percent of the global foreign direct investment going to the continent, and when it comes to trade revenue, it’s $17.7 billion (as of 2021) is dwarfed by the United States’ $65 billion and the European Union’s (EU) $295 billion. If economic measures were the only consideration in choosing partnership, Russia likely wouldn’t make any list.

The only market where Russia leads in Africa is the arms market. Last year, Russia overtook China as the largest supplier of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part of what makes Russia so appealing as a partner—in addition to its offers of security assistance—is Russia’s ability to market itself as anti-imperialist based on the Soviet Union’s support for African countries when they were fighting for independence. For example, when the junta seized power from a French-backed president, Russia’s Prigozhin framed the coup as a liberation from Western powers. African countries still have concerns about the remaining influence wielded by former colonial powers.

How Washington works

The United States, on the other hand, makes its appeal to African countries by promising partnership on local economic development—the critical minerals discussion is only part of that partnership. The US approach is reflected in projects such as the Lobito Corridor—which is intended to make transport, including of critical minerals, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola easier. Alongside its mineral extraction initiatives, the United States is eager to showcase regional and community benefits for its projects. 

In addition, the United States often cooperates and coordinates with its European partners when approaching investment and activity in Africa. For example, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have signed similar agreements with both the United States and EU in which the countries agree to promote responsible mineral extraction activities that build local capacity and to bring more of the minerals value chain (including processing, manufacturing, and assembly) to the region.

Partnership with Europe can be an effective strategy for the United States, as such an approach gathers more funds, capacities, and markets. Yet, there are downsides. By tying itself with Europe, the United States ties itself to a colonial legacy. In Niger, the junta took power and quickly sought to evict French forces and EU partners—but not US forces (at least initially). This generated tension in the US-France relationship and underscored the extent to which the United States is willing to deviate from cooperation with its partners to maintain engagement in Africa. Such a method lines up with the revamped US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa under which the Biden administration has been adamant that it is seeking to partner with African countries on equal footing and that it will not treat Africa as a great-power battleground. Europe is itself aware of its history. A former Latvian prime minister, for example, called for EU members without colonial pasts to lead the bloc’s engagement with countries across Africa.

The United States, for the most part, holds its engagement conditional on the health of each country’s democracy. In the case of Niger, the United States suspended financial assistance, saying that “Any resumption of US assistance will require action . . .  to usher in democratic governance in a quick and credible timeframe.” The United States has also not shied away from terminating partnership in programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (which provides duty-free entry for certain products) when the country in that partnership has seen an erosion in democratic governance, human rights, and freedoms. The United States shouldn’t shy away from doing so; but this is not a priority Russia shares.

To be fair, the United States, often alongside its European partners, does collaborate on military affairs with African countries. For example, the United States and United Kingdom joined African democratic partners in conducting a large military drill in Kenya. Many African countries, especially those that are partners with the United States, recognize the risk Russia’s support poses. Some have been vocal in making their opposition to Russia’s geopolitical actions known.

Yet, deadly incidents (and the resulting political fallout)—such as the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush or the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu—have doused US enthusiasm for assistance with direct combat. The United States focuses on supporting roles with airpower, intelligence sharing, and training. Even France, after deploying troops across the Sahel for years in Operation Barkhane, was unwilling to deploy its forces to Niger during the coup to support the president it had backed. Compare that to Russia, which seems willing to sustain partnership with blood. When the Central African Republic’s president changed the constitution last year to abolish term limits, Russian forces in the country increased their presence and provided support and security services to the president.

The United States (especially when joining with its allies) is an economic power, and that is attractive for African countries seeking much needed domestic development and value addition. Yet, US partnership does have its limitations. Should a country’s domestic policies run afoul of American principles, partnership is near impossible. Unlike Russia’s limitations, the United States’ are largely self-imposed.

Weighing the choice

Going forward, African countries must choose wisely between the United States (and its offer of economic and development support) and Russia (and its offer of direct military support) in their search for a partner on critical minerals.

Juntas and dictatorships will likely choose Russia, even if offered another choice (which seems unlikely). Russia offers them the equipment and military support they need to fight insurgent and terrorist groups.

The West will need to closely watch democratic countries in Africa. Russia is looking to make the choice easier by deploying disinformation. France has accused Russia of even staging atrocities and framing the West to promote its narrative.

As for what the United States could do: It could theoretically start adding direct kinetic security support to its offer. However, the United States isn’t likely to align itself with military leaders who trampled democracy on their road to power, and it isn’t very likely to deploy forces to protect them. The United States could, theoretically, also turn to the private sector—supporting the efforts of private military companies that are already operating in the continent. But the government would still be limited, rightly so, by laws that restrict it from supporting nondemocratic regimes.

With African minerals in high demand, Russia and the United States will continue to offer what the other can’t.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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This “democratic winter” is not unique to Africa. In the United States, according to Gallup, only 28 percent of Americans—a record low, fewer even than in the aftermath of the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021—are satisfied with the way their democratic system works. In France, two in five voters dream of an unelected strongman at the head of the country.  It is not surprising that the value of democracy is also disputed in Africa, and that arguments against it take the form of claims to national sovereignty and are mainly directed against the former colonial powers. Wherever recent coups have taken place, the putschists have publicly rejected the influence of former colonial powers (as in the Sahel region with France) or Western institutions (as in Sudan, where General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan used the structural reforms inspired by the World Bank to justify his coup in October 2021). Coup leaders have accused the previous governments of having installed falsely democratic regimes, which they claim were weak and responsible for the persistence of underdevelopment. In Niger, President Mohamed Bazoum is still being held against his will, accused by a military junta of having had “exchanges” with “foreign heads of state” and “heads of international organizations.”

How has the concept of democracy, at least in terms of aspiration, become so divisive that its rejection is no longer even taboo? No international conference lacks African putschists who have not been elected by anyone claiming their legitimacy to take power by force with the cheers of their supporters. While some of the allegedly “spontaneous” demonstrations in the streets they refer to are organized, these events resonate deeply in African opinions, especially among the younger generations.

These are poor excuses, not to mention that there is something deeply insulting about suggesting that Africans do not deserve to choose their leaders and, therefore, to live freely. Besides, why should anyone believe that democracy is only a Western concept?

An African vision of democracy

The Manden Charter, proclaimed in 1222 at the time of the Mali Empire—centuries before the UK Bill of Rights—is considered in Africa to be the first declaration of human rights in history. The charter celebrated the preservation of life (Article 5: “Everybody has a right to life and to the preservation of physical integrity”) and organized coexistence between communities (Article 11: “When your wife or your child is missing, stop running after them in the neighbour’s house”). It also protected the rights of women (Article 14: “Never offend women, our mothers”; Article 16: “Women, apart from their everyday occupations, should be associated with all our managements”), foreigners (Article 24: “In Manden, do not maltreat the foreigners”), the homeless (Article 31: “We should help those who are in need”) and even the enemy in battle (Article 41: “You can kill the enemy, but not humiliate him”).

As we can see, Africans are very familiar with democratic practice, and that is true well beyond the Mali Empire. Among the Yoruba, the power of the chief was revocable. Among the Ashanti in Ghana, the village chief was chosen by the heads of families, who formed a council. An association of adults from each village represented public opinion and elected a president.

Today, there are plenty of examples of democratic successes in Africa. In its 2023 report, Freedom House wrote, “Freedom in Africa slightly advanced in 2022 with 11 countries seeing improvements in their political rights and civil liberties and 9 experiencing declines.” In Liberia in January 2024, Joseph Bokai peacefully succeeded George Weah, who had succeeded Africa’s first female president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in January 2018. In Botswana, all elections since independence in 1966 have been conducted peacefully, in a multiparty institutional system where minorities are represented. Botswana has no curse around raw materials: Diamonds, which generate half of public revenues, ensure the prosperity of the country and the government finances the primary and secondary education of all students. From Mauritius to the Seychelles to Cabo Verde, African islands enjoy remarkable political stability. According to Freedom House, “Cabo Verde (receiving a total score of 92 on Freedom in the World’s 100-point scale), Mauritius (85), and São Tomé and Príncipe (84) have the highest aggregate scores in the region. All are rated Free.” Namibia is notable for having only three presidents since 1990. The third—Hage Geingob, who died in February 2024—was first elected in November 2014 in Africa’s first fully electronic elections. He succeeded Hifikepunye Pohamba, who respected the constitution and stepped down after two terms in office.

Ghana is one of the countries that has made progress in its democratic practice. Since the 1992 constitutional reform, Ghana has held eight free elections, while the current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, is preparing to leave power in December 2024 after two terms.

In Zambia, President Hakainde Hichilema took office in August 2021 following a smooth political transition with outgoing President Edgar Lungu, despite a longstanding rivalry between the two men. Hichilema was running for president for the sixth time, three of them against Lungu. This was the third time since 1991 that power passed to the opposition in Zambia.

In Tanzania, former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who introduced multiparty democracy and recently died at the age of ninety-eight, was called the “champion” of democracy in East Africa by US Vice President Kamala Harris during her March 2023 visit. Under his successor, Samia Suluhu Hassan—in office since April 2021 and one of two women leading African nations, a distinction she shares with Ethiopia’s Sahle-Work Zewde, who has been in office since 2018—Tanzania is fighting for a democratic practice that began with Julius Nyerere, the Mwalimu (“the Teacher”), the president of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985.

In Senegal, recent upheavals—including a February announcement, since rescinded, by President Macky Sall that he would delay the previously scheduled February 25 elections—have not derailed the institutional system. Sall and the National Assembly have complied with the decision of the top legal authority that set the date of the presidential election, confirming the exceptional democratic journey of Senegalese society. In sixty years, the country has had only four presidents, and each transition has taken place under the watchful eye of communities and institutions—including the army, which is known for its peacemaking role.

At the level of regional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been criticized by commentators for failing to prevent recent coups d’état in the region and for the withdrawals of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from the organization. However, the majority of ECOWAS members have upheld democratic norms—including Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, which previously faced war and conflict. Notably, from 2015 to 2020, ECOWAS maintained peace and stability in the region, without any coups.

It is worth noting that while all these successful experiences are individually celebrated as exceptions, they represent a significant trend of African democratic successes. Out of fifty-four African countries, 17 percent are considered “free” by Freedom House and 37 percent are considered “partially free.” Added together, the majority of African nations (54 percent) are at least partially free. In comparison, of the twelve countries in the Eurasia region (the countries of the former Soviet Union), 67 percent are considered “unfree” and none are perceived as “free.” According to Freedom House, people live freer in Africa than in Eurasia thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the popular belief that Africa is a land of inter-ethnic wars, the continent’s significant cultural diversity, far from being only a challenge, is one of the most original elements of African democratic systems. For example, Senegal was led for twenty years by a president who belonged to two minority groups, Serers and Catholics, in a country that is predominantly Wolof and Muslim. With more than three thousand languages spoken and multiethnic cultural challenges, African political models have no equivalent elsewhere in the world. 

Africa’s history is full of experiences of multicultural governance. In the Mali Empire, diverse ethnic peoples—Tuareg, Wolof, Malinke, Bamba, Fulani, and Toucouleur—lived together, and a religious tolerance prevailed in which no Malian king waged a holy war (jihad). The Ghana Empire, which covered a large area from Tekrour to Awdaghost, included populations as diverse as the Bambara, Toucouleur, Wolof, and Serer. While the emperor practiced animist religion, he showed tolerance toward Muslims and chose most of his ministers from among them, as recalled by the Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo.

There’s no conflict between democracy and sovereignty

But if the arguments against democracy made by coup leaders and their supporters hit the nail on the head, it is because modern democratic practice, far from this African heritage, has disappointed them. First, the colonial period resulted in the destruction of traditional African participatory structures such as “acephalous societies, centralized kingdoms, elective theocracies, independent city-states, and oligarchic republics,” as researchers Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla reported in a January 2024 book. Democracy in Africa was then the collateral victim of geopolitical rivalries, as ordinary men who sought power in the aftermath of independence—such as Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Samora Machel in Mozambique, and Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau—were killed during or after running for office. Secondly, security was prioritized over democracy in countries where jihadist danger needed to be contained. In several cases, containing such danger has been a convenient excuse to muzzle dissidents, and to dodge or even rig elections. In the 1990s, the democratic opening was able to sweep away old leaders—such as the first president of Zambia, defeated in 1991 after twenty-seven years in power, or the first president of Malawi, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, defeated in 1994 after thirty years—but family and military transitions are a widely shared reality in Africa. The most successful democratic experiences have been akin to national liberation struggles and have come at a high price, as symbolized by South Africa, where the story of former President Nelson Mandela demonstrates the harshness of the democratic struggle.

Undoubtedly, these hardships have created a “democratic fatigue” that has been reinforced by the persistence of underdevelopment in countries richly endowed by nature.

The restoration of the democratic ideal requires going far beyond simple rankings with points awarded according to indicators of freedoms or rights. It also requires doing better than the use of election-observation missions in Africa. Although there are numerous such missions (including those by the African Union, International Organisation de la Francophonie, European Union, ECOWAS, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations), and they are governed by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (2005), the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (2007), and the Declaration of International Principles for the Impartial Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizens’ Organizations (2012), election-observation missions are often perceived as illegitimate because they are externally funded and, in some cases, do not prevent protests or violence. Moreover, missions can fail for security reasons, such as when the European Union withdrew from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in November 2023. Solutions to restore the luster of these missions have been widely documented, including greater integration of in-country residents, improvement of civil-status registers, better distribution and security of polling stations, and national financing of electoral missions.

But in an ideal situation, Africa would still be able to do without such solutions. Democracy is bigger than any one election. No matter how perfectly organized an election is, if the turnout is low, if the political parties competing are on the same side, if the conditions for competition are biased, if citizens are not educated or informed about the stakes, or if there is no possible appeal, a country is still falling short of the democratic ideal. These things are matters of education policy, civic training, and strong institutions, and often escape international observation missions and rankings.

With its population expected to double in the next twenty-five years, and a generation emerging with the ambition of making its voice heard, Africa holds much of global democracy’s future in its hands. The youth of Africa are fiercely committed to public affairs. There is a clear gap between the young Africans, including movements such as Le Balai Citoyen and Lucha, who are chasing away authoritarian regimes,  and those who applaud the Sahelian putschists. Young Africans are united by their desire for stronger national sovereignty. To regain value in the eyes of the people, the African version of democracy will not only have to renew some of their leaders (the new forty-year-old leaders of West Africa contrast with the advanced age of African leaders) but also embody their aspiration for sovereignty and a regained dignity. Neither Washington nor Beijing can bring this to Africans. As for the Westerners who want to reconnect with this old continent with such a young population, it is important that they do not practice the double standards, and instead apply to Africa the level of democratic demands they have for their own citizens. This is a competitive advantage they have over the Russians and the Chinese. This path holds great promise, as it is not certain that African youth—more educated and attached to their freedom of expression—would let Russia and China drag them onto the authoritarian path they promote.

African leaders must understand that democracy, far from being a simple electoral operation, is first and foremost an act of patriotism. That is why it is fundamental to teach the democratic history of Africa, so that democracy and national sovereignty on the continent no longer clash. It is also essential to strengthen civic education, starting in elementary school. In the political arena, the strengthening of institutions is crucial, including the administrations, federal institutions and services, and checks and balances such as the judiciary and media. It will also be necessary to reform institutions so that they better reflect African realities, including better representation of elders, strengthening of local governance, and inclusion of youth associations. Finally, it is crucial that the opponents—often weakened by years or even decades of opposition, exile, or prison—be equal to their heavy task. While men in fatigues are in vogue today, we can bet that this will not always be the case, and it will then be necessary for visionary patriots to be ready to take over.

Ambassador Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

She is a Senegalese and French citizen.

Prior to joining the Council, she was a consultant for the World Bank. She also has strong experience in the private sector as an editor in London and as director for development at a French consulting firm in corporate and social responsibility.

Yade has over a decade of experience working in French, European, and international politics. At the age of thirty, she was appointed as the deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights of the Republic of France: the first ever French minister for human rights and the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet. In recognition of her work, she was Nelson Mandela’s personal guest on his ninetieth birthday in Johannesburg. At that time she was also recognized as Young Leader by the World Economic Forum.

She was subsequently appointed to the position of deputy minister of sports. Yade was also appointed as the ambassador of France to UNESCO. She started her professional career as a parliamentary high civil servant at the French Senate and director of communications of the TV network of the Parliament.

New Atlanticist Aug 3, 2023

What Niger’s coup means for West Africa’s geopolitical contest

By Rama Yade

The ongoing coup in Niamey and others that have taken place in West Africa in recent years reflect significant geopolitical changes underway.

Africa Conflict

AfricaSource Mar 13, 2023

The US has gotten the day to day right in Africa policy. Time to think bigger.

By Aubrey Hruby

The Biden administration’s commitment to high-level engagement with African leaders is welcome, but its recent US-Africa Leaders summit should have been a launch pad for big, bold ideas.

Africa English

AfricaSource Feb 23, 2023

The African Union is at a crossroads. It’s time to seize its moment.

By Rama Yade

The African Union needs to be strong inside to be strong outside. The new chair will need to kick off an exploration of the Union’s organization, identity, role, and means.

Africa General Africa

The post Why Africans hold the future of global democracy in their hands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Just as important as a technology’s impact is the technology’s origin—or origins. Any given technology can be traced back, through its individual components and materials, to a number of sources. And the question about where those components and materials come from matters. Modern technology, economies, livelihoods, and weapons depend on critical minerals such as magnesium, cobalt, lithium, or even copper. Where countries source these minerals makes a difference for national and strategic security.

Since Africa is home to 30 percent of the world’s known critical minerals, the continent is at the forefront of conversations. But currently, African nations aren’t getting their fair share of the benefits of the critical-minerals boom and buzz generated by the evolution of modern technologies. For that to happen, Africa will need more investment in its capacities to refine or add value to minerals within the continent; such investment could fuel a long-awaited boost in development.

Africa is home to many critical-mineral reserves, but it is not home to industry that adds value to the minerals, such as the processing and refining of them. While Africa does have some processing and refining capacity for certain minerals, substantial value-additive steps across the sector remain absent. To be blunt, Africa will only reap the benefits from the critical-minerals boom associated with mineral extraction. Concrete action toward the goal of the development of long-awaited value chain enhancement and investment in the continent remains elusive.

The African Union (AU) and various African nations have long been aware of the continent’s need (and right) to benefit from its mineral wealth, instead of supplying the minerals to the rest of the world for others to process and then reap economic benefits. In 2009, the AU released its African Mining Vision, highlighting the importance of value-adding industry. In 2019, the AU released the African Commodities Strategy, calling for the transformation of Africa from a continent that is merely a raw materials supplier to a continent that is integrated into global value chains. The AU created a African Minerals Development Centre to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the African Mining Vision. But since it was created in 2016, the center hasn’t been ratified by enough member states, meaning that it hasn’t been fully put into operation. 

At this year’s Mining Indaba—for which heads of state, ministers, and thousands of mining-industry leaders and experts descended upon Cape Town, South Africa to chart a new future for African mining—it was clear that several topics are slated to dominate the critical-mining space on the continent in the years to come. Among the conference’s participants were members of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, who were there as part of a newly launched task force on critical minerals. Here are a few insights into the topics that will dominate Africa’s critical mining space in the near future and what the Africa Center will be focusing on in the sector over the next three years.

Minerals matter—for now

As the ever-growing importance of critical minerals continues to influence geopolitical gamesmanship, so too does a growing desire to find alternatives to the current supply chains in order to alleviate overreliance. Resources are being poured into initiatives that could lessen dependence on the extraction of critical minerals.

Take battery recycling for example. The global lithium-ion battery recycling market alone was valued at $6.5 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach $35 billion by 2031. On the public investment side, the United States has deployed funding and regulatory incentives for the recycling of batteries. The European Union (EU) adopted a regulation that sets target percentages for the recovery of critical minerals from batteries. Part of the regulation includes the introduction of a new “battery passport,” a digital record that accompanies each battery and includes information about its history and components to ensure it is recycled responsibly. Beyond efforts to increase battery recycling, there are also initiatives underway to develop batteries that are not reliant on rare-earth elements.

Private investment in research about battery replacement and alternative materials is rising—and with it, so too rises the likelihood that the economic benefits from today’s critical-minerals boom will bypass Africa. Today, the world needs what Africa has, but that may not be the case tomorrow.

US presence and prose

This year’s Mining Indaba was notable for the large delegation sent by the United States, which included high-level government officials such as Amos Hochstein, Jose Fernandez, British Robinson, and Reta Jo Lewis. That delegation is a clear demonstration of Washington’s level of interest regarding Africa’s critical minerals sector.

Perhaps the cornerstone of public US investment in Africa’s mining sector today is the Lobito Corridor project, which is looking to lay over a thousand miles of railroad to help transport critical minerals from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to a port in Angola. The United States has emphasized that its interest in the project is not just about mineral extraction. As Hochstein highlighted at Mining Indaba, a train runs both ways. For the United States, publicly highlighting associated energy and livelihood projects is a way to show that the country is in Africa to do more than just national resource extraction.

Following Mining Indaba, US delegates made the trip from South Africa to Zambia for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) Lobito Corridor Private Sector Investor Forum. The forum sought to gather up private-sector investment for the Lobito Corridor. At the forum, the US International Development Finance Corporation announced a new $250 million debt facility to the Africa Finance Corporation to support infrastructure across the continent. Other attendees—from the public and private sectors—rolled out projects for and investments in building energy power plants and storage facilities, and struck various mining and refining deals, including one that will seek to build the continent’s first refinery for electric-battery-grade cobalt sulphate.

While these are promising developments, most of the investment in the corridor is from the public sector: The United States, in partnership with the EU, has joined with the African Development Bank and the Africa Finance Corporation to inject over one billion dollars into the project. While the EU and United States are involved, private sector involvement is crucial for economic success. Just because Washington wants something doesn’t mean that it’ll happen; plus, what the US government wants and what private sector companies do does not always align. For example, while the US was relatively inactive in the minerals sector in Africa, China purchased cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from sources including a US-based mining company. The private sector, and the money and operations it chooses to conduct, will steer the success of projects such as the Lobito Corridor.

At Indaba, Hochstein stressed that there is no expectation from the US side for African nations to side exclusively with any country. The Biden administration has gone to great lengths to deemphasize great-power competition in its strategy toward Africa. This aligns with the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which the White House released in 2022. Yet, some experts view US and EU investment in the Lobito Corridor as an effort to counter China, amid concerns about Beijing’s dominant position over the African critical-minerals market.

Ideally, investment in Africa’s critical-mineral sector would support the continent’s capacity to add value to minerals before shipping. But efforts are needed beyond the Lobito Corridor which is, after all, intended to help transport—and eventually export—critical minerals. The underlying impetus of this project is the minerals; so if the demand for minerals falls, investment may begin to wane too.

The connection between Africa’s natural mineral wealth and the continent’s strategic importance for the United States is hardly new. The United States has sought out Africa’s critical minerals, for example for its geopolitical objectives, in the past: Infamously, the uranium used in the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was sourced from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Congo.

What the Africa Center is doing

The critical minerals discussion on extraction, national security, and supply chains will move past Africa unless the moment is seized.

The Africa Center’s task force will aim to unite stakeholders from the United States, Europe, and Africa, including representatives from the financial sector, development institutions, and government. Together, this group will regularly convene to explore the role and potential of African minerals in critical supply chains, strategies for greater inclusion of African nations and suppliers, and ways to mobilize the private sector. The task force will host public conversations on topics ranging from the need for private investment (and how to best facilitate it) to domestic African policymaking. The task force hopes to contribute to the building of a new business and development model through strategic and win-win partnerships.

If Africa is to truly benefit from the critical-minerals boom and buzz, then it will need support in developing its ability to add value to its minerals on the continent. Unless African nations can break from a history of serving only as a minerals supplier, they will be left behind.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post The critical-minerals boom is here. Can Africa take advantage? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties. 

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MOU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MOU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MOU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counterterrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

The post What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If left to its own devices, US policy probably would default to a business-as-usual approach in West Africa. Unfortunately, that approach has not worked and is even less likely to work now that the French have been ousted from the region. US rhetoric about governments transitioning to civilian rule often falls on deaf ears, and many people in the region are convinced that Russia is a better partner than the United States was and is likely to be in the future. Worse, it is not clear that they are wrong.

A better approach would be for US policymakers to look more comprehensively at the entire region and the major trends there, which include anti-French sentiment, impatience with democracy, and support for Russia. Meanwhile, China clearly dominates the region in terms of investment and trade. The United States is looked upon much more favorably than France, but Washington offers little that might help counter pro-Russia and pro-China views. The United States is not positioned to fill the vacuum France has left behind.

One way to try to increase US influence is to step up significantly what the United States is offering, though for various reasons, Washington is at a competitive disadvantage in this regard vis-à-vis Russia and China. Announced this past fall, the Biden administration’s major investment in the Lobito Corridor rail and road project in Angola, Congo, and Zambia (a key talking point for US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Angola in January) is a big step in the right direction. But Washington’s Lobito initiative is all the more striking for how unusual it is for the United States to be playing China’s game of massively investing in large-scale infrastructure projects.

It is also important for US policymakers to discern among those countries that Washington is unlikely to pull away from the Russian orbit (including the juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), those that are open to it, and those that in fact are pro-American. Washington should then find creative ways to engage with each of these three groups to strengthen, reorientate, or weaken them.

The difference between the first two groups—countries firmly in Russia’s orbit and those that might break free—often is a function of the balance between ideology and pragmatism on the part of a country’s leaders. Some African leaders are ideologically predisposed to working with Russia and committed to the idea. Others are driven more by pragmatism: They might earnestly believe Russia and China to be better partners, but perhaps can be convinced otherwise. Carrots will work better than sticks, which do not work and are more likely to provoke resentment. The Sahel’s military juntas have demonstrated remarkable insouciance in the face of economic sanctions and Western countries’ cessation of financial assistance. Washington, for example, presently seems to think that it can entice Niger’s junta with the promise to reduce sanctions as part of its effort to keep open the drone base in the north of the country; it is highly unlikely that the junta cares. The recent decision by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to quit the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) underscores the fact that their governments have different priorities. Leaving ECOWAS may do profound damage to the economies of these poor landlocked countries, which rely on regional trade.

The last group, countries that are indeed pro-American, is larger than one might think, especially but not exclusively in Anglophone countries and regions. For example, in West Africa, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone are friendly. (Nigerians also happen to make up the largest African immigrant group in the United States, including several US officials.) US policymakers could focus on cultivating even more positive views of the United States in those countries as a first step in a new US strategy toward West Africa.

In some cases, a country’s government might be drifting toward Russia, but significant portions of its population are not. An example of this is Southern Cameroons, also known as the Anglophone region of Cameroon. Southern Cameroons is the portion of the German colony of Kamerun that came under British colonial rule after Britain and France carved up the German possession in World War I. In 1961, the two Cameroons were fused into a single entity after the United Nations voted in favor of Cameroonian independence. Today, they remain considerably distinct, and there is a Southern Cameroons independence movement, which the Cameroonian government represses.

The argument here is not necessarily to recognize the Anglophone region’s independence (which the United States opposes on principle) or to build bases there (which is impossible without Yaoundé’s blessing). The argument is instead to be more attuned to trends in African countries and among their populations, and then find creative ways to engage those countries and their peoples in the US interest, including at levels below the national governments in local communities and municipal and regional governments.

US policy in sub-Saharan Africa should focus not only on dialogue with leaders in national capitals but also with a much broader array of people at different levels and in different regions. This is particularly imperative in the areas where the United States had relied on French influence, only to see it collapse in recent years, with Russia filling the vacuum. Cameroon, whose government appears to be tilting toward Russia, is an example of that, and the English-speaking periphery region of the country presents the United States with opportunities for engagement based on language, geography, and real competition from the big powers.

The United States can no longer stick to its current way of engaging with West African countries, which often involves dealing with centers rather than peripheries. Long-standing policies regarding whom to talk to and how should be questioned, to see if the United States should try a different approach to the region.

Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and a former political analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The post No more business as usual: The US needs a broader engagement strategy in West Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the aftermath of the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the Caribbean republic has seen escalating gang violence that has threatened the political system and security. Between January and August of this year, 2,439 Haitians were killed, 951 were kidnapped, and 902 were injured. On October 3, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolution 2699, which approved a multinational mission, led by Kenya, to help the Haitian National Police defeat the onslaught of criminal gangs perpetrating violence and other crimes. Although the mission is UN-authorized, it is not an official UN peacekeeping mission. Kenya plans to lead the mission by sending over a thousand officers, a number that will be supplemented further by the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua and Barbuda.

An intervention in a Caribbean state by an African country could perplex some given the vast physical distance between the regions and a lack of historic military and security support. However, the planned deployment aligns closely with Ruto’s foreign relations agenda.

Under Ruto’s presidency, Kenya has stepped up to play a more active role in regional and international politics and to secure for itself a leadership role in championing African interests. Kenya hosted the first Africa Climate Summit in September which concluded with the Nairobi Declaration, a document laying out a consensus among participating African countries about their climate priorities. Ruto also recently announced that Kenya will no longer require visas for visitors from all countries beginning January 2024 in an effort to boost tourism and international connectivity.  

A policing mission to Haiti could further raise Kenya’s profile as a champion of African interests. While there has been little collaboration between African countries and Haiti historically, many Haitians are a part of the African diaspora. Since Haiti’s 1804 revolution and independence, the country has experienced repeated bouts of instability further worsened by nearly two decades of occupation by the United States (from 1915 to 1934), and subsequent UN-approved intervention missions, including one led by Brazil that ran from 2004 to 2017. For Kenya to achieve its newly oriented foreign-policy goals through this intervention, it would have to avoid repeating the failures seen in past missions and steer clear of channeling US paternalism.

In October 2022, Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry authorized a request for foreign intervention through a written appeal to international partners. However, observers including the National Haitian American Elected Officials Network and the Family Action Network Movement are highly skeptical of further intervention and are concerned that supporting the unelected Henry government could worsen the nation’s political crisis. Those organizations have called on the Biden administration to withdraw US support for the mission.

Critics in Kenya have been asking another question: Who asked Kenya, specifically, to intervene? Officially, Kenya volunteered to lead the security force on July 29 in a statement by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Mutua. According to Mutua, the commitment came after a request by the “Friends of Haiti Group of Nations.” However, some observers argue that Kenya is leading the intervention to be a good “friend” to the United States. In September, the United States pledged one hundred million dollars in support to the intervention; days later, the United States and Kenya signed a defense agreement that included resources and support for security deployments.

Putting theories and unknowns aside, it is clear that Kenya is taking a newly proactive approach to the crisis in Haiti. That new approach underscores Ruto’s atypical foreign policy strategy, which aims to distinguish Kenya from its African peers globally and add to Nairobi’s list of accomplishments as a pan-African leader. Success in achieving that strategy could pave the way for greater influence in regional and international politics, setting Kenya up to challenge South Africa and Nigeria, who have historically been regional hegemons. But success in Ruto’s foreign policy approach depends, in part, on the success of this mission to Haiti—one that will be hard to come by.

To be sure, Ruto’s plan has faced numerous domestic challenges. On November 16, Kenya’s high court extended an order blocking the mission’s deployment pending a final decision in January 2024. Despite the court order, the mission was approved by the Kenyan Parliament.

There have also been signs that public support is mixed, as some people have questioned Nairobi’s priorities, arguing that it should focus on protecting lives in Kenya first. Currently, insurgencies are underway along the Somalia border and cattle banditry and clashes between nomadic pastoralists have challenged communities in Northern Kenya.

Amnesty International has also condemned the deployment, not just because of a “troubling history of abuses” associated with past interventions in Haiti, but also because of extrajudicial killings and excessive force used by the Kenyan police. These concerns about human rights violations raise questions as to whether the Kenyan police will be able to succeed in Haiti where other missions have failed.

Regardless, the first batch of police officers have begun training for their planned mission in Haiti. In preparation for the deployment, the director general of the Haitian National Police, alongside a delegation from the Haitian government, visited Kenya last week. However, in early November, Interior Minister Kithure Kindiki asserted that police officers will not be deployed to Haiti “unless all resources”—perhaps including extra funding from the United Nations, recently requested by Kenya—“are mobilized and availed.”

Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta oriented Nairobi’s foreign policy more closely towards China. Ruto, on the other hand, appears more interested in seeking out partnerships with the West—particularly the United States. This year alone, at least six high-level US officials have visited Kenya: First Lady Jill Biden, United States Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Trade Representative Katherine Tai, Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. Kenya and the Millennium Challenge Corporation also signed a sixty-million-dollar threshold program focused on urban mobility and growth in September.

At the same time, Ruto’s administration has also developed a new policy focused on pan-Africanism and, in its dealings beyond the continent, South-South cooperation. If Kenya were to achieve success in Haiti, which would require learning from the tough lessons of past interventions while incorporating the aspirations of Haitians, its global profile could benefit, and Nairobi could secure a status as a reliable ally to the United States both on the continent and beyond.

It remains to be seen whether Kenyan police will eventually be deployed to Haiti. If the deployment occurs, watch the mission closely: Success in helping Haiti secure its future, if attained properly and without repeating mistakes of the past, could see Kenya amplify its bid to claim a bigger seat on the world stage.

Sibi Nyaoga was a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post What Kenya’s proposed mission to Haiti says about Nairobi’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But will COP28 give Africa the attention it deserves on other climate needs? Our experts, some of whom are headed to Dubai, outline what is at stake for Africa.

1. What are African countries hoping to achieve at COP28?

First, there is a strong and well-accepted push among African countries for a change in narrative, recasting the continent from a recipient of climate aid to a full participant in climate solutions. Following the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in June, the Africa Climate Summit in September, and the Annual International Monetary Fund-World Bank Meetings in October, Africans are hoping to secure a place for themselves to do more on adaptation and mitigation because—despite having the lowest greenhouse gas emissions in the world—they live in the continent that is the most affected by climate change.

Second, governments are grappling with debt sustainability, while balancing the need to address the climate crisis. Even though climate is a priority for leaders, they must balance their climate-related initiatives with poverty alleviation, health, education, and debt financing. Governments are starting to think creatively about how to bring more money into the system—climate finance is becoming an important part of the solution.

COP28 will offer the grounds to test, improve, and challenge innovative financing products such as debt-for-nature swaps (such as the $500 million debt-for-nature swap deal in Gabon), a variety of bonds focusing on social and environmental impact, carbon markets, blended finance, and more. A promising trend that will likely have impact on the ground in Dubai is the push for green banks, which can be seen in examples across the African continent, including in an initiative with the African Development Bank.

Finally, as a new push for innovative technology—in solar and wind energy, and in newer fields such as carbon capture and green hydrogen—is underway, African entrepreneurs are looking to carve a place for themselves as leaders in climate technology and will likely be looking for opportunities to scale their solutions at COP28.

—Jacqueline Musiitwa is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

African countries are managing a delicate balancing act when it comes to the green transition.

On one hand, African countries are among those which suffer the worst from the negative impacts of climate change while having contributed the least to global warming. On the other hand, the African continent has the lowest energy access rates in the world, with more than six hundred million people lacking access to electricity.

There is considerable need for energy on the continent, and the private sector and public decision makers face dilemmas in deciding how to get that energy to people. Given the large economic development challenges, it may be tempting to prioritize short-term access to energy, whatever the source (especially oil and gas). African countries must reconcile economic development with the green transition—or, rather, ensure that the green transition is the faster route to economic development.

At COP28, African countries—with their widely differing energy access, natural resources, and green transitions—will seek the recognition of their unique circumstances and the need for tailored support. They will likely call for a differentiated approach to climate action, acknowledging that Africa’s priorities differ from those of developed countries and other regional groupings. They are likely to advocate for a fair transition and seek concrete and significant financial support for adaptation and mitigation measures—including financing to build better energy infrastructure.

In that respect, COP28 is an opportunity to show that the green transition boosts, rather than hinders, economic development by mobilizing and driving investment towards green energy infrastructure. Africa’s abundant renewable resources (including solar, wind, hydropower, and biomass) can help foster economic development by providing clean, affordable, and reliable energy while also meeting decarbonization and net-zero climate goals.

—Emilie Bel is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

2. How will COP28 be different from previous years?

COP28 will likely unfold like its predecessors—African countries will call for the realization of promises made at past conferences, particularly pledges made by developed countries that have benefited from carbon-intensive growth. The cynical view would be that, by the end of the convening, COP28 probably will not be too different than UN climate conferences in the past. But given that COP28 will be in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Gulf countries have become major sources of global capital recently, there may be more announcements of new climate initiatives backed by Gulf governments focused on Africa. In September, the UAE committed $4.5 billion to finance climate projects in Africa, and in October, Saudi Arabia hosted the first Saudi-Africa summit. There seems to be a willingness by Gulf countries to partner and put forth financing offers—the question is how the projects will be structured.

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and leads the Africa Center’s work on climate and energy issues.

3. Which African issues related to finance, inclusion, and technology and innovation—COP28’s biggest themes—are likely to draw attention?

The question of climate justice is deeply tied to Africa’s development experience and will characterize discussions at COP28 as well. African countries have contributed the least to carbon emissions yet bear enormous costs. Without a sensitivity to the climate justice issues at play, it will be difficult to make meaningful progress.

In addition to discussions about the need to develop natural gas capacity, there will be discussions around how to ensure African countries and companies meaningfully participate in newly minted climate finance flows and green technologies. Expect discussions to prioritize three key technologies: green hydrogen, electrical vehicle batteries, and nuclear. Africa’s role in the critical minerals that are necessary for electric vehicles will certainly be highlighted in Dubai as the conference continues to unfold. Not many people are talking about Africa’s nuclear potential yet—though the world arguably should. Bangladesh has just inaugurated its first nuclear power plant, but it is yet to be seen how this fits into the African context.

With six hundred million people lacking reliable access to electricity on the continent, there is a dual imperative for African countries to go green and connect their populations to power resources. This must be recognized at COP28 to meaningfully make progress in Dubai.  

—Aubrey Hruby

4. Will the Nairobi Declaration, issued by African leaders following the Africa Climate Summit, affect negotiations at COP28?

Since COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, African stakeholders have been working to develop a unified African position that can meet the needs and challenges of the continent. The Africa Climate Summit helped African countries achieve consensus on key negotiation points such as global decarbonization and openness to green investment (summarized in the Nairobi Declaration) strengthening the continent’s negotiating position and supporting efforts to initiate a big push to help Africa green.

With the Nairobi Declaration having helped drive an African consensus, two subjects should dominate the African agenda as COP28 unfolds. The first topic is ensuring that Africa is not marginalized in the green industrial revolution, which can be achieved with a focus on technology appropriations and with Africa serving as a foundation of green value chains. Second, leaders should push to secure a climate-finance architecture capable of financing the continent’s greening needs. Attracting more private capital is paramount, but leaders should also place pressure on developed countries to meet the one-hundred-billion-dollar climate finance pledge, mobilize new resources, and implement key reforms—for example, initiatives to ensure Africa gets fair prices for its carbon credits.

—Jean-Paul Mvogo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and author of “Developing Green Banking Ecosystems: A Solution to Better Finance Green Challenges and Address Climate Change in Africa,” a new Africa Center report to be launched at COP28.

5. How are discussions around critical mineral extraction likely to play out?

This year has seen Africa’s importance in the green energy transition increase because of the number of critical minerals in Africa’s soil. 

There is an increased push by African countries to localize supply and production chains of critical minerals (such as lithium, cobalt, and copper) and other resources. For example, a new agreement between Botswana and De Beers Group commits the jeweler to move more of the value chain to Botswana, and a memorandum of understanding between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (with support of the United States and European Union) sets them up for collaboration on the processing of copper and cobalt for electric vehicles locally. The trend will likely continue.

—Jacqueline Musiitwa

Developed countries’ increased focus on Africa’s critical mineral deposits, coupled with rising competition to access those resources, creates an opportunity for Africa and its trade partners to avoid repeating history—one in which partners lost out when mining and exporting raw or scarcely processed natural resources. New cooperation models should favor virtuous cycles—characterized by local, value-added transformation and ownership. By creating much-needed jobs and local added value, those new value chains could help offset the social consequences of climate change, reduce migratory pressures, and generate the resources to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Those value chains could be drivers of “glocal” prosperity and stability, if well structured.

—Jean-Paul Mvogo

6. COP28 participants include not only government leaders but also private-sector leaders. What is their role in supporting African countries?

Private sector funding has to play a massive role.

To achieve the green transition, mobilizing billions in investment for green energy infrastructure will be necessary. Today, African governments are the first source of infrastructure financing (33 percent of total commitments). The current financing gap is too large to be bridged by public funding alone. African countries therefore need to explore multiple financing sources, especially private funding.

In every discussion at COP28, officials will have to look at how the private sector, and especially international investors, can be leveraged. The current trend is a mix between public and private financial tools.

—Emilie Bel

7. Will the coalition of African countries likely see support from other regional groups?

Africa shares similar climate vulnerabilities and demands as many other developing countries in Latin America and small island developing states. Many of these countries face increased debt vulnerability, reduced fiscal space, pressing social issues, and high borrowing costs when seeking to implement climate change adaptation and mitigation programs. 

African negotiators, as peers of other developing regions, are also focused on ensuring that climate policies in developed countries do not harm development objectives in developing countries. By adopting policies, such as carbon trade measures, developed countries may inadvertently weaken key systemic sectors in developing countries without providing the adequate support to help those sectors transition to greener standards.

—Jean-Paul Mvogo

The post Africa’s priorities at COP28, from climate finance to a brand-new narrative appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Tue, September 19, 2023 • 9:30 am ET

2023 Atlantic Council in New York

On the sidelines of the 2023 United Nations General Assembly, the Atlantic Council hosted global leaders taking on the world’s most pressing issues and shaping its future.

Africa’s population is set to double by 2050. Knowing the continent’s ability to feed its current population of over 1.3 billion people “is weak, how are we going to feed 2.6 [billion]?” asked Ibrahim Mayaki, the African Union special envoy for food systems.

Mayaki outlined solutions to that challenge during Atlantic Council in New York, in a discussion hosted by the Council’s Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Mayaki joined Cary Fowler—the US State Department’s special envoy for global food security—who argued that any solution will need to “focus on the smallholder farmer” to be effective.

On Monday, the United States and Norway unveiled a new seventy-million-dollar fund to provide financing for farmers and small- and medium-sized agricultural businesses in Africa “to try to de-risk some of the risks that are inherently” embedded in Africa’s agricultural sector, as Fowler explained.

“There is a consensus on the necessity to protect the small-scale farmers,” Mayaki said, adding that because these farmers “produce 80 percent of the food we eat,” empowering them would be a “huge boost” to the continent’s development.

Below are more highlights from the event, which was moderated by Africa Center Senior Director Rama Yade and Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby and featured the launch of a new issue brief on the promise of agritech by the Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South.

Read the issue brief

Issue Brief

Sep 19, 2023

Unlocking Africa’s agricultural potential

By Aubrey Hruby and Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub

The ongoing digital revolution in Africa presents a valuable opportunity to revolutionize the continent’s food systems.

Africa Economy & Business

Innovative solutions

• In addition to rising food prices, the war in Ukraine has “increased food insecurity” in Africa, said Yade, adding that “weak local infrastructure” and “the lowest levels of [agricultural] productivity” only make matters worse.
• In July, Russia pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed Ukrainian food exports to continue during wartime. But even when the agreement was in place, it benefited Europe “much more” than Africa, Mayaki said, “because we got very little percentage of the grains that were supposed to come” to the continent. This, coupled with Africa’s supply-chain struggles during the COVID-19 pandemic, showed Mayaki “that it’s important for Africa to count on itself… first” for food security.
• But “there’s no such thing as food security in a land where the soil is degraded… or where the crops are [not yet adapted] to climate change,” Fowler warned. “Unless we begin to start building the soils and adapting the crops, we’re going to run into real trouble.”
• “If you look into the future, you’ll see that there’s a need to produce 50 to 60 percent more food in Africa” by 2050, Fowler said; but projections based on current trajectories, he warned, indicate that for some crops, “the yield will be even smaller than it is today.”
• Fowler said that in continuing to support Africa’s food systems, the US government is looking to build food systems “in a sustainable way” that is going to be resilient to climate change. It is now working with the AU and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization on an initiative to identify traditional indigenous crops that offer the most nutritional value—and that can grow in a climate-changed world.
• Mayaki said that fragmentation across the AU’s fifty-five countries is holding back the agricultural industry’s development. “We must push for regional policies” that allow countries to specialize in what they’re strongest in, effectively creating continental “food baskets” that trade effectively and attract investors, he argued.
• Policies will also need to be “holistic,” he added, in that they will need to tackle agricultural issues alongside trade, infrastructure, and even governance challenges—for example, land tenure policies. “We will not be able to feed” the African population “if we do not think holistically,” Mayaki said.

The next frontier

• Hruby said that the digital revolution currently underway in Africa offers a “game-changing opportunity” to implement potentially transformative agritech solutions for the “hundreds of millions of smallholder farmers” who are currently operating “at suboptimal and unproductive” levels across the continent.
• Agritech offers a way to improve agricultural productivity without demanding more resources, explained Fatima Ezzahra Mengoub, a senior economist at the Policy Center for the New South—and co-author of the newly launched agritech issue brief. But, she added, the technology must be accessible and fitting for each local context.
• Eli Pollak, chief executive officer of Apollo Agriculture, discussed how Apollo helps farmers access needed credit—which is important particularly for women farmers who may not have collateral for bank loans. According to Ezzahra Mengoub, women contribute between 60 and 80 percent of total food production in Africa.
• Niraj Varia, the chief executive officer of iProcure, which digitizes rural supply chains, advocated for building up digital infrastructure across the continent to make sure that farmers can better access the materials and equipment they need. Cameron Alford, vice president of the Department of Compact Operations at the Millennium Challenge Corporation, said that working with African governments will be important in identifying and implementing solutions, as “country ownership is an important part of the model.”
• Highlighting the solutions that are growing in Africa has helped shape a more positive vision for investors and supporters, said Mayaki. “We are out of the negative narrative.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

The post What it will take to feed Africa—and the world—in the coming decades appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Together, the BRICS countries have already overtaken the Group of Seven (G7) advanced economies in terms of their contribution to global gross domestic product, with the group now accounting for almost a third of worldwide economic activity measured by purchasing power parity. The consequences of this economic rise have reverberated through a number of areas, including trade. While trade between Russia and the G7 has fallen by more than 36 percent since 2014 under the weight of economic and financial sanctions, trade between it and the other BRICS nations has soared, increasing by more than 121 percent over the same period. China and India have become the largest importers of Russian oil following bans imposed by the European Union. China’s trade with Russia hit a record of $188.5 billion dollars last year, a 97 percent increase from 2014 and around 30 percent greater than in 2021. The surge occurred as Russia more than doubled its rail exports of liquefied petroleum gas as part of a drive to diversify its exports under the harsh sanctions regime.

By opting not to comply with western-led economic and financial sanctions, the solidarity of BRICS has been a balm for Russia. The bloc has offered trade diversion and other relief to one of its founding members and, in the process, weakened the effectiveness of US-led sanctions as a tool for advancing economic and geopolitical interests.

Online Event Wed, August 23, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

The 2023 BRICS Summit: Africa in Action

With South Africa hosting the BRICS Summit and the 2023 AGOA Forum, the Africa Center brings together leading experts examining Africa’s growing role on the geopolitical landscape.

Africa Economy & Business International Financial Institutions International Markets

A multipolar magnet

Thwarting the sanctions regime has had consequences that reach far beyond the impact of the crisis in Ukraine. Bolstered by their success on the economic and geopolitical fronts, the BRICS group is increasingly viewed by a growing number of countries in the Global South as an attractive agent of multilateralism. More than forty nations—including Algeria, Egypt, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, but also key Group of Twenty (G20) countries such as Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia—have formally expressed their interest in joining the BRICS in the lead-up to this week’s summit.

If the effectiveness of trade diversion by BRICS nations in weakening the impact of western sanctions against Russia is any indication, sanctions could become less effective as a tool for advancing the economic and geopolitical interests of the G7 after the admission of new BRICS members. In a zero-sum global trading environment, the bloc’s expansion would also accelerate the diversification of demand away from G7 countries and reduce members’ exposure to future geopolitical risks.

The focus in Johannesburg will certainly be on the admission of new members, as well as trade and investment facilitation in a challenging global environment where the escalation of trade and tech wars—along with the “friendshoring” of supply chains—has increased the risk of global growth deceleration and a hard landing in China. BRICS members are likely to discuss sustainable development in the climate change era, global governance reform, and an orderly process of increasing trade in local currencies. On the latter point, more and more emerging economies are exploring ways to conduct trade in non-dollar currencies following the imposition of sanctions against Russia.

The dollar remains the global reserve currency, and the pace at which other currencies have chipped away at its dominance has been incremental. But a growing number of experts, including senior US government officials, recognize that the aggressive use of economic and financial sanctions to advance US foreign policy could threaten the dollar’s hegemony in the years ahead. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen recently emphasized this point: “There is a risk when we use financial sanctions that are linked to the role of the dollar that over time it could undermine the hegemony of the dollar.”

A new reserve currency?

The significance of dedollarization takes on greater importance in light of rumors that the bloc might attempt to develop a BRICS-issued reserve currency to be used by members in cross-border trade. While the BRICS nations—which collectively enjoy a comfortable balance of payment surplus—have the financial wherewithal to establish such a currency or unit of account, they lack the institutional architecture and the scale to sustainably achieve this end.

Even assuming that its members are fully aligned geopolitically and more inclined to co-operate than to compete, adopting a common currency presents several challenges. As the creation of the euro, now the world’s second largest reserve currency, illustrated, hurdles will include: achieving macroeconomic convergence, agreeing on an exchange rate mechanism, establishing an efficient payment and multilateral clearing system, and creating regulated, stable, and liquid financial markets.

The United States was able to persuade other countries to use the dollar owing to its hegemonic position as the world’s industrial powerhouse and single-largest trading nation following the end of World War II, reinforced in the decades since by the size of the market for US treasuries, which are often considered to be the world’s leading reserve asset. If they wish to provide a competitive alternative, the BRICS countries would need to agree upon a state-of-the-art bond market. It would need to be big enough to absorb global savings and provide assets with low risk of default where surplus funds could be parked when not used for trade.

Reflecting on these challenges, Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s ambassador-at-large to BRICS, reiterated in July that a BRICS currency will not be on the agenda during the summit, though expanding trade and settlement in local currencies will be. In fact, BRICS countries are already making strides in the use of local currencies in cross-border transactions. Their use is helping to sustain and boost cross-border trade between members, even amid a challenging operating environment of heightened geopolitical risks. It is also loosening the balance of payments constraints associated with dollar funding, bolstering local economies.

Although China and India may have diverging security interests, they each stand to benefit from the increased use of local currencies. BRICS nations are already using their own currencies for some bilateral trade payment settlement, and Saudi Arabia is considering signing a deal with China to settle oil transactions in renminbi. Meanwhile India is expanding the use of local currencies for bilateral trade payment and settlement beyond the BRICS group, inviting more than twenty countries to open special vostro bank accounts to settle trade in rupees. In a history-making move, India made its first oil payment to the United Arab Emirates in rupees earlier this month.

If the BRICS group expands its membership, then it could increase the risk of a divergence of interests and raise more coordination challenges—but it could also dramatically expand the group’s consumption power, with significant economic and geopolitical implications. Expansion could create scale and enhance the transition from bilateral to multilateral clearing, and perhaps ultimately toward a common BRICS currency. This would address one of the major challenges associated with the use of local currencies for bilateral trade payment settlement: the difficulty of deploying these currencies once imbalances arise. Lately, such challenges led to the suspension of bilateral trade arrangements that had allowed India to settle imports of Russian oil in rupees, with Russia accumulating billions of Indian rupees that it could not use.

Meanwhile, membership expansion could further weaken the effectiveness of US-led economic sanctions and accelerate the multipolarization of the global monetary order. Several members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries have already said they wish to join the BRICS group, which would increase the shared benefits associated with the use of local currencies for cross-border transactions and could further curtail the volume of global trade conducted in dollars.

To be sure, the stickiness of institutional arrangements, along with the breadth and depth of US financial markets is such that dollar dominance will remain a key feature of the global financial architecture for some time. But following membership expansion, the BRICS group could set in motion its transformation into an even more powerful geopolitical coalition that could accelerate the process of dedollarization and the transition to a multipolar world.

Hippolyte Fofack is the chief economist and director of research at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

The post Piece by piece, the BRICS really are building a multipolar world appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Africa too, the ongoing coup in Niger seems to trigger a harder reaction than the previous ones in Mali and Burkina Faso. After earlier sending Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby to Niger to lead mediation talks, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—under Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s leadership—threatened to use force if the coup leaders don’t reinstate Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum by August 6 and announced new sanctions, harder than those used for other junta-led Sahelian countries. That is predicted to deal a blow to Niger, a country that depends on external aid. This unusual firm answer can be explained by several reasons:

• First, there is a strong fear that the region may collapse now that the G5 Sahel—a regional group of countries promoting development and security—is led by four juntas. Among the five members, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad have recently experienced an undemocratic transition; Mauritania remains. Niger is the fifth country in West Africa to experience a coup d’état over the past three years.

• Second, despite numerous African Union and ECOWAS sanctions over the past few years, the regional coup leaders seem to taunt the African organizations for whom this recent coup in Niger is an ultimate test of credibility.

• Third, Nigeria—which chairs ECOWAS and shares a one-thousand-mile border with Niger—needs a win in this moment, as Tinubu just assumed presidential office a little over two months ago. 

The coup in Niger seems to have been triggered by a very light justification: Bazoum was reportedly going to remove the military head, which is far from the typical reasons—or excuses—given for coups, such as security or governance failures. Even while the country faced attacks coming from groups ranging from the local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to Boko Haram, Bazoum was doing better than his neighbors (but obviously not enough) to remain in power—his ability to remain in power was surprising given the weakness of his security guard and his support base. The alarm signaling that weakness had been blaring even before Bazoum’s inauguration, as a group attempted a coup just two days before the then president-elect’s swearing-in ceremony in March 2021. One of the sources of that weakness may have been his attachment to his partnership with France, as his internal opponents vocally criticized his France-friendly policy.

For Paris, a lot is on the line. Its remaining influence in the Sahel is collapsing. As of earlier this summer, 2,500 of its troops were based in Chad and Niger—France’s last two key strategic partners in the region. The troops were left without any clear roadmap after Operation Barkhane ended in 2022 and France withdrew from Mali after ten years of presence; French-commanded European troops under the Takuba Task Force also withdrew from Mali at the time, while French troops who were part of Operation Sabre withdrew from Burkina Faso less than a year later. A total withdrawal from Niger would be a disaster for France, which is why the coup has occupied French attention. France’s vital interests in Africa have been hit. 

The French government has seemed to run out of solutions to the region’s challenges. But critics are wondering why France thinks it needs to get things under control in Africa; even before the coup, those critics wondered why a military answer to the problems in the Sahel (an answer that has already failed) is still and exclusively on the table. And in finding new answers to this problem, it isn’t just about adjusting aid to the region: France needs to change its paradigm. A growing part of the French population, including experts in military and security circles, are aligned with these views and are requesting changes.

There is still time for the French government to do things differently. It can renew old networks and reshape its Africa policy for its approach toward Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Gabon (its other West African partners), countries that have been shaken by demonstrations questioning French presence. At this point, these countries are still in the situation to welcome the French troops without risking domestic political turmoil.

Africa has deeply changed; the new generation, with a politically conscious middle class, has demands. They won’t accept double or low standards when it comes to Africa. This motivation is stronger than the generation’s so-called attachment to Russia, a geopolitical player that opportunistically wants to advance its interests in the region by raising its flags at demonstrations. That scene unfolded last week in Niger as the Russia-Africa Summit kicked off over five thousand miles away in St. Petersburg, without Bazoum in attendance (he had already planned not to attend the summit). Of course, speculation was rife about Russia’s involvement in the coup given this timing, even though Russia recently condemned the coup.

This coup and others that have taken place across West Africa in recent years reflect significant geopolitical changes underway, from France’s retreat to Russia’s angling for opportunity, but also the need of West African governments to be better supported by their partners and allies. Most Africans don’t explicitly want to oust France or other Western partners from their countries: Instead, they are seeking a renewed partnership on a healthier and more equal basis. When it comes to the war against jihadists, Africans expect more wins than a ten-year military presence. To renew their partnerships globally, African governments are diversifying their roster of international partners, adding countries such as China, Turkey, Israel, and India to their lists. Niger itself has worked with China for years on oil exploration—which has included work on a pipeline that runs from Niger to Benin—and it has worked with Western allies such as Canada on uranium.

As these geopolitical changes have unfolded, Niger has seen many domestic challenges, including coups—experiencing four since its independence in 1960—in addition to other attempts to cut back on the government’s power such as Tuareg rebellions. In recent years, the country has also seen terrorist attacks launched by ISIS affiliate groups, al-Qaeda affiliate groups, and Boko Haram. As a landlocked and desert country with a population of about 26 million people (about half of whom live below the poverty line) and with the highest birth rate in the world, hardships are accumulating in Niger; the region’s coups and terrorist activity make those hardships even worse. 

Knowing the severity of these hardships, and knowing that a few officers abandoned the Nigerien government in the hours leading up to its fall, one may wonder on what basis these regimes rested: the much-vaunted popular vote or the police? If a military leader tried to bring down a government every time he or she had personal concerns that contradicted elected leaders—whether it be France’s General Pierre de Villiers or US General Mark Milley—many governments based on the popular vote would have already fallen apart. This problem is much deeper than a simple dispute; it is about the strength of the institutions. The Sahelian governments don’t have such strong institutions, as they face pressure from terrorist movements that aim to see institutions crumble. 

Russia is quick to lend its support to countries under coup leadership, solidifying its role as a partner to these countries. But the West, in striking contrast, tends to stick with old paradigms, easily exploited by Russia in its misinformation strategy. At times, Western partners—who know at least one way to save threatened regimes (via defense agreements)—seem no longer able to find their satellite navigation quickly enough to rescue government leaders held in their residences (such as Burkina Faso’s Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Mali’s Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, or Niger’s Bazoum). Caught between inefficient strategies and noninterference, Africa’s Western partners are leaving these presidents to face their downfall without any strategy that would help them to connect with the civilian populations and their request of renewed partnership.

Russia, determined to prove that it is not isolated after the international response to the war in Ukraine, has been able to use Africa to circumvent Western economic sanctions and rebuild its forces via the Wagner Group, which is active in the Central African Republic and Mali. There, the countries’ gold, diamonds, and sugar serve as bargaining chips for the security services of the private militia. The United States, meanwhile, has redirected its focus to the European continent to support Ukraine and also to protect its strategic interests. But the Niger events show that US strategic interests still run through Africa.

However, while the field may be wide open for Russia, it may not be so easily navigable. After all, Russian troops are blamed, along with Malian forces, for the terrible March 2022 massacre in Moura, which will haunt the Sahel for a long time. And Russia is starting to appear weaker globally, especially after Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion exposed the leaks in the Russian defense apparatus. The redeployment of Wagner’s forces to Africa following their ousting from the Ukrainian ground was also negatively perceived in African circles. 

Even the Russia-Africa Summit has revealed a weakened impression of Moscow: This year’s convening in St. Petersburg gathered only seventeen heads of state, whereas the first convening in Sochi in October 2019 gathered forty-three heads of state—as Russia was just beginning to re-engage with the continent for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s recent suspension of the agreement to export grain from Ukraine only accelerated the weakening of its image on the continent. Clearly, Africa remains a challenge for Russia, too.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

The post What Niger’s coup means for West Africa’s geopolitical contest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Tinubu is inheriting a country burdened by concurrent security and economic challenges. Nigerians expect Tinubu to unify the country and address economic hardship caused in part by the removal of unsustainable subsidy regimes that constrain the government’s ability to finance growth and development. Tinubu has made initial efforts already. For example, the Nigerian government spent $10 billion in 2022 on just the petroleum subsidy, and another $2.41 billion in the first five months of 2023. Now with Tinubu having removed the subsidy and also having implemented foreign-exchange reforms, Nigeria is expected to save $5.10 billion in the second half of 2023, which could go toward the government’s financing of growth and development projects.

Meanwhile, at this inflection point for African leadership on the global stage, Tinubu has been elected chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). There is currently a grave need for leadership among and better coordination between African countries, as shown by dissonance between African countries on their visions for a new global financial architecture during the recently concluded Summit for a New Global Financing Pact and bilateral deals by African Union members. For example, Senegal and the International Partners’ Group—including France, Germany, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada—signed a 2.5-billion-euro clean-energy agreement, while Zambia negotiated a $6.3 billion debt restructuring plan with its creditors. While these deals will offer relief to Senegal and Zambia, they are mere palliatives that distract from united African positions and fall short of systemic recommendations from the Africa High-Level Working Group on the Global Financial Architecture, including structural reforms that lower financing costs and availability, overhaul the Group of Twenty (G20) Common Framework, and amplify African voices in global forums. Tinubu should lead the coordination of a united African movement on the global stage that pushes wealthy countries to support African debt relief and new financing for climate action.

Domestic challenges

The Nigerian government’s social contract with the country’s citizens is broken and made harder to repair by economic-inclusion and inequality challenges that often manifest in bouts of insecurity and banditry.

The Tinubu administration certainly did not create these conditions, but it must now address them with economic and security measures. The administration has responded with new security measures and bold economic policies, including the removal of the fuel subsidy; it has also signed the Student Loan Act, a much-needed mechanism for increasing access to higher education, and suspended the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor, a step taken to depoliticize the office. Newly installed Acting Governor of the CBN Folashodun Shonubi ended the practice of using multiple exchange rates and replaced it with a liberalized exchange rate regime. The arbitrage between the black-market and official foreign-exchange rates, in the previous regime, fueled rent-seeking uneconomic profits of round-tripping, where banks divert foreign exchange obtained from the CBN at a lower official rate to the parallel market for higher profits.

But there’s plenty more Tinubu must do. First, to help maintain the public’s support, the administration needs to clearly communicate that it faces a tradeoff in addressing Nigeria’s two major economic challenges: high inflation and high unemployment. Any attempts to address either will exacerbate the other in the short run. Even so, the Tinubu administration should prioritize economic growth and job creation, especially as there are endogenous and exogenous inflationary pressures that economic tools at the disposal of the president will simply lack the scope to address.

Exogenous inflationary pressures are driven primarily by two concurrent events. First, while the World Bank expects global commodity prices to fall in 2023, food prices will be at the second-highest level since 1975. A projected 2023 crude oil average price of eighty-four dollars a barrel is expected to inflate the price of goods and services; in addition, the strength of the US dollar increases the cost of most internationally traded commodities. That doesn’t bode well for an import-dependent economy such as Nigeria. Endogenously, the removal of the petrol subsidy has increased the costs of goods and services, and the liberalization of the foreign exchange market has prompted Nigeria’s currency to rapidly devalue. Yet, Tinubu’s economic reforms are needed to reduce Nigeria’s estimated debt service-to-revenue ratio—73.5 percent in 2023—and its debt-to-GDP ratio, which is projected to reach 37.1 percent this year.

To its credit, the Tinubu administration is also balancing economic reforms with increased social programs. The Nigerian Senate approved the administration’s request to borrow $800 million from the World Bank to mitigate inflationary pressures from the subsidy removal. The administration has further declared affordable food and clean water as national-security imperatives. However, debt-funded measures are only temporary, and the administration needs to increase internally generated revenue (but not necessarily increase taxes) and invest in improved infrastructure to drive economic growth and job creation—even if increased liquidity and purchasing power exacerbate short-term inflation. To this end, the administration must improve the ease of paying taxes in Nigeria; in a ranking of countries according to the ease of paying taxes there, Nigeria currently stands at 159 out of 189 countries. Accordingly, Taiwo Oyedele, a former partner at PWC who now heads the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, must bring coherence to Nigeria’s often conflicting tax laws and fiscal policy and harmonize taxes and revenue administration to improve the ease of doing business which should grow the tax base and increase the tax collection rates. The alternative would be a worsening economy and increased emigration of talented young Nigerians.

Investments in infrastructure should prioritize the implementation of the recently signed 2023 Electricity Act, which authorizes states, corporations, and individuals to generate, transmit, and distribute electricity, encouraging private-sector investment. Currently, Nigeria generates an inadequate four thousand megawatts of electricity, even though its population of more than 210 million people needs an estimated 30,000 megawatts of electricity. Reliable electricity supply is a precondition for industrialization, increased productivity, and improved quality of life. Overall, the administration should implement a bottom-up regional industrialization framework to move the 80 percent of workers who are employed in informal sectors or sectors with low productivity to the formal sector.

More broadly, the administration should focus on fostering better economic integration among Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. The Nigerian National Economic Council (NEC)—a presidential economic planning advisory group composed of the vice president and state governors, among others—can help create such integration. Nigeria’s constitution requires principal political officeholders to reflect the “federal character”—or diverse tribal, religious, and regional differences—of its six geopolitical zones. But the diversity, equity, and inclusion intent of federal character has devolved into a political arrangement to distribute national resources and patronage. The NEC should reappropriate the six geopolitical zones as regional economic development clusters that leverage regional comparative advantages into productive, rather than distributive, economic activity.

Furthermore, the Tinubu administration should reorganize the country’s chronically underfunded tertiary education system. It should do that by creating entrepreneurship and green-technology innovation centers that gather universities and polytechnic colleges to develop solutions to the country’s challenges and, ultimately, bolster Nigeria’s economic competitiveness. This will generate additional well-thought-out and intentional solutions for tackling domestic challenges. For example, Nigeria is reported to spend $22 billion annually to fuel private electricity generators to satisfy the country’s energy demands, but has only 2 percent solar-power adoption. The federal government has introduced a $550-million off-grid solar electrification program, which should partner with polytechnics to develop domestic solution for powering homes and small businesses with clean energy—but that’s just one solution; Nigeria needs more.

Global expectations

The Tinubu administration will also need to prove that Nigeria can be a leader on the global stage. The administration should start by intentionally engaging with Nigeria’s highly educated diaspora, many of whom represent or lead organizations that can become natural conduits to international markets, capital, and foreign direct investment.

Of the countries in Africa, Nigeria has the largest economy and population. Coupled with Tinubu’s position as chair of ECOWAS, this heightens expectations for the Nigerian president to shape an African consensus on a host of issues, including the defense of a rules-based international order that reflects African equity and strategic interests. These are the prerequisites if Nigeria is to successfully lead the advancement of African interests in the G20—there are proposals for African Union membership in that forum—and other international forums such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and United Nations. Regional challenges remain, not only domestically, but also with the recent coup in Niger and ECOWAS’s response under Tinubu. What is clear is that Tinubu faces a myriad of challenges and that the world is closely watching how his leadership will seek to address and confront them on the world stage.

Inclusive domestic economic policy and a well-prepared foreign policy agenda are critical for Nigeria’s international engagement. The international order is demonstrably replete with opportunities for the Nigerian government to deliver for its citizens and the African continent. Tinubu must seize the opportunity.

O. Felix Obi is a member of the Executive Office of the US president’s Trade Advisory Committee on Africa at the Office of the US Trade Representative. He is also chair of the Economic & Trade Development Taskforce (Africa Commission) at the Maryland Governor’s Office of Community Initiatives.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post There are high expectations for Nigeria’s new president. Here’s how he can fulfill them. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite a long-term military counterterrorism effort, Nigeria still ranks as the eighth most-affected country on the Global Terrorism Index. Because of the persistence of the problem, Tinubu will need all the help he can get, including from the United States. Thus—especially at a time when the Sahel and coastal West Africa are embroiled in ever-worsening security crises—it may seem illogical for the US State Department to remove Boko Haram, once considered the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

However, this action is long overdue. To designate a group as an FTO, the State Department must demonstrate that 1) the group is a foreign organization, 2) the group is engaged in, or retains the capability and intent to engage in, terrorist activity and 3) this activity threatens US citizens, interests, or national security. The US secretary of state must revoke a listing if they find “that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.”

Sure, the circumstances have not changed. But the circumstances never met these criteria to begin with because Boko Haram, one of Africa’s most well-known terrorist organizations, does not exist at all. Ultimately, “unlearning” this term will yield more accurate and valuable insights into the reality of the threat. Revoking the designation will set the United States and its partners on a more productive path toward finally resolving the violence in Nigeria.

The source of the misnomer

Around 2005, a fundamentalist Islamist sect emerged in northern Nigeria under the direction of Mohammed Yusuf. He began preaching a specific interpretation of the Quran, and one of his core arguments was that Nigerian Muslims should reject Western education and schools that had been introduced under British colonial rule. Because of this message, locals began calling him and his followers “Boko Haram,” which translates to “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language. Outsiders used this phrase as a derisive term to refer to this secretive sect, their followers, and other suspected affiliates.

In 2009, Yusuf’s sect staged an uprising across several northern states following escalating tensions with the state police. Within a matter of days, the movement was essentially eliminated by security services in a brutal crackdown (killing approximately eight hundred members in just a few days) and Yusuf was taken into custody and then executed shortly after. Since then, several movements have emerged in the region. The most active group has been Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (JAS), which was founded around 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. His organization is responsible for many of the murders and violent incidents in the country over the last decade. Several factions have split from JAS, including Ansaru in 2012, which later rejoined JAS and then splintered again. In 2016, a third group emerged that called itself Islamic State-West Africa Province. They have all, at various times, been active across the region.

What’s in a name?

“Boko Haram” doesn’t really fit into that history. From the first uses of the term to describe Yusuf’s sect, locals have repurposed the name to describe suspected fundamentalist and Islamist extremism in the region. All these operations and more, including a wide array of non-terrorist criminal and gang activity, have variously been attributed to “Boko Haram” by government officials, state security forces, journalists, and locals who lacked complete information about what they were describing.

In short, the use of the name survived even as the actual insurgent organizations in the region changed affiliations, splintered, or disbanded.

Thus, since the early years of the violence, many observers believed they were witnessing the rise of “Boko Haram,” but this perception did not correspond with the activity on the ground and the constellation of terrorist organizations (none of whom used the name) in the region. The ultimate challenge, therefore, isn’t just the use of the wrong name, but what it signifies: It gives an inaccurate impression that there is a singular operational group with a clear ideology and an organizational history. Researchers and experts have analyzed the activity in the region through this lens, bringing a host of largely unrelated activity under the umbrella of the supposed entity. In late 2013, when the State Department designated “Boko Haram” as an FTO, US decision makers seemed to be influenced by what the British anthropologist Ruben Andersson has called “the Timbuktu syndrome”—the mapping of the West’s jihadist fears onto the world’s less familiar peripheries.

Why delisting matters

The State Department’s FTO designation is essentially targeting a ghost. Delisting the organization would have several tangible benefits.

Most importantly, it would streamline the resources the United States dedicates to countering terrorist activity in northern Nigeria. An FTO designation unlocks new authorities for government agencies to target terrorists, but it also requires agencies to follow through and enforce these designations. Due to the host of violence and petty criminal activity that has mistakenly been attributed to “Boko Haram,” the United States is pouring resources into addressing unaffiliated crime and issues that fall solely under the jurisdiction of the Nigerian government without realizing any stabilizing counterterrorism benefits.

Removing “Boko Haram” and instead correctly listing JAS will also benefit the national research apparatus, including academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies. Since the early years of the violence, independent researchers have helped shape the US approach toward “Boko Haram” and informed US counterterrorism strategies, including military involvement, intelligence collection, and humanitarian assistance. Researchers and academics have had no reason to question the existence of “Boko Haram” when conducting research on the region, which has allowed for persistent uncertainty to dominate the field. As a result, attempts to analyze the confusing array of activity and operations that have been linked to “Boko Haram” have yielded weak insights and less productive recommendations.

For example in 2021, two of the most influential and long-standing leaders in the region—Shekau and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi—were declared dead. For counterterrorism officials, whom Shekau had eluded for almost a decade, this development marked a welcome shift. With the en masse surrender of fighters formerly associated with JAS, some hoped that they had finally witnessed the end of “Boko Haram.” However, many scholars and experts believe that a fundamental aspect of the “group” is its perpetual adaptability, which in fact is largely driven by the loose application of the term to violent events in Nigeria. Thus media organizations, for example, are still publishing articles on new purported attacks by the “organization.” Absent a rejection of “Boko Haram,” the reliance on the term thus ultimately invites a perpetual motion of resurgence that leaves no real end to the violence in sight.

By delisting “Boko Haram,” the State Department will serve its own interests by setting new analyses and inquiries on the right track to accurately identifying terrorist activities and trends in the region. Without this change, there are two grim yet likely consequences. Counterterrorism research projects and resulting US strategies will continue to operate based on avoidable misconceptions and incomplete information on the violence. And more concerningly, without a real reckoning over the existence of the “group,” every new instance of violence in northern Nigeria risks becoming engulfed in the thickening fog of suspected “Boko Haram” activity.

The responsibility now lies with the global collective, and with these US State Department officials in particular, to consciously and deliberately unlearn the deep-seated belief in the “organization’s” very existence.

Alexandra Gorman is a young global professional with the Africa Center and is a masters’ candidate at Johns Hopkins University in the Global Security Studies program. As an undergraduate at Duke University, she received high honors on her senior thesis, “Nigeria’s Militant Jihadism in the Mirror of the Media: the Creation of ‘Boko Haram.’”

New Atlanticist Mar 1, 2023

Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria?

By Atlantic Council experts

What went wrong with election administration and what can Bola Tinubu do to win over his critics? Atlantic Council experts, one of whom served on the ground as an election monitor, weigh in.

Africa Democratic Transitions

AfricaSource Oct 7, 2022

How Niger’s safety net helps its most vulnerable citizens thrive amid crises

By Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou and Mamta Murthi

The World Bank’s Wadata Talaka safety-net partnership program with Niger aims to empower women in the country and protect its human-capital gains in the face of overlapping shocks.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Sep 27, 2022

Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like

By Jean-Paul Mvogo

The development progress the DRC witnessed in the 1970s is now lost. A massive economic assistance program equivalent to the Marshall Plan may be necessary to recover what’s been lost.

Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Boko Haram is a ghost. The US needs to recognize that. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The initiative is rare enough to draw some sarcasm about African presidents who are seeking to stop a European war when they can’t stop wars closer to home. For those critics—who overlook the work done in an effort to end the conflict in Ethiopia last year—it is hard to remember the last time such a delegation of African presidents assembled together to respond to a war on African soil. They point to cases in Khartoum, Sudan, and Goma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where any conflict-resolution efforts were ineffectual.

Other observers see this new delegation of African leaders as an attempt by South Africa to distract people from troubles at home. The announcement of the delegation came just days after US Ambassador to South Africa Reuben Brigety’s allegation that a Russian cargo ship stocked up on ammunition and arms at a port in Cape Town in December 2022.

The recent (albeit cautious) support from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Washington, and European capitals—along with the varied geopolitical positions of these African countries—lent enough credit to the initiative to give it a chance. In the United Nations General Assembly’s recent vote to condemn Russia over its invasion of Ukraine—held on February 23 this year, around the one-year mark of the full-scale invasion—thirty African countries voted to condemn Russia, twenty-two countries abstained, and two supported Russia. These African leaders, representing both countries who voted to condemn Russia and countries who abstained, form the optimal group to propose a peace plan, as several of them see this as an opportunity to justify their varied positions—including neutrality—and find a diplomatic end to the war.

What does this peace plan say? Frankly, not much—at the moment. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa spoke of vague preparations and of having separate phone calls, but avoided critical details. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said he was looking forward to seeing the delegation’s “concrete initiatives.”

What African leaders are weighing

Russia’s links to the African continent date back to the Cold War and a desire to support communist regimes (in places such as Guinea, Congo, and Ethiopia) and social-democratic or socialist political movements (in places such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe). The Soviet Union deployed forty thousand advisers across Africa between 1970 and 1975, and, over the course of the Cold War, received about sixty thousand African students—notably at the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, which drew students from developing countries across the world. Some major African infrastructure projects are products of partnerships with the Soviet Union, Russia, or Russian companies. Those include the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Capanda hydroelectric dam, and power plants planned in Congo and Nigeria. These are all countries that Putin hopes to rely on in order to find the support he lacks in the Global North.

Yet, while the USSR and, later, Russia have supported Africa in these ways, Africans are unlikely to blindly align themselves with Russia. It is impossible to ignore that previous support was more inspired by a desire to compete against the United States than by a love for freedom or Africa. Today, outside observers and African publics alike cannot ignore the humanitarian cost posed by Russia’s Wagner Group militias in the Sahel, Libya, the Central African Republic, or Mozambique. It is also difficult to see African youth seduced by the Russian way of life rather than the American dream, the latter of which has been able to increase its appeal to African youth via Netflix and Silicon Valley.

In fact, even if the West can’t see what Russians could seriously offer to Africans now, it has not been very difficult for Russia to fuel the very real African resentment towards the West. For Russia and the West, Africa is a coveted asset—one that holds 28 percent of the votes at the United Nations. In the post-Cold War period, Ukraine had neither the resources nor the geopolitical interest to engage in Africa like Russia did. That gave Russian views justifying aggression a hearing in Africa that it otherwise would not have received.

The complicated relations between African countries and also between African countries and global competitors such as Russia, the United States, and others leaves African policymakers in a bind. Those policymakers must carefully balance their economic interests and historical ties.

Further complicating the choice for African policymakers is the overwhelming US and Western support for Ukraine, in contrast to the lack of support and attention for African countries facing conflict. African countries, out of national interest, are looking to diversify their partnerships; they will need to balance their specific needs and local contexts in this geopolitical chaos.

A change in the narrative

The delegation of African presidents aiming to bring an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine offers a unique opportunity for these leaders to be a part of the solution to a global problem and no longer rest on the sidelines of geopolitics as collateral victims.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a considerable increase in the price of grains, worsening food security particularly in the Horn of Africa; at the same time,it has also allowed Africa to step up as an alternative producer of some critical goods. For example in the energy sector, as Europe diversified away from Russian energy supplies, Africa helped fill the void, with Algeria now among the top four exporters of gas to Europe and with Egypt also bolstering its gas-export capacity, according to its Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. Recent hydrocarbon discoveries in Senegal and Mozambique are set to come online in the years ahead. These significant actions show that Africa is playing a leadership role and refusing to sit on the sidelines as a victim of geopolitical fallout.  

Africa has the peace and conflict-resolution experience to put forward in ending Eastern Europe’s geopolitical crisis. Even if African efforts have not always been successful, these efforts are valuable; the leaders behind them still have crucial experience in conflict management. Some might argue that the existence of countless conflict resolution tools, demobilization programs, peace-building mechanisms, and strategic frameworks such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union indicate that African leaders fail to settle the conflicts and wars happening in their own countries; but in reality, the existence of these initiatives shows that African leaders have created dialogue where there were voids, demobilized fighters so they could return home, and, in some cases, helped societies address the horrors of war and build a lasting peace. Several of the leaders in the African peace delegation have participated in responding to violent conflict or have worked to end conflict. That experience may be usefully applied to Russia’s war on Ukraine.

By bringing the unique peace initiative together, African presidents are attempting to advance their leadership on the global stage. This is an incredible challenge for a continent that has often been applauded for its potential, but which must now deliver.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

AfricaSource Jun 21, 2022

How Africa is responding to the war in Ukraine

For the 2022 Africa Day, the Atlantic Council was happy to host top top DC think tank voices for a discussion on Africa and the new geopolitical order.

Africa Politics & Diplomacy

AfricaSource Jun 16, 2022

The Ukraine war is giving Europe a chance to reset ties with Africa

By Rama Yade

The war in Ukraine has sent shock waves throughout the international system. For both Europe and Africa, it means a strengthened relationship is more imperative than ever.

Africa Energy & Environment

AfricaSource Aug 30, 2022

Inaction to reform the international development system is not an option anymore

By Rama Yade

Africans are looking at the United States’ focus on the war in Ukraine and on tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and they’re wondering: Will the United States truly consider African countries as strategic partners as China and Russia claim to do?

Africa International Financial Institutions

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Give Africa’s peace delegation for Ukraine a chance appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Through the purchase of carbon credits, corporations can immediately reduce their global carbon footprints while also serving their long-term economic interests to expand their market bases. That is in part because, by purchasing high-quality carbon credits in voluntary carbon markets, these companies can support the sustainable growth of low- and middle-income populations in the world’s fastest-growing regions—including across the African continent.

Voluntary carbon markets allow entities like corporations and individuals to buy carbon credits entirely at their discretion to offset their emissions. These markets differ from compliance markets, which feature legally binding emissions-reduction obligations, often under cap-and-trade structures like those in the European Union and California. Carbon credits are not intended to replace corporate emissions-reduction efforts; rather, they can serve as an additional mechanism to accelerate transitions to net zero, offset unavoidable emissions, and direct capital to regions with insufficient local investment.

Although still relatively immature, voluntary carbon markets have grown considerably—in 2022, their overall value surpassed two billion dollars, a fourfold increase from 2020, and African credits have grown 36 percent on average over the last five years. However, this rapid growth coupled with a lack of underlying structure has led to various issues, including concerns about the quality and legitimacy of many carbon credits sold, which cast doubt on the credits’ actual contributions to climate-change mitigation and stall market growth. Additionally, some carbon credits, which are primarily purchased by corporations based in the Global North, have hindered development in the Global South. For example, some governments in the Global South have forced local communities to sell land for the purpose of creating carbon credits. Organizations such as the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market are working to solve the various issues related to the voluntary carbon market; in March, it released the first part of its “Core Carbon Principles,” outlining standards around carbon credits to ensure that offset efforts create verifiable impact.

Carbon-credit prices currently lack standardization, with prices being determined by the type or specific characteristics of the credits. They typically range from under four dollars per ton for lower-quality credits, often renewable energy projects, to over one hundred dollars for higher-quality credits, mainly tons removed from the atmosphere through carbon-removal technologies such as direct air capture. However, with large-scale removal technology still in development stages, removal projects accounted for just 3 percent of all projects issuing credits in 2022. In recent years, low-priced or “junk” credits have flooded the market, enabling dozens of companies to claim carbon-neutral status while only making limited environmental impact. At the twenty-seventh United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, Kristalina Georgieva, head of the International Monetary Fund, asserted that unless carbon credits are priced on a trajectory that attains a seventy-five-dollar average price per ton by 2030, climate goals will remain out of reach. While Georgieva’s comments were likely targeted at compliance markets, pricing between the two markets is inherently connected, and there’s interest in formalizing that connection. By adopting thoughtful carbon-credit-purchasing strategies, including by supporting higher-quality credits that accurately reflect the value of a carbon ton, corporations can strengthen the voluntary carbon market and help it integrate it with compliance markets, rather than delegitimize it.

As rating agencies in the industry mature, corporations will need to take it upon themselves to work with these players and do their own due diligence to ensure that the carbon credits they purchase are high quality, as determined by key characteristics. For example, high-quality credits are “additional”: In other words, the emission reduction would not have occurred without the offset financing activity, an increasingly difficult hurdle for renewable energy credits. A high-quality credit is also quantifiable, in that it is produced by a project that can properly track resulting emissions reductions, and brings other environmental benefits such as improving air quality or enhancing biodiversity. Corporations may need to hire teams to analyze and determine the best partners to purchase credits from or work with trusted brokers with shared values. It will require collaborating with governments, banks, and other industry players to help build the necessary infrastructure and integration with compliance markets.

Thoughtful participation comes at a price, leaving open the question of why corporations should, if not mandated, participate sincerely or meaningfully in voluntary carbon markets at all. Engaging cheaply just to claim carbon-neutral status, what many call “greenwashing,” will likely become meaningless to consumers soon. While corporations may be incentivized to invest in credits to get ahead of regulatory risk or to appease investors, another often unmentioned reason is to support and grow their future consumer bases. Many opportunities for high-quality carbon credits are in the Global South, which will be disproportionately affected by climate change—and also host the largest urban centers and burgeoning middle-income populations. By the end of the century, Africa is projected to be the only continent experiencing population growth and will be home to thirteen of the world’s twenty largest urban areas. India’s population just surpassed China’s. If the Global South is not supported in its sustainable growth, achieving climate goals will become nearly impossible, and economic environments will become less prosperous.

Instead, by purchasing high-quality carbon credits, corporations can help build a sustainable future that expands economic opportunity in the Global South. For example, corporations can purchase reduction credits by supporting organizations like KOKO Networks, which developed a bioethanol cooker and fuel dispensary service in the hopes of transitioning the third of the world’s population that currently cooks on charcoal or wood (particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia) to a less carbon-heavy and less pollutive fuel source. By integrating hardware (their cookstove) with software (data collected at their dispensaries) KOKO Networks is able to properly measure its carbon impact and issue carbon credits to account for the reduction in emissions. Other such organizations are LifeStraw, which prevents carbon-dioxide emissions generated from boiling water via wood or charcoal by offering a drinking straw that filters water, and Mauto, which recently closed a five-million-dollar transaction to deploy electric two-wheelers across Africa. While more advanced technologies for carbon removal may prove fruitful in the future, corporations should not overlook the credits available today via initiatives like these that can have an immediate impact on ensuring Africa and other regions’ low- and middle-income populations grow sustainably.

Carbon-reduction credits (in contrast to carbon-removal credits) can help shift high-polluting consumer behaviors to sustainable practices in the world’s fastest-growing markets. When purchasing a bioethanol cookstove or an electric vehicle is not financially feasible in African markets, the sale of carbon credits could effectively subsidize these products and make them available to consumers at competitive prices. On the individual level, a mother in Nairobi can cook cleanly in her home, improving her family’s health, resulting in possibly lower medical costs or fewer days of missed work. On a larger scale, avoiding deforestation can help lessen the local impact of climate change because forests regulate weather conditions and help to avoid massive droughts or monsoons that can destroy crops and livelihoods. It is in corporations’ best interest to ensure African consumers are increasingly economically advantaged, a reality that is only possible through sustainable expansion, and carbon credits serve as one tool to support this growth.

By participating in the voluntary carbon market and purchasing high-quality carbon credits, corporations can contribute to sustainable development in the urban centers of tomorrow, while serving their own business interests. Rather than turning away from carbon credits due to the difficulties involved, corporations should lean in and consider which credits can best support their future customers.

Aubrey Rugo is co-president of the London Business School Tech & Media Club.

Further reading

AfricaSource Dec 2, 2022

The Africa investment imperative: Diversification and resilience amid economic downturns

By Aubrey Hruby and Guillaume Arditti

At a time when investors are faced with high risks due to a global economic downturn, African markets are a viable investment opportunity.

Africa Democratic Transitions

AfricaSource Jul 8, 2022

Europe’s Green Deal plan is Africa’s green finance opportunity

By Emilie Bel

Can natural gas and nuclear power be green? “Sometimes, and for a limited period of time,” said the European Parliament on July 6, as part of an ongoing negotiation over the EU taxonomy, a key component of the European Green Deal (EGD). The EGD is the European Union’s ambitious plan to create the first emissions-neutral […]

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Apr 23, 2021

Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Through carbon markets, corporations have a role to play in Africa’s development. They should take it seriously. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the same time, the African continent faces a wide infrastructure investment gap, estimated at more than one hundred billion dollars annually, according to the African Development Bank.

This gap affects both the continent’s global competitiveness and many Africans’ poor living conditions. Yet Africa has great potential, with an economic-growth rate that is expected to be surpass the global average in 2023 and 2024; high renewable-energy potential; and young, dynamic, and innovative populations.

To turn Africa’s potential into reality, investing billions—from African governments, the international community, and the private sector—in infrastructure will be crucial.

Global Gateway, the European Union’s (EU) answer to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, plans to mobilize up to 300 billion euros (about $331 billion) in public and private investments by 2027, with half designated for African countries. Even though Global Gateway is providing the billions that Africa needs to harness its potential and close its infrastructure gap, success is not guaranteed. For it to be a success, several conditions must be met.

A priority partnership

Global Gateway’s prioritization of Africa is quite plain to see, even beyond the fact that half of the planned funds are going toward the continent. Global Gateway is embedded in the renewed EU-Africa relationship. In February 2022, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Senegalese President Macky Sall, who was then the African Union (AU) president, announced that the Africa-Europe program would be the very first regional plan under Global Gateway.

This announcement took place a few days before the EU-AU summit that set out to establish a renewed EU-Africa relationship based on a balanced and well-defined appreciation of interests and responsibilities of both partners. Going into the summit, the parties expected a “renewed, modernized, and more action-oriented partnership.” Global Gateway, as a partnership itself, checks those boxes.

For the EU, it is crucial to be perceived by African partners as delivering on promises made at the EU-AU summit. With Global Gateway, it seems as though the EU is making another effort to be a reliable partner that makes commitments that have concrete effects on the ground. That will be important for the EU as China and Russia continue to present competing narratives and models of international order, political organization, and values.

Aligning with Africa’s 2063 vision

For Global Gateway’s projects to have an impact and to live up to the promises of the renewed EU-AU partnership, they have to align with the goals and priorities of the AU’s Agenda 2063. The agenda, adopted in 2015, aims to develop infrastructure, improve energy access, build an integrated network of transport infrastructure, and connect the African continent to the rest of the world.

So far, Global Gateway’s initial projects seem in line with the Agenda. The EU intends to invest in particular in energy, digital, and transportation infrastructure—doing so is a real emergency in Africa. The bloc also intends to accelerate the green transition, bolster health systems, and support education and training. Projects that tackle these issues include the construction of a EurAfrica Gateway Cable, a submarine fiber-optic cable connecting Africa with the EU; a Strategic Transport Corridor between Cabo Verde, Senegal, and the Ivory Coast; and solar power plants in Niger. Global Gateway also aims to boost youth entrepreneurship by financing the launch of high-potential startups and to more generally create jobs for Africa’s growing youth population. The VaMoz Digital program, for example, plans to invest in digital literacy and skills for youth in Mozambique.

How China compares

Chinese investment always looms large, especially considering that China has mobilized over two trillion dollars for almost four thousand investment and construction projects abroad since 2005. Overall, China is far ahead of the EU in overseas investments.

But looking only at Africa, and more especially at Sub-Saharan Africa, the picture is not so clear. China signed over $303 billion in investments and construction contracts between 2006 to 2020. From this perspective, the EU’s 150 billion euros ($165 billion) over the course of only five years is certainly significant, especially considering that the investments made by EU member states outside of the Global Gateway initiative should also be added to this amount in totaling the EU’s contributions.

To reach its ambitious spending goals, the EU will need to rely on a range of financial instruments such as grants, capital investments, and guarantees; it will need to mobilize, among other tools, the European Fund for Sustainable Development+ (which is overseen by a financial tool called Global Europe: Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument) as well as the European Investment Bank.

While China gets called out for its predatory loan practices—and especially its controversial resource-backed lending model—and for neglecting environmental health or human rights in its investments, Global Gateway aims to comply with the highest environmental and social standards and to respect the EU’s democratic values. The program is rooted in EU values, and especially transparency, sustainability, and good governance.

While the program is rooted in EU values, it is not just a one-sided European idea or an investment project; it is an investment in a relationship. In this regard, Global Gateway differs from traditional development policies by placing a greater focus on embedding the project in a political and strategic relationship built on partnership principles. The initiative aims to help African partners build quality and sustainable infrastructure to strengthen their resilience and their strategic autonomy in the energy, technological, health and economic fields; in doing so, it could be the foundation of long-term African growth.

Conditions for success

Critics of Global Gateway argue that the initiative has overly long timelines, that the EU communicates poorly about it, and that the goals are difficult to discern; some critics also say that some of the funding was already mobilized for existing projects and that, in the end, the initiative amounts to no more than rebranding.

It is partly true that the EU often has difficulties in explaining its programs and initiatives, often opting for administrative jargon. It is also indeed the case that Global Gateway serves as an umbrella for some existing projects—which is understandable given that it takes more than a year to launch such infrastructure projects. However, Global Gateway scales up existing major infrastructure projects, speeds up their implementation, and provides a much-needed political impetus to unlock greater funding. African partners should take advantage of this to close the infrastructure gap in a sustainable way.

For Global Gateway to succeed, European and African partners must do the following:

• The EU must deliver on making the Global Gateway a renewed, and action-oriented partnership in line with the AU-EU summit’s objectives. The EU should nurture its relationship with African countries by delivering concrete and ambitious projects that contribute to Africa’s long-term economic growth. Both sides should recognize that this is not just a business issue: It is a political one.
• African partners must seize Global Gateway to close the continent’s infrastructure gap. But as it will be important to mobilize all investment needed—and to not come up short on funds—African partners should be more proactive in identifying their needs and on broadcasting successes to maintain the political momentum for the initiative.
• European and African partners should ensure that each project is compliant with the highest environmental and social-norms standards so that they contribute to green and resilient growth in Africa. Robust reporting will be crucial. Global Gateway projects have to be seen as an opportunity to reconcile economic development with climate-change mitigation and adaptation.
• Since Global Gateway is designed to leverage private fundings, African partners should build on this opportunity—in which the private sector is already investing in Africa—to unlock even more private-sector financing, beyond the initiative. African partners should use these investments to supplement the financing of green-growth and resilience projects.

Emilie Bel is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and deputy to the director of public affairs and head of international affairs at the French Insurance Federation.

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By Jean-Paul Mvogo

The development progress the DRC witnessed in the 1970s is now lost. A massive economic assistance program equivalent to the Marshall Plan may be necessary to recover what’s been lost.

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The post The EU global investment initiative that could close Africa’s infrastructure gap appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power. 

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

The post To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To ensure that Sudan’s transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudan’s leaders and those who support Sudan’s transition to democracy can take now.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

The post <strong>As Sudan’s transition to democracy accelerates, reforming the security forces must be a top priority</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Summits are about announcements. In the days and months prior to these splashy events, there is always a mad dash to gather success stories and draft up new—at times purely aspirational—funding commitments. The recent US-Africa Leaders Summit in December is a case in point, featuring a large number of announcements, some new and some repackaged. It also included some sizable financial commitments to African markets, albeit with a little creative accounting that makes it difficult for even the most assiduous US-Africa policy watchers to make sense of what’s new and what is repackaged. (See one attempt in the chart below.)

Two solid successes and continued momentum

The three-day US-Africa Leaders Summit in December brought together high-level delegations from forty-nine African countries and the AU, along with business and civil society leaders. The summit was part of an overall new Africa strategy authored by Judd Devermont, the special assistant to the president and senior director for African affairs at the National Security Council. The strategy has returned US-Africa policy to the basics, including consistent high-level diplomatic engagement between US and African leaders—and US President Joe Biden pledged at the summit to continue to make that engagement a priority.

The Biden administration is thus far making good on this promise. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield have already made official visits to the continent in 2023. Vice President Kamala Harris will travel to Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia from March 26 to April 1, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo will visit the continent this summer. Devermont has long argued for this type of consistent, high-level engagement, and it is refreshing to see it operationalized. Regular, high-level engagement has long been a staple of how the United States approaches other regions of the world and it is important that African nations continue to be integrated into the broader, day-to-day practice of US diplomacy. He reiterated this view during his recent visit at the Atlantic Council. “If we are going to solve problems in the world, if we are going to come up with creative solutions, it is going to be with our African partners,” he said. “The summit was just a kick off.”

Biden’s focus on the diaspora was another important aspect of the US-Africa Leaders Summit, with diaspora interests and concerns highlighted across sectors and in multiple fora. The African diaspora in the United States distinguishes and enriches US-Africa ties from those of global competitors and should remain a centerpiece of US policy toward the continent. The summit also served as the launching pad for the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States, a new initiative that follows in the footsteps of the Obama administration–established President’s Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa. The new initiative should help ensure the diaspora has a seat at the table in shaping US policy toward the continent.

The summit also gave additional momentum to US efforts to support digitization in African markets. While hugely important and widely supported across the US-Africa policy community, Biden’s new flagship Africa initiative—Digital Transformation with Africa—simply builds on old programs such as the US International Development Finance Corporation’s Connect Africa and the US Trade and Development Agency’s Access Africa (among others with overlapping mandates). In its new form, the initiative intends to invest $350 million in the digital sector, but it will require congressional support.

Big ideas for US-Africa policy

The Biden administration’s summit could have been a launch pad for big, bold ideas, but here it fell short. Instead of repackaging existing programs, the Biden administration, working with Congress, should champion new initiatives that match US competitiveness with African opportunity while deepening US-Africa relations. Here are three ideas:

• Create a US Commercial Corps as a corollary to the US Peace Corps that would send recent graduates or retired volunteers to emerging markets to work alongside Prosper Africa embassy deal teams on commercially related engagements. The potential benefits of such a program are numerous, including advancing people-to-people diplomacy, supporting US government personnel across the continent with business acumen and commercial expertise, and creating a cadre of US business professionals with working experience in emerging markets who will enhance long-term US competitiveness on the international stage. Six decades of the Peace Corps has yielded CEOs, members of Congress, and community leaders with lasting ties and relationships across the Atlantic. A Commercial Corps could do the same for US-Africa commercial relations.
• Prioritize partnerships in the creative industries by establishing an advisory council modeled on the Presidential Advisory Council on Doing Business in Africa and the newly minted President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement. This new council would link company executives from the music, film, and fashion industries in the United States and across Africa with financiers and key US government stakeholders to drive investment into Africa’s creative industries. Building on the work of the Africa Center’s Task Force and efforts being made by Afreximbank, the council could focus on creating the linkages needed–particularly around financing growth in the sector.
• Support sustained capacity-building in climate finance. The Atlantic Council’s Millennium Leadership program runs an accelerator for climate finance leaders, for example. Additionally, the International Finance Corporation and Milken Institute are now in their seventh year of a unique training program that brings mid-career professionals from finance ministries, central banks, and stock exchanges to the United States to deepen their experience with capital markets. Since 2016, 160 professionals have participated in the program from nearly fifty countries, the majority in Africa, and strong working relationships have been created that deepen regional integration. The Biden administration could partner with them to expand the effort to focus on climate finance or bring others to the table such as Bloomberg Green, the Rocky Mountain Institute, and leading US and European universities to design a best-in-class program. African countries are home to some of the world’s most important natural assets, including the Congo Basin, and they need to ensure that their finance executives—both in the public and private sectors—have access to the best thinking and skills when it comes to ensuring sustainable growth.

The Biden administration’s return to summit diplomacy is a welcome development, and the commitment to consistent, high-level engagement with African leaders is being demonstrated month by month. Still, given the potential of the world’s youngest continent and the growing role African nations will play in global affairs in the coming decades, the United States needs to be bolder and more creative with initiatives that create lasting structural change in US-Africa relations.

A summary of key summit takeaways–some old, some new, some questions remain

The chart below is a first effort by the author to track and categorize the summit commitments in order to stimulate further discussion. 

Aubrey Hruby is a co-founder of Tofino Capital, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

The post The US has gotten the day to day right in Africa policy. Time to think bigger. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

World Genealogy Day is on March 11 this year, and it serves as a reminder that genealogy is important for any individual or family. Yet, it is perhaps even more important for societies and communities that have been shaped by forces that have taken them far from their roots. For global Africans, like me, genealogy is a valuable resource that can promote greater insight, connectedness, and cultural preservation.

‘Global Africa’—as defined by various academics and scholars like W.E.B. Du Bois, Henry Louis Gates Jr., Robin D.G. Kelly, and Kwame Anthony Appiah—refers to the concept of a transnational and interconnected African diaspora that exists beyond the continent of Africa. It acknowledges the cultural, economic, and social ties that connect people of African descent around the world, including those in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The term Global Africa recognizes that the history, culture, and experiences of African people have been heavily impacted by colonialism, slavery, and immigration. It also highlights the diverse contributions that people of African descent have made to various fields, such as literature, music, art, and politics, and underscores the importance of building solidarity among different communities of African descent to address shared challenges and promote mutual understanding.

If the United States truly wants to embrace the African diaspora that resides there, as stated at the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, it must reduce the prices to access genealogy records, increase public awareness campaigns to help young people everywhere to learn about their ancestors, and foster economic ties that can grant the diaspora freedom to travel and explore their genealogy first-hand.

Journey through time

I used DNA services and genealogy platforms to trace my family lineage. Through years of research and accessing free records on websites like Slave Voyages and the Freedmen’s Bureau of the National Archives, I was able to piece together my family’s story going back six generations: from the 1700s to the present day. From my research, I discovered that my African roots go back to the Mali Empire where my distant cousins were once kings.

While the desire to know one’s family lineage is universal, each culture faces a unique set of challenges. For instance, while some Africans don’t feel as directly impacted by slavery as many African Americans, colonization left stains that persist in young African minds after many European powers had captured people, artifacts, and resources from Africa during the sixteenth to twentieth centuries. Initiatives like African Ancestry help in rediscovering roots, while others like H3 Africa—a consortium of research projects led by African scientists—are playing a significant role in researching African genetics to help people better understand whether they are at risk, through genetics or their environment, for developing specific diseases.

Countries around the world have different laws and regulations regarding access to genealogy records. While the United States is fortunate to have access to millions of historical records, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services charge high fees for access to genealogy records, creating a barrier for many everyday Americans. Gatekeepers must strike a balance between protecting privacy and making genealogy accessible to those who seek it.

And with the United States becoming the site of fierce discussion over migration and mobility, improving access to genealogy is one important way it can communicate a more welcoming message to the African continent—and a more supportive one to the African diaspora community at home.

Control of the narrative

Today in the United States, school systems are facing complex questions about what should be taught regarding African American history, how lessons should be delivered, whether interpretations of historical moments are accurate, and which students should be receiving these lessons.

For example, in my home state of Virginia, new proposed history and social-science Standards of Learning are facing criticism for avoiding and downplaying Black contributions to society. In Florida, state officials blocked a proposed advanced placement African American history course, saying it “significantly lacked educational value.” The Texas House of Representatives is considering a bill that would remove all diversity, equity, and inclusion programs in state universities. The largest proportion of Black immigrants lives in Southern states where these debates about Black history and inclusion are unfolding.

What signal is the United States sending to African students who want to study in the country? This is a question that’s particularly relevant at a time when the global competition to attract African students is sharpening. Europe hosts the biggest group of Sub-Saharan African students outside the continent. But while France, which has 92,000 students enrolled according to the latest data, has long dominated in attracting African students, the United States (41,700), South Africa (30,300), and the United Kingdom (27,800) have also grown as major players in recent years.

If young people, such as students, can meaningfully engage with genealogy, they can strengthen diaspora communities by connecting together via their cultural and familial ties, which then boosts religious, social, and political connections across communities. Ultimately, this can create a heightened sense of identity and belonging across borders. Jeanine Stewart, a psychologist with expertise in inclusion and belonging, shared in a Forbes interview that, “being surrounded by other human beings doesn’t guarantee a sense of belonging.” Instead, she said, “belonging actually has to do with identification as a member of a group and the higher quality interactions which come from that. It’s the interactions over time which are supportive of us as full, authentic human beings.”

The United States’ message in attracting African students to study in the country extends beyond the education sector. Having a positive message would signify a broader commitment to diversity, globalization, and engagement with the African continent. The United States sees Africa as a vital partner in shaping the world’s future, and welcoming African students is a way to build lasting relationships and promote economic growth. Additionally, by attracting more young, talented individuals from Africa, the United States could bolster its own population growth by attracting a diverse range of perspectives and skills; it could also help make genealogical information more available, as young people from various family trees may carry their genealogical stories with them to the United States.

Genealogy awareness and access: What’s needed next

Many African societies have traditionally used oral history to pass down stories and genealogical information from generation to generation. This connective experience between the young and old is important.

At the same time, there is a need for genealogy thought leaders to collaborate with the public sector and other organizations to generate public awareness campaigns about the advances in the field. These campaigns can highlight the value of understanding one’s identity, connecting with distant relatives, and providing insights into past societies. Public awareness campaigns can also help dispel myths about genealogy and DNA to promote its legitimacy as a valuable field of study.

Institutions such as the Robert F. Smith Explore Your Family History Center—which is part of the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of African American History and Culture—is facilitating free genealogy expert consultations for those interested in tracking down their ancestry.

That said, there is still much work to be done to make genealogy and DNA records more accessible worldwide. Governments, including the United States, should create policies that promote the digitization of records and the creation of databases that are affordable and accessible to the public, especially given the fact that the genetic testing market size is anticipated to grow, reaching almost $18 billion by 2030.

Private companies currently access genealogy and DNA records to monetize direct-to-consumer DNA testing, medical research, DNA research services, data sharing and collaborations, and affiliate marketing.

Access to genealogy records can provide individuals with a sense of identity and belonging, connect them with distant relatives, and help them understand their place in the world. It can also inform understanding of past societies and help the world build more sustainable and prosperous communities.

Therefore, organizations around the world must work together to create policies that promote free access to genealogy records. Governments and institutions must work to strike a balance between protecting the privacy and providing access to history that is at the core of how families and communities have evolved over centuries.

Together, citizens of the world can ensure that genealogy remains a valuable resource for individuals and societies worldwide. By understanding the past, people can build a more prosperous and connected future.

Tyrell Junius is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a US returned Peace Corps volunteer of Zambia.

The post How genealogy can help restore historical ties through meaningful diaspora engagement appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Constance Berry Newman: The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

Aubrey Hruby: To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

Rama Yade: Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

On the ground, where I served in recent days as an election observer, it is about the Nigerian people—the voters, non-voters, youth, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other government officials, political parties, media, and civil society. Around ninety-three million Nigerians were registered to vote, but only 26 percent of those registered turned out to vote. Those who voted were engaged, standing in lines sometimes for hours, staying for the final counts, saluting each announced winner in their polling site. 

One puzzle not yet solved is: Why did so many more people decide not to vote than in previous elections? It’s probably all the same reasons Nigerians did not vote in the past—a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures. However, the youth are amazing. We saw them at the polling sites, though exact turnout numbers are yet to be verified, and the National Youth Service Corps ran the election at the polling site level. My conversations with many of the youth led to an observation that Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country. There are mixed reviews regarding the role of the media, because there are barriers to media having the freedom to do its job, and parts of the media allow for and even provide misinformation and hate speech. 

With regard to the civil-society participants, many are sophisticated in data collection and analysis, questioning government officials with facts, using media and social media in effective ways. However, neither they nor the government nor the political parties has been effective in getting the citizens to vote in any meaningful numbers. Also, the political parties have a long way to go in terms of improving inclusion for youth, women, persons with disabilities, and internally displaced persons in the political process.

With regard to the government’s role in the administration of the election, one can draw both positive and negative conclusions. On the positive side: 

1. The Electoral Act of 2022 took steps to improve electoral integrity. However, conclusions are yet to be determined about the implementation of those steps across the board. 
2. Preparations for the election started earlier than for previous elections, which should have resulted in improved Election Day activities at the polls and final reporting of the results. 
3. Generally speaking, the technology worked, but it would have worked better had INEC pilot tested the technology on a national level prior to the February election. INEC piloted the key new systems in three off-cycle elections but never conducted a nationwide test.  
4. The government secured signatures from the eighteen political parties to the 2023 Peace Accord. Therefore, each presidential candidate and the candidate’s party committed to accepting the outcome of the elections or seek legitimate means of remedy in the event of divergent viewpoints.

For the various governmental entities charged with playing a role in the election, currency and fuel shortages were a negative. Also, while some may argue that it is unfair to assign blame, the fact is that the government did not stop election violence such as the assassination of the Labour Party senatorial candidate for Enugu East.

Specially for INEC, there were three main negatives: 

1. A lack of transparency, so voters and the general public did not understand why election data was published late, for example. 
2. Very late openings of polling sites because of late transportation of materials, missing materials, and late arrival of staff. This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities. 
3. A seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.

—Constance Berry Newman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs. She is a member of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission to Nigeria’s 2023 presidential and legislative elections.

To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

After one of the closest elections in recent Nigerian history, Tinubu has called for an “era of renewed hope,” asking for peace, patience, and solidarity. He acknowledged the role that the youth have played in the elections and the need to address young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.” The fact that the “godfather of Lagos” lost his home city to Peter Obi demonstrates the power of the message Nigerian youth sent in this election.  

In order to address the concerns of the youth, the septuagenarian Tinubu will need to turn his immediate attention to the economy. Food inflation, at a seventeen-year high, is up 28 percent year on year from 2021 to 2022, official youth unemployment hit 42.5 percent (according to the national bureau of statistics) and oil production has fallen to a forty-year low. Power is still expensive—Nigeria is home to sixty million diesel generators and fuel products are still imported—and the World Bank estimates that over 40 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Borrowing on international markets to invest in infrastructure is not really an option for the new Tinubu administration, as Nigerian debt has nearly doubled since 2015 and is now over one hundred billion dollars.  

In the campaign, Tinubu committed to removing the fuel subsidies that cost Nigeria more than ten billion dollars in 2022, but this is not the first time a president tried to take on this beast. Then President Goodluck Jonathan’s efforts to remove the fuel subsidies ended after nationwide protests in 2012. This time around also promises to be politically difficult given the financial hardships faced by Nigerians.

Tinubu will also be asking a lot of Nigerians who are dependent on day-to-day imports should he push for the free float of the naira. The central bank currently restricts access to foreign exchange and rations dollars to prop up the naira, which is now valued at half of what it was when outgoing President Muhammad Buhari was first elected in 2015, resulting in a large spread between the official and street exchange rates. By the time Tinubu officially takes office at the end of May, hopefully the current government will have rationalized the demonetization plan that has caused cash shortages and long lines at ATMs.  

Despite all of these economic challenges, the Nigerian spirit has remained resilient. The informal economy (which, based on my experience doing business in the country for twenty years, is two-to-three times the size of the official economy) continues to absorb newcomers to the labor market, and there is a bright spot within Nigerian tech and entrepreneurship. The country is home to Africa’s largest venture capital and tech hub, and Nigerian companies such as Sabi, SeamlessHr, Moniepoint, and Moove are expanding to other economies in the region. 

But Tinubu will have an uphill battle in renewing young people’s faith in Nigeria. Young Nigerians are leaving the country in record numbers—those going to the United Kingdom to work has quadrupled since 2019—and the Nigerian Medical Association says that at least fifty doctors are leaving every week to work abroad. Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide. 

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, a co-founder of Tofino Capital, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

What we can say today is that even if the election was highly disputed, with Bola Tinubu, logic prevailed. Tinubu’s victory is not a surprise. He was running on behalf of the ruling All Progressives Congress. He is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos. If the result is confirmed, the largest African democracy will have passed one of its most important tests since military rule ended in 1999. And it is not over: Beyond the presidential election, Nigerians are also electing their 469 representatives in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Democracy is a tough path.

This election is special, too, because Nigeria is transitioning to a new environment marked by an economic turning point and a changing continental and international context. The expectations have never been so high. Tinubu will lead a country that is expected to become the world’s third most populous by 2050. At the African level, Nigeria is a major actor whose economy represents 70 percent of the West African gross domestic product. The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands. Even as it faces major shifts, it will tremendously impact the rest of the continent. At the global level, the African continent will negotiate its role in international bodies from the Bretton Woods system to the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Yet this is also a moment of rare opportunity for the AU. It is expected to play a crucial role in the new geopolitical order. This new role will require responsibilities and a vision. How the Union responds could shape the future of the AU and whether it emerges as a continental actor on par with other international blocs.

Like the outgoing AU chair (Senegalese President Macky Sall), the new chair will be confronted with many short-term hotspots from Bamako to Addis Ababa. Sudan remains suspended from the AU. Meanwhile, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina-Faso remain suspended from both the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These three West African countries will have to manage tough political transitions after experiencing coups—especially as they all sit in a region where jihadist movements continue to destabilize large areas of the Sahel. Months after the signing of ceasefire agreements between the federal government and rebels in Tigray, Ethiopia still needs to progress toward peace. Nongovernmental organizations continue to face difficulties accessing and distributing food and medical supplies in Tigray. War-crimes investigations remain difficult. The withdrawal of Eritrean troops is happening slowly. And over in the African Great Lakes, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are clashing around the M23 rebel group’s role in the region as presidential elections in the DRC quickly approach.

In addition, Assoumani will also need to help the continent manage pressing challenges such as food security, climate change, energy access, and global-governance reforms—and the implementation of the free trade area. The management of these challenges depends on regional and worldwide cooperation with global powers.

Comoros will also be the AU’s primary point of contact for the follow-up and implementation of multiple commitments emerging from a slate of summits over the past two years, including the US-Africa Leaders Summit, the China-Africa Summit, the Europe-Africa Summit, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, the Confederation of Indian Industry-Exim Bank Conclave, and, soon, the Russia-Africa Summit. At the summits that have taken place, participants have pledged billions in investments for Africa and support for African seats in various international bodies, including the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council.  

Individual nations cannot or should not solely address many of the challenges that lie ahead. In addressing issues such as supply shortages due to the war in Ukraine, representation at the next UN climate conference, access to finance, or Bretton Woods Institutions reforms, African nations must speak as a team to secure the best outcomes for all of them. That also applies to Africa’s relationship with the United States; the continent will need to collectively voice its priorities in regard to Washington’s plans for digitalization, trade (with the forthcoming expiration of the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and more. The AU must draw on its collective agency to harmonize national positions and face these continent-wide issues together. This will require strong leadership from the new chair.

Being a group of four islands with less than one million inhabitants, Comoros may seem a minor player in comparison to the African powerhouses that typically chair the AU, with the Union representing a continent of 1.3 billion people. The country has the opportunity to make its mark and turn its apparent weakness into a strength: African island diplomacy can be vital for advancing the continent’s defense and climate priorities. The United States recently launched an Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the Indian Ocean Commission, of which Comoros is a member, could serve a strategic role—especially as the West becomes increasingly concerned about the region, most recently because of ongoing joint naval exercises between China, Russia, and South Africa near Durban. An island strategy could have an impact beyond Africa, benefitting all small-island developing states. Comoros could advocate for alleviating island states’ financial problems—since 2008, the external debt stocks of small-island developing states have more than doubled. And, islands feel the brunt of climate change, as President of Seychelles Waval Ramkalawan explained at the Atlantic Council in December; Comoros has the opportunity to use its leadership in the AU to advocate for addressing the continent’s climate challenges.

Africa is at a crossroads. The African Union needs to be strong inside to be strong outside. It cannot request global governance reforms without exploring its own organization, identity, role, and means.

The African identity

The Union’s identity inevitably depends on the question of what it means to be African. Europe’s experience with understanding its own identity holds lessons. For example, Europe has wrestled with whether Russia and Turkey should be included. In the same vein, where does Africa begin and end? What does it mean to be African?

Some Africans even deny this word any legitimacy, preferring the terms “Kemit” or “Katiopa,” as they claim their ancestors would never have called themselves “African.” In Africa, people often refer to themselves first by the community to which they belong. In fact, most Africans know little about each other on the continent. Yet institutions are bringing African nations—or at least regions—together. For example, the African Cup of Nations, the continent’s premier soccer event, is as famous in North Africa as much as it is in Sub-Saharan Africa. And even though the Maghreb is sometimes lumped into the Middle East (as if being African means being black), Morocco is joining African institutions in an attempt to connect with other countries on the continent, having applied to join ECOWAS and having rejoined the African Union in January 2017 after thirty years of absence. After rejoining, Morocco’s king said “it is so good to be back home.”

Pan-Africanism

Africa, for all the diverse ideas around its identity today, has long had a pan-continental impulse. Inspired by the father of Ghana’s independence, Kwame Nkrumah, the Pan-Africanist movement has paved the way for the creation of the Organization of African Unity, the African Development Bank, the airline Air Afrique (which has since ceased operations), and a range of monetary, customs, and economic unions. Today, the African Union is twenty years old. Pan-Africanism created not only institutional change; it fueled an unprecedented cultural wave that inspired the first International Congress of African/Black Writers and Artists in Paris and Rome in the 1950s, the first World Festival of Negro Arts in Dakar in 1966, the Pan-African Festival of Algiers in 1969, the second World Festival of Negro and African Arts and Culture in Lagos in 1977, and similar seminal events.

Even though it is less vibrant today, the Pan-Africanist movement continues to inspire the African Renaissance. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), established in 2018 and launched in January 2021, is the latest illustration of this. As the largest free trade area in the world, it aims to establish a dynamic market, its consumers and customers already attracting the appetite of the global private sector. Beyond technical considerations such as tax harmonization, lowering customs tariffs, and the construction of viable infrastructure, the AU’s next mission will likely be to remedy the balkanization of the continent that unfolded in the 1950s and 1960s as colonial empires dissolved and the continent was broken up into countries. At the thirty-sixth AU summit, the next steps for the AfCFTA were a topic of debate.

Missed opportunities

Many of Nkrumah’s proposals never took off. Those include the idea of an African constitution and a continental parliament with two chambers, one of which would represent the population while the other would have all states, regardless of size or population, represented equally. Africa still doesn’t have a joint army (the African Standby Force is still on standby) or a universal passport (which has only been ratified by four countries). The Great Museum of Africa, planned by the AU, was initially supposed to open in 2016. Many of the AU’s continental institutions have no effect on the ground. Documents such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in June 1981 or the Peace and Security Council Protocol adopted in July 2002 have not been implemented either.

Despite the very effective presidency of Paul Kagame, which improved the Union’s financial autonomy in 2016, the AU still needs the means for its economic sovereignty as it is still too dependent on foreign subsidies: In 2021, 65 percent of the AU’s 650-million-dollar budget was funded by international contributors. The African share, meanwhile, is concentrated in the hands of five countries. To finance the budget, the AU introduced in 2016 a 0.2 percent tax on all eligible goods imported into the continent. But only seventeen countries have actually implemented it as of June 2020. There is an urgent need to achieve budgetary sovereignty for the AU so that it can make its own choices freely. Otherwise, it will never be able to independently demand the seats Africans covet in the G20 or the UN Security Council.  

The future

It is, above all, for the sake of its citizens that the African Union must raise its ambitions. The AU has a historical responsibility to foster a community of African nations coming together in a shared voice, as dreamed by Nkrumah and fellow Pan-African leaders.

Going forward, among numerous AU flagship projects, the new chairperson will need to lead two major and urgent initiatives—the accomplishment of them would impact a generation of Africans.

First, he’ll have to help craft an African vision for the climate and an African green bank, a necessary response to today’s climate challenges that will compensate for the shortcomings of the international community and unsuccessful UN climate convenings. Each year, the world incurs a fifty-five-billion-dollar debt to the African continent: This debt is the value of the carbon-absorbing service provided by the Congo Basin, the largest carbon sink in the world, covering six countries (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo). But Africans have never monetized it as a service. African countries should work together to raise the issue of the world’s debt to the African continent at the next UN climate conference.

Second, to limit the migration movements to Europe and strengthen people-to-people ties inside the continent, they’ll have to address free movement across the continent, which will require renewing the old physical infrastructure (roads and rail), building the Single African Air Transport Market, and fostering access to digital infrastructure through the reduction of data costs. This transition will require discussing an African passport on a continent where more than half the people have neither identity documents nor birth certificates. Creating such a passport would be a strong signal of unity. It is also critically important to negotiate the next steps of the Free Trade Area.

This is no small charge for the Union’s next leader. But anything less would do a disservice to 1.3 billion citizens who are ready to emerge on the world stage.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

The post <strong>The African Union is at a crossroads. It’s time to seize its moment.</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa’s advancement today is still tied to Pan-Africanism. And with the upcoming 2024 Paris Olympics and 2026 World Cup in North America, African nations have an opportunity to collectively lobby for permanent representation in institutions including the Group of Twenty (G20) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). They’ll be able to combine the modern media spotlight of these global events with a model established nearly six decades ago.

The 1966 strikers

The 1966 World Cup offers a clear example of Africa using smart power and bloc voting to push for greater representation, and it speaks to the potential of Pan-Africanism to shape the continent’s integration in the global community today.

Nelson Mandela once said: “Sport has the power to change the world. It has the power to inspire. It has the power to unite people in a way that little else does.” For Africans in the 1960s, soccer was a unifying vehicle that helped them advance a regional agenda in the new world order that followed a wave of African nations declaring independence.

FIFA, which was established in Paris in 1904 by soccer officials from seven European countries, did not envision Africa as integral to the sport—as shown by its decision to allocate fifteen of the sixteen team slots in the 1966 World Cup to countries in Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean. That left almost thirty countries across Africa and Asia competing for one slot, sparking great discontent, with some arguing an injustice was being placed on already disadvantaged countries. In response to FIFA’s decision, Africa boycotted the tournament.

When Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah tapped Ohene Djan, Ghana’s Football Association president, to lead the fifteen-nation African boycott, three things happened: It brought African soccer to the fore, laid the foundation for Sub-Saharan Africa and newly independent nations to flex global influence, and forced FIFA to open more qualifying spots for non-European countries. Ultimately, the boycott displayed the growing importance of the African regional bloc in the geopolitical sphere.

Tackling barriers with Black political power

One of the important factors that contributed to Africa’s effectiveness in boycotting FIFA was Pan-Africanism, the movement to unite and mobilize everyone of African descent (including Black people in the United States, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean) in the pursuit of shared goals such as eliminating racism and colonialism. In the spirit of collaboration around a shared experience, Nkrumah, who is considered a founding father of Pan-Africanism, exercised grassroots soccer diplomacy and reinforced the idea among African thought leaders that solidarity would be the key to improving representation and inclusion.

Such thinking, heavily influenced by the African-American experience, defined the way in which Africa inserted itself into the Cold-War geopolitics of the time and asserted its claim to representation in global institutions. Specifically, Nkrumah’s engagement with African Americans during his formative years in the United States was critical. In his pursuit for African sovereignty—and while a student at historically Black Lincoln University in Pennsylvania—Nkrumah sought not only to understand the common struggle among Black people but also to identify global solutions for addressing structural racism. Later on, his interactions with African American civil-society leaders including W.E.B. Du Bois, Martin Luther King Jr., and Malcom X transformed diaspora relations.

The US civil rights movement inspired an identity shift among Black people from colonized to citizen, informing Nkrumah’s perspective. Using his platform as the leader of the first independent African nation south of the Sahara, he helped shape the thinking on African citizenship and its connection to a larger struggle rooted in a shared Black experience. Such a framework integrated common cultural experiences, values, and interpretations shared among people of African descent. Nkrumah’s concept for African citizenship also encouraged Africans of newly independent countries to see themselves as global actors, ultimately influencing Africa’s conduct of international affairs—including the continent’s participation in the World Cup.

Nkrumah saw the need to push for change in soccer, a sport heavily tied to politics. His solution to address FIFA’s barriers drew from the African American experience as well: Boycotts throughout the civil rights movement became synonymous with the fight against exclusionary institutions. In taking a page from the African American liberation struggle playbook, members of the boycott during the World Cup saw themselves as confronting similar barriers that inhibited integration.

All players on the pitch

Since FIFA’s inception, countries have used World Cup diplomacy to advance nation branding (or convey a particular image of their national identities), political protest, and grassroots diplomacy. For example, at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the host country promoted a specific image of itself as a strong and newly emerging international market player in an attempt to expand its soft power: Recall the theme “all in one rhythm,” which promoted collaboration. In another example of how countries have used World Cup diplomacy, players, countries, and international institutions against apartheid boycotted South Africa, and in response FIFA suspended South Africa in 1961.

Following the 1966 boycott, Nkrumah leveraged his platform to engage and persuade FIFA to make the World Cup more inclusive. He showcased smart power in a way that did more than change soccer; it influenced how Africans saw themselves in the global community. In particular, Ghana’s leadership around the boycott helped change perceptions about Africa and its international profile.

The collective front of boycotting countries highlighted Africans’ abilities to think for themselves and navigate Western institutions. And, with the boycott, Africans demonstrated that they, too, could play the game of global politics, using Western platforms and tactics such as regional bloc voting, collective bargaining, and political mobilization to compel change from FIFA. In doing so, African leadership challenged the idea that Africans lacked intellectual savviness to advance their causes. The act of taking on established institutions such as FIFA brought to light the importance of representation, which enabled African nations, through nation branding, to enhance their soft power.

Pan-Africanism, as it was in the 1960s, remains an increasingly critical tool for African nations searching for ways to assert themselves in the era of great-power competition and looking to change the course of development across the continent.

In the next three years, African nations will have two venues—the 2024 Paris Olympics and 2026 World Cup spread across the United States, Canada, and Mexico—at which they can unite with the diaspora, mobilize their diplomatic corps, and propel their regional organizations to lobby for permanent representation in the G20 and UNSC. A renewed approach to African bloc engagement—in which African nations and the diaspora exert influence to direct their advancement on their terms and engage in public diplomacy with other leaders in attendance at international convenings—would acknowledge Africa’s pivotal role in forging global peace and prosperity.

A renewed approach to African bloc engagement would also unlock new avenues for addressing the toughest challenges facing the international community. Intellectual, financial, and entrepreneurial collaboration between Africans and the diaspora through knowledge sharing and partnerships could address global challenges such as climate change, social injustice, and economic exclusion. The combination of Africa’s wealth of natural resources and its burgeoning youth population gives the continent strength that, with the support of the African diaspora, could potentially reshape power dynamics in favor of Africa’s development. The 1966 World Cup boycott showed that when an international intervention gets a dose of Pan-Africanism, change on a global scale is possible.

Deneyse A. Kirkpatrick is the senior advisor at the US Department of State’s Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and an award-winning public diplomacy expert. Her previous diplomatic postings include Angola, Niger, Iraq, Brazil, and Egypt. Follow her on Linkedin. The views in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of the State Department or the US government.

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The international community then committed to supporting Sudan’s transition toward democratization, reconstruction, and sweeping reforms across politics, economics, and the security structure to meet the aspirations of the country’s people after the revolution.

Yet the transitional process began to unravel almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, amid turmoil and instability. The Transitional Military Council—the military junta that took power after Bashir’s ouster—and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian and rebel groups—agreed on the Constitutional Charter and on the formation of a Sovereignty Council to lead the country during the transition to democracy through fresh elections. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the transitional government and rebel groups in October 2020 appeared to be cementing those gains toward peace and democracy.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

1. Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
2. Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
3. Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

• arrangements for international monitoring
• implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
• the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
• the enactment of a Political Parties Law
• the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

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The World Bank’s Wadata Talaka safety-net partnership program with Niger aims to empower women in the country and protect its human-capital gains in the face of overlapping shocks.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

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The United States has traditionally focused on security priorities in its African engagement. This Cold War vision not only dominates perceptions in the public and private realms but also distracts from the authentic economic and strategic opportunities the continent offers investors in the twenty-first century. The impact of the 9/11 attacks has strengthened this approach over the past two decades. More recently, the United States has seen Africa as a battleground for competition with China, ignoring that the continent’s nations have their own strategic interests.

The December summit offered signs that the Biden administration recognizes the limitations of that approach. Yet to change that, the United States must build on its commitments to African leaders in Washington.

A new approach

The emphasis at the summit was not on threats but on opportunities, not on security but on business engagement, diaspora ties, and Africa’s cultural soft power. The message continued when, earlier this year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken unveiled a new US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa that emphasized that the United States would be looking for partnerships with African nations rather than dictating terms to them.

Blinken’s multiple trips in Africa, from Senegal to South Africa and Kenya to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2022, followed by a tour of the continent this week by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, show that the Biden administration is taking Africa’s emergence as an influential global player seriously.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the willingness of African nations to use their votes at multilateral platforms—30 percent of United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes belong to African countries—in pursuit of their national interests. In vote after vote at the UN, many African nations have abstained from outright condemnation of Russia’s invasion. This search for strategic autonomy is also reflected in other bold initiatives, such as a proposal by the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, BRICS, to develop its own currency. The grouping, which South Africa will chair in 2023, already has its own development bank.

Even as it focuses on Taiwan and Ukraine, it is time for the United States to recognize Africa’s centrality in the geopolitical churn the world is witnessing. After all, the United States also has vital interests at stake in Africa.

Follow the money

On the summit’s last day, the Biden-Harris administration announced plans to invest at least fifty-five billion dollars in Africa over the next three years.

This follows many other nations making similar investment announcements: China pledged forty billion dollars late last year, Japan promised thirty billion dollars in August, and India said last July that it will boost investment to $150 billion by 2030.

Furthermore, China is a leading source of greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) —when foreign companies create local subsidiaries—in Africa, investing more than seventy-one billion dollars from 2016-2020. On the other hand, the United States was the fourth highest source of African greenfield FDI during the same time, totaling twenty-three billion dollars. While the United States is a stable partner for the continent, it invests less in Africa than in any other region. The United States needs to fix that to signal to African nations that they are genuinely valued as strategic and trusted partners in addressing global crises, including energy production, food insecurity, and job creation.

Out with the old and in with the new

The US National Defense Strategy, unveiled in October, also signals the shift in approach toward Africa as a partner rather than a region that the United States can dictate to. This strategy document has outlined a new policy on working through partners on security matters.

With France rethinking its security focus in West Africa and the Sahel, and Europe focused on North Africa, General Stephen Townsend, then-commander of US Africa Command, said last year: “I think there’s actually room on the continent for all of us to do our respective nations’ business.” China, by assisting in anti-piracy patrols, has played a helpful role too, he said.

Such an approach has lent credibility to the Biden-Harris administration’s claim that it does not seek to turn Africa into a sphere of great-power competition. Africa will not have to choose between potential partners.

With a firm security foundation, global FDI in the fast-growing creative and cultural industries, technology, mining, and agribusiness will continue. Some of the mechanisms through which the White House plans to strengthen the partnership with Africa include established platforms such as ProsperAfrica, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Export-Import Bank, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Development Finance Corporation.

Yet it is vital for the United States to be mindful that the priorities of the two sides might not always align. On climate, for example, while the United States seeks to lead the world to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, African nations where crucial natural gas discoveries have been made eye gas as a critical temporary source of power.

The task of finding a path forward on all these issues will fall to longtime US diplomat Johnnie Carson, who is the special representative implementing the agreements from the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit.

More than a summit

Even as Africa grapples with the impact of the war in Ukraine and the lingering effects of the pandemic, the United States could redefine its relationship with the continent if it offers a game-changing answer to the main challenge African markets face: access to international capital.

Yet that challenge is also the result of an inadequate understanding of Africa’s opportunities. At a welcome dinner for visiting African heads of state hosted by the Africa Center, Atlantic Council Chairman John Rogers, who is also executive vice chairman of Goldman Sachs, said: “Outside of this room, most would be surprised to hear that Africa’s debt is lower than European debt.” The African Export-Import Bank, also known as Afreximbank, has pointed out how Italy’s external debt at the height of the COVID-19 crisis ($2.6 trillion) was more than three times what all African countries combined owed to their external creditors at the end of 2019.

“Nonetheless, it is easier today for African nations to borrow from the Chinese. We must continue to work hard to change this and to overhaul outdated risk profiles that put open markets at a disadvantage when providing loans or working capital to African nations,” Rogers said, echoing African Union Chairperson Macky Sall’s advocacy at that same event for a pan-African rating agency.

In 2021, investment flowing to Africa reached a record eighty-three billion dollars. The private sector must boost support for policymakers to address Africa’s economic and green transformation. During the US-Africa Business Forum as part of the main summit, US President Joe Biden noted that his administration was “working with Congress to invest $350 [million] to facilitate more than almost half a billion dollars in financing to make sure more people across Africa can participate in the digital economy.”

The road ahead

In 2022 the United States took steps to center its relationship around mutually beneficial partnerships. The summit solidified this approach, but the United States will need to put words into action to succeed. This year offers it a unique opportunity to reset and reengage its relationship with Africa.

People-to-people ties are a critical area that separates the United States from other contenders seeking influence in Africa. There, the United States has no competitors. From Hollywood to Silicon Valley, the American way of life remains attractive to many young African people—as it does to their peers in other parts of the world. The connection between Africa and the Black community in the United States serves as another resilient and robust bond.

African leaders recognize this too. Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo is trying to attract the diaspora to invest in his country’s development through a project called Beyond the Return. Meanwhile, the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States is trying to build a new narrative that recalls the past but builds a future that reconnects both continents based on shared prosperity.

This year could also witness the United States outflank its geopolitical rivals. Russia, which centers its engagement in Africa around arms diplomacy, is mired in the conflict it started in Ukraine. It is unclear how long Russia can afford to send military hardware or mercenaries abroad when it desperately needs them in Ukraine. China, likewise, is undergoing turmoil. COVID-19 continues to play havoc with its economy and social order, resulting in some of the most widespread protests the country has seen in decades. The Chinese Communist Party might focus inward rather than outward in the coming months.

All this leaves the United States room for maneuver. If it can make up lost ground and build on what it started with the December summit, the United States and Africa will prosper.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

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The summit comes at a challenging time, characterized by deteriorating security conditions on the continent—reminiscent of the Cold War era—exacerbated by rising geopolitical tensions and the urgency to ramp up the energy transition and combat climate change. There is a risk that the subordination of growth and development objectives to security priorities, which has dominated US engagement with Africa, will persist in today’s highly geopolitically driven world.

The United States’ continuous prioritization of security over development (otherwise known as the securitization of development) in its engagement with Africa could be counterproductive: It could easily undermine the net-zero transition as well as opportunities for maximizing the benefits of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which policymakers hope will alleviate the concentration of global supply chains for greater resilience.

Moving up the value chain

The securitization of development has been costly for both Africa and the United States and has led to the weakening of US-Africa relations. This is especially evident in the trade arena, where the United States has been losing ground at lightning speed. For decades, it was Africa’s largest trading partner, accounting for as much as 26.5 percent of total African trade in 1980 according to data from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank). That figure has fallen into the single digits, to around 6 percent of total African trade, with US investment on the continent having declined sharply as well.

Perhaps the most consequential factor behind the collapse of US-Africa trade has been the stickiness of the colonial development model based on resource extraction, under which Africa is relegated to participating in global value chains (GVCs) along forward rather than backward activities, predominantly as a provider of primary commodities and raw materials. Initially this model grossly inflated US-African trade—both on the export and import side of the trade balance sheet—with the United States importing crude oil from Africa and exporting refined petroleum products back to the continent.

In the modern era of global value chains, in which intermediate goods have become the leading drivers of world trade, falling US investment in Africa has blunted the expansion of US-African trade. Moreover, the predominance of natural resources in that trade has always presented a major risk. For example, as the twenty-first-century US shale boom put the country on a path toward energy independence—with advances in fracking technology lowering production costs and raising oil output—US petroleum imports declined dramatically; between 2014 and 2020, the United States cut its oil imports from Africa by around 40 percent, according to Afreximbank.

While many African countries are oil producers, they rely on imports for refined petroleum products. Under that highly carbon-intensive “round-tripping” model, Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil-producing country, for decades exported crude oil to the United States and imported refined petroleum products back to power its economy, at a huge cost in terms of macroeconomic stability, jobs, and environmental degradation.

Besides increasing the carbon footprint of the heavily polluting shipping industry, the costs of the round-tripping model are significant and go beyond dwindling trade numbers. There is a human element: People are being sickened by intense greenhouse gas emissions and wounded—or, in the worst cases, killed—in conflicts fueled by climate change and competition for scarce resources. Africa is on the frontlines of the global climate crisis, despite being the continent contributing the lowest total greenhouse gas emissions. Round-tripping has also exported jobs off of the continent, which is already contending with Great Depression-level unemployment rates, exacerbating poverty and adding to conflict-fueled migration flows.

At the macro level, the conditions created by round-tripping have long undermined the continent’s pursuit of economic stability, with sustained foreign-exchange leakages increasing the frequency of balance-of-payment crises. Africa’s position as an importer of refined petroleum products plays an outsized role in these crises, a vulnerability that leaders across the continent are looking to address. In Nigeria, for example, a new Dangote Group refinery and petrochemical plant that will come on stream early next year could, according to estimates from the Central Bank of Nigeria, save the country up to 40 percent of its foreign exchange earnings.

Ultimately, the securitization of development in US-Africa engagement has delivered neither security nor development. And the predominance of natural resources has underscored the economic and political risk to both parties, with the sharp decline of US-African trade weakening its relevance for Africa’s development in an increasingly competitive geopolitical world.

Next steps for the US and Africa

There are key questions to consider during what could be a history-making summit in Washington: Can the trend be reversed to boost US-African trade and correct the balance between security and development? And why should such a course of action be undertaken?

On the first question, increased manufacturing in Africa can help the continent diversify its exports beyond primary commodities and natural resources and integrate effectively into the global economy. In addition to its strong theoretical foundation for economic development, manufacturing has other positive spillovers including opportunities for economies of scale and productivity growth, technology transfers, integration into GVCs, and capital accumulation. Recent estimates show that this drives 20 percent of US capital investment and 60 percent of US exports.

Across the developing world, manufacturing has offered a path for low-income countries to increase their shares of global trade. One example is Vietnam, which over the course of the past decade has become one of the United States’ ten largest trading partners, leaping ahead of powerful nations such as France and Italy, according to the Africa Export and Import Bank. Vietnam has achieved this by successfully improving its connections to GVCs, including those around technology. More than 40 percent of Samsung cellphones are manufactured in Vietnam, enabling the country to reap the benefits of the frontier technology industries that are propelling global growth.

Most African countries, which possess the raw materials necessary to manufacture these and similar technology products, could achieve the same performance—if it weren’t for the colonial development model of resource extraction. For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo, which some call “the Saudi Arabia of cobalt,” could potentially enter electric vehicle GVCs not solely as a resource provider but as provider of lithium batteries and other crucial, manufactured components.

In addition to boosting US-African trade, such involvement across GVCs would mitigate the continent’s vulnerability to adverse commodity terms of trade and improve living standards, as has been the case in Vietnam, where poverty rates have fallen sharply. Simply put, since greater backward participation in GVCs leads to higher gross exports, domestic value added, and employment, manufacturing reduces poverty—and its poverty-reducing effects are even more pronounced in low-income countries.

Turning to the second question, the benefits of increasing manufacturing output and diversifying exports in terms of growth and welfare are textbook trade theory. But there are also two additional benefits with significant geopolitical implications: The diversification of global supply chains for greater resilience and the reduction of the global carbon footprint.

The AfCFTA, which entered into force last year and is expected to catalyze competitive value chains across the continent, provides a new framework for US-Africa engagement. Beyond diversifying Africa’s sources of growth and turning the page on the costly round-tripping model, the agreement has the potential to cut carbon emissions significantly by facilitating the net-zero transition and promoting the diversification of global supply chains. The latter is especially important for building greater resilience in today’s geopolitically tilted world, where trade is increasingly treated as another weapon in superpowers’ arsenals.

There are other reasons for the United States and the world to prioritize Africa in the decentralization of global supply chains. The continent’s young population positions it as a growing consumer market, and shrinking the distance between production and consumption would further alleviate the global carbon footprint during the net-zero transitional period. Simultaneously, economies of scale associated with the AfCFTA will further boost productivity and returns on investments, especially as corporations take advantage of regional integration to spread the risk of investing in smaller markets and, in the process, strengthen investment and trade and lift African exports.

Transcending the colonial development model of resource extraction could position a reforming Africa as the next great frontier market for global investors chasing high yields and resilient supply chains amid today’s rising geopolitical tensions. Earlier this year, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen promoted “friend-shoring” to shift supply chains away from countries that present geopolitical and security risks to supply chains. It is up to the United States to change its ways and make new friends during its second US-Africa Leaders Summit.

Hippolyte Fofack is the chief economist at Afreximbank.

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In the same way, institutional capital has remained concentrated in developed markets. Investors have sought to optimize for near-term returns rather than sustainable returns through diversification. The situation has resulted in unprecedented levels of liquidity: Global assets under management (AUM) have grown by more than 40 percent since 2015 and are expected to grow from over $110 trillion today to $145 trillion by 2025.

Investors looking for returns need to look to new markets. Africa—the most demographically dynamic region of the world—has been making headlines for the massive investment potential it offers, and yet has been stubbornly ignored. The continent’s average growth over the past two decades has oscillated between 4.5 percent and 5 percent, with five countries averaging over 6 percent. While the recession induced by COVID-19 hit wealthy countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development hard with a 5.5 percent contraction in 2020, African countries were more resilient, only shrinking by 2 percent.

Despite the compelling economic data, the African growth story has not resulted in the concomitant boost in investment from global players. Investment into the region is made by the same long-time investors, including development finance institutions. Meanwhile, mainstream institutional investors remain on the sidelines.

Surveys have long documented the difference in risk perception between investors with established operations on the continent and those that are considering opportunities from afar. Those already invested in the region see Africa as the most attractive investment destination, while those that don’t have operations in African markets view it as the second-least attractive region. For funds and firms that have yet to enter African markets, a stubborn dichotomous view of African risk—one that oscillates between seeing the continent through a lens of foreign aid and another that embraces the high risk/high return view—creates confusion and causes hesitation. Furthermore, the mainstream investment strategy used by investors in developed markets—one that is data dependent and push-oriented—is ill-suited to the opportunities in African markets.

From data dependence to trend analysis

Developed markets are data rich. In North American or European economies, investing is governed by subsector experts who focus on niche industries and specialized asset classes. The accelerating financial complexity and sophistication of highly public markets in developed countries progressively made specialists critical to finding opportunities and delivering returns. The internet economy of the 2000s and the growing importance of real-time data has accelerated the specialization. Now, large data sets and artificial intelligence-powered analysis have become quantitative assets to specialist investors.

This was not always the case. Prior to the 1980s, top-level generalists who deeply understood political economy dynamics were successful investors. In the post-war era, international investors navigated domestic social change, reconstruction, decolonization, and oil shocks to build the continent’s first private equity firms and iconic multinational companies. Over the same period, the emerging computer revolution transformed economics from the study of human behavior in an environment of scarcity to a series of equations and advanced mathematical modelling. Economics as a science grew up alongside Masters of Business Administration (MBA) programs, resulting in a disconnect between economic and geopolitical analysis and an elevation of data in business decision-making.

In contrast to developed economies, African markets are defined by a lack of real-time, reliable data and strong interaction between political and economic realities, thus developed market analytical approaches will fall short. Cutting and pasting the data-dependent, specialist model in African markets leaves managers unable to understand and mitigate the operational, on-the-ground market risks. Country risk assessments, developed by economists at international financial institutions, tend to position geopolitical risk as a matter of insurance instead of being central to investment decision-making in projects and deals with medium-to-long-term returns horizons.

Taking a more intersectional perspective bringing together economic and geopolitical analysis requires an understanding of the trends currently reshaping the continent.

Most investors still operate on dated perceptions of African markets driven by oft-repeated factoids and the news cycle, failing to recognize the mutually reinforcing trends that have over the past twenty years restructured many African economies and enhanced their resilience. Coups grab headlines but day-to-day political stability makes for boring news. Despite the recent coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, the map of Africa is no longer a swath of autocratic regimes as it was in the 1980s but rather a mosaic with standout democracies such as Ghana and Senegal, which have—for the most part—been fortifying their institutions.

Regional powers such as Kenya and Nigeria, despite setbacks, have been on a trajectory of democratic progress. After the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, the country reformed its electoral process and promulgated a new constitution in 2010 which devolved power. In Nigeria, the 2015 elections marked a turning point: the first time since the return of civilian rule in 1999 that an opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, won against the People’s Democratic Party that had ruled until then. In the 1990s, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) only identified three democratic countries in Africa. In 2020, the EIU ranked twenty African countries as hybrid or higher on a democratic scale, despite democratic backsliding globally (including in the United States).

Accompanying the increasing political stabilization, economic diversification has also shored up African economic resilience. The continent’s sustained growth cannot only be attributed to high commodity prices but also is the result of a progressive shift away from raw material export models toward services and middle-class-based consumption.

The “oil curse” that colors the conversation of African economic growth is proving to be less powerful even in major oil exporters such as Nigeria. The oil price collapses of 2008 and 2014-16 revealed a previously unrecognized level of resilience on the continent. When oil hit a low of twenty-six dollars a barrel in 2016, regional gross domestic product fell to 2.2 percent from 3.4 percent the previous year, but the continent did not become mired in stagnation as it did in the “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, growth recovered in 2017, revealing structural improvements (particularly in Nigeria).

Diversification has been supported by increased investments made in infrastructure, deepening regional integration culminating in the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2019, and greater amounts of disposable income that have supported domestic markets for consumption. African countries have had greater choice in international partners. Over the past two decades, China has become Africa’s most significant trading partner and the largest financier of infrastructure in the region to the tune of twenty-three billion dollars between 2007 and 2020. Over seven billion dollars of that financing went to telecom infrastructure. Increasing mobile penetration and digitization accelerated by COVID-19 are undergirding an exponential growth in venture capital into African markets. In 2016, total venture capital flowing into the region was just above $350 million. Five years later, it crested four billion dollars, with the lion’s share going to Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, and Kenya, and with over 60 percent of the capital coming from US-tied entities.

The interaction of political stabilization, better macroeconomic management, technological change, and young demographics will support the continent in returning to growth after the COVID-19 crisis. Just like in the case of the 2016 oil shock, African growth bounced back to 3.7 percent in 2021, showing unanticipated resilience after the continent’s economy contracted by 1.7 in 2020. By analyzing the trends and accepting that rapid growth is neither linear nor smooth, investors can find success in African markets.

Pull over push strategies

Understanding transformative macro trends is sine qua non, but not enough to guarantee successful ventures. It is also critical to employ a pull strategy rather than a push approach. The latter focuses on creating new consumer needs and desires and then pushing relevant products into the market. The former instead rests on identifying unserved market needs and then creating products to meet that latent demand. Push strategies work well in consumption-based economies supported by efficient capital markets such as the United States or Europe in which affluent consumers can be convinced that their want of the newest mobile phone is actually a need. African markets are best-suited for pull strategies.

Most large European and US investors have a self-referential bias whereby they consider African opportunities through the lens of their own market operating environments. Many of them are looking to simply add a high-risk premium to compensate for investing in African markets on top of their familiar underlying asset structures. Some seek short-term, liquid, and safe assets such as treasury bonds while others pursue high internal rates of return (IRRs) in a seven-year fund lifecycle. Some are looking for real assets with developed secondary markets to ensure liquidity, while others want to deploy billions of dollars through thematic strategies such as infrastructure or climate.

Each “push” strategy will be exposed to difficulties that can create Goldilocks-type scenarios: not enough market depth, too few “bankable” projects, too much volatility, not enough liquidity, too much risk, inadequate profitability, and other such conditions. The list of reasons not to invest therefore becomes overwhelming and results in the accumulation of dry powder.

Fundamentally, African market realities are different—liquidity more often than not comes with volatility due to systemic local currency risk on the continent. The days of making 20 percent IRR in relatively safe private equity (PE) environments are also long gone: The first and second vintage in the early 2000s of African PE funds invested in banks, telecoms, and other low-hanging fruit, leaving only difficult operational, consumer-facing firms for today’s investors to build. Reports from both the International Finance Corporation and the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association—better known as AVCA—show returns of less than 10 percent in African PE due to currency fluctuations. High returns can be found in the African early-stage venture space, but those opportunities are often too small for institutional investors.

To gain access to the tremendous opportunities that African markets offer at scale, emerging market investing must be built on pull strategies based on intersectional approaches, incorporating an understanding of existing demand and working to find overlaps between the realities of African markets and the requirements of investors. For example, the billions flowing into climate and environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) funds can deliver good returns, strong developmental impact, and advancement of United Nations sustainable development goals if investors think beyond immediate climate resilience within today’s economic context and recognize that African countries have a dual imperative–stimulating rapid green growth and alleviating poverty.

On a continent where six hundred million people lack reliable access to electricity, additional generation capacity is a critical priority on which the green or digital revolutions depend. While climate investors rightfully eschew investments in coal, natural gas generation opportunities may prove a good opportunity as they can create the base power necessary for broad-based solar. Likewise, attractive carbon reduction opportunities can be found in agribusiness, so having the flexibility to invest outside the energy sector increases the potential for success.

A flexible and intersectional approach can also help asset managers wanting to deploy billions of dollars in the short term. By recognizing that market absorption capacities will limit their deployment, they can invest smaller amounts in the nascent private debt industry, which will grow rapidly in the next three to five years given the continuously growing financing gap in African markets.

If large asset managers want the diversification and returns that these markets can offer, they must accept the intrinsic trade-offs found in emerging markets. If liquidity is the priority, an investor can buy bonds in Cairo, Lagos, or Johannesburg but must accept the concomitant volatility and depreciation risk resulting from the underlying assets being valued in local currencies.

If predictability and stability are desired, then an investor must prepare for illiquidity. While investing in illiquid assets in the real economy offers opportunities ranging from infrastructure to agribusiness to renewable energy, exits are difficult to time. The classic high risk, high return investment profile does exist but is now concentrated in the emerging tech and creative industries.

With recession looming on the horizon in the United States and Europe, investors who want to participate in the next wave of growth and create wealth from—and in—fast-growing emerging and frontier markets in Africa and beyond need to adjust their approaches to invest along transformational trends, navigate political economy concerns, and tap latent demand.

Twenty years ago, the Economist dubbed Africa “the Hopeless Continent.” Today, the associated risks with investing in Africa are very different. Risk perception must be updated to reflect the increasing resilience, digitization, and integration that now are taking hold in African markets. Investors will succeed if they work to understand market realities instead of coming with pre-defined investment strategies, if they find the overlap between their internal requirements and market needs, and if they embrace flexibility and intersectional approaches. The geopolitical and economic dynamics of this post-COVID-19 world make looking at African markets not a niche option but rather a mainstream necessity.

Guillaume Arditti is founder of Belvedere Africa Partners and a lecturer in international relations at the Political Sciences Institute of Paris (Sciences Po).

Aubrey Hruby is a co-founder of Tofino Capital, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

An abbreviated version of this article also appears on LSE Business Review.

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Yet even against that historical backdrop, the late Queen Elizabeth II was respected by her peers across the continent, and upon the announcement of her death, tributes from African heads of state poured in.

How did a monarch that, for many, embodied empire and colonialism garner such tribute among people whose ancestors chafed against British rule? The Queen committed herself to fostering relationships with various African heads of state, an effort that sometimes required her to step outside the United Kingdom’s dominant political context of the time. And after seventy years on the throne, she was omnipresent as a symbol of continuity, comradery, and commonality across the Commonwealth.

The Queen, both as head of state or head of the Commonwealth to twenty-one African nations, took her duties seriously. She respected local customs, was comfortable operating in a post-colonial environment, and often went against the advice of the British political establishment when approaching issues on the continent.

Such an approach paid off.

Not only was the Queen respected by many African political figures, but she enabled the United Kingdom to make inroads where politicians were unable to do so. But can the Commonwealth’s relationship with Africa continue to thrive with its greatest asset gone?

The Queen’s triumphs

The Queen’s relationship with Africa began at the very start of her reign: After all, she ascended the throne while in the foothills of Mt. Kenya in 1952. Her connection to the continent over the course of her reign would be long standing, but also one defined by a forced evolution as the United Kingdom left its ambitions for empire behind.

From her first visits to Africa as monarch, she would work to cement her credibility as a leader not only for the United Kingdom, but also for the Commonwealth. While reigning over a tumultuous shift in global geopolitics, she was able to juggle her responsibilities and effectively serve as a moral and figurative leader.

This is perhaps most evident in her 1961 visit to Ghana. The former colony had recently declared its independence and was debating leaving the Commonwealth; its founding father and president, avowed socialist Kwame Nkrumah, increased his hold on power and cozied up to the Soviets at the same time the Berlin Wall was being erected and the Cold War was getting into full swing.

British politicians were very much against the trip. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill called the prime minister at the time, Harold Macmillan, in an attempt to lobby the government to cancel the Queen’s travel. The Queen was steadfast, however, and despite the pressure visited for twelve days.

The visit was an immense success.

Most famously, at a ball organized to celebrate the trip, the Queen shone in a way only she could. In the year that apartheid partitioned South Africa and the Freedom Riders took on segregation in the United States, the Queen danced with Nkrumah in front of the world media. The Queen was able to reassure Ghana’s political leadership on a personal level, one of her key skills as a monarch.

Nkrumah maintained his political differences with the West, but he chose to keep Ghana in the Commonwealth, allowing the West crucial access to counter Soviet influence in the region. But on a more concrete level, the Queen demonstrated that while the nations of the Commonwealth may have their political differences, they could remain united under her leadership; more than just an association of former British colonies, the Commonwealth could also be a community of independent nations working together for their mutual advancement.

Another example of the Queen’s strong moral determination and her sense of duty was her willingness to go against the British political establishment in the 1980s. It was an open secret that the Queen quarreled with then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over sanctioning the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Queen would go on to establish a close personal friendship with Nelson Mandela, the dissident who became the country’s first post-apartheid president. Not only were they known to call each other by their first names, but they also communicated regularly and famously danced together during his state visit to London.

Her willingness to advocate for the needs of Commonwealth nations, sometimes contradicting the home government’s positions, earned the Queen the respect she held among several important African leaders—relationships that were only enhanced by her seemingly singular ability to connect with leaders on a personal level.

In short, the Queen’s personality and her approach to cultivating people-to-people relationships with African leaders allowed the Commonwealth to remain relevant and even thrive at a time when it probably shouldn’t have.

However, despite the Queen’s ability to connect with Africa and (at least by the standards of the time) rebut the sometimes racist tendencies of Western attitudes toward the continent and its leaders, some Africans saw her, and continue to see her, as an emblem of a painful history of empire and colonialism. This viewpoint is one of the key challenges facing the future of the Commonwealth.

A legacy of colonialism

With the United Kingdom’s history of colonialism in Africa, it comes as little surprise that the Queen’s death brings complex emotions to the fore for many former colonial subjects. There is a history of brutal colonial oppression that many say has been overlooked.

For example, Nigerian Carnegie Mellon professor Uju Anya recently made headlines for her criticism of the Queen on Twitter, saying that Queen Elizabeth II “supervised a government that sponsored the genocide that massacred and displaced half my family” in reference to the UK government’s role in the Biafran War in the late 1960s.

This dichotomy is one with which the Commonwealth will continue to struggle. Queen Elizabeth II’s emphasis on strong interpersonal ties with African leaders helped smooth over relationships, but it didn’t address the past injustices endured by many African groups. Given that past injustices are no longer swept under the rug, the monarchy will need to address criticism of its historical actions and its representations if it hopes to maintain the Commonwealth’s relevance.

At a time when imperial legacy is a burden, not a boon, and the dark shadow of colonialism is no longer quietly brushed aside, it remains to be seen whether the Commonwealth will be able to flourish without its greatest asset and distraction from that historical truth: Queen Elizabeth II.

What’s next for King Charles III

The Commonwealth has historically served as a vital link for the United Kingdom, and by extension the West, to engage with Africa.

But to maintain that link, the Commonwealth needs to address its imperial legacy and work to solidify itself in a changed world.

King Charles III stands a good chance of managing that endeavor and for the past few years has stood in for his mother at many Commonwealth meetings. Those meetings have seen significant change. To the dislike of many of its detractors, the Commonwealth has not been relegated to the history books just yet—it is actually expanding.

Just earlier this year, Togo and Gabon were admitted to the club at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Rwanda—a country that itself joined in 2009. The inclusion of two Francophone nations signifies how the Commonwealth is evolving and how crucial that evolution is for the organization’s future. They joined not because of historic connections to the British empire, but because of the cultural and commercial prowess of the Commonwealth. Charles III should harness these cultural and commercial ties to maintain the strong ties that currently exist across the continent and to foster new ones.

The Commonwealth is evolving into an organization based more exclusively on mutual interests and benefits. King Charles III, as head of the Commonwealth, will need to shepherd the organization through this transformation using similar methods as his mother: personal connections and an acceptance of each member’s political autonomy. He will also need to address the Commonwealth’s origins rooted in colonialism, but there are questions about whether he will even be able to do so.  

The African continent is crucial to the Commonwealth’s continued success. Out of fifty-six Commonwealth members, twenty-one are African. Plus, the continent is central to many of the United Kingdom’s economic interests abroad, as Africa is now home to the world’s youngest population and the largest free-trade zone by number of countries. And in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and of increased Chinese interest across the continent, Africa’s role in geopolitics is growing—which will be of interest to the post-Brexit United Kingdom. Without ties to the European Union, the Commonwealth is increasingly important as a key mechanism for both the United Kingdom to remain a key player on the international stage and for the West’s attempts to engage with Africa.

The West and Africa’s historical ties, while not always something to be proud of, served as a foundation so that Queen Elizabeth II could build people-to-people ties and reset bilateral relations with African countries in a way that reflected the modern world. That desperately needs to continue. But in addition, King Charles III will need to address the very real grievances those historical ties represent.

Queen Elizabeth II’s reign saw her navigate a tumultuous shift in global geopolitics all while keeping a steady course. Hopefully, King Charles III is up to the challenge to do so as well. If he is, the Commonwealth will continue to flourish. If he isn’t, the West will have lost an invaluable tool to engage with a continent and group of nations that are now more important than ever.  

Alexander Tripp is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Caitlin Mittrick is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a graduate student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs.

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Neutralizing even one of these crises can be confounding and perilous. Some countries, unfortunately, face them all at once, fighting on multiple fronts. That usually keeps them from attending to the longer-term task of giving people the knowledge, skills, access to health care, and opportunities they need to live out their full productive potential. Investing in resilient, shock-responsive systems is critical to protect human-capital gains and improve resilience to future shocks.

Niger is an example of a country that faces many complex and interconnected challenges. Shocks and crises are increasingly frequent and overlapping in Niger, disrupting efforts to sustain broad-based growth, build human capital, and reduce poverty. Regional instability has led to the displacement of families and the closure of schools, threatening social stability and increasing insecurity; that, in turn, complicated Niger’s efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and worsened the food insecurity that is now affecting more than 4.4 million of the country’s people. Climate shocks have triggered localized flooding, while steady rises in temperatures threaten the more than 80 percent of Niger’s citizens who depend on agriculture for their nourishment and livelihoods.

The government of Niger is determined not to lose any ground in its steady climb to protect and invest in all its citizens by pressing ahead with programs and reforms that are having transformational impact on people’s lives. A great example of this is the Wadata Talaka safety-net program, a partnership between Niger and the World Bank that focuses on poverty reduction, resilience building, and women’s empowerment. The program provides monthly cash transfers to extremely poor households to smooth their consumption expenditures and improve their ability to cope with shocks. It also provides “economic inclusion” support—life and micro-entrepreneurship skills training, coaching, and support to village savings groups—and helps poor children get essential mental stimulation in their early years. Such programs can respond quickly to help poor and vulnerable families prepare for, cope with, and adapt to shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic: As the virus spread, the program expanded to four hundred thousand households to protect them from the pandemic’s adverse economic consequences. The program is well-placed to assist poor households with rising food insecurity and climate shocks.

A successful response will need to include supporting women and innovation. Because women are the primary beneficiaries of Wadata Talaka, the program is an important vehicle for their empowerment. Evaluations of the economic inclusion program show that in the eighteen months since it began, it improved household consumption and food security. The total income of women beneficiaries has increased (by 60 to 100 percent, much of it from non-farm businesses), and there is strong evidence of gains in their mental health and social wellbeing.

To develop such systems reaching the poorest and most vulnerable, countries will need strong social registries and good enrollment, delivery, and payment systems, often leveraging technology. The government of Niger is fully committed to these efforts. For example, responding to climate change, Wadata Talaka was the first program of its kind in West Africa to use satellite data to quickly anticipate drought hotspots and provide emergency funds more quickly than usual (three months ahead of the traditional response) to help people before they entered the lean season. Research is currently underway to measure the impact of that speed.

At a time when countries are forced to contend with the ebb and flow of shocks like climate change, pandemics, conflict, or food price increases, investments in social protection systems are more critical than ever. Niger’s programs serve as an example of just how impactful such adaptive systems can be.

Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou is the prime minister of Niger.

Mamta Murthi is vice president for human development at the World Bank.

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Instead, over decades, an abysmal series of obstacles have repeatedly hindered the country’s development. A poorly managed decolonization process by Belgium, multiple rebellions, and the failure to promote good governance—combined with living in a state of war since 1996, particularly in the east—have resulted in profound setbacks in health, education, the economy, society, and governance.

Those obstacles led to deep and pervasive effects on Congolese society, and they make a good case for massive assistance. There is a model already in place for the United States and other friends of the DRC around the world to follow: the 1948­–1951 European Recovery Program, otherwise known as the Marshall Plan. Advanced by then US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, the plan gave countries that were devastated by World War II mostly donations to restore industry, support agriculture, and increase international trade. The United States appropriated $13.3 billion over four years. In the end, the plan helped Western and Southern European countries boost industrial production by 55 percent and average gross national product by 33 percent, laying the foundations for a prosperous Europe. Since then, the expression “Marshall Plan” has been used to refer to massive assistance or economic stimulus programs worldwide, the latest case being the European Recovery Plan.

Comparable assistance focused on improving governance could help the DRC develop while laying a similar foundation for a prosperous African Great Lakes region—and even African continent. Yet, achieving this goal will require focusing the plan more on building strong institutions and less on building infrastructure, the beloved child of many development partners. Then US President Barack Obama emphasized a need for updated partnership programs with Africa in a July 2009 speech in Accra, Ghana, declaring: “The true sign of success is not whether we are a source of perpetual aid that helps people scrape by… It’s whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change.”

Decades of development lost

A bit like in the 1960s and 1970s, military conflicts and violence are entrenched in  the DRC. The death toll of near-weekly attacks by the allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an insurgent group with ties to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), practically tripled between 2020 and 2022. Furthermore, the militant March 23 Movement, after a deceptive slumber, has occupied the strategic town of Bunagana since June.

After former President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-decade single-party rule and former President Joseph Kabila’s tumultuous terms from 2001 to 2019, Congolese people hoped that their political class would mobilize in favor of development. This has not yet fully happened; and far from rallying the much-needed unity required to end the conflict in the east, political parties seem preoccupied with the 2023 presidential election.

Despite recent social and economic progress—notably a solid annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate that has averaged above 5 percent over the last ten years—many long-term per capita indicators have worsened since the 1970s, according to the World Bank: Electricity consumption per capita (159 kilowatt hours in 1972 and 109 kilowatt hours in 2015) and the number of hospital beds per thousand people (3.2 in 1975 against 0.8 in 2006) have dropped. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita remains less than half of values in the 1970s ​​($1,372 in 1974 versus $518 in 2021, in constant 2015 US dollars).

There are several other indicators that raise concerns about the country’s economic and social progress: As of the beginning of this year, twenty-one diseases under surveillance in the DRC had the potential to become epidemics—and in the year before, six had done so, including measles, cholera, and COVID-19. According to the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4.2 million people, including 2.4 million children under five years old, suffer from acute severe malnutrition. Roughly six million people are internally displaced, and 74,000 cases of sexual and gender-based violence were reported over the period, with the majority occurring in the eastern conflict-torn part of the country.

These economic and social indicators are a sign of an unhealthy ecosystem that cannot support development. Contributing factors include political instability, wars, a lack of economic diversification, an overreliance on natural resources, and the consequences of a conflict economy—in which investment is dampened by the uncertainty caused by wartime disruptions to local and national activities, and Congolese don’t benefit from the revenues created by their natural resources. These factors make it difficult to uproot corruption, mismanagement, and state capture, even more than half a century after the DRC’s independence, despite recent efforts, such as reforms within the central bank and the publication of mining contracts.

Thus, the country’s lack of development, caused by its political, social, and economic conditions, is likely to be long-lasting.

The “big push” to prosperity

In his farewell letter, Lumumba was optimistic about the destiny of his country because he believed that the DRC could overcome its afflictions, just as other countries that have experienced war and political instability have done.

Germany experienced such a period of economic and social adversity after World War II: In 1947, industrial output was only one-third and food production was one-half of the country’s 1938 levels. Nearly one-fifth of the country’s housing had been destroyed over the course of the war. Inflation had resulted in a wave of poverty, while the country’s price controls fueled the expansion of the black market.

But today, Germany has become a formidable economic force. The reasons for the German economic miracle, or “Wirtschaftswunder,” are subject to debate among economists, but some credit the Marshall Plan.

The initial Marshall Plan and its variants worldwide are in line with economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan’s “big push” theory that massive reforms and investments are more helpful than gradual actions in overcoming obstacles that preclude development in underdeveloped economies. In other words, a “big push” is required to undo the inertia of a stagnant economy. Such a “big push” would help the DRC get out of its rut, given the country’s numerous and multifaceted economic, social, and security challenges. But the push must address the real issues that Congolese face.

Institutions over infrastructure

Investment plans for African countries often focus on spending in areas like infrastructure and equipment—and ultimately, some costly and not terribly useful “white elephants.” A Marshall Plan for the DRC should avoid falling into those two pitfalls by taking a completely different approach: focusing on institutions rather than infrastructure.

After all, infrastructure projects in the DRC easily mobilize resources from a variety of public and private stakeholders. The Emirati company DP World, for example, is investing hundreds of millions of dollars over decades in the construction and management of the DRC’s first deep-sea port in Banana due to the economic potential there. Beyond that case, the country’s infrastructure potential and needs are so immense that all that the government would have to do is to design bankable projects and abide to the conditions set by international private or public partners.

Conversely, commitment to lasting and in-depth institutional reform is far below what the DRC and other poor nations need because a reformed institution is less immediately visible than a bridge or a school. In addition, reforming or even creating an institution is more time-consuming, more complex, and dependent on combining success factors such as overcoming vested interests and tailoring institutions to sociological realities. It involves mapping and optimizing processes, investing in training, and paying civil servants better—but also limiting abuses vis-à-vis users of public services, who are often not considered as customers but rather as sheep that can be sheared mercilessly.

Overcoming the DRC’s development obstacles will require a substantial investment in the country’s institutions. Strong institutions are the key to turning the DRC’s immense potential into tangible results, enabling the country to fish for itself instead of being offered fish by other countries.

A DRC with strong institutions would see civil servants better paid, unbiased decisions from the courts, vulnerable groups protected by the police, natural resources and projects managed without corruption, better-equipped schools, and a social safety net that protects the most vulnerable.

Preparing for the push

Initial work in designing the Marshall Plan should start with an in-depth inclusive discussion among Congolese and between Congo and its partners about the governance mechanisms of such an initiative.

This initial discussion is essential because of the colossal sums at stake and also the controversies that have plagued Congolese infrastructure projects: In order to avoid problems associated with the DRC’s poor public finance management and to increase the likelihood that the plan succeeds, this discussion should be structured around strengthening its absorptive capacity—the amount of foreign aid that the DRC can use productively. The DRC has faced difficulties in quickly implementing quality investment projects and ensuring that every dollar invested reaches its intended beneficiary. Shaping a new normal will require improvements in three areas.

1. Preparations for the Marshall Plan should include the recruitment and training of motivated and skilled people who can effectively design and manage reform projects in the long term.
2. The DRC must establish a stronger and more efficient control mechanism to ensure good fiduciary management of the plan’s projects in order to avoid misappropriation, collusion, and corruption. Such practices have long bedeviled public contract tenders and public funds management.
3. It will be necessary to meticulously prepare the various projects and investment plans in order to avoid mistakes of the past, including some famous white elephants, and to guarantee adequate social impact. To do this, leaders taking part in the plan should adopt an experimental approach in which they run small-scale test projects to better understand and correct their shortcomings before deploying them throughout the country.

Institution building is a serious matter. It requires time and stability. Besides, institutional quality is sensitive to policy changes that follow shifts in political leadership. Hence the need, as a foundation to the Marshall Plan, to build a clear, accountable, and trans-partisan consensus around institutional reform. If a platform for reform has buy-in from political parties and stakeholders across Congolese society, it would be immune to the negative side effects of changes in government. With new elections slated for 2023, now is an opportune political moment to start that dialogue. Presidential candidates, in particular, should explain how their pledges will contribute to the much-needed institutional transformation. The country’s burgeoning civil society could seize the opportunity to mobilize Congolese across party lines and identify priority sectors for institution building in preparation for the plan.

Such a process would empower the Congolese people, who have often been marginalized in designing development policies even though they’re meant to be the beneficiaries. It would foster crucial local commitment to institutional transformation. Plus, the preparation effort could help establish an equal relationship between the DRC and its financial partners in their mission to propel the country into the twenty-first century.

Doing the Marshall Plan math

How much should an institutional Marshall Plan for the DRC cost? Let’s start with a linear method to evaluate the original.  

From 1948 to 1952, sixteen countries received a total of $13.3 billion, representing roughly $159 billion in 2022. Distributing that among the total 1948 population (approximately 270 million) of the countries that received this aid yields a per capita endowment of $588 in today’s dollars to match the original Marshall Plan.

That would add up to approximately $55 billion for the DRC and its estimated 95.2 million people. The amount is practically the size of the DRC’s GDP and more than ten times what it receives in annual Official Development Assistance. It may seem enormous—but that is not the case considering the scale of the DRC’s weak social indicators and immense needs. The sum is about one-third more than the $40 billion the US Congress committed this year to aid Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and represents roughly three to four years of expenditures for Washington, DC, or Chicago.

The spillovers from the Marshall Plan would also be transformative; those resources would help provide the “big push” that the country needs to fight against the rise of the ADF in eastern DRC, meet its development challenge, rebuild, and, above all, consolidate its governance and move from a cyclical, natural-resource-led growth to a more balanced and sustainable momentum supported by strong institutions.

A Marshall Plan-style investment could quickly transform the DRC, which is projected to become the world’s eighth most populous country by 2050, into one of the globe’s most dynamic markets. The DRC, with its connections to world cobalt battery supply chains, could also become a home for green industries, with jobs available for youth in all sectors of a radically transformed economy.

Ultimately, an institution-centered Marshall Plan would dramatically transform the DRC over the next decades, helping new generations of Congolese achieve Lumumba’s vision of a bright future for the country, the region, and for Africa.

Jean-Paul Mvogo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Africa Center.

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Under Abe’s leadership, Japan’s cooperation shifted from assistance to business investment in the private sector. Kishida aims to supercharge both with a three-year, thirty-billion-dollar, public-private commitment announced at TICAD8.

The outcomes of TICAD8 in Tunis, where some twenty African heads of state and government were among the five thousand participants, reflect the clear aim of Japan to differentiate itself from China. A number of side events on subjects ranging from deforestation and digital transformation to agriculture and more leveraged Japan’s strengths. The ministerial and summit meetings focused on key countries across West and East Africa and the Sahel.

Japan’s investment levels might fall far short of China’s and its “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative, but Japan clearly wants to position itself as a key partner. In a closing speech at TICAD8, Kishida called for a permanent African seat on the United Nations Security Council and announced that his country will push in that direction when it becomes a non-permanent member in 2023-24.  

Where Japan makes the difference is the role of its private sector in Japan-Africa cooperation. Japanese companies have a presence in all fifty-four countries, with firms like Toyota Tsusho, Rakuten, Sony, Nippon Steel, and Ajinomoto leading the way. The number of Japanese companies on the African continent increased from 169 in 2013 to 259 in 2019. It is in the field of innovation that these companies bring the most significant advantage compared to China, which is more focused on infrastructure. To crown this policy, the Japan International Cooperation Agency created the Next Innovation with Japan (NINJA) program to further harness entrepreneurship, innovation, and business creation. Africa can draw lessons from Japan’s experience with having the world’s longest-running businesses with 33,000 companies over a century old to complement the rise of start-ups in Africa that need support with sustaining and scaling their businesses.

Japanese strengths

Japan is right to elevate its ambitions in Africa. It is a global power and can restore influence by leveraging its tremendous strengths in Africa. Their relationship isn’t new: Yasuke, an African man born in Mozambique, arrived as a slave in Japan toward the beginning of the sixteenth century before becoming the country’s first foreign Samurai. The internationalization of Japan has historically been slow due to the history of the archipelago during the isolation period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. There are just twelve thousand Africans in Japan today, compared to some eleven million in Europe, five million in the Middle East, more than three million in North America, and an estimated five hundred thousand in China. Still, Japan is starting to open up: Foreign residents hit a new record of 2.56 million in 2017.

Travel freedom strengthens this renewed openness. According to the Henley Passport Index, Japanese citizens can travel to more destinations without needing a visa than their peers from any other country. While Seychelles has the most powerful passport in Africa, improving access for other African nations to travel freely to Japan will spark innovation, build trust, and enable a diverse group of foreigners to participate in domestic business opportunities.

In sports too, Japan is showing a newfound commitment to diversity—through the Tokyo Summer 2020 Olympic Games concept of “Unity in Diversity,” which was later modified to “United by Emotion,” and standout athletes like Japanese-Beninese basketball player Rui Hachimura and Japanese-Haitian tennis star Naomi Osaka. When Japan hosted the Rugby World Cup in 2019, it reached the top eight with more than half of its roster made up of foreign-born players. “Without such diversity, I don’t think they could have accomplished what they did,” Shinichi Inoue, president and CEO of All Nippon Airways, said this year.

Japan also has unique advantages in Africa. It is neither a former colonial empire nor a global power with hegemonic views. This provides Japan freedom to explore different areas of cooperation and build an innovative relationship with new generations. The third-largest economy in the world, Japan can leverage its hard power in transport production, electronics equipment manufacturing, and steel for infrastructure development, as well as its soft power in traditional arts, culinary science, sports, creative industries, space, gaming, sciences, and technology. On a continent that has a critical need for creating jobs and transforming its economy, Japan can be a game-changer.

Japan and Africa also complement each other in ways that can help the East Asian nation deliver on its domestic objectives. Japan’s efforts toward the modernization of its economy and a low-carbon transition face challenges: the highest national debt in the world at 234 percent of its GDP, and the highest proportion of the total population over the age of 65. Japan’s dwindling working-age labor force caters to its aging population, which impedes economic growth. In July, companies offered 129 job openings for every 100 job seekers in Japan, according to government data. Africa, on the other hand, has the fastest-growing youth population and many of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Africans could help fill those vacant jobs and power the Japanese economy.  

People-to-people ties

Africa’s demography can be an asset in the Japan-Africa relationship, especially as education and training levels rise on the continent and poverty falls. By opening its borders to more Africans, Japan could usefully develop new people-to-people ties and in the meantime find renewed answers to its challenges of aging and low productivity.

Africans, who grow up speaking four languages on average on a continent with thousands of dialects, are increasingly exposed to Mandarin in their classrooms as China expands its influence. In comparison, just thirteen thousand Africans were learning Japanese as of 2018. With more knowledge and understanding could come a cultural awakening.

Leveraging technology transfer

Japan ranks third in the world in information and communication technology with a 6.4 percent market share, placing big bets on 5G, cloud and quantum computing, and edge computing. However, technology alone will not solve the social determinants that are inhibiting inclusive growth. Back in 2016, the Council for Science, Technology, and Innovation came up with the concept of Society 5.0, which is defined as “a human-centered society that balances economic advancement with the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace and physical space.” It’s the Japanese version of the metaverse but really aims to solve social problems.

To unlock this idea, a whole-of-government approach is vital. For the TICAD8 follow-up, African leaders should examine how their youth populations can contribute to this large vision and what digital infrastructure investments are required to realize it both in Japan and Africa.

Balancing climate and development

Earlier this month the US Congress passed the Inflation Reduction Act, which includes nearly $400 billion of investments intended to fight climate change. As the second-largest polluter in the world, behind China, the United States is taking a big step toward meeting the $4.5 trillion to $5 trillion of climate investment required every year to keep the globe from warming more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. Japan should heed the Africa Economic Outlook 2022 report to meet the energy goals of Africa.

Furthermore, United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) seven—addressing affordable and clean energy initiatives—is an area where Japan seems to have begun reducing its strategic influence. Financing schemes are required to accomplish the SDGs in Africa, with the continent only halfway to achieving the targets by 2030. This is all the more important as Japan had prioritized this question at the 2019 TICAD7 and more specifically in the Yokohama Plan of Actions Monitor, an online platform that allows partners to report progress on key performance indicators.

These objectives are well in alignment with the African Union’s program infrastructure development plan, the global Group of Seven (G7) nations Partnership for Global Infrastructure Initiative, and the 2+2 Dialogue between India and the United States. Though they were disrupted due to the global pandemic and now the war in Ukraine, these initiatives present opportunities for Japan to partner with its global allies and build a collective approach to developing the continent.

The competitive context in the Indo-Pacific offers a historic opportunity for such cooperation between the West (specifically the United States and France) and major Asian powers (Japan and India). That is the most recent testament to the allure of the African continent.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

Tyrell Junius is associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He served as a US Peace Corps volunteer in Zambia and earned his master’s in business administration from the Graduate School of Management at Globis University in Tokyo.

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The new strategy is a sign that the Biden administration is motivated to show Africans how much they matter. And the next few months—with convenings ranging from the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP27) in Egypt, and the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit—will offer the administration the opportunity to add specifics to its new strategy.

But for now, Africans are looking at the United States’ focus on the war in Ukraine and on tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and they’re wondering: Will the United States truly consider African countries as strategic partners as China and Russia claim to do?

Clearly, African countries no longer seem to want to settle for words. Now having the choice of their alliances, these countries prioritize their national interests, as demonstrated by the seventeen African countries that abstained in March from the UN General Assembly vote to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Far from expressing regret, several non-aligned African countries have confirmed their positions by working with Russia as the war in Ukraine unfolded. This spring, Madagascar and Cameroon enacted military cooperation agreements with Russia while the war in Ukraine was in full swing. Even Nigeria and Egypt, countries that voted to condemn Russia, have joined UN vote abstainers Algeria and Sudan in showing interest in membership to BRICS, an economic bloc including both Russia and China. In fact, Moscow and Beijing are currently working with BRICS countries to develop a new reserve currency that would serve as an alternative to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) special drawing rights (SDRs)—and offer Russia an avenue through which it can widen its economic influence. And finally, African countries are still planning to attend Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2023 Russia-Africa Summit and Economic Forum, which will follow up on the first edition in Sochi in 2019 that brought together African leaders from forty countries.

Still, none of these diplomatic moves indicates that African youth dream of the Russian or the Chinese way of life. From Hollywood to Silicon Valley, and from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the United States maintains a wonderful power of attraction. It has assets that no other global power can offer. It now must match that by sharing the benefits of its financial dominance. Africa needs more equitable access to the global financial system in order to better address its biggest development, health, food security, migration, and climate change challenges. Senegalese President Macky Sall, the current chair of the African Union, recently blamed the multilateral financial system for stalling the continent’s development: “The rules set up by international institutions have put us in a straitjacket… The rules are unfair, outdated, and need to be disputed.”

Set up in a time when many people were under the colonial yoke of dying empires in the aftermath of World War II, the current international financial and development system echoes the twentieth century’s global security architecture. The Bretton Woods Institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—clearly represent a world order centered on the Global North, especially because of a gentleman’s agreement ensuring that the IMF head would be European and the World Bank president would be American.

And the cracks are beginning to show.

Limited access to the financial system

The answer to addressing these challenges is multifaceted, but the key component is money. African countries need access to affordable credit and global financial mechanisms to help alleviate these challenges and to further develop the continent’s economic potential. The African Development Bank Group (AfDB) estimated that the continent will need roughly $432 billion to support its economic recovery in 2022 and 2023.

The only way to get access to these much-needed funds is to increase African countries’ power, voice, and agency in the global financial system.

That’s because current support has faltered. For example, in August 2021, the IMF issued its largest-ever allocation of SDRs to support countries dealing with the economic consequences of the pandemic. The IMF allocates SDRs based on a country’s quota—a measurement that largely reflects a nation’s position in the world economy and that grants each country a percentage of voting power or access to financing. African countries, along with other members of the Global South, tend to have smaller quotas and less access to these critically needed funds under the current financial system. In the end, the IMF allocated roughly $650 billion globally; but African countries received a total of just $33 billion—which is less than what Japan, Germany, China, and the United States received individually. High-income countries have had to take it upon themselves to make up for this skewed distribution system, with a few having pledged to send their unused SDRs to low-income countries including ones in Africa. But that begs the question: Why wasn’t Africa allocated SDRs fairly in the first place?

Rumblings of reform

It is not a new phenomenon for countries to be chafing at the current state of the global financial structure. The governance of the IMF and World Bank should be under scrutiny. For example, it is worth questioning why in the IMF, Group of Seven (G7) members have over 40 percent of the voting power; because an 85 percent majority is required to allocate SDRs, these seven developed countries wind up having a de facto insurmountable veto.

In a similar vein at the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), which focuses on the world’s poorest countries, about 55 percent of the voting rights lie in the hands of Part I members—in other words, countries that donate funds. That has also rankled those who wish to see more equitable representation and governance in a changed world.

Calls for reform have grown. In fact, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen spoke earlier this year at the Atlantic Council on the need for the Bretton Woods Institutions to modernize and become more democratic in nature in order to face this century’s new challenges. Other world leaders are issuing the call too, as the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center tracks in its Bretton Woods 2.0 Project.

Beyond inaction, some of the international financial organizations’ decisions have even outright disrupted democracy on the continent. For example, in June 2021, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok secured debt relief from the IMF that removed subsidies on some goods and angered the public; the Sudanese military then used the public anger as a pretext to stage a coup and eventually oust Hamdok. And in the 1980s and 1990s, some African countries faced similar circumstances in which structural adjustment policies prescribed by international financial institutions like the IMF led to cuts in essential services such as education and health, leading to civilian protests and political unrest, even in the most stable democracies.

“From an economic point of view, the results of structural adjustment [programs] are far from satisfactory,” wrote the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in a 1995 study that examined how structural adjustment programs impacted education and the economy in African countries. They found that countries with these programs had an annual average growth rate of -0.53 percent, whereas countries with weak programs had 2 percent growth and non-adjusting countries had 3.5 percent growth. And with these tight economic conditions, UNESCO found that school attendance and completion dropped in adjusting countries as parents sent their children to work instead of school. Granted education’s role in development, stability, and democratic governance, UNESCO urged the international community to recognize the need to protect against the “harmful effects” of structural adjustment programs.

African initiative

Given that competition between global and even regional powers is accelerating, inaction is not an option for Africa anymore. The absence of change from international financial institutions has encouraged various emerging markets to move forward and set up systems to rival the Western-centered institutions. For example, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which began operations in 2016; thirteen African countries joined the bank as members. This May, Sall called for the creation of a pan- African credit-rating agency, arguing that international financial organizations have been overstating investment risk in Africa and that as a result, African countries are forced to pay higher interest rates. He explained that while all economies suffered during the pandemic, 56 percent of African countries saw their credit rating downgraded, compared with 31 percent of countries globally over the same period.

Refusing to wait for action from financial institutions, African countries have been setting up mechanisms for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in reaction to the COVID-19 crisis: Côte d’Ivoire created a fund the size of 150 billion CFA francs (about $232 million) to support SMEs, and Senegal set up a financing mechanism for companies amounting to 200 billion CFA francs (about $310 million) in cash loans. Meanwhile, South Africa released 200 billion rand (then $10.8 billion) in loan guarantees.

On a continental scale, initiatives have multiplied. In 2020, the AfDB created a ten-billion-dollar fund to support African economies. The African Union launched a special fund in response to COVID-19, to which member states have, as of February, reportedly contributed $200 million. Meanwhile, the Central Bank of West African States and the West African Monetary Union Securities Agency issued Bons COVID-19 (COVID-19 bonds) that, over the course of 2020, mobilized 3.2 trillion CFA francs. Finally, the African Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises—established in 2011 by the AfDB, Denmark, and Spain—created a $1.2 billion guarantee fund to support SMEs struggling in the pandemic.

And globally, twenty-three African leaders issued Abidjan’s Declaration in July 2021, calling on the World Bank’s IDA to “support an ambitious and significant IDA20 replenishment of at least USD 100 billion by the end of 2021.” The World Bank listened, although it was short a few billion dollars: At $93 billion, IDA20 (covering fiscal years 2022 through 2025) was the largest financing package mobilized in the organization’s sixty-one-year history. In uniting to get what they needed, and with the package being granted, these African countries showed that their requests, based on their financial prudence, wouldn’t be unreasonable if granted a greater voice in international financial institutions, despite what arguments against their inclusion claim.

By taking action on their own, Africans have shown that they can be a powerful, yet reasonable voice in multilateral and financial institutions. But with a greater voice and more agency in institutions, they could do much more. The world can grant them that voice by opening up guaranteed African seats on the UN Security Council and the Group of Twenty (G20), and by carving out a more significant role—and voting power—for African countries in financial institutions. With these new opportunities, African countries would have an improved ability to inspire lasting solutions to African crises, both originating on the continent and elsewhere.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

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But Mandela, who would have turned 104 on Monday, wasn’t always universally admired. In fact, for most of his life, he was unpopular in the West—and largely ignored. His calls for equality and fairness in South Africa and on the global stage were often passed over. Ensuring meaningful representation for Africa at the international high table remains an unfinished task for those committed to Mandela’s legacy.

It’s a challenge that in many ways reflects Mandela’s struggle to get the world to recognize the crimes of apartheid. For years, he was labeled a terrorist, not only by the South African government, but also by the United Kingdom and the United States—where he was on the terrorist watchlist until 2008. It was only in 1986, more than two decades after Mandela had been imprisoned, that the United States sanctioned apartheid South Africa by passing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act.

Yet many of the ideals that would rightfully earn him the gravitas he carried on the world stage later in his life were present throughout his imprisonment—even when the world wasn’t paying attention. At the Rivonia Trial in 1964, where he was sentenced to life imprisonment, he delivered his famous three-hour long “I Am Prepared to Die” speech, which served as a rallying cry for South African democracy and the dream of a rainbow nation.

“During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against Black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.”

While Mandela is most famous for his struggle against apartheid, he also called for greater African agency and voice in the international governance. In 1995 before the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, in a speech marking the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN, Mandela stated that:

“The United Nations has to reassess its role, redefine its profile and reshape its structures. It should truly reflect the diversity of our universe and ensure equity among the nations in the exercise of power within the system of international relation, in general, and the Security Council, in particular.”

At the UN, Mandela was not only applauded, but cheered. In the United States, hundreds of thousands flocked to see him across the country; he received a ticker-tape parade in New York City and addressed a joint meeting of Congress. In London, he filled Wembley Stadium were the crowd belted out the British soccer standard “You’ll Never Walk Alone” in his honor.

However, nearly three decades after Mandela gave that speech at the UN, global governance is still in desperate need of reform, and African voices need to be heard more urgently than ever.

Today, Africa has the world’s youngest population, the planet’s largest free-trade zone by number of countries, and many of the fastest growing economies. It represents 28 percent of the UN General Assembly. Yet African nations are still often ignored, forced to the sidelines in international disputes. The governance of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank is dominated by the United States, Europe, and more recently China. The Group of Twenty (G20) nations gives the European Union a seat at the table, but not the African Union—something that Indonesia, as the grouping’s host this year, wants to correct. Climate change, the fuel and food crisis stemming in part from the invasion of Ukraine, and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are all hitting Africa hardest off all. Still, the continent continues to be denied the voice and agency it deserves in international governance.

Mandela changed the world for the better, fought against injustice his entire life, and sought equality and just representation. He united the world during his life, and in death, when the world quite literally came to South Africa to pay their final respects to the great man.

The greatest tribute to him, however, would be to continue the pursuit of his vision for a world where African leadership, representation, and agency are truly respected; where Africa’s experiences and ideas help shape the planet’s collective future. Nelson Mandela and his legacy remind us of what Africa and its voices can truly offer the world.

Alexander Tripp is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Yet, the positive effects of the EGD need not stay limited to Europe. Africa possesses an abundance of opportunities to tap into renewable energy, a dynamic demography, and vibrant economic prospects. What it needs are significant private-sector investments. The EGD’s innovative work on a green bond standard and a taxonomy for sustainable activities is shaking the Western financial world. If seized correctly, it represents an opportunity to foster green finance on the continent. 

A new green bonds standard to build on 

Since the first issuance by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World Bank in 2007, the green bond market has enjoyed a remarkable growth rate. In December 2021, cumulative green bonds issuance reached a total of $1.5 trillion, with more than $500 billion issued in 2021.  

By leveraging private-sector investment, green bonds have a significant potential to finance climate change adaptation and mitigation projects in Africa. International private investors have an increasing appetite for this finance mechanism, as shown by the successful initiatives taken by the African Development Bank over the past decade since its launch of such bonds in 2013. The West African Development Bank (BOAD) issued its first sustainability bond in January 2021. Yet, much more can be done. Africa represented only 0.26 percent of global green bonds issued last year.  

Until now, the Climate Bonds Standard (CBS) developed by the Climate Bonds Initiative has been the reference against which green bonds at the global level are certified. However, a proposed new European Green Bond Standard will go beyond the CBS by refining and expanding the scope of eligible green projects while proving their legitimacy. The EU standard will improve the quality of the external review and increase transparency, making it easier for investors to compare and assess green bonds.   

This ambitious framework, currently under negotiation, will be open to European and non-European issuers. The EU’s work on climate finance is innovative and ahead of the rest of the world. If the “Brussels Effect” holds, as it has in other policy areas, such as digital privacy regulation, this framework could become the new gold standard for the green bonds market.  

African markets see in green bonds a huge potential to drive green investment to finance climate projects on the continent. Relying on the EU standard, which will be familiar to investors and deemed trustworthy, is an opportunity to channel investment into African Green Bonds.  

This will require African countries to acquire a good grasp of the EU standard. The Africa Green Finance Coalition (AGFC) could help. Launched during last year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) and inclusive of all African countries, its mission is to ease learning and technical assistance to support financial-sector reforms. AGFC should seize the opportunity to help African countries benefit from this standard.  

Leaning on EU taxonomy  

The EU taxonomy is a standardized classification system based on clear qualitative and quantitative criteria. It identifies economic activities that are eligible to be defined as “green” by contributing substantially to the transition to net-zero emissions. The objective is to build a reference framework of green activities to drive the private sector’s investment in the green transition.  

Until now, only a few countries in the world have developed taxonomies. In Africa, South Africa is alone in having launched one, with its April announcement coming after almost two years of work. By pledging to reach net-zero by 2050, South Africa is setting an example and is demonstrating the continent’s ambition. Other African nations must follow suit.  

The EGD will be an important steppingstone in setting up a shared global regulatory framework for green finance. Both innovative and sophisticated, the European taxonomy is influencing jurisdictions that plan to develop their own classification systems for green projects. The EU framework is opening a new path that African countries can adapt to their own markets, creating a taxonomy that investors would already be familiar with, thereby lowering market-entry costs and facilitating green investments.  

Crucially, this process must treat African nations as partners, not just recipients of rules handed down to them. Different African countries have a range of abilities when it comes to implementing complex regulations. It’s important that additional regulations do not hinder growth by adding complexity. Leveraging both the EU Green Bonds Standard and taxonomy to foster investment in Africa does not mean importing them directly. They must be adapted and tailored to the African markets with the possible help of the AGFC. This also requires a partnership approach.  

Beyond a renewed EU-Africa partnership  

European leaders must also address the grievances raised by African nations concerning the impact and potential blind spots of Europe’s climate policy. The EU is Africa’s largest trade partner, and the European Commission’s plan to end fossil-fuel consumption will have serious implications for oil- and gas-dependent exporters, although these will be mitigated by a transitory period when specific gas activities that, for example, replace coal energy generation will be considered as green. New agricultural regulations and carbon taxes proposed in the EGD may have severe impacts on African producers and will likely create new barriers between African and European markets. 

Instituting a green agenda without accounting for Africa’s unique climate needs and capabilities can further exacerbate the social and economic disparity between European and African nations. If the EGD’s climate finance opportunities are to work in, and for, Africa, EU ministers must develop a more equitable and accountable approach to partnering with the continent. 

This approach is at the heart of the renewed relationship between the African Union and the EU. At their February summit, they agreed on a partnership including an Africa-Europe Investment Package of 150 billion euros to foster private and public investment. A large part of this investment is dedicated to supporting African countries in implementing their climate transition strategies under the 2015 Paris Agreement. 

This renewed partnership emphasized that the strategic alliance has to be based on a “clear understanding of our respective and mutual interests and responsibilities,” including in “developing a green growth model.” Africa and Europe could build on the example of the International Platform on Sustainable Finance (IPSF) launched by the EU in October 2019. The IPSF aims to foster private green investments by making international green finance systems more comparable. Kenya, Morocco, and Senegal have joined the platform. Such initiatives will enable the development of a more inclusive dialogue toward common standards on green bonds and classification systems for climate-friendly projects.  

African nations must not miss the opportunity to better integrate their perspectives in the formulation of international regulations—which would allow them to drive a larger share of global green finance just as the sector is taking off.

Emilie Bel is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, the head of international affairs at the French Insurance Federation, and a consultant for the World Bank. 

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As the world grapples with pressures caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and the war in Ukraine, there is an urgent need for Africa, Europe, and the United States to work more closely than ever before on their common challenges in order to build a more secure and equitable future for all. That was the central message that emerged from a timely forum on a trilateral partnership between the US, African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU), hosted on June 16, 2022 by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and Europe Center.  

“I hope Africans choose the United States and the EU as their partners of choice,” said US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee. The conversation, held in collaboration with the Delegation of the EU to the United States, featured an array of distinguished leaders from Europe, Africa, and North America. It served as a follow-up to the AU-EU Summit held in Brussels on February 17, 2022. 

Here are some highlights, ranging from insights on economic investment and development collaboration to lesser-discussed ways in which the United States, EU, and AU can build a new transatlantic partnership.  

Watch full event

Security cooperation 

• The impact of the war in Ukraine was a major area of concern for European, African, and US officials alike. “We are facing, indeed, the greatest global food security crisis of our time,” said Stavros Lambrinidis, EU ambassador to the United States, during his opening remarks. He noted the severe repercussions of Moscow’s aggression and military tactics in preventing the flow of grain exports from Ukraine, especially on African food access. Lambrinidis stressed the need for Europe, Africa, and the United States to “stand with and by each other.”  
• As Africa continues to deal with its own regional conflicts, French Ambassador to the United States Philippe Étienne pointed to the ongoing transatlantic cooperation in the field of security “where the EU and the United States are very much aligned, especially fighting terrorist groups in the Sahel and unfortunately in other parts of Africa.” He went on affirm the need for the EU and United States to assist African security forces states in counterterrorism training. Étienne highlighted France and Ivory Coast’s new international counterterrorism academy near Abidjan as an example.
• Phee discussed the United States’ role in the Horn of Africa, where American troops were recently deployed to Somalia. “The choice of a new prime minister, the recent revision of the AU mission in Somalia, support from outside actors like the United States to reinforce the security architecture, as well as support by US and EU to help Somalia and the Horn deal with the devastating drought that is affecting those countries—all those factors I think create an opportunity that we have not seen in a while for the Somalis to finally begin to move forward.” Phee also made note of developments in Sudan where “inspiring and amazing” leaders in civil society, the professional world, and among the youth are “saying they want their country to be a democracy.”

Social and youth empowerment 

• AU Ambassador to the United States Hilda Suka-Mafudze called for greater “recognition of Africa as a global player,” and encouraged further action by AU partners to help strengthen the continent’s health and education capacities.
• Themis Christophidou, director-general for education, youth, sport, and culture for the European Commission, outlined EU initiatives to “nurture people-to-people contact” between Europe and Africa including research and university partnerships, cultural and artistic exchange programs, and developing pathways for legal migration. She acknowledged the importance of investing in Africa’s youth calling them “the continent’s greatest asset.” 
• In a similar vein, Scott Taylor, vice dean and professor for diversity, equity, and inclusion at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, addressed the idea of ‘brain drain’ and explained why there should be greater focus on creating mechanisms for African talent, on the continent and abroad, to return to and stay in Africa so that they can contribute their global skills and expertise to local economies.  

Revitalizing investment 

• Senegal’s ambassador and permanent representative to the United Nations Cheikh Niang described the EU’s 150 billion-euro Global Gateway Investment Package as “an opportunity for Africa and Europe to strengthen development cooperation.” The initiative aims to help Africa accelerate its green transition, digital revolution, health and education systems, and job creation.
• Arianna Vannini, principal adviser on international partnerships for the European Commission, explained the importance of this new investment commitment. “It does not aim at simply establishing a trade relationship; it doesn’t focus only on infrastructure,” she said. “It expands to human development, and it involves further dialogue with our partner countries, the local communities, the voice of partners on the ground and in particular the young generations which are such a key resource for a young continent like Africa.”
• Abdoul Salam Bello, alternative executive director for the World Bank Africa Group, stressed the need for collaboration on how to implement large investment programs at the continental, national, and local level. He stated that the Global Gateway “will be a very good opportunity” as long as the national development plans of African states are fully considered, and increased attention is given to supporting the continent’s private sector because “that’s where the prospect of growth will be.”
• Acting Assistant Administrator for Africa at the US Agency for International Development Diana Putman said that the US government was updating its Africa policy to enhance partnerships with African states and the African Union on issues of economic growth, health security, and climate change. “There is a clear commitment on the part of the different agencies to reset our relationship and make sure that Africans realize we see them as full partners.”

Narayan Felix is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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This year’s Africa Day on May 25 took place against a backdrop marked by post-COVID challenges and the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Amidst unprecedented changes to the global economy, international trade, energy, and food security, the African continent has found itself at the center of a new geopolitical order.

To commemorate Africa Day 2022, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center hosted a panel of experts including Mvemba Dizolele, Africa program director at the Center for Strategic International Studies; Ebenezer Obadare, Douglas Dillon senior fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations; Joseph Sany, vice president of the Africa Center at the US Institute of Peace; and Rama Yade, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. In the conversation moderated by Julian Pecquet, Jeune Afrique‘s Washington and United Nations (UN) correspondent, these experts on African affairs from think tanks across Washington, DC, discussed Africa’s burgeoning role in the international system. 

Here are highlights from the event, covering everything from Africa’s relationship with Western countries to the trajectory of democracy across the continent.  

Watch the full event

African agency and geopolitics 

• In the context of heightening great-power competition and Africa’s mixed voting on the UN resolution to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sany noted that the entire geopolitical status of Africa cannot be reduced to a single UN voting session. He affirmed that Africanists are happy with the continent’s growing agency in the world but stressed that this agency comes with the responsibility of upholding “core principles of the collective security.” 
• Obadare highlighted the readiness of African leaders to cooperate with international actors to promote and defend shared principles. He recalled seeing young Nigerians in Abuja looking to enlist in order to “help Ukraine defend their sovereignty” because they believed there were “fundamental, universal issues at stake.”  
• Dizolele recommended that the West “change its mindset” when approaching Africa and engage African states as sovereign countries. “The world is not unipolar; the world is multipolar and still reconfiguring itself,” he said. “You go to Djibouti you find the Chinese, you find the Americans, you find the French, you find the Turks, and you find the Gulf Arab States. So Africans have choices and as they make decisions they take into consideration all those options in front of them.” 

From crisis to opportunity 

• Yade identified the various crises facing Africa and the global economy as a result of the war in Ukraine. She went on to explain how this unique moment in history presents an opportunity to reform international systems and institutions to more effectively address these pressing issues including climate change, development, energy, and security.  
• “We are facing a confluence of transnational crises, and therefore this is an opportunity to rethink our global responses,” Sany added. “It is a time [during which] Africa needs more global economic engagement and [the United States] and the West [need] more partners. Considering that this is a moment of opportunity, it is also a moment to redesign our multilateral system.”  

The future of African leadership and governance 

• Several African governments have struggled to resolve crises due to ineffective leadership and insufficient structural capacities, said Dizolele. In responding to the current food crisis affecting the continent, he questioned why a Nigerian or Congolese citizen would be reliant on wheat when maize is a more locally abundant food source. “You have to have a ministry of agriculture and a presidency that is invested in this kind of thinking,” Dizolele said, adding that he believes this structural leadership is missing.  

• There’s a need to be creative in thinking about leadership when responding to crises in African states, Sany explained. “The consciousness that creates the problem is not the same consciousness that will resolve it,” he said. He later added that it is difficult to point to a leader “because we keep looking at the government. We have not talked enough about the private sector… This is a moment of opportunity to bring in new stakeholders; the private sector, civil society, youth movements.”  

Democracy in question 

• “This word democracy, as a concept and as practice, is in a deep crisis,” said Yade. While there is a “strong willingness of African civil societies to promote democratic values,” she explained, there is also a growing resistance to Western democracy among younger generations. 
• Obadare concluded his remarks by saying, “the answer to democratic erosion is democratic deepening. Liberal values are not Western values [and] they are not African values; they are grounded in who we are as human beings.” He called on African intellectuals to take the lead as champions of these values.  

Narayan Felix is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

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Good foreign policy is good domestic policy, and vice-versa. But the systemic flaws in US domestic policy when it comes to racial justice became even clearer after police officers killed George Floyd in 2020. Human-rights organizations across the world, but especially in Africa, demanded justice. African countries lobbied the United Nations Human Rights Council to investigate systemic racism and police brutality in the United States and elsewhere. Two years later, we are in the same position, and more Africans and African descendants are dying.

Meanwhile, African diaspora communities in the United States and Caribbean are strengthening economic and cultural ties with African communities through business, sports, art, movies, politics, religion, philanthropy, and more. One of Africa’s first tech unicorns, Flutterwave, became the highest-valued African startup at three billion dollars, and its backers include American companies. Pearlean Igbokwe, who is Nigerian, is chairman at American film producer Universal Studio Group. Virgil Abloh, the late artistic director of Louis Vuitton, came to the United States from Ghana.

The second annual AFRICON last month in Los Angeles saw prominent members of the Black diaspora gather to celebrate Africa. As Grammy-nominated recording artist Jidenna told BET: “I thought it was special that first-generation Africans here care so much about building the bridge between Black Americans, Caribbean Americans, and Africans.”

That bridge is fortified through programs like the US Peace Corps, which trains and deploys volunteers around the world, and the Young African Leaders Initiative’s Mandela Washington Fellowship, which hosts Africans to study at US universities and work with US employers.

Working as a US Peace Corps volunteer in rural Zambia, I experienced this ecosystem of collective impact firsthand while I helped create health programs and carried out sponsored projects in collaboration with African government officials and private-sector stakeholders. This opportunity for me and plenty of other African Americans to become more involved on the continent is a result of influential travelers to Africa and international-affairs professionals who paved the way.

Meanwhile, the number of Sub-Saharan African immigrants residing in the United States tripled from 2000 to 2019. This is a clear signal that diaspora communities want to become part of the solution for American and African innovation.

A slow start

There is strong public demand for continuing to improve ties between African diaspora and African communities—and there are several ways the United States can foster those ties.

The government has already made a few gains, as Congress passed the 400 Years of African-American History Commission Act establishing a group to educate the public about the contributions of African-Americans since 1619. Congress also passed the Countering Malign Russian Activities in Africa Act requiring the US State Department to develop a plan to counter Russian influence in Africa. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden issued an executive order expanding initiatives supporting Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) and formed the President’s Board of Advisors on HBCUs. Biden also is planning to host a US-Africa Leaders’ Summit after an eight-year hiatus—earning unanimous praise from the Senate for doing so—and there’s movement in the House to support the US African Development Foundation.

The United States has recently made gains in improving the representation of the African diaspora in public positions, most notably with the election of US Vice President Kamala Harris, the Senate’s confirmation of Ketanji Brown Jackson to the Supreme Court, and the appointment of White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre. Biden’s cabinet includes seven Black leaders—including Lloyd Austin, the first Black secretary of defense—while the 117th Congress includes fifty-eight Black representatives, with Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY-5) becoming the first Black lawmaker to chair the House Foreign Affairs Committee. And just weeks ago, Lisa Cook was sworn in as the first Black woman on the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors.

Following these diversity and representation achievements, the United States is moving toward inclusion for Black communities everywhere, with the goal being what Nigerian curator Okwui Enwezor envisioned: “The formation of a diaspora could be articulated as the quintessential journey into becoming; a process marked by incessant regrouping, recreations, and reiteration. Together these stressed actions strive to open up new spaces of discursive and performative postcolonial consciousness.”

And yet, according to the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, the United States only ranks forty-first in minority rights among the 174 countries measured. There’s plenty of work to be done, and it should include concrete action from the US government in the form of glocal policies that empower African diaspora communities and improve their access to cross-cultural collaboration and economic opportunity.

A new vision: Glocalization

In this new vision, the United States should implement policies at the local level that fold into an international agenda. The United Kingdom’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act, for example, is a local policy that aims to end modern slavery in the United Kingdom—and ultimately seeks to remove the United Kingdom, an important economic player, from the centuries-long global system of oppression behind the transatlantic slave trade. Meanwhile, the United States has yet to amend the Thirteenth Amendment which, while abolishing slavery, allows criminally convicted people to be subjected to involuntary servitude.

Another example of glocalization is the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While states are taking up some measures to reach the SDGs, they’re far off course for meeting them by 2030—and progress on a fifth of indicators in every state is moving backwards. That poor performance, according to the Sustainable Development Solutions Network, points to rising inequality in the United States and, especially, economic disparities by race and ethnicity. By working more meaningfully on the SDGs, states could not only reduce inequality and its consequences, improving livelihoods across the board, but also improve the United States’ reputation as a leader in human rights and equality—leaving a different impression on its African partners.

However, some states are spearheading important glocal policies. One example is California, which established a Reparations Task Force, the first of its kind in the nation to study slavery and its harms. Its interim report included recommendations for supporting, compensating, and empowering local African Americans. But California can’t transform the country’s reputation alone.

In addition, the massacre in Buffalo, New York, that killed ten Black people has reignited fear of more racist attacks. This impedes the United States’ ability to project values like equality, liberty, democracy, unity, and diversity. If these kinds of killings—and the climate of fear they create—are left unaddressed, tourism and immigration from Africa could decline, with devastating impacts on the African diaspora and the economy.

There are other creative glocal policies that the US government could deploy. For example, it can create soft landings for African or African-diaspora entrepreneurs and foster cross-cultural collaboration by issuing entrepreneur passports similar to the United Arab Emirates’ Gold Visa. This would contribute to the ecosystem of collective impact that is central to the relationship between the African diaspora and African communities.

My brother’s keeper

There is a strong desire to connect Black Americans whose ancestors were uprooted from their homes back to their African brothers and sisters. As a young Black man, I am fully aware that we are one people. The African American and African communities are my home, and the world is my backyard. I am proud to be part of a diverse and global community that cares about and loves Africa, and I believe that everyone, not just every Black person, has a role to play in supporting African diaspora communities. I see many Africans and members of the African diaspora traveling across the Atlantic to form meaningful connections, often using these journeys to self-reflect and discover ancestral roots—aided by advances in DNA research allowing them to make specific connections.

Tremendous progress has been achieved, but global leaders must continue to push for glocal measures that empower the African diaspora and strengthen ties with African communities. It starts with educating American youth about African and Black history and culture—and the ties that bind our two continents. Glocal policies have the potential to boost development on the continent and within US Black communities. Western governments, financial institutions, and civil society leaders are mobilizing now to protect and ultimately realize their collective impact.

Tyrell Junius is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Data means development

Efficient capital markets in developed economies are characterized by, among other things, active buying and selling, deep pools of liquidity, and price transparency. Such markets allow capital to be allocated “efficiently” throughout an economy, spurring growth and increasing standards of living.

Perhaps the most important attribute underpinning efficient markets and development is high-quality, timely, and trustworthy data. It could be economic data such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation, exchange rates, or a country’s account balance; capital markets data such as bank lending rates, trading volumes, and options prices; industry data such as market sizes and growth rates for various sectors; and firm data such as financial statements, company registrations, background checks, and ownership records. Access to this data—when it exists, is standardized, and is publicly available—helps investors make sound decisions.

But historically, African public- and private-sector institutions have had challenges gathering, aggregating, standardizing, and disseminating this kind of data. Most recently, nearly every African country had difficulty tracking the spread and scale of COVID-19, leading the World Health Organization in October 2021 to conclude that six out of seven cases are going undetected. Conflict-affected countries, such as South Sudan, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, understandably have difficulty gathering data on GDP and census figures. And not unlike the developed world, African countries with high levels of political tension, such as Nigeria, see data either blocked from being collected or misused once in the hands of the political party in power.

The vast majority of economic activity across Africa is informal, making it difficult to understand and measure. In addition, Africa’s immature public capital markets (excluding the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) face structural problems including inadequate regulatory disclosures, low trading volumes, a lack of liquidity, and a small number of listings that restrict the production of information. Whereas public exchanges at least require minimum levels of information disclosure, private markets, where most of the investable opportunities are, have no such standard.

At the industry and sector level, market research is often not readily available. Interviewing customers or businesses in order to conduct primary market research is difficult because of the relatively poor internet penetration, myriad different languages on the continent, and the informal nature of the economy. Thus, estimating the size of a market segment, its growth rate, and any other relevant characteristics becomes a more difficult and expensive task.

Even so, there are bright spots. Nigeria recently released its draft “open banking” framework and announced its first census in seventeen years. Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, and Malawi account for 65 percent of the total published African economic papers, a testament to the amount of available data these five countries have. Most exciting is how Africa’s large-scale usage of mobile money could dramatically alter the data landscape. More than two-thirds of the world’s one trillion dollars’ worth of mobile money transactions in 2021 occurred in Africa, and all of them are recorded. Data on everything from merchant payments, remittances, shopping habits, bill payments, and insurance trends are being captured on a plethora of platforms across the continent. This new ecosystem will likely give rise to more data-centric services, applications, and platforms similar to the fast-growing start-up Pngme in the not-too-distant future.

Investment at scale

While investors await the downstream effects of the growth in fintech and mobile money, the impact of today’s “information asymmetry” between Africa and international investors is profound. First, transaction costs are higher compared to investment opportunities in developed markets. For companies that are listed on the handful of public exchanges in Africa, the brokerage fees, exchange fees, and other costs associated with trading are higher compared to their developed market peers. Investors also often spend extra time and resources to gather proprietary information to perform their due diligence, further increasing time and expense costs.

Second, it is difficult to agree on risk, return, and price. The lack of data means that typical valuation methods, like an analysis of comparable transactions or discounted cash flows, become much harder to use. A recent survey ranked “inability to agree on value” as the top cause of deal failure across Africa. Estimating the cost of capital also becomes tricky when there is a lack of financial market data. For example, African banks struggle to establish the risk profiles of borrowers, which leads to excessively high interest rates and requirements for significant collateral.

Third, misperceptions about Africa are formed when developed-market-based investors are left to make assumptions based on the casual information to which they are exposed. Unfortunately, the international news about Africa is often negative, reinforcing pessimistic perceptions about investing in the continent. These distorted negative perceptions lead to higher perceptions of risk, higher costs of capital, and lower valuations compared to developed market investment opportunities. The continent is also often treated as a monolith in the minds of foreign investors instead of fifty-four separate and distinct countries, each with their own economic fundamentals, growth trajectories, and sector strengths. Unfortunately, these perceptions are widespread enough to eliminate investor interest in Africa altogether.

The specialist investors who operate in Africa today understand these difficulties well and have developed ways of operating amid data challenges. These include developing deep local partner networks to vet management teams and conduct diligence, using development-finance institutions (DFIs) to subsidize transaction costs, operating at lower margins to invest in proprietary research, employing creative investment instruments to manage downside risk amid data gaps, and having investment strategies that don’t rely upon bespoke, granular data. In fact, some investors embrace these attributes because of the potential to achieve outsized returns.

But the ecosystem is tiny relative to Africa’s potential. In 2021, Africa-focused private equity funds raised a record $4.4 billion, but compared to the over $700 billion raised globally, it shows just how much data challenges hinder large-scale international investment. Academic research regarding cross-border investments also confirms the data problem.

Although the reasons for the lack of data are many, including the security environment, government ineffectiveness, underdevelopment, culture, and level of training, examining the supply of, and demand for, data helps visualize the way forward: A lack of data leads to diminished demand from international investors, which leads to underinvestment. This underinvestment leads to underdevelopment, and underdevelopment leads to less data being supplied, and so on. This is how a doom loop is formed.

A three-pronged approach

To break this loop, governments, institutions, and investors must support both the supply of and demand for data.

First, DFIs and multilateral institutions should insist on the collection and dissemination of economic data and government statistics as conditions for sovereign investment. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund are currently helping create data standards and improve data quality through conditionality that requires country borrowers to meet specifically defined economic metrics, including commitments from countries to improve how they track data. This data then helps private-sector investors get a better understanding of the macroeconomic environment. DFIs and multilateral institutions should also help government statistics offices build capacity in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data, and seek to release investment performance and loan default data to help investors better understand risk and return profiles.

Second, African governments should incentivize entrepreneurs to respond to investor demand for information and establish market data aggregation and reporting entities. Firms and associations like Briter Bridges, The Baobab Network, Asoko Insight, and the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, as well as larger platforms like PitchBook and Refinitiv that are beefing up their African databases, should be given subsidies, investment incentives, or partnership opportunities by governments. Consumer research firms and management consultancies like KASI Insight, Dahlberg, and BCG that use surveys to capture customer behavior data should be pulled in to help with government census data collection in order to gain better insights about consumer demographics and trends. Governments must also establish permissive regulatory frameworks for mobile money and its data-focused applications.

Third, governments and public and private institutions should expand their support to Africa-curious investors and develop the capital markets ecosystem. Development agencies should increase funding designed to subsidize direct transaction costs and expand their role as de-facto brokers via the use of “deal rooms.” These are a low-risk way to showcase and educate potential investors regarding the “flavor” of deals, thus increasing awareness and understanding. Governments should organize, sponsor, and fund more trade delegations to Africa that are similar to the partnership between MiDA and USAID.

In the longer term, large developed-market private equity firms, which are presently too big to exist in Africa, should seed, mentor, and support smaller investors and general partners in order to promote best practices, develop market depth, and create a pipeline for future deal flow “up the food chain.” Activities including personnel exchanges, secondments, and pro-bono work should be designed to reduce informational barriers, understand African capital markets and the local regulatory environment, and develop local partnerships. Big banks from developed nations should also mentor smaller African banks and look to create opportunities for partnerships, alliances, and deal making.

Finally, governments in Africa and the developed world should fund university-led research and graduate-level classes on African financial markets.

It doesn’t take sophisticated data to see the potential within Africa. But for that potential to be realized, governments, institutions, and investors must take a clear-eyed and long-term approach to building a mature data ecosystem. It’ll be a worthy investment.

Tom Koch is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and director of global capital and strategy at FCA Corp, an investment firm.

The post Better data is the key to unlocking major investment in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 18, leaders of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) convened in Brussels to announce a “renewed partnership” and a Joint Vision for 2030. Six days later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended such long-term planning for Europe and most of the world.

The war in Ukraine has disturbed Europe’s stability and has sent shock waves throughout the international system. However, the “unprecedented and mounting common challenges” referenced in the Joint Vision have only intensified with the new conflict. For both Europe and Africa, a strengthened relationship is more imperative than ever.

Mutual challenges, mutual help

Already dealing with pandemic setbacks, European officials suddenly had to address a nuclear adversary, a new refugee emergency that could see over eight million people flee Ukraine, and record levels of inflation. Even before the war, soaring fossil fuel prices, low income levels, and energy inefficiency left eighty million European households struggling to heat their homes last winter.

On the other side of the Mediterranean, African economies have seen the prices of food, fuel, and fertilizers skyrocket as imports from Ukraine and Russia have ground to a halt. The inflation has amplified food scarcity throughout the continent with millions of people in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa at risk of extreme hunger. While Africa was trying to recover from the economic consequences of COVID-19, African leaders have turned to the international community for increased awareness of the critical impact on their countries of a war they have nothing to do with. On June 3, AU chair Macky Sall, the president of Senegal, met Russian President Vladimir Putin requesting the release of food supplies that have been blocked in the Black Sea.

This meeting made headlines worldwide for its unprecedented diplomatic impact.

This was much more than a simple humanitarian request expressed by some African begging for help. First, it was a signal of Africa’s existence on the international scene as a significant player. Sall did not simply represent his country, but rather fifty-four states as chairman of the African Union. Second, Sall’s voice represented non-aligned nations. Africa spoke in the name of its own interests and not as an annex of global powers.

This new global assertiveness could also serve as the seed for renewed cooperation between Africa and its partners, including Europe.

New EU sanctions banning oil imports from Russia will likely exacerbate Europe’s fuel scarcity, especially in the short run. The United States is exporting large volumes of oil and gas across the Atlantic Ocean. However, Europe also has alternative suppliers in Africa that it could tap.

Africa’s extensive fossil fuel reserves and proximity to Europe could allow it to help EU states wean themselves off Russian energy, and governments are wasting no time fortifying relations with key suppliers. Italian officials have already secured new deals with Algeria, Egypt, Angola, and the Republic of Congo to replace nearly two-thirds of the country’s Russian gas supply, while German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Dakar in May to discuss the development of natural gas projects off the coast of Senegal.

But these resources cannot be taken at the expense of Africans’ critical needs for development. That is why in the name of mutual and shared benefits, Europe must consider the advantages of financing African fossil fuel projects, especially given Africa’s relatively tiny contribution to carbon emissions and surging global demands for fossil fuels. This can jumpstart the development of critical infrastructure and expand local access to power in several African states that have made discoveries in natural gas.

The long-term vision of EU-AU energy cooperation must remain the facilitation of a complete transition to net-zero carbon emissions. As EU ministers look to accelerate the implementation of the European Green Deal, African states can once again serve as promising trade partners to help make the plan a reality. The African continent’s geography offers enormous potential for wind, solar, geothermal, and hydroelectric power, while also being home to some of the richest deposits of critical minerals and rare-earth metals essential for green technology.

As with fossil fuels, this isn’t a one-way street. The African continent has been severely impacted by environmental crises underscoring the urgent need for climate-resilient development in collaboration with the world’s leading polluters. European investments in African clean energy capacities and adaptation programs represent an opportunity for the wealthier continent to secure its renewable future by importing green energy while taking actionable accountability for its role in greenhouse gas emissions.

The announcement of a 150 billion euro Global Gateway Investment Package last year is an encouraging commitment from the EU to Africa, but it needs to be followed by consistent, responsible, and sincere diplomacy to make sure the investments deliver in a transparent way.

Needed: A new paradigm

For the alignment in interests between Europe and Africa — whether on energy or climate change — to work, what’s most important is a rest of the former’s mindset about the latter. For centuries, European colonialism and slavery plundered Africa, robbing its men and natural resources. However, Africa is changing: Already home to the world’s youngest population, Sub-Saharan Africa is poised to become home to nearly one quarter of the planet’s population in twenty years. Africa is experiencing the emergence of a three hundred million-strong middle class-trade area in the world by number of participant countries, since the start of the millennium.

The continent does not need only assistance and humanitarian aid. Its strategic transformation points to the beginning of a new geopolitical order that is not reflected in the international development architecture. If it stands by Africa in advocating for deep reforms to Bretton Woods institutions, Europe will strengthen its relationship with its growing neighbor.

That’s an area where Europe has work to do—despite its geographical proximity and historical links. Apart from France, China, and the United States, a series of other players—India, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf countries—have rapidly expanded and diversified their partnerships with Africa.

While the EU remains the continent’s leading multilateral partner, with trade reaching $245 billion by 2018, China rules the roost bilaterally, with $254 billion in trade in 2021. China is also Africa’s largest foreign aid donor demonstrating that it is no longer content building bridges and hotels.

Moreover, Europe’s traditional taunts at Africa over its relationship with China aren’t working. Fears that Chinese debts are toxic and that Russia’s war could set dangerous precedents aren’t enough to dissuade African nations from choosing their partners freely according to perceptions of their interests, as their diverging United Nations votes on the war in Ukraine have shown. From the perspective of African nations, the mistreatment of their students at the Polish border early in the war and the West’s reluctance to share vaccines initially during the COVID-19 pandemic are examples of why they must stay non-aligned.

At the center of the populist rhetoric and actions that migrants, for instance, often face when seeking to move to Europe, is a pessimistic and paternalistic approach toward Africa. For a decade now, remittances from the African diaspora have outstripped international aid to the continent. Citizens of African countries aren’t threatening to swamp Europe: 70 percent of African migrants remain within the continent. Even with high birth rates, Africa’s population density is closer to Europe’s than to the relatively cramped nations of China and India.

This does not mean turning a blind eye to the tragedies of migrants crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe. Instead, it’s important to recognize the biases that people fleeing Africa face and how these biases impact the relations between the two continents. With most African migration now occurring within the continent rather than to Europe, there are signs that those attitudes are reducing Europe’s appeal to Africa’s younger generations. Europe’s admirable compassion toward Ukrainian refugees has reminded African migrants that they’ve never received similar benevolence while escaping equally perilous conflicts.

Is Europe ready?

European leaders such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have committed to working on reestablishing grain exports to Africa as AU officials focus on stemming food insecurity amid the war in Ukraine. To combat the spread of terrorism, another key issue for the AU, the European Union has agreed to continue its support of “African-led Peace Support Operations.” This week, at the UN Security Council, the Europeans have advocated for a renewal of the MINUSMA whose mandate will expire on June 30 despite the degradation of the relations between Paris and Bamako.

Irritants in the relationship persist: The EU, for instance, continues to resist the demands of AU leaders calling for short-term intellectual property rights waivers to expand COVID-19 vaccine access in Africa.

Still, opportunities for renewed Europe and Africa cooperation remain abundant. The effects of the coronavirus pandemic, as well as recent outbreaks of monkeypox in Europe, are reminders that both continents remain highly vulnerable to health emergencies. The success of vaccine production in Europe and the ability of African health authorities to contain monkeypox outbreaks without the use of vaccines or antivirals may signal a need for greater research exchange and scientific cooperation. Food security in Africa is also in Europe’s interests, as it will help to curb mass migration.

Beyond the emergencies, there is an unprecedented opportunity to reshape the international financial architecture and better address African challenges. At the 2022 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Conference of Ministers, Sall strongly advocated for a renewal of the multilateral system, stressing the necessity to create an African credit rating agency to fight anti-African bias among global rating agencies that overstress African risk, preventing countries from borrowing at acceptable rates. Sall also called for a new agreement on International Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights, reserve assets that can be exchanged for hard currency and are allocated based on the size of a country’s economy—meaning that the entire continent received less help for COVID-19 recovery than the United States, Japan, China, and Germany individually.

As it resets ties with Africa, Europe must stand by Africans’ side to engage these important reforms and build a fairer international financial system and a more democratic international governance. If not, the risk is to let Africa build an alternative multilateral system without their traditional partners. From China and the United States to Russia and India, African leaders have multiple potential partners vying for a stake in the continent’s future.

It is up to Europe to win Africa’s attention and affection. For that, it must do something it has never quite done before: stand shoulder-to-shoulder with African nations as equal partners.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

Online Event Thu, June 16, 2022 • 9:30 am ET

The transatlantic partnership in Africa

A conversation on the joint vision for a renewed partnership that EU and AU leaders agreed to at the EU-AU Summit and its relevance in the context of EU-U.S. cooperation in Africa.

Africa European Union Geopolitics & Energy Security International Markets

The post The Ukraine war is giving Europe a chance to reset ties with Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Today, the country is on a knife’s edge. 

The promised road to reform is now fully blocked by security forces bent on what they claim is an effort to “save” the country from civilian leaders. But as these forces hold ever tighter to power, they are squeezing the life out of the country: Since their October 25 coup that effectively brushed aside the civilian transition and reignited a popular revolution, the economy has gone into a death spiral. Inflation is rising above 250 percent, the value of the country’s currency has plummeted against the dollar, and the price of key imported commodities in Sudan, such as wheat and fuel, have risen by more than 30 percent. 

In other words, a loaf of bread that cost two Sudanese pounds when civilians assumed office two years ago now costs more than fifty. The United Nations World Food Program projects that 40 percent of the country’s population will face “acute food insecurity” later this year if nothing changes, leading donors to begin planning for a new humanitarian emergency in the country’s urban areas.

As Sudan’s supporters watch this calamitous economic situation unfold, they are desperately searching for any defensible reason to restart lending and debt-relief programs to help avoid the coming financial collapse and humanitarian emergency. But, here too, the military has given no reason to show any leniency: Since the October coup d’état, dozens of leading political figures and protest leaders have been targeted for disappearance or arrest, while ninety-three pro-democracy demonstrators have been killed by security forces (which continue to use a nationwide state of emergency as justification for their brutality).

Last week, the country’s military leader, General Abdallah Fattah al-Burhan, even threatened to expel the head of the country’s UN peace-support mission for “lying publicly” and failing to report to the UN Security Council the supposed progress under the junta’s rule.

As the junta hunkers down internally, its emissaries are on a globetrotting tour of friendly capitals, from Moscow to Abu Dhabi, seeking political backing and a financial rescue. So far, no one has been willing to wager on the military or against the will of the Sudanese people, whose demands for democratic change have not abated.

But that could soon change. A series of recent meetings in Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi suggest that Sudan’s longtime friends are rapidly losing patience with the political deadlock and impending economic collapse, and are searching for a way to create a soft landing (even if it comes at the expense of the Sudanese population’s democratic aspirations).

For Gulf partners, who bought up Khartoum real estate and commercial holdings at fire-sale prices in the waning days of the Omar al-Bashir regime (and since his ouster), Sudan’s unraveling would spell disaster for their investments. Egypt, which continues to view Sudan as its vassal, fears a mass exodus of Sudanese northward and political chaos on its southern border. Khartoum’s ability to stay in political lockstep with Cairo in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations with Ethiopia—Egypt’s single biggest foreign-policy priority—is also a major question.

Considering Sudan’s political history, the time appears ripe for another notorious elite deal, with regional buy-in, that walks the country back from the financial brink—but, in the process, short-circuits any hope that the bottom-up political movement will lead to genuine civilian rule and democracy.

Washington needs to get serious

For weeks, Khartoum has been awash in rumors that the hapless former prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, seen as capable of putting financial markets at ease, could return. The re-establishment of a civilian and technocratic—but compliant—cabinet, which puts a more acceptable face on the regime, might also follow. But most concerning is the discussion of the establishment of a new Security and Defense Council that would ensure security interests remain firmly in the military’s hands and separate from civilian-led ministries. This would leave the military with ultimate executive authority. 

Such a set-up would pave the way for quick elections, which the military and its political allies would surely dominate, and thereby provide new surface-level legitimacy for unreformed security interests and their foreign backers. As they likely see it, the only real losers under such a deal are the 44 million Sudanese not in the military or associated with the previous regime, who will once again see their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic future dashed by political expediency and regional stability.

Sudan’s dedicated pro-democracy movement would categorically reject any deal engineered with outside backing and did not emerge from a process they were fully a part of—but that doesn’t mean that the military and their allies might not still try. Importantly, it is not too late to prevent this scenario. But it requires the United States and partners to step up and demonstrate a strategic focus on long-term change and a return to core principles that bring it into greater alignment and allegiance with Washington’s true partners: the Sudanese people.

First, the international community must remind itself that Sudan’s revolution was never merely about overthrowing a dictator or dismantling his party; it was about undoing the corrupt, racist, and authoritarian power structures that have governed Sudan since independence. 

Western calls for the military to enact “confidence-building measures” only plays into the existing discriminatory power dynamics in the country and elevate the security services as an equal, if not legitimate, part of Sudan’s political future (and therefore undermines a core tenet of the revolution). Instead, the military should be getting constant reminders that their days are numbered and a return to the pre-coup, pre-revolution status quo is both impossible and unacceptable.

Second, Washington needs to improve its public messaging in the face of the military’s political double-dealing. It is no longer enough for the United States to say it’s “on the side of the protesters.” If it were, it would call out every single abuse and death suffered by pro-democracy activists at the hands of the security services, as well as demand an investigation of crimes committed under the coup government. Instead, Washington’s numbness to the sustained deluge of crimes normalizes the deaths of innocent people and reinforces the military’s hold on power.

Third, the United States needs to start listening to the demands of the people and let them inform its public statements. Calling for a “return to civilian-led transitional government” or the “full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement,” as recent US and Troika statements have, reflects deafness to popular calls for a new way forward, tells allies on the ground that stability is more important than transformation, and suggests that Washington would rather save face by salvaging formulas it once endorsed rather than seeing the writing on the wall and changing tack.

Lastly, it is well past time that the United States rebalance the negotiating table by imposing targeted sanctions on the individuals directing these abuses and profiting from the current stalemate. Since the military’s coup, those most responsible for the disruption of the transition and human-rights abuses have suffered no direct consequences for their actions. While symbolic, the recent sanctioning of Sudan’s Central Reserve Police by the US Treasury was short on impact and rang hollow with both the victims and the perpetrators: With no dollar-denominated bank holdings or large physical presence outside of Sudan, the sanctions have little to no practical effect. And by targeting an institution with far less responsibility for Sudan’s failing state than the military, even the symbolism of the action was lost on most. 

Instead, Washington continues to betray a lack of real understanding of what is happening on the ground, who is responsible, and how to impact the calculations of the principal belligerents. But it is not too late to correct the course. Making clear the conditions required to restart lending and avoiding sanctions, conceived in consultation with its democratic allies on the streets, could help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact and demonstrate that Washington is giving real weight to the popular will.

In the long run, this is what is required to achieve actual stability—not the cheap imitation Sudan has always known.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

The post The days of elite deals in Sudan should be over appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It also served as a wake-up call to the United States. The episode is emblematic of choices being made by African nations on the core question of open internet access. Countries such as Uganda, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Sudan have restricted access to the internet this year in the midst of elections or civilian unrest. And Nigeria’s recent actions smack of Beijing’s long-championed policy of “internet sovereignty”—as does the Buhari administration’s reported meeting with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) to discuss plans to build an internet firewall.

Over the past ten years, there has been a borderline obsession with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) within Washington’s foreign policy circles and a strong bi-partisan consensus that the twenty-first century will be defined by US-China competition on the global stage. Policymakers often employ simplistic tropes and frequently voice concern about the big-ticket, Chinese-financed road, rail, and dam projects across the continent that comprise Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Over time, the Chinese have added to the traditional transport infrastructure projects by investing in telecom infrastructure, media assets, and light manufacturing—while the United States has failed to significantly deepen its commercial footprint in the region. US policy initiatives such as ex-President Barack Obama’s Power Africa and his successor’s Prosper Africa, housed in the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), have been limited in their budgets and buy in at the highest level of government.

But today, the real competition is in the digital, rather than the physical, realm: the struggle to shape Africa’s technology infrastructure and digital future, as well as how the next generation of Africans will consume, interact, and do business with the world.

Africa is not only the youngest continent in the world, with a median age of eighteen, but it is also urbanizing faster than any other: In the next ten years, it will be home to seventeen cities with more than five million inhabitants each. African youth are better connected than ever before and developing local start-up ecosystems that attract double-digit fundraising growth year-over-year to tap into the continent’s 1.2 billion-person market. The means by which Africans view and see the world will be increasingly shaped by the hardware and software they use—and, perhaps more importantly, to which they have access.

While trucks, trains, and planes have long dominated how African consumers and businesses are able to transport and interact with global markets, the digitization in the last decade, particularly on mobile devices, has changed this equation. Competition between China and the United States is playing out at each of the six layers of Africa’s technology stack: undersea cables and satellites; telecommunication companies and internet service providers; mobile handsets; data networks; operating systems; and apps, mobile money, content platforms, and web browsers. In contrast to US investment, which comes through American companies, Chinese investments in telecom infrastructure are often more intertwined with government backing and support.

As more Africans come online, they’ll increasingly interact with this technology stack—knowingly or not—and the information they consume could vary greatly depending on the digital infrastructure that supports these interactions.

For example, Shenzhen-based Transsion accounts for almost half of all smartphones, with the next nearest competitor, Samsung, holding only 16 percent market share. Increasingly important is the preferential treatment Transsion can give its own apps (similar to how Google and Apple operate), including market-leading music streaming service Boomplay and mobile-money provider PalmPay. Much of this consumer experience is supported behind the scenes by ZTE and Huawei infrastructure.

By 2025, Africa’s mobile penetration is expected to reach 50 percent, or 614 million connections, with 65 percent of those connections being smartphones. Like South America and India, a reduction in data costs and a growing desire for leisure activities will push individuals to the internet, and providers like Transsion are well-positioned to meet this need with their cheap, market-specific handsets.

With informal markets, which dominate African commerce as the continent moves into the digital world, this technology stack will only rise in importance. A critical example of an area of future competition is in digital currencies, including China’s digital yuan. While the utility of the digital yuan in Africa is currently minimal, the proliferation of Chinese handsets with pre-downloaded apps and wallets that could be loaded to support digital yuan transactions could significantly change this picture within the next ten to fifteen years, as both businesses and individuals embrace the currency.

As the Biden administration launches the large Africa Trade and Investment program at USAID and puts forth its official Africa strategy in early 2022, it must consider the continent’s digital infrastructure. By adopting a sectoral approach under Prosper Africa, with a focus on technology and digital infrastructure, the administration will be able to mobilize the resources and acquire the expertise needed to support increased, targeted American investment—much like the Obama administration did with Power Africa, but hopefully at a larger scale.

The picture is changing rapidly, and without a more concentrated effort to support Africa’s digital infrastructure, the United States risks losing a major opportunity to align itself with the continent’s arc toward innovation, technology, and youth-driven global culture.

Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, co-founder of Insider, and an active investor in African start-ups.

The post Africa’s digital infrastructure is the next playing field for great-power competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Exports plunged 19 percent in 2020, versus a 12-, 7-, and 5-percent drop for North and Latin America, Europe, and Asia, respectively, while recovery in Africa has not been as strong as on other continents. SMEs that started their commercial adventures in regional or international markets were hit particularly hard. More broadly, businesses on the continent have faced collapsing global demand and rising logistics costs linked to growing bottlenecks along the global supply chain. In a world where air travel has become more expensive and travel restrictions remain in place, meeting new and old customers will likely become more difficult for African corporate managers.

In the post-COVID world, these factors could lead to an even more precarious situation for Africa’s SMEs. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund highlighted three economic scenarios the region might experience. For African SMEs, those scenarios would pave the way for three very different paths:

The status quo. This scenario would see Africa return to world trade with unchanged patterns: a high concentration of exports around a few products, mostly raw materials. Indeed, in 2020, manufactured products accounted for only 25 percent of African exports, compared to 79 percent in Asia. That same year, the concentration index—the proportion of a country’s exports that is concentrated in a small number of commodities—was 55 percent and 38 percent in central and west Africa, respectively, against only 10 percent in Asia.

An export stall. This could result from a weakening of exports due to the many shocks of the pandemic, as well as the poor capacity of African governments to support SMEs (especially compared to their counterparts on other continents). A deterioration in the health profile could also fuel such a scenario, thus jeopardizing progress made over the years on foreign markets by African SMEs thanks to their creativity and innovative products.

A strong take-off. In this scenario, a tight network of exporting African SMEs would operate as the bedrock of African structural transformation, with revenues trickling down in their home economies and leading to higher income per capita and wider access to basic social services. Africa’s trade balance would resemble those of other emerging countries, moving away from the noxious combination of raw material exports and imports of low-quality essential products to a more positive combination of exports of manufactured goods and imports of intermediate consumption and capital goods. This scenario is feasible if policies aimed at controlling the health crisis are combined with government initiatives concentrating all the resources of economic and commercial diplomacy (or ECD) to help SMEs.

Some African countries are already implementing ECD by mobilizing national public institutions and their diplomatic network to create opportunities for national companies abroad, attract foreign investors, and influence international economic rules—such as the creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area—to meet their own interests. They often have commercial attachés in key embassies, and they sometimes encourage their SMEs to attend trade fairs abroad in order to promote their products and services.

Yet, despite regional role models such as Morocco or South Africa, ECD systems across the continent lag behind and could do better. In some countries, they exist on a de facto basis and are conducted by various stakeholders without any strong institutional support. In others, de jure instruments and bodies exist but fail to achieve the expected results, thanks to poor governance or a lack of resources. They often lack a proactive and systematic approach, suffer from poor operational integration, and do not cultivate a culture of results.

They might learn from many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, notably the United States, France, and Germany, which have made ECD a priority to develop their businesses and, in particular, their network of international SMEs. Some developing countries, such as Cambodia, have also embraced the practice. The topic is discussed during ambassadorial conferences and is also integrated into performance assessments of embassies’ economic sections (through indicators such as the number of interactions between domestic and foreign companies or the volume of investments realized).

Support for African SMEs has been reaffirmed bilaterally and multilaterally as a leading engine for African structural transformation. Now, turning that agenda into reality requires African diplomats who are seasoned commercial representatives, recruited and assessed not only on their ability to defend the political positions of their government but also on their commercial and economic performance.

Institutional mechanisms, as well as cooperation among the various actors in charge of conducting economic diplomacy, should also be strengthened. Numerous emerging countries that have achieved continent-wide commercial successes, such as China and Turkey, are a good illustration of this concept. Their commercial influence is underpinned by a strong interweaving among the commercial sections of their embassies, trade ministries, business associations, and various other national institutions.

Ultimately, African heads of state interested in engaging in economic diplomacy should be proactive and systematic about it. ECD should be considered a strategic tool for developing SMEs and become a key element of their political agenda.

It should not be acceptable to only invite a few business leaders and corporate unions for an official visit abroad at the last minute; organizing around real opportunities for economic discussions—and well in advance by the economic sections of embassies—should become the norm. The success of high-level visits will be judged by the number or value of contracts signed by a country’s companies, which would be a more revealing indicator of dynamism than the amount of bilateral loans signed.

Achieving successes in African ECD requires preparation, strategic reflection, and well-designed roadmaps. Building those foundations could be done using a twofold approach.

First, a research effort aimed at identifying best practices in Africa or on other continents should take place through a series of conferences with key specialists. These conferences should emphasize incremental reforms capable of crafting solid, low-cost, and highly efficient ECD systems. The next step is advocacy designed to disseminate those findings among business leaders, top diplomats, and decision makers. Since speeding up pandemic recovery is a top priority for many African institutions, Senegalese President Macky Sall should leverage his upcoming presidency of the African Union to promote ECD.

Everybody agrees that SMEs are the lifeblood of Africa’s economy. Its leaders need to use this moment of peril to step up on their behalf.

Jean-Paul Mvogo teaches and conducts research on private sector development and innovation in Africa at Sciences Po Paris. He has worked for several United Nations institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations Development Program.

The post Economic and commercial diplomacy is crucial to strengthening African business appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But the festive mood shouldn’t overshadow the need to address the entrenched inequality of the quota-based allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs)—an International Monetary Fund (IMF) composite currency unit that member countries can convert into a freely usable currency to finance imports and other needs.

The G20, which accounts for around 80 percent of global GDP, must enhance the impact of SDRs where they are most needed, such as in low-income countries (LICs). That would set the world on a path toward synchronized recovery in the short-term and global income convergence in the medium- and long-term.

“A historic decision”

In both size and scope, the $650 billion SDR allocation is the international community’s most ambitious response to the pandemic, increasing fiscal space and fortifying global financial stability. It has benefited all member countries and represents the largest such allocation in the IMF’s history—around triple the amount it injected into the international financial system during the 2008 financial crisis.

Across the developing world, the newly issued SDRs will reduce countries’ exposure to exchange-rate volatility and mitigate liquidity constraints associated with elevated balance of payment pressures. This will be especially impactful in Africa, where the allocation could help countries confront myriad challenges, including weathering currency gyrations, replenishing dwindling foreign-exchange reserves (which declined by 27 percent in 2020), and financing essential imports, such as COVID-19 vaccines.

In addition to preventing liquidity crises from morphing into insolvency crises, the SDRs will help sustain investor confidence and enhance the prospects for an inclusive global recovery.

By indiscriminately injecting liquidity into the global economy, the unconditional and countercyclical SDR allocation was always the most cost-effective and low-risk response to the pandemic-induced economic downturn. As IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva said in August: “This is a historic decision—the largest SDR allocation in the history of the IMF and a shot in the arm for the global economy at a time of unprecedented crisis.”

A distribution dilemma

But there is a problem: The global distribution of this financial shot in the arm is just as skewed as the supply of inoculations against COVID-19.

High-income countries that have drawn on effective advance purchase agreements and hoarded vaccines have also received nearly 60 percent of SDRs (or 65 percent when including China). This is despite the fact that they do not genuinely need SDRs, since most enjoy the exorbitant privilege of issuing a reserve currency. Conversely, LICs that do not enjoy the same privileges have been wildly disadvantaged: Only 0.5 percent of vaccines worldwide have been administered in LICs, compared to 77 percent in high- and upper-middle-income countries.

In practice, the effect of the allocation is expected to be more significant in LICs, where limited fiscal space and prohibitively high borrowing costs have limited the size and scope of government stimulus measures. Individually, these countries received a very low volume of SDRs and collectively a lower share (around 3 percent) of the total allocation, setting the stage for a two-speed recovery. Africa, which is home to most LICs, received just 5 percent of the total allocation (around $33 billion). That’s less than Japan and South Korea, which together received more than $37 billion (6 percent), or the European Union, which received $139 billion (21 percent).

The low allocation of SDRs to LICs is commensurate with their share of global GDP, which ultimately determines their IMF quotas. Currently, these nations account for less than 1 percent of global GDP; this partly reflects invariance in the drivers of growth and trade, which remains heavily dependent on commodities. The latest United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s Commodities and Development Report classifies nearly 80 percent of the seventy low-income countries as commodity-dependent. This production structure exposes these nations to global volatility and adverse commodity terms of trade shocks.

A few high-income countries have pledged to recycle their unused SDRs to increase the volume of concessional lending to the most vulnerable LICs. More countries should support such efforts. A reallocation of around four hundred billion dollars in SDRs to countries that need them most would make a huge difference in terms of economic recovery and structural transformation. By injecting large amounts of investments to set these countries on a robust and long-run growth trajectory, it could also engineer a Big Push green growth development model which would narrow interregional income inequality and accelerate global income convergence.

Big push, big help

Operationally, a shift towards a Big Push model, supported by the effective redeployment of unused SDRs, would help LICs overcome several development challenges, including the unhealthy low-savings and poverty traps. At sufficient scale, this would provide long-term capital to finance the necessary massive investment in critical infrastructure to boost productivity and crowd-in private investment, which will help alleviate supply-side constraints and diversify sources of growth and trade.

The needs of these poorest countries are acute and their financing gaps have been exacerbated by the pandemic, which caused governments to dramatically raise social spending as fiscal revenues shrank. According to IMF estimates, LICs will need around two hundred billion dollars annually until 2025 to bolster their pandemic response—and an additional $250 billon to keep pace with advanced economies that are on a stronger recovery path. Under the best-case scenario of the effective mobilization of resources, LICs would be able to return to their pre-crisis convergence path with advanced economies no earlier than 2023.

In addition to rebuilding external buffers for greater resilience in the face of the looming tightening global financial conditions triggered by heightening inflationary pressures and expectations, the reallocation of unused SDRs could also provide the minimum level of resources for infrastructure investment required for self-sustaining growth. Over time, the growth of public investment and the expansion of industrial production will accelerate the development of regional value chains and create complementary demand—which will ignite a virtuous cycle of sustained and robust per-capita income growth.

The opportunity of injecting large-scale resources in LICs under the proposed Big Push model could transform the collective goodwill borne out of the pandemic into a more inclusive, global economic integration model that blurs the historical divide between developed and developing nations, and between high-income and low-income countries. It has the potential to alleviate climate-related challenges and reduce global income inequality, especially interregional inequality shaped by structural factors, such as sticky colonial development models of resource extraction that sustain commodity dependence.

The Big Push green growth development model engineered by the effective reallocation of unused SDRs could also rebrand the IMF not just as the world’s lender of last resort—but one that engages effectively with regional development banks to meet sustainable development goals.

Hippolyte Fofack is chief economist and director of research at the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

The post G20 leaders can rescue low-income countries by redistributing their IMF windfall appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On this occasion, some world leaders responded by announcing commitments to address climate change. US President Joe Biden vowed to double American funds that help developing countries deal with the knock-on effects of climate-change to $11.4 billion per year by 2024. China committed to stop building new coal-fired power projects abroad. 

But as Guterres said in his appeal, it’s vital for “emerging economies to go the extra mile” by contributing to emissions reductions. African countries will be key players in minimizing global climate change, and it is in their interest to do so, considering the continent has suffered the most from the impacts of climate change (even though they’ve contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions). In the future, Africa will represent a much larger proportion of the global population and economic activity, meaning that its ability to go green now will shape the continent’s contributions to climate change looking ahead. 

The continent possesses an abundance of renewable energy resources, but capitalizing on its potential and activating political will remains a challenge. Harnessing that potential will require closing Africa’s infrastructure gap—and mobilizing billions of dollars in private-sector investment to do so. 

Africa’s green start

African countries face a wide infrastructure gap. According to the African Development Bank (AfDB), the continent’s need for infrastructure amounts to between $130 billion and $170 billion a year, with a financing gap of between $68 billion and $108 billion. 

But instead of building carbon-dependent infrastructure and adapting it to produce fewer emissions, as many developed countries have done, Africa has an opportunity to leapfrog that process altogether and build green from the start.

That infrastructure should also be resilient, since disruptions due to poor maintenance or natural disasters cost between $391 billion and $647 billion annually for households and businesses in low- and middle-income countries, mainly in Africa and South Asia. 

Energy infrastructure is a central part of the story. Nearly half the population of sub-Saharan Africa lacks electricity, a stark contrast to the global electrification rate of about 90 percent. Numerous large clean-energy projects are already underway: the Noor-Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power Plant Project in Morocco, the construction of six geothermal power stations in Olkaria in Kenya, and the Nachtigal Hydro Power Project in Cameroon. 

To meet the continent’s significant electricity needs, African countries will need to tap into their considerable access to renewable resources (solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal) while drastically increasing production capabilities with new, green infrastructure. 

The private sector has the most to give—and much to gain

African governments are the primary source of infrastructure financing, representing 37 percent (or $37.5 billion in 2018) of total commitments. However, they shouldn’t shoulder the entire burden alone, as overreliance on public funding risks increasing Africa’s debt. Moreover, public funding cannot be expected to bridge the $68 billion to $108 billion in annual financing that’s needed, especially given the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic.

International organizations and development finance institutions (DFIs) (such as the World Bank and the AfDB) as well as donor countries including Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States are increasingly involved in providing climate finance and supporting African countries with advisory services and technical assistance, grants, loans, equity, bonds, guarantees, and lines of credit. But even DFIs and donor countries cannot be expected to bridge the massive amount of financing needed to bridge the infrastructure gap.

African countries need to explore additional financing sources beyond public funding and international assistance. At the Paris Summit on the Financing of African Economies in May 2021, forty-three countries adopted a declaration that emphasized how private-sector funding will be key to transforming Africa’s energy sector and improving infrastructure. And for private investors, green projects in African markets could deliver attractive financial and impact returns. 

Private-sector involvement currently amounts to little, representing only 12 percent (or $11.8 billion in 2018) of infrastructure funding in Africa. The private sector usually participates in green projects if DFIs also invest in the projects and mitigate risk. But a more readily investing sector could make a huge difference; McKinsey & Company estimates that investors interested in African markets could contribute as much as $550 billion to the continent’s infrastructure. That $550 billion comes, in a large part, from institutional investors like pension funds, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds. 

However, global regulatory changes resulting from the 2008 financial crisis, local currency risk, and a lack of knowledge among investors about the opportunities in Africa continue to limit the private sector’s inclination to invest.

How to loosen the private sector’s purse strings

To steer private investors toward African energy infrastructure, DFIs and countries should deploy the right mix of innovative and effective instruments. 

Since investors tend to perceive higher political, regulatory, and currency risks in African markets than in other developing markets, DFI support will be critical to mitigate those risks, thereby shifting the balance between perceived risks and rewards, through tools like guarantees or blended finance. Making a more attractive environment for the private sector to implement its solutions—especially by strengthening macro-financial, legal, and institutional frameworks—will also be critical. 

Emerging economies are issuing green bonds more than ever, a relatively accessible option to finance climate-change mitigation and adaptation projects since they provide steady and moderate returns. African countries should continue to offer or increase their offerings of these bonds. While Africa (mainly South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Morocco) represents merely 1 percent of global green-bond issuance, the bonds present significant potential given investors’ appetite for them. Public-private partnerships are also an excellent instrument, even if they’re complex, because they marry the skills and resources of the public and private sectors while distributing the associated risks. Finally, African countries should develop carbon pricing, which most of the governments have listed in their nationally determined contributions, as it carries great potential. 

Yet DFIs, private investors, and African governments are only scratching the surface of potential financial innovation today. As the number of investors and emerging economies interested in green investment is increasing, financial institutions in Africa should expand and diversify the offerings of green products. The development of green shares is a promising example. Adopting best-in-class regulatory frameworks for green finance will pave the way for financial innovation.

Given the dynamism of African financial markets, there is plenty of room for further innovation, including moving beyond conventional debt instruments, to attract private funding and help the continent grow green. Heading into COP26, financial players must commit to supporting Africa in innovative ways as the continent builds its energy infrastructure and contributes to the fight against climate change.

Emilie Bel is a Europe and international-affairs expert with a financial background and experience working in Brussels, Paris, and Washington DC.

Portions of this piece first appeared in the May 2021 Atlantic Council report “Growing Green: Catalyzing Climate Finance in African Markets” by Emilie Bel.

Further reading

AfricaSource May 25, 2021

Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it?

By Rama Yade

Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Sep 24, 2021

Make way for Wakanda: The UN Security Council needs an African seat

By Rama Yade

The Security Council was built on the principle of sovereignty and equality of all nations. Its democratization and reformation are overdue—and must consider Africa.

Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo

New Atlanticist Oct 7, 2021

Time is running out for Abiy’s ‘new beginning’ in Ethiopia

By Cameron Hudson

Cheering crowds and soaring rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s troubles run deeper than just one restive region.

Africa Conflict

The post For Africa to go green, the private sector must step up. Could COP26 provide an answer? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

News of the failed plot came the same day that US President Joe Biden extolled democracy, and the courage of those seeking it, in his address to the United Nations. He mentioned Sudan specifically: “The democratic world is everywhere … It lives in the brave women of Sudan who withstood violence and oppression to push a genocidal dictator from power and who keep working every day to defend their democratic progress.” 

It came as no surprise that elements apparently aligned with al-Bashir, who was overthrown in 2019 after a quarter-century in power, might seek to subvert the country’s progress toward democratic rule. The jailed former leader is wanted on International Criminal Court charges of genocide and war crimes allegedly committed in the region of Darfur. Sudanese authorities say the coup perpetrators are Bashir loyalists both inside and outside the military. 

Officers are notably part of the transitional government. During the two years that a civilian cabinet has nominally been administering the affairs of state, the country’s technocrats have seemingly gone to great lengths to put their military partners at ease and avoid direct conflicts with them. Civilian leaders choose to focus on the social, economic, and administrative reforms squarely under civilian control, allowing the question of security-sector reform to loom in the background. 

A fork in the road

But now that those reform efforts have collected much of the low-hanging fruit, Sudan’s civilian leaders have come to a fork in the road: Either they continue their reforms with only limited efficacy, or they pursue structural changes to the military’s role in political and economic life, as well as in the security of the country. 

In his attempt to enlist international support, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok recently warned the world of the dangers of this binary choice. In a June press conference, he cautioned that chaos could follow if divides continue developing among post-revolutionary forces. “The big question today,” he said, “is will Sudan exist or not.”   

For its part, the military has created its own facts on the ground to support its narrative that civilian leaders are incapable of managing the country’s complex ethnic, security, and economic challenges and are therefore not fit to lead alone. It is in this context that the military’s fingerprints are on the violence and displacement rising across Darfur, on military skirmishes and provocations heating up along the Ethiopian border, and on protests in eastern Sudan against the cabinet’s failed economic policies (which are being both fueled and suppressed by the military).

‘The ones who want to steal it’

This strategy of discrediting civilian leaders aligns with the coup attempt. A day after the event, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, deputy head of the Sovereign Council, Sudan’s current executive body, blamed political leaders for neglecting the citizenry and “fighting over seats and divvying up positions.”

His superior, General Abdel al-Burhan, shares a similar perspective, saying during the same public appearance: “Who should they rise to protect the revolution against? From us, the military? We are the ones who are protecting it from them, the ones who want to steal it.”

The irony is, of course, that civilians cannot steal what rightfully belongs to them. Under the terms of Sudan’s transitional constitutional charter, the chair of the Sovereign Council is supposed to transfer to a civilian midway through the transition. Whether that handover occurs this November (as originally anticipated) or next year, as negotiated under the Juba Peace Agreement, is a matter of legal interpretation. 

But what shouldn’t be open to interpretation is whether that transition should occur.

Cacophonous rabble

As part of its argument that civilians have not properly managed the transition, the military cites a number of true and even convincing arguments about areas where the civilian cabinet is falling short. Indeed, there are reasonable debates to be had about the pace and effectiveness of the economic reform agenda and its ability to improve the lives of those most at need. 

It also is true that significant elements of the constitutional charter remain unimplemented, namely the seating of a transitional legislative council. Of course, Sudanese politics remains a largely cacophonous rabble—unreformed, disorganized, and often at odds with each other—precisely as the previous regime wanted it.

Most civilian leaders are willing to acknowledge and debate these shortcomings. Many would also argue that the work of governing is only made more difficult by an unreformed security sector that maintains control over vast portions of the economy. The same critics would also say these authorities benefit from the ability to undermine efforts that would strip them of the power and privilege they’ve long enjoyed. 

Yet contrary to the military’s contention, frustration with civilian rule is by no means an endorsement of the military status quo. The Sudanese Professionals Association, one of the lead organizers of the 2019 revolution, made that clear when it said this week: “Our rejection of any coup or the return of dictatorship is principled and is not in defense of the transitional authority or the continuation of the [civil-military] partnership.”

Sudan’s transitional charter and the effectively forced marriage between civilian and military leaders it created was an artful way to address the winner-take-all system that has long defined Sudan’s political existence. But in the current impasse, both sides feel like they are losing. As in any democratic system built on compromise, that may be alright—as long as the millions of civilians who cried out for freedom, peace, and justice don’t also feel like they’re losing.

Loud and clear signals

As Sudan tries to skirt disaster, the international community has taken notice, condemning the coup attempt and dispatching a flurry of envoys and other VIPs to Khartoum this week to convey their support for civilian rule in person. The US Congress went so far as to threaten to reimpose sanctions and withdraw as much as $1 billion in promised investment and development assistance if the military attempted to reassert total control. 

While welcome, this response also serves to reinforce the zero-sum mentality that stokes fear on both sides. Now that the military is on notice, it seems unlikely that pressure tactics from the West will do much beyond entrenching them even further—and pushing them toward a host of eager, more malign suitors. After all, it was largely their fear of being displaced that has fueled their strategy until now. 

What’s required is not ultimatums, but a serious discussion of what the future holds so that Sudan’s political order is not defined simply by winners and losers. Civilians must be given the chance to lead without encumbrance. The hard work of security sector-reform must begin in earnest, but in a way that doesn’t paint the security services into a corner; instead, they should be offered a role in a new Sudan.  

To be sure, there must also be some agreement on accountability for past crimes. Ill-gotten gains must be returned to the state and the military must divest itself of civilian-oriented businesses. Functions better suited to the police, customs, and intelligence services should be removed from the military’s purview. Perhaps most importantly, militia groups and other paramilitary groups must be brought under a unitary command structure. 

There are real security threats in and around the country that require a response from professional security services, as evidenced by the killing of five Sudanese intelligence officers this week in a raid on a supposed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) cell in Khartoum. Growing instability emanating from Ethiopia, perennial turbulence from a host of neighbors including South Sudan, Libya, and the Central African Republic, and human smuggling and drug trafficking all remain challenges that will require a professional army to confront. 

As Sudan grapples with the fundamental choices that will decide the country’s future for decades to come, the United States and its partners have a critical role to play. Just as Western democracies have incentivized the reform process by illustrating the benefits Sudan and its people will gain for choosing the path of peace and democracy, they must now help illustrate what a future Sudan, with a competent and professional security sector, will look like. 

In responding to this wake-up call, international supporters would do well to bear in mind Dagalo’s words: “The military is met with humiliation and insults day and night, so how can there not be coups?”

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former chief of staff of the Office of the US Special Envoy to Sudan at the US Department of State.

Further reading

AfricaSource Mar 3, 2021

The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan

Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.

Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Aug 27, 2021

A cable from Mali: How to bring Bamako back from the brink

By Olivier-Rémy Bel, Petr Tůma

Against the backdrop of two coups, interethnic and terrorist violence moving south toward Bamako, and France shifting its posture in the Sahel, this could be the last chance to stabilize Mali.

Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Sep 17, 2021

Biden finally gets bold on Ethiopia. But will it bring peace?

By Cameron Hudson

The Biden team has launched its final and most elaborate warning shot before cracking down with sanctions against human-rights abusers in the Tigray region.

Africa Conflict

The post Sudan’s failed coup shows why military reform is a must appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In this seventy-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Africans represent the largest group, with 28 percent of the votes, ahead of Asia with 27 percent, and well above the Americas at 17 percent, and Western Europe at 15 percent. Yet everyone knows that Africa does not decide anything. The real decision-making body is the Security Council, and its five permanent members are China, Russia, France, Great Britain, and the United States.

The founding of this prestigious council was based on the results of World War II, where global superpowers were defined based on hard power. What about the African people? Weren’t they involved in the victory over Hitler’s Germany? The French launched the Resistance from Brazzaville, and numerous African countries served in the war. They deserve their seat at the victory banquet. 

Besides, the United Nations Security Council still functions on a conventional framework, which was written back in 1945, before the majority of African countries had gained independence from their colonizers—which is another fault to correct.

This gap is all the less bearable because the African continent has dealt with issues threatening peace and security for centuries. Africa even was home to one of the world’s first human-rights charters: the Manden Charter, launched by the great Sundiata Keita, founder of the Mali Empire, long before the English Bill of Rights (1689) and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), and perhaps even before the Magna Carta (1215).

Capitalizing on culture

The composition of the UN Security Council—let’s call it aristocratic for this argument—does not reflect the current world at all. Today, the notion of power has evolved from hard power, which is forceful and coercive, to a subtle but more influential power. Soft power enables a nation to lead other countries through influence, which allows those countries to lead their own development without coercive interference, which is what the Security Council should note. Afghanistan and the Sahel are proof of the limits of hard power—and Black Panther, the 2018 movie based on a Marvel comic, is the consecration of soft power. That’s right, it’s Wakanda time.

Africa and its powerful creative industries—driven by connected youth amid the biggest digital revolution of the past two decades—shine beyond the borders of Nollywood to influence Hollywood. This growing market expands its influence everywhere: Nigeria’s entertainment and media market doubled from 2014 to 2019 to become the fastest-growing in the world, according to the audit firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). When Nigeria incorporated Nollywood in its gross domestic product in 2013 (in a rebasing of data), it became the largest economy in Africa. From Dior to Louis Vuitton, luxury fashion has been renewed with African inspirations. Ready-to-wear brands such as Sweden’s H&M and Spain’s Zara have joined in as well. African Fashion Weeks from Johannesburg to Lagos have inspired international celebrity entertainers like Beyoncé and Rihanna, who is a fashion designer herself.

Beyoncé’s Disney-produced musical, Black Is King, is a celebration of Africa, dreamed up in line with the global success of Black Panther, which featured award-winning African actors in Hollywood such as Lupita Nyong’o and Daniel Kaluuya. Moreover, Netflix has greatly enriched its platform of African series, targeting African audiences and not just English speakers. In the music industry, Nigerian artists such as Burna Boy, Davido, and Wizkid have signed with major US labels such as Sony and regularly win Grammy awards. Burna Boy’s songs were included on the playlist for US President Joe Biden’s inauguration. Jay-Z, Will Smith, and Jada Pinkett Smith backed a Broadway musical, Fela!, about a Nigerian singer that won three Tony Awards in 2010. Not so long ago, Nigerians were paying dearly for collaborations with American and European stars, but now the opposite is true. Soft power is now the predominant power.

At United Nations Plaza, these changes have not been taken into consideration. It is quite alarming that the ruling procedures for the security council have not been amended since 1982. The Security Council was built on the principle of sovereignty and equality of all nations; therefore, democratization and reformation of this organization are overdue and a reassessment must ensure fairness and justice for the African continent. Fairness should start with demography. Africa is predicted to become the largest population of the world in the next twenty years, and it already is the youngest: Almost one in four world inhabitants will be a sub-Saharan African in 2050.

Three options for the Security Council

Several African candidates merit consideration for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. First, Nigeria is the continent’s most populous nation, at more than 210 million people. In 1963, after its independence in 1960, Nigeria was one of the founding members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now known as the African Union. From 1960 to 1995, Nigeria provided $61 billion in funding for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. This country also assisted prominent leaders of liberation movements in decision-making against the military government regimes of the time throughout the continent. Nigeria founded the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, when it utilized its soft power to address a civil war in Angola through OAU policy. By nationalizing Barclays Bank and British Petroleum in the late 1970s, Nigeria was able to pressure the British and contribute to Zimbabwe’s independence.

Another contender for a permanent seat is South Africa. Despite recent concerns about xenophobic violence against African migrants, South Africa has a universal audience because of its powerful story of transformation. The iconic struggle and leadership of the late Nelson Mandela, who went from jail to the presidency, is known the world over. After holding its first democratic elections in 1994, one of the most multiracial countries in Africa went on to have one of the most remarkable constitutions in the world through the Convention for a Democratic South Africa talks, where the current president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, was chief negotiator for Mandela’s African National Congress party. Since then, South Africa has diversified its industry and now plays a role in the Southern African Development Community, is a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and is regarded as one of the “BRICS”—five major emerging economies, alongside Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Sports has played a role in South Africa’s appealing story. Shortly after its first free elections, South Africa won the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Bafana Bafana, the South African soccer team, was allowed to play international soccer again, after being banned due to nation’s apartheid policy, and went on to win the 1996 African Cup of Nations. These achievements through sports showed that diversity is far more powerful than segregation, and provided a stepping-stone for the country’s influence in Africa and around the globe. In 2010, South Africa was the first African country to host the FIFA World Cup. This year, South Africa assumed the presidency of the Confederation of African Football, the leading voice on sports on the continent and a hub for creative industries.

“Oho! Congo, couched in your forest bed, queen over subdued Africa,

Let the phalli of the mountains bear your pavilion high…”

Right in the middle of Africa’s heart lies the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), heralded above through the words of poet Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first president of Senegal. The DRC is not only a queen—it is mythical Wakanda. It has always been and was so much so that, in a crazy move, the bloodthirsty Belgian King Leopold II decreed Congo as his personal possession. The richness of the resources surfaced in US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield’s recent remarks at the Atlantic Council. Speaking about Congolese minerals including cobalt, copper, zinc, silver, gold, platinum, and other resources that contribute to the world electronics industry, she said: “Every time I see the movie Wakanda, I think this is DRC. And I know it was an imaginary story, but imagine a DRC where the resources that are available there are being used to build the country, are being used to educate the people, are being used to provide health care and services for the people of DRC, and we would have a Wakanda in the making.” 

Not only is this country rich in terms of its soil, but also in history and culture. With two hundred ethnic groups and two hundred different languages, the DRC is the largest French-speaking country in the world, with more students in school than residents of France. Kinshasa, with its seventeen million inhabitants, is the largest French-speaking city in the world, before Paris. At the UN Security Council, Congo would know how to speak to the three hundred million French-speaking people in the world and the thirty million Lingala-speakers of Africa.

But the most important reason why the DRC should be a permanent member of the Security Council lies less in its strengths than its weaknesses: thirty years of civil wars, political coups, the impotence of the six thousand UN peacekeepers in the eastern DRC (present for two decades), and the distress of 4.5 million displaced people. These are the reasons why the DRC is never quoted among the pretendants to a UN permanent seat. Its tragedy does not even seem to upset the international community, even though a collapse of the DRC, under the pressure of dark forces, would have a tragic, deep, large, and long-term effect on the African continent and beyond.

The reasons why the DRC should join the Security Council are to gain a powerful lever to stop myriad manipulations by its neighbors and the international community, and to help this country’s voice to be heard. The DRC would bring to the Security Council something referred to as “weakness politics”: the effects of fragility causing processes that lead to achievements and the shaping of events. Such a change would be the best and most innovative way to reform and democratize this body. Bring out the new wineskins!

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. 

Further reading

Fast Thinking Sep 21, 2021

FAST THINKING: Biden’s UN reality check

By Atlantic Council

President Biden spoke of “relentless diplomacy” at the UN on Tuesday. But can that relentlessness overcome transatlantic strains, not to mention a still-raging pandemic and climate crisis?

Africa Crisis Management

New Atlanticist Sep 10, 2021

Gregory Meeks: For counterterrorism and economic opportunity, turn toward Africa

By Katherine Walla

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it has become clear that “terrorism now is global, and we’ve got to work in a multilateral way to combat and fight that,” said US Representative Gregory Meeks.

Afghanistan Africa

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021

Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities

By Katherine Walla

Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.

Africa Crisis Management

The post Make way for Wakanda: The UN Security Council needs an African seat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Africa Center recently had the pleasure of hosting Mr. Admassu Tadesse, president and CEO of the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB), and Mr. Morten Elkjær, vice president for the financial sector and business development at the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), to discuss de-risking and transforming institutional capital into greater impact in Africa for attractive returns. Mr. Tadesse and Mr. Elkjær both spoke to how development finance institutions such as their own mobilize capital in African markets and what innovations are currently being made in this space.

Watch the full interview, moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, below.

Further reading:

AfricaSource Jul 9, 2021

Development policy needs to be DARPA-fied

By Aubrey Hruby

Just as tech innovation requires experimentation, US commercial policy in African markets needs to embrace and operationalize experimentation.

Africa Economy & Business

Event Recap Jun 14, 2021

No longer neglected: DAS Cook forecasts more robust engagement with Africa under the Biden administration

By Africa Center

Speaking at an Atlantic Council event as part of the Africa Center’s African Conversations Series hosted by Africa Center Director Amb. Rama Yade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Ms. Akunna Cook promised a turnaround in US-Africa relations under the Biden administration, avoiding the “neglect” shown in recent years and in contrast embracing African nations as partners across critical global challenges.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Report May 14, 2021

Growing green: Catalyzing climate finance in African markets

By Emilie Bel

While African countries are the most impacted by the effects of climate change, the continent is home to an abundance of natural resources and vibrant economic prospects. To face the climate emergency, overcome the economic shock of COVID-19, and ensure that African economic development is sustainable, growth can only be green. However, tapping into Africa’s vast potential will require mobilizing billions in investment for infrastructure.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post De-risking and transforming institutional capital for impact in Africa: A conversation with Admassu Tadesse and Morten Elkjær appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With African markets younger, more connected, and better integrated than ever before, the US commercial approach to the continent needs revamping. Currently half of Africa’s population is already connected to a smartphone, and in less than ten years, Africa will be home to seventeen cities with over five million inhabitants. Despite COVID-19, the International Monetary Fund estimates a return to 3.2 percent growth in African markets in 2021, matching 2019 levels, and rising to 3.9 percent in 2022. This economic resilience, coupled with positive demographic trends, positions African countries as ideal markets for US capital in search of diversification, yield, and higher returns. However, actively mobilizing investment, particularly from small to medium-sized businesses and less traditional asset classes like institutional investors and venture capital, has not been in the DNA of USAID or the newly operational DFC. Creative and collaborative thinking will be necessary to determine what policies will work in this new era that ultimately benefit the US and African economies. 

More commonly seen in technology and research and development (R&D) organizations, rapid, iterative experimentation with a willingness to fail often leads to better solutions. Yet this philosophy is not commonly implemented in the formation or execution of US commercial or development policy. To increase the effectiveness of large efforts aimed at mobilizing US investment in African markets, such as Prosper Africa and its forthcoming Proper Africa Trade and Investment (PATI) initiative, a team should be tasked with small-scale policy experimentation so as to determine the most effective ways to stimulate investment. This new team could either be housed in the Department of Commerce or an expanded Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of International Trade, given their domestic reach and respective mandates to enhance the competitiveness of US businesses globally. 

Albeit sizably different in scope and resources, the organizational model of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), responsible for the development of emerging technologies for the US military, could be an innovative model for the team as the undergirding principles are not defense-specific. According to a former director, DARPA has three mutually reinforcing elements: ambitious goals, temporary project teams, and independence. Substantially increasing two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa is an ambitious goal, and much like problems DARPA tackles, likely is not going to happen without a catalyst. Temporary project teams are a critical aspect of a successful DARPA project. The limited time frame attracts high-caliber talent that may be willing to leave the private sector for two years but not decades. Taking one small aspect of US-Africa commercial policy, say how to expand partnerships between Hollywood and Nigeria’s Nollywood, could benefit from a small team dedicated to the challenge for two years. Lastly, the effort should have independence. The team needs to be empowered to not only pick the projects it works on, avoiding political and agency priorities, but also have the financial freedom to fail. 

A recent project between Prosper Africa and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) looked to uncover the barriers US companies face in African markets by hosting virtual roundtables in three US cities. Companies shared a myriad of reasons they are hesitant to invest—from the lack of consistent US government support to the issues around data policy in some African countries. This project served as a one-off experiment in matching sector interests to US cities. But it should not be a one-off. What is needed now is a systematic learning process and an ability to test potential solutions, working directly with experts in the private sector. And most importantly an acknowledgement up front that US policy makers and their traditional partners do not have all the answers, but rather a willingness to experiment and to let some endeavors fail. 

Given the size and breadth of the American economy, mobilizing US investment into African markets will require experimentation. As a starting point, this new team could focus on experiments in three main areas: messaging, education, and structure. First up, policy makers need a better understanding of how to effectively present African investment opportunities to US investors. Despite years of economic and governance progress in African nations, old stereotypes remain, and US investment is stagnant. By holding focus groups and leveraging innovative public relations and marketing firms, this team could experiment with new messaging tactics to learn what works and what doesn’t. Beyond messaging, effectively educating different types of investors from venture capitalists to pension fund trustees requires some experimentation. This includes everything from determining who in these organizations are the correct targets for education to understanding which up-to-date, actionable data is needed. And finally, experimenting with structure. While the DFC already has experience when it comes to structuring deals to entice private sector players and USAID has been building blended finance expertise, further experimentation with deal structure could focus on how to incentivize US corporate investors or others that traditionally have not engaged with US government agencies.

Ultimately, as US-Africa policy evolves so too must the approaches taken, including those around generating and crafting policy and future programs. Tried and true models like DARPA can serve as inspiration for a new way of thinking about development policy—one that is experimental, agile, and ultimately takes investors’ needs into greater account. With the opportunities in African markets growing and evolving year-over-year, now is the time to experiment with how to better mobilize US investors to ensure American companies remain active and competitive in the decades to come.

Aubrey Hruby is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She is also co-founder of Insider and the Africa Expert Network. Follow her on Twitter @AubreyHruby.

Further reading

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post Development policy needs to be DARPA-fied appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While the African Union hosts summits annually and France and the United Kingdom have long histories of convening their former colonies, Japan kicked off the international trend of regularly scheduled pan-African head of state level summits hosting the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 1993 and continues to host TICAD every five years with the next scheduled for 2022. France expanded the annual Africa-France summit continent-wide in 1996. In 2006, China launched the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has since alternated between being held in China or in Africa every three years. Senegal will host this year. India followed in 2008 with the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), and Russia joined in the pageantry in 2019 holding the first Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi with the second to follow in 2022. While the style of each country’s approach to their regular head of state Africa summits is different, they share a commitment to pomp and circumstance with China’s red carpet treatment attracting more African leaders than the United Nations General Assembly and Russia’s military weapon-filled exhibition hall featuring a virtual reality shooting range.

While the United States’ competitors show off their strengths, the United States has largely sat on the sidelines, with the Obama administration hosting the first and only U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit in 2014 followed by a second U.S.-Africa Business Forum in 2016 (the first was included in the Leaders Summit). The United States does hold the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Forum annually, however at the ministerial level it lacks the prestige and press attention of a head of state summit and over the last decade has seen few important outputs. While the Obama administration events provided good photo ops and intended to attract investment commitments from US business leaders, their ad hoc and quickly planned nature did little to develop any long-term momentum in high-impact, high-level US-Africa relations, and their dollar impact is difficult to track. The Biden administration, with an expressed interest in bringing back a US-Africa Summit, now has the opportunity to learn from past failures and do it right. In shaping the future of the US-Africa Summit, the administration should take cues from the Summit of the Americas (a summit among the leaders of Western Hemisphere nations every three years) and adopt three key elements: a long-term commitment, involving African nations and the diaspora in planning, and continued connectivity and engagement.

Unlike China’s FOCAC and Japan’s TICAD, the United States has lacked any sustained commitment to African partners in the model of a summit or forum, leaving African nations with a mixed view on US high-level commitment to the region. With an expected combined consumer and business base of $6.7 trillion by 2030 and a population with a median age of eighteen, African markets are increasingly courted by American allies, as they are keenly aware of the increasing role the continent will play in global political and economic realms. Acknowledging this reality, the United States should commit to a summit model that meets regularly, ideally every three years, and continues this momentum for decades. This would cement a US-Africa summit as a pillar of US-Africa policy rather than something that comes and goes and is continuously redefined by each administration. As a result, African politicians and businessmen, along with US business leaders would feel more certainty in the commercial aspect of US-Africa policy and ultimately may feel more comfortable working together.

The Summit of the Americas brings together a diverse group of Western Hemisphere nations but also a diverse set of individuals, including those from civil society and businesses. Following this model, a US-Africa summit should look outside the US government and involve African leaders, the diaspora, entrepreneurs, and youth in its agenda setting and planning, ensuring the next Africa is represented. In doing so, the summit is more likely to address not only the issues and challenges most important to furthering collaboration between US and African leaders, but also engage individuals and organizations that may have less familiarity working with the government. For example, the Global Entrepreneurship Summit attracts both the public and private sectors and effectively emphasizes the role each plays for the other.

A new US-Africa Summit should also copy the backend structure from the Summit of the Americas to ensure continuity to support the implementation of promises made and goals set during summit meetings. A dedicated small staff for a US-Africa summit (that works out of the State Department between summits) would result in more than just one-off, disconnected events and instead ensure summit meetings fit into the larger narrative of US-Africa policy and are goal-oriented. During President Obama’s 2014 speech at the 2014 U.S.-Africa Business Forum he spoke about over $33 billion in US commitments between the government and private sector to Africa, yet there is little ability to follow up on stated commitments. Staff could work to track follow-on investment and ultimately use this data to better understand the US commercial footprint in African markets to inform future policy decisions.

Taking a cue from the Chinese and Russians, the United States should focus on its competitive advantages and highlight all that the country does well, from the entertainment business to ag-tech. The summit meeting structure should consist of more than just speeches and PowerPoint presentations, instead looking at models like South by Southwest (SXSW) that provide more variety to participant interactions. Bringing in US commercial leaders and allowing attendees to participate in demos and at times get their own hands on the latest products will bring to life potential partnerships between US and African companies.

The United States is a unique partner for African nations and a US-Africa summit needs to capture the potential of a deeper partnership. The two sides share strong people-to-people relations, with 20 percent of current African leaders having studied in the United States. A growing African diaspora population that is not only financially linked to their home nations through remittances, but is also raising the prominence of African products in the United States, whether it be music, fashion, or food. The enduring twenty-first century strengths of the US economy in technology and entertainment speak to the ambitions of Africa’s youth who are developing start-up ecosystems and attracting double-digit fundraising growth year-over-year. With the Biden administration’s commitment to multilateralism, reviving a US-Africa summit is a no-brainer and it can be done in a meaningful, sustainable way that captures the potential of US-Africa relations. 

Aubrey Hruby is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She is also co-founder of Insider and the Africa Expert Network. Follow her on Twitter @AubreyHruby.

Further reading

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post A US-Africa summit done right appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“May this convention of union last 1,000 years,” the Ethiopian leader said, while Angola and Mozambique (still Portuguese colonies) along with South Africa and South Rhodesia (under apartheid rule) were fighting for their freedom.

Since then, that union has been succeeded by the 55-member African Union, “inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States,” according to its Constitutive Act.

If Africa seems geographically distant to Americans, it shouldn’t; the United States wouldn’t be what it is today without the labor force of Africans brought to the country as part of a bloody multi-century transatlantic trade. As the US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently pointed out, that experience is “just three generations back from me.”

Rather than being defeated by this mass depopulation—which cost it one-hundred million of its own, directly or indirectly, according to the macabre accounting of W.E.B Du Bois—Africa survived. Now it is the new frontier, full of all the promise presented by its youth, its dynamism, and its universalism despite the persistent presence of poverty on the continent.

As it re-engages with the world, Joe Biden’s United States will find a vigorous and uninhibited Africa, at least in the civil-society sector and among young generations, that does not expect leadership from the United States but rather a win-win partnership. With each passing day, Africa grows more critical for the United States in national-security and especially economic terms.

US policy in Africa has been thrown off course by China, which is methodically implementing a grand, 21st-century Marshall Plan for the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative. And Beijing is hardly to blame. As home to a large share of the world’s water resources, untapped arable land, and by 2050 nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, Africa has emerged as the most important piece on the geopolitical chessboard. Without a drastic shift in strategy, the United States is on the verge of being on the outside looking in for decades to come.

China is playing the long game in Africa and has strategically invested in infrastructure projects including railroads, ports, dams, and hydropower-generation sources. But these investments could be the warm-up act for China’s entry into fields traditionally dominated by the United States—namely technology and banking—where it aspires to compete with American heavyweights like Microsoft, Boeing, Google, and General Electric. Such game-changing moves would play into China’s larger ambition of unseating the US dollar.

All of these measures reflect the coming surge in economic demand from Africa. As the population grows, so too does its pool of potential consumers and clients. The African middle class, which stood at 355 million people in 2010, will reach 1.1 billion by 2060.

From Morocco to Ethiopia, Africa has become the workshop of the world. It was home to six of the world’s ten most dynamic economies in 2018. The world’s largest free-trade zone—the African Continental Free Trade Area—was launched in 2019 to put an end to the dramatic effects of the old colonial policy that prevented Africans from trading with each other. A cosmopolitan billionaire class has sprouted, largely from the tech sector, as Africa has experienced the largest telecommunications revolution in the world. Kenya is a global leader in developing mobile-payment systems. Smart cities are cropping up in Ghana and Angola. And companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon invested two billion dollars in African tech ventures in 2019.

Encouragingly, the new generation of Africans driving this change do not want to live in a Leninist system. They want democracy, an open market, and free trade. This gives the United States an opening—if it is willing to act on it.

The Biden administration has sent strong signals that it is eager to engage. Biden earned positive reviews following his appearance at the 34th African Union Summit—his first international forum in office—during which he committed to stand as Africa’s partner and support African nations’ entrepreneurship and innovation.

A new policy toward Africa needs to chiefly reflect the realities that competition among global powers (Russia, Turkey, and others are vying with China for influence on the continent) and the major changes underway in African societies have a significant impact on the strategic long-term interests of the United States. The continent should be viewed through the lens of opportunity rather than risk. The Chinese have maximized the opportunity by being explicit with their investments, which prioritize long-term projects that minimize risk. As Senegalese President Macky Sall puts it, “What handicaps the continent is prejudice and the stigmatizing gaze on it. When it comes to investing in Africa, the perception of risk is always exaggerated, which further increases the cost of investment and debt. In fact, the risk in Africa is no higher than in many other parts of the world.”

China’s rapid advance in infrastructure investments will be difficult for Americans and Europeans to match. But Americans should invest in an area where they don’t yet have a competitor: cultural soft power. Fashion, entertainment, and even sports convey values of fair play, freedom, and success. During the Cold War, they enabled the American way of life to spread everywhere. Culture proved stronger than nuclear weapons. And that’s a good thing: Africa’s cultural industries are in dire need of investment. From the African Development Bank to the African Export-Import Bank, pan-African investors are working to address this. To launch this cultural and geopolitical revolution, the United States has a tremendous asset: its African American community, whose interest in the African continent is growing. Cooperation is beckoning from both sides of the Atlantic—from one new world to another.

Biden can further build ties with Africa by working to give its nations more influence on the global stage. He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations—including the UN Security Council—but also because they offer innovative yet often unnoticed solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19. African marginalization is no longer an option, and its nations will not soon forget who gave them a long-overdue seat at the table.

A new start with Africa is possible for the United States. It turns out that the world’s oldest continent is also the youngest. In this dual capacity, Africa has much to say. It’s time to listen to it.

Ambassador Rama Yade is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @ramayade.

Further reading

AfricaSource Apr 23, 2021

Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Apr 6, 2021

Keys to African recovery: Vaccines, debt, and commodities

By Rabah Arezki

In the wake of COVID-19, African markets are consumed by uncertainty about the economic recovery. Because of its large population—1.2 billion people—developments in Africa will weigh heavily on the world. The recovery from COVID-19 in Africa will depend on three factors—vaccines, debt, and commodities.

Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 22, 2020

African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead

By Africa Center

African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s […]

Africa Coronavirus

The post Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the teams in their Kigali bubble and final preparations underway for the launch, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center reached out to sports stakeholders across the BAL’s inaugural countries to hear their perspective on why the BAL represents a historic moment. Their feedback provides a compelling case for the developmental, diplomatic, and economic potential of African basketball.

An unparalleled opportunity

Dr. Houda Jorio, spokesperson for Moroccan BAL team AS Salé, describes the BAL as “the greatest opportunity a Moroccan team has ever seen.” Reflecting on the team’s rise to prominence, she attributes the turning point to the team’s first taste of international competition in Dubai over a decade ago. Despite only getting into that tournament after another team passed on the invitation, the international exposure turned out to be the spark the team needed to invest in its future. The result has been over a decade of continental success, and analogously, the BAL looks to be that same spark for clubs all across Africa’s fifty-four countries.

This opportunity is not lost on the hosts. To Landry Jabo, executive director of the Rwanda Basketball Federation, the moment is historic and a recognition of Rwanda’s capacity. For him, the tournament shows the country’s determination to “change livelihoods and encourage partnerships that will grow Rwanda’s economy sustainably over the foreseeable future.” For teams in other markets, the BAL is a point of national pride and a unique opportunity for international visibility. Nantenaina Ranaivosoa, head of communications for Madagascar’s team, GNBC, notes that, “The BAL will bring a lot of experience to GNBC,” and “we are also very proud to represent our country Madagascar and GNBC will try to do its best to be at the height of the big clubs during the competition.”

Elsewhere, too, the local buy-in is apparent. For example, the Mozambican team, Clube Ferroviário de Maputo, was seen off at the airport by the country’s secretary of state for sport and the head of the Mozambican Basketball Federation Roque Sebastião, with the secretary voicing that “thirty million Mozambicans are rooting for you.” Commenting on the significance of the moment, Sebastião relayed that, “I hope that the BAL can help us as basketball players, or should I say basketball community as a whole, to acquire recognition outside Africa, as well as within Africa. In terms of benefit, the BAL can help our country to be known, so our players will be appreciated.”

Developmental impact

The passion and buzz surrounding the league extends well beyond the confines of basketball. Pabi Gueye, coach of Senegal’s BAL team AS Douanes, describes the BAL as “an important vector of development,” and in a powerful acknowledgement of the league’s potential for impact, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) has been announced as an official partner of the league, pledging to advance education and inclusion through sports.

Education was a common theme in discussions with stakeholders. For Dr. Jorio, who has a background in the education sector, the two are inextricably tied. Investments by the teams and leagues in basketball camps and youth training facilities support education and citizenship skills just as much as basketball acumen. And the game’s international bent also contributes to added linkages and incentives to support language learning.

Mamadou Boubel Konaté, deputy national technical director of the Malian Basketball Federation, adds that while basketball is the second sport to soccer in most African markets, basketball, in Mali at least, is the sport in which the participation of women and girls is closer to parity. Like the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) in the United States, many African countries have developed women’s leagues as well, such as the Zenith Bank Women Basketball League in Nigeria.

As Africa has the youngest population in the world, with 70 percent of Africans under the age of thirty and the population expected to double by 2050, the continent’s future will depend on the ability to guarantee jobs for its youth and integrate them economically and socially. The role of sports in this vision cannot be discounted and is supported by the fact that many African ministries combine the portfolios of sports and youth, clearly recognizing their complementarities and shared potential.

A sector ripe for investment

Discussion of the African sports sector’s developmental impact must also take into account the economic growth and employment potential, which make the sector ripe for investment. The global sports industry has surpassed $500 billion annually, according to a report by Research and Markets, and emerging markets lead the sector’s robust growth. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion with 690 million smartphone users by 2060, the increasingly urbanized and connected continent is a premier market for expansion.

Put simply by Oni Afolabi, board member and media representative for the Nigeria Basketball Federation, for some “sport is a means to wealth” and there is no reason that sport should not be a focus of non-governmental organizations to fight poverty and unemployment, as is done with other sectors.

Building local sports ecosystems in African markets can also contribute to positive spillovers in related sectors. Companies, like Wilson, sponsor of the Official Game Ball of the BAL, are conscious of these opportunities, as Kevin Murphy, general manager of Wilson Team Sports, reflects that, “The sports industry can fuel immense growth for an economy – from investment in job creation to ticket sales, and licensed merchandise to strategic sponsorship opportunities.” The teams and leagues directly employ hundreds of staff per country, and tournaments fill up hotels, bring business to vendors, and drum up business in tourism and services.

Other blue chip US, European, and African corporates are already involved as well. Nike is the official outfitter of the BAL and sees quarterly sales in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa market above $3 billion. New York-headquartered New Fortress Energy, a global energy infrastructure company founded by Milwaukee Bucks owner Wes Edens, is also a founding partner of the BAL, and other US companies to include GE, Ford, and Marriott have sponsored past NBA Africa Games. European giants Total and Orange sponsor Nigerian and Malian leagues, respectively, and the domestic sponsors are largely drawn from the African banking and telecom space, with players such as Zenith Bank, the Bank of Kigali, and Unitel involved as sponsors. It will take corporate champions like these to continue to move the needle.

People-to-people ties

The developmental and economic draws of the BAL are also complemented by an opportunity to build people-to-people ties through sport, both between African countries and between Africa and the United States. The BAL itself is effectively a product of US-Africa basketball linkages and the culmination of growing engagement, including the NBA Academy Africa and NBA Africa Games, played on the continent since 2015. Fourteen Africans currently play in the NBA, and many more have ties to the continent. For instance, nineteen players have Nigerian origins, alone, among them the two-time reigning MVP and arguable face of the league Giannis Antetokounmpo. Legendary hall of famer Hakeem Olajuwon helped put basketball on the map in Nigeria and Nigeria on the map for many Americans, and in his wake, current players the likes of Joel Embiid (Cameroon), Serge Ibaka (Congo-Brazzaville), and Pascal Siakam (Cameroon) have found success at the highest levels. And while many Americans might know next to nothing about Cameroon or Congo-Brazzaville, they may know these players, making them a window to Africa for many average Americans.

Notably, the crossover extends in both directions. Americans are represented on several BAL teams (four foreign players are allowed per team, of which two must be African) and their coaching staffs, including the apparent signing of rapper J. Cole by Rwanda’s Patriots Basketball Club. Golden State Warriors Associate Head Coach Mike Brown was also selected to coach Nigeria’s Olympic team. Such linkages show the opportunities and potential to engage the US and African diasporas through sport, and US embassies are taking note. The US Embassy in Kigali is heavily promoting the BAL on its Facebook page; the US Chargé d’Affaires to Morocco hosted a ceremony in April presenting AS Salé’s participation in the league; and other embassies regularly engage with NBA players like Ibaka for public affairs events or with the NBA Academy in Dakar, for instance.

The BAL’s NBA connection makes it well-suited for heightened engagement. Sports, along with the associated creative industries, remain a tool of US soft power, and the BAL provides a positive story that can cut through the political or security concerns the US faces in certain bilateral relations, such as the security situation in Mozambique. In this way, sport can help keep the door open to US engagement, while building positive people-to-people relations and strengthening civil society directly.

According to a US State Department Spokesperson, its “Sports Diplomacy Division has a long-standing history with the African continent, using our shared love of basketball, to promote solidarity and friendship between our people. The expansion of the NBA into Africa only further serves to connect us socially and economically through the game of basketball. We look forward to supporting increased access, inclusion, capacity, and opportunity for African sports leaders and youth as we continue building bridges through sport.”

Room for growth

While the league’s potential and merits are clear, it is worth stressing that the ecosystem will not change overnight. Progress will be step by step, according to stakeholders, and key areas for growth remain. A recent survey by the African Sports & Creative Institute found that a vast majority of industry stakeholders noted the sector as “underdeveloped,” and interviewees for this article described deficits in infrastructure, attracting sponsorship, and the amateur designation of many leagues.

Even for the hosts, the domestic league is currently amateur. And while the Kigali Arena seats ten thousand, with similar capacities in Dakar and Luanda among others, the average capacity of BAL teams’ local arenas is just 4,600. For reference, this figure is closer to par with a small US college basketball arena. To finance facility expansion and other growth, sponsorship will need to expand well beyond existing levels. In places like Rwanda, the government is the biggest sponsor. But private sector interest must grow to be sustainable. For small markets, the available domestic takers are limited, and while Jabo is ready to see how the BAL’s visibility can impact sponsorships, Konaté cautions that it may take time. For him, in Mali, pitching sponsors will still require explaining the linkages of the BAL, which he contends will need to be met by a continued communications campaign.

Hopes for the league

So while the BAL cannot be expected to revolutionize Africa’s sports ecosystem all at once, it can be a jolt that elevates African basketball, offers a developmental success story, and convinces investors of the vibrancy of African sports and creative industries. But a jolt is good for nothing if momentum is not maintained. Thus, it is telling that when asked for her hopes for the league, Dr. Jorio responded, “one word: sustainability.”

For Afolabi, there is optimism that seeing what the NBA and FIBA bring to the table, by bringing together the best of the best, will be a model for success. But in the longer term, the growth of the league and the expansion of the African sports sector will rely on expanding the pool of interested stakeholders. Active corporate and government champions can play a critical role, but with audience metrics sure to matter, we can all play our part. And there’s an incentive to do so, for as Wilson’s Kevin Murphy puts it, “We want to contribute to the growth of sports globally, because it benefits everyone.”

Luke Tyburski is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter @TyburskiLuke.

Note: This piece was updated from its original form to add a comment from a US State Department Spokesperson.

Further reading

AfricaSource Aug 23, 2019

Oui, le sport peut être un puissant levier de développement en Afrique

By Rama Yade

English Synopsis: Last month’s African Cup of Nations has generated global enthusiasm and an outpouring of African patriotism, and other important sporting events are taking place on the continent, from South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup to Senegal’s hosting of the 2022 Summer Youth Olympics. Next year, the prestigious American National Basketball […]

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Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

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The post The Basketball Africa League has arrived: Here’s why it matters appeared first on Atlantic Council.

While perhaps of little thought to most Americans, Chad, three times the size of the state of California, sits at the crossroads of most major conflicts in Africa where the United States currently has a security interest, if not an actual operational presence.

To Chad’s east, the United States has invested heavily over the last decade in the political and humanitarian response in Darfur and more recently as part of the national transition effort in Sudan; to the north, the United States has played a leading role in ending the Libyan civil war and attempting to return a measure of stability a decade after Gaddafi’s death plunged the region into conflict; to the south, the fight against Boko Haram is the central preoccupation; while the United States has been perhaps most involved in responding to manifold threats from jihadist groups in the Sahel region to Chad‘s west, including through the establishment of a drone base, support to United Nations peacekeeping, and the deployment of special forces combat troops. 

From the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea and from the Red Sea to the Atlantic, all roads on these security axes run through Chad and for the past decade or more depended in no small part on the military prowess of its fallen leader, Idriss Déby.

Déby’s unique ability to respond to, manage, and in many ways shape these conflicts was a testament to both his strategic vision and his battlefield acumen. In life, and now in death, it earned him the admiration and respect of his neighbors and global powers, as reflected in the outpouring of genuine praise and mourning at his passing.

Mali, perhaps most rife with instability and dependent upon Chad’s security involvement, declared three days of national mourning for Déby, while Nigeria’s Foreign Minister cautioned that, “His demise could lead to vacuums that could implode in these subregions.” But no expression of grief was as personal and as heartfelt as from France’s President Emmanuel Macron, who said, “Chad is losing a great soldier and a President who has worked tirelessly for the security of the country and the stability of the region for three decades. France loses a courageous friend.”

Less fondly remembered is the way he managed his own country: brutally, corruptly, and vengefully; an old school African strongman who as recently as the campaign last month for his sixth term as president harassed, intimidated, jailed, and even killed his opposition opponents and their family members. He was a killer who brought order and discipline to an unstable region, but imposed fear, poverty, and misery on his own people. In his wake, he leaves a legacy of ashes, at home and across the region; and among his opponents, both real and imagined.

But his greatest personal achievement—glossed over in all the homilies and testimonials—his ability to cling to power for thirty years, was in retrospect pyrrhic for the nation he leaves behind. Chad today is little more than a collection of fractious tribal fiefdoms and hollowed out institutions, underpinned by abject poverty and a corrupt patronage system of tribal elites, all of which are exacerbated by a diffuse network of simmering rebellions that could well tear apart the meager remnants of what he left behind.

These painful facts have been known to all of Déby’s security partners across the region and beyond for years. But for so long it was easier to turn a blind eye to his domestic autocratic realities which were accepted as being in service to his significant regional security contributions. But in his death that strategy is no longer tenable, as much as some may still like it to be. And the international community’s forbearance and ignorance of the country’s unravelling is now its own to manage if it hopes to maintain any semblance of the regional order that Déby helped to impose.

France, the former colonial power, and the country whose security relations and bonhomie with Déby are in fact the most externally responsible for the country’s deleterious state, has not missed the opportunity to once again intervene, if not militarily, then behind the scenes to ensure a soft-landing for its interests. In his eulogy, speaking as Deby’s “loyal friend and ally,” President Macron warned the FACT rebels and other armed opponents that, “France will not let anybody put into question or threaten today or tomorrow Chad’s stability and integrity.”

But unlike in decades past, where Washington was content to view Chad as ‘a French problem,’ Washington’s regional security interests are today equally as bound to what unfolds in Chad. The massive US political and financial support to neighboring Sudan’s transition could easily be upended from an implosion in Chad. So too could all US efforts in rolling back the spread of jihadism from the Sahel to the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Washington’s blood and treasure extend across the region and it can neither afford to sit out the conversation on what comes next in Chad nor subcontract its involvement to other powers with presumably more at stake. France’s parachuting in to N’Djamena last week and its early endorsement of the military transition should not constrain Washington from finding its own voice and using what influence it has to help lay the foundations for more than just a soft landing.

Indeed, in the midst of the fast-moving changes there is an opportunity to not only ensure that long-term security interests in the region are met, but to also take immediate steps to begin to address the kinds of massive democracy and development deficits that have left Chad so enervated today. It is a view that has already been espoused by the incoming Biden administration.

As Washington contemplates its next steps, there are a few actions it should prioritize:

Listen to Chadians. Under Déby, Chadian civil society was kept intentionally weak, divided, and fearful, and so observers should not expect to see the kind of organized, popular uprising that swept neighboring despot Omar al-Bashir from power in Sudan two years ago to emerge in Chad. But that does not mean Chadians lack a vision of their own future and a voice to express it. 

Indeed, late last week a collection of more than five dozen Chadian political and civil society organizations released a joint statement calling for, “Respect for the constitution and the immediate establishment of a civilian transition; demand from the military a return to the constitutional order; the suspension of hostilities between the Chadian armed forces and armed groups; and the immediate opening of a national consultation with all political forces, civil society, armed groups and institutions of the Republic to initiate inclusive institutional and political reforms with a view to ensuring the stability, peace and development of Chad.”

These legitimate demands should serve as the guiding political framework for moving forward. The fact that Chad’s new military government has already rejected talk of a ceasefire and political dialogue, and is maintaining and extending Idriss Déby’s public ban on public protests, suggests that the marginal political space is about to close even further. As such, Washington’s explicit endorsement of civilian demands would not only lend legitimacy to this nascent collection of civil society actors seeking to gain their footing, but would begin to reorient years of US engagement away from Chad’s security apparatus towards an emerging civilian dispensation.  

Engage the African Union. It should go without saying that in the year 2021, the former colonial power should not be picking winners and losers nor deciding the fate of the population for another generation of Chadians. There is no greater or more substantial voice that should be leading the international response to the now-coup and crisis in Chad than the principal regional organization. But while the international response should have an African face, it has been complicated in Chad by the African Union (AU) Commission’s own Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat. 

A Chadian and former prime minister and foreign minister under the late Chadian leader, Faki made a “private visit” to his home capital, N’Djamena, the day after Déby’s death and the installation of Déby’s son as commander of the extra-constitutional Transitional Military Council. Even in his private capacity, Faki’s presence signaled to Chadians an acknowledgment and tacit support for the illegal transfer of power in his country. For this reason, Washington ought to push privately to see him recuse himself from further direct involvement in the crisis.

Fortunately, soon after Faki’s visit, the AU’s Peace and Security Commission stepped in with a roadmap of its own, calling for Chad, “to respect the constitutional order. . . quickly engage in a process of restoration of the constitutional order and the transfer of political power to civil authorities.” The statement also alluded to the potential coercive power of AU membership suspension and economic sanctions if the constitutional order is not promptly restored. Adding to the African-led effort, the presidents of Niger and Mauritania, coalition members of the G5 Sahel Initiative, have also seemed to step into a mediating role when late last week in consultations with Chad’s political opposition they cited, “the need for a dialogue to set up transitional institutions that will be responsible for drafting a new constitution and organizing elections.” At the same time, Niger has also been asked, and agreed, to work with Chad’s new junta to hunt down and arrest fleeing FACT fighters who may be seeking refuge in Niger, further complicating the regional role to ultimately support a transition to civilian rule.

African mediators have now floated the model of the kind of civil-military power-sharing arrangement seen most recently in Mali after its latest coup and in Sudan after the popular uprising there, both of which Washington endorsed previously and worked to ensure were implemented. Endorsing this approach and committing to its success would give Washington a seat at the table and help position it on the right side of the history being written in Chad.

Put “loafers on the ground.”  While statements from Washington have their place, there is no alternative to on-the-ground diplomatic engagement. Here, Washington is at a severe disadvantage compared to virtually everyone else with a stake in the outcome in Chad. One of the Trump administration’s most neglectful legacies was keeping US embassies understaffed and nowhere is this omission felt today more than in N’Djamena where the United States has been without an ambassador for nearly three years, resulting in a disadvantaged position in its use of influence to engage civilians, politicians, rebels, and military leaders alike. Even prior to this moment, so absent was US diplomacy that in the past three months of the country’s flawed presidential campaign, the US embassy did not issue a single statement of concern over its conduct or in solidarity with the beleaguered opposition as they were harassed and intimidated into submission. US credibility with and access to those negotiating for power is now no doubt severely constrained as a result of overall diplomatic absence. 

But Washington can begin to make up for this neglect through the immediate reappointment of a US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region of Africa. This position, created under Trump and ably filled by my colleague Ambassador J. Peter Pham, should not only serve as a point person in ensuring that US security partners across the region are consulted and coordinated, but the envoy must now also serve as the country’s diplomatic point person inside of Chad, representing a broader set of US objectives in support of a peaceful, democratic transition. Reappointing a special envoy would reinvigorate a sclerotic diplomatic approach at the very moment it is needed most.

Act immediately; think strategically. Lastly, while the United States must move quickly to help define a framework that will avoid new violence and create the conditions for a stable transition, it would be a mistake and a missed opportunity to view developments in Chad in a vacuum. Washington should instead recognize the voluminous criticism being leveled at its ‘whack-a-mole’ securitized approach to engagement across the Sahel region to rethink and reset its agenda across the wider region. The recent successful democratic transition in neighboring Niger is a starting point. So too is recent helpful research from the likes of colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Chatham House, among many others, all of whom argue for, inter alia, investments in human security, improved governance, a focus on state-building and service delivery, and more intentional engagement with local actors versus political and military elites. All of these are in desperate need in Chad today.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

Fast Thinking Apr 20, 2021

FAST THINKING: After the death of its president, Chad is on the brink

By Atlantic Council

After three decades in power, Chadian President Idriss Déby was killed following clashes with insurgents, state media announced Tuesday. What’s next for the country after the fall of its long-ruling autocrat?

Africa Crisis Management

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Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

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The post Washington’s role and responsibility in Chad appeared first on Atlantic Council.

By pointing to rich countries’ unfulfilled pledges, Tshisekedi focused on the challenge at the heart of a summit where US President Joe Biden pledged a comparatively meager $5.7 billion per year for poor countries by 2024: A continent that contributes so little to global warming stands to be hurt the most by it. And yet, the world has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

While home to 15 percent of the world’s population, Africa is responsible for only 4 percent of global carbon emissions. Of the seven countries in the world that emit two-thirds of total greenhouse gas emissions, none are African, according to the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Meanwhile, Africa faces droughts, floods, declining agricultural productivity, deforestation, difficult access to water, rising seas, advancing deserts, and a rural exodus.

According to the UN Environmental Program, a warming of 2 degrees Celsius would reduce agricultural yields in sub-Saharan Africa by 10 percent. If warming goes above 3 degrees, the climate would be unsuitable to grow maize, millet, and sorghum across the continent.

While Western countries seek to reduce their carbon footprint, African people are already on the front lines of the climate fight. Around Lake Chad, which lost 90 percent of its surface area in the 1970s and 1980s, nearly 5 million climate refugees are moving from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, while they’re also under the pressure of another threat: Boko Haram.

From the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the 2016 Paris Agreement (COP21), most African states have ratified environmental treaties. Awareness campaigns are multiplying, including the African Union’s Agenda 2063, preservation funds such as the Blue Fund, the African Development Bank’s Desert to Power project, or the Great Green Wall initiative to grow trees and plants across the Sahel. From Burkina Faso, home to West Africa’s largest solar power plant, to President Macky Sall’s Green Emerging Senegal Plan, to Ethiopia, which draws 93 percent of its electricity from renewable sources, governments are taking action. Nigeria, for its part, aims to achieve 30 percent clean energy within ten years.

Because Africa’s renewable energy potential remains unmatched, it is the continent most likely to combine industrialization and decarbonized growth. Seven of the ten sunniest countries in the world are in Africa, a tremendous asset for solar energy. Africa has 10 percent of the global potential of hydropower. Even its weaknesses can become assets: 600 million Africans lack electricity, so the continent can rely on abundant renewable energy resources. Led by the African Union, the African Renewable Energy Initiative aims to produce 300 gigawatts by 2030 thanks to Africa’s large renewable energy capacity.

Development that takes advantage of Africa’s climate requires massive investments—fifty billion dollars per year by 2050, according to the United Nations—as well as transfers of technology and expertise. However, as Tshisekedi pointed out, rich countries have not kept their funding promises, a situation made all the more serious by the pandemic draining African countries’ budgets. This issue will need to be given more attention at the next Group of Seven (G7) or Group of Twenty (G20) meetings and at the UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) this fall in Scotland.

The key to change could be to give more consideration to African solutions. For Africans, climate change is not a threat, but a reality, and they can provide solutions—both ancestral and innovative—to inspire the rest of the world. 

Ancestral solutions come from centuries of agroecology based on traditional know-how. Philosopher Mohammed Taleb has clearly demonstrated that the fight for the environment is first and foremost a social and cultural struggle to defend the lands inherited from ancestors, rather than simply an effort to preserve a stock of resources. It is also a struggle rooted in the working classes.

In the 1980s, President Thomas Sankara’s Burkina Faso was a symbol of African ecology, including a real reforestation policy that was based in part on popular and spiritual culture. The waste sector, a new lever for economic and social development and the pillar of the new circular economy, has existed in Africa since before the colonial period. This African cosmology has been broken by colonization whose goal was to “develop” lands insufficiently exploited by African populations.

Innovative solutions come from Africans’ ecological know-how developed in the era of the digital economy. A Nigerian university trains 300 women to recycle plastic bags into bags, baskets, or other accessories, which are then sold. In Cameroon, an engineer installs solar panels in villages where electricity is too expensive or out of reach. In Kenya, to clean up pollution from Lake Nakuru, a company collects wastewater from sewers and turns waste into fuel briquettes.

At the community level, smart cities are more advanced in Africa than in much of the world. New eco-cities like Kilamba near Luanda, Angola; the green Centenary City near Abuja, Nigeria; the Kenyan technological city of Konza; and Appolonia in Ghana display this promise. The urban emergency justifies this inventiveness, since in 2050, Africa will be the home of one in four of the world’s human beings, including 1.5 billion urban dwellers with exponential energy needs.

Finally, global warming will not be solved without Africa because the world will need its soil.

The Congo Basin, the world’s second largest lung (behind the Amazon), has forests that act as an essential carbon sink for climate regulation. As the UN Environmental Program points out, Africa is home to 30 percent of the world’s mineral reserves, 40 percent of the world’s gold, and up to 90 percent of its chromium and platinum, making it an ideal hub for manufacturing green technologies such as batteries, wind turbines, and hydrogen fuel cells.

The challenge here is not only African. But just as Africa faces the most urgency to tackle the problem, it must be at the heart of the solutions in the universal fight against global warming.

Ambassador Rama Yade is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @ramayade.

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What is Chad’s strategic significance?

Chad sits strategically astride the Sahel and the Horn of Africa and has largely been viewed by Western powers as a critical state in staunching the spread of radical Islam and terrorism from the western Sahel region and as a buffer to the long-term instability coming from Sudan’s Darfur region on Chad’s eastern border. Chad shares its northern border with Libya and has been seen as an important part of regional strategies to stem the tide of instability emanating from its collapse since the overthrow of long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi. 

Who is Chad’s current leader?

Chad’s leader, Marshal Idriss Déby Itno, has ruled Chad for thirty years, having overthrown his mentor and predecessor, Hissène Habré, who is himself now serving a life sentence on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture, conducted while Déby served as his army chief. Just last week, Chad held presidential elections where Déby declared, “I know in advance that I will win.” Preliminary results that are just now beginning to emerge suggest that he is right. Most outside observers agree that Déby’s re-election to a sixth six-year term is a foregone conclusion given that he disqualified fully half of the candidates who sought to unseat him; attacked, jailed, and intimidated his closest contenders; and banned campaign and protest rallies for the remaining candidates in the weeks leading up to the April 11 vote. After he changed the constitution in 2018, allowing himself an additional two terms as president, Déby could now serve until 2033, a total of forty-three years.

Déby’s efforts to undermine the opposition and hollow out civil society are both a function and a driver of his growing unpopularity in the country. Déby’s inability to turn billions of dollars in oil revenue accumulated since Chad started exporting its production through a World Bank-financed oil pipeline has emerged as a particular sore point for any Chadian not a part of Déby’s Zaghawa tribe, who have benefited the most from the corrupt patronage system that oil wealth has created. When the World Bank pulled out of the pipeline deal in 2008, its final report noted “Chad failed to comply with the key requirements of this agreement. . . The government did not allocate adequate resources critical for poverty reduction.”

What is Déby’s relationship with Western powers today?

Déby has strong ties to Washington and Paris, who for decades have largely overlooked his abysmal record of human, civil, and political rights at home because of his strength and reliability in leading military operations against common foes across the region. Déby earned his reputation as a tough-as-nails military tactician during the decade of Chad’s wars with Libya in the 1980s, leading one of the few African armies to successfully beat back Libyan influence and incursions. 

Trained in France as a pilot and in military tactics, Déby in recent years earned admiration and respect for his role in France’s Operation Barkhane and the broader G5 Sahel initiative, a US, European, and African security mission deployed primarily across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to roll back the terrorist threat there. Déby has been equally active in neighboring Nigeria in combatting Boko Haram elements and even famously complained to the New York Times about “a definite deficit of coordination, and a lack of common action” from the Nigerian army in the fight. Déby’s main political opponent, Saleh Kebzabo, who boycotted last week’s presidential election, has described Déby’s relations with the West the most succinctly, “They’ve found someone to do their dirty work. Then, they close their eyes.”

Beyond “dirty work,” Déby has also sought to disarm his Western critics through other relations of convenience. He has ingratiated himself with a generation of French military officers who have at some point in their careers cycled through the French airbase now constituting the largest French presence on the continent and representing the most visible remaining vestige of the Françafrique relations that emerged after African independence that ensured that France’s former colonies remained in a cozy French orbit through a not-so-secretive web of interlocking political, economic, and military ties binding French and African elites. Most significantly, France intervened militarily to ensure Déby’s hold on power when in February 2019 French Mirage fighter jets were dispatched from France’s airbase on the outskirts of N’Djamena to destroy a column of advancing rebels, doubling down on France’s commitment to the autocrat.

Washington, too, along with other European powers, have benefitted from Déby’s strategic decisions. Serving as host to more than a million Darfuri refugees in Chad’s far eastern region for more than a decade, Déby financed much of the relief operation there and allowed Western humanitarian organizations, human rights observers, and journalists ready access to his country to investigate atrocity crimes within Darfuri refugee camps there and as a staging ground into Darfur during the years of Sudan’s genocide against African Darfuris. Similarly, he dispatched his troops to Libya in support of Western efforts to install Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army when that was still the policy, and has been the beneficiary of European Union (EU) and member state funding to crack down on the human trafficking and illegal migration routes stopping migrants before they arrive in Libya to embark for European shores.

What is the current situation on the ground?

It is hard to assess the current threat to Déby given conflicting reports that are emerging from the region and the remoteness of the landscape the rebels are currently crossing. What we do know is that as many as one hundred vehicles and perhaps five hundred or more anti-Déby rebels from Chad’s Front for Alternation and Concord in Chad (FACT) crossed back into Chad on Sunday, April 11. Despite a government announcement that the “terrorists have been routed,” subsequent rebel statements have claimed the downing of two Chadian MiG-21s and an army helicopter, the seizing of several army armories and by Saturday, April 17 a claim of control over the entire region of Kanem, which at its southern point is only 150 kilometers from N’Djamena and nearly 1,000 kilometers south of the Libyan border from where they entered Chad.

FACT rebels in their statements have sought to put anxious observers at ease. They have invited Chadian soldiers to “serve the nation” by joining their rebellion, all the while attempting to reassure Chadian “citizens and Chad’s external partners” that the rebellion intends to ensure their safety and security and that of the country’s borders, while also continuing to support Chad’s external security commitments, presumably meaning under Operation Barkhane. Thus far, FACT appears to be avoiding any urban areas and there have been few reports of civilian casualties. In fact, Déby’s deep unpopularity, as demonstrated by the country’s bleak economic outlook (still ranking 187 out of 189 countries on the UN Human Development Index despite earning billions in oil revenues) and recent lower voter turnout rates, suggest that the FACT could well be successful in tapping into pent up frustration from within the military and civilian ranks.

What are the implications for the region if Déby were to fall?

Déby’s fall at this time would send shockwaves from the Red Sea to the Atlantic. Its most immediate impact would be on the multinational G5 Sahel initiative, to which the United States and France are the most substantial contributors. However, as violence has only continued to rise after ten years of combat operations and both countries’ publics continue to question the goals and values of having their forces deployed in remote regions whose direct security threat to national interests seems equally remote, the possible loss of the leading African element could cause Paris and Washington to fundamentally rethink their involvement. Many have begun to argue that the military component of the Sahelian response operation has been a failure for the West anyway and what is really needed is development assistance, institution strengthening, service delivery, and civil society engagement—ironically, all of which Chad itself requires.

Less well known but as significant has been Déby’s increasing involvement in recent instability in the neighboring Darfur region of Sudan. Sudanese media attribute the recent uptick in violence in the West Darfur capital of Geneina between Arab and African tribes to Déby’s arming of Masalit and Zaghawa tribesmen in the absence of United Nations peacekeepers. His departure from the scene would remove a perennial source of instability inside Darfur, but at the same time would deny the leader of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, a key Zaghawa ally to whom Hemedti had reportedly entered into a mutual security pact last January. Without external backing, Hemedti, who has been seen as a potential Déby-like strongman in Sudan, might well temper some of his notorious ambitions, giving the fragile transition in Khartoum more time to take hold.

What to watch for?

All eyes should be on France and whether President Macron will once again fly into the defense of his friend Idriss Déby, despite Macron’s own efforts early in his time in office to distance himself from the long history of nefarious and unseemly ties between his government and multiple generations of African strongmen. In 2019, France’s national newspaper Le Monde warned that airstrikes in support of Déby made Paris “appear as the protector of a predatory and corrupt regime.” And in light of last week’s deeply flawed elections and the abhorrent treatment of the political opposition in the lead-up to the vote, such an open and self-serving embrace from Paris now could well damage Macron’s credibility even further in the lead-up to elections next year if he appears to double down on a failed military approach in the Sahel on top of a distasteful support of a notorious autocrat.

This time, however, France’s European allies who are similarly committed to the extremist fight in the Sahel as part of the G5 initiative might themselves have something to say about Paris’ continued backstopping of such an odious regime, despite its usefulness to their security mission. According to Western diplomats in the region, rumors abound that German and other Nordic contributors have warned Paris that they could well pull their support from the entire mission if France were to intervene in what they see as an internal Chadian concern.

But Paris is no doubt hoping it need not come to that. Reading the current thinking and its own public opinion, Paris is likely attempting to assist their man in N’Djamena all the while attempting to stay off the field of battle in Chad. We can be sure that France’s military and intelligence services are sharing all matter of battlefield intelligence and providing Déby the operational and logistical support necessary to stop this incursion, but are at present clearly leaving the fighting to Déby. French reports indicate that Déby is stationing tanks and other heavy armaments around the city now in anticipation of mounting a final stand from the presidential palace. This explains the evacuations of many Westerners from N’Djamena this weekend, but it does not answer the question of how Paris will respond to the dilemma it faces in Chad: ensure your preferred strongman continues his unpopular grip over your former colony or stand by while your thirty-year investment in Idriss Déby is washed away and a new approach to security in the Sahel is foisted upon you. The implications for French and US security policy are likely to be felt for years to come.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

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Climate change will not be fixed without Africa

By Rama Yade

When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

The post Will events in Chad force a reset of Sahel strategy? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

According to the China Global Investment Tracker, Chinese technology investments and contracts in sub-Saharan Africa totaled $7.19 billion between 2005 and 2020. Huawei and ZTE have established more than forty 3G networks in more than thirty African countries and built national fiber-optic communications networks and e-government platforms for more than twenty African countries. To counteract the influence of China through Chinese telecom companies, the United States cannot use the same tactics that have been successful in the developed world. Instead, US policy should provide an alternative to Chinese technology by promoting new direct-to-consumer satellite solutions and supporting US tech firms that are already investing in African markets. The United States can also invest in tech solutions, such as improved routing protocols, that stand to build device trust and avoid the binary choice between US and Chinese tech. Through these policies, the United States can slow and possibly erode the gains that companies like Huawei have made on the continent by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

As the youngest continent with the highest urbanization rate in the world, Africa’s 1.2 billion-person market, home to six of the ten fastest growing economies, increasingly commands more attention from US tech and entertainment companies. In 2019, Google announced a subsea cable called Equiano that runs from South Africa to Portugal, with a stop in Nigeria. This submarine cable will be owned and operated solely by Google, in contrast to the consortium of investors that typically co-own these cables. Facebook is undergoing an even more ambitious project—the 2Africa subsea cable that loops around the continent and connects twenty-three countries in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. The 2Africa cable alone, which is scheduled to be completed by 2024, would double the total internet capacity on the continent. These subsea investments from American firms stand to drastically increase the supply of internet on the continent, potentially leading to reduced internet prices.

The additional broadband capacity that will be delivered by the new subsea cables will then require investment into terrestrial fiber infrastructure to spread access from the port inland. US companies are also investing in innovations still at pilot stage but with the potential to scale and be transformative. Google’s parent company, Alphabet, through its X moonshot company has launched Project Taara to expand the existing fiber network to surrounding rural areas at significantly lower costs. Initially piloted in Kenya and India, Project Taara uses light to transmit high-speed data between two points above ground through invisible streams of light. Transmitting data through the air avoids the costs and inconveniences of digging paths to lay fiber cables and will be met with fewer regulatory hurdles since private and public land is not required. US government agencies, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the US International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and the US Agency for International Development, could partner with X to scale these pilots and provide regional solutions as learnings accumulate and costs drop.   

The high cost and low margins of laying fiber cables in rural areas has led to a persistent last-mile problem, reinforcing dependence on mobile data usage and reinforcing the digital divide. Less than one third of Africans have regular access to internet of any sort. One attempt to solve this problem was another Alphabet project called Google Loon. Although Loon was ultimately unsuccessful and was shut down in January 2021, the ambitious project to use tennis-court sized, solar-powered balloons to provide internet access to rural areas is the sort of out-of-the-box thinking needed to cross the last mile in internet connectivity on the continent. With self-proclaimed low chances of success, the small victories of providing internet to hurricane-damaged Puerto Rico and to rural farmers in Kenya should encourage both Alphabet and other tech firms to continue investing in developing innovative solutions aimed at increasing internet access on the continent.

The SpaceX StarLink satellite project could also prove transformative in delivering high-quality internet directly to consumers wherever they be. The project’s network of interconnected satellites can provide high-speed internet access, with speeds that are faster than 95 percent of US connections, to even the most remote locations on the planet. It is currently in a public invitation-only testing phase and is only available in latitudes 45 to 53 degrees, which covers a small range of regions in the northern hemisphere. Initially only available in the northern United States and southern Canada, recent regulatory permission in the UK has allowed StarLink services to be offered in the country as well. As more satellites are launched, more areas around the globe will be covered by this service. Countries such as Greece, Germany, and Australia have already approved StarLink operations in anticipation of such an expansion. StarLink’s startup kit cost of $499 and monthly payment of $99 would be an obstacle for expansion into African economies but expected price drops of new models will make this an exciting option for internet access in African markets in the next eighteen to twenty-four months.

African nations are no longer just attracting investment into extractive industries. The young and fast-growing markets have proven attractive to Chinese tech infrastructure companies for decades. Leading US companies are finally taking note and they can help to unleash the developmental benefits of a second internet revolution in African markets, providing the backbone for innovative e-health, edutech, fintech, and reg-tech companies to grow. The Biden administration has the opportunity to work with flagship US tech companies to accelerate and scale critical digital infrastructure to the benefit of Americans and Africans alike.

Aubrey Hruby is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She is also Co-Founder of Insider and the Africa Expert Network. Follow her on Twitter @AubreyHruby.

Further reading

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Asia, notably China, is leading the global recovery, followed by the United States and other advanced economies. Behind the brighter outlook for these economies is disproportionate access to vaccines and the use of massive amounts of fiscal and monetary stimulus, totaling trillions of dollars. Concerns have even started to shift from recession to the risk of overheating and inflation in certain economies because of the oversized nature of the stimulus measures—especially the United States, which recently adopted a $1.9 trillion package to fight the effects of COVID-19.

By contrast, most of the developing world, especially Africa, is consumed by uncertainty about the economic recovery. Because of its large population—1.2 billion people—developments in Africa will weigh heavily on the world. The recovery from COVID-19 in Africa will depend on three factors—vaccines, debt, and commodities.

Access to vaccines, both globally and in Africa will help determine when the continent can truly reopen for business—including the important tourism sector, which has been devasted. Recovery from COVID-19 in the travel and tourism sector, especially in Africa, will be slow. There is also risk of a resurgence of the pandemic due to new variants, including one that has spread from South Africa to its neighbors.

The international community must act on several fronts. It should limit the hoarding of vaccines by richer countries and frontload distribution through the COVAX mechanism, the multinational effort to provide vaccine to poor and lower-middle-income countries. At the current pace, Africa will not soon reach herd immunity—the point at which enough people are immune that the virus struggles to spread. That delay could allow new strains of the coronavirus to emerge, which might lead to an economic and humanitarian catastrophe. Advanced economies should stop opposing the temporary lifting of patents to allow for mass generic vaccine production. That would lower prices and increase vaccine supply, helping to ensure the pandemic will end and averting catastrophe.

African countries also must do their share to ensure maximum transparency and fairness in distribution of the vaccine—including enhancing logistics chains. Whether it is for vaccine distribution or other forms of relief, such as income transfers, COVID-19 has shown that ensuring government resources reach their intended targets through transparency and accountability of governments is a basic element required to build trust with citizens.

Debt distress is another hurdle developing countries, particularly in Africa, must clear to ensure recovery. Several African countries defaulted on sovereign obligations in 2020, including Zambia, and these defaults are likely to accelerate in 2021 because fiscal and monetary buffers are exhausted. Preventing unsustainable debt loads that preclude borrowing and ensuring orderly debt resolution are top priorities. The G20 Common Framework adopted in November 2020 provides hope for bilateral official debt relief, as well as private creditor relief on comparable terms for poorer countries. But coordination at the regional and global levels will be essential. Some rating agencies have warned countries approaching the G20 for help that they risk being downgraded. That is likely to reinforce the fear countries typically have of losing their access to capital markets by seeking debt relief. Historically, however, waiting too long to restructure debt has proven costly for the continent. Regional development banks can play an important role in coordinating and supporting individual countries trying to deal with debt burdens and reignite growth. But again, developing countries must do their share. Rebuilding strong governance systems, perhaps through fiscal rules and fiscal councils—at national and regional levels—to promote both discipline and solidarity will be crucial. Stronger governance would help reignite growth and align debtors’ and creditors’ incentives. Only economic growth can  provide systematic and orderly resolution of debt.

Not everything is grim, however. Commodity prices are on the rise. A new commodity super cycle seems to be in the making—driven by a combination of factors, including a strong Asian recovery and a big US stimulus package on the demand side and pervasive shortages on the supply side due to the lack of investment since the 2014 collapse in oil prices. Such a super cycle might be the last one for oil, however, because major economies appear committed to replacing fossil fuels. An appropriate governance framework to manage proceeds from commodities in good and bad times is important to fostering the local private sector and creating much-needed jobs. Good governance is also important to rebalancing African growth drivers from external to internal ones, especially in the face of the new and growing risk of stranded assets. 

All in all, bold actions on governance by African countries will help reignite growth over the medium run. But to avoid a catastrophe in the short run, urgent action is needed by the international community on widening access to vaccines and debt relief.

Dr. Rabah Arezki is chief economist and vice president for economic governance and knowledge management at the African Development Bank, having served prior at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Follow him on Twitter @rabah_arezki.

Further reading

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post Keys to African recovery: Vaccines, debt, and commodities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Getting greener will require a lot more of everything from solar panels to wind turbines to electric vehicles to large-scale batteries to hand-held devices. This, in turn, will drive demand for various minerals and metals, both commonly well-known and not-so-familiar, on which the clean-energy technologies depend.

African countries are already a major source for some of these elements. For example, cobalt is a key component in rechargeable batteries. Roughly half of the 7.1 million metric tons of total global reserves of cobalt are found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which, moreover, accounts for 70 percent of overall production of the metal, according to the most recent statistics.

In other cases, certain African countries are key to a secure supply chain. Take the case of neodymium, a silvery rare-earth metal that plays an outsized role in renewable energy since there is currently no ready substitute for it in the manufacture of so-called permanent magnets used in both generators (where they convert mechanical energy into electricity) and electric vehicles (where they do the reverse, converting electricity into mechanical energy)—and this is in addition to its longstanding uses in a host of applications ranging from credit cards to speakers to medical equipment. Some 80 percent of the world’s neodymium is currently produced by China, a fact that suggests that the supply of this critical metal will come up in at least two of the reviews mandated by President Biden’s executive order on America’s supply chains, the study of high-capacity battery supplies led by the Secretary of Energy and the review of critical minerals led by the Secretary of Defense. While the reviews are currently underway, the possible alternative sources are already known: the Gakara Mine in Burundi operated by London-listed Rainbow Rare Earths and the Songwe Hill Mine in Malawi operated by Canada’s Mkango Resources. Of course, getting the ore is only part of the challenge; until alternative avenues for offtake are created, these producers will still have to turn to China for processing.

But seemingly esoteric minerals, whether technically rare-earth elements or not, are not the only material inputs needed for the transition to clean energy. A greener economy will also require even greater volumes of some metals that humankind has been exploiting for millennia.

The switch to cleaner, electrically-powered vehicles, for example, will require copper—lots of it. A conventional automobile operating with an internal-combustion engine contains on average about 48 pounds of copper, a hybrid electrical vehicle (HEV) about 88 pounds, and a battery electric vehicle (BEV) about 183 pounds, according to the Copper Development Association, an industry-supported nonprofit research and educational group. HEV and BEV public transportation require upwards of 1,000 pounds of the ductile native metal. Renewable energy infrastructure also requires large amounts of copper. According to the National Mining Association, 4.7 tons of copper go into each typical wind turbine. No wonder that, as enthusiasm for electric vehicles gained momentum, copper prices doubled over the last year to over $9,000 per metric ton in February, the highest level in almost ten years and pretty close to the all-time record price set in 2011, staying ever since at that level. The biggest trader of the metal reportedly expects the price to surge even further to $15,000 a ton this decade “as demand for global decarbonization produces a deep market deficit.”

While increased demand accounts for part of the commodity’s price, there is also a supply-side factor as many existing mines are in the declining phases of their life cycles. In fact, a peer-reviewed study a few years ago suggested that without new reserves being tapped, global copper production may be nearing peak just when demand is set to spike. Thus, projects under development are perhaps even more important than existing production. Moreover, with some potential major producers, like Alaska’s Pebble Mine, facing uncertain futures due to environmental concerns and regulatory issues, the pipeline for new sources is critical. Of the top ten projects currently under development, the biggest by far is Canadian mining company Ivanhoe’s Kamoa-Kakula project in the DRC, which contains 38 million tons of copper, more than twice the amount of the second-placed Pebble Mine—if the latter ever produces.

There is also increased demand anticipated for iron, a metal humankind has worked with for since the Middle Bronze Age. The same wind turbine that contains 4.7 tons of copper, requires 335 tons of steel which, of course, is an iron alloy. While three of the largest iron mines in the world are located in Brazil and, unsurprisingly, operated by the country’s flagship Vale, the Zanaga Mine in the Republic of the Congo is not far behind in scale. And the literal mother lode is in Guinea, where the world’s largest—and, by many estimates, the highest-quality—untapped iron ore deposits are to be found in the hills of the country’s east at Simandou and in nearby blocks. Bringing online this resource will not only transform the global supply chain for the critical ingredient in steel, but it carries the promise of dramatically jumpstarting the development of Guinea and its neighbor Liberia, respectively the 178^th and 175^th placed on the most recent UNDP Human Development Index of 189 countries and territories (exporting the ore through the nearby Liberian port of Buchanan makes far more economic sense than hauling it overland some 400 miles to the Guinean capital of Conakry on a not-yet-built railroad).

With government, industry (witness GM’s announcement of plans to become carbon neutral in its products and operations by 2040), and individuals widely embracing the various aspects of the green economy from major infrastructure to manufacturing to consumer products, the African continent will play an increasingly strategic role by providing critical material inputs to the supply chain. This reality will necessitate both a greater focus on Africa on the part of governments and companies as well as a better coordination between the public and private sectors, but it also provides African countries with an unprecedented opportunity to leverage this new attention to the benefit of their citizens and economies.

Ambassador J. Peter Pham, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, was the first-ever US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region. Previously he served as US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Prior to serving in government, he was Atlantic Council vice president for research and regional initiatives and director of the Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter @DrJPPham.

Further reading

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post Africa’s real strategic import for the green economy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Early 2021, the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC) secured a tier-2 loan of $250 million from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to enable the institution to continue its low-cost financing to African borrowers in the wake of COVID-19. This move signifies greater opportunities for US-African collaboration and the essential role of African development finance institutions in addressing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Africa Center had the pleasure of hosting Mr. Sanjeev Gupta, executive director of financial services at AFC, and Ms. Danielle Montgomery, managing director of structured finance at the DFC, for an interview to discuss opportunities for US-African collaboration for post-COVID recovery, the recently announced capital loan, which is intended to help address Africa’s infrastructure deficit and spur economic growth, and the importance of partnerships to advance development goals.

Watch the full interview, moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, below.

Further reading:

AfricaSource Jul 9, 2021

Development policy needs to be DARPA-fied

By Aubrey Hruby

Just as tech innovation requires experimentation, US commercial policy in African markets needs to embrace and operationalize experimentation.

Africa Economy & Business

Event Recap Jun 14, 2021

No longer neglected: DAS Cook forecasts more robust engagement with Africa under the Biden administration

By Africa Center

Speaking at an Atlantic Council event as part of the Africa Center’s African Conversations Series hosted by Africa Center Director Amb. Rama Yade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Ms. Akunna Cook promised a turnaround in US-Africa relations under the Biden administration, avoiding the “neglect” shown in recent years and in contrast embracing African nations as partners across critical global challenges.

Africa Democratic Transitions

Report May 14, 2021

Growing green: Catalyzing climate finance in African markets

By Emilie Bel

While African countries are the most impacted by the effects of climate change, the continent is home to an abundance of natural resources and vibrant economic prospects. To face the climate emergency, overcome the economic shock of COVID-19, and ensure that African economic development is sustainable, growth can only be green. However, tapping into Africa’s vast potential will require mobilizing billions in investment for infrastructure.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Financing post-COVID recovery in Africa: Lessons from the AFC-DFC partnership appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In recent weeks, the United States and its European allies have launched a diplomatic campaign to convince Ethiopia’s once-venerated prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, to relent in his campaign to vanquish militarily his greatest political threat in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I once feared the onset of a bloody struggle for control over Tigray that would pit near-equally matched foes against each other in something approximating conventional, interstate war. But what has instead emerged is a widespread TPLF insurgency that could drag on and take as many lives through deprivation as it does through combat.

The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies. Indeed, it is this possible unintended consequence of Abiy’s “law and order operation” in Tigray that could well do the most extensive damage in the region. In contrast to the conflict in Tigray, however, it is not too late for the United States and its allies in the region and beyond to do something to prevent a border war that would amount to a historic strategic blunder.

The seeds of this potential calamity were planted at the start of the last century when the border between Ethiopia and Sudan was first agreed to, though never formally demarcated, by modern Ethiopia’s founding father, Emperor Menelik II, during the British-Sudanese condominium. Since 1993, a patch of agricultural land on the Sudanese side of the border, referred to as the al-Fashqa Triangle, has been occupied by Amhara farmers. Many of them were relocated there by the Sudanese government in recognition of historic claims to the area by this powerful minority group. Since 2008, a de-facto agreement has existed whereby Ethiopia has acknowledged the historic legal boundary putting al-Fashqa inside Sudan, while Sudan has granted Amhara farmers continued rights to cultivate the land. Efforts to definitively demarcate the border have been stalled since the last meeting of an ad-hoc border commission last year, but Sudan’s designs on the region have never abated. Indeed, as recently as August 2020, in remarks by the head of the Sudanese army and chairman of the transitional government’s Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to the Army General Command, he predicted that they would “raise the flag of Sudan above al-Fashqa… and not waste one inch of the homeland.”

What has broken that decade-plus status quo is the onset of conflict in Tigray and a series of strategic and tactical calculations by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Unlike many outsiders, senior-level Sudanese officials claim not to have been surprised by the brutal assault by the TPLF on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) Northern Command outpost in Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, on the night of November 4. Only a week prior, a delegation led by the deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, General Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo, met with Abiy in Addis, where the restive Tigray region, mounting border tensions, and the stalemated negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were all reportedly topics of discussion.

More surprising to the Sudanese was the Ethiopian government’s near-immediate need for supplementary troops—pulled in from Ethiopian deployments in Somalia and, most notably, the al-Fashqa Triangle—to respond to the TPLF attack in Mekelle. The subsequent entry into the Tigray conflict of Eritrean forces and Amhara state militias further indicated that the ENDF was unable to subdue the TPLF uprising on its own and was operating from a greater position of relative weakness than was perhaps anticipated. 

By December, as primarily SAF forces gathered along the Sudanese side of the border to monitor the crossing of Tigrayan refugees and possible retreating TPLF forces, SAF and ENDF troops found themselves in closer proximity than ever before—increasing the risk of clashes. Multiple ENDF surprise assaults on SAF army officers prompted SAF forces to move in on the night of December 29. In that incursion, SAF forces reportedly destroyed Ethiopian army outposts and administrative centers while also displacing Amhara farmers and destroying crops in their successful bid to reclaim the entirety of the al-Fashqa Triangle. 

Sudan has presented its tactical decision as a legitimate response in light of the ENDF’s own unprovoked incursions against Sudanese patrols and Khartoum’s historic and legal claims to the area. But there is no question that the SAF, which has witnessed its traditional importance in Sudan’s body politic decline substantially under the country’s civilian-led transitional government, see in their defense of Sudan’s territorial integrity an opportunity to once again assert its primacy as the protector of the Sudanese state. 

It is also true that in its effort to change facts on the ground, whether justified or not, the SAF has now further aggravated an inherently unstable situation in the region and may have disrupted the delicate balance among security forces inside Sudan that has kept the transition there on track.

As bellicose rhetoric by both sides has increased in recent weeks, Khartoum and Addis have come to frame the threat of territorial loss in national-security and even existential terms—similar in certain respects to how each side has recently described the contentious and protracted GERD talks. Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia was recently recalled to Khartoum, and various peace envoys and proposed mediators from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Sudan, and the African Union (AU) have all largely seen their willingness to help the parties achieve a negotiated solution rebuffed. Even Eritrea, whose peace agreement with Ethiopia has emerged as more of a mutual-security pact, tried unconvincingly to paint itself as a peacemaker in a letter last week from President Isaias Afwerki to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Sudan’s newly appointed foreign minister, Mariam al Saddig, suggested in late February that Sudan would be open to talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But that regional body, currently chaired by Hamdok and historically controlled by Ethiopia, has not yet offered its good offices and likely lacks the independence to offer impartial mediation.

In the absence of concerted external mediation, both sides risk turning their cold war much hotter. And with such intertwined politics and long histories, both sides have the points of leverage to do it. Ethiopia currently supplies the totality of troops (more than five thousand) to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Abyei, the highly contested region along the Sudan-South Sudan border that remains at the heart of the tensions between those two countries. Concerns abound that Ethiopia could withdraw those troops, potentially forcing the SAF to fill a security vacuum there that could well spark renewed conflict with Juba. There are also worries that Sudan could unilaterally expel those forces out of fear that Ethiopia could use these forces as a fifth column in the event of a sustained outbreak of violence along its border—opening a new front against Sudan and vastly expanding their zone of conflict. Addis, for its part, is right to fear Khartoum’s ability to re-arm and re-supply TPLF rebels should Sudan wish to open its own additional front in a border conflict.

Adding to the volatility has been an influx of allied armies and militias into the border zone between Sudan and Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian side, it is not just the ENDF, but also Amhara militias and Eritrean Defense Forces. Similarly, on the Sudanese side of the border, the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have also been identified in increasingly large numbers.

Given the lack of interoperability among many of these forces, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of this mobilization is occurring in a narrow band along the border that is only a few kilometers wide, the chances are high that the slightest misstep or miscalculation could result in a large-scale outbreak of violence and a rapid escalation among three national armies and many state and national militias. This is particularly true inside Sudan, where the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have even turned on each other in the past year in areas like Darfur and Kordofan when they have been deployed in close proximity.

Absent some kind of international monitoring, there are simply too many well-armed forces in too close proximity with too little experience working with each other to discount the risk of a cataclysmic conflict breaking out.  

The tense standoff has bred rumors that additional outside forces could light the spark that ignites that conflict. Egypt, which has grown increasingly frustrated with the state of GERD negotiations, is often identified as a prime potential instigator. But while there is no question that Egypt has sought to use its historic ties to Sudan to produce a GERD outcome to its liking, Egyptian officials privately express a clear-eyed understanding that an Ethiopia wracked by internal war and interstate conflict will be incapable of focusing on, let alone reaching, a binding political and technical agreement on the demanding issues that the GERD presents. 

So where do we go from here? It seems unlikely that ad-hoc bilateral demands for de-escalation and withdrawal from contested areas will be sufficient at this stage. Late last month, AU Commission Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat dispatched retired Mauritanian diplomat Mohamed Lebatt to Addis and Khartoum to probe each side’s willingness to accept outside meditation on the brewing border conflict. While no progress was made, it is a conversation worth building on.

Coordinated, high-level outside mediation is urgently required to avert the potentially dire consequences of a conflict for not just the civilian populations in the border area, but also the countries at the center of the dispute and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Sudan recently proposed outside mediation for the final phase of the GERD negotiations that would include the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union. Some sponsorship of border mediation by this grouping—under the leadership of an eminent, empowered figure—is worth pursuing given the substantial risks to international peace and security and the potential for the parties’ largest donors to bring financial leverage to efforts to reach a resolution.

While all these disputes are linked, there is no single process, individual, or institution that will be able to untangle the overlapping and complicated politics of the competing conflicts. What is essential is coordination. Any process that can be put in place to help with the de-escalation of war in Tigray should be kept on its own track. So too with the GERD. And so too with a process for unwinding the military buildup and tensions on the border, which should be narrowly defined and time-limited so as not to be exploited as a potential leverage point in any other mediation processes. But these must all be coordinated by a central Contact Group with the power, leverage, and legitimacy to advance options for resolution and enforce outcomes that contribute to overall peace.

Such processes must be jumpstarted now to avoid a downward spiral, and there are several immediate steps that Washington can take to do just that. In a fortunate coincidence, the United States took up the presidency of the UN Security Council in March. The newly installed US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, should prioritize a special session of the Security Council to discuss the manifold crises emerging in the Horn of Africa, with added attention to the still-unfolding conflict in Tigray and the stalemated GERD talks. Given the many competing interests at play in the Horn from all manner of external powers, the session should include discussion of an International Contact Group that can promote dialogue and transparency and ensure that potential spoilers remain in the tent rather than outside of it.

To support and complement this effort, the United States should also appoint a Horn of Africa envoy who is capable of both setting the policy agenda in Washington and corralling leaders in Europe and the region in the near term. In the long run, an envoy can only succeed if he or she is equipped with a clear set of policy objectives and the tools to advance them. In contrast to its approach in the Great Lakes or Sahel regions, Washington has for too long viewed the countries in the promising but volatile Horn of Africa in a vacuum or else simply provided wide berth to the area’s anchor state, Ethiopia, to project its power and influence to police regional disputes. With Addis having lost the ability to play that role any longer, the burden has shifted to Washington to become more actively involved in protecting its interests in the region. 

That process promises to be complicated and messy. But preventing a war is surely more attractive an enterprise than ending one.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Africa Center’s Coronavirus: Africa page documented the early impact of the pandemic, and our virtual convenings with the leadership of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Food Programme highlighted the early successes and agency of African stakeholders in combatting the crisis. The likelihood of greater pan-African collaboration in the wake of COVID-19 was a key finding of the Center’s report on great power competition in Africa in the post-COVID landscape. That report was the result of a newly-launched collaboration with the Policy Center for the New South, which seeks to explore and reframe perceptions of Africa through a series of paired research papers written from both North and South lenses.

COVID-19 did not slow the pace of political developments in Africa this year. Sudan’s transitional government achieved a watershed when the US State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designation was finally lifted and a massive aid package was bestowed on the nation in exchange for normalization of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv. The Africa Center’s convenings and analysis on this topic provided thought leadership across the political spectrum that helped steward the SST lifting to a successful conclusion. The Center’s robust analysis of the conflict in northern Ethiopia between the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and members of the former authoritarian regime helped to shape perceptions of the dispute both regionally and in Washington, DC.

Looking ahead, it’s clear that in 2021 the new Biden administration will be challenged by the need to repair and reinvigorate key bilateral relationships on the continent (including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa), and there is a major question mark over how many of the former administration’s initiatives will be abandoned. Prosper Africa’s launch was problematic, but in concert with the launch of the new US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its equity capability, it signaled a concrete shift in US priorities to “trade, not aid” that was long overdue. The Africa Center marked that transition with a summit-level conference hosted in cooperation with the DFC, which laid out the United States’ all-of-government approach to Africa policy and, importantly, underscored both the strong bipartisan support for Prosper Africa’s expanded toolkit and the essential role of African development finance institutions in the process.

An event under the auspices of our new Afro-Century Initiative—which unites a coalition of African development finance institutions in an effort to forge a more authentic, optimistic narrative on Africa—capped the Center’s year of programming. An esteemed panel of economists and business leaders offered the following observations and predictions for what 2021 has in store for Africa’s economies:   

What to watch for in 2021:

• African markets have an advantage in 2021 and beyond, says Renaissance Capital’s Global Chief Economist Charlie Robertson, because the continent has been the least hurt by COVID-19 relative to other regions (a story similar to that of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis). Consequently, low interest rates in the West could push more institutional investors to chase high yields in Africa by increasing portfolio exposure in African fixed income and equities.

• Getting Africa to “catch up” is the wrong framing, says AfroChampions Co-Founder Edem Adzogenu. To him, the attitude must rather be: “can you turn in a completely different direction and perfect another model that passes the others but also learns from them.”

• The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can be a “game-changer,” says the Africa Finance Corporation’s Chief Economist Rita Babihuga-Nsanze, but there is still a lot of work that needs to be done to build an enabling environment, especially when it comes to infrastructure.

• While China will remain a key financing partner, the scaling back of Belt and Road Initiative lending will provide space for new international lenders and other financial institutions to support the continent’s growth ambitions, says Standard Chartered Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa Razia Khan. According to Babihuga-Nsanze, African development finance institutions can play a critical role in closing the financing gap that emerges.

• Chinese growth—not lending—is going to lift the whole continent, says Robertson, but African countries need to invest in the right infrastructure. China’s GDP is likely to grow about $2.3 trillion next year and another $2.3 trillion the year after: equaling the size of the entire African market. This growth could help drive commodity price increases and create a lever for wealth creation in Africa, lifting the whole continent. Yet, key to cashing in on this Chinese growth will be Africa’s ability to build infrastructure to enable it, while forgoing projects that do not.

• Value addition and industrialization are two critical trends, according to Babihuga-Nsanze. The post-COVID reset will provide a push to shore up local supply chains and double down on the building of local industrial parks, which can promote investment.

• Ghana is a market set for growth, Khan and Robertson agree. But Nigeria must make good on its diversification promises, while South Africa’s political reforms will have investors watching.  

• Observers are missing the huge SME-driven informal sector, notes Adzogenu, as well as the huge creatives space. For African Development Bank Chief Economist and Vice President Rabah Arezki, the bottom-up wave of fintech and innovation will transform the continent, including in rural areas where growing digitization could be critical for improved agriculture. To Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, digitization is the single most significant trend coming out of 2020 for Africa.

The last word:

• “For a continent that has the youngest population, [Africa] should be the center of the world. I mean this should be the center for the freshest ideas for innovation and everything, and the center for which people can come and bring their ideas to bring growth that will benefit the entire world as well.” –Edem Adzogenu, AfroChampions

Explore highlights from the Africa Center’s year of programming

New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020

The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.

Africa Future of Work

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2020

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta says his country needs ‘fiscal space’ amid the COVID-19 crisis

By Larry Luxner

“Coronavirus is mainly a health issue, and our key focus is ensuring that we keep our people safe,” Kenyatta said. “But this is also an economic crisis because it has resulted in some key sectors hugely affected by lockdowns. We were forced to close our airspace, which affected tourism, a very critical part of our economy.”

Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020

African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape

By Bronwyn Bruton

In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020

Reducing Africa’s infrastructure deficit: An interview with AFC President & CEO Samaila Zubairu

By Africa Center

The Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), a pan-African development finance institution, has been developing and financing infrastructure, natural resources, and industrial assets to increase economic prosperity and growth across the continent since 2007. Watch Samaila Zubairu, president and chief executive officer of the Africa Finance Corporation, join Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby for an interview to discuss AFC’s investment philosophy, innovation, and future growth, along with the critical role of African development finance institutions in improving economic prosperity.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 15, 2020

An interview with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy

By Africa Center

US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, joins Atlantic Council Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton to discuss bipartisan support for increased US trade and investment in African countries.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020

Financing African trade and development: An interview with TDB Group President & CEO Admassu Tadesse

By Africa Center

The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has been financing trade and development projects and promoting economic integration and prosperity in the region since 1985. Watch an interview below between Mr. Admassu Tadesse, president and chief executive officer of TDB Group and Ms. Aubrey Hruby, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Mr. Tadesse covers what makes TDB unique and different, the role African development finance institutions (DFIs) play in returning the African continent to economic growth post-COVID, how TDB can interface with US investors, and ways DFIs can be catalytic in increasing capital flows to African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020

What Sudan’s terror delisting really means

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist May 8, 2020

WFP’s David Beasley warns of dire famines in Africa, Mideast if COVID-19 supply chains damage continues

By Larry Luxner

Up to 300,000 people could starve to death every day if the COVID-19 pandemic ruptures global food supply chains—even more than the roughly 275,000 people who have died of the disease worldwide so far.

Coronavirus International Markets

AfricaSource Nov 13, 2020

Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war

By Bronwyn Bruton

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven […]

Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Apr 29, 2020

Africa still sees a massive pandemic in its future, but partnerships may lessen blow

By Katherine Walla

With an uncertain future for the pandemic that lies ahead, the Africa CDC is encouraging pivotal partnerships to act quickly to secure Africa amid haphazardly understood policies, little access to water and sanitation, and resource constraints.

Africa Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020

Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis

By David A. Wemer

A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”

Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Jul 10, 2020

Dr. Dambisa Moyo, panel reinvigorate debate on a Marshall Plan for Africa

By Africa Center

On Friday, July 10, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on whether the time has come for a Marshall Plan for Africa. The panel featured Global Economist and Author Dr. Dambisa Moyo, former US Congressman Dr. David Brat, and Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Aubrey Hruby. The virtual conversation was moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, with opening and concluding remarks given by the Center’s Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton.

Africa Corruption

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Leaving aside for a moment the last-ditch effort by the Trump Administration to exploit Sudan’s efforts to remove the terror designation to expand its own Middle East peace plan, the Administration should be acknowledged for betting on the prospects of democratic transition in Sudan. From the early days of the transition, Washington and many other capitals were skeptical that the civilian half of the transitional government was strong enough to stay the course and to keep at bay revanchist forces within the security sector. Equally questionable was the prospect that Sudan’s security forces would not overstep their constitutional limits and remain partners in steering Sudan toward a definitive, civilian-led future. While the transition is not yet complete, and faces increasingly stiff headwinds, today’s removal of the terror designation should be seen as affirmation that the sometimes-competing wings of the transitional government have and are largely abiding by the principals of the revolution: Freedom, Peace, and Justice.

Procedurally, today’s announcement is the culmination of a process of bilateral negotiations that started early this year that saw Sudan meet policy and statutory requirements demonstrating that it no longer supported international terrorism and would work with US counterterror efforts going forward. It removes perhaps the greatest sticking point and inconsistency in US policy and the bilateral relationship: the US treatment of Sudan as both a reliable counterterror partner and a terrorist state. For nearly two decades, this has been the first and last talking point of every Sudanese official in any bilateral conversation with an American diplomat. With this hypocrisy removed, the chances for deeper and more serious bilateral relations are at last possible.

Statements today from Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Risch both suggest that with the terror restrictions out of the way, the United States will lean forward on arrears clearance, bridge loans, and ultimately debt relief to revive Sudan’s failing economy. This represents perhaps the most tangible and immediate prize associated with Sudan’s delisting. Other promises—such as trade delegations, investment summits, and subsidized staple imports, offered as part of the Administration’s Israel gambit—may not materialize in the waning days of Trump’s term. But setting in motion a multilateral process that allows Europeans and the international financial institutions to move forward this critical engagement is what is most necessary now.

But despite today’s news, challenges in this terror saga still remain. Negotiations are still ongoing over when and how Sudan will have its sovereign immunity restored and be granted the legal peace it seeks to be protected against future terror-related claims. The greatest impediment to sovereign immunity stems from a claim from a group of 9/11 victims who have tried to argue that because of Sudan’s complicity in other al-Qaeda orchestrated terror attacks, like the USS Cole and the US Embassy bombings, Sudan should now also be tried for its possible involvement in the September 11 attacks. 

Ironically, these claims have emerged now because 9/11 victims felt for the first time that Sudan had recognized the legitimacy of the US justice system over them and were prepared to pay large sums of money to meet the political demands for getting off the terror list. Under Omar al-Bashir, 9/11 families never thought their suits would go anywhere and never thought Sudan could be compelled to pay, so they chose not to pursue their suits when the opportunities were abundant. But that all changed under the transitional government, which has showed a willingness to negotiate and make amends. The idea that the Sudanese are now being potentially punished for their cooperation is regrettable. That these groups have found champions among the Senate’s Democratic leaders is even more disheartening. 

Good faith efforts to resolve the obstacle to a final settlement appear to be continuing within the Senate and among victim groups. The Trump Administration has even offered substantial financial settlements—from US taxpayer funds—to compensate victims who don’t even have a legal court judgement in their favor. If they don’t succeed, Sudan could be faced with future lawsuits from terror claimants and US businesses could have liens placed on the repatriation of revenues coming from Sudan. This would undermine and deter the kind of reputational cleansing and investment promotion removal from the terror list was intended to promote. It would also represent another self-inflicted wound to US policy of the kind that today’s announcement was trying to correct.

But in the end, today’s announcement ultimately moves the US out of the way of Sudan’s own success or failure. As inflation soars and the Sudanese pound continues its precipitous decline, what Sudan makes of this opportunity is now up to its leaders.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

AfricaSource Jun 1, 2021

A US-Africa summit done right

By Aubrey Hruby

The last few decades of global Africa policy can be defined in a single word: summitry. After five years of absence from the summit stage, a revived US-Africa summit under the Biden administration is a no-brainer.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Apr 19, 2021

Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

By Aubrey Hruby

This new decade has created a unique moment for the Biden administration to reset US-Africa policy. A more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Apr 8, 2021

The digital infrastructure imperative in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

Over the past two decades, Chinese companies have come to dominate the telecom infrastructure landscape in emerging markets. The United States can slow and possibly erode these Chinese gains by promoting innovative US technologies and providing resources to help unleash the second wave of the internet revolution in African countries.

Africa Digital Policy

The post What Sudan’s terror delisting really means appeared first on Atlantic Council.

That recession certainly hasn’t hit Africa’s tech industry. In fact, as countries adapt to the expanding digital universe created by COVID-19, technology ecosystems across the continent are booming—and global investors have noticed. Africa-focused startup funding finally crossed the $1 billion dollar mark last year (at $1.3 billion), already a big increase from previous years (total investment in African startups was just under $200 million in 2015). The better news is that, eight months into 2020 and in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, total funding had still increased by 8 percent compared to 2019, according to Africa-focused fund Partech, making the tech sector an undeniably lush spot in Africa’s parched economic landscape.

A string of recent investment milestones clearly indicates a sector on the rise. In April 2019, Jumia made history by becoming the first startup from Africa to list on the New York Stock Exchange. Two months ago, Stripe acquired Nigeria’s fintech darling Paystack for over $200 million: the largest exit for an African startup, ever. And just last month, Bezos Expeditions—the personal venture capital fund of Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos—participated in a $30 million Series B round investment for the fintech startup Chipper Cash, which offers cross-border payments in seven African countries. Many US investors once viewed Africa as too risky, but African tech—although still small compared to the global tech sector—is drawing increased attention from Silicon Valley executives and Fortune 500 CEOs.

It’s no surprise that Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt—big economies home to the continent’s most vibrant startup hubs (Lagos, Nairobi, and Cairo)—have benefitted the most from this surge in investment activity. Because startups are universally recognized to be a vital engine of economic growth, fostering a vibrant innovation ecosystem is a chief goal of governments across the globe. And while countries like the United States, China, Israel, Sweden, and Singapore have taken slightly different approaches to nurturing a ‘startup culture’ (one that encourages risk-taking and rewards talent), these approaches have consistently included both heavy government investment in local ecosystem support organizations and startup legislation that simplifies business transactions. In Africa, successful startup ecosystems have also benefitted from government engagement, too, though there have been far fewer resources available and more red tape for entrepreneurs to wade through. There’s even an argument to be made that the emergence of Africa’s top startup ecosystems is more a function of size than anything else: Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria have three of the top seven largest populations on the continent, replete with large diaspora talent networks and growing youth populations eager to adopt mobile technology.

Attempting to cash in on the growing global surge in investment, smaller African countries have tried to bolster their own innovation ecosystems through supportive legislation. Italy passed the world’s first-ever Startup Act—a law specifically designed to spur innovation demand and foster entrepreneurship—all the way back in 2012, and since then plenty of African governments have considered following suit. The passage of Startup Acts in Tunisia and Senegal, in 2018 and 2019 respectively, paved the way for multiple proposals in other African countries that reflect growing interest in improving the enabling environment for startups and investors. Rwanda and Ghana, home to two of Africa’s fastest growing economies, have both kickstarted discussions with key stakeholders in the last few months. Even larger economies, such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda, have jumped on the bandwagon and are in various stages of passing their own versions.

African entrepreneurs have long suffered from unfavorable regulatory environments that can make it harder to start, grow, and scale an innovative business. Endeavor Nigeria CEO Elohu Giban-Mbelu recently made this point in a TechCabal interview, saying that “…the lack of clarity and the time or cost spent on lobbying efforts around policy and regulation can take away from time and cost injected into growing the business instead.” For many entrepreneurs—especially in countries like Nigeria where elderly politicians rule over a young populace—tech-savvy individuals tend to view the government as out-of-touch with their demands. Changing this perception by reviving trust between lawmakers and entrepreneurs, an important first step, requires new policy formation with the interest of entrepreneurs, investors, and other stakeholders at heart.

Startup Acts could help do the trick. Designed to make it easier for startups to operate, Startup Acts include an amalgamation of policies intended to increase the incentives for young people to start a venture, investors to put their money into promising companies, and other ecosystem actors to lend their support where it’s needed. For Tunisia and Senegal—the two first movers in this arena—these policies are part of broader government strategies to position their countries as innovation hubs by leveraging an emerging tech scene to improve economic development.

Ideas put forth in the Tunisia and Senegal acts were developed through an innovative policy hackathon hosted by i4policy, a multi-stakeholder group promoting policy reforms in Africa’s startup space. Key elements of Tunisia’s Startup Act include state salaries for up to three founders per company during the first year of operations, generous tax breaks, and a one-year leave period for both public and private sector employees to start a company with the right to return to their old jobs. Additional incentives encourage potential entrepreneurs to launch new ventures, including available startup grants, fast-track licenses to obtain startup registration documents, and increased state support for covering patent licenses. Similar to Tunisia, Senegal’s version aims to help position the country as the Francophone leader in tech and entrepreneurship on the continent. The country’s policy includes three tax-free operational years for startups, training for youth and female entrepreneurs, and a startup registration platform easily accessible on a government website.

Two years after being passed, Tunisia’s Startup Act has paid off and the country’s digital economy has deepened. 2019 Q4 data obtained from Entrepreneurs of Tunisia (EOT)—a new organization formed after the Startup Act passed—shows that the country had over 165 new startups registered, twenty-four new co-working spaces opened, and $18.5 million fundraised in a one-year period. In an April 2020 profile by WeeTracker, some Tunisian entrepreneurs expressed concerns about how the pandemic will affect business, however they largely credit the Startup Act for solving the ecosystem’s main bottlenecks by making it easier to focus on growing their venture. This is a very promising indicator that undoubtedly influenced other countries to consider following suit and enacting their own version. If implemented more broadly across the continent, Startup Acts could further catalyze a positive change in the broader business environment by improving local support for entrepreneurs and signaling to global VC investors that African innovation is here to stay.

While it’s still too early to tell how Senegal’s Startup Act will impact its fledgling tech ecosystem, the increasing appetite among governments in signing pro-startup legislation is encouraging. Enacting this type of legislation to provide more support and runway for startups—a key engine for job growth in African economies—could prove even more important during economic downturns when businesses suffer and credit dries up. Perhaps this is a sign that governments recognize how intertwined growth in African tech ecosystems are with GDP; data from TechCabal found that, in Nigeria, the technology sector contributed more to the country’s overall GDP than the oil and gas sector did between 2010-2019. Put simply: growth in technology innovation can boost overall economic growth at a time when Africa faces its first continent-wide recession in over two decades. A key component to expanding startup ecosystems, keep an eye on the Startup Act trend to continue across Africa after Tunisia’s success, and expect more countries to sign similar pro-startup legislation to spur innovation, create jobs, and grow trust between governments and entrepreneurs.

Jordan Wolken is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow him on Twitter @WolkenJordan.

AfricaSource Dec 4, 2020

Data remains a weak spot for African elections, but Ghana can lead the way

By Luke Tyburski

Ghana, with elections slated for December 7, may be the most robust environment for domestic election monitoring on the African continent. But fieldwork conducted in January 2020 confirmed that most stakeholders still find that data is a “weak spot.” This is not to say that peace and credibility are in doubt in Ghana’s election, but by better leveraging existing data resources, Ghana has an opportunity to champion transparency and set an example for regional peers.

Africa Elections

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020

Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis

By David A. Wemer

A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”

Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020

African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape

By Bronwyn Bruton

In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

Africa Economy & Business

The post Startup Acts are the next form of policy innovation in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite donor reluctance to fund data collection, the scale and availability of African election data has never been better. For example, election commissions in Malawi and Mauritania released polling station-level results for the first time in 2019, while domestic and international observers regularly collect thousands of raw data points from observer cohorts numbering at times in the tens of thousands. The problem is that while international missions do aggregate these data into topline statistics and general reports, they do not provide the public with access to the granular data. Domestic election monitoring operations are usually even more expansive than international ones, but their findings are even more likely to go unpublished or underpublicized.

Ghana, with elections slated for December 7, may be the most robust environment for domestic election monitoring on the continent, with more than 12,000 observers active during the last election cycle in 2016. But fieldwork I conducted in January 2020 confirmed that most stakeholders still find that data is a “weak spot.” This is not to say that peace and credibility are in doubt in Ghana’s election, but by better leveraging existing data resources, Ghana has an opportunity to champion transparency and set an example for regional peers.

Two weeks of stakeholder interviews conducted in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale in January 2020 revealed the following key takeaways and specific recommendations to enhance future election cycles, with applicability well beyond Ghana.   

Despite ample supply, data is being left on the table

First, the supply of data is not wanting. Ghana’s civil society and election ecosystem is formidable, with actors in 2016 including five international election observation missions (EOMs), three major domestic observer coalitions, two election situation rooms, and countless active media and civil society organizations (CSOs)—see figure below. These groups accounted for more than 12,000 observers and tens of thousands of data points, which if pooled could paint a detailed picture of election day at over a third of all polling stations.

Yet, elements of this data are underutilized or lost in aggregation. Not every observer agency even published a report or digitized their data in 2016, with some citing a lack of donor funding and interest. While election observation may have non-reporting purposes, such as the deterrence of fraud or building voter confidence, the decision not to leverage data that has already been paid for and collected is inefficient. Stakeholders seem to agree, as the most common comment from field interviews was that data remains a “weak point” or “work in progress.” The election commission was also not immune to data shortfalls, failing to fulfill a promise to release polling station-level results.

Demand exists for granular data products

The reality is that demand exists as well, and for more granular products. In expressing interest in better data access, civil society leaders outside of the capital consistently noted that they struggle to access even standard government data, and community radio representatives relayed that it can take weeks to ascertain relatively basic local election results and turnout figures, which are valuable to their work. Thus, while observer reports release national or regional statistics, more localized figures are what could reasonably inform these stakeholders’ activities, enhancing grassroots efforts that are critical to effective governance. 

Capacity building will need to be built in

Despite a near-universal desire to better incorporate data into their work, respondents voiced an important caveat that any new program would have to come with capacity building or sensitization. Data products would need to be simple, accompanied by guides on how to interpret them, and disseminated through careful campaigns meant to explain their value to the intended recipients. This might be in the form of trainings for journalists, civil society bosses, or the public at large. 

Constraints associated with the donor environment exist

Another takeaway is that donors will have to play a role. Collaboration and data sharing come into conflict, at times, with organizational imperatives: namely, programming and funding. Ghana’s robust civil society space means it is crowded, too, and to compete, organizations have to set themselves apart, while often molding themselves to the desires of external proposals. In this environment, pro bono cooperation becomes a secondary concern at best. The easiest way to resolve this is for donors to explicitly incentivize data usage and sharing, with recommendations on how to do so expressed below.  

Local models can be built upon and formalized

None of these reflections are meant to undermine the already outstanding efforts of Ghanaian civil society. To list a few examples, the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) conducted an 8,000-member EOM in 2016 with far more advanced methodology than any international peer; STAR-Ghana, a civil society umbrella group, builds monitoring and evaluation, communications assistance, and lessons learned sessions into its grants process; collaboration between groups already exists even if not always formalized; and an expanding set of actors are recognizing the need to integrate data into their operations. The puzzle is how to ensure that these positive data practices are maximized and routinized amongst the broader ecosystem in ways that can be replicated, both in future election cycles and in other African environments, including those lacking such a developed civil society apparatus.

Building off the takeaways above, the below recommendations outline specific actions that the major stakeholders should consider to better leverage data in African elections.

Donors

Earmark a percentage of program funding for data collection and storage. The average European Union (EU) EOM costs 3.5 million euros, and the US Embassy spent upwards of $5.7 million in 2016 to support Ghana’s election. The reality is that just a couple of percent of this would be all it would take to elevate data collection and reporting. For example, Ghanaian data clerks could be easily trained to input observer reports using applications like CSPro. Further considerations would be hiring several data managers to assist across grantees, and for the construction of a centralized data portal. But realistically, significant progress countrywide could be achieved in the range of several hundred thousand dollars.  

Put collaboration explicitly into grants. Stakeholders are open to collaboration and express demand for data products. But many are unlikely to take the effort to process, clean, and share their data with others without an incentive. They may also need a push to formalize cooperation channels with other Ghanaian CSOs. Donors should demand this in their calls for proposals, and could do so by asking for more than one grantee on a project or asking grantees to specify partners or sub-grantees.

Seek grantees earlier in the election cycle and prioritize local input. Programming would ideally be set more than a year out from the election, in contrast to just several months. Early calls for proposals should give CSOs an opportunity to bring their unique ideas and concerns to the donors, at the very least informing the eventual programming, even if more donor-driven in the end. 

Emphasize communications and messaging. To a certain extent, the utility of research and reporting is a function of its viewership. Donors should allocate public relations/communications assistance to grantees, and there is no excuse for reports going unpublished or buried on sites with little web traffic. Donors should work to ensure that the reports and lessons learned are circulated to in-country stakeholders as well as relevant external policymakers.

International EOMs

Assess value added compared to other international missions and the broader domestic response. Ghana did not need five international observation missions in 2016, especially with several not submitting public reports and understanding that domestic efforts were orders of magnitude more expansive. When the US Agency for International Development, for example, is deciding whether to fund an EOM or support a competent domestic observer group, it may be best to throw everything at the domestic response. And returning to the issue of messaging, this should include a marketing campaign to ensure DC policymakers are reading more than just an EU report, especially if Ghanaian data and findings are more useful or prescriptive.

Be more active in the dialogue before and after the election. If an EOM is chosen as the most useful instrument, it should be fully leveraged. Even as honest brokers, observers can inject more analysis than is currently done, or at least curate others’ findings. For reference, in Malawi’s disputed election, the EU EOM went silent before the results were even announced, despite contestation that extended more than half a year. Observers should not wait until final reports six months down the line to add value. Even just tweeting out CSO reports, linking to available data, or convening public conversations could be incredibly useful, though a stark contrast to what is normally pursued.

Civil Society

Create a centralized data portal. This would include relevant government, civil society, and observer data organized and available for ease of consumption. The pooling of raw observer data would be a massive breakthrough for transparency and research, though even just putting observer reports and statements in one place would be a valuable start, as some from 2016 proved difficult to find or had to be retrieved from internet archives. This was the central recommendation that came of my fieldwork, and one that received broad approval from civil society interlocutors.

Distribute standard reports aimed at the constituency level. Ideally tied to the centralized data portal, these one-to-two-page reports aimed at the constituency level would be disseminated to relevant local stakeholders. These could ostensibly include vote and turnout trends from prior elections, key incidents reported in the last election cycle, and any notable irregularities. These could provide a localized baseline for stakeholders to integrate into strategic planning, use to assess against once new data comes in, to prepare observers for their specific deployments, and for media stations to provide accurate localized coverage.

Government

Embrace transparency. The election commission should be called upon to publish polling station-level results, as was promised in 2016. The Open Election Data Initiative outlines that this should occur not only in a timely fashion, but also in an easily downloadable format and in a permanent capacity, not to be taken down at a later date.

Conclusion

In Africa, Ghana is often considered a democratic role model, and in many ways this contention is true. Nowhere else can you find such a robust civil society and observer ecosystem, yet even Ghana could substantially benefit from better leveraging existing data resources. Notably, demand for such data resources exists among stakeholders, and the silver lining is that workable solutions are neither excessively costly nor complicated, especially in such a developed civil society environment. Donor emphasis on making progress on data usage and transparency in places like Ghana first might thus be an efficient way to set a positive example and then move toward standardization elsewhere. Streamlining both the donor process and the domestic observer response, the result will ideally be a set of more intentional, impactful programs that are able to iteratively improve over time.

Luke Tyburski is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He is grateful to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies for supporting the fieldwork that contributed to this analysis.

Report Nov 30, 2020

African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape

By Bronwyn Bruton

In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

Africa Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Nov 13, 2020

How a Biden presidency could change US relations with the rest of the world

By Atlantic Council

We asked experts from around the Atlantic Council to preview what the election of Joe Biden as US president will mean for countries, big and small, all across the world. Here’s a quick spin around the globe as we preview what lies ahead for US foreign policy under Joe Biden:

Africa East Asia

New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020

The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa

By David A. Wemer

Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.

Africa Future of Work

The post Data remains a weak spot for African elections, but Ghana can lead the way appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But there is a worse alternative: and that is the very realistic prospect that the two sides will fight each other nearly to the death, then agree to negotiations that will allow both sides to heal and re-arm, until some provocation inevitably retriggers a new round of conflict, which will lead to another conflagration with immense costs to human life, and so on, as the cycle endlessly repeats itself. This is the scenario that has played out time and again in South Sudan, and it is by far the likeliest outcome of current demands for negotiation between the TPLF and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).

The reason for this is simple: the TPLF has good reason to think that it can attack the Ethiopian government forces, and yet not be held accountable by the Western democracies that wield so much influence in the country.

Despite the massive human rights violations that were associated with the TPLF’s rule—despite the authoritarianism and theft, the imprisonments and the torture that have been laid at its door—the TPLF’s international allies have never repudiated it, nor examined their inappropriate investment in the TPLF’s welfare. International analysts have pointedly and repeatedly failed even to raise the TPLF’s maladministration and intransigence in their assessments of this current crisis. This has created an attitude of impunity in the TPLF, but it has also undermined the Ethiopian leadership’s faith that international mediation and diplomacy can work on their behalf. And that is an awful tragedy, because if Abiy had any reason to believe that the international community could fairly and impartially mediate his conflict with the TPLF, he might actually be persuaded to stand down.

An unfinished revolution and the road back to insurgency

The TPLF took power in Ethiopia in 1987. Its leader, Meles Zenawi, effectively ruled Ethiopia unilaterally until his death in 2012, although he exercised his power through a four-party ethnic-based coalition called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was successful in producing a period of seeming ethnic calm and economic prosperity in Ethiopia; but it lost popular elections in 2005, at which time it took an alarming authoritarian turn, and grew increasingly repressive. Under Zenawi and his successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, the EPRDF effectively outlawed the freedoms of assembly and speech, banned most civil society organizations, and imprisoned tens of thousands of youths, Muslims, political opposition members, and journalists. Many of these individuals were cruelly tortured in prison. During this time period, the EPRDF—under the TPLF’s influence—launched a misguided invasion of Somalia and refused to withdraw its forces from Eritrean territory, violating the terms of a peace agreement and the ruling of a United Nations-backed border commission. Both of these actions have produced profound instability in the greater Horn of Africa region—in Somalia, by bringing the extremist al Shabaab militia to power, and in Eritrea, by prolonging a two-decade period of cold war that has isolated and impoverished the Eritrean people. But because the TPLF was widely viewed as an ally of the United States’ war on terrorism, it was insulated from international criticism, and also benefited from immense flows of foreign aid, which in turn allowed it to build a massive military and intelligence apparatus that was helpful in controlling the Ethiopian population, and further prolonged the EPRDF’s nondemocratic rule.

After years of public uprisings, in which many Ethiopians lost their lives, Desalegn was forced to resign as prime minister and the TPLF lost much of its hold on power. The group was largely forced to withdraw to its northern enclave, where it retained an arsenal of weaponry vastly disproportionate to its presumed political constituency (which represents approximately 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population). Though these allegations have not been definitively proved—and should therefore be referenced with caution—the new Ethiopian government has repeatedly and credibly accused the TPLF of working to incite ethnic conflicts and to undermine the new political order. Tensions have continued to rise, and have been aggravated by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has prevented the timely holding of national elections that might have produced some consensus on proposed reforms to the federalist system and the Ethiopian constitution.

In its impatience, the TPLF defied government orders and called Tigrayans to the polls. The lack of observers and the nature of the announced results—which showed the TPLF winning 98 percent of the popular vote—prevent this exercise from being described as an election.

The international community failed at that point—and at innumerable points leading up to it—to condemn the TPLF’s goading and irresponsible actions, and in particular, its blunt refusal to recognize the authority of Abiy’s administration. This international silence has persuaded the TPLF that it has retained the sympathies of its old international backers, and has inadvertently emboldened the hardliners at the top of the party. Prime Minister Abiy, who could have chosen to ignore what was at best a flimsy provocation, likewise chose to escalate rather than defuse the situation. He retaliated by cutting funding to the TPLF leadership. That in turn, appears to have goaded the TPLF into attacking an Ethiopian Defense Forces base located in the Tigray region. Non-Tigrayan soldiers, in a foreshadowing of ethnic-based violence by TPLF-aligned forces to come, were allegedly executed during the attack, and other federal soldiers still remain hostage.

And yet, at no point has any Western or African power called for the TPLF to lay down its arms. At no point have Western powers discussed leveling sanctions on the TPLF officials who authorized the attack. In fact, pointed op-editorials in premier publications have actually blamed the Prime Minister for “marginalizing” the TPLF from power, and held him equally responsible for the escalating tensions.

In fact, Abiy has been right to call the TPLF’s assault on federal forces a “red line” provocation. There is no government in the world that would tolerate such an assault. The moment that it took up arms against the federal government, and oversaw the execution of federal soldiers, TPLF forfeited its status as a political party and regional administration, and returned to its old roots as a rebel movement. There is thus no precedent in international law for calling its military assault an act of war. It is an act of insurgency; it is an act of armed revolt; and most dangerously, it is a revolt being prosecuted on ethnic lines, as the TPLF is politically isolated and lacks any political constituency outside of Tigray. TPLF forces—having consumed the narrative of ethnic-based persecution being fed to them by the TPLF leadership—have subsequently been implicated in the massacre of scores or hundreds of innocent non-Tigrayan bystanders at Mai-Kadra (though we should absolutely assume, given the previous conduct of the Ethiopian Defense Forces in Oromia and elsewhere, that there will be atrocities on both sides).

The urgent question is, how can the international community intervene to stop the fighting, and what actions can prevent a recurrence of the fighting?

Moving forward

First, the diplomatic community must recognize what is painfully obvious: that its lack of credibility has rendered it powerless to exercise influence on this conflict. This extends beyond the Western democracies to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), who are equally guilty of abetting the abuses of the TPLF, especially insofar as Somalia and Eritrea are concerned.

But the United States, in particular, has for too long failed to confront the abusiveness of the TPLF ruling cadre. US President Barack Obama’s repeated references to the Ethiopian government as “democratically elected” in spite of the flagrant rigging of elections—in which the unpopular ruling party always won between 97 percent and 100 percent of seats in the parliament—was widely viewed in Ethiopia as a betrayal of fundamental American principles. The international community has also maintained a pointed silence about the TPLF since Abiy took power. Time and time again, as the TPLF has been implicated in serious acts of provocation and violence, as the TPLF has rejected the authority of the central government—and the popular will that brought the new dispensation into being—Washington and its allies, particularly those in the chattering classes, have utterly failed to repudiate the TPLF.

If any of these international actors wish to stand as credible mediators, they must admit to their previous bias and address the threat that the bias poses moving forward. They must acknowledge and act on the recognition that the international silence on the TPLF’s conduct has played a significant role in creating the conditions for this current crisis.

Second, the international community must understand that Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea have long understood that the TPLF would never be constrained or barred from a return to power by Ethiopia’s external allies. While analysts claim that “no military solution is possible,” the ongoing international toleration of the TPLF has convinced them that the very opposite is true—and that both Abiy and Isaias believe that they can quickly win this battle.

Abiy has been widely lauded for making peace with Eritrea after decades of near-war over a border dispute. But the alliance served a vital tactical purpose of containing the powerful TPLF in its northern corner, where it has been surrounded by unfriendly forces: the Eritreans, the rival Amhara ethnic police and militias, and the federal troops controlled by Abiy. This coalition of forces—as well as fears that too-aggressive action by the TPLF could trigger broad ethnic reprisals against the innocent Tigrayan population—combined for a few years to keep a northern insurgency in check. But the TPLF is thought to control several hundreds of thousands of soldiers and irregular militia, and has a powerful modern arsenal. Until now, Abiy has not had the military strength to confront it, even as the TPLF has been widely accused of fomenting ethnic unrest around the country.

But since the day he came to power, Abiy has been frantically working to reduce the TPLF’s stranglehold on Ethiopia’s military resources and manpower. He is a calculating leader, and his willingness to take action to confront the TPLF in its stronghold, after years of strategic patience, indicates that he believes that he can win. Here is why he may be confident:

First, the US Department of State has formally indicated its concern about reports of the TPLF attack on ENDF bases on November 3. This puts down a marker that the Trump Administration considers the TPLF to be the instigator of the current round of violence, and gives Abiy a political green light to quell the unrest. That may change when the Biden administration takes control of the US government, but Abiy surely expects the conflict to be over by then.

State Department personnel have also pointedly resisted the temptation to echo descriptions of the conflict between the TPLF insurgency and the ENDF a “civil war.” The term is widely being used in the press, but it is alarmist: Abiy’s assault on the TPLF is certainly a gamble, and there is a possibility that a prolonged conflict in the far northern corner of Ethiopia could eventually spark unrest elsewhere. But there is a better than even chance that the military confrontation will play out in a matter of days rather than weeks. Prime Minister Abiy’s round rejection of outside intervention suggests that he is indeed confident of this result. It’s also important to understand that the TPLF, regardless of its residual military strength, is a politically isolated faction with few internal or external allies. Its grievances are unlikely to spark widespread unrest, as long as the Ethiopian population can resist the temptation to act out reprisals on innocent Tigrayans around the country.

And in spite of speculation that the TPLF may attempt to push an attack towards Addis Ababa, the battle is unlikely to spread southward. Abiy came to power when millions on millions of Ethiopians took to the streets to overthrow the TPLF-dominated regime. Anger against the TPLF—and unfortunately, against the broader Tigrayan ethnic group, precious few of whom have truly benefitted from TPLF rule—ran so high in the months following Abiy’s rise that many feared that a genocide against the Tigrayans could be imminent. For all the popular disenchantment with Abiy’s government, a launch of TPLF forces towards Addis Ababa, for the explicit purpose of overthrowing the government by force, would almost certainly produce an avalanche of popular anger. Abiy seems to have done a pretty good job of convincing average Ethiopians that his military assault is indeed a law and order operation designed in the long run to reduce conflicts across the country. Abiy’s popular standing has also benefitted from the nationalist fervor rising over Egyptian threats against the GERD, and US President Donald Trump’s casual incitement of a conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. (Another powerful reason, frankly, for the Ethiopian government to distrust any Western attempts at mediation.) The TPLF seems aware of this risk: apart from some bombast, its rhetoric has squarely emphasized a goal of self-defense.

A regional conflagration as a result of the fighting between the TPLF and ENDF is also unlikely. Neighboring states—all of whom have good relations with Abiy and poor relations with the TPLF—have so far resisted any impulse to insert themselves into the crisis. Sudan immediately closed its border with Tigray, and far more importantly, Eritrea has not launched troops into Ethiopian territory. (There have been unconfirmed reports of fighting between Eritrean and TPLF troops at various points along the border, but these have not been confirmed, and there is reason to think that Abiy and Isaias will resist Eritrea’s entry into the conflict unless it is absolutely necessary.) At a time of great uncertainty in Ethiopia, the restraint of the neighboring nations is a profoundly important asset: in Africa, “civil wars” are often sparked and aggravated by the meddling of foreign forces. Ethiopia’s strong relations with neighboring states are likely to prevent this outcome.

There is a risk that the TPLF may, out of desperation, attempt to push into Eritrean territory—as it did most recently in June 2016, at a time when the TPLF was at the height of its political and military power, in control of the entire Ethiopian military apparatus, and in possession of strong international support. (That attack also led to panicked headlines about the potential for a new war in the Horn.) But Eritrea successfully deflected the attempted invasion and is just as likely to be able to defend itself now. Plus, if the TPLF moves into Eritrean territory, Asmara will be able to justify a counterattack—and the TPLF will then be forced to fight powerful enemies on two fronts, with good reason to think that the ENDF and Eritrean forces would seek to coordinate their assaults. Again, that is not an outcome that the TPLF is likely to seek out.

This conflict has been years in the making, and it’s hard to see how it can be resolved through dialogue. By allowing most of the TPLF leadership to live unmolested in the north after losing power—without a truth and reconciliation commission, and with few attempts to hold the old regime accountable for human rights abuses or thefts of Ethiopian treasure—Abiy, willingly or not, had embarked on a grand experiment. The TPLF has not kept its side of that bargain. It’s true that if Abiy’s military gamble now misfires, Ethiopia and the rest of the region may be in for a miserable round of suffering. But neither can Abiy govern the country with an intransigent, heavily-armed spoiler in the north. There is no indication that any of these actors are willing to negotiate, and Abiy probably feels that this military confrontation is his best chance of achieving long-term peace.

Indeed, Abiy probably fears that if he fails to answer the TPLF’s overt attacks on the Ethiopian state and its citizens, it will cause him to lose control of his government. And all Ethiopia’s allies should fear that outcome, because we have no idea at all what might come next.

The most effective means of discouraging the continuation of this conflict is to finally put pressure on TPLF leaders—especially Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael—to stand down his forces in the interest of protecting the local population. Abiy urgently needs to be persuaded that he can rely on the international community—and not only his army—to ensure that the TPLF will be prevented from returning to power. Counterintuitively, the fastest way for the international community to do that is to stop calling for negotiations, and to start demanding accountability for the TPLF.

Calling for negotiations, as so many are advocating, will only encourage TPLF leaders to believe that violence will permit them to fight their way to a bigger chair at the table. That is not only a losing strategy in Ethiopia—it sets up an extraordinarily dangerous precedent for the next armed insurgency that wants to challenge central authority.

Bronwyn Bruton is the director of programs and studies of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @BronwynBruton.

AfricaSource Dec 4, 2020

Data remains a weak spot for African elections, but Ghana can lead the way

By Luke Tyburski

Ghana, with elections slated for December 7, may be the most robust environment for domestic election monitoring on the African continent. But fieldwork conducted in January 2020 confirmed that most stakeholders still find that data is a “weak spot.” This is not to say that peace and credibility are in doubt in Ghana’s election, but by better leveraging existing data resources, Ghana has an opportunity to champion transparency and set an example for regional peers.

Africa Elections

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020

Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis

By David A. Wemer

A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”

Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020

African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape

By Bronwyn Bruton

In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.

Africa Economy & Business