Public trust, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said during a press conference on August 14, is the “basis of politics.” But the task of restoring public trust, he added, would fall to another, as the prime minister announced that he will not seek reelection as the leader of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) next month. Despite establishing himself as a beacon for democracy in a period of tremendous global upheaval, several domestic scandals in his party led to his decision to step down. As the LDP has dominated both the lower and upper house of Japan’s national legislature almost continuously since 1955, his successor is all but guaranteed premiership of the country. This question instead is: Will the next prime minister be able to overcome domestic political and economic constraints to meet the high expectations Kishida has set for Japan’s contribution to global security?
Support for Ukraine
Just four months into Kishida’s term as prime minister, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Under Kishida’s leadership, Japan has shown a strong commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty. In an unprecedented shift away from its self-defense-only principle, Japan has provided almost twelve billion dollars of assistance to Ukraine since February 2022, including nonlethal military aid. The 2023 Group of Seven (G7) Summit, which was held in Kishida’s hometown of Hiroshima, will also leave a mark on his foreign policy legacy. At the summit, he drew on Japan’s unique experience as the only country to have suffered wartime atomic bombing to emphasize his staunch opposition to Russian threats to use nuclear weapons. (A point he also made during his acceptance speech at the 2023 Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards.)
The global ramifications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led NATO to invite likeminded partners in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) to three consecutive annual summits. Through this transatlantic-Pacific partnership, NATO succeeded in garnering widespread support for Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. However, in the face of rising security challenges from China, the Indo-Pacific Four are determined to ensure this newfound partnership is a two-way street. As Kishida said in March 2023 of Russia’s full-scale invasion, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”
Indo-Pacific security
In the South China Sea, Beijing has ramped up its dangerous and aggressive behavior, including unlawful maritime claims and the coercive use of military vessels against the Philippines, particularly around the Second Thomas Shoal. Demonstrating firm support for Manila’s right to freedom of navigation and access to supply lines within its own maritime domain, Kishida and US President Joe Biden convened a historic trilateral summit with President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in April 2024.
On top of Chinese attempts to unilaterally alter the maritime status quo in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea continues to pose an imminent threat to Japan’s national security through advancements in its nuclear and missile arsenal. The willingness of Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to put aside longstanding and emotionally charged historical disputes between their two countries indicates the direness of the Indo-Pacific security environment. During his August 14 press conference, Kishida pointed out that the sixtieth anniversary of Japan-South Korea normalization is next year, adding that “we must make the normalization even more certain.”
Together with the United States, Kishida and Yoon ushered in a new era of enhanced US-South Korea-Japan cooperation at the historic Camp David Summit in August 2023. To better address shared regional security and economic challenges, the three countries institutionalized regular high-level consultations and working level meetings.
Kishida has also made enormous strides to bolster Japan’s defenses against an increasingly belligerent China and provocative North Korea. In December 2022, he released three new strategic documents that reflect a record-breaking 16 percent increase in defense spending. Kishida has also shifted Japan away from its postwar pacifist stance, including by easing the ban on lethal weapons exports to enable the co-development of next-generation fighter jets with Italy and the United Kingdom and the possession of counterstrike capabilities that could hit enemy targets.
What’s next?
Although Kishida has shown considerable leadership amid global uncertainty, his foreign policy stances are at significant odds with domestic sentiments in Japan. Despite vowing to nearly double Japan’s defense budget by 2027, he has not made clear how the country’s heavily indebted government plans to pay for this. The approval rating for Kishida’s government has regularly been below 20 percent since last December, with respondents pointing to dissatisfaction with his handling of the struggling economy. On top of this, he has faced intense backlash due to the LDP’s unreported political funds and longstanding ties to the Unification Church, which came to light during his term.
During his August 14 press conference, Kishida said that he hoped an LDP “dream team” would emerge to move the country forward. If the LDP continues to dominate Japanese politics, then major foreign policy stances, including the country’s alliance with the United States, will likely remain unchanged. However, the LDP is now at a crossroads as it seeks to regain the public’s trust. And the roster of candidates seeking party leadership reflects this.
Broadly speaking, the candidates can be divided into two categories: legacy party favorites lacking public support, and more progressive candidates who lack the backing of party leadership.
The former category includes LDP Secretary-General Toshimitsu Motegi, the party’s second-in-command, who also previously held the post of foreign minister from 2019-2021. In this role, he expressed interest in improving relations with Seoul for the sake of regional stability yet refused to put aside historical grievances to do so. Another candidate is Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, who is a hardline nationalist under whom relations with South Korea would likely deteriorate significantly. These established candidates could previously rely on factional support for party elections but the dissolution of and mass exodus from dominant factions demonstrates an attempt by the LDP to reform and regain the public’s trust.
The latter category is made up of potential candidates like Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, who, like Takaichi, would be Japan’s first female prime minister. In the current administration, she has advocated for a more gender-inclusive security policy, toed a careful line between holding China accountable for aggressive behavior while seeking areas of common interest with Beijing, and made concerted efforts to normalize ties with Seoul. Another popular candidate who has made waves in the LDP for seeking reforms to modernize Japan is Digital Minister Taro Kono. Although it is unclear how he would respond to the current geopolitical climate, he took a more dovish approach as foreign minister. For instance, he has advocated for greater territorial integrity for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces within the US-Japan alliance and vowed not to make an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese convicted war criminals are buried.
Kishida benefited greatly from the right combination of political will and geopolitical upheaval to secure the support necessary to shift Japan’s postwar foreign and defense policies. But with increasing domestic pressure to reduce government spending in a turbulent economic environment, it is uncertain whether Japan will be able to deliver on all the national and global security promises made under the Kishida administration.
Ultimately, if the next Japanese prime minister has any hope of continuing on this trajectory, then they must demonstrate a willingness to listen and address domestic concerns, while also effectively communicating the importance of upholding the rules-based international order to everyday Japanese citizens.
Kyoko Imai is an assistant director with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Further reading
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Image: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida speaks during a news conference at the prime minister's official residence in Tokyo, Japan October 14, 2021. Eugene Hoshiko/Pool via REUTERS