Syrians voted in 8,151 polling stations that opened across the country, with the exception of areas not controlled by the Assad regime. To cater to residents displaced from opposition-held areas, the government established special polling stations scattered throughout the country. For example, stations were set up for Raqqa residents in the Hama, Damascus, Hasakah, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous governorates. For Quneitra residents, more than 111 out of 175 stations were located outside the governorate.

In northeastern Syria, the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) prevented elections by establishing a security cordon around the Qamishli “government quarter,” in which the Assad regime provides administrative services to the residents of the area. SDF-affiliated social media and news outlets broadcasted warnings that the election sites might be subject to unspecified terrorist attacks. In Idlib and northern Aleppo, areas controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA), there were no electoral activities.

Of all the areas under governmental control, the most disruptions were reported in the southern areas of Sweida. Before the polls, and continuing into Election Day, demonstrators protesting against the elections entered several polling centers, took away ballot boxes, and set election materials on fire. The anti-election protests were a continuation of the anti-regime protests that have been regularly occurring for the past year. On Election Day, demonstrators in Sweida’s al-Karama Square came under fire by security forces, and a civilian was injured. It’s worth noting that protests were not limited to Sweida—violence and demonstrations were reported across the governorate, as well as in the towns of Qarya and Mazraa and the villages of Melh, Slim, and Koraya. In Daraa governorate, protests and threats of violence forced the government to relocate twenty-five polling stations. For example, stations in the town of Mahja were moved to the city of Izraa, stations from al-Karak were moved to al-Musayfrah, and those in the city of Jasem were relocated to a safer part of the city.

Where the polls were conducted without disruption, the process unfolded identically to the 2020 election. Because the election authorities neither register voters nor compile the voters list in advance of elections, the first step at the polling station was to register a voter using the blank forms used to write in voters. This way, the voters list was compiled on Election Day rather than being available to the committees before the elections.

Voters would then be handed a ballot and needed to choose to either use ballots pre-filled with the Baath Party-sponsored candidates on the National Unity (NU) list or, if they dared, a blank ballot. Those who opted for a blank ballot had to write in the names of the candidates by hand, ranging from five names in al-Quentra to thirty-two names in rural Aleppo, which is a burdensome process. In some areas, the non-NU candidates would also distribute pre-printed ballots, such as the “Sham” list in Damascus, which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). The practice is fully permitted by law.

To ensure high turnout, public institutions, companies, committees, factories, banks, and unions were instructed by the government not to give employees a day off, which prevented them from ignoring the polls, and to compel them to vote en masse, likely under supervision. Many polling stations were set up in or near their workplaces—like factories and universities—to boost turnout. However, in contrast with the previous elections, there was no information on turnout either during the day or immediately after the close of the polls. According to our research, the Supreme Judicial Election Committee (SJEC), governors, and heads of polling committees used vague language to describe the turnout in the media, with statements like “turnout was good,” “nice,” “high,” “not bad,” and “it got better in the afternoon” being used throughout the day. During a live interview on state television with the polling station committee in rural Damascus, the reporter abruptly changed the subject and asked the polling station president not to share any information about the number of voters or the station’s results.

There is little to be said about the credibility of the polling process itself. As described in a previous article on electoral administration, the process did not meet fundamental standards for impartial management of elections nor the standards of transparency. There were no independent national or international observers, and there were no systematic, evidence-based reports of the polling process. For what it is worth, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of mass proxy voting, underage voting, voting without secrecy, and voting in military barracks without a chance for supervision.

The same lack of transparency shrouds the process for resolving election disputes. The president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Jihad Lahham, announced on July 28 that all forty-seven appeals were rejected for “not meeting the conditions stipulated in the laws” and “not supported by any document or evidence.” Nothing is known about the nature of the appeals or those filing them.

The Syrian opposition was campaigning against the legitimacy of the elections. These efforts were led by the Syrian Negotiation Committee, several Syrian nongovernmental organizations, and the media. The key slogan of the campaign was “No to Assad and his elections” alongside “Resolution 2254,” which also appeared as hashtags on X (formerly Twitter). The campaign messages were of a general anti-elections character, pointing out that they were against the framework set by the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 2254. The campaign was launched late and was effectively active only on Election Day. It does not appear to have gained any significant traction.

The Baath Party endorsed NU lists that included 185 candidates across the country. As expected, the electoral system ensured that all of them were elected, making the partisan composition of the assembly identical to the previous one: 67 percent for the Baathists (a total of 74 percent for all the NU candidates) and 26 percent for those elected to seats not contested by the NU. The number of seats not contested by the NU candidates, a maximum of sixty-five, is not random; it is by design. It avoids the perception of single-party rule and allows for a semblance of diversity, but protects the regime by securing a two-thirds majority needed to fend off legislative challenges, enact constitutional amendments, or accuse the president of treason. This golden ratio has been the formula in place since the 2016 legislative elections held in the aftermath of the 2012 constitutional reforms.

Are there any other conclusions besides the predictable 100 percent victory for all of the NU candidates? Detailed analysis is difficult because of the lack of transparency; there is simply not enough data published for a granular view of the results. If elections were ever to be held under the framework of the UNSC Resolution 2254 and within international standards, the authorities would be obliged to publish the complete election results, including turnout with gender breakdown, numbers of invalid ballots, registered voters, and votes for all the candidates. Currently, the results published by the SJEC present only the votes of the winning candidates, not all the candidates. This makes election analysis impossible, as by how much the election losers lost will never be known.

Because the voting data are missing, and because the competition was, in practice, resolved before Election Day through internal elections and the primaries, the analysis is reduced to levels of participation. The SJEC only announced an overall number of voters in elections: 7,325,844 out of 19,200,325 claimed by the government to be eligible, which results in a turnout of 38.16 percent, about a 5 percent increase since the 2020 elections. This overall number says nothing about regional differences.

Voting patterns are even harder to analyze because of elections used a block vote system with multiple candidates. The workaround is to consider the top candidate on the list as representative of the support received by the list. Employing this method reveals a pattern of some voting shifts between the governorates and between the 2020 and 2024 elections. Countrywide, the NU lists received 5 percent fewer votes than in 2024. Some drops in the votes were dramatic, such as in Damascus, where NU lost 49 percent of the votes, followed by Hasaka with 43 percent. On the other hand, votes for NU in rural Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama dramatically increased (42 percent, 51 percent, and 71 percent, respectively.)

It will take some time to understand the cause of these changes. They could be simply the result of the redeployment of the military and the return of internally displaced persons, especially to Damascus. The only solid conclusion at this point is that the actual increase in the total number of those who voted by 1.1 million has not resulted in increased support for the NU lists, as they lost two hundred thousand votes compared to the 2020 elections. And, when compared with the 2016 elections, the increase in 2.2 million voters led to a decrease in support for the NU by 1.2 million votes.

Shifts in support for the NU lists do not seem to be related to whether the candidates on the lists were incumbents. As in the previous elections, the rates of turnover were high. Out of the 250 elected to the new parliament, ninety-three are incumbents, which is only 37.2 percent of the total—and almost exactly the same as in the 2020 elections, when 37.6 percent of incumbents were re-elected.

However, turnover is not uniform across the country. The variations between the regions are significant. In Idlib, Tartous, Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Damascus, more than 80 percent of representatives were replaced. On the other side of the spectrum is Sweida with only 33 percent, followed by Daraa at 40 percent, and Hassaka at 42 percent.

Besides analysis of the turnout and the turnover in the parliament, what are the election results saying about the structure and political dynamics of the newly elected assembly? On an individual level, it might be of interest that six of the eight members serving in the governmental delegation to the UN-sponsored Constitutional Committee were not re-elected, including Ahmed Kuzbari, the co-chair. In Damascus, the “Sham” list led by Hamsho, a sanctioned businessman closely affiliated with Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, won twelve seats that were not contested by the National Unity list. One of the new independent members of parliament from Aleppo, Mohammed al-Ruslan, is a former leader of a militia faction reportedly affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Madoul al-Aziz, a former leader of a militia affiliated to al-Nusra, was re-elected as an independent candidate for Deir ez-Zor.

But, as explained in the previous article on candidates, if there was any political competition, it played out in advance to general elections, in the intra-Baath Party elections and primaries. The conclusion from observing those processes is that the new parliament might be rejuvenated with significant turnover, but will likely remain in the service of the top Baath leadership.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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This article analyzes the evolving dynamics of Syria-Turkey relations, focusing on the key diplomatic milestones and the underlying factors influencing their interactions, and providing a comprehensive understanding of the path toward potential reconciliation. The objective is to identify the critical factors that could facilitate or hinder the normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara.

Turkey’s intentions

The ongoing situation in Syria presents risks for Turkish security, prompting a search for viable solutions to its multifaceted challenges. Starting in 2019, developments in Syria have been shaped by shared Russian-US interests in preventing Turkish intervention in the country and, in particular, safeguarding the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The presence of the Russian military and the prospect of economic sanctions from the United States have repeatedly prevented Turkish efforts to launch military operations in Syria. At least three planned Turkish military operations appear to have been prevented because of these factors.

Turkey urgently needs to address the situation in northeastern Syria, mainly because it has lost hope in the United States resolving its security concerns related to the YPG-dominated SDF. Ankara views the US partnership with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—as a national security threat.

As mentioned earlier, Turkey has three main objectives in Syria: to eliminate the YPG threat, facilitate the return of refugees, and seek a political solution for long-term stability. There is growing anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey and the Turkish opposition is gaining strength, putting pressure on the government to address the refugee crisis. Domestic politics significantly influence Turkey’s involvement with Damascus as the government aims to ease public discontent and bolster its political position.

Furthermore, Russia has conducted a successful propaganda campaign targeting the Turkish public and decision-makers, shaping perceptions, and influencing policy decisions. This campaign has further emphasized the supposed benefits of talking with Damascus.

Turkey didn’t perceive a realistic policy option to cooperate with the United States in Syria and pursue talks with Damascus. Speculation about a possible US withdrawal from Syria due to the upcoming US elections in November and a new momentum in Turkish-US relations resulted in Ankara hoping for a joint approach with Washington. However, the United States’ refusal to abandon the YPG continues to be the main barrier to reaching any agreement.

As Turkey cannot achieve its objectives given opposition from Russia and the United States, and Washington has yet to provide Ankara with a viable alternative, Turkey is willing to consider the option proposed by Russia. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has acknowledged the need for an exit strategy from Syria, a reality recognized across the Turkish political spectrum. The main issues concern Syria’s conditions and the nature of governance there. Erdogan has emphasized the need for a new social contract in Syria that would ensure the safe return of refugees and address Turkey’s security concerns.

The Russian strategy

Russia’s efforts to pressure Turkey into a military retreat from Syria suffered a significant setback in 2020, when the Turkish Armed Forces effectively defeated regime forces after the unfortunate loss of thirty-four Turkish soldiers. This event exposed the limits of Russia’s power and necessitated a reassessment of its strategy toward Turkey and the broader Syrian crisis.

While Russia has been focused on the invasion of Ukraine, its strategy in Syria has been aimed at preventing a situation in which a fait accompli by another actor diminishes its influence. Russia is actively pursuing a plan to secure its ongoing presence and control in Syria, while also preventing Western powers or their regional allies from establishing a solid position in Damascus. This strategic maneuvering is essential for Moscow to maintain its geopolitical leverage in the Middle East.

Turkey remains the primary obstacle to a decisive Russian victory in Syria. Moscow recognizes that, to surmount this impediment, it must actively involve Ankara in a manner congruent with Turkey’s interests, which only sometimes coincide with those of Western countries. Russia believes that Turkey is pursuing an autonomous agenda in Syria, which might deviate from the objectives of Western countries. This autonomy presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Russian diplomacy.

Russia is greatly concerned about the possibility of a Turkish-US agreement regarding Syria, particularly considering the potential future withdrawal of US forces from the area. This agreement could weaken Russian interests, leading Moscow to influence Turkey’s position actively. In the worst-case scenario for Russia, negotiations between Ankara and Damascus could serve as a stalling tactic, buying time until the situation in Ukraine stabilizes or the United States withdraws from Syria.

Russia has skillfully capitalized on Turkey’s concerns about migration to benefit itself. At first, it used the tactic of threatening to attack internally displaced persons (IDPs) along the border between Turkey and Syria to put pressure on Ankara. Presently, Russia is implementing an all-encompassing propaganda strategy intended to persuade the Turkish population that engaging in negotiations with Damascus is the definitive resolution to Turkey’s refugee crisis. This psychological and media campaign aims to alter public opinion and enable diplomatic talks.

Moscow is invoking the 1998 Adana Protocol, which would officially legitimize the Turkish military’s existence in Syria, to promote a consensus between Ankara and Damascus. Nevertheless, this proposal would require a thorough examination and possible protocol enhancement to make it more attractive to Ankara. Russia’s proposal for a formal and globally acknowledged military presence is intended to give Turkey a feeling of safety and credibility in its actions, thus creating a favorable atmosphere for diplomatic talks.

Damascus’s position

Reconciliation with Turkey, the last-standing primary regional adversary, is crucial to completing Syria’s narrative of victory. The prevailing sentiment in Damascus is that mending ties with Ankara would deliver a significant blow to the opposition, further impeding the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (UNSCR 2254). By reconciling with Turkey, Syria could strategically undermine the opposition’s position in the negotiations and strengthen its stance. This would help Syria consolidate its control over its future political landscape.

Syria would have preferred to negotiate with a Turkish government other than the one led by President Erdogan. Opposition parties in Turkey have demonstrated more eagerness to engage with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and are less bound to impose burdensome conditions for reconciliation on Damascus. Syria must confront the current reality of Erdogan’s government, which holds power despite its contentious position. The general sentiment in Damascus is that a potential reconciliation with Ankara should lead to only a limited amount of diplomatic interaction, allowing Syria to maintain some influence for possible future negotiations with a more favorable Turkish government. By adopting this pragmatic approach, Damascus can effectively navigate the intricate dynamics of Turkish politics while maintaining flexibility in its long-term strategic choices.

Moreover, re-establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey would significantly influence opposition armed factions in northern Syria. If Ankara changes its position, these groups—many of which depend on Turkish support—would experience a substantial decline in their influence. By ensuring that Turkey is held responsible for their actions, the opposition from these factions is anticipated to decrease significantly. Additionally, this normalization could resolve the stalemate in negotiations with the YPG-dominated SDF. The process of reconciliation with Turkey has the potential to either result in Kurdish communities making further concessions or lead to the formation of a united anti-YPG front by antagonistic Arab communities, with the support of Ankara. This transition has the potential to result in a more united and secure northern Syria, which aligns with Damascus’s broader strategic objectives.

Reconciliation with Ankara also carries substantial economic and financial incentives. Regaining partial or complete control over Turkey’s borders would provide Syria access to international trade routes, which would be crucial for economic recovery. The Syrian economy, severely damaged by prolonged conflict and financial restrictions, urgently needs opportunities for expansion and progress. Despite Turkey’s interest in other regional connectivity projects, Syria’s connectivity remains more feasible and cost-effective. The strategic advantage of re-establishing trade links with Turkey highlights the economic imperative for Syria to pursue normalization.

Nevertheless, Damascus has substantial apprehension about the validation of the Turkish military’s presence in Syria. Damascus might lose vital leverage in future discussions with Ankara by acknowledging or temporarily legitimizing this presence. As a result, Syria, with Tehran’s backing, is expected to consistently insist on the complete withdrawal of the Turkish Armed Forces from northern Syria as a prerequisite for reconciliation.

As Syria and Turkey navigate this new phase of diplomacy, the path to reconciliation remains fraught with uncertainty and complex technical negotiations. While recent developments hint at a thaw in relations, the demands and concessions required from both sides are more complicated. A photo-op between leaders might offer a symbolic victory, but it is the most accessible milestone in a future filled with arduous discussions and complex agreements. The real test lies ahead as both countries strive to address deep-seated issues, balance regional interests, and forge a sustainable path forward amid enduring skepticism.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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‘I’jaam: An Iraqi Rhapsody’ by Sinan Antoon 

I’jaam offers a poignant glimpse into 1980s Iraq under Saddam Hussein through the eyes of a prisoner. As part of the rich tradition of prison literature, it vividly captures Iraqi life under constant surveillance and the resilience of a community striving to escape torture. In this oppressive environment, only writing that “serves the cause of the Leader and the military establishment” is permitted. Thus, writing in defiance of this regime becomes an act of resistance. The imprisoned protagonist—an admirer of the famous Iraqi poet Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, whose work is considered subversive in Saddam’s Iraq—uses writing as a means of survival.

This intimate portrayal also serves as a crucial window for Western policymakers, providing insight into the lives of those in the region who bear the brunt of their policy decisions. Often treated as collateral damage or mere casualties in the pursuit of a greater good, the populace—be it in Iraq, Gaza, or Sudan—deserves to be better understood to shape policies with human rights in mind.

—Manal Fatima is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

‘Killing a King: The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the Remaking of Israel’ by Dan Ephron

In Killing a King, Dan Ephron recounts the two years between the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington and the murder of Yitzhak Rabin on a Tel Aviv street, juxtaposing the Israeli prime minister’s final acts with those of his murderer, Yigal Amir. Rabin’s murder came at a time of intense internal political debate in Israel over its future relationship with Palestine, feeding into existing divisions and making it a highly consequential moment in the country’s history. This retelling by Ephron helps explain the divisions in Israel that led to that fateful moment and how they linger today.

—David Maloney is the program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. 

‘Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books’ by Azar Nafisi

Reading Lolita in Tehran is an intimate and captivating look through Azar Nafisi’s lived experiences of revolutionary Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the formation of a clandestine book club, and eventual emigration. The memoir also delves into historical reversals, the loss of rights, and the plight of women across the country. Despite receiving its fair share of criticism since its 2003 publication, the book is arguably more relevant today, two years on from the beginning of the Women, Life, Freedom movement, offering readers an account of the early period of the Islamic Republic and the legacy of Iranian women’s struggles to regain the freedoms lost. And for those who love literature, the author—a professor of Western literature—delves deep into some of her favorite writers, including Vladimir Nabokov, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Jane Austen, and Henry James.  

—Masoud Mostajabi is a deputy director of the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘Syrian Dust: Reporting from the Heart of the War’ by Francesca Borri

A raw and powerful account of the Syrian war by Italian correspondent Francesa Borri, Syrian Dust provides a compelling personal account of events in Aleppo and surrounding areas from the chemical attacks of August 2013 through the following months. Borri hides with dozens of terrified civilians, scavenges to survive, meets with officials, observes the development and fracturing of warring parties, and provides a human lens for an inhumane time. Syrian Dust provides a view from inside the conflict itself—focusing on the human realities for a conflict and region so often discussed from 30,000 feet.

—Emilia Pierce is the deputy director of operation and finance for the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs. 

‘The Sheltering Sky’ by Paul Bowles

My favorite read this Summer (thus far) has been The Sheltering Sky by Paul Bowles. While written over seventy years ago, its themes, structure, and language seem surprisingly contemporary. The story follows a young American couple and their third-wheel friend who initially appear to be stereotypical wealthy “travelers, not tourists,” the kind of self-regarding intellectuals that pride themselves on their cultural openness but still disparage any local accommodations that don’t meet their standards. Over time, however, it becomes clear that exploring foreign lands is a convenient way for each to avoid their responsibilities, including to each other, much less confront their underlying alienation. As they travel through French-controlled North Africa—mainly Algeria—moving farther into the continent, their repeated efforts to escape their existence into environments that they don’t understand produces catastrophic results.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘No One Prayed Over Their Graves: A Novel’ by Khaled Khalifa

No One Prayed Over Their Graves was the last novel by Syrian writer and poet Khaled Khalifa before passing away in Damascus in 2023. The author is the Victor Hugo of the Arab World, known for his poignant realism, his vivid depiction of “Les Misérables” of subaltern Syria, and his criticism of the Baathist regime. The novel recounts the story of Christian and Muslim friends, Hanna and Zakariya, from a village near Aleppo in 1907 and how their lives were altered after a massive flood leveled their homes, businesses, and places of worship, and took the lives of their loved ones. The book that was long-listed for the 2023 National Book Award for Translated Literature is also a sweeping tale of religious diversity, coming of age, and class mobility in the hubbub of Aleppine society at the turn of the twentieth century. This novel was a particularly emotional read for me, as Khaled was a personal friend, and a living witness of the socio-political hardships and transformations in modern-day Syria that he immortalized in lush and elastic storytelling in novels like In Praise of Hatred, No Knives in the Kitchens of This City, or Death Is Hard Work.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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PKK penetration of the DAANES has also created a range of negative consequences for Syrians in the northeast, including relentless Turkish targeting of the area, anti-democratic governance by the PYD, systemic corruption, and armed clashes between the SDF and insurgents in Deir ez-Zor. To create conditions for a wider solution to the Syria crisis and satisfy their own interests, Washington and Ankara must find a mutually agreeable course of action; the two countries are due for a strategic dialogue on Syria later this year, where options can be scrutinized. A perennial idea for solving the impasse calls for the United States to facilitate delinking of the DAANES/SDF and the PKK. However, such a decoupling is easier said than done, and its feasibility hinges on US and Turkish willingness to make tough concessions.

Reign of the PKK

Despite unofficial US government claims to the contrary, the PKK has been intimately tied to the governance and security structures of northeast Syria from its inception. The foundational expertise and personnel that enabled the PYD and YPG to defend, administer, and expand their territorial holdings came from veteran PKK members. Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian Kurds affiliated with the PKK and its franchises flocked to northeast Syria after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, forming the core of the area’s administrative and military personnel. PKK veterans assumed greater responsibility as Syria’s security situation deteriorated and new adversaries like ISIS confronted the nascent self-administration. Senior YPG leaders were often Syrian Kurds who had spent time fighting abroad, such as future SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.

The network of experienced PKK operatives, or kadros in local parlance, subsequently became the chief conduit for PKK influence in the northeast’s civil and military architecture. While the DAANES has established myriad local political, security, and administrative councils and committees across its territory, power ultimately rests with the kadros assigned to “advise” them; no local authority can overrule the decisions handed down by the often foreign PKK veterans. Key economic functions, such as extracting, transporting, and selling oil from occupied fields in Deir ez-Zor, also fall under the kadros’ purview. Leaders in the DAANES-sponsored local councils have no oversight of the process, creating rampant opportunities for corruption. Smugglers allegedly seek the protection of kadros to protect their operations, and some experts contend that the YPG generates large swaths of its funding from kadros-linked oil diversion.

In the multi-ethnic SDF, kadros are a linchpin of the entire force; they comprise the most experienced fighters and often lead the forces’ non-Kurdish formations. An analysis of YPG casualty figures from 2013 to 2016 showed that nearly half of the militia’s battle deaths were Turkish citizens, demonstrating the importance of foreign fighters on the frontline. During the main phase of operations against ISIS in Syria, units of kadros frequently fought alongside embedded US troops in high-stakes operations, such as in amphibious crossings near Manbij and the liberation of Raqqa. The SDF’s—or, rather, the YPG leadership’s—lack of confidence in Arab partner forces tasked with holding Arab-majority areas like Deir ez-Zor, translated to the appointment of “shadow commander” kadros in these formations as well. PKK leadership reportedly even assigned kadros as minders for SDF commander Abdi.

Kadros are not the only PKK presence in the northeast. The party also works through a proxy known as the Revolutionary Youth (RY), a political organization that conducts civic and military programming but also engages in child recruitment for the PKK. The RY has also been instrumental in the recent PYD-instigated repression of opposing Kurdish political parties operating in the DAANES—a pattern dating back to the earliest days of the civil war in Syria. Offices of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a Kurdish political alliance closely linked with the Iraq-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and opposed to the PKK, are frequent targets of RY-linked arson attacks. In spite of these actions, the SDF and other security elements make no public effort to stymie the RY. In March, the US Department of State delivered a rebuke to SDF leadership over its failures to halt attacks on KNC offices and officials.

Discord in the DAANES

The entrenchment of the PKK has further complicated the already complex dynamics in northeast Syria. Turkey has adopted a more aggressive strategy for countering the PKK in Syria and Iraq, leading to several major military operations, as well as recent assassination and airstrike campaigns targeting DAANES officials, SDF fighters, and civilian infrastructure in the northeast. Non-Kurdish Syrians have their frustrations with the kadros’ rule, as demonstrated by Arab grievances aired during last year’s uprising and ensuing SDF crackdown in DAANES-controlled Deir ez-Zor. The United States is well aware of Turkish concerns and the degree of PKK influence in the northeast, though it has little to show for its efforts to dilute the latter. In spite of years of US-facilitated negotiations between the two Kurdish parties, the PYD continues to obstruct any power-sharing agreement with the KNC.

The situation within the SDF and its civil Syrian Democratic Council counterpart is no less knotted. Insiders and analysts have noted signs of a schism between hardliners and pragmatists within the Kurdish power structures. The former dismisses the idea of delinking from the PKK and eschews any power-sharing settlement with other Kurdish parties; hardliners also allegedly maintain a firm hold on critical political and security functions in the northeast. Meanwhile, pragmatists are open to dialogue and compromise with groups like the KNC; they favor greater international engagement and, perhaps, even breaking with the PKK.

Mazloum Abdi, ostensibly the leader of the pragmatists, claimed in 2020 that the SDF was working to remove foreign kadros from positions of authority and eventually from Syria, stating that “regional Kurdish support” was no longer needed in the DAANES’s extensive network of civic and military bodies. Whether Abdi was unwilling or unable to follow through is an open question, but PKK influence remains just as strong, if not stronger, four years later. Observers on the ground in the northeast have also reported the training of fresh, local Syrian kadros who now operate in areas such as Manbij and Deir ez-Zor, according to speakers in an expert working group attended by the author.

The narrow path to a win-win-win

Beyond its firm grip on power in the area, a complete decoupling of the PKK from northeast Syria also faces obstacles from stakeholders. The PKK has little current incentive to abandon or reduce its presence in Syria while it is losing ground in its traditional refuge in northern Iraq. If claims of oil revenue diversion are correct, hypothesized to constitute 40 percent or more of DAANES oil production, the group also stands to lose a significant fundraising stream connected to the kadros-run extraction operations. The existence of the aforementioned pragmatists might demonstrate some willingness by certain DAANES authorities to delink, but their seeming lack of leverage compared to the more militant hardliners and the lack of incentives from Washington and Ankara dim the prospect of a peaceful transition.

Were the United States and Turkey to agree on the end of direct PKK influence over northeast Syria, a mutually acceptable result would require considerable policy gymnastics from each side. First, Washington must recognize, at least tacitly, that it has empowered the PKK, as refusal to recognize empirical links between the group and the US counter-ISIS campaign in Syria strains credulity and damages mutual trust. Meanwhile, Turkey cannot wish away all the PKK-sympathetic Kurds and others in northeast Syria, even if the party leadership’s grip on the area is broken. A more practical goal for both sides is elevating pragmatist local Syrian elements in the DAANES and SDF and brokering a sustainable peace with Ankara. Reporting on previous US-Turkish compromise attempts indicated that Turkey would accept an opening with the Syrian Kurds in tandem with the expulsion of foreign PKK-linked Kurds, though the path to this might be dubious.

To whatever degree the purging of PKK personnel is operationalized, the effort would presumably create gaps in local administrative, governance, and security capabilities, which would need to be filled. Can the United States contribute to filling such gaps? US policymakers are leaning toward ending the US presence in northeast Syria, and discussions have already occurred on potential exit strategies. However, if an agreement can be reached with Turkey that ejects the PKK from the DAANES, this may incline Washington to invest in its involvement in the northeast to ease the transition from kadros administration to the local bodies already incorporated under the DAANES. Especially critical would be ensuring the competence of security forces tasked with maintaining the fight against ISIS, necessitating closer collaboration between the United States and Turkey.

The odds are slim that the two countries will reach the preconditions and compromises necessary for a delinking deal, let alone smoothly execute it in the face of expected PKK opposition. Still, the strategic logic presents wins for the United States, Turkey, and northeast Syria: Washington eases conflict with Turkey and maintains its Syrian partner, hedged on a commitment of diplomatic energy and finesse rather than new troops or money; Ankara drives a bitter foe from its physical and financial haven on the Syrian border and advances its thaw with Washington; and Syrians in the northeast can take the reins back from foreign militants ruling from the shadows. An agreement on the northeast could also jumpstart wider collaboration on Syria at a critical moment, benefiting millions of Syrians throughout the country still suffering from the fallout of their civil war. With soaring violence and humanitarian needs throughout the country, a burst of joint US-Turkish leadership has the potential to bring the international community back to the table and address the most grievous symptoms of the Syrian crisis.

JP Reppeto is an assistant with the Syria Strategy Project and a former Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. Follow him on X: @jp_reppeto

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Algerian Olympic boxer Imane Khelif made international headlines on August 1, when she knocked out Italian boxer Angela Carini just forty-six seconds into their match. After two forceful strikes to the head, Carini quit and fell to her knees in tears before walking away, refusing to shake Khelif’s hand. At one point, Carini could be heard on camera telling her coach, “It’s not right, it’s not right,” before exclaiming to the media that she had never been hit this hard in her career. Shortly after this, the hashtag #IStandWithAngelaCarini started to trend on social media.

Prominent public figures, like former US President Donald Trump, the Republican presidential nominee, accused Khelif of being a transgender athlete and promised to keep “men out of women’s sports.” Others have called on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to ban her from competing in future matches, noting that she was disqualified by the International Boxing Association (IBA) from the Women’s World Championships in New Delhi last year. The IBA said recently the disqualification was for failing to meet eligibility criteria.

Some have erroneously claimed that the disqualification was because Khelif was biologically a male, despite the fact that Khelif was born female. The IBA stated that, ahead of the world championships in 2023, Khelif underwent a test (the nature of which is confidential, but the IBA stated it was not a testosterone examination). The IBA president later told Russian news agency Tass that her disqualification was because “it was proven they have XY chromosomes.” (There is no evidence that Khelif has XY chromosomes.) IOC spokesman Mark Adams told reporters that the committee could not confirm the IBA test results and that “this is not a transgender issue.” (The two organizations no longer work together.)

Although Carini has since apologized for not shaking her opponent’s hand and said she felt badly that an online debate had transpired as a result, it wasn’t enough to stop the personal attacks on Khelif’s gender identity.

Several media outlets have speculated that Khelif could have differences in sex development (DSD), a group of rare medical conditions, but there is no verification that she has DSD or any medical condition related to sex traits. Khelif is not transgender and does not identify as intersex, contrary to what many have claimed about her on social media. In the face of criticism after her disqualification last year, Khelif responded, “To say that I have qualities and abilities that do not qualify me to compete with women is illogical. I did not create myself. This is God’s creation.”  

Middle East and North African (MENA) social media users were quick to stand behind Khelif, using the English and Arabic hashtags #IstandWithImaneKhelif and #إيمان_خليف (#Iman_Khelif) and calling her “brave” for standing her ground. The themes of discourse found online, mainly in Arabic, highlighted colonial-linked narratives about the “West” attempting to steal this win from an Arab athlete by fabricating lies about her gender identity. This also comes at a time when transgender rights in the West remain a highly contentious topic, especially in the lead-up to the US presidential election in November. 

Some Algerian fans, in particular, have described the West’s reaction to Khelif’s win as “anti-Arab,” maintaining that Western notions of Arab womanhood remain entrenched in a profoundly Eurocentric and racist understanding. On X, Algerian cartoonist Nime posted a drawing of Khelif with her boxing shorts pulled down to reveal her pink undergarments to affirm her identity. Meanwhile, Algeria’s official football X account posted a picture of Carini at the press conference with the caption “cry more,” which has now gone viral with 59 million engagements.

Many Algerians have highlighted the hypocritical nature of the accusations, noting that other Olympic female athletes, like US rugby player Ilona Maher, have been praised for taking a stand against body negativity and supporting women of “all the different body types,” while Khelif was harassed online for hers. Maher told her fans stories about how she was shamed for her masculine body type in a now-viral TikTok post with the caption, “All body types can be Olympians.” Yet, that same understanding was not extended to Khelif. Unfortunately, as the Associated Press noted, “Female athletes of color have historically faced disproportionate scrutiny and discrimination when it comes to sex testing and false accusations that they are male or transgender.” 

Shortly after Khelif defeated Carini, far-right Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni posted a picture with Carini on X, stating, “I know you won’t give up, Angela, and I know that one day you will earn with effort and sweat what you deserve in a finally fair competition.” Other conservative public figures, like X’s Elon Musk, reposted videos of Khelif’s match and commentary warning US voters that “Kamala Harris supports this” in a bid to link the incident to domestic right-wing narratives about sexual identity amid a critical election cycle. Author J. K. Rowling, who has made transphobic comments in the past, also posted a picture of the match on X with the caption, “Could any picture sum up our new men’s rights movement better? The smirk of a male who’s knows he’s protected by a misogynist sporting establishment.” This strain of Western discourse portrays a bigoted understanding of womanhood, one rooted in anti-LGBTQI sentiments. 

The contrast between both sides of the discourse highlights gaps in the social understanding of womanhood and sexuality. By denying Khelif’s womanhood and leveraging her win to disseminate miseducated narratives that fuel anti-LGBTQI sentiments, critics are essentializing the definition of gender and perpetuating stigmas. 

This dangerous narrative, coupled with a rise in anti-Arab sentiments amid the ten-month Gaza war, has brewed the perfect storm for right-wing figures to launch baseless attacks on Khelif’s gender identity.

Analyzing the sentiments behind these narratives can paint a picture of how divisive gender and sexuality discourse can be, especially amid a global election cycle. With the backdrop of race and nationality, these sentiments can be used to sustain a limited understanding of gender and LGBTQI identities. There is no “one box fits all” definition of these themes. Instead, using a nuanced approach to these complex issues could help shed light on the many unique experiences of womanhood. Like all Olympians, Khelif has dreamed of this moment since she was a young girl, growing up in an impoverished neighborhood where she and her family used to sell bread and plastic to afford her boxing lessons. Having beat Carini, Khelif won the quarterfinals against Hungarian boxer Anna Luca Hamori and is set to advance to the semifinals on August 6. With thirty-seven victories and nine defeats in her career, Khelif has earned her spot at the Olympics. Barring Khelif’s participation would only let misguided ideologies concerning gender identity win. 

Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs.

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The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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This is the first international investigative report presenting factual findings and legal conclusions on violations during the conflict. The COI found that Hamas and other Palestinian militants committed war crimes and violated international humanitarian and human rights law in their October 7, 2023, attack, and Israeli authorities and security forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and violated international humanitarian and human rights law, in their military campaign in the Gaza Strip. These findings and the robust evidence backing them may support future accountability proceedings.

About the COI

The UN Human Rights Council established the COI in May 2021, mandating it to investigate all alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Palestinian territories and Israel leading up to and since April 13, 2021—a date marking an increase in protests and violence in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza sparked by disruptions at the al-Aqsa Mosque and the anticipated eviction of Palestinian families from East Jerusalem.

The COI is led by three independent and impartial experts, supported by a team of investigators and analysts. The standard of proof is “reasonable grounds,” following most other UN human rights investigative bodies, including those on Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela. Facts are reported “where, based on a body of verified information, an objective and ordinary prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to conclude that the facts took place as described,” and legal conclusions are reported where “facts meet all the elements of a violation or abuse.”

The COI based its June report on thousands of forensically verified open-source items, more than 350 items received from public calls for submissions, and witness and survivor interviews in Turkey and Egypt, where individuals had fled, as well as remotely. The COI sent one request for information to the state of Palestine (represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization), which provided “extensive comments.” Israel did not respond to the COI’s six requests for information and access to the territory. However, officials denounced the COI, alleging prejudice and antisemitism—echoing allegations from prior UN investigative mandates concerning Israel—and reportedly restricted witness communication.

October 7, 2023, attack

The COI found that members of Hamas’s military wing, other Palestinian armed groups, and Palestinian civilians committed war crimes and violated international humanitarian and human rights law in their October 7, 2023, attack.

The COI detailed the war crimes of murder and intentionally directing attacks on civilians, committed by shooting and killing eight hundred civilians at twenty-four kibbutzim and civilian locations on October 7, 2023. The report details the horrific methods by which militants killed—systematically moving from house to house, shooting at hiding and fleeing civilians, setting homes on fire, and killing civilians at a music festival, in public toilets, in public shelters, and at bus stops and along roads. Among the dead were forty children, including a nine-month-old shot and killed while hiding with her mother, and 130 people aged sixty-five and older. Through these acts, militants also committed the war crimes of torture and cruel or inhuman treatment and destroying or seizing the property of an adversary. The COI also described unlawful attacks at military outposts, including killings of soldiers who were hors de combat.

Palestinian militants’ indiscriminate rocket fire toward populated places in Israel—killing eighteen civilians on October 7, 2023, and in following weeks—also constitutes the war crimes of murder and intentionally directing attacks on civilians.

Palestinian fighters also committed the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity by desecrating corpses, including burning, mutilating, lacerating, decapitating, and undressing and subsequently exhibiting bodies.

The COI confirmed acts of sexual violence against women and men at the Nova music festival, Route 232, Nahal Oz military base, and kibbutzim Re’im, Nir Oz, and Kfar Aza on October 7, 2023. Evidence included restraints placed on women, positions of and signs of violence on victims’ bodies, and disseminated imagery of undressed bodies. The COI also found that gender-based violence was “perpetrated in similar ways in several locations and by multiple Palestinian perpetrators,” with patterns including abducting women with force or threats, coerced close physical proximity to abductors, treatment of women’s bodies as “victory trophies,” and gendered slurs. The COI could not verify reports of rape, sexualized torture, and genital mutilation due to lack of access to victims, witnesses, and crime sites, nor did it find evidence that militants were ordered to commit sexual violence.

Finally, the COI found that militants committed the war crime of taking hostages—often combined with outrages upon personal dignity and inhumane treatment, including sexual and gender-based violence, assault, harassment, and intimidation—by abducting 252 people from Israel (approximately twenty security forces and the remainder civilians, including thirty-six children) and brought them to Gaza. As of May 21, half of the hostages were released or rescued, with the remainder in captivity, whether alive or dead.

Military response in Gaza

The COI found that Israeli authorities and members of the security forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and violated international humanitarian and human rights law, in their military campaign in Gaza.

Israeli authorities and forces perpetrated the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare, evidenced by the imposition of a total siege for two weeks, from approximately October 9 to 20—with water shut off and no aid allowed in—followed by meager aid deliveries, with measures hampering entry of aid and restricting or blocking specific items. The COI concluded that authorities imposed the siege as retribution for militants’ October 7, 2023, attack and that aid restrictions were intended “to instrumentalize and weaponize the provision of necessities” and hold hostage the Gazan population “to achieve political and military objectives,” constituting collective punishment of Palestinians in Gaza. Israeli forces also attacked humanitarian convoys, further limiting aid availability and distribution.

Israeli authorities and forces also committed “[e]xtermination, as a crime against humanity”—”the killing one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population, … [as] part of a mass killing of members of a civilian population”—based on attacks on civilians and humanitarian aid restrictions.

Israeli authorities and forces also committed the war crimes of murder and intentionally directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects, as well as the crime against humanity of murder. Israeli officials’ statements evidence permissive changes in targeting practices—launching more strikes than in prior conflicts, targeting locations with “an inkling of intelligence,” and using more intense weaponry with wider impact areas—resulting in significantly higher casualties than in prior Israel-Hamas conflicts and a higher proportion of women and children killed. The report detailed instances in which Israeli forces targeted civilians who were clearly unarmed, including civilians sheltering at a church, a child holding a white flag, and three unarmed Israeli hostages. The COI also found Israel’s military campaign consistent with the Dahya doctrine, a military strategy to use “overwhelming and disproportionate force against civilian areas and infrastructure” to defeat the enemy.

The COI noted it continues to investigate reports that Hamas and other militants operate from civilian locations, but it could not verify evidence Israeli authorities publicly presented. The COI made no finding regarding Hamas’s use of human shields.

The COI found that Israeli evacuation orders constituted the war crime and crime against humanity of forcible transfer. From October 7, 2023, to December 30, 2023, more than eighty orders instructed civilians to leave their neighborhoods and go to areas that effectively constituted safe zones with legal protections. However, many evacuation orders were unclear and confusing, had insufficient or unstated time frames, and/or were difficult or impossible to comply with due to chaos along evacuation routes—including Israeli checkpoints where individuals were forced at gunpoint to strip and “walk for prolonged periods without clothes,” a lack of transport, inadequate support for vulnerable persons, and Israeli and Hamas attacks on and harassment of evacuees. Moreover, evacuation orders were issued alongside or in the context of authorities’ statements dehumanizing Palestinians, labeling all Gazans as Hamas, referring to the second Nakba, and calling for the removal of Gazan civilians and the establishment of Israeli settlements. Accordingly, the evacuation orders did not constitute an advance effective warning to civilians, but instead amounted to forcible transfer. Israeli forces also attacked safe zones and destroyed entire communities and residential areas that were evacuated, leaving nothing for families to return to.

The COI also documented Israeli forces’ commission of the war crimes of sexual violence, outrages upon personal dignity, and sexual and gender-based violence amounting to torture or inhuman and cruel treatment, as well as the crimes against humanity of gender persecution and torture and inhuman and cruel treatment. Israeli forces compelled public stripping and nudity “in many locations,” with victims “blindfolded, kneeling, and/or with their hands tied” while subject to interrogation, verbal or psychological abuse, and/or coerced physical acts. “[M]en and boys were targeted in particular ways,” including Israeli forces repeatedly filming and photographing them with images disseminated online and family and community members forced to watch. Women were also targeted with specific forms of psychological violence and sexual harassment, including online shaming and doxing, sexualized graffiti, and invasion of personal privacy, including by soldiers rifling through lingerie. These acts were aggravated by violating Gazans’ modest and private social practices and disseminating humiliating content online that would be almost impossible to remove. The COI concluded that the sexual and gender-based violence “was intended to humiliate and degrade the Palestinian population as a whole.” The pattern of forced public stripping and nudity indicated it was either ordered or condoned, and the prevalence and severity of sexual and gender-based crimes suggest they are part of Israeli operating procedures.

Impact of the report

The COI is not a court or a tribunal, and it cannot prosecute or ensure legal accountability. However, it can issue recommendations to promote accountability and support accountability mechanisms, including by sharing evidence with domestic, regional, and international courts. Thus, while the report itself will not result in trials, its documentation can advance investigations and contribute to future prosecutions of Palestinian and Israeli forces and authorities. These cases may proceed at the International Criminal Court (ICC)—where the prosecutor has applied for arrest warrants for Hamas and Israeli officials—or in domestic courts. The COI is also recommending these accountability steps—that ICC member states support and cooperate fully with the Office of the Prosecutor’s investigation and that states parties to the Geneva Conventions, Convention against Torture, and the Genocide Convention investigate core international crimes under domestic or universal jurisdiction.

While investigations and prosecutions may take years, legal accountability is essential to recovering and healing from a conflict that has resulted in “months of losses and despair, retribution and atrocities.” As the COI concluded: “The only way to stop the recurring cycles of violence…is to ensure strict adherence to international law.”

Elise Baker is a staff lawyer with the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project. Previously, she worked at the United Nations International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism on Syria and led Physicians for Human Rights’ Syria Mapping Project, which documented attacks on Syria’s health care system.

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The turbulence of the current political climate cannot be overstated. Netanyahu’s schedule has been plagued by constant turmoil. Biden’s recent bout with COVID-19, the campaign obligations of Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, and confusion about who would preside over—or even attend—the joint session of Congress convened in the prime minister’s honor have all complicated logistics. This, at a time when the upcoming US elections in November are already absorbing the vast share of America’s attention. None of this commotion detracts from the importance of high-level engagement at this critical juncture.  

In his face-to-face encounter with Biden, Netanyahu had a pivotal opportunity—which one hopes that he didn’t squander—to synchronize Israeli and American objectives for the remaining six months of the Biden presidency. He would have done wisely to move beyond pithy slogans and platitudes and, instead, provide detailed outlines of his plans for the future of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the festering conflicts with Lebanon and Iran, and the drive to further Israel’s integration into the Middle East. Coordination with the United States is a force multiplier for Israel. Discord weakens its hand.

Netanyahu is advocating what his aides have dubbed a “new way” of confronting Iran—the same country that featured prominently in his previous, and no less controversial, appearance on Capitol Hill in 2015. Summoning memories of Pearl Harbor and Winston Churchill to draw parallels between World War II and the present moment, he appealed to Congress on July 24 for the United States to take a more aggressive approach toward combatting the Islamic Republic by bolstering support for Israel’s war on Hamas and helping to craft a new Abraham Alliance to “counter the growing Iranian threat.” That plea comes on the heels of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s July 19 warning that Iran is “probably one or two weeks away” from producing enough fissile material to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

The general themes of the prime minister’s case will undoubtedly resonate with the president. But significant gaps endure. The pace of ongoing negotiations to facilitate freedom for the captives in Hamas custody and an end to the fighting in Gaza has fallen short of Biden’s expectations. The US has also been known to encourage Israel toward restraint when responding to the provocations of Iran and its regional proxies.

When Netanyahu and Biden met privately in the Oval Office, both leaders came armed assuredly with extensive wish lists. The prime minister will have beseeched the president to continue having Israel’s back for as long as it takes the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to defeat its enemies resoundingly. (They likely disagreed on what that actually entails.) More specifically, Netanyahu will have repeated his request for unimpeded access to American weaponry and asked that the Biden administration remain steadfast as a bulwark to prevent the imposition of international sanctions against Israel. He will have sought US backing for his vision of a demilitarized and deradicalized Gaza—one where Israel will maintain security oversight while Palestinians who favor coexistence with their Israeli neighbors exercise civilian control—and for Israeli measures to defend against threats from Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Above all else, he will have implored Biden to leverage the full weight of America’s power in order to halt Iran’s malign influence and thwart its nuclear ambitions.

The president will have pushed the prime minister to line up behind US-sponsored efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza and win the release of all those being held hostage. He will also have pressed Netanyahu to contribute to de-escalating rising tensions across the region. In that context, Biden will have reiterated his call for Israel’s government to articulate a pathway that can lead to eventual Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite to the creation of a broader multinational framework—analogous to the “Abraham Alliance” which Netanyahu previewed before Congress—that can function as a means to counter Iranian belligerence decisively.

Echoes of Biden’s words to Netanyahu would have surfaced in the prime minister’s subsequent conversation with Harris, who has now stepped further into the limelight as the senior-most administration figure to deliver public comment on the discussions with the Israeli leader. That said, the White House readout of her meeting with Netanyahu included a pointed reference to “extremist settler violence and settlement expansion” as destabilizing elements in the West Bank. Where the vice president appears also to have deviated from Biden is in the intensity of her reaction to Gaza’s humanitarian predicament, about which she intoned on July 25 that “we cannot allow ourselves to become numb to the suffering and I will not be silent”—prompting a senior Israeli official to express concern that her remarks could “be interpreted by Hamas as daylight between the US and Israel, thereby making a deal harder to secure.”

The clock is ticking. Biden, no longer inhibited by the constraints of a re-election bid, is primed to make legacy moves and determined, by his admission, to “keep working to end the war in Gaza, bring home all the hostages, and bring peace and security to the Middle East and end this war.” Caveats notwithstanding, these are all objectives that Israelis can embrace wholeheartedly. Given the uncertainty of what may transpire after January 20, Netanyahu—whose political legacy hangs in the balance—should hasten to roll up his sleeves, attach Israel’s wagon to Biden’s train, and pray it reaches that destination.

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

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The absence of an independent electoral administration in Syria is not news to anyone. The electoral authorities are deeply embedded within the judicial and executive structure and operate as extensions of the ruling party’s apparatus, rather than as impartial overseers of the electoral process. This integration ensures that electoral commissions at all levels, from national to regional, strictly adhere to the governing party’s agenda.

The administration is not a centralized system under a single hierarchical institution. Instead, it involves multiple governmental and judicial bodies. At the top of this system is the Supreme Judicial Elections Committee (SJEC), which in practice is appointed by presidential decree instead of by the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as required by the law. The SJEC is neither equipped nor mandated to implement elections, as it does not have staff or offices for election operations.

Below the SJEC are the governorate-level subcommittees. Nominally, these should be the key institutions in managing election operations other than the candidacy process, which is managed by the nomination committees that work independently from the governorate subcommittee.

Both committees are staffed by judges who approach their work by focusing on providing legal cover for processes implemented by other institutions, rather than actively managing electoral operations.

These committees suffer from the same lack of independence as the rest of the judicial system in Syria, as the president wields significant control over the judicial system overall. He is a member of the SJC and appoints the Supreme Constitutional Court, which handles election appeals.

However, even if the judicial committees were more independent, they would have little control over the process: the Ministry of Interior (MoI) is the key operational entity. It is tasked with various matters, such as managing the voters register, custody over all the electoral documents, procurement and management of sensitive election materials, and logistics.

At the local level, election day operations are managed by election committees composed of civil servants appointed by governors. These committees are part of the governmental structure and do not report to the SJEC, further eroding the processes’ independence. The committees are hardly trained, as their training consists of oath-taking ceremonies with little focus on the actual procedures.

The lack of comprehensive regulations that are supposed to operationalize the election law exacerbates these issues. With judicial commissions reduced to issuing appointments and loose guidance, many aspects of the elections remain unregulated. This regulatory vacuum gives the MoI and election committees significant discretion in implementing electoral procedures.

In conclusion, the Syrian electoral administration system is designed to centralize control under the president through the judicial system, governors, and the MoI. This structure eliminates any meaningful chance for truly independent elections, as every key aspect of the electoral process can be traced back to presidential influence or control.

All this raises the question: what are the options for credible management of elections in Syria? Can the system be reformed by focusing on key problematic aspects? That said, the system is so deeply flawed that it needs to be rebuilt entirely for elections to enjoy any credibility. The standards required are familiar and often used in post-conflict settings, such as establishing a new independent electoral management body with authority to both regulate and implement elections and whose leadership is appointed through a consensual process. Until that is possible, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254 attempts to provide a transitional fix, stating that elections should be “administered under supervision of the United Nations.”

However, the term “supervision” has various forms and definitions, even within the UN framework, and the UN’s role has ranged from approving steps in the management of the process to “conducting” elections as part of the peace process, as it did in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, or East Timor. Yet, such deep involvement of the UN in Syrian elections would require a high degree of political consensus among the UNSC members, which is hard to envision.

On the other hand, when examining the system and the candidacy process, it is apparent that the laws and procedures—or lack thereof—are tools serving a single purpose: eliminating candidates not endorsed by the Baath Party.

The constitution neither protects nor restricts the right to run in assembly elections. Instead, candidacy is entirely regulated by an election law adopted in 2014 by presidential decree. This law introduces several unfair limits on this right. Some restrictions, like the ten-year Syrian nationality requirement, seem minor but impact those with unregularized status (except for Hasakah’s Kurds, who were designated as foreigners or “ajanib”) and potentially up to 4 million Syrians living overseas.

There are a few more restrictions of particular concern for those who opposed the Assad regime, such as the exclusion of those who have been sentenced for a “felony or misdemeanor that is dishonorable and shakes the public trust.” These offenses are defined by the decree of the justice minister and disqualify all those sentenced for political reasons. However, even if the offense does not fall into this category, all criminally convicted individuals automatically lose their civil and political rights, including the right to stand for office, for ten years after serving their prison sentence.

Those eligible to apply for candidacy must navigate a process that is only vaguely regulated, giving judge-led committees considerable flexibility in deciding on nominations. For example, committees may request an “accredited certificate” proving literacy even when candidates present university degrees. Another quirk requires candidates who wish to contest a “worker or famer” seat to prove they are not listed in industrial or commercial registers.

As presented in the electoral system article, candidates not running on the Baath-endorsed National Unity (NU) List have minuscule chances of being elected. What, then, explains the large number of candidates for the 250 seats in the assembly? For example, in the SJEC accepted 11,341 applications in the 2016 elections, 8,735 in 2020, and 9,194 in 2024. The answer is that the Baath Party encourages members to apply in massive numbers as an indicator of vigorous and credible political competition. Registering for candidacy with the SJEC is only the first prerequisite for becoming a Baath candidate. The second step is the Baath Party process, in which the aspirants compete for the endorsement. This is colloquially called “primaries,” but “consultation” would be a more accurate term.

Without a real election campaign—as a case in point, the NU lists of candidates were only published six days before the polls—hyping up the primaries is essential for the illusion of choice. And, because the Baathists not featured on the NU lists have little chance of winning a seat, the primaries are more important than the polling. Most of the aspirants not included in the list withdrew before election day, so only 1,516 candidates are heading to the polls.

Despite being central to elections, the primaries are still just theatrics rather than a genuine competition. While they look like a proper election process on the surface, their results are not binding. The participation of Baathists is wide and includes an “electronic voting system” that could be easily manipulated and does not guarantee secrecy, and “the party independent election commission” oversees the process. Yet, the result of voting is only advisory. The final say remains with the top Baath Party body, the Central Command, which regularly tweaks the results, claiming to have taken into consideration the “opinion of the general public.” That outcome is regularly criticized on social media.

The Baathists on the NU List were announced, with a delay of two days, on July 9 and for unclear reasons. Baath-affiliated media justified the delay by arguing it was to “ensure fair representation, support the democratic process, and respect the voters’ will in a balanced manner.” But the concurrent news of the dismissal of the nineteen incumbent members of the assembly for “low ideological awareness,” and the lifting of the immunity of another seven members due to corruption, attracted interest and was a matter of debate in social media.

A cursory review of the NU lists reveals that the number of incumbents (fifty-eight) is somewhat lower than in the 2020 elections (sixty-eight), which might reflect the above-mentioned renewed party leadership. The Baath strategy appears to be the promotion of lower-tier loyalists to rebuild party discipline. A deeper analysis of that trend is warranted and should examine why the governorates with the highest turnover are Damascus, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, Tartous, and Raqqa. On the other hand, Daraa (where five out of eight candidates are incumbents) and al-Hasakah (with six incumbents out of eleven) seem to have only a few replacements.

The number of women in the assembly is consistently trending downward—in 2020, it dropped from thirty-three to twenty-eight—and this year’s elections did not reverse that trend. Twenty-two female candidates are now on the NU list (12 percent), even fewer than in 2020 when NU featured twenty-five women. The Baath Party could easily endorse more women if it wanted to promote women’s participation, as the 2020 elections show that women have minimal chances to be elected outside of the NU lists (only 1.5 percent of the non-NU candidates are women), so the Syrian parliament will likely remain one among those with the lowest representation of women in the world.

The candidates running for the uncontested seats are colloquially called “independents.” More than one thousand of those remaining in the race competed for the sixty-five seats. They sometimes formed “independent candidate lists,” mostly in urban governorates like Damascus and Aleppo. These are often businessmen or militiamen closely affiliated with the regime, supporting the facade of diversity. In some cases, they feature prominent personalities, such as the Damascus list “From Damascus For You Syria,” which includes Mohamed Hammam Miswati and Bilal Naal, assembly incumbents with close ties to the Assad regime. Another Damascene list is “Sham List,” which features the incumbent Mohamed Hamsho (sanctioned by the European Union and the United States). Others, like Wael Melhem from Homs, ran without forming a list and count on personal prominence.

And while the polls were held on July 15, the elections were effectively over at the end of the primaries. The candidates on the National Unity list will sit in the assembly. If there was hope for even a minor opening of political space, the regime sent a clear message: there was no interest in political reforms. Elections are only an aspect of internal Baath consolidation, and the assembly will have free rein for constitutional amendments needed to allow Bashar al-Assad to stay in office beyond 2028.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post Syrian elections are decided before election day appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The absence is significant, as accountability for genocide is an integral part of a surviving community’s healing. Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Yezidi survivor of ISIS enslavement, has spoken directly on the issue, stating, “Convictions of ISIS members for genocide are vital to our healing process; they let us know that the world has seen, and condemns, the efforts to eradicate the Yezidi people.”

Since 2016, the United States has made some progress in this regard with the State Department’s recognition of genocides in Iraq, Xinjiang, the Ottoman Empire, and Myanmar. But during the same period, US genocide law has failed to keep pace. While there are some logistical reasons for the lack of prosecutions—notably, the lack of direct perpetrators on US territory—the US justice system can instead pursue those otherwise complicit: corporations. However, alarming gaps in US genocide law shield corporations from accountability while denying comprehensive justice to victims and survivors.

Shortcomings in US genocide law and policy

In the US legal system, the Genocide Convention Implementation Act (codified under 18 US Code § 1091) constitutes most of the legal criminal bullwork aimed at genocide prosecution. The code mirrors much of the 1948 Genocide Convention’s language, prohibiting actions with the “specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.”

In some ways, the law’s reach extends beyond the Genocide Convention’s scope, allowing authorities to hold corporations criminally liable for federal crimes, including genocide, committed by their employees, officers, or agents in their scope of employment. In contrast, the International Criminal Court, and even some countries, cannot hold corporations themselves accountable.

Despite this broader scope, the act remains poorly equipped to handle cases of genocide in general, let alone to prosecute corporations specifically. For instance, according to the Open Society Justice Initiative, the code’s wording renders the act less effective than the Genocide Convention. Possibly most damaging to the law’s breadth is the act’s (18 US Code § 1093) definition of “substantial part.” Where the Genocide Convention does not require “substantial” destruction in the first place, the act requires the destruction of “a part of a group of such numerical significance that the destruction or loss of that part would cause the destruction of the group as a viable entity within the nation of which such group is a part.”

US and international law also differ in defining the degree of mental harm constituting genocide. US code requires “the permanent impairment of the mental faculties…through drugs, torture, or similar techniques,” compared to the Genocide Convention’s broader protection of victims suffering “serious…mental harm.” Therefore, the code’s variation from international law substantially limits the recognized scope and qualifying acts of genocide.

Beyond wording, other legal factors continue to impede genocide prosecution. For example, temporal jurisdiction prevented prosecutors from bringing cases prior to the act’s passage in 1988, and the code only allowed for trying foreign nationals after the Genocide Accountability Act’s passage in 2007.

The issue of mens rea, or “mental state,” also poses a unique challenge to prosecutors seeking corporate accountability for genocide. Mens rea requires proof of express genocidal intent, but international interpretations of this requirement have remained vague and inconsistent. Mens rea under US law becomes even more complicated when introducing secondary liability, as some states’ caselaw interpretations require a complicit party to possess the same mens rea as the direct perpetrator, while other states’ caselaw does not. This divide reflects a broader international debate and complicates the legal considerations for possible US cases against corporations, potentially disincentivizing prosecutors.

But one of the greatest obstacles facing genocide prosecution is the lack of US policy prioritizing such cases. Genocide charges require political approval from the assistant attorney general of the Criminal Division of the DOJ, but little is likely to change without political support backing this approval. Gev Iskajyan, national grassroots director of the Armenian National Committee of America, acknowledged this fact in 2021, simultaneously praising President Joe Biden’s recognition of the Armenian genocide as “a fundamental step in that ladder to justice” and clarifying that true justice requires more substantive action from political leaders. Indeed, the lack of political support and accompanying legal obstacles have effectively dissuaded prosecutors from indicting anyone on genocide charges since the Genocide Convention Implementation Act’s passage in 1988.

Litigating the Yezidi genocide

Nowhere in recent litigation has this dissuasion been more apparent than with efforts to address corporate involvement in ISIS’s genocide against the Yezidi community. The genocide began on August 3, 2014, when ISIS launched a campaign in Sinjar, killing more than five thousand Yezidis and taking 6,800 more into captivity, where they faced brainwashing, physical abuse, and sexual slavery. ISIS did not achieve this persecution in isolation. The organization received material assistance and took advantage of lax oversight on social media platforms to further its genocidal program. Without criminal cases charging corporations with complicity in genocide—whether from lack of political will or the shortcomings of the law—American and Yezidi cases in the United States have instead used civil provisions that do not cover liability for genocide.

Legal cases against Lafarge, a French cement manufacturer, stand as an excellent example of this phenomenon. In 2022, as a result of a DOJ investigation, the company pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to foreign terrorist organizations. The company was ordered to pay $777.78 million in fines and forfeitures for cooperating with ISIS and al-Nusrah Front in exchange for a Lafarge factory’s security in Syria. Emboldened by the DOJ’s success, American Yezidis have since opened a similar civil suit based on Lafarge’s alleged violation of the Antiterrorism Act.

Undoubtedly, prosecuting the company under the United States’ expansive legal framework for terrorism is more likely to succeed than a case under genocide law. The DOJ has historically prioritized terrorism cases, creating more robust legislation and caselaw that prosecutors can draw from, and often more favorable provisions. For example, extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime of material support for terrorism is far-reaching, covering, e.g., an offense that “occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Furthermore, any effort to hold Lafarge accountable while obtaining funds for Yezidi victims and survivors is laudable. However, Lafarge knowingly and willfully continued illegal payments to an organization actively committing genocide, yet has not had to answer for these uniquely harmful acts.

As another example, a separate group of Yezidi activists is looking to hold WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube accountable for the illegal slave trade of Yezidi women, which the activists allege occurred on the platforms. According to the group, these companies acted slowly and inconsistently in removing harmful material related to trafficking Yezidi women, which could be in violation of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017. However, legal experts have noted that certain provisions may shield these tech companies from civil liability through wide-ranging immunities. But even if the civil suit succeeds, the companies’ liability will only extend to sex trafficking, without acknowledging the fundamental role that slavery played in this genocide. The civil suit would bring prosecution closer to specific acts of genocide but, like the Lafarge case, would still fall short of addressing genocide directly.

Better accountability measures needed

The United States needs far better genocide accountability measures if justice is ever to follow recognition. On a legal level, several reforms could work in favor of such a pursuit. Removing the word “substantial” from the act’s current language, and expanding qualifying instances of mental harm, would help bring the law closer in line with general improvements to US genocide recognition.

Similarly, a law delineating the requirements for mens rea between perpetrators and collaborators would establish clearer responsibilities for corporations in dealing with a genocidal group. Legislation along these lines could become as effective as terrorism legislation, which seeks to define a similarly nebulous crime, to punish companies for enabling both terrorist organizations and governments committing genocide.

At the same time, and arguably more crucially, prosecutors need to pursue genocide cases. DOJ officials must be willing to bring charges under reformed genocide law, the assistant attorney general of the Criminal Division must approve these charges when they are brought, and lawmakers need to move beyond mere genocide recognition by calling for prosecution. Though legal amendments are not retroactive and cannot influence any cases related to the Yezidi genocide, conflicts with genocidal allegations rage on in Russia, Sudan, and the Gaza Strip. It is time for the US legal system to meet this reality.

Charles Johnson is a former Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. He is a senior at the University of Kansas majoring in history, political science, and religious studies.

The post Ten years on, Yezidi cases expose a lack of corporate accountability in US genocide law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Elected on an anti-corruption platform in 2019, President Saied initiated consolidating powers in 2021 by unilaterally dismissing then Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and freezing parliament with military support. Saeid subsequently rewrote Tunisia’s constitution to extend his presidential powers and granted himself the authority to unilaterally dismiss magistrates after he dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council. Parliamentary elections he called for had a turnout of just 11.2 percent after opposition parties boycotted them, resulting in the election of mostly unaffiliated politicians close to him. In 2022, Saied extended his control over the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE) by granting himself the power to appoint and dismiss its members, nullifying the ISIE’s independence from the executive. With virtually all branches of government now under his direct or indirect control, President Saied has eliminated internal obstacles and monopolized all checks and balances, paving the way for an unchallenged run in October. Consequently, Freedom House downgraded Tunisia’s score from “free” to “partially free,” indicating there is broad consensus among members of the international community that Saied’s actions are illegitimate.

In addition to controlling all branches of government directly or indirectly, Saied is cementing his power grab by clamping down on opposition party members, critics, independent media outlets, and civil society. Over the past year, Saied has imprisoned and threatened most opposition candidates. Two of the ten presidential candidates are currently behind bars, while four face prosecution, including Rached Gannouchi—the leader of the main opposition party, Ennahda—who was imprisoned last year on charges of “conspiring against the state” and will remain in prison for at least another three years. Civil society is also facing unprecedented repression, with a draft law currently under revision by Tunisia’s parliament to limit foreign funding streams into the country. Critics and journalists are jailed daily over dissenting opinions, escalating a clampdown on the country’s freedom of expression and emanating fear among critics, enabling the president to run uncontested.

Saied’s legitimacy is also hindered by his continued mistreatment of minorities—including black African migrants and Jews—which has drawn international criticism and led to the violation of international norms. A mass grave with the bodies of sixty-five migrants was recently discovered on the border between Tunisia and Libya, sparking condemnations of Tunisia’s mishandling of sub-Saharan migrants arriving in the country. Saied publicly showcased his antagonism toward black African migrants when, in March 2023, he claimed migrants were threatening Tunisia’s demographic composition, citing the highly controversial “great replacement” theory. A wave of violence against migrants ensued, with many of them losing their jobs and risking their lives. Reports of unlawful mass expulsions toward Algeria and Libya began to emerge, showcasing a well-thought-out strategy by state apparatuses in direct violation of international law, hindering the nascent democracy and Saied’s overall legitimacy.

The local Jewish community, now comprising only 1,500 people, has also felt uneasy and under threat after Saied claimed the devastating floods that hit Libya in September 2023 were a product of the “Zionist movement.” His comments came only months after a terrorist attack occurred in the city of Djerba, each year visited by thousands of Jewish pilgrims, that was believed to have antisemitic motives. More recently, with the outbreak of the Gaza war, several synagogues were lit on fire in signs of protest, elevating the Jewish community’s concerns about its safety. There is little indication of the government taking any action to safeguard the rights of Tunisia’s remaining Jews, raising questions about Saied’s overall motives and his willingness to safeguard minorities.  

Saied’s continued clampdown on opposition, his mistreatment of minorities, and his overall control over the three branches of government will allow him to run unopposed in the upcoming polls. While the elections may seem like a legitimate democratic exercise, the context in which they are held is nothing short of an authoritarian regime, whose control over the state apparatuses is becoming more and more evident. This erosion of democratic norms undermines Tunisia’s hard-won democratic gains and is pushing the country further into autocracy.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council.

The post How Tunisia’s upcoming presidential elections will erode its democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Five cases of youths committing suicide were recorded in just the first two weeks of June in Wasit alone, according to a recent communiqué issued by the Iraqi National Security Services, which condemned the “deviant” movement and arrested thirty-one of its members. This wasn’t the first incident linked to the sect, which is affiliated with a mysterious leader based in Iran’s holy city of Mashhad claiming to worship Imam Ali, the son-in-law of Prophet Mohammad, as a deity—an unorthodox belief condemned by mainstream Shia clergy. The movement claimed the lives of several young men in Dhi Qar governorate last year, and some reports suggest that it has already spread to other countries including Lebanon, where a young man took his own life in a similar ceremonial ritual in July 2023. Because its epicenter is in Dhi Qar governorate, it is hard not to associate Jamaat al-Qurban with the human sacrifices that took place only twenty miles away in the Sumerian city of Ur some 4,500 years ago.

Collective trauma and messianic creed

Iraq remains a fertile ground for messianic doctrines and often irrational eschatological dogmas due to a mixture of deeply engrained Mesopotamian mythological legacy, pronounced esoteric beliefs associated with the dominant Twelver Shiism creed, and the many minority religious beliefs in the country linked to Gnosticism, such as Mandaeans, Kakais, Shabak, and Kasnazani Sufi order—communities that all still practice ancestral hermetic and mystic rituals.

These peculiar incidents—along with the flourishing of tens of other doomsday sects led by self-claimed prophets, charlatans, and characters with a Messiah complex—should be understood as a social phenomenon in the context of a collectively traumatized post-invasion Iraqi society. Repetitive conflicts since 2003 have caused political unrest, sectarian unrest, fragmented state structures, and a suppressed Tishreen social movement—a youth-led protest movement between 2019 and 2021 condemning corruption and asking for less foreign interference—and might offer explanations for why so many Iraqis are plunging into the abyss of obscure metaphysical beliefs after seemingly losing hope in the physical realm.

Despite its apparent resilience and openness to a future with ambitious economic reforms and infrastructure projects, Iraq still suffers from invisible fractures affecting the core of its society. A 2007 national survey revealed that nearly 60 percent of the population experienced traumatic events with next to no access to psychological support—these numbers don’t even take into consideration the ordeal caused by conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Additionally, the World Health Organization warned about the soaring number of suicide attempts among young Iraqis in 2020.

A savior in a beanie and an Atlantis for the Shia

The United Kingdom, which hosts an important community of Arab refugees and expatriates, is the site of the hours-long live broadcasts by Sheikh Yasser al-Habib. From his headquarters in southern London, the exiled Kuwaiti cleric has been collecting live donations for the purchase of three islands amounting to $3 million, which he will allegedly transform into a sovereign homeland for all Twelver Shia individuals willing to relocate to the promised idyllic Atlantis. The project, announced earlier this year, will be designed in accordance with the sheikh’s religious preachings, and will aim to prepare for the savior’s return from his millennium-long occultation.

Another Iraqi-born doomsday sect, the Ahmadi Religion of Peace and Light—a syncretic faith mixing psychedelic consumption, New Age beliefs, soul reincarnation, ancient Egyptian gods, and space aliens—also calls the United Kingdom home. The movement, formally known as the Black Banners, is currently based in Manchester, where an old orphanage converted into a temple is adorned with a marble statue of a man from Basra called Ahmed al-Hassan al-Yamani, who had proclaimed himself the vizier of the Mahdi amid the chaos that followed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

This religion took a new turn when an Egyptian associate of Hassan, Abdullah Hashem, appeared in a black beanie during the pandemic, claiming in a hall full of devotees to be the final Mahdi, prophesizing the political demise of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, and condemning the persecution of the movement’s activists across the world. It remains unclear how these movements fund their large-scale events and media presence.

This is but the tip of the iceberg. In recent years, many baffling figures have risen to fame, like Abu Ali Shaibani—a former Iraqi secret services officer and herbalist based in Lebanon, who accurately predicted the assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces—who claims to be the equivalent of a trumpet of Armageddon in the Bible. Other famed charlatans include Diaa Abdu Zahrae al-Garaoui, killed on a farm in Zargha with hundreds of his followers by US coalition forces in 2007 after conspiring to assassinate top Hawza clergy in Najaf. The leader of Jund al-Samaa (“the Soldiers of Heaven”)—Iraq’s own Jim Jones—claimed to be a 1,400-year-old dormant embryo from Imam Ali and his spouse Fatima Zahra, who rose to become the Mahdi.

A larger MENA phenomenon

It is important to note that this phenomenon is part of a larger messianic resurgence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the past two decades. Cases of self-proclaimed end-of-day prophets emerge every other day on social media, such as an amusing Lebanese fortuneteller “sent from the heavens to save humankind,” who appeared two years ago. However, only a few become full-fledged religious leaders, such as the controversial Yemeni Naser Mohamed, a tribal leader from Marib, or his compatriot Hassan al-Tuhami, who was arrested and tortured by the Houthis with his followers.

This tendency created an entire ecosystem of social media content creators and famed prime-time television clairvoyants like the Egyptian-Lebanese Leila Abdelatif. This new army of influencers interprets the holy scriptures, tracks the signs of the end of days against current regional conflicts like the Gaza war, and projects apocalyptic Islamic protagonists on modern-day political leaders like Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman, or Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Interestingly, similar trends are observed regarding Israel and the Gaza war, fueled by certain Haredi Jewish groups and their US Christian right allies, and by the dichotomous biblical rhetoric promulgated by members of the Israeli government, a coalition that more secular analysts describe as “messianic.” Following the terror generated by the October 7, 2023, attacks, several Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, described the conflict as a holy war between “the sons of lights, and the sons of darkness.” (Though it’s unclear if these statements are mere allegories or discursive tactics used to appeal to an increasingly religious Israeli society.) Another internet and media sensation to follow is the Texas red heifers associated in the scriptures with the building of the Third Temple in Jerusalem and the advent of the Jewish Messiah. As certain far-right Jewish and Christian activists call for conducting a purification ritual using the ashes of the Angus cows on the Temple Mount, where al-Aqsa Mosque stands today, Hamas leadership made a salient declaration associating the ritual with the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks.

Historically, messianic movements in the MENA region are symptomatic of profound social and economic malaise and are a form of subaltern resistance by frustrated citizens opposing the existing tyrannic political and theological structures. Many messianic leaders even brought immense change and shifted the course of entire empires—like Mahdi ibn Tumart, the founder of the Moroccan Almohad dynasty, or the early Ismaili Fatimid rulers in Tunisia and Egypt. Others were less fortunate, like Juhayman al-Otaybi and his failed 1979 coup d’état in Mecca. Nonetheless, in a region where the borders between the natural and supernatural remain blurred, it is extremely worrisome and premonitory of greater regional upheaval to observe an unprecedented doomsday fever and a high concentration of messianic groups—probably the most important since Prophet Mohammad and Jesus of Nazareth. 

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

The post What’s behind the Middle East’s doomsday fever? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The roots of the current tension can be traced back to the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) withdrawals from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Lebanon in 2006. Since then, Hamas and Hezbollah have been allowed to grow their capabilities, largely unchecked by Israel. While Israel has had a policy of “mowing the grass” in Gaza—i.e., regularly launching attacks into the strip to degrade Hamas’s capabilities—this has not prevented the Palestinian group from building more than five hundred kilometers of tunnel, its greatest asset in its war against Israel. For context, Hamas has built an underground system roughly the size of the London Underground. Israel’s actions toward Hezbollah have been even more hands-off since 2006, largely limited to strikes against Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria. This has allowed Hezbollah to greatly expand its stockpile of missiles, giving the group the ability to escalate a conflict against Israel far beyond previous wars. The result is a volatile situation akin to a tinderbox.

While recent events, such as an Israeli airstrike on July 3 that killed Mohammad Naameh Nasser, a senior Hezbollah commander in southern Lebanon, have exacerbated tensions, they are merely symptoms of a much deeper, long-standing conflict. The ongoing exchange of fire across the Israel-Lebanon border is part of a series of tit-for-tat attacks that have characterized the relationship between these adversaries for years.

The specter of a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah looms large. Hezbollah’s extensive rocket arsenal, which has significantly expanded since 2006, poses a grave threat to Israeli civilians. Israeli estimates put Hezbollah’s arsenal at roughly 150,000 rockets and missiles, while an IRGC Quds Force official boasted a stockpile of more than 1 million. Whatever the figure, these are not rudimentary missiles like Hamas’s Qassam rockets; Hezbollah’s arsenal is more sophisticated and dangerous—ranging from the smaller unguided Fajr-5, with a range of 75 kilometers, to powerful ballistic missiles such as the Fateh-110 and Scud variants, which can hit anywhere in Israel. So far, this has forced a mass evacuation of around sixty thousand Israeli residents from the north of the country.

The range and payload of these missiles have also allowed Hezbollah to threaten countries like Cyprus against providing any assistance to the IDF, meaning that the group has the ability to drag third parties into a wider conflict. Furthermore, an Israeli military offensive in Lebanon could potentially trigger responses from Hezbollah’s allies across the region, including Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The situation is complicated by the potential for direct conflict between Israel and Iran, which is no longer merely an academic concept after the retaliatory responses between the foes in April.

On the domestic front, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a multitude of challenges. Beyond the pressure to secure the northern border, he grapples with the ongoing hostage crisis, the lack of a clear “day after” plan for Gaza, and internal political strife. Corruption charges loom over Netanyahu but are currently held at bay by his immunity as prime minister. Political rivalries and domestic crises, such as that regarding the Supreme Court, have been put aside due to the unity government formed after October 7, 2023. However, these underlying issues are only delayed by the existential need to defeat Hamas. Once the threat subsides or the Israeli population tires of war, these issues will resurface.

The northern front with Hezbollah may serve as a distraction from these pressing issues, allowing Netanyahu to double down on security concerns. Hezbollah, too, faces domestic pressures. Lebanon has remained without a head of state for two years, and various political factions are pushing for accommodation in the presidency. The lack of a functioning and unified executive authority has led to political inaction over the country’s growing banking crisis, threatening to create one of the worst economic crises since 1857. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth contracted by 6.7 percent in 2019, followed by another contraction of more than 20 percent in 2020. Unemployment currently stands at more than 11 percent. Hezbollah must balance its ideological commitment to resistance against Israel with the complex realities of Lebanese politics and the potential consequences of escalation.

The Joe Biden administration also finds itself in a precarious position, with some officials raising the alarm over the evolving crisis and worries that Israel and Hezbollah might be underestimating the risks associated with their actions. The administration must navigate a delicate balance: showing unwavering support for Israel while simultaneously attempting to prevent a wider regional conflict. Domestic political considerations further complicate this balancing act, with the November US presidential election looming and the potential for criticism from both sides of the aisle. The diplomatic efforts to resolve this crisis face significant challenges. Even if a Gaza ceasefire were negotiated and Hezbollah ceased its rocket attacks, Israel is unlikely to sit quietly with the knowledge of such a big threat to its north. This places US diplomacy in a difficult position of finding incentives for Hezbollah to pull back from a position of strength while accommodating Israel’s security concerns.

Questions have been raised about the efficacy of current diplomatic channels, particularly the role of Amos Hochstein as the primary envoy. While Hochstein has experience in energy-related diplomacy between Lebanon and Israel, his background as a former IDF soldier and his lack of extensive experience in high-stakes geopolitical negotiations raise concerns about his suitability for mediating this potentially explosive situation.

The consequences of a war between Israel and Hezbollah would be catastrophic. Such a conflict would likely draw in the United States in a far more substantive way, potentially marking a return to the “forever wars” that recent administrations have sought to avoid. The potential for Iranian-backed fighters from across the region joining Hezbollah in a conflict against Israel adds another layer of complexity and risk to the situation. As the current state of affairs is assessed, it is clear that the situation in the Middle East remains extremely volatile and dangerous. This is not a fragile peace, but a combustible situation that threatens to escalate into what could be characterized as “a forever war on steroids.” The ongoing exchange of fire and the high risk of miscalculation make the prospect of a broader regional conflict a looming threat.

The international community, led by the United States, must double down on its diplomatic efforts and continue to urge restraint on all sides. However, these efforts must be led by experienced professionals with a deep understanding of the region’s complexities. The stakes are extraordinarily high, and the consequences of a full-scale war would be dire for both the region and global stability.

Daniel Elkins is the founder and president of the Special Operations Association of America. A former Green Beret and Special Operations combat veteran, he is also an Atlantic Council Counter-Terrorism Project member.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the positions of the United States government or the Department of Defense.

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The 2003 US-led invasion, which led to the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein, presented an opportunity to rebuild Iraq’s educational system. While there were initial efforts to revitalize schools and universities, the ongoing violence and political instability hindered sustained progress. Corruption, sectarian strife, and the absence of coherent education policies exacerbated the challenges. The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) severely disrupted the educational system in areas under its control. Despite these hurdles, there were pockets of progress, particularly in the autonomous Kurdistan region, which began to chart its course for educational reform.

Today, with 60 percent of Iraqis under the age of twenty-five, the nation’s education system is at a critical juncture. The young population represents both a tremendous opportunity and a daunting challenge. High unemployment rates and inadequate educational facilities threaten to undermine the potential of youth contributing to the country’s rebuilding efforts. The lack of investment in modern educational infrastructure and the disconnect between educational outcomes and labor-market needs are stark.

For instance, according to a 2021 IREX report, only 22 percent of university graduates find jobs in their field of study within three months of graduating. This highlights the critical need for a more responsive education system that meets the market’s needs. According to the World Bank, 2 million Iraqi children are deprived of education, presenting a significant challenge for their future prospects. In addition, literacy rates remain alarmingly low, especially among women.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has recognized the urgency of addressing these issues. The cabinet has developed Vision 2030, which prioritizes enhancing and adapting education to support economic diversification. This unprecedented framework aims to align Kurdistan’s educational system with international standards, while fostering a workforce capable of driving economic growth across sectors. A key element of this vision is establishing the Kurdistan Accrediting Association for Education (KAAE), a national accreditation body designed to bridge the educational gap and propel the region into the twenty-first century.

Because standardization can serve as leverage for reform, the KAAE seeks to establish standards to ensure that educational institutions in Kurdistan and Iraq meet rigorous quality-assurance requirements. By promoting best practices and fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and continuous improvement, the KAAE, as a twelve/fifteen-year project, aims to support the government in establishing sound policies for educational quality, making it more relevant to the needs of the economy and society. This initiative is crucial for modernizing Kurdistan’s education system and enabling it to catch up with global advancements, as it is for Iraq and the broader region when used as a model.

Strategic investment in education

Effective implementation of the KAAE’s quality-assurance standards necessitates leveraging the expertise and experience of the international community in building the capacity of academic institutions. The United States and Iraq have a framework agreement that identifies education as a cornerstone of bilateral relations as part of the broader cultural cooperation between the two countries. It is now time to translate this agreement into action. Strengthening this partnership can have far-reaching reverberations beyond education, fostering economic development, political stability, and social cohesion. While the United States has invested significantly in Iraq’s reconstruction, this has been disproportionately allocated to the security sector. According to the Military Times, the United States has spent nearly $2 trillion on military operations in Iraq. Even a fraction of this amount, 1 percent, would have a transformational impact if directed toward educational initiatives.

Investing in Iraq’s education system offers a unique opportunity for the United States to not only support a key ally but also address the root causes of instability in the region. The United States can help build the foundation for a stable and prosperous Iraq by directing resources toward educational reform. This investment would both strengthen US public diplomacy and promote the values of democracy and human rights, which are integral to long-term peace and security. Such support includes establishing partnerships between US schools and universities and their Iraqi counterparts to implement the quality-assurance standards the KAAE sets. These partnerships could focus on building capacity and mentorship, embedding student-centered learning in curricula, and creating continuous assessment and evaluation strategies. Because the Kurdistan region has already established the KAAE, this could serve as a pilot model for Iraq as a whole, with the goal of replicating the body in other parts of Iraq.

Countries like Singapore and South Korea provide valuable lessons in how education can drive national development. Both nations have transformed their economies through substantial investments in education, focusing on skills development and innovation. For example, South Korea’s emphasis on technology and vocational training has made it a global industry leader. Similarly, Singapore’s education system, known for its rigor and focus on STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), has produced a highly skilled workforce that drives the country’s ongoing economic success.

By supporting similar models in Iraq, the United States can help foster an education system that not only equips young Iraqis with the skills and qualifications the local market and economy need, both today and in the long term, but also cultivates critical thinking and innovation. This approach aligns with the US strategy of promoting regional stability through economic development and education.

The role of education in peace and security

Enhancing education in Iraq is not just about economic growth; it is a crucial element of peacebuilding. Education fosters understanding, tolerance, and critical thinking, which are essential for mitigating conflict and promoting social cohesion. A well-educated populace is better equipped to participate in democratic processes and contribute to the nation’s development. By investing in education, Iraq can build a more inclusive society in which young people are empowered to contribute positively to their communities.

For Iraq, education is more than a policy priority; it is a pathway to peace and prosperity. The United States can play a critical role in achieving such prosperity. By leveraging initiatives like the KAAE and drawing on successful global models, Iraq can transform its education system, paving the way for a brighter future. This investment is not just about building schools; it is about building a nation with a capable and empowered citizenry.

The United States and the international community can seize this opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to a stable and prosperous Iraq, promoting a region where education empowers young people as agents of positive change.

Dr. Honar Issa is the secretary of the Board of Trustees at the American University of Kurdistan (AUK). He also serves as chair of the Middle East Peace and Security Forum.

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This article presents the structure of the Syrian electorate: who the voters are, how many voters are there, and why credible projections are so elusive. In theory, the constitution guarantees all Syrian citizens voting rights—with consequential caveats built into the electoral and nationality laws.

Syrian citizens obtain their status through their father, as defined by the Nationality Law of 1969, but cannot obtain it through their mothers. Syrian women also cannot pass citizenship to their husbands. Yet, there are shortcuts to Syrian citizenship—the Syrian interior minister has significant authority to grant citizenship through facilitated or exceptional naturalization processes.

The Syrian opposition claims the government is altering demographics and voting preferences by granting citizenship to foreigners fighting in the conflict. There are no reliable reports about the number of foreigners granted citizenship since 2011, but the issue is politically significant and Syrians are keenly aware of the Lebanese case. This matter is especially relevant for ethnic Kurds, who have historically been denied their citizenship rights. On the opposite side, the right to vote in assembly elections has been extended to the military since 2016, but this has only fueled suspicions of vote manipulations.

The laws include a few other categories of potentially problematic restrictions, but it is unclear whether they significantly impact the electorate’s structure. For example, those convicted of a “felony or dishonorable misdemeanor or that which shakes public trust” and those “mentally ill in a manner that affects his eligibility” are excluded from the electorate. However, the Syrian diaspora is the largest group of Syrians excluded from the elections. While the diaspora has the right to vote in the presidential election, that right is not extended to the assembly elections. This is contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254, which recommends diaspora participation in elections.

If given the right, how many Syrians in the diaspora could vote? For that matter, how many Syrians in total would have the right to vote? Unfortunately, it is impossible to answer that question credibly. The underlying reason for the speculative nature of the electorate’s size is that, despite being legally required to do so, the government does not register voters. Nor does it compile the voter lists. Evidence from previous elections clearly confirms that voter registration is nonexistent. In the 2020 and 2021 elections, there was no voter registration, polling committees did not have a voter list, instead they had blank forms to register voters as they approached the polls. Similarly, there was no evidence of voter-registration activities before this year’s elections.

So, where do the data about voters published by the government come from? According to statements by governmental officials, they come from the civil registry. However, in Syria this cannot be considered an accurate record of citizens. While the Assad regime used the administrative apparatus to control the population, it failed to create an orderly civil registry, even before the conflict. Since the conflict began in 2011, maintenance of the civil registry has been disrupted. Efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to preserve records might be crucial for those who will need to prove their civil status in the future, but these records are not reflected in the current version of the civil registry.

Official voter data are extremely scarce. Historically, the Supreme Judicial Election Commission only publishes overall voter numbers. These are virtually impossible to analyze, as no details are provided, and data are not even broken down by governorate. Governors or governorate-level commissions sometimes provide these randomly, but they are often rounded up by commissions without explanation.

The significant increase in the number of reported registered voters in 2020 is likely due to the change in how the number is calculated. In the pre-2020 elections, the election committees received a preliminary voters list extracted from the civil registry. They would then audit the list by removing and adding voters. Since the 2020 election, that process has been abandoned, and the number of registered voters simply reflects all the civil registry adult records.

When it comes to diaspora voters, the numbers are difficult to crunch. The Syrian population is estimated to range between 24–27 million, with 16–20 million Syrians in the country and 5–6.7 million outside the country. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan alone are hosting more than 5 million Syrian refugees. Using a conservative estimate, the Syrian voting-age population is about 60 percent, which would imply 14–16 million voters in the country and 3–4 million outside the country. That would be within the range of the 18 million voters claimed by the government. However, it is unclear how many live in the government-controlled areas, as the estimate of 9.5 million might not be reliable.

In contrast to the previous election, the government has not issued a single statement about the size of the electorate, no matter how incredible the numbers may be. A comparison of reports from various sources regarding the eight rounds of assembly elections starting in 1990 shows that turnout varies between 50–60 percent. Extrapolating this and applying it to the number of voters who voted in the 2020 elections, in theory, suggests that the total number of voters should not be more than 10 million, which is much smaller than the previously announced 18 million.

Is it possible that, in the pre-2020 elections, almost half of the Syrian electorate was missing from the voter lists? Or are the post-2020 election figures enormously inflated? The confusion over the true size of the electorate will certainly not be resolved in these elections. The Assad government is not investing in even minimal efforts to sort out the voter registry. If there is ever a chance to hold elections according to the standards set by UNSC Resolution 2254, voter-registration reform will be one of the most technically and logistically challenging aspects. Such reform would need to protect the right of Syrians inside and outside the country to vote, while also infusing a basic transparency standard into the electoral process.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

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The proposed ceasefire and hostage exchange deal, recently championed by the Joe Biden administration on May 31, has failed to move forward. It faces opposition from a hesitant Hamas that is dragging its feet, and from an intransigent Netanyahu who just declared he is backing away from the proposal, saying that he’s okay with exchanging some hostages but wants to resume the war after a pause. While some “day-after” scenarios have been proposed for what follows the war’s end, no progress has been made in establishing real and viable plans for who governs Gaza after the war or for a meaningful exit strategy for all parties involved.

There appears to be an unspoken alignment between Netanyahu and Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, to keep the war going in a manner that serves both parties’ divergent interests. Netanyahu is more likely to escape accountability for the shortcomings and grave miscalculations that resulted in the October 7, 2023 attack’s catastrophic success, arguably the worst single security failure on Israel’s territory. Furthermore, the chances of Netanyahu maintaining political power and avoiding early elections are greater with a protracted war in Gaza, a view that has become mainstream within Israeli society and politics. The Biden administration also seems to be aware of this reality, which is why the United States hosted opposition leader Benny Gantz and invited Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to Washington on June 23 to explore viable options beyond Netanyahu’s narrow interests.

Sinwar and the hardline military commanders of Hamas, on the other hand, may have realized that a perpetual war in Gaza, even a low-intensity one, would ensure Hamas’s political and geo-strategic relevance and survival as a resistance movement. Should the war persist without an end in sight, the Israeli military is likely to maintain some presence in Gaza, allowing the Islamist group to engage in a protracted insurgency that would afford Hamas credibility and clout within Palestinian politics and the broader Arab and Muslim worlds. Should this happen, Sinwar might rid Hamas of the headache associated with governing Gaza, which proved difficult for the group amid perpetual blockades, financial sanctions, and limited resources for fulfilling the strip’s vast needs. This scenario would also outsource care for Gaza’s displaced and suffering civilians to the international community, which is currently the only source of humanitarian and medical support for the battered coastal enclave.

Netanyahu and Sinwar’s calculus would be disastrous for Israel and the Palestinians alike. The longer the war goes on, the more likely it is that a severe escalation with Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front will occur and trigger a broader war that could severely harm Israel militarily and weaken it strategically. Hezbollah’s capabilities are widely discussed as being vast and advanced, with the potential for wreaking extreme damage on Israeli cities and targets. In fact, Sinwar is likely hoping that a protracted war in Gaza increases the likelihood of a miscalculation in the north that could trigger a full-fledged war, which would consume Israel’s focus and attention—and increase regional instability in line with what Sinwar had hoped for in the first place when launching the October 7, 2023, attack. A wider conflict in the north also risks increased militancy targeting the Golan Heights through Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, scenes of destruction, widespread devastation, and loss of life in Lebanon will inflame tensions in the Arab and Muslim world, possibly destabilizing the fragile Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which has struggled with Islamist political forces seeking to exploit the war in Gaza to undermine the monarchy’s rule. The Arab League’s decision to drop Hezbollah’s terror classification foreshadows the likely setbacks in Arab-Israeli relations should the Israeli military destroy Lebanon in a war the way that it did the Gaza Strip.

A perpetual low-intensity conflict in Gaza—which appears to be the upcoming new phase that Netanyahu has recently described—is effectively a form of stalemate that keeps the war going at a limited scale, which fails to achieve strategic results while preventing the reconstruction of Gaza or the introduction of alternatives to Hamas’s rule. A protracted stalemate would be extraordinarily painful and challenging for the families of Israeli hostages and Gaza’s battered Palestinian civilians alike. Hamas has made it crystal clear that it will not agree to any hostage exchange deal absent a complete cessation of the war—a deal that hostage families and their allies are demanding to ensure the safe release of their loved ones. As for Gazans who have faced nine months of bombardment, displacement, and humanitarian crises, the continuation of the war in the manner envisioned by Netanyahu or Sinwar would become a disastrous new chapter in their suffering and elevate their level of hopelessness, which could trigger new waves of radicalization and unpredictability.

In the near term, it is difficult to envision a serious shift in Netanyahu and Sinwar’s attitudes toward the Biden ceasefire and hostage deal. Nevertheless, the administration should push for small steps that could plant seeds for transformation and sustainable stability in the Gaza Strip, even amid a potential stalemate. The United States, its regional allies, moderate Palestinian players, and the international community need a secure beachhead in Gaza that could serve as a measure of stability in a deeply unstable territory. 

This beachhead should start with a limited peacekeeping force that has an extremely narrow mandate: deploying along the Gaza Strip’s borders with Israel and Egypt. Critically, this would help separate the Palestinians from the Israelis, prevent the establishment of an Israeli-occupied buffer zone inside Gaza that would rob the Palestinians of precious territory, prevent infiltration and new cross-border attacks, and serve as an early-warning system to coordinate with Israeli authorities in case of future security incidents. Hamas’s incentives to agree to this mandate-limited force would stem from its serving as a separation shield that would cement the end of the war and prevent the permanent presence of Israeli occupation forces.

Additionally, this force would secure the Philadelphi Corridor to prevent future smuggling that would replenish Hamas’s stockpiles of munitions and illicit items. Limiting the force’s mandate to border security and protection would mean that participating troops, ideally from Arab and Muslim nations, would not need to carry out counterterrorism operations inside Gaza. The lower risks of harm to their soldiers would increase the likelihood that various nations would agree to be part of this effort.

On the Gaza side, a primary benefit of border security with such a limited force is that the area near the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings in Gaza’s southeastern territory could become a beachhead of stability. These two crossings, one of which is no longer functional, are critical for facilitating the entry and exit of humanitarian aid and people in the coastal enclave. The area by the Kerem Shalom crossing, where desperately needed aid comes in, is regularly targeted by bandits and looters who compromise the safety of aid delivery by seizing trucks immediately after they enter Gaza. The proposed peacekeeping force could stabilize the area, allowing for the establishment of makeshift medical, administrative, and other installations and facilities that could become headquarters for Gaza’s reconstruction and a new administrative entity.

Palestinians and Israelis would want separate assurances for such a limited force to work: Palestinians would need guarantees that it will not be a permanent “foreign occupation,” and Israelis would require assurance that this force will not become another version of the impotent United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that hasn’t stopped Hezbollah from threatening Israeli territories in southern Lebanon.

Ending the war in Gaza—even through the Biden ceasefire and hostage deal and without introducing any executive foothold in Gaza that breaks Hamas’s monopoly on control—would risk a permanent stalemate with no progress toward political transformation in the coastal enclave. The limited scope, mandate, and deployment zone of this proposed peacekeeping force make it much more likely that an internationally binding agreement for its formation could be reached quickly.

Hamas remains present and relevant as a player in Gaza, and that cannot be changed anytime soon. While the group is significantly weakened and lacks the territorial and administrative control it once had, its continued existence in Gaza is all but assured. No viable immediate alternatives exist to challenge the group’s monopoly, due to both Israeli war-planning failures and the deep entrenchment of Hamas in Palestinian society.

Given the absence of ideal options and alternatives, the only way forward includes gradual political transformation, security arrangements that contain Hamas, and not giving Hamas an opportunity to engage in the kind of perpetual insurgency that a direct Israeli occupation would enable. The Biden administration and its regional allies are running out of time to insert a body other than Hamas, even in a limited capacity and scope, before the war in Gaza ends.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on X: @afalkhatib.

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Apart from indifference to the US president’s political struggles, there are a number of reasons why Hamas is not jumping at Biden’s proposal. First and foremost, Hamas is an Islamist organization, and its resistance to Israel is riddled with rigid religious principles that permit no operational or strategic half-measures. Hamas’s 2017 charter characterizes Palestine—congruent with the mandate—as highly esteemed in Islam, probably due to its unique holy places. Hamas argues that Palestine is both the spirit and central cause of the ummah (Islamic community), and that Islam values standing up to aggression. In Hamas’s characterization, Israel is a colonial project imposed by force, and its settlement and Judaization of the country are illegitimate. Conversely, it sees all means to advance the struggle against Israel as legitimate. Escalating, de-escalating, or diversifying the means of the conflict are integral to the conduct of the fight. Much recent reporting reduces Hamas to its terrorist identity, rather than evaluating the group as a whole. Presenting an offer that Hamas would accept requires a full understanding of how the group perceives itself in the context of broader Islamic principles.

Second, Hamas clearly intended to alter the sclerotic state of the Palestinian pursuit of independence, much as former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat did when he initiated a military assault and subsequent diplomatic initiative to reclaim the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation on October 6, 1973. With regard to Palestinian statehood, prior to the October 7, 2023 attack, the Israelis were unreceptive, the corrupt Palestinian Authority was ineffectual, and the United States was disinterested. By conducting the brutal attack, displacing Israelis, highlighting Israel’s intelligence and military shortcomings, and promoting regional instability—both directly and via its allies Hezbollah and Iran—Hamas has gained the United States’ focus, if not Israel’s, on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although not on Hamas’s terms. As long as the Gaza war goes on, despite significant battlefield losses, Hamas is stoking Israeli anxiety by holding its hostages, displacing its civilians, engaging its troops in deadly battle—with more than three hundred Israeli troops killed in ground combat as of mid-June—and making the status quo ante more difficult to restore.

Third, Hamas leaders understood that Israel would, as it has countless other times, respond disproportionately to Hamas’s attack and inevitably lose the worldwide sympathy it gained on October 7, 2023. Apart from the latest Gaza Health Ministry numbers of some thirty-eight thousand killed and at least eighty-five thousand injured, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, and the Palestinian government estimate that, as of June 30, Israeli attacks had damaged 80 percent of Gaza’s commercial facilities, 88 percent of school buildings, and 267 places of worship, while half of Gaza’s thirty-five hospitals were only partially functioning. Hamas’s use of civilian facilities for operational centers and weapons caches is bait to which Israel routinely rises with minimal regard for civilian casualties. So the longer the war continues, the more likely it is that Israel will continue to suffer worldwide approbation to Hamas’s and the Palestinians’ benefit, as was demonstrated by Norway, Ireland, and Spain recognizing Palestine as a state on May 22. As Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s military leader in Gaza and the architect of the October 7 attack, recently said, “We have the Israelis right where we want them.” According to the Wall Street Journal, Sinwar also described Palestinian civilian deaths as “necessary sacrifices,” citing past high-casualty Arab independence conflicts like Algeria’s.

Fourth, Hamas understands that it has leverage over Israel due to the roughly 120 hostages it continues to hold, including those believed to be dead, and its readiness to continue the conflict. Conversely, the leverage Israel holds—its ability to kill Palestinians, both militants and civilians, and to destroy infrastructure—is a sacrifice Hamas and other groups are manifestly willing to accept. Though it desires an end to the war, Hamas is working to extract the maximum benefits it can, including denying Israel the “complete” victory Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu keeps vainly promising. Hamas leaders likely assess they can outlast the pressure on Israel’s government to secure the release of the hostages. They have set the price for the hostages’ release to be the complete end of the war, including Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and, by extension, Hamas’s continued involvement in Gazan affairs. On June 20, Israeli military spokesperson Daniel Hagari rejected the notion that completely eliminating Hamas was a realistic war aim, a statement that signaled growing tension between Netanyahu and Israel’s security establishment—a tension that Hamas has no doubt also noted. There was never a possibility of a Hamas military victory, but Sinwar and other leaders are fervently pursuing a political triumph that remains within reach.

For all these reasons, Hamas is unlikely to agree to any terms to end the Gaza conflict unless Sinwar assesses they represent the maximum “victory” he can extract. The recent Biden offer, designed to satisfy Israeli equities, continues to fall short. Sinwar spent decades in Israeli prison, learned Hebrew, studied Jewish history, and extensively examined Israeli media to better comprehend his adversary. Whether his decision-making regarding the conflict is sound or not, the Biden administration should not expect Sinwar’s acceptance of an offer Hamas assesses it can improve upon merely by holding out. Hamas views its resistance as religiously mandated, and nine months of military and political pressure have not altered its position.

Amir Asmar is an adjunct professor of Middle East issues at the National Intelligence University. He was previously a senior executive and Middle East and terrorism analyst in the US Department of Defense.

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Economic diversification and foreign direct investment

The US-Morocco FTA removed tariffs and significantly reduced trade barriers between the two countries. This, alongside other FTA and advanced trade agreements with the European Union (EU), China, Egypt, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributed to Morocco’s efforts to diversify its economy and trade. Through providing access to the US market, the FTA encouraged Moroccan firms to expand into new high-tech manufacturing such as automotive and aeronautics parts, as well as electronics. The agreement has also contributed to a steady increase in bilateral trade. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, US-Morocco trade in goods and services has grown to nearly $7 billion annually. This trade growth reflects a deepening of economic ties between the two countries.

Another significant impact of the US-Morocco FTA and other trade agreements has been increased foreign direct investment (FDI). The agreement provided a framework that infused confidence in US and EU investors and caused an inflow of investment in various sectors, including manufacturing, tourism, and renewable energy. These investments have been central in creating jobs and developing the skills of the Moroccan workforce.

One example is the automotive industry, in which major companies like Japan-based Yazaki, Ireland-based Delphi Technologies, Germany-based Schlemmer, and US-based Lear Corporation have established operations in Morocco. These investments have created thousands of jobs and positioned Morocco as a regional hub for automotive parts manufacturing, generating more than $10 billion in revenue and making it a leading sector in the country’s export market. Additionally, the growth of the renewable energy sector has made Morocco a global leader in the green energy industry, with ambitious projects like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex.

Challenges and structural reforms

While Morocco’s FTA and trade agreements with the United States and other major economies have brought numerous benefits, challenges exist. One of the main issues has been guaranteeing that the gains from free trade are distributed equitably across Moroccan society. There is a need for sustained efforts to address regional disparities and support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may struggle to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a liberalized trade environment.

Moreover, the agreement has highlighted the importance of structural reforms to enhance Morocco’s competitiveness. Hence, the Moroccan government has undertaken various measures to improve the business climate, such as simplifying regulatory procedures, developing and improving infrastructure, and investing in education and vocational training, with a particular focus on empowering girls and women. These reforms are crucial for sustaining long-term economic growth and ensuring that Morocco can fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by free trade.

Future prospects

Looking ahead, the US-Morocco FTA serves as a foundation for further economic cooperation and integration between the two economies. Both countries have expressed a commitment to deepening their trade relationship and exploring new areas of collaboration. For Morocco, this includes leveraging the FTA to attract more investment in high-tech industries and innovation-driven sectors. Morocco’s strategic location and proximity to European Union and African markets, coupled with its relatively modern infrastructure and stable political environment, position it as an attractive investment destination in emerging market economies.

Alongside the agreements signed between Morocco and other countries, the US-Morocco FTA remains one of the most important as it has played an integral role in transforming Morocco’s economy and labor force, contributing to the diversification of its trade portfolio and helping to attract foreign investment. However, regulatory, legal, and labor force challenges remain, and continued efforts are needed to ensure that the benefits of free trade are more equitably shared across various sectors of Moroccan society.

As Morocco looks to the future, the strategic vision should focus on further enhancing its competitive edge and strengthening its position as a key player in the global supply chain. Morocco’s Atlantic Sahel initiative is an important step in this direction. With sustained commitment and strategic planning, the next twenty years can bring even more prosperity and development for the Moroccan economy and greater profits for US and other foreign businesses operating in the kingdom.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou leads the Bretton Woods 2.0 Project at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is also a senior lecturer of economics at the American University in Washington, DC.

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Until recently, the regimes in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco were significantly stressed. Record-high consumer prices, combined with widespread youth unemployment and deepening repression—all in the absence of clear pathways for meaningful leadership change—suggested that political stasis could give way to a social explosion akin to the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. However, over the last two years, these governments have deftly managed to tap the veins of several global crises—including wars, migration, and rising populism in Europe—to revive their faltering rule.

Energy partnership

While a long-standing ally of Russia, Algeria’s strategic importance to Europe was dramatically upgraded by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In January 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni traveled to Algiers with a clear mission of increasing the supply of Algerian gas to Italy through the TransMed pipeline. “Facing the great energy crisis that Europe in particular is experiencing, Algeria could become a leader in production,” she said. Also seeking to decouple from Russian gas supplies, Germany signed a deal in February to buy Algeria’s pipeline natural gas for the first time. Like Meloni, German Minister for Economic Affairs Robert Habeck emphasized a long-term vision behind the blossoming “close energy partnership.”

The warmth of this European embrace, powered by the European Union’s (EU) energy needs, has rescued Algeria from the isolation of membership within the Russia camp, endowing Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune with the Western seal of approval that had eluded his troubled tenure since 2019. This comes as penalties and prison sentences against journalists and pro-democracy activists are becoming even more harsh and human rights organizations are banned.

The catastrophic war in Gaza has coincided with Algeria’s two-year term on the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member, which began on January 1. In tabling resolutions demanding an immediate ceasefire and pushing for urgent sessions on specific emergencies like Rafah, Algeria has played a prominent role in centralizing the Palestinian experience and in giving voice to the moral and legal outrage animating much of the global South. The Algerian government has also found a platform to showcase its Arab nationalist credentials, as well as its historic and principled anti-colonial position.

Migration deal

For Tunisian President Kais Saied—over whom the Algerian regime is said to exercise “increasing tutelage”—the European migration crisis has opened a critical lane for maneuver.

Overturning a decade of democratic progress since the Arab Spring, Saied’s three-year crackdown on opponents, judges, journalists, and civil society groups culminated on May 12 with the arrest of the lawyer Sonia Dahmani during a live television broadcast. As Tunisia’s economy stares down the barrel of bankruptcy, its president has sought to energize his base by weaponizing racial difference, crafting a chilling, xenophobic narrative about migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. In February 2023, Saied espoused the far-right “great replacement” conspiracy theory, triggering a wall of abuse against thousands of Africans who work and study in Tunisia—including black Tunisians, who make up 10–15 percent of the population.

The main targets of this surge in violence, migrants have been rounded up by Tunisian security forces and fatally abandoned in the desert without food or water. Yet the European Commission has seen fit to offer Saied 105 million euros ($112 million) in aid and almost 1 billion euros ($1.07 billion) in additional loans in exchange for “border management” to stem the flow of refugees and other migrants to Europe—with no human rights conditions attached. As Amnesty International has pointed out, the deal “risks legitimizing Saied’s assault on the rule of law and his ever-increasing repression of dissent.” Of course, for Saied, that is the point.

On Ukraine, Tunisia initially voted in favor of the United Nations resolution condemning Russia in 2022. As a consequence of the invasion, ordinary Tunisians were experiencing price surges and fuel and wheat shortages. Subsequently, however, Saied sought to rebalance Tunisia’s position—no doubt with Algerian encouragement—accepting overtures from the Kremlin, announcing a new grain deal with Moscow, and even turning up in Tehran to attend the funeral of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi—a Russian ally—in May.

Fallback zone

But Saied’s recalibration was, like those of other North African governments, partially informed by perceived Western complicity in Israeli war crimes in Gaza. Concerns over popular sentiment were indeed what pumped the breaks on Libya’s exploratory normalization talks with Israel, to the extent that Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh felt compelled to disavow his foreign minister when the news broke in August 2023, sending her fleeing from the country.

Both sides of the East and West divide in Libya have sought to leverage the war in Ukraine to strengthen international relationships. Sensing the chance to bolster its legitimacy in European circles, and bearing in mind its long-expired mandate to govern, the Dbeibeh administration in western Libya made grand promises of boosting oil production to help Europe deal with its energy shortfall. Yet, despite the Libyan National Oil Corporation’s access to an unprecedented budget, the key projects that would make this a reality have been mired in allegations of mismanagement and malfeasance, debts have been defaulted on, oil corruption has skyrocketed, and much of Libya’s highly organized $5-billion fuel-smuggling industry uses product imported from Russia. Indeed, on June 5, Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsevilev became the chairman of the Russian-Libya intergovernmental committee for trade. 

The warlord Khalifa Haftar, who holds much of eastern and southern Libya in his grip, has also watched his stock rise because of the war in Ukraine. Russia has been a key backer of the rogue general, with weapons, military jets, funds, and fighters from the Wagner Group. In 2020, after Haftar’s failed war to take Tripoli, the Kremlin began to hedge its bets. However, since Russia invaded Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has doubled down on the relationship. Eastern Libya has proved an invaluable fallback zone and a strategic platform from which Russia can bust sanctions, print currency, smuggle fuel to allies in Sudan and Syria, and supply its forces in sub-Saharan Africa. Haftar’s territory will also be used to establish a Russian naval base within touching distance of Southern Europe, and potentially interfere in European elections by weaponizing migration routes. 

Libyan authorities have also exploited Europe’s migration fears to ink agreements with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Italy, despite overwhelming evidence of the violence Libyan groups inflict upon migrants and the well-known collusion of the Libyan Coast Guard with human-trafficking gangs.

Friendship in motion

For Morocco, which recognized Israel through the Abraham Accords in 2020, the war in Gaza is a chance for the leadership to demonstrate its steadfast friendship with Israel and the United States, and to lay the groundwork for deepening security and intelligence cooperation.

Despite initial jitters—direct flights between Morocco and Israel were suspended in October 2023, and Israeli liaison office officials were asked to leave—by November 2023, Morocco was one of the countries that blocked an Arab League resolution to cut ties with Israel. Indeed, Rabat has continued cooperating with Israel, though Moroccan officials no longer wish for meetings to be documented with photographs. Rabat’s price for normalization with Israel was US and Israeli recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara region and investment in its economy.

Crucially, for Morocco, the Abraham Accords have unlocked the type of defense cooperation that has decisively shifted the local balance of power in its favor, mainly through the transfer of drones. The monarchy has also gained access to cutting-edge Israeli surveillance technology, including the NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware, which has allegedly been deployed against Sahraoui activists, European leaders, and Moroccan human rights defenders.

However, in leveraging ties with Israel to secure its position, the Moroccan leadership risks a disconnect with its people. Pro-Palestinian sentiment is consistently high and, since the onslaught in Gaza, tens of thousands of Moroccans have thronged the streets in protest. Those demonstrations have increasingly involved slogans rejecting the normalization deal with Israel. In response, the authorities have canceled Gaza demonstrations and handed down harsh prison sentences over Facebook posts. Away from the street, the Islamist opposition has openly criticized the government’s limp response to the “Gaza genocide.” Even one of the signatories of the Abraham Accords, former Prime Minister Saad Eddine el-Othmani, changed his position and met with the Hamas leadership in Doha as a gesture of solidarity. Beyond internal ruptures, for Rabat the risk also includes escalation with neighboring Algeria, a staunch backer of both the Palestinians and the separatists in Western Sahara, which could bring an element of spillover to North Africa from the conflict in the Middle East.  

Thus, while a crisis may convey opportunity, it can also represent danger. The North African political classes have certainly won a series of important medium-term victories off the back of global disasters. However, Europe should not assume that increasing transactional dealings with these elites will produce stability on its southern frontier. As crises expand, it remains doubtful that these regimes have forged the legitimacy or the longer-term strategies necessary to withstand civil unrest.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.
Dr. Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow within the Middle East Programs. She is also a former research fellow at Oxford University and the London School of Economics. 

The post A world in crisis is good news for North Africa’s political elites appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The first article of the series discussed the outline of the election process and its significance.

This article examines the system of representation, which determines how many candidates will be elected for a four-year term from each of the electoral districts and how the voters will vote for candidates in these districts. Variations of these elements can produce vastly different results. In Syria, the system guarantees three effects: overrepresentation of regime strongholds in parliament, manipulation of candidates through a quota system that reserves seats for workers and farmers, and prevention of effective multi-party competition.

There are no criteria for the number of members of parliament allocated from each governorate, with allocation decided purely at the president’s discretion. The allocation remains the same as it was in the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections, failing to consider any demographic changes seen in Syria since 2011. Based on the most recent official data, Syria’s population is 30 million (compared to a United Nations estimate of 23 million), and there has been no census since 2004.

Even a cursory look reveals how unfair the allocation of seats to constituencies is, and that it leads to significantly disproportional values of the vote. The allocation directly discriminates against the voters of the Raqqa, Al-Hasakah, Daraa, Aleppo, and Damascus City governorates—historically associated with opposition—while it favors voters in Quneitra, Latakia, Tartus, and Damascus governorates. The chart shows clearly the “value of the vote.” As an example, comparison of the official population data reveals that Damascus City governorate is represented in the assembly double than Rural Damascus and three times more than al-Hassakah. In another example, only 85,000 residents are needed for one member representing Lataka, while it takes 150,000 residents of Dara for a seat in the assembly.  This is contrary to the international electoral standard of equality of the vote.

While districting defines the inequality of the vote, the quota for farmers and workers defines inequality between the candidates. Of the 250 seats in parliament, the presidential decree assigned 127 to farmers or workers and 123 to “other sectors of society,” but the law does not elaborate on what “other sectors” means.

Nominally, the quota for farmers and workers introduced in 1973 was supposed to reflect socialist values and secure representation for working-class Syrians. In practice, the lack of criteria for candidacy in this category allows for manipulation, and many businessmen opted to run for these seats. In the 2020 elections, only 27.5 percent of the candidates (456 of the total 1,658) registered to run as farmers or workers, making those seats far less competitive. Also, while the system has a quota for farmers and workers, it does not include a quota for women. While far from the only method for protecting the representation of women, such a quota could counter the extraordinary and historically low representation of women; in the 2020 elections, only twenty-eight women were elected (11 percent of members).

But of all the stifling elements of the system, the ballot structure is the most damaging. On its face, the system appears simple: voters vote for as many candidates as there are seats in the district. Candidates run as individuals and, after the votes are tallied, are ranked simply by the number of votes. Those with the highest rankings win the seats. Yet this simplicity masks the extraordinary effect of this system, which is somewhat deceptively called the “block vote” system. In theory, it allows voters to vote for individual candidates, but in practice voters almost exclusively give all the votes to a block of candidates, often using a ballot with already selected candidates rather than voting on a blank “write-in” ballot.

Even when a block gains only a slight advantage, this translates into winning all the seats in the district. Those familiar with the Palestinian elections will remember that this system produced an overwhelming parliamentary majority for Hamas in 2005. In Lebanon, it guaranteed the pro-Syrian composition of the parliament in the post-civil war elections from 1992 to 2005. The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Jordan abandoned this system, so Syria remains the only country in the world using it for the national elections. This is not by coincidence—the system is designed to disincentivize competition between political parties. The results of the 2020 elections demonstrate its effect, as the candidates nominated by the Baath-dominated National Unity list won all the seats for which they competed, while those who were not on the list had no chance to be elected. This will remain the case as long as there is no well-organized, disciplined, and unified opposition with a single list of candidates, as the effect of vote splitting between the individual candidates is tremendously damaging to all that campaign as individuals.  

It is virtually impossible to estimate outcomes if Syrian elections were held under a different electoral system. Because each voter votes for multiple candidates, their votes cannot simply be re-calculated to present how much each party would receive under a putative proportional representation system. Besides vote tallying, the block vote system has far-reaching implications for political competition as well. Because it assumes competition between individual candidates, undermining options for political organizing and competition between political parties, it all but ensures fragmentation of the opposition. The framework of the block vote is so advantageous to the Baath Party that, even if the opposition were welcome to compete in elections with guarantees that their candidates would not be disqualified or harassed, in practice, opposition parties would not stand a chance to win a significant number of seats.

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post The Syrian electoral system guarantees inequality appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The SNA, the northern Aleppo-based factions’ military structure, was established in 2017 to lead Turkey’s counterterrorism missions in Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syria branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The coalition included a mix of groups and fighters, some of whom fought against the Bashar al-Assad regime since 2011, while others joined Turkey’s counterterrorism mission in 2016. Over time, the SNA not only managed to dominate the military scene in areas liberated from ISIS and the YPG, but also became an important component of Turkey’s military missions in Libya, Azerbaijan, and, reportedly, in Niger.

Reforming the SNA—viewed in some quarters as a military subcontractor or proxy for Ankara—is doubly challenging given protracted wartime conditions and the fact that survival against local competitors and self-interest under those conditions leaves scant room for reform or ideological formation.

The transformation of the SNA is part of Turkey’s plan to transform the areas it controls into a self-sufficient political-military structure that would protect Ankara’s national security interests and, perhaps, improve the Syrian opposition and Turkey’s leverage in any future settlement. The transformation would also ease the pressure on Ankara, which has been criticized for the SNA’s behavior, and would put the opposition’s Syrian Interim Government (SIG) at the center of the relationship with Turkey. This can be interpreted as Ankara’s intention to change its relationship with the Syrian opposition in the international arena. The empowerment of such a structure, theoretically led by the SIG, cannot be done without taming the SNA’s fragmented military structure, whose leaders have become contractors.

De facto local bodies and the challenges of creating space for the SIG

For nearly two years, Ankara has been implementing its plan to strengthen the SIG and bring order and stability to the SIG-held areas in northern Aleppo step by step, albeit slowly—despite the SNA’s resistance. The reform of the SNA aims to link the legitimate ground with a legal concept that comes from civilian government: loyalty to legislative and executive power. This would also change the perception of the Syrian opposition as an “entity dominated by armed groups.” In this way, transforming the SNA into an army with a clearly defined legal structure under its leadership would provide an internal balance to Syria’s opposition. Ultimately, the aim is to reduce the dominant role of the SNA and transform the Syrian opposition, particularly the SIG and all other civilian sectors, into an autonomous political actor.

In 2018, the SIG established a military judiciary mechanism to hold SNA groups accountable by adopting a military code in line with humanitarian law norms and setting up a military police force as the mechanism’s law-enforcement agency. According to Arafat Hammoud, the prosecutor in charge of military judicial administration, 433 members of the SNA were indicted and sentenced on various charges between January and May 2023 and have already been sentenced. Hammoud said that civilians who believe that SNA soldiers have committed crimes can appeal to the military judiciary. Independent reporting from human rights organizations does not yet confirm the impact of these reforms. Local civil society leaders are satisfied in principle, though they say that some SNA factions have gone beyond the limits set by the reforms and have been involved in various crimes. For the tribes, which have often had problems with the SNA, the aforementioned reforms will improve public safety and security by forcing the SNA to act within the limits of the law.

In 2023, the military judiciary mechanism gave the death penalty to four SNA soldiers who deliberately killed four people during the 2023 Nowruz holiday. Although all death sentences have been suspended, this symbolic punishment also shows that the SIG will not hesitate to confront the SNA as part of the structural reforms.

The challenge for the SIG, however, is that SNA leaders are unlikely to suddenly relinquish the financial, military, and political power they gained over the past decade. Meanwhile, small groups within the SNA seem more attentive to the SIG’s reforms. Per my research, in the northern Afrin region, a quasi-democratic spontaneous local system has been established between the Kurdish, Yazidi-Kurdish, and Alevi-Kurdish communities and small groups of SNA components controlling relatively small areas.

Committees established between small SNA groups and the local population have solved the issues practically, without waiting for a centralized organization. For example, according to the interviews I conducted in the village of Darwisha, north of Afrin, a committee was established to resolve the disputes between the SNA factions and the Kurdish population in the village, which concerned olive groves and the return of the Kurdish population displaced because of the conflict. While it did not confiscate the olive groves or the houses of the displaced, villagers told me the SNA only agreed to pay taxes for olive production for one year. The village’s needs, such as a well to draw water for the water-supply network, were resolved similarly. However, this approach, which consists of mutual promises, has no traditional or legal basis and varies from village to village.

In a way, this local system is laying the groundwork for the structural reform being implemented by the SIG through the smaller revolutionary groups in the SNA. However, it is also known that the SNA often abolished this spontaneous structure, which was established with the experiences of the first years of the revolution, by intervening in in line with the faction’s interests. This is because a protective or constitutive law does not shape these de facto structures but only by mutual understanding and power at the mercy of the SNA. Yet, the small groups of the SNA that have tried to preserve their revolutionary character are transferring the experience of local self-government to these structures.

Progress despite structural problems

Between the levels of factions’ pragmatism and senior officials of the SIG and its defense ministry lies a diffuse network of power brokers who lack incentives to consent to systematic military reform. A centralized military structure, completely withdrawn from the civilian sphere and subordinated to the SIG, is not in the interest of some powerful factions within the SNA. In contrast to these groups, whose military presence is the basis of their economic and political influence, other smaller groups have shown greater openness to centralization.

This is already evident in the periodic and operational alliances that some factions have formed among themselves, not within the formal structure of the SNA. In this context, coalitions such as the Joint Force and Tahrir and Construction Movement within the SNA, which are based on economic and influence competition between leaders rather than politics, are among the issues that the SIG should address.

Here, naturally, the issue of the SIG’s arm wrestling with the SNA comes up—namely the issues of authority and power. The SIG is not a bottom-up organization nor an elected government whose will is derived from the people of the regions it governs. The SNA has a closer relationship with the population in areas of northern Aleppo and, in this respect, the SIG lacks the mass influence of SNA leaders.

Despite the obvious structural needs to implement centralized policies, the reforms that the SIG has so far implemented through its defense ministry have been functional due to the support of Turkey, which provides the economic and military backbone for areas under SIG administration. The withdrawal of SNA components from civil, economic, judicial, and law-enforcement functions—as well as the cessation of its military power to act contrary to judicial decisions and laws, and the reduction of its influence over the masses and the media—will not happen overnight. But with the support and encouragement of Turkish authorities, these things might occur over time.

Although the SIG and the defense ministry have established various institutional committees, such as the Military Advisory Council, they have so far failed to deter the SNA leaders with military power. However, the council provides a potential mechanism to make fast and fair decisions on SNA issues. In the medium term, it is safe to assume that the military council, the military judiciary, and the military police will become effective institutionalizing forces.

The military police, established due to the inter-factional conflicts within the SNA, has come a long way since 2018. Military Police took over checkpoints set up on the roads by military groups, because SNA factions often imposing themselves instead of public order in SNA-controlled areas. The military police have also taken control of the crossing gates to the YPG and the regime areas, centralizing humanitarian crossings. In this respect, it must be said that the military police, together with the Border Protection Brigades, have been very effective in reducing illegal crossings into Turkey from YPG- and regime-held areas.

The institutionalization of the military police, including the military judiciary and the defense ministry’s takeover of the crossing points and customs gates from the SNA on behalf of the SIG, also changed the economic rivalry that often led to internal conflicts within the SNA. SNA revenues were centralized and placed under the control of the defense ministry through the SIG budget.

While these institutionalization efforts and the functioning of military law have not yet reached the desired level, they show that the SIG is working to separate civilian and military status and to civilianize the administration from the municipalities to the government. In other words, although it is not emphasized, in the long run the process of change in northern Syria will paint a picture of whether the Syrian opposition is ready for solutions and whether it can be an alternative to the Assad regime.

SNA reforms, led by the SIG and supported by Turkey, will expand beyond the military sphere to the public sphere and civil society. The ultimate goal of reforming the SNA, which dominates the political, economic, and social spheres with its military power, is to create space for a self-sufficient political actor that organizes public policies. Withdrawing the SNA from the political sphere and turning it into a defense force under the rule of law will pressure the SIG to become a civilian political body subject to local and general elections. This might also take the governance situation in northern Syria to a higher level than the predicted rebel quasi-state phase. One of the medium- to long-term benefits of this process will be the confidence that the civilianized public sphere will offer to economic investors. This process may allow the SIG-administered areas, where the conflict has largely moved away from the civilian sphere, to attract small-to-medium investors and combat poverty and unemployment.

Levent Kemal is a freelance journalist and researcher based in Istanbul.

The post From rebel factions to an army: Efforts to tame the Syrian National Army appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Cemetery desecration and Gaza

Responding to CNN’s identification of sixteen such scenes from around Gaza, the IDF offered two explanations. First, the organization explained the military necessity for the operations, accusing Hamas of using cemeteries for military purposes, an accusation the Israeli military has levied before. In 2007, an Israeli airstrike destroyed Sheikh Radwan Cemetery. Accounts of the strike varied, but an IDF spokesperson pinned the destruction on “secondary explosions” caused by a Hamas arms dump and rocket-launching site nearby. The IDF also provided video evidence of an alleged Hamas rocket launch from an unnamed cemetery during the 2014 Gaza War. In response to these attacks, the IDF shelled cemeteries in Gaza City and Rafah. While CNN could not confirm the alleged usage in the current conflict, Amnesty International has traced Hamas’s consistent use of human shields to 2007, bolstering the IDF’s claims.

Challenging this explanation, some legal analysts have noted that an attack targeting a cemetery would not be automatically legal under international law. Furthermore, the IDF also stands accused of using cemeteries for military operations. CNN discovered a makeshift road for IDF vehicles cutting through a bulldozed cemetery, and Scripps News provided evidence of this practice at multiple locations, with advance teams clearing graves as IDF vehicles approached to allow for quicker passage through the cemeteries. CNN also found indications at other sites that the IDF has used Palestinian cemeteries as staging grounds, “leveling large swaths and erecting berms to fortify their positions.”

The IDF’s second claim addresses the ongoing Israeli hostage crisis in Gaza. The IDF stated that its mission to find and return the estimated forty-three bodies of deceased Israeli hostages necessitates the exhumation of various sites, including Palestinian cemeteries.

Contrasting the IDF narrative are several reports demonstrating that the IDF improperly handled Palestinian bodies in those cemeteries. In the process of extracting corpses, the IDF reportedly damaged tombstones and left body parts exposed. Moreover, according to one Palestinian doctor, the IDF did not record information about the bodies’ identities or locations while exhuming, posing challenges for officials and Palestinian families trying to claim their dead. Instead, reports show that the Israeli government verified that the bodies did not belong to Israeli hostages and then returned the 180 exhumed Palestinian corpses to southern Gaza, where they now wait in mass and anonymous graves for DNA testing and repatriation.

Cemetery desecration and history

Cemetery desecration is not a new phenomenon, having featured in several conflicts and genocides over the past century. Indeed, the IDF’s first explanation for attacks on cemeteries fits into a pattern of militant tactics in a couple of Middle East conflicts.

In the 2003 Battle of Najaf, al-Mahdi troops in Iraq used Wadi al-Salaam (Valley of Peace), the world’s largest cemetery, as cover to wage war on US forces. More than a decade later, the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) began employing a similar tactic, constructing eighteen cemeteries around southwest Turkey and allegedly using the sites as bases and hideouts to further their fight against the Turkish government. In response, Turkey ordered the sites’ demolition, culminating in government attacks on the cemeteries in 2015.

However, the IDF’s alleged treatment of cemeteries outside of direct conflict with Hamas is also noteworthy, given cemetery desecration’s well-established place in the history of genocide. Cemetery desecration and genocide are so intimately linked that Raphael Lemkin, coiner of the term “genocide,” even recommended outlawing the practice in early drafts of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Great Britain and France ultimately rejected the inclusion, largely due to their engagement in cultural genocide as part of colonial projects. Still, the political decision does not diminish the fundamental role cemetery desecration has played in genocide.

For instance, white settlers in the United States frequently desecrated Indigenous burial grounds in a centuries-long campaign of cultural destruction and ethnic cleansing. Likewise, Nazis desecrated and destroyed countless Jewish cemeteries during the Holocaust, often using headstones as construction materials in a blatant effort to excise both Jewish people and Jewish heritage from occupied German territories.

Desecrating Muslim cemeteries in genocide is also nothing new. In the lead-up to the Srebrenica genocide, Bosnian Serbs inflicted mass atrocities against Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Muslim community, including the destruction of thirty-five Muslim cemeteries. Similarly, in China’s genocide of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims, the government has leveled nearly one hundred cemeteries in what the Uyghur Human Rights Project has labeled a “cultural genocide.”

Cemetery desecration and peace

The parallels between cemetery desecration in these historical examples and the current conflict are cause for considerable concern. Hamas is likely using cemeteries for military purposes, and Israel has the right to respond in line with the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law. However, the alleged IDF practice of razing these sites for military operations, as well as the destructive exhumations of Palestinian bodies without diligent cataloging, is unacceptable and demands further attention.

The conflict in Gaza highlights the dire need to revisit colonial-era shortcomings in understanding and addressing the crime of genocide. Humanitarian organizations will—and should—prioritize living individuals suffering from conflict. But helping the living is not mutually exclusive with preserving the lineage and history tying a community to a conflicted territory.

When the IDF razes Gazan cemeteries, it also razes Palestinian heritage, culture, and claims to the land. This fact is often lost in conversations about long-term security and postwar peace. Ending a conflict goes beyond merely fighting militants in a graveyard to gain one strategic position after another. Israel implicitly acknowledges this fact in vocalizing its mission to reclaim all Israeli hostages, both living and deceased. But any path toward an enduring peace will require not only security for the living, but also assured dignity for the dead.

Charles Johnson is a Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. He is a junior at the University of Kansas majoring in history, political science, and religious studies.

The post Razing the dead: Contextualizing IDF cemetery desecration in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The decision by the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to seek arrest warrants against a head of state who enjoys support from the West is unprecedented. While the United States has never been a member of the ICC, it participated in the negotiations that led to the court’s creation. In the subsequent years, the United States actively supported—or at least did not impede—the court’s investigation and prosecution of international atrocity crimes in Darfur, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, and recently, Ukraine. 

During the Donald Trump administration, however, the United States was hostile to the ICC. In 2020, President Trump issued an executive order imposing sanctions and travel restrictions on ICC officials involved in investigating alleged war crimes by US personnel in Afghanistan. Then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described the ICC as “an unaccountable political institution masquerading as a legal body.” Although the ICC investigations in Afghanistan remained ongoing in 2021, the Biden administration revoked these sanctions, signaling a shift in policy and a more cooperative stance toward the court. In that same statement, Secretary of State Antony Blinken highlighted that the administration still disagrees with the ICC investigations in Afghanistan and during the Gaza war and called to reform the court to “achieve its core mission of serving as a court of last resort in punishing and deterring atrocity crimes.”

The United States’ most recent admonition of the ICC over its allegation that Israeli leadership has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity has legal and political dimensions. Legal experts, such as Gissou Nia and Elise Baker of the Atlantic Council, argued that the OTP’s decision to request warrants is legally and jurisdictionally sound. Politically, however, US support for the ICC is more complicated, particularly in this case. The reason for this is twofold: first, protection of US military personnel and, second, protecting US allies from ICC prosecution, both now and in the future. The argument around protecting US personnel implies that the United States has something to hide, echoing Russia’s anti-ICC stances. Interfering in the work of the court on behalf of US allies also echoes the behavior of Russia and China, which notoriously stepped in to protect Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad from the ICC in 2014.

President Biden has emphasized the importance of a rules-based international order, consistent with the US support for the ICC’s warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin for war crimes in Ukraine. However, Biden’s vision for a rules-based world has been widely criticized due to what appears to be unconditional support for Israel in Gaza. If the administration chooses to sanction the ICC, it would display inconsistency and undermine Biden’s efforts to distinguish his administration from those of Barack Obama and Trump, both of whom were criticized for fluctuating foreign policy stances and values. With that, the United States would concede to Russia and China that great-power competition would be based on their values of selective interference and legal reasoning, not acclaimed, consistent US values.

The existence of the ICC benefits the United States by helping maintain order in an increasingly unstable world. As the world moves into the second quarter of the twenty-first century, with great-power competition involving China and Russia as a major theme, many middle powers are finding more space to avoid pressure by hedging their alliances. This hedging allows these middle powers greater latitude to resist any US efforts against domestic or regional conflicts. Isolated ideological regimes like those in Syria and North Korea do not need to meet economic demands to survive; their legitimacy comes from their authoritarian control and mafia-like rule of society.

In contrast, middle and regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) must remain connected to the world. They will take seriously the risk of being targeted by the ICC if the court is allowed to operate effectively. However, these countries are not members of the ICC, and the lack of prosecution against their governments and others for alleged atrocities limits the ICC’s ability to influence their behavior and casts doubt on its credibility. By sanctioning ICC officials, the United States forfeits a potential deterrent against human rights violations and sets a dangerous precedent for nations seeking Chinese or Russian protection from future ICC prosecutions.

On a strategic level, Biden’s support for Israel aligns with his support for other allies like Ukraine and Taiwan. However, this conflict is distinct and multilayered. In part, it is a war between Israel and Hamas but Israel is also fighting Iran-led Axis of Resistance proxies in the region. On these two layers, the Biden administration should continue to offer Israel the support it needs to defend itself. But this is not the whole image or what this conflict is all about. There are other crucial layers, including the historical conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. This layer should be treated differently and, in this circumstance, the administration can and should carve out a space in its policy that does not protect Netanyahu and Gallant. It is widely recognized that this conflict cannot be resolved through military means alone—a sentiment Biden has acknowledged.

Regardless of whether Biden sanctions the ICC, Netanyahu will likely become a lame duck on the international scene, as countries might avoid inviting him due to the ICC’s announcement. This includes France and Germany, which backed the legitimacy of the OTP announcement. This has played out before. Despite Putin’s global clout and close ties to South Africa, a fellow member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), he couldn’t travel to attend the summit hosted by Johannesburg in August 2023. South Africa, a member of the ICC, initially criticized the ICC’s arrest warrant against Putin, with its minister of justice citing “inconsistency” in the court’s work. President Cyril Ramaphosa also tried to get an exemption from the ICC to avoid arresting Putin if he attended the summit. In the end, however, South Africa complied and urged Putin not to attend.

The ICC is not perfect. It has faced legitimate criticism regarding the politicization of its cases and the OTP’s failure to pursue cases against certain perpetrators of atrocities, such as the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran or Syria’s Assad, even in instances where the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over their crimes—and despite many requests to do so. However, it remains a multilateral institution born from the US-led world order, aiming to hold individuals accountable for core international crimes. Supporting the ICC, or at minimum not undermining it, is ultimately in the US interest, as is promoting justice and adherence to international law.

By restraining itself from being hostile to the ICC, the Biden administration demonstrates a much-needed consistency, reinforces the rules-based order that the president champions, and enhances US credibility on the global stage. Ultimately, this aligns with core US interests in promoting global stability and upholding the principles of international law. This will also help the administration focus on what truly matters: ending the war, returning the hostages, and pushing for a two-state solution to resolve the conflict.

Ibrahim Al-Assil is a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. Follow him on X: @ibrahimalassil.

The post Sanctioning the ICC over Israel is a strategic misstep for the US appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But the group believes this threshold is not fixed. Instead, it rises as Israeli operations in Gaza deepen, which prompts Hezbollah to act while Israel’s attention and resources are concentrated elsewhere. But when these Israeli operations create growing US dissatisfaction—which uniquely restrains Israel, Washington’s “forward military base” and “tool” in Hezbollah’s thinking—Hezbollah feels it has more freedom of action, and thus increases the depth and lethality of its attacks.

Hezbollah has been monitoring growing US-Israeli differences over Rafah operations. After these tensions culminated in Washington halting weapons shipments to Israel in early May, the group believed it could increase the intensity, lethality, and frequency of its attacks with relative impunity. Therefore, when Israel nevertheless initiated Rafah operations on May 6, Hezbollah launched a directed suicide drone attack, killing two Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers.

As the Joe Biden administration doubled down on the weapons freeze, Hezbollah did the same on the lethality of its attacks—deliberately killing one civilian and one soldier, wounding five others, and bombarding the Golan Heights with sixty rockets over the next week. That week also saw Hezbollah launch a suicide drone 35 kilometers (21.7 miles) into northern Israel, its deepest attack yet, and introduce its Jihad Mughniyeh missiles and drone-launched S-5 surface-to-ground missile on May 12 and May 16, respectively.

Hezbollah’s independent hostility calculus with Israel can fully explain neither this escalation nor its decision to join the Gaza war. In mid-2019, the group quickly enforced its vow to retaliate against Israel for killing its fighters in Syria. But, after Lebanon’s economy collapsed a month later and Israel crossed that red line twice in subsequent years—even bombing inside Lebanon—Hezbollah noticeably held back, and even revised its retaliation equation to save face. Meanwhile, it tapped Palestinian groups to attack Israel. The group understood it had to delicately navigate Lebanon’s economic collapse to ensure its survival and, therefore, could not risk compounding the financially depleted country’s miseries with a war of unprecedented destruction with Israel.

Those restraining factors remained when the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas pit Hezbollah’s duty to assist its partners in Gaza against its need to avoid war in Lebanon. The group’s compromise—an attrition campaign—has followed the trend line of Israeli intervention in Gaza and US-Israel ties.

The war’s onset in October coincided with both minimal Israeli ground involvement in Gaza and peak US support. President Biden conducted an unprecedented wartime visit to Israel, sternly warned Hezbollah against intervention, and deployed US carriers.

Hezbollah’s first attacks were, therefore, relatively tepid. Initially, it only struck the Shebaa Farms, within the old rules of engagement, before slowly expanding to attacking the infrastructure of other Israeli outposts straddling the Lebanon-Israel frontier. Riskier attacks against Arab al-Aramshe, Nahariya, Kiryat Shmona, and Hanita were again outsourced to Palestinian factions.

Hezbollah would soon shift its posture. Five days after Israel’s ground invasion of the coastal enclave on October 27, Hezbollah first deployed loitering munitions, reportedly struck an Israeli border outpost with its 300–500-kilogram Burkan rocket two days later, and then fired its first Katyusha barrage, consisting of twelve rockets, the following day. By late November 2023, Hezbollah was emboldened enough to boast about using Burkan rockets, and then bombard northern Israel with a thirty-five-rocket Katyusha salvo.

In the background, Israel had acquiesced to Washington’s increasingly cumbersome conditions on its operations in Gaza—including delaying its ground invasion, then accepting daily humanitarian pauses, and finally a limited ceasefire—for fear of incurring US disfavor amid attempts to recover its hostages, then numbering more than 250, and a growing two-front war. Meanwhile, Hezbollah was confident it had been spared an imminent Israeli campaign, as the United States was also blaming Israel for escalation in Lebanon.

Hezbollah would raise the ante again in January. By then, many of Israel’s intense urban battles in northern Gaza and Khan Yunis had become sieges over sharper US disapproval and growing pressure to accept unsatisfactory ceasefire terms with Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the group was buoyed by US public sentiment souring on the Gaza war, with its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah enthusiastically citing a Harvard CAPS/Harris Poll finding that 51 percent of 18–24-year-old Americans supported “Israel to be ended and given to Hamas and the Palestinians,” as a development that “will have tremendous impact in America.” Within a week, Hezbollah launched a sixty-two-rocket barrage at Meron air traffic control base and hit IDF Northern Command Headquarters in Safed with loitering munitions.

None of this is to suggest that the intensity of Israel and Hezbollah’s direct engagements over the past eight months has had no impact on the group’s immediate responses—only that the tactics Hezbollah has adopted are not entirely reactionary, but are instead strategically attuned to this broader context. For example, while Hezbollah’s strikes on Meron and Safed followed Israel’s assassinations of senior Hamas official Saleh Arouri and Radwan deputy commander Wissam Tawil, Israel was preoccupied with besieging two Gazan cities and absorbing a high degree of US pressure. By contrast, when Israel killed five Radwan operatives and Qassam Brigades deputy commander in Lebanon Khalil Kharraz in November, with strong US backing, Hezbollah’s response was comparably restrained.  

Hezbollah understands the risks it is inviting upon itself and Lebanon. Nasrallah, while exaggerating the group’s contributions to the war, has acknowledged that “even one of the[se] operations…in the past” would have prompted Israel to declare war. While Israel’s preoccupation with Gaza is therefore crucial to Hezbollah’s freedom of action, “the American position,” in Nasrallah’s words, and developments in the United States are “decisive.” After all, in 2006, the US greenlight enabled Israel to suspend an ongoing ground operation in Gaza to fight a monthlong war against Hezbollah in response to the latter’s July 12, 2006, attack. This, Nasrallah said, is because “America controls Israel…when the Americans put their foot down, threatening to halt funds, Israel quakes in fear. When the Americans halt weapons shipments, the Israeli Chief of Staff is forced to take stock of his remaining ammunition.” 

This is an exaggeration, but not by much. Israel will prioritize and pursue its interests, but diminished US support impacts its ability to do so. Therefore, Israel will continue its necessary pursuit of the destruction of Palestinian factions in Rafah. Hezbollah, conversely, will act to ensure their survival. But as the group does so, it will cast a constant eye on Washington—searching for signs of displeasure to continue transitioning the ongoing clashes with Israel into deadlier, more escalatory phases.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

Ahmad Sharawi is a research analyst at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, focusing on Middle East affairs. Follow him on X: @AhmadA_Sharawi.

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While all eyes were on the government-formation disputes, a terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) raided the city of Mosul in Nineveh province on June 10, 2014. It captured the entire territory in a matter of hours, with a brazen goal of establishing an Islamist caliphate that included Iraq, Syria, and eventually the entire region, and ruling under its version of Islam. The complete meltdown of three divisions of the Iraqi Army emboldened the terrorists and allowed them to take most of Salahuddin province. With most of Anbar province already in its hands since January 2014, ISIS secured complete control over one-third of Iraq’s territory within a few days.

The Iraqi government became paralyzed by the lack of progress in the post-election political negotiations, the continued meltdown of the armed forces, and the lack of military support from the international community. On June 13, 2014, as ISIS was about to close in on Baghdad, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shia religious scholar, issued a rare fatwa calling on Iraqi “citizens to defend the country, its people, the honor of its citizens, and its sacred places.” Tens of thousands volunteered to defend the country and help the government fight the most existential threat Iraq faced since its founding in 1920.

Fighting and defeating ISIS was one of the most important accomplishments of the Iraqi population, showcasing the resilience of people who stood up for their national dignity and defended their liberty at a time when no one else was ready or willing to defend them, including their government. Although other countries were involved—Iran supplied weapons to Baghdad shortly after the ISIS invasion, and the United States formed a coalition to provide advice, logistics, and air support starting in August 2014—none of these efforts would have mattered if Iraqis had not risen to defend their nascent, albeit flawed and uncertain, democracy.

Had Iraqis given up in the critical moments after June 10, 2014, as their armed forces had, their democratic dreams would have witnessed a catastrophic end much like what occurred in Afghanistan under similar circumstances in 2021. Self-organized ordinary Iraqis refused to see their country delivered to a terrorist organization or leave themselves at the mercy of religious extremists. Their acts of valor in the early days of the crisis restored morale to the Iraqi armed forces and revived the international community’s faith in the future of Iraq. What followed was a matter of time to plan and manage the battle of liberating the territories that ISIS captured and stop its rule of systemic civilian oppression and mass murder.

In the years following the 2017 defeat of ISIS, Iraq has progressed positively despite serious challenges. Having endured the painful lessons of 2014, it reorganized its armed forces to prevent a similar security collapse. Those forces stand today among the most confident and combat ready in the region, and some of their components, such as the counterterrorism force, perform at par with elite international peers. Iraqi leaders and their counterparts in allied countries, the United States in particular, have gained confidence in the efficiency and performance of the Iraqi armed forces, prompting discussions to transition the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, which is led by the United States and includes eighty-four other nations, into bilateral agreements between Iraq and coalition members, focusing on continued security cooperation and capacity building for the Iraqi security forces.

In January, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced “the commencement of the first round of bilateral dialogue between Iraq and the United States of America to end the mission of the Coalition in Iraq.” The Iraqi government also requested that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) terminate the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) mandate by the end of 2025, arguing that Iraq now has mature institutions to cooperate directly with international organizations like other nations do. On May 31, the UNSC voted unanimously to approve the Iraqi request. The Iraqi government described these developments as the end of contingency relations and the inauguration of a new era of normal cooperation with the international community while leaving internal Iraqi governance to its institutions, which have acquired adequate maturity and competence.

What Iraq needs to ensure its success on the path of security and self-governance is to tackle the two most pressing challenges: economic uncertainty and corruption. Iraq continues to depend on a rentier economy, fully dependent on oil revenues, which fall short of supporting the governmental operational cost or leaving extra funds to invest in building a robust economy. Iraq’s only way out of the current economic quagmire is a diversified economy that encourages investment and a private sector. The Iraqi government must move away from the old philosophy and practice of a state-controlled economy to a new direction where its role is to create a healthy environment in which private businesses can thrive. In contrast, the Iraqi government is a regulator in most sectors where governments have not traditionally performed adequately.

The same attention needs to be given to the malignant threat of corruption.

After two decades of political change, the Iraqi political elites have coexisted with a deeply entrenched culture of corruption, and many high-level officials have contributed to it. Normalized and systemic financial, political, and administrative corruption has denied the Iraqi people the opportunity to build a functional state and heal a society that was traumatized by five decades of wars, international economic sanctions, and terrorism. Efforts to combat corruption continue to be limited in scope and target only insignificant perpetrators. To secure a permanent defeat of ISIS and prevent its return, or the emergence of a similar threat, it is important to eliminate conditions that helped such a group thrive to begin with. The pervasive culture of corruption and a poor economy have been among the leading conditions that contributed to the rise of ISIS in Iraq. Now is the time to address those conditions.

Dr. Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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The latest sign of Algeria’s obsession with Morocco was its decision to confiscate the jerseys of Moroccan soccer club RS Berkane after its players traveled to Algeria on April 19 to play a CAF Confederation Cup semifinal match against USMA Alger. Algeria justified its decision by stating that the team’s equipment bore an “illegitimate” map of Morocco, which included Western Sahara. 

African soccer’s governing body intervened, ordering Algeria to drop its case and allow RS Berkane to play in the jerseys. However, Algiers disregarded the ruling, seizing any opportunity to display its support for what it describes as the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.

Many have maintained that one of the main drivers of Algeria’s hostility toward Morocco is the ideological makeup of the Algerian establishment and its strategy of seeking popular legitimacy.

Algeria’s operating philosophy is to galvanize nationalist fervor against its enemies. For the past three decades, it has constantly needed to create external enemies to mobilize national support and divert public opinion from the country’s economic, social, and political problems. 

While largely pertinent, this analysis ignores the psychological dimension of this chronic animosity between the two countries. Algeria’s military and political leaders harbor unresolved grievances against Morocco, which contribute to tensions. Additionally, Morocco is one of the oldest monarchies in the world, and has managed to maintain its sovereignty for much of its history. The same cannot be said of Algeria, a sixty-two-year-old country. 

This makes the Algerian regime reluctant to fully explore the past, out of fear that a deep dive into the country’s history might lend credence to some critics’ claim that modern Algeria is the creation of imperialist France.

It’s worth mentioning that Morocco was a strong supporter of the Algerian liberation movement, contributing financially and logistically to the war effort against French domination. Then a champion of what some have described as a strong belief in the urgency and imperative of Muslim solidarity, Morocco ignored warnings and secret deals from France, committing itself to the liberation of Algeria instead.

Yet, post-independence, Algeria’s leadership quickly whitewashed this well-documented episode of Moroccan solidarity and generosity, providing invaluable insights into what would later become Algeria’s deep-seated desire to be the Maghreb’s undisputed leader.

Morocco’s defeat of Algeria in the border war known as the 1963 Sand War created a psychological barrier, as generations of Algerian military and political elites grew up with the idea of avenging the humiliation that newly independent Algeria had suffered at Morocco’s hands.

Morocco’s “betrayal” of Algeria

Over time, Algeria’s resentment against Morocco for its humiliating defeat morphed into a radical desire to take revenge by fostering separatism on Moroccan territory. Therefore, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front is the culmination of the Algerian elite’s strategy of attaining regional primacy by establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. While proclaiming its support for the “liberation struggle” of the “oppressed Sahrawi people,” Algeria’s primary goal is to keep Morocco in check by fomenting and prolonging the dispute over the Western Sahara region to prevent Rabat from reopening the issue of unresolved Algerian-Moroccan borders.

As far as Algiers is concerned, ending the Western Sahara dispute would provide Morocco with a level of strategic continental depth that would overwhelmingly consolidate its status as a regional hegemon. Algeria has steadfastly supported the Polisario for the past four decades to prevent Morocco from settling the territorial dispute. The Algerian-Moroccan rivalry entered a new phase in 2017 when Morocco joined the African Union (AU). Algeria had tirelessly used Morocco’s absence from the AU to push for a “parallel African agenda” on the Western Sahara question. This entailed lobbying for the Polisario Front’s Sahrawi cause, which it presents as a decolonization struggle against what it describes as Moroccan occupation.

Given that the AU’s official position on Western Sahara has shifted in Morocco’s favor since 2018, some of Algeria’s anti-Moroccan agitation speaks of deepening diplomatic disarray and a profound sense of disappointment. Algeria seems to be furious that Morocco, in the short time since its return to the AU, has effectively destroyed all the work that Algerian diplomacy had done for three decades to get the AU to fully support a self-determination referendum that would culminate in the creation of an independent state in the Western Sahara region.

Algeria’s displeasure with Morocco’s growing continental influence can be seen in three regional efforts that Algiers has undertaken in recent years to contain Rabat’s rising leadership. The first is the attempted revival of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project in 2022 to derail the more promising Nigeria-Morocco pipeline project. The second is the planned creation of free-trade zones with Niger and Mali to counter Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel. Finally, the most recent is the Algerian regime’s push for the creation of a Maghreb Union without Morocco.

For all these counterattacking efforts, highlighted by the projected openings of more African consulates in Dakhla and Laayoune, the fact remains that Morocco’s African diplomacy is having morale-boosting results. In contrast, Algeria’s diplomatic influence has declined across the continent. More importantly, Morocco’s African diplomacy now extends to countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria, outside its so-called traditional francophone comfort zone. In the coming months and years, Algeria will redouble its efforts to persuade some of these countries to reconsider their cooperation with Morocco. 

Perhaps the most significant blows to Algeria’s diplomacy have come from outside Africa. These include the consistent pro-Moroccan stance reflected in all United Nations (UN) resolutions on Western Sahara since 2007, the decisive US decision in 2020 to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the region, and Spain’s 2022 declaration of full support for Morocco’s autonomy plan. While the first development has been gradual, and lacks absolute finality due to the presence of marginal pro-Polisario voices within the UN, the latter two events have shaken Algeria.

Taken together, however, these and other emerging developments clearly indicate that self-determination dreams have been buried—and that compromise is the only viable route to a politically feasible and lasting solution in the Sahara dossier. Faced with what increasingly appears to be an irreversible diplomatic setback, Algeria has shifted tactics by confronting Morocco on alternative battlefields. In recent months, as noted earlier, Algeria has used the unconventional platform of sport to settle scores with Morocco.

The goal is to open a second narrative front to rally popular sympathy and support for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Algeria’s permanent representative to the UN recently drew parallels between Palestine and Western Sahara, reflecting the regime’s overarching aspiration to distort historical facts and equate the Western Saharan and Palestinian cases. 

It is unlikely that Algeria’s continued attacks on Morocco will compel the UN to reconsider its implicit, but increasingly apparent, burying of the self-determination option on Western Sahara. At the same time, there are growing signs that many in Morocco, having grown tired of ignoring Algiers’s unrelenting hostility toward Rabat, might start pushing Morocco to discard its long-standing patience and the ensuing hope of brotherly reconciliation between the two countries.  

Time for the United States to step in

The animosity and hostility between the two countries have reached worrying levels, raising the specter of a military conflagration breaking out. Against this bleak backdrop, the United States should lead a vigorous diplomatic campaign.      

To calm the waters between the two countries and ensure that the current state does not get out of hand, the United States should give more attention to its military cooperation with Morocco, while signaling to Algeria that Washington would do everything in its power to prevent it from taking any actions that could destabilize the region. Such a move could send Algeria an unmistakable signal of Washington’s commitment to security cooperation with Rabat.     

Second, the United States must pressure the Algerian government to abide by the provisions of the UNSC Resolution on the Western Sahara issue since 2018, all of which call on Algeria to fully cooperate with the UN as it works toward a compromise-based and realistic political solution to the dispute. As Algeria’s rejection of some recent UN resolutions has shown, the only way to get it to commit to the UN-led political process is to pressure it to fully acknowledge its political responsibility for creating and prolonging this conflict and to negotiate a face-saving political solution with Morocco. 

However, this goal will remain out of reach if the United States clings to a balancing diplomacy that prevents it from unequivocally supporting Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The time has come for the United States to break with this policy. It must align its political discourse and actions by reaffirming its recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara while calling on Algeria to fully participate in the UN-led political process to achieve a political solution to the dispute.

Indeed, such a move would simply reflect the long-standing US position in the dispute. Numerous declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents show that the United States has never believed in the viability of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. Americans have long praised the proverbial friendship that unites the United States and Morocco, stressing that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. It is time for the United States to give true meaning to this friendship by fully supporting Morocco’s decades-long quest to end the dispute over Western Sahara; by doing so, it could help end the conflict between Rabat and Algiers once and for all.    

Samir Bennis is a senior political analyst specializing in Arab affairs and Morocco’s foreign policy. He is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. His upcoming book, The Self-Determination Delusion: How Victim Politics and Feel-good Advocacy Have Hijacked the Western Sahara Case, comes out in July.

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Economic tools are among the few levers for global and regional actors to extract concessions from the Syrian regime and its foes. However, easing sanctions or normalizing trade with Syria might strengthen Damascus, undermining peace prospects. Also, the alignment of economic recovery goals among different actors complicates efforts. The United States promotes development in northeast Syria but hesitates in northwest Syria. Turkey fosters growth in areas under its influence but opposes northeast Syria normalization. Meanwhile, Russia, Iran, China, some United Nations (UN) agencies, and regional actors reconciled with Damascus and pushed for centralized reconstruction under the Syrian state, seeing it as a unifying force to maintain territorial integrity.

In the meantime, the international community must navigate this complex landscape, balancing local economic recovery while keeping political conversations relevant. This results in a fragmented economic recovery framework lacking cohesion and sustainability. The United States and its allies can foster an early recovery in opposition-held areas without undermining the UN-led political resolution efforts. Critical challenges include addressing stakeholders’ varied interests, ensuring equitable resource distribution, and focusing on sustainable development amid conflict. These strategies are vital for building a resilient economic structure that supports peace and stability, and that serves as a foundation for future diplomatic efforts and the eventual reconstruction of Syria.

Areas of intervention

In the realm of economic recovery in Syria, production-based activities stand out for their relative resilience and minimal taint by the war economy. In comparison, trade, services, and real-estate sectors are dominated by warlords and business cronies due to their easier monopolization, quick returns, and low capital demands. Syria’s agricultural and industrial production has historically benefited from state intervention and protection, mainly in the forms of subsidies and customs laws. Moreover, the Syrian government’s interventionist policies underwent fundamental changes in the last decade before the conflict, with a clear shift toward liberalization and state offloading to the private sector. Mostly, production-based activity was primarily the result of small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs) output and investment by what qualifies as an “independent” business community.

The primary objectives of any meaningful economic recovery intervention should be reviving and expanding these production-based activities, rehabilitating their damaged assets, or facilitating their replacement. Specifically, in opposition-held northwest Syria, interventions should target the private sector—businesspeople, entrepreneurs, households, and skilled labor—and the public sector, including local councils, municipalities, and regional governance structures.

The rural character of these areas means that involving the private sector can distribute the benefits of such interventions more broadly, reinforcing the autonomy of local communities relative to armed groups and terrorist organizations. On the other hand, engaging the public sector can democratize access to crucial infrastructure and enable better strategic coordination and planning for local and national development.

Since 2020, the local private sector in northwest Syria has started to invest in production-based activities, establishing new industrial zones, agriculture cooperatives, and thousands of workshops. Thus, support for the private sector should adopt a bottom-up approach and assist at the policy level in navigating challenges in accessing finance, markets, and labor.

However, infrastructure in northwest Syria has historically been poor, a condition exacerbated by the conflict, which saw the destruction of vital assets such as oil-production facilities, electricity-generation plants, and silos for strategic agricultural reserves. Therefore, any international involvement at the infrastructure level must be strategically planned to ensure secure access to these facilities, aiming to enhance production efficiency and eliminate redundancy. This strategic approach is essential to build a foundation that restores functionality and fosters sustainable economic growth in these war-torn regions.

Additionally, the revitalization of these areas could be accelerated by integrating technological advancements into traditional sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing. The regions could increase output efficiency, reduce resource waste, and attract new investments by adopting modern technologies, such as precision farming and automated production lines. Furthermore, international partnerships and funding can be crucial in providing the capital for infrastructure rebuilds and technological upgrades. Emphasizing the importance of sustainability and resilience in these projects can ensure that the recovery efforts are immediate and long-lasting, laying the groundwork for a stable economic future for Syria.

Challenges

The challenges confronting economic recovery before a political settlement in Syria are manifold and complex. One fundamental issue is the risk that initiating economic recovery prematurely could cement the autonomy of various zones of influence and control, potentially making it harder to reunify the country. Despite the well-defined control of multiple factions, cross-frontline trade is significant and growing. However, if this trade does not begin to include services, raw materials, and labor, local economies may seek alternatives that could further entrench division.

Intra-regional trade in Syria, occurring even among staunch enemies, is born out of necessity rather than efficiency or cost-effectiveness. These exchanges often involve smuggling, are laden with high taxation and fees, and carry significant risks, usually falling under the control of warlords and bandits. This makes the trade environment unpredictable and insecure, posing a substantial barrier to the stabilization and growth of a local economy.

Additionally, the economic recovery efforts are hampered by limited and insecure access to finance. In northwest Syria, the absence of a functioning national or international banking sector leaves the local business community with few and unsatisfactory alternatives. Options are typically limited to small grants with stringent conditions provided by the international community, loans and investments by armed groups, or modest foreign-capital investments by the Syrian diaspora that have yet to surpass the level of remittances and family support.

Access to international markets also presents numerous hurdles. Importing raw materials or finished goods into opposition territories may be relatively straightforward and inexpensive, but financing these imports requires complex arrangements involving offshore companies acting as intermediaries. Export challenges include a lack of legal documentation and an irregular supply chain that struggles to handle low-volume shipments or reach the appropriate markets.

Finally, no viable production activity can flourish without skilled labor, and Syria faces compounded challenges in this area. Many skilled workers either emigrated or reside in other territories, and their return or resettlement in Syria would require financial incentives, security, housing, and a basic level of social services. Moreover, during the war vocational training was interrupted or provided at a low skill level. Opposition-held areas desperately lack the institutional educational facilities necessary to train the next generation of technically skilled labor that production industries require to overcome these challenges and scale up production effectively.

These economic hurdles are exacerbated by the overall security situation, which remains volatile and unpredictable across many parts of the country. The lack of a secure environment deters investment and complicates any logistical efforts to rebuild or maintain infrastructure necessary for economic activities. Additionally, the fragmented nature of governance in opposition-controlled areas poses unique challenges for implementing coherent economic policies and programs. Establishing a more stable and cooperative political framework could significantly enhance the efficacy of recovery strategies, leading to more sustainable development outcomes across the region. Addressing these multi-layered challenges requires a coordinated approach that encompasses economic, social, and political dimensions, and ensures that recovery efforts are effective but also equitable and inclusive.

Solutions and policy recommendations

Addressing the challenges of early economic recovery in opposition-held areas in Syria demands a multifaceted strategy that can lay the groundwork for a sustainable and comprehensive international intervention framework. Conceptually, any internationally led economic recovery plan must preserve the potential for a political settlement while respecting Syria’s territorial integrity. This involves preventing exploitation by the Bashar al-Assad regime, warlords and their allies, or affiliated businesses, ensuring high coordination to prevent redundant infrastructure efforts, and fostering connectivity among various zones of influence—or at least encouraging it. Central to the success of such initiatives is the active involvement of SMEs in production-based economies and the local business communities that represent them. The plan must also cleverly design systems that reinforce distributed value chains and engage local communities as partners and sponsors.

Financially, there is potential to broaden access to economic resources through innovative financial services like micro loans and revolving funds, with an expansion of scope and the inclusion of new stakeholders to enhance access for local communities. The United States has encouraged local governance to formulate and enforce banking regulations in northeastern Syria, a process that should be supported with robust governance structures to maintain these policies in other opposition-held areas. The 2022 general license initiated a dialogue among financial institutions about expanding services in opposition-held areas. Further de-risking and initialization would significantly move economic recovery efforts forward and share the financing burden with private actors. Additionally, the Syrian diaspora keenly observes the legal frameworks for private investments, suggesting that the right settings could create investment funds.

On the labor front, there is a critical need for the international community to collaborate with local communities to finance and establish advanced vocational training and educational institutions. These should focus on disciplines essential to a production-based economy, such as engineering, new energy technologies, smart agriculture, and information technology, which are vital for developing a skilled workforce supporting sustainable economic growth.

Navigating the intricate landscape of Syria’s economic recovery demands comprehensive solutions that respect the delicate balance between immediate economic needs and the long-term goal of political stability. By integrating smart financial solutions, fostering skilled labor markets, and ensuring a robust coordination framework, the international community can support Syria in paving a pathway out of conflict and toward sustainable development.

These efforts, while challenging, are essential for establishing a peaceful and prosperous future for Syria, where economic recovery acts not just as a response to immediate needs but as a foundational step toward enduring peace and stability. Enhancing the effectiveness of these efforts requires continuous monitoring and adjustment of strategies to align with evolving on-the-ground realities and stakeholder needs. This dynamic approach can help ensure that recovery initiatives are responsive and adaptive, maximizing their impact and sustainability. Through concerted and well-coordinated actions, the potential for a transformed Syrian society—one that thrives on the principles of equity and inclusivity—becomes more attainable.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

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1. The reputation of the United States and US company brands have taken a major hit in the region

Support for the United States was not high in the Middle East prior to October 7, 2023 and strong US support for Israel has always angered the Arab public. Still, the mass casualties caused by Israel’s post-October 7, 2023 operations, coupled with President Joe Biden’s strong support for Israel, have caused public indignation towards the United States to reach new heights. From my conversations with business leaders and experts in the region, there is a concerning level of outrage with US policy, which is perceived as both amoral and damaging to the region’s ability to develop economically.

Social media platforms Instagram and TikTok enable users to view real-time glimpses of the war zone straight from the ground and make it easier to share horrific, haunting clips. The United States’ support for Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion—and US efforts to rally allies and partners, including in the Middle East, to avoid supporting Russia’s war machine—makes US aid to Israel at this moment seem particularly hypocritical in the region.

In an Al-Monitor poll conducted in March, respondents in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey were asked who they view more favorably: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, or US President Biden. Forty-four percent of respondents said Putin, 33 percent said Xi, and only 21 percent said Biden. These numbers are an indication that the United States is not winning hearts and minds, despite its many advantages.

Although the United States is primarily known in the region for its security partnerships with governments, it also makes life-changing investments in human development, such as the Women Innovators (WIn) Fellowship for entrepreneurs in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain that I co-founded, as well as a host of other programs to support young leaders and civil society organizations through mentoring, people-to-people exchange, and direct grants. Unfortunately, these impactful programs do not get much publicity and may now face an exodus of participation due to people’s hesitation about associating with US government programs.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the only factor driving the negative perception of the United States. The explosion of this issue onto the scene again amplifies preexisting concerns regarding perceived US hypocrisy, Islamophobia, and callousness about the deaths of Arabs. Competitors to the United States, such as China, are capitalizing on this situation by speaking out in support of the Palestinians and painting the United States as only following the rules-based international order when it suits US national goals. This message will resonate with many people across the world, despite China’s abysmal record on human rights and its stated intention to reunite with Taiwan by force if necessary.

If the current conflict widens or remains in a slow-motion state of mass suffering, anger toward the United States may intensify. As discussed later, this can have multiple second-order effects.

2. Boycotts of certain US brands are occurring and will continue to flare up periodically

In Middle Eastern countries where protests are severely restricted, and the consequences for speaking out can be dire, boycotting US brands is a low-risk way to collectively demonstrate anger about the situation in Gaza and US support for Israel. Boycotts of this nature have occurred sporadically in the past, but they lacked the momentum and staying power of those taking place now.

Starbucks has been hit hard by boycotts in the Arab world after the company sued its workers’ union in the fall over its social media post that said “Solidarity with Palestine.” The AlShaya Group, which operates Starbucks in the region, has announced that it will lay off 4 percent of its fifty-thousand-person workforce—a figure that equates to about two thousand workers—due to sales declines. Starbucks’s earnings have also plummeted: net income declined 15 percent in the second quarter of this year, and the company’s chief executive officer said one factor impacting this poor performance was “misperception around its brand, tied…to the Israel-Hamas war.”

Similarly, Americana Restaurants, which operates KFC and Krispy Kreme in the Middle East, reported a 48-percent decline in first-quarter profit this year. Several other companies, such as Domino’s and Coca-Cola, have also been targeted. More brands may face similar challenges, particularly if they are perceived as taking a pro-Israel stance.

Domestic brands will seek to replace boycott targets whenever possible. Sales of Egypt’s local soda alternatives have increased 500 percent since October 7, 2023. Jordanian coffee chain Astrolabe’s business has increased between 30 and 40 percent, according to its founder. On social media, images of boycott targets and suggested local alternatives abound. As many people find alternative products and stick with them for months, their loyalty may transfer to the replacement brands in the long term.

The boycott movement is not confined to the Middle East. Two waves of recent social justice movements—#MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter—have drawn attention to discrimination and abuse in the United States. These movements have impacted many young Americans and helped fuel activism by and on behalf of other marginalized groups, such as Palestinians. The members of society who feel strongly about this issue—whether in the region, the United States, or Europe—will likely remain committed to pursuing boycotts and protests to call attention to this issue.

3. Israel’s ability to bring in foreign direct investment may be diminished

Aside from the predictable economic consequences of mobilizing 360,000 reservists for military service for months on end, Israel will face other types of economic headwinds. Israel is famed for its “startup nation” entrepreneurial ethos; it has the world’s largest number of startups per capita. Despite its small population of about 9 million, Israel has also punched above its weight in terms of attracting investment. However, funding for Israeli tech startups fell by 56 percent in 2023, and this trend will likely continue.

The reputational and financial earnings risks of associating with Israel have significantly increased. Multinational companies have seen the damage boycotts or other types of protests can cause, and they also worry about triggering internal, employee-led movements. Most companies would prefer not to take a public stance on the divisive Israel-Palestine issue, and investing in Israel could be seen as taking a side.

Companies are also concerned about how the war could impact in-country security for employees or their ability to do business because of airspace closures, supply-chain disruptions, the need to shelter in place, or other challenges that an expansion of the violence could cause. These business risks are another factor impacting Israel’s slowdown in foreign investment. In short, nonessential corporate investments in Israel may be shelved, and future investments may be directed elsewhere.

4. Arab states are pulling away publicly from the United States in some ways, but still desire close ties

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are cultivating ties with China, India, Iran, and others because they have concerns about US reliability. They would rather have stable relations with Iran and the groups it backs so that tensions do not boil over into conflict that disrupts economic diversification, the top priority for both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.  

Still, only the United States can provide the kind of security assurances countries in the region seek. The remarkable collective response to Iran’s attack on Israel in April demonstrated the security cooperation that is possible. The United States, Israel, France, Jordan, and the United Kingdom successfully shot down the majority of the drones and missiles Iran fired, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE reportedly shared critical intelligence with the United States.

This type of alliance presents domestic political risks to Arab leaders when it is activated to come to Israel’s aid during a devastating war in Gaza. However, in other circumstances, it may help deter Iranian and proxy-group aggression in ways that China is unwilling and unable to do. Governments in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar are therefore likely to keep close security ties with the United States, while also seeking to keep ties with Iran stable and further develop an economic relationship with China.

5. The potential for destabilizing regional protests and lone-wolf attacks has increased

Another outcome of the Gaza war is the increased likelihood of lone-wolf attacks on US officials, embassies, and companies operating abroad. In a recent poll of sixteen Arab countries, 51 percent of respondents said they view US policies as the biggest threat to the security and stability of the Middle East, up from 39 percent in 2022. Before the start of this most recent war, the majority of the populations in Arab states favored diplomatic relations with Israel so long as a Palestinian state was established. Now, some experts I speak to worry that Arab public opinion has hardened, and the majority are in favor of breaking ties with Israel.

In tandem with these developments, violent groups are using the ongoing war as recruiting and radicalizing fodder. There have already been more than 150 attacks on US forces based in the region since mid-October 2023, plus several murders in France and Belgium carried out by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) supporters who are newly energized by the situation in Gaza.

When the world’s attention begins to move away from Gaza, it will be tempting to think the situation will stabilize. However, as Arab media expert Marc Lynch argues, a backlash from the Arab world may eventually erupt, so it would be a strategic error for the United States and companies operating in the region to ignore the potential impact of Arab public opinion. As just one indicator of what may be boiling under the surface, people in Jordan continue to demand a ceasefire despite the high risks of protesting. Since October 2023, the country has arrested more than 1,500 people for participating in demonstrations, including five hundred since March who were picketing outside the Israeli embassy in Amman.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict resonates fiercely with many people globally. Though the protests, boycotts, and risk of violence may ebb and flow, they are unlikely to decrease significantly until the root causes of this tragic situation are addressed.  

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is an Atlantic Council nonresident fellow and a senior director at international affairs consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. 

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The reshuffle comes at the height of an upsurge in the securitarian clampdown imposed by the president on opposition and civil society organizations. Over the past two weeks, dozens of human rights organization activists, journalists, and lawyers have been arrested. The arrests are a response to the increasingly frequent protests against the government, especially against President Saied’s authoritarian turn in Tunisian politics since July 2021, when the president arbitrarily shut down parliament and progressively began a process of centralization of power.

On May 24, a demonstration was held in the capital, Tunis, where protesters loudly chanted slogans against the president. They described Saied as a dictator and called for the revocation of a recent decree, which allowed the government to crack down on political dissent and facilitate the arrests of those protesting against the line President Saied has imprinted on Tunisian politics and the economy.

Other measures have led to concern from the European Union and the United States. Both have expressly called for restraint by the Tunisian government in its crackdown on dissent, which President Saied has since described as intolerable foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Tunisian government.

The Tunisian Journalists’ Union (SNJT) has also denounced the government’s gradual authoritarian turn and the judiciary’s tendency to indict many journalists for criticizing the government’s line. SNJT claimed that more than fifty journalists have been detained over the past year for expressing views critical of government policy and have been accused of spreading fake news aimed at disrupting the constitutional order.

The government reshuffle also resulted in the appointment of Khaled Nouri as the head of the Interior Ministry, replacing Kamel Feki. Kamel Madouri, head of the Ministry of Social Affairs, replaced Malek Ezzahi. At the same time, Sufyan bin Sadiq was appointed under secretary of the Interior Ministry and was responsible for the new director of national security post. All three officials are considered very close and loyal to Saied. The president has since to comment on the decision behind this reshuffle or his reason for establishing a new post for national security within the Interior Ministry.

It seems quite clear that the cabinet reshuffle was brought about by the president’s dissatisfaction with the management of national security and the containment of the ongoing protests in the country, particularly in the capital, where the tone of accusations toward the government is becoming more serious by the day. The replacement of Feki with Nouri is most likely motivated by the intention to implement a more aggressive policy against opposition forces and to reduce the scale of protests. This is likely also behind the establishment of the new post of under secretary for national security, now chaired by Sufyan bin Sadiq, who will be specifically tasked with managing the growing phenomenon of dissent.

Despite the growing number of protests, however, President Saied’s popularity appears to be solid. Meanwhile, the opposition—however vocal and persistent in expressing its opposition to the government’s authoritarian drift—appears disorganized, divided, and seemingly unable to counter the government’s pervasive action in suppressing dissent.

President Saied succeeded in arresting the leaders of the Islamic Ennahda Party and the Free Desturian Party in 2023, considerably reducing the capacity of the main opposition parties. This, in turn, has paved the way for him to compete with a greater chance of success in the presidential elections scheduled for later this year.

Thus, at this stage the main force of opposition to the Tunisian government remains the National Salvation Front coalition, led by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, which includes many of the smaller political groups opposed to the government’s authoritarian drift. Members of the front include the Islamist Ennahda party, the Al Amal party, Islamist parties Al Irada and Al Karama, and other minor groups of different ideological backgrounds united by a shared condemnation of President Saied’s policies.

Aware of his weakness, and in an attempt to fuel further critical debate of the government, Chebbi declared in March 2023 that he does not intend to run in the presidential elections unless authorities meet at least some basic conditions, including the reopening of Ennahda headquarters, the release of political prisoners, and, above all, the guarantee of the independence of the electoral commission that will monitor the elections. This last point is especially complex, as the constitutional amendments promoted by Saied have given the president the power to appoint the members of the electoral commission, making it somewhat unlikely that guarantees of transparency and impartiality will be provided.

What emerges from these latest events in Tunisia is a progressive increase in President Saied’s repression of all opposition to his role and, as a consequence, further opposition to him. The events in Tunisia are taking place in front of the international community, including Western democracies, which once again show their inability to uphold actions that they support in theory: human rights and democracy.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

Nicola Pedde is director of the Institute for Global Studies.

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As political tensions between Algiers and Rabat have continued to mount since 2020, threatening to destabilize the entire North African and Sahel region, another front is being fought with no possible détente in sight: the cultural heritage war. The most recent chapter of this absurd dispute began when the Moroccan Ministry of Culture took legal action on May 20 by filing a complaint against Algeria with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the alleged appropriation of a unique Moroccan traditional garment known as Caftan Ntaâ El Fassi (Ntaâ Kaftan), which came originally from the Moroccan city of Fez and which Algeria is trying to inscribe among its intangible cultural heritage list.

In recent years, there has been a renewed awareness about the significance of cultural heritage symbols and their undisputable value in nation branding. This was popularized, in part, by the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage introduced by UNESCO in 2003, which calls for the documentation and preservation of living cultural expressions such as crafts, oral traditions, and performing arts. This phenomenon was also encouraged by the business opportunities presented by cultural tourism, an important source of national wealth that accounts for an estimated 40 percent of all tourism worldwide.

Starting in 2008, Morocco and Algeria raced to inscribe diverse aspects of their local traditions with UNESCO. For Morocco, these included the Tbourida equestrian performance, Gnawa music, and the Argan tree and its know-how; for Algeria, they included the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Sidi ’Abd el-Qader Ben Mohammed, Tlemcen wedding traditions, and the rituals of Sebeiba. However, many cultural elements remain the subject of fierce clashes between the two countries, which compete over the authenticity, exclusivity, and preeminence of disputed cultural symbols like Rai music, the couscous dish, or the Moorish Zellige tile.

The limits of cultural fortresses

Culture is a complex anthropological phenomenon that cannot be confined within the limits of modern nation-state borders—a more recent and contested political invention often inherited from colonial calculus over natural resources. This is particularly true in the case of the Moroccan Kingdom and Algerian Republic’s borders, which were engineered by their former occupiers after the 1845 Treaty of Lalla Maghnia. It is common knowledge by now, as demonstrated by historical maps, archive documents, and an International Court of Justice ruling, that colonial France considered Algeria one of its foreign territories—it annexed Algeria in 1830 and maintained control there until 1962—while Morocco was a mere strategic protectorate with a perpetual Alaouite monarch, which Paris would eventually need to exit with the growing decolonial movements starting in the 1930s. It was evident to France that it was more beneficial for its long-term interests to extract as many territories as possible from the Cherifian kingdom and generously subjoin them to the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.

The impossibility of drawing a line in the sand between two intertwined cultures is the very source of the recent conflict between Rabat and Algiers. Disputed bordering districts like Tlemcen, Tinduf, and Bechar are witnesses of the demographic hybridity and heritage spillover of several forms of craftsmanship, musical expressions, and culinary traditions. For instance, it would be absurd today for Morocco to claim the cultural exclusivity of Malhoun music or for Algeria to claim Rai music—though both are ironically inscribed under one country with UNESCO. This example and many others around the world demonstrate how this United Nations (UN) mechanism, while claiming to preserve cultural heritage, also contributes to the creation of imaginary borders and obsolete disputes among transnational communities that share many affinities, such as the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa.

The concept of cultural authenticity itself is historically questionable. It was established by authors like Eric Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition and David Lowenthal in The Past Is a Foreign Country that nation states handle, and often fabricate, historical narratives “celebrating certain aspects and expunging others.” It all depends on what serves their immediate interests, unity, and legitimacy. While Algeria’s oil-economy dependency and introverted military regime delayed its quest to reclaim its heritage, Morocco has benefited from its alignment with Western liberal economies and the urge to develop its tourism and services sectors to tap into its rich traditions and brand itself as an attractive destination at the doors of Europe—often caressing a certain Western orientalist fantasy about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rabat profited from its first-mover status to successfully market its souks, food, and crafts, sometimes exclusively claiming certain shared North African heritage symbols like Amazigh carpets, pottery, and the iconic dish of couscous, though such claims upset its Maghreb neighbors.

Heritage as a unifying juncture

Another recent episode illustrating this cultural heritage battle occurred in 2022, when the sports company Adidas revealed the Algerian soccer team’s jerseys comprising patterns commonly found in Moroccan ceramics, such as Fez Zellige. Morocco responded by issuing a legal warning to the company. The German sportswear brand ended up officially apologizing to Rabat and settling the dispute amicably after admitting to being inspired by Moroccan craftsmanship. Interestingly enough, back in 2015, the kingdom had engaged in patenting the Fez Zellige in the Vienna Classification of Figurative Elements of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—a more robust and legally binding mechanism to preserve national crafts compared to the UNESCO treaty. Morocco has since attempted to trademark many more cultural elements, including kaftan embroidery patterns, which closes the loop for anyone trying to “culturally appropriate” Moroccan designs and use them for commercial gains.

Local media, Wikipedia, and social platforms are becoming central fronts in this incongruous cultural war. Both Morocco and Algeria engage restlessly and spend large amounts of money on distasteful online confrontations on YouTube, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter) debating whether the kaftan is Almohad or Ottoman in origin and if the tajine is an authentic Moroccan or Algerian earthenware pot. Algerian bots, in particular, have been notorious for spreading propaganda and claiming many confirmed Moroccan traditions for themselves. Moroccan social media users carried out an outrageous, yet revealing, social experiment to prove this theory. To make a point, online users jokingly posted that the “Jaghdid” (colloquially meaning poison in Darija) is “a purely Moroccan delicacy,” prompting Algerian users to rush to claim the imaginary dish as theirs.

On the positive side, North African countries are gaining awareness of the importance of documenting and researching their history and memory, leading to a true revival in local crafts, ethnographic research, and a certain pride to showcase and reinvent those ancestral traditions long ignored in favor of Western consumerist goods. Moreover, this awareness contributed to liberating the Maghreb from the shadows of living in the periphery of Middle Eastern capitals like Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad that repetitively spread false claims that North African countries’ heritage and aesthetic beauty are all to be credited to romanticized and fictitious perceptions of “Arab” Andalucía—a claim that historical evidence strongly refutes.

Last year, “the arts, skills, and practices associated with engraving on metals (gold, silver, and copper)” were inscribed as intangible world heritage by UNESCO in ten MENA countries, including Morocco and Algeria. If the Algerian copper artisan I had encountered and Si Mohamed, the Moroccan one, were to speak today, they would surely approve of this positive collective effort to recognize their craft. The artisans would also agree that while respecting local know-how, originality, and unique historical trajectories is essential, cultural heritage can also be plural and an essential juncture for constructive exchanges beyond trivial political agendas.  

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.  

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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The April 16 resignation of the head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Abdullah Batili, demonstrated the failure of international efforts to resolve the crisis, exacerbating divisions within Libya. Thus, the path to elections remains uncertain.

For the Libyan people, elections are crucial to establishing legitimate governance and resolving the political crisis. While Libya faces significant hurdles in organizing elections, concerted efforts toward political dialogue, security stabilization, and electoral-law reforms are vital for progress.

Tahani Elmogrbi, a Libya expert, interviewed the High National Election Commission chairman, Dr. Emad al-Sayah, on May 14 for the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative, to get his perspective on the elections in the current environment after Batili’s resignation.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Will the elections ever happen in Libya?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: The stakeholders involved in the current Libyan political crisis, including the international community, led by the UNSMIL, consider elections as an objective rather than a tool. Everyone knows that elections serve as a tool for the peaceful devolution of power, necessitating their implementation within a consensual political environment and a cultural framework fostering a minimum level of security and stability. Unfortunately, these conditions are currently absent in the Libyan political landscape. As long as this perspective dominates, the pathway toward elections and a peaceful devolution of power in Libya will face significant constraints, potentially delaying or even preventing the conduct of elections in the short term.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: What are the current main reasons behind its delay?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: The Libyan political environment has become hostile toward democratic principles, particularly elections. This phenomenon can be attributed to some factors that have produced negative outcomes and shaped the environment over the past twelve years. The most prominent of these factors include the absence of a culture of democracy and peaceful devolution of power within Libyan society; lack of a constitution to regulate the process of power devolution; negative foreign interference aimed at preserving its interests and maintaining the status quo; and ineffective performance of most of the United Nations secretary-general’s special envoys.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Is it possible to amend the electoral law?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: Due to the absence of a permanent constitution establishing the primary legislative rules for the electoral process in Libya, political parties involved in the crisis have not accepted specific articles and provisions, particularly those related to candidate qualifications and the electoral system. In Libyan elections, it is common for some political parties to obstruct any electoral process that could potentially end their political careers. Therefore, amending electoral laws in Libya is much more challenging than drafting them initially.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Will Batili’s resignation affect the possibility of holding elections?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: During the twelve years of dealing with the Libyan crisis, the United Nations mission did not have any strategic vision for moving the Libyan state from the transitional phase to the phase of permanent stability. Each UN envoy adopted a different vision for resolving the political crisis based on his/her convictions and perceptions, which would undoubtedly be affected by his/her personal behavior on the one hand, and by the constant and changing political facts in the local and foreign arenas on the other hand. Most of them failed in their missions, and those who would have succeeded found themselves facing challenges that they could not overcome without having international support, which is also divided. Analyzing the briefings they presented to the United Nations Security Council, which primarily reported on Libya’s political, economic, and security situations, reveals that the resignation of any special envoy and their replacement will not have a significant impact without a coherent strategy in place.

TAHANI ELMOGRBI: Is it beneficial to focus on military and economic dialogues rather than political dialogue?

EMAD AL-SAYAH: The central issue in the Libyan crisis is the political dimension, which serves as its primary source and cannot be disregarded. Addressing other aspects, such as economic or security concerns, requires a political solution that results in an elected authority possessing the legitimacy to effectively manage other crises transparently and prioritize national interests above all else. Currently, there is a trend of leveraging foreign interests and ambitions to maintain power, which hinders progress toward resolving the crisis. Continuing with this approach, in the absence of unified and conscientious political leadership, will exacerbate political conflicts and deepen internal divisions. It will also safeguard the interests of foreign countries involved in the conflict and their local allies, preventing any political changes that may threaten their interests.

Tahani Elmogrbi is a Libya expert and international development specialist.

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Egypt fears a sweeping assault on Rafah—where more than one million displaced Palestinians have sought refuge from Israel’s incessant bombardment of the northern and central Gaza Strip—may force hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees to storm the Rafah border and cross into the Sinai Peninsula with little prospect of ever returning.   

If Israel goes ahead with its planned incursion, Egypt will most certainly come under immense internal and external pressure to open the Rafah border crossing and allow a mass influx of refugees into Sinai. This has long-term implications for the country. Hamas and members of other extremist groups might make their way into Egypt among those who enter. Over time, they could export instability to Sinai by launching attacks against Israel from Rafah on the Egyptian side. Should Israel decide to respond with a counterattack, this would harm relations with Cairo and hurt the Camp David Accords signed in 1978, dragging Egypt into a new war with Israel.  

President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has made clear from the start that he categorically rejects any attempt to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the expense of other countries. Sisi has also rejected the displacement of Palestinians into Egypt, saying that would be tantamount to “the liquidation of the Palestinian cause.” Moreover, Egypt does not want to be seen as being complicit in the “ethnic cleansing” of the Palestinians.  

In recent days, Cairo and Jerusalem have traded accusations regarding the closure of the Rafah border crossing which has prevented humanitarian aid from passing through.

On May 14, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz said, “The world places the responsibility for the humanitarian situation on Israel, but the key to preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza “is now in the hands of our Egyptian friends.”

Katz’s remarks evoked a stern rebuke from his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Shoukry, who counter-accused Israel of distorting facts by trying to deflect responsibility for the unprecedented humanitarian crisis and passing the buck to Egypt. The Egyptian foreign minister called on Israel to fulfill its legal obligation as the occupying power by allowing aid to enter through the land ports under its control. He noted that Israel’s capture of the Rafah crossing and its military campaign in the border area were the reasons for the closure as the shelling around the area endangered the lives of aid workers and truck drivers.

Israel’s May 7 takeover of the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing—a key artery of aid—is the main reason behind the chill in relations between Egypt and Israel. Cairo sees it as a breach of the peace treaty and, in particular, a violation of the 2005 Philadelphi Accord which had allowed Egypt to deploy 750 border guards along the border with Gaza. 

Another reason for the escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries is Israel’s intransigence in ceasefire talks mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the United States. Israel rejected the ceasefire plan proposed by Egypt and Qatar, insisting that it had not been consulted about the terms of the deal which Hamas accepted.       

Announcing the Israeli war cabinet’s rejection of the deal on May 6, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “Our opponents’ expectations are unacceptable.” The proposed deal would have seen a gradual release of the remaining Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian detainees and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian territories. A source close to the ceasefire talks told me that a bone of contention had been whether an initial ceasefire would be made permanent and at what point it would turn into a lasting ceasefire. 

After Israel’s rejection of the ceasefire deal, Netanyahu defiantly announced he would go ahead with his planned incursion into Rafah; the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) ordered the displaced Palestinians to evacuate into an even narrower strip of land—to the chagrin of the Egyptian leadership, which has since taken several retaliatory steps to pressure Israel to rescind its decision.

For one, Cairo announced on May 12 that it would back South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), calling the Rafah military operation ”a flagrant violation of international law.”  Israeli officials expressed their disappointment with the decision, telling Haaretz that while the move ”is not expected to have a material effect on the ICJ’s legal process, it reflected a new low in relations between the two countries.”

Egypt has also halted the transfer of humanitarian aid through the Rafah crossing in protest of Israel’s takeover of the strategic gateway—the sole exit point for Palestinians trying to flee the violence. There has also been talk in recent days of Cairo contemplating the downgrading of its relations with Jerusalem—a rumor that the Egyptian government has neither confirmed nor denied. Some analysts believe it is unlikely that Egypt will withdraw its ambassador from Jerusalem. Such rhetoric is meant to pile pressure on Israel to reverse course and withdraw its troops from Rafah.

May 16 Israeli media reports of the IDF sending an additional brigade to Rafah to prepare for an expansion of the ground offensive have caused alarm in Egypt. Some analysts, like Hassan Nafaa, a professor of political science at Cairo University see it as a direct threat to Egypt’s security and stability. 

“Expanding the ground offensive in Rafah would not only result in a catastrophic humanitarian crisis but would also constitute a direct threat to Egypt’s security and stability,” Nafaa told me. He urged President Sisi to warn Israel that Rafah was a “red line” as it is the last haven for the displaced Palestinians and called for the severing of diplomatic ties as a pressure card to force Israel to end the war.  

At a recent Arab Summit held in Bahrain’s capital, Manama, Sisi criticized Israel for moving ahead with its ground offensive into Rafah despite warnings of the dire consequences of such an invasion for the entire region. He further lambasted Israel’s takeover, calling it a tightening of the siege on the Gaza Strip. His fiery remarks—the harshest criticism of Israel since the start of the war on October 9, 2023—reflect a change of heart on the part of Cairo which Israel had perceived as sharing its goal of eliminating Hamas. Sisi’s turnabout also signals a closer alignment with public opinion in Egypt: the majority of  Egyptians are sympathetic toward the Palestinians and are outraged by the graphic scenes of dead and orphaned children they are witnessing daily on their television screens and social media platforms. 

In what appears to be a hate crime, an Israeli-Canadian businessman was fatally shot by unknown assailants in the coastal city of Alexandria on May 7, the second such revenge attack since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. On October 8, 2023, two Israeli tourists and their Egyptian guide were gunned down by a policeman at an archaeological site in the same city known as Pompey’s Pillar. While the assailant who carried out the October attack was arrested, the gunmen in the attack on May 7 managed to escape and remain at large. The attacks signal the start of what could become a disturbing trend of tit for tat killings of Israelis visiting or residing in Egypt.    

There has been no official response from Jerusalem regarding Cairo’s about-face and the recent escalation between the two countries. Still, diplomatic efforts are likely under way behind the scenes to contain the growing diplomatic row. Whether or not those efforts meet with success remains to be seen, but the rising tensions reflect the fragility of ties between Egypt and Israel, which fought several wars between 1948 and 1979 but have a peace treaty allowing for a cold peace to have largely prevailed between them.

However, the decade since Sisi took power in 2014 has witnessed a thaw in relations as Cairo and Jerusalem moved to strengthen their bilateral ties and, in particular, bolster their security and economic cooperation. In 2017, Israel allowed Egypt to beef up its troop presence in the Sinai Peninsula beyond the terms of the Camp David Accords. Cairo has also continued to play its traditional role as a key mediator between Israel and Hamas and between Palestinian factions. Egypt’s intention to pull out of hostage deal mediation efforts and the continued closure of the Rafah border crossing are alarm bells for Israel, signaling that it can no longer take Cairo’s support for granted.   

With relations between the two countries on the brink, Cairo has a set of demands that can help defuse tensions.

“We are calling on Israel to cease fire immediately to allow humanitarian aid to reach the displaced Palestinians,” Major General Samir Farag, a military strategist and analyst, told me. He continued, “Secondly, we want Israel to withdraw from the Rafah border crossing on Gaza’s side and allow the border area to be administered by Palestinians (excluding Hamas.) Moreover, Israel must coordinate closely with Egypt about the next steps and the post-war scenario. But above all, Israel must heed Cairo’s warnings about an expanded ground incursion into Rafah.”

The time is ripe for the Joe Biden administration to iron out differences between the two sides before relations further deteriorate.  

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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The emir’s move certainly did not evoke a strong public reaction from Kuwaitis themselves. They are not known for manning the barricades in political protest, and some of them are likely just as frustrated as their emir with the lack of progress in the country—a country that is simultaneously wonderfully rich and utterly unable to diversify its economy away from producing oil and managing the cash that oil sales produce. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that Kuwait’s real gross domestic product will actually decline by 1.4 percent in 2024, lagging behind its Gulf partners. Partly because of opposition in parliament, Kuwait has not been a welcoming destination for foreign investment. Kuwaitis and foreign investors still recall the 2008 cancellation of a $17-billion Dow Chemical investment in petrochemicals as emblematic of the difficult environment for major foreign investment.

Other Kuwaitis are likely waiting to see how strong the repression will be. A well-known Islamist and former member of parliament, Walid al-Tabtabaie, was arrested a day after the suspension on May 11, reportedly for a tweet suggesting foreign interference in Kuwaiti affairs—in other words, Gulf state support for the emir’s actions. Although Tabtabaie will likely consider his arrest a badge of honor, it will also serve as a warning to others who might consider publicly opining on their leadership’s actions. However, Kuwaitis will not abandon their tradition of having a say in their politics. They can be expected to find ways over time to express themselves and demand accountability from the ruling Sabah family.

Regional reaction has also been muted. Uniquely, Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed quickly called his Kuwaiti counterpart to offer his support, noting the utmost value of stability. The sultan of Oman, Haithan bin Tariq, was in Kuwait for a previously scheduled state visit ending May 14. He did not comment on internal Kuwaiti matters, but there was some press spin that the visit was a show of support for Sabah’s moves. Other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and regional leaders have been silent, perhaps quietly pleased that Kuwait’s longtime experience with a parliament with some genuine power has been quashed for the moment.

And what about the United States’ reaction to the backsliding of democratic norms in Kuwait? No public statements emerged from the White House or the US Department of State. An anonymous State Department official told me, “We are aware of the developments regarding the Kuwaiti parliament suspension and are monitoring the situation closely.”

In other words, this is not a fight the United States will pick. The reasons for this reticence could range from a simple lack of bandwidth to deal with what is considered a relatively minor matter in the Middle East to a more serious weighing of current priorities. Sabah is known as a reliable security partner, and Kuwait has been a generous and flexible host for US military installations. Thousands of US Army personnel have served at or passed through Camp Arifjan, and Ali al-Salem Air Base has provided a key hub for US aircraft.

Although Kuwait and Bahrain reportedly asked the United States not to use bases located on their soil for any attacks on Iran in reaction to its April 13 retaliation against Israel—which came in response to the killing of senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) at  Iran’s embassy compound in Syria—these bases remain extremely useful.

But it is not impossible to balance concerns for security and stability with support for political liberalization. On April 15, Kuwait celebrated the nineteenth anniversary of Kuwaiti women achieving the right to vote, prompted by the George W. Bush administration’s “freedom agenda” in the Middle East. That very year, the United States was also pursuing a major war in Iraq, with Kuwait as the critical entry point for US forces. At the time, President Bush was instrumental in convincing Emir Sheikh Sabah to push this measure through the Kuwait parliament. Liz Cheney, a State Department official at that time, came to Kuwait to celebrate the granting of female suffrage.

Democracy mattered then. It still matters now. 

Ambassador (ret) Richard LeBaron is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He served as US Ambassador to Kuwait and in a number of other senior diplomatic positions in the Middle East and Washington. He is a member of the Advisory Council of Global Ties US. Follow him on X: @RBLeBaron.

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The restored Jewish cemetery in Praia—more precisely, the Jewish section of an interfaith cemetery—was reinaugurated in 2013 after a collaboration between the Municipal Chamber of Praia and the Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project, with the support of Morocco’s king. The Cabo Verde Jewish Heritage Project worked closely with the Cabo Verdean Ministry of Communities and the National Library of Cabo Verde to coordinate the celebration, which included the unveiling of commemorative plaques and a conference at the National Library exploring the legacy of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde. This event brought together scholars, historians, and descendants of Cabo Verde’s Moroccan Jews for a dialogue about their profound historical and cultural impact.

The origins of Cabo Verde’s Jewish communities date back to the nineteenth century, starting with the arrival of Moroccan Jews from cities like Tangier, Tetouan, Rabat, Essaouira, and Gibraltar in search of economic opportunities. These communities left a lasting impression on the archipelago’s history by contributing significantly to its cultural and economic development. The descendants of Moroccan Jews in Cabo Verde still have their Sephardic names—such as Auday, Brigham, and Cohen—and descendants of these families speak with great pride of their Jewish ancestors and honor their legacy by preserving their Jewish heritage. The resurrection of this house of life, which was falling into disrepair and represents the Jewish Moroccan presence in this Atlantic archipelago, is a profound act that transcends merely dusting off the collective memory. Restoring the cemetery of Praia is an acknowledgment of the historical connection, the influence of the Moroccan Jewish community, and the safeguarding of their heritage and preventing it from being lost to time.

In its steadfast pursuit of fostering convivencia and interfaith dialogue, Cabo Verde has worked to recognize and respect cultural diversity. This has been achieved by embracing Moroccan and Gibraltarian Jewish heritage as an integral part of Cabo Verde’s national heritage. In doing so, Cabo Verde commemorates the diverse heritage of its multicultural past and honors the profound bonds between Cabo Verde and Morocco today—specifically their shared values and mutual dedication to upholding the principles of religious and cultural pluralism.

This reciprocal acknowledgment and the elevation of Jewish heritage as a pivotal element of Cabo Verde’s national heritage is an expression of the commitment of Cabo Verde and Morocco to fostering peace and valuing diversity. This ten-year-old project’s continued relevance is a poignant symbol of the myriad steps taken to forge a more inclusive and cohesive society. Cabo Verde’s initiative goes beyond merely safeguarding its varied cultural and religious identity; it fortifies the bridges of comprehension and mutual respect with Morocco, underscoring the crucial role of diversity in underpinning national unity and social harmony.

Moreover, Morocco and Cabo Verde’s joint efforts exemplify the essence of intra-African collaboration dialogue, including respect for diversity and the recognition that harmonious living among communities is pivotal for societal advancement and overall stability. This approach paves the way for a peaceful and prosperous Africa, embracing inclusivity and convivencia as cornerstones for progress.

Highlighting this, Minister of Cabo Verdean Communities Jorge Santos signed the Call of Rabat for the Preservation of the African Jewish Heritage during the second annual Jewish Africa Conference in 2022. African leaders, as well as friends of the Jewish community in Africa, signed the call, which invites all parties involved—individuals, civil society, and governments—to acknowledge the rich history of the Jewish people in Africa and the need to protect and make accessible Jewish historical sites across the continent; to strengthen the sacred “chords of memory” that connect various generations and peoples to the African Jewish experience, particularly through cultural and educational initiatives; to give African youths the tools they need to preserve, propagate, and celebrate African Jewish cultures; to collaborate in the preservation, restoration, and renovation of significant Jewish sites on the African continent; and to establish a mechanism to further these objectives as well as to provide opportunities for African Jewish voices.

The Call of Rabat is a considerable effort to unite and celebrate the rich diversity of African-Jewish and non-Jewish communities. Africa’s history, culture, and religion are woven together like a complex tapestry with strands of coexistence, unity, and togetherness, as evidenced by Cabo Verde’s restoration of Jewish cemeteries. Judaism in Africa has grown from biblical times to the present, symbolizing the continent’s rare ethnic and religious diversity. Beyond bridging historical gaps, the Call of Rabat opens the door to a future in which diversity and unity combine to form a peaceful, inclusive society by bolstering the presence of Judaism in Africa.

From Rabat to Praia, a new generation of African leaders is reclaiming their Jewish history and realizing a brighter future.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s N7 Initiative and the founder and president of Mimouna Association, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization. Follow him on X: @ElBoudra.

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European and Gulf frustrations with US strategy

First, European allies were skeptical. They expressed disagreements with Washington’s support for Israel’s operation in Gaza and questioned the strategic objectives of Operation Prosperity Guardian. As a result, on February 19, the European Union (EU) announced Aspides, its own maritime security operation.

The creation of Aspides stirred tensions among officials from both sides of the Atlantic. Unsurprisingly, the French government of Emmanuel Macron—a strong believer in Europe’s ability to offer an alternative to the US strategic framework—is at the forefront of this European initiative. In conversations I’ve had with US officials, they have argued that Aspides sends a message of disunity among NATO allies without providing a credible alternative at the military level.

The European operation faces its own issues, particularly regarding the modest naval capabilities provided by the contributing nations. As of today, the operation merely relies on four warships to counter Houthi attacks. Europeans also suffer from limited air-defense capabilities. The French Navy has repeatedly used Aster 30 surface-to-air missiles to counter multiple Houthi ballistic missiles. The interceptions were successful, but one Aster system cost roughly $1.1 million. It is doubtful, in terms of logistics and finances, that European navies have the means to sustain a monthslong campaign of this scale. This highlights the disconnect between European ambitions in maritime security and the reality of their military resources.

The US response to the Red Sea crisis has also been met with distrust by the country’s Gulf partners. Out of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, only Bahrain joined Prosperity Guardian. Specifically, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dismissed the US operation because of their dispute with Washington over the Yemen conflict that predated the Red Sea crisis.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been the largest contributors to the operation started in 2015 by Riyadh to oust the Houthis from Yemen. Both grew frustrated with the United States’ evolution regarding the war. In their eyes, Washington initially supported the Saudi-led operation in Yemen during the Barack Obama administration, but then Congress shifted and criticized Gulf states when they faced a stalemate on the battlefield with the Houthis. Later, President Donald Trump vetoed attempts by lawmakers to suspend US military aid to the Saudi coalition. But after Biden was elected in 2020, his administration removed the Houthis from the State Department terrorist list (they were reinstated since January). The White House then stopped providing logistical support to the Saudi coalition and announced, “this war has to end.”

In the following months, the Houthis revived attacks against the coalition, either on the battlefield or on the Saudi and Emirati territories. This forced Gulf states to compromise and enter talks to end the war in 2021. However, negotiations proved difficult, largely due to the reluctance of Houthi leaders to share power with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government.

As a result, the current US campaign against the Houthis is seen in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as an operation limited by design and unlikely to solve their predicaments. Worse, their participation could turn against them, lead to a resumption of Houthi attacks on their cities, and derail the fragile talks in Yemen.

Asian powers dismiss the US operation in the Red Sea

Another key US partner, India, has also suffered from the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. Dozens of ships heading toward India, or with Indian crews on board, have been targeted. As a result, the Indian Navy increased its patrols in the Red Sea and deployed five guided-missile destroyers and a maritime-patrol aircraft.

But India’s naval activities did not lead its government to join the US operation either. This is mostly the result of New Delhi’s desire to preserve its nonalignment tradition, both diplomatically and militarily. Even though Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly supported Israel’s response to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, India also maintained good diplomatic relations with Iran—the primary supporter of both Hamas and the Houthis. At the operational level, the Indian Navy wants to retain freedom of action, which could be curtailed if the country joins a US-led operation.

More significantly, China and its economy also rely heavily on the Red Sea. Beijing refrained from intervening in the crisis and dismissed US offers to cooperate. Its position is based on the belief that the primary targets of the attacks are the United States and its allies. In March, China reportedly reached an agreement with the Houthis to ensure the safe passage of its ships. However, this nonaggression deal proved risky. On March 23, the Houthis fired four anti-ship ballistic missiles at a Chinese-owned oil tanker crossing the Red Sea. The attack happened only days after the reported agreement, and it was a blow to Chinese diplomacy. This may have been caused by misinformation, as the ship under attack had changed ownership a month earlier. Nevertheless, it suggests that relying on Houthi compliance is a perilous gamble for China.

The coming troubles for US Middle East policy

All in all, the Red Sea crisis highlights the United States’ inability to mobilize its partners behind its leadership. But this does not mean that another power has replaced Washington. The strategies pursued by all the stakeholders in the area have not compensated for the failure of the Biden administration.

Europeans are eager to keep a high profile in maritime security. In regions such as the Red Sea, the EU believes it can offer an alternative to the great-power competition. This may sometimes appeal to local partners growing uncomfortable with the US-China equation. However, securing maritime spaces such as the Red Sea requires naval capabilities that European countries cannot provide.

Meanwhile, Gulf states have raised their ambitions in past years. But they have yet to offer a credible solution for governance in the Red Sea. Some of this failure derives from the limitations of Gulf navies. Underfunded for years, they struggle to operate beyond missions to protect their coasts.

At the diplomatic level, Gulf monarchies have also been conspicuously absent. One could almost forget that Saudi Arabia created a Council for the Red Sea in 2020 to enhance security cooperation among eight littoral states. Back then, the new body indicated the Saudi desire to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa, but progress has been slow since its creation.

Finally, the Indian and Chinese strategies vis-à-vis the Houthi attacks reveal elements of continuity with their foreign policy orientations: acting alongside Western forces while cultivating New Delhi’s nonalignment and preventing entanglement in local disputes, while Beijing benefits—at least implicitly—from the US naval presence.

Eventually, the erosion of US leadership leads each player to push for its agenda at the expense of finding a collective framework. This then exacerbates political fragmentation—not only in the Red Sea, but across the Gulf and the Middle East. This trend puts aside the existing regional institutions and favors ad hoc coalitions that might compete with each other. This risks wasting stakeholders’ diplomatic and military resources, which has immediate implications for the success of Operation Prosperity Guardian. In the long term, these developments in the Red Sea also foretell the increased difficulties Washington has in shaping the security architecture for the Middle East.

Jean-Loup Samaan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He is also a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore. Follow him on X: @JeanLoupSamaan.

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One overarching aim of the vision is to diversify the economy and, in doing so, to create new opportunities for work and investment at all levels—for both large-scale projects and small ventures. Changing the status of women has been a critical marker of change and success over the past eight years. In that time, the participation rate of women in the labor market, now around 35 percent, has exceeded the initial goal. Women working in new sectors are supported by various active labor-market policies and new laws to facilitate their work. 

The Vision 2030 midway annual report features photos of women working alongside men across sectors, highlighting their importance in driving the economy forward. More than one million commercial registrations are owned by women—representing 45 percent of registered companies—and women held 43.7 percent of leadership roles. Government officials and analysts have openly celebrated this momentum, which continues to progress positively.

While these advancements are welcome and worthy of celebration, it will be necessary to ensure that women have the financial know-how to grow in their careers and manage their new ventures effectively to achieve a sustainable level of empowerment, especially in an environment where traditional gender roles of male breadwinner and female caretaker have persisted for so long. Financial literacy is necessary for women who have managed to launch their own companies and who balance formal employment with other demands. Still, it remains true that women who remain on the fringes of the formal economy can face barriers to inclusion.

Financial inclusion ensures that those who demand funds recognize how to access them and ensure that the supply of funds is accessible, leading to a level of liquidity that can enhance growth and reduce poverty or an overreliance on state support. Since the launch of Vision 2030, economic developments have pushed women to be more independent and in control of their finances. Reforms to social welfare created more pathways out of poverty by replacing blanket subsidies with targeted support and new policies related to social insurance, social assistance, and the labor market.

However, these changes will initially benefit those who are younger and more digitally connected. The expansion of e-government and the crackdown on corruption have linked all kinds of payments to bank accounts, including salaries and alimony payments. Furthermore, small companies are required to issue e-invoices, and economic growth is driving out smaller commercial outlets that cater to those who might not be linked online to the formal economy through bank accounts. A 2018 King Khaled Foundation study reported that up to 6.9 million adults, 28 percent of the kingdom’s adult population, were “unbanked,” and 56 percent were women. Because property ownership is guaranteed to women by sharia law, bank accounts are available and accessible to women. A 2019 report in Alsharq al-Awsat highlighted that 20 percent of all bank deposits went into women’s accounts, an amount greater than $53 billion. Thus, women with lower levels of education and socioeconomic status are the ones who tend to be left behind due to cultural norms and low financial literacy—meaning that women resort to saving through informal channels and have limited awareness of the benefits of learning how to manage their money.

At the macro level, the kingdom’s economic reform policies are focused on facing economic shocks and ensuring sustainability and growth. This is also important on a micro level, as individuals must manage emergencies and income shocks through enhanced financial literacy. This will enable citizens to accumulate wealth and contribute to economic growth through increased savings and more measured spending. Improvements in financial literacy tend to be motivated by various factors, including overall economic growth and global competitiveness. Saudi Arabia’s National Savings and Financial Literacy Strategy outlines key objectives to improve financial literacy, including a target to address the low household savings rate of 1.6 percent. Globally, 10 percent is considered the minimum level for ensuring long-term financial independence.

While economic growth might be the overarching national motivation, international organizations are building programs that seek to empower individuals as well. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank have worked with individual countries to enhance financial literacy at the population level through targeted national programs, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed guidelines to support participating countries in improving financial literacy.  

In tandem, economic reforms in the kingdom have sparked increased engagement with different financial tools. Because women and minorities tend to have lower financial literacy globally, often compounded by other factors such as limited educational backgrounds and socioeconomic status, these segments of society are usually the targets of financial-literacy programs. The most successful programs, such as the Khazna program launched by the Riyadh-based women’s charity, Al-Nahdha, are designed with such attitudes and challenges in mind.

Launched in 2017, Khazna aims to address the gap in financial literacy by targeting low-income women who are the financial decision-makers in their households. The curriculum stresses ways to save, reduce consumption, budget, and, above all, reduce debt. Khazna has expanded and evolved through feedback loops after each cohort goes through training. It is successful because it considers the communal family structures, the enduring stigma attached to women-led households, and the cultural obligations of generosity and giving. Other programs target women with varying levels of socioeconomic status and are led by banks and different government institutions.

Financial literacy is essential for social inclusion. Khazna is expanding to offer entrepreneurial training, beginning with key information about businesses and ending in a business plan that fills a gap in the market, with a community angle that ensures allyship and support.

As the number of women joining the formal economy within Saudi Arabia continues to grow, it will be important to build programs that circumvent the global traps of severe pay gaps, male-dominated decision-making, and implicit biases that favor men. This can happen if programs begin early as part of a joint effort within the national curriculum, and through community initiatives that bring together industry experts and educators as part of a lifelong approach to literacy. 

While Khazna is one such example, funding for more programs that achieve the targets of the National Savings and Financial Literacy Strategy is key. This must expand beyond basic budgeting to include enhanced literacy on financial security and more complex issues such as home ownership and financial products that offer varying long- and short-term savings and investment opportunities. The programs must also consider women’s diverse backgrounds and the psychological barriers associated with managing money. True empowerment will come from increased agency and decision-making; for working Saudi women, this must be enhanced through elevated financial independence. Any successful program must be tailored to the needs of different categories of women so everyone can share a slice of the development pie.  

Hanaa Almoaibed is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a research fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh. Follow her on X: @hanaaalmoaibed.

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was set to visit the White House in May—but the trip was postponed, with a Turkish official saying a new date will be set soon. The visit, if solidified, would be the first since Biden took office in 2021, marking improved relations between the NATO countries with the two largest militaries. The United States should not lose the opportunity to support Turkey as a balancing actor in the region. Ankara has proved its ability to maintain good diplomatic relations with “frenemies”—particularly Tehran. While Turkey and Iran have significant disagreements in Iraq and Syria, there are opportunities for cooperation and courting, which position Ankara as a valuable voice of stability and restraint. 

The way to achieve such stability passes through Syria, but the argument starts with Iraq. Turkey, Iran, and the United States all have stakes in Iraq that spill over to the rest of the region, particularly Syria. Iraq’s mountainous terrain is home to several paramilitaries, including Iran-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, both of which operate in Syria either directly or through affiliated groups, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a US-designated terrorist organization with which Turkey has been at war since the 1980s. Yet, the PKK’s Syrian leg, the People’s Defense Units (YPG), receives US support for its assistance in fighting ISIS. 

Turkey’s long-standing campaign against the PKK has become increasingly existential in recent months, with Turkish forces suffering unprecedented losses in Iraq. In response, Turkey is signaling increased activity in northern Iraq over the summer—ringing alarm bells for Iran that is fighting to maintain its influence. Tehran gives at least indirect support to the PKK, and Ankara has accused the Iran-backed Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the minority stakeholder in the Kurdistan Regional Government, of having ties to the PKK, which Turkish officials have warned against. In March, the Iraqi government in Bаghdad officially banned the PKK following high-level talks with Ankara, marking a major win for Turkey that may compel the PUK to follow suit. 

There is a lot at stake for Ankara in preventing Tehran from finding excuses to increase support for the PKK or its Syrian affiliates. While some Iranian proxies target US-backed Kurdish forces to pressure US troops to leave Syria, others fight the Turkish army alongside PKK-linked groups. Turkish presence in northern Iraq pits Turkey against Iran, but also helps mitigate Washington’s concern about Tehran exerting full influence on Iraqi security forces. A large part of that influence can be seen in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which were founded in 2014 to fight ISIS but soon became an umbrella organization of Shia militias loyal to Iran. The PMF acts as a channel for Iran to exert political and military influence in Iraq without being directly involved in internal affairs.

Make no mistake—an angry Iran is not a win for the United States, nor a win for the region. The tricky diplomatic task at hand is encouraging Turkey to partner with the United States while Ankara maintains stable relations with Tehran. 

A theater where Turkey and Iran can play friends and foes

The Iraqi government plans to reopen a section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which runs through northern Iraq and could provide Turkey with significant energy resources. The Turkish Petroleum Corporation’s discovery of high-grade crude oil in the Mount Gabar area in southeastern Turkey (located in a petroleum system running from Iraq) could help reduce Turkey’s oil imports by 10 percent, according to Turkish officials with whom I have spoken. Turkey and Iraq have also agreed to cooperate on a Development Road project to link Iraq’s Basra province to Europe via Turkey. These are great opportunities that the United States should back to break Iraq’s energy dependence on Iran. Doing so would not only help Iraq become a more dependable regional ally, but would also ensure that US measures against Iran are more effective. In March, to give Iraq more time to develop its energy resources, the United States extended a sanctions waiver for Iraqi purchases of Iranian electricity. Turkey is doing precisely that, moving Iraq away from Iran’s orbit and closer to US interests.

Iran sees several problems with these initiatives. For starters, Turkey is Iran’s second-largest natural-gas customer after Iraq, but Ankara has been working to break that dependency by investing in oil and gas exploration around its shore and building infrastructure that would provide easier access to the resources of neighboring countries, including Iraq and Azerbaijan. Ankara has also been reluctant to negotiate with Tehran about renewing a pipeline contract set to expire in 2026. The list of alternative buyers for Iranian oil is limited due to US sanctions, and Turkey’s projects in Iraq are designed to push Iran into further isolation.

Against these odds, however, Ankara and Tehran have shown interest in increased energy cooperation. In April, Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar visited Tehran—only a few months after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Ankara, which resulted in energy-related economic deals and a renewed commitment to increase annual trade volume to $30 billion. Turkey’s dire economic situation certainly makes any trade relations significant, but, at least when it comes to energy, Ankara has alternatives. 

So, why is Turkey courting Iran?

Syria is the backbone of balancing diplomacy between Turkey, Iran, and the United States. Establishing a 900-kilometer secure zone along the Turkey-Syria border to drive Kurdish forces south and return millions of refugees remains a top priority for Ankara. This requires buy-in from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who said last year that he would not sit down with Erdoğan without the precondition that Turkey agrees to withdraw its forces from northern Syria—a nonnegotiable item for Ankara. Therefore, Turkey’s message delivery requires the involvement of Iran and Russia. Occupied with the war in Ukraine, Russia is less of a potential advocate than Iran, which started closing gaps with Turkey since the start of the Gaza war by sending high-level delegations to Ankara to discuss regional politics. 

Iran views both the United States and Turkey as occupying forces in Syria but believes diplomatic channels could resolve its disagreements with Turkey. Tehran tried to mediate between Damascus and Ankara, although this did not produce results. Turkish leadership continues to explore options to receive support from Tehran and Moscow, as evidenced by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Tehran in September 2023 to discuss Syria, which was preceded by a visit to Moscow.

The United States needs to understand that Syria is the crucial driving force of Turkey-Iran relations. Although Ankara and Tehran back opposing forces within Syria, Ankara needs Tehran’s support to achieve one of its top foreign policy goals. Therefore, Turkey is motivated to appease Iran through other means, such as energy cooperation. Keeping friendly relations with Iran also helps Turkey protect the security dynamic in Iraq by preventing a red light from Tehran as Ankara maintains its military presence. Here, too, Ankara plays a balancing role by preventing full PMF control on the ground and keeping Iran’s military influence in check. 

Turkey and the United States continue to disagree on various policies in the Middle East, such as the United States’ support of Israel and Kurdish forces in Syria. Still, relations between Ankara and Washington are warming up. Turkey’s membership in the Western security architecture allows for more flexibility and room for maneuver and enables Ankara’s balancing act. Objectives surrounding Syria drive Ankara to seek stable relations with Tehran amid geopolitical competition. This allows the United States to partner with Turkey to de-escalate crises, such as the tit-for-tat between Iran and Israel and attacks on US forces in the broader Middle East. If Erdoğan visits Washington in the coming months, Biden should offer the Turkish president enough incentives to strengthen Ankara’s balancing act and encourage a more restrained Iran. 

Doga Unlu is a research associate at The Cohen Group, where she advises defense and energy companies. Her portfolio also covers Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean.

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It is crucial that the United States and Turkey overcome their differences because the governments need to strengthen their alliance—especially as it concerns Syria. 

While the situation in Syria is viewed as a top security priority in Turkey, it is receiving less attention in the United States. That needs to change. Both countries need to refocus on resolving disputes involving Syria so that they do not explode into fresh areas of major stress on bilateral ties.

The structural realities

The differences in priorities between the United States and Turkey in Syria have been based on structural realities.

Both nations emphasize counterterrorism and unconventional threats in their foreign policies, but their objectives differ. In Syria, the United States concentrated primarily on combating the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Turkey also fought against ISIS directly, but regarded the United States’ anti-ISIS approach as a threat to its national security. The US partnership with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—became Ankara’s top security concern.

Additionally, the Turkish public and politicians have blamed a sect led by Turkish religious leader Fethullah Gülen, who resides in Pennsylvania, for the attempted coup in Turkey in 2016, which has complicated ties. Separately, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air-defense system was a deal breaker for the United States, which expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program and issued new sanctions under a law primarily meant to target foreign adversaries—not NATO allies.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with its neighbors have been upended by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. Despite their differences, these conflicts have pushed the United States and Turkey to value their alliance more.

Since the Ukraine war began, Turkey and the United States have established a new level of cooperation, expanding beyond sales of F-16 fighter jets to include Black Sea security, support for Ukraine, and defense-industry collaboration. Turkish assistance to Ukraine has included armed drones and cluster bombs, and the country has also enforced the Montreux Convention, which allows Ankara to regulate the passage of military ships through its straits during wartime. Furthermore, Turkey supplied NATO with 155-millimeter shells and protected NATO countries’ airspace in the Black Sea region. The country has also facilitated a grain deal between Ukraine and Russia to prevent a global food crisis.

More recently, US-Turkey relations played a significant role during the recent Israel-Iran escalation. Turkey acted as a mediator to prevent a regional war between the United States and Iran and to limit tit-for-tat responses from Iran and Israel. Although the conflict in Gaza could potentially damage US-Turkey relations, Ankara and Washington need to understand that the resolution of this war—through a ceasefire in the short term and a two-state solution in the long run—is fundamentally not about their bilateral relations.

The Syrian puzzle

Turkey and the United States have identified collaboration areas, but disputes still need to be resolved. The situation in Syria is particularly concerning, as any new escalation there could potentially disrupt the recent progress made in US-Turkey relations and compel Turkish decision-makers to address the imminent unconventional security threat on their doorstep.

If the United States fails to provide a solution to Turkey’s national security concerns, Russia and Iran may exploit that scenario and once again use Syria to exert pressure on Turkey. Ultimately, Russia and Iran want to reassert full territorial control of Syria for President Bashar al-Assad and push out Turkey.

There are more than four million Syrians currently living in northwestern Syria. If the conflict were to escalate, or if internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps along the Turkish-Syrian border were to be deliberately targeted, this could lead to a rise in migration toward Turkey. In fact, the United Nations warned in 2019 that a military escalation in Syria’s Idlib governorate could result in up to two million refugees. Turkey already has the largest refugee population in the world, and with anti-refugee sentiments on the rise in the country, an influx of new refugees would be disastrous for Turkish domestic politics. Moreover, Turkish soldiers are currently stationed on the ground in the area. As long as Russia maintains air superiority in northwest Syria, there is a risk of harm to Turkish soldiers. Russia has been directly responsible for the deaths of Turkish soldiers on numerous occasions, with the deadliest incident in 2020 when thirty-four Turkish soldiers were killed in a single airstrike carried out by the Bashar al-Assad regime during a Russian and Syrian offensive. (Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and some anonymous Turkish officers claimed that Russia was behind the attack, but Russia denied responsibility.)

Also, from the US perspective, maintaining the status quo in Syria means the continuation of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) created by the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces, which Turkey is determined to destroy. The territory controlled by DAANES is predominantly Arab, but the Kurdish YPG holds significant control in political, military, and social spheres through a socialist one-party doctrine. Each passing day risks a new incursion by Ankara. It is not feasible for Turkey and the United States to count on the current relative calm in Syria persisting.

To make progress, both countries need to think big. The talking points that have dominated US-Turkey relations for the past decade are no longer valid. Rather than solely concentrating on counterterrorism, a broader geopolitical outlook must be considered. This shift is crucial because it allows Ankara and Washington to engage in a more strategic dialogue, which could pave the way for long-term solutions beyond immediate tactical concerns. It is time for the leaders of both nations to come together, show courage, and forge a new path.

It would be a significant and positive step if a deal could be made for Syria, where Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States currently have military presences. At the moment, despite Iran and Russia working together, NATO allies find themselves on opposing sides, trying to balance Tehran and Moscow’s alliance on their own. At a time when the United States is allocating $61 billion for Ukraine and $26 billion for Israel, it seems wrong for it to consider withdrawing from Syria. The US-Turkey divergence in Syria regarding tactics and priorities in counterterrorism appears misplaced.

It would be beneficial for decision-makers to work together to find a joint approach that would require the unification of Turkish and US spheres of influence in Syria. The United States could trade its support for the YPG in exchange for the Turkish army taking over most of the missions of US troops deployed in Syria and the preservation of Syrian Kurdish gains in the country. In this particular scenario, the United States would assign the task of managing ISIS prisoners and their families to local Sunni Arabs and Turkey, with the United States overseeing the process.

This would transform the Syrian conflict from a three-way battle to a two-way one, and thus pave the way for a political resolution. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 outlines a transition period between the Syrian government and the opposition. However, the United States is currently supporting a third faction, the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces. This is not part of the resolution, and indirectly aids Russia and Iran in blocking the political process.

Such an agreement would positively impact NATO and hold great geopolitical significance. Resolving the dispute in Syria would be a breakthrough. After restoring bilateral trust and turning Syria from a dispute into cooperation, both NATO allies could enhance their cooperation in other theaters to advance the Alliance’s interests. Also, within the Middle East context, an agreement could pave the way for improved collaboration between Turkey and the United States in Iraq.

The cancellation of Erdoğan’s visit is just a symptom of a wider problem. Ankara and Washington must adopt a broader perspective and be willing to make strategic concessions to manage and resolve issues that divide them. The changing nature of conflicts in Turkey’s region necessitates a fresh approach that values conventional alliances while recognizing new geopolitical realities.

Syria is the key to stable and robust relations. Otherwise, Turkey and the United States will not be able to fulfill their relationship’s potential, and a new regional escalation may undermine all of the recent progress in the partnership. Ankara and Washington must not allow that to happen.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Bathily’s resignation was motivated by the UN’s inability to successfully support the political transition process that it has been trying to foster in Libya for more than a decade in the wake of the country’s civil war and enduring political fragmentation. As Bathily pointed out, the reason for this inability is that Libya’s various political actors are unwilling to place the collective interest above their own personal interests. Bathily bluntly described the leaders of the country’s political factions as lacking “good faith,” rendering UN initiatives futile and ruling out the possibility of any solution to the country’s current chaotic and unstable political impasse. His resignation, and his candid assessment of the political process in Libya, demonstrate the slim prospects for UN initiatives in Libya so long as national leaders remain unwilling to collaborate.

Bathily described the attitude of Libyan political leaders as driven by a “selfish resolve” to defend their individual interests and impede the transition process through political and administrative expedients. Bathily’s criticism is directed at the major political figures in Libya whom the UN special envoy had often described as the “big five”: General Khalifa Haftar, Mohammed Takala, Mohamed al-Menfi, Aguila Saleh, and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. For these five political figures, the transition process doesn’t offer any incentives, but rather would severely limit their current ability to control the political system and the national economy. Particularly frustrating for Bathily, after almost two years of continuous initiatives that these internal actors systematically boycotted, the UN needed to put off a planned national reconciliation conference, which was initially scheduled for April 28 and is now postponed indefinitely due to the rival parties’ intransigence. 

The reasons for Bathily’s criticisms are clear. Although a relative calm has returned to the country since the failure of Haftar’s siege of Tripoli in 2020, this calm has not facilitated the resumption of national dialogue nor the start of the necessary transition process to organize national elections. Instead, this quiet period has allowed the different political factions’ balance of power to freeze in place. They are now unwilling to give up their respective spheres of power by initiating an unpredictable transition to elections that could subvert the status quo.

The web of individual political interests, moreover, is closely linked to a variegated framework of parallel interests, including control of the economy, corruption, management of the various militias that control most of Tripolitania (although in a disorganized manner), and deep ties with organized crime, which runs trafficking of all kinds in Libya.

Bathily’s resignation thus demonstrates how the role of the UN special envoy to Libya has become frustrating and devoid of real prospects over time. In 2020, Ghassan Salame resigned after two years in office citing health reasons, although he expressed deep disappointment at how the transition process had been systematically opposed by both local actors and the foreign powers and regional actors that have been intermingling in Libya since the 2011 revolution. He was succeeded by Jan Kubis, who in turn resigned in 2021 without clearly specifying the reasons, although he had clearly determined that it was impossible to fulfil his mandate.

The question remains how and whether the United Nations intends to appoint a new special representative. Talk among insiders indicates that the next special envoy could be Stephanie Koury, currently the vice head of the UN mission in Libya, who would take up the post on an interim basis pending new guidelines from the Security Council.

But regardless of who replaces Bathily, the next special envoy will not be able to solve Libya’s longstanding political impasse as long as the leaders of the country’s factions remain unwilling to meaningfully engage with the UN’s initiatives. The country’s political stasis is unlikely to shift anytime soon.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative at the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post The UN Libya envoy’s resignation shows why the political transition is failing appeared first on Atlantic Council.

 This vacuum not only invites external intervention but also presents Russia as the most conspicuous, power-hungry player poised at Libya’s doorstep.

Following the eruption of Libya’s civil war, the conflict swiftly escalated into a matter of international concern, prompting various international actors to align with different factions based on their strategic interests. Turkey and Qatar directly and militarily support the GNA, while most other nations, while formally recognizing the government, play both sides to their advantage. General Haftar, however, is supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia. Nevertheless, in 2020, an opportunity to stabilize Libya appeared thanks to the support of Turkish forces leaving Cyrenaica in Russian forces’ hands. 

At first, the Russian penetration in Libya was limited to a few hundred instructors for General Haftar’s LAF in 2015 and 2016. It was only around late 2018 that these Russian soldiers were substituted by a couple of thousand—mostly Russian—mercenaries hired by the Wagner Group, a Russian company owned by a close friend of the Kremlin’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, who died in a suspicious plane crash after his mercenaries attempted a coup in Russia in 2023.

Wagner’s presence did not take place suddenly. It was preceded by constant courting by the Russian top establishment, General Haftar, his family, and his officers, not only with generous provisions of weapons and equipment but also with a public show of support for Haftar’s political positions and views, which consisted mainly in his ambition to rule over the whole country. Thus, the Russians had established a strong foothold in Libya by the end of 2019 and the beginning of the attack on Tripoli. All of this happened with almost no reaction from the United States and its NATO allies, even though this has brought armed Russian troops less than a few hundred miles from the southern shores of Italy, the Southern flank of NATO. 

This became even more evident after Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022 as Russian presence in Libya started to raise some questions among commentators, pundits, and military strategists. Still, even when confronted by this evidence, western decision-makers seemed to pay scant attention to the issue. The truth is that the US diplomacy and political establishment in general in the years between 2014 and 2022 were not receptive to any alarm coming from Libya since they had practically checked out mostly due to the shock of the assassination of US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, in 2012. Since then, the US has preferred to delegate the task of untangling the Libyan issue to the Europeans and the United Nations. 

Despite the presence in Tripoli of the United Nations Secretary-General Guterres on April 4, 2019, on a visit with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj, Haftar launched his troops in a sudden attack against Tripoli. The US barely reacted, limiting itself to publishing a few diplomatic notes protesting the military operation. It was a worldwide deafening silence that met Haftar’s aggression. The US position sounded to Haftar like a green light for the attack. The Russian component of the aggressor’s forces was primarily formed by contractors—almost all from Moscow’s special forces hired by the Wagner Group. The Russians constituted the better-trained and equipped contingent of Haftar’s army and were the ones who fought harder and got closer to the center of Tripoli. The intervention of Turkish troops in defense of the legitimate government forced the Russians to abandon the capital’s outskirts and withdraw behind the Sirte line about halfway between Tripoli and Benghazi. After a truce was declared between the parties, only about 600 Russian mercenaries remained in Libya, mainly to guarantee that Western Libyan troops and their Turkish allies would not stage a blitz and charge toward Benghazi.

At the end of 2021, reports of an expansion of Russian forces— as it became hard to distinguish Wagner contractors from regular troops—began to appear in the Western press, and it was revealed that Russians were penetrating the territories of countries in the African Sahel ostensibly to protect their economic interests, including mining investments. While this could well be true, they were there with a different purpose, as it was revealed by a series of military coups that mainly overthrew pro-western governments in favor of military dictators who showed evident pro-Russian inclinations. 

The Russians penetrated the territories and political environment of the Sahel countries with the precise purpose of intervening in their internal affairs. Russians are very thorough in their destabilization plans since they do not limit the penetration of a particular country only to their armed forces but, as the Libyan case proves, extend the destabilization to the economic area as well. Between 2016 and 2020, the Central Bank of Libya branch, located and operating in the east under the control of General Haftar, contracted the Russian state-owned Joint Stock Company Goznak to print its version of the Libyan dinar even though Haftar’s administration did not have access to collateral, such as gold, and thus in open violation of various international norms as well as Libya’s Banking Act. The issue of these false banknotes in the order of billions of dollars in Libyan dinars is tied to Haftar’s plans of conquest, as shown by data that noted that 4.5 billion Libyan dinars ($0.93 billion in 2019 value) were dispatched in four shipments from February to June 2019, just as Haftar attacked Tripoli in April 2019.    

It is estimated that Russians flooded the Libyan market with at least the equivalent in Libyan banknotes of more than 10 billion dollars, most of which paid for Haftar’s army and civil officials. The destabilizing effect of these maneuvers is self-explanatory. There are also unconfirmed rumors of another quantity of counterfeited bills being smuggled again into the Libyan market at the beginning of 2024. Despite all this evidence, coupled with the expulsion of French troops from these countries, there was still no American reaction besides some mid-level officials’ “outrage” and vague calls for the return of democracy. With all the above-described strategies, Russia is attempting to establish itself as the dominant power in Libya to control the territory of the country and, from there, safely project its power towards other North African countries and even further south like Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

The ups and downs of Russia’s war against Ukraine, compounded with the tragic events of October 7, 2023, in Israel and following more than six months of the war in Gaza with all the international consequences that these conflicts brought about, absorbed the US attention and capacity to react, even more so than before. But Washington and its allies cannot ignore anymore the importance of stabilizing Libya through a constant, inclusive, and transparent political process accompanied by a forceful action of resistance and pushback against the Russian infiltration by establishing in Libya a new unity government that could lead the way towards this objective. This would go a long way to gratifying the population and winning their hearts and minds to Western values.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

The post An Iron Curtain may fall again—this time in Libya appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With wars raging in Ukraine since 2022 and in Gaza since October 2023, not to mention other conflicts, one question that comes to mind is the cost in terms of climate change. First, direct conflict-related emissions from military equipment, damage to facilities that cause emissions—such as fuel reserves and chemical plants—or fires, and a reversion and reliance on carbon-heavy fuels, including coal. Most estimates quantify emissions from the Ukraine conflict, for example, as equivalent to Belgium’s annual emissions. The other is the opportunity cost of the lack of cooperation on climate issues across borders. (For more on this topic, see the author’s forthcoming report for the Atlantic Council to be released in summer 2024.) 

As long as Israel and Lebanon, for example, cannot agree how to cooperate on optimizing exportation from the region and eventually transition out of natural gas reserves from any shared sources towards cleaner sources of energy, both countries and the wider region will lose. (It’s worth noting that under the important Lebanese-Israeli Maritime Agreement, brokered by the United States, there are some provisions for how the parties will exploit any said gas fields and any revenue therein, but as long as the parties are not in direct contact and dependent on mediation, any additional prospect for cooperation beyond exploitation and border demarcation likely will be limited.) The same principle applies to cooperation in mitigation of extreme weather impacts through exchange of meteorological data, for example. The first cost is more straightforward to quantify, but the consequences of the second cost will only be assessed by future generations. These are the “double costs” of conflict-driven climate change impacts.

With the ongoing wars, it’s easy to dismiss the notions of climate change cooperation across borders as detached from reality. Unfortunately, the devastating impacts of climate change are not going away because of the existential threats posed by conflict. Instead, they are being worsened because of conflict.

For most countries, climate change has become a national security issue as they face mounting challenges from its impacts. In the MENA region, the risk for conflicts increases as the region becomes dryer, with scarcer sources of water, food, and energy. As the region looks to undertake an effective energy transition—which entails sharing of emission-reduction technology such as carbon capture, interconnecting electricity grids that are also capable to include increasingly renewable energy-based electricity, etc.—cooperation across borders becomes critical. Unless countries in the region and beyond find ways to work to mitigate and adapt together, it will turn into a race to the bottom—a lose-lose situation. 

As long as the world has reckless and authoritarian leaders who are bent on continuing to rule by force and conflict, the rest of the world will suffer. Beyond the immediate loss of human life in conflict zones—including Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war, Sudan, and Myanmar—other parts of the world will suffer the impacts of the “double cost” of climate change due to these events. 

The trouble is that most politicians think short-term due to election cycles. So, medium- to long-term climate impacts are often not prioritized. Democratic countries governed by policies endeavoring to tackle climate change impacts can play an important role, as has been demonstrated by governments in Europe and North America. However, the continued success of such policies only works as long as a new government isn’t sworn in with a change of policy towards climate change, which undermines the milestones achieved. This was evident when then US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Paris Climate Accord in 2020. If he returns to the White House, Trump may repeal the Inflation Reduction Act, a move that would take away incentives for companies to invest in cleaner energies and, rather worryingly, send a strong signal to other global players that the United States is not a reliable partner for dealing with climate change.

A successful energy transition will address developing and developed economies’ current real energy needs, including hydrocarbons, for a defined period. However, it will critically establish medium- to long-term plans to scale up green energies. Moreover, democratic systems of government with policies and agendas in place to adapt and mitigate the effects of climate change would be wise to consider establishing mechanisms that help ensure the longevity of these policies beyond a change of government. This is a tall order to ask democratic governments to do, especially as the tools they have to limit the ability to reverse such policies are restricted. Nonetheless, the more such policies are enshrined, for example, in international relations, and with clear economic incentives, the more difficult it is to undo them. 

While it is tempting to focus on the here and now, especially with respect to devastating live conflicts, it is critical to equally take steps to enable climate change mitigation and adaptation cooperation across borders—including across conflicting ones. Although nearly impossible to contemplate in the midst of conflict, this is precisely what needs to be done. Warmongering leaders in the region and beyond inflict not only direct losses today, but the impacts will be felt for generations to come. In the national security realm of climate change, this means that damage done to the planet is not just the direct emissions from conflict but also the opportunity cost of the lack of cooperation in dealing with the largest threat facing humanity. The “double costs” of conflict-driven climate change need to be understood and acted upon today in the MENA region and beyond.

Ariel Ezrahi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Ezrahi currently serves as the director of climate strategy at a fintech fund. Ezrahi is also on the board of the MENA2050 Climate Action Committee and the chairman of its Energy Transition Subcommittee. He was the architect of the Gas for Gaza project, the inaugural director of energy at the Office of the Quartet, and the Energy Adviser to the Quartet Representative, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. 

The post The double costs of conflict-driven climate change in MENA and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The political environment in Syria has remained unchanged since the 2020 elections. Thus, the polls will be held again against a backdrop of massive displacement, unresolved conflict, partial occupation, and an intransigent regime. At the same time, the Independent High Electoral Commission of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) announced elections for municipal councils on May 30. Whether these will be followed by elections for the AANES legislature is unclear.

In northwest Syria, the General Shura Council announced the formation of a Supreme Electoral Committee to organize elections. Of course, none of these elections are “free and fair”; they are about the consolidation of power, not political competition. But their results will determine the governance setup for years to come. Little is known about what the electoral process in the northeast, and particularly in northwest Syria, will look like. However, there are fairly good insights into the process managed by the Syrian government.

Historically, Syrian elections are rigged, and this election is no different. Some aspects of it are simple and in plain sight, especially the suppression of any genuine opposition, the lack of media freedoms or a safe space for civil society, and the enormous numbers of displaced voters. Other aspects are perhaps less obvious and could be overlooked when advocating or negotiating for political reforms. They appear somewhat mundane, such as the distribution of seats to electoral districts, the system of representation, and the ballot structure. Yet, they have a tremendous impact and have guaranteed an overwhelming Baath majority in parliament since 1973.

Separately, constitutional term limits for the presidency mean that the primary job of the next parliament will be to amend the constitution so that President Assad can run again in 2028. This is not unprecedented. In 2000, the parliament amended the constitution and lowered the age of candidacy from forty to thirty-four so that it could propose young Bashar for the presidency. When the UN-facilitated Syrian Constitutional Committee was set up in 2019 to discuss reforms as the prerequisite for ending the country’s civil war, some had hoped that the inevitable constitutional tweaks could present an opportunity for more substantial and negotiated constitutional reforms. But the committee has been inactive for two years, and any resurrection will need to wait for the rearranging of global political relations.

The 2015 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2254 sees elections in the wider context of a negotiated political resolution of the conflict. However, these will be the sixth elections organized by the Syrian regime since the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2254 and the regime will again ignore the parameters it sets, which include free, fair, and transparent elections under UN supervision, inclusion of diaspora voters, and the meaningful participation of women.

The deadline for calling elections is May 11. Russian government statements are already legitimizing the process, and the Baath Party is currently holding internal elections that may not be directly linked to the parliamentary elections. In any case, the first step in the process is to update and audit the voter register, which should be completed by next week but has not yet started.

Unavoidably, Syria watchers will ask why these elections should matter at all. Yet, opportunities to observe Syrian political processes are limited, so looking at the 2024 Syrian parliamentary elections is an attempt to find any evidence that Assad has any policy for the future of Syria other than reinforcing a status quo of statistically implausible polls with no opposition. Considering that the reform of the constitution is inevitable, will the composition of the parliament matter?

Vladimir Pran advises electoral authorities, governments, and political leaders on transitional, electoral, and political processes.

Maroun Sfeir advises international and local civil society organizations, political groups, and electoral authorities on electoral and political processes.

The post The Syrian parliamentary elections are coming up. Should anyone care? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Former Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher explained that downing the Iranian drones was designed to “prevent an escalation” and was in the country’s strategic interests. A full-scale Iran-Israel war would likely harm the Hashemite Kingdom, which is squeezed between the two more powerful adversaries.

Ordinary Jordanians offered a mixed reaction to the dramatic move. “A Jordanian who loves his homeland should rejoice that Jordan has the ability to intercept Iranian drones and ballistic missiles,” Madallah Nawarseh, a Jordanian activist, said on X (formerly Twitter). “This means that we are a country that possesses strong military capabilities and can defend its borders and airspace from Iran.”

However, others were more critical. In addition to Amman authorizing France to use its military base in Jordan to down the Iranian drones, NBC News reported that the Hashemite Kingdom also permitted Israeli fighter jets to enter Jordan’s airspace and intercept the Iranian missiles.

“Jordanian airspace is supposed to be closed for American and Israeli warplanes,” veteran Jordanian journalist Lamis Adnoni posted on Facebook. “Hey, people who are above, [Jordanian government] for a reminder—Israel is the enemy.” Former Jordanian Information Minister Taher al-Adwan also expressed discomfort with the downing of Iranian missiles over Arab territory. In an apparent rebuke of the Jordanian government, Adwan charged that it allowed the “infringement of Arab sovereignty, dignity, land, and skies to every foreigner or non-Arab seeking influence.” As frustration against Jordan intensified, a satirical image spread on X of King Abdullah donning an Israeli army uniform. Some online activists even claimed that Princess Salma—a pilot in Jordan’s Air Force—shot down Iranian drones, but this rumor was debunked.

The Jordanian government sought to refute such accusations of protecting Israel. Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said that Amman has a long-standing policy of intercepting any missile that violates the Hashemite Kingdom’s airspace, irrespective of the country of origin. The top Jordanian diplomat also demanded that Israel not retaliate following the Iranian barrage and harshly rebuked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Safadi’s comments were aimed at better attuning the Jordanian government’s actions with popular sentiment. Many Jordanians were already frustrated with Abdullah for maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel despite the soaring Gaza death toll. The Iranian drone barrage, and the subsequent decision to shoot the drones down, added further strain between the Jordanian government and the country’s populace, which largely supports the Palestinian struggle. With unemployment in the Hashemite Kingdom soaring to about 22 percent, Jordanian authorities are not interested in creating additional tensions with the public.

Yet, Safadi’s critiques did not lessen the joy shared by some Israelis, who lauded Amman for neutralizing the Iranian threat. “Israel should give full thanks to King Abdullah and the kingdom’s army for their part last night in stopping the attack,” Member of Knesset Meirav Cohen posted on X.

Jordan’s downing of Iranian drones was noteworthy because Amman was one of the harshest critics of Israel’s war in Gaza and recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv in November 2023. Safadi said that month that the 1994 peace treaty with Israel was collecting “dust” and Prime Minister Bisher Khasawnah spoke of a possible war with Israel. Yet, when the Jewish state needed the most help during a moment of vulnerability in the face of the largest-ever Iranian attack, Jordan’s armed forces took concrete action to save Israeli lives. The Hashemite Kingdom neutralizing the Iranian threat demonstrated that military ties between the two neighbors remain strong even as Abdullah is often upset with Netanyahu’s policies.

Such close Israeli-Jordanian security cooperation was exactly what Iran sought to avoid. The semi-official Fars News Agency cited an “informed source” in the Iranian military warning that Tehran is “carefully monitoring the movements of Jordan during the punitive attack against the Zionist regime, and if Jordan intervenes, it will be the next target.”

Naturally, the Hashemite Kingdom was not pleased with Iran’s threat. On April 14, the Jordanian Foreign Ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to Amman for a reprimand over the Islamic Republic’s repeated “insults.” Tensions with Tehran were already elevated earlier in April as Kataib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq, threatened to supply twelve thousand fighters in Jordan with rockets and explosives to fight Israel. A Jordanian security official rebuked the announcement for “stoking tensions.” Abdullah has no interest in an Iran-backed foreign militia operating in the Hashemite Kingdom, weakening the Jordanian security services’ control over the state and inviting possible Israeli military reprisals. Only a few months ago, an Iran-backed militia launched a drone attack that killed three US soldiers and injured more than thirty in northeast Jordan.

This month’s Jordan-Iran rift only deepens decades-long tensions between the two nations, despite both countries sharing the same temporary goal of an end to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. In January, the Hashemite Kingdom launched airstrikes against Iran-linked drug smugglers in southern Syria. A few years earlier, King Abdullah said in an interview that drones with an “Iranian signature” had previously attacked Jordan. Most famously, the Hashemite leader warned in 2004 of a “Shia Crescent,” with Iran expanding its influence over Jordan’s neighbors Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. In December 2004, Jordan’s embassy in Baghdad was bombed, killing nine people. In his memoir, Abdullah blamed a “well-known” Shia political group with backing from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for the attack.

Only hours after Jordan downed Iranian drones, Abdullah received a call from the White House. President Joe Biden told the Hashemite leader that he “strongly condemned” Tehran’s attack that threatened Jordan. With Washington laser-focused on stopping Iran’s aerial assault against the Jewish state, Abdullah understood the need to reinforce his alliance with Jordan’s largest donor. Iran placing Amman in this awkward spot—having to either face ridicule among some Arabs by intercepting the missiles or snub his top ally and allow the attacks to strike Israel from the kingdom’s airspace—only bolstered Jordan’s long-standing suspicion of Tehran.

Aaron Magid is the host of the podcast On Jordan. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles on the Hashemite Kingdom have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid

The post Jordan took out Iranian munitions over its airspace. Now it has tensions with its people and Iran. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The tale of two parties

Following the 1991 Kurdish uprising in Iraq, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein withdrew central administration institutions from the Kurdish-controlled provinces of Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 688, imposing a no-fly zone and allowing the KRI to hold its first elections in 1992.

The KDP narrowly won the disputed 1992 elections. It eventually made a power-sharing agreement with the PUK to divide parliamentary seats and senior government positions equally. Later, in 1994, a civil war led to separate PUK and KDP administrations, with each party maintaining complete control over two separate geographical areas. The two parties became deeply entrenched, with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) institutions dependent on them.

The next regional elections didn’t take place until 2005, after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The KDP and PUK ran as an alliance to avoid disputes and won the overwhelming majority of the seats. But in 2009, that balance faced a new challenge with the rise of an opposition in Kurdistan.

In 2009, the PUK faced an internal crisis as the opposition Change gained support from former PUK voters, leading the PUK to accept the KDP’s dominance over the KRG. The KDP exploited this to amend electoral laws, establish a regional electoral board, ratify results through the Kurdistan Judicial Council rather than the Federal Supreme Court, create a separate voter-registration system, and increase minority-quota seats—which historically voted in favor of the KDP in the parliament—from five to eleven. These changes allowed the KDP to increase its seats from 35 percent in 2005 to 44 percent in the 2018 elections, while the PUK declined from 34 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2018. The PUK, preoccupied with its internal struggles, tolerated this until 2021.

The PUK’s resurgence: challenging the KDP’s hegemony

After undergoing a leadership transformation in 2021, the PUK has focused on reforming the electoral law to restore the balance of power. The dispute between the two parties came to a head in 2022 when the KDP unilaterally passed a new electoral law with the support of minority seats, ignoring the PUK’s demands for voter-registration reform, district division, and minority-seat allocation. In response, the PUK filed a complaint with the Federal Supreme Court, which ultimately annulled the KDP-sponsored electoral law and ruled that the KRI would be divided into four districts, which meant eleven minority seats were canceled. The court also mandated that the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), a federally elected board, oversee regional elections and that the federal voter-registration system be used.

The KDP’s hesitancy to participate in the upcoming June elections goes beyond its public stance against the Federal Supreme Court. The 2023 provincial elections in the federally controlled provinces served as a wake-up call for the party, as it faced a shocking defeat to the PUK in disputed areas. Since 2005, the KDP has dominated Kurdish votes in these areas. Still, in the 2023 provincial elections, the PUK won nine seats while the KDP only secured six—a sharp decline from the 2021 national parliamentary elections when the KDP won ten seats and the PUK seven.

Another concern is the new rules imposed by the IHEC, such as the exclusive use of electronic biometric cards for voting. This has disproportionately affected the KDP, as a majority of the nine hundred thousand voters of KRI use temporary cards—a temporary pass for voters without biometric voter IDs who reside in its strongholds of Erbil and Duhok. Voters in Iraq use biometric IDs to prevent voter fraud.

Furthermore, discrepancies between the Iraqi Federal Census Bureau and the Kurdistan Census Bureau have raised concerns about the accuracy of voter-registration data. The Federal Census Bureau estimates the combined population of Duhok and Erbil to be 3.4 million, while the Kurdistan Census Bureau data shows 3.9 million—a difference of more than half a million.

The PUK claims that the KDP-controlled Kurdistan census has inflated population numbers. Conversely, the Federal Census data estimates Sulaymaniyah and Halabja populations to be around 2,336,191, while Kurdistan data puts the figure at 2,268,000—a difference of 68,140 in Sulaymaniyah’s favor. The shift from KRG-controlled data to federal voter-registration data has left the KDP grappling with the prospect of diminished electoral performance.

Behind closed doors, the KDP has made demands to the IHEC, including establishing a counting center in Erbil, using Kurdistan’s voter-registration system, allowing voters with temporary registration receipts to vote, and increasing Halabja governorate seats from three to six. The Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani also made an official request to the IHEC, addressing some of these concerns, but the IHEC rejected the request. The PUK may accept some of these changes to accommodate the KDP’s concerns but is unlikely to concede to all of them.

Compromise or fragmentation?

Although there is no clear constitutional or legal path to dealing with Kurdistan’s internal crisis, the outcome of this electoral impasse could lead to several scenarios. The KDP’s main goal appears to be delaying the June elections; the IHEC’s term will expire in July, making it impossible to hold parliamentary elections until next year. Meanwhile, the PUK insists on holding the elections on time.

If elections are held and the KDP participates, the most likely outcome is a return to the 50-50 power-sharing agreement between the two parties, which the KDP seeks to avoid. If the PUK agrees, there might be a delay until October 2024 after some of KDP’s concerns are addressed. If the KDP refuses to participate and prevents elections in its dominated region, the PUK warns of the risk of the Kurdish Regional Government losing its legitimacy, which may invoke the unconstitutionality of Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s position and call for the dissolution of the cabinet and for a transition government until elections are held. The worst-case scenario is a complete break-up of Sulaymaniyah from the KDP-controlled KRG, risking the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s constitutional status as a federal region.

As the June election deadline looms, the future of Kurdistan’s political stability hangs in the balance. The international community watches closely, hoping to reach a compromise to ensure the democratic process prevails in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Despite their flaws, elections have been a source of legitimacy for the KDP and PUK to resolve differences peacefully. The longer elections are delayed, the higher the risk that instability in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq will spill over to the rest of Iraq, as both parties are influential partners in forming the Iraqi government.

Sarkawt Shamsulddin is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and was a member of the Iraqi Parliament from 2018 to 2021.

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“They’ve reduced us to the way the world wants to see us,” one of my Gazan companions comments to me. “Miserable, begging, and in tents.”

This is madness, I think to myself, staring out the car window. We’re barely moving every few minutes through this crush of people, donkey carts, and aid trucks. Ambulance sirens wail, drones buzz above head, and people yell and shout.

It’s the beginning of April, six months into the Gaza war. Rafah’s population has swelled from around 275,000 to, by some estimates, 1.4 million as Gazans were forced to flee their homes in other parts of the strip.

I lock eyes with those of a mother, her infant passed out on her shoulder. She gives me a weak smile. I see two teenage girls hanging off the back of a donkey cart, giggling at each other, and I am relieved—relieved that I caught that moment in the middle of this sea of human sorrow. People look like ghosts but are haunted by all those they have lost.

It’s nearing the end of the holy month of Ramadan, during which Muslims around the world fast from sunrise to sundown. Iftar meals traditionally bring families and friends together to break their fast.

All I can think about is the impending Rafah invasion, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said he has set a date for. The possible invasion has been the largest bone of contention between Israel and its long-standing ally, the United States, which has been “urging” Israel not to proceed. It’s an alliance that no one here can understand. How can the United States continue to support and fund this?

I imagine a bomb falling on these souls, and a part of me wonders in horror if I’m just staring at the already condemned. My heart starts pounding when we’re stuck behind an ambulance—as ambulances have been targeted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

There are no proper toilets, showers, or sanitation, and there is no proper access to clean water. I drive past a cluster of people—young and old—surrounding a water truck, carrying beaten-up gallon bottles, pots, and whatever they have managed to scrounge to fill up with water.

Some stalls in the street sell produce from aid parcels. I’ve seen this in other war zones as well. A family that needs baby powder will barter the lentils and canned beans from their food parcel. They don’t have a choice because their babies need diapers, women need sanitary pads, and people will scrimp on any volume of food to be able to supplement a meal with a couple of wilted vegetables. They don’t have money, and there is no way to make money, so they barter what they are given for a more pressing need.

There is neither enough aid getting through nor enough commercial trucks, and as a result, what is available on the market is grossly overpriced. As of April 12, according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), around 20,500 trucks have made it into Gaza during the last six months. Pre-October 7, 2023, Gaza saw around 500 trucks a day enter, which means that Gazans needed roughly 90,000 trucks over the past six months.

Addressing this level of desperation is about so much more than just counting trucks that have made it across the border. Aid must get to a warehouse and then move to the needy population.

Humanitarian aid moves through a warzone in what’s known as “deconfliction,” whereby warring parties are informed of and, in theory, agree to specific routes and locations. It’s a process that has never really worked in this wretched battlespace. Convoys are regularly denied movement requests by the Israeli side, and even when those requests are granted, any movement is fraught with dangers.

The starkest and most recent reminder of that is the April 1 Israeli airstrike on a convoy from the World Central Kitchen (WCK), an organization that I would argue had the best lines of communication to the Israeli side, the best “deconfliction.” WCK has since suspended its operations, as did a handful of other organizations.

Two days after the WCK hit, I arrived in the Gaza Strip on a humanitarian mission for my charity, the International Network for Aid, Relief & Assistance (INARA). Fellow humanitarian workers and volunteers I chatted with on the way in were all anxious—myself included. If WCK could lose people like this, what did it mean for the rest of us?

INARA works with thirteen informal shelters and has a Gazan team. We discussed pausing our work and whether the team felt safe enough to continue.

“We can be hit at any time. It’s always a risk,” Mona, one of our lead team members, whose full name is being withheld for safety reasons, explains to me. “If we don’t do this for our people, our people’s children, then who will? We have to stay strong. We have to keep going.”

Our team arrives at one of the shelters we work with north of Rafah. The children swarm around Mona; she’s a familiar face here, and they know that this Gazan woman in her thirties brings a break from their monotonous existence. They all clamor to help her set up the speakers, hula-hoops, balls, and other games. I play and dance with the children. I even smile and laugh, but my heart breaks into a million pieces.

That evening, at the breaking of the fast meal known as iftar, we hand out hot meals INARA purchased from a local makeshift community kitchen set out of a former car repair shop. We splurged to provide Palestinian chicken mandi, a specially spiced dish that is cooked for hours in a pit underground. It’s a taste of the past, before October 7, a time when parents could afford to feed their children something like chicken. For months, one could rarely find chicken or meat on the market in Gaza. Over the last few weeks, supply has increased, but the vast majority of Gazans, with no income, still cannot afford it.

“Thank you. We used to get hot meals from WCK, but it’s been a few days, and nothing has arrived,” one of the older men says to me.

A few weeks ago, we managed to find solar panels locally and install them at one shelter. Now, children can play at night and go to the toilet—two for two hundred people—without being as afraid as they were before. There is no electricity in Gaza, and generator fuel is astronomically priced. Solar panels are a solid option, but trucks carrying them have been rejected entry since the war began.

A woman comes to plead with me, her daughter in tow: “We are thankful, but please, can you get her out? She had a scholarship to study in Turkey.”

Another mother begs, “Please help us! What has this government [Hamas] done for us? I don’t care; they just need to end this.”

But I can’t get them out, and I can’t end this. What I can do just feels so small, and my heart aches for every single one of them.

That night, I crashed at Mona’s place with her family. No one moves at night; it’s too risky, with Israel’s reported use of artificial intelligence to determine targets and the seeming randomness of what is being hit. Her elderly mother asks if I think the Rafah invasion will happen and where they are supposed to go. I don’t know how to answer that. She asks when I think it will end. I don’t know how to answer that, either.

“Stay with us,” Mona’s mother jokes. An explosion shakes the windows, drones buzz overhead, and she grips the armchair. I notice that her hands are trembling.

Mona and I “girl talk” in her room. I’m in a pair of borrowed sparkly pink pajamas, and she’s telling me about how, war or no war, she must be elegant when she goes out. Mona shows me some of her sister’s clothes that she wears all the time to feel closer to her.

Mona’s sister managed to get out to Egypt along with her young children early on in this war. She gave me a couple of bags of medicine, dried fruit, and other goodies to carry into Gaza for her family inside. The family wants to share what they have just received. I gently refuse, saying there is plenty for me when I go home, that I’m not hungry. But this level of generosity just hurts the soul.

If only the rest of the world could see this level of kindheartedness—could just be here in this moment, I think to myself. I wonder if I were subjected to such circumstances, would I be able to hold on to my humanity like this?

Just as I am about to fall asleep, another explosion jolts me off my mattress. I am here but don’t understand how anyone copes with this. This constant web of anxiety that settles in your chest. 

The next morning, Mona and I head to Mawasi, the southernmost part of Gaza’s beachfront. Here, families used to picnic, and children screamed and played. We drive past Mona’s favorite fish restaurant, where she used to walk and work out with friends.

“I can’t believe what I am seeing,” she turns to me. “I just can’t believe this. This can’t be real.”

We meet up with two doctors to set up medical points and address some of the basic medical needs of the population. Gaza’s medical infrastructure has been decimated; hospitals cannot handle the influx of the injured, never mind the ill. There is a massive spread of communicable diseases, from diarrhea to hepatitis A, and there are infected wounds. There is someone who needs medical attention in just about every tent.

With each step in one tent, my foot sends a swarm of flies in the air. A mother shoves her listless baby at one of the doctors accompanying us. He’s severely malnourished.

Mothers are not getting enough food and nutrients to produce breast milk, there isn’t enough baby formula to supplement, and finding clean water to mix it with is yet another challenge.

United Nations agencies have warned of the risk of famine since December 2023. In northern Gaza, where the humanitarian situation is significantly more catastrophic, more than two dozen children are reported to have died from malnutrition and dehydration.

We talk about the need for hygiene kits and sanitary reusable underwear, and the need to distribute those items at Rafah and Mawasi. We try to plan around the unknowns: whether Rafah will be bombed, where everyone will go, what will happen to all the aid warehouses, and what access people will have to aid if Rafah is invaded.

It’s utterly overwhelming. The sort of overwhelming that twists your guts and sits in your chest. Later that day, a mother—hearing that we work on mental health with children—comes up, grabbing my arm.

“Please, my son, every night he screams and convulses,” she tells me. “It started when he saw his sister’s head blown off in an explosion that hit our house.”

My mouth dries. I stare at this mother talking about her son and her daughter’s awful death. Her voice is even-keeled as if it was just a story she was telling nonchalantly. I wonder if it’s because she’s been through so much that she’s lost all ability to process it. But then again, how does one process that?

“May she rest in peace, may God give you strength,” I say, my voice a whisper, barely able to form the words. 

Arwa Damon is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and president and founder of the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need life-saving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations.

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Despite various peace initiatives undertaken by the international community—including efforts by the United States, Arab countries, and other African nations—regional and international responses have thus far failed to produce any meaningful resolution. In seeking to resolve the war, the absence of accountability for supporters of Burhan and Hemedti looms large, and foreign powers have a crucial role to play. Peace efforts have been unsuccessful because mediator Arab countries—like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—are not acting in good faith but are supporting opposing sides. Halting external support to the generals is crucial to achieving peace in Sudan and setting it on the path to civilian-led rule. 

A fertile ground for foreign meddling

Sudan’s civil war is a battle for legitimacy and power between two ambitious generals, each wielding a distinct advantage but without sufficient power to achieve victory. Currently, al-Burhan positions himself as Sudan’s legitimate ruler and has Cairo’s support. Conversely, Hemedti—with backing from the UAE and control over Sudan’s goldmines—leverages the advantage gained from former President Omar al-Bashir’s coup-proofing policies, which gave the RSF independence from civilian and SAF control. He not only rejects Burhan’s claim, but is determined to emerge as the sole ruler of Sudan.  

The intricate power dynamics of smaller, independent militias in Sudan add layers of complexity and uncertainty, creating an anti-peace equation that outside forces could easily exploit through proxies.

While Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have proven ineffective in stopping Sudan’s war, they play a significant role in its continuation. All three countries have vital interests in Sudan, motivating them to choose sides that will maximize their benefit, even if it undermines Sudan’s. 

Egyptian President Fattah el-Sisi sees Burhan as a stable partner to safeguard its regional interests, particularly in the Nile River, which the countries share. While Egypt has participated in mediation efforts and started the Neighbors of Sudan Initiative, it hasn’t been able to leverage its relationship with Burhan to progress toward a peace deal. Instead, it has assisted the SAF’s military efforts by providing drones and warplanes. 

In contrast, the UAE supports Hemedti and the RSF by providing military and financial assistance disguised as humanitarian aid. Abu Dhabi serves as a financial haven for Hemedti’s gold business, hosting RSF front companies and bank accounts. Despite being part of peace efforts, the UAE has directed its influence toward assisting Hemedti’s diplomatic efforts rather than fostering negotiations.  

Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia views Burhan as a reliable ally to protect its investments in Sudan’s key sectors and its strategic interests in the Red Sea region. However, Riyadh finds it more beneficial to bolster its image as a neutral mediator, potentially giving it an advantage over the UAE in establishing regional dominance and emerging as a credible international partner.  

Key US lawmakers have highlighted the UAE’s involvement in supporting the RSF, as seen during the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee for Africa hearing on December 5, 2023. Earlier, members of Congress urged Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) to UAE cease support for the RSF via a formal letter. Most importantly, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the need to ensure peace in Sudan with MBZ in January. While Egypt’s support for SAF has also faced criticism, the involvement of Cairo and Riyadh with the warring sides has not received sufficient attention. The external meddling of these countries has run counter to their involvement in peace efforts. This must be stopped to achieve any solution in Sudan.

 US response and course correction 

Several peace efforts are in place, but progress remains elusive. The RSF and SAF consistently violate agreements, resulting in brief ceasefires and escalating civilian casualties. Even opportunities flaunted as promising—such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s meeting on January 18, before Burhan suspended Sudan’s membership in the East African bloc—have met persistent challenges. There is pressure from the United Nations as well as the United States for a ceasefire, but calls for a Ramadan truce were rejected by Burhan. These efforts, inclusive of US sanctions for human rights abuses and undermining peace and security in the region, have been unable to stop external support, let alone the war.   

As the war continues, there is still an opportunity for course correction. US Special Envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello’s recent trip to African countries, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt from March 11–23 was a step in this direction. The objectives of this trip highlighted the need to align mediation efforts that are spread across various international platforms, including the IGAD, the African Union, and the respective initiatives led by Arab countries. It also emphasized engaging civilian actors, including resistance committees, trade unions, protest groups, women, and the youth in democratic transition and peace talks. Thus, this trip could be the catalyst needed to advance key priorities in Sudan.   

The upcoming Jeddah talks on April 18 could be another opportunity to build on the objectives outlined on Perriello’s trip. The most significant is unifying various peace efforts and making these talks inclusive. This would signal to all parties involved that mediators are willing to collectively pressure the generals, adding seriousness to the peace talks. Additionally, bringing mediating countries together will prevent the creation of competing circles of influence. It will ensure a unified front, rather than fragmented efforts, toward achieving the desired goal. 

However, aligning mediation efforts would only be fruitful if the United States were also adamant about aligning mediators’ priorities vis-à-vis Sudan. This begins with prioritizing Sudan in its foreign policy agenda and maintaining a consistent approach. Despite other global priorities like the Israel-Hamas war, and potential time constraints posed by the upcoming US presidential election, the United States must continue building momentum in its engagement in Sudan. One way to do so is to support Perriello and ensure his office is fully staffed. In a recent interview, Perriello acknowledged that “a lot more international engagement is needed” and mentioned “raising the heat on all those who are fueling the conflict.” While commendable, this is a belated recognition of the situation’s gravity, similar to Perriello’s late appointment as special envoy. The key now is for the United States to add weight to its words with constructive actions, which could mean serious backchannel dialogues with its Gulf allies and Egypt to stop their support of the RSF.

As peacekeeping efforts aim for an immediate ceasefire, deploying United Nations peacekeepers in Sudan to ensure the safety of its people and eventually oversee the transition process (akin to the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan) should be considered. This proposed UN mission should be granted access to effectively monitor Sudan’s entry points, including seaports, air routes, and land borders, to curb weapons smuggling and establish humanitarian corridors. To facilitate humanitarian assistance, international efforts should utilize existing networks of local emergency responses. Most importantly, the United States and the international community must provide the much-needed funding to support these efforts. The upcoming humanitarian conference in France could be the chance to hit the nail on its head.  

Past efforts have underscored that, unless the underlying issue of mediator support for the generals is addressed, these well-intentioned efforts risk being futile. They will fail to deter ongoing atrocities and leave a power vacuum that attracts actors like Iran and Russia, which also have interests in establishing naval bases on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.  

It must be made clear that those providing weapons and funding for Sudan’s civil war are accessories to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the country. If the international framework lets them fall through the cracks with no accountability, its ripple effects will be felt globally in the form of a refugee crisis and an increase in proxy warfare in the region. 

Manal Fatima is a program assistant with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Follow her on X: @mafasaad.

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Interestingly, the first country to condemn the airstrike was the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Shortly after the attack occurred, the Emirati foreign ministry released a statement “[condemning] the targeting of the Iranian diplomatic mission in the Syrian capital, Damascus.” Then, four other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members—Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—also denounced the attack, with Bahrain the exception. This was unlike after Soleimani’s assassination when GCC states, especially Oman and Qatar, called for de-escalation between Washington and Tehran. Still, no Arab monarchy in the Persian Gulf outright condemned the killing of Soleimani.

Unknowns of Iranian retaliation

The leadership in Abu Dhabi has grave concerns about being caught up in any escalation of regional hostilities, which have been exacerbated since the Gaza war began in October 2023 and spread to Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere. The fact that the UAE normalized relations with Israel in 2020 via the Abraham Accords leaves the Persian Gulf country increasingly vulnerable to the Middle East’s conflict dynamics.

The UAE has reason to fear Iran-backed actors in the Arab world, particularly in light of the Houthi drone and missile attacks against Abu Dhabi in 2022. Today, the UAE—with an Israeli embassy in Abu Dhabi and a consulate in Dubai, Israeli tourists in Dubai, and Israeli businesspeople and expatriates in the country—does not want Tehran targeting Israeli diplomats, citizens, or interests on Emirati soil in retaliation for the April 1 attack in Damascus. As Dubai is a popular tourism destination and a Middle Eastern hub for finance and business, the UAE’s brand depends heavily on peace and stability.

By quickly condemning Israel’s airstrike against Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus, the leadership in Abu Dhabi was able to send a strong message to Iran and various Tehran-backed groups in the Middle East. Despite the UAE normalizing relations with Israel and refusing to abrogate the Abraham Accords in response to Israel’s conduct in Gaza since October 2023, Abu Dhabi is increasingly confident and vocal in criticizing certain Israeli actions.

The UAE’s swift condemnation of Israel’s killing of six international World Central Kitchen workers in an airstrike on April 2, as well as the strong language regarding the Gaza war from the UAE during its time as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), further underscores this point. Although Algeria—which replaced the UAE as the only Arab state sitting on the UNSC on January 2—has a far more adversarial relationship with Israel, the UAE repeatedly condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza while it had a seat on the body. Within the war’s first month, the UAE ambassador to the UN, Lana Nusseibeh, addressed Israel’s “dangerous, unrealistic evacuation orders” and declared that Israel’s killing of Palestinian children in Gaza “should stain our moral conscience if nothing else does” while speaking at the UNSC.

In a grander context, the UAE is attempting to conduct an increasingly nonaligned—or, perhaps more accurately, multi-aligned—approach to geopolitics. This entails Abu Dhabi striving to maintain positive ties with a host of countries in the Middle East—Iran, Israel, Syria, Qatar, and Turkey—as well as all five permanent members of the UNSC. Ultimately, as US hegemony steadily declines, the UAE strives to shore up relationships with states in the neighborhood that have been on historically negative terms with Abu Dhabi, including Iran. At the same time, the UAE is diversifying its global partnerships by deepening ties with Beijing and Moscow.

Such a foreign policy requires the Emiratis to strike a delicate balancing act. In terms of Abu Dhabi’s reaction to Israel’s April 1 airstrike, this consisted of the UAE condemning the attack without ever mentioning Israel. In doing so, Abu Dhabi signaled its disapproval of Israel’s illegal bombing of a diplomatic mission without appearing to align with the Iran-led Resistance Axis.

Dangerous ripple effects

Five of the GCC’s six members quickly condemned this attack on Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus, which occurred against the backdrop of Gulf Arab officials taking diplomatic steps aimed at ending the Gaza war as soon as possible. With the war further regionalizing, policymakers in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other GCC capitals fear spillover into the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. This scenario could severely harm their countries’ economies and threaten their security.

Saudi Arabia, which has not normalized relations with Israel but took a host of small steps in that direction before October 7, 2023, embraced the same approach as the UAE in terms of responding to Israel’s April 1 attack against Iran’s embassy complex in Syria. Riyadh reacted by putting out a statement expressing its “categorical rejection of targeting diplomatic facilities for any justification, and under any pretext, which is a violation of international diplomatic laws and the rules of diplomatic immunity.” Yet, at no point has Saudi Arabia officially called out Israel by name for this airstrike, despite Riyadh consistently condemning Israel for its conduct in Gaza throughout this war.

One reason why further expansion of the Gaza war unsettles officials in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh is that they remain deeply suspicious of Tehran. This is despite their détente with Iran following the UAE’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran and the return of its ambassador to Iran in 2019 and 2022, respectively, and Saudi Arabia’s renormalization of diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic in 2023. Leaders in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia fear Tehran’s capacity to foment turmoil on Emirati and Saudi soil if Iran’s leadership comes to see GCC states supporting Israeli adventurism in the Middle East that targets Iranians and Iranian interests.

Sometimes referred to as the GCC’s “doves,” Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar perceive Iran as much less of a threat than other GCC members do. Over the past three decades, Oman and Qatar have played critical bridging roles between the West and Tehran. Since October 2023, Kuwait City, Muscat, and Doha have used strong language to condemn Israel’s war against Gaza. Notably, Kuwait, which is said to be the most anti-Israeli GCC member, was the only Gulf Arab monarchy to call out Israel by name when condemning the April 1 airstrike.

Fearful that hostilities between Israel and Iran could spiral out of control, the GCC states are keen to avoid the heat as much as possible.

As Israel ratchets up tensions with Iran, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other GCC capitals want Tehran to know that they have nothing to do with such Israeli behavior and are on record condemning it. At this point, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other GCC members have significant fears about how the continuation of the Gaza war and its spillover effects threaten their national interests. For a host of reasons, including their domestic purposes, Gulf Arab states desperately want a ceasefire implemented immediately.

Giorgio Cafiero is the chief executive officer of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.

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The Gaza war only added more stress on the Jordanian government. The Hashemite Kingdom witnessed a significant drop in tourism during the fall of 2023, further damaging a weak economy. Given that approximately 50–60 percent of the Hashemite Kingdom’s population—including Queen Rania—is of Palestinian origin, it is no surprise that Jordanians voiced their opposition to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. A University of Jordan poll found that 66 percent of Jordanians supported the October 7, 2023, Hamas assault that killed about 1,200 Israelis. As the Gaza death toll spiked, Jordanians hit the streets to highlight their outrage. On October 20, 2023, Reuters reported that thousands of Jordanians chanted in Amman, “Oh Hamas, hit them with Qassam rockets…bring the suicide bombers to Tel Aviv.”

Jordanian authorities were not pleased with the large protests. Amnesty International noted that at least one thousand people were arrested in Amman during pro-Palestinian demonstrations in October and November 2023. Jordanian security forces said some of those arrested during the protests engaged in arson. At the same time, activists cited public criticism of the Hashemite Kingdom’s stance on Gaza as the genuine reason for the detentions. After Jordanian authorities cracked down on 2020 demonstrations in support of teachers’ pay, it was no surprise that the government felt certain protests about Gaza were also threatening.  

Public opinion pushes boundaries

Even as security forces detained activists in Amman, the royal family and Jordanian government understood the need to better align themselves with public opinion by intensifying their criticism of Israel. Queen Rania has given numerous interviews in which she assailed Western leaders for not condemning Israel’s killing of Palestinian civilians. Abdullah took the lead in voicing opposition to cutting funds for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The king also participated in a February military airdrop of medical supplies to Gaza. Donning a military uniform, the Hashemite leader flew in a Jordanian Air Force helicopter and helped provide humanitarian goods for the besieged enclave. Jordan later collaborated with the US military to drop food packages to Gazans.

On November 1, 2023, Jordan withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and instructed the Israeli ambassador to Amman not to return until the Gaza war ended. Then on November 16, 2023, after thousands of Palestinians had been killed in Gaza, Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi announced that the Hashemite Kingdom would not proceed with a water-for-energy deal with Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The country’s top diplomat insisted that Israel had no right to self-defense as an occupying power.  

In response, the Israeli foreign ministry expressed regret for the Hashemite Kingdom’s “inflammatory” remarks but emphasized that the neighboring countries’ ties are of “strategic importance.” That very month, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh also warned that any Israeli attempt to transfer Palestinians in the West Bank to Jordan would be considered a “declaration of war.” Yet, some six months later, Jordan has avoided military clashes with Israel, in contrast to neighboring Lebanon and Syria.

Still, it’s worth noting that Jordanian-Israeli ties were chilly even before the Gaza war.

In January 2023, the Jordanian foreign ministry repeatedly summoned Israel’s ambassador to Amman for reprimands over Benjamin Netanyahu’s government policy at the al-Aqsa Mosque compound. When Netanyahu was out of office, Amman still refused to participate in the “Negev Summit,” a 2022 meeting between Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE. From 2000–2005, Jordan also left its ambassador post in Tel Aviv empty to protest Israeli military operations during the Second Intifada. Despite numerous instances of pushback since October 7, 2023, this was not enough for the Jordanian public.

Protestors deplore Jordan’s balancing act

Around six months into the war, many Jordanians have not been satisfied with their government’s response to the Gaza war. During late March, thousands of Jordanians demonstrated in Amman on a nightly basis, with some trying to storm the Israeli embassy. “Our protests will continue until the war on Gaza comes to an end,” asserted Jordanian activist Mohammed al-Abssi. The large resurgence of protestors demonstrated the increased disconnect between the public and government officials. Activists in Amman held signs with pictures of Hamas military spokesman Abu Obaida, even as Abdullah expelled Hamas officials from the kingdom after assuming power, with authorities later accusing the Palestinian militant group of illegally smuggling weapons into Jordanian territory.

Despite this pressure, King Abdullah has declined to take more drastic steps. While activists have demanded that Jordan sever all ties with Israel, the Hashemite leader refused to cancel the landmark 1994 peace treaty and has proceeded with the multibillion-dollar gas deal with Israel signed in 2016. In March, Jerusalem-based Kan 11 television reported that the Hashemite Kingdom asked Israel to extend a water agreement for an additional year as Amman continues to suffer from severe water shortages. The kingdom has also forcibly dispersed hundreds of Jordanians trying to march along the country’s border with the West Bank.

The king’s measured stance on the Gaza conflict also extended into Amman’s ties with Washington. In a rare move, the Jordanian government canceled President Joe Biden’s planned October 18, 2023, meeting in Amman, with Safadi saying that such a summit would be ill-advised while the United States would not agree to end the Gaza war. Nonetheless, Abdullah proceeded with a February visit to Washington even as the Biden administration continued to support Israel’s military campaign. The Hashemite monarch was the first Arab leader to sit with Biden at the White House after the Gaza war erupted and press for an immediate ceasefire. Abdullah understood that refusing to meet the US president was not a sustainable policy, and instead felt it would be more effective to promote a pro-Palestinian viewpoint directly with Israel’s top ally. While Jordanian protestors criticized the United States for its support of Israel, Washington pushed to keep bilateral ties with Amman on track. Biden praised the Hashemite leader for his “critical leadership” in increasing Gaza aid and pledged “unwavering” US support for Jordan.

Jordan’s delicate balancing act in response to the Gaza war stems from its need to maintain cordial ties with the United States. As Washington provides the cash-strapped Jordan with about $1.5 billion in annual aid, the Biden administration remains the Hashemite Kingdom’s largest donor. If Abdullah were to annul his peace accord with Israel as some protestors demand, he would likely face congressional threats of a cut in the kingdom’s massive annual assistance package. Washington has already demonstrated its willingness to suspend aid to UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, Jordan would be unwise to ignore the precedent by pro-Israel US lawmakers and risk losing such critical bilateral assistance.

Abdullah’s relatively moderate response to the Gaza war has only reinforced his importance to Washington. Whether Jordan’s cooperation on airdrops of Gaza humanitarian aid or its participation in the anti-Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) coalition, US officials can count on Amman to be a reliable partner during regional crises. By rebuffing protestors’ calls to support Hamas, the king demonstrated his willingness to sacrifice domestic popularity to cement his alliance with the Biden administration. Such flexibility helps ensure that Abdullah will continue to be a regular White House visitor, far beyond the current Middle East conflict.

Aaron Magid is the host of the podcast, On Jordan. A former Amman-based journalist, his articles on the Hashemite Kingdom have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor. Follow him on X: @AaronMagid.

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The EU-Egypt deal comes on the heels of an expanded $8 billion loan agreement sealed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on March 6 to encourage Cairo to continue the deep structural reforms it started in 2016, which were conditioned by the IMF loan program. This includes shifting to a flexible exchange rate, reducing the state’s footprint in the economy, and leveling the playing field between the public and private sectors. The deal also comes just weeks after Egypt struck an agreement with the Emirati sovereign wealth fund,Abu Dhabi Developmental Holding Company (ADQ), for $35 billion in investments to develop part of Egypt’s Mediterranean coast.  

Aid packages offer lifeline to faltering economy

The recent financing—totaling a staggering $51.1 billion—offers Egypt’s faltering economy a lifeline at a time when the country faces a severe foreign currency shortage, unprecedentedly high debt levels (public debt currently exceeds 92 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)), and soaring inflation. The influx of cash is intended to address the foreign currency crunch and reinforce stability in the country. The bailouts are also meant to help Egypt address the fallout from the conflict in the neighboring Gaza Strip that has been raging since October 8, 2023. Among the repercussions of the ongoing war on Egypt’s northeastern border is a 40 percent drop in Suez Canal revenues so far this year due to Houthi rebel attacks on commercial and military ships using the vital waterway. 

But while the funding secured in recent weeks will help ease the economic crisis and stabilize Egypt in the short term, skeptics fear it may only offer a temporary respite. Timothy Kaldas, deputy director of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, argues that the 2016 IMF loan program failed to achieve its objectives because the IMF did not adopt stricter conditionality.  Others warn that the financial support may be wasted on a failing economy if President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi continues to pursue the same economic policies that have led the country to where it is today.   

“The EU package will provide Egypt with some welcome relief from its current economic distress,” James Moran, an associate senior research fellow at the Center for European Studies (CEPS), and former head of the EU delegation to Egypt, told me.  

“Global crises such as the coronavirus pandemic, the Ukraine war, and the war on Gaza are partly to blame for Egypt’s current economic troubles,” he noted, adding that “misguided economic policies in recent years have also played their part.”  

Policies such as Egypt’s expensive subsidy regime, a bloated and degenerating civil service, and what some analysts describe as Sisi’s ”vanity” mega-projects—including a new administrative capital in the desert at an estimated cost of $59 billion—have pushed the economy to the brink of collapse.

While over the last decade, Egypt has significantly reduced its energy subsidies, which had previously accounted for around 6 percent of the country’s GDP—the latest fuel price hikes were announced on March 22, in line with IMF conditions—food subsidies still account for 2 percent of GDP. This is partly due to wheat imports from Russia, Ukraine, and, more recently, Australia and Eastern European countries like Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. By the end of last year, wheat subsidies cost the government $119.8 billion (95 billion Egyptian pounds)—more than double the previous year’s cost. Meanwhile, the country’s civil service employs approximately 5.6 million Egyptians—one civil servant for approximately every eighteen citizens—across dozens of state-owned companies headed by army generals or military loyalists.

As Moran said, “If the EU funding is to have a real impact, it will be important that the IMF agreement, with which much of the EU package is linked, is honored.”  

Fundamental changes are needed for the economy to recover from the current downturn. For one, the state—specifically the army—must diminish its extensive economic role. The army’s vast empire includes practically anything and everything; from hotels and gas stations to housing and infrastructure projects, and from mineral water and food to consumer goods. With multiple privileges that include exemption from taxes and customs duties, the army has crowded out civilian competitors. Also, several “rival” businessmen have reportedly been arrested and jailed for refusing to hand over their assets. 

There has been little to indicate that the military is willing to loosen its stranglehold over the economy thus far, despite the government’s promises to withdraw from “non-strategic sectors.” This is understandable as dismantling its diverse business interests would mean an erosion of the army’s political influence as well as the loss of substantial revenue for the armed forces. But reducing the state’s footprint would allow for an enabling and more inclusive business environment, paving the way for faster growth, lower prices, job creation, and more opportunities for ordinary Egyptians.  

Secondly, shifting to a flexible exchange rate would help the economy better adjust to external shocks. Scaling back state intervention in the economy would attract greater investments and support exports by allowing Egyptian businesses to sell their goods and services in international markets.  

After years of stalling the necessary monetary and fiscal reforms based on the false premise that a stable currency reflects a stable economy, the Central Bank of Egypt finally announced a “flotation” of the Egyptian pound on February 1, but only after hiking interest rates by six hundred basis points. Analysts remain skeptical, believing the move is yet another devaluation of the currency to curb soaring inflation. Whether the latest devaluation will evolve into the flexible exchange rate regime conditioned by the IMF remains to be seen. If not, it will be virtually impossible to keep the lid on inflation—which is currently around 36 percent.

The success of the IMF loan program will also largely depend on the government’s ability to stem inflation’s erosion of the purchasing power of low-income and middle-class families and protect society’s poorest and most vulnerable. Failure to do so would increase the risk of social unrest. Social protection programs are crucial to ease the suffering of the poor, who feel the pinch of soaring food prices and rampant inflation. The government has taken steps to quell rising discontent, expanding coverage of cash transfer programs to cover more than five million households and increasing the minimum wage for public-sector employees—part of a $3.8 billion social protection package.

However, ensuring adequate social protection for the poor is only one part of the equation: the government also needs to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending to help maintain the fiscal discipline demanded by the IMF. It needs to prioritize growth-stimulating capital expenditures and focus on reducing the country’s staggering debt. Continuing to spend badly-needed funds on wasteful mega-projects that may take years to yield economic returns—if at all—is a recipe for disaster and can only exacerbate the current crisis.

Egyptian government must ease ‘systematic repression‘

But that’s not all. Marked progress must also be made in improving Egypt’s poor human rights record to guarantee continued support from donors and development partners.

“The European parliament will probably want to see an improvement in the country’s approach to rights issues before agreeing to the release of a large part of the funding,” Moran said, noting that “there’s a lot of work to do on both sides for the aid package to be fully effected.” 

Shortly after news of the EU aid package was announced, Kenneth Roth, former Human Rights Watch executive director, lamented in a post published on his X (formerly Twitter) account that the EU is “going to funnel billions to Egypt’s President Sisi—ignoring that Sisi has imposed the most brutal dictatorship in modern Egyptian history—because he will help stop irregular migration to Europe.” Rights advocates fear that the Egyptian authorities’ systematic repression will continue if the funding is not directly linked with progress being made on human rights.  

Meanwhile, in a move that signals the government is taking concrete steps to shed its old image, an Egyptian appeals court abruptly ordered the closure of a long-running investigation into five remaining nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the 2011 Case 173, known to Egyptians as the “NGO foreign funding case.” The move came shortly after the announcement of the aid package, which led some observers to speculate that the closure of the probe was linked to the aid. Investigations in the case have continued for some thirteen years—ever since security forces raided the offices of several NGOs in 2011, arresting dozens of civil society workers and prosecuting them on charges of receiving illicit foreign funding and/or operating without a license. 

In 2013, forty-three of the accused—including sixteen Americans—were sentenced to between one and five years in prison. The Court of Cassation ordered a retrial in 2018, which resulted in all defendants being acquitted. The justice ministry released a statement in August 2023 announcing that it would drop charges against seventy-five civil society organizations—the bulk of them charity organizations and others working in development. Travel bans and asset freezes imposed on the NGOs were also lifted, but the same punitive measures remained in place for twenty prominent human rights defenders standing trial in the case. 

While the closure of the case is a significant step in the right direction, ending arbitrary detentions and widespread and systematic enforced disappearances, and releasing the thousands of political prisoners detained for their ideological and political views would be another milestone and further proof that the Sisi regime is seriously implementing its promised democratic reforms. The authorities would also do well to stop curtailing freedom of speech and assembly. Such moves are crucial to show that Egypt is worthy of the bailouts it has received and would go a long way in ensuring additional support in the event of any future unforeseen crises. 

The Sisi government knows only too well that the EU and the IMF will continue to support Egypt because of its strategic location and its pivotal role in curbing migration. However, it would be a grave mistake for the Egyptian leadership to think it can get away with delaying the promised reforms, or that the aid will be forthcoming regardless of whether it continues its failed economic policies. The outcome of continued economic mismanagement, flawed priorities, and repetition of past mistakes can only deepen the current crisis—and perhaps even lead to economic collapse.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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This attack is a reminder that Ukraine is not the only entity Russia is at war against. Although Moscow’s war against the Muslim breakaway region of Chechnya officially ended in 2009, Russia has experienced a number of jihadist attacks. This one is just the latest.

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), it should be recalled, was what al-Qaeda in Iraq was renamed when it broke away from al-Qaeda central over leadership quarrels and policy issues. Although ISIS quickly came to control a large amount of territory in both eastern Syria and western Iraq, it was largely crushed by several forces, including the US military, Syrian Kurdish forces, Iraqi government troops, Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias, and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Although Iran and its allies did not do so in cooperation with the United States, the fact that Tehran and Washington both regarded ISIS as an opponent is indicative of the depth of the rivalry between Shia and Sunni Islamists. But while the activities of the original ISIS became severely constrained, those of its affiliates—including ISIS-K—have expanded.

This attack by ISIS-K, which operates primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan, may have been motivated by several grievances, including retaliation for the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. With ISIS-K now fighting against the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which has relatively good relations with Russia, the Moscow attack may have been intended to draw a distinction between how ISIS-K fights against a Russia that oppresses Muslims while the Taliban cooperates with it. Assuming that the four Tajiks Moscow arrested and accused of perpetrating the attack actually did so, they may have launched it in response to what they see as the oppression of the Russian-backed Tajik government. ISIS-K’s grievances against Russia, as well as those of many other jihadist groups, include Russian support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, as well as Russian cooperation with Iran and other Middle Eastern governments that Sunni jihadists regard as enemies. What does not seem to have motivated ISIS-K’s attack in Russia is any particular concern about Ukraine.

ISIS-K and other ISIS affiliates, of course, have launched attacks not just against Western and pro-Western governments but also against anti-Western governments, including Iran (whose Shia regime ISIS-K and other Sunni jihadists consider anathema) and the Taliban. It is not surprising that ISIS-K has also attacked Russia. Indeed, it would have been more surprising if it did not do so.

This attack is a reminder that the Ukraine war is not the only conflict Moscow is fighting; its “war on terror” is not over and could even revive. In fact, ISIS-K and similar groups might see Moscow’s war against Ukraine as making Russia less vigilant against, and more vulnerable to, jihadist attacks.

Some might see this jihadist attack at the concert hall as raising the possibility of some degree of cooperation between Russia and the West against a common threat. Putin, however, seems to have put paid to this notion. He rejected US warnings beforehand that a jihadist attack might take place. And even after finally admitting that “radical Islamists” were behind the attack, he still linked it to Western-backed Ukraine. This suggests that Putin is in no mood to rein in his hostility to Kyiv and the West, much less cooperate with them.

Indeed, Putin’s reaction to the March ISIS-K attack in Moscow is eerily similar to his response to the September 2004 jihadist attack in Beslan. Even then, Putin claimed that the West supported—and even sought to benefit from—the attack.

This suggests that Putin may be a “worst case” thinker, believing that if the West and Ukraine are opposed to Russia, and if jihadists are opposed to Russia, then the West, Ukraine, and the jihadists must all be working together. On the other hand, Putin may not care so much whether this is true, but believes that linking ISIS-K to Ukraine and the West will resonate with the Russian public. Opposition to his war in Ukraine can then be equated not just to support for Russia’s Western enemies, but its Muslim ones as well.

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its conflict with jihadist groups like ISIS-K, though, are separate. And as horrific as it was, the ISIS-K attack on a Moscow theater is not nearly as much of a challenge to Putin as the war in Ukraine, in which hundreds of thousands of Russians have been killed or wounded. But the potential for an expanded Russian conflict with Sunni jihadists exists as long as Russia supports those such jihadists oppose—such as the Assad regime in Syria, oppressive rulers in the former Soviet Muslim republics and the Muslim “autonomous” regions inside Russia itself, Shia Iran, and the Taliban. Putin may have not just one war on his hands, but two.

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Our MENASource editor, Holly Dagres, had the pleasure of sitting down with Dr. Pfaff on March 7 to discuss his most recent book, Proxy War Ethics: The Norms of Partnering in Great Power Competition, and its implications for US foreign policy.

MENASOURCE: What compelled you to write a book about proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Great question! This project originally started as a presentation for the US Naval Academy’s Post-Doctoral Fellowship Program back in 2017. The director of the program was interested in exploring the topic, but there was not much at the time written on it. What got me interested was not only that this is an under-covered area of research and policy, but the lack of understanding regarding governing proxy relationships sets us up for significant moral failure and hazard.  

Part of the problem is that “proxy” is often used pejoratively. To have a “proxy” is to be exploitive and to be a “proxy” is demeaning. The difficulty with that view is that “proxy” describes a structure of relationship that exists independently from the label. It might make political sense to call a “proxy” an “ally,” but that does not change the political reality. So the first step in understanding how to govern these relations is understanding their structure, which is much of the first chapter in the book, where I examine the differences between alliances, partnerships, and proxies.

Put simply, what differentiates proxies from other relationships is the indirect nature of the benefit for the sponsor, the extra-constitutionality of the proxy, and divergent interests. Under such a principle-agent arrangement, the sponsor enables the proxy to fight while the proxy enables the sponsor to minimize its risks. It is not difficult to see how proxies get a bad name. Even where sponsors and proxies share an interest, they often are not willing to pay the same price to achieve it. As a result, the history of proxy wars is littered with proxies who were “hung out to dry” by sponsors or sponsors that are dragged into a quagmire, escaping from which is costly. Perhaps more importantly, the presence of a sponsor can make nonviolent but politically costly alternatives to war less attractive, leading to wars that may have otherwise not happened. So, there is a lot to uncovering proxy relationships and trying to explain how to manage and govern such relationships.

MENASOURCE: Were there any things that surprised you or really stood out to you during your research that you were not aware of?

DR. TONY PFAFF: The understanding of proxy as a structure, and showing how that impacts the application of the just war tradition, I thought was illuminating. Also, the ubiquity of moral hazards identified in the book in the history of proxy wars really underscores the need for more robust international norms. What you often see in that history is that even well-meaning actors who are willing to self-regulate get caught up in the logic of the proxy relationship and cause all sorts of harm. The United States, for example, did condition assistance to El Salvador in the 1980s on conformity to the law of armed conflict and holding violators accountable—but those conditions were waived when rebel forces achieved any level of success. In Afghanistan, providing Stinger missiles seemed like a good idea—though there is some controversy over how impactful they really were—until they started showing up all over the world.

MENASOURCE: Which countries are the top sponsors of proxies today? Some obvious countries come to mind, but I wonder if there are ones we have missed.

DR. TONY PFAFF: Well, the Oscar for “Best Use of Proxies” probably goes to Iran, which has successfully utilized proxies to advance its national security objectives, generally at very little risk to itself, in part because there is very little in the way of international law or norms—formal or informal—that would allow the international community to hold it responsible. But…many international actors, including the United States, have relationships that more resemble a proxy structure than an ally or partner.

That brings me to another important point. “Proxy,” “ally,” and “partner” are ideal descriptions. Any particular relationship may exhibit traits of more than one; it is not all or nothing. So, you can have an element where there is just enough indirect benefit or where there is just enough risk mitigation and cost-cutting that something that you might actually get genuinely described as a partnership or alliance is still prone to the same kind of moral failure and hazard more obvious proxy relationships are.

So it would be naïve to look at US support to Ukraine or Saudi Arabia in Yemen and not count them as some kind of proxy relationship. This doesn’t entail that the United States is wrong for providing this support or that Ukraine or Saudi Arabia are demeaned for accepting it. However, that support raises the kinds of concerns that one would expect from a proxy relationship. While the United States and Ukraine may share an interest in repelling Russia’s invasion, they are not willing to pay a similar price to achieve it. That’s because while these interests are shared, they are not fully aligned. So, there is a risk that limiting US and NATO support will place Ukraine in a position where it ends up with the same result had it not fought at all, but at a much higher price.

Having said all that, I think Iran’s use of proxies is much more central to how it generally meets its security objectives, whereas for actors like the United States and even Russia, such relationships may complement other means, but they are not as reliant on them as the Iranians seem to be.

MENASOURCE: It is interesting you mention the United States because the term “proxy” is typically associated with a negative connotation. Do you think that there is a misunderstanding of the nomenclature?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Sometimes I feel like the kid in The Sixth Sense film who saw dead people. Except I see proxies. But as I mentioned, the word “proxy” describes a particular structure of relationships that I distinguish from alliances and partnerships. So yes, the United States has proxies. The Russians have proxies. The Iranians have proxies. The Chinese use proxies. Ukraine is a good example. Saudi Arabia is a good example. We supported Saudi Arabia against Houthis in Yemen for a very long time before we got directly involved as a way of containing Iran. That is the structure of a proxy relationship.

My point is that engaging in such relationships is not necessarily exploitative or otherwise wrong. In this view, proxy relationships are just another way actors mitigate cost and risk. What matters are the norms they employ that govern them.

So, for me, the word “proxy” is morally neutral. Supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia is a just cause and fits under the traditional “just war” rubric of defense of another. However, because we are doing it indirectly, we are mitigating our own risks. Thus, you start seeing those proxy dynamics creep in. For example, why are we having discussions about terminating support to Ukraine? Because we can. In an alliance where actors take on similar costs and risks against a common threat, it would be much harder to have that discussion. If we had skin in the game, if we were fighting alongside the Ukrainians, with US troops engaged alongside the Ukrainians, quitting would be a whole lot harder.

I don’t think there is anything wrong with our support for Ukraine or Saudi Arabia, for that matter. But that support forces us to ask questions, such as when it is permissible to withdraw it. It also forces us to consider to what extent we are responsible for how that support is used. When Saudi operations in Yemen raised discrimination concerns, we were arguably obligated to, and to an extent did, modify our support to address those concerns.

But it isn’t just about regulating our actions. Absent adequate international norms, it is difficult to rein in more abusive practices, such as Iran’s. The problem is traditional just war theory, even as it is reflected in international law, does not fully account for the effect the introduction of a sponsor has. Moreover, there is very little with which to hold sponsors accountable.

The reason accountability is important here is because the structure of the relationship frequently discourages it. For example, Nicaragua took the United States to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over its support to the Contras, who had arguably committed a number of law of war violations in their resistance against the Sandinistas. The court decided that because no organ of the United States ordered those violations, even though the court did find that the United States provided a manual that appeared to advocate illegal practices like assassination, the United States was not accountable. What is interesting is that the manual was intended to rein in the Contras’ abuses.

The problem with both these standards is that they disincentivize sponsors to hold proxies accountable. The more a sponsor gets involved in trying to control proxy behavior, the more likely they could be accountable for it. So, it is better, as Iran did for Hamas, to provide resources and training but little else. This is why I think more robust international norms would be beneficial. As it stands, not only would Iran not likely be legally responsible for Hamas’s atrocities on October 7, 2023, or Houthi attacks against Red Sea shipping for that matter, if the United States or Israel decided to attack Iran directly in response, they would arguably, at least from a legal point of view, be the aggressor.

MENASOURCE: Are there any other examples of proxies being held accountable in the context of international law? Given how they are set up, it seems like a really hard thing to do.

DR. TONY PFAFF: There are two precedents that are usually cited in this regard. One is the ICJ ruling on Nicaragua, which I just mentioned, that applied a standard of “effective control.” The other is in Yugoslavia, where it applied a standard of “overall control.” There, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia found that the Yugoslav government was accountable for Serbian Army actions in Bosnia since the Serbian and Yugoslav armies effectively shared personnel, paid salaries, provided logistics, and so on. This standard, however, basically says that for an actor to be accountable for a proxy’s action, they pretty much have to assimilate them into their constitutional structure to the extent they are not really a proxy anymore.

There is also the Arms Trade Treaty, which prohibits transfers of weapons where the exporting party knows that the receiving party will use them to “commit genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, or attacks against civilians.” The difficulty here is that Russia, Iran, or the United States are not parties to the treaty—despite the fact the United States was largely responsible for drafting the treaty—and even for those who are, enforcement is pretty weak. I should note that for the United States, many of the provisions in the treaty are already a part of US law. Israel is a signatory, but it has yet to ratify it.

MENASOURCE: What is your read on Tehran’s use of proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Well, Iran’s use of proxies is more central to how it operates than other similar actors. It is not the only thing, of course, but it certainly prefers asymmetric to symmetric means. Ballistic missiles, for example, are also a security pillar because they are hard to defend against.

So, Iran uses [proxies] because they are a great way to mitigate cost and risk, whatever their actual objectives are—until they are not. The case of Iran actually illustrates the pros and cons of proxy use. For example, one of its proxies, Kata’ib Hezbollah, attacked a facility in Jordan, killing three US soldiers and wounding several others, who were supporting the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). While there has been a tit-for-tat exchange going on for a while in Iraq and Syria, attacking US troops in Jordan was a significant escalation, and one it appears Tehran didn’t intend. After the attack, Kata’ib Hezbollah put out a statement that, while it certainly didn’t apologize for the attack, did say it would not retaliate against any subsequent US attacks and that Tehran had no prior knowledge of the attack. So, this could certainly have been a case of a proxy dragging a sponsor into a deeper, more costly conflict.

MENASOURCE: Can Tehran be held accountable for its proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: Absent a consensus that providing assistance used in an atrocity could make one, in some way at least, accountable for it, I’m not sure how. Of course, one can always impose non-lethal costs such as sanctions and so on, but those typically haven’t been effective.

MENASOURCE: What do you think policymakers in Washington get wrong about proxies?

DR. TONY PFAFF: The first part goes back to what I started talking about at the beginning. Proxy refers to a particular structure and to ignore the effects of that structure is to risk moral failure and hazards, which I discuss in detail in the book. Moral failure occurs, for example, when sponsors facilitate wars that may not have otherwise needed to happen, and especially when they withdraw support in ways that leave the proxy worse off for having fought in the first place. That doesn’t mean support should be open-ended or unconditioned. However, it is important to be upfront about what those limits and conditions are so all actors can make better informed decisions.  

Ukraine is a great example. Had we not supported it—and I am not saying we should not have—at worst, there would be a new Russia-aligned government in Ukraine. At best, Ukrainians would have been forced to settle earlier on. They may have lost Donbas, they may have lost Crimea, but they may have been able to come to an accommodation with the Russians, and the fighting would have been over much sooner. The fact we supported them allowed them to continue their fight, which made settlement less attractive. That by itself is not a bad thing. As I noted previously, they have a just cause. However, if withdrawing that support encourages or enables Russia to achieve a more complete victory, then I think there is a moral failure. I think once an actor provides support, it should continue absent bad actions by the recipient, physical limitations of the sponsor, or a conflict with a higher priority.

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

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The carefully choreographed and worded meeting between Erdogan and his Egyptian counterpart, President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, also served as a final burial ceremony for what was once an emerging third axis in the Middle East. This axis was distinct from the Saudi-led, pro-Western camp of Arab states that includes the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Morocco, and Jordan, as well as the Iranian-led, self-described “Axis of Resistance” consisting of Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Shia militias in Iraq. 

That partnership consisted of Turkey, Qatar, and movements and political parties in the Middle East and North Africa rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Sunni political populism that peaked in the region following the 2011 Arab uprisings. Erdogan last visited Cairo in 2011, when he came to address the Arab League while pro-democracy and Islamist protesters were still triumphantly celebrating the toppling of longtime President Hosni Mubarak. In the afterglow of the Arab uprisings, Erdogan, then then prime minister of Turkey, was hailed as a “rock star” by Arab activists and Western thinkers for his country’s perceived model of moderate Islamic principles within a secular democracy. 

Back then, Sisi was an obscure but powerful senior army officer and a member of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the body that assumed power in Egypt after removing Mubarak in 2011. He emerged from the shadows in 2013, removing and jailing democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi and rebuilding Mubarak’s autocratic military regime but with himself at the center. 

Erdogan led the way in condemning the coup d’état, as he saw Morsi as a political fellow traveler. Turkey welcomed Egyptians—mostly Muslim Brotherhood or Islamist-leaning dissidents fleeing Sisi’s purges and mass arrests—allowing the activists to launch television stations and operate relatively freely. Egyptian authorities abruptly canceled Erdogan’s planned visit to the Gaza Strip via its Sinai border. Just months after the coup, in November 2013, diplomatic ties between Egypt and Turkey were downgraded.

In Sisi, Erdogan likely saw the type of military autocrat who had undermined Turkish democratic aspirations since the republic’s founding. The generals sent one of Erdogan’s political idols, the popularly elected Adnan Menderes, to the gallows in 1961, and removed his onetime political mentor, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, from office in 1997.

Relations between Turkey and Egypt remained bitter for years. Egypt drew closer to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which considered the Muslim Brotherhood their archenemy. 

In 2017, the Gulf states, with the backing of Egypt, launched an unprecedented blockade of Qatar over its geopolitical ambitions and support for populist Islamic groups. Turkey came to Doha’s aid, not only airlifting emergency provisions but deploying additional troops, expanding a security cooperation deal the countries had signed in 2014. 

Though tensions had been developing since Sisi’s coup, the blockade and its aftermath can be seen as marking the emergence of the third axis.

After Morsi died in prison in 2019, relations between Cairo and Ankara worsened. Erdogan described Sisi as a “tyrant” and accused him of having a direct role in the death of the ousted president, who died from a heart attack suffered while in court. “They are so cowardly that they could not even deliver his body to his family,” Erdogan said. Meanwhile, Egyptian officials accused Turkey of backing terrorist groups.

The rift impacted commerce. Turkey’s exports to Egypt fell to a twelve-year low of $2.3 billion in 2017, while Egypt’s exports to Turkey sank to a twelve-year low of $1.2 billion in 2015.

More dangerously, Turkey and Egypt—along with their respective partners—found themselves on opposite sides of armed conflicts and political struggles across the Middle East and North Africa. Ankara backed the Syrian rebels, while Sisi sought to ease tensions with President Assad. Turkey sought engagement with Iran even as Cairo’s Saudi and UAE partners, backed by then US President Donald Trump, were at the forefront of confronting Tehran.

But Libya’s civil war was the most perilous and decisive battleground between the Saudi-led axis and Turkey’s camp. Cairo and Abu Dhabi funneled arms and fighters, including fighter jets as well as Russian Wagner military forces, to warlord Khalifa Haftar’s eastern-based army as it launched an attack on Tripoli in 2019. Turkey, with the possible financial backing of Qatar, openly ferried weapons and military advisers to help defend the government in Tripoli, which included elements of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Libya branch. It was in Libya that Turkey first successfully deployed the now famous Bayraktar drones. They helped turn back Haftar’s forces in an expensive and bloody full-blown proxy war. 

As 2021 began, the blockade of Qatar was ended in a deal brokered by Washington and Kuwait. Concluding the dispute made sense. For one thing, Morsi was dead. The Muslim Brotherhood and its offspring had been wiped out, along with domestic political-reform movements in the Arab world. Haftar’s expensive gamble had failed. Turkey had successfully inserted itself into the Arab world, establishing semipermanent military presences in former Ottoman lands, including Libya, Syria, Qatar, and Somalia. 

Effectively, there was nothing left to fight about. 

While alongside Erdogan in February, Sisi said he welcomed this “current period of calm” in the region. “I hope we can build upon it to reach lasting solutions to outstanding disputes,” he said.

Days after Erdogan’s meeting with Sisi on February 14, Turkey stripped the acquired Turkish citizenship of former Muslim Brotherhood branch leader Mahmoud Hussein and his wife, along with fifty other members of the organization.

Continuing to hold grudges would hurt both countries. As tensions have eased, trade has rebounded. Turkey’s exports to Egypt jumped to $4.5 billion in 2021, a 43-percent increase from the previous year, and to $4.5 billion in 2022. Egypt’s exports to Turkey increased from $2 billion in 2018 to a ten-year high of $2.6 billion in 2021 and a record high of $3.7 billion in 2022.

Making nice with Egypt, along with ending the Muslim Brotherhood’s free reign in Turkey, was also likely required for rapprochement with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as access to their pools of liquidity amid an economic crisis and the most formidable political challenge Erdogan had faced since 2003. During his public appearance in Egypt last month, Erdogan said the two countries had committed to doubling their trade volume. He spoke of collaboration on defense and energy projects, including eastern Mediterranean gas reserves. 

While the de-escalation between the two countries began in earnest in 2021, it would likely have begun sooner had Morsi not died, an event that sharply escalated the rhetoric between the two countries. In addition to economic interests and a regional shift toward more multipolar diplomatic postures, Erdogan’s political ideology began to change in 2015. That is when he abandoned hopes of courting pious Kurdish voters or the liberals who had once supported him, and instead embraced the same hardline nationalists who tormented his ideological forebears for decades. 

Egypt and Turkey nearly slipped into armed conflict in the late 1950s as the Arab nationalist movement led by Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to draw Syria into Egypt’s temporary unification with Iraq. But the latest rift between Egypt and Turkey was anomalous. Two militaristic nations ruthlessly fixated for decades on territorial security and empowerment of privileged elites fell dramatically afoul not over a border or resources, but on matters of principle, including popular legitimacy, human rights, and political teleology. 

Before his historic Cairo visit in 2011, in which he addressed activists in Tahrir Square, Erdogan was scheduled to visit Mubarak in a grand state visit, presumably to cut the kinds of deals he recently forged with Sisi. Erdogan canceled that visit over the president’s response to the ongoing protests at Tahrir Square, a testament to the Arab uprising’s far-reaching impact. 

“Listen to the shouting of the people, the extremely humane demands. Without hesitation, satisfy the people’s desire for change,” Erdogan said.

The tremors of the 2011 earthquake have long since dissipated. The region has settled into a duller status quo dominated by autocrats divvying up the spoils behind closed doors. Both Erdogan and Sisi alluded to their support for the Palestinian cause amid Israel’s offensive in Gaza, but it is unlikely the two countries will take bold steps in that regard. For the foreseeable future, Turkey and Egypt’s relations will be focused on big energy deals, tourism numbers, and expansion of lucrative business ties.

Borzou Daragahi is a journalist who has covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe for US and UK news outlets since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on X: @borzou.

The post Turkey and Egypt bury the hatchet, marking an end to emerging third axis in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The ODNI’s predicted outcome could transpire more quickly than imagined—notwithstanding the rejoinder of an irate and anonymous “very senior” Israeli official, who issued a statement reading, “we expect our friends to act to overthrow the terror regime of Hamas and not the elected government in Israel”—but from another direction. The spark would be provided by the crisis surrounding an idiosyncratic feature of Israeli life: the blanket exemption from military service granted to ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Jews who are enrolled in a Talmudic academy (yeshiva).

Despite enjoying broad domestic support for its war in the Gaza Strip—roughly two-thirds of all Israelis favor the expansion of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations into Rafah—Netanyahu’s cohort remains decidedly unpopular among the electorate. (That dichotomy also appears to have infused the evolving approach of the Joe Biden administration, which is reportedly maneuvering to “break” with Netanyahu while “sticking” with Israel against Hamas.)

Against this backdrop, rampant speculation about potential triggers that might accelerate Netanyahu’s political demise has become a national sport. Much attention has focused on the hypotheticals of ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot resigning from the cabinet or of a handful of Likud legislators backing a no-confidence motion to unseat Netanyahu. Circumstances have thrust the question of mandatory conscription for yeshiva pupils—a perennial threat to the stability of Israeli governments—back to center stage.

The mainstream Haredi community—predicated on insularity and a strict interpretation of religious law—reasons philosophically that exposing its members to the influences of secular society, including the ranks of the IDF, would risk compromising their traditional values. Moreover, by their logic, it is precisely from engagement in Torah study that the security of the Jewish people is ensured—in other words, via divine providence—and the ultra-Orthodox are, it follows, the true defenders of the state of Israel. That argument holds scant traction among other sectors of the Israeli public, for whom enlistment is the norm.

Bringing this clash to its latest boil is a fast-approaching April 1 deadline for the Knesset to approve new legislation that would regulate the Haredi exclusion from the IDF draft—failing which, the state will lack authority to continue precluding the induction of all eligible Haredi men. Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara has appealed to the High Court of Justice (HCJ) for a postponement, citing delays related to the Gaza fighting. Still, the HCJ has compounded the predicament by ordering the state to provide justification for perpetuating even the current arrangement. A scenario in which all ultra-Orthodox eighteen-year-olds are commanded suddenly to report for IDF duty would likely spell the departure of the Haredi factions from—and precipitate the collapse of—the Netanyahu coalition.

This showdown could scarcely arrive at a more precarious time for Netanyahu, coming on the heels of the Hamas-led October 7, 2023, massacre of more than 1,200 Israelis—a debacle for which the vast majority of Israelis hold him personally culpable. In February, the IDF telegraphed its intention to extend the duration of military tours, necessitated by the urgency of emerging needs and troop losses. Consenting to a wholesale Haredi exemption at the exact moment when hundreds of thousands of IDF regulars and reservists—whose families have borne the physical, emotional, and economic brunt of the war—are being asked to assume additional burdens would be untenable. Ever since Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s refusal to submit any new conscription bill that does not win the endorsement of the entire government—including Gantz’s centrist Blue and White Party—that exemption is a non-starter.

Netanyahu is scrambling to craft a remedy, including a pledge to his Haredi partners that he will “compensate them retroactively” if the HCJ bars their institutions from receiving public funds over the draft issue. But the spirit of compromise is not in the air.

Banners waved at an ultra-Orthodox demonstration on March 3 cried, “We will die and not enlist.” Later that same week, on March 9, Sephardic Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef—whose salary is paid by the state—ignited a firestorm when he threatened a mass Haredi exit from Israel if immunity from IDF service is revoked. His remarks provoked one financial columnist to opine that the Israeli economy, “which supports yeshiva students, and schools where core curricula are not taught, to the tune of billions of shekels,” would only stand to benefit from such an exodus.

Hopes within Israel that the tragedy that began to unfold on October 7, 2023, might instantly rectify the country’s societal ills seem—at least on this particular score—to have been naively premature. Only 540 of the 66,000 ultra-Orthodox men to have been exempted this year have opted to join the military since the war commenced, according to a representative of the IDF Personnel Directorate. The solidarity that troops from different backgrounds have experienced among their field battalions has not translated into an immediate shift of attitudes among the Haredi population, almost 70 percent of whom believe they should remain excused from the military.

Netanyahu could still surprise naysayers with a fix that satisfies Haredi and HCJ conditions. However, other pitfalls await his government. As far as conscription goes, fundamental change will come slowly, if at all. Meanwhile, all sides are hunkering down for battle.  

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

The post Heaven can’t wait: Are Israel’s Haredi parties about to bring Netanyahu down? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Inspired by her experience reporting on conflict in the Middle East, Damon founded the International Network for Aid, Relief, and Assistance (INARA), a nonprofit organization that focuses on building a network of logistical support and medical care to help children who need lifesaving or life-altering medical treatment in war-torn nations. Since 2015, Damon has acted as president of the organization, leading INARA in its mission to fill in the gaps in access to health services for children in communities worldwide. In 2022, she joined the Atlantic Council as a nonresident senior fellow.

Our MENASource editor, Holly Dagres, had the pleasure of chatting with the journalist on March 2 to discuss her recent projects, mental health in journalism, and the importance of effective storytelling.

MENASOURCE: Tell us your origin story. There is always a moment in life that sets you on the trajectory that gets you to where you are today. What led you to journalism? 

ARWA DAMON: So, I have a degree in biology and French and a minor in international relations—so really glad I went to college for nothing to do with anything. I ended up in New York working for a Turkish textile company, which is basically a fancy way of saying, “I sold bathrobes and towels.” I had no experience in business whatsoever.

But I was in New York when September 11, 2001 happened. Obviously, the city was paralyzed and horrified, and a lot of realities came crashing down that day. I saw the dehumanization that happened afterward, and I remember burning inside, hearing the rhetoric that was being leveled toward Muslims and Arabs. I was very cognizant of the fact that I was spared a lot of what my more Middle Eastern-looking friends were because I’m blonde and I have green eyes. That, for me, was really it.

I had also realized in my years in the United States that because I grew up mostly in Morocco and Turkey, when I would speak about the Middle East, people would listen, people who were not necessarily interested. But here was someone who looked like them and spoke like them, and had a bit of their same mannerisms speaking about this place that was over there, the big, mysterious Middle East. It was the realization that when I spoke to people about this, they related to me because I look like them, and so that somehow made them relate more to the “other.”

MENASOURCE: I would like to hear about the advantages that have supported you as a woman journalist, in addition to the potential challenges you’ve faced because of your background.

ARWA DAMON: Well, what is very interesting about being female is that you have access to both spaces. You have access to the male space, and you have access to the female space. There have been numerous situations where I can tackle subjects that a male colleague would not be able to just because women are more comfortable talking to each other about these things, especially when it comes to sexual violence and that sort of thing. I have personally found it to be an advantage to be a woman in the areas where I have worked because, for a lot of the men, you are a woman but you are also a journalist. So, they accept you into their midst to a certain degree, and you have access to all of that. And then, when the women are in the back room and a safe house, the male reporters cannot go in there and talk to them. But I could scurry in and just chitchat, then I could try to incorporate their story and their experience into the reporting. And I do think that gives us the advantage of more nuanced reporting and storytelling.

In terms of challenges, the hardest thing about being a woman in the field is finding a place to pee. Hands down. No joking. It is epic. If you are a guy, you can go almost anywhere. If you are not a guy, you are going to run into a lot of problems, and it is insanely uncomfortable. 

MENASOURCE: What are you working on these days?

ARWA DAMON: I parted ways with CNN because I really wanted to start exploring different methods of storytelling, and I had an opportunity to film a documentary that I really felt could transcend a lot of perhaps the apathy that exists around the story of survivors of war and refugees, which was also an opportunity to bring that story to a much more diverse audience. What Seize the Summit does is follow this epic weeklong adventure up to the summit of Mount Kilimanjaro, with all of the questions of who is going to make it and who is not when the team is running out of oxygen and it is becoming harder to breathe.

I do a lot of mountains, and I have found that they will push you to a physical and psychological space that you did not even know that you could exist in, and in many ways, they force you to look inward and can be very healing. And the four climbers, who we take up and are all showcased in this documentary, are all survivors of war from Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Syria, and one of them is in a wheelchair.

And of course, I have my charity INARA, which is on a purely volunteer basis. But it eats up a lot of time, especially because crises in the areas where we work just keep coming.

MENASOURCE: You have me thinking about mental health in the world of journalism, especially conflict reporting. Do you think media outlets are doing enough in that realm? 

ARWA DAMON: I can only speak to my experience at CNN. We always knew that the network would make resources available to us with no questions asked. I think there is a condition among a lot of people, but prevalent among journalists, to want to tough it out.

It is part of the whole “Keep going. Keep moving forward. I can get through this kind of thing” mentality, and we do not necessarily give ourselves the space to acknowledge the impact on us.

From my own personal experience, I was exactly that way. When you leave these extraordinarily intense situations, or when you leave behind people who have been through unimaginable horror and hardship, you carry their story with you, and you leave a part of yourself with them. And you also carry a lot of guilt. It is the guilt of leaving and having the privilege to leave. It is the constant questioning of “Did I do their story justice?” “Did I portray their pain in a way to move the world to take action?” And sadly, most of the time, the answer to that last question is that we do not see the sort of mass global movements to alleviate people’s pain.

Whether that is reporting on protests, people demanding equal rights, or the horrors and atrocities of a war zone, I think oftentimes for journalists the impact that we really hope our journalism would make is not necessarily there. And for me, that led to a lot of self-doubt and questioning. If I were to ever write a book about my life, it would be called Not Good Enough.

But you try to tough it out, and for myself, I would default to anger. It took me a while to be able to recognize that I was poisoning myself. I was becoming very toxic to myself and then trying to find the tools to work through that, which is not just that I have it all figured out.

The whole process is like a roller coaster. You are at the bottom of this cesspool trying to claw your way out, and the minute you make it to the edge of the cliff and you are hanging on, you say, “Okay, I’m fine again,” and then you just allow yourself to fall back down. And at the end of the day, you do not end up doing yourself, or the people suffering, any favors.

MENASOURCE: What have been your coping mechanisms?

ARWA DAMON: So again, just speaking from my own personal experience, I have, on two occasions, gone to see a normal psychologist. For me, that did not work. I think it was because their frame of reference was so different to what my frame of reference was for things, and I did not necessarily find that to be very beneficial. What worked for me personally very well was EMDR (eye movement desensitization and reprocessing). That could have also been because who I was doing it with was actually a former journalist himself. All I had to do was go in and sit in front of him, and in our first session, I said, “I have spent seven years reporting out of Iraq,” and he just got it like that. He knew where I was coming from, and that, for me, was very beneficial.

I have also found that less conventional techniques have worked better for me, like breathing and looking inward…There are a lot of different kinds of breathing techniques, but it is not really meditation.

So, for me, if I lose my passion and my fire and my anger, I’m going to lose my drive. And this whole notion of needing to be better and the anger that I have at myself, that is my driver. But what I realized with EMDR and the work I was doing is that I still had the passion and the drive. Everything is still there. It is just not emotionally quicksanding me. 

MENASOURCE: You brought up not being good enough. I certainly suffer from imposter syndrome, and I think a lot of women in our field, whether it is journalism or foreign policy, suffer from that. Do you get a sense that, as a trailblazing Syrian-American journalist, there was a lot of pressure on you to do well in your career because you are an Arab-American woman living in a post-9/11 world?

ARWA DAMON: First of all, the not good enough notion, I do not think is necessarily imposter syndrome for me. It is just this idea that comes from the notion that, if it had been done well enough, then surely change would have occurred. And because change is not occurring to the scope that one goes into journalism thinking that they are going to be able to generate, that turns into “Obviously, it must be my fault because the reporting was not good enough. If it had been good enough, if it had been powerful enough, something would have to change.”

I do not think I’m hard on myself; I think I’m honest with myself, but everyone around me will tell me that I’m abnormally hard on myself. I think that I put an extraordinary amount of pressure on myself.  

I do not think that any of the sort of pressure points that I felt have necessarily been because of imposter syndrome. I’m part of this fortunate cadre of women who already had the glass ceiling broken for them. We had the generation of Christiane Amanpour, Marie Colvin, Lyse Doucet, Liz Sly, and a whole host of women who broke that glass ceiling for us. And if you look back to the core Baghdad (Iraq War) years, the press corps was split pretty fifty-fifty.

I think the pressure I put on myself comes from the fact that I’m perhaps uniquely positioned because I’m Arab-American. I did grow up in a household that was very cross-cultural. It was a fully bilingual household. I like to say breakfast was labneh with za’atar and blueberry pancakes. And I look so American, I sound so American, so I really hoped that I could be something of a bridge between cultures and peoples because my heart, my soul, my essence is so blended. 

MENASOURCE: If there was anything you could tell your younger self, what would you tell her?

ARWA DAMON: I think about that question a lot. I believe we are a product of our mistakes and the times that we stumble and fall. So, if I were to turn to my younger self and tell her anything, she would not have made all the mistakes that she did, and she would not have stumbled and fallen all of the times that she did, and she would not be where she is today. So, in some ways, I do not think I would tell her anything because no matter how hard it gets sometimes, I do not regret where I’m right now or what I’m able to do right now, even though I do have this desire to do more and do better. I think I would be too nervous that she would veer off the path that led me here to want to say anything to her.

MENASOURCE: You have covered many stories from the Middle East. Is there a specific one that really stands out to you?

ARWA DAMON: Look, there is a lot. But then my brain automatically, when I get asked that question, goes to the first time I heard pain, fully heard what it sounds like. I’m talking about the kind of pain that comes from a person’s gut and feels as if it is emanating from them and grabbing you by the throat with its tentacles. 

And that was in Iraq during the Battle of Samarra. I think it was October 2004. We had gone in embedded with the US military. I was a producer back then, and this was after the battle for the city—which was this craziness of what battles are—and we were driving with the Americans to the area that they designated as the morgue, and Iraqi civilians were making their way there to identify their loved ones. And I remember sitting in the Humvee, looking at everything through the thick bulletproof, dust-covered glass, and we drove past a woman. In my mind’s memory, everything is slow motion, but it could not have been as slow as I remember it being. But this woman was wearing the full black covering, and she just drops to her knees, and the covering falls off her head, and her hair comes tumbling out, and this scream comes out of her. That is the first time I really heard pain. 

MENASOURCE: How do you pick your stories?

ARWA DAMON: It depends on what you are going to cover. So, I defaulted to the Middle East because my value added to that storytelling is that I’m an Arabic speaker and I can have a direct conversation with somebody, which makes all the difference compared to going through a translator. And very early on, I was always focused on the small emotional connectors that can help enhance a story. It has been finding those little things that people would not necessarily think to relate to.

So, if we are talking about civilians fleeing bombing in Syria, this is a story that has been done over and over again. But if you can walk into that story and look at it from the perspective of an audience that really has no frame of reference for this experience, you can focus on a different part of the story. The children are cold, hungry, and scared, and any child who is cold, hungry, and scared should be screaming, crying, or nagging their parents. These children are not. That is how deep the trauma is.

So, I constantly find myself looking for those little details when I’m out in the field. That is my frame of reference for everything. I try to find reference points of commonality because that is how people relate to each other. Unfortunately, a lot of that is on the extreme of the emotional spectrum. Extreme pain or extreme joy. 

And then another approach, maybe it is very simple, is that I try to break down boundaries. This has nothing to do with anything we are talking about, but here is a funny story. So, we were doing this INARA event down in Gaziantep, Turkey, and the Syrian kids were painting T-shirts, and a bunch of the girls were painting “BTS” on their T-shirts. I literally had absolutely no clue what was going on, and I went up to one of our caseworkers, and I was like, “Are they trying to spell something or like, are they misspelling something?” And she is like, “No, it’s BTS,” and I’m like, “What is BTS?” And it is like some famous K-pop band that these refugee girls should know absolutely nothing about. But here they are, part of this global young teen female hysteria about something.

So, if I had actually been covering that as a journalist, I would have totally highlighted that whole aspect with it because everyone can relate to teenage fandom except for me because I live under a rock. 

In terms of choosing your stories, you also need to look at where you are best suited to tell the most powerful story. For example, am I best suited to tell the most powerful story in a region where I do not speak the language, where I do not have a lived historical experience, or is someone else better suited to that? That is not to say you do not go and cover other stories. It is about trying to align your natural interest with what it is that you want to cover. So, for me, it has always been the human story and war. I also get all riled up about sexual slavery, about forced migration, about abuses that happen on the migration route. I mean, give me a lost cause, and I will be your champion.

MENASOURCE: What do you think right now is one of the more underreported stories?

ARWA DAMON: So, here is the thing that I get really curious about a lot of times, even when it’s stories that I have covered in the past. It is the “Well, what is going on with them now?”

If you take big moments that have happened, and then the media spotlight moves away, and then a few years go by. Of course, we all know that it is not over, and it is never over. But if we look at, for example, the Yazidis who were kidnapped by ISIS, some of whom were rescued, some of whom were released. Where are they now? It has been years. How does life get rebuilt after something like that? Does it even get rebuilt? These are things that I know because I pay attention to what is happening. But if we are going to talk about a global stage, there are these key global moments that sort of captivated the world’s attention. But where are they now? 

MENASOURCE: What advice would you bestow upon the new generation of women journalists starting out in the field? 

ARWA DAMON: I say this to anyone who asks me that question: You need to know that you will leave a part of yourself behind. You will crack into so many pieces, and those pieces will get left behind with the people you have met whose stories you have tried to tell. And you need to be okay with that. You need to be okay with the way that it is going to affect you.

I would tell someone young coming into journalism: “Do not be afraid to ask for help.” If someone says they will look at your work and then they do not, push them for it. I remember when I was starting out, I was working for this bathrobe double-ply company, and I wanted to be a journalist. So, of course, I reached out to a bunch of people, and I remember to this day the one person who responded to me. And it was not that it was groundbreaking. It did not pave the way for me, but I still remember that she bothered to respond to me. 

I know that there are some organizations that are trying to build these sorts of networks and the whole mentorship concept. But it can be quite difficult, even when you are trying to mentor somebody, because I would love to take more people under my wing. 

What is the point of having a skillset, or twenty years of experience, if you are not going to share it? That is my philosophy. I do not know if everybody has it. The field is also disgustingly competitive…I think we owe it to the next generation to make ourselves more available. Male or female, actually. 

Holly Dagres is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs and editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs. Follow her on X: @hdagres.

The post Journalist Arwa Damon on conflict reporting: ‘You will leave a part of yourself behind’ appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This year, as part of International Women’s Day, three women from the Middle East, working toward a more equal world, have been recognized in Time magazine’s annual list of the most influential women. They include Nadia Murad, a Yazidi human rights activist, as well as two women who have formed a historic Israeli-Palestinian partnership: Yael Admi, a co-founder and leader of the Israeli movement Women Wage Peace; and Reem Hajajreh, founder and director of the Palestinian organization Women of the Sun. The one thing they have in common is that, despite their circumstances, they continue to push forward for equal rights.

Nadia Murad is a leading advocate for survivors of genocide and sexual violence. She was captured by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) militants in 2014 and has been outspoken about the horrific abuse she suffered at their hands. In her 2017 memoir, The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight Against the Islamic State, Murad recounts her brutal experience and the heroic reclaiming of her life. She earned a Nobel Peace Prize in 2018 alongside Congolese physician Dr. Denis Mukwege for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war. Murad is also the founder of Nadia’s Initiative, an organization dedicated to “helping women and children victimized by genocides, mass atrocities, and human trafficking to heal and rebuild their lives and communities.”

Despite heroes like Murad and Dr. Mukwege, and other international efforts to address these issues, the prevalence of violence against women in conflict remains a harsh reality. Women often bear the brunt of violence during times of conflict, becoming victims of war. That includes sexual violence, displacement, and targeted attacks. Their bodies become weaponized, and the expressions of their tormentors’ rage and dehumanization. The impact of war on women extends beyond direct physical harm, as displacement and breakdown of social structures further expose them to vulnerabilities. Disproportionate suffering is evident in the staggering number of female refugees and internally displaced persons, who often face increased risks of gender-based violence.

This tragic cycle repeated itself on October 7, 2023 with the “systematic, targeted sexual abuse of Israeli women during the Hamas-led assault on southern Israel” aimed at terrorizing and humiliating victims and their families. There is a growing body of evidence of acts of sexual torture—including rape and gang rape, as well as mutilations and gunshots to genital areas—the facts of which have been documented in the recent report of the Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel, which was submitted to decision-makers at the United Nations (UN).

Subsequently, there has been a disproportionate impact of war on Palestinian women in Gaza. According to the World Health Organization, women and newborns are bearing the brunt of the conflict, representing 67 percent of all casualties. UN Women has also pointed to gender inequality and the burden on women fleeing the fighting with their children, accounting for 63 percent of all deaths in Gaza. Recently, the UN has also noted credible allegations of both human rights violations and sexual violence against Palestinian women and girls in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

With cruel and almost prescient timing, just three days before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, some 1,500 Israeli and Palestinian representatives of Women Wage Peace and Women of the Sun descended on Jerusalem and the shores of the Dead Sea, calling for their governments to find a diplomatic solution to the ongoing situation, elevate the role of peacemaking, and stop further violence. The two distinct, yet fully aligned grassroots peace organizations gathered to demand an end to the “cycle of bloodshed” consuming their communities and for their respective leaders to return to the negotiating table to secure a nonviolent resolution to their decades-long conflict.

It was a jubilant affair, but the joy was short-lived. Just three days later, Hamas militants unleashed their massacre, killing some 1,200 people in Israel, including three members of Women Wage Peace, one of whom was co-founder and Canadian-born Vivian Silver. Since then, at least twenty-seven Women of the Sun members in Gaza have been killed.

Despite this horrific backdrop, both organizations continue to forge ahead. They are focused on their respective communities, and they are also dedicated to continuing working together. One of their primary achievements has been the Mothers’ Call, a joint declaration by Palestinian and Israeli women united for a peaceful resolution and a future of peace, freedom, equality, rights, and security for their children and future generations.

As the Israel-Hamas war rages on, their cause is gaining momentum. The two organizations have been jointly nominated for the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, acknowledging not only that women are unjustly impacted by war, but that they are also part of the solution. According to data published by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, the more women are engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, the more peace there is in the world. Negotiations go better, peace is more enduring, and more members of society reap the benefits. 

Women make up 50 percent of the global population, though they are seriously under-represented in areas that have the greatest impact on all members of society. Data show that the more women are included in the economy, education, politics, and the legal system, the more prosperous, peaceful, just, and safe the world will be for children and future generations.

On International Women’s Day this year, the world needs more voices echoing the resounding calls for peace and justice in the face of ongoing conflicts. The international community must acknowledge and support those women who are fighting every day to make a difference. The recognition of Nadia Murad and the collaborative efforts of Yael Admi and Reem Hajajreh underscore the indispensable role women play in shaping a more harmonious world. Their resilience has been tested, but their unwavering commitment persists. As these women stand at the forefront of change, they serve as powerful reminders that women are more than victims of war; they are crucial architects of lasting, peaceful solutions.

Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

The post While wars rage on, women wage peace in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Just like then, the violence applied against the protestors had physical and verbal dimensions. The prime minister’s supporters online and in the media often attack the families of the hostages, blaming them and their supporters for “destroying Israel’s security” and even “working for the enemy.”

The question of the responsibility of Netanyahu and his government for the security breach that allowed for the Hamas massacre of mostly civilians in the Israeli south on October 7, 2023, as well as his ability to manage the war, was central to many Israelis from the very beginning. Today, when Israel is at a crossroads, this issue is more crucial than ever before. Apart from the immediate hostage deal that is currently being discussed in Cairo, Doha, and Paris, there is another grand deal on the table, which includes a vision for Gaza—the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, security and financial assistance for Gaza from the Arab states and the United States, normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, and, possibly, a security pact between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

The deal is promoted by the United States and endorsed by the Arab world. Yet, Gaza and Jerusalem display zero interest in this deal. Hamas, as part of Iran’s Resistance Axis rejects the deal because the new security architecture in the Middle East is aimed at its eradication. Netanyahu is not interested because this deal is the antithesis of his view of Israeli and regional security, which allows for Hamas to exist but not an independent Palestinian state.

By denying any direct responsibility for the security breach on October 7, 2023—the worst in Israel’s history—Netanyahu is basically telling Israelis that his theory, which maintains the status quo and the impermissibility of the Palestinian state no matter what it takes, was correct and that the danger to the state of Israel would be even greater otherwise. If the prime minister believes that he did nothing wrong, and that the full weight of the blame lies on the shoulders of the security services (as Netanyahu and his supporters argued soon after the fateful events of October 7, 2023), then there is no need to change a thing—neither the coalition that includes extreme-right elements, nor the ideology that rejects a Palestinian state. In other words, no grand deal.

But what does Israeli society think today about Netanyahu, his responsibility for October 7, 2023, and his ideology of accommodating Hamas while denying the Palestinians statehood? Polls show that the Israeli public is torn on many issues, but trust in Netanyahu’s government is not one of them. Israelis repeatedly show a historically low level of confidence in the prime minister, while support for his Likud party keeps dwindling.

At the same time, it’s also clear that the general public in Israel supports Netanyahu’s policies. According to a poll conducted by the daily newspaper Israel Hayom, the public is almost equally divided about “which of the two goals of the war is more important”: 46.6 percent prioritized securing the release of hostages, while 44.8 percent said “victory in the war against Hamas” is more important. However, the respondents’ answers also show that a vast majority of the public is not ready to accept the Hamas terms for the release of the abductees.

In the same poll, respondents were asked, “What is the best way to obtain the release of the hostages?” and 81.5 percent answered that “military pressure should be applied to Hamas so that it agrees to acceptable conditions for the release of the abductees.” This is something that Netanyahu and his military chiefs repeat every day.

Another survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) shows that about two-thirds (63 percent) of the Jewish public do not support Israel agreeing in principle to an independent and demilitarized Palestinian state. The gap between the political camps is large: on the left, the majority (77 percent) supports a statehood agreement in principle, while only 48 percent of the center and 22 percent of the right agree. In contrast, most of Israel’s Arab citizens (73 percent) support such an agreement in principle. A tiny minority of the Jewish respondents believe that terrorism will stop if a Palestinian state is established. On the contrary, 44 percent think that a Palestinian state is “a prize for terror” and will result in more attacks.

The polls also show a stern objection to the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza, even if the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is replaced, and that Israelis have a somewhat pessimistic view about the chances for a “complete victory” against Hamas in Gaza. In recent months, the Israeli government accused UNRWA of ongoing cooperation with Hamas. At the same time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified a few members of UNRWA staff who took part in the October 7, 2023 atrocities. (A few donor countries have withdrawn their support from UNRWA, and Israel has repeatedly demanded for the agency to be shut down.)

Even if the protests intensify soon—another outcome of IDI’s poll—and the country heads for elections sometime during 2024, there is a huge question mark in regard to the structural changes in Israeli political thinking and public support for unpopular moves. That includes support for the two-state solution—a consensus shared around the world, but a big no-no for almost all Israeli politicians from the extreme right to the center. To ignite a process that will allow for a realistic discussion about “the day after” in Gaza and the need to implement the two states solution, Israeli society first needs to acknowledge that the policies that Netanyahu has advanced since 2009 have failed, and to start searching for alternatives. October 7, 2023 might be the beginning of the end of Netanyahu’s era, but it will be truly finished only when his political legacy of maintaining the status quo is gone.

Ksenia Svetlova is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs, and is the director of the Israel-Middle East Relations Program at Mitvim. Follow her on X: @KseniaSvetlova.

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On February 26, Israel staged its deepest air raid into Lebanon in years, hitting targets just west of Baalbek, some 62 miles (100 kilometers) north of the border with Israel. They reportedly included two buildings—one affiliated with a Hezbollah civilian institution—and a convoy of trucks. Israel said it had hit part of Hezbollah’s air-defense network. The raid came hours after Hezbollah shot down an Israeli reconnaissance drone over south Lebanon. In response to the Baalbek air raid, Hezbollah fired some sixty rockets at an Israeli military base in the central Golan Heights and, on February 27, launched a rocket attack on the Mount Meron air-control center.

Fighting has steadily escalated since the beginning of the year, with attacks and counterattacks creeping deeper into Lebanon and Israel with each passing week. Judging from comments made by Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, a ceasefire arrangement in the Gaza Strip may have no impact on the fighting along the Lebanon-Israel border. During a four-day lull in Gaza in November 2023, both Hezbollah and the Israeli military also ceased fighting. But on February 25, Gallant said that even if a ceasefire takes effect in Gaza, “We will continue the fire [against Hezbollah], and we will do so independently from [Gaza] until we achieve our goals… to withdraw Hezbollah to where it should be, either by a diplomatic agreement or we will do it by force.”

But diplomacy is moving slowly. Hezbollah has repeatedly said it refuses to participate in any negotiations until Israel ends its war in Gaza. Israel says it prefers a diplomatic solution but is prepared to launch a major operation against Hezbollah if diplomacy fails or takes too long. In a February 22 letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz warned, “We will not be patient much longer for a diplomatic solution in the north.”

The Israeli government faces mounting pressure from some eighty thousand residents of northern Israel who have been evacuated to areas further south to escape the violence along the border. Mindful of the Hamas assault on October 7, 2023, that left some 1,200 Israelis dead, the residents of the north are collectively refusing to return to their homes until Hezbollah has been pushed back from the border. However, achieving that goal is no simple matter. Hezbollah is not a regular army deployed in various barracks that can be moved from one location to another. Hezbollah fighters live with their families and work in the villages and towns of the southern Lebanese border district.

International diplomatic efforts appear to focus on exploring generally practical, and potentially achievable, ideas. At the heart of these deliberations is finding ways to strengthen the commitment of both parties to UNSC Resolution 1701, which helped end the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Among the clauses in the resolution was for the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line—the UN name for the boundary corresponding to Lebanon’s southern border—to be free of all weapons except for those of the Lebanese state and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping mission, which operates in the southern border region.

In practice, however, Hezbollah and Israel have paid little heed to the resolution’s demands. Israel breached Lebanese airspace on a nearly daily basis, using manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance missions or to launch attacks into Syria. Since 2006, Hezbollah has maintained a military presence in the southern border district, which was all but invisible until three or four years ago. Around 2020, Hezbollah began emerging into the sunlight, establishing dozens of border observation posts nominally manned by personnel from Green Without Borders, an environmental nongovernmental organization affiliated with the group, as well as discreet military posts tucked into wooded valleys. Less discretely, Hezbollah constructed six 100-meter (328-foot) firing ranges, where local militants practiced shooting with an array of weapons from rifles to rocket-propelled grenades. The latest firing range, a bulldozed 100-meter (328-foot) strip, lies in a valley less than 5 kilometers (3 miles) from UNIFIL headquarters in the coastal village of Naqoura.

France and the United States have offered separate proposals to end the fighting. However, Hezbollah has remained dismissive of any negotiations before the war in Gaza ends, and the Lebanese government has yet to respond formally. The French offer, according to diplomats, would see a de-escalation in fighting over several days, an end to Israeli overflights, a pullback of Hezbollah fighters to a certain depth from the border, and the deployment of some fifteen thousand Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops in accordance with UNSCR 1701. The French proposal also mulls the possibility of establishing a monitoring group to adjudicate any complaints by either side—similar to the five-nation body that operated between 1996 and 2000 during the latter years of Israel’s occupation of south Lebanon. The US proposal is similar, but unfolds in three phases: first, Hezbollah pulling back by between 8–10 kilometers (5–6 miles) from the border; second, an increased presence of LAF troops south of the Litani River; third, a return of displaced Lebanese and Israeli civilians to their homes. The deal would include a commitment to reach agreements on delineating the Lebanon-Israel border, a possible cessation of Israeli overflights, and potential financial incentives for Lebanon.

If reports on details of the US proposal are correct, in its current configuration, the offer is unlikely to fly with Hezbollah and, therefore, the Lebanese government, which is not in a position to override the powerful group’s views. For Hezbollah, after months of fighting, deaths of dozens of cadres—including senior field commanders—and destruction of property in south Lebanon border communities, a withdrawal of the party’s fighting force from the border in exchange for a vague promise to discuss the path of the international boundary would be a non-starter.

For a sustainable cessation of hostilities to succeed, the Israeli government and Hezbollah will require “wins” they can sell to their respective domestic audiences to justify the bloodshed, destruction, and population displacement of Lebanese and Israeli civilians. That means both sides will need to give concessions. Neither side seeks a full-scale war, and after five months of fighting, Israel and Hezbollah are probably ready to be led to an off-ramp that leads to a cessation of hostilities. Sources in south Lebanon close to Hezbollah tell me that the organization is concerned at the growing vocal unhappiness of Lebanese Shias whose homes and livelihoods have been destroyed by Israeli shelling and air strikes. The fighting, they say, has lasted far longer than was originally expected.

So what concessions can be placed on the negotiating table for both sides to mull over? Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly said that his government’s goal is to achieve “total victory” against Hamas and to return Israeli hostages to their families. But on the northern front, Israel’s priority is returning the evacuees safely to their homes. Therefore, it is looking for a tactical solution to achieve that goal, rather than necessarily effecting a decisive strategic win against Hezbollah. The group’s massive stockpile of rockets, precision-guided missiles, UAVs, and tens of thousands of fighters is a long-term problem for another day.

International diplomats tell me that the Israeli military is seeking an end to the threat posed to Israeli border communities by Hezbollah’s relatively short-range weapons systems, such as mortars and anti-tank missiles, as well as the ability of the group’s elite Radwan Brigade to cross the frontier en masse in an October 7-style assault. Ending those threats would require a weapons-free zone of a few kilometers from the border (the distance depending on factors such as topography), even if Hezbollah fighters are still living and working in border communities. In such a scenario, Hezbollah would agree to a cessation of hostilities with Israel and agree not to rebuild its Green Without Borders observation posts along the Blue Line. Similarly, it would agree to abandon the six firing ranges, along with the small military bases that have emerged since 2020, many of which have been destroyed since October 2023 in Israeli airstrikes. With enhanced international support and funding, the LAF would deploy in much greater strength along the Blue Line. These accommodations would allow the Israeli government to tell the eighty thousand evacuees that Hezbollah is no longer a threat along the border and that they can return to their homes and resume everyday life.

If Hezbollah accepted some or all of those conditions, it could sell the deal to its supporters on the basis that the LAF, as per its national duty and responsibilities, is to man the “frontline” against the Israeli “enemy.” At the same time, Hezbollah would assume the role of Lebanon’s “strategic reserve,” with its rocket and missile arsenals and army of trained fighters—a powerful deterrence factor. Such an argument would fall neatly within Hezbollah’s somewhat strained explanation to justify why it needs to keep its weapons—the so-called “golden triangle” formulation in which the “army,” the “resistance” (Hezbollah), and the “people” combined are the key elements of Lebanon’s defense strategy against Israel.

For Hezbollah to even contemplate accepting these conditions, Israel would also need to offer concessions. Simpler concessions could include Israel committing to ending its troop presence in the northern end of Ghajar, which lies on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line. Israeli troops have been present in northern Ghajar since the end of the 2006 war with Hezbollah in contravention of UNSCR 1701. Another simple concession is for Israel to knock down a wall it constructed four years ago on the Lebanese side of the Blue Line in a World War II-era railway tunnel that runs through the Ras Naqoura headland on the Mediterranean coast. In addition, Israel could quickly reach an agreement on thirteen locations where Lebanon and Israel disagree on the path of the border (this is part of the US proposal). Unwritten solutions regarding seven of those disputed locations were reached a few years ago and, given sufficient mutual goodwill, the remaining disputed areas could be resolved quickly through minor land swaps.

Among the more difficult concessions would be Israel agreeing to cease overflights in Lebanese airspace. Israel will likely oppose such a compromise, but there is wiggle room for negotiations. Israel could commit to cease using Lebanese airspace to launch attacks against targets in Syria. Or it could agree to end manned overflights in Lebanese skies, while continuing with UAVs and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. Perception will play a role in reaching agreements. For example, Israeli jets are often visible from their contrails and audible. UAVs, on the other hand, usually fly too high to be seen or heard. If Israel were to agree to end manned overflights, the Lebanese public would see no Israeli aircraft in the skies above, creating a perception that Israel is no longer breaching Lebanese airspace.

Another thorny concession is an Israeli troop withdrawal from Shebaa Farms, an unpopulated mountainside running along Lebanon’s southeast border that the UN considers occupied Syrian territory but Beirut claims as Lebanese land. Syria has never officially declared in writing that the Shebaa Farms belong to Lebanon, rendering the sovereignty of the mountain ambiguous. If Israel agreed to pull out of Shebaa Farms, UNIFIL could deploy there in its place until Lebanon and Syria finally decide to whom the land belongs. A troop withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms would be the jewel in the crown for Hezbollah and a bitter pill for Israel to swallow. But Shebaa Farms, first and foremost, is a potential bargaining chip for Israel, and dangling the possibility of withdrawing from the area could help maximize concessions from Hezbollah. It’s all in the negotiations.

Still, even if both parties agree to make an equitable number of mutual concessions that lead to a prolonged cessation of hostilities, there remains the question of verifying that the deal is not breached by one or both parties. Trying to agree on a credible and unbiased verification mechanism that both parties would support could present a new set of headaches.

Gaza is key to the Lebanon-Israel front. If a temporary ceasefire is reached in the Gaza Strip but Israel continues attacking Hezbollah, the Lebanon-Israel border will remain on fire, with all the attendant risks of it spiraling into a broader conflagration. If, however, Hezbollah and Israel observe the Gaza ceasefire, that could allow a window for accelerated diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term cessation of hostilities along the Lebanon-Israel border. The chances of calming the Lebanon-Israel border will be that much greater if a temporary ceasefire in Gaza evolves into a permanent ceasefire.

After the trauma of October 7, 2023, and five months of fighting Hezbollah, Netanyahu’s hardline government may be in no mood to offer any concessions to its Lebanese adversary. However, without mutual concessions, it is unlikely that a diplomatic agreement will be reached—and if diplomacy fails, the only alternative is war.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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A month after President Joe Biden took office in 2021, the designation was revoked due to those very concerns. Nonetheless, these efforts to advance the path of peace in Yemen did not pay off, and the political, economic, and humanitarian situation deteriorated in an unprecedented manner in the three years since that revocation.

As a result of recent attacks by the Houthis on international shipping and trade lines in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden, the Biden administration reviewed its decision and redesignated the Houthis on January 17. The voices against this measure disappeared after it became clear that the Houthis present a danger not just to Yemen and the region, but also to the world. This danger exists on several levels.

First, the US decision to revoke the designation sent the wrong signals to the Houthis and was considered a green light to continue their escalation. At the same time, Iran saw it as permission to exercise more influence and dominance over the region. Nearly a month after the United States revoked the designation in 2021, the Houthis escalated by launching a series of attacks using ballistic missiles and drones manufactured in Iran against energy facilities in several Saudi cities.

More significantly, the Houthis continued to commit crimes and violations against civilians in the areas under their control, and hostilities extended to areas under government control. The group thwarted the extension of the United Nations (UN) truce in 2022 and, at the behest of Iran, it undermined de-escalation and peace efforts. The Houthis have also breached United Nations Security Council resolutions related to the Yemeni crisis. Taking advantage of the international community’s keenness to resolve the crisis peacefully, the Houthis regrouped, mobilized their fighters to the battle fronts, and accumulated weapons and military technology smuggled from Iran.

Additionally, the economic situation has deteriorated, and the humanitarian suffering has worsened throughout Yemen since the terrorist designation was revoked. The Houthis have since escalated their pressure on and extortion of international organizations.

In November 2023, the Houthis expelled the deputy representative of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), Safireddine Sayed. The expulsion is not unprecedented, coming three years after the Houthis denied entry to the commission’s representative in 2019.

They have also detained several employees of the United Nations and international organizations—including Prodigy Systems and the OHCHR—and forcibly disappeared them to prevent them from performing their mandate. In one instance, they even tortured to death an employee of Save the Children.

Houthis also continued to seize cash and food aid, divert funds and supplies to their members, sell relief materials, and use the money to attract and mobilize fighters and finance their wars. This prompted several organizations to suspend their operations and move their headquarters to the interim capital, Aden. The United Nations World Food Programme also announced in December 2023 that it would suspend programming in areas under Houthi control.

The Houthis also continue to obstruct all government initiatives and solutions, including the UN mechanism, to allocate revenues from the Hodeidah port to pay the salaries of public servants in areas under Houthi control. Houthis also continued the siege of Taiz.

The Houthis also imposed an economic war on the government by obstructing oil exports and the delivery of cooking gas shipments from Marib governorate. Additionally, they imposed levies on goods coming from the liberated areas to disrupt the port of Aden, which harmed the state’s budget, affected the government’s ability to fulfill its obligations in the liberated areas, and paralyzed its ability to pay the salaries of public servants.

Since the beginning of November 2023, the Houthi militia has launched a wave of maritime piracy and terrorist attacks on commercial ships and oil tankers in international shipping lanes, pressuring Israel to lift its blockade on the Gaza Strip.

The Houthis have ignored the disastrous repercussions of these attacks on the prices of shipping and insurance fees on ships entering Yemeni ports, as well as their effects on the prices of food and consumer goods. Their actions threaten to double the burden on Yemenis, who depend on imports to cover 90 percent of their needs.

The Biden administration’s decision to revoke the Houthi terrorist designation contributed to the complexity of the Yemeni crisis, prolonging the war, exacerbating human suffering, and pushing peace beyond the reach of the Yemenis. This decision was also a gift to Iran and helped strengthen its subversive policies and terrorist activities in both Yemen and the region.

To avoid replicating the same scenario, a new approach must be taken to counter the Houthis.

Forming alliances to protect international trade and launching limited strikes against the Houthis will not solve the problem. The international community must comprehensively review how it deals with the Yemeni issue to avoid making the same mistakes. Treating the symptoms is not enough. It must address the root causes of the problem: the Houthis.

It is the responsibility of the international community to coordinate a response to Houthi activities and to force them to abandon their terrorist tactics. Beyond designating the Houthis as a terrorist organization, governments must dry up the militia’s financial, political, and media resources. This includes restricting trade, imposing sanctions on Houthi leaders, freezing their assets, and banning travel. These measures will not jeopardize the channels of dialogue necessary for any future peaceful solution, but will still pressure the Houthis.

International partners must also support the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, led by President Rashad Muhammad al-Alimi. The Yemeni government requires political, humanitarian, and military support to restore the country. Failure to address the root causes of the conflict will lead to replicating historical mistakes that have been repeatedly committed. These recommended approaches can establish security and stability in all Yemeni territories and stop Houthi terrorist activities that threaten regional and international peace.

Moammar Al-Eryani is the minister of information, culture, and tourism of the Republic of Yemen.

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In early 2021, it was clear that the Joe Biden administration sought a normalization agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia by the end of 2023 as a capstone to the Donald Trump administration’s 2020 Abraham Accords normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The historic breakthrough of the Abraham Accords, which bolstered Israel’s sovereign right to exist, brought fresh hope for regional stability and economic growth. The heinous attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, sought to bury such hope of stability and were launched by those who refuse to accept any terms short of Israel’s destruction. It is the fault of Hamas and its Iranian sponsors that peaceful coexistence is now seemingly further off than ever. 

Among the now heightened normalization stakes in 2024, constants remain in the discourse as leaders in Riyadh, Jerusalem, and Washington continue to signal normalization remains on the table. As stakeholders continue to address the war in Gaza, negotiate the release of hostages, advocate for the movement of humanitarian assistance into the Gaza Strip, and seek to mitigate a regional conflagration, there is ongoing strategic consideration of normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Primary constants revolve around the pernicious threats from Iran and its proxies, and persistent interest in Palestinian statehood. Though not a new Saudi position, Palestinian statehood has become amplified during talks of Israeli ceasefires with Hamas and the post-conflict development of Gaza.

To varying degrees, Saudi officials—including royals—condemned the Hamas attacks on Israel, which required a deliberate Israeli kinetic response. Still, they also recognize that for any reconciliation to take root and normalization to occur, there must be a path toward Palestinian statehood. Before a panel of reporters at the 2024 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,  Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, Saudi ambassador to the United States, noted, “While Saudi Arabia recognizes the need for Israel to feel safe, it cannot be at the expense of the Palestinian people.” 

Additionally, during the February 5 visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, as part of his broader Middle East tour to seek de-escalation of regional tensions, his stop in Riyadh included talks with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). The consideration of normalization was among the critical issues discussed regarding the Gaza war and Yemen’s Houthis attacking shipping routes in the Red Sea. Parallel to Blinken’s tour, the release of an annual Arab public opinion survey likely read in Riyadh reported that a current majority of Arabs do not support official recognition of Israel, with 89 percent of respondents from sixteen Arab countries either outright hostile or deeply skeptical of the idea.

Following Secretary Blinken’s fifth regional visit since the war began, the Saudi foreign ministry clarified overtly what had been stated all along in bilateral communications with US officials in the Biden and Trump administrations: “The Kingdom has communicated its firm position to the US administration that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 border, with east Jerusalem as its capital.”

Secretary Blinken then confirmed Saudi Arabia had conveyed that advancing a two-state solution to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a prerequisite for normalization. Still, as his colleagues at the State Department are well aware, the Abraham Accords—which the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan signed in 2020—did not require the condition of regional progress on creating a Palestinian state. 

The door for normalization discourse has been wide open since the 2020 Abraham Accords, and the desire remains. However, any credible movement to formalize bilateral relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem cannot ignore what the Saudis have consistently stated about the two-state solution. Looking back at the autumn of 2020, then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged his counterpart, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, toward recognition of Israel, stating, “We hope Saudi Arabia will consider normalizing its relationships as well, and we want to thank them for the assistance they’ve had in the success of the Abraham Accords so far.” Pompeo added that he hoped Riyadh would encourage Palestinian leaders, including the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, to return to negotiations with Israel. 

During the 2020 pinnacle of normalization, any US diplomat or official spending time in the Gulf, myself included, was met with sincere expressions of anticipation along with measured pragmatism over the Palestinian file. Fast forward to summer 2023, and the Saudi ambassador to the United States publicly shared the Saudi perspective on Israel-Palestine relations when she noted that Saudi Arabia aims for integration, rather than mere normalization, with Israel. Her remarks highlighted that Israeli-Palestinian peace aligns with Saudi Arabia’s ambitious social reform project, Vision 2030, and that Saudi Arabia envisions “a thriving Israel” alongside “a thriving Palestine.” 

The Saudi stance Princess Reema further articulated at Davos, inclusive of Vision 2030, is intended as a comprehensive approach in which prosperity and collaboration transcend the mere coexistence of neighboring states. This declaration, like MBS’s most recent engagement with Secretary Blinken, is an acknowledgment that there is a place in the normalization discourse for Saudi Arabia to use its regional political and economic influence to enable reform of the Palestinian Authority and deradicalize the Gaza Strip and West Bank.  

There is also the candid recognition of “statehood” in international affairs that is more consequential than simply recognizing the idea of a state. In treaties and international law, statehood has important sovereign characteristics, including having a defined territory and population and a capital city, and being able to implement government functions. To date, there is not an existent “Palestine” that is both de jure and de facto, in that it exists according to law and practice. If there is to be such a state, it will be incumbent upon existent states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to ensure such a state exists according to both law and practice. Any sort of two-state solution cannot allow for the development of a proto-state permissive to radicalization and terrorist facilitation to exist next to thriving neighboring countries. 

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and is the founder and president of Guard Hill House, LLC. He previously served as assistant secretary for political-military affairs at the US Department of State. 

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On February 19, Israel staged airstrikes against two warehouses in Ghaziyeh, just south of Sidon and some 50 kilometers (31 miles) north of the border. Israel claimed they were Hezbollah arms depots and that the strikes came in response to an apparent suicide drone that crashed and exploded earlier in the day near Tiberias, some 28 kilometers (17 miles) south of the border. If the drone was dispatched by Hezbollah from Lebanon, it would have been the deepest attack into Israel since the clashes began along the Lebanon-Israel border on October 8, 2023, a day after Hamas launched its devastating assault on Israeli communities and military bases adjacent to the Gaza Strip, killing some 1,200 Israelis. Lebanese media reports said that the targets in Ghaziyeh were a cement factory and an oil production plant.

On February 14, an Israeli soldier was killed and eight others wounded when rockets were fired from south Lebanon and struck Safed and the surrounding area. Safed is home to the headquarters of the Israeli military’s Northern Command and has been targeted before by Hezbollah. In response, Israeli jets carried out raids deeper than usual into south Lebanon, which left a mother and two children dead in the village of Sawwaneh, and killed at least five members of a family when their house was partially destroyed in the town of Nabatiyeh. The target had been Ali Deeb, a senior Hezbollah field commander, who died in the airstrike on the house. He had been wounded days earlier when an Israeli drone fired a missile at his car, also in Nabatiyeh. In the tit-for-tat manner of the fighting, Hezbollah fired Grad rockets into Kiryat Shmona on February 15, claiming the attack was a response to the deaths of civilians the previous day.

Around 268 Lebanese, most of them Hezbollah fighters, have been killed since fighting broke out more than four months ago. Ten soldiers and six civilians have been killed on the Israeli side. Tens of thousands of Lebanese and Israeli civilians have fled the fighting.

Hezbollah launched its campaign under the rubric of offering “support to the Palestinian people and the resistance in Gaza,” and said its actions are directly tied to the Gaza conflict.

“When the war on Gaza ends, we will stop our offensive,” Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said on February 13. “If the enemy resumes its hostilities, we will act in light of the rules and formulas.”

Despite the intensifying violence of recent weeks, the fighting between Hezbollah and the Israeli military still falls well short of reaching a threshold that could precipitate war. Hezbollah’s actions clearly demonstrate that it and its patron, Iran, have no appetite for a full-scale war with Israel. In general, Hezbollah is in a reactive mode, escalating only in response to an increase in the tempo of Israeli attacks or when there are Lebanese civilian casualties.

For the most part, Hezbollah’s attacks—averaging around five or six a day, judging from Hezbollah’s daily statements—have become routine. Hezbollah’s targets are mainly Israeli border posts. Hezbollah primarily employs anti-tank weapons, most of them legacy systems, including 106-millimeter recoilless rifles and wire-guided AT-3 Sagger missiles, both of which date back to the 1960s. Even the more modern AT-14 Spriggan (known in Lebanon by its Russian name “Kornet”) is a second-generation version dating back to 2006. These line-of-sight systems require the operator to have a direct view of the target—for example, an Israeli outpost. Given that these anti-tank systems have a relatively short range, the Hezbollah attack squad must be within 5 kilometers (3 miles), the maximum range of the second-generation AT-14, of the target. Therefore, the conditions required to fire anti-tank missiles limit the number of locations from which attacks can be launched, making the Hezbollah units particularly vulnerable to Israeli drones prowling overhead in the skies of the south Lebanon border district. 

Initially, Israeli drones attacked the missile units in the open. More recently, the drone locates a Hezbollah unit in the field and then tracks it back to a house. The house is subsequently targeted by a drone or jet. This appears to have been the fate of Hussein Yazbek, a local Hezbollah official, who was killed in the early hours of January 3 when an airstrike in the coastal village of Naqoura destroyed his home. The blast killed three additional Hezbollah men, all of them from different villages, suggesting that they may have been on an operation when they were spotted and tracked back to Yazbek’s home.

Hezbollah suffered comparatively heavy casualties in the opening weeks of the conflict. Nevertheless, sources close to Hezbollah told me that fighters’ morale remains high—at times, recklessly so. On more than one occasion, fresh recruits comprising an attacking squad refused orders to withdraw, pressed ahead with their mission, and were subsequently killed or wounded by overhead drones. To compensate, Hezbollah reduced the size of the attack squads from five or six members to two or three, and sometimes sent an older fighter as a “chaperone,” ensuring that the enthusiastic fresh recruits follow orders.

Hezbollah also introduced new weapons systems into the battlespace, partly to keep the Israeli military off-balance and partly to demonstrate its new capabilities to a domestic and foreign audience. In early November 2023, Hezbollah launched its first attack against an Israeli border post with a Burkan rocket. The Burkan comprises a barrel packed with between 100 and 500 kilograms (220 and 1,102 pounds) of high explosives mounted on a rocket motor. It is fired in pairs from a double-barreled launcher. Although it has a range of only 10 kilometers (6 miles), it packs a powerful punch.

On November 20, Hezbollah launched four Burkan rockets at the Biranit military post, the headquarters of the Israeli army’s 91st Division. At least one of the rockets struck the center of the base and caused considerable damage, judging from footage that was uploaded to social media. Yet, not one soldier suffered so much as a scratch. The reason? The base was evacuated earlier in the conflict, a fact that Hezbollah, which closely observes Israeli troop movements along the border, must have known in advance of the Burkan barrage. Asked why Hezbollah had fired rockets at an Israeli base it must have known was empty, a veteran Hezbollah official and former fighter in south Lebanon told me somewhat sheepishly, “We did it for the video.” Sure enough, a day after the attack, Hezbollah released a video showing the launching of the rockets and explosions emanating from the Israeli outpost.

Other systems introduced by Hezbollah include the short-range Falaq-1 heavy rocket with a range of 10 kilometers (6 miles) and carrying a 50-kilogram (110-pound) warhead, a weapon it used in the 2006 war with Israel. In the past three weeks, Hezbollah showed off, for the first time, its Almas anti-tank system, an Iranian reverse-engineered version of the Israeli Spike missile with a range of between 8–10 kilometers (5-6 miles). Hezbollah has used the Almas in at least three separate strikes, targeting the radomes of two Israeli border positions and a Merkava tank in another outpost. The advantage of the Almas is that it has a television camera mounted in the nose, allowing the operator to launch the missile without having to view the target directly. The missile can be pre-locked onto its target or guided onto the target during flight via its camera and fiber-optic link.

Hezbollah has also employed its fleet of drones for both attacks and reconnaissance missions. On January 24, Hezbollah dispatched a drone into Upper Galilee to observe an Iron Dome anti-missile battery next to Kfar Blum. The Israeli military did not detect the drone, and Hezbollah used the footage to mount suicide drone strikes the following day against the battery and an air-defense facility.

Israel also does not seek a war with Hezbollah, an enemy far more formidable than Hamas in the Gaza Strip. But it has steadily escalated its attacks against Hezbollah in frequency, range of targets, and depth into Lebanon. At the beginning of the conflict in October 2023, Israeli artillery and air power were used to retaliate for Hezbollah attacks along the border. Now, the day often begins with Israeli preemptive shelling and air raids against areas from which Hezbollah mounts attacks. The strip along the border between 1–3 kilometers (roughly between half a mile and 2 miles) has become an Israeli free-fire zone, residents and officers serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping mission, have told me. Most residents of Lebanese border communities have moved north, leaving behind only Hezbollah fighters and a few civilians who have nowhere else to go.

In particular, Israel has been going after senior Hezbollah field commanders. In November 2023, an Israeli airstrike on a house in the village of Beit Yahoun killed four members of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Brigade—one of them Abbas Raad, son of Mohammed Raad, a Hezbollah lawmaker. More recently, on January 8, Wissam Tawil, a senior commander, was killed in a roadside bomb ambush near his home village of Khirbet Silm. Tawil, like other senior Hezbollah officers, was taking precautions to avoid being targeted by the Israelis, including swapping vehicles multiple times and abandoning the use of cell phones. A Hezbollah source in south Lebanon told me that the cadres were no longer driving sports utility vehicles or Renault rapid vans—a signature Hezbollah vehicle in south Lebanon—opting for smaller and older cars instead.

The targeted killings are likely causing alarm within Hezbollah about the extensive reach of the Israeli intelligence services. Nasrallah even addressed the problem in his February 13 speech, saying that the vulnerability of cell phones to interception and tracking makes them more dangerous than human collaborators. He also urged residents and business owners in south Lebanon who have closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras linked to the internet to disconnect them because “Israeli cyberwarfare units hack into them and collect valuable information.”

For now, there appears to be no end in sight to the border clashes while the war in Gaza rages on amid faltering efforts to broker a humanitarian ceasefire. Israeli politicians have repeatedly said that while they prefer a diplomatic solution, they are prepared to mount a major operation against Hezbollah if necessary.

The Israeli government is under pressure from some eighty thousand residents of northern Israel who have evacuated their homes and are refusing to return unless Hezbollah is pushed away from the border. A poll published by Israel’s Maariv newspaper on February 16 showed that 71 percent of respondents favored a large-scale military operation to drive Hezbollah back. However, there is no viable military solution for dealing with Hezbollah beyond achieving a temporary tactical setback. Israel could opt for a limited ground conflict restricted to the area south of the Litani River to destroy as much Hezbollah infrastructure and kill as many fighters as possible. Such an option would stop short of a full-scale war, which would inflict massive loss of life and physical damage on both Lebanon and Israel and would probably turn into a regional conflagration.

However, a limited offensive confined to south Lebanon would not be easy for the Israeli military. The 2006 war demonstrated the limitations of relying primarily on airpower to fight Hezbollah. But a ground invasion would be a risky endeavor, bearing in mind Hezbollah’s capabilities, that it has had nearly eighteen years to prepare the battlespace for such an eventuality, and, not least, given the fact that the topography of south Lebanon suits the defender, not the invader, to which past generations of Israeli soldiers can attest. Furthermore, a limited conflict can become unlimited very quickly if the Israeli army is struggling to meet its objectives, is taking too many casualties in south Lebanon’s hills and valleys, and chooses to escalate. Even if the Israeli military were able to inflict some form of defeat against Hezbollah in south Lebanon, it would eventually have to pull back into Israeli territory, assuming the Israeli government does not wish to repeat history and reoccupy the area. Then, Hezbollah would simply slip back into the south once the Israeli military had departed and prepare, once more, for a future confrontation. Such a scenario is hardly conducive to encouraging the return of the Israeli evacuees to their homes along Israel’s northern border.

There are several diplomatic proposals underway from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Hezbollah says it refuses to negotiate until the war ends in Gaza. Therefore, if the war drags on for much longer and clashes continue to persist along the Lebanon-Israel border, the pressure on the Israeli government to launch some form of offensive into south Lebanon is going to be hard to resist, even if it has little chance of achieving long-term success.

Nicholas Blanford is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Since 2014, when the Barack Obama administration searched for a local partner force in Syria to fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) without opposing Iran, the relationship between Turkey and the United States has deteriorated. The US partnership with the People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—was viewed by Ankara as a national security threat. However, in early October 2019, the situation got more complex when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former President Donald Trump agreed on a partial US withdrawal. Trump later ordered a full withdrawal, but it was prevented at the last minute by a decision to secure oil in Syria. Shortly after, in October 2019, the Turks launched Operation Peace Spring and entered parts of northern Syria. However, Russia secured the majority of the territory from which the Americans withdrew, following a deal between the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus. The Russians effectively protected the SDF against Turkish attempts to launch new cross-border military operations.

If a complete US withdrawal from Syria is going to occur, Turkish decision-makers would prefer the United States to coordinate with Ankara. This option would allow different scenarios and roadmaps to facilitate US and Turkish interests in Syria and the broader region. For Turkey, a US withdrawal is not significant; the crucial question for Turkey is how the United States will withdraw.

In the event of an abrupt US withdrawal similar to what happened in Afghanistan, the Turkish government may face difficult decisions and encounter new threats from Syria. One of the most notable threats would come from Iran.

Iran is the best positioned to fill the void

The US forces in Syria rely on a single point of entry from Iraq for their logistical supply line. As a result, they will have to withdraw from the south to the north and retreat into Iraq gradually. Due to insufficient infrastructure, an airlift is not a viable option. In this scenario, Iran’s network across the Syria-Iraq border region around Abu Kamal in Deir ez-Zour makes it well-positioned to fill the void left by the United States. This would allow Iran to expand its only land supply route from Tehran to Beirut. Iranian militias on the western side of the Euphrates River would likely cross to the eastern side and enter former US zones of influence.

At the same time, Russian presence in SDF-controlled areas would enable the Russian military to move further eastward and control the entire Turkey-Syria border up to Iraq. The YPG-dominated SDF would probably negotiate with Damascus and trade its control over parts of Syria for official recognition and legitimization by the state. A potential agreement may be founded on shared hostility toward Turkey and the Syrian opposition. As a result, Iran would gain control over the oil-rich regions of Syria and expand its influence across the Syria-Iraq border. Conversely, the YPG would gain official status in Syria and ally itself with Russia, Iran, and the Bashar al-Assad regime, which could be troubling for Turkey.

To address the threat posed by the YPG in Syria, Turkey would need to secure the Kurdish-populated areas along its border. This decision would involve a military operation, and could potentially escalate tensions with Russia and Iran. This risky move could help Turkey limit the threat posed by the YPG, but could also be a premature birth of a battle in Syria.

The Turkish Achilles heel: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham

Regardless of Turkey’s actions in northeastern Syria, it will face significant pressure in the northwest. The Syrian conflict would then transform from a three-axis conflict into a two-axis conflict. In this new scenario, Tehran, Moscow, Damascus, and the YPG would probably aim to expel Turkey from Syria and enforce a military resolution to the conflict by dispossessing the Syrian opposition from their territory. Turkey and the Syrian opposition would then need to confront a new alliance of these four actors, which could tip the balance of power against them.

It has been reported that negotiations between Ankara and Damascus were not resolved due to the Assad regime’s insistence on a complete withdrawal of Turkish forces. On the other hand, Ankara argues that a withdrawal would have negative consequences for the political process and could lead to a mass migration of up to four million Syrians into Turkey. This scenario would be detrimental to Syria and result in significant domestic repercussions for Turkey.

In 2020, Turkey risked a confrontation with Russia and Iran after witnessing a similar situation. After thirty-four Turkish soldiers lost their lives in a single night, Ankara conducted a drone campaign that caused great destruction to the Syrian regime forces and Iran-backed Shia militias. Despite being alone in Idlib governorate, Turkey managed to successfully defend Idlib. However, this new scenario would have no US military presence in the east. Iran would have expanded its influence and secured a more stable logistical line from Iraq into Syria. Emboldened by the US withdrawal, Iran would likely be more aggressive.

Turkey’s primary vulnerability is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Idlib, where it faces mounting military pressure. The opposing alliance is likely to exploit the terrorist designation of HTS to launch a military operation in the name of counterterrorism. Such a step could lead to a new humanitarian disaster for more than three million people living in Idlib, as Iran and Russia are likely to exploit the HTS issue both militarily and diplomatically against Turkey.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is likely to reduce the amount of Russian investment available for a military escalation in Idlib, leaving Iran and its proxies to drive the attacks against Idlib. The Russian limitation presents an opportunity for Turkey to leverage its new domestically produced drones and air-defense systems, which were not present in 2020, to counter Iran.

In that case, Iran may seek to enhance its ties with the YPG, which the United States previously supported. This could result in a wider escalation of tensions across Syria. Similar to the current Iranian attacks against US bases in Syria and Iraq, Iran would use the PKK and its Syrian branch, the YPG, to attack Turkish forces in Syria and Iraq.

Ankara may initially perceive a potential US withdrawal from Syria as a positive development; however, the outcome could vary significantly based on how the US withdraws. Turkey would prefer a well-coordinated and orderly withdrawal process in close collaboration with its NATO ally. If the United States decides to withdraw from Syria without any coordination, it may lead to the handover of the US partner forces and the US zone of influence to Iran. In such a scenario, Iran would likely prioritize removing Turkey from Syria, as Ankara would be the only obstacle to Syria becoming a puppet state of Iran.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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In preparation for the anticipated full-scale assault on Gaza’s southernmost city—where approximately 1.4 million displaced Palestinians have sought refuge in cramped tent encampments from Israel’s intense shelling of the Strip’s northern and central cities—Egypt has reportedly deployed forty tanks and armored personnel carriers to northeastern Sinai in recent days. The deployment is meant to bolster security in the border area, where a concrete wall topped with barbed wire was earlier erected—including an underground structure—to hinder the ability of Hamas to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip.   

The recent security reinforcements are, meanwhile, meant to avert a possible mass influx of Palestinian refugees into northern Sinai; Cairo fears that Israel’s planned ground offensive of Rafah may prompt hundreds of thousands of desperate Palestinians—fleeing the violence—to storm the border and cross into Egyptian territory, never to return. The fears are not entirely unfounded: in the early days of the war, members of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition had publicly called for the transfer of Palestinians to Egypt. 

Since November 1, 2023, Egypt has allowed more than 2,200 wounded Palestinians to enter through the Rafah border crossing for medical treatment at hospitals in northern Sinai. An unknown number of Palestinians have also managed to cross into Egypt by directly negotiating a price—ranging between $6,000 and $13,000—with “brokers” to escape from the conflict. 

Two elderly Gaza residents residing with relatives in Egypt, who asked that their names be withheld for fear of reprisals, told me they recently managed to flee the violence and make their way to safety through the Rafah crossing after paying the “exorbitant fees” requested by a local businessman “as a price for our safety.” I have heard similar accounts from other Palestinians. This option is reserved for a small number of affluent Gazans who have relatives outside the enclave and can afford to pay the high fee that guarantees their passage to safety.  

Still, Egypt’s leadership is adamant about not allowing a mass influx of Palestinian refugees into Egypt—despite having taken in refugees from Syria, Sudan, and Yemen who had sought to escape the conflicts in their countries. Officials argue that the expulsion of Palestinians into Egypt would end the possibility of a Palestinian state and risks transforming Sinai into a base for militant attacks against Israel—with profound security implications for Egypt. Moreover, Egypt would likely need to deal with a humanitarian crisis in the Sinai Peninsula, piling added pressure on a country already in the throes of a dire economic situation.  

Egyptian officials have reportedly warned that a mass displacement of Palestinians could cause Cairo to suspend the Camp David Accords signed in 1979, and would undermine security cooperation between the two countries, which has been strong since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi assumed power in 2013.   

This warning, allegedly reiterated during talks between Sisi and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Cairo on February 7, is Egypt’s sternest yet to Israel and comes amid rising tensions between the two neighboring states over Netanyahu’s plan for Israel to seize control of the Philadelphi Corridor—a fourteen-kilometer ( 8.7 miles) route along the border separating the Sinai Peninsula from Gaza. Nevertheless, during a press conference in Slovenia on February 12, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry denied reports that Cairo intended to freeze the peace treaty with Israel and insisted that Egypt would uphold its accord with Israel. 

“A peace agreement between Egypt and Israel already exists and has been in effect for the last forty years,” Shoukry said. He added that the treaty will remain in place.   

Netanyahu had unveiled the plan for Israel to overtake the buffer zone during a press conference on December 31, 2023 saying that the Philadelphi Corridor must be placed under Israel’s control to stop weapons from being smuggled through the southern border and ensure that Gaza is demilitarized after the war. Egypt and the Palestinian Authority have controlled the narrow buffer zone since 2003, following Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip, which allowed Egypt to station border guards along its side of the frontier to patrol the area and prevent smuggling and infiltration into its territory. 

After the overthrow of then-President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)—the group that oversaw the transitional period leading up to Egypt’s first free and fair elections in 2012, which brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power—destroyed the vast majority of the underground tunnels leading into the Gaza Strip. Hamas had used the tunnels to smuggle commercial goods and weapons into the enclave. 

After Sisi took power in 2013, he continued destroying the tunnels. Some Israeli officials, however, believe that additional tunnels still exist between Rafah and Sinai. Sisi also declared a state of emergency in North Sinai, effectively banning independent reporting from the region: several journalists who covered events here have been prosecuted and imprisoned. Security forces have since carried out a military campaign to rid the area of Islamic State of Iraq and el-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated insurgents who had sought to establish an Islamic state in the Sinai Peninsula.  Egypt has since largely sealed its northern border, aiding Israel in enforcing a tight blockade around Gaza. The border crossing was only intermittently opened to allow Palestinians seeking medical treatment and students to enter Egypt.  

Netanyahu’s recent remarks about seizing control of the buffer zone, effectively cutting Gaza off from Egypt, have irked the Egyptian authorities and the public alike—drawing harsh rebukes from government supporters and analysts. 

Diaa Rashwan, head of the State Information Service, rebuffed the plan as an attempt by Israel to cover up its failure to achieve its stated goals of eliminating Hamas in the Gaza war. Mustafa Bakri, a pro-government member of parliament, called the plan “an attack on Egypt’s sovereignty” and “a violation of the peace treaty” between the two countries. He urged Cairo to prevent the scheme at any cost—even if Egypt had to resort to military options. Mustapha Kamel el-Sayed, a professor at Cairo University, told me it shows a lack of respect on the part of Israel for the peace treaties it signed with neighboring Arab countries. He noted that the Philadelphi Corridor is a demilitarized zone under the Camp David Accords and should remain as such.  

Tensions are also simmering in Cairo over US President Joe Biden’s remarks during a February 8 press conference that Egypt had initially been reluctant to open the border crossing to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza and that the US president had persuaded his Egyptian counterpart to open the border to allow the aid in. Cairo was quick to refute the allegations: 

“Egypt opened the border from the start of the war, allowing the passage of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip without restrictions,” according to a statement released by the presidency on February 9. The Egyptian leadership pointed the finger at Israel, accusing it of disrupting the flow of aid by shelling the border crossing several times in the early days of the war. The statement called for a ceasefire to avert “a humanitarian disaster” and “protect civilians from further bombings, starvation, and disease.”

One thing is clear: The Egyptian leadership is stuck between a rock and a hard place. If it opens the border crossing to allow Palestinian refugees into Egypt, it risks being accused of complicity in the mass displacement of Palestinians. Many Egyptians believe that Palestinian refugees who enter Egypt will likely never be permitted to return to their homeland, which will be seized by Israel. On the other hand, if Sisi refuses to allow Palestinian refugees to cross into Egypt, he may be held accountable for the deaths of thousands more civilians, including women and children. 

It’s worth noting that, according to a Wall Street Journal report published on February 15, Egypt has begun constructing an eight-square mile walled enclosure in the Sinai Desert near its border with the Gaza Strip to reportedly accommodate Palestinians should Israel’s imminent ground offensive prompt a mass exodus of refugees into the country. Egypt has denied any such contingency measures are taking place. However, the New York Times has also reported that satellite images have shown “a large patch of land being bulldozed and a wall being built in the buffer zone between Egypt and Rafah.”  

Opposition activists have in recent days, taken to social media to express their skepticism over Sisi’s refusal to allow Palestinian refugees into Egypt. They claim that Cairo will eventually let the refugees in, which makes Egypt complicit and gives Israel the green light for the “ethnic cleansing” of Palestinians. Government supporters, on the other hand, laud Sisi for standing his ground and refusing to bow to the immense pressure from Israel and some Western governments to open the border to refugees fleeing the carnage. 

Now that Israel has clarified its intent to undertake operations in Rafah, after evacuating the nearly 1.4 million displaced Palestinians who have sought a safe haven in the Gaza Strip’s southern city, it may only be a matter of time before Sisi’s true intentions are revealed. In either case, the Egyptian president will not emerge as a winner.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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Moreover, Egypt is renowned for its rich cultural heritage, boasting seven UNESCO World Heritage Sites. These treasures include the Great Pyramid of Giza, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. The allure of Egypt’s cultural legacy, coupled with competitive travel costs due to the substantial devaluation of the Egyptian pound (LE), positions the country as a pivotal travel destination with immense potential for tourism revenues.

In addition to its cultural wealth, Egypt possesses a substantial human capital base, with a population of about 115 million people, representing approximately 1.4 percent of the global population. Notably, 60 percent of Egypt’s population is under thirty, highlighting a sizable workforce poised to enter the job market. Egypt also benefits from abundant sunlight and elevated wind speeds, positioning the country as an optimal site for renewable energy sources. The burgeoning renewable energy market in Egypt holds significant economic potential, amounting to billions of dollars.

However, despite all its inherent advantages, the economy has been grappling with persistent challenges for nearly seventy-five years. High poverty rates continue to plague the nation, with World Bank statistics indicating a rise in the poverty rate, with the proportion of the population below the poverty line increasing from 25.2 percent in 2010 to 32.5 percent in 2017–2018.

Egypt’s tourism revenues have also remained modest, averaging around $8–$9 billion annually between 2014 and 2022, despite the country’s potential as a premier tourist destination. In comparison, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has consistently generated higher tourism income, averaging around $30 billion annually during the same period, and is projected to reach $60 billion by 2028.

Additionally, Egypt’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows have been relatively modest, amounting to $11 billion in 2020. This figure pales in comparison to that of other middle-income countries that have attracted significantly higher FDI inflows for the same year, such as India ($50 billion), Brazil ($70 billion), or South Africa ($90 billion). Egypt also has a chronic trade deficit, which registered $37 billion by the end of 2023, down from $48 billion in 2022. 

Moreover, Egypt has grappled with fiscal deficits, averaging 9.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the past decade. As a result, the government has accumulated a substantial public debt, with external debt stocks, including International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit, rising from an average of $40 billion post-Arab Spring to $130 billion in 2020, comprising nearly 70 percent long-term debt, which poses significant challenges for the economy.

The economy’s vulnerability is further compounded by its reliance on volatile revenue sources, including tourism, the Suez Canal, and foreign remittances. Therefore, external shocks—such as the pandemic, the Ukraine war, the Gaza war, and the recent Red Sea attacks—have exerted additional economic pressure on Egypt. As a result, the current account, which closed with an average surplus of $2 billion between 2002 and 2007, reversed to a significant deficit of $16 billion by the end of 2022 and is projected to settle at $9 billion by the end of 2024.

Consequently, the Egyptian pound has experienced substantial depreciation, losing more than 70 percent of its value since early 2022, making it the sixth worst-performing currency globally since the beginning of this year. Delayed adjustments to the foreign exchange policy have resulted in the emergence of a parallel market, with the Egyptian pound plunging to LE 68–70 per US dollar, compared to a fixed rate of LE 30–31 per US dollar in the formal banking sector, where the supply of foreign currency is minimal. Central bank reserves of foreign currencies have also dwindled, declining from $44.6 billion in 2019 to $32 billion by the end of 2022.

But why does Egypt, despite its considerable potential, encounter such notable economic hurdles? While many mainstream economists attribute the crisis to macroeconomic mismanagement, acknowledging the importance of macroeconomic stability for growth, this explanation does not capture the full complexity of the issue. Instead, Egypt’s sluggish, and relatively modest, economic transformation can be better understood through the lens of the “political economy of ideas.” This theory, elucidated by Harvard economist Dany Rodrick in his paper “Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking,” underscores the pivotal role of ideology as a catalyst for shaping public policy and institutional change.

The concept of “ideology” or the “influence of ideas” is a fundamental tenet in political economy, offering insights into why some nations progress more rapidly than others and, conversely, why some lag behind.

Historically, Egypt’s economic ideology long adhered to an inward-looking, import-substitution approach under the Gamal Abdel Nasser regime (1950–1970), a trend common among developing economies during the decolonization era. Key features of the Nasser regime included the nationalization of private assets, management of state enterprises, import substitution, and restrictions on exports.

Later, the Anwar Sadat regime (1970–1981) sought to reverse this trend by introducing a new pro-market investment legislation known as the “open door” policy. However, his ideology was rejected widely, as evidenced by the 1977 Bread Riots. In 1981, Hosni Mubarak came to power in the wake of these riots, which prevented him from initiating similar fundamental reforms. Instead, his government used a mixed approach, implementing partial, piecemeal pro-market policies while relying on strong remnants from the Nasser era. This pattern persists to this day. This mixed ideology has been manifesting, for example, in the slow progress of the public asset-management (privatization) program, and the relatively large size of the public sector in the economy.

However, for a nation to fully embrace a pro-market stance, it must possess a strong ideological commitment to pro-market policies and clear political incentives to foster this ideology. For instance, the adoption of South Korea’s export-driven Industrialization Program (1962–1980) was guided by a long-term vision of joining the ranks of the most industrialized nations, culminating in the country’s successful accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996. Similarly, Turkey’s aspirations to join the European Union drove its pro-market economic reform and overall economic progress in the 1980s and 1990s. At the same time, economic reforms in post-apartheid South Africa have been predominantly driven by a strong commitment to business competitiveness and economic equity.

In comparison, Egypt has never fully embraced a long-term, target-driven, pro-market ideology. The economy continues to operate using piecemeal economic reforms, which are hindered by strong Nasser-era remnants, resulting in a slow and inconsistent pattern of implementation. This mixed approach has led to heightened economic uncertainties, posing challenges for both local and global investors. While investors may navigate political instability, economic policy uncertainty deters firms from hiring, investing, and accessing markets. Therefore, to address the fundamental challenges facing Egypt’s economy, it is imperative to assess and address the political economy prerequisites, not just focus on macroeconomic fundamentals. Without fostering a more robust pro-market ideology, both within the government and among the public, economic reforms in Egypt will remain trapped in a cycle of stagnation for years to come.

Racha Helwa is the director of the empowerME Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East.

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Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state, is credited with having said, “If you don’t know where you are going, every road will get you nowhere.” Four months into the Gaza incursion, with Israeli troops controlling the vast majority of the Hamas-run territory, the inability of Israel’s elected leadership to articulate a coherent endgame has the country’s defense establishment up in arms. That logjam featured prominently on the itinerary of Kissinger’s current-day successor, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who was back in the troubled region from February 5-8—his fifth visit since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack. 

Trapped between two cabinets with conflicting outlooks—a narrow war cabinet, whose purview is limited to managing the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operation in Gaza, and an expanded security cabinet, which asserts authority over matters that do not pertain to actual combat—Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resorted to stonewalling. “In order to talk about the day after, it needs to get here first,” he declared on December 31, 2023. An incredulous IDF brass is sounding the alarm that a vacuum will result in the “erosion of gains made thus far.”

That predicament is already evident in Hamas’ return to sections of Gaza—neighborhoods which Israel has cleared but whose prospects it has left deliberately amorphous. As Arab nations converge around a program for Gaza, and the Netanyahu government rejects their conditions without proposing any viable alternative, the probability of unintended consequences from a prolonged battle rises for Israel. 

The potential grows for a wayward shell to strike a civilian target and derail IDF maneuvers abruptly, before Israel has an opportunity to consolidate a new Gaza architecture without the involvement of Hamas. Demoralization could take root among IDF soldiers, whose enthusiasm for defeating Hamas has remained high thus far, but who risk becoming disenchanted by the thought of an open-ended deployment that lacks any hopeful vision. Mounting casualties, or the infliction of torture upon any of the remaining 134 Israeli hostages in Hamas captivity, could tip the scales suddenly toward a shift in Israel’s tactics. 

Netanyahu must appreciate that Israel should seize the reins of its destiny. The tragedy—for the prime minister and Israel—is that he’s wedged tightly between a personal “rock” and a professional “hard place.” Israel’s National Security Council may have convened multiple discussions about the “day after” for Gaza, but those deliberations are no substitute for direct ministerial engagement. Netanyahu will win no relief from his cabinet colleagues. 

Even if the war cabinet—in which two of five participants are members of the centrist National Unity faction—were inclined to consider ideas such as introducing a “revamped and revitalized” Palestinian Authority (PA) into Gaza, these shots are called elsewhere. The security cabinet, whose tenor is set by right-wing firebrands Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, is entrusted with formulating policy, and it has no intention of restoring PA rule in Gaza. And Netanyahu, whose political survival is contingent on those ideologues’ support in parliament, has stepped in line dutifully behind their approach. He continues to hedge his bet by making no final decisions on the issue. 

The prime minister is doing Israel a great disservice. Deciding not to decide is, after all, also making a decision. While Netanyahu treads water to preserve all his options—and to keep his coalition intact—other actors are working to construct the “day after” on their own terms. 

Both the United States and the United Kingdom are reportedly weighing recognition of a Palestinian state. Domestically, Netanyahu’s right-wing allies are being exuberantly proactive about promoting their dream of renewed Israeli sovereignty in Gaza. A January 28 rally—headlined by Smotrich, Ben-Gvir, and lawmakers from the prime minister’s Likud Party—calling for the restoration of Jewish communities in the Gaza Strip met with only a faint response from Netanyahu, who said his opposition to that scheme “has not changed.” In the absence of any official blueprint, however, the unconstrained settlement agenda—which Netanyahu does not ostensibly endorse—dominates the Israeli narrative. 

Faced with an array of imperfect solutions for Gaza, Israel’s government needs urgently to define and present the contours of what it would deem an acceptable aftermath. “Israel has no interest in controlling the civil affairs of the Gaza Strip,” Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security advisor, opined on the Arabic-language Elaph news site on December 20, 2023. “This will require a moderate Palestinian governing body that enjoys broad popular support and legitimacy, and it’s not for us to determine who will this be.”

Elements of a touted US-backed bid to end the war—in particular, normalization with Saudi Arabia and regional assistance in rehabilitating Gaza—could provide an attractive platform for Israel to get such a process on track. Engaging productively in that conversation will not only allow Israel to influence the “day after,” but will also foster additional patience for the IDF to pursue its offensive against Hamas on the “day before.”

Ambiguity has run its course. If Netanyahu doesn’t put politics aside, Israel could end up missing the train entirely. 

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow for Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. From 1990 to 2016, he served seven consecutive premiers at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem. Follow him on X: @ShalomLipner.

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Those Resolution 1701 guardrails have proved illusory, with both sides incessantly trading cross-border fire for more than four months, and diplomats are now scrambling to prevent escalation. Rather than supporting these efforts, Lebanon is exploiting them. Instead of trying to constrain Hezbollah, Beirut—if not acting in concert with the group—is at least attempting to use its attacks as a bargaining chip—seeking to link an end of Hezbollah’s violence to a broader “package deal,” through which Lebanon can extract concessions from the international community and Israel.  

Hezbollah began its latest attacks against Israel on October 8, 2023, to hamper Israel’s war efforts in the Gaza Strip. Initially, Lebanon’s caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati cautioned against “adventurism,” while the rest of the government remained largely silent about the attacks. But Mikati and other senior government officials soon shifted to cautious endorsement after Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah said on January 5 that his group’s attacks were an “opportunity” for “Lebanon… to liberate every inch of our Lebanese land” along thirteen points of contention on the Blue Line, “from point B1 in Naqoura to Ghajar, to the Shebaa Farms and Kfar Chouba Hills.” Within days, Mikati was praising Hezbollah’s wisdom and characterizing its attacks against Israel as acts of self–defense, before officially aligning Lebanon’s position on a ceasefire in the south with Hezbollah’s, demanding a halt to Israel’s war in Gaza first. 

Mikati’s subsequent attempts to walk back this alignment only entrenched it, particularly when he repeatedly echoed Nasrallah’s position that Lebanon was facing a “golden opportunity” to advance its position on territories disputed with Israel. 

Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib, meanwhile, described Hezbollah as “Lebanese who know” and seeking to secure “Lebanon’s interests.” He argued Lebanon would not try to silence Hezbollah’s guns—let alone consider disarming Hezbollah—until Israel settled all outstanding disputes. The Lebanese government, he reasoned, “doesn’t work for the Israelis to allow the[ir] settlers to return home” without gaining something in return. Bou Habib suggested Lebanon could hold out until these demands were met because it was long accustomed to instability. 

As a result, diplomatic efforts to quell Lebanon’s desire to play with fire have gone nowhere. The Lebanese government seems to believe that it will get better terms as international desperation to stop Hezbollah’s attacks grows. That Western benefactors have reportedly floated a willingness to bankroll Lebanon’s failing economy to “sweeten the deal” only reinforces Beirut’s belief that this blackmail will ultimately be rewarded. Hezbollah may also believe that Washington’s eagerness to avoid an outbreak of another major war plays in its favor.  

Hezbollah and the Lebanese government are not wrong in assessing Washington’s fear of escalation. To understand the interplay of the Lebanese government and Hezbollah today, it is crucial to appreciate how the two worked in tandem during the Joe Biden administration’s January–October 2022 mediation of the Lebanese-Israeli dispute regarding where their maritime boundary ran through potentially lucrative offshore gas fields.  

At the time, Hezbollah also detected a US desperation to avoid the outbreak of a major war in the Middle East while it was already confronting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The group decided to, in Nasrallah’s words, “exploit” the situation by repeatedly threatening war to force the Americans and Israelis into agreeing on the maritime border. 

While this cooperation remained officially unacknowledged by Lebanon, the course of events made it obvious. First, Beirut would adopt a position, then Hezbollah would swiftly move to reinforce it through threats—hence why the group adhered to the more minimal but official demand for Line 23 and not, as one might expect, the more maximalist Line 29. Nor did Lebanon ever disavow Hezbollah’s general posture during negotiations; it only once criticized the group’s actions, and only under US pressure. Nasrallah, meanwhile, readily acknowledged this symbiosis, repeatedly saying that Hezbollah was only acting to advance the Lebanese national interest as expressed in the government’s positions. 

On his last day in office, Lebanese President Michel Aoun described Hezbollah’s “initiative” as “useful,” but once again stopped sort of admitting coordination. By contrast, Abbas Ibrahim—the head of Lebanon’s General Security Directorate and the chief Lebanese interlocutor during the maritime negotiations—has effectively denied that the Lebanese side was so passive. In a post-retirement interview, he described himself working hand in glove with Hezbollah to achieve Lebanon’s national interests. He explained how, when the Lebanese side sensed any Israeli hesitation to meet a Lebanese demand, Hezbollah would act aggressively while Nasrallah passed threats of war through Abbas to Amos Hochstein, the chief US negotiator, who would then pressure Israel into a concession. So it went until the undeservedly celebrated Israel-Lebanon maritime border deal was signed on October 27, 2022—and even then, Hezbollah refused to consider the matter fully closed. 

Nevertheless, at face value, the “package deal” being offered by Lebanon appears worthwhile. After all, Israel is seemingly only being asked to concede a few kilometers of irrelevant territory. In exchange, it would obtain not only a ceasefire on the northern border but full Lebanese compliance with Resolution 1701, allowing more than eighty thousand displaced Israeli citizens to safely return home by permanently resolving the perpetual threat Hezbollah poses to their lives. 

But appearances are deceptive. Lebanon, by the admission of its officials, will never disarm Hezbollah. Bou Habib acknowledged that “would lead to a civil war, destroying the country.”

“Personally, if we have a choice between civil war and regional war,” he explained, Lebanon should choose regional war. Bou Habib also refused to guarantee that Hezbollah would willingly accept constraints. He said Hezbollah should grant concessions to the Lebanese state, adding, “We’ll see what happens.” However, Bou Habib stressed, “in the end,” Beirut simply “may not succeed.” With a war more destructive than any that Hezbollah and Israel have ever fought hanging over the region like the Sword of Damocles, it may be tempting to grasp for this illusionary carrot being offered by the Lebanese government. Lebanon may not be identical to Hezbollah, but it is hard to deny that Beirut is again seeking to make gains by taking advantage of the very real and dangerous stick being wielded by Hezbollah. 

David Daoud is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), focusing on Hezbollah, Israel, and Lebanon issues. Follow him on X: @DavidADaoud.

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The Houthi militants have described their attacks on commercial vessels as “an act of self-defense.” They claim they are attacking ships suspected to be linked to Israel or those that are heading to or from there. The Houthis believe that the disruption of global trade will pile pressure on the international community to coerce Israel into accepting a ceasefire in the Gaza war which has killed nearly 27,000 Palestinians since October 7, 2023. Instead, since January 11, the United States and the United Kingdom have launched a series of airstrikes against Houthi targets in a major escalation described by some analysts as a US-Iran proxy war in Yemen. 

According to Osama Rabie, head of the Suez Canal Authority, the diversion of ships has resulted in a 40 percent drop in Suez Canal revenues in early January compared to the same period last year.  The losses are significant, amounting to “hundreds of millions of dollars,” per International Monetary Fund (IMF) managing director Kristalina Georgieva. The decline in canal revenues—which account for 2 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)—has put further strain on Egypt’s already faltering economy at a time when the country faces a severe foreign currency shortage. Egypt badly needs the hard currency to import wheat and other goods and to repay its staggering foreign debt, which reached $164.5 billion in September 2023, $29 billion of which is due for repayment this year.  

And, no, tourism revenues won’t compensate for the Suez Canal revenue losses. The tourism sector—another of Egypt’s main sources of foreign currency—has also been dealt a blow by the ongoing war in the Gaza enclave, which shares Egypt’s northern border. The American credit ratings agency Standard & Poor has predicted that the tourism sector in Egypt—along with Lebanon and Jordan— could suffer the most from the ongoing war, hampering GDP growth and “weakening the country’s external position.” 

Egypt’s gas exports have also suffered over the past year. Aging gas fields and upstream issues have resulted in a 10 percent year-over-year decline in gas production during the first eight months of 2023. This starkly contrasts with the previous year, when Egypt had exported 80 percent of its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to Europe, stepping in to replace Russian pipeline gas in the wake of Russia’s onslaught on Ukraine.

To meet high domestic demand over the summer, Egyptian gas has been used for local consumption with no surplus left for export. The outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in the neighboring Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023 has aggravated the problem: Israel’s gas exports to Egypt dropped by 70 to 80 percent in the weeks after the war—Israel shut down its Tamar gas field off its southern coast to safeguard it against potential attacks from Hamas—compared to the first eight months of 2023. The month-long shuttering of the gas field resulted in a halt in exports through the underwater EMG pipeline. Fortunately for Egypt, gas production at Tamar resumed in mid-November 2023. Egypt subsequently restarted its LNG exports to Europe, with the first shipment leaving its LNG export terminal at Idku on November 21, 2023. In December 2023, ABN Amro reported that Egyptian imports from Israel were back to pre-war levels. 

Meanwhile, according to the Central Bank of Egypt, remittances from Egyptians working abroad fell by nearly 30 percent during the third quarter of last year (July-September 2023).  Analysts attribute the drop to a lack of confidence in the Egyptian economy and the existing dual foreign currency exchange rate: one US dollar is equivalent to nearly thirty-one Egyptian pounds when exchanged in banks, but sells for nearly double the value on the black market.  

The Egyptian pound has already lost more than half its value in a series of devaluations of the currency—part of a package of economic reforms (including moving to a flexible exchange rate) conditioned by the IMF in 2016 to allow Egypt to secure a $12 billion rescue package to restore investors’ confidence in the economy. Prices of essential commodities, including food and fuel, have since soared, with inflation at 33.7 percent in December 2023; and public discontent—and the risk of instability—rising.  

The government, which has been dragging its feet in carrying out the painful but necessary reforms it agreed to at the time the IMF deal was sealed in 2016, is left with no option but to comply with the IMF loan conditions, which include free flotation of the currency, and will reduce the state’s economic footprint by enhancing private sector participation—in other words, it will level the playing field for all economic actors.  

In 2022, Egypt secured nearly $3 billion of new financing from the IMF. Still, that deal has been at a virtual standstill pending progress in the conditioned reforms, which include a flexible exchange rate and the accelerated sale of military-owned companies to private investors. One economic analyst who chose to remain anonymous told me he believed the 2024 presidential elections were brought forward to December 8-10, 2023 because the Abdel Fattah el-Sisi government had been reluctant to announce another currency devaluation before the vote, fearing the decision may spark social unrest. 

Meanwhile, per Ahram Online, Georgieva said that Egypt and the IMF have continued to try to reach an agreement on “systematic adjustments to state policies;” she added that the two sides were “very close” to agreeing on the implementation details of Egypt’s economic reform program. According to the global credit rating agency, Moody’s, the adjustments would allow for “expansion of the IMF loan program to $10 billion” to help Egypt overcome its enormous challenges and bridge its widening financial gap. 

It looks like Cairo has woken up to the realization that it needs to urgently deliver on its promises of reforms to the IMF to avert further economic disaster. Even as the IMF talks were ongoing in Cairo, the Central Bank of Egypt announced a 2 percent hike in interest rates as of February 1, signaling that another currency devaluation is in the offing. While the decision may infuriate the majority of Egyptians—30 percent of whom live below the poverty line—it is a bitter pill that must be swallowed. The alternative is an Argentina– 2001 scenario with Egypt defaulting on its foreign debt.

Amid heightened social tensions due to the skyrocketing prices of basic commodities and the possibility of social unrest, Cairo has already braced itself for a major cabinet reshuffle, a source close to the government told me. A change of government would allow President Sisi to remain in power and continue the harsh austerity measures introduced in 2016. Sisi, however, needs to put the brakes on grandiose projects that many Egyptians consider unnecessary and revisit some of his controversial policies that have led Egypt to where it is today. Egyptians find themselves having to foot the bill for what many describe as “the mismanagement of the economy,” “state monopoly,” and decades of “preferential treatment for military agencies.”

Despite the general harmful implications of the Gaza war and the Houthi attacks, in particular, Cairo has refused to partake in military operations against the Houthis, calling them “a dangerous development” that threatens to destabilize the region. Rather than take action to deter the militant group, Cairo has urged the Houthis to focus their attacks only on Israeli ships, the London-based Al-Araby Al-Jadeed has reported. This lack of action by the Egyptian leadership is likely due to fear of being perceived by Egyptians—the majority of whom sympathize with the Palestinians—as siding with Israel. 

Egypt, meanwhile, is doing all it can to mitigate the economic harm caused by the reduced traffic through the Suez Canal, including by raising transit fees by 10 to 15 percent starting mid-January. Cairo has also intensified its mediation efforts to end the conflict.

Nevertheless, the longer the war continues, the greater the toll it will take on Egypt’s troubled economy and the higher the risk of social unrest—regardless of whatever emergency measures Egypt takes. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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Arab-Israelis, Arab citizens of Israel living within the country’s official borders, have struggled relative to Jewish communities for decades. The causes are many. Discrimination against minorities is hardly unique to Israel and occurs against the incommensurable security challenges faced by the Jewish state. But much of the crisis is caused by demography and the ineffective retail political strategies pursued by Israel’s Arab minority. There is low-hanging fruit here that provides an opportunity to ameliorate the crisis and spark further progress.

Year after year, crime rates—specifically violent crime rates—rise at an unprecedented rate. In 2023, 244 Arab-Israelis were killed in crime-related events. From 2018-2022, 70 percent of those killed in crime-related incidents were Arab despite making up only 21 percent of Israel’s population. By and large, these are intra-community crimes.

According to a study by the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel, the rising Arab-sector murder rate correlates to a few demographic factors. There is a population bulge of young Arabs from their late teens to mid-twenties. Arabs aged eighteen to twenty-two comprise the highest percentage of Arabs in any age demographic category: 29 percent compared to the overall 21 percent. The study observed “a positive and statistically significant correlation” between “the rate of growth in the number of Arab men aged 18-22 and both the murder rate and self-reported feelings of a lack of security.” Simultaneously, as the number of young Arab-Israeli men grows, so too has their unemployment rate. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the unemployment rate rose 7 percent in two years, reportedly due to disparate skills and demands of the labor market.

The study points to the lack of higher education among Israeli-Arab men as another factor driving the crime rate. Only 18 percent of men in their thirties hold bachelor’s degrees compared to 47 percent of non-Haredi Jewish men and 35 percent of Arab-Israeli women of the same age group. Not only does this impact their employability in Israel’s modern economy, but it has shifted gender attitudes and marriage norms. In the past decade, the number of Arab-Israeli women earning college degrees has doubled, affording them higher employment rates and greater independence. As a result, divorce rates in Arab communities have grown, and Arab-Israeli women are increasingly marrying non-Arab-Israeli men. Arab-Israeli men seeking marriage will face even greater challenges moving forward. Currently, the average age difference for intra-marriages within the Arab-Israeli community is six years. This will become increasingly problematic as, in coming years, there will be 5-10 percent more eligible men for marriage than women. These compounding factors of demographics, education, and marriage are pushing young Arab-Israeli men to the margins of their communities despite comprising a significant portion of the population. 

High poverty rates and underfunding of education further exacerbate the issues facing Israeli-Arab communities. In 2015, they received approximately $4,110 per primary student compared to about $5,150 per primary student in the Hebrew system (no other study exists to date). The reasons behind this discrepancy are complicated. The Israeli education system offers students the choice between primarily Hebrew and primarily Arabic instruction, with further options between secular schools and a variety of religious ones. In practicality, geography is a significant determinant of school choice. In Arab-Israeli towns, it is unlikely to find a predominantly Hebrew school. 

Israeli schools also have multiple sources of funding. The central government provides most schools’ budgets. Ninety-five percent of its resources are distributed equally between students, with the remaining 5 percent allocated based on socioeconomic conditions. In 2018, 45.3 percent of Arab-Israeli families fell below the poverty line compared to just 13.4 percent of Jewish families. The disparity in funding, therefore, does not come from the central government but from the ability of localities to provide their schools with additional funding. Considering that in 2023, 53 percent of Arab-Israeli households were living in poverty, Arab-Israeli communities are limited in the support they can provide. The effects of this discrepancy are detrimental to the success and well-being of Arab-Israelis. There is a direct correlation between school budgets and scores on Israeli university matriculation exams. The lack of a college degree, especially for men, impacts their job prospects, leaving them far more likely to remain in the cycle of unemployment, poverty, and crime, keeping schools underfunded for the next generation.

The Israeli government is aware of the challenges present in Arab-Israeli communities. At the end of 2015, the Knesset adopted a five-year plan to improve Arab sector economic development, integrate it into broader Israeli society, and narrow the socio-economic gap between Arab and Jewish communities. The plan allocated $2.6 billion to education, transportation, healthcare, and employment—an amount meant to be proportional to the Arab share of the population. A second five-year plan with a budget of almost $10.8 billion was passed in 2021 by the Naftali Bennet and Yair Lapid government. Significantly, this was the first governing coalition in Israel’s history to include an Arab party. 

When the current government came to power in December 2022, Bezalel Smotrich, the controversial far-right Religious Zionist leader, was appointed as finance minister. In subsequent months, he froze the release of $54 million designated by the five-year plan for Arab municipal authorities, citing an insufficient “supervisory mechanism” to prevent the funds from falling into the hands of criminals. This action was followed by calls from other ministers to review or even reallocate the funds. After a stalemate followed by the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, Interior Minister Moshe Arbel overrode Smotrich’s decision on November 1, 2023, sending the frozen funds, as well as an additional $62 million of emergency funds, to the Arab municipalities.

Why Israel should care

While the current war between Israel and Hamas presents many domestic challenges, it also displays to Jewish Israelis why they must care about the country’s Arab citizens. Eighty percent of Arab-Israelis oppose the October 7, 2023 attacks carried out by Hamas, and 66 percent support Israel’s right to defend itself against the terrorist group, according to a poll by the Agam Institute and Hebrew University. Similarly, another poll by the Center for Democratic Values and Institutions (Arab Society in Israel Program) noted that 56 percent believe the attacks “do not reflect Arab society, the Palestinian people, and the Islamic nation.”

Though this support is likely to wane as Israel carries out its counter-offensive in Gaza, the initial numbers show that Arab-Israelis have a sense of camaraderie with their fellow citizens. These are perhaps the most “pro-Israel” numbers to be found in the Arab world. Arab-Israelis were among those killed and kidnapped on October 7, 2023, and they were also among those saving Israeli lives. And there are numerous Arab-Israeli soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) fighting against the country’s enemies.

Israel also has much to gain from properly addressing the issues facing the Arab sector. Israel’s always-prevalent security concerns regarding domestic and West Bank terrorism have heightened during the war. The more that Arab citizens identify with their fellow Israelis, the less support extreme factions of Arab-Israeli society will receive, and the more secure all Israelis will be and feel. Economically, the cost of investing in the growth and development of Arab-Israelis now will be far less than the cumulative cost of indefinitely providing large amounts of welfare and managing the effects of poverty. The economic success of Arab-Israelis will help integrate them into Israeli society, aid in improving the crime rate, and bolster Israel’s economy. Arab-Israelis should feel as though their fate is tied to the fate of their fellow citizens and vice versa. When Israel prospers, all its citizens prosper; when Israel suffers, all its citizens suffer. 

Opportunities for social and policy changes

In order to solve the Arab sector crisis, both Jewish and Arab leadership need to commit to change. Jewish political leaders must recognize the role of Arab society in Israel and the importance of helping it prosper. The five-year plans were a step in the right direction. The crisis cannot be rectified without purposeful and sufficient funding, and the whims of politicians should never condition this funding. However, funding alone is inadequate. The money must reach the sectors where it is most needed and effective. This will require the input and expertise of local Arab-Israeli leaders familiar with the crisis and affected communities. 

Additional avenues for integration and development should also be explored. Israel and the international community have long invested in people-to-people interactions between Jews and Arabs, but these experiences should be the norm and not the exception. Schools are a prime environment to house these programs. Geographic constraints and religious education complicate the integration of such programs into the regular school day, but after-school and extra-curricular activities could be effective. Not only would these programs create more face-to-face time between Jewish and Arab youth, but they also would emphasize the relevance and importance of school.

Tackling the crisis cannot solely focus on the next generation, though. Continuing adult education and skill acquisition programs can both help change the economic realities of Arab-Israeli families in the present moment and enable parents to emphasize the importance of education through their actions. But however ideal, it is unrealistic to expect Jewish politicians to pursue these policies on their own. Securing the necessary funding and support requires partnership and concessions from Arab leaders as well. 

The political behavior of Arab-Israeli citizens and politicians must change if they want to see greater government engagement with the crisis. Over the past few decades, Arab voter turnout has waned from 75 percent to 44 percent. To gain political influence, Arab citizens must increase their political involvement and vote in greater numbers. In turn, it is the responsibility of Arab parties to harness the potential of this support. As the 2021 elections proved, Arab parties are most effective when they put aside their political differences and run together in elections. This way, no representation is lost to the 3.25 percent threshold to make it into the Knesset, and Arab parties maintain greater bargaining power.

Another way Arab parties can grow influence in the Knesset is by mimicking the behavior of ultra-orthodox Jewish parties. For much of Israel’s history, ultra-orthodox parties would largely ignore rights versus left politics and join governments based on securing funds and specific, advantageous policies for their communities. Although de-prioritizing other political beliefs in favor of ensuring funding for education and development may not address all communal goals, it can unlock the resources required to address some of them.

However, government action can only go so far. Hopefully, the impact of these policies will promote social values of education and national unity—without which the crisis will continue. On October 7, 2023, Hamas viewed their victims’ religion and ethnicity as secondary to their nationality. Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs would be wise to do the same.

Rachel Friedman is an Iran research intern at the American Enterprise Institute‘s Critical Threats Project and a former Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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China has long tried to maintain a tricky balancing act in the Middle East, working with every country while trying to avoid alienating any of them. This friend-to-all logic makes sense for an extra-regional actor without aspirations of playing a significant political or security role. It allowed Beijing to build up its regional interests, enhance its economic presence, offer mediation that few took seriously, and release five-point plans that few read. The expectation has long been that China’s considerable interests in the region would result in a larger political role, and Chinese leaders have been saying as much for at least a decade. 

In a 2014 interview with Al Jazeera, Foreign Minister Wang Yi was grilled about the perception of China as an economics-only actor. He acknowledged “a need for China to build up its capabilities for sustained expansion of such cooperation,” noting that China would “play a role in the political field as well.” He added that “China’s political role in the Middle East will only be enhanced, not diminished.”  However, in the following years, there was little movement to indicate that China was willing to be more than an economic actor in the region.

After President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Riyadh in December 2022, this perception of a modestly influential China began to change. Throughout the first half of 2023, it looked like Beijing was ready to start spending the political capital it had long been saving up; Iranian President Ebrahimi Raisi visited China in February 2023, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas did the same in June 2023. 

After the Abbas visit, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that he had been invited to visit China in October 2023. Ultimately, he didn’t go because of the Hamas attack on Israel, but for a time, China appeared willing to wade into the murky waters of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Additionally, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) expanded to include members from the Middle East. Most notably, in March 2023, the surprising announcement in Beijing came that Saudi Arabia and Iran were normalizing diplomatic relations. (It has been well-documented that the Omanis and Iraqis did the heavy lifting on that agreement, but China gladly put its great power stamp on the deal.)

Taken together, the popular narrative was that China had emerged as a major power in the Middle East, and one of the issues on which this was expected to pay dividends was in its relationship with Iran. The two announced a comprehensive strategic partnership during President Xi’s visit to Tehran in 2016, although it took five years to bring it to fruition. During that visit, Beijing and Tehran announced—far too optimistically, as it would turn out—that they would increase trade to $600 billion by 2026. Last year, according to the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics dataset, the volume of trade reached $12.5 billion. Still, China is consistently Iran’s largest trade partner and has provided the Islamic Republic international legitimacy with Raisi’s state visit and full membership in BRICS and the SCO.  Many hoped this would result in Chinese leverage in Tehran that could be used to temper the aggressive behavior affecting China’s regional interests. The limits of that logic have been demonstrated over the past few weeks.

One issue is related to the SCO, which Columbia University’s Alexander Cooley described as “China’s attempt to establish, from scratch, a new organization that is neither controlled by nor beholden to Western interests and inputs.” Founded in 2000, it is a security-focused international organization, with the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) being one of only two permanent bodies (the other being its secretariat). While not a fully-fledged security community, member states are expected to come to a consensus on SCO matters, and the non-use of force among member states is a typical baseline expectation for these organizations. This is one reason why the dual memberships of India and Pakistan in 2017 raised eyebrows. Did SCO leaders China and Russia really believe they could manage such a tense relationship? As it turned out, China and India proved to be the more combustible ones, with hostilities in Doklam, Bhutan in 2017 and the Line of Actual Control in 2020.

On January 16, however, the newest full member of the SCO—Iran—strained the organization’s harmony and credibility when it launched missiles into Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Pakistan, in turn, launched counter-strikes into Iran. Tehran said that its target was Jaish al-Adl, a Sunni separatist group that killed eleven Iranian police officers in a December attack; Pakistan said its strike targeted separatist groups—the Baloch Liberation Front and the Baloch Liberation Army—that they suspect are hiding in Iran. Both strikes resulted in the death of children.

China’s foreign ministry called for calm and offered to “play a constructive role in cooling down the situation,” but it is not clear what that meant in real terms. It does underscore the SCO’s institutional weakness; if the member states were worried about terrorist groups operating in each other’s territory, they could share intelligence through RATS and coordinate a response. That Pakistan and Iran instead chose to launch airstrikes into their partner’s sovereign territory is not a rousing endorsement of the utility of China’s flagship international organization. 

The second issue is more troubling for Beijing: Yemen’s Houthi rebel attacks on Red Sea shipping. This began last October 2023 and escalated in January, with attacks on at least thirty vessels. Navigation between the chokepoints of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal is crucial for maritime commerce, an issue that affects all countries economically, including China. The European Union is one of China’s largest export markets. China has substantial investments in Egyptian Red Sea ports, a military facility in Djibouti, and the China Industrial Park, a China-Saudi joint investment in Jizan on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. Re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope is costly in time and money, adding between eight to ten extra days in shipping from Shanghai to Rotterdam.

The bigger impact is on global inflation and regional economic pressures across the Middle East, including in two of China’s comprehensive strategic partners: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is already facing a deeply troubled economy and relies upon Suez revenue. Saudi Arabia has focused on building a stable and sustainable economy through its Saudi Vision 2030. More than anything, the Vision requires a stable region if it is going to attract foreign direct investment and global talent, and the Houthi attacks seriously undermine that. 

China’s response has been modest. Predictably, it did not join Operation Prosperity Guardian, the multinational coalition meant to ensure safe transit through the Red Sea. This was rewarded when the Houthis announced they would offer Chinese and Russian ships safe passage as long as they did not have links to Israel. China’s COSCO, with the industry’s fourth largest shipping fleet, has re-routed to avoid the security risk, despite the Houthi’s assurances. Others have not. 

The Financial Times reported on January 25 that smaller Chinese shipping companies—Transfar Shipping, Sea Legend, and Fujian Huahui Shipping—have taken advantage of this immunity to redeploy to the Red Sea. One can imagine that Beijing’s partners in Riyadh, Cairo, and elsewhere would have found this combination of a political non-response and commercial opportunism incredibly disappointing after all the pronouncements of a greater present last year. 

The US has repeatedly and publicly asked for Chinese support, which has not been forthcoming. On the face of it, this looks like a lack of US influence; China is confident enough to ignore the global superpower. Look more closely, however, and this seems to be a deft bit of positioning by Washington. China’s inaction exposes the self-interested and transactional nature of its position in the Middle East. Regional actors need international leadership in the Red Sea, and China has not offered it.  

On January 26, Reuters reported that Beijing had been working behind the scenes. It reached out to Iran—the Houthi’s sponsor and closest partner—asking them to rein in the group or risk Tehran’s economic relations with China. It is often assumed that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy, but it is more of a partnership than a patron-client relationship. A Houthi spokesman said there had been no message from Iran concerning China. Whether or not this is true—there is no reason for them to acknowledge such discussions publicly—it seems that the leadership in Tehran is far more focused on regional priorities right now.

At the same time, the partnership with China has not delivered in economic terms to the degree the Iranians expected. Since finalizing the comprehensive strategic partnership deal in 2021, Iran has been the recipient of a flimsy $185 million in Chinese investment, which pales in comparison to the excess of $5 billion Saudi Arabia has provided over the same period. Iran’s deputy economy minister Ali Fekri complained last year that he “is not happy with the volume of Chinese investment in Iran, as they have much greater capacity.” This frustration seems to have boiled over in January, when Iran decided that the days of cheap oil for China were done; Iran began withholding crude shipments to Beijing and demanded higher prices after long offering significantly discounted crude. The perception of Chinese leverage in Tehran—much like the perception of Chinese power and influence in the Middle East and North Africa—took a hit.

It is important to emphasize that these dynamics are all very fluid. Seeing its status and interests in the Middle East threatened, Beijing may yet step up and play a role commensurate with its economic footprint. However, it is more likely to continue to be the regional actor it has been over the past decade—one that comes to the Middle East to trade and build, not lead. 

Jonathan Fulton is a nonresident senior fellow for Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an association professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, UAE.   

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Kibbutz Nir Oz was founded in the mid-1950s. Its purpose was to help create Israel’s “bread basket.” A second goal was to serve as a barrier between Israel and the terror attacks from then Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip.

In 2014, Israel built a supposedly unbreachable fence around Gaza. That did not stop Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from frequently firing mortars, rockets, and anti-tank weapons into border towns or flying incendiary or explosive kites and balloons into farmlands and homes.

Having learned to live with these threats, the people of Kibbutz Nir Oz—nearly all peaceniks to the core—grew crops, orchards, livestock, and ran a successful factory. Most of these, along with our homes, have been destroyed. We have all lived in temporary housing since October 8, 2023, and have no idea when it might be safe to return.

Until the terrorist attack, I believed that the Israeli army would defend the kibbutz within minutes of any breach at the border fence, approximately one mile from our homes. On what has become known in Israel as “Black Saturday,” that entire system collapsed. Had I been home on that date, I, too, would surely be dead or held hostage.

Blurring the atrocities of October 7, 2023

The number of dead from October 7, 2023 constitutes for Israel—a small country of less than 10 million—the equivalent of approximately 44,500 American lives, or nearly fifteen times the deaths from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since October 7, 2023, many voices have invoked memories and comparisons to the Holocaust and the many pogroms (anti-Jewish riots) that preceded it. These voices loudly rang every day for my son and the 135 other hostages still held in the Gaza Strip.

To my mind, October 7, 2023 was the worst security failure in Israel’s history. But framing it in the context of the Holocaust or pogroms, while perhaps natural, blurs what happened that day. On the one hand, these comparisons obscure the culpability of Hamas for its butchery. On the other, they muddle the inescapable accountability Israel’s government must bear for what happened and its lasting effects.

That date was indeed the deadliest single day for world Jewry since the Holocaust. But there was no sovereign Jewish state—Israel—or strong Jewish army—the Israel Defense Force (IDF)—in 1939. Hamas’ attack would not have happened and certainly would not have been so deadly if Israel’s government and army had done their jobs. By invoking the Holocaust when talking about October 7, 2023, the Israeli government is released from its accountability for the massacre that day and its sacred responsibility to return all the hostages alive.

Calling October 7, 2023 a pogrom is similarly unhelpful. Unlike the spontaneous anti-Jewish mob violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Eastern Europe, the recent massacre was formulated, organized, funded, and executed by Hamas, who controls the Gaza Strip. By invoking memories of pogroms, it risks obscuring the responsibility of Hamas and its leaders for the mass murders and kidnappings it directed on Israel’s border communities. Whatever the scale of civilian casualties inflicted by the IDF on Gaza’s civilians since that tragic day, Hamas’ brutality must never be brushed over. The Israeli victims and the people of Gaza deserve this truth.

Peace can only be secured if the hostages are freed

The release of approximately a hundred hostages (approximately forty were from my kibbutz) between November 24, 2023 and November 30, 2023 thrilled my community. However, worry continues to grow because males constitute more than a hundred of the remaining group, and their release may seem less urgent to some. A grave concern is that the fate of sons, brothers, fathers, and grandfathers held captive—including my own—will not be prioritized as the news cycle moves forward. Sagui and all the hostages are running out of time.

The Israeli government must live up to its obligation of protecting its citizens and never leaving anyone behind. It must not abandon these hostages like it abandoned the residents of my kibbutz on October 7, 2023 in its desire to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip. If Israel does not hold itself to account by getting back all the remaining hostages alive and the remains of those bodies taken by Hamas, the country will never heal the nationwide trauma from October 7, 2023. Invoking the Holocaust around the events of that day is neither historically accurate nor necessary to absorb the magnitude and consequences of the massacre.

The possibility of future peace in a troubled Middle East depends not just on the war ending, but also on all hostages returning home alive. The destruction and suffering wrought by Hamas on that horrible day stand alone. 

Jonathan Dekel-Chen is the Rabbi Edward Sandrow Chair in Soviet & East European Jewry at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of Kibbutz Nir Oz. His son, Sagui, is currently held hostage by Hamas in Gaza.

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Evidence does suggest that Hamas has lost significant capabilities to sustain its armed resistance. The rockets being launched toward Israeli cities and targets have gone down significantly, and there are only small pockets of resistance in the northern Gaza Strip, where some rockets are still being launched. Estimates point to the remainder of Hamas’ forces being largely present in southern Gaza, particularly in Khan Younis and Rafah.

Nevertheless, almost daily, the group publishes videos of its fighters launching anti-tank projectiles at Israeli armor units and troops and documenting various attacks, resulting in Israeli casualties, including twenty-one Israeli soldiers on January 23. Most importantly, Hamas retains a significant number of its tunnels, including strategic ones that double up as shelter facilities and operational sustainment centers, even though the Israel Defense Force (IDF) has revealed the destruction of many of them. New Israeli estimates based on uncovered evidence point to the presence of up to 450 miles of tunnels under Gaza, far more than initially believed. The failure to retrieve the remaining Israeli hostages is further evidence that Hamas still has robust hidden networks and combat-effective cells.

As the humanitarian conditions throughout Gaza become catastrophic for the coastal enclave’s civilian population—particularly right now, given the seemingly inevitable onset of famine—growing diplomatic and political pressure on the Israeli government may force a significant change to the scope and objectives of the operation. The maximalist goals that Israeli officials stated at the beginning of the campaign may very well have to be tamed and reduced to more modestly achievable outcomes that do not bring about the total destruction of Hamas.

Most day-after models, scenarios, and plans for Gaza’s future have assumed the IDF’s ability to break and destroy the Islamist group entirely. Few have contemplated an end to the war that sees some of Hamas’ military and governance capabilities remaining in place. While Israeli planners have spoken of subsequent phases of the military operation that will go on for many more months, they represent low-intensity efforts that will likely be focused on the most serious of militant threats—not the eradication of every single Hamas member and government employee.

This poses an uncomfortable and pressing question: What do Israeli, US, Arab, and international decision-makers do with a devastated Gaza Strip, where militant infrastructure has been severely weakened but is still under some control by Hamas’ remaining presence?

There are three gradual and linked phases that may help in navigating such a scenario.

The first phase requires a negotiated settlement that includes the release of the hostages as part of a prisoner swap mediated by Qatar and Egypt; the initiation of a long-term ceasefire; and the beginning of a gradual transformation of Gaza’s political system. Most importantly, this would require options for senior Hamas leaders and members to depart Gaza under international guarantees, similar to the Yasser Arafat and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) departure from Lebanon after the 1982 Siege of Beirut. What becomes of these individuals once they depart Gaza is between their host and Israel’s priorities. The main concern of this phase would be ending the presence of Hamas’ military leadership through political means. Given that almost none of the group’s political leaders are currently in Gaza, this would effectively leave Hamas’ remaining rank-and-file without any motivation to act on behalf of a leaderless organization.

The second phase requires establishing an interim provisional administration that would initially recycle most existing governance bodies responsible for administrative functions throughout Gaza’s various sectors. A mix of Palestinian Authority (PA)-paid employees—including those in the finance and water management sectors, along with Gaza government-employed teachers, doctors, and public safety officers—could quickly bring about some resemblance of a functioning administration. This phase is arguably the most crucial because it will necessitate retaining some of the public safety infrastructure in Gaza, and will help fight crime, chaos, and the disruption of humanitarian aid distribution. The provisional use of existing public safety employees is critical for rapidly facilitating the removal of rubble and unexploded munitions, as well as the establishment of a temporary port to receive aid and power-generating ships. This measure would also enable the formation of a new administrative body that can set up a capable and professional police force with Palestinian, Arab, and international involvement and support.

It is important to note that regardless of what a revitalized Palestinian Authority looks like and whether that conforms to the publicly stated expectations of the United States and international community, the weak, yet still functioning and existing PA frameworks, are sufficient for kickstarting a new reality in Gaza after the cessation of the IDF’s operation. This primarily entails representing Gaza’s interests in international arenas to ensure that Palestinians have a voice in all planning discussions. The PA will be vital in giving political and diplomatic legitimacy to post-war efforts aimed at aid provision, reconstruction, political reform, restoring public services and administrative functions, managing various financial transactions (e.g. paying worker salaries), and, more importantly, creating a new internal and outwardly facing security infrastructure. The situation in Gaza cannot afford to wait for a completely revitalized PA to emerge per US expectations; instead, working with what is present will, in fact, begin the path of rejuvenation that is needed for the desired effectiveness of the PA.

The limited presence of the PA in the Gaza Strip, by definition, means that its role in the coastal enclave will require new structures, systems, and processes, not just the importation of West Bank apparatuses or the activation of dormant Gaza staff and administrative structures. The success of the PA’s role will depend upon its ability to use intelligent and level-headed messaging and professionals to build foundations for a new, prosperous, and terror-free Gaza. It was the PA’s incompetence and corruption—real or perceived—that contributed to Hamas’ political and electoral rise in the first place. For the PA to play a meaningful role in reshaping Gaza’s future, it must learn from past mistakes to gain legitimacy with its battered, resentful, and traumatized population.

The third and most challenging phase calls for initiating the reconstruction effort along a parallel track to transform Gaza’s political system. The reintroduction of some elements of the Palestinian Authority, along with Arab and international monitors, would signal that a new political process is beginning to take shape. During this phase, existing day-after scenarios that have already been articulated for Gaza may have a chance at implementation. Additionally, at this stage, broader regional reorientations, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Israel, may provide a catalyst for reinvigorating the two-state solution and pragmatic steps toward implementing it.

Primary considerations should focus on the gradual pace of change amidst unprecedented destruction while ensuring that Gaza’s borders with Israel are secured and a repeat of October 7, 2023 can never take place. With its ground and surveillance assets, the IDF is more than capable of securing the border from the Israeli side and detecting militant threats.

The most troublesome open-ended question is what remains of thousands of Qassam Brigades fighters who will still have some of their weapons and military training? Can these fighters be rehabilitated, de-radicalized, and recycled into a new Gaza administration? Can contemporary examples, such as what happened with Columbia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) rebels, the Irish Republican Army members in Northern Ireland, or the PLO fighters (who became the nucleus of the Palestinian Authority), serve as viable examples for political rehabilitation? If Hamas members who were not involved in egregious crimes against Israelis are willing to be part of a new administration, would Israel and the US support a rehabilitation program?

A combination of incentives, safety guarantees, and promising prospects could provide viable off-ramps for leaderless and commander-less Hamas fighters looking for a way out of a quagmire. Despite their ideological orientation, members of the Qassam Brigades are, in essence, employees of an organized outfit with monthly salaries, benefits, and incentives that reward their dangerous and deadly work. While a certain segment of these fighters are irredeemably radical and militant, serious thought should be given to programs, initiatives, and offers that could provide a safe and dignified way out for thousands of young Gaza men whose conditioning, circumstances, and sociopolitical resentments led them down the militancy path.

Creative approaches, such as weapons buy-back programs—especially those seeking to collect strategic gear like anti-aircraft missiles, long-range rocket systems, weapons manufacturing machinery and equipment, mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and heavy munitions—could prove vital in shrinking the availability of weapons inside Gaza. This, coupled with continuous monitoring to prevent future smuggling, will reduce the ability of remaining Hamas fighters to sustain a post-war insurgency, particularly if most of their leaders are exiled or eliminated.

Another approach worthy of consideration is the successful experiment with the Awakening Councils in Iraq (also known as the Sons of Iraq), which sought to combat the atrocities of al-Qaeda during the height of the Iraqi insurgency. Sunni tribal leaders, former Iraqi military officers, and even former insurgents and militants were rehabilitated in a new security architecture to leverage their expertise and local know-how to combat ruthless insurgents. This approach proved invaluable in taming widespread violence in the Anbar province and the “Sunni Triangle,” ultimately supporting the success of General David Petraeus’ “surge” in stabilizing Iraq at that time. However, the success of the Awakening Councils was reversed due to the refusal of the Shia-dominated Iraqi government to integrate Sunni fighters into the Iraqi security forces, setting the stage for many of these Councils’ fighters to join the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) years later. Similarly, many Hamas fighters may abandon militancy if they are offered a long-term and sustainable path into a new system that incentivizes them to abandon violence or be part of a new security paradigm.

The disastrous de-Ba’athification program following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq is a cautionary tale of a zero-sum approach to reconstruction and political rehabilitation. While the policy may have been well-intentioned in wanting to root out remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime from the new Iraqi political system, it contributed to the ensuing chaos and an insurgency by resentful public service workers without prospects in the new country. This is important to consider because there are many public service employees working under Hamas’ regime simply because it is the only employer in town. These employees, including those in the healthcare, education, and public safety systems, could prove vital if retained in a provisional administration to run Gaza’s affairs.

Destruction is easy, but building is hard. After Hamas’ criminality and horrendous conduct toward Israelis and even its own people, it might be tough to tolerate a scenario in which some of Hamas’ infrastructure is recycled into a future Palestinian political system. However, the realities on the ground and Israel’s inability to fully eradicate Hamas, coupled with a catastrophic humanitarian situation that will likely accelerate the end of the war, necessitate these uncomfortable discussions. Undoing decades of Hamas’ terror and administrative control will require convincing Palestinians to turn away from the Islamist group’s ideological and political subjugation of Gaza. Indeed, contemporary history has multiple examples of political actors and players who were involved in violent terror before getting rehabilitated as part of agreements and processes. What remains of Hamas in Gaza may be no different.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a naturalized American citizen from Gaza City and provides analysis and opinions on the Gaza Strip’s affairs and politics. Follow him on X: @afalkhatib.

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This concern is shared by all countries in the region, who, for various reasons, understand how the evolution of current tensions into a wider conflict could generate catastrophic consequences for their interests at large.

Israel does not want a regional escalation because it has to manage a complex military operation in the Gaza Strip that is far from producing the results that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised. Palestinian militants have not only not been defeated nor eradicated from Gaza, but it is not at all clear how the Gaza Strip will be governed when the conflict ends and by whom. Moreover, the war has only pushed to the background, but not resolved, the deep political crisis of the far-right government headed by Netanyahu and its judicial vicissitudes. It is, therefore, evident how a regional escalation, with the risk of direct involvement from Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, represents an untenable risk variable for Israel, which could lead to the opening of new and far more complex fronts on which to fight.

Paradoxically, however, regional escalation also poses a real risk for Hezbollah and Iran. For Lebanon’s Shia militia, the possibility of a direct conflict with Israel would almost certainly result in a political crisis at the national level that would risk dragging Beirut back into a civil war after more than four years of economic collapse, parliamentary deadlock, and growing tensions between the country’s different confessional groups. For Tehran, on the other hand, a regional escalation could result in the United States and Israel entering a conflict dynamic capable of reaching the country directly. Not least, a military confrontation could result in the re-emergence of demonstrations by Iranians generally upset by the regime’s handling of everyday life.

At the same time, escalation concerns are also alarming for other countries in the region, as they would be immediately and directly affected despite not being directly involved in the war. Syria could become one of the hottest fronts in countering Iran’s role in the region, thus, thwarting the strenuous efforts of the Bashar al-Assad regime to emerge from a bloody decade of civil war. Jordan, with over three million refugees in its territory—most of them Palestinians—would likely become the epicenter of Palestinian demands, straining the Hashemite Kingdom’s resilience. Egypt, beset by a severe economic crisis, would also have to deal with increasingly large refugee flows into the Sinai region from Gaza. Additionally, it may also have to confront the emergence of domestic anti-Israeli sentiment and the possible resurgence of the ousted Muslim Brotherhood, potentially setting the stage for a crisis that Cairo is in no way willing to address. Finally, Gulf monarchies may have to deal with potential fallout from Iran’s threat to turn the Strait of Hormuz—where 20 percent of the world’s oil passes through—into a war zone by blocking the waterway.

Another potential consequence could be the possible re-emergence of Islamist-backed terrorism, which would disrupt social and economic order across the region. As it is, in the Red Sea, the Houthi rebels are increasing their attacks against international naval security for the precise purpose of raising the stakes with their long-time rival Saudi Arabia (rather than supporting the Palestinian cause). However, this pretext of fighting for the defense of Palestinian rights may become the reason for their entanglement into a larger conflict. Despite this picture of collective risk for the entire region, however, each country seems to be forced to make choices that increase the risk of regional escalation every day.

Israel is caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, it must deal with growing international dissatisfaction over the high number of casualties generated by the intervention in Gaza without having a viable solution for either the management of the conflict or the post-conflict future of the government in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Hamas’ blatant resilience, the continued firing of rockets into Israel, and Iran’s ability to supply its regional allies dictate not only the continuation of operations in Gaza, but also the need to strike Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, Hamas leaders in Beirut, and the storage locations of Iran-supplied weapons in Syria, generating continued retaliation and an exponential increase in risk.

The United States is demanding that Israel find a solution to its war with Hamas. But since Iran emboldens Hamas, this translates into finding a solution with Iran. Iran, however, is not currently amenable to negotiating given its perception of continued American and Israeli aggression against its allies in the region, which allows it little space to maneuver. Even if a potential Iranian reformist elite wanted dialogue with the West, this would be undermined by hardliners’ objections over what they deem to be violent American behavior. This represents a dynamic that generates increasing violence, from which even Washington does not seem to know how to extricate itself. The current situation is further complicated by the disastrous perception that the US is withdrawing from the region. Hezbollah does not intend to get involved in a conflict. However, it has increased its assertiveness against Israel through continuous missile launches and rapid raids against the Israel Defense Force (IDF), provoking a constant Israeli response.

Finally, the situation in Iran is even more complex, where the political polarization between the first and second generations of revolutionary leaders results in systematic discord in institutional positions, ranging from the former’s desire to pursue traditional pragmatism to the latter’s impetuousness. Although Iran has no interest in a regional escalation, the need to support its regional allies, Israel’s continued strikes on its logistical chains in Lebanon and Syria, and the recent assassination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Seyed Razi Mousavi and five military advisors in Syria, are likely to result in Tehran acting with increased assertiveness. It is clear how this dynamic poses the real risk of fueling an escalation.

No country in the Middle East and North Africa wants a regional conflict. Nevertheless, each country acts in such a way that exponentially increases its likelihood, trapped in a dynamic that finds no capacity for mediation while displaying the limitations and weaknesses of each actor. If this continues, the probability of an escalation to an all-out war increases exponentially.

Karim Mezran is resident senior fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council.

Nicola Pedde is the Director of Institute for Global Studies in Rome, Italy.

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While Saudi Arabia does seek to boost its reputation as part of a broader effort to reform its economy and increase tourism, sportswashing is not the most useful way to analyze Saudi Arabia’s recruitment of top sports talent or its creation of LIV Golf.

Understanding the changes occurring in Saudi Arabia is critical for US policymakers and American companies, especially since more big Saudi sports investments are likely around the corner and Riyadh is part of a changing “middle power” geopolitical landscape. The negotiations around the PGA/LIV merger passed a December 31, 2023 deadline but are continuing, with reports that US investors may join the new entity.

Sports investments as part of the Kingdom’s broader strategy

Saudi Arabia’s big financial bets in the sports world are part of its broader Vision 2030 plan to diversify the economy away from oil, create more private sector jobs for Saudi people (not just expats), and ensure a sustainable future for the Kingdom when the oil eventually runs out.

Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) is highly motivated to achieve the ambitious goals in his Vision 2030. The current war between Israel and Hamas is unlikely to derail MBS’s focus on driving forward his reform and development agenda. Sixty-three percent of Saudi Arabia’s population of over thirty-two million is under the age of thirty, so if the reforms are not successful by the time the oil has run out, the Kingdom will face serious challenges.

MBS is focused on metrics and performance; he said in a September 2023 interview he doesn’t care about sportswashing criticism so long as his strategy yields the results he wants, such as GDP growth.

Sports for All (SFA) is the Saudi government initiative responsible for driving progress on the Vision 2030 targets relating to sports. It was launched in 2018, and it has specific strategies for every age group from young people to older adults. Interestingly, SFA specifically targets housewives of all ages and has released official regulations that require the use of feminine words whenever masculine words are used to ensure sports are presented as open to both men and women. SFA’s goals include: 1) motivating people from all walks of life and at all levels of capability to be healthier, 2) increasing community-wide physical activity level and opportunities to socialize through sports, and 3) working through the private sector to achieve the overall growth in sports and physical activities in the Kingdom.   

As SFA President Prince Khaled bin Alwaleed explains, SFA’s “mandate [is] to have 40 percent of all people in Saudi active by 2030.”

Sports reforms in Saudi Arabia positively impact regular people, especially women

Many Americans still associate Saudi Arabia with three things: the September 11 terrorist attacks, its war in Yemen, and the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. Many also rightly have serious concerns about Saudi Arabia’s human rights record. So it’s unsurprising that when Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, the Public Investment Fund (PIF), wanted to buy the PGA in June 2023, the US public reaction was to connect this to what it knows of the Kingdom. Considering how lasting those negative associations have been, it’s difficult to imagine how an investment in a US sports tournament could “wash” that away.

If you ask Saudis, especially women, about why their government is investing in sports, what you may also hear is that it has opened a pathway to health, fitness, and careers unimaginable a decade ago. For others, it provides opportunities to children their parents didn’t have, including exercising in school. And for many—young and old—it’s cultivating a sense of personal aspiration and civic pride as they watch their national teams compete.

When Saudi first licensed gyms for women in 2017, 40-year-old Sara Rahimaldeen was one of the first to join. As a young mom to two children, she wanted to do something to “regain her energy,” as she told one of us. Six years later, Sara now trains as a competitive athlete and has a career as a coach and personal trainer. “Now I’m changing people’s lives just as my life was changed,” Sara said.

In 2017, the right to obtain driver’s licenses opened up opportunities for female Saudi athletes. Two years later, Reema Juffali, the first Saudi woman to hold a racing license, participated in an international racing competition hosted in the country. In 2020, Saudi Arabia hosted its first professional international golf tournament—the Ladies European Tour—where Saudi women played alongside international female players. “Before we could drive, we had to go out to the outside of the city at four in the morning to run,” Sara recalled. “And it was so difficult to convince someone to take us.” Now, the government organizes public marathons through the recently launched triathlon federation, where men and women run in the streets side by side.  

The same year that local municipalities issued business licenses for women’s gyms, the Education Ministry allowed physical education in schools for girls and boys. Kevin Kerns, a former American tennis player who competed in the US Open, recently started teaching tennis at schools across Saudi Arabia. He initially launched the tennis training program in thirty schools and expects to roll it out to 290 schools this year, reaching over 70,000 kids. “Tennis is more than a sport. It teaches goal setting, how to work with others, and life lessons on winning and learning. We’re teaching kids to engage in sports for a lifetime,” explained Kevin to one of us.

Changing geopolitical reality and the need for a new US approach

The United States needs to recalibrate its approach to middle powers such as Saudi Arabia to take into consideration new geopolitical and domestic political dynamics. As the United States faces more competition from China and from middle powers banding together in blocs such as BRICS—which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recently joined—it needs to recognize that trade-offs will be the new normal for successful US strategy.

Saudi Arabia’s sports investments are a useful case study of how the United States needs to alter its policy approach. Here are the critical elements of a new way forward:

• The US government and human rights organizations criticized the Kingdom in the past for preventing girls from playing sports and not permitting women to work out at gyms. Saudi Arabia has radically changed its approach: gyms that allow women now abound; girls now play sports in school; and Saudi women athletes are competing internationally. The United States should see Saudi investment in sports as part of a broader win for millions of Saudi women and girls—not to mention men—in terms of personal freedom, health, and leadership development.
• Sports can be a way to bridge divides, organize collaboratively, develop people-to-people networks, and improve business and government relations. This includes continuing to fund sports diplomacy programs through the State Department to train coaches and referees, as well as sharing American expertise on nutrition, sports psychology, and the entertainment infrastructure needed to support sports, to name just a few areas where partnerships can take place. These types of partnerships can be good for American companies and can also nurture important relationships that can impact societal change.
• The United States often tells Saudi Arabia and other middle powers what it doesn’t want them to do. Lately, growing close to China has been a major concern. Situations—like the potential investment in the PGA Tour—where Saudi Arabia is seeking a partnership that China cannot offer and that does not harm US national security interests or go against US values should be seen as a win for the United States and an opportunity to lead.
• The United States needs to consider the self-interested motives of countries rather than viewing every policy decision as a referendum on its relationship with the United States. The Kingdom saw golf as a sport ripe for a shake-up and knew, with their deep pockets, that they were well-positioned to make a move that could help them achieve their broader tourism and entertainment development goals. It’s not all about the United States: Saudi Arabia is considering similar investments in countries such as India, where PIF has “expressed an interest” in acquiring a multi-billion dollar stake in a major cricket league.
• Saudi Arabia will be more persuaded by arguments that speak to their national interests rather than appeals to follow international norms or threats about withdrawing American support. Human rights violations reduce the appetite for foreign investment and association with the Kingdom. American companies and government officials can remind Saudi counterparts of the potential reputational and economic consequences if they commit such abuses. US negotiators working with PIF on the merger should also emphasize the massive negative blowback that would occur if golfers are prevented from speaking their minds or if other controversial restrictions are put in place. To avoid these issues, US negotiators should also ensure a strong governance structure for the new golf entity.

If Americans persist in seeing Saudi sports investments primarily as “sportswashing,” they will be scoring own goals. The Saudis will not end their investments in this sector or in many other sectors of the US economy, such as the 60 percent stake it holds in Lucid Motors or its significant investments in Activision Blizzard and Uber. Instead, US-Saudi tensions will cause rifts among athletes, sponsors, and fans, and may preclude cooperation that could be a win-win.

Sovereign wealth funds in the Gulf have over $5 trillion in assets, with expected upward growth continuing. If the United States wants to encourage more investment in US companies and global infrastructure projects—as the Joe Biden administration reportedly does—it is essential to understand the multifaceted motivations of these countries, as well as the human and economic potential of their citizens rather than relying solely on past negative tropes.  

The PGA Tour contends that LIV Golf would have eventually run them out of business if a deal with PIF had not been reached. Saudi Arabia is flexing its sports investment muscles globally and playing the long game, like when it was the only bidder for the 2034 World Cup. Negotiating partnerships on sports that both sides can live with is an example of the kinds of trade-offs that the United States should accept to achieve its broader national security goals in this volatile, multi-polar world.

Stefanie Hausheer Ali is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council and a senior director at the international strategic advisory firm Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. The information in this article represents the views and opinions of the author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. 

Jaime Stansbury is a vice president at The Cohen Group and was formerly the executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Saudi Arabia. The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of The Cohen Group.

The post The real reason the Saudi government is investing in sports. Hint: It’s not to impress you. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hamas’ atrocities on October 7, 2023 featured the largest international hostage-taking in modern history. Inhumane acts—including public beheadings, desecration of corpses, rape, and mutilation—were perpetrated and recorded on video for broadcast during the assault. Over 240 people were taken captive, representing over twenty-five different nationalities, many different ethnicities, and a range of religions and beliefs. They span all ages and vulnerabilities, including a baby, a cancer patient, and a wheelchair-bound Holocaust survivor. While motivated by genocidal antisemitism, Hamas’ crimes envelop all of humanity.  

This unprecedented hostage-taking was the culmination of a long and violent history of international crimes by Hamas. The organization’s reign of terror and kidnapping intensified following its 2007 violent takeover of the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian Authority, which was accompanied by the execution of political opponents, scores of attacks against Christians for exercising their right to freedom of religion, and the torture and arbitrary detention of rivals, journalists, and peace activists. Hamas’ crimes against Palestinians have continued unabated in its two decades of domination over the Gaza Strip, whose population Hamas effectively holds hostage.

Over the course of years of Hamas terror attacks against Israeli civilians, hostage-taking has emerged as a prevailing theme:

• In 2006, Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was illegally taken captive and held under conditions violating international law without news of his whereabouts, health, or any sign of life. He was used as a bargaining chip and was released five years later in exchange for over one thousand convicted terrorists, many of whom went on to commit further crimes, including masterminding the October 7, 2023 massacres.
• In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and murdered three teenage Israeli students.
• In the same year, Hamas violated a US-brokered and United Nations-mandated ceasefire by taking two soldiers hostage: Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul. They were believed to have been killed, with their remains continuing to be withheld illegally.
• Two civilians, Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, who unwittingly entered Gaza due to mental illness, have been illegally held hostage by Hamas since 2014 and 2015, respectively.

Hamas’ continued holding of hostages and many abuses of them—withholding of information on identity and situation; inhumane and degrading treatment, including forced participation in propaganda materials and being publicly paraded through Gaza; sexual and gender-based violence; torture and denial of medical treatment; use of hostages as human shields; murder of those held; and holding and desecrating remains—are crimes against humanity and a standing violation of international law.

These acts are prohibited under customary international law and in treaties, including the Convention Against Torture, the Convention Against Hostage-Taking, and the Geneva Conventions. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities further underscore the unique vulnerabilities and protections for specific victim classes held by Hamas. Whether considered an international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict, there are clear legal prohibitions against taking hostages, torturing hostages, executing hostages, and outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment. Withholding remains, preventing their repatriation and burial, and desecrating or mutilating remains are prohibited as outrages upon personal dignity. 

These criminal acts are in breach of Islamic principles and prohibitions, including in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, which states that “[t]aking hostages under any form or for any purpose is expressly forbidden” and that the dignity of the dead must be protected from desecration. As Karim Khan, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) put it, “[c]hildren and men and women and elderly people cannot be ripped from their homes and taken as hostages…They are the most un-Islamic of acts and cannot be committed in the name of a religion whose very meaning is peace. These acts represent some of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Hamas committed war crimes and crimes against humanity under Article 7(1)(c),(e),(f),(g) (i), and (k); Article 8(c)(i), (ii), and (iii); Article 8(e)(i), (vi), and (xi). In particular, Article 7(2) defines “enforced disappearance of persons” as the “abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” As per Article 7(1), when carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, enforced disappearance is a crime against humanity. Hamas’ hostage-taking of over 240 people and withholding of information on abductees—as part of widespread and systematic attacks on the Israeli civilian population—clearly meet these criteria.  

Despite obstacles—Israel is not a member of the ICC; leading international law scholars and subject experts assert that the court does not have jurisdiction over Israel; and a diverse group of key Rome Statute states filed briefs at the court arguing that there is no jurisdiction over Israel—recent developments provide a path forward for Hamas victims. Following Palestinian ratification of the Rome Statute and a controversial request from then-Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that “Palestine is a state party to the Statute” strictly for the first stage of proceedings, without bearing on questions of sovereignty or borders, and with disagreement amongst the judges on territorial jurisdiction.

This means there is jurisdiction for issuing arrest warrants based on personal jurisdiction for crimes committed by Palestinian nationals. The current prosecutor Karim Khan affirmed this position in a recent public statement, with specific reference to investigating and punishing the crime of hostage-taking. He reiterated this position following a solidarity visit hosted by the families of Israeli hostages, the first-ever visit by an ICC Prosecutor to the region.  

As Hamas victims provide crucial evidence and testimony, including Palestinians and Israelis taken hostage and brutalized by the terror group, the court should be encouraged to prioritize the investigation of Hamas perpetrators and move expeditiously toward the issuance of arrest warrants against them. 

Rule-of-law nations, while seized of the crimes against their nationals taken hostage in Israel, concerned for the impunity that underpins it, and highly supportive of issuing arrest warrants against Hamas, may be reluctant to appear to interfere with the independence of the Office of the Prosecutor at the investigative phase and therefore might not intervene.  

However, demonstrating the broad global consensus on the need for accountability for Hamas crimes—including the worst international terrorist kidnapping in modern history—and reinforcing norms against hostage-taking would serve the ICC and support the prosecutor’s mandate. It would also help deter rising global terrorism and the crimes of its pariah state supporters. 

As a proxy of the Resistance Axis that is armed and trained by Iran, uses North Korean weapons, and receives diplomatic support from Russia, Hamas commits crimes on behalf of the most malign and regionally destabilizing actors. These rights-abusing regimes trade best practices on bad conduct and use each other’s crimes as a testing ground for their own. Russia deploys Iranian drones and North Korean weapons in its atrocities against Ukrainians, just as Hamas does with Israelis. South Korea and Japan face the threat of a Hamas-like invasion from North Korea, with the prospect of tunnels across the demilitarized zone, kidnappings, and missiles targeting civilians, with lessons drawn from Hamas crimes and the impunity surrounding them.

The states with the greatest stake in upholding the rules-based international order are also those facing the greatest threats from the rogue regimes that back Hamas.  

Many of the most concerned countries were founding members and top funders of the International Criminal Court and intervened under the Rome Statute in historic numbers to support the investigation of crimes against Ukraine via state referrals, grants, and secondments. The same approach should be taken regarding Hamas crimes.  

While unprecedented public state support pursuant to the Rome Statute helped bring about the expeditious issuance of warrants against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Presidential Commissioner for Child Rights, Maria Lvova-Bevova, for the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, these warrants, in turn, brought greater credibility and contributions to the ICC, most notably from the United States as a non-member of the court. Above all, it comforted suffering victims and gave them hopes of seeing justice.

Likewise, countries intervening under the Rome Statute for arrest warrants against Hamas leaders for the parallel kidnapping of Israeli children will expedite the process. Similarly, their issuance will, in turn, generate more state support for the crucial mission and mandate of the ICC while supporting victims in their greatest hour of need.

As securing the return of the hostages and justice for the perpetrators are a major national priority and preoccupation in Israel and the United States, warrants and eventual prosecutions could also significantly advance a new golden era of cooperation for the court and expand ratification of the Rome Statute. 

The world’s worst terrorist crimes and the plight and pain of its victims demand urgent action. Justice delayed is justice denied, especially for those being tortured in Hamas captivity and their loved ones being tormented in awaiting their return. The ICC and all those supporting the cause of justice should prioritize the case against Hamas in 2024. 

Brandon Silver is an international human rights lawyer and director of policy and projects at the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, and pro bono international counsel to the Families of Hamas Hostages and Missing Persons. 

Irwin Cotler is a former minister of justice and attorney general of Canada and long-time parliamentarian. He is professor emeritus of international law at McGill University and chair of The Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights.

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Below, Atlantic Council experts share their views on what to know about the attacks and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

C. Anthony Pfaff: IRGC attack against Erbil poses challenges and opportunities for the United States

Holly Dagres: The read from Iran

Thomas S. Warrick: The war in the shadows will continue

Masoud Mostajabi: The subtleties of Iranian actions across the region

IRGC attack against Erbil poses challenges and opportunities for the United States

This escalation poses a significant challenge—and possibly an opportunity—for the United States to undermine Iranian regional influence and bolster its relations with Iraq. While US facilities were not likely a target, these attacks will likely increase popular concerns that US-Iran tensions will drag them into a wider conflict. These concerns could energize the movement to remove the entire US presence from Iraq, which gathered new steam after the US strike that killed Harakat al-Nujaba leader Mushtaq al-Jawari, who had been organizing strikes against US forces in Iraq on behalf of Iran. This concern manifests in other ways that place strain on US-Iraq military relations. Recently, the chief of staff of the Iraqi Army walked on a likeness of an American flag during an observance of IRGC Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani’s death in Baghdad.

While some of these protests can be dismissed as political theater, the current dynamic has placed the United States in a bind, where its choices are to endure the attacks or risk being forced to withdraw. Neither, of course, are optimal. However, the Iranian strikes against putative Israeli targets in Kurdistan may present an opportunity. Whatever one believes about the merits of Tehran’s claims of an Israeli presence in Kurdistan, the missiles largely struck civilian areas, causing significant collateral damage. In doing so, the attacks exposed gaps in Baghdad’s ability to defend its sovereignty against external attack, making it even more vulnerable to Iranian pressure.

Thus, these challenges and opportunities suggest the following short-term measures that could improve US-Iraq relations and alter the current dysfunctional dynamic. To address pressure for the withdrawal of US forces, the United States could offer to increase support to Iraqi air defense forces to counter missile and drone attacks, which have increased since October 7, 2023. Doing so could diminish the effectiveness of Iran-backed attacks, mitigating the need for more active measures. Baghdad, for its part, should take this opportunity to increase pressure on the militias to cease destabilizing attacks. In the past, the Iraqi government has had little success reigning the militias in. However, with Iran now directly attacking Iraqi territory, these militias may have some incentive to distance themselves from Iran.

—Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative, and the research professor for Strategy, the Military Profession, and Ethics at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College in Carlisle, PA. 

The read from Iran

#Pink_Jacket was scrawled in Persian on the ballistic missiles that hit Erbil. The hashtag was referring to a toddler donning a pink jacket who was among those killed in the attack in Kerman at a memorial service for Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani on January 3. Part of the civilian casualties by the IRGC missiles included the 11-month-old daughter of multimillionaire Kurdish businessman Peshraw Dizayee, who also perished with two other members of his family. That irony wasn’t lost on Persian language social media, where many pointed out that to take revenge for a child’s death, the IRGC had killed a child in the process.

The next day, on January 16, two celebratory billboards appeared in the capital, Tehran. “Hard answer with God’s permission,” one read with an image of a missile and Hebrew text that said, “We’re going to take more revenge against the infidels.” A separate billboard also had a missile and appeared with the Hebrew text that stated, “Shelter?! Prepare your coffins…” and repeated the phrase in Persian.

From the statement issued by the IRGC to the personalized missiles and newly revealed billboards, the IRGC wants to emphasize that the goal of their attacks was “hard revenge” for the Kerman attack and the assassinations of members of the Resistance Axis. Earlier in the month, Tehran had vowed revenge, and now it had delivered.

Now the question is whether Dizayee was, in fact, a targeted assassination by ballistic missiles or whether he and his family were collateral casualties retroactively claimed by the IRGC to exaggerate the accuracy of its missiles.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter.

The war in the shadows will continue

Iranian actions against the United States and US allies almost always display a peculiar sense of symmetry. Iran does something that requires retaliation in the form of sanctions, a cyberattack, a tanker seizure, or something else. Iran then retaliates—not always identically, but in some similar way. At first, Iran’s January 15 missile strike into Erbil looked like a dramatic escalation. After the dust settled and the identities of those killed became known, the peculiar sense of symmetry became painfully apparent: the Iranian regime’s target this time was not the United States but a prominent Kurdish businessman, Peshraw Dizayee, alleged by Tehran to have ties with Israel.

Regardless of whether this is true or not, eyes turned toward Israel’s December 25, 2023 strike in Syria that killed IRGC General Mousavi. His role in arming groups responsible for killing Israelis made him a legitimate military target. It remains to be seen whether Iran’s peculiar sense of symmetry was at work in Erbil on January 15, but this fits the pattern.

Iran’s hypocrisy is apparent. The Iranian ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazam al-Sadegh, is affiliated with the IRGC Quds Force, labeled in 2007 as a terrorist group by the United States and, eventually, by other countries. Sadegh knows his way to Kurdistan, having been photographed with Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirvan Barzani on September 11, 2023. While the ambassador and the Iraqi Kurdistan president—both highly skilled at the diplomatic game—look engaged in a friendly discussion, the widescreen photo gives a better sense of the frosty atmospherics. As a prominent Iraqi Kurdish statesman once told me, Kurdistan’s problem is “You can pick your friends, but you can’t pick your neighbors.” Iran’s January 15 strike painfully illustrates both truths.

Tehran could have complained through diplomatic channels and asked Baghdad or Erbil to rein in anti-Iranian behavior on Iraqi soil. Baghdad or Erbil would then have been able to insist that Iran rein in anti-American behavior by Iran and its proxies on Iraqi soil. The fact that the Iranian regime continues to use Iraq as territory from which to carry out attacks means that Tehran has little justification to complain when others do the same to it. The war in the shadows will continue.

—Thomas S. Warrick is the director of the Future of DHS project at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense program and a nonresident senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

The subtleties of Iranian actions across the region

Launching its most extensive operation to date, the IRGC has had a busy week, targeting Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan. According to Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the IRGC Aerospace Force commander, the operations aimed at a “Mossad espionage base in Erbil,” used for planning terrorism in the region, particularly against Iran, and “strongholds of Daesh in Syria.” Additionally, on Tuesday, Tasnim reported strikes on the “headquarters of Jaysh al-Dhulm (Jeysh al-Adl) terrorist group” in Pakistani Balochistan. 

These actions permit Tehran to claim achievements in response to for example the recent assassination of General Seyed Razi Mousavi, addressing ISIS-claimed attacks in Kerman and Rask – some Iranian officials attribute the former to Israel – and sending a message to Iraq’s Kurdish region, accused of harboring anti-Iran subversives.  

Moreover, by avoiding targeting Americans and US infrastructure, Tehran is able to showcase its missile and drone capabilities without escalating regional tensions. Adrienne Watson, the NSC spokesperson, confirmed that “no American personnel or facilities were targeted.” From Tehran’s perspective, these attacks serve as a signal of preparedness to both domestic and international audiences, indicating that Iran has the means and will to respond to threats against Iranians and the Iranian homeland, without substantially risking a broader regional conflict involving the United States. 

These actions won’t be the final ones from the Iranians, as it aligns with Tehran’s strategy to persist in striking perceived enemies. When questioned about the possibility of such attacks continuing, Hajizadeh explicitly stated, “the fight between good and evil never ends.” 

Nevertheless, the US and Western allies would be wise to take note of these subtleties, recognizing Iran’s need to project strength while also expressing a clear reluctance to escalate into a war with the West. Analysts advocating for a more forceful response to Iran should heed these considerations.

—Masoud Mostajabi is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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The United States put teeth into its warnings by deploying naval vessels and assembling a coalition of mostly European nations to stand against the attacks. But the Houthis were undeterred. On January 9, the group launched what US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby described the next day as “a complex attack of one-way attack drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile” toward US ships in the Red Sea.

The US-led barrage launched late on January 11 and a follow-up the next day struck positions in the capital, Sana’a, the port city of Hodeidah, and other cities, according to the Houthi’s al-Masirah news platform. The barrage hit radars, missile, and drone launch sites as well as weapons storage areas, said US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in a statement. The US and its allies studiously avoided targets that could create casualties—an attempt to prevent a further escalation while deterring the Houthis from their regular attacks.

The Houthis will remain defiant. Before the attacks, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled around the region warning of consequences for Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who vowed that he would not halt its attacks on ships it believed were linked to Israel, regardless of what the United States and the United Kingdom did. Hours after the barrage, the Sana’a government’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Hussein Al-Ezzi, warned on social media that “America and Britain must prepare to pay a heavy price and bear all the dire consequences of this blatant aggression.”

Such bluster is unsurprising. After an initial face-saving response that will likely involve the Houthis’ arsenal of drones and Iran-supplied rockets, the US-led demonstration of firepower may prompt the Houthis to ease up their attacks for a period—a predictable pattern of behavior by Iran-backed groups and allies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and even Tehran itself. Despite the dire headlines and reports on the Houthis’ al-Masirah channel, the elders within the Houthi camp, as well as the group’s backers in Iran and Lebanon, will likely detect a US reluctance to get more militarily involved in the Middle East’s various conflicts than it absolutely must.

But the airstrikes were relatively unprecedented. The United States has launched drone strikes against al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and struck Houthi coastal and marine forces in the past. However, the January 11-12 attacks amounted to only the second American action against a non-jihadi group on Yemeni soil and the first to hit Sana’a. Though it was measured, it amounted to yet another escalation in the Middle East since Hamas’ October 7 attack on southern Israel and the subsequent ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza. The attack will almost certainly stoke passions regardless of how political leaders interpret them. The Houthis called for thousands of protesters to gather for politically charged Friday prayers.

There have been other novel events in recent weeks. On New Year’s Day, Iran’s Alvand-class frigate, the Alborz, entered the Red Sea. Though upgraded several times over the decade, the British-made warship is fifty-five years old and was delivered to the late Shah of Iran. It has made previous sojourns to the Red Sea; doing so on one occasion to protect Iran’s ships from the scourge of piracy. It is no match for the United States and allied forces that have been deployed in the waters off Yemen. Yet the arrival raised alarm bells. While Iranians have surreptitiously provided the Houthis with weapons, training, and support, the voyage marked a rare instance when Iran overtly dispatched military hardware to the waters off Yemen.

Over the last three months, precedent-setting armed escalation has taken place in trouble spots all over the Middle East. It began with Hamas’ shocking attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, and continued with the unceasing length of the Israeli response. The Houthis have attacked civilian ships in the past, but they have done so over the last few weeks with a particular intensity.

Steering the region toward a more stable path may be beyond the power of any world power. However, the White House and its allies could limit or slow the deterioration by addressing each crisis separately.

Though the Joe Biden White House has toned down some of the hyperbole of its predecessors, it continues to operate in the Middle East with a Cold War mentality; it still attempts to rally partners against perceived enemies while clinging to the notion that the region has good and bad guys. Instead, the US and its partners could work to resolve more manageable problems that contribute to the region’s toxicity.

Both Hamas’ attack and Israel’s lengthy offensive are rooted in intra-Palestinian and intra-Israeli politics and rivalries. Iraqi militias’ abuses and transgressions, including their attacks on US troops in Syria, are aimed at weakening the central government in the eyes of Iraqis and the world. Even Iran’s decision to avoid direct involvement in the Gaza conflict may be rooted in domestic ambivalence toward the Palestinian cause.

Local conditions—rather than broader geopolitical objectives—may also drive the Houthis’ aggression. Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Iraq’s Shia militias, the Houthis, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad make up a so-called “Resistance Axis.” Tehran may have influence over Houthi leadership as it offers guidance, material, and logistical support, and there is evidence that Yemeni fighters have taken part in the same military training programs Iran has provided to Iraqi, Syrian, Afghan, and Lebanese militiamen.

However, there is little evidence that Iran has much direct operational control over the increasingly sprawling network of coalitions and alliances that make up the Sana’a government. Neither Iran nor Hezbollah, for example, are systematically targeting foreign vessels believed to be traveling to or from Israel.

While there is a sense of triumphalism that the ten-year-old rebel movement has now surpassed all expectations for its survival, it may not be a coincidence that the attacks and the Houthis’ escalating aggression are coming on the heels of the ceasefire with Saudi Arabia. Increased military capacity may contribute to the Houthis’ action. However, sustaining a sense of crisis and unceasing war also plays a role in maintaining domestic control. As long as the Saudi-led war effort against the Houthis raged, the group could keep a siege mentality and paper over its incompetence, misgovernance, corruption, and repression. With the Saudi-led war all but over, the Houthis may be feeling vulnerable. The Gaza war and the Houthis’ direct involvement perpetuate the crisis atmosphere.

Striking targets engaged in attacks on foreign-flagged vessels is legitimate. Nevertheless, the United States and international response should remain otherwise measured so as not to play into the hands of the Houthis. Instead, the US would do well to point out the Houthi’s failures and press them on basic matters, with a focus on asking tough questions about when the group will begin the arduous work of capitalizing on the Saudi ceasefire, such as restarting the country’s economy and rebuilding from more than a decade of war and one of modern history’s worst humanitarian crises. Such an approach could put the Houthis on the defensive while showing solidarity with a Yemeni public chafing under Houthi control, perhaps pressing the group to address basic local needs instead of grandstanding over Israel.

No power in the world seems capable of cooling down a Middle East aflame. Nevertheless, if the United States tailors its messaging and actions around each crisis on its own terms, and takes local and regional dynamics seriously, it may be able to place modest limits on the escalatory actions of the various players in the Middle East.

Borzou Daragahi is a journalist who has covered the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe for US and UK news outlets since 2002. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on X: @borzou.

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Despite securing a year-long truce between the US and the Iraqi political and armed groups that reject the US military presence in Iraq, and receiving the Biden administration’s declared support for his government, Prime Minister Sudani has not traveled to Washington. Now, with the security truce dissolved following the Israel-Hamas war since October 7, 2023, and the tit-for-tat drone strikes in the past weeks, Sudani is unlikely to be received in the White House soon, if ever.

The invitation US Secretary of State Antony Blinken extended to Sudani in September 2023 “to visit the White House soon” will be frozen under the current tense relations and as President Biden’s calendar becomes increasingly crowded in the months leading to the November presidential election. Meanwhile, it would not be an exaggeration to state that US-Iraqi relations are rapidly approaching the dynamics observed under the Trump administration in 2020, when a US drone strike killed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Deputy Commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. This led the Iraqi Council of Representatives to pass a resolution calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.

On January 4, a US drone strike inside Baghdad killed Mushtaq Jawad al-Saeedi, the deputy commander of Baghdad Belt for the PMF, who belongs to Harakat al-Nujaba, an armed group that is closely associated with Iraq and designated by the US as a terrorist group. The drone strike coincided with the Iraqi activities commemorating the fourth anniversary of the assassination near the Baghdad International Airport, which killed several Iraqis and Iranians, including Soleimani and Muhandis.

The Iraqi Presidency, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Foreign Ministry issued three separate statements condemning the latest drone attack, calling it a violation of Iraqi sovereignty and a breach of the bilateral agreement on the rules of engagement and the terms of the presence of US forces in Iraq. Major General Yehia Rasool, the spokesperson of the Commander-in-Chief of Iraqi Armed Forces, described the drone strike in the following terms: “In a blatant aggression and violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and security, a drone conducted an act akin to terrorist activities.”

In his daily briefing at the Pentagon on January 4, Air Force Major General Pat Ryder reiterated the often-cited basis for the presence of US forces in Iraq: they are in the country at the invitation of the government of Iraq and they are stationed there “for one reason, which is to support the defeat-ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham] mission.” He added that the US will “continue to work very closely with our Iraqi partners when it comes to the safety and security of our forces. When those forces are threatened, just like we would anywhere else in the world, we will maintain the inherent right of self-defense to protect our forces.”

However, this “inherent right of self-defense” has caused a bilateral crisis every time it has been exercised in Iraq. The Iraqi government’s reaction was articulated by Prime Minister Sudani, who called the January 4 drone strike “a crime” and said, “we affirmed our standing and principled position regarding ending the presence of the International Coalition after the end of the justifications of its presence, and we are working on setting a time to start the dialogue through the bilateral committee that was established to define the arrangements for ending this presence, and this is a commitment the government will not back down from.”

The Iraqi government took another unusual step: sending a text message surveying average Iraqis for their opinion on the matter. “Dear citizen, do you support the continuation of the International Coalition’s mission in Iraq?” the text read. A polling center sent the message, but the link people needed to click in order to give their answers led to a website administered by the government.

Despite this and the many strong statements made in the past few days, the Iraqi prime minister sent a soothing message to the United States while speaking to the press. On January 10, Sudani told Reuters that the upcoming talks to negotiate an end to international forces’ presence in Iraq “is not a discontinuation of the partnership between Iraq and the International Coalition, but a beginning of bilateral relations between Iraq, the US, and other countries, including security relations. We have no reservations on signing bilateral security agreements for general security cooperation or for training and capacity building purposes.”

The coming few months will reveal whether the Iraqi government intends to uphold the position Sudani announced and make an official request to withdraw US forces or, as skeptics claim, Sudani’s statement was made for domestic consumption.

What made an already tense situation worse was Major General Ryder’s statement to journalists at the Pentagon daily briefing on January 4: “We do know that the Iraqi security forces have continued to assist in identifying in some cases where these Iranian proxies have conducted attacks against US forces, and we are appreciative of that support.”

Prime Minister Sudani’s Iraqi opponents interpreted this as an accusation that Iraqi security forces were working as informants to aid the US airstrikes. The Prime Minister’s Security Media Cell issued a press release calling Ryder’s statement a deception attempt, adding, “We firmly deny the existence of such cooperation, but the opposite is true, yesterday’s aggression was executed directly without informing the knowledge of any Iraqi security or military entity.”

It is hard to explain how US government officials, who insist that the presence of US forces in Iraq is based on the invitation of Iraq’s government, fail to see the irony in the unanimous condemnations of their acts coming from all Iraqi leadership quarters. By the same token, it is also hard to explain how the Iraqi government, which validates the claim of their invitation of US forces, fails to protect its “guests” from attacks by groups it describes as Iraqi security forces, which are supposed to be working according to the authorities granted to them by the commander-in-chief. It is high time the governments of Iraq and the United States review and uphold their respective obligations instead of waffling between partnership and belligerence.

Dr. Abbas Kadhim is director of the Atlantic Council’s Iraq Initiative. Follow him on X: @DrAbbasKadhim.

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US government statements are very clear about the international legal justification for its military actions in the Red Sea defending freedom of navigation, an objective laid out on page forty-five of the Biden-Harris National Security Strategy and the national security strategies of US administrations since 1987. US spokespersons stress that each US action to intercept a missile or drone or to sink a boat has been an act of self-defense, per Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.

But statements about US thresholds for military action are more ambiguous. The Houthis believed that the US redline for offensive action would be the killing of an American. They also believed that Biden would be loath to engage in offensive military operations in an election year. Both were a misread in the current context. The Houthis assessed that the United States would strike only if a US asset were targeted, and then only with countermeasures.

However, the existence of an international coalition supportive of military intervention to disable the Houthi capability to endanger global shipping lanes shifted both the US redline for action and the willingness of the US president to act. A joint statement released on January 3 by Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom warned the Houthis against further attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea but did not define consequences for ignoring this warning.  

This allowed the Houthis the interpretive space to believe staging a follow-on attack using munitions from a distance would result only in the targets being protected but would pose no risk to their lives or assets. The US Central Command statement issued January 9 after the latest barrage of Houthi missiles and drones simply repeated the warning. However, in this case, it was not a warning to Sana’a but rather as a statement of justification for what was about to happen. On January 11, the US military, backed by international partners, conducted limited strikes against Houthi ballistic missile, cruise missile, and drone storage, production facilities, and launch platforms.

Despite the gripes of some members of Congress, Biden was on firm legal ground to launch the strike. The Houthi spokesperson’s statement on January 9 that their just-completed missile and drone assault targeted a US ship providing support to Israel removed any ambiguity about grounds for a US response. Article II, Section 2 of the US Constitution allows Biden, as Commander in Chief of US Armed Forces, to direct action against immediate threats like the Houthi tools of assault without Congress deliberating and declaring war. In the case of both international and US domestic law, the ongoing imminent threat from the Houthis gives the US president authority to act when and if he feels it is wise.

Biden’s biggest pre-strike questions

Ahead of authorizing the strikes, Biden had to carefully consider arguments for and against conducting strikes to limit the Houthis’ capacity to continue waging war on international shipping. Here are the big questions to grapple with.

1. Will striking Houthi military assets result in further military escalation in the Red Sea and the region?

US strikes against Houthi military assets will not stop Houthi acts of war. On the surface, therefore, it appears to be a cut-and-dry argument against Biden taking military action. But would not striking Houthi military assets have resulted in otherwise avoidable escalation? Yes.

The Houthis do not need provocation for further escalation. In the absence of strikes against them, they continued to escalate their attacks on global shipping interests, as evidenced by January 9. Defensive action only has not deterred their escalation.

Will the US strikes against Houthi military assets stop Houthi attacks against Red Sea shipping? No. Will such strikes reduce the Houthis’ ability to continue the assault for as long or to inflict greater damage than without strikes? Probably. Would not reducing Houthi arsenals in response to their actions encourage further attacks on global shipping? Yes.

Tit-for-tat strikes against Houthi munitions and launchers will not end the Houthi involvement in the conflict. However, they could deplete Houthi capabilities to extend or intensify their military actions.

Hezbollah is considering a land buffer agreement in its exchange of fire with Israel. The group has nothing to gain from an all-out war with Israel. It could inflict serious damage, but ultimately, the United States would come to Israel’s aid, and Hezbollah would be outgunned. In the process, Hezbollah would expend its arsenal, much of Lebanon’s infrastructure would be destroyed with Hezbollah to blame, and the group would lose ground in terms of its objectives. Hezbollah can appease those in its base clamoring for the group to show off its renowned store of weaponry as well as Lebanese citizens who prefer that their country stay out of the war next door by signing the agreement senior White House adviser Amos Hochstein is shepherding while retaining the capability to reach into Israel despite the buffer created by the agreement.

2. Do the US-led strikes jeopardize the fragile UN-led Saudi Arabia-Houthi talks?

In early December, the United Nations was presented with a draft plan for a political settlement to the nearly ten-year war between the Houthis and neighboring Saudi Arabia. Houthi political leadership appears focused on these negotiations while its military leadership fires on global interests in the Red Sea. The Houthis assessed that the United States and international community are so desirous of a political solution for this land and air war that they would not risk reacting to reckless Houthi maritime militancy. 

Will the United States and the international community conducting strikes uniquely jeopardize the political negotiations? No—not any more than standard Houthi intransigence around these negotiations has for the past five years. Even as the recently proposed plan—approved by the Houthis as well as the Saudis—was presented to UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg, the Houthis were already registering that they would like additional concessions. Based on the Houthis’ past performance, it is safe to assume that if they acted as the spoiler to this plan, it was their predetermined intent.

3.  Will the US-led strikes strengthen the Houthis in Yemen or abroad?

The Houthis are gaining popularity among Yemenis for their pushback against Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip since the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. Could this translate to greater Houthi political popularity inside Yemen at a time when critical future political power-sharing decisions are being discussed? It is unlikely. The Yemeni populace backs political actors based on local and community interests. Houthi action elsewhere does not translate to adopting Houthi goals domestically, goals which include implementing a fringe religious sect’s view on how they conduct their lives.

From a broader counterterrorism perspective, the Houthis are applauded throughout the Muslim world for challenging Israel more robustly than other groups backed by the same Iranian flag. But this is unlikely to lead to global recruitment to their cause. Unlike al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in years past, the Houthis do not espouse a global vision and cannot pretend to belong to a mainstream religious group. Houthi ideology is comprised of a political agenda controversially tacked onto the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam and calls for absolute obedience to a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed who should rule the entire Arabian Peninsula. Their current popularity is linked very specifically to their opposition to Israel’s war in Gaza and not to mass affiliation with this ideology.  

4. Will the US-led strikes provoke Iran?

The answer is: no more than Iran is already encouraging such action. The January 3 joint statement warning the Houthis against further targeting of ships was extremely carefully worded: “The Houthis will bear the responsibility of the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global economy, and free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways.” 

Tehran will note that the Houthis are singularly held accountable in this statement—and in the subsequent US strikes. That means Iran is off the hook. The US focus on these strikes allowed Iran to quietly carry out their two-year goal of retaking their oil tanker, the Suez Rajan, in the Gulf of Oman on January 11. There is no motive for Iran to underscore its ties to the conflict or the Houthis at this juncture. Tehran is already achieving its strategic goals with the decline of US popularity around the world and the halt of Israeli influence expansion in the Arab world through the Abraham Accords. Meanwhile, the distraction in the Levant allows the regime to focus domestically on broadening its nuclear program for greater future political leverage and shoring up its control of the population in advance of the eventual supreme leader transition.

5. Will the US-led strikes create reputational risk for the US on the international stage?

US support for Israeli military operations against the terrorist group Hamas has inspired criticism from countries with no connection to the conflict. The effort to build Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) on December 18, 2023 to secure the Red Sea was a test of the United States’ ability to build a coalition. The US military action conducted in the Red Sea is with the backing of OPG partners—some of whom have been quite critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza. This multilateral approach to threat assessment and planning tamps down cries about US unilateral action that risks impacting its reputation.

6. Will the US-led strikes harm Biden’s domestic political standing?

Biden’s biggest hurdle is his political party and Congress. He now has to worry about discontent among primarily Democrats about the humanitarian crisis in Gaza being mirrored in Yemen and his poll numbers dipping further. He also has to worry about opposition to the strikes from members of Congress who will vehemently decry an expanded US role in any sort of conflict in Yemen. Additionally, the president has to worry about opposition from members who fear kinetic action would suck the United States into another expensive war in the region. But with multilateral consensus for using military action to free a global shipping chokepoint impacting the flow of free trade, each of these risks are now reduced.

In the ring

The goal of taking action against Houthi military resources is to reduce the group’s ability to destabilize the region, threaten global shipping, endanger Israel and surrounding countries with poorly planned strikes, and protect civilians on land and at sea.

The Biden team is reviewing whether treating the Houthis as a legitimate political actor and a minor threat has emboldened Houthi militancy instead of encouraging their positive political evolution, and if so, whether it is time to prioritize a different objective. The United States has not redesignated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization but has enacted sanctions on individuals who facilitate their operations. The Houthis may not have imagined that the Biden administration would take military action without first a redesignation, and that was probably the case before the turn of the new year. However, the formation of a multilateral coalition in OPG and attempted Houthi strikes against US aircraft and a ship have altered the scenario and given Biden legal justification for the January 11 action without a protracted debate in Washington about designation. The Houthis wittingly took Biden’s gloves off for him, and he threw a punch. 

Kirsten Fontenrose is anonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and former US National Security Council senior director for the Gulf.

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Tourism, one of Egypt’s primary sources of income, has been dealt a blow through a surge in trip cancellations—particularly to South Sinai which was reported in recent weeks by Egyptian tour operators. Suez Canal revenues have also plummeted as a result of the reduced shipping traffic, owing to recurring attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea by Iranian-backed Houthi militants.           

In recent days, several global shipping companies have suspended shipping through the Suez Canal “until further notice,” citing security concerns. A missile attack on the Maersk Hangzhou, a container ship, by Houthi militias on December 30, 2023, marked the twenty-third attack on ships crossing the Red Sea since the start of the war on October 7, 2023. The suspensions and the slump in tourism have added to the country’s economic woes—Egypt is grappling with an acute foreign currency shortage and a staggering foreign debt amounting to $164.73 billion by the end of June 2023—thus, requiring Cairo to do all it can to resolve the Israel-Gaza conflict and prevent it from escalating into a wider war.  

Growing calls by some ultra-nationalist Israeli officials to displace Palestinians into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula—a suggestion that’s been categorically rejected by Egypt as “a red line” that would undermine its national security—have also given impetus to Cairo’s efforts to end the conflict and avert a possible standoff with Israel over the contentious issue. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who won a third term in office in the December 2023 elections (he secured a landslide victory against three little-known rival contestants), knows only too well that giving his nod of approval to the displacement of Palestinians would provoke the ire of Egyptians and may even threaten to destabilize the country.  

The majority of Egyptians—enraged by the scenes of Gaza’s destruction and corpses of children being pulled out from the rubble—have thrown their weight behind the Palestinians. Many Egyptians also back Hamas, perceiving the Palestinian militant group as a resistance movement fighting against a brutal occupation. While there is no love lost between Sisi and Hamas—the Egyptian president sees the Palestinian militant group as an affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group he helped overthrow in 2013, which has since been designated a terrorist group by Egypt—the Egyptian people’s solidarity with beleaguered Palestinians in the Gaza Strip has prompted Sisi to tread cautiously. As a result, he has been using one narrative with Israeli officials and another pacifying narrative at home.

The pressure from all sides has spurred Sisi into action, causing Cairo to intensify its efforts to broker a permanent ceasefire. Keen on regaining its traditional leadership role as chief mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, Cairo has put forward a three-stage plan to end the conflict. 

The Egyptian plan suggests an initial, temporary truce of one to two weeks that would be extended after each phase. The temporary halt in fighting would allow for the release of hostages in exchange for Palestinians held in Israeli prisons and for the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza. It would also enable displaced Palestinians, who were ordered by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to evacuate to the south, to return to northern Gaza, and for the hostages to be released in batches: first, women, children, and elderly citizens, then, women soldiers, and, finally, all remaining hostages in exchange for an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners. In the second stage of the plan, corpses of Israeli hostages who died while in captivity would be exchanged for the bodies of Palestinians who have died in Israeli jails. The final stage of the plan would see the withdrawal of IDF troops from the Gaza Strip, paving the way for a permanent ceasefire that Diaa Rashwan, head of the State Information Service, told Al Sharq Al Awsat “would restore peace and stability to the region.”    

The proposal, which also suggests that Hamas relinquish power in a post-war Gaza Strip, was initially met with a frosty reception from the Palestinian militant group, according to an Egyptian security source who spoke to me on condition of anonymity. In recent days, however, it had appeared to be gaining traction with both Israel and Hamas.

“Hamas and [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad, which held talks with Egyptian mediators in Cairo in late December, remain unwavering in their position not to negotiate a prisoner exchange before there’s a cessation in hostilities and all IDF troops withdraw from Gaza,” Ghazi Fakhry Murrar, a member of the Palestinian National Council who resides in Cairo, told me. Hamas leaders also insist that the Palestinian people should elect their leaders.

Despite Hamas’ seeming intransigence, Al Sharq Al Awsat reported on January 1 that a breakthrough in mediation talks was imminent as the two sides moved closer to sealing a prisoner exchange deal mediated by Egypt and Qatar. The news site added that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—the two Palestinian factions that are at war with Israel—were “open” to the Egyptian proposal, which would be implemented after coordination with the concerned parties. Al Sharq Al Awsat quoted Israeli Public Radio as saying that Hamas had privately agreed to a month-long truce despite making public statements insisting on a complete cessation of hostilities to move forward with a new hostage exchange deal.

The Egyptian mediation efforts had appeared to be making headway up until the January 2 assassination of Arouri in a drone strike on a southern Beirut suburb, derailing talks between Egyptian intelligence officials and a visiting Israeli delegation to broker a new hostage release deal. Quoting Qatari sources, Sky News Arabia reported on January 3 that Egyptian officials had informed the Israeli government of their decision to halt mediation efforts in protest of Arouri’s assassination. This decision prompted the Israeli delegation to cut its visit short and return home without clinching a deal.

All signs now point to an escalation in the war that has dragged on since October 7, 2023,  leaving Egypt’s mediation talks in limbo and putting the Egyptian leadership under additional strain. Israel refuses to back down until it eliminates Hamas and dismantles the group’s military capabilities—goals that many analysts argue are unrealistic or close to impossible to achieve. Israel’s targeted assassinations of Hamas and Iranian-backed Hezbollah figures are only exacerbating the crisis,” Murrar told me. “Such provocations are widening the conflict and are threatening to destabilize the entire region.”

As Israel’s war looks set to expand to new fronts with Lebanon, Syria, and possibly even Iran in the coming weeks, Egypt’s mediation efforts have been left hanging in the balance. Even if Israel was willing at any point in time to hold a temporary truce to release the nearly 130 hostages still held captive by Hamas, it would be more likely to opt for Qatari mediation, said a political science professor who preferred to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal. On January 2, Qatar, which hosts the largest US military facility in the Middle East at its Al Udeid Air Base, struck a deal with the United States to extend US military presence at the base for another ten years. Doha has also been hosting Hamas’ leadership since 2012 and, thus, has greater leverage with the militant group, he explained. 

It looks like the Egyptian proposal may be shelved—at least for now.  

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets, including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on X: @sherryamin13.

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From 2017 until his assassination, Arouri served as the deputy chairman of Hamas’ political bureau. This deceptively humble title conceals Arouri’s significance. He founded and directed the West Bank branch of Hamas’ Qassam Brigades, was a central coordinating figure of the Resistance Axis’ efforts to “unify the fronts” against Israel, and has been eulogized by Hamas as one of the “architects of Al-Aqsa Flood”—all of which made Arouri a prime target for Israel and an invaluable asset and ally to Hezbollah.

So, when leaks from an Israeli cabinet meeting in August 2023 suggested the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would resume targeted killings of senior militants in response to the then-ongoing uptick in terror attacks, everyone—including Arouri himself—understood he was marked for liquidation. Consequently, Arouri’s ally, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah—whose group, Hezbollah, had formed a protective cocoon around Arouri in Beirut—took to the air on January 3 to threaten Israel against “any assassination on Lebanese territory targeting a Lebanese, Palestinian, Iranian or Syrian,” noting that such measures “[would] be met with a strong reaction.” Nasrallah stressed that Hezbollah “could not remain silent or absorb” such an action because the group’s passivity threatened to “reopen Lebanon again to assassinations.” He also stated that Hezbollah would “not accept any change to the existing rules of engagement” and that “the Israelis must understand this.”

Soon after Arouri’s assassination, Hezbollah issued a statement echoing Nasrallah’s August 2023 address, calling the Israeli strike “a crime” and part of a “policy of liquidation of all who planned, executed, or supported the heroic Al-Aqsa Flood Operation.” Hezbollah further claimed that Israel’s strike was a “dangerous aggression against Lebanon… and development in the war between the [Israeli] enemy and the Axis of Resistance,” which “Hezbollah cannot allow to pass without a response and punishment.”

Nasrallah, in his speech commemorating the deaths of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani and Kataeb Hezbollah Secretary-General Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, briefly echoed a variation on that theme, restating his position made in December 2023 that “the battlefield will speak.”

But Nasrallah is notorious for having a much noisier bark than bite; just how loudly he will allow Hezbollah’s guns to roar over Arouri remains in question. Whatever the group may deem the proper response to his assassination in an ideal world, it is currently constrained by Lebanon’s realities: namely, economic freefall and abandonment by its traditional financiers amidst yet another interminable round of political deadlock. Hezbollah is hyper-cognizant of the importance of popular support to its longevity and durability and risks unnecessarily compromising that support—including among its supporters—were it to embark on some military adventure of whatever size against Israel. Doing so would invite untold destruction upon Lebanon, which would compound the country’s ongoing political and economic woes all the more so if it did so to avenge a commander of a Palestinian terrorist organization who was killed in the context of a foreign war.

Since Lebanon began to unravel in 2019, Hezbollah has been acutely cognizant of this Lebanese constraint and how this chafes against its obligations as a constituent organization (and most power member) of the Resistance Axis. Until October 7, 2023, Hezbollah found various methods of navigating this tension between its “resistance” duties and survival, but walking this tightrope became increasingly untenable after Al-Aqsa Flood. The group, therefore, opened fire at Israel along the entire border with Lebanon the next day. Hezbollah’s barrage was at a level not seen since the 2006 war between the two adversaries, and was meant to demonstrate its continued viability as a “resistance” organization. Hezbollah, after all, derives its durability from popular support, which, in turn, is partially dependent on the group’s perceived ability and readiness to confront Israel at any time.

But Hezbollah’s brinksmanship was, by its own admission, a highly calculated risk, and its newfound daring was dependent upon two factors: the first, per Nasrallah, was Israel’s preoccupation with fighting the war in Gaza. “Had just one of our operations during the past month [since October 7, 2023] occurred [before], the enemy wouldn’t have tolerated it, but they do today,” he said on November 3, 2023.

The second factor fueling Hezbollah’s boldness was the knowledge that the Joe Biden administration has pressured Israel to not open up a second front against the group in Lebanon.

With these factors in place and with the knowledge that they would act as a limitation on any Israeli retaliation, Hezbollah allowed itself to escalate along the border. But even this has been relatively limited, aimed largely at harassing Israel, disrupting civilian life, dividing Israeli forces along two fronts, and increasing the war’s burden on the Israeli economy—all in the hopes of slowing Israel’s advance in Gaza so that a premature ceasefire can be imposed before the Resistance Axis forces in the coastal enclave are defeated, allowing the latter to survive and rebuild to fight again in the future. 

What Hezbollah has not been seeking, however, is opening a full-scale war with Israel. Given that Hezbollah’s circumstances after Arouri’s killing remain the same as before his death, that desire is unlikely to have changed. This makes the organization’s promised response—assuming it hasn’t happened already—fairly predictable.

Hezbollah is unlikely to declare an all-out war against Israel, even over someone as critical to the Resistance Axis’ operations as Saleh Al-Arouri. Instead, as it did after Israel killed IRGC Quds Force General Razi Mousavi on December 25, 2023, the group will likely temporarily escalate the intensity of its unceasing attacks on northern Israel—perhaps for a longer duration while trying harder to draw Israeli blood because the attack occurred in Dahiyeh—before resuming its new, post-October 7, 2023 routine of attacks.

Hezbollah also has other indirect options that it may activate. Throughout the past four years, the group has sidestepped the constraints of Lebanon’s economic collapse on its activities by outsourcing its attacks against Israel to Palestinian organizations—primarily the offshoots of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the West Bank, but also to their Lebanon-based franchises. This has allowed Hezbollah to continue bleeding Israel while maintaining just enough plausible deniability to avoid the full brunt of the consequences. Hezbollah has maintained this approach after October 7, 2023, facilitating rocket attacks and incursions by Hamas and PIJ from Lebanon into Israel. Now that Palestinian terrorist factions have threatened to avenge Arouri “on all fronts,” Hezbollah is likely to once again facilitate the use of Lebanese territory by its Palestinian partners to avenge their fallen commander.

Another indirect option may mimic Hezbollah’s behavior after Israel assassinated its former Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi in 1992. At the time, the group avoided retaliating across the Lebanon-Israel border and embarked upon a campaign of global terror, targeting Israel’s soft underbelly: Israeli diplomatic missions and diaspora Jewish communities. Hezbollah may opt to do so again or to facilitate such attacks by its Palestinian partners.

David Daoud is a senior fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) focusing on Hezbollah, Lebanon, and Israel.

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The tennis tournament was not the first time that Mubadala—the United Arab Emirates’ sovereign wealth and investment fund, with a portfolio valued at $276 billion under management—had sponsored a sporting event. But it was the first time it had done so in the Beltway, where Abu Dhabi probably views these sponsorships as fruitful business investments that yield meaningful political and reputational benefits. (In the interest of disclosure: The Emirati government is a donor to the Atlantic Council.) 

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) joins Saudi Arabia and Qatar in their race to position their countries as global sporting leaders. In June 2023, Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund became the first foreign sovereign fund to invest in a major US sports franchise. Saudi Arabia is now set to host the 2034 World Cup.

Other countries have invested in US sports teams as well. Norway’s sovereign fund, valued at $1.3 trillion, has reduced its sports investments since 2020, but it still owns a small equity share of 1.07 percent in Madison Square Garden Sports, which manages the National Basketball Association (NBA) team the New York Knicks, National Hockey League (NHL) team the New York Rangers, and some of the latter’s minor league affiliates.

Since 2022, the NBA and Women’s NBA have allowed such foreign investments so long as they consist of no more than a 20 percent stake and do not include ownership control. However, it remains an open question how long these investments will be restricted to non-controlling interests. Currently, Major League Baseball (MLB) does not prohibit sovereign investment fund investments in its clubs, nor does the NHL. For now, the National Football League (NFL) prohibits sovereign wealth funds’ investments in its franchises. According to NFL commissioner Roger Goodell, such investments are something the league will “contemplate at some point in time.” The commissioner of Major League Soccer also said in July that the league was considering allowing such investments.

More than just oil

Starting around 2040, revenues from oil are expected to decline because of reductions in global demand driven by a higher need for renewable energy. Amid rising interest in international sports, as well as broadcasting and merchandising opportunities, sports clubs offer an opportunity for Gulf investment funds to generate returns. Gulf leaders also want to remodel their countries’ oil-focused images into ones that attract investment and people who want to work and live there. They want to show that they can impact and contribute to world powers—not vice versa.

The Mubadala Citi DC Open happened shortly after the announcement that the Qatar Investment Authority had bought a 5 percent stake in Monumental Sports and Entertainment. Monumental owns NBC Sports Washington, the NBA’s Washington Wizards, and the NHL’s Washington Capitals—a successful franchise that won the league championship in 2018. Monumental’s founder and CEO Ted Leonsis has also been in negotiations to buy the MLB’s Washington Nationals.

Saudi Arabia probably made the most significant move in this realm in 2023; the Saudi LIV Golf-PGA Tour merger—now being investigated by Congress and the US Department of Justice to determine whether it violates federal antitrust statutes amid suspicion regarding the Saudis’ widening role in US sports—marked the $650 billion Saudi Public Investment Fund’s first foray into the US sports market.

US sports franchises are arguably more multifaceted businesses than those in Europe, where Gulf investments in sports are not new. And US sports franchises offer no risk of relegation—unlike European football clubs in the Union of European Football Associations leagues—which makes the valuation of US teams exceedingly high. From 2012 to 2021, the average value of an NBA team increased by 387 percent while the average value of an NHL team increased by 207 percent. As a result, US sports franchises are viewed as “recession-proof,” outpacing the growth of the S&P 500—a US stock market index made up of 500 of the largest public companies—from 2004 to 2012.

Given these political and economic benefits, Gulf investments in US sports are likely to rise. US sports franchises offer a limited investment risk with known recurring revenue, eye-popping valuations, and a loyal fan and customer base. Such investments provide Gulf states media attention and a means of influencing public opinion and molding their countries’ brands.

A new field competition

One big question is whether US regulators will scrutinize these deals more, especially controlling stakes in US teams if and when they happen. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)—the interagency committee that examines the national security implications of foreign acquisitions of US companies—could have jurisdiction if there are national security concerns related to the data collected by these teams. But such a review would not adequately examine these deals based on reputational risk to the teams. Given that, the US government should consider whether it wants to give CFIUS those powers or create a new review mechanism.

Gulf investments in US teams could pose reputational challenges to those teams as a result of Western concerns about the state of political, social, and labor rights in Gulf countries. Additionally, the increased attention that comes along with growing investments will also bring potential challenges for Arab Gulf governments. The scrutiny on the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar is likely to be repeated for World Cup 2034 host Saudi Arabia, especially as it seeks to get more involved in US sports franchises and become a global sports hub. 

But these investments aren’t going away. Any resistance in US sports leagues to controlling stakes and foreign ownership will likely dissipate in the next decade or two if such investments prove effective and productive and ownership rules continue to change, albeit slowly. Expect Gulf countries to increase their investments in US sports teams while trying to play up the economic benefits of those investments and their impact on the community, as they have done in the United Kingdom.

In the United Kingdom, research conducted by New Economy Manchester, a local governmental entity, showed a return on investment of £1.63 per pound invested in Abu Dhabi United Group-owned Manchester City’s City in the Community, a program that benefits individuals with disabilities. The same study reported a return on investment of £1.98 per pound invested in Manchester City’s Kicks program, which helps reduce anti-social behavior and crime among youth. Nevertheless, others, including Amnesty International, argue that Manchester City is being used as part of an exercise in “sportswashing”—allowing a nation with a record of human rights abuses to project a positive image of itself on the world stage given the immense international advertising platform that the Premier League provides. They posit that, by investing in the emotional power of football clubs and East Manchester, Abu Dhabi is instrumentalizing sports to win hearts and minds.

In the contest among Gulf states for stakes in US sports franchises and tournaments, the next front in the United States could be the MLB—especially if Leonsis and Monumental Sports buy the Nationals. Such a sale would put three major Washington sports teams (the NBA, NHL, and MLB squads) and NBC Washington Sports under Monumental, providing the Qatar Investment Fund a huge platform and opportunities for growth and partnerships in the nation’s capital. In November 2023, Muriel Bowser, the mayor of Washington, DC, departed for Qatar “to engage with leaders on the issues of infrastructure, sports and education, as well as promote Washington, DC as a destination for investment and tourism,” signaling interest from a top Beltway official in allowing these investments to move forward.

One thing is certain: There will be more competition among Gulf countries to become the biggest shapers of global sports, with each vying to have the most popular US team in their portfolio. Fans will care most about their teams winning, but they will—perhaps unwittingly—be taking part in another rivalry half a world away.

Joze Pelayo is an associate director at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Follow him on Twitter: @jozemrpelayo.

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‘Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads’ by David Rundell

Saudi Arabia is a mid-sized country with outsized influence due to the unique global role it has played in energy markets, within the Islamic community, and as a security partner to the United States. If you want to understand its history, its relationship with the United States, and its domestic ambitions and challenges, then you should pick up Vision or Mirage by David Rundell, who is an American diplomat who spent thirty years in the country. 

This book helps frame the most important question about the country today: is the bigger risk that Saudi Arabia is not reforming fast enough or that it is reforming too fast? The former is what I often hear from critics in Washington, but the latter is what people elsewhere in the region are worried about.  

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

‘Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry That Unraveled Culture, Religion, and Collective Memory in the Middle East’ by Kim Ghattas

Black Wave offers an excellent and well-researched account of the intricate developments of the Middle East in the wake of the 1979 Iranian revolution. It reflects not only historical facts and data but also inside stories and firsthand accounts that have not been presented before. The book delves into many of the root causes of the current geopolitical trends that affect not only the Middle East but the world. For instance, it covers the relationship and competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the rise of interstate or cross-border groups undermining state authorities, and sectarian conflicts. It’s very insightful. 

—Nadereh Chamlou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s empowerME initiative and an international development advisor.

Russian-Arab Worlds: A Documentary History by Eileen Kane, Masha Kirasirova, and  Margaret Litvin 

One of the best books published in 2023 on Russia’s relations with the Middle East is one that policy-oriented audiences are likely to miss but really shouldn’t: Russian-Arab Worlds: A Documentary History. Edited by two history professors (Eileen Kane and Masha Kirasirova) and one Arabic/comparative literature professor (Margaret Litvin), the book is a compilation of thirty-four documents written between 1773 and 2019 by Russians and Middle Easterners (with expert introductions to each) on various aspects of their multifaceted relationship with each other.

Several of these documents show that the Middle East has not been a passive arena in which Russian governments have acted. Instead, various Middle Easterners have actively sought to interact with Russia. Other documents describe how the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, in particular, fostered Russian popular interest in Palestine and an affinity for Russia in the Levant.

Above all, this collection of documents provides a sense of the deep roots of Russian soft power in the Middle East. This is something Western foreign policymakers need to understand.

—Dr. Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

‘Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics’ by Tim Marshall

Prisoners of Geography has been a staple on my bookshelf since 2015, when it was originally published, but I took the opportunity to review it after October 7.

The chapter on the Middle East explores how geography has shaped its history, politics, and conflicts. The region is divided by mountains, deserts, rivers, and seas, creating natural barriers and borders that have influenced the identities and alliances of its people. Its oil wealth, water scarcity, and religious diversity have further contributed to its instability and violence. The chapter covers topics such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Kurdish situation, and the challenges of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

While time has passed since its initial publication, the themes stand the test of time. The Middle East is a complex and dynamic region often misunderstood and misrepresented by outsiders. However, the region’s geography is not destiny but rather a factor that must be considered when trying to understand and resolve its problems. If you are interested in the transformation of the Middle East, dig into the other two books in the Tim Marshall trilogy: The Power of Geography: Ten Maps That Reveal the Future of Our World and The Future of Geography: How the Competition in Space Will Change Our World.

—Marcy Grossman is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs and former Canadian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. 

‘Syria’s Secret Library: Reading and Redemption in a Town Under Siege’ by Mike Thomson

Many of us agree that libraries possess a kind of charm that can captivate a visitor upon stepping in—whether it’s the smell of rustic shelves, the orderly display of books, or the soothing sound of silence embodying the space. If you can relate to this experience, then Syria’s Secret Library is for you.

In the government-besieged town of Daraya, a group of Syrian civilians find a glimmer of hope amid the horrors of death and destruction brought by the civil war in a small underground library that they secretly built from scratch. In a series of exchanged letters and phone calls with these librarians, BBC journalist Mike Thomson documents the journey of this library and that of its guardians, who find refuge through literature and purpose to be enlightened in the darkest of times.

—Nour Dabboussi is the program assistant to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

‘Moroccan Other–Archives: History and Citizenship after State Violence’ by Brahim El Guabli

Moroccan Other-Archives investigates how histories of exclusion and silencing are written and rewritten in a postcolonial context that lacks organized and accessible archives. The book draws on cultural production concerning the “years of lead”―a period of authoritarianism and political violence between Morocco’s independence in 1956 and the death of King Hassan II in 1999―to examine the transformative roles memory and trauma play in reconstructing stories of three historically marginalized groups in Moroccan history: the Berbers/Imazighen, the Jews, and political prisoners.

—Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

‘The Vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon’ by Fouad Ajami

Written by the late scholar Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam offers a personal account of the charismatic religious and political leader Sayyid Musa al Sadr. The book details his life from the mid-twentieth century to his mysterious disappearance in the summer of 1978. Exploring the history of southern Lebanon, where a sizeable Lebanese Shia population resides, Ajami eloquently intertwines the narrative of the imam’s tireless efforts for reform and the countless struggles he faced; it is a tale of his commitment to his community and adopted country—all set against the backdrop of increasingly challenging circumstances.

For those watching the developments currently playing out across southern Lebanon, this is a highly recommended read, as it provides a valuable glimpse into the origins of the Amal Movement and Hezbollah.

—Masoud Mostajabi is a deputy director of the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post Need a book on the Middle East to read during the holidays? Here’s our recommendations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

2023 also produced moments of hope and diplomatic feats. MENA countries were included in development organizations and plans that aimed to bolster the region’s economic prosperity; Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations; and the Abraham Accords continued to prosper.

Learn about the region’s biggest moments:

January 1: Israeli Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir decisively visits Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif)

The year had a rocky start as Israel’s controversial newly appointed minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, visited the Temple Mount, also known as Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary). Since Israel won the holy sites in the 1967 war, it granted the administrative authority of al-Aqsa Mosque, the Temple Mount, and the surrounding complex to the Jordanian Islamic Waqf. Under the status quo, the site is open to Muslim worshipers while Jewish visitors are allowed only at certain times and are not permitted to pray there.

“Ben Gvir, who is the leader of the extreme-right Otzma Yehudit party, has previously been convicted for supporting terrorism and inciting racism,” highlighted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. Given his background, Ben-Gvir’s January 1 visit—and subsequent visits later in the year—angered Palestinians, Arab-Israelis, and the wider Arab and Muslim world, as he has previously voiced discontent with the status quo, making his visit appear threatening to Muslim rights at the holy sites in Jerusalem.

MENASource

Jan 30, 2023

Ben-Gvir’s controversial new position angered the Arab world. But how will it impact a potential peace deal with Saudi Arabia?

By Ksenia Svetlova

Will PM Benjamin Netanyahu find the desired equilibrium between the radical politics of his coalition partner and diplomacy with Arab capitals?

Israel Middle East

January 5: Libya’s rival governments agree to develop a constitutional basis for elections 

Since the 2011 uprising against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the country has faced violence, uncertainty, and division, resulting in two parallel governments. In January, after more than a decade of conflict and failed attempts at unity, the two governments of Libya—the Government of National Unity in the west and the Government of National Stability in the east—entered into negotiations to find a constitutional basis to end the conflict and hold elections for a single, unity government.

The talks took place in Cairo after Egypt volunteered to host. Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, represented Tobruk and eastern Libya. In contrast, Tripoli and western Libya were represented by Khaled Al-Mishri, the head of Libya’s Higher Council of State. The representatives agreed to create a roadmap for the election process in the talks. The prime ministers of both governments also passed along the country’s constitutional document for approval from their respective legislatures.  

MENASource

Feb 1, 2023

Libya’s political impasse and the $6 billion question

By Alia Brahimi

On January 5, after months of talks brokered in Egypt, Libya’s rival legislative bodies finally agreed to begin discussions to develop the constitutional basis for elections.

Libya Middle East

February 6: Deadly 7.8 magnitude earthquake hits Turkey and Syria 

On February 6, a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck southern Turkey and northwest Syria, killing over 55,000 people and affecting 15.7 million more. The damage was widespread; homes, schools, and hospitals were destroyed as the earthquake left entire cities and villages in ruin. While it was known that war-torn Syria would not have the capacity to respond to disaster, the earthquake exposed the inadequacy of Turkey’s response system.

Despite international aid, rescue and rebuilding efforts in Turkey were insufficient, with help slow to reach many areas. The earthquake has also had detrimental economic effects. The rebuilding efforts are expected to cost upward of $130 billion—over one-eighth of Turkey’s GDP—while many industries and livelihoods have also been destroyed. But as one Syrian told senior fellow Arwa Damon hours after the earthquake struck: “It did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along.”

MENASource

Jun 12, 2023

I work in Syrian civil society. There were gaps in our performance after the February 6 earthquake.

By Kenda Hawasli

It is clear that humanitarian response planning in Syria requires a full review process that reconsiders existing approaches and involves local partners while listening to their experiences.

Civil Society Crisis Management

February 10: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security leads Iranian opposition gathering 

An Iranian diaspora opposition coalition known as the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) officially came together at an event hosted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security months after anti-establishment protests kicked off in September 2022.

Although the conference’s scope was limited and pushed important issues like the type and makeup of a future government down the road, it was a successful first gathering, resulting in the release of the Mahsa Charter a month later. Unfortunately, several months later, in May, the AFDI collapsed.

“The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media,” noted writer Arash Azizi.

IranSource

May 10, 2023

After a failed coalition effort, where is the Iranian opposition headed?

By Arash Azizi

Cracks within the Iranian opposition coalition were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s persona.

Civil Society Iran

February 13: ‘Manifesto for Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organizations of Iran’ published 

As part of the ongoing anti-regime protests, twenty trade unions, activist groups, and student organizations signed and released a manifesto for fundamental change in Iran that was quickly endorsed by other parts of civil society. The revolutionary document covered several different issues ranging from the prohibition of torture to gender equality to the privatization of religion.

The manifesto “offer[s] an articulate and elaborate meaning to the slogan ‘woman, life, freedom,’ aiming to end the formation of any power from above and to establish a society free of oppression, discrimination, tyranny, and dictatorship,” said Shadi Sadr, a human rights lawyer. Read the manifesto text here.

IranSource

Feb 23, 2023

Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.

By Shadi Sadr

Signed by twenty organizations and released on February 13, the manifesto gathered the support of many civil society organizations in Iran.

Civil Society Iran

February 14 – 16: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi goes to China 

President Ebrahim Raisi made a telling visit to Beijing, marking the first time an Iranian leader has made an official state visit to China in over twenty years. This visit was geopolitically significant, as it displayed the consolidation of the China-Russia-Iran axis, which could effectively counter US sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

During the three-day visit, President Raisi and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed twenty documents and agreements on topics ranging from trade to information technology to transportation. The projects and agreements could be worth billions of dollars. But as senior fellow Jonathan Fulton rightfully asked, “Does a visit from Iran’s president help with any of this? In material terms, probably not. China is a lifeline to Iran, while Tehran is of marginal importance to Beijing.”

IranSource

Feb 22, 2023

Iran’s economic future is uncertain. It’s no surprise why Raisi visited China.

By Jonathan Fulton

From February 14-16, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was in Beijing for his first foreign trip of the year and the first official visit to China for an Iranian leader in twenty years.

Iran Middle East

February 20: Iran acknowledges enriching uranium at 84 percent

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was to eliminate its medium-enriched uranium, reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent, and, for the next fifteen years, only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent. After the United States pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed unilateral sanctions, Iran incrementally stopped following the terms of the agreement.

In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed it had found uranium particles enriched at 84 percent—not far away from 90 percent, weapons-grade uranium. As Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, spelled out, “Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were the accidental product of Iran reconfiguring its centrifuges or produced by design, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.”

IranSource

Mar 2, 2023

Iran’s nuclear program is advancing. So too should negotiations.

By Kelsey Davenport

Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were accidental, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.

Iran Middle East

March 1: Abrahamic Family House opens in Abu Dhabi, UAE 

On September 15, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the Abraham Accords, becoming one of six Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel formally. Since then, the UAE and Israel have significantly benefited from their newfound cooperation in sectors from trade and tourism to security and diplomacy.

The opening of the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi—a place of worship for all the Abrahamic faiths, containing a synagogue, a mosque, and a church—symbolized the prosperity to be gained through peace and cooperation. The House represents the hopeful future of co-existence and respect between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As senior fellow Marcy Grossman wrote, “It is also a beacon of light at a time when western antisemitism is at an all-time high. Perhaps, most significantly, it is a beacon of peace in the Middle East.”

MENASource

Feb 27, 2023

What the opening of the Abrahamic Family House Synagogue in the UAE means for the Jewish community and the rest of the world

By Marcy Grossman

The Abrahamic Family House, a mosque, church, and synagogue all sharing a multi-faith campus in Abu Dhabi is about to make its worldwide debut, opening its doors to the general public on March 1.

Israel Middle East

March 10: China brokers deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran 

Seven years after severing diplomatic ties following the storming of Saudi missions in Iran in response to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations in a deal brokered by China. This event was geopolitically significant on both a regional and global level.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been leaders of opposing sects of the Arab world, taking different sides in practically every war and conflict since 1979. Despite housing the holy cities and sites of Islam, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly secularized in contrast to Iran. Saudi Arabia has also been opposed to the expansion of Iranian regional influence, even exploring normalization with Israel. It has yet to be seen whether restoring diplomatic ties is more than an empty nicety.

Globally, China’s role as a mediator demonstrated its aspirations to challenge America’s role in the Middle East and to present itself as a serious player. However, as fellow Ahmed Aboudouh pointed out, the deal “is beset by Saudi-Iranian mutual distrust that runs deep in their strategic thinking and a wide range of regional conflicts—Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—that serve as a battleground for their competition.”

MENASource

Mar 21, 2023

China’s mediation between Saudi and Iran is no cause for panic in Washington

By Ahmed Aboudouh

The deal is a mere statement of intentions by both countries to improve relations, meaning reconciliation is not complete.

China East Asia

March 13: Megiddo bombing in northern Israel

On the morning of March 13, a roadside bomb went off in Megiddo, seriously injuring an Israeli Arab. The location of the bombing, the Megiddo Junction, was just thirty-seven miles from the Lebanese border. Based on shrapnel and remains of the bomb, Israeli officials did not believe the attack to be from a Palestinian group. According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the suspected terrorist crossed into Israel from Lebanon and was found hitchhiking following the attack.

“If Hezbollah was behind the Megiddo bombing,” argued senior fellow Nicholas Blanford, “it likely came within the context of supporting the growing popular unrest in the West Bank.” 

For Israelis, the incident reinforced the necessity of the wall currently being built on the border with Lebanon to replace an ineffective fence.  

MENASource

Mar 22, 2023

Was Hezbollah behind the Megiddo bombing in Israel? If yes, it’s a new escalation.

By Nicholas Blanford

The suspect was shot dead when Israeli security forces intercepted him in a vehicle traveling close to the border with Lebanon.

Lebanon Middle East

March 18: Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visits Cairo 

Following the 2013 coup d’etat in Egypt that ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi banned the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group that Turkey supported. The incident brought a rift in ties. Now that Ankara has abandoned its critical approach to Sisi, the two countries have tried to mend their relationship.

At the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, President Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan were photographed shaking hands. In March, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Egypt and met with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry. This encounter led to the first official meeting of the two presidents in over a decade on the sidelines of the September G20 summit in New Delhi.

MENASource

Apr 12, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Ankara’s perspective 

By Ali Bakir

While Turkey would prefer to speed up the normalization process, Cairo might prefer to wait until the next elections before expediting it.

Europe & Eurasia Libya

MENASource

Apr 11, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Cairo’s perspective 

By Shahira Amin

After a decade of ruptured ties and simmering tensions, Egypt and Turkey are inching towards a rapprochement—a move thought unimaginable by some observers a couple of years prior.

Africa Europe & Eurasia

March 30: International Court of Justice issues judgment on Certain Iranian Assets case 

In the case of Certain Iranian Assets, Iran challenged its responsibility to issue payments to families of victims of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism based on the now-terminated 1955 Treaty of Amity. The United States had frozen $1.8 billion from the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi) in 2012. Iran brought the case to the International Court of Justice in 2016, which issued a mixed ruling on March 30. Families of terror victims will receive compensation, but the funds and assets from which the compensation money may be obtained have been found to be narrower in scope than the United States had aimed.  

IranSource

Apr 24, 2023

What the ICJ ruling on the Central Bank of Iran means for the US and the Islamic Republic—and those seeking reparations for state-sponsored atrocities

By Celeste Kmiotek

On March 30, the International Court of Justice issued its final judgment on a case between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on the fate of “Certain Iranian Assets.” The judgment contains wins and losses for both sides.

Iran Middle East

April 4: Iran cracks down on hijab law 

In the face of mass anti-regime protests across Iran following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, mandatory hijab laws were laxed. However, after announcements in March and April, Tehran reversed this trend with even harsher enforcement than before the protests began.

Punishments for evading the law and servicing women without mandatory hijab now include up to $60,000 in fines, deprivation of social and public services, revocation of documents, ban of internet access, and the confiscation of property and forced closing of businesses. The clerical establishment is enforcing the hijab law by installing cameras and facial recognition technology. However, as former Young Global Professional Mahnaz Vahdati argued, “Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.” 

IranSource

Apr 20, 2023

The Islamic Republic is mobilizing all its forces against unveiled Iranian women, but they’re pushing back

By Mahnaz Vahdati

Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.

Politics & Diplomacy

April 6: Rockets launched at Israel from Lebanon 

On April 5, Israeli police forces and Palestinians clashed at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Palestinian and Arab media and governments claimed Israel was “storming” the mosque and had assaulted worshippers. At the same time, Israeli police justified their force with reports of masked young people barricading themselves inside the al-Aqsa Mosque with fireworks, clubs, and rocks after evening prayers. Following reports of the clashes, rockets and projectiles were allegedly launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Hamas reported that the IDF then struck targets in Gaza. The next day, on April 6, thirty-four rockets were shot at Israel from Lebanon, presumably launched by Hezbollah.

The escalation of violence in early April overlapped with Hamas Political Chief Ismael Haniyeh’s visit to Lebanon to discuss the Resistance Axis, which is made up of Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As program assistant Nour Dabboussi explained, it was a reminder of “how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country—considering itself entitled to maneuver partnerships that fall outside of the official realm of the Lebanese government—with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.” 

IranSource

Apr 12, 2023

The attacks on Israel should be a wake up call for the Lebanese people

By Nour Dabboussi

The rocket fire from Lebanon on April 6 highlights how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country, with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.

Iran Lebanon

April 15: Fighting breaks out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum 

On April 15, another round of fighting broke out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between the two factions that made up Sudan’s government. In 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overthrew Sudan’s transitional government, which was created after the 2019 military coup. For the past two years, the SAF and RSF ruled Sudan together, but now the leader of each group wants to rule Sudan independently.

“As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states,” underscored senior fellow R. Clarke Cooper. 

The conflict has displaced over six million people and has created over 1.2 million refugees.  

MENASource

May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

May 7: Arab League normalizes with the Bashar al-Assad regime 

In 2011, the Arab League voted to suspend Syria from its membership based on the Bashar al-Assad regime’s violent suppression of peaceful protests. The decision to readmit Syria in May also called for a resolution of the Syrian Civil War and its spillover effects, which have impacted its neighbors and the region through the refugee crisis and drug trade. The readmission of Syria to the Arab League was controversial. Some Arab countries already have relations with Syria while others still will not be persuaded to normalize.

“Not much will change in Syria or across the region for now, but keeping Assad isolated would not be as easy as before, especially as he eyes recognition from the West followed by the removal of sanctions and funding for reconstruction,” emphasized Qutaiba Idlibi, head of the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project.

MENASource

May 19, 2023

Experts react: Assad gets warm reception at Arab summit. Where does that leave the US and its allies?

By Qutaiba Idlbi, Gissou Nia, Michel Duclos, Emadeddin Badi

Atlantic Council experts react to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s attendance at the Arab League summit in Jeddah and explain its significance below. 

Human Rights Middle East

May 9 – May 13: Israel conducts Operation Shield and Arrow against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza 

On May 2, a prominent member of the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Khader Adnan, died after an eighty-seven-day hunger strike while in Israeli prison. Following Adnan’s death, PIJ launched 102 rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, injuring seven people. The IDF responded to the rocket attack on May 9 with Operation Shield and Arrow. During the three-day operation, seven PIJ commanders were killed in targeted assassinations, approximately 938 rockets were fired into Israel by PIJ, and a total of thirty-four Palestinians (including the targeted commanders and members of PIJ) and one Israeli were killed. A ceasefire was signed on May 13, negotiated by the Egyptian government.

Operation Shield and Arrow was just one of the many escalations around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this year. “It seems that the next Israeli operation in Gaza is inevitable,” predicted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. “Everyone in Israel, Gaza, and Egypt knows how it will look and how many days it might take. The only unknown factor is the operation’s future name.”

MENASource

Jun 2, 2023

In an endless series of Israeli operations, Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza was yet another name on the list

By Ksenia Svetlova

The current Israeli government is just as unable as previous ones to produce a solution to stop PIJ and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank.

Conflict Israel

May 27: Clashes between Iran and Afghanistan over Helmand River 

The Helmand River, a major water source for Iran and Afghanistan, has been a point of contention between the two countries for centuries. The river, which flows through Afghanistan and ends in eastern Iran, is essential for farmers in both countries. Since a 1973 treaty, Iran will receive 820 million cubic meters of the river each year.

On May 18, tensions over the river and water access flared up again when Iranian President Raisi warned the Taliban to respect Iran’s water rights. Then, on May 27, fighting broke out when alleged armed drug smugglers attempted to cross the border into Iran. Iranian security forces fired at the drug smugglers, but Afghan forces, unaware of the drug smugglers, believed that Iranian forces were shooting at them unprovoked. Afghan forces then attempted to attack Iranian border villages. Each side reported that the other began shooting first. But as the Middle East Institute’s Fatemeh Aman emphasized, “Several factors have contributed to the current situation, including the impact of climate change.”

IranSource

Jul 7, 2023

Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Helmand River. The water wars have no end in sight.

By Holly Dagres

Fatemeh Aman, a non-resident senior fellow at MEI, on why the Islamic Republic and Taliban are bumping heads on transboundary water issues.

Afghanistan Climate Change & Climate Action

June 23-June 24: The Wagner Group rebellion 

On June 23, the Wagner Group, a Russian-funded private paramilitary organization, staged a rebellion against the Russian military and defense ministry. Wagner forces attacked and took control of Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of the Southern Military District before continuing their offensive towards the Russian capital, Moscow. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko brokered a deal between Wagner and Russia before the rebellion reached the capital. Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, claimed the uprising was in response to the defense ministry’s attacks on his forces and demanded Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov be turned over to the group. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the rebellion treasonous. Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash. 

“It must be noted that the recent Wagner crisis affects not just those Middle Eastern countries with a Wagner presence, but all Middle Eastern countries cooperating with Russia—which is basically all Middle Eastern governments,” said senior fellow Mark Katz.

MENASource

Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

June 29: Biden administration announces inter-agency counter-captagon strategy

Though the issue of the illicit captagon trade has not been covered much, its impact threatens the stability of the Middle East and has the potential to propagate the drug crisis worldwide. On June 29, the Joe Biden administration announced an inter-agency plan to counter the captagon trade. The plan includes the provision of diplomatic and intelligence resources to law enforcement agencies; applying financial pressure and economic sanctions on the Assad regime and other groups involved in the illicit captagon trade; the provision of counternarcotics training to affected countries; and diplomatic engagement and strategies to hold Syria accountable. 

MENASource

Aug 24, 2023

No quick fixes for the Middle East’s captagon crisis

By Karam Shaar

Counter-captagon policies should look further ahead and deeper into the causes of the demand in the first place.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

July 4: Iran admitted as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

Since 2009, Iran has held observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a group started in 1996 largely to manage territorial disputes that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SCO originally had just five members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, adding Uzbekistan in 2001 and India and Pakistan in 2017. Iran was admitted as a full member in July. Although the group is largely ineffective, having been stalled by the rivalry between China and India, Tehran’s membership signals the failure of the United States to effectively isolate the country and the growth of an illiberal alliance. 

IranSource

Jul 13, 2023

Iran joining the SCO isn’t surprising. But Beijing’s promotion of illiberal norms in Eurasia should get more attention.

By Jonathan Fulton

Deeper coordination between Iran and other member states gives momentum to the China-centered illiberal order being promoted by Beijing.

China East Asia

July 10: Russia sides with the United Arab Emirates over Iran on territorial claims 

Iran and the UAE have had a decades-long territorial dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Strait of Hormuz. Both countries claim historical ties to the islands, dating back centuries. For a large part of the twentieth century, the British controlled the islands. When they left in 1971, Iran immediately seized control of the islands and has effectively, if not legally, administered them ever since. The UAE’s efforts to diplomatically regain control of the islands have not ceased for the past fifty years. Most recently, Russia has surprised the world by voicing support for Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims despite the former’s strong relationship with Tehran.

As senior fellow Mark Katz explained, “The Russia-GCC joint statement does nothing to alter the fact that Iran remains in control of the three islands and is likely to remain so.”

MENASource

Jul 18, 2023

Is Russia really siding with the UAE against Iran?

By Mark N. Katz

For Russia to endorse the GCC’s position on three islands is especially surprising, considering how much Iran has done to support Moscow.

Iran Middle East

July 18: Israeli President Isaac Herzog visits the United States

Despite a decades-long friendship, the Joe Biden-Benjamin Netanyahu relationship has been strained by the current right-wing government in Israel—the most extreme in the country’s history. In July, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, whose role is largely ceremonial, was welcomed to the Oval Office. During the meeting, President Biden reaffirmed the “unbreakable” friendship between the United States and Israel and strengthened his commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Biden also stated that a meeting between himself and Netanyahu in Washington was in the works for the coming months.

While in the United States, Herzog addressed Congress and met with American Jewish leaders. However, as senior fellow Shalom Lipner highlighted, “Israel and the United States have some tough decisions to make if they harbor any hopes of refreshing the trifecta—shared values, shared interests, and broad-based support—which has kept them famously on the same page.”

MENASource

Jul 17, 2023

At risk of separating, can Israel and the US renew their vows?

By Shalom Lipner

President Joe Biden is rolling out the red carpet for his Israeli counterpart, Isaac Herzog, who arrives in the United States on July 18.

Israel Middle East

August 10: United States reaches hostage deal with Iran 

After months of negotiations, the United States and Iran reached a deal to exchange prisoners. In September, five Iranian-Americans held hostage in Iran on unsubstantiated charges were released in exchange for five Iranians imprisoned in the United States on charges of sanction violations. “Many have criticized the deal as constituting a ransom payment, incentivizing Tehran’s hostage-taking model,” said staff lawyer Celeste Kmiotek. The United States also released $6 billion of frozen Iranian funds held in South Korean banks, which was transferred to Qatari banks for humanitarian purposes but may be re-frozen by Congress. After the American hostages returned home, the Biden administration introduced new sanctions against Iran. 

The Islamic Republic is holding at least three other hostages who may be considered nationals under the Levinson Act: Green Card holder Shahab Dalili; US permanent resident Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani; and US resident Jamshid Sharmahd.

IranSource

Aug 17, 2023

The Levinson Act means all Americans must return home—not just citizens

By Celeste Kmiotek

Shahab Dalili, Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani, and Jamshid Sharmahd are all considered US nationals under the Levinson Act.

Human Rights Iran

August 20: Protests and strikes in Sweida, Syria begin

In August, the pan-Syrian August 10 movement was founded by Syrian opposition leaders to end poor economic conditions, violence, and sectarianism in Syria. Simultaneously, the Free Alawite Officers published a declaration expressing demands of the Assad regime, including an end to Iranian influence in the country and the creation of accountability methods. Both groups appealed to the Alawite community of Syria. Just days later, small-scale protests began.

On August 17, a general strike was called in Sweida—a predominantly Druze area—and hundreds of protesters gathered near police headquarters and the governor’s office, chanting anti-Assad regime slogans. Protesters participated in mass demonstrations, causing road closures, boycotts, and destruction of Baath party property. As the protests continued throughout August and into September, the movement became more explicitly anti-government, calling out the crimes of the Assad regime and demanding his overthrow, and even spread to areas that traditionally supported the dictator. The government responded to the protests violently, killing many demonstrators.

Despite this, it seems the regime has been unable to stop the protests thus far. “It may be unexpected to witness this scene after all the suppression and war crimes committed by the Assad regime in Syria,” emphasized writer Rima Flihan. “However, it signifies that the desire for change in Syria still exists within the Syrian people.”

MENASource

Sep 5, 2023

The uprising in Sweida will continue until the regime changes in Syria

By Rima Flihan

These demonstrations call for a change in the Syrian regime and the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

August 22-August 24: Middle Eastern countries admitted to BRICS 

During the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in South Africa in August, the group—which is a geopolitical rival to the G7—announced the admittance of six new countries to the bloc, including four Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This move was made to give a greater voice to the Global South and to grow BRICS’s share of the global economy.

However, the divide that the G7 and BRICS represent between the Global North and Global South is unclear. BRICS contains important American strategic allies like India and Saudi Arabia, and there are significant geopolitical tensions between BRICS members India and China. Senior fellow Mark Katz pointed out that “For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China and that the West will just have to accept this.”

MENASource

Aug 25, 2023

The BRICS come to the Middle East and North Africa

By Mark N. Katz

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China

International Financial Institutions International Markets

September 9: White House Announces India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor

In September, the Memorandum of Understanding for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was signed at the G20 summit in New Delhi. The project, seen as an American alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to promote economic development, integration, and connectivity throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The rail and shipping networks are to include many strategic American allies and will travel through India, Europe, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

“The project serves primarily as a US diplomatic tool to counter China’s influence in the Middle East. In fact, IMEC should be considered in the same light as Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): an ambitious foreign policy project that captures the world’s attention, even though it is unlikely to deliver on its lofty promises,” claimed senior fellow Jean-Loup Saman.

The IMEC is just the latest initiative in the growing global competition between the United States and China.

MENASource

Oct 6, 2023

The India-Middle East Corridor: a Biden Road Initiative?

By Jean-Loup Samaan

Economists and regional experts expressed their reservations on the feasibility—both politically and financially—of a corridor that would redraw the map of infrastructure across Eurasia.

Economy & Business Financial Regulation

September 10: Tragic floods strike Libyan city of Derna 

Tropical Storm Daniel hit Libya on September 10, becoming the deadliest storm recorded in the Mediterranean. The storm caused the failure of two dams in the city of Derna, releasing 30 million cubic meters of water, which flooded the city and resulted in an estimated 5,300-20,000 deaths. While Libyans were grieving and rescue efforts were still underway, it was revealed that the dams burst because of decades of neglect.

After Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, the city changed hands four times and was a battleground in the Libyan civil war. As North Africa director Karim Mezran explained, “the tragedy of the dam collapse results from neglected dam maintenance, city infrastructure, and civil services, such as inadequately trained and equipped firefighters and medical personnel, the absence of a warning system, and numerous other issues.”

MENASource

Sep 22, 2023

The Derna catastrophe is a sign that the international community needs to take action in Libya

By Karim Mezran

This narrow window of opportunity is unlikely to remain open for long.

Libya Middle East

September 16: First anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death 

On September 16, 2022, twenty-two-year-old Kurdish-Iranian Mahsa Jina Amini died while in custody of the so-called morality police. Amini was arrested for “violating” mandatory hijab law. In the year since her murder, mass anti-regime protests erupted across Iran. #Mahsa_Amini reportedly broke the X (formerly known as Twitter) hashtag record, as the cause was taken up globally. Amini’s death also united the Iranian diaspora, which mirrored and amplified the voices of the people of Iran.

“I strongly believe that the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic… By no means are we going to stand back and surrender. We will be victorious,” said one Gen Z Iranian protester on the anniversary of the protest movement.

IranSource

Sep 13, 2023

Letters from women protesters inside Iran: One year after #MahsaAmini’s death 

By Khosro Sayeh Isfahani

“The people of Iran want to overthrow this regime. If you believe in freedom, equality, and human rights, remember that this regime stands against these values.”

Human Rights Iran