Support for Ukraine

Just four months into Kishida’s term as prime minister, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Under Kishida’s leadership, Japan has shown a strong commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty. In an unprecedented shift away from its self-defense-only principle, Japan has provided almost twelve billion dollars of assistance to Ukraine since February 2022, including nonlethal military aid. The 2023 Group of Seven (G7) Summit, which was held in Kishida’s hometown of Hiroshima, will also leave a mark on his foreign policy legacy. At the summit, he drew on Japan’s unique experience as the only country to have suffered wartime atomic bombing to emphasize his staunch opposition to Russian threats to use nuclear weapons. (A point he also made during his acceptance speech at the 2023 Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards.)

The global ramifications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led NATO to invite likeminded partners in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) to three consecutive annual summits. Through this transatlantic-Pacific partnership, NATO succeeded in garnering widespread support for Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression. However, in the face of rising security challenges from China, the Indo-Pacific Four are determined to ensure this newfound partnership is a two-way street. As Kishida said in March 2023 of Russia’s full-scale invasion, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

Indo-Pacific security

In the South China Sea, Beijing has ramped up its dangerous and aggressive behavior, including unlawful maritime claims and the coercive use of military vessels against the Philippines, particularly around the Second Thomas Shoal. Demonstrating firm support for Manila’s right to freedom of navigation and access to supply lines within its own maritime domain, Kishida and US President Joe Biden convened a historic trilateral summit with President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in April 2024.

On top of Chinese attempts to unilaterally alter the maritime status quo in the Indo-Pacific, North Korea continues to pose an imminent threat to Japan’s national security through advancements in its nuclear and missile arsenal. The willingness of Kishida and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol to put aside longstanding and emotionally charged historical disputes between their two countries indicates the direness of the Indo-Pacific security environment. During his August 14 press conference, Kishida pointed out that the sixtieth anniversary of Japan-South Korea normalization is next year, adding that “we must make the normalization even more certain.”

Together with the United States, Kishida and Yoon ushered in a new era of enhanced US-South Korea-Japan cooperation at the historic Camp David Summit in August 2023. To better address shared regional security and economic challenges, the three countries institutionalized regular high-level consultations and working level meetings.

Kishida has also made enormous strides to bolster Japan’s defenses against an increasingly belligerent China and provocative North Korea. In December 2022, he released three new strategic documents that reflect a record-breaking 16 percent increase in defense spending. Kishida has also shifted Japan away from its postwar pacifist stance, including by easing the ban on lethal weapons exports to enable the co-development of next-generation fighter jets with Italy and the United Kingdom and the possession of counterstrike capabilities that could hit enemy targets.

What’s next?

Although Kishida has shown considerable leadership amid global uncertainty, his foreign policy stances are at significant odds with domestic sentiments in Japan. Despite vowing to nearly double Japan’s defense budget by 2027, he has not made clear how the country’s heavily indebted government plans to pay for this. The approval rating for Kishida’s government has regularly been below 20 percent since last December, with respondents pointing to dissatisfaction with his handling of the struggling economy. On top of this, he has faced intense backlash due to the LDP’s unreported political funds and longstanding ties to the Unification Church, which came to light during his term.

During his August 14 press conference, Kishida said that he hoped an LDP “dream team” would emerge to move the country forward. If the LDP continues to dominate Japanese politics, then major foreign policy stances, including the country’s alliance with the United States, will likely remain unchanged. However, the LDP is now at a crossroads as it seeks to regain the public’s trust. And the roster of candidates seeking party leadership reflects this.

Broadly speaking, the candidates can be divided into two categories: legacy party favorites lacking public support, and more progressive candidates who lack the backing of party leadership.

The former category includes LDP Secretary-General Toshimitsu Motegi, the party’s second-in-command, who also previously held the post of foreign minister from 2019-2021. In this role, he expressed interest in improving relations with Seoul for the sake of regional stability yet refused to put aside historical grievances to do so. Another candidate is Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, who is a hardline nationalist under whom relations with South Korea would likely deteriorate significantly. These established candidates could previously rely on factional support for party elections but the dissolution of and mass exodus from dominant factions demonstrates an attempt by the LDP to reform and regain the public’s trust.

The latter category is made up of potential candidates like Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, who, like Takaichi, would be Japan’s first female prime minister. In the current administration, she has advocated for a more gender-inclusive security policy, toed a careful line between holding China accountable for aggressive behavior while seeking areas of common interest with Beijing, and made concerted efforts to normalize ties with Seoul. Another popular candidate who has made waves in the LDP for seeking reforms to modernize Japan is Digital Minister Taro Kono. Although it is unclear how he would respond to the current geopolitical climate, he took a more dovish approach as foreign minister. For instance, he has advocated for greater territorial integrity for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces within the US-Japan alliance and vowed not to make an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese convicted war criminals are buried.

Kishida benefited greatly from the right combination of political will and geopolitical upheaval to secure the support necessary to shift Japan’s postwar foreign and defense policies. But with increasing domestic pressure to reduce government spending in a turbulent economic environment, it is uncertain whether Japan will be able to deliver on all the national and global security promises made under the Kishida administration.

Ultimately, if the next Japanese prime minister has any hope of continuing on this trajectory, then they must demonstrate a willingness to listen and address domestic concerns, while also effectively communicating the importance of upholding the rules-based international order to everyday Japanese citizens.  

Kyoko Imai is an assistant director with the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The post Kishida has transformed Japanese foreign policy. Will his successor continue on his path? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

We still don’t know the military significance of Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast, which marks the first time that foreign troops have occupied Russian territory since World War II. But judging from the Kremlin’s whiny initial response—in which Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top officials decried and downplayed the offensive as a “terrorist attack” and an “armed provocation”—the political fallout promises to be enormous.

This is because the invasion and occupation of parts of Kursk Oblast marks the third major military humiliation the Kremlin leader has suffered since launching his full-scale assault on Ukraine in February 2022.

The first humiliation: February-September 2022

First, of course, there was the routing of Russian forces in the battle of Kyiv in the early phase of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The embarrassing withdrawal of Russian forces from near the Ukrainian capital in March 2022 was quickly followed by more military humiliations for the Kremlin, including Ukraine’s April 2022 sinking of the Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

And if you thought it couldn’t get much worse for Russia than losing its flagship in a land war to a country without a navy, you would be wrong. In September and October 2022, Ukraine launched lightning counteroffensives to liberate large swaths of Russian-occupied territory in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions.

UkraineAlert Aug 11, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is erasing Vladimir Putin’s last red lines

By Peter Dickinson

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has erased the last of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and made a complete mockery of the West’s frequently voiced escalation fears, writes Peter Dickinson.

Conflict Defense Policy

UkraineAlert Aug 15, 2024

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia exposes the folly of the West’s escalation fears

By Oleksiy Goncharenko

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has shown that Putin’s talk of red lines and his nuclear threats are just a bluff to intimidate the West, writes Oleksiy Goncharenko.

Conflict Defense Policy

New Atlanticist Aug 9, 2024

Is Ukraine’s raid into Russia a ‘crossing the Delaware’ moment?

By Daniel Fried

With echoes of earlier raids, Ukraine’s recent push into the Kursk region of Russia shows its tactical cunning, audacity, and tenacity against a superior foe.

Conflict Russia

The result of these first humiliations was, for lack of a better term, the shrinkage of Putin in the international arena. When Russia launched its invasion in the beginning of 2022, most analysts believed the war would be over in a matter of weeks. But by the end of 2022, Russia’s war machine no longer looked invincible—instead, it looked quite fallible and beatable. And Putin no longer looked like a ten-foot-tall master strategist—instead, he looked small.

The dismal performance of the Russian Armed Forces in 2022 weakened Putin domestically and divided the Russian elite into hawks, who wanted nothing short of the complete conquest of Kyiv, and kleptocrats, who wanted to go back to the prewar status quo. Ukrainian forces prevented Russia’s complete conquest, while Putin continued to isolate and impoverish his country, and therefore neither group was happy. Which set the stage for Putin’s next humiliation.

The second humiliation: June-August 2023

Putin’s second great military humiliation came not at the hands of Ukraine, but from within his own inner circle. The June 2023 mutiny of Yevgeniy Prigozhin and his Kremlin-connected mercenary army, the Wagner Group, exposed deep cracks in the Russian political elite as well as the hollowness and rot of the Russian Armed Forces.

The fact that Prigozhin, a Putin crony since the 1990s, would launch a rebellion against the Kremlin illustrated the perils of Putin’s “venture-capital foreign policy,” which outsources key military and security tasks to nominally private-sector actors. These informal patronage networks, in which Putin is the ultimate arbiter, only function well when the Russian leader is strong. When Putin is weak, it can lead to events like the Wagner Group mutiny.

And the fact that Prigozhin could effectively take control of the city of Rostov-on-Don—to a hero’s welcome, no less—and march his Wagner mercenaries north to the outskirts of Voronezh, roughly three hundred miles from Moscow, further punctured Putin’s aura of omnipotence.

Prigozhin, of course, paid a price for his mutiny. He died in a plane crash together with nine others, including Wagner co-founder Dmitry Utkin, on August 23, 2023. The crash, to state the obvious, was not an accident. It was, according to sources in Western intelligence agencies, an assassination organized by longtime Putin aide Nikolai Patrushev.

Putin’s second humiliation did not just deepen the divisions in Russia’s ruling elite exposed by the invasion of Ukraine. It also exposed the fundamental weakness of the armed forces in performing their core mission: protecting the homeland. And this, in turn, set the stage for Putin’s most recent humiliation.

The third humiliation: August 2024

The Ukrainian Armed Forces’ invasion of Kursk Oblast—conceived, planned, and executed in strict secrecy—came as a shock and instantaneously transformed the narrative of the war. Instead of the steady drumbeat of news about incremental Russian gains in the Donbas, a headline in the New York Times said it all: “Deception and a Gamble: How Ukrainian Troops Invaded Russia.”

From the mass surrenders of unprepared and outmanned Russian troops, to the chaotic evacuation of civilians, to the steady advances of Ukrainian forces deeper into Russian territory, the Kursk operation exposed the weakness not just of the Russian Armed Forces, but of the Russian state itself.

Over his more than two-decade rule, the Putin regime’s social contract with Russian society has been based on restoring lost greatness and reestablishing the empire. But today, it seems to have failed at achieving the most fundamental responsibility of a state: protecting its territory and citizens from foreign invasion. And the fact that Putin is rumored to have tasked one of his former bodyguards, Aleksei Dyumin (whom some Russian Telegram channels have dubbed Russia’s “shadow defense minister”), with ending Ukraine’s cross-border offensive, suggests that panic is in the air and that recently appointed Defense Minister Andrei Belousov may not be up to the task.

The military fallout of Ukraine’s bold invasion of Russia is still unclear. It may turn out to be, as former US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Daniel Fried suggested, a George Washington “crossing the Delaware moment.” In a smart post on Substack, retired Australian Army Major General Mick Ryan noted that as a result of the incursion, Ukraine has options: It can try to hold on to the territory it has seized, it can retreat to more defensible positions inside Russia, or it can withdraw to Ukraine after embarrassing the Kremlin. Putin, meanwhile, faces the difficult choice of whether to move troops from the front in eastern Ukraine to take back Russian territory in the Kursk region.

Regardless of how this plays out militarily, the political damage is done, and it is rooted in the nature of Russian politics. As I have written, under Putin, the Russian state has become, in essence, an organized crime syndicate. Its internal logic, processes, incentive structure, and behavior resemble those of a mafia family. And the most destabilizing moment for a crime syndicate is when the mafia boss looks weak.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of the Power Vertical podcast.

The post Ukraine’s Kursk offensive marks Putin’s third major humiliation of the war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

However, two years on it is becoming increasingly clear that the legacy of the IRA is tethered to a renewed pact between government and the US economy, with key implications for trade, technological competition with China, and foreign policy writ large.

Since the early 1980s, the prevailing dogma on both sides of the aisle regarding US economic policy has largely been one of skepticism about direct government intervention in the economy. Trade and domestic market liberalization have been features of Republican and Democratic rhetoric since at least the Reagan administration. Of course, US government spending did increase over this period, and Washington did often step in with, for example, countercyclical spending during economic downturns. Nonetheless, most US politicians took as axiomatic that the government should not be “picking winners and losers” in the economy. The IRA has ushered in a new era in which this reflexive aversion to economic intervention may be vanishing.

Industrial policy has risen from the gutter

The IRA’s subsidies and grants for low-carbon electricity generation and technology manufacturing, along with its capitalization of the US Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, represent a divergence from the once-dominant economic policy consensus. The IRA is among the most significant government investments in the US economy since President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. In fact, it is rivaled only by primarily demand-side stimulus packages, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and the CARES Act of 2020.

According to Goldman Sachs estimates, by 2032 the IRA will provide $1.2 trillion in incentives with the intention of fueling the deployment of energy technologies. This includes technologies that are currently profitable, such as solar and onshore wind, as well as new market entrants, such as electric vehicles, grid storage, new forms of bioenergy, offshore wind, clean hydrogen for hard-to-abate sectors, point-source carbon capture, and carbon removal. If the broad-scale deployment of these technologies is achieved at the scale envisioned by prevailing models—which is dependent on additional regulatory reform—these effects of the legislation will be uniformly positive for climate mitigation and economic growth alike.

These positive effects are being borne out in data. Of an estimated seventy-eight billion dollars in public investment since the IRA’s enactment, the bill has shepherded between five to six times that figure in private investment. In fact, investment in low-carbon technologies and manufacturing has comprised about half of private investment growth since the IRA’s passage. That is a success.

The implications of the IRA as a shift in economic policy are not uniformly positive, however. The global consequences of this shift have manifested in at least two ways.

First, the floodgates of government market interventions have been opened. In 2023 alone, governments around the world implemented more than 1,600 industrial policies. The IRA is both an example of this general trend and, given the size of the US economy and the IRA’s intervention, something other countries have reacted to with their own interventions. For example, the United States’ use of subsidies for its economy has prompted adverse reactions from the European Union, whose single market makes the use of subsidies difficult, and prompted concerns regarding the comparative advantage of its domestic industry. This year, the European Parliament and European Council passed the Net-Zero Industry Act, which provides financial support through grants, loans, and other funding mechanisms to promote research, development, and deployment of clean technologies and manufacturing capacity—a direct response to the IRA.

In a sense, the IRA has prompted global competition among governments to make public investments in emerging industries and technologies.

Second, trade measures have arisen as a method by which to protect, or “ring fence,” domestic industrial policy strategies from foreign competition. Notably, the May 2024 suite of tariffs announced by the White House represent a substantial signal of intent to isolate encroachment of Chinese imports on domestic industries that have not yet been established and that the IRA supports. In the IRA, certain softly punitive measures impact trade, stoking additional tension. For instance, eligibility for subsidies under the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit is limited, based on the country of origin of critical minerals and battery components and excluding several US allies and partners.

Economic competition among the United States, the European Union, and China is increasing, and the decades-long criticism of China’s subsidy-centric growth model by Washington and European capitals is being usurped by a new industrial policy with US and European characteristics. In some sense, although all three blocs are competing, two distinct visions have emerged: the bottom-up, private sector-led and government-enabled vision of the United States and European Union, and the top-down, state-directed vision of China.

Trade-offs, tariffs, and technological innovation

Will this trend continue? Industrial policymaking in democracies is necessarily impacted by political feasibility, what is favored by those with power, and what works within the parameters of a state’s administrative capacity, as an International Monetary Fund publication recently reflected. As such, the IRA is also a product of the political moment, dubbed by the Breakthrough Institute as a period of “post-COVID congressional profligacy.” It is difficult to predict what the next major industrial policy package in the United States will consist of, but it will likely be shaped as much by the political forces at play as by rigid economic analysis.

Careful reflection is needed going forward, as industrial policy, by definition, leads to concentrated benefits and carries diffuse costs. As such, it can also lead to unintended or counterproductive outcomes. The recent tariffs may prove this true, depending on one’s definition of the intended outcome.

Take the 25 percent tariff increase that was imposed on imports of Chinese solar cells. While this may protect domestic solar manufacturers, it may also slow the rate of solar deployment overall, given the higher resulting price for panels. Absent this tariff, solar panels would likely be cheaper, so it would be fair to say that the Biden administration’s implicit target of countering China’s industrial prowess is countering its explicit goal of achieving a carbon-free power grid by 2035.

The effects of trade policies such as this are unclear. What is clear is that acknowledgement of the trade-offs is necessary.

Public investments in infrastructure do have an important role. They are critical conduits of productivity growth and are necessary in areas where clear incentives for the private sector are not present. For instance, while nuclear energy is critical for bolstering the reliability of the electric grid, its business model has suffered significantly from the natural gas production boom that the United States has experienced from 2005 to the present. The affordability of gas, and increasingly of other resources, such as solar power, has made nuclear power’s high operating and capital costs less attractive to utilities, among other factors. Programs such as the Department of Energy’s Civil Nuclear Credit Program, which provides financial assistance to the United States’ nuclear reactor fleet, play an essential role.

Looking forward, however, it is also worthwhile to recall what is historically the engine of growth for the modern US economy, and the principal root of US competitive advantage in the global economy—technological innovation. It was not the tariffs of the McKinley administration or the safety net of the Roosevelt administration that led the way in supercharging US growth, although safety nets and infrastructure definitively do breed innovation.  

Attempting to reinvigorate domestic industry through grants, loans, or subsidies may be necessary to achieve goals such as “reshoring” manufacturing. At the same time, investments in research and development (R&D) are proven over decades to provide consistent macroeconomic returns and drive technological progress. An independent report commissioned by the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy found that investments of twelve billion dollars made by the office since the mid-1970s have yielded more than $388 billion in total undiscounted net economic benefits to the United States.

However, public R&D spending in the United States has been stagnant for decades as a percentage of gross domestic product. If government investment is looking for the best rate of return, as sound investors do, R&D may be an underappreciated “asset class” that should increasingly be targeted by the United States and its partners.

William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

The post The IRA two years on: A signpost of the new economic policy consensus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, experts from the Atlantic Council and its Venezuela Solutions Group answer five pressing questions about the country’s ongoing political crisis.

1. What is the situation in Venezuela since the election?

Venezuela is experiencing a deepening of its crisis. The lack of transparency in the electoral process and the failure of the CNE to present the electoral bulletins have led the country into a chaotic situation. Repression is increasing by the day, reaching levels that exceed anything previously seen in Venezuela. Respect for the right to demonstrate and for the popular will of the people are fundamental pillars of any government that calls itself democratic. The world cannot remain silent in the face of the systematic and violent repression of opponents and dissidents in Venezuela.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group. 

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

2. What exactly is the issue with the election results?

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group. 

3. What role can other countries in the region play? 

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries. 

—María Ángela Holguín

4. Is there any hope the Maduro regime will negotiate a transfer of power?

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.  

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

5. How is the US working to advance a democratic transition?

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution. 

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Will Maduro negotiate a transfer of power? And four other questions about Venezuela’s political crisis. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How did this happen? Russia, long opposed to the Council of Europe’s 2001 Budapest Convention on cybercrime, began this process in 2017. Then, in 2019, Russia, along with China, North Korea, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Syria, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Belarus, presented a resolution to develop a global treaty. Despite strong opposition from the United States and European states, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in December 2019, by a vote of seventy-nine in favor and sixty against (with thirty abstentions), that officially began the process. Already, it was clear that the member states did not share one vision. Indeed, they could not even agree on a name for the convention until last week. What they ended up with is a mouthful: “Draft United Nations convention against cybercrime: Strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of information and communications technology systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crimes.”

This exceedingly long name reveals one of the biggest problems with this convention: its scope. At its heart, this convention is intended to allow law enforcement from different countries to cooperate to prevent, investigate, and prosecute cybercrime, which costs trillions of dollars globally each year. However, the convention covers much more than the typical cybercrimes that come to mind, such as ransomware, and includes crimes committed using technology, which reflects the different views as to what constitutes cybercrime. As if that were not broad enough, Russia, China, and other states succeeded in pushing for negotiations on an additional protocol that would expand the list of crimes even further. Additionally, under the convention, states parties are to cooperate on “collecting, obtaining, preserving, and sharing of evidence in electronic form of any serious crime”—which in the text is defined as a crime that is punishable by a maximum of four years or more in prison or a “more serious penalty,” such as the death penalty.

In Russia, for example, association with the “international LGBT movement” can lead to extremism charges, such as the crime of displaying “extremist group symbols,” like the rainbow flag. A first conviction carries a penalty of up to fifteen days in detention, but a repeat offense carries a penalty of up to four years. That means a repeat offense would qualify as a “serious crime” under the cybercrime convention and be eligible for assistance from law enforcement in other jurisdictions that may possess electronic evidence relevant to the investigation—including traffic, subscriber, and even content data. Considering how much of modern life is carried out digitally, there will be some kind of electronic evidence for almost every serious crime under any domestic legislation. Even the UN’s own human rights experts cautioned against this broad definition.

Further, under the convention, states parties are obligated to establish laws in their domestic system to “compel” service providers to “collect or record” real-time traffic or content data. Many of the states behind the original drive to establish this convention have long sought this power over private firms. At the same time, states parties are free to adopt laws that keep requests to compel traffic and content data confidential—cloaking these actions in secrecy. Meanwhile, grounds for a country to refuse a cooperation request are limited to instances such as where it would be against that country’s “sovereignty,” security, or other “essential” interest, or if it would be against that country’s own laws. The convention contains a vague caveat that nothing in it should be interpreted as an obligation to cooperate if a country “has substantial grounds” to believe the request is made to prosecute or punish someone for their “sex, race, language, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinions.”

Russia claimed that such basic safeguards, which do offer some protection in the example regarding LGBT activity as “extremist,” were merely an opportunity for some countries to “abuse” the opportunity to reject cooperation requests. Those safeguards, conversely, could also be abused by the very same states that opposed them. The Iranian delegation, for its part, proposed a vote to delete that provision, as well as all other human rights safeguards and references to gender, on the day the text was adopted. These provisions had already been weakened significantly throughout the negotiation process and only survived thanks to the firm stance taken by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Iceland, the European Union, Mexico, and others that drew a red line and refused to accept any more changes.

The possible negative consequences of this convention are not limited to human rights but can seriously threaten global cybersecurity and national security. The International Chamber of Commerce, a global business organization representing millions of companies, warned during negotiations that “people who have access to or otherwise possess the knowledge and skills necessary” could be forced “to break or circumvent security systems.” Worse, they could even be compelled to disclose “previously unknown vulnerabilities, private encryption keys, or proprietary information like source code.” Microsoft agreed. Its representative, Nemanja Malisevic, added that this treaty will allow “for unauthorized disclosure of sensitive data and classified information to third states” and for “malicious actors” to use a UN treaty to “force individuals with knowledge of how a system functions to reveal proprietary or sensitive information,” which could “expose the critical infrastructure of a state to cyberattacks or lead to the theft of state secrets. Malisevic concluded that this “should terrify us all.”

Similarly, independent media organizations called for states to reject the convention, which the International Press Institute has called a “surveillance treaty.” Civil society organizations including Electronic Frontier Foundation, Access Now, Human Rights Watch, and many others have also long been ringing the alarm bell. They continue to do so as the final version of the convention adopted by the committee has failed to adequately address their concerns.

Given the extent and cross-border nature of cybercrime, it is evident that a global treaty is both necessary and urgent—on that, the international community is in complete agreement. Unfortunately, this treaty, perhaps a product of sunk-cost fallacy thinking or agreed to under duress for fear of an even worse version, does not solve the problems the international community faces. If the UN General Assembly adopts the text and the required forty member states ratify it so that it comes into force, experts are right to warn that governments intent on engaging in surveillance will have the veneer of UN legitimacy stamped on their actions. Rights-respecting states should not allow themselves to be co-opted into assisting abusive practices under the guise of cooperation. Nor should they willingly open the door to weakening their own national security or global cybersecurity.

Lisandra Novo is a staff lawyer for the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council specializing in law and technology.

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The last day I went to the office was August 15. On that day, I was dismissed from my job and told that the Taliban had entered the city. Out on the streets, the city was gripped with terror: people running everywhere, cars stuck in traffic, policemen removing their uniforms, and parents frantically trying to pick their children up from school and rush to their houses. When I finally got home, I found my daughters in despair and the neighbors hoisting a Taliban flag over their gates. Overnight our lives had changed.

It took me three days to venture outside after the Taliban’s military takeover. With a friend, I walked through the Shahr-e Naw neighborhood and posted on social media, encouraging other women to come out, so that the Taliban could not deny our existence. Nearly three weeks later, on September 3, I participated in the first protest at Fawara Aab, or “Water Fountain,” square in Kabul. As I published photos and videos on social networks, I began receiving messages from friends seeking to join. I created a WhatsApp chat group and, after adding those I trusted, we organized another protest the following day. This time, however, the Taliban were prepared and quickly suppressed our rally, beating people and firing tear gas into the air. Most protesters dispersed but some of us continued on to another location, growing along the way to include men and women from the public. We felt so energized we decided to organize more protests.

With no previous experience in organizing protests, I learned quickly that it was a lot of work. We began coordinating through the WhatsApp chat group I had started while also establishing media contacts and trying to get our voices heard inside and outside the country. At first, we were a loose coalition of many different protest groups, at least fifty, but soon we operated under one large umbrella group, united as a movement in our opposition against gender apartheid, tyranny, restrictions, and the exclusion of women.

Taliban members responded to our growing protests with ever more suppression and violence. They knocked us to the ground, punched and kicked us, and destroyed our phones and property. Many of us were detained for days and subjected to threats and insults. Some were imprisoned and tortured for longer. Until I was kidnapped and imprisoned by the Taliban, I participated in thirty-eight protests against its oppressive apartheid regime.

Over time, Taliban intelligence infiltrated our organization, and the regime knew about our protests before they even took place. On September 19, 2023, I received a call alerting me that the Taliban had kidnapped a fellow organizer along with her husband and child, and warning me that I could be next. I fled my home that day, leaving my daughters with my mother for their safety. But when I secretly returned a week later to attend a funeral, I was accosted on my street by a man who shouted, “It’s her.” Within minutes, twelve Taliban military vehicles arrived. The men put a black hood over my head, forced me into a car, and took me to a police station with my hands tightly and painfully bound for hours.

On arrival, they pointed a gun at me and demanded the password for my mobile phone. I resisted at first but relented when they threatened to torture and arrest my children. They threw me into a room where I sat, worried for my fellow female protesters who were unaware that my phone was now in Taliban hands. Half an hour later, the person who arrested me entered the room with my son’s and daughter’s phones. When I saw my nineteen-year-old son’s unlocked phone, I realized that he too had been arrested and I collapsed to the ground.

I was held in solitary confinement in a damp room for nearly two months and routinely interrogated and tortured for a confession. They would show me videos of my son, wearing a prison uniform and growing weaker by the day. I later learned that he was also being held in solitary confinement. Twice during my imprisonment I was hospitalized, once due to severe pain and swelling, the other because I broke down after witnessing the suicide of a young boy who took his life after being tortured.

Still, I was lucky compared to other prisoners, who were subjected to whipping, electric shocks, and forced starvation. They didn’t torture me in these ways. Instead, they inflicted psychological torture, placing my room across from the men’s torture chamber where I lay awake listening to their screams for days. During my interrogation sessions, I was forced to sit upside down with my hands tied to the arms of the chair. At one session, I overheard the Taliban interrogators say, “If she is released, she will talk about this. After all, she is the leader of these movements.” I realized then that they were afraid of my voice, just as all apartheid regimes fear the voices of their citizens.

On the forty-fifth day, I was allowed to see my family for five minutes. They told me they had been searching for me and submitted endless petitions to the Taliban before the regime finally confirmed my detention. This was the first time I was allowed to see my imprisoned son, though only for five minutes.

About eighteen days later, I was returned to the general cells, where other women prisoners recounted their stories and those of other friends, including one who repeatedly tried to escape and fought fiercely every time Taliban soldiers took her for interrogation. She was eventually released after nine months.  

I too was desperate for release and to see my family, but I never showed my despair to the prison guards. Even when they punched and kicked me—or worse, when they called my son “de caper zoi” (son of the infidel), I kept my composure. No one was willing to bail me out of prison because they feared becoming targets as well. Eventually, however, a former Taliban governor agreed to be my guarantor, and I was released into my family’s custody.

Although free, I was confined to my house, the streets of my city closed off to me. Taliban fighters kept a constant watch on me and my home. They also offered me a proposition: Spy for them, and I could live comfortably wherever I wanted in Afghanistan. Betraying my homeland and the freedom of its women was never an option for me.

Ultimately, I was forced to accept exile. Late one evening, I received an email notifying me of my transfer outside the country. I cried through the night, mourning the loss of my home and homeland. When I crossed the border out of Afghanistan, I screamed in anguish. I considered staying behind and secretly working under an assumed identity, but it was not a viable choice for my family.

I am now a stranger in a foreign land, without a home and without an identity. I count the minutes until I can return to Afghanistan and witness the fall of the Taliban. In exile, my greatest hope is that our protests, our sacrifices, our rebellions were not in vain.

Zholia Parsi is a member of the leadership of the “Spontaneous Women’s Protest Movement of Afghanistan” and was imprisoned and tortured by the Taliban for protesting against gender apartheid. This article was edited from an interview with Parsi by Nayera Kohistani and Mursal Sayas.

This article is part of the Inside the Taliban’s Gender Apartheid series, a joint project of the Civic Engagement Project and the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center.

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What’s next for the parliament?

The second round of legislative elections on July 7 left France with three different blocs of competing agendas. With the Olympic “political truce” over, appointing a new prime minister has become the priority. Macron is under no legal pressure to name Prime Minister Gabriel Attal’s successor, which gives the president time to strategize how to form a stable government. Negotiations are already underway, but some speculate that Macron might seek to extend the political truce through the Paralympic Games, which run through September 8.

Typically, the president chooses a prime minister from the party with the most seats in the National Assembly—currently, the New Popular Front (NFP) coalition. However, the NFP, composed of five different political parties, faces internal challenges, particularly with the far-left France Unbowed party at the helm. The coalition has proposed Lucie Castets as their preferred candidate, yet Macron’s allies have labeled France Unbowed as too “extreme” to govern. This situation has increased the likelihood that Macron might attempt to lure some moderate Socialists and Greens from the NFP to his more centrist bloc.

Whoever is named prime minister is in for a rocky road ahead, starting on October 1, when the National Assembly reconvenes. France’s budget is under tight scrutiny after the European Council launched formal action against its high deficit-to-gross domestic product ratio. The Council has requested that France submit medium-term plans by September to get its deficit levels back on track. Managing these budget concerns while operating in an unprecedented hung parliament will be a daunting task for Macron’s choice.

What’s next for Macron?

Despite embracing gold medal–winning French swimmer Léon Marchand and capitalizing on the feel-good spirit evoked by the Olympics, Macron will soon find that sporting euphoria doesn’t last. Shortly after the French men’s soccer team won the World Cup in 2018, the “yellow vest” movement gripped the nation for fifty-two consecutive weeks. It’s too soon to tell whether 2024 will resemble 2018, but Macron will undoubtedly attempt to keep the spirit of the Olympics and Paralympics alive for as long as he can.

The division of labor in French politics grants Macron a near monopoly over foreign policy, but his agenda could be complicated by the French Parliament. Many of Macron’s plans—reducing the budget deficit through spending cuts or tax increases, transitioning to renewable energy, and maintaining a hard stance on Russia—could be upended by bureaucratic hurdles raised by the NFP or the National Rally (RN) party. Marine Le Pen of the RN, for example, already made it clear that Macron’s defense and foreign policy agenda will not go his way.

What does this mean for the EU?

As the next few weeks unfold in France, no one will be watching the French political scene more anxiously than policymakers in Brussels who rely on French support. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has outlined a strategic agenda for the EU with ambitious goals surrounding competitiveness, defense, and clean energy. Realizing these initiatives will require strong support from France.

Perhaps the most significant implication of the French political saga for the EU is its impact on support for Ukraine. Macron has been a staunch advocate for aiding Ukraine, saying in May that “if Russia wins in Ukraine, there will be no security in Europe.” Going forward, however, maintaining a high level of support hinges on his ability to navigate a hung parliament.

Another factor in the equation is Jordan Bardella, president of the RN party, who now leads the far-right Patriots for Europe (PfE) group in the European Parliament. The PfE has emerged as the third-largest bloc in the European Parliament and has the backing of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The far right may have faltered in the second round of the French snap elections, but with the PfE’s increasing momentum in the European Parliament and Orbán as a powerful ally in the European Council, the RN still has the potential to complicate the pro-EU agenda.

Macron is basking in the success of a spectacular Olympics, but it’s unlikely that that success will translate into political gains for the president or lead to compromises in the French Parliament. The two biggest tests will be naming a prime minister and addressing the budget proposal for the European Council. French politics will certainly stay in the headlines for the foreseeable future, leading to profound implications for both Paris and Brussels.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The vision was amplified by Johnson when he became president. In a letter to the Senate in 1967, he emphasized that cooperation in space would provide a basis by which to avoid confrontational national tendencies, thereby leading to substantial contributions toward peace. The historic US Apollo and Soviet Union Soyuz (Apollo-Soyuz) docking in July 1975 was heralded as a first step toward meaningful space cooperation between otherwise adversarial nations. The image of astronauts and cosmonauts welcoming each other across their open spacecraft hatchways sparked an optimism and a sense of unity that inspired the world community. NASA astronaut Tom Stafford said that opening the hatch in space opened a “new era” back on Earth.

The current state of space diplomacy

Today, the International Space Station is a testament to multinational cooperation, persisting despite seismic geopolitical shifts. The partnership between the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia has required a myriad of joint engineering projects and mutual reliance on resources despite monumental earthly tensions—a striking step forward in space diplomacy.

In recent years, however, hostility between the United States on one hand and Russia and China on the other has overshadowed the core tenets of space cooperation. The realization that space is not only an arena for scientific exploration and economic competition, but of future military conflict, has come to the fore. Although the United States and forty-two other nations have recently agreed to a set of principles for the peaceful exploration of space, known as the Artemis Accords, there exists no such agreement with other key space-faring nations, most notably China and Russia.

Parallel lunar ambitions

The United States and its allies are developing a major space program to return to the moon and establish a permanent presence with a lunar base and an orbiting lunar space station. The project has ignited public excitement and forged new agreements between the United States and partner nations. At the same time, China is leading a very similar project called the International Lunar Research Station to establish a permanent lunar presence, working with Russia and several other countries, including Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, and South Africa.

Two groups of nations separately working on the same goal, establishing separate lunar bases with no cooperation between them is a disappointing setback from earlier achievements. One might ask: What happened to the spirit that drove the handshake on Apollo-Soyuz?

There are of course challenges and barriers to sparking and sustaining cooperation. The growing conflicts on Earth and the threats posed by anti-satellite weapons provide arguments against initiating a dialogue. However, similar dynamics were present in the past, when leaders decided to work together to embrace the common objectives of exploring the cosmos and harvesting space for the betterment of life on Earth. Despite major tensions and conflicts, the two sides gained a measure of mutual understanding and respect for each other’s humanity through the efforts of scientists, engineers, and astronauts, as they joined in a common purpose.

Starting points for US-China space cooperation

The logical question is: Given substantial concerns regarding military hostility in space, where should the United States and China start? How can they find common ground in an environment of such intense mistrust?

Washington and Beijing can begin with a principle that has already been agreed upon and that touches a core human value. The UN Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement came into effect in 1968. It commits nations to come to the assistance of astronauts in distress, no matter what country they launched from. It was a noble step forward, and a theme largely taken from the finest of maritime traditions. The agreement, however, is hollow without plans, procedures, and systems in place to enable meaningful action. Spaceships and space suits are complex and unique, and without forethought and the right equipment it is highly unlikely that astronauts from separate nations could possibly provide any meaningful aid. For instance, how would a Chinese astronaut connect and supply the right pressure to provide oxygen to an American astronaut in distress without first having the right connecting gear and knowing the pressure settings? How can countries make their ships compatible to dock if medical support is needed? What would be the communication protocols to use when determining whether assistance is necessary?

A bilateral working group between NASA and China’s National Space Administration (CNSA) should be established to prepare for joint rescue operations. This interaction would lead to improved communication between the respective space communities. The collaboration would also establish readiness for potential rescue missions, which would have profound benefits in the event that an astronaut rescue was needed.

Once the rescue working group is formed, further bilateral agreements should be pursued. These could include mutual use of lunar communication and navigation services, as well as agreements on providing consumables, power, habitats, and transport.

What steps does the United States need to take? The United States should repeal the Wolf Amendment, which was put in place in 2011 due to concerns about space technology transfer to China. The establishment of this barrier has not slowed China’s space technology development. Instead, it has only hindered useful interchange between NASA and the CNSA.

And China? Beijing should foster more open communication with the United States regarding norms of behavior in space exploration and the preservation of the space environment. It should take a leading role in space sustainability, including being transparent about its plans to remedy issues with the Long March 6A rocket that broke apart earlier this month and left significant space debris. China should also initiate discussions to join moratoria on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing, which it has so far opposed.

Eisenhower and Johnson advocated for cooperation to prevent misunderstandings and mistrust from growing into armed conflict in space. They saw the need to take firm steps to avoid such a tragic result. To that end, the United States and China must now take swift steps to initiate space cooperation and lead a more unified world into the final frontier.

Dan Hart is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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Robert Bassett Cross is a former British Army officer and the founder and CEO of the UK-headquartered AI software developer Adarga. He is a nonresident senior fellow at the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and an honorary research fellow at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute.

Writing in 1946, just a few years before NATO was founded, Director of the US Office of Strategic Services Bill Donovan knew precisely how valuable publicly available information could be.

“[E]ven a regimented press,” he wrote, “will again and again betray the national interest to a painstaking observer . . . Pamphlets, periodicals, scientific journals are mines of intelligence.”

Today, seventy-five years after the Alliance was formed, such open-source intelligence (OSINT) is more important—and more powerful—than ever. However, underinvestment in OSINT capabilities and a culture favoring classified data currently hold back member states’ intelligence-collection potential. To fully utilize the available technology to detect threats from adversaries, NATO member states must overcome these barriers to embrace open-source intelligence enabled by artificial intelligence (AI).

Understanding the threat landscape

OSINT can help leaders get a fast, up-to-date understanding of their operating environment. If you want to know who’s doing what, where, and when, then an open-source specialist can quickly tell you.

If, for example, you want to find out who’s jamming GPS systems in the Baltic region, the relevant data isn’t hard to come by. Similarly, OSINT analysts can provide insights into issues ranging from the effectiveness of Iran’s attack on Israel (and the Israeli response) to China’s current role in fueling the Russian war machine. 

In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that, in addition to insight into current and recent events, OSINT can help leaders forecast what an adversary might be planning to do weeks, months, or even years from now.

By exploiting OSINT more fully and by integrating it into the wider intelligence cycle, NATO can preempt, deter, and defeat its adversaries’ efforts to expand their influence and undermine the security of member states. Here are several ways that OSINT can be used:

1. Across the physical domains of land, air, sea, and space, NATO can exploit publicly and commercially available data to explore an adversary’s order of battle and—more importantly—monitor changes in the strength and disposition of its military units and formations to infer its intent.
2. In the cyber domain, NATO can leverage commercially available information to detect and counter the penetration of networks governing critical infrastructure, as well as those related to research organizations, academic institutions, and technology developers.
3. In the information space, OSINT can help NATO identify, understand, and counter influence campaigns, specifically when it comes to the detection and attribution of disinformation and misinformation.
4. NATO can draw on vast swaths of open-source data to infer long-term strategic intent. Every subtle change to a government’s policies, every adjustment to its economic positioning and investment strategy, every new law and regulation it enacts, every new treaty and trade agreement—all of these can help the Alliance reverse engineer an adversary’s confidential playbooks.

Given the vast quantity, complexity, and diversity of the data, it is vital that NATO employs AI to extract the maximum value from it—to enhance analysts’ abilities, accelerate the analysis cycle, and build a reliable, contextual understanding of what Donovan called “the strategy developing silently behind the mask.”

The barriers to OSINT adoption

While AI is, of course, an emerging technology, its utility is already being realized across industries and sectors outside defense. From corporate intelligence and advisory services to finance and media, more and more private-sector organizations are using AI to make sense of the information environment, drawing on an ever-expanding range of sources to manage risk, identify opportunities, and adapt to geopolitical volatility.

However, the barriers to its widespread adoption and effective exploitation in political and military circles remain considerable. A paper published in 2022 by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), in collaboration with the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the Alan Turing Institute, identified three in particular.

First, there are tradecraft barriers relating to the methodologies governing everything from the analysis of publicly available information to the evaluation and dissemination of the resulting intelligence. Second, there are resourcing barriers stemming from underinvestment in the requisite tools, technologies, data sets, and training.

The third barrier identified by the RUSI authors—and the most daunting one—is cultural. Presented with so much open-source data, analysts and decision makers tend to favor classified information and internal data sets. These sources and insights are easier to trust and are imbued with what the authors call “the perceived power of the ‘secret’ label.” 

Speaking at the Eurosatory exhibition in Paris in June, US Major General Matthew Van Wagenen, deputy chief of staff for operations at NATO, confirmed how great this cultural barrier is. Up to 90 percent of “what Western militaries are looking for,” he said, can be derived from open sources:

This is a revolution in how we look at information. The ways of discerning information through classical means and techniques, tactics, and procedures that militaries have been adapted to—that’s really an old model of doing business. The new open source that’s out there right now, and the speed of information and relevance of information is coming, this is how things need to be looked at.

It is reasonable to believe that the tradecraft and resourcing barriers can be overcome. Methodologies are evolving swiftly, as are the requisite technologies. In fact, many of the tools NATO needs to capitalize on OSINT already exist. New AI applications are coming online almost every week. But if NATO fails to overcome the cultural barrier, it risks going into the next conflict underinformed and ill-prepared.

How AI-enabled OSINT can earn NATO leaders’ confidence

The cultural barrier to AI-enabled OSINT cannot be surmounted simply by decree or directive. Nor can it be overcome by intelligence professionals alone. The technology—and the discipline—must earn the justified confidence of civilian leaders and military commanders across the international staff, the military committee, and the supporting agencies. This could happen if AI-enabled OSINT were applied first to the simplest intelligence-gathering tasks before being applied to the most complex. To borrow the terminology made famous by former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, NATO should apply the discipline to corroborating “known knowns,” resolving “known unknowns,” and surfacing “unknown unknowns.”

Corroborating “known knowns”: NATO should start by recognizing where the skills of the human analyst currently outperform even the most sophisticated models, and where AI can best be applied to elevate these skills. This means asking the right kind of questions, and employing OSINT to corroborate what is already known and to triangulate insights gathered from well-established secret sources. In this way, NATO can begin to overcome the skepticism that’s too often associated with publicly available information and OSINT. 

Resolving “known unknowns”: With so much data to draw on, it is essential that NATO uses AI to help collate, process, and (where necessary) translate that data so it is ready for analysts to interpret. If AI-enabled OSINT can prove useful to intelligence professionals in this capacity, those professionals may be more willing to apply it to the most complex and valuable intelligence tasks of all—surfacing risks and opportunities that civilian and military leaders would otherwise struggle to identify.

Surfacing “unknown unknowns”: Perhaps the greatest contribution that AI can make to the intelligence-gathering discipline is identifying patterns and connections that are invisible to the human eye. Dedicated, AI-powered information-intelligence applications that synthesize publicly available information with proprietary data can help analysts and decision makers tease out insights they would otherwise miss.

This combination of publicly available information with classified data will enable NATO analysts to give military and political leaders a uniquely rich, nuanced, and highly contextualized understanding of the operating environment. Decision makers at every level will be able to examine intelligence from every angle, and apply their experience and imagination to infer an adversary’s intentions based on the interplay of evidence.

The critical need for human-machine teaming

The necessary tools and methodologies exist. What’s missing is the determination to get these tools into users’ hands, to supply the requisite training, and to capitalize on the integrated output derived from all sources of intelligence, open-source and otherwise.

OSINT is becoming known among some intelligence professionals as “the intelligence of first resort.” Compared with clandestine methods of information gathering and analysis, OSINT is fast, low-cost, and low-risk. But if it can be combined with those same methods then NATO’s analysts and leadership will have an enduring competitive edge, with access to the kind of strategic information that would likely be, in Bill Donovan’s words, “of determining influence in modern war.”

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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Late last month, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken headed to the Philippines to meet with their counterparts and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. Their visit was the latest in a series of top-level diplomatic meetings between the two countries highlighting, among other factors, their shared interest in security and a free and open Indo-Pacific region. As the officials emphasized, this trip was also a reaffirmation of each country’s concerns about Chinese actions that threaten maritime security in the region.

Marcos did not mention China by name in his state of the nation address on July 22, but it was clear who he was talking about when he said the Philippines “cannot yield . . . cannot waver.” Marcos then continued, “The West Philippine Sea”—meaning the portion of the South China Sea that the Philippines claims as its exclusive economic zone—“is not merely a figment of our imagination. It is ours. And it will remain ours as long as the spirit of our beloved country, the Philippines, burns brightly.” As a demonstration of this resolve, Philippine armed forces continued their work to resupply the BRP Sierra Madre on the Ayungin (Second Thomas) Shoal in the days that followed Marcos’s speech.

After a year of working alongside Philippine Marines and servicemembers, I can say that the attitude of national resolve to defend their homeland and surrounding waters is widely shared in the country. It is reflected in Balikatan, for example, arguably the most well-known Joint-Combined exercise in the Philippines, which translates as “shoulder to shoulder.”

This cross-cutting sense of purpose is important because the true strength of US and Philippine efforts—and the efforts of both with other countries in the Indo-Pacific—lies not simply in diplomacy among top officials and leaders. It also rests on what is happening on the ground among US and Philippine servicemembers and officials—the action officers. It’s in the day-to-day communication, coordination, planning, and relationship-building that is required to establish deterrence. This work is part of what the US Department of Defense calls “integrated deterrence,” an important but often misunderstood concept.

Taking integrated deterrence from concept to reality

In 2022, when the current National Defense Strategy was released with its “primary focus on the need to sustain and strengthen US deterrence against China,” I was working as an operations analyst for the Department of Defense, contributing toward the development of the Joint Warfighting Concept. As concept writers do, my fellow officers and I dismantled, debated, and explored what the words on screen meant and how they should be translated into action at each echelon of command within the Department of Defense—particularly the new idea of “integrated deterrence.” The idea was often met with skepticism early on. Some people asked: How is this different from what the United States has always done? At the same time, there was a shared belief in our discussion group that making deterrence a reality required a new conceptual approach.

After this experience, I wanted to take what we had done conceptually and see it implemented in practice. The Indo-Pacific seemed the most logical place for this, and I asked for my next assignment to return me to the tactical level, a regiment in the Marine Corps, hoping to take ideas discussed in wargames and within the walls of the Pentagon and do my small part to help see them realized at the forward edge of the first island chain. My request was granted, so I write this while in the Philippines, deployed with one of the most lethal, modern US military formations. We are manned by some of the smartest and most capable humans I have ever met and equipped with cutting-edge technology that has yet again changed the character of warfare. But, with each month of being here and working with our allies in the Philippines, especially as a logistician, it becomes clearer to me that integrated deterrence is not simply a product of measured combat power born of sheer numbers of postured tanks and ships; there is something more to getting deterrence right.

Preparation is essential. It is hard to imagine today, but during World War II, the United States wrote and trained its military leaders on plans written to contend against many of the credible military powers of the day: Japan, Mexico, Latin American countries, and even the British empire. These plans prepared military leaders for a multitude of scenarios that may require action from them. Hearkening back to the spirit of these color-coded plans, the Joint Staff continues to develop concepts for employment and wrestle with what it would take to win. To be ready for a potential conflict, the United States and its allies and partners must find innovative ways to implement the capabilities and tools they have developed. This leads to another essential requirement: integration.

All the components contributing to defense need to work together to be effective. Traditional measures of military strength, such as the number of servicemembers, ships, and tanks available, count for little if they cannot operate together and be sustained. This integration must happen across several areas, including:  

• Integration to reinforce and balance Joint Force and ally capabilities. Host nations are ready to defend their homelands, and US international partners and allies are eager to contribute; the United States must be ready to stand by them as leaders. That means knowing what everyone brings to the table. As the Joint Force, the world will look to the United States to provide the structure. A combat-credible force must have clear command relationships, a clear understanding of available combat power, and be ready to exercise decision-making authority quickly and effectively. Forces must be ready to find commonalities and overlaps that can mutually benefit each other’s maneuver and sustainment.

• Integration across multiple spectrums of conflict to sustain military operations posturing. The spectrum of conflict ranges from competition to crisis to armed conflict. To integrate across this spectrum, senior leaders must attain a greater understanding of what stakeholders bring to the table. How do nations in the competition phase strengthen their militaries, develop new technologies, and deter hostilities? Educating all parties on the gruesome realities of war and the amount of resources required to sustain open conflict could be just as important as the technology required to wage such a war. 

• Integration of capabilities across terrestrial with non-terrestrial domains. Even today, tanks, piloted airplanes, and battleships appear to many people as national power realized. It is one of the reasons why Hollywood remains obsessed with World War II movies. And while the terrestrial domains of land, air, and maritime remain important, before these weapons are wielded, there are tools that have already been at work, clearing a path. It is important to understand how the information environment, cyberspace, and space contribute toward integrated deterrence and how they will aid in the rapid decision-making needed to execute warfare.

Deterrence is and will continue to be a team effort. The United States and its allies and partners must work together across all levels, from meetings among top-level officials to servicemembers on the ground helping teach close-quarter battle tactics. Success will be measured by maintaining order, under a structure agreed to by multiple nations as equals, benefiting as many peoples as possible.

Kevin M. Wheeler is a nonresident fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Wheeler is an active-duty US Marine Corps Major serving as the regimental logistics officer for the 3d Marine Littoral Regiment. He was previously assigned to the Joint Staff J-7, focusing on assessments and analysis for future employment of the US military Joint Force. His comments are his own views, and do not represent those of the Department of Defense, the United States Marine Corps, or any other US government or military organization.

The post From the Pentagon to the Philippines, integrating deterrence in the Indo-Pacific appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Some raids have no impact on the course of a war. In the summer of 1864, with Union forces besieging Richmond and Petersburg, Confederate General Jubal Early mounted a large and spectacular raid north into Maryland and then southeast into the District of Columbia. Early’s troops stopped just five miles from the US Capitol. It was spectacular but inconsequential, however: The raid distracted the Union command for a few days but made no difference to the outcome of the war.

Other raids do have strategic impact. In 1776, George Washington’s forces had been routed from New York and chased out of New Jersey. Morale was low and political support for the American fight for independence was flagging. In a risky maneuver that December, Washington led a large raid across the Delaware River, surprised enemy forces, and returned to Pennsylvania with captured prisoners and supplies. The raid revived morale and support for the war, demonstrated the Continental Army’s tactical cunning, audacity, and tenacity against a superior foe, and presaged eventual victory.

While it is too early to say with certainty, there is at least a case that the Kursk raid more resembles Washington crossing the Delaware than Early’s raid on Washington; namely, that it has strategic significance. In a war in which battlefield transparency is supposedly universal, the Ukrainians achieved surprise, demonstrating Russia’s failure of intelligence and weakness along its border. The attack thus upends the Kremlin narrative of inevitable Russian victory, a narrative that Kremlin propaganda deploys in Europe and the United States to advance its argument that Ukrainian resistance is useless and support for Ukraine is futile. The raid and the public alarm in Russia it has generated may compel the Kremlin to shift forces from its current offensive in the Donbas region to defend its own territory. Certainly, the raid is a morale booster for Ukrainians.

Politically, the raid undercuts the current Russian demand that, as a precondition for negotiations, Ukraine withdraw from all of the territory of the four Ukrainian provinces that Russia partially occupies and claims but does not totally control. The Russians were in effect demanding Ukrainian capitulation as a condition for opening peace negotiations. Even before the raid, the demand that Ukraine withdraw from its territory that Russia has tried but failed to conquer seemed an arrogant overstretch. This demand is now revealed as feckless in the face of Ukraine’s ability not only to limit Russian attacks to marginal advances, but also to launch successful surprise attacks of its own, defending its own land while seizing Russia’s.

It is premature to make final judgments about a raid still in progress. While some military analysts have suggested that the raid seeks to seize and hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip in eventual negotiations, that seems a stretch: Raids are one thing, a full-scale offensive is another. After all, Washington crossed the Delaware to attack exposed Hessian mercenaries. He then retreated back across the Delaware to avoid a full-scale British assault. But, in the end, Washington, with a lot of help from France, won the war. Ukraine’s current raid does not mean that Ukraine will win its war of national survival. It does suggest that Ukraine could win, given the right and timely help from its friends.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

The post Is Ukraine’s raid into Russia a ‘crossing the Delaware’ moment? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The August surprise came from Ukraine. Beginning on Tuesday, as many as a thousand Ukrainian troops reportedly crossed the border into the Kursk region in Russia, capturing an estimated seventeen square miles of territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the move a “major provocation,” while the Ukrainian government has largely declined to comment. The size and depth of the incursion adds a significant new dimension to the ongoing conflict. Below, our experts share their insights on the thinking in Kyiv and what could come next.

• Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
• John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
• Konstantin Eggert (@kvoneggert): Deutsche Welle Russian affairs analyst and program host
• Shelby Magid (@shelbyjmag): Deputy director of the Eurasia Center

The element of surprise

• “In a war where battlefield transparency is supposedly universal, the Ukrainians achieved surprise, demonstrating a Russian failure of intelligence and weakness along its border,” says Dan. “The attack thus upends the Kremlin narrative of inevitable Russian victory,” which “Kremlin propaganda deploys in Europe and the United States to advance its argument that Ukrainian resistance is useless and support for Ukraine futile.”

• “Even if Ukrainian forces are soon forced out of Kursk, this is a clear shot in the arm for Ukraine,” John tells us. In recent weeks, Russia has made advances in eastern Ukraine, but this incursion may now “force the Kremlin to relieve its current pressure on Ukrainian positions in the Donbas or north of Kharkiv.” If Ukrainian forces do establish defensible positions on Russian territory, then “Moscow will have to consider even more adjustments of its forces in Ukraine” and “a ceasefire in place” would be “less attractive to the Putin clique.”

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A rattled Russia and uplifted Ukraine

• As with the short-lived mutiny by Wagner Group mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in June 2023, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk revealed “the vacuousness and inefficiency of modern Russia’s governance system, based on corruption and fear,” argues Konstantin. “Even reports in Russian state media (which are generally upbeat) had to mention the evacuation of the population and hint at the intensity of the fighting,” while “pro-Kremlin Telegram channels paint a picture of a major strike that took Russia’s military and civilian authorities by surprise.” 

• Dan notes that another risky and successful raid, George Washington’s crossing of the Delaware River in December 1776, boosted troop morale and political support at a critical moment in the American Revolutionary War. Like Washington’s raid, Ukraine’s Kursk incursion reveals its “cunning, audacity, and tenacity against a superior foe” and could have “strategic significance.”

• Ukrainians are closely following reports of the raid. “As a further sign of success and a morale boost for the exhausted Ukrainian troops and society, video is circulating of dozens of Russian troops surrendering to Ukrainian forces,” Shelby points out.

• For Ukrainians, it’s an opportunity to “show to Russia’s ruling class how vulnerable the country is,” Konstantin explains, noting that the situation has been made all the more urgent by the fact that the Kursk nuclear power plant is within reach of Ukraine’s forces. The incursion also “shows Kyiv’s determination to incorporate the politico-psychological warfare factor into purely military operations.” 

What’s next?

• While some Ukrainians have characterized the raid as an effort to “seize and hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip in eventual negotiations, that seems a stretch,” according to Dan. “Raids are one thing, a full-scale offensive is another.” Shelby agrees, noting that “entering and seizing land is different than holding it.” 

• It’s “highly likely” that part of Ukraine’s goal is to demonstrate its capability to its partners, observes John. Kyiv faced a months-long delay in receiving additional US aid, and continues to be restricted by US and German reluctance to provide more advanced weapons in large quantities and allow their use against strategic targets deeper inside Russia, he explains. The Kursk incursion, John maintains, “should be a reminder to the more timid Western leaders that Ukraine can win this war if we enable and allow them to win.”

The post How Ukraine’s incursion into Russia could change the war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Such dramatic developments have put the country in uncharted territory. Three aspects of the developing situation warrant attention.

What will the interim government look like?

On August 6, a day after Hasina fled Bangladesh, the country’s only Nobel Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus, was selected to lead the interim government. His name was proposed by the student protesters, who have spearheaded the movement. The choice of Yunus is a clear testimony that unlike on previous occasions, when political parties, in consultation with the military and bureaucracy, decided who would head the government, a new political force is making the decision this time around. The students have emerged as the center of power, and will seek to exercise that power in the selection of the interim government’s cabinet.

It is notable that the appointment of Yunus is beyond the purview of the existing constitution. While the political actors and army leaders appear to be operating with the understanding that Bangladeshi President Mohammed Shahabuddin is the chief executive, they seem to recognize that under the circumstances, all actions draw their legitimacy from the student-led movement.

How the remainder of the interim government will be formulated is unclear. While the cabinet is expected to reflect the country’s broad political spectrum and its civil society, it must represent the aspirations of the mass upsurge as articulated by the students, who have made it clear that this is not only about deposing an autocrat but also about creating a system that will prevent the rise of a future autocrat. In its language, this movement seeks to change the existing political settlement.

Can the interim government tackle the immediate challenge?

That the interim government will face enormous challenges is an understatement. Indeed, over the medium term, the country’s economic challenges will be the most formidable. But those pale in comparison to what the new government will face in the coming days. The most immediate challenge is to restore confidence in the administrative structure, including law enforcement agencies, while ensuring that those who committed transgressions are held accountable.

In the fifteen years that Hasina was in power, the state’s administrative apparatuses were too often filled with party loyalists who served the party first and acted beyond the remit of the law. Officials persecuted the opposition, siphoned off money from the country, and participated in a kleptocratic system. In a similar vein, many in law enforcement agencies have been involved in gross violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

The same goes with leaders and officials in previous regimes. Holding them accountable for their alleged crimes is necessary for the sake of justice, but so too is the need to assure the public that this is something more than just one government replacing the old one with no other changes. Many Bangladeshis, including those from the business community, have either fled or are trying to flee. The government will have to act swiftly but avoid any impression of seeking revenge. It is a delicate balance to maintain, but imperative for going forward.

As an immediate aftermath of Hasina’s downfall, there were reports of looting, arson, and attacks on religious minorities from around the country. Roving mobs ransacked houses and offices. The situation is improving now, but a worrying development was reports of attacks by weapon-wielding individuals in various places. The death toll mounted. The identity of these attackers remains unknown, but the indiscriminate nature of these attacks gives the impression that they were intended to create an apparently lawless situation and destabilize the country. While some of these incidents can be described as settling personal scores, the scale makes it suspicious.

In the weeks leading to the demise of the regime, especially since the middle of July, when then ruling Awami League Secretary General Obaidul Quader threatened that the party activists were enough to confront the demonstrators, party loyalists had used lethal weapons in broad daylight. Individuals loyal to Hasina and her party might now see it as in their interest to create the impression of widespread chaos.

How will India react?

While the sudden change in Bangladesh has implications for the wider international community, its impacts are most immediately pertinent in neighboring India. Hasina’s decision to take refuge in India was not only predicated by its geographical proximity but also was due to her close connection to the Indian establishment. Since 2009, India has supported the Hasina regime and helped it to survive adverse situations. India’s business interests and desire to keep the country within its sphere of influence shaped India’s policy toward Bangladesh. Indian policymakers, analysts, and media have for years insisted that a change in the government in Bangladesh will create a security threat. They have tacitly suggested that stage-managed elections delivering victory to Hasina were preferable to free and fair elections that would have reflected Bangladesh’s popular will.

At the same time, Indian media has portrayed Bangladesh’s legitimate political opposition parties, including the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, as conspiring with Pakistan’s main intelligence agency. Even though anonymously sourced and devoid of any real evidence, such allegations are quickly becoming a mainstay of Indian media discourse. In the final days of her rule, Hasina insisted that the movement against her government was orchestrated by “militants” and “terrorists”—a message that several Indian news outlets have amplified in recent days.

This approach has now become a central element of Indian media discourse and policy making. Since Hasina landed in India, the mass movement that toppled her has been portrayed as an Islamist upsurge, and some in the Indian establishment are highlighting the violence in Bangladesh since her departure more than the autocratic nature of her governance. The statement of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar to the Indian parliament on August 6 is a case in point. The meeting between Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Hasina at Hindon Airbase near Delhi upon her arrival also sends the message that India is most concerned with the security aspect.

As the situation in Bangladesh is unfolding, the Indian establishment will be better served if it revisits its Bangladesh policy and acknowledges the underlying causes that led to Hasina’s downfall. In recent months, an “India Out” movement, akin to a campaign that emerged in the Maldives several years ago, has gained attention in Bangladesh. A large segment of Bangladeshis seem to feel that Indian policy since 2009 had deprived them of their right to freely choose their leaders and that an unequal relationship was forged with Hasina. The sooner that Indian policymakers acknowledge the necessity to recalibrate their country’s policy, the sooner a better relationship with the interim government can emerge.

Ali Riaz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center and a distinguished professor at Illinois State University.

The post Hasina is out. Yunus is in. Here are the three biggest factors to watch in Bangladesh. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

These days, however, NATO is adapting its partnerships to respond to changed structural realities and the focus on strategic competition given the growing assertiveness and militarism of revisionist states such as Russia and China.

In that sense, there have been significant qualitative changes in the way NATO partnerships with the individual Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—and the minilateral grouping operate today and challenges they face compared to when they were first created. Namely, both sides now see their respective partners as significant for their own defense and deterrence, rather than as interlocutors in the provision of security for third parties, as was the case in out-of-area missions, where crisis management and cooperative security were the central organizing principles of these partnerships.

NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific

Last month’s NATO Summit in Washington demonstrated that the IP4 countries occupy a pivotal place in the ecosystem of NATO’s partner states. This role began to emerge in its present form at the 2022 Madrid summit, which unveiled NATO’s current Strategic Concept. Substantive engagement between NATO and the IP4 countries has continued to develop since then. This year’s summit, for example, marked the third consecutive year that IP4 leaders attended, making it clear that this informal grouping is becoming a mainstay of NATO’s outreach to and strategic thinking about the Indo-Pacific.

The 2022 Strategic Concept referred to the Indo-Pacific as “important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” Such a diagnosis of the international security environment converges with the general assessment of trends as seen from Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul, and Wellington, which have also witnessed firsthand how Russia’s war against Ukraine is reverberating in their region. Furthermore, the Strategic Concept characterized China’s ambitions and policies as major challenges to the Alliance’s security, interests, and values. It also raised concern over increased China-Russia cooperation, which threatens to undermine the rules-based international order. The Washington Summit Declaration, issued on July 10, also underscored how these trends have continued to grow in pace and magnitude as North Korea and Iran provide direct military support to Russia.

In response, coordination and engagement channels between NATO and the IP4 have become even more relevant to the security of both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, creating a strong common basis for cooperation. However, the intra-Alliance consensus for engagement has not been easy to reach due to some notable differences among the thirty-two allies.

At the Washington summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the “strong and deepening cooperation” between the Alliance and the IP4. Emblematic of the greater ambition behind NATO-IP4 cooperation has been a move to the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme agreements, which replaced the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, and which all of the IP4 countries signed over the past year.

Moreover, NATO has pursued engagement with these partners as a minilateral group rather than as a collection of four individual partnerships. This commitment has resulted in four joint projects, announced by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in July, which will focus on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, combating disinformation, and cybersecurity.

At the same time, IP4 countries have continuously demonstrated their commitment to Euro-Atlantic security by providing military and economic aid to Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, and initiating a range of direct and indirect capacity-building initiatives. Some of the IP4 members’ leaders, such as Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, have even urged US lawmakers to continue aiding Ukraine.

The future of NATO-IP4 cooperation

If managed well, NATO’s IP4 partnerships can be a vital tool to enhance the Alliance’s core tasks of cooperative security and crisis management. More importantly, these partnerships have the potential to contribute to NATO’s defense and deterrence, strengthen the Alliance’s competitive advantages, and shape the global security environment in ways that serve its interests and values.

To be successful, NATO must recognize and cater to the spectrum of ambition for cooperation among IP4 partners. The Alliance should tailor its approach and maximize the benefits of cooperation at various levels. For countries with lower levels of ambition, the benefits to cooperation with NATO come primarily from political consultations, and these talks should continue. These consultations foster a shared strategic domain awareness and enhance the understanding of how events in one region impact the security of others.

For those with greater ambitions for strengthening ties with NATO, there should be an emphasis on expanding cooperation in science and technology. This includes capacity building, which can have significant positive effects on the security of both NATO and its partners. With sufficient political will and consensus from both sides, individual IP4 partners can further develop their relationships with NATO. This cooperation could then lead to achieving, strengthening, and maintaining interoperability—that is, operating together according to agreed-upon rules and procedures, as well as using similar equipment. It also could mean working together on international standards-setting and the co-production and joint maintenance of military assets, expanding on existing cooperation between NATO and its partners in other initiatives.

The NATO-IP4 format has already proven useful for information sharing and presenting a unified front to promote common values vis-à-vis revisionist states. The Alliance should build on the significant groundwork that has already been laid for integrating the IP4 into various NATO structures and processes to continue the multiparty coordination and “regularize” these partnerships in a way that would shield them from domestic politics. However, considering that Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns have propagated the narrative that NATO is attempting to expand into the Indo-Pacific, it is crucial for the Alliance to consistently emphasize that the partnerships with IP4 nations, or any future potential partners from the region, are not a prelude to full membership.

Finally, while it may seem self-evident, managing and reconciling expectations is crucial, as NATO operates on a consensus basis. Therefore, given the past episodes of disagreements among allies around NATO’s outreach to the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative to handle these relations carefully to avoid creating unnecessary intra-Alliance tensions and to demonstrate how nurturing ties with the IP4 serves the interests of both sides.

Gorana Grgić is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post How NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can work together in an era of strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The initiative also represents a significant part of Armenia’s peace agenda in the South Caucasus amid negotiations with Azerbaijan. Armenian leaders envision these renovated and newly built routes as conduits for cultivating economic, political, and cultural ties between the countries involved, thus advancing long-term peace and stability in the region. With the potential to economically benefit the region, promote peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus, and reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, the West should support the Crossroads for Peace plan with more robust diplomatic backing and infrastructure investment.

Decades of instability

The South Caucasus, straddling the juncture between Europe and Asia, has long been a region of strategic importance plagued by persistent instability and conflict. Most notable has been the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which emerged in the early 1990s and led to the closure of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders, severely restricting Armenia’s trade and hardening political divides.

The conflict experienced a significant turning point on September 27, 2020, when Azerbaijan launched a major offensive, triggering the worst escalation since 1994. After six weeks of intense fighting, a Russia-brokered ceasefire was signed on November 9, 2020, which stipulated concessions of Armenian-controlled territory within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan blockaded Karabakh for nearly ten months starting on December 12, 2022, leading to a humanitarian crisis. On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military assault that seized full control of Karabakh and forced more than one hundred thousand ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia. The United Nations estimates that only about fifty Armenians remain in the region.

The Karabakh conflict ended on January 1, 2024, with the Karabakh authorities announcing that their unrecognized government ceased to exist. Consequently, the initial rationale behind the closure of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders no longer holds. Despite this, both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with the latter often aligning with the former’s policies, continue to refuse to reopen their borders with Armenia. This refusal persists even in the face of Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative—a proposal that would be beneficial for regional development.

Corridors and crossroads

The Trans-Caspian Corridor, also known as the “Middle Corridor,” is an increasingly important channel for transportation and cross-border trade connecting the Central Asian states with Europe. It primarily involves the transport of goods and resources across the Caspian Sea, bridging Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan via maritime routes. From Azerbaijan, the goods are then transported through Georgia and Turkey, reaching European markets. Though trade volumes and capacity are still relatively low, the corridor holds immense strategic opportunities, as it offers a viable alternative to the traditional, longer routes through Russia or the southern maritime paths via the Suez Canal, significantly reducing transit time and avoiding geostrategic hotspots.

The Eurasian Northern Corridor, offering both road and rail options, is currently the primary route for transcontinental transport but largely traverses Russian territory. Western sanctions, investment deterrents, and financial restrictions tied to Russia’s war on Ukraine complicate this corridor’s use, and potential instability in Russia might eventually further weaken this route’s reliability. More direct routes through Central Asian and South Caucasus nations could diminish the value of the Eurasian Northern Corridor, aligning with US and European Union efforts to reduce dependencies on Russia. The development of the Trans-Caspian Corridor offers such a strategic alternative, diversifying energy supplies to Europe and enhancing trade connectivity between Asia and Europe, while bypassing Russian influence.

Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative, therefore, would create a vital complementary set of routes, enhancing the strategic depth and utility of the Trans-Caspian Corridor. By developing infrastructure such as the Yeraskh-Julfa-Meghri-Horadiz railway, Armenia would offer new logistic pathways linking the Caspian region directly to the Mediterranean and Black seas through Armenian territory. This would not only shorten transit times and distances between Asia and Europe but would also introduce reliable alternative routes.

Additionally, the integration of Armenia into the Trans-Caspian Corridor could stimulate economic growth in the region by attracting foreign investment focused on logistics and infrastructure development. Armenia could become a central node in Eurasian trade, enhancing the corridor’s capacity and security. This strategic expansion would diversify the transport routes available to major trading powers and fortify the economic independence of Armenia and its neighboring countries by reducing their reliance on Russia.

Moreover, the Crossroads for Peace initiative is premised on the principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction, ensuring that infrastructure within each country’s borders remains under its control. The idea is to promote mutual respect and cooperation among its neighboring nations, facilitating equal and reciprocal management of border and customs controls. This ensures that each country would be able to safeguard its interests while promoting shared economic growth.

Obstacles in the path

However, Crossroads for Peace faces significant geopolitical hurdles. Azerbaijan has so far refused to support Armenia’s initiative, with analysts stating that neither Baku nor Ankara had been consulted. While the Armenian government should intensify its outreach on Crossroads for Peace, Armenia’s neighbors should judge the initiative in good faith on commercial viability, rather than on geopolitical grounds.

If realized, Crossroads for Peace could significantly benefit both Azerbaijan and Turkey by boosting regional trade and opening new markets. For Azerbaijan, it could provide a more direct route to European markets, while Turkey could see enhanced trade corridors that bypass less stable regions. Additionally, the project could serve as a diplomatic bridge, easing longstanding tensions and transforming a historical conflict into a hub of international commerce. For Turkey in particular, supporting this initiative could strategically position it as a peace broker in the region, which could strengthen its diplomatic relationships not only with its immediate neighbors but also across Europe and into Asia. 

Baku has instead called for the development of the “Zangezur Corridor,” which would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s southernmost Syunik province. Azerbaijan’s conception of Zangezur includes not only a railway link, but also a highway between the two parts of Azerbaijan, and demands that it would have extraterritorial status, which would require Armenia to cede control over a strip of its own territory. Crucially, Zangezur envisions opening a single transit route with Azerbaijan, whereas Crossroads for Peace aims to open several border crossings with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenia has firmly stated that any discussions involving the loss of sovereignty and territorial integrity or third-party control over its territory are nonnegotiable red lines. Indeed, Baku has insisted that a detachment from Russia’s Federal Security Service guard Zangezur; having just kicked Russian border guards out of the country, it’s understandable why Armenia would balk at the installation of more Russian agents on its territory.

Azerbaijan’s Zangezur plan is also detrimental to Western interests in several ways. First, it would hinder the broader Western strategic objective of stabilizing and economically developing the South Caucasus—critical for energy routes and geopolitical balance among Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. By stalling broader regional integration initiatives, Azerbaijan’s position perpetuates dependence on existing routes that run through Georgia, which face logistical and capacity hurdles, and which could be susceptible to disruptions by external geopolitical influences.

This ongoing tension and the resultant lack of comprehensive peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus allows Russia and Iran to exert their influence there. Armenia’s isolation forces it to maintain its reliance on Russia, countering Western efforts to promote democratic governance and market liberalization in the area. This situation becomes increasingly dangerous as autocratic Azerbaijan deepens its ties with Russia. Simultaneously, Iran benefits by positioning itself as a crucial partner for Armenia in energy and trade, while also providing diplomatic support by rejecting the Zangezur plan to maintain clout in the South Caucasus.

By keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders closed, Azerbaijan impedes Armenia’s economic and connectivity opportunities, limiting the scope for Western engagement and investment in the region. This keeps Armenia overly dependent on trade with Russia. Baku has long complained about Armenia’s close ties with Russia and should welcome Yerevan’s desire to open trade with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as its commitment to leave the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The Crossroads for Peace initiative, therefore, offers a more promising path. By opening up the region and paving the way for a new era of mutual economic growth and cooperation in the South Caucasus, Crossroads for Peace could serve as a catalyst for regional stability and prosperity. This initiative not only counters the restrictive nature of the Zangezur plan but also aligns economic incentives with geopolitical opportunities.

How the West can help

Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative deserves more robust support and engagement from Western nations. By backing Armenia’s efforts to integrate into the Trans-Caspian Corridor and promote cooperation across the South Caucasus, Western countries can help ensure that the region develops into a vibrant economic hub that is less dependent on Russia. Increased investment in infrastructure, clear diplomatic backing, and strategic partnerships, such as the recent upgrade in US-Armenia relations, can solidify the West’s commitment to promoting a more balanced geopolitical landscape in this region.

This should start with applying diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Azerbaijan to engage constructively with the initiative and entering security pacts with Armenia that help deter aggression and maintain open and secure trade routes. Subsequently, Western countries should implement targeted funding and financial incentives along with technical assistance for the construction and modernization of infrastructure in the region. Potential new trade agreements and the promotion of private sector involvement encouraging Western businesses to invest in and partner with local firms within the framework of Crossroads for Peace would also help make the initiative more viable.

Enhanced Western support for Armenia could also serve as a catalyst for broader regional cooperation and prosperity, setting a precedent for peaceful conflict resolution and cooperative development efforts. Western policymakers should therefore help integrate Crossroads for Peace into regional connectivity plans that promote open, stable, and cooperative international systems and can make Armenia a key player in the diversification of transit routes across Eurasia.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations. The views expressed herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

The post How Armenia’s ‘Crossroads for Peace’ plan could transform the South Caucasus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The cause? One mere faulty section of code in a software update.

The update came from CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity firm whose Falcon Sensor software many Windows users employ against cyber breaches. Instead of providing improvements, the update caused devices to shut down and enter an endless reboot cycle, driving a global outage. Reports suggest that insufficient testing at CrowdStrike was likely the cause.

However, this outage is not just a technology error. It also reveals a hidden world of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that deserves more attention from policymakers.

What is digital public infrastructure?

DPI, while an evolving concept, is broadly defined by the United Nations (UN) as a combination of “networked open technology standards built for public interest, [which] enables governance and [serves] a community of innovative and competitive market players working to drive innovation, especially across public programmes.” This definition refers to DPI as essential digital systems that support critical societal functions, like how physical infrastructure—including roads, bridges, and power grids—are essential for everyday activities.

Microsoft Windows, which runs CrowdStrike’s Falcon Sensor software, is a form of DPI. And other examples of DPI within the UN definition include digital health systems, payment systems, and e-governance portals.

As the world scrambles to fix their Windows systems, policymakers need to pay particular attention to the core DPI issues that underpin the outage.

The problem of invisibility

DPI, such as Microsoft Windows, is ubiquitous but also largely invisible, which is a significant challenge when it comes to managing risks associated with it. Unlike physical infrastructure, which is tangible and visible, DPI powers essential digital services without drawing public awareness. Consequently, the potential risks posed by DPI failures—whether stemming from software bugs or cybersecurity breaches—tend to be underappreciated and underestimated by the public.

The lack of a clear definition of DPI exacerbates the issue of its invisibility. Not all digital technologies are public infrastructure: Companies build technology to generate revenue, but many of them do not directly offer critical services for the public. For instance, Fitbit, a tech company that creates fitness and health tracking devices, is not a provider of DPI. Though it utilizes technology and data services to enhance user experience, it does not provide essential infrastructure such as internet services, cloud computing platforms, or large-scale data centers that support public and business digital needs. That said, Fitbit’s new owner, Google, known for its widely used browser, popular cloud computing services, and efforts to expand digital connectivity, can be considered a provider of DPI.

Other companies that do not start out as DPI may become integral to public infrastructure by dint of becoming indispensable. Facebook, for example, started out as a social network, but it and other social media platforms have become a crucial aspect of civil discourse surrounding many elections. Regulating social media platforms as a simple technology product could potentially ignore their role as public infrastructure, which often deserve extra scrutiny to mitigate potential detrimental effects on the public.

The recent Microsoft outage, from which airlines, hospitals, and other companies are still recovering, should now sharpen the focus on the company as a provider of DPI. However, the invisibility of DPI and the absence of appropriate policy guidelines for measuring and managing its risks result in two complications. First, most users who interact with DPI often do not recognize it as a form of DPI. Second, this invisibility leads to a misplaced trust in major technology companies, as users fail to recognize how high the collective stakes of a failure in this DPI might be. Market dominance and effective advertising have helped major technology companies publicize their systems as benchmarks of reliability and resiliency. As a result, the public often perceives these systems as infallible, assuming they are more secure than they are—until a failure occurs. At the same time, an overabundance of public trust and comfort with familiar systems can foster complacency within organizations, which can lead to inadequate internal scrutiny and security audits.

How to prevent future disruptions

The Great IT Outage of 2024 revealed just how essential DPI is to societies across the globe. In many ways, the outage serves as a symbolic outcry for solution-oriented policies and accountability to stave off future disruptions.

To address DPI invisibility and misplaced trust in technology companies, US policymakers should first define DPI clearly and holistically while accounting for its status as an evolving concept. It is equally crucial to distinguish which companies are currently providers of DPI, and to educate leaders, policymakers, and the public about what that means. Such an initiative should provide a clear definition of DPI, its technical characteristics, and its various forms, while highlighting how commonly used software such as Microsoft Windows is a form of DPI. A silver lining of the recent Microsoft/CrowdStrike outage is that it offers a practical, recent case study to present to the public as real-world context for understanding the risks when DPI fails.

Finally, Microsoft has outlined technical next steps to prevent another outage, including extensive testing frameworks and backup systems to prevent the same kind of outage from happening again. However, while industry-driven self-regulation is crucial, regulation that enforces and standardizes backup systems, not just with Microsoft, but also for other technology companies that may also become providers of DPI, is also necessary. Doing so will help prevent future outages, ensuring the reliability of infrastructure which, just like roads and bridges, props up the world.

Saba Weatherspoon is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Geotech Center.

Zhenwei Gao is a young global professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

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What accounts for this market correction? The most important factor has been the perception that the US Federal Reserve is behind the curve, having missed the opportunity to cut the federal funds rate in last week’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. This perception was reinforced by weaker than expected employment numbers on August 2. Nonfarm payrolls increased by only 114,000 in July, and the unemployment rate rose to 4.3 percent from 4.1 percent in June. The fact that the unemployment rate (on a three-month moving-average basis) has risen by more than 0.5 percentage points from its low of 3.5 percent in July 2023 has heightened fears of an imminent recession, according to the so-called Sahm rule. As a consequence, market interest rates declined substantially with two-year US Treasury yields falling to 3.8 percent, causing the gap against the effective federal funds rate of 5.3 percent to widen the most since the global financial crisis in 2008. Furthermore, the federal funds rate is also far above the policy rate of 3.95 percent, according to the Taylor Rule (developed by economist John Taylor in 1993 to calculate what the federal funds rate should be given current economic conditions). These gaps appear to validate the view that the Federal Reserve is behind the curve.

Having painted itself into this corner, there are no good options for the Federal Reserve going forward. Waiting until the September FOMC meeting to start cutting rates—as implied by the July meeting—could risk having additional weak economic data prolong the market selloff, undermining business and consumer confidence and hurting economic activity. Implementing a rate cut before September could send the message that things are not well, triggering worse fears among investors. Cutting by fifty basis points—instead of the traditional pace of cutting twenty-five basis points per meeting—would also confirm that the Federal Reserve has been wrong in delaying easing for too long. On balance, using the September meeting with more data to make an appropriate cut—of fifty basis points, if necessary—would be the least bad option, minimizing the risk of the Federal Reserve inadvertently feeding into the present market panic.

This “September fifty” option seems to be supported by a close look at the overall economic conditions. The July employment data could be distorted to some extent by Hurricane Beryl and problematic seasonal adjustment factors. The increase in the unemployment rate was caused by a rise in the number of workers entering or reentering the labor force—the prime-age (twenty-five to fifty-four years) labor force participation rate surged to 84 percent—and not by a decline in employment. Furthermore, the Purchasing Managers Index for the important services sector recovered to 51.4 in July from 48.8 in June. In fact, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis gross domestic product “nowcast model” estimates 2.54 percent growth in the third quarter, accelerating from the 1.14 percent pace in the second quarter. Weakening employment numbers warrant close attention to growth prospects, but a recession is yet to become the base case scenario.

Moreover, the global market selloff has also been driven by the normalization of outsized expectations for the high-tech sector and one-way betting for low Japanese interest rates and yen exchange rates. It could, therefore, be regarded as fundamentally healthy. For example, the US “magnificent seven” high-tech stocks, including Nvidia and Apple, have accounted for most of the market price gains over the past year or so, significantly stretching their market valuations. Their recent disappointing earnings reports have triggered the correction, shedding nine hundred billion dollars in market value.

In the case of Japan, investors have expected interest rates to remain low compared to the United States and for the yen to be weak against the dollar. Consequently, investors have borrowed substantially in yen to put on carry trades—investing in higher-yielding bonds, including in the United States and emerging markets. As the Bank of Japan hiked policy rates to 0.25 percent last week—for the second time since 2007—and outlined a plan to unwind its massive bond purchase program, the yen has strengthened by 10.5 percent against the dollar from its thirty-eight-year low of 166.99 yen/dollar in June. The appreciation of the yen has been magnified by short covering on the part of carry-trade investors—and this is expected to go on for some time given the estimated huge carry-trade positions, underpinning the yen in foreign exchange markets. A stronger yen would reduce the profits reported by many Japanese corporations, many of which rely on overseas markets for their profits, negatively impacting Japanese stock markets. To a lesser extent, the renminbi has also recovered to a seven-month high of 7.13 yuan/dollar due to short-covering of yuan-based carry trades.

On balance, the sharp equity market selloff may be painful to investors, but it could turn out to be a timely and healthy correction. Meanwhile, it is important that the Federal Reserve uses its long-planned review of its monetary policy operating framework to learn from its recent mistakes. (It has been behind the curve twice: keeping the federal funds rate too low for too long in 2022, and too high for too long now.) Going forward, the Federal Reserve must adopt a forward-looking policy framework instead of being fixated on current economic data.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

Data visualization created by Alisha Chhangani.

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An instigating ingredient added this past weekend was the disappointing jobs report released on Friday. Analysts expected 180,000 jobs—which would signal a slowdown but still relatively healthy job growth. This was, it seems, what the Federal Reserve expected last Wednesday when it decided not to cut interest rates and its chair, Jerome Powell, said, “the labor market has come into better balance.”

Instead, 114,000 jobs were created in July. This was disappointing, and some believed it signaled that the United States is headed for slower growth than forecast and even—dare one say the dreaded word—a recession. But within a day or two, most market participants had taken a deep breath, recognizing that bad weather probably had an impact, remembering that unemployment was still near historic lows, and aware that US gross domestic product growth was far outpacing that of the rest of the Group of Seven (G7).

Then Japan happened. As several financial commentators have noted, a unique mix of problems is plaguing Japanese markets. The Bank of Japan had stuck to zero interest rates during the global cycle of rate hikes but was forced to intervene last week to avoid further yen depreciation. This now means that Japanese borrowing conditions are becoming tighter as recession risks grow, making it an outlier during the coming easing cycle—just as it was during the global cycle of rate hikes. The record Nikkei index rout on Monday can also be attributed to the export-oriented nature of Japanese firms, which had benefited from the weak yen, until now.

So why then did US markets react so violently Monday? It’s not just the jobs report and it’s not just Japan. Instead, it’s the x-factor ingredient—geopolitics. Specifically, Iran’s likely imminent attack on Israel, as retribution for the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iranian territory.

Pricing in geopolitics is almost always an impossible task for Wall Street. Speculation about equity markets is one thing. Speculation about Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s intentions is usually far outside traders’ field of expertise. With more uncertainty comes more fear—see the VIX index, which is essentially Wall Street’s fear gauge, below—surprisingly showing that the market is more concerned now than it was during Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse in March 2023. In fact, it’s the highest volatility reading since the COVID-19 pandemic, rivaling volatility during the global financial crisis.

What’s especially hard for markets is to navigate a geopolitical crisis intertwined with bad economic news. Individually, either one can be mitigated and hedged against. But together, the two developing at the same time create a haze that can make each situation appear more threatening than it actually is. How then do we find solid ground? Focus on the data.

The US economic data remains strong. The economy is slowing, but it is nowhere near a recession. And in fact, as the chart below shows, it could slow significantly before falling to the level of its G7 peers.

Moreover, data released Monday show that economic activity in the service sector grew more than expected. And remember that the United States is still creating new jobs, even if at a slower pace than before. Gas prices are significantly lower than two years ago at the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. So even if a crisis widens in the Middle East, a slower global economy should keep price increases in check.

Meanwhile, inflation is finally coming back down to the Federal Reserve’s target range of 2 percent. All this signals an economy that is, as long forecast, coming off its breakneck pace. The Federal Reserve should probably have acted sooner by cutting rates last week, but to jump into an emergency session as some have called for is not supported by the data right now and risks creating more panic. The economic fundamentals remain stable.

Geopolitical tensions actually present the greater risk to markets. No one knows how and when Iran will retaliate and what the fallout will be. And as I wrote in February, the relative weakness of the region’s economies means any worsening of the situation could send multiple countries into debt distress and trigger more market failures.

Still, the overwhelming likelihood is that whatever develops in the Middle East this week will be contained to the Middle East. While that may impact energy prices, it is unlikely to trigger wider global economic fallout. To be sure, nothing is guaranteed. The situation could deteriorate and the worst fears could be realized. But it is not the most likely outcome.

So in the days ahead, it’s geopolitical tensions that will likely move the markets more than the macroeconomics. Watch carefully in the coming days (or as Macbeth would say, “tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow”) as markets recognize this reality and, hopefully, cooler heads prevail.

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

Data visualizations created by Alisha Chhangani, Mrugank Bhusari, and Sophia Busch.

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Prisoner swaps between Russia and the West have an asymmetric quality: Arms dealers and assassins get traded for journalists and dissidents. Such is the moral calculus between autocratic regimes and those striving to uphold the ideals of democracy and republican governance. It is regrettable that such deals must be struck, but the cost might be quite a bit higher if truth-speakers in the dark spots of the world thought no one would bargain for their freedom in a pinch. So, the multinational deal on Thursday that returned journalists, political dissidents, and friends of the West in exchange for the release of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cadres can be welcomed and regretted at the same time.

Given the sharp divide between Western democracies and their authoritarian antagonists in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere, it is remarkable that deals remain possible at all. The reality of global polarization and great-power competition means that a very small number of countries maintain diplomatic contact and influence across dividing lines, and Turkey is one of the few. Thus, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, as well as its geographic position, made it a linchpin of the recent prisoner swap. Ankara receives a fairly steady stream of Western criticism for hedging and balancing behaviors keeping the door open to Russia, but Thursday’s deal demonstrates the wisdom of having allies with an open line to rival camps—which is why the West has generally acquiesced to the Turkish balancing act.

The politics of prisoner exchanges have been unfortunately prominent in 2024, in light of the ongoing wars in Ukraine and in Gaza, where Hamas has sought to use Israeli hostages as tools to shape the outcome of the war that followed its October 7 attacks into Israel. There have been previous exchanges of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine, including several facilitated by the United Arab Emirates, some via joint Saudi-Turkish mediation, and roughly fifty other prisoner exchanges done bilaterally or through third parties. But this week’s deal represented a different level of difficulty—politically prominent prisoners and accused spies, a half dozen countries, complex negotiations, and US electoral politics in the mix. Before this week, Ankara had been the site and the facilitator for less high-profile swaps of Russians and Americans, but after the complex deal this week, the trade space may narrow.

The international system has left an era of aspirational globalization and entered an era of hard power-driven geopolitical competition. In this era, diplomatic agility will matter a great deal, especially when coupled with economic and military leverage over prospective negotiating parties. Mediating or facilitating countries must not only have a reputation for even-handedness in the dispute in question, but they also need a degree of trust with the parties and enough geopolitical sway to incentivize cooperation. Turkey meets two key criteria in this regard: It has an imperfect alignment with the West, with sufficient friction to foster understanding of and hedging positions with non-Western powers. It also has relative self-sufficiency in defense matters, which provides it a risk tolerance in diverging from strict adherence to Western policy lines.

Prisoner exchanges, peace talks, and creative diplomacy become more difficult as alignments, bloc behavior, and other aspects of great-power competition reemerge as norms in the international system. While deterrence requires intra-alliance solidarity and discipline, deal-making requires occasional line-crossing, albeit not nonalignment altogether. Ankara clearly favors this aspect of modern statecraft. It remains a robust NATO member, passing the 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending commitment this year and solidly supporting collective defense requirements, including significant military support to Ukraine in the current conflict. Yet it engages in line-crossing diplomatic gambits in pursuit of de-escalation with some frequency, including in the Caucasus, Libya, Israel-Palestine (less successfully), and the war in Ukraine.

The swap just completed is in part a fruit of such line-crossing. That Ankara can pull off the balancing act of providing lethal aid to Russia’s enemies, fully supporting Western military deterrence, yet trading and making deals with Moscow in a manner that helps US policy interests is both rare and valuable. So the next time an article in a Western publication claims that Turkey is an ally in name only or not an ally at all due to imperfect alignment, it might be worth remembering that bad allies are a good deal more useful than enemies or neutrals, especially when they have demonstrated military, economic, and diplomatic heft.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

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I am very happy that some of the hostages, including Russian citizens who were captured solely because of their honesty and courage, have been freed. They stood against the war in Ukraine and fought for freedom. Until the moment they were released, I feared that some of them would end their lives in prison.

Who gained freedom thanks to these efforts?

One is seventy-one-year-old Oleg Orlov, a legendary Soviet human rights defender and one of the leaders of Memorial, an organization that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. Orlov publicly called the Putin regime totalitarian and fascist, and for this, he was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison this year.

There is also Sasha Skochilenko, a thirty-three-year-old artist from St. Petersburg. At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, she made a small art performance in which she replaced price tags in a grocery store with anti-war slogans. For this, she was sentenced to seven years in prison. Her imprisonment posed a direct threat to her life: Sasha has a heart defect and bipolar disorder, and in the conditions of a Russian prison, she could have died.

Another example is the schoolboy Kevin Lik, who is now nineteen years old but was arrested while still a minor. He was accused of photographing military equipment and sending the photos to someone abroad. He was accused of state treason. Obviously, the Russian authorities themselves did not believe that a schoolboy could be a spy, and in the end, he was sentenced to only four years in prison, whereas in Russia, espionage usually results in much longer sentences. However, this is practically a child, and he was sentenced to four years in prison.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent activist and journalist whom Russian special services tried to poison, sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Ilya Yashin, probably the most famous opposition figure in Russia after Navalny’s death, sentenced to eight-and-a-half years. 

Now Evan, Paul, Oleg, Sasha, Kevin, Vladimir, Ilya, and other hostages of Putin’s regime have gained freedom.

But even on such a day, I cannot stop thinking about the thousands of people who remain in Putin’s prisons. About the poet Zhenya Berkovich. About the politician Alexei Gorinov, who protested against the war from the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and is now dying in prison. About Daniil Kholodny, an information technology specialist who was imprisoned for eight years for creating a website for now-deceased opposition leader Alexei Navalny. About thousands of other people.

I do not call them all “hostages” by chance.

I am sure that most people living in Russia feel like hostages. About twenty-five years ago, power in Russia was seized by a gang of terrorists led by Vladimir Putin. All these years, they have been terrorizing the country’s population, imprisoning people for any disobedience, teaching citizens to think that resistance is impossible and useless, doing everything to make Russians develop Stockholm syndrome. It is impossible to help all of them; it is impossible to exchange millions of people. But it is important to remember that thousands of hostages are sitting in Putin’s prisons. And over the years, Putin has successfully turned the whole country into a gulag. And many people feel like hostages, even if they are not behind bars.

Mikhail Zygar is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of Russia’s only independent news television channel, Dozhd (TVRain). He was recently sentenced in absentia by a Moscow court to eight and a half years in prison for criticizing the Russian army.

A version of this article originally appeared on Zygar’s Substack, the Last Pioneer.

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At least two hundred people have been killed and thousands more injured in protests that included law enforcement firing on protesters, as Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her government face the most serious popular challenge of the past decade. Many Bangladeshis have been arrested, and cases against thousands of people have been filed.

Two weeks of heightened violence has left visible damage to property in cities across the country. Burned buildings stand as testimonies to anger and mayhem, but what remains unknown is the exact number of deaths, injuries, and missing. The extent of the lethal force used by members of law enforcement agencies is unprecedented in the history of the country, which has all too often experienced bouts of political violence since its inception in 1971.

Despite the claim of a gradual return to normalcy, an overwhelming number of police and soldiers are patrolling the streets of major cities, and a shoot-on-sight order is still in place for curfew violators. The government is on edge, economic activity has stalled, and many citizens are in a state of shock and uncertain about what will come next. For Bangladesh watchers, the question is whether Hasina has weathered the political storm or if the current situation is a larger tempest in the making.

How did it begin?

This episode of protest began in early July as peaceful student demonstrations demanding reform of the quota system in public service. This quota system, which reserved 56 percent of government jobs to various categories, was widely considered by students to be discriminatory and was allegedly used by the government as a means of patronage dispensation. The system was scrapped in 2018 after students launched a movement against it, but it was reinstated by Bangladesh’s High Court in June 2024. The government appealed, and the Supreme Court suspended the verdict, scheduling a hearing for August 6. However, students demanded that the system be reformed by enacting a law. The government insisted that there was nothing it could do while the issue is being litigated. The students felt that this was a stealthy way of reinstating the system.

The situation took an ominous turn after activists aligned with the ruling party swooped in on the demonstrators as they protested Hasina’s comments at a press conference on July 14. In that press conference, Hasina likened the demonstrators with collaborators of the Pakistani army during the war of independence in 1971. As the quota system reserves a percentage of government jobs for the descendants of war of independence veterans, Hasina portrayed opposition to the policy as demeaning to veterans. In the following days, the students organized street protests and called for a general strike, which was confronted with force by police and ruling party activists, leading to the deaths of some students. On July 16, the government closed all educational institutions for an indefinite period.

The situation further deteriorated on July 18, as thousands of protesters joined the students on the street; at least twenty-five people died throughout the country and various public buildings were set ablaze in the capital and elsewhere. The government stopped services. Then the government backtracked and offered to negotiate, but by then the protests had transcended the quota issue.

On July 19, demonstrations engulfed the entire country. The number of deaths, the extent of the spread of protests, and the ferocity of police response made it one of the worst days in the history of the country. Curfew was imposed, the military was called in, a shoot-on-sight order was issued, and internet and broadband services were completely shut down. Yet the violence continued for days, and the death toll continued to mount. 

In the meantime, the government met a delegation of the agitating students, and the Supreme Court voided the High Court verdict, issuing guidance to drastically reduce the quota to only 7 percent. However, the government resorted to heavy-handed measures, including allegedly abducting six student leaders of the movement and detaining them without charges. While detained, the student leaders issued a video message on July 28 calling off the movement, but other leaders continued the organize protests.

A perfect storm?

The peaceful student protest transformed into an antigovernment upsurge because of simmering discontent among younger Bangladeshis, as well as in a large segment of the wider society. Economic and political disenfranchisement drove the youth. The economic growth they have heard about for a long time seems to have left them behind. They see very little prospect of a decent job while they witness unbridled corruption and the extravagant lifestyle of a new wealthy class. According to official accounts, unemployment among youth is 15.74 percent and at least 41 percent of youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four are not in school, employed, or engaged in job training.

Bangladeshi youth were supposed to be the kingmakers in a free and fair electoral process, the role their predecessors played in the election of 2008. But that opportunity was taken away through fraudulent elections. The government’s disregard for their demands regarding quota reform was symptomatic of a system that cares little for them. Violence perpetrated by the student wing of the ruling party was the instigation that unleashed the anger within the student community.

As for the larger population, resentments originating from rampant corruption by the cronies of the ruling party, impunity enjoyed by party henchmen, utter disregard to the sufferings of the common people, and concentration of power at the hands of one person—Hasina—all came together.

While the regime has a support base, it is bereft of moral legitimacy due to rigged elections. Increasingly, the government also lacked performance legitimacy as the development narrative has been unraveling since summer 2022. Skyrocketing inflation and dwindling foreign reserves have put the government in a precarious situation. In the past decade, Hasina has increasingly relied on force, leading many international organizations, including the Varieties of Democracy Institute, to describe Bangladesh as an autocracy.

What is next for Hasina?

This week, the city streets in Dhaka were filled with cars and buses, and shops and offices are being opened once again. A semblance of normalcy may return in the short run. But the political ground has shifted, and the possibility of a return to the status quo is unlikely. As such, the country is standing at a crossroads.

The number of deaths and the extent of police actions have laid bare the fact that the ruling party and Hasina are entirely dependent on brute force. The upheaval appears to have shaken the regime’s sense of invincibility.

By creating a narrative that her government is facing “terrorists,” Hasina is trying to gain sympathy and tacit support from the international community, or at least their silence. The international community, however, should see through this charade and raise its voice against the gross violations of human rights by a regime that wants to stay in power without a popular mandate.

So, what’s next? Dubbed “Asia’s Iron Lady,” Hasina may double down on more persecution and arrests in an attempt to stem further unrest. This may lead to a closed autocracy in Bangladesh. Alternatively, as discontent continues to grow and demands for her resignation become louder, the country may erupt. 

Ali Riaz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center and a distinguished professor at Illinois State University.

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The news broke after the Moroccan royal palace released a communiqué that referenced a letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to the king of Morocco on the commemoration of the silver jubilee of his coronation. The letter states that the “present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” In his correspondence with the Moroccan king, Macron added that “France intends to act consistently with this position at both national and international levels.” Although the French position explicitly references Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, it will need more clarification and translation into concrete policies in the coming months.

Nonetheless, the French decision is particularly significant given its colonial past in North Africa and its shared responsibility with Spain in largely determining the postcolonial borders of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. These borders are the origin of many of the current territorial disputes in the region. France’s endorsement of the Moroccan autonomy plan this week follows similar support from Spain in 2022 and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara expressed by the United States in 2020 and Israel in 2023, along with a growing list of Arab and African nations.

Understanding the French calculus

France’s shift of stance comes as its relations with Morrocco have been strained. Since 2020, Rabat has pressured Paris to break the status quo—a neutrality on the issue apparently intended not to upset either Morocco or Algeria—and take a clearer stance on the Western Sahara. Striking a deal with then-US President Donald Trump in 2020 over the disputed territories and normalizing ties with Israel boosted Morocco’s diplomatic confidence and helped redefine the kingdom’s foreign policy. As a result, the Sahara issue, in the words of the Moroccan king, became “the lens through which Morocco looks at the world.”

As an example of the deteriorating bilateral relations, Mohammed VI reportedly “definitely shelved” relations with Macron and declined state visit requests by the French president last year. In addition, the kingdom started to increase its divestment from business partnerships with France—previously considered its international economic partner of choice. Torn between Morocco and Algeria, France failed to balance its act in the Maghreb after a chain of unfortunate events, including the Pegasus spyware case, a visa crisis, and the recall of Rabat’s ambassador to France in February 2023. Most recently, Morocco refused French aid after the Marrakesh earthquake in September 2023.

France, however, never stopped courting Morocco, because Paris did not want to lose strategically important economic and political ground in Africa. For its part, Rabat did not break its relations with Paris entirely, continuing its intelligence and security cooperation with France. Moroccan forces, for example, are currently helping to secure the Paris Olympics. Morocco also appointed Samira Sitail, a dual national and Makhzan insider, as its ambassador to attempt to stir the stagnant waters.

Rather than trying to deter Morocco’s ambitious Atlantic Initiative—aimed at offering landlocked Sahel countries trade access to the ocean through a $1.2 billion harbor in Dakhla, Western Sahara—France is eying a share of the economic benefits promised by the project. The only catch is how to address the 2021 European Union (EU) court ruling against the Morocco-EU trade deal over Western Sahara, which the Elysée may now advocate to reverse together with other pro-Moroccan EU countries ahead of the final judgment, due in a few months.

Western Sahara and global realignment

Another defining factor in understanding the recent French decision lies in the global realignment behind old Cold War frontiers, and NATO allies engaging in historic contests against increasingly destabilizing forces. Morocco has always been a reliable partner to the global liberal West in its fight against Russian aggression and different terrorist groups. The country is also more-or-less aligned with the United States and France on a common vision of the future. As Iran and its proxies reinforce ties with the Algerian regime, which has been cultivating close relations with Russia since the 1970s, North Atlantic allies fear a new stronghold of antagonists in North Africa.

For the past five decades, Western Sahara has been a major security loophole at the doors of the Mediterranean and the Sahel. With growing rumors about Iranian and Wagner Group presence among Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps in western Algeria, where an estimated 173,600 refugees live, it’s becoming imperative for the United States and European countries to try to resolve the Western Sahara file once and for all.

Disrupting the status quo in the Maghreb

While on paper the French decision to side with Morocco may seem in line with its economic and global priorities, it does come at a price. EU neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and exclusive reliance on the United Nations peacekeeping mission to maintain the status quo between Rabat and Algiers has been central to stabilizing the region. After the United States and Spain sided with Morocco, Algeria responded by severing diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 and recalling its ambassador in Madrid in 2022. Algeria also disrupted gas exports to Spain through Morocco by closing the EU-Maghreb pipeline just as tensions were building around Russia’s gas exports ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reaction by Algiers to Macron’s swing toward Mohammed VI described France and Morocco as “colonial powers, new and old.” This was followed on Tuesday by Algeria recalling its ambassador in Paris to express its discontent.

Macron’s decision has alienated an already nervous Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is running for reelection on September 7. This week’s events may push him deeper into Iranian and Russian arms. Even though not expressly sought by any of the parties, the risk of recent events sparking up a wider regional conflict in the Maghreb is higher than ever. Even if in a way designed to avoid escalation, Algeria will likely feel it necessary to respond in some form.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027. 

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

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Click to jump to an expert analysis:

John E. Herbst: Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Mercedes Sapuppo: The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

Hanna Liubakova: German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

Brian Whitmore: This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Today’s news is a truly extraordinary event: a large prisoner exchange involving twenty-four captives in seven countries. Russia and Belarus released sixteen prisoners; and the United States, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia sent eight back to Russia. Those released by Moscow include three Americans held essentially as hostages on trumped-up charges—businessman Whelan and journalists Gershkovich and Kurmasheva—and political prisoners Kara-Murza and Yashin. Belarus released Rico Krieger, a German convicted of “terrorism” in Belarus, who was sentenced to death but then pardoned by Lukashenka’s regime. The most notable prisoner released to Russia is Krasikov, a Kremlin operative who murdered a Chechen activist in Germany.

Two constants drove this deal. The first is Putin’s great interest in securing the release of Russian spies and provocateurs captured and jailed in the West. When he succeeded in trading American basketball player Brittney Griner for Viktor Bout with the United States in December 2022, Putin’s highest priority became the release of Krasikov from Germany. When Putin gave up Griner, he still had Whelan as a hostage for future trades with the United States. Then he added Gershkovich in March 2023 for additional trade bait and Kurmasheva this past spring. The second constant is the Biden administration’s interest in securing the release of all Americans unfairly detained by Moscow. After the Griner-Bout exchange, US efforts to secure the freedom of Whelan and then Gershkovich foundered on the refusal of Germany to include Krasikov—Putin’s prime objective—in any trade.

These constants alone do not explain this deal. The new factor was the arrest of Krieger in Belarus last fall. This gave Berlin a reason to consider releasing Krasikov. Germany’s willingness to do so likely set in motion a long negotiation that led to today’s news. The final deal also gave Putin back Russian operatives in Norway, Poland, and Slovenia; and provided an opportunity to free prominent Russian opposition figures Kara-Murza and Yashin.

It is notable that sixteen prisoners moved West and only eight east. But, as we know from the lopsided trade that sent 215 Ukrainian prisoners of war home in exchange for Putin-favorite Viktor Medvedchuk and others in the fall of 2022, there are times when Putin’s interest in a particular captive persuades him to make an uneven trade.

Still, Putin has the tactical advantage of being able to grab additional hostages from Americans and other Western visitors in Russia. One way for the West to reduce this nasty advantage would be to lower the evidentiary requirements for holding spies from Russia and other US adversaries.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

The news that Gershkovich, Kurmasheva, Whelan, Kara-Murza, and Yashin—along with other human rights activists and innocent civilians—have been released from Russia in a prisoner swap is historic. For those now free who were wrongfully detained on contrived and false charges and bravely endured the conditions of Russian detention, today is hugely celebratory. It is also a good day for their families and for all who have been advocating for their freedom, including the Biden-Harris administration. The swap released many who suffered unjustly and marks a positive day for independent media and press freedom.

The timing of this swap—and its scope—indicates that Putin thought it was time to cash out the bargaining chips that he had illegally collected to leverage against the West in the form of innocent Americans and Russian activists. However, it does not suggest that the Kremlin will pull back on its malign tactics of aggression against Ukraine as well as the United States and its allies, and Putin is by no means walking away empty-handed: Russia will welcome home convicted murderers, spies, hackers, fraudsters, and smugglers.

What this swap demonstrates on the Kremlin’s strategic front is a twisted and self-serving pragmatism that is unlikely to translate into a deescalation of Russia’s violence in Ukraine, nor into a new appreciation for international norms. Putin is still a war criminal, and he is still bolstering his autocratic alliances abroad. The drive demonstrated by global leaders and advocates pushing for the release of these unjustly detained journalists and activists should not be the end. Rather, it should be only the beginning of continued work to defeat Putin in Ukraine and deter his aggression, which includes the imprisonment of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers being kept in harrowing conditions in temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine.

—Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

The prisoner swap story between Russia and Western countries took an unexpected turn with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s involvement. Krieger, a German national sentenced to death in Belarus, was among the Western prisoners released in Thursday’s exchange. His case gained attention following his pardon on July 30. The unusual circumstances surrounding Krieger’s sentencing had sparked speculation that the Minsk regime was positioning itself for a high-profile prisoner exchange.

Shortly after the pardon, Lukashenka’s spokesperson indicated that Minsk was open to negotiations regarding Krieger, stating that various “proposals” had been made. This suggested that the pardon was a strategic maneuver to facilitate discussions with Germany. Krieger’s exchange demonstrated the Belarusian regime’s manipulative tactics, with speculation arising that he was swapped for Krasikov, a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assassin imprisoned in Germany.

Krieger was arrested in Belarus in October for allegedly acting as a mercenary and planting explosives. He appeared in a propaganda video, claiming he wanted to fight in Ukraine but was directed to a mission in Belarus. However, the inconsistencies in the video raise doubts about his claims.

The regime’s actions—capturing a foreigner, sentencing him to death, and then negotiating his release—resemble hostage-taking tactics. While Russia may have reclaimed some of its agents in part through Krieger’s exchange, Lukashenka seems to be sacrificing his relationship with Germany to support Putin’s interests. This mirrors Lukashenka’s previous concessions to Russia, including offering Belarusian territory for the invasion of Ukraine, despite his people’s opposition, or stationing Wagner Group troops in Belarus.

Amid these high-stakes negotiations, the plight of Belarusian political prisoners is often overlooked. Although eighteen political prisoners were released last month, an estimated 1,400 remain imprisoned, many urgently needing medical assistance.

—Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

The sweeping prisoner exchange that freed Kurmasheva, Gershkovich, Whelan, and others from Russian captivity was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, and the Biden administration deserves enormous credit for working with the United States’ allies to make it happen. And full disclosure, this one is personal. Two of the released hostages—Kurmasheva, a journalist with whom I worked for more than a decade at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Kara-Murza, a Russian dissident whom I have known for years—are close personal friends. The fact that sixteen hostages of Putin’s regime—including Americans, Germans, British nationals, and Russian political prisoners—are now free is cause for celebration.

That said, we should all use this occasion to reflect on what this prisoner exchange illustrates about the nature of Putin’s Russia. In order to get these hostages released, the United States and its allies needed to free actual criminals who were convicted after receiving the benefit of due process and fair trials in Western courts of law. Among these were a hitman, Krasikov, convicted of an assassination in Germany, and a cybercriminal, Roman Seleznev, who was convicted of bank fraud and identity theft in the United States. This is reminiscent of the United States securing the release of WNBA star and Olympic gold medalist Brittney Griner in exchange for convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout and swapping US Marine Corps veteran Trevor Reed for Russian drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko back in 2022.

One has to wonder, why does Putin want all these hitmen, cybercriminals, arms traffickers, and drug dealers released? And why is he willing to take Western hostages to do so? The answer is simple: The line between the government and the criminal underworld in Putin’s Russia is so thin that it is nonexistent. As I have argued in the past, the Putin regime is effectively a crime syndicate masquerading as a state. The correct metaphor for this prisoner exchange is not the storied Cold War-era swapping of Western and Soviet spies. Instead, it is the result of an unfortunately necessary hostage negotiation with a criminal and terrorist regime.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of the Power Vertical podcast.

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Reporters at risk: In honor of Evan Gershkovich

Leading journalists discuss risks facing foreign correspondents, resilience in reporting, and global press freedom.

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Established political parties are now taking steps to win back support. Policymakers around the world should take note of these efforts, such as the use of citizens’ assemblies in Germany, as one way to counter this polarizing environment and rebuild trust in democratic systems.

Growing disillusionment and persistent divides

Germany is a compelling case study for the rise of populist ideology. Nearly thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East-West divide in the country persists. To this day, people in eastern Germany often face fewer economic opportunities, underrepresentation in elite professions, power imbalances, and an aging population. As recently as 2019, 60 percent of Germans in the east perceived themselves as second-class citizens. While on the rise throughout Germany, it is in large part for these reasons that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party resonates in the eastern part of the country, in states such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Elections in all three in September see the AfD polling in first place.

The AfD was formed in 2013 in reaction to eurozone bailouts for other countries, but the 2015 refugee crisis transformed its platform into the extreme one it has today. When nearly one million migrants entered Germany, a majority of citizens called for an immigration cap. The AfD, weaponizing both economic and social grievances, built itself on and instigated this cultural discontent. The party trademarked “Islam does not belong to Germany” in its 2016 manifesto, and has taken aim at costly climate action to spur discontent with the center and fuel its own base. This approach propelled the AfD to ninety-two opposition seats in the Bundestag in 2017, and in the years since it has established itself as a formidable populist alternative to Germany’s traditional parties closer to the political center.

The AfD’s 2024 manifesto paints a worrying picture of its vision for Germany. The AfD proposes to reduce the net number of annual immigrants to zero and oppose all major climate actions, arguing such government encroachments threaten to unravel the cultural fabric and stability of German society. These extreme stances threaten to endanger the unity of Germany and could hamper international cooperation. The party is largely Euroskeptic, anti-American, and pro-Russian, which drives its urge to scale back on Ukraine aid. Notably, the far-right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament kicked out the AfD in May of this year, following scandals surrounding its extreme statements and potential connections to China and Russia.

Nevertheless, the party remains relatively popular in Germany. It scored second among German parties in the European Parliament elections in June and could well secure more than a quarter of seats in state elections this fall. The AfD’s success has inspired other upstart parties on the left. The newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), for example, is expected to secure around 20 percent of seats across the three states, appealing to voters that are dissatisfied with the state of Germany’s economy and support for Ukraine.

The populist phenomenon is not exclusive to Germany. It is symptomatic of a general trend in the West. From gains in the European Parliament to momentum heading into the US presidential election, populism does not bode well for the liberal international order, especially at a time when intensifying global challenges demand collective solutions.

The long road to rebuilding trust

One strategy to counter illiberal tendencies and reengage citizens is the establishment of citizens’ assemblies: representative groups of randomly selected constituents that develop policy recommendations on a given issue based on expert briefings and discussions. The assemblies can be implemented at all political levels.

Citizens’ assemblies have been tried before. In various forms, they have been tested by several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. They all share the goals of bringing participatory democracy to the public and reconnecting with voters who have lost trust in democracy.

These citizens’ assemblies have led to big changes before. In Ireland, the successful 2018 referendum to remove the Eighth Amendment banning most abortions stemmed from a recommendation from a ninety-nine-person-strong citizens’ assembly and helped end years of deadlock over the issue. A similar Convention on the Constitution in the country helped lead the way to the 2015 referendum on marriage equality.

In Germany, ten nationwide citizens’ assemblies have been convened since 2019, covering topics such as “Germany’s role in the world,” “climate action,” and “countering disinformation.” While the practical policy proposals are not binding, they do provide policymakers with valuable insights on current positions, possible compromises, and existing sticking points. Within just five years, the German citizens’ assemblies have grown from being independently organized by a nonprofit to being implemented by the Bundestag—an indication of the growing hope and trust politicians are placing on these fora.

The German approach isn’t perfect. Commentators have identified several challenges facing Germany’s citizens’ assemblies, including the representative selection of participants, the neutrality of moderators and experts, the optimal format and institutionalization of the assemblies, and the effect on participants and nonparticipating citizens.

And in truth, so far, it is too soon to see the impact of these assemblies in Germany. Mostly experimental in design, few concrete recommendations were implemented by policymakers. Some people believe the concept’s success hinges on the assembly on nutrition, food labeling, and food waste, the first citizens’ assembly instituted directly by the German Bundestag, which met in January 2024. The outcomes of this assembly included recommendations on school lunches and new regulations on energy drinks.

The participatory idea behind citizens’ assemblies cannot replace the parliamentary process. To avoid conflicts of legitimacy between participatory and representative democracy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation recommends that parliaments initiate and mandate the process. It is crucial that the fora are not influenced externally and provide some flexibility regarding approach and outcome. They cannot be expected to arrive at predetermined conclusions and, depending on topic, composition, and mandate, every citizens’ assembly will be unique. To sustainably strengthen democracy and rebuild trust in political processes, it is important to complement the assembly with a broader public campaign. Linking the citizens’ assemblies with parliamentary institutions through the involvement of parliamentarians in the expert briefings could further improve the current system. Alternatively, an assembly could be followed by a referendum, giving citizens beyond those randomly chosen participatory power.

No easy fixes

Citizens’ assemblies alone are not sufficient to head off the rise of populists in Germany anytime soon: The AfD and BSW parties, for example, will very likely make gains in the eastern German elections this fall. Instead, the assemblies should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address the root causes of voter dissatisfaction. 

It is imperative to see citizens’ assemblies for what they are. Policymakers should not expect a panacea for polarization. Instead, the fora are a piece of a bigger puzzle. Implementing citizens’ assemblies in tandem with regional structural policies can start the process of rebuilding trust in government. Until more citizens feel like they have a real voice in politics, the seeds of populism will likely continue to find fertile ground—in Germany, in the United States, and beyond.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Can citizens’ assemblies help counter a rising populist tide in the West? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

William F. Wechsler: With the parties eager to avoid a wider war, the primary danger remains miscalculation

Kirsten Fontenrose: The Gaza conflict is already spilling over into a regional war

Jonathan Panikoff: The strikes were a tactical success for Israel. But the strategic impact will depend on Iran’s response.

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib: Watch for a split within Hamas, and pressure on Iran and Hezbollah for a calibrated retaliation 

Beth Sanner: Israel boldly threads a needle

Thomas Warrick: Haniyeh’s death will not change Hamas’s goal of destroying Israel

Danny Citrinowicz: Even if the current escalation stops here, the next one is around the corner

Alex Plitsas: The difference between these strikes and Israel’s Iran strike in April

Holly Dagres: The attacks reveal—yet again—the Islamic Republic’s intelligence weaknesses

Nour Dabboussi: Dark clouds now hang over Beirut

With the parties eager to avoid a wider war, the primary danger remains miscalculation

It was a bad day to be an Iranian proxy. From Tehran’s perspective, the significance wasn’t only the importance of the targets—Hamas’s Haniyeh, Lebanese Hezbollah’s Shukur, and Kataib Hezbollah’s drone bases—but the locations, the near simultaneous timing, and what they demonstrate about the reach of Israel and the United States.

Israel was able to find, fix, and finish Shukur in Beirut, in a building close to Hezbollah’s Shura Council. It was able to do the same (presumably, as Jerusalem hasn’t confirmed this action) to Haniyeh in Tehran, at his state-provided residence while he was visiting to attend the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. And the US strikes in Iraq, the first since February, took place south of Baghdad against a key element of the Iranian-backed umbrella organization Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which has taken credit for attacks on US forces and on Israel.

Together, the United States and Israel have demonstrated, once again, their impressive intelligence and strike capacities in places that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) undoubtedly has put on the top of their list to defend. It is also notable that senior US officials are currently in Riyadh to discuss US defensive maritime and air operations against the Houthis, another key Tehran terrorist partner whose recent deadly drone attack in Tel Aviv triggered a direct Israeli counterattack in Hodeidah. I hope these talks are intended to gain Saudi cooperation for a wider US special operations campaign to target Houthi leadership. This all follows, of course, Israel’s successful killing in April of senior Quds Force leader Mohammad Reza Zahedi in what was purported to be the Iranian consulate in Damascus, an attack that prompted Iran to launch an unprecedented, large-scale, direct strike on Israel less than two weeks later. If it were not for the US-led, region-wide air defenses, that Iranian attack would have killed a large number of Israelis.

Of course, Iran and its proxies have promised to respond to these attacks once again. But as I have described previously, the current environment in the wake of Hamas’s terrorist attacks on October 7 is one that unfortunately advantages the Iranian regime. Indeed, Israel’s actions can be seen as attempts to degrade this advantage. From Tehran’s perspective, they would thus be foolhardy to intentionally provoke the kind of regional war that would reverse this progress, especially one that risks involving the United States. Therefore, just as it was predictable that Israel would respond to Hezbollah’s attack against civilians in Majdal Shams in a targeted fashion rather than launching a full-scale war in Lebanon, I suspect Tehran will also respond in a manner that it believes will avoid a regional war. The primary danger today therefore remains more a question of miscalculation than of intent. 

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

The Gaza conflict is already spilling over into a regional war

The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh should surprise no one other than Iran’s Air Defense Force. Israel was clear on October 8 that it would seek to eliminate Hamas leadership anywhere in the world. Israel has not targeted the group’s political leadership in Doha out of respect for Qatar’s role as mediator, at the behest of the United States. Traveling to Tehran to attend Pezeshkian’s inauguration was a known risk. 

One thing is certain: This assassination will not alter Hamas military leader Yahya Sinwar’s calculus. In fact, when news of the assassination first broke, I heard questions among Palestinians about whether this was an inside job orchestrated by Sinwar to eliminate a colleague who might sell him out. It would not be the first Sinwar assassination of his own political leaders. Sinwar likely reads this probable Israeli operation as confirmation that Israel cannot reach him, since he is higher on the target list than was Haniyeh. Sinwar will be as unenthusiastic now about making a hostage deal with Israel as he was before Haniyeh’s death. Haniyeh and his political ilk have not figured into Sinwar’s calculus at any point, and were rarely looped in on it.

Smart questions are being asked after this event. Will it force the new Iranian president to abandon his reformist tendencies and move to the right? This depends on how “reformist” you believe he is; Israel’s assessment is “not very.” Pezeshkian’s statements affirming allegiance with Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis immediately after his election seem to support this assessment, as do videos of him warmly embracing Haniyeh this week in Tehran. But we can expect ongoing debate about whether coming hardline decisions out of his office were inevitable or colored by the assassination. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for his part, has threatened revenge against Israel.

Another question being asked: Does this assassination in Tehran indicate that Israel can reach all of its adversaries inside Iran? Mulling this over will unnerve IRGC and Iranian political leadership and could influence decision making. It will make Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah wonder why he is alive. It will make Abdulmalik al-Houthi in Yemen glad he did not attend. In the United States, calls from some corners for Doha to expel Hamas political leadership were countered with the argument that it would not be as easy to track and monitor them if they relocated to Iran. This remains comparatively true, but the assassination of Haniyeh makes the argument almost moot.

A third question under discussion: How will this event, on the heels of the assassination of Hezbollah senior military advisor Fuad Shukur, impact Hezbollah’s strategy? Shukur’s death was in retaliation for a strike on a dozen Syrian Druze children that Hezbollah was loath to claim. The group may have wished to consider the case closed, a tit for tat. The strike on Haniyeh will put pressure on Hezbollah from their peers inside Gaza and Tehran to bundle the two assassinations and retaliate for both. Hezbollah would be wise to analyze the two events separately, focus bilaterally, recall Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s statement of regret after the 2006 war with Israel, and consider their own interests. 

The fourth question resurfacing is whether the conflict in Gaza is now spilling over and threatening to engulf the region. Attacks on Israel from as far as Iran and Yemen as well as Syria and Iraq, the quick action of regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan in preventing further loss of life in such attacks, and creeping escalation despite the tireless diplomatic energy of Egypt and Qatar all indicate that we are already at the point of regional spillover. It is the interests of the parties in the conflict themselves that have dictated the ebb and flow of escalation thus far.

—Kirsten Fontenrose is a nonresident fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. She was previously the senior director for the Gulf at the National Security Council.

The strikes were a tactical success for Israel. But the strategic impact will depend on Iran’s response.

In a matter of twenty-four hours, Israel killed not one but two of the most senior officials in the so-called Axis of Resistance. The deaths of both Hezbollah senior military leader and Jihad Council member, Fuad Shukur, and Hamas’s political leader, Ismael Haniyeh, led to Israel having its most impactful day of tactical successes in months. But tactical success does not always beget strategic victory, and Israel’s short- and long-term strategy remains unclear, likely to be driven in part by the answers to two key questions.

Will Iran independently respond or seek to attach itself to whatever retaliation Hamas and Hezbollah undertake? For Iran, which always prioritizes regime stability above everything else, it might see the timing and targets of the assassination as an opportunity to claim retaliation while foisting the actual kinetic response off on Hezbollah and Hamas. This would be the traditional pathway of response and is probably the most likely one. But two potentially interceding considerations may challenge Iran in taking this path.

First, Haniyeh’s assassination happened in Iran. In April, following Israel’s killing of senior IRGC officials in Damascus, Iran decided it had to respond directly, opening a new stage in the shadow war between Iran and Israel. In this case, it was not an Iranian official killed, but Iran may decide that it has to respond itself in order to not fall into a deterrence deficit against Israel.

Second, Haniyeh was in Tehran to attend the Pezeshkian’s inauguration. The new president was viewed as the “reformist” in the election and lacks the depth of ties to Iran’s security establishment and IRGC that some of the other candidates had. Ultimately, it will be the supreme leader who signs off on any response. But Pezeshkian may decide, one day into his term, that he needs to align with whatever response the IRGC prefers or risk diminished standing and immediate tensions with one of the most important power bases in the Iranian government.

What does this mean for the hostage negotiations? The killing of Haniyeh, one of the primary negotiators for Hamas, does not mean the chances of a hostage release and temporary ceasefire are over, but they will almost certainly be delayed—again. Haniyeh was negotiating from Doha, but decision making power has always rested with Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza and the mastermind behind the October 7 terrorist attack. That reality does not change because of the assassination.

Sinwar has long calculated that for Hamas, continued civilian deaths is ultimately a net positive, and has been more reluctant to agree to a ceasefire than others. But the conditions on the ground in Gaza don’t shift because of Haniyeh’s assassination. Hamas fighters are reported to be exhausted and desperate for the reprieve a ceasefire might bring.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, meanwhile, has continuously changed the terms of a ceasefire but has always been clear since immediately after October 7 that Israel will hunt and kill the leaders of Hamas responsible for the attack. The prime minister may view a byproduct of Haniyeh’s death to be that it provides him sufficient political goodwill to make a deal that the ultranationalists in his coalition continue to oppose.

Iran’s, Hezbollah’s, and Hamas’s responses will drive the direction of the Middle East for the coming weeks and months: a reversion to current tensions or toward a potential broader regional war.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Watch for a split within Hamas, and pressure on Iran and Hezbollah for a calibrated retaliation

There is no doubt that the assassination of Haniyeh, Hamas’s head of the Politburo and chief political figure, will impact the war in Gaza and the entire region in numerous ways. Here are six thoughts on this significant event: 

1. Israel could have killed Haniyeh months ago but didn’t want to compromise its relationship with Qatar, which remains the chief mediator with the Islamist group. Plus, the presence of the Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US military installation in the region, in Qatar prevents Israel from carrying out political assassinations in the Gulf Emirate. That’s why when Haniyeh entered Iran, which is known to be compromised by Israeli intelligence assets, and following the attack on the Golan Heights, an opportunity presented itself to take him out. After this assassination, Hamas is unlikely to move its headquarters out of Qatar, which affords the group unparalleled safety. 
2. The assassination was likely ordered to coincide with the strike against Hezbollah’s senior commander in Beirut’s suburbs hours earlier to send a strong signal that Israel could fight on two fronts simultaneously. However, Netanyahu’s government may have intended for the assassination to pressure Hamas’s senior leadership into accepting a hostage deal and ending the war in Gaza, given the limits to how much more can be done on the ground in the coastal enclave. This is especially so following the assassination of senior military commanders in the Gaza Strip, including Marwan Issa and probably Mohammed Deif—not to mention the assassination of Saleh al-Arouri in January in Lebanon. Yahya Sinwar remains the only major figure still out of Israel’s reach. 
3. This event will likely generate pressure on Hamas, even if the group doesn’t capitulate or change its stance immediately, to end the war and seek to preserve what remains of its political structures. The group is weakened militarily despite not being outright defeated. However, it is interested in self-preservation, and the group’s political wing may view this event as a monumental shift that necessitates ending the war quickly to ensure the continuity of Hamas’s political relevance, which requires the survival of its senior political figures. In the months following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, and during negotiations, Haniyeh was a mere messenger and courier of communication that was sent to Sinwar in Gaza. This means that Haniyeh’s actual influence over Hamas’s military wing was quite limited. The assassination will likely widen the gap between the political and military wings of Hamas, both of whom have divergent interests that are increasingly disconnected. 
4. Haniyeh’s assassination may expedite political reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, integrating the group into the Palestine Liberation Organization and offering it a political off-ramp that could save it from its trouble. While the agreement last week in China is part of a long series of attempts to reconcile Hamas and Fatah, the assassination may finally force Hamas to feel unprecedented pressure that finally bridges the seemingly irreconcilable differences between it and its chief political rival. 
5. Iran will likely respond to the assassination in a manner similar to its missile and drone strikes against Israel in April. Haniyeh’s death mere hours after the inauguration of the new Iranian president on Iranian soil is a huge, humiliating blow to the Islamic Republic’s prowess and prestige. There’s no way that the IRGC will not respond directly or in a dramatic fashion. Iran is unlikely to launch an all-out confrontation with Israel over Haniyeh’s assassination. However, Tehran has no choice but to attempt to restore its deterrence capability, fearing that its people and regional proxies will start doubting the country’s power. For Pezeshkian, his tenure begins with a major embarrassment and security incident that forces him to take a hardline position toward Israel and the United States. He’ll quickly lose whatever “moderate” margins he was hoping to operate within, especially as he vowed to remove Western sanctions, which are crippling the nation’s economy. Pezeshkian will have to toe the line of hardliners seeking revenge and retaliation, greatly frustrating his efforts to usher in new geopolitical opportunities for his nation. 
6. Hezbollah is facing a difficult choice to either return to the pre-Majdal Shams strike established rules of engagement with Israel or escalate to retaliate for the strike on Beirut’s suburb and avenge the assassination of Haniyeh. The group does not want an escalation that triggers an all-out war but will nevertheless face immense pressure to respond to a significant slap in the face of its partner Hamas and chief sponsor Iran.

—Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is an American writer and analyst who grew up in Gaza City.

Israel boldly threads a needle

Israel has carefully calibrated blows against its main adversaries in the region in the past week, with an assist (although not intended as such) of the United States in its own strike against Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq. Israel is executing deterrence in its most bold and raw form, and may have done so without the full blessing, or even foreknowledge, of the United States. This could have long-term implications for the bilateral relationship. But for now, the question is whether Israel has calibrated correctly in deterring Iran and its proxies or if they have set off an escalatory cycle. The answer to that cannot be known until Iran’s supreme leader decides on Tehran’s next steps.

The target selections and methods speak volumes about Israel’s capabilities and the intended effects:

Beirut: The strike that killed Fuad Shukur not only demonstrates that Israel has the intelligence and capability to conduct a precision strike on Hezbollah’s senior leadership on its home turf, but it also removes its main operational commander, which could affect Hezbollah’s military command-and-control in the near term. Israel seems to have conducted this strike against the wishes of the United States. But because Shukur played a central role in the attack on the US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, (which killed more than three hundred people including 241 US soldiers) it is impossible for the United States to object.

Tehran: The audacious strike on Haniyah in Tehran is part of Netanyahu’s goal of decapitating Hamas’s leadership. More importantly, it clearly establishes, following Iran’s retaliatory strike on Israel and Israel’s counterstrike inside Iran, the new normal of direct strikes between Israel and Iran. Iran’s failure to prevent this will rightfully terrify the regime, but also force it to respond in some way. That said, the statement from the Iranian United Nations mission that it will respond with special operations suggests that we will not see a missile attack on Israel as we did in April. The strike also exposes Netanyahu’s willingness to forge ahead with his main goal—deterring Iran—even at the expense of a hostage-ceasefire deal, Washington’s key objective as a first step toward its broader goals in the region. 

—Beth Sanner is a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project advisory committee and a former US deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration.

Haniyeh’s death will not change Hamas’s goal of destroying Israel

Israel’s strike on Haniyeh is a strategic gamble. While many Israelis will take grim satisfaction at the death of a leader of the group that organized the October 7 attack that killed 1,200 Israelis and started a war that has killed almost 40,000 Gazans, previous attacks on Hamas’s top leadership like Ahmed Yassin in 2004 have not changed Hamas’s intent to destroy the state of Israel. The strike will almost certainly derail ceasefire-for-hostages talks for weeks, at best, so the short-term consequences could be considerable.

The medium-term consequences for how the war ends are likely smaller, however. Israel is determined that Hamas not have a role in postwar governance in Gaza, and Hamas has been angling for a role that preserves its ability to rebuild itself militarily into a Hezbollah-like military power without the burden of civil governance. Hamas’s military leaders are more important to the group’s strategy than its exiled political leadership like Haniyeh.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.

Even if the current escalation stops here, the next one is around the corner

The recent assassinations of Shukur (Hajj Mahsan) in Beirut and Haniyeh in Tehran might lead to a strong reaction from Iran and especially Hezbollah, which likely see these assassinations as crossing all red lines by Israel and in complete contradiction to the rules of the game between Israel and the Axis of Resistance. 

These reactions may drive the parties, despite their reluctance, into a regional war in light of the desire of Iran and Hezbollah to restore the deterrence equation vis-à-vis Israel and to prevent similar acts from It in the future.

Israel’s ability to thwart the expected attacks by the axis elements, along with Israel’s relatively measured response to these reactions, may lead to the containment of the current event. It is still important to remember that without a ceasefire in Gaza, even if the current escalation is prevented, the next escalation is around the corner. Very tense days lie ahead.

—Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project working group. He previously served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence.

The difference between these strikes and Israel’s Iran strike in April

Yesterday, Israel launched lethal strikes against Haniyeh in Tehran, Iran, following his attendance of Iran’s presidential inauguration, and Shukur, architect of the 1983 bombings of the US Marine Corps barracks that killed 241 US servicemembers and French barracks that killed fifty-eight French servicemembers. The strikes served several purposes: decapitating Hamas and Hezbollah leadership as well as making it clear that Israel will find and eliminate its enemies anywhere in the world, including in nonpermissive environments such as Iran. The strikes likely eliminated a false sense of security for leaders in the Iran threat network of proxy forces and were also meant to reestablish deterrence against attacking Israel. The strikes also were a response to a recent Hezbollah attack that targeted a soccer field in northern Israel and killed twelve Israeli children and adolescents.

While still measured, Israel’s strikes were stronger than the retaliatory strike Israel launched against Iran in April, which had followed Iran’s failed attack on Israel involving several hundred one-way attack drones and missiles. At that time, Israel chose to respond in a way that communicated that Israel was capable of evading Iranian defenses and striking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Israel did so through a missile strike at a single site in Isfahan, home of Iran’s nuclear program, that didn’t cause significant damage but made it clear that Israel could do so if and when it wants. While the April strike was more symbolic and meant to convey a deterrence message, the strikes in the last two days decapitated senior leaders in the threat network attacking Israel.

 —Alex Plitsas is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs’ N7 Initiative and former chief of sensitive activities for special operations and combating terrorism in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The attacks reveal—yet again—the Islamic Republic’s intelligence weaknesses

In Karaj, a city west of Tehran, two boxes of pastries were placed on a street corner with signs saying these were sweets to celebrate the news of Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Tehran. For anti-regime Iranians, inside Iran and in the diaspora, this news was much welcomed because of the Islamic Republic’s material and financial backing of Hamas. For years, Iranians have been honing in on the reality that the people’s money is being spent on proxies abroad, as noted in the popular chant, “No to Gaza, no to Lebanon, our lives for Iran.”

Haniyeh’s assassination, presumably by Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, was yet another major blow to the intelligence apparatuses of the Islamic Republic, which have repeatedly failed to prevent sabotage, assassinations, and cyber attacks on Iranian soil. In 2022, IRGC intelligence chief Hossein Taeb was sacked, in part because he failed to thwart those very events during his ten-year tenure. Some officials have pointed to the fact that the intelligence apparatuses have invested too much in domestic “threats,” in other words suppressing civil society and arresting and imprisoning dissidents.

While Haniyeh was technically the second member of a terrorist organization killed in Iran by Mossad—the first being Abu Muhammad al-Masri, al-Qaeda’s second-highest leader, in 2020—the fact that this happened while on a visit for Pezeshkian’s inauguration sends a big message about Israel’s ability to infiltrate Iran at a moment of its choosing, even if that moment is during heightened security for more than one hundred foreign delegations.

—Holly Dagres is editor of the Atlantic Council’s IranSource and MENASource blogs, and a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs. She also curates The Iranist newsletter.

Dark clouds now hang over Beirut

I left Lebanon less than a week ago—it was brimming with life as it always does during summertime, with an airport bustling with tourists and restaurants filled with long-awaited expats family reunions, bringing a light of hope during these somber times. Yet, since yesterday, and for the first time since the region’s conflict, serious anguish has started to fill the air of Beirut.

In the aftermath Israel’s assassination of Shukur in Hezbollah’s heartland, Haret Hreik, on Tuesday, Lebanon has maintained its official position of not wanting war with Israel by calling for the full implementation of UN Resolution 1701, which it reiterated in a letter of concern to the UN Security Council. Despite asking to give peace a chance, the country’s caretaker foreign minister also announced that “there’s going to be retaliation,” which he said he hoped would not be met by an Israeli response. With a quasi-functioning Lebanese government under Hezbollah’s influence over military, political, and security institutions, these contradictory statements do little more than reveal the government’s frailty. 

Ultimately, the intensity, timing, and nature of this declared retaliation remains at the discretion of Iran and under the execution of Hezbollah. Lebanese opinion about such a decision seems divided between those who support Hezbollah’s rhetoric and those who want to avoid any escalatory action that could take the country back to 2006, when Hezbollah and Israel fought a destructive thirty-four-day war.

Following Israel’s assassination of Haniyeh, Iran’s supreme leader gave an order to strike Israel directly, a statement which, in the eyes of many, gives the green light for its Lebanese proxy to execute a direct response. 

Hezbollah’s response will be critical for its leadership to maintain credibility in light of its repeated pledge to respond to any Israeli aggression on Lebanon. Still, such a response will need to be carefully calibrated. A direct response by Hezbollah that, for example, hits important Israeli military sites might lead to an all-out war, which the group has been trying to avoid, despite its repeated claims of being ready for such a scenario.  

Alternatively, Hezbollah could aim for a more diluted attack that might avenge the killing of Shukur while also containing further escalation. But such a response threatens to undermine the group’s deterrence strategy; after all, this isn’t the first time Hezbollah is being cornered to respond to an Israeli political assassination of a high-level target on Lebanese soil. Earlier in January, the group retaliated against the killing of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut by firing rockets into Israel, and since then, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, has vowed that “any assassination on Lebanese territory targeting a Lebanese, Palestinian, Iranian, or Syrian . . . [would] be met with a strong reaction.” Cognizant of this dilemma, Hezbollah is tactically limited.

The international community may very well get additional clarity on what Hezbollah’s response will entail during Nasrallah’s speech Thursday at Shukur’s funeral. In the meantime, amid growing fears of what looms ahead, Beirut International Airport has started to grapple with frantic travelers again; yet this time, facing delayed or canceled flights as they try to return back.

—Nour Dabboussi is the assistant director to the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

The post Experts react: Two top Hamas and Hezbollah leaders have been killed. What’s next for Israel, Iran, and the war in Gaza? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Two days, two earth-shaking strikes. This morning, an air strike killed Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, one day after a rocket strike killed Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukur in Beirut. Israel reportedly launched both strikes as it continues its response to Hamas’s terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, and an apparent Hezbollah attack that killed a dozen children in the Israel-controlled Golan Heights last week. Following Haniyeh’s death, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said that “it is our duty to take revenge.” Is a wider war next? And how will these events affect the ongoing war in Gaza? Our experts explain below.

• Jonathan Panikoff (@jpanikoff): Director of the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and a former US deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East
• Beth Sanner: Member of the Atlantic Council’s Iran Strategy Project advisory committee and a former US deputy director of national intelligence for mission integration
• Ahmed F. Alkhatib (@afalkhatib): Nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an American writer and analyst who grew up in Gaza City

Behind the attacks

• “In a matter of twenty-four hours, Israel killed not one but two of the most senior officials in the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance,’” Jonathan tells us. It is Israel’s “most impactful day of tactical successes in months.” But, he adds, “tactical success does not always beget strategic victory, and Israel’s short- and long-term strategy remains unclear.”
• Beth says the “audacious strike” on Haniyeh is part of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aim of “decapitating Hamas’s leadership.” But “more importantly, it clearly establishes, following Iran’s retaliatory strike on Israel and Israel’s counterstrike inside Iran, the new normal of direct strikes between Israel and Iran.”
• Qatar’s prime minister, who has been mediating negotiations between Israel and Hamas, denounced the “assassination” of the Qatar-based Haniyeh. Ahmed believes that “Israel could have killed Haniyeh months ago, but didn’t want to compromise the relationship with Qatar.” But when Haniyeh traveled to Iran, “which is known to be compromised by Israeli intelligence assets,” Ahmed notes, “opportunity presented itself to take him out.”

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Implications for Gaza

• Haniyeh was one of the primary negotiators for Hamas, Jonathan notes. His assassination “does not mean the chances of a hostage release and temporary ceasefire are over, but they will almost certainly be delayed—again.” More important, he adds, is that the ultimate decision on any hostage deal and ceasefire rests with Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza and the mastermind behind the October 7 terrorist attack. “That reality does not change because of the assassination.”
• Ahmed expects the killing to exacerbate rifts between Hamas’s political and military wings. “The group’s political wing may view this event as a monumental shift that necessitates ending the war quickly to ensure the continuity of Hamas’s political relevance,” he tells us. But Haniyeh had “limited” influence over Sinwar—acting as “a mere messenger” during negotiations.

The view from Tehran

• “Iran’s failure to prevent this will rightfully terrify the regime, but also force it to respond in some way,” Beth says. The statement from Iran’s mission to the United Nations that Tehran will respond with “special operations,” she says, “suggests that we will not see a missile attack on Israel as we did in April.”
• For Haniyeh to be killed on Iranian soil just after attending the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is “a huge, humiliating blow to the Islamic Republic’s prowess and prestige,” Ahmed tells us. Expect a “dramatic” response from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), but not “an all-out confrontation with Israel,” Ahmed adds, as Tehran will “attempt to restore its deterrence capability, fearing that its people and regional proxies will start doubting the country’s power.”
• Pezeshkian “was viewed as the ‘reformist’ in the election and lacks the depth of ties to Iran’s security establishment and IRGC that some of the other candidates had,” Jonathan notes. While the supreme leader will decide any response, he adds, Pezeshkian may decide that “he needs to align with whatever response the IRGC prefers or risk diminished standing and immediate tensions with one of the most important power bases in the Iranian government.”

What to look for next

• Israel’s strike, which Beth notes may have come “without the full blessing, or even foreknowledge, of the United States,” could have “long-term implications” for the two countries’ relationship. “But for now, the question is whether Israel has calibrated correctly in deterring Iran and its proxies or if it has set off an escalatory cycle.”
• The fastest escalation, Ahmed says, is likely to come between Hezbollah and Israel. “While escalation on multiple fronts is inevitable,” he adds, “all players will be carefully assessing their options and avoiding risky moves that greatly destabilize their power, gains, and positions.”
• Jonathan reminds us that Iran “always prioritizes regime stability above everything else.” In this case, that means Tehran “might see the timing and targets of the assassination as an opportunity to claim retaliation while foisting the actual kinetic response off on Hezbollah and Hamas,” Jonathan says. “Iran’s, Hezbollah’s, and Hamas’s responses will drive the direction of the Middle East for the coming weeks and months.”

The post Will the killings of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders lead to a wider war? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Female political representation is important. According to 2023 data, only fifty-nine of the 193 member states of the United Nations had a woman head of state or government in their history. Against this backdrop, four countries in the Caribbean have had or currently have women leaders: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados. But representation still lags behind, with an average of 22 percent of ministerial portfolios and cabinet positions in the English-speaking Caribbean held by women. And according to World Bank data, only four Caribbean countries—Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Grenada—have 30 percent or more seats in national parliaments held by women.

At the same time, greater and more effective female political representation must go hand in hand with bringing gender equity perspectives into all aspects policymaking in ways that improve the lives of citizens. In the Caribbean, women and girls face significant vulnerabilities, and gender mainstreaming is needed to address them, in particular gender-based violence.

The Caribbean has one of the highest rates of gender-based violence in the world. According to UN Women data, 46 percent of women in the Caribbean have experienced at least one form of violence in their lifetime. Jamaica, for example, has the second-highest femicide rate in the world, while 55 percent of Guyanese women have experienced at least one form of violence, including intimate partner violence or nonpartner sexual abuse. And data on gender-based violence is often underreported.

To tackle gender-based violence through gender mainstreaming in policymaking, governments in the Caribbean should work closely with civil society organizations that focus on gender and gender-based violence. They should also work with victims of gender-based violence to understand the bottlenecks of the system and its inadequate responses. With this deeper understanding, governments can map out specific areas to improve support for women victims of gender-based violence.

Governments should also include chief gender officers in key government institutions, particularly within the judicial system and the police. Chief gender officers can help ensure appropriate support, accountability, and sustainability of policies for victims of gender-based violence. These officers should be appropriately trained to bring a gender-sensitive perspective to decision-making processes, and their authority and dedicated office to these issues can help to overcome institutional inertia.

In the legal sphere, these officers should revise and help update legislation through a gender lens, as a mechanism to avoid the perpetuation of laws and norms that might have pervasive negative consequences for women and girls. Within the police, chief gender officers can be trained to welcome and support victims of gender-based violence, helping them as victims instead of discriminating against them. Focus groups commissioned by the Atlantic Council in Jamaica and Guyana, for example, found a lack of trust that institutions, such as the police, can support women victims of gender-based violence. One Jamaican woman explained, “But sometimes you go to the police and the police take your statement and look at you and be like if you wear that then you don’t think the man is going to see you.”

Ensuring that women victims of gender-based violence feel heard and supported could lead to more accurate data on this issue, as underreporting is a significant challenge. This, in turn, could help governments gain a better understanding of gender-based violence and the policies and programs that can help solve it.  

Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council.

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While previous G20 meetings have been noteworthy for their disagreements, Brazil has emphasized substance and consensus over geopolitics during its G20 presidency. Felipe Hees, the Brazilian diplomat and sous-sherpa of this year’s G20 presidency, explained this strategy on July 25 at an Atlantic Council conference on the sidelines of the meeting. Brasília, he said, has sought to acknowledge fundamental disagreements on geopolitics between some members, and then to sidestep them entirely at the ministerial level. The big question now is: How long can this approach last?

So far, Brazilian officials have chosen to focus on economic development issues that already enjoy widespread support. Last week, this approach resulted in one of the few joint G20 ministerial-level communiqués in the past two years. Released on July 26, this communiqué displays G20 members’ alignment on launching the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under the Brazilian presidency. It’s an important topic for the host country, since Brazil is the world’s leading producer of soybeans, corn, and meat, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has emphasized his country’s role in alleviating global food insecurity. At the same time, the issue has a wider resonance. At the Atlantic Council conference, Cindy McCain, executive director of the World Food Program, emphasized that “food security is a national security issue, and it should be labeled as one.”

Climate finance and the energy transition were at the forefront in Rio last week as well. Discussions focused on how to mobilize the public and private sector in achieving climate goals. At the Atlantic Council’s conference, Renata Amaral, the Brazilian secretary for international affairs and development in the Ministry of Planning and Budget, formally called for technical assistance from multilateral development banks for catastrophic weather events, such as the floods in southern Brazil this May. Immediately following the summit, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen headed to Belém, the capital city of the northern Brazilian province Pará. Located near the mouth of the Amazon River, Belém was a symbolic choice for the unveiling of the US Treasury’s Amazon Region Initiative Against Illicit Finance, which is intended to help combat nature crimes.

Another issue that garnered attention last week was wealth inequality, which the Brazilian president spotlighted in his speech on June 24. “The poor have been ignored by governments and by wealthy sectors of society,” he said. Despite disagreements on whether the G20 is the right forum for the issue, it issued the first ever ministerial declaration on taxation. While Brazil’s ambition was to move the needle on a 2 percent global wealth tax, the declaration simply said that ultra-high-net-worth individuals must pay their fair share in taxes. While this fell short of Brazil’s hopes on this issue, the meetings in Rio have done more on building consensus than the past two presidencies, which have been rife with outbursts over geopolitical issues between member states.

In 2022, the then G20 president, Indonesia, saw its plan to build international cooperation for the post-pandemic recovery paralyzed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February. When finance ministers and foreign ministers met in April and July of the year, officials from Russia and from the United States and Europe walked out of the room when their counterparts spoke. Ministers failed to agree on a communiqué, and negotiations on climate and education also broke down over criticisms of the war. Ahead of the leaders’ summit in November 2022, Western leaders balked at the thought of sharing a table with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who ultimately did not attend the summit. In the end, the leaders could only agree to a declaration that was a broad, noncommittal summary of approaches to addressing global challenges.

Last year, India focused its G20 presidency on depoliticizing the issue of the global supply of food, fertilizers, and fuels, as well as on addressing climate change and restoring the foundations of negotiations at the forum. Its strategy was to move geopolitics off center stage by highlighting perspectives from the “Global South,” including formally adding the African Union as a full member, and thus shaping the platform as an action and communication channel between advanced economies and emerging markets.

This was difficult. Shortly into India’s presidency, Russia and China withdrew their support for the text in the Bali statement on Ukraine. At the technical level, none of the ministerial meetings produced a joint communiqué, and New Delhi was forced to issue chairs’ statements instead. Since the leaders’ summit in New Delhi, the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023 has made the job of navigating geopolitical tensions all the more difficult for Brazil.

While the Russian and Chinese leaders did not attend last year’s leaders’ summit, the New Delhi Declaration was nevertheless bolder and more specific than its Bali predecessor. It set the agenda for the G20 for the years ahead but offered few specifics on how to achieve these goals.

Will Brazil’s strategy of sidestepping geopolitics work at the leaders’ summit scheduled for November 18-19 in Rio? Finance ministers and central bank governors can ignore geopolitics; presidents and prime ministers often cannot. If Brasília concludes technical negotiations on the various proposals ahead of the leaders’ summit, then consensus-building at the gathering will be easier, as geopolitics will remain just an elephant in the room.

If Brazil is successful, it can end the stalemate that the G20 has found itself in and remake it into a relevant economic coordination body—one that can adequately address the goals of its emerging market and advanced economy members. If Brazilian officials are not successful, however, the forum’s relevance may begin to wane.

It has been in the interest of the last few G20 presidencies to keep up the balancing act between the United States, China, and Russia. Moreover, it is likely that South Africa will follow this approach as it takes on its presidency in 2025. As many of the discussions in Rio noted, however, what happens in the US presidential elections this November could determine both the relevance and the tone of the G20 meetings going forward.

Ananya Kumar is the deputy director, future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Mrugank Bhusari is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

The post Dispatch from Rio: Can Brazil set the G20 leaders’ summit up for success? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

To enhance the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence and counter Russia’s nuclear threats, the United States should expand nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO to allies such as Poland, Finland, and Romania. The United States should also expand the presence of medium-range US ground-based dual-capable missile systems in Europe. Connected to these changes, NATO should stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which is limiting the Alliance’s freedom and which Moscow has repeatedly violated. Only by expanding its approach to nuclear sharing can the Alliance adequately improve its deterrence posture and counter Russia’s nuclear blackmail.

A brief history of NATO nuclear sharing

The spread of nuclear weapons was a major concern at the dawn of the Cold War. In 1963, US President John F. Kennedy worried about “a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons” within a decade. NATO’s current nuclear sharing program emerged in the 1960s as Washington sought to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and two other pressing challenges: bilateral relationships across Europe and the defense of Western European NATO allies. Of particular concern to the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union, was West Germany’s desire for some sort of access to the nuclear deterrent at the heart of NATO’s defense strategy.

US efforts originally focused on a “hardware” solution to this dilemma known as the Multilateral Force, which would have created a fleet carrying Polaris A-3 missiles under NATO command. But once Washington realized Soviet opposition to this arrangement would also kill the much-desired Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Johnson administration switched to a “software” approach based on training and consultation with allies—what is now referred to as “nuclear sharing” within NATO. Under this arrangement US B-61 nuclear weapons are stored in secure locations in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The weapons are under US custody and control to maintain compliance with the NPT.

In the event of a nuclear war, a nuclear mission by NATO allies can only occur with explicit approval from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, along with authorization by the US president and UK prime minister. France remains outside the nuclear consultation mechanism with its own sovereign nuclear force.

Nuclear sharing today

NATO’s current nuclear sharing policy, which has been detailed in various publications, is based on layers encapsulated in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, the post-2012 NATO summit declarations, and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. The doctrine deliberately avoids specificity when it comes to qualifying circumstances for nuclear weapon use.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas has prompted NATO to reconsider the Alliance’s previous inattention to its nuclear deterrent. The 2016 Warsaw Summit signaled this change, but despite the Alliance speaking more publicly about the nuclear issue and signaling more clearly about its nuclear exercise (Steadfast Noon), the bulk of the balancing efforts have focused on conventional forces. The problem with this, as Simond de Galbert and Jeffrey Rathke note, is that conventional parity is “unrealistic and costly” and perhaps even “escalatory.”

Making matters worse for NATO were Russia’s violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. Although disputed by the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reportedly deployed missiles (9M729) with a range of 2,500 kilometers in Mozdok, North Ossetia, and near Moscow, which was a gross violation of the treaty, placing NATO’s eastern and northern allies under direct threat. In response, the United States withdrew from the INF treaty in 2019, a move that NATO allies supported.

Three years later, in 2022, the Alliance once again increased its signaling on the nuclear deterrent in its Strategic Concept, saying that it would “take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission.” The following year, the Alliance announced further modernization of NATO’s nuclear capability at its Vilnius summit. This modernization of NATO nuclear capability is facilitated through the renewal of national forces in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as upgrades to European dual-capable aircraft. For current nuclear sharing allies, the old B-61 gravity bombs, which number around one hundred, will be replaced by the advanced B61-12. These are new weapons utilizing existing warheads and the replacement does not represent an increase in the overall number of US warheads.

Nuclear sharing tomorrow

To date, despite modernization and stronger signaling, NATO’s nuclear posture remains stagnant. To improve the Alliance’s deterrence posture, the United States and its allies should take two steps: expand current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward and deploy land-based US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Expanding current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward will require fully breaking with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which Moscow has torn to shreds. Several allies refuse to abandon under the mistaken notion that it somehow provides a road back to peace. In practice, this has meant that the Alliance has focused on rotating conventional forces in Eastern Europe to stay within the spirit of the Founding Act.

But it is Russia, not NATO, that has destabilized Europe. Time and again, the Kremlin has blatantly ignored the Founding Act. There should be no illusions that there is a road back, and heeding the spirit of the act while Russia wages a brutal, illegal war against Ukraine and engages in political warfare against NATO allies including the United States is foolish.

Balancing Russia with conventional forces in places such as the Baltics is simply an attempt at reassurance rather than an actual effective deterrence and defense strategy. Equally ineffectual would be relying just on F-35 combat aircraft in bases already storing US nuclear weapons in Europe.

The only adequate solution is to respond to Russian moves in a tit-for-tat manner that George Bunn and Rodger Payne call an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Only in responding to the Kremlin in a manner that inflicts a real price can Washington bring about eventual cooperation from the Kremlin. The United States can do this by continually raising the stakes to a point where Russia views cooperation, rather than competition, as the best solution. Given the economic strength of the United States, and nuclear allies France and Britain, it would be logical for them to impose increasing costs on Russia through expanded nuclear sharing.

Moreover, the Pentagon recently announced that it would send Tomahawk, SM-6, and developmental hypersonic missiles to Germany in 2026. This is a good start, but again it does not impose a high enough price on Russian actions and a broader deployment should be considered for two reasons. First, Russia has deployed reciprocal technologies, and the current US deterrent is inadequate. Second, as noted above, the deployment of US ground-based dual-capable missile systems to NATO allies could be used as a bargaining chip to influence Russian behavior—in effect, escalating to deescalate. While this last point may not be appreciated by all advocates of expanding NATO’s deterrent, if it results in a decrease in Russian tactical nuclear deployments, it may be worth the trade if it elicits cooperation.

The United States should take a page out of the new Russian deterrent playbook, which sees little distinction between peacetime and wartime, instead favoring persistent engagement with the enemy across a range of capabilities as part of overall deterrence. Putin has time and again played Washington and its European allies, believing that they are too scared of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons to push back against his threats. Only by responding in kind may Washington find the Kremlin perhaps willing to listen.

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post To deter Russia, NATO must adapt its nuclear sharing program appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He’s not giving up without a fight. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s election commission declared him the winner in Sunday’s vote, despite ample evidence of fraud and intimidation. Opposition candidate Edmundo González declared victory as the United States and other countries expressed concerns about the results. What will be the opposition’s next move? How will Maduro respond? And what role will regional and global powers play? We polled our experts for the answers.

• Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
• Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
• Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

How to steal an election

• The stage was set for this moment in the months leading up to the vote, when the regime banned opposition leader María Corina Machado, with González ending up on the ballot. Then, as Jason points out, only small delegations from the United Nations and the Carter Center were allowed to monitor the vote, meaning “the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results.” 
• The González camp said he won about 70 percent of the votes that his team was able to verify—while Venezuela’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won 44 percent of the vote, with Maduro earning 51 percent. Jason notes that “it would be a mathematical miracle for Maduro to prevail” based on how the opposition has described the votes that it has seen.
• The public isn’t fooled, Iria tells us, noting the “outpouring of messages and videos on social media” from witnesses on the ground indicating their certainty that González won. “This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy,” she adds.
• As of this afternoon, those voters are mobilizing in the streets, creating a new test for the regime. “Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames,” Geoff says. “He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years.”

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Pressure from abroad

• In addition to the “serious concerns” expressed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, several countries throughout the region called for more transparency around the vote count—including neighboring Colombia, where, as Jason notes, “President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro.”
• Without full results and an independent audit, “the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure,” Geoff says, with the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe playing a crucial role.
• That international pressure will be important to uphold the will of Venezuelans, but there are self-interested reasons for regional and international powers to push for change. Jason says another six years of Maduro will lead to “new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.”

Crackdown at home?

• The major point of contention will be sanctions, which the United States reimposed in April after the Maduro government didn’t uphold its end of last year’s deal to hold free and fair elections. “I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe,” Geoff says.
• The opposition, therefore, should “exploit divisions within the ruling coalition,” Iria says. At the same time, opposition leaders should “find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017.”
• And if Maduro were to return to the bargaining table, it would look very different from the negotiations between the government and the opposition, Iria tells us. Now, she says, negotiations would no longer be about electoral conditions “but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela.”

The post Can Maduro hold onto power? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

—Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

—Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

—Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

—Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The post Experts react: Maduro is clinging to power after a disputed election. What’s next for Venezuela? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With EU countries now facing greater fiscal constraints, the bloc needs to either further amend them or find a way to have more common European debt. Only then will EU member states be able to make the increases in defense spending that are necessary to bolster security on the continent and deter further aggression from Moscow.

The EU’s fiscal rules

The EU is a partial monetary union (not every state uses the euro) and is not a fiscal union. Twenty of its twenty-seven member states use the euro, but they maintain their own public accounts. The EU’s budget amounts to just 1 percent of the bloc’s entire gross domestic product (GDP). Brussels levies few taxes and spends little for the bloc, and that relatively small budget is the sum of the EU’s fiscal union. The real power of the EU resides in the supervision of the member states’ fiscal policies.

This is why some countries with high levels of debt or deficit—France, Italy, Poland (which spends 4.1 percent of its GDP on the military), and several others—might be under special supervision by the European Commission under the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP). The EDP requires the country in question to provide a plan of fiscal consolidation that it will follow, as well as deadlines for its achievement. Countries that do not follow up on the recommendations may be fined. Of course, many EU countries are in debt, and most of them run a deficit even in good times; in bad times, they just run even bigger deficits. The European Commission will take into account additional military expenditures in the assessment, but only on military equipment, not on increasing the number of soldiers.

In 2023, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU reached 82 percent, and it was even higher in the eurozone, at 89 percent (with France exceeding 110 percent and Italy going beyond 137 percent). The highest deficits were recorded in Italy (7.4 percent of GDP), Hungary (6.7 percent), and Romania (6.6 percent). Eleven EU member states had deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP. In comparison, the United States has a debt of around 123 percent of GDP and ran a deficit of 6.3 percent in 2023.

The original EU fiscal rules implemented thresholds for each country’s deficit and debt at 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP, respectively, and they required cutting national excess debt-to-GDP ratios by one-twentieth each year. These restrictive rules contributed to the eurozone’s prolonged recession from 2011 to 2013, and some rules have since been relaxed. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the bloc activated its general escape clause, which allows for deviations from the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact in times of crisis. Moving forward, however, the rules will likely turn restrictive again, though less so than the old ones. In April 2024, EU institutions agreed on a consensual change to the fiscal framework, making the path back to a debt of 60 percent GDP and a deficit below 3 percent of GDP a matter of negotiations between each member state’s government and the European Commission.

Treat military spending differently

Some EU countries, such as France and Poland, argue for military expenditures to be treated differently, as some member states have different needs in the current geopolitical climate. Not all EU member states are in NATO; for example, Austria is neutral. But under the current EU rules, the fiscal space for military expenditures is one-size-fits-all. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, defense expenditures incurred that year were within the escape clause, but this does not address the underfunding of the military within the EU.

In 2024, the average military expenditures of NATO and EU members is expected to reach 2.2 percent of GDP, with a group of countries far below the threshold of 2 percent. More importantly, these are big economies with relatively large armies, such as Italy (1.49 percent of GDP), Belgium (1.3 percent), and Spain (1.28 percent). All of these countries have high levels of debt and issues with deficits. Germany is set to reach 2.12 percent of GDP on defense spending this year, but it is held back by its constitutional debt brake, which does not allow for an annual deficit higher than 0.35 percent of GDP. This has created tensions within Germany’s coalition government, since spending more on weapons might mean having to spend less on climate change mitigation and social services.

Meanwhile, the United States spends 3.38 percent of its GDP on defense. To put that into perspective, the total expenditure of all European NATO members is $380 billion, almost three times lower than that of the United States (nearly $968 billion). At the same time, Russian military spending this year is estimated to reach $140 billion, or 7.1 percent of its GDP.

Common debt

European capitals need to treat the need for a stronger military in Europe as urgent and serious, but their accountants in the finance departments are not going to make it easy. Unless Brussels changes its fiscal rules to allow for greater defense spending, common EU debt might be the only solution.

The bloc can issue EU debt outside of national fiscal rules, which it did for the first time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some analysts argue for common debt for a European air defense system, which is a good starting point. EU debt funding could include spending on the further development of European defense industrial capacities. EU leaders such as former Estonian Prime Minister and future EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton have supported some version of common debt for defense purposes.

Utilizing common debt should not aim solely to expand the power of the European Commission, as some critics in various capitals fear. Instead, it should transform this measure from a temporary crisis-management tool into a standard policy instrument, enabling Europe to develop a meaningful defense industrial strategy, which has been lacking since the EU’s inception. After the failed attempt to establish a European Defence Community in the 1950s, the European project has primarily focused on economic issues. Unfortunately, it’s time to revisit that discussion.

Europeans must now prepare for a challenging geopolitical environment by investing in European defense, whether through changes in fiscal rules or by taking on more European debt.

Whichever path forward the EU chooses, it must do so quickly. There’s no time to waste.

Piotr Arak is the chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

The post The EU needs to adapt its fiscal framework to the threat of war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Public Event Thu, July 25, 2024 • 8:30 am ET

Shaping the global economy: From food security to digital transformation

Shaping the global economy conference will develop a blueprint for the G20 to address the range of challenges facing its member states from global economic governance and digital transformation to food security and hunger. 

Brazil China Digital Policy Energy Markets & Governance

“We’ve lost all the progress that we’ve made in the past fifteen years” on lowering global hunger levels, World Food Programme (WFP) Executive Director Cindy McCain warned on Thursday.

McCain spoke at an Atlantic Council event hosted on the sidelines of the Group of Twenty (G20) meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in Rio de Janeiro. She pointed out that one in eleven people globally faced hunger last year.

On Wednesday, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced that Brazil—which holds the G20 presidency—will later this year launch the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty to bring countries together in sharing knowledge and resources.

“We have the capability as a planet to feed everybody on the planet—we grow enough food,” McCain said, “but we don’t” due to funding and other coordination issues.

With those challenges, the Global Alliance is “a great opportunity for all of us . . . to get together, exchange ideas, brainstorm” and to “develop science and technology” tools to help, McCain said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Valentina Sader, deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Food security

• Food security is a “national security issue,” and “it should be labeled as one,” McCain argued, pointing out how access to food has shaped broader security crises in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
• Yet, food security “gets kicked down” the list of priorities every time “something else happens in the world,” McCain warned.
• She said that the WFP and United Nations agencies, because they provide critical aid, are “on the front lines” of crises and the “first in and last out.”
• The WFP previously got most of its grain from Ukraine. But it has had to diversify its sources in the wake of the agricultural disruptions caused by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. WFP is also working with other countries to help them mitigate the effects of the conflict on global food supplies.
• In the global hunger crisis, “women and children are taking the brunt,” McCain said. “You’ve never seen more of an example of it than in Gaza.”
• She added that equity and gender inclusion are important to factor into food security efforts because “a woman will feed her family,” and while doing so, “she will make sure everybody else eats” before she does.
• Moreover, with women making up around half of smallholder farmers, McCain argued that it is important to make sure that these women have the tools, expertise, seeds, and access to water that they need to farm effectively. “If a woman farms and can feed her family, she will wind up feeding the community,” McCain said.

Farm to negotiating table

• McCain noted that G20 countries include not only the world’s leading economies but also some of the planet’s largest agricultural producers. That, she said, empowers these countries to work together to address the full spectrum of food-security challenges, from poverty to improvements in agriculture.
• She added that the G20 is an optimal forum for raising the urgency around hunger because of how it brings together both governments and civil society organizations from countries that represent 85 percent of the world’s gross domestic product and over 60 percent of its population. “So the voice is huge,” she said, adding that “governments simply cannot do it all. We need everybody in on this.”
• She urged global stakeholders to “continue to elevate the conversation” about the urgency of food security—and advised countries “most affected” by food insecurity to keep conveying the plight they face. “The problem is [that] around the world, people don’t understand what’s going on” or believe that hunger and malnutrition are only problems in Africa rather than globally, she said. “It’s all about. . . making sure that people understand.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

The post ‘We’re back to square one’ in fighting the hunger crisis, warns Cindy McCain appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the Call to Action, the secretary-general makes clear that governments and policymakers must protect and care for the lives and livelihoods of frontline communities, protect workers, advance the evidence base to drive innovative resilience solutions, and limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius. 

This clear recognition from the Office of the Secretary-General is an important moment for us all. Extreme heat is often underestimated and ignored, but its impacts are unavoidable. The planet is heating up faster than we thought. We are outside scientific model predictions and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and devastating. 

Rising heat affects our major critical systems—such as water, energy, food, transportation, and communications. It also feeds mega droughts, wildfires, and storms, creating cascading and compounding crises. It’s a global crisis. But we are not ready for any of it. We’re sleepwalking.

In my work as global chief heat officer and first chief heat officer for the city of Athens, I have worked directly with cities and have seen the impacts of heat firsthand. Cities are heating up at twice the rate of the global average. At 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming, sixty-seven cities will experience 150 or more days per year of temperatures exceeding 35 degrees Celsius (95 degrees Fahrenheit). At 2 degrees Celsius, the number jumps to ninety-four cities. At just under 3 degrees Celsius of global warming, it soars to 197 cities.  

Policies to address extreme heat so far remain scattered, disjointed, and underfunded. But the rising temperatures mark a global crisis with local impacts. That’s why the global focus of the UN’s Call to Action is so crucial. Increasingly, our world is facing challenges that go beyond the capacity and limited mandate of single nation states. We’re facing crises, like climate change, that need international cooperation to support and facilitate equitable, multilevel, science-based decision making and solutions. The UN is the only legitimate multilateral governance structure able to address issues that need global mobilization and localized solutions. As cities take on climate change, they need support at every level.  

In 2022, globally, humanity spent a little over one trillion dollars on adapting to and mitigating the effects of climate change. For comparison, the world spent $11.7 trillion on COVID-19 emergency fiscal measures in 2020 alone. As temperatures rise, this funding gap is a dangerous threat. And there is another issue that needs to be urgently addressed: In 2022, about one trillion dollars went to financing emissions mitigation, while only one hundred billion dollars went to adaptation and resilience-building initiatives. We urgently need both climate adaptation and resilience financing. 

The UN’s Call to Action is an important milestone for climate resilience, but it is also only the beginning. As the document explains, the world urgently needs a Global Action Strategy to “mobilize governments, policy makers, and all stakeholders to act, prevent, and reduce heat risk.” A dedicated trust fund for urban heat resilience initiatives is also needed, because cities are on the frontlines of extreme heat, and they are where more than half of the world’s population lives—a share that is expected to rise to seven-in-ten people by midcentury. Finally, more dedicated heat champions, like the community of chief heat officers established by the Arsht-Rock Resilience Center, with heat resilience departments that can articulate the challenges and co-create the best solutions are needed. These champions are critical to ensuring that the dangers of—and the solutions to—extreme heat are understood widely.

Each of these essential efforts, as well as others, requires building an international consensus around the scope of the problem and its solutions. Here, the UN’s Call to Action on Extreme Heat can help shape conversations in positive directions at upcoming conferences such as Climate Week NYC and this year’s UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29. Heat resilience must be at the top of the agenda at these and other international meetings, and work is needed at every level to ensure that cities have the support and finances they need to scale solutions.

As the Call to Action makes clear, everyone is at risk from extreme heat, and we must enable resilience at the local and international level, taking “bold decisions to change the way we live to avoid an even more scorched Earth in the future.” 

Eleni Myrivili is the world’s first global chief heat officer, a role jointly created and appointed by the Atlantic Council’s Arsht-Rock Resilience Center and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat).

The post The world is sleepwalking into an era of extreme heat. The UN just issued a wake-up call.  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, our experts break down Netanyahu’s message to Congress and what his visit to Washington reveals about the future of US-Israel relations.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

William F. Wechsler: The “Abraham Alliance” idea is new, but not fully developed

Jonathan Panikoff: Netanyahu’s rhetoric today is less meaningful than his meetings tomorrow

Emilia Pierce: Netanyahu’s math that civilian casualties in Rafah have been “practically none” doesn’t add up

Thomas Warrick: Netanyahu lays out a vision for postwar Gaza, but the serious talks are just starting

Carmiel Arbit: The controversies plaguing Netanyahu at home followed him to Washington

The “Abraham Alliance” idea is new, but not fully developed

Netanyahu has proved once again that he is an excellent orator, but this address was almost entirely a collection of statements he’s made previously, packaged for a new audience and carefully balanced for the US election cycle to give talking points to both political campaigns.

The most important new policy idea offered was the creation of an “Abraham Alliance” that would build on the ad-hoc coalition that shot down Iranian missiles headed to Israel in April. Netanyahu knows that work on this is already underway, led by the United States. But these discussions are best held in private, through military-to-military channels. The Gulf states are reluctant to be seen as building mechanisms that will protect Israel but leave them on the front lines in any confrontation with Iran. Indeed, the Gulf’s public and diplomatic strategies toward Iran have gone in the opposite direction, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and now Bahrain working to reestablish formal ties and improve commercial relations with Tehran.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

Netanyahu’s rhetoric today is less meaningful than his meetings tomorrow

Before Netanyahu’s address to Congress began today, CNN posted a video report with the headline, “What to expect from Netanyahu’s high stakes speech to Congress.” It was curious framing—the speech was never high stakes and nothing in its delivered content altered that reality. 

For many on the left, represented by the large swath of Democratic lawmakers who didn’t attend, there was nothing that the prime minister could have said today that would have changed their opinion of him or Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza. For many center-left Democrats, centrists of both parties, and some Republicans, there was little he could have said to diminish their broader support for Israel, even while they maintain contempt for Netanyahu as its leader. And for many on the right, who view any criticism of Israel as inappropriate, there was unlikely to be anything the prime minister could have said to temper their support of him or Israel.

That does not mean that the speech wasn’t powerful and well-delivered. It was. Among the prime minister’s long-standing political gifts has been his eloquence in both Hebrew and English. His recognition of President Joe Biden’s support, especially in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on October 7, 2023, his criticism of those US protesters who have aligned themselves with Iran, and Hamas’s use of Palestinian civilians as human shields were all points strongly delivered that deserve to be highlighted.

But how much more powerful would the speech have been if it had contained the same robust defense of Israel and its military operations in Gaza, while also acknowledging the humanitarian tragedy that exists there today? How much more impactful would the speech have been if it had recognized that even if the Hamas-led health ministry numbers are inaccurate by having inflated numbers and not distinguishing between civilian and terrorist deaths, that still leaves at least twenty thousand innocent Palestinians who have perished during this conflict? War always results in civilian casualties. It’s a horrid reality. But recognizing that reality would have shown light on Netanyahu’s own humanity, which many view to be lacking.

Juxtaposed against today’s speech, what will be rather high-stakes are tomorrow’s meetings between Netanyahu and Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. Negotiators have been trying for months to reach an elusive temporary ceasefire in which hostages held in Gaza would be returned to Israel and Israel would pause military operations in the Gaza Strip.

For months, Netanyahu and Hamas’s leader in Gaza (and the mastermind of October 7) Yahya Sinwar have actually been aligned in their goals to avoid a ceasefire. Sinwar is convinced that more fighting, and more Palestinian deaths, are a long-term net positive for Hamas. Netanyahu, who has been changing the terms of Israel’s requirements, is desperate to try to stay in office. As a result, the press accounts of tomorrow’s meetings and the potential for a ceasefire, whether temporary or permanent, are likely to be far more important than anything the prime minister said today in the Well of the House.

—Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.

Netanyahu’s math that civilian casualties in Rafah have been “practically none” doesn’t add up

Whatever viewers started the day believing about Israel’s war in Gaza is almost certainly what they will end the day believing. If viewers can agree on any one thing, it is likely that the speech contained little if any new information and certainly no surprises. However, two points from Netanyahu’s speech do merit additional scrutiny.

The first is the civilian harm caused by the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF’s) air and ground operations in Gaza. As social media has been flooded with graphic images of the humanitarian devastation, Netanyahu would have been better served by acknowledging the ongoing human toll and making good-faith arguments about civilian harm. In his speech today, he claimed that civilian casualties in Rafah were “practically none,” when former members of his military forces paint a very different picture. It is not a good-faith argument to claim that civilian deaths are “practically none,” when sources both external and internal to the IDF have reported serious concerns about lax rules of engagement and a breakdown of discipline. Additionally, investigations have shown that after executing short-notice evacuations from densely populated areas, the IDF has established “no go” areas where individuals are considered a threat and shot on sight regardless of demographics or whether that person was armed. If Netanyahu wants to defend the IDF’s treatment of civilians, those arguments must at the very least be made in good faith and with a clear-eyed assessment of the facts.

The second is Netanyahu’s framing of the northern threat from Hezbollah. Though his remarks on Hezbollah were relatively brief, they made an impression. Right or wrong, he clearly framed Hezbollah as an existential threat to Israel that cannot be disentangled from their wider struggle against Hamas, the Houthis, and ultimately Iran. One possibility is that this speech was meant to set the stage for a ground incursion into southern Lebanon and soften global public opinion on such a decision. However, opening a new active front against Hezbollah would be catastrophic for many reasons, both humanitarian and strategic. For civilians living in both southern Lebanon and northern Israel, an active conflict would spell further displacement and suffering. For the beleaguered IDF, it would mean a full-scale war against a well-armed adversary and make further regional spillover ever more likely.

While Netanyahu’s fourth speech to Congress may go down in history as the highest number of congressional addresses by a foreign leader, it will likely be remembered for little else—except perhaps his commitment to a misleading representation of humanitarian realities.

—Emilia Pierce is the deputy director of operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Netanyahu lays out a vision for postwar Gaza, but the serious talks are just starting

Netanyahu’s speech to Congress laid out his vision for postwar Gaza: a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel and are willing to live side by side in peace. While Netanyahu and his top advisers have said similar things before, the reported meeting convened on July 18 by UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed with top US and Israeli advisers shows that serious talks on postwar Gaza are just starting.

The key words to understand in Netanyahu’s speech are “de-militarization” and “de-radicalization.” Demilitarization means that Hamas should not be allowed to rule postwar Gaza, but it also means that Hamas cannot be allowed to follow the path of Lebanese Hezbollah—of letting someone else govern Gaza while Hamas rearms so that it can attack Israel again. Biden said something similar on May 31, as did US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 15 and July 1. Top US and Israeli officials are thus aligned on the goals, but with no agreement on a realistic, common plan to achieve them.

The key to how demilitarization can be achieved is a serious approach to what Netanyahu called de-radicalization. This will require taking control of Gaza’s institutions of governance away from Hamas or those who would tolerate Hamas’s re-armament. It will take a serious plan for keeping Hamas from killing the Palestinians who Netanyahu envisions would eventually govern Gaza. This is one of the practical steps that may come out of the discussions started in Abu Dhabi. There are a number of serious plans for how to do this, but as Netanyahu told Congress, it will take Israel, the United States, Arab nations, and Palestinians—all of them—to make this a reality.

—Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.

The controversies plaguing Netanyahu at home followed him to Washington

Before heading to Washington for his fourth address to Congress, Netanyahu had promised to deliver a unifying speech—to stay above the political disarray that has overtaken Washington, promote bipartisan support for the US-Israel relationship, and commit to a path to ending the war in Gaza. Insofar as he praised both Biden and former President Donald Trump, he was certainly less partisan than he was in his 2018 address decrying the Iran nuclear deal. Yet Netanyahu, aided by the extremism of his far-right coalition, has continued to preside over the politicization—and potential weakening—of the US-Israel relationship. Very little he said in today’s speech—which also failed to address a path forward—will change that.

By some accounts, roughly half of the Democrats from the House and Senate were absent from the event; compare this with the fifty-eight who sat out his address in 2018 and the five who boycotted Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s speech earlier this year. Democratic legislators are fed up with Netanyahu, who has all but endorsed Trump publicly and whose right-wing rhetoric and kowtowing to extremists is anathema to the party’s values. Their patience for the war in Gaza has waned significantly in the months since October 7, as the death toll among Gazans and hostages alike only grows in the absence of a ceasefire agreement with Hamas.

Yet despite this snub from so many members, Netanyahu will still have meetings with Biden, Harris, and both House and Senate minority and majority leadership. No matter how disliked Netanyahu may be, or how politically charged the war in Gaza may be for many Americans, the meetings underscore the enduring strength of the relationship between the two nations—or, as Netanyahu put it, that the victories of the countries are shared.

Still, Netanyahu’s addresses to the United States are never really intended for American audiences alone, and he is deft in leveraging both negative and positive receptions in Washington to bolster his standing at home. The divisions and controversies plaguing Netanyahu in Israel followed him to Washington. His tribute to the hostages rang hollow for many Israelis—including those present in the Capitol today. Several family members of hostages being detained during Netanyahu’s speech was a startling image for Americans—and a reminder of the complexities of what’s at stake almost a year into the war.

—Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

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Since US President Joe Biden dropped out of the presidential race and endorsed Harris on Sunday, she has emerged as the likely Democratic nominee. So what might US foreign policy look like if she wins the presidency? For Harris, the daughter of Jamaican and Indian immigrants, there are ample clues in her work in the Americas over the past three-and-a-half years. Her approach: Listen to a broad array of stakeholders, act, follow up, and then adjust tactics as needed. This approach can take time to implement, but it also proves adaptive to unexpected challenges.

Although the United States’ southern border was not specifically part of the portfolio handed to her, Harris’s indirect involvement—through her role in seeking to reduce migratory push factors in northern Central America—has received considerable scrutiny, especially among those who criticize the Biden administration’s approach to migration. The data at this point indicate that the Biden administration has made progress in reducing the number of migrants arriving at the US border from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to levels last seen toward the end of the Trump administration, even as increased migration from other countries has contributed to a high level of overall encounters at the border.

At the same time, more work is clearly needed to ensure that migration levels from northern Central America do not jump back up. It is imperative that the efforts undertaken as part of the ongoing “root causes” strategy carry forward no matter who wins the US election in November. This means ensuring that local organizations have the technical and financial resources to improve opportunities for job creation and human-capital development and also to combat often-endemic corruption. These and other conditions are needed not just to dampen the drive to migrate but also to create longer-term economic security that ultimately benefits the national security of the United States and partner countries.

In one example of her “listen, act, then follow up” approach, Harris traveled to Guatemala and Mexico in June 2021. A month later, she rolled out a five-pillar strategy that revolved around working with in-country partners to address the root causes of Central American migration, noting that “migration to our border is also a symptom of much larger issues” and admitting from the start that “progress will not be instantaneous.” She subsequently visited Honduras in January 2022. In March 2024, she welcomed Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, to the White House for more discussions. This approach suggests that Harris could govern in a manner where decisions are carefully thought out and where a multitude of factors are taken into account before acting.

In its three years, the five-pillar strategy has produced more than $5.2 billion in commitments from companies and organizations to invest in the region while supporting local development in areas of high emigration. And there are signs that migration from the region is now slowing. The number of Guatemalans encountered at the southwestern border last month (11,485) was the second-lowest since November 2020. The number of Hondurans (8,896) was the lowest over the same period. Overall, the proportion of migrants encountered at the US border who are citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has dropped from 49 percent (March 2021) to 18 percent (June 2024).

Still, reflecting the shift in migrant patterns, including new or growing countries of origin, the overall number of migrant encounters by border authorities remains high (130,419 in June) as compared to the last full month of the previous administration (73,994 encounters in December 2020).

Though it has been less high-profile than her Central America work, Harris has also given substantial attention to addressing the many significant challenges facing the United States’ Caribbean neighbors. As she has explained it, doing so is a US national security priority that cannot be overlooked.

In June 2023, just over a year after virtually hosting leaders of fifteen Caribbean nations, Harris became the highest-ranking US official to visit The Bahamas, where she co-hosted the US-Caribbean Leaders Meeting. That meeting—and her overall engagement—has been focused on establishing a greater US presence in the Caribbean at a time in which it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Caribbean prosperity yields benefits for the United States too. The region’s geographic proximity also means that there is a national security imperative for the United States to be more fully engaged in a partnership with the Caribbean.

In keeping with her typical approach, Harris met with Caribbean leaders first to hear their priorities before crafting a strategy. Her priorities started with climate change and the energy transition, expanded to food security, and then extended to security and arms trafficking. At that June 2023 meeting, she announced $100 million of US assistance to address these issues, including Haiti’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. (In parallel with these efforts, the Atlantic Council organized the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit on the sidelines of her Bahamas trip.) Still, as with her Central America portfolio, substantial progress will not happen overnight.  

Over the coming days and weeks, Harris will set about defining what her foreign policy might look like. In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean, at least, she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions. And she has followed through on implementation, adjusting tactics along the way as the situation on the ground evolves. As she seeks to become commander-in-chief at a time of deep global instability, she will have no shortage of complicated challenges to confront.

Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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It’s often easy to spot where repression and hardship are severe. Parts of Europe and the Middle East are now entrenched in brutal war, and Russia and China are promoting autocratic models of governance around the world. Yet it would be a mistake to overlook some of the less visible efforts to advance democracy, freedom, and prosperity in response to these challenges. In particular, the Biden administration has made several important strides to adjust and adapt how the United States engages in international development.

US President Joe Biden, who announced on Sunday that he would not seek reelection, and his administration have sought greater inclusion of developing nations in addressing economic, social, and climate-related issues. Not only rooted in a battle for soft power against China and Russia, these efforts are also advancing global prosperity. They define how the United States interacts with the developing world, and they help shape how the United States is perceived abroad.

Shortly after Biden came into office in January 2021, his administration reengaged with international organizations. The administration has, for example, viewed the United Nations (UN) as an important venue for realizing US foreign policy goals and demonstrating global leadership. While US contributions to the UN have remained steady, the Trump administration sought to reduce or eliminate voluntary contributions to some UN programs, targeting peacekeeping operations and several specialized agencies. Biden restored funding to agencies that faced cuts under Trump, and he halted the planned US exit from the World Health Organization, allowing US contributions to continue uninterrupted. Biden also restarted funding for the UN Population Fund to support its work on ending preventable maternal death, reducing the unmet need for family planning, and ending gender-based violence. Under Biden, the United States contributed nearly $100 million to this fund in 2021, and more than $160 million in both 2022 and 2023, making it the largest single country contributor.

But international organizations are only part of the equation when dealing with the developing world. A more consequential legacy for Biden will be the Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the rebrand of his “Build Back Better World” initiative.

Over the past two decades, China has shifted its international development strategy, building influence through traditional global organizations and launching initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative. China’s expanding influence through these initiatives has raised concerns about its impact on the developing world. While allegations of debt-trap diplomacy might be wrong, Beijing’s approach of decoupling human rights from governance risks fueling the rise of autocratic societies.

The BRI, now a one-trillion-dollar endeavor, has prompted the United States and its G7 partners to create their own alternative, the PGI. The PGI aims to counter the BRI’s influence by boosting investments in sustainable infrastructure around the world and driving transparent investment in quality infrastructure.

At the 2024 G7 summit in Italy, Biden and other G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the PGI, emphasizing sustainable infrastructure investment. Biden highlighted historic progress, including mobilizing more than sixty billion dollars toward the PGI through federal financing, grants, and leveraged private-sector investments over the past three years—in effect doubling the contributions announced at the previous year’s G7 summit. The Biden administration’s stated goal is to mobilize $200 billion by 2027 to support the G7 target of $600 billion.

Successful implementation of the PGI will be essential to regaining the trust of developing countries by providing much-needed investment in social infrastructure. There is hope that the effort will continue beyond 2025 no matter who the next president is. A sister initiative, the Blue Dot Network, which aims to advance robust standards for global infrastructure, was launched in 2019 by the Trump administration and is rooted in the same principles as the PGI. The Biden administration continued this initiative and officially launched it in April of this year, at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris.

By securing support from the G7 and the OECD, Biden’s PGI might not only endure but significantly improve how other nations view the United States. The initiative has the potential to foster a win-win relationship in development finance, something that the United States and the West have been failing at over the past ten years.

Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank.

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The visa-free policy seems to be a strategic propaganda effort from Minsk to ease these tensions. Following new European Union (EU) sanctions in late June, Poland has significantly restricted the import of goods into Belarus by Belarusian individuals, while Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have banned cars with Belarusian license plates from entering their countries. These measures impact the people of Belarus, and against this backdrop, the visa decision is an attempt by Lukashenka and his regime to “demonstrate the openness and peacefulness of our country.”

In reality, Lukashenka is continuing his campaign of domestic repression, targeting Belarusians in exile (including the author of this article), and weaponizing allegations that neighboring countries are setting up camps to train militants intent on overthrowing his regime. On July 19, for example, the Minsk regional court sentenced German national Rico Krieger to death in Belarus on charges including an “act of terrorism” and the “creation of an extremist formation.” The regime is using Krieger as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Germany, showcasing its manipulative tactics. According to the human rights organization Viasna, at least thirty foreigners remain imprisoned in Belarus, and a Lithuanian citizen died in a Belarusian prison in March after being arrested at the border.

Even so, expect more rhetorical shifts as the 2025 Belarusian presidential election approaches and as Belarus tries to alleviate the economic pressures it faces from Poland and the Baltic states for Minsk’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. For example, newly appointed Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou has expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with Poland, stating earlier this month that “the ball is on the Polish side.” This came after a slowdown in truck traffic at the Kazlovichy checkpoint on the Polish-Belarusian border on July 10.

Minsk accused Warsaw of halting the acceptance of Belarusian cargo. Poland has hinted at potentially closing its remaining border crossings with Belarus to counter Lukashenka’s hybrid tactics, the migration crisis that the regime helped engineer on the Polish border, and the imprisonment of journalist and Polish minority activist Andrzej Poczobut. The stabbing death of a Polish soldier by a migrant on the border in June prompted Polish President Andrzej Duda to discuss migration and economic cooperation with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in late June, hoping that Beijing would exert its increasing influence on Minsk.

Recent developments may have influenced Lukashenka’s shift in rhetoric. These developments include threats from Poland and the Baltic states to close border crossings with Belarus, efforts to involve China in political pressure on Minsk, and new EU sanctions. Lukashenka now calls for “reciprocity” in diplomatic relations with Poland and Lithuania, a stark contrast to his comments in March. At that time, accompanied by his white Pomeranian, Lukashenka had inquired about the width of the Suwałki Corridor and told a commander, “You will have to confront the Baltic republics . . . And you will grab part of Poland.”

Lukashenka has also softened his rhetoric on Ukraine in recent days. June was a month of major rhetorical escalation between Belarus and Ukraine, as the Belarusian national intelligence agency accused Ukraine of amassing troops near the Belarusian border. This led to a sudden military readiness check in Brest and Homiel, including troop deployments to Belarus’s southern border and the establishment of new checkpoints. For weeks, Belarus’s Ministry of Defense warned of a Ukrainian threat, citing a drone interception and an explosives cache.

However, this escalation ended abruptly on July 13 when Lukashenka visited an air defense unit in Luninets, announced the resolution of border tensions, and ordered troop withdrawals. He appeared to resolve a crisis he had fabricated, saying that “we are not enemies for Ukrainians,” calling for urgent negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv.

Some hoped for a real shift when, in early July, the regime freed eighteen political prisoners in a rare amnesty, nearly four years after Lukashenka’s crackdown on the opposition, following his announcements to release “seriously ill” prisoners. One of those released, Ryhor Kastusiou, who ran for president against Lukashenka in 2010, had been diagnosed with cancer. The names of the other released prisoners have not been disclosed. Both the United States and the EU welcomed these releases but urged the regime to free all remaining political prisoners.

While the release of some political prisoners is positive, many more are still incarcerated. An estimated 1,400 political prisoners are still being held in Belarus, hundreds of them in urgent need of medical assistance.

Belarus may continue to make gestures of goodwill to Ukraine and the West, but it’s crucial to differentiate between rhetoric and reality. Repression in Belarus continues. As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia to between ten and eleven-and-a-half years by a Minsk court. The author of this article is among those convicted.

The regime accused me of four criminal charges, including an attempt to seize power, joining an extremist formation, harming national security, and inciting social discord. The regime-appointed lawyer never responded to my messages and emails. I was denied the right to a fair trial and refused legal assistance.

The regime is engaged in repression against Belarusians in exile, targeting their families abroad. In Belarusian jails, many prominent political prisoners are held incommunicado, and even their families don’t know whether they are alive. If the Belarusian regime wants to show Ukraine and the West that it is interested in real change, then it must take real actions to stop its brutal campaign of terror and repression at home.

Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

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Passing over green fields

For the most part, CFIUS only has jurisdiction to review foreign investment in existing US businesses, often referred to as cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or brownfield investment. Its inability to review most greenfield investments, or foreign investments that establish a new business, is purposeful.

Since CFIUS’s creation in 1975 there have been calls to give it authority over greenfield investments But every time CFIUS rules have undergone legislative updates, Congress has decided to retain the Committee’s focus on M&A. This has generally reflected lawmakers’ desire to prevent CFIUS from being used as a protectionist tool or from discouraging beneficial forms of foreign direct investment (FDI). Most economists and policymakers view greenfield investment as more beneficial to economic growth than cross-border M&A.

For years, the United States has been careful to emphasize in its outreach to other countries that investment screening should apply to investment in existing businesses only. Most governments with screening mechanisms agree; among the twenty-five Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries with such mechanisms in 2023, eighteen countries, or 72 percent of them, do not review greenfield investments.

A real estate exception

When Congress updated the CFIUS process in 2018 (through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, or FIRRMA), it retained the committee’s historical focus on M&A activity—with a few important exceptions.

The committee now has review authority over real estate transactions that grant foreign investors access to or control over land located in close proximity to sensitive sites. These sites are defined in the regulation through an appendix to the implementing rules and are comprised of key critical infrastructure installations, such as ports and some military bases.

The rationale behind this change was straightforward: The US government needed additional authorities to address any attempts by foreign adversaries to buy or otherwise gain access to prime real estate from which they could spy or launch attacks on critical infrastructure.

In September 2012, for instance, then President Barack Obama used CFIUS authorities to issue a divestment order against a Chinese company that had invested in a wind farm near a US naval base in Oregon used for weapons testing and training. CFIUS was able to intervene because the Chinese company had invested in a US business. This case helped to make these kinds of collocational risks clear to US lawmakers, but before FIRRMA, there were no federal government authorities to block the sale or lease of land to foreign nationals near sensitive government sites. FIRRMA closed that regulatory gap.

Update or sea change?

So, what does CFIUS’s June 8 proposal add? On the surface, the new proposals are less new rules and more of a technical update. The proposed rules simply add a list of about fifty sensitive sites to the real estate rules’ appendix, expanding CFIUS’s jurisdiction to any land acquisition by foreign buyers that occurs close to a listed government site. For most instillations, “close” is defined as within a mile radius; for the most sensitive sites, “close” covers a one-hundred-mile radius.

This is the second time that the list of sensitive sites has been updated. The first update was made in August 2023 after a controversial proposed greenfield investment by a Chinese firm of North Dakota farmland located about twelve miles from a military site was found to be outside the scope of CFIUS’s original jurisdiction. The newly proposed rules come shortly after the Biden administration issued an executive order in May requiring a Chinese firm to divest its holdings in a crypto mining operation in Wyoming located within a mile of Warren Air Force Base. This was the first use of CFIUS’s real estate authorities to formally block a transaction that was structured as a real estate purchase and subsequent greenfield investment.

When the new rules were announced, some immediately called for CFIUS to use these new authorities to block controversial greenfield investments, such as the Chinese-owned Gotion’s development of an electric battery plant in Michigan. However, there are two reasons to be skeptical that these new authorities could be used in such a manner.

First, the Gotion land purchase occurred prior to the proposed rule change. Typically, CFIUS regulatory changes are not applied retrospectively, though the final rule should make this explicit. If CFIUS chose to attempt to apply the rules retrospectively, it would invite a lengthy legal battle.

Second, CFIUS real estate authorities provide the committee with jurisdiction over the real estate transaction, not the nature of the business activities that are planned to occur on the site in question. That is, the national security risk review of the transaction is supposed to address risks arising from colocation only, and not create a jurisdictional hook that would allow for a more comprehensive review of broader security risks associated with the specifics of the proposed greenfield investment.

In other words, a faithful interpretation of CFIUS’s real estate rules requires that transactions only be mitigated or blocked if a risk arises from the foreign entity owning or gaining access to the land under review. Whether the land is used to make cutting-edge technology or to grow cucumbers is beside the point.

For CFIUS to stop a transaction like Gotion’s from moving forward, it would need to find that access to the investment site generated a clear national security risk. The Gotion plant is located within one hundred miles of a US National Guard base that hosts joint trainings with the Taiwanese military, but there are no clear indications that the terrain in that area facilitates useful intelligence collection of activities on that base from the Gotion facility.

Likely effects

Given the narrow, technical nature of these updates to CFIUS’s authorities, it may be tempting to conclude that these expanded real estate rules will have little effect on foreign real estate acquisitions. Indeed, as the figure below illustrates, real estate FDI in the United States is low in volume and has recently experienced substantial declines.

But these figures only track FDI in land sales. They don’t track investment associated with greenfield investment that depends on acquiring or leasing land.

Considering how restrictions on land transactions could negatively affect greenfield investment, it becomes clear how these new rules could bite. They substantially expand the US land mass that is subject to CFIUS review, especially with the expansion of the number of sites for which an “extended range” of up to one hundred miles is reviewable. (See here for an especially useful map).

In today’s geopolitical environment, it is very hard to imagine CFIUS clearing any Chinese real estate transactions that fall under its jurisdiction. Espionage risks may be low-probability, but they are also of high consequence. This, plus the fact that discovering intelligence-gathering operations is challenging by design, suggests that the US government will likely be highly risk-averse when it comes to Chinese real estate purchases in designated areas.

In other words, CFIUS real estate authorities may operate functionally as a ban on Chinese greenfield investment in any area located close to a sensitive site. If that is true, then the real question will be how the US Treasury ensures that the process for identifying covered sites remains focused on narrow national security concerns and does not become overly expansive.

Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a resident senior fellow in the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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“Bringing women on board is not only a women’s rights issue. It brings benefits to the whole of society and to our collective security,” Icelandic Foreign Minister Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir said on the first day of the summit. “It’s not about waiting for the time when you can afford focusing on women, peace, and security, or gender equality for that matter, or empowering women,” she added. “You become stronger because you focus on those points, not when you afford them.”

WPS commitments at the Washington summit

The show of support for advancing the WPS agenda during the summit was not just rhetorical. It included concrete commitments, such as adopting a new NATO policy on WPS that is “fit for purpose” for the twenty-first century security environment. Several allies also committed to fund more than ten thousand uniforms and body armor sets for Ukrainian female servicemembers defending their country against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

If the Alliance is looking for something that increasingly earns bipartisan support in the United States, then it should look to the importance of women’s inclusion in national security strategies. In 2017, then President Donald Trump signed the first national law that took steps to institutionalize a United Nations mandate to make the security sector more inclusive of female leadership and more responsive to the needs of women and girls, including freedom from conflict-related sexual violence. In 1994, then Senator Joe Biden was an original cosponsor of the Violence Against Women Act that year, and the Biden-Harris administration continues to make important reforms to the military code of justice on sexual assault in the military.

One of the highlights of the Washington summit was the announcement that as of 2024, twenty-three allied nations have met the commitment to spend 2 percent of annual gross domestic product on defense spending, a change that is applauded by both sides of the aisle in the United States. What is less known is how those fiscal commitments relate to national aspirations for a more inclusive force. According to the most recently published NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, released in 2020, twenty-seven members of the Alliance, including the United States, have national action plans on WPS. NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland, also have national action plans on WPS. Furthermore, twenty-five NATO nations reported an increase in female participation in the armed forces in the years before 2020. On average, 13 percent of allied forces were comprised of women that year.

In the Washington Summit Declaration, allies committed to integrate an ambitious WPS and human security agenda across all of NATO’s core tasks. NATO had previously committed to women’s meaningful participation in the security sector. But the new policy recognizes the conditions that make women’s leadership possible, including their full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation in decision making in national institutions.

The declaration also referred to the human security trends shaping today’s conflicts, including disregard for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, cultural property protection, and forced displacement that fuels human trafficking and irregular migration. These human security trends disproportionately affect women and girls, who make up more than half of the 117 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the United Nations. In Washington, the Alliance also renewed its commitment to international law and the fundamental norms of armed conflict, which distinguishes between military targets and civilians.

Lessons from Ukraine

Although NATO did not welcome Ukraine into the Alliance at the summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in his closing press statement that it is a matter of when, not if, Ukraine will become a member. This followed NATO commitments at the summit to establishing a new NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and NATO Security Assistance Training for Ukraine to increase Kyiv’s interoperability with the Alliance.

For the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has shown that the conduct of war involves more than military strategy. Providing security has become a whole-of-society effort, involving women in uniform and civilians providing support to the front lines. The evolving nature of conflict can blur the distinction between civilian and military action and change societal norms on what roles are appropriate for men and women. These dynamics are important for understanding the human domain, which is adaptive to evolving threats. Supporting female soldiers and addressing civilian harm caused by the war should be an integral part of NATO plans to train for the future operational environment and to secure peace in Ukraine.

The NATO Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for WPS, which has responsibility for a broader umbrella of cross-cutting human security policies, can continue working toward integrating lessons from the human domain in military training. While NATO continues to identify military lessons from the war in Ukraine, these lessons should also include concrete steps to protect civilians from air missile attacks, mitigate the use of sexual violence in conflict, and protect children against forced deportations to Russia. NATO can emphasize the lessons allies have learned about how to protect civilians in other conflicts, such as in Iraq and Libya, as it establishes new security cooperation training centers.

The war in Ukraine is a test case for whether the Alliance can help partner nations achieve stability and whether its actions are inclusive of the whole-of-society approach that has characterized the mobilization of the Ukrainian population. While volunteerism, patriotism, and the inclusion of women have sustained Ukraine’s war effort, the need to protect the civilian population from attack remains paramount.

Sarah Dawn Petrin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously advised the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute on integrating women, peace, and security and human security in US military operations.

The post The Women, Peace, and Security agenda made important strides at NATO’s Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Three years ago, Brian Deese, then the director of the National Economic Council at the White House, came to the Atlantic Council to announce the Biden administration’s new “industrial policy.” Considering that the term had largely been taboo in economic orthodoxy in recent decades, the announcement took many of us at the Council—and throughout Washington—by surprise. But what Deese outlined that day will turn out to be one of the enduring legacies of the Biden administration: coordinated policy to steer public and private capital toward revitalizing domestic manufacturing and prioritizing the technologies needed to compete with China.

The legislation that made up the backbone of this industrial policy will have ripple effects for the rest of the decade: the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. In total, the legislation authorized more than two trillion dollars in spending and tax incentives over ten years. But it wasn’t just the money; it was also the fact that major subsidies were directed to US companies producing semiconductors, clean energy, and electric-vehicle batteries. The Biden administration will point to the eight hundred thousand manufacturing jobs and fifteen million total jobs created in the past four years as proof of the success of these policies. Critics will say that the spending was misallocated, fueled the deficit, and contributed to inflation.

The final verdict will come in the years ahead, when all the investments finally pay off—or don’t. But already, the legacy of the decision is clear: There is a bipartisan consensus now on investing in domestic manufacturing. Whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris becomes the next president—and even if the sectors he or she chooses to focus on are different—that kind of economic policymaking is not going away.

Of course, the rest of the world took notice of the world’s largest economy making a major macroeconomic shift. The Inflation Reduction Act in particular alarmed European allies who saw their own companies racing to set up US subsidiaries and take advantage of the new law’s incentives to manufacture in the United States. 

The administration tried to explain that this new economic approach wasn’t about the United States going it alone. Two years ago, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen announced the administration’s “friendshoring” strategy at the Atlantic Council. She spoke in detail about how one of the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic was the need to rethink supply chains and work more closely with partners and allies to achieve economic security and resilience, not just maximize speed and reduce cost. Her choice of the term “friends” was intentional. It was meant to be an outstretched hand to countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, not just traditional US allies.

Being a friend didn’t mean being a full partner—at least in the ways other countries had come to expect during the previous decades. The Biden administration has remained unwilling to open the US market to allies and other countries any further and has instead pursued trade-facilitation dialogues through plurilateral arrangements, in particular the Trade and Technology Council with the European Union and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity with the Asia-Pacific. While these were welcome steps, officials from several countries who met with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center team over the years said privately that it wasn’t enough. 

What motivated the Biden administration’s economic framework wasn’t only creating jobs at home, although that certainly was a goal. The equally important ambition was competing with China. Biden maintained Trump’s unprecedented tariffs on Chinese goods and added to them earlier this year. The lines between economic policymaking and national security continued to intertwine—and will be impossible to disconnect in the years to come.

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo best encapsulated this dynamic when she discussed Chinese electric vehicles at the Atlantic Council in January. Raimondo pointed to the unfair trade distortions created by Chinese subsidies, which could hurt US automakers. (That’s the domestic part of the Biden administration’s economic policy.) Then she pointed out that sensors in those cars could be used for surveillance; Chinese authorities, in fact, are worried enough about US surveillance that they do not allow Tesla cars near secure facilities. (That’s the national security argument.) 

It would be a mistake to say that Biden created a new paradigm in economic policymaking. Instead, he helped rediscover an old idea—one that was part of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, but that the United States largely had the luxury of forgetting in recent decades: Economic security and national security are deeply interconnected. Whatever policies come next, that lesson won’t be forgotten again anytime soon.

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

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There are two concrete steps NATO should take that will help achieve this goal.

First, NATO should upgrade its recent summit invitations to the IP4 by offering them a standing invitation. It is unwise to continue leaving this practice up in the air each year.

Second and more substantively, NATO and the IP4 should establish an Atlantic-Pacific Partnership Forum (APPF). This would be in the tradition of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and its Mediterranean Dialogue. Adding an APPF is the next step, arguably an overdue one.

The need for closer cooperation

The enduring threats from the revisionist autocracies show the need for closer Atlantic-Pacific cooperation among democracies, just as recent new channels for NATO-IP4 cooperation provide momentum for it. The increasingly aggressive alliance of autocracies is seen in China’s military exercises in Belarus near NATO’s border and in its de facto aid to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. It is also present in North Korea’s military pact with Russia.

Despite the geographic distance, NATO strategists increasingly see Indo-Pacific security as a necessary and complementary part of Euro-Atlantic security. This reality was recognized in the 2022 Strategic Concept and reaffirmed at the Washington summit. Any deterioration in Indo-Pacific security, such as a mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan or escalation of other territorial disputes in the region, would not just damage the world economy; it would challenge the larger international order as well. And China has consistently challenged NATO members directly with threats of economic coercion over Taiwan.

Making it official

So far, Atlantic-Pacific cooperation has occurred mostly in silos between NATO and the individual IP4 states, and much of it is unsecured from being disrupted by ordinary changes. For example, Japan’s ambassador in Brussels has met semi-regularly with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other senior figures in the NATO secretariat to discuss progress on Japan’s Individually Tailored Partnership Programme. Its higher-level meetings regarding security cooperation have occurred mostly at the past three NATO summits, plus recent Group of Seven (G7) summits and one visit by Stoltenberg to the region in 2023.

The relatively slow pace of these summits’ convenings—as well as the conspicuous absence of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea from the most recent G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, after their previous attendance at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan—indicates that these channels, without institutionalization and supplementation, cannot be relied upon consistently.

The domestic political situations in the IP4 states also risk the continuity of this cooperation. This is normal; in fact, a prime motive for institutionalizing cooperation is to ensure that it won’t die out when domestic politics take their next turn. It has been overlooked how easily the intense transatlantic cooperation of 1946-1948 could have dissipated after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 if it had not been institutionalized in 1949 in NATO and already gathered momentum in the years after.

Today, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have low approval ratings in polls in their respective countries. A change in government in either country might well shift it away from its pro-NATO stances, and from their efforts to improve Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. This would be a major reversal of recent progress.

An APPF would address these structural shortcomings in Atlantic-Pacific Cooperation. Developing new institutionalized platforms would help ensure continuity across shifts in domestic politics. For example, the APPF could overcome existing deficits in NATO-IP4 meetings by committing to convene respective foreign and defense ministers at least twice a year—a wider version of the 2+2 ministerial consultative committees. NATO could likewise invite its APPF partners to be observers in NATO committees. There is a precedent for this move: The security and partnerships and the cooperative security committees are already open for participation from partner countries on an ad hoc basis.

Meanwhile, an APPF could open partnership offices in its two main regions, like the one NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is opening in Jordan. This would fill in for NATO’s inability to reach agreement on the more daring step of opening a formal office of its own in the Indo-Pacific region.

The larger picture

The APPF could accelerate NATO members’ progress on developing Indo-Pacific policies and act as a consultative platform between NATO and the IP4 in times of crisis, such as in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

An APPF goal would—to borrow a 1990s NATO phrase—be to develop “interlocking but not interblocking” institutions. One model for such an effort is the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States grouping, known as AUKUS, discussing the inclusion of Japan and South Korea under pillar two of the partnership. Another would be the forthcoming secretariat for the US-Japanese-South Korean entente. These could be briefed with the NATO members in the APPF, ensuring they remain informed on the policy trajectories of these minilateral groupings. The APPF could then facilitate further development of the minilateral structures; for example, its discussions could encourage the trilateral entente secretariat to invite NATO, UK, Australian, and New Zealander delegates as observers, keeping avenues of cooperation open between the entente, AUKUS, IP4, and NATO.

Thus, more than seventy-five years after NATO’s founding, establishing an APPF would demonstrate that the Alliance remains ready to adapt to the challenges throughout the world. It would provide NATO with much-needed channels to deepen the cooperation across the two theaters between its annual summits. Perhaps most important, it would further underline the Alliance’s role as a values-based organization, reconnecting it to its moral and intellectual roots.

The IP4 are NATO’s best democratic partners by far in the wider world. Already in 1939, American journalist Clarence Streit called for uniting the leading democracies of the world—mostly Atlantic but also Pacific—for their shared economic and security interests, and as a nucleus to rally other democracies around. The founders of NATO were greatly motivated by his call. As democracies face the threat of growing autocratic aggressiveness, they can benefit by harkening back to the NATO founders’ vision: building a wider and deeper unity on the basis of shared democratic values.

Ira Straus is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Francis Shin is a research analyst specializing in transatlantic institutions, anti-corruption, and clean energy policy. He has previously worked at the Atlantic Council, Royal United Services Institute, and Center for a New American Security.

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What can be expected from a von der Leyen 2.0? Ahead of her confirmation, she laid out a raft of proposals in her political guidelines for the next Commission term—a combined effort to outline her vision and win over votes. The guidelines prioritize:

1. Building a more competitive Europe that balances regulation and innovation that facilitates Europe’s green transition, 
2. Boosting the EU’s defense ambitions, 
3. Pushing social and economic policies such as affordable housing, 
4. Sustaining agriculture and environmental policies, 
5. Protecting Europe’s democracy, and 
6. Standing up for Europe’s global and geopolitical interests.

In practice, this means her next term will mean more of a central and active role for the Commission—and for von der Leyen. But there will also likely be more roadblocks from the European Council and Parliament.

Start with her leadership style. In her first term, von der Leyen turned the Commission into the most important arm inside the EU at a time when crises came new and often. She served as the EU’s chief decision maker and negotiator during the COVID-19 crisis, helped coordinate Europe’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and shaped the EU’s economic de-risking strategy and general hawkishness toward China, serving as Europe’s “bad cop” standing up to Beijing’s coercive and unfair trade practices. The grumblings of an overstepping and power-hungry Commission president from other arms of the EU and national capitals aside, European leaders still looked to the Commission and von der Leyen to take action.

The Commission’s role was boosted by its policy successes too. Her first term oversaw the adoption of major rules on the digital and green transitions. The EU pushed through world-leading digital regulations on artificial intelligence, online content moderation, and platform competition, and it incentivized semiconductor manufacturing. She also prioritized green policies to reduce emissions, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and setting new emission reduction targets for cars, shipping, and factories.

For her second term, von der Leyen will seek to pick up where she left off. The Commission will also look to build itself a stronger role in the traditional defense and the economic security agendas, with an eye to boosting Europe’s defense capabilities against Russia and de-risking from China. Von der Leyen’s focus on a competitiveness agenda will push for greater innovation and industrial support while furthering the green transition. On Thursday, von der Leyen promised a “European competitiveness fund” and a “clean industrial deal” within the first hundred days of the Commission’s next mandate, along with greater investment in energy infrastructure and technologies. This will all come with a price tag, and more responsibility for the Commission.

As a consequence of a busy 2019-2024 legislative cycle, von der Leyen and her Commission must now see through a raft of new rules. On digital policy alone, the to-do list is a tall order. The EU is standing up new offices and hiring a new army of competition lawyers, boosting the already massive size and scope of the Commission.

But there will be limits to von der Leyen’s ambition as member states and the parliament will look to exercise their own power.

Europe’s political center is not what it was in 2019, and EU members will want their influence felt. Von der Leyen will have to contend with a growing number of populist leaders around the table at Council meetings. More far-right governments may pop up over the next five years, including in major countries such as France as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally gets ever closer to power. And as the Commission tries to take on a bigger role in traditional member-state driven policies, such as security and defense, von der Leyen will need to deal with more engaged member states looking to exact concessions or carveouts, or to wield their own influence at the EU level.

Far- and hard-right groups in the European Parliament are also on the rise, and they are looking to make a mark. In a shift from her first term, emboldened hard-right politicians are more eager to influence EU policy rather than just play spoiler to it. The growing number and influence of far-right and hard-right groups will likely add extra complexity to the legislative process, and legislation may need to pass with ad hoc coalitions rather than the tradition of grand coalitions of parliaments past.

Greater influence on the right may hamper the Commission’s regulatory ambition. Von der Leyen promised she would continue the green transition, but the EU’s green rules have already become a political target. The platforms of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s own group, and the further right European Conservatives and Reformists, both have peppered in objections to onerous new regulations, especially those associated with the green transition. And the competitiveness debate is in large part spurred on by this backlash to the Commission’s regulatory appetite. This may be difficult for the Commission. Institutionally, the Commission is designed to present new regulations and proposals. It is the only arm inside the EU that can. But that desire will be a point of friction with the aversion among member states and Parliament to new, seemingly onerous, rules.

Von der Leyen will face challenges from beyond Europe, too. “We have entered an age of geostrategic rivalries,” notes the policy guidelines. To the east, Beijing will continue to try to split Europe and poison the EU’s de-risking agenda just as it is starting to take off. And supporting Ukraine against Russia’s full-scale invasion will require sustained attention and funds.

To the west, von der Leyen cannot ignore the upcoming US elections. A transatlanticist at heart, she pushed the EU closer together with the United States in her first term—in large part benefiting from a new EU-friendly US administration. She will likely face an uphill battle in strengthening transatlantic ties in the event of a second Trump administration. “They treat us very badly,” former President Donald Trump said to Bloomberg News when asked about the European Union on June 25.

Von der Leyen’s confirmation this week goes a long way already to set up the EU for success and avoids an own goal for team Europe. Rejecting her would have forced the European Council back to the drawing board to pick a new—and likely weaker—appointee, wasting more time on internal bickering and politicking when predictability, not chaos, is critical. It’s not hard to picture the jubilee from Beijing, taunts from Moscow, and even snide comments from Washington about EU dysfunction in the face of a no vote. In the words of Greek Commissioner Margaritis Schinas (and von der Leyen ally) on her appointment, “There is no plan B.” It is a good thing plan A worked.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post What to expect from Ursula von der Leyen’s second term appeared first on Atlantic Council.

At the core of the charges against Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant are allegations that the two were part of a “common plan” to use “the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” in Gaza—a war crime. In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is seeking charges for various crimes against humanity associated with the crime of starvation, including extermination and/or murder, persecution, and “other inhumane acts.”

This moment is especially significant for the ICC because—despite evidence indicating its commission in past and ongoing conflicts—the war crime of starvation has never before been prosecuted at the international level. The lack of precedent has until now made prosecutors hesitant to venture into untrodden legal territory, thus rendering the crime “an issue that floats at the periphery of [war crimes] prosecutions.” Given the prevalence of civilian starvation in armed conflict—particularly as a result of urban siege warfare—the decision by the ICC’s pretrial chamber in this matter could help shape international practice for identifying the war crime of starvation and associated starvation crimes, and create a clearer pathway to accountability for victims.

The recently alleged crimes, however, are not the first accusations that Israeli leaders have employed starvation tactics in Gaza since October 7, 2023. Since Gallant’s order for a “complete siege” of Gaza on October 9, the United Nations (UN), human rights organizations, and Khan himself have warned that the closure of border crossings, restriction of essential supply transfers, severing of water and electricity, attacks on humanitarian aid convoys, and the killing of Gazans gathering to receive aid could constitute starvation crimes. Just last month, the UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Palestine released a report finding that through the siege of Gaza, Israeli officials have “weaponized the withholding of life-sustaining necessities” including food, water, electricity, fuel, and humanitarian assistance.

Israeli officials have consistently denied allegations that they are restricting aid deliveries to Gaza, instead citing diversion and black-market resale of aid by Hamas as primary causes of the hunger crisis. Hamas did recently manage to divert and temporarily seize a shipment of aid delivered through Jordan—the “first widespread case of diversion that we have seen” in Gaza, according to US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller. Officials have also accused UN agencies, including the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and the World Food Programme, of bottlenecking aid distribution and exacerbating the conflict. Israel has further claimed that UNRWA is complicit in aid diversion and maintains the agency’s alleged links to Hamas.

What happens next?

The OTP’s requests now lie with a pretrial chamber of the ICC, which will review the applications and determine whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that the parties “committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”

To meet the “reasonable grounds” standard, the application should outline the crimes alleged, a “concise statement of the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes,” and a summary of the evidence supporting the belief that an individual is responsible for those crimes. However, Khan has said that the OTP’s investigation and applications regarding Gaza have sought to exceed an even higher standard of proof—in his words, a standard of “realistic prospect of conviction.” It is probable that the prosecutor imposed a higher standard than what is required to ward off criticisms of bias from Israel and its allies, who have previously threatened the court and questioned its legitimacy.

Although Israel is not a member of the ICC, the Palestinian Authority’s 2015 accession to the Rome Statute allows the court to exercise jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated by Palestinian nationals—including Hamas fighters—and those crimes occurring at least partly on Palestinian territory, including those committed or ordered by Israeli officials. The decision of a pretrial chamber in February 2021 further affirmed ICC jurisdiction over Palestinian territory, including Gaza. This same principle enables the ICC to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in Ukraine despite Russia not accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC.

It also bears noting that the war crime of starvation initially only applied when committed in the context of an international armed conflict (IAC), and Palestine has not ratified the Rome Statute’s 2019 amendment extending the crime to encompass non-international armed conflicts. Khan, with the support of a report by a panel of international law experts, reasons that the war is an IAC due to Israel’s use of force or status as an occupying power in Gaza. The pretrial chamber may only opt to issue arrest warrants for the war crime if it determines that there is in fact an IAC underway between Israel and Palestine.

Should arrest warrants be issued against Netanyahu and Gallant, all states party to the ICC will be obligated to arrest and surrender them to the court. While it remains to be seen if states will actually comply with the order, statements from France, Belgium, Germany, and Slovenia have affirmed their support for the ICC since the requests were submitted.

What does the law say, and how does it apply to Gaza?

The weaponization of hunger is considered one of the oldest methods of warfare, but its recognition as a war crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction is relatively new.

More than twenty years after its prohibition in two additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the crime of starvation was codified under the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) renders “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” a war crime, so long as perpetrators intentionally deprive civilians of “objects indispensable to their survival,” or OIS.

To prove the war crime of starvation, it must be shown that a perpetrator indeed deprived civilians of OIS—such as “foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies, and irrigation works”—a non-exhaustive list defined in the Geneva Conventions. Directives by Israeli officials to impede aid delivery, and the razing of agricultural areas and cutting off fuel or water sources could suffice in this regard. Although recent reports have spurred debate over whether the situation in Gaza technically qualifies as a famine, such a determination is not required for the war crime to attach. It is not necessary to prove that the conduct in question resulted in civilians’ deaths or suffering—solely demonstrating that a perpetrator took action to deprive civilians of indispensable objects is enough.

However, it is required to prove two elements of intent: that the perpetrator intended (1) to deprive civilians of OIS and (2) “to starve civilians as a method of warfare.” Without the aid of prior case law, the threshold for satisfying the second element is uncertain. Must perpetrators aim to weaponize starvation specifically, or are acts that would foreseeably starve civilians sufficient?

In favor of the latter interpretation, the so-called default intent standard in the ICC Statute likely indicates that this second element may be established if a perpetrator took actions knowing that civilian starvation could result or was aware it would occur “in the ordinary course of events.” Under this understanding of intent, proving that Netanyahu and Gallant were virtually certain that civilians would starve without humanitarian aid deliveries, along with the severing of water and electricity to Gaza, could help establish intent.

What is the wider significance?

Already, the ICC has made a pivotal move in recognizing the need for accountability for starvation crimes. As UN-backed documentation from recent and ongoing conflicts in Yemen, South Sudan, and Myanmar has shown, the weaponization of food remains a pervasive feature of armed conflict. Notably, actions taken in the laying of sieges—as seen in Aleppo, Madaya, Eastern Ghouta in Syria, the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and Mariupol—exhibit increasing overlap with starvation tactics.

Khan’s application for arrest warrants here opens the door for further efforts to investigate and charge the war crime of starvation, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity associated with starvation. Regardless of whether a trial ultimately results, a potential issuance of charges alone could help clarify the contours of the crime and create a clearer pathway to accountability for victims from other contexts.

Alana Mitias is the assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project.

Yousuf Syed Khan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Strategic Litigation Project at the Atlantic Council. Several of his most visible legal contributions have centered on starvation-related crimes, including leading the drafting of the first ever report by a UN-mandated mechanism on starvation as a method of warfare.

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Online Event Fri, July 12, 2024 • 12:15 pm ET

The Czech president on next steps for transatlantic cooperation post-NATO Summit

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—President Petr Pavel discusses the future of US-EU collaboration on support for Ukraine and European security.

The support required to allow Ukrainians to fully reclaim their territory is “not realistic at this time,” Czech President Petr Pavel argued on Friday. 

Pavel portrayed this sobering reality at an Atlantic Council Front Page event in Houston, Texas, following NATO’s Washington summit, where allies agreed to a “bridge” to membership in the Alliance for Ukraine.  

“In the foreseeable future, we cannot expect any significant breakthrough on the front line,” he argued, later clarifying that if Ukraine holds the line and Russia doesn’t achieve any major successes, breakthroughs could happen late this year or early next. “We have to have in mind who is the opponent, and Russia definitely has much greater resources . . . than Ukraine.” 

Following the NATO Summit, the Czech president said he was “positively surprised” by the Alliance’s response to Ukraine’s needs, with allies reaching bilateral security agreements with Ukraine and committing to send more financial and military support. “I believe that even [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy] was assured, even though he didn’t receive an invitation to the Alliance.” 

As for when that invitation might be extended, Pavel said Ukraine’s military already works “seamlessly” with NATO in a number of areas—but the war is an “obstacle.” “Once we have a ceasefire, once we start negotiating peace, then we should also, in parallel, proceed with the integration,” he said. 

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which touched upon the Czech Republic’s support for Ukraine, approach toward China, and hopes for European autonomy. 

Holding the line 

• Pavel argued that Ukraine’s partners should strive at this moment to “convince” Russia that it “cannot achieve any significant successes on the battlefield.” That, he said, would “bring them to the negotiating table.” 

• “And then once the negotiation starts . . . our position shouldn’t be to legalize occupied territories as Russian,” he clarified, “but rather declare them as temporarily occupied territories.” 

• “To achieve that, we have to equip Ukraine with all they need to really hold the line,” he said.  

• The Czech Republic took a “special forces approach” to support Ukraine, the president explained: “Act first, ask questions later,” he said. Low on stocks of artillery to send to Ukraine, Prague instead has located artillery in other countries and pooled funds from NATO allies to purchase rounds for Ukraine.
• “We have financial cover for about half of a million rounds,” he said, adding that “it will fully cover Ukrainian need” and even fill reserves. He said that he is looking to expand the model to other forms of equipment.

Unity on China

• Allies should concurrently work to convey to China that “it’s not in their interest to be so closely aligned with Russia,” Pavel said. 

• With four Indo-Pacific partner countries having attended the NATO Summit, Pavel explained that allies need to be “concerned” about security in that region because Euro-Atlantic security “cannot be separated” from security in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.  

• A Russian victory “would [embolden] China and make it more assertive,” he said, adding that the Indo-Pacific countries and NATO “are together in this global security environment,” because they share the same values. 

• Pavel said that while China is in many ways a “superpower,” it is also somewhat “dependent” on the “democratic world,” for example for trade. But the West doesn’t have “a common policy towards China,” the president said, warning that China is using that to divide the West “for its own benefit.” 

Friendly autonomy

• Pavel said that while European countries including the Czech Republic have reduced their dependency on Russian oil and gas, there is “still room for more coordination.” This summer, the Czech Republic and Germany began to push the European Union (EU) to hold talks on how to officially end imports of energy from Russia. 

• With US elections approaching, and the possibility of another Donald Trump presidency raising concern about the US role in transatlantic defense, some European members of NATO have argued that they need to reduce their military reliance on the United States. The EU “loves the word autonomous” in defense, the economy, energy, and more, Pavel said. “But whenever Europe gets into trouble, we look over the ocean.” 

• Ideas such as creating an EU army, Pavel argued, “don’t make sense” because such efforts would “duplicate what already exists.” Rather, European countries should “work with what we have,” he said, by reinforcing the European pillar of NATO. 

• This effort to reduce military reliance shouldn’t be “aimed against” the United States but rather should be seen as building “along with” the United States, he said. “The United States will need an equal partner in Europe, not a dependent child.” 

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

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Click to jump to an expert reaction:

John Herbst: There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

Alyona Getmanchuk: Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

Peter Dickinson: Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Shelby Magid: Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

It is the eleventh summit since Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 and the third annual summit since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022. Like its ten predecessors, this summit has taken incremental steps to deal with the challenge posed by the first large-scale war in Europe since Adolf Hitler was defeated. There was progress, sure, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive.

On the plus side, the communiqué states plainly that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” But the question is what steps NATO took this week to address that threat.

The answer came in two ways. The first was in its treatment of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. The hard fact is that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine joins NATO. Yes, the communiqué says the decision on Ukraine’s membership is “irreversible.” And it introduced steps to foster cooperation—putting a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, establishing a training program for Ukraine, and implementing a new venue for cooperation in the NATO-Ukraine Council.

But these steps are modest and contrast with the stronger interim advantages enjoyed by Sweden and Finland before they became members. For instance, why can’t the Ukrainian ambassador to NATO participate in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s decision-making body)? And why can’t Ukrainian officials participate within the NATO apparatus? This might explain why Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, exhibited unease at the NATO Public Forum regarding the question of how he would assess the summit, before acknowledging that Ukraine was “satisfied.”

In contrast to those modest steps, there were better results from the summit in the form of security agreements Ukraine signed with NATO members and partners. While these agreements are no substitute for the protections offered by NATO’s Article 5, in some cases—such as the agreement signed with Poland—they provide additional air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These agreements also pledge long-term security aid.

The picture is also positive when it comes to the actual weapons supplies—the most immediate need—that NATO allies committed to at and around the summit. The new packages include five Patriot batteries and other sophisticated defense systems, Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and F-16 fighter jets. Collectively, this will be a major addition to Ukraine’s defense capability—even if long overdue—and a strong signal to Russia of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

This positive story, unfortunately, has been marred by a well-timed provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin: the egregious attack on Kyiv on Monday that struck a children’s hospital. This was designed to tweak NATO and underscore to Ukrainians how vulnerable they remain. The United States could have turned this incident back on Putin if it used the occasion to remove all restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. (Such strikes are now limited to border areas against targets that are planning imminent attacks.) Instead, the White House announced publicly that its restrictions remain in place, a decision that is bad for the people of Ukraine and for US leadership.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

The NATO Summit in Washington was a Biden summit, not a Ukraine summit. Even a statement on Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO—clearly a step forward compared with the Vilnius summit last year—turned out to be not an easy gain, but rather a result of rounds of exhausting negotiations.

Ukraine was offered a bridge to membership when it needs a highway—with an invitation or decision to start accession talks without formal invitation. Not to mention that the symbol of a bridge has quite a negative connotation in Ukraine since the days years ago when opponents of Ukraine entering into NATO and the European Union—both inside and outside of Ukraine—stubbornly positioned Ukraine merely as a “bridge” between East and the West.

It’s a false claim that starting Ukraine’s accession process to NATO can and should happen only after the war ends. This process is needed not only after the victory, but in order to accelerate the victory. If you can’t change Putin’s calculus on the battlefield, it is important to do so by adopting political decisions that could encourage him to think about ending the war. 

It’s good that some important decisions on enhancing Ukraine’s air defense capabilities were announced in Washington, even though there was no need to wait with those announcements until the summit. Also, for those who really care that Ukraine would be able to protect its people and kids’ hospitals, those decisions should be underpinned with a green light for a deep strike on Russian launchers on its territory and the creation of an air defense shield over the western and southern parts of Ukraine. 

—Alyona Getmanchuk is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and is the founder and director of the New Europe Center, a foreign policy-focused think tank based in Kyiv.

Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Few here in Ukraine expected this week’s NATO Summit to produce any major breakthroughs on the key issue of the country’s membership aspirations. Instead, attention was firmly focused on securing meaningful practical support for the fight against Russia. In that sense, the summit was a success, with NATO members promising to deliver much-needed air defense systems and pledging forty billion dollars in military aid over the coming year. Ukraine also used the Washington, DC, event to hold a series of useful bilateral meetings, which produced additional commitments.

At the same time, the Washington Summit Declaration’s rhetoric of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward NATO membership failed to elicit much excitement in Kyiv, where there is widespread cynicism over past failures to match grand proclamations with meaningful progress. A majority of Ukrainians have been calling for a clear roadmap toward NATO membership since Russia’s invasion first began ten years ago. A decade later, they are still waiting. 

This mood of quiet frustration was evident during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s Thursday interview with CNN. “We have heard reassuring messages that Ukraine will be in NATO,” he commented. “But we cannot wait another seventy-five years to celebrate Ukrainian accession. It has to happen sooner rather than later.” 

—Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

NATO’s Washington summit was a mixed bag when it comes to deliverables for Ukraine. While the seventy-fifth anniversary summit had a celebratory tone for many in the Alliance, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians.

The summit served as another occasion for disjointed feelings for those focused on Ukraine’s security and future. The week started with Russian forces firing a cruise missile into a Ukrainian children’s hospital and ended with champagne toasts and celebrations in Washington.

As volunteers in Kyiv helped dig children’s bodies out of the hospital’s rubble, NATO allies applauded their efforts to support Ukraine. There is reason for praise—the summit’s communiqué had strong language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward membership, and allies made commitments for political, military, and financial support along with efforts to enable further integration into NATO. Those allied commitments included much-needed decisions to enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and the launch of the Ukraine Compact with commitments to Ukraine’s long-term defense and security largely made through bilateral agreements. The NATO-Ukraine relationship grew stronger, while the Alliance also rightfully acknowledged the threat Russia continues to pose and the significant assistance it gets from China in its war effort.

While these decisions are positive, Ukraine still needs more. There are a number of NATO allies who would like to have seen the summit go further on Ukraine’s membership in NATO and immediate military support. Strong words and nonbinding agreements are important, but they don’t provide timelines, nor do they prevent missiles from destroying more hospitals. Ukraine’s leaders hoped to use the summit to get all restrictions removed on the use of US and other Western weapons against military targets in Russia. Yet even after the heinous attack against the children’s hospital, the White House shamefully announced that it is not changing its policy. When asked about those limitations on Thursday, US President Joe Biden replied that it wouldn’t make sense to strike the Kremlin, despite this being far from Ukrainian intentions. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, it is “crazy” that Ukrainian forces can’t attack the military bases firing missiles at them, including the military base that launched the attack on the hospital earlier this week.  

NATO leaders can still be proud of the steps they took in the right direction for Ukraine, but they can’t stop here. The focus on tangible steps for support to Ukraine and work toward Kyiv’s membership must continue with an urgency and quick pace. Following the summit, NATO can’t go away for summer vacation. Ukraine doesn’t have the convenience of waiting for the fall, while Russia continues to unleash criminal attacks.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

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Bevin was an inspirational Labour foreign secretary—and is a personal hero of mine. He was proud of his working-class origins, firmly internationalist in outlook, and committed to realism, a politics based on respect for the facts.

Nowhere was this clearer than in his role helping to create the NATO alliance seventy-five years ago, which included signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 on behalf of the United Kingdom. As foreign secretary, he was equally committed to supporting the nascent United Nations. But he recognized that “naked and unashamed” power politics would limit its ambitions. Establishing NATO therefore became central to his strategy for how to protect Britain and its allies against future aggression.

Moscow protested that this new grouping targeted them. But while Bevin made every effort to engage the Soviet Union in dialogue, he dismissed such criticism. If that was how the Kremlin felt about a defensive alliance, that said much about its intentions.

Seventy-five years on, the wisdom of Bevin’s approach is as clear as ever.

Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations remain indispensable. But they are struggling under the strain of multiple challenges. With a return of war to our continent and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with our closest allies is firmly in the national interest.

NATO is the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s collective security. This week, I am joining the British prime minister and defense secretary at the NATO Summit in Washington, DC. Our commitment to NATO and Britain’s nuclear deterrent is unshakeable.

The United Kingdom and our allies must step up defense spending. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has confirmed that the British government will launch a Strategic Defence Review, putting a “NATO-first” policy at the heart of Britain’s defense plans and setting out a road map to spending 2.5 percent of gross domestic product on defense. At the summit, the United Kingdom has been arguing that all NATO allies should adopt this as a new defense target. 

The war in Ukraine has only reinforced the enduring centrality of NATO. But as in Bevin’s time, Kremlin disinformation about NATO’s role is rife. I am as dismissive of this as Bevin was. If Russian President Vladimir Putin feels threatened by a purely defensive alliance, that says much about his own intentions. It is Russia that has ridden roughshod over its neighbors’ sovereignty and conducted assassinations on Europe’s streets. It is Russia that has walked away from its international commitments, leaving a trail of lies and broken promises.

The prime minister has recommitted to providing Ukraine with three billion pounds a year of military support for as long as needed. And Britain is contributing forty million pounds to NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, making us the third-largest donor to the package. As the prime minister will tell NATO allies on Thursday, the frontline defense of the Euro-Atlantic region is the Ukrainian trenches.

As foreign secretary, I will do all that I can to build on the great legacy Bevin left us. At a time of rising insecurity, we join our allies in marking NATO’s immense contribution to our collective security and renew our determination to invest in the most successful defensive alliance the world has ever known.

David Lammy is the UK foreign secretary.

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Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Daniel Fried: In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

Rachel Rizzo: There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

Ann Marie Dailey: The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

Luka Ignac: NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

Wayne Schroeder: NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

Andrew D’Anieri: Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Christopher Harper: The language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path to NATO is an important achievement

Robert Soofer: On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

Beniamino Irdi: NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

Joslyn Brodfuehrer: What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

Michael John Williams: Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

Through its Washington Summit Declaration, NATO has strengthened its support for Ukraine’s security and its “irreversible path” to NATO membership. This language, contained in the declaration’s paragraph 16, is a step forward. More importantly, it was not a grudging compromise (as at the Vilnius NATO Summit in 2023), or a fraught showdown (as at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008). This time, the allies, especially the United States, seemed serious in asserting that, difficult as it may be to bring Ukraine into the Alliance, in the end, this may be the only way to provide long-term security to Europe in the face of Russia’s imperial ends and violent means. 

NATO also set up long-term mechanisms to provide military support for Ukraine and issued a supplemental statement that lays out details of this support. This, combined with the announcements of air defense equipment and F-16s for Ukraine, demonstrate that NATO is continuing to face down Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

The remaining US caveats on Ukraine’s authorization to use US-provided weapons to attack even legitimate military targets inside Russia remain a problem. The laws of war ought to be sufficient in restricting Ukraine’s military actions; going beyond them seems excessive.

Many will argue that NATO should have just extended an invitation to Ukraine or at least started accession negotiations. I have sympathy for these views. Nevertheless, NATO moved forward. It is easier to write an article than negotiate a communiqué with thirty-two governments. 

The decisions the allies took at the Washington summit and the language on Ukraine in the declaration passed the test of seriousness in time of war.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

The final communiqué calls Ukraine’s pathway toward NATO “irreversible.” For a consensus-based organization, that’s a big deal. On top of that, we can finally see Ukraine’s “bridge” to NATO membership taking form, with the Alliance vowing to station a senior civilian in Kyiv and to set up a command in Wiesbaden, Germany for coordinating security assistance and training—with allies agreeing to send the Ukrainians a package of new air defense systems, including four Patriot batteries.

But with allied leaders saying the bridge will be short and well-lit, major questions remain about the duration and lighting. And what happens between now and Ukraine’s eventual membership, which could still be decades away?

From my conversations around town, I’m gathering that there’s also a sense of frustration amid the celebrations. Thus far there have been no announcements that the United States is willing to loosen the restrictions on how the Ukrainians can use US-supplied weapons. People seem frustrated that Ukraine can’t strike deep inside Russia, and there’s a feeling that the United States is making Ukrainians fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

There is also a somewhat somber mood regarding the US election. US President Joe Biden’s speech last night at the summit kickoff was strong and presidential, but there’s still some doubt about whether he has what it takes to pull off a win in November. And a loss for Biden means a win for former US President Donald Trump, which further rattles already-nervous Europeans. What I’ve been saying to them here at the summit is this: Tell NATO’s story, because it’s a good one. Keep increasing defense spending; twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are now spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an increase from nine allies when Biden took office. And keep shouldering more of the defense burden for the European continent. This is likely what Europeans will wind up needing to do anyway, so best to start now.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

This communiqué contains few surprises, with the biggest announcement—the creation of a mechanism for the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine—previewed weeks in advance. The other key Ukraine-related deliverable is the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, which pledges forty billion euros in the coming year, with language loosely indicating that the support should continue in future years. While significant, this is a step down from some allies’ hope for a multiyear commitment of a percentage of each NATO nations’ GDP. With the Indo-Pacific partners on hand, the declaration missed an opportunity to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to global security, not just Euro-Atlantic security. The bureaucratic, stilted language on a “bridge” to NATO for Ukraine belies ongoing disagreement within the Alliance on Ukrainian membership, but the language on Russia underscores a united NATO assessment that Russia is a long-term, strategic threat. 

The declaration is also an acknowledgment that more needs to be done to operationalize the commitments made at Madrid and Vilnius, namely that in order for NATO’s new regional defense plans to be executable, NATO nations will have to spend more than 2 percent of their GDP on national defense. Allies also acknowledged that gaps remain in key areas, including munitions stockpiles, integrated air and missile defense, command and control, and sustainment. The NATO Defense Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge aims to address some of these gaps. The declaration also acknowledges the need to partner with the European Union to counter emerging and hybrid threats, as well as the importance of working with like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific, including on support for Ukraine, cyber, disinformation, and technology. 

One major missed opportunity was the absence of Latin America in the section outlining  a new action plan for NATO’s southern neighborhood. China and Russia are conducting active disinformation and malign investment campaigns in South America. But unlike Africa and the Middle East, Latin America remains relatively stable, and it has significant economic and political cooperation potential with NATO allies. Whoever assumes the newly created role of special representative for the southern neighborhood should ensure that they include Latin America in their dialogue, outreach, and visibility. 

—Ann Marie Dailey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently serving as a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.

NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

It is significant that NATO has highlighted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This acknowledgment underscores the Alliance’s unity and awareness of the evolving geopolitical landscape. By recognizing the mutually reinforcing attempts by Russia and the PRC to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order, NATO lays a crucial foundation for formulating strategies to address and counteract this burgeoning nexus.

This statement signals a collective commitment among member states to not only monitor but also actively engage in identifying and implementing measures to mitigate the influence of this partnership.

—Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

The Washington Summit Declaration correctly addresses the need to more urgently sustain national commitments to defense. It also correctly understands that expenditures beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed to remedy existing shortfalls and improve the capabilities, capacity, and readiness of the thirty-two NATO allies in all five defense domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space.

To achieve the 2 percent goal or even go higher, NATO allies will have to achieve real growth in their defense spending—growth beyond the rate of inflation—and stick to that goal for multiple years. Real growth in defense spending is how most NATO countries got to 2 percent, and it is how the remaining allies can get there.

—Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Buried at the bottom of the NATO communiqué are key details on the Alliance’s pledge to contribute a minimum of forty billion euros over the next twelve months to Ukraine for military purposes. While forty billion euros is no small change, the communiqué notes that this pledge is in fact not an increase in military aid to Ukraine, but an approximation of annual provisions by allies since Russia began its full-scale war of aggression in 2022. 

In an effort to systematize and track military contributions to Ukraine by NATO member states, the “Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine” pegs minimum funding to countries’ GDP as a share of the Alliance total. For example, 2024 US GDP is estimated to be around $28 trillion, more than half of the roughly $46 trillion GDP total of the Alliance, so Washington would contribute approximately $26 billion in military aid to Ukraine over the next twelve months. Notably, allies must report on their contributions every six months to make sure each country is pulling their weight—a welcome dose of transparency. The first reporting period back dates to the start of 2024, so the United States is already much of the way toward fulfilling its minimum obligation.

The level of detail outlined in the pledge is no doubt aimed to mollify Ukraine skeptics (in the Trump orbit or otherwise) that allies in Europe are taking support for Ukraine seriously. Those efforts could be strengthened by continuing to source and send air defense, artillery ammunition, and long-range missiles to Ukraine on time and in appropriate quantities.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The language on Ukraine’s ‘irreversible’ path to NATO is an important achievement

The word “irreversible” in the paragraph regarding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is powerful and important. One should not underestimate how tricky it will have been to achieve consensus on this. The implication is that this path cannot be reversed during any negotiations that might occur with Russia.

—Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. As a Royal Air Force (RAF) pilot, he was involved in active operations over Iraq and in the Balkans and has commanded at all levels of the RAF. He also served in several positions at NATO, including director general of the HQ NATO International Military Staff.

On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

As expected, the communiqué reaffirms NATO’s commitment to modernize its nuclear capabilities, strengthen its nuclear planning capability, and adapt as necessary to changes in the security environment punctuated by Russia’s nuclear intimidation and ongoing modernization of its large stockpile of theater-range nuclear weapons. 

As a former US representative to NATO’s High-Level Group (HLG) for nuclear planning, I recall how difficult it was just five years ago for the HLG to issue even a bland communiqué after each meeting—that’s how ambivalent some allies were about the nuclear mission. Today, NATO appears to be grappling with topics once considered off limits and is taking seriously the nuclear planning, exercises, and training necessary to demonstrate resolve.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg once said that “deterrence starts with resolve. It’s not enough to feel it. You also have to show it.” This communiqué, taken in conjunction with the 2022 Strategic Concept and 2023 Vilnius communiqué, sends a strong message to Russia that nuclear deterrence remains “the cornerstone of Alliance Security.” 

—Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.

NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

As most NATO leaders have acknowledged in recent statements, Russia fights a nonmilitary war against the West alongside its effort on the battlefield in Ukraine.

The communiqué released today does reflect an awareness of this in the paragraphs dedicated to hybrid threats. For example, it notes that Russia has “intensified its aggressive hybrid actions against allies, including through proxies.” It also lists several hybrid actions, including sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference, and provocations at allies’ borders, such as by provoking irregular migration. In addition, the communiqué names China as engaging in “sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation.”

However, the space and dignity reserved by the document to this challenge do not do justice to its profound strategic nature. The effort to undermine democratic societies by leveraging its freedoms is the common denominator among all of NATO’s systemic adversaries, first and foremost China, and it will remain such after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been repelled.

Perhaps distracted by the kinetic pace of war on the European continent, NATO language on hybrid threats is still somewhat unrefined, especially at the leadership level. A more explicit focus should be put on the multi-domain, or “DIMEFIL,” dimension of the challenge, especially by avoiding any confusion between the parts—such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion—and the whole-of-society offensive coordinated campaigns they form.

Clearer and deeper language in top-level NATO communication on hybrid threats would achieve two key objectives. 

First, it would emphasize the systemic aspect of these threats, which would be an implicit reminder that NATO is an alliance based on values, at a time when some allies need to be reminded of this message. A whole-of-government offensive will only be effective if it is directed from an authoritarian regime and addressed toward a democratic society, whose openness is not only its target but also the weapon used against it. 

Second, it would inform a better counter-strategy to hybrid threats, one based on the whole picture and the adversaries’ strategic objectives rather than independent efforts in single domains.

—Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

As heads of state gather to take part in this milestone NATO Summit, we are reminded that today’s security environment differs significantly from the one that twelve nations faced when signing the Washington Treaty seventy-five years ago. War is raging in Europe. Russia has threatened to send troops to new ally Finland’s border and is rebuilding its land forces in preparation for a long-term conflict with NATO. But these conventional threats are situated within a broader spectrum of challenges ranging from nuclear saber rattling to the very real hybrid activities levied against frontline allies. The Washington Summit Declaration recognizes the complexity of the increasingly connected battlespace, with commitments to “enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense against all threats and challenges, in all domains, and in multiple strategic directions across the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Maintaining NATO’s edge will hinge upon the Alliance’s ability to operate across domains at speed and scale. Allies pledged to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to resource the new defense plans in preparation for “high-intensity and multi-domain collective defense” and integrate space—NATO’s newest operational domain—into the Defense Planning Process. While developments in this year’s declaration yet again reflect a push to accelerate the Alliance’s transformation into a multi-domain-operation-enabled warfighting machine, it remains unclear as to whether NATO Allied Command Operations and its military personnel are equipped with the tools and expertise they need to facilitate coordinated activities across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains—none of which are equal. Now is the time to move beyond NATO Allied Command Transformation’s 2023 concept by integrating capabilities across domains, increasing training on new domains, and ramping up NATO exercising. Without innovative, mutually reinforcing initiatives from allies in the short and medium term, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Christopher Cavoli will be constrained in his ability to leverage new domains to secure the advantage in a future fight. 

—Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

The Washington Summit Declaration covers all the familiar ground, from setting expectations for Ukraine to defense spending to Indo-Pacific strategy. But for me, the most interesting parts are sections 12-14, which are focused on collective resilience, hybrid threats, and disinformation. The inclusion of these three sections is critical, because it is highly probable that any Russian actions against a NATO ally will be specifically geared to avoid a direct violation of Article 5. It is far less probable that the Kremlin would launch a full-scale invasion against Poland or the Baltics.

The Kremlin has waged a broad campaign of “political warfare” against NATO allies for a solid decade—and this “war” shows no sign of abating. Evidence of this is found in Kremlin funding for far-right parties across Europe, cyber attacks against Estonia, assassinations in the United Kingdom, and election meddling in the United States, to name but a few of the most egregious examples. 

These sections of the communiqué convey the high level of concern within NATO around these critical issues, but they also lack specificity. For example, NATO should lead efforts across the Alliance to change national legal frameworks to recognize state-supported cyber attacks. One hopes that sections 12-14 of the communiqué will be further developed in the coming year, not least because indirect political warfare is just as popular in Beijing as it is in Moscow. 

—Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

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At the latest NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Prague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised Ukraine a “bridge” to NATO. For a start, US President Joe Biden at the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Italy delivered a three-pronged blow to Moscow­—a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, a fifty billion dollar loan to Ukraine from several nations backed by payments from Russia’s immobilized assets, and a new bilateral US-Ukraine security pact to ensure long-term aid.

Additionally, NATO’s new report on defense spending shows that twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are on pace to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) benchmark for defense spending this year. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, twenty-three allies is “more than twice as many as four years ago and demonstrates that European allies and Canada are really stepping up and taking their share of the common responsibility to protect all of us in the NATO alliance.”

These are positive steps, but they do not solve the lack of speed and scale that plagues NATO’s decision making. NATO should tackle three big sets of deliverables at the Washington summit that began today. At the summit, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to start accession talks, augment military support to Kyiv, and substantially elevate member states’ defense budgets to reach a collective 3 percent of GDP, with an allocation of 0.25 percent of GDP to Ukraine’s military assistance. Only then will NATO be operating at the appropriate speed and scale to address the Alliance’s security challenges and deter further threats from its adversaries.

First, NATO must provide Ukraine with a credible path to membership. Ukraine’s long-term security is impossible without membership in the world’s most powerful military alliance, while Europe’s security cannot be guaranteed without Ukraine in NATO. Statements from leaders of NATO member states that they will do “whatever it takes” to support Kyiv are no longer sufficient—real steps to absorb Ukraine into the NATO family are needed.

I had a chance to serve as a member of the International Task Force (ITF) on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration, co-chaired by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak. The ITF report released in May has proposed a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which should start with NATO inviting Ukraine to start accession talks at the Washington summit this week. To empower the process, the NATO-Ukraine Council should define specific conditions for membership. The ITF also recommends setting a timeline for Ukrainian membership of no later than July 2028, provided specific conditions are met.

Second, NATO must commit to augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities to tip the balance on the battlefield. At ITF, we recommended five concrete initiatives on which NATO member states can agree at the Washington summit: 

1. Lift all the caveats on the weapons delivered by allies to Ukraine;
2. Create an extended air defense shield in western Ukraine;
3. Deploy a freedom of navigation and demining mission in the Black Sea;
4. Ramp up the training of Ukrainian forces, including inside Ukraine;
5. Provide the so-called “fix forward” logistics support on the ground in Ukraine rather than transporting it back abroad, which wastes time and money.

The members of the ITF believe that “[t]aken together, these measures would help Ukraine deny Russia the possibility to escalate its conventional war. They would also constitute an enhanced commitment to Ukraine’s security in the interim period between an invitation and full membership.”  

Third, NATO allies must increase military spending. To address the perennial resource question, the Alliance should set an ambitious multiyear trajectory for members’ defense budgets, committing every ally to spend 0.25 percent of their GDP on military assistance to Ukraine. When NATO defense ministers first proposed the 2 percent of GDP defense spending guideline in 2006, the target was not enforceable, and many allies did not take it seriously. Many NATO members failed to meet this target even after the Wales summit in 2014, where NATO leaders signed the Defense Investment Pledge. At the Vilnius summit in 2023, 2 percent of GDP became a “floor” rather than a goalpost. That year, total NATO defense spending, which stood at $1.3 trillion, accounted for around 2.5 percent of NATO’s collective GDP, thanks in large part to the United States’ massive defense expenditure. To reach a 3 percent of GDP spending target for NATO, the allies in 2023 would have been short $234 billion. In other words, an additional 18 percent increase in defense spending would have been required on top of the already steep 18 percent growth last year. 

Adequate increases in spending will take time. At the Washington summit, NATO allies should commit to a multiyear plan of uninterrupted defense budget growth with an aim for all allies, but especially European countries and Canada, to contribute enough to breach the 3 percent spending threshold for the Alliance’s collective defense. 

At the same time, allies should agree to allocate 0.25 percent of their GDP to military support for Ukraine, which would amount to around $125 billion per year. Such an agreement could directly institutionalize NATO’s security assistance and training to Ukraine. The planned NATO command in Wiesbaden, Germany, which will coordinate training and aid to Ukraine and is set to include more than seven hundred personnel, is an important preparatory step for Ukraine’s eventual membership in the Alliance. In addition, the Atlantic Council’s Ian Brzezinski is right to recommend that such arrangements that allow Ukrainian personnel to embed in NATO structures should be accompanied by a formal acknowledgment that Ukraine is ready to join the Alliance.

This week in Washington is an important test for the Alliance. Can NATO operate at the speed and scale of relevance? Progress on paving the way to Ukraine’s NATO membership, augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities, and unambiguously elevating defense budgets would serve as proof of the Alliance’s continued relevance in a time of uncertainty.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the International Task Force on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Previously, he served as NATO’s assistant secretary general for executive management and as Lithuania’s deputy defense minister.

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At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region.

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together. 

NATO members should note that Russia has outpaced the Alliance in its establishment and usage of trade corridors in the Arctic region, funded heavily by Chinese investment. Transporting energy and mineral commodities via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) presents strong advantages to Russia: staying within its territory and circumventing the Suez Canal shortens Russian tankers’ trips to China by about ten days per journey. As climate change warms the Arctic at a pace far exceeding other parts of the world, the viability of the NSR will increase and the region’s strategic importance will continue to grow. Historically, Russian energy in the High North has been dispatched using ships specially built to navigate sea ice, but in September 2023, the first shipment was sent using a conventional, non-ice class oil tanker due to high levels of summer ice melt, an increasingly common phenomenon. 

“The energy crisis that has emerged from the Ukraine war has been building for decades,” Paul Sullivan, an energy and international relations professor at Johns Hopkins University, told us. “Russia’s development of Arctic LNG [liquefied natural gas] and usage of the NSR should be of top concern to NATO countries with concerns about the precarity of energy sources and trade routes, respectively.”

Russia’s economic dependence on exporting its extensive energy and mineral resources has led to strengthened cooperation with China, an imperfect relationship based on mutual need. Chinese state-owned energy enterprises have in the past five years invested billions of dollars in Russian oil and gas ventures and mineral projects in the Arctic. Since facing Western sanctions, Russian reallocation of its crude oil supply to a discounted Chinese market cemented the partnership between the two nations. Since then, this infrastructure investment for ports, pipelines, mines, and railways has surged. Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing, which has affirmed its own involvement in the region as a “near-Arctic state.” For example, Russian and Chinese vessels were spotted in August 2023 conducting joint military exercises near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. That said, NATO members rethinking Arctic strategies should take a clear-eyed approach as to the extent of the “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing. At the beginning of June, the Russian gas market announced a pause of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to China. The deal has reportedly stalled over monopsonistic Chinese demands to pay drastically lower prices for lower quantities of gas.

NATO’s Arctic member states—the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—remain intent on maintaining free and navigable Arctic shipping lanes and are exploring their own energy and mineral resource projects in the region. Jennifer Spence, the project director of the Arctic Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, explained to us that “in these remote areas, military and economic infrastructure development go hand in hand—securitization of the Arctic can help facilitate investments in a more diversified economy for Arctic states.”

Recent European Parliament legislation to facilitate the construction of new mines to secure critical minerals has been a boon to Swedish mining companies, which have discovered mineral resources in the country’s north. In the United States, the ConocoPhillips Willow project is set to commence in northern Alaska’s National Petroleum Reserve, and in Canada, the federal government recently announced new investments in Arctic defense. Separately, the province of Alberta has worked with the state of Alaska to promote energy development ties. Per Spence, “commercial progress in the North American Arctic is comparatively more rhetoric than action, though signals of permanent infrastructure investment seem to be not too far behind.”

NATO’s Arctic member states have increasingly focused on the region as an important operational theater—and this trend should continue. Nordic countries have announced major NATO exercises in the High North as well as training events with the United States. Canada is procuring and deploying new Arctic-proof military aircraft and ships, and recently conducted joint exercises with the United States, demonstrating an independent investment in regional security. The United States has also increased its Arctic presence. This has included an initiative by the US Coast Guard and the US Navy, which built three Polar Security Cutters, upgraded versions of heavy-duty icebreakers replete with advanced sensors and equipment. 

As of now, Russia’s pause in its Arctic developments reflects the status of commercial investment progress in the region. International sanctions, most of which were initiated by countries that are also NATO members, have taken a major toll on Russian Arctic commercial expansion (for example, Russian energy behemoth Novatek suspended production at its Arctic LNG 2 project in the spring due to sanctions and a shortage of ice-class gas tankers). As for NATO progress, according to Sullivan, the Johns Hopkins expert, the accession of Sweden and Finland “increases NATO’s Arctic footprint massively and thereby significantly improves its position.” With a vastly larger Arctic footprint and record levels of military spending, the time is ripe for NATO to further address the looming security consequences of Russia’s Arctic expansion. The NATO Summit in Washington provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 

David Babikian is a graduate from Princeton University in economics. His research practice spans from work with policymakers, investment firms, and nongovernmental organizations, pertaining to climate resilience, commodities, and critical minerals. He is a fellow at Climate Cabinet.

Julia Nesheiwat is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a member of the Atlantic Council board of directors, vice president for policy at TC Energy, and the former US homeland security advisor.

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However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

Spanish public opinion takes a turn

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook Spanish public opinion. Blessed by favorable geography, Spain did not consider Russia to be a threat to its sovereignty, and most Spaniards did not feel Russia threated European security writ large. The invasion changed all of that. Spanish citizens judged Russia’s actions to be a clear violation of international law.

According to a Pew Research Center poll, only 5 percent of Spaniards held a favorable opinion of Russia in 2023, down sharply from 31 percent in 2020 and 46 percent in 2011. Many Spaniards disapprove of Russia’s malign activity, such as its propensity for election interference, including during the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum. More recently, the alleged Russian assassination in February in Alicante, Spain, of a Russian helicopter pilot who defected has further hardened Spanish public opinion against Russia’s role in the world.

With broad public backing, Spain has given Ukraine unwavering support since the beginning of the conflict. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez optimized Spain’s July-December 2023 Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) to showcase the nation’s commitment to Ukraine. Sánchez traveled to Kyiv on the first day of Spain’s presidency while hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the October 2023 European Political Community gathering, with both King Felipe VI and Sánchez individually meeting Zelenskyy. Spain also guided Ukraine’s EU accession negotiation process during its presidency.

Direct Spanish support to Ukraine continues to intensify as the war progresses. Madrid and Kyiv signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement in May 2024, accompanied by a Spanish pledge of one billion euros in military aid. Spain has provided Ukraine vast amounts of lethal and nonlethal military assistance, both bilaterally and through EU mechanisms. Spanish military equipment contributions have included air defense systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems with associated ammunition, including Patriot missiles, which had been desperately requested by Ukraine.

Given Spain’s underinvestment in defense prior to 2022, the Ukrainian donations have cut into Spanish reserves. This has not dampened Spain’s willingness to support Ukraine, with Sánchez meeting Spanish defense industry executives in March to ask them to prioritize Ukrainian needs over Spanish requirements. Spain hosts an EU training facility in Toledo as part of the EU Military Assistance Mission and has exceeded its mandate to train two thousand soldiers, with the Spanish Army more than doubling its output with nearly five thousand Ukrainian graduates. Spanish leaders also highlight their nonmilitary support for Ukraine, including hosting more than two hundred thousand Ukrainian refugees, earmarking reconstruction funds, and actively supporting Ukraine’s efforts for judicial accountability for Russian war crimes in the country.

Spain’s commitment to NATO deterrence and defense

In addition to supporting Ukraine, Spain bolstered its commitment to NATO deterrence efforts in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Spain deploys a high proportion of its armed forces to participate in NATO operations while actively volunteering to lead NATO missions in all domains. The Spanish Air and Space Force deploys fighter aircraft to either the Baltics or the Black Sea region eight months out of the year on average, and currently leads the April-July 2024 Baltic Air Policing detachment in Lithuania. For the maritime domain, the Spanish Navy commanded NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 for the first half of 2024, helming a multination, multi-ship maritime deterrence force in the Baltic Sea.

The Spanish Army notably increased its operational tempo in the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Spanish Army immediately augmented its troops in Latvia following the invasion, where it had been participating in NATO’s legacy Enhanced Forward Presence. The Spanish footprint in Latvia is a reinforced company-sized unit equipped with armor, artillery, and air defense enablers. This reinforcement included bilateral support to Latvia in the form of an advanced air defense unit. More importantly, Spain enthusiastically volunteered to be the framework nation for a new battlegroup in Slovakia. The Spanish Army officially took command of the battlegroup on July 1, bringing the same quality of forces to Slovakia as it did to Latvia, while it keeps another reserve battlegroup ready in Spain to augment its forward deployed forces if needed. Finally, the Spanish Marines (naval infantry) will send a company of soldiers to Romania to embed with the French-led battlegroup later this year. Thus, Spain is one of the few NATO members to have land forces defending the Alliance’s territory in the three separate regions along the eastern flank.

Keeping a vigilant eye on Europe’s south

Although Spain’s commitments to the eastern flank speak for themselves, it is Europe’s southern flank that gives Madrid the most cause for concern. Spain is a long-standing contributor to security and defense missions in Africa and the Middle East, often under a United Nations (UN) or EU mandate. Through these experiences, especially in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, Madrid consistently raises concerns about Russia’s behavior in Africa, closely observing Russian malign activity, including through Moscow’s Wagner Group or post-Wagner operatives. Spanish diplomats are especially concerned about Russia’s support for illegitimate governments and military juntas, viewing this as a deliberate effort by Moscow to hinder these nations’ development toward freedom and prosperity.

Spain urged NATO to launch its “southern neighborhood” working group and was an active participant in the final report, advocating for a larger yet humbler role for NATO in these regions. Spain led the NATO Mission in Iraq for one year, participates in every EU military and civilian mission in Africa, and is currently the commander for the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a force commitment of more than seven hundred troops.

Another Spanish commitment in support of Europe’s southern flank is often overlooked: Spain hosts US forces at its Rota naval base and Morón air base. These installations provide two of the four large runways in Europe for US air power projection (with the other two in Germany), enables the forward deployment of US maritime power in and beyond the Mediterranean Sea, and provides a gateway for three US geographic combatant commands, which itself contributes to European security.

Increasing defense spending for Spain’s benefit

Spain’s support for Ukraine and its reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank do not absolve it from its defense spending credibility problem. While it is likely to try to spin the defense spending discussion toward recent increases, Spain still has a long and steep climb to reach its self-proclaimed 2029 goal of passing the 2 percent of GDP threshold. To accomplish this, Spanish defense spending will need to grow at a minimum of 10 percent each year through 2029, while staying ahead of inflation. This is a real challenge, especially given the fractured nature of Spanish politics, budget processes, and high debt levels. While there is a consensus between the center-left and center-right in support of increased defense spending, both parties would be wise to formalize this and pass budgets so the armed forces can invest over time with confidence no matter which party is in power.

Increased spending is critical for acquiring much-needed capabilities. The Spanish Navy’s sole aircraft carrier, the multi-purpose Juan Carlos I, will face irrelevancy as a fixed-wing launch platform if the navy does not procure a replacement for its fleet of EAV-8B Harrier II jump jets. Although Spain joined the French-German Future Combat Air System project, the earliest any production aircraft may join the Spanish Air and Space Force is 2040, beyond the lifespan of its EF-18 fleet. The Spanish Army’s Fuerza 2035 program needs to be funded through completion. Soldier salaries continue to fall behind the cost of living and inflation, and the military may need to grow to employ future capabilities.

In other words, the to-do list is long. Spain’s political leaders need to commit to funding these capabilities if there is any hope for the Spanish military to keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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This change in the Alliance’s strategy began at the Madrid summit in 2022, where allies agreed to a new Strategic Concept that acknowledged the evolving security landscape and committed them “to defend every inch of Allied territory.” The Vilnius summit in 2023 marked another crucial moment for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. It introduced an ambitious “family of plans” comprising three regional defense strategies, covering the Atlantic and European Arctic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and Black Sea. These three regional defense strategies are supported by subordinate strategic plans across seven functional domains, including cyber, space, special operations, and reinforcement.

This integrated approach aims to synchronize military operations across the Euro-Atlantic region and various domains, offering diverse responses to threats from adversaries such as Russia or terrorist groups. As part of these plans, allies will maintain up to three hundred thousand troops at high readiness (ready within thirty days), along with one hundred brigades, 1,400 fighter aircraft, and 250 ships and submarines. This initiative represents NATO’s most ambitious restructuring of its force posture since the end of the Cold War.

However, successfully executing these plans remains the ultimate challenge. At the Washington summit this week, NATO allies must address persistent issues, such as long-term capability gaps and the revitalization of arms production, to ensure these blueprints translate into actionable strategies. The Washington summit presents a critical opportunity for Allies to chart a clear path forward—not just to demonstrate that these plans exist, but also to provide a credible roadmap for effectively implementing them.

Bridging the capability gap

The fact that twenty-three allied nations are meeting the defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is important progress. However, more needs to be done to ensure NATO’s ability to successfully deploy its regional plans. Under the new regional plans, the Alliance must be capable of defending every inch of allied territory across multiple domains. To accomplish this, allies must adhere to greater capability requirements and higher levels of defense spending.

While the capability requirements based on the regional plans are still being determined as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process, the new defense plans necessitate a three-fold increase to existing military capability targets and for each ally to spend 3 percent of its GDP on defense. The key question facing allied leaders is whether they are ready to commit these resources to ensure the credibility of these regional plans.

The Washington summit presents several opportunities to solidify the implementation of NATO’s family of plans:

• Exercise at scale and frequency: Allies must reaffirm their commitment to fully resource and regularly exercise the family of plans. This includes conducting exercises at a scale not seen in decades to rehearse, refine, and validate the plans while enhancing readiness. Steadfast Defender 24, NATO’s largest military exercise since the Cold War with more than ninety thousand troops from all thirty-two allies, is a great example of the type of exercises that the Alliance needs to conduct more frequently.

• Continue to develop regional plans: The executability of NATO’s family of plans hinges on the availability of readily accessible resources, the ability to move forces, and the fulfillment of capability requirements by the allies. To achieve this, allies must place significant emphasis on integrating national defense plans with NATO’s defense plans. This integration will enhance force mobility, foster greater cohesion and interoperability among allies, and strengthen NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture.

• Revitalize the transatlantic industrial base: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine has exposed the need for a revitalized defense industrial base. Allies must ramp up defense production to not only support Ukraine but also replenish their own stocks and meet the demands of modern warfare. The Washington summit needs to facilitate collaboration among allies to procure and develop capabilities jointly, leveraging economies of scale and expertise. NATO allies need to expand existing production facilities to meet the increased demand for military equipment, ensuring the timely delivery of critical capabilities. Moving forward with the NATO defense industrial pledge is a step into the right direction to help allies boost already existing industrial capabilities, standardize equipment, and inform their national production strategies.

The Washington summit represents a pivotal moment for NATO. While the family of plans offers a promising blueprint for collective defense, its success hinges on allies’ ability to verify readiness, overcome capability gaps, revitalize the transatlantic defense industrial base, and integrate national defense plans with NATO defense plans in the face of evolving security challenges. By seizing the opportunities presented at the summit, NATO can reaffirm its commitment to collective defense and ensure the credibility of its deterrence posture in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.

Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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NATO leaders gathered in Washington, DC from July 9 to 11 to grapple with that big question and many others, ranging from Ukraine’s path forward with NATO to the Alliance’s collective defense spending and coordination.

With the global stakes so high, we dispatched our experts to the center of the action at the summit and the NATO Public Forum. Below, find authoritative, up-to-the-minute analysis and insight from behind the scenes of these gatherings.

• Jenna Ben-Yehuda’s main takeaways from the 2024 NATO Summit

• Biden’s press conference showed how political drama overtook summit substance

• Did the 2024 NATO Summit go far enough on Ukraine? The country’s former prime minister responds

• Allies sign ‘Ice Pact’ to counter Russia and China in the Arctic

• In a war of attrition, ammunition is critical, as Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonson underscored

• The Washington summit showcased the growing ties between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners

• See our previous analysis

Jenna Ben-Yehuda’s main takeaways from the 2024 NATO Summit

Biden’s press conference showed how political drama overtook summit substance

The substantive parts of US President Joe Biden’s press conference on Thursday, at the end of the NATO Summit, were overshadowed by questions about his health and him mixing up the names of world leaders. It was a microcosm of press coverage of this consequential past week.

This year’s NATO Summit made progress on many important issues. The Alliance recognized its global role, highlighting the threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea while incorporating the IP-4 countries (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) into its planned response. It took meaningful steps toward strengthening deterrence and defense, including announcing the deployment of new, long-range conventional missiles in Germany. Although more work remains to be done, NATO made progress on burden-sharing, with twenty-three of the thirty-two Alliance members expected to meet or exceed the agreed-upon target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. And the Alliance took concrete steps to help Ukraine defend itself, offering a “bridge” for Kyiv’s eventual NATO membership.   

Still, much of the coverage focused on domestic political turbulence within NATO’s member states, particularly stemming from the recently concluded elections in France and the United Kingdom, as well as elections in the United States later this year. Some of that coverage questioned whether Biden will be forced off the Democratic ticket or whether a second Trump administration would weaken NATO.

These angles risk missing the bigger picture for the sake of an immediate news hook. NATO has been a successful alliance of democracies for more than seventy-years years. It has weathered more significant domestic political turmoil within its member states before, and it has almost always emerged stronger on the other end.

That will likely be the lasting conclusion when the dust settles on this week’s meetings. NATO is entering its third strategic age. It won the Cold War, expanded in the post-Cold War era, and is now gearing up for strategic competition in an age of interdependence. Despite, or maybe even because of, its members’ vibrant democratic politics, NATO is successfully adapting to meet the new and significant challenges it faces at this inflection point in world history.

Did the 2024 NATO Summit go far enough on Ukraine? The country’s former prime minister responds

Allies sign ‘Ice Pact’ to counter Russia and China in the Arctic

It might be sweltering in Washington, but three NATO allies have ice in their veins. Yesterday, the United States, Canada, and Finland broke the ice on an Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or “ICE Pact,” to bring as many as ninety icebreaker ships into production in the coming years—a number nearly as giant as the ships themselves compared to the United States’ current count of two. While Canada and Finland respectively have nine and twelve icebreakers, NATO lags behind Russian icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic.

As the 2024 NATO Summit winds down, the Ice Pact demonstrates how close cooperation among allies is a tremendous asset to US security. As revealed through congressional testimony, siloed US efforts to shore up the icebreaking fleet have faced budgeting complications and time delays. Icebreakers that were originally expected to be built by the summer of 2024 have been delayed to 2029, and will come at a 60 percent higher cost than anticipated. Additionally, the United States hasn’t built a heavy polar icebreaker in nearly fifty years, or a medium polar icebreaker in twenty-five years.

As authoritarian states band together to challenge the international world order, the United States and NATO stand to benefit from collaborative efforts to ensure a peaceful and stable Arctic region. The United States may be increasingly looking toward China, but China is looking north. China’s “near-Arctic” state ambitions, coupled with Russia’s desperate need for partners, are opening a historically peaceful and stable region to potential hybrid warfare and dual-use scientific research. To mitigate these challenges, the United States and NATO must ensure the ability to operate in the region. Shoring up allied icebreakers is a critical step in this direction.

The Washington summit showcased the growing ties between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners

Over the course of this week’s summit, there’s been much attention paid to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—who are, for the third year in a row, attending the NATO Summit. The decision to extend invitations to these countries comes from a recognition, as explained in the Alliance’s summit communiqué, that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” The two “theaters cannot be decorrelated,” as US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said during the NATO Public Forum on Thursday.

Cooperation and integration between countries in the IP4 and NATO outside of the Euro-Atlantic area is not new, as exemplified by Australia and New Zealand’s support for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan between 2015 and 2021. However, there has been a significant evolution in this cooperation in recent years, reflecting shared support for Ukraine as well as mutual concern about China and its growing cooperation with Russia. NATO’s role in setting standards across the defense industry also interests the IP4 countries, especially those with a robust defense industrial base. 

First, as reflected in the communiqué, NATO and the IP4 are launching tailored projects in the areas of “supporting Ukraine, cyber defense, countering disinformation, and technology.” These projects will rely on strengthened political and technical sharing of information, especially in the case of Japan, as highlighted by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Australia, unlike the other IP4 countries, is already well integrated since it has been an Enhanced Opportunity Partner since 2014, which allows it to partake in regular consultations and access interoperability programs, exercises, and information sharing. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said that the steps taken this week on airworthiness certification for Korean aircraft would help ensure “mutual military compatibility” with NATO.

Second, we could see more joint messaging and signaling going forward. Kishida and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a joint statement, saying that NATO and Japan are coordinating to potentially hold joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic region this year. In an effort to jointly work on strategic communication, Japan will dispatch new personnel to the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia. 

Finally, representatives from the European Union (EU) were also present at the meeting Thursday between NATO and the IP4. Their presence reflects the complementary efforts that the bloc might play in the Indo-Pacific and in response to the growing Russia-China nexus. Stoltenberg expressed it best when he said on Wednesday that China “cannot have it both ways” if it continues to play a role in Russia’s defense expansion. NATO this week warned China that continuing to do so will generate negative consequences for “its interests and reputation.”

The EU can leverage funding, know-how, and security capabilities other than in military domains—and it has tools to impose political, economic, and reputational costs to respond to malign actors impacting its interests, including by preventing the flow of dual-use or defense technologies. While there is no consensus on it, some allies have apparently discussed taking action to reclaim some Chinese-owned infrastructure projects in Europe should a wider conflict with Russia break out, a domain that would directly concern the EU. As Campbell aims to “institutionalize” the links between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, building EU-NATO and US-EU consultation frameworks on China will be key in making sure the multidomain dimension of the threat is fully taken into consideration. 

In a war of attrition, ammunition is critical, as Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonson underscored

Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, the NATO Summit emphasizes the imperative of further strengthening the Alliance to defend democracy and protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, to secure victory, Ukraine’s forces require a consistent flow of weapons, ammunition, and critical equipment such as air defense systems and fighter jets. NATO allies and other partners have delivered ten long-range Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, roughly 250,000 anti-tank munitions, and 359 tanks, among other critical defense capabilities. 

However, as Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson highlighted at the NATO Public Forum on Wednesday, the challenge will be for NATO members to maintain this support from a production standpoint in the months ahead. 

In the panel, moderated by the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig, Jonson called attention to the fact that Europe’s defense industrial base is shaped for peacetime. But with the ongoing war in Ukraine, stockpiles are depleting and production is not keeping pace. The 1.3 million 155mm howitzer rounds that the United States and European allies are expected to produce this year fall dreadfully short of the roughly 4.3 million shells per year that then Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said last year that Ukraine would need. The inability to reconcile this production gap hinders Ukrainian defenses and detracts from NATO’s power of deterrence. 

Although a historic twenty-three NATO members now meet the target of spending at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, NATO must collectively send a demand signal to the defense industry to adequately ramp up production. Lengthy lead times simply will not suffice. The solution? Jonson argues “Spending more and spending more together.”

• Dispatch from the NATO Summit: The pluses and minuses for Ukraine

• Inside the new NATO action plan for engaging with the Alliance’s neighbors to the south

• Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

• The Washington summit shows just how much the NATO-IP4 partnership has evolved

• Jake Sullivan previews the Ukraine Compact and takes stock of allied support for Kyiv

• UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

• What to expect on day two: Focus on China and rallying behind Ukraine

• See our previous analysis

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: The pluses and minuses for Ukraine

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

It is the eleventh summit since Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 and the third annual summit since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022. Like its ten predecessors, this summit has taken incremental steps to deal with the challenge posed by the first large-scale war in Europe since Adolf Hitler was defeated. There was progress, sure, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive.

On the plus side, the communiqué states plainly that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” But the question is what steps NATO took this week to address that threat.

The answer came in two ways. The first was in its treatment of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. The hard fact is that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine joins NATO. Yes, the communiqué says the decision on Ukraine’s membership is “irreversible.” And it introduced steps to foster cooperation—putting a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, establishing a training program for Ukraine, and implementing a new venue for cooperation in the NATO-Ukraine Council.

But these steps are modest and contrast with the stronger interim advantages enjoyed by Sweden and Finland before they became members. For instance, why can’t the Ukrainian ambassador to NATO participate in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s decision-making body)? And why can’t Ukrainian officials participate within the NATO apparatus? This might explain why Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, exhibited unease at the NATO Public Forum regarding the question of how he would assess the summit, before acknowledging that Ukraine was “satisfied.”

In contrast to those modest steps, there were better results from the summit in the form of security agreements Ukraine signed with NATO members and partners. While these agreements are no substitute for the protections offered by NATO’s Article 5, in some cases—such as the agreement signed with Poland—they provide additional air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These agreements also pledge long-term security aid.

The picture is also positive when it comes to the actual weapons supplies—the most immediate need—that NATO allies committed to at and around the summit. The new packages include five Patriot batteries and other sophisticated defense systems, Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and F-16 fighter jets. Collectively, this will be a major addition to Ukraine’s defense capability—even if long overdue—and a strong signal to Russia of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

This positive story, unfortunately, has been marred by a well-timed provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin: the egregious attack on Kyiv on Monday that struck a children’s hospital. This was designed to tweak NATO and underscore to Ukrainians how vulnerable they remain. The United States could have turned this incident back on Putin if it used the occasion to remove all restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. (Such strikes are now limited to border areas against targets that are planning imminent attacks.) Instead, the White House announced publicly that its restrictions remain in place, a decision that is bad for the people of Ukraine and for US leadership.

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Inside the new NATO action plan for engaging with the Alliance’s neighbors to the south

Yesterday at the NATO Public Forum, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced that the Alliance has adopted a new action plan for its southern flank. The prime minister said NATO must do more in its southern neighborhood because instability there affects NATO allies and because adversaries—namely Russia—take advantage of that instability to pursue their interests and entrench their influence.

The action plan he outlined has three parts: First, NATO will engage in enhanced political dialogue with partners in the Middle East and Africa based on mutual respect and mutual interest. A new NATO special representative for the southern neighborhood will spearhead this effort. Second, the Alliance will enhance work with international organizations such as the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League. It will also coordinate its efforts with the European Union, which already engages in development activities in the region. Finally, Sánchez said NATO is ready to work with southern partners to do more to combat terrorism, bolster maritime security, respond to climate change, and enhance resilience.

NATO’s new action plan for working with its neighbors to the south echoes the themes of a report released in May by a group of experts reviewing NATO’s approach to such engagement. Not all will be happy with it, however. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and leading members of her government had called for a more ambitious agreement. Expect calls for more to be done on NATO’s southern flank to come at the 2025 Hague summit.

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

NATO leaders have this week declared that Ukraine’s path to membership is “irreversible,” but once again stopped short of officially inviting the country to join the alliance. This represents another missed opportunity to end the ambiguity over Kyiv’s NATO aspirations and set the stage for a return to greater international stability.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was high on the agenda as alliance leaders gathered in Washington DC for NATO’s three-day annual summit. This focus on Ukraine was hardly surprising. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is the largest European conflict since World War II, and poses substantial security challenges for all NATO members.

Since the invasion began almost two and a half years ago, Russia has strengthened cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, who all share Moscow’s commitment to undermining the existing rules-based world order. The emergence of this Authoritarian Axis has helped underline the need for a decisive NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Alliance members are acutely aware that China in particular is closely monitoring the NATO reaction to Moscow’s invasion, with any Russian success in Ukraine likely to fuel Beijing’s own expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere.

While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, this week’s summit confirmed that there is still no consensus within NATO over Ukrainian membership. On the contrary, the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue.

Objections center around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

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UkraineAlert

Jul 11, 2024

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

By Paul Grod

The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington failed to produce any progress toward Ukrainian membership but there are five compelling reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join the alliance, writes Paul Grod.

Conflict European Union

The Washington summit shows just how much the NATO-IP4 partnership has evolved

Marking the third consecutive year of attendance by Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) leaders at the NATO Summit, it is evident that this informal grouping is becoming a regular fixture of summit activities. Beyond the symbolic family photos, the substantive engagement is also evolving. With each summit, NATO and IP4 countries are presenting increasingly ambitious agendas for cooperation.

On the final day of the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg opened the North Atlantic Council meeting by emphasizing the “strong and deepening cooperation” between NATO and the IP4. This commitment translated into the launch of four new joint projects aimed at enhancing collaboration on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cybersecurity.

Furthermore, addressing one of the central themes of the Washington summit—strengthening the transatlantic defense industrial base to tackle challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—there has been significant discussion about the potential for IP4 countries to co-produce weapons and engage in joint maintenance of military assets.

As an observer of Australian politics, I was particularly struck by the limited international attention given to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s absence from the meeting, with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Richard Marles attending in his place. In Australia, this decision faced criticism for overlooking important geopolitical discussions, especially given that the gathering was intended to demonstrate that the world’s leading democracies stand united in their commitment to preserve the rules-based order.

A key question surrounding the future of the IP4 is whether there will be efforts to institutionalize this grouping in the coming years (although Stoltenberg stressed yesterday that NATO would not add Indo-Pacific members) and, of course, to evaluate the tangible outcomes based on the current plans for cooperation.

Jake Sullivan previews the Ukraine Compact and takes stock of allied support for Kyiv

According to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the landscape of the conflict in Ukraine is “far different” today than it was in April, thanks to Ukraine’s battlefield progress and the various steps allies have made in support; and there’s more on the way, Sullivan said today at the NATO Public Forum.

“In a few hours, we’re going to make history again,” he said in a speech where he was introduced by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, explaining that over twenty allies will be joining together to launch the Ukraine Compact, a commitment to develop Ukraine’s forces and to strengthen them into the 2030s. It “makes clear that we will continue to support Ukraine in this fight,” Sullivan argued, “and we will also help build this force so it can credibly deter and defend against future aggression.”

Sullivan spoke ahead of the NATO-Ukraine Council gathering and US President Joe Biden’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy later today, during which the presidents will discuss the additional assistance needed to “get the job done,” as Sullivan put it.

But getting the job done will require adjusting to “an evolving battlefield,” Sullivan warned, as warfare is “transforming before our eyes” due to Russia’s efforts to expand its defense capabilities—with help from Iran, North Korea, and China—and innovations in both tactics and technology. “Already we’re working with Ukraine to solve some of the key technological challenges,” he said. “No one should bet against our collective advantage.”

The national security advisor took stock of all that allies and partners have done to support Ukraine, both on the military side (providing artillery, air defense systems, long-range missiles, and F-16 fighter jets) and on the diplomatic side (with the Group of Seven’s decision to tap Russian sovereign assets and with NATO’s “bridge” to membership for Ukraine).

“None of the progress that we’ve seen so far was inevitable. None of it happened by accident,” he said. It took NATO allies “coming together,” he explained, “to choose again and again to stand with [Ukraine] to defend the values that have always united us as democracies: Freedom, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity.

“This is what our predecessors did for seventy-five years, and this is what we all must do in the years ahead, even when it’s tough—in fact, especially when it’s tough.”

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 11, 2024

The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor

By Atlantic Council

Nothing is inevitable, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said at the NATO Public Forum. “It comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.”

Europe & Eurasia NATO

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

Walking into King Charles Street for the first time as foreign secretary last Friday, I passed the bust of Ernest Bevin.

Bevin was an inspirational Labour foreign secretary—and is a personal hero of mine. He was proud of his working-class origins, firmly internationalist in outlook, and committed to realism, a politics based on respect for the facts.

Nowhere was this clearer than in his role helping to create the NATO alliance seventy-five years ago, which included signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 on behalf of the United Kingdom. As foreign secretary, he was equally committed to supporting the nascent United Nations. But he recognized that “naked and unashamed” power politics would limit its ambitions. Establishing NATO therefore became central to his strategy for how to protect Britain and its allies against future aggression.

Moscow protested that this new grouping targeted them. But while Bevin made every effort to engage the Soviet Union in dialogue, he dismissed such criticism. If that was how the Kremlin felt about a defensive alliance, that said much about its intentions.

Seventy-five years on, the wisdom of Bevin’s approach is as clear as ever.

Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations remain indispensable. But they are struggling under the strain of multiple challenges. With a return of war to our continent and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with our closest allies is firmly in the national interest.

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 11, 2024

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

By David Lammy

With a return of war to Europe and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with its closest allies is firmly in the national interest, writes UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy.

NATO Politics & Diplomacy

What to expect on day two: Focus on China and rallying behind Ukraine

An eventful second day of the Washington summit is underway. Heads of state will meet with Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union, and the European Commission, followed by a session of the NATO-Ukraine Council. With yesterday’s communiqué labeling China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, expect China to feature prominently on the agenda during the discussions with Indo-Pacific partners. NATO-EU cooperation also received significant attention in the communiqué, with emphasis on ensuring European defense efforts are complementary and interoperable with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication. That is reminiscent of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s three “D’s” (no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication) regarding European defense ambitions. As the European Union gradually emerges from its election cycle, the new Commission’s defense ambitions will be under particular scrutiny.

Allied leaders will also meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the NATO-Ukraine Council. Following yesterday’s announcement of a minimum baseline funding of forty billion euros within the next year, more air defense systems, and F-16s for Ukraine, discussions will focus on reaffirming that Ukraine’s future lies in NATO. Expect talks on speeding up aid, allowing the use of allied weapons for striking targets deeper in Russia, and adopting a more forceful stance in support of Ukraine.

• Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Celebration—with a tinge of frustration and worry

• Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

• An exclusive look behind the scenes, courtesy of Philippe Dickinson

• How Russian aggression is transforming European security 

• Beyond the Beltway, Americans’ support for NATO remains strong

• Stoltenberg: If China continues enabling Russia, it can’t expect a “normal relationship” with NATO allies

• What is Poland’s role in Euro-Atlantic security?

• US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the ‘blunt military reality’ about NATO

• A fond (and substantive) farewell from Stoltenberg

• Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s rousing kickoff speeches should linger in leaders’ heads

• Allies launch new initiative to aid Ukrainian servicewomen

• What will NATO leaders make of Orbán’s “peace missions”?

• See our previous analysis

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Celebration—with a tinge of frustration and worry

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

The final communiqué calls Ukraine’s pathway toward NATO “irreversible.” For a consensus-based organization, that’s a big deal. On top of that, we can finally see Ukraine’s “bridge” to NATO membership taking form, with the Alliance vowing to station a senior civilian in Kyiv and to set up a command in Wiesbaden, Germany for coordinating security assistance and training—with allies agreeing to send the Ukrainians a package of new air defense systems, including four Patriot batteries.

But with allied leaders saying the bridge will be short and well-lit, major questions remain about the duration and lighting. And what happens between now and Ukraine’s eventual membership, which could still be decades away?

From my conversations around town, I’m gathering that there’s also a sense of frustration amid the celebrations. Thus far there have been no announcements that the United States is willing to loosen the restrictions on how the Ukrainians can use US-supplied weapons. People seem frustrated that Ukraine can’t strike deep inside Russia, and there’s a feeling that the United States is making Ukrainians fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

There is also a somewhat somber mood regarding the US election. US President Joe Biden’s speech last night at the summit kickoff was strong and presidential, but there’s still some doubt about whether he has what it takes to pull off a win in November. And a loss for Biden means a win for former US President Donald Trump, which further rattles already-nervous Europeans. What I’ve been saying to them here at the summit is this: Tell NATO’s story, because it’s a good one. Keep increasing defense spending; twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are now spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an increase from nine allies when Biden took office. And keep shouldering more of the defense burden for the European continent. This is likely what Europeans will wind up needing to do anyway, so best to start now.

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Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

What can thirty-two allies accomplish in forty-four paragraphs? NATO leaders on Wednesday afternoon released the Washington Summit Declaration, a consensus document setting forth what the Alliance stands for. In the case of Ukraine, it lays out a “bridge” to membership and a long-term financial commitment, but stops short of declaring when the country will be formally invited into the Alliance, as it continues to battle Russia’s full-scale invasion. The document is also notably tough on China, which it describes as the “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Our experts dig into the fine print below to break down what’s in the communiqué—and what isn’t.

New Atlanticist

Jul 10, 2024

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts offer their insights on NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration, released on Wednesday during the Alliance’s seventy-fifth-anniversary meeting in the US capital.

China Europe & Eurasia

Watch our experts give their takes

An exclusive look behind the scenes, courtesy of Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative Philippe Dickinson takes viewers behind the scenes of the NATO Public Forum, where allied leaders are discussing the issues at the top of NATO’s agenda.

How Russian aggression is transforming European security 

Amid ongoing discussions on the nature of the “bridge” to Ukraine’s NATO membership, what should be the criteria for a successful Washington summit in terms of the Alliance’s support for Kyiv?

“Success is that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin makes a call to his defense minister and tells him to get out of Ukraine,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski today at the NATO Public Forum, where he was joined by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielus Landsbergis and Micael Johansson, the president and CEO of Saab, for a panel moderated by Atlantic Council Executive Vice President Jenna Ben-Yehuda. 

In the more immediate future, NATO needs to give Ukraine “a very clear commitment” that “we are serious about the invitation,” Landsbergis said. Ultimately, though, Landsbergis echoed Sikorski’s answer on what constitutes success for the Alliance. “If it’s not a victory,” for Ukraine “then it’s a loss. If it’s a loss, it’s our loss,” not just Ukraine’s, he said. 

Both Sikorski and Landsbergis cited their countries’ history and geography when noting their increases in defense spending. Landsbergis highlighted that in the Baltic region, “there is no big debate whether we should be funding our defense,” touting Lithuania’s commitment to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Sikorski added, “We will do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again, irrespective of what anybody else does.” 

When it comes to the private sector’s role in bolstering European security, Johansson called Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “huge wake-up call” for industry. Johansson noted that the European defense industry is “there to support” Ukraine, but outlined some of the obstacles to a better defense investment climate on the continent. One solution to this, he noted, would be for NATO to more clearly outline its capability requirements over a ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe to justify longer-term investments. He also argued that greater European Union (EU) defense investment would help persuade the European defense industry, whose leadership was shaped by a “peace dividend period,” that defense spending will remain high into the future.

While the Washington summit is focused on European security, Sikorski sees an emerging threat from Russia taking shape in Africa. “This business of Russian mercenaries taking over African resources” and destabilizing African nations “has to end.” To counter this threat, Sikorski recommended using an EU rapid reaction force, which he hopes will be operational in a few years. “We don’t need to beg the United States to solve every problem for us,” he said.

At the same time, Landsbergis emphasized that in the event of major global conflicts, neither the United States nor Europe could act effectively alone. “We need these two pillars of the transatlantic alliance working together,” he said.

Note: Saab is a corporate partner for the NATO Public Forum. More information on forum sponsors can be found here.

Beyond the Beltway, Americans’ support for NATO remains strong

NATO is all over Washington, DC, this week. Rows of blue banners adorn lampposts announcing the summit. Heads of state and government have been spotted weaving through the streets in motorcades. On Monday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg even threw out the opening pitch at a Nationals baseball game.

It would be easy in all this DC-based activity to overlook an important fact: Americans’ support for NATO extends well beyond the US capital. According to the latest polling among a nationwide sample of the US public by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a strong majority—67 percent—of Americans say NATO remains “essential” to US security. Chicago Council polling from last year shows that an even larger share, 78 percent, say the United States should increase or maintain its current support of the Alliance. Moreover, this support is broadly bipartisan, with 92 percent of Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans saying the United States should increase or maintain support. 

Americans’ support for NATO extends across generations as well as across the political aisle. As the Chicago Council’s June poll reveals, 70 percent of Baby Boomers view NATO as “essential” to US security—but so do 67 percent of Generation Z, all of whom were born after the end of the Cold War. Three-quarters or more or respondents across generations—Silent, Baby Boomer, Generation X, Millennial, and Generation Z— told the Chicago Council last year that they favor maintaining or increasing the US commitment to NATO.

Finally, on the important question of NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense guarantee, majorities of respondents across all generations (though only a slim majority of Millennials) said last year that they would support US troops defending NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia if Russia invaded. Many Americans, it seems, agree with what US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said this morning: “NATO has always stood by us, and we’re going to stand by NATO.”

Stoltenberg: If China continues enabling Russia, it can’t expect a “normal relationship” with NATO allies 

“The paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed [to] long-term support to Ukraine, the sooner this war can end,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday. 

Stoltenberg spoke with Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum, saying that he expected allies to, within hours, agree on a “bridge” to NATO membership that aims to bring Ukraine’s defense systems and infrastructure closer to those in the Alliance. With the bridge in place, the hope is that once NATO extends an invitation to Ukraine, “they can become members straight away,” Stoltenberg said. 

Stoltenberg said that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would help stop Russia’s “pattern of aggression”—in which it has violated ceasefire agreements and continued to illegally annex portions of Ukraine. “When the fighting stops, we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia, and they need security guarantees,” he explained. “And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article 5.” 

Stoltenberg said that “China is the main enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with China continuing to sell Russia tools and technology that Moscow is using to produce its weaponry. “If China continues, they cannot have it both ways,” Stoltenberg warned. “They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies . . . and then continue to fuel the war in Europe.” 

One of the major developments over Stoltenberg’s decade as secretary general is closer engagement with the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific partners. “The threats and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge,” Stoltenberg argued, adding that the Alliance is facing more and more global challenges—from cyberwarfare to space-security threats. During the Washington summit, Stoltenberg said, NATO and its global partners are working on flagship projects related to technology and supporting Ukraine. Still, he stressed that NATO will not add Indo-Pacific members. “We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners . . . to address these global challenges.” 

With a potential change in administrations raising concern about the United States’ role in NATO, Stoltenberg said he is “an optimist,” reminding the audience that over the course of NATO’s seventy-five years, similar concerns have cropped up as elections took place in various allied countries. But, he said, “we have proven extremely resilient and strong . . . all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians—they realize that we are safer and stronger together.” 

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 10, 2024

‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

By Atlantic Council

The outgoing NATO secretary general spoke with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

What is Poland’s role in Euro-Atlantic security?

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the ‘blunt military reality’ about NATO

“I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today,” US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the NATO Public Forum this morning. “And we are determined to keep it that way.”

To help keep it that way, the US defense secretary outlined an “ambitious” agenda that heads of state and government from NATO’s thirty-two allies would tackle at the Washington summit this week.

First, Austin said, the Alliance will continue to implement its so-called “family of plans” to ensure the defense of “every inch” of NATO. This “family” includes (as the Atlantic Council’s Luka Ignac has explained) three regional defense strategies for the Alliance covering the Atlantic and European Arctic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and Black seas. It also includes an array of subordinate plans covering areas such as cyber and space. Austin called this new defensive strategy for the Alliance the “most robust since the Cold War.”

Second, NATO allies will pledge this week to expand industrial capacity across the Alliance. This is intended to help scale up much-needed military production and to send signals to industry as it makes long-term decisions about where to focus its attention and resources.

Third, NATO this week aims to deepen its cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense, Austin said. This includes a new effort by the Alliance to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine. 

Austin was unequivocal in his condemnation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “imperial invasion” of Ukraine. He likened it to the “sickening blow of unprovoked aggression” that US President Harry S. Truman, referencing the first and second world wars, spoke about at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. “We will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice,” Austin said. “But we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security,” he added, noting that F-16 fighter aircraft were at that moment on their way to Ukrainian forces. 

Fourth, Austin said that the Alliance will seek to deepen cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific and around the world. “I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine,” Austin said. “That just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security.” This is the third year in a row that leaders of Japan and South Korea are attending the annual NATO Summit.

Austin’s speech underscored the wide-ranging nature of the challenges that the Alliance faces today. As Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe said when introducing Austin, “The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor.” 

The room was filled with visitors from across the Alliance and the world. But Austin saved his final words for an audience closer to home: Americans. 

“Here’s the blunt military reality,” said a man who spent forty-one years in uniform before becoming US secretary of defense. “America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies.

“And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.” 

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 10, 2024

Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin

By Atlantic Council

At the Washington summit, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed NATO’s history and the Alliance’s plans to bolster support for Ukraine.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

A fond (and substantive) farewell from Stoltenberg

Outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was first up after the coffee break at the NATO Public Forum this morning. Appearing in conversation with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, Stoltenberg came on stage caffeinated and animated, sitting forward in his chair, joking about his first pitch at the Washington Nationals game earlier this week and reminiscing on his longevity in the role.

His main announcement was the (likely) five-pillared package of support for Ukraine that he expected to be announced at the summit, comprising of:

1. Institutionalized assistance to Ukraine, in the form of a new command in Wiesbaden, Germany, staffed with seven hundred NATO personnel to coordinate training and assistance to Ukraine;
2. A new “substantial” long-term aid package to Kyiv;
3. Additional military support, including air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced were currently being transferred to Ukraine;
4. At least twenty bilateral security agreements between Ukraine and NATO members;
5. Enhanced interoperability between NATO and Ukraine.

Reflecting on his involvement with NATO summits dating back to 2001, the secretary general projected an optimistic tone for the future of the Alliance. He has made incredible contributions to NATO over those twenty-three years. And the mutual affection was evident in the room, with a warm and prolonged standing ovation to send him on his way back across the street to the summit.

Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s rousing kickoff speeches should linger in leaders’ heads

Sitting in the auditorium where NATO was born for Tuesday night’s official opening for the NATO Summit, it was hard not to be inspired by the unity and symbolism on display. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg gave one of the most forceful speeches of his career. “Everyone in this room has a responsibility, as political leaders, as experts, as citizens,” he said. “We must show the same courage and determination in the future, as was demonstrated in the past when NATO was founded and shaped.”

Stoltenberg was followed by an equally passionate address from US President Joe Biden, who announced a donation of new air defenses for Ukraine and awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Stoltenberg. Biden also extolled the virtues of the Alliance, pointing out how polls show that Americans in both parties back NATO. “And the American people understand what would happen if there was no NATO: Another war in Europe, American troops fighting and dying, dictators spreading chaos, economic collapse, catastrophe,” Biden said. “Americans, they know we’re stronger with our friends. And we understand this is a sacred obligation.”

Both leaders gave it their all. Now that the celebration is over, the hard work begins. Friendship, as both leaders noted, takes work, but we are ultimately stronger for it. Defending our shared future requires Europe to step up and do more on deterrence and defense, alongside the United States. As the summit continues, Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s words should be ringing in their fellow leaders’ ears.

Allies launch new initiative to aid Ukrainian servicewomen

Yesterday, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Irene Fellin and the US State Department co-hosted a WPS roundtable, one of only two official side events at the Washington summit. A dedicated event focused on advancing WPS at NATO has become a fixture of the past three summits. But this WPS roundtable was different. 

As Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine with no end in sight, allies reaffirmed their commitment to the WPS agenda. But this year, several allies put their words into action by funding ten thousand specialized gear sets for women in the Ukrainian armed forces. This initiative was supported by the United States with financial contributions through NATO’s comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, and Norway. For allies that want to do more for WPS and Ukraine but have minimal resources to contribute, funding for women’s gear for the Ukrainian armed forces costs a small fraction of the forty billion euros in military aid that allies have pledged to Ukraine in the coming year. NATO should certainly celebrate this win, since ill-fitting gear has placed Ukrainian servicewomen at increased risk of injury on the battlefield. 

As NATO launches its plan for Ukraine’s “bridge to membership” this week, funding gear for women in the Ukrainian armed forces will remain a low-cost, high-impact effort that puts allied commitments for both WPS and Ukraine into action. That said, allies must also remember that this is one of several options on the table for advancing WPS within their continued support to Ukraine. It will be interesting to see how committed allies will be to including WPS considerations within efforts to shore up Ukraine’s defense capabilities, institution building, and military interoperability over the next year.

What will NATO leaders make of Orbán’s “peace missions”?

May you live in interesting times, the old saying goes, but what about living in the weirdest of times? Reflecting the strangeness of the current situation in international politics, one of the leaders of NATO arrived in Washington on Tuesday to attend the Alliance’s historic summit straight from visiting the capitals of NATO’s main adversaries, and just shortly after criticizing NATO and its leaders for being “pro-war” in a Newsweek op-ed.

Less than a week into holding the rotating presidency of the European Union (EU), Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has been jet-setting around the world to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, purportedly on a “peace mission” to help negotiate the ending of the war in Ukraine. In Beijing, Orbán endorsed Xi’s twelve-point peace plan for Ukraine and highlighted that Hungary will use the EU presidency “as an opportunity to actively promote the sound development of EU-China relations,” i.e. to de-escalate EU-China trade tensions and to reverse the shift to de-risking.

EU, US, and NATO leaders have been quick to condemn Orbán for his visits to Moscow and Beijing, with the representatives of the European Union also fuming at the suggestion that the Hungarian leader negotiated as “the president of the EU.”

Orbán landed in Washington with NATO allies planning to give Ukraine the necessary help for its self-defense and a “bridge to NATO membership” by setting up a new NATO command in charge of supplying arms and military aid to Kyiv.

One of the big questions swirling around the Washington summit, then, is how much further allied leaders will go in responding to one of their own going completely rogue. Another is whether Orbán will sign off at the summit on more support for Ukraine in a war that has just seen some of its bloodiest days.

But it’s worth noting that none of this is terribly new. Since the breakout of Putin’s war, Hungary has opposed Western support for Ukraine and refused to provide weapons or allow other countries to transport weapons to Ukraine through Hungarian territory. Under Orbán’s leadership, Hungary has oriented its foreign policy around Russian and Chinese interests since 2014, doing the two powers’ bidding inside the European Union and NATO and becoming increasingly hostile to the leaders of the United States and the EU. For a NATO ally, Hungary’s behavior has been strange for quite a while, but these days we are seeing even stranger things.

• Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Learn from front-line allies

• How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

• A Nordic-Baltic message to Washington: Future-proofing NATO begins in Ukraine 

• So what’s the strategy for NATO?

• NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s arctic expansion

• Inflection Points Today: The split screens haunting the NATO Summit

• For NATO, this summit is more than an anniversary—it’s a homecoming

• Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

• The NSC’s Michael Carpenter details Ukraine’s “bridge to membership”

• See our pre-summit analysis

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Learn from front-line allies

In my past job as a NATO official, I helped prepare for several of these summits, but none of them was quite like this one. This summit needs to deliver strong outcomes—not only because it’s the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary, but also because we are in Washington (with the US presidential race heating up) and the world is proving more and more volatile, dangerous, and uncertain.

That’s probably weighing heavily on the allied leaders who are crowding Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium this evening for the official summit opening, hosted by US President Joe Biden. For several of those officials—specifically eight from Nordic and Baltic countries—their first stop today was Atlantic Council headquarters, to discuss cooperation in NATO’s northeast.

It is the easternmost and northernmost allies—including my home of Lithuania, where I served as deputy defense minister—that intimately understand the nature of the Russian threat. Because of that common understanding, these countries demand more from themselves: All of them (except Iceland, which doesn’t have a standing military) exceed the NATO target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense.

The Nordic-Baltic agenda for the summit rests primarily on making sure the rest of the Alliance feels that sense of urgency. I’ll be watching closely to see whether NATO increases its defense budget targets and produces clarity on Ukraine’s path to joining the Alliance. But the Nordic-Baltic agenda also includes committing capabilities to implement NATO’s defense plans that were agreed to last year in Vilnius, and reaffirming US leadership in NATO while “future-proofing”—not just “Trump-proofing,” as many are saying—the Alliance with strong commitments from Europe.

The communiqué released at the end of this summit will include dozens of carefully written paragraphs agreed to by consensus. Yet eloquent writing cannot make up for a lack of concrete decisions on capabilities, Ukraine, and investments.

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How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

In a dangerous world, NATO’s role has never been more important. Yet, to remain relevant, the Alliance needs to adapt to today’s security challenges at greater scale and speed. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it took three years for NATO to deploy the enhanced Forward Presence battalions in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, two-and-a-half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the allies have neither defined Ukraine’s path to NATO membership nor delivered what Ukraine needs to win. This “too little, too late” approach from NATO neglects the security interests of member states and empowers the Alliance’s adversaries.

At the latest NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Prague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised Ukraine a “bridge” to NATO. For a start, US President Joe Biden at the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Italy delivered a three-pronged blow to Moscow­—a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, a fifty billion dollar loan to Ukraine from several nations backed by payments from Russia’s immobilized assets, and a new bilateral US-Ukraine security pact to ensure long-term aid.

Additionally, NATO’s new report on defense spending shows that twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are on pace to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) benchmark for defense spending this year. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, twenty-three allies is “more than twice as many as four years ago and demonstrates that European allies and Canada are really stepping up and taking their share of the common responsibility to protect all of us in the NATO alliance.”

These are positive steps, but they do not solve the lack of speed and scale that plagues NATO’s decision making. NATO should tackle three big sets of deliverables at the Washington summit that began today. At the summit, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to start accession talks, augment military support to Kyiv, and substantially elevate member states’ defense budgets to reach a collective 3 percent of GDP, with an allocation of 0.25 percent of GDP to Ukraine’s military assistance. Only then will NATO be operating at the appropriate speed and scale to address the Alliance’s security challenges and deter further threats from its adversaries.

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 9, 2024

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

By Giedrimas Jeglinskas

Allies must do more to augment Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities and bring it into the Alliance, as well as boost their own spending on defense.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

A Nordic-Baltic message to Washington: Future-proofing NATO begins in Ukraine 

The security environment has changed in the Nordic and Baltic regions, not only with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, but also with the rise of cyber and information threats and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  

“In a sense, it’s the old mission coming back with a vengeance,” said Norway’s foreign minister, Espen Barth Eide, at an Atlantic Council event on Tuesday. “And if we didn’t have NATO, we’d have to invent it immediately.” 

Each of the eight Nordic and Baltic foreign ministers and senior officials gathered for the event agreed that they now feel safer with Sweden and Finland having joined the Alliance. Sweden’s foreign minister, Tobias Billström, noted that it was like a “coming home” for them, as joining NATO capped off a thirty-year process of growing closer to the Alliance. Political State Secretary of Finland Pasi Rajala said that joining has been a “big mind shift” for Finns, who have come to realize that they are “no longer alone” in defense. 

As Russia’s war in Ukraine rages on, several speakers argued, continued coordination with each other—and the United States—will be important. “The policy of Russia is war. It’s not going to go away for the next few years,” said Latvia’s foreign minister, Baiba Braže. “So the actions that we take in that regard . . . we need the US to be with us on that.” 

As the NATO Summit begins in Washington, Braže said that she would remind the United States that “they have reliable allies” in NATO. “I think that is something that is very important to internalize for any leading American politician on any side of the aisle,” she said. 

Iceland’s foreign minister, Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir, agreed, saying that the United States also “needs to know that they need true friends and allies.” Rajala added that “NATO is not charity; it’s a two-way street.” 

The prospect of former President Donald Trump’s return to office has raised concerns in Europe about the White House’s prioritization of NATO and support for Ukraine after the November elections. Lars Løkke Rasmussen—Denmark’s foreign minister—said that “instead of discussing whether we can ‘Trump-proof’ things, we should discuss whether we could future-proof things.” Lithuania’s foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, warned that focusing on “just an election” doesn’t answer the question of how allies will “meet this inflection point” in history marked by Russia’s aggression. 

The war in Ukraine has “highlighted the need to step up,” Estonian Undersecretary for Political Affairs Kyllike Sillaste-Elling added. “We don’t have the luxury of waiting anymore. We need to build up NATO’s defense posture.” That can be done by spending more on defense, she added, and ensuring that NATO’s defense plans are able to be implemented.  

Barth Eide argued that the Nordic and Baltic countries have a “responsibility” for maintaining American public support for the idea that backing Ukraine is important for global security. “Because if you live in Europe, it’s hard not to notice what’s happening in Russia. It might not be that obvious in the Midwest or in the deep South of America, we understand that,” he said. “We should also be part of that conversation that this is a good investment for you.”

Watch the full event

Public Event Tue, July 9, 2024 • 9:30 am ET

The Nordic-Baltic region: Cooperation in NATO’s northeast

A virtual discussion on Nordic-Baltic priorities for the Washington Summit, their contributions to NATO security, and Northern Europe’s perspective on alliance challenges.

Europe & Eurasia NATO Northern Europe Security & Defense

So what’s the strategy for NATO?

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

This week, NATO is holding its landmark seventy-fifth anniversary summit. The Washington, DC, event is expected to focus on trade security, the war in Ukraine, and the organization’s greatest adversary, Russia. This comes on the heels of news that a record twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries will reach the Alliance’s defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product this year, according to NATO statistics published on June 17. This increase in spending is in large part a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region. 

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together. 

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New Atlanticist

Jul 9, 2024

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

By David Babikian and Julia Nesheiwat

The Washington summit this week provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 

Geopolitics & Energy Security Maritime Security

Inflection Points Today: The split screens haunting the NATO Summit

The split screen was the devastating work of Vladimir Putin. On one side, a barrage of Russian missile strikes hit Ukraine, and rescue workers search for survivors at Kyiv’s finest children’s hospital. On the other side, heads of state and government arrive in Washington for NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit, the world’s most powerful alliance being shown by Putin as unable to save Ukrainian children.

Another screen shows a NATO leader, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, paying homage to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, following his visit with Putin in Moscow. The next screen shows the leader of the world’s most populous democracy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, making his first visit to Moscow since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Yet another screen shows US President Joe Biden looking lost in his presidential debate, raising new concerns about what his health means for NATO’s future.

No one can convince me it was a coincidence that Putin chose Monday, the eve of the NATO Summit, to launch one of his largest recent barrages of missiles on Ukraine. The leaders of Hungary and India both knew the significance of the timing of their visits—one by the Alliance’s most rogue member and the other by a major power keen to underscore its autonomy of action.

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Inflection Points Today

Jul 9, 2024

Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit

By Frederick Kempe

The split screens haunting the NATO Summit include a deadly attack on a children’s hospital and meetings with autocrats in Moscow and Beijing.

China Europe & Eurasia

For NATO, this summit is more than an anniversary—it’s a homecoming

This evening, US President Joe Biden will host heads of state and government, minister-level officials, and civil-society and private-sector representatives to officially open the NATO Summit. But it’s not only the attendees and the reason for gathering that give this event its monumental significance—it’s also the venue.

In recognition of NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, the White House selected the historic Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium as the location for tonight’s occasion. At that site seventy-five years ago (or more specifically, on April 4, 1949) then US President Harry S. Truman convened with eleven allies—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—in signing the historic North Atlantic Treaty, enshrining the principals of collective defense and transforming the global order in the aftermath of World War II.

Since then, the world has changed dramatically. In seventy-five years, NATO now includes thirty-two highly capable allies committed to transatlantic cooperation. Defense investments are at record-breaking highs with two-thirds of NATO member states now reaching the spending benchmark of 2 percent of their gross domestic product. The Alliance is deepening its ties with partners in the Indo-Pacific to protect the rules-based international order and counter rising cooperation between Russia and its allies.

In many ways, tonight will be a homecoming for the Alliance—one that marks an important milestone for NATO and offers allied leaders the opportunity to reflect on seventy-five years of expanding coordination on deterrence and defense.

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

NATO’s recent defense expenditure report was a cringeworthy moment in Madrid. Despite self-applauding recent years of defense spending growth, Spain had the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last among Alliance members for defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), clocking in at an estimated 1.28 percent for 2024. Although consistently investing in equipment expenditures at or above the NATO guideline of 20 percent of its defense budget, Spain’s inability to spend on defense at a rate agreed upon by allies will lend credence to naysayers who question its commitment to the Alliance.

However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

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New Atlanticist

Jul 9, 2024

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

By Andrew Bernard

While Spain still falls short of its defense spending goals, Madrid nevertheless leads NATO missions, supports Ukraine, and helps guard Europe’s southern flank.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

The NSC’s Michael Carpenter details Ukraine’s “bridge to membership”

On the eve of the NATO Summit, US National Security Council’s Michael Carpenter broke down one of the summit’s biggest expected outcomes on Monday at the Atlantic Council: Ukraine’s “bridge to membership.” 

“We have a meaty, solid deliverable for Ukraine” that includes support for training and force development, a new senior civilian representative in Kyiv, and bilateral financial pledges, Carpenter explained. “We want Ukraine to have the capabilities, the readiness, to be able to essentially plug and play with the rest of the Alliance on day one when they get the invitation.”

Carpenter appeared at a curtain-raiser event held by the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. He spoke alongside Benedetta Berti, head of policy planning at NATO, and Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.  

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made clear that “spending in defense is not a luxury,” but rather it “is incredibly essential,” Berti said. In preparing for “resourcing our defense plans,” she explained, “a number of countries” will need to spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. But “the trajectory is positive,” she said; “they understand that 2 percent truly is the bottom, the bare minimum.” 

Ahead of US elections in November, the prospect of a new administration is raising concerns about the United States’ role in NATO. Kroenig noted that while former President Donald Trump has had “some tough words” for NATO allies, so too did former Democratic administrations. He then pointed to a study that found broad support for NATO across the US political spectrum. “The support for NATO is bipartisan and strong,” he said, “stronger than some people might think looking at the headlines.” 

Watch the full event

Public Event Mon, July 8, 2024 • 2:30 pm ET

All eyes on Washington: What to expect at the 2024 NATO Summit

A discussion on the priorities, essential deliverables and the most important messages for the Washington Summit.

• Dispatch from the NATO Summit: What to watch this week, beyond the political fireworks

• Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

• Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

• The three items at the top of NATO’s summit agenda

• What to expect at the NATO Summit in Washington

• Inflection Points: The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

• The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.
• See our earlier analysis and insight

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: What to watch this week, beyond the political fireworks

Just last week, the roads in Washington were packed with fireworks-seeking Americans celebrating the Fourth of July. Now, several downtown roads are closed and NATO flags wave in the rare breeze. Thanks to the many workers who toiled in baking heat, this city is ready for the NATO Summit.

Washington is hosting the summit for the first time since 1999—a geopolitical lifetime ago. This year is NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, and there is a sense of anticipation that this could be a make-or-break summit for the Alliance.

There will be a lot of focus on politics—and not just because the summit is taking place in politics-obsessed Washington (where residents form long lines outside bars for presidential-debate watch parties). One of NATO’s major goals will be to project unity. On this front, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s unexpected trips to Moscow and Beijing in recent days haven’t helped.

Ukraine and the defining question of its future membership in NATO will test the display of unity. The White House has talked about building a “bridge to membership” for Ukraine. At Atlantic Council headquarters this afternoon, the US National Security Council’s Mike Carpenter hinted at what that bridge would be made of: financial pledges, numerous bilateral security agreements, and a new senior NATO civilian post in Kyiv.

But NATO is a military alliance as well as a political one. Tangible progress on military planning efforts might not get the headlines, but it will be consequential for NATO’s ability to deter aggression. NATO nerds will be keeping an eye out for how the Alliance operationalizes NATO’s regional plans, develops its multi-domain warfighting abilities, reforms its command-and-control structure, and refines how allied militaries quickly work together in a crisis.

As a co-host of the NATO Public Forum, the Atlantic Council will be at the heart of the action, guiding allied leaders and senior officials in conversations about the top issues on the agenda.

To receive our dispatches from the NATO Summit directly in your inbox, subscribe here.

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

Though all eyes will be on Ukraine as NATO leaders gather in Washington this week, the Alliance cannot afford to ignore the Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies face what is perhaps the most daunting international security environment since World War II. Revisionist autocracies—China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are working together to disrupt and displace the US-led, rules-based international system, including through military aggression and coercion. The challenge facing the free world, therefore, is how to simultaneously counter multiple adversaries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe, but this is the wrong answer. Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific . . .

We propose the following actions for NATO and its constituent members to bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region. Some of these initiatives are already underway, but there is room to both intensify these activities and expand them to include fuller participation from additional transatlantic partners.

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Memo to…

Jul 8, 2024

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

By Matthew Kroenig, Jeffrey Cimmino

NATO and its constituent members must bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around existing US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region.

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This week, NATO allies will gather in Washington DC, to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance. Many of those allies have historically failed to meet the NATO target, set in 2014, of allocating 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, even as the United States in particular has pushed for more defense investment for the sake of burden sharing across the Alliance. However, this year, a record number of countries have stepped up. Out of the thirty-two NATO allies, twenty-three now meet the 2 percent target, up from just six countries in 2021. 

This surge in defense spending follows Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war in Ukraine has prompted an unprecedented 18 percent increase in defense spending this year among NATO allies across Europe and Canada. In total, NATO countries now meet the 2 percent target, together spending 2.71 percent of their GDP on defense. This creates positive momentum and success to build on for the Washington summit, which is expected to highlight the Alliance’s collective strength and focus on deeper integration with Ukraine. 

Poland stands out as the biggest spender, allocating 4.12 percent of its GDP to defense. Sweden has also increased its defense spending dramatically since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Washington summit will witness Sweden’s first participation in a NATO summit as an official NATO member, following its accession in March.  

As NATO celebrates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the large increase in defense spending can help renew the Alliance’s unity and strength to continue supporting Ukraine and be prepared for the future. 

The three items at the top of NATO’s summit agenda

What to expect at the NATO Summit in Washington

Inflection Points: The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

Amid the noise accompanying NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington this week—with the backdrop of growing concerns over US President Joe Biden’s health—you can be excused if you missed last week’s meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Kazakhstan.

The SCO’s ten member countries, led by China and Russia, reached twenty-five agreements on enhancing cooperation in energy, security, trade, finance, and information security, including the adoption of something expansively called the “Initiative on World Unity for Just Peace, Harmony, and Development.”

Western leaders often roll their eyes at the lofty language and empty agreements of the SCO, which was invented in 2001. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the intention behind the SCO’s ambition to be a counterweight to NATO and a piece of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s larger goals to supplant the existing global order of rules and institutions with something more to their own liking . . .

Even if one sets the SCO meeting entirely to the side, NATO leaders this week confront three simultaneous but underestimated threats, none of them explicitly on their agenda.

These threats are: (1) considerably increased coordination, particularly in the defense-industrial realm, among adversarial autocracies; (2) continued and growing weaknesses among democracies (underscored in the Atlantic Council’s newest edition of its Freedom and Prosperity Indexes); and (3) insufficient recognition among NATO’s thirty-two members of the gravity of the historic moment, reflected in their still-inadequate backing for Ukraine.

“Like a lightning strike illuminating a dim landscape,” wrote Jonathan Rauch in the Atlantic last week, “the twin invasions of Israel and Ukraine have brought a sudden recognition: What appeared to be, until now, disparate and disorganized challenges to the United States and its allies is actually something broader, more integrated, more aggressive, and more dangerous.”

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Inflection Points

Jul 8, 2024

The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

By Frederick Kempe

Autocracies’ growing common cause, democracies’ continued weaknesses, and an insufficient recognition of the gravity of the historic moment confront the Alliance as it meets in Washington.

Central Asia China

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

The NATO Summit will take place in Washington, DC, this week, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of history’s most successful military alliance. A major topic of the summit will be Russia’s war in Ukraine and Ukraine’s future relationship to the Alliance. Some believe that it is risky to talk about Ukraine joining NATO any time soon, but, on the contrary, the free world would be much safer with Ukraine in the Alliance. Membership for Ukraine would be fundamental for lasting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, benefiting both Ukraine and NATO.

At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO members declared that Ukraine would join the Alliance at some unspecified point in the future. At last year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, following Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allies reaffirmed their 2008 commitment, adding the tautological qualifier that they would only “extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

This year, the Alliance is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” which will consist of a number of measures meant to strengthen Ukraine. These measures are expected to include NATO’s stepped-up role in coordinating military assistance and pledging long-term support, as well as individual Alliance members promising investments in Ukraine’s defense industrial base and further development of bilateral security agreements. However, these steps still fall well short of an invitation to join the Alliance.

Hesitancy to extend an invitation to join the Alliance stems mostly from a concern about what Ukrainian membership would mean for the security of existing NATO allies, including the United States. Would an invitation be provocative to Russia and set off a new cycle of escalation? What does it mean to extend a NATO Article 5 security guarantee to a country already in conflict, and would this be tantamount to a NATO declaration of war against Russia? Even if the current conflict dies down, creating space for Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to abandon his deep desire to reconquer Ukraine. Would not a future Russian attack on Ukraine set off a direct NATO-Russia war?

To help answer these questions, the Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring that brought together dozens of leading experts, including current US and allied government officials, to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. Some exercises were set in the near future, after Ukraine had already joined NATO, while others gamed out the process of Ukraine joining NATO. The scenarios included variants in which Ukraine had succeeded in taking back all of its territory, and others in which parts of the country remained occupied by Russia.

The results of the exercises were unequivocal: Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. 

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New Atlanticist

Jul 7, 2024

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

By Matthew Kroenig and Kristjan Prikk

The Atlantic Council recently held a series of tabletop exercises to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. The results are clear.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

• NATO’s Irene Fellin: The inclusion of women, peace, and security in its plans may be the Alliance’s biggest achievement
• Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

• Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

• This NATO Summit will be of historic importance

• Smart in sixty seconds: Why NATO matters

NATO’s Irene Fellin: The inclusion of women, peace, and security in its plans may be the Alliance’s biggest achievement

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

WARSAW, Poland—After ten days in Warsaw, I’m struck by Poland’s rise, politically and militarily—even amid the dangers the country faces from Russia and Poles’ intensified post-debate doubts about the steadiness of the United States.

Poland’s strategic consensus—in support of Ukraine, opposed to Russia’s aggression, pro-NATO, and committed to its alliance with the United States—is solid, notwithstanding second-order (and avoidable) sniping between the governing coalition and the rightist opposition that controls the presidency. That’s more than can be said for France or, for that matter, the United States.

Poland’s dark assessment of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been vindicated. But the Poles are not indulging in declinist pessimism or Ukraine fatigue. Poland’s best analysts, including those within Warsaw’s top-notch Center for Eastern Studies, are more optimistic about the course of the war in Ukraine than I have heard in a long time. They don’t foresee easy Ukrainian success, but their bottom line is that time is no longer necessarily on the Kremlin’s side—if the West keeps up the pressure. Relative success for Ukraine is possible, the analysts maintain, if—though only if—the West keeps backing Ukraine by delivering more weapons with fewer conditions, tightening economic pressure against Russia, and generally pushing back on Putin’s imperial ambitions. (I’d come to Poland for the Atlantic Council’s “Warsaw Week” events and a Warsaw University conference on how to deter Russia.)

In a good precedent for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, Poland’s military spending started to rise sharply under the previous government, and that trend has continued under the current one. Newly purchased heavy equipment, tanks, and fighter aircraft are arriving to replace tanks and aircraft that Poland sent to Ukraine shortly after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.

But the West, the key institutions of which Poland joined at great effort, is no longer looking as sure as Poland had counted on. The June 27 debate between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump came as a shock to the Poles, who, like many, had not expected such a poor showing from Biden. The next day, many Poles were more openly contemplating the increased possibility of a second Trump term and weighing Poland’s options if the former president were to return to the White House. Trump’s more critical statements about NATO and friendly statements about Putin alarm many in Warsaw. But Polish politicians on both sides of the country’s political divide have good relations with many US Republicans both inside and outside Trump world, including Trump himself. They are now considering how to use these relationships to advance Poland’s customary “free world first” strategy.

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New Atlanticist

Jul 5, 2024

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

By Daniel Fried

Its rise at home and its strategic clarity about Russia have placed Poland in the first rank of European powers for the first time in centuries.

NATO Poland

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

From July 9 to 11, the United States will host the NATO Summit in Washington, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of what has been deemed by some as the world’s “most successful military alliance.” While the summit will mark an important milestone in NATO’s history, it will also provide an opportunity to discuss the future of the Alliance and for high-level officials to engage in discussions about boosting defense and deterrence in the most dangerous security environment since the Cold War.

Among those attending the summit will be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey has been a major contributor to NATO’s operations around the world since it joined the Alliance in 1952 to defend itself and NATO’s southeastern flank against the Soviet threat. Today, as the Alliance’s second-largest military power and the gatekeeper of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey plays a critical role in European stability and security. However, the complex nature of Ankara’s relationship with Washington and a lack of dialogue between the allies have often overshadowed the successes in the transatlantic partnership and limited opportunities for cooperation.

US Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake recently said that the NATO Summit provides an opportunity for a meeting between Erdoğan and US President Joe Biden, as “there is some desire on both sides” to do so. It remains unclear, however, whether this meeting will take place. Erdoğan’s previously scheduled visit to the White House in May was canceled due to scheduling problems, as cited by both sides, and Flake said it happened at a time when the crisis in Gaza cast a “difficult political backdrop.”

Despite that backdrop, Biden and Erdoğan shouldn’t let another opportunity to meet go to waste, as close cooperation would bring to bear several geopolitical, economic, and security benefits.

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TURKEYSource

Jul 5, 2024

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

By Yevgeniya Gaber

Strengthening relations between the US and Turkey will be critical for the future of the Alliance’s regional defense strategies.

Conflict Eastern Europe

This NATO Summit will be of historic importance

Smart in sixty seconds: Why NATO matters

Chart the Alliance’s future

As the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces revanchist old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order. This series features seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security. 

The post Live expertise and behind-the-scenes insight as NATO leaders gather at the Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

One of the IMF’s tasks is indeed to deflect some of the political blame from a government that has committed to fiscal adjustment measures and faces public opposition. Even after the bill was withdrawn, however, public anger has yet to subside, fueled by killings of demonstrators and accusations of corruption and misuse of public money.

The truth is, of course, that Kenya’s decline into fiscal trouble has been entirely predictable, led by the ambitions of past leaders who followed the path of easy money. Especially during the mid-2010s, under President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya was looking for ways to leverage its “frontier market” status into higher growth via debt-financed investments and infrastructure projects. As a result, within a decade, Kenya’s public debt ratio almost doubled from 41 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 to a projected 78 percent of GDP in 2024.

One prominent creditor has been China’s Export-Import Bank, which provided Kenya with $3.2 billion to build a Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) between Nairobi and the port of Mombasa—a project that has been criticized because of its weak governance and high cost but, according to recent reports, will be extended to Kenya’s western border with Uganda.

Although public investment does have an important role in raising a country’s economic fortunes, Kenyans are still waiting to see the social returns of the debt-financed investment spree. GDP growth has hovered around 5 percent since the mid-2000s, real GDP per capita has stagnated in recent years, and the poverty rate (at just below 40 percent) remains above pre-COVID-19 levels. It is no wonder that the fiscal belt-tightening now required to arrest a further run-up of public debt has met with resistance, amid legitimate questions about who benefited from the loans that ordinary Kenyans now have to repay.

Ruto, in office since 2022, carries his share of responsibility for the fiscal sins of the past, having been vice president in the previous administration and a proponent of the Chinese railway loan. His government is also dealing with droughts and the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, which hit Kenya and other frontier markets particularly hard, including through spillover effects from global inflation and higher interest rates. Being caught out in a weak fiscal position and facing eventual default, Kenya turned to the IMF in 2021 to help stabilize its finances, including a “multi-year fiscal consolidation effort centered on raising tax revenues and tightly controlling spending.”

The government did reasonably well under this program, which originally foresaw a steady pace of fiscal adjustment (at about 1 percentage point of GDP per year over five years) and allowed for measures to absorb its social impact. Both the primary fiscal deficit and the trade balance improved, and the shilling unwound much of its decline vis-à-vis the US dollar as Kenya surprised markets by repaying a two-billion-dollar Eurobond last month. Moreover, the program unlocked a considerable amount of concessional multilateral financing, including from the World Bank.

But the country remains in a financial hole from which it will be very difficult to climb out. One problem is that higher interest rates keep adding to Kenya’s debt dynamics, as illustrated by the hefty 10 percent interest rate on a smaller Eurobond that Kenya issued in February to meet its June payment. Therefore, despite an improvement of the primary deficit broadly in line with program targets, Kenya’s public debt is still projected to increase this year.

While the government planned to continue on its programmed adjustment path, the latest package of measures—including tax measures to offset gradual revenue slippages over the years—appears to have been the political straw that broke the camel’s back. So, what are the alternatives available to the government now?

• First, “keep calm and carry on” may be the motto of the day. The government appears to be looking for spending measures to substitute for lost revenues, but this will not be viable in the long term. Expenditure compression has its own distributional (and political) consequences, and the overall fiscal adjustment strategy will need to be balanced across revenue and spending items.
• Second, with interest payments accounting for more than a quarter of total revenue, the Kenyan government may decide to seek a debt restructuring. This is not something the IMF could impose on Kenya, unless it judged that public debt was unsustainable. However, the government went to great lengths in the past to service its debt and retain access to financial markets. It would have been cynical on the part of IMF shareholders, who routinely call for strong ownership from program countries, to force Kenya into an unwanted debt operation—as long as there was still a realistic chance of avoiding it. This now looks less assured, and it may be the only avenue left for the government.
• Third, however, the Export-Import Bank of China is the biggest bilateral lender to Kenya, holding claims worth $6.5 billion, close to two thirds of all bilateral debt. China has a special responsibility to provide debt relief, given the history of corruption and questionable economic value of the SGR project it helped finance. Kenya would have to request a debt treatment under the Group of Twenty (G20) Common Framework, which has recently become more efficient in dealing with problem cases. However, bilateral debt negotiations could still take a long time to resolve, and Kenya would risk being cut off from external financing for a considerable period.

As the government needs to chart a fresh course in this difficult environment, it is also very likely that supporters in the West will call for more money and fewer fiscal adjustment as the solution to Kenya’s problems. The Nairobi-Washington Vision, formulated during Ruto’s state visit to the United States in May, has also called for increased financial support for developing countries. The question is, where should this money come from?

• First, anyone who has looked at a financing needs table of an IMF program (for example, see Table Six here) understands that spending can either be financed by revenues, grants, or borrowing. Since grants don’t carry any interest or repayment burden, they would be ideal for a country in Kenya’s situation. But taxpayers in rich countries have shown less and less inclination to finance development aid, let alone through direct transfers or outright debt relief for poorer countries.
• Second, the IMF and other multilateral institutions have raised funds and mobilized special drawing rights (SDRs) in recent years to subsidize interest rates paid by poorer member countries, and Kenya is already benefiting from this effort. However, there are limits to this approach. Subsidies have to be either financed from donor countries’ budgets (with less and less political support) or they are generated from richer countries’ SDR holdings.
• Third, SDR-based lending works only to a limited extent. SDRs derive their value from their status as foreign exchange reserves and being exchangeable for dollars and other hard currencies held by central banks in wealthy countries. Any overuse or exposure to default risk (for example, from rising public debt in recipient countries) could compromise their reserve-asset status, which would impact both the IMF’s financing model and its capacity to lend to countries in distress.
• Fourth, could the IMF and World Bank provide larger loans? The two institutions regularly review the amounts that countries can access under various conditions. Ceilings have gone up over time, but shareholders (who carry the ultimate risk) generally require that larger loans come with stricter macroeconomic conditionality, an approach that would presumably have triggered a similar outcome for Kenya. Moreover, multilateral loans already account for more than a quarter of Kenya’s public debt. Since these loans cannot be restructured, private creditors might be more hesitant to invest in the country, because any future debt operation might need to be deeper than in similar countries with a smaller share of multilateral debt.

To sum up, Kenya’s predicament is largely homemade, albeit with help from willing external lenders. The COVID-19 crisis exacerbated a lack of fiscal discipline, eventually forcing the country to adopt a stabilization program. While meeting with some initial success, recent events have made it clear that the government’s adjustment strategy needs to change, putting a possible debt operation on the table. The IMF did its best to support an initially credible effort by the government, but it must also ask itself what could have been done to prevent the sharp increase in public debt that is at the heart of Kenya’s problems today.

Martin Mühleisen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former IMF official with decades-long experience in economic crisis management and financial diplomacy.

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At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO members declared that Ukraine would join the Alliance at some unspecified point in the future. At last year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, following Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allies reaffirmed their 2008 commitment, adding the tautological qualifier that they would only “extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

This year, the Alliance is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” which will consist of a number of measures meant to strengthen Ukraine. These measures are expected to include NATO’s stepped-up role in coordinating military assistance and pledging long-term support, as well as individual Alliance members promising investments in Ukraine’s defense industrial base and further development of bilateral security agreements. However, these steps still fall well short of an invitation to join the Alliance.

Hesitancy to extend an invitation to join the Alliance stems mostly from a concern about what Ukrainian membership would mean for the security of existing NATO allies, including the United States. Would an invitation be provocative to Russia and set off a new cycle of escalation? What does it mean to extend a NATO Article 5 security guarantee to a country already in conflict, and would this be tantamount to a NATO declaration of war against Russia? Even if the current conflict dies down, creating space for Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to abandon his deep desire to reconquer Ukraine. Would not a future Russian attack on Ukraine set off a direct NATO-Russia war?

To help answer these questions, the Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring that brought together dozens of leading experts, including current US and allied government officials, to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. Some exercises were set in the near future, after Ukraine had already joined NATO, while others gamed out the process of Ukraine joining NATO. The scenarios included variants in which Ukraine had succeeded in taking back all of its territory, and others in which parts of the country remained occupied by Russia.

The results of the exercises were unequivocal: Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. Russia did not choose to escalate when Ukraine was offered NATO membership, and in all scenarios, Russia was much more cautious in its interactions with Ukraine once it was a member of NATO. Even in scenarios that started with a visible and direct Russian military attack on Ukraine, the conflict quickly de-escalated. Both sides had strong incentives to avoid a direct NATO-Russia conflict—one that could result in nuclear war.

This finding corresponds with Russia’s behavior over the past decade and a half. Putin has been willing to use force against countries outside of NATO, including Georgia and Ukraine, but he has been deterred from attacking NATO countries.

Moreover, at present, some observers assume that only the West has an overriding incentive to avoid nuclear escalation in Ukraine. But with Ukraine in NATO, which is a nuclear-armed alliance, Putin would also have to fear the possibility of nuclear conflict, making him much more cautious in his relations with Ukraine.

The lesson coming out of these exercises is clear. This week, Western powers can offer Ukraine a bridge to NATO, but for the sake of a better future for the entire Alliance, the bridge must be short, it must be made of steel, and it should end with a firm invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristjan Prikk is Estonia’s ambassador to the United States.

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Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Gérard Araud: The anti-far-right bulwark worked, but Macron lost his bet

Rama Yade: After a sigh of relief comes instability, with 2027 still looming

Jörn Fleck: The European Union will now worry about uncertainty and paralysis in Paris

Léonie Allard: Coalition building will be messy, but expect some continuity on security and defense issues

Jean-Loup Samaan: French recognition of a Palestinian state may be more likely now, but don’t expect much change in Middle East policy

The anti-far-right bulwark worked, but Macron lost his bet

The first round of the French parliamentary elections was seen as a success for the National Rally. The far-right party seemed on its way to get a majority in the French National Assembly that would have allowed it to govern the country with the support of some conservatives.   

But the first surprise was the number of candidates—more than two hundred—from either the left or the center who announced before the second round that they were stepping aside in favor of another centrist or leftist to prevent the far right from winning in their constituency. The question was whether the voters would follow their call. Pollsters were doubtful. Apparently, they were wrong.

The second round is indeed a total surprise. The anti-far-right bulwark has worked. Not only is the leftist coalition, New Popular Front, the first-place party in the National Assembly, but the Macron-aligned party is the second, and the National Rally is only the third. France has clearly said “Non” to the prospect of a far-right government.

Having said that, there is no potential majority in the new parliament, which is divided in three unequal blocs. The far-left leader, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, has already claimed that the New Popular Front should get the power and fully implement its program, while a centrist representative has answered that the National Assembly composition means compromises are unavoidable.

The coming weeks will indeed be a test to determine whether the left and the center are able to cooperate. This would probably entail a break-up of the New Popular Front, which has shown its fragility during the electoral campaign between the far-left La France Insoumise party and the center-left Socialist party.

France is entering a long crisis full of uncertainties and political instability. Macron has lost his bet for clarification from the electorate. He is weakened, but resignation and realism are not his strong points. 

—Gérard Araud is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former ambassador of France to the United States.

After a sigh of relief comes instability, with 2027 still looming

There are three key observations to draw from the second round of the French legislative election:

1. The National Rally did not win; it only came in third: The “republican front” that was said to be dead worked perfectly.
2. The left, with the New Popular Front, is in the lead, even though no poll had predicted it.
3. No party won an absolute majority.

France is entering an era of coalition politics, a practice to which the country is not accustomed. Macron, who was looking for clarification, did not get it. The relative majority he had in 2022 has disappeared, and his party is now in the minority in the National Assembly. He will have to choose a prime minister who will appoint a government whose first task will be to be strong enough to avoid falling prey to a no-confidence vote. The center of gravity of French politics will shift from the executive to parliament. There is a possibility of permanent instability if the opposition parties unite.

Within the victorious left, the far left of Mélenchon came out ahead of the other left-wing parties. As of Sunday evening, we can already sense little agreement on who should lead the government. Although many of their members of parliament have been elected thanks to the left, some within Macron’s party are beginning to hope that they can build a coalition of the minorities that includes politicians from the right and the left. In the meantime current Prime Minister Gabriel Attal announced, in accordance with the logic of the institutions, that he will resign Monday morning—while saying he is available to manage current affairs during the upcoming Olympic Games.

Great relief dominates in the country, which had come to the brink of an abyss. But the aftermath will be difficult. The ten million French citizens who voted for Marine Le Pen’s party have not disappeared. The National Rally has become the leading opposition force, and it will now focus on embodying the alternative in the only battle that is worth fighting in France, the 2027 presidential election. As the results came in on Sunday night Le Pen announced, “Our victory has only been delayed.” The new French government has less than three years to succeed and refute this prediction.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow with the Europe Center. She was the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet, serving as France’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and human rights, deputy minister of sports, and ambassador to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) under French President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012).

The European Union will now worry about uncertainty and paralysis in Paris

Europe is collectively breathing a sigh of relief at the outcome of the second round of the French parliamentary elections. The worst-case outcome for the European Union—that of a majority for the National Rally, which could have wreaked budgetary and procedural havoc on France’s European Union (EU) policies from behind the scenes—has not come to pass. But even so, one main takeaway already for European partners will be uncertainty, paralysis, and a self-consumed political leadership in Paris. There are no clear winners, even if the leftist coalition of the New Popular Front claimed first place by surprise and Macron’s party edged out a second place over the populist, anti-EU nationalists of the National Rally in third. 

A hung parliament and a diverse, if not unstable, left-wing coalition as the improbable election winner will still weaken France’s position in Europe—and Europe itself. It will likely mean at least a year of political gridlock in Paris—and lots of “it’s complicated” for the EU’s second-largest member in Brussels’s decision-making. France has no recent tradition of coalition or technical expert governments. While on paper and in media speculation, a coalition of the anti-National Rally forces is possible, in practice this will be hard to achieve. The hard left of France Unbowed (LFI) under its firebrand leader Mélenchon dominates the New Popular Front and has already staked out maximalist demands vis-à-vis Macron. LFI’s election platform of domestic reform reversals, exits from trade agreements, and a leftist reform of the EU won’t give anyone in Brussels or capitals around the EU much relief. Center-left forces in the New Popular Front alone won’t bring enough votes and heft to form a stable centrist coalition with Macron’s “Ensemble” and the center-right Republicans, if the latter are even reliable partners for such a coalition.

Whatever the exact domestic dynamics, Paris will likely be largely consumed by its own affairs for the foreseeable future. At the same time, even if the worst outcome has been averted, Macron’s credibility and political capital have been sapped in the eyes of Europe’s leaders by his brinkmanship and unforced strategic mistake of calling the snap elections in the first place. That will weaken an important voice for forward-leaning, more ambitious EU positions and postures, from internal reform to defense cooperation, support for Ukraine, and a tougher course on China.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Coalition building will be messy, but expect some continuity on security and defense issues

Current predictions show that a far-right dominated scenario is out of the picture, even if the verdict is still not in across all of the 577 French districts. Given the absence of any clear-cut majority between the three groups dominating the second round—the left, the presidential party, and the far right—the question is: On what terms will Macron designate the prime minister to form a government? Given that the Fifth Republic institutional set-up is built around a bipartisan system, in the current deadlock, coalition building seems to be the way forward. However, because there is no such customary practice in France, unlike in other European democracies, this could prove arduous. Macron is unable to call another parliamentary election for a year, therefore the governability of France could be a major issue. 

On foreign and defense policy, it’s likely that Macron will attempt to carve out specific prerogatives for the executive, provided by the constitution or by custom, as opposed to economic or internal affairs, on which the parliament will likely weigh in more strongly. 

It will be important to follow how the left clarifies its hastily assembled program, as the final election count will influence the internal equilibrium within the bloc. No specific candidate has been designated by the left bloc for the prime minister role yet. If the New Popular Front is confirmed as the most powerful group, it would be the driving force in coalescing others around a project. So far, the recently unveiled program provides very little information on defense issues, including on NATO. Nevertheless, the left-wing group’s platform calls for “unfailing defense of the Ukrainian people’s sovereignty and freedom, including the integrity of Ukraine’s borders, through the necessary arms transfers” and taking the necessary steps to ensure Russian President Vladimir Putin will “fail in his war of aggression.”

France has rejected once again the prospect of the far right in power, but this legislative election will likely have repercussions beyond those regarding the Fifth Republic’s governance model and party system. The results might also affect whether Macron’s party has a future beyond 2027.

—Léonie Allard is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, previously serving at the French Ministry of Armed Forces.

French recognition of a Palestinian state may be more likely now, but don’t expect much change in Middle East policy

As of Sunday evening, France’s left-wing coalition will represent the biggest bloc in the new National Assembly. But in the absence of an absolute majority, compromises will be unavoidable to form a stable government.

Foreign policy had not been a major issue of the three-week campaign, but the program of the left coalition and its leaders did specify some aspects of their Middle East policy, especially on Gaza and Lebanon. In both cases, there is actually no major disagreement between the left and Macron’s centrist Ensemble party.

The left coalition calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, but the outgoing government has already called for one for several months now. On Lebanon and the looming fears of a new conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the French left were vague and merely promised to empower the Lebanese Armed Forces. This is again not a point of friction with the policy led by Macron. That is reassuring. Given the important role Paris plays, in close coordination with Washington, in preventing the opening of a new front between Israel and Hezbollah, continuity between French governments would be good news.

Perhaps the only major change would be a symbolic one: The left coalition has been very vocal in demanding the recognition of a Palestinian state, following the example of several other European governments in the past months. Macron himself contemplated the idea and said that doing so “is not a taboo for France.” Apart from irritating the current Israeli government, such a decision would have no major consequence on the ground (which might be one reason why Macron would be open to it in a coalition government with left parties). But beyond this, one should not expect a major shift in French policy toward the Middle East.

—Jean-Loup Samaan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.

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Instead of focusing on China’s current problems, the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee—so-called because it is the third session of the committee’s five-year term—will prepare China for a confrontation with the United States by building industries powered by massive investments in cutting-edge technologies. This program is aimed at reinforcing the party’s hold on Chinese society and paying obeisance to paramount leader Xi Jinping, whose policy mistakes—ranging from zero-COVID-19 lockdowns to a crackdown on major online companies—have produced economic malaise. It will also underline China’s shift away from its longtime economic strategy of growth for growth’s sake.

Among the policies expected to be announced at the July 15-18 plenum (which was inexplicably delayed from late 2023) will be reforms restructuring tax and fiscal policies, as well as greater coordination of regional economic development. Both are policies that will reinforce the role of the central government in guiding development. There will probably also be declarations of support for China’s beleaguered private sector, which accounts for more than 60 percent of gross domestic product and over 80 percent of urban employment. But Xi and his subordinates have emphasized that the policy pendulum is swinging decidedly toward statist solutions.

This strategy will offer little respite to a population struggling to make ends meet and businesses that have lost the will, or means, to invest. Beijing’s drive for what it calls a “high-level socialist market economy” based on “new quality productive forces” will be powered by Xi’s willingness to see the Chinese people—especially its young people—“eat bitterness” in pursuit of national ideals. Government resources are being directed to research and development and industrial subsidies, not social programs.

It should come as no surprise that as the plenum approaches, the Chinese media has featured renewed calls for “common prosperity,” a Mao Zedong-era egalitarian slogan that Xi returned to prominence during the 2021-2022 crackdown on online conglomerates. While that campaign was subsequently de-emphasized, the party-run People’s Daily on June 24 published a full-page article “solidly promoting common prosperity in high-quality development” (originally reported by the Sinocism blog) and a contribution from the secretary general of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences advocating for China to “resolutely abandon the erroneous tendency of putting capital first, material first, [and] money first.”

All of this is a far cry from the late leader Deng Xiaoping’s call nearly five decades ago to “let some people get rich first.” It is also a clear shift from the landmark directives of previous Third Plenums that heralded market-oriented economic policies. Deng’s turn away from Maoist “class struggle” and toward modernization came at the 1978 Third Plenum. His endorsement of China’s full-fledged opening to the global economy was the theme of the 1993 meeting. And even Xi’s first Third Plenum in 2013 called for more than three hundred market-related reforms (most of which were never implemented).

Since then, however, the ideological tide has turned. The 2018 plenum rubber-stamped the elimination of term limits for CCP general secretaries, allowing Xi to hold power indefinitely and heralding a marked change in policy direction. Recent CCP speeches and articles have featured a word salad of Marxist-Leninist jargon justifying new statist policies and endlessly praising Xi, but the propaganda boils down to greater government control over the economy.

Beijing justifies this policy shift as necessary because of national security concerns, or what the State Council, in announcing the plenum, called “the increasingly fierce international competition” with the United States and its allies as they tighten controls on the flow of technology and capital to China. As a result, Beijing is prioritizing “high-level technological self-reliance,” by investing tens of billions of dollars in research into advanced semiconductors, quantum computing, new types of renewable energy, and many other areas. This high-octane industrial policy has the government supporting state-owned enterprises and picking winners among private companies to achieve rapid growth in “a single-minded pursuit of technological progress,” as Arthur Kroeber wrote in a recent Brookings Institution paper.

Chinese officials certainly pay lip service to addressing the current economic difficulties, and the plenum likely will trumpet its intention to deal with the property crisis and depressed business confidence. But while Beijing has spoken for months about a “new model” of real estate and the need to expand domestic demand, there are few signs of major measures to pursue these goals. Instead, the plenum will push the reform of tax and fiscal policies. This will be aimed at channeling more money to heavily indebted provinces, cities, and counties, whose main source of cash—land sales—has dried up amid the property slump. With the economy struggling and tax revenue falling, Beijing will be hard-pressed to make up the difference, even with more central government resources slated to be shared with local governments. In the end, a newly empowered bureaucracy could end up squeezing the citizenry—especially if, as Xi has envisioned, local authorities are to assume some of the burden of supporting new technologies and industries.

The plenum is also expected to announce measures to reduce restrictions on Chinese citizens’ movement from the countryside to cities, and thus ostensibly offer new opportunities to millions who have not benefited from the country’s growth. But Beijing does not appear to have policies to generate jobs for them. Nor is it taking adequate steps—either social programs or fiscal stimulus to lift consumption—that would assist all those who are feeling the pinch of youth unemployment, lower income, sinking housing prices, corporate downsizing, and a struggling stock market. A highly touted effort to subsidize purchases of new cars and appliances has fallen flat.

China has clearly decided to direct all available resources to next-generation technologies while neglecting to support the vast majority of the population who scrape by outside the tech sector. That suggests Xi will end up with shiny new industries built on a weak economic foundation.

Jeremy Mark is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He previously worked for the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Wall Street Journal. Follow him on X: @JedMark888.

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Poland’s strategic consensus—in support of Ukraine, opposed to Russia’s aggression, pro-NATO, and committed to its alliance with the United States—is solid, notwithstanding second-order (and avoidable) sniping between the governing coalition and the rightist opposition that controls the presidency. That’s more than can be said for France or, for that matter, the United States.

Poland’s dark assessment of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been vindicated. But the Poles are not indulging in declinist pessimism or Ukraine fatigue. Poland’s best analysts, including those within Warsaw’s top-notch Center for Eastern Studies, are more optimistic about the course of the war in Ukraine than I have heard in a long time. They don’t foresee easy Ukrainian success, but their bottom line is that time is no longer necessarily on the Kremlin’s side—if the West keeps up the pressure. Relative success for Ukraine is possible, the analysts maintain, if—though only if—the West keeps backing Ukraine by delivering more weapons with fewer conditions, tightening economic pressure against Russia, and generally pushing back on Putin’s imperial ambitions. (I’d come to Poland for the Atlantic Council’s “Warsaw Week” events and a Warsaw University conference on how to deter Russia.)

In a good precedent for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, Poland’s military spending started to rise sharply under the previous government, and that trend has continued under the current one. Newly purchased heavy equipment, tanks, and fighter aircraft are arriving to replace tanks and aircraft that Poland sent to Ukraine shortly after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.

But the West, the key institutions of which Poland joined at great effort, is no longer looking as sure as Poland had counted on. The June 27 debate between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump came as a shock to the Poles, who, like many, had not expected such a poor showing from Biden. The next day, many Poles were more openly contemplating the increased possibility of a second Trump term and weighing Poland’s options if the former president were to return to the White House. Trump’s more critical statements about NATO and friendly statements about Putin alarm many in Warsaw. But Polish politicians on both sides of the country’s political divide have good relations with many US Republicans both inside and outside Trump world, including Trump himself. They are now considering how to use these relationships to advance Poland’s customary “free world first” strategy.

Polish President Andrzej Duda, associated with the rightist former government, has had good relations with Trump and met with him in New York shortly before the US Congress finally voted to resume assistance to Ukraine, reportedly encouraging Trump not to oppose it. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, part of the centrist ruling coalition, has his own extensive ties with the US right and is also using them. Other leading Polish political figures, such as the Marshall (Speaker) of the Sejm Szymon Hołownia, are doing or preparing to do the same: reach out to Republicans in and around Trump world, especially during the July 9-11 NATO Summit in Washington, to urge a more Reaganite and less neo-isolationist US approach should Trump succeed Biden. How much they will succeed is not clear but, given that much of Trump world seems to regard the high-defense-spending Poles favorably, they will likely get a hearing, and it seems smart to try.

It’s not just across the Atlantic that Poland faces new challenges exacerbated by politics. The Poles had invested a lot in a newly rejuvenated relationship with French President Emmanuel Macron, who has become notably tougher on Russia in recent months. But France’s first-round snap parliamentary elections on June 30 and the possibility of a hard-right (and potentially soft on Putin) French government have weakened Macron and complicated this new alignment.

While Poles on both sides of the political divide had been frustrated by Germany’s long and fruitless courtship of Russia, the more centrist Polish government that came to power late last year has been more willing to work with Berlin, especially with the staunchly pro-Ukraine Green Party that controls the German foreign ministry. But June’s European parliamentary elections weakened the Greens and strengthened Germany’s Putin-friendly, far-right Alternative for Germany party. The France-Germany-Poland “Weimar Triangle” grouping, which some Poles had thought might emerge as a pillar of European strategic strength vis-à-vis Russia, much on Polish terms, suddenly seems to have been eclipsed by French and German domestic politics.

Between Russia’s war of aggression to the east and political storm clouds to the West, Poland has a lot to deal with. But its capabilities are far greater than they were. Since its peaceful overthrow of Moscow-backed communist rule in 1989, Poland has enjoyed a steady and remarkable rise in economic and now military terms. Its rise at home and its strategic clarity about Russia, now vindicated, have placed Poland in the first rank of European powers for the first time in centuries. And just in time, as it turns out.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

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The Statement of Intent also builds on existing bilateral agreements. At the EU-US Trade and Technology Council meeting held in April 2024, the EU and the United States announced that the AI Office and the US AI Safety Institute would work together to develop the tools needed to evaluate AI models. Additionally, ahead of the Seoul Summit, the US AI Safety Institute signed a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom’s AI Institute, also aimed at building out a shared approach to AI safety, with an emphasis on developing testing and evaluation metrics.

The Statement of Intent signed at the Seoul Summit represents an important step forward in the AI safety conversation. It demonstrates both increasing international interest in and commitment to advancing the science needed to promote AI safety. To be successful in its implementation, however, the signatory countries will need to prioritize the most pressing areas of need for scientific practices, deepen their engagement with international standards-setting bodies, and collaborate with stakeholders across the AI ecosystem.

Why the Seoul Summit statement matters

The Statement of Intent matters for several reasons. First, it will help foster not only a common understanding of key AI safety concepts but also help advance common approaches to testing models (or otherwise ensure that approaches are interoperable). Indeed, there remains a lack of consensus around terms and taxonomy specific to AI safety—for example, the specific difference between a “frontier” AI model, an “advanced” AI model, and a “general purpose” AI model. There is also a lack of consensus on what constitutes red-teaming for AI, which is typically understood in cybersecurity as a process by which a team within an organization (a “red team”) attacks a system to expose vulnerabilities or weaknesses. There is also, in the context of AI, a lack of consensus about whether additional testing, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV) techniques beyond red-teaming are required to appropriately evaluate a system’s capabilities and risk. The Seoul Summit statement enables cross-border information sharing, allowing the institutes to learn from each other, share empirical findings, and identify best practices. 

Second, the statement helps lay the groundwork for the institutes to share resources, such as expertise, datasets, and infrastructure. Indeed, beyond questions around red-teaming and testing and evaluation, there remains an important need to develop consistent metrics and criteria for risk evaluation, guidance related to transparency, and benchmarks for safety, reliability, and performance. Setting out a collaborative vision for how institutes intend to leverage joint resources can help to progress the research needed to advance work on these critical topics.

Finally, such an agreement can potentially contribute to technical capacity building and talent development. While the primary objective of these institutes is to advance the science of AI safety, they could play an important role in developing specific training curricula for practitioners, ensuring that guidance is practical and can be implemented. 

How the AI safety institutes can turn intent into action

It’s early days for the network of AI safety institutes, and it remains to be seen exactly how collaboration will unfold. But to make meaningful progress on their stated objectives, there are three important objectives that will be vital for the institutes to focus on. 

The AI safety institutes should:

• Prioritize collaborating to develop metrics for testing and evaluation of advanced AI models and ways to quantify emerging risks. While there are many areas worth exploring in the field of AI safety, the institutes should focus their immediate efforts on establishing collective practices that are most necessary to advance the development of trustworthy AI systems. One area the institutes should focus on is the testing and evaluation of advanced AI models. This is unsurprising given the ongoing focus on the role of red-teaming in AI risk management, but it is important that the institutes also seek to make progress on TEVV more broadly, including pre-deployment TEVV to assess and manage known and emerging risks associated with advanced AI systems. Indeed, stakeholders have agreed that assessing and understanding risks presented by such models is important to mitigating them, but there remain challenges in consistently measuring and evaluating those risks, particularly in cases where those risks are still emerging. The institutes should also seek to develop consistent ways to measure and report on model and system performance.

• Prioritize engagement in standards bodies that are undertaking standards development activities. International technical standards, and the work of bodies such as the International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission’s Subcommittee 42 on AI, will be critical to consistently implementing AI safety best practices. For example, bringing the institutes’ work on testing and evaluation of advanced AI models to international standards bodies will help promote international alignment and adoption. Conversely, engaging with international standards bodies may also help inform the safety practices and guidance that the institutes are seeking to develop.

• Seek to collaborate with stakeholders from across the AI ecosystem. Announcing a network of publicly backed institutions is important. But it is equally important that the AI safety institutes prioritize engagement with stakeholders from across the AI ecosystem. This includes the private sector, civil society, and government officials and policymakers. In particular, the institutes should consider how to enable cooperation between affiliated consortiums. For example, the AI Safety Institute Consortium within the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is comprised of stakeholders from multiple parts of the ecosystem, and NIST has sought to engage the Consortium on initial AI trust and safety work under the Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy AI. To the extent that other institutes pull together similar groups, it will be imperative that there is understanding of exactly how the expertise of those groups will feed into the wider network. 

The Statement of Intent is a necessary first step in fostering international collaboration on AI safety. By focusing on making concrete progress on metrics for AI safety, engaging with standards-setting bodies, and ensuring that stakeholders from across the AI ecosystem are involved, countries can build on the Statement to make concrete advances in AI safety.

Courtney Lang is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Philippe Dickinson: Expect continuity on major foreign and defense policies

Livia Godaert: Watch for economic reforms and a power-sharing shift

Nicole Lawler: The UK will get closer (but not too close) with Europe

John M. Roberts: Starmer’s first act toward national renewal is ensuring stability

Expect continuity on major foreign and defense policies

After fourteen years of Conservative government, Labour’s one-word campaign slogan said it all: “Change.” But when it comes to the major foreign and defense policy issues of the day, “continuity” might be more appropriate.

The United Kingdom has been one of the strongest supporters of Ukraine since Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion in 2022 and spends more on defense than any other European NATO member. These are consensus issues in mainstream British politics. If anything, on the campaign trail, Labour and the Conservatives sought to outdo each other in the resoluteness of their support for Ukraine and the urgency of their plans to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

This is central to Starmer’s political project. When he became Labour Party leader in 2020, Starmer took over a party that had just suffered its worst electoral defeat since 1935 under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, a figure from the party’s pre-Tony Blair left. Restoring Labour’s credibility on national security and defense was an early priority for Starmer. He firmly declared Labour’s support for NATO—pointing out that Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was one of the Alliance’s founding fathers in 1949—and re-committed to the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrence (known as “trident”).

This worldview permeates the party’s election manifesto, which describes its commitment to trident as “absolute” and promises to apply a “NATO test to major defense programmes” to meet obligations. The new government will conduct a Strategic Defence Review in its first year, setting out the path to spending 2.5 percent of GDP on defense and the ways in which a proposed UK-EU security pact could strengthen NATO. On Ukraine, the incoming government has pledged “steadfast” support. It has backed calls to repurpose frozen Russian assets in support of Ukraine, and it intends to play a “leading role in providing Ukraine with a clear path to NATO membership.”

For the incoming government, there will be no time to waste. After six weeks of talking the talk on the campaign trail, week one in office coincides with the Washington NATO Summit—an ideal opportunity for the new prime minister to walk the walk on the world stage.

—Philippe Dickinson is a deputy director with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served on the political team at the British Embassy in Washington, DC.

Watch for economic reforms and a power-sharing shift

Labour’s landslide victory in the general elections follows years of political instability and chaos. The postmortem of the last few governments reads like a rejected political satire, but the most important takeaway from the absolute drubbing the Conservatives have just received is that Labour has now inherited an angry and impatient electorate ready to see their lives improve under the new government.

Starmer is not a particularly radical Labour leader. Under the former crown prosecutor, Labour has committed to maintaining the status quo on tax rates and has pledged to reduce net migration—policies that represent a rather conservative ethos. Nevertheless, the party has laid out a big vision for Britain’s economic future: setting up Great British Energy (a publically owned clean energy company), renationalizing the railways as contracts expire, and implementing a new industrial strategy, to name a few major policies. These are lofty goals, but not impossible to achieve with the mandate that Labour has received. The previous government got caught up in its own machinations, leaving it directionless, and the Labour government must maintain its discipline to achieve its ambitions.

On foreign policy and defense, there won’t be major shifts. The United Kingdom will still be an active NATO member, and it will push to raise defense spending to 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (as the Conservatives also pledged). However, Labour has made clear that a closer relationship with the EU is a priority. Another key difference with the Conservatives is that in its manifesto, Labour commits to pushing for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, with unimpeded aid access to Gaza and recognition of a Palestinian state as part of a two-state solution and future peace process with Israel.

Labour has also made proposals with constitutional implications for the United Kingdom. In its manifesto, Labour says it will reset the relationship between Westminster and the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The manifesto also outlines a new Council of the Nations and Regions, which would include the prime minister, leaders of the devolved national governments, and mayors of major regions across the United Kingdom. This power-sharing shift—which would also be evident in changes to transportation, employment, planning, and housing—is a departure from Westminster’s strict hold over the regions and is worth watching in the coming years.

The second area to watch is matters of democratic representation, a contrast to the illiberal moves seen across democracies in recent years. Labour outlines significant reforms—and the eventual replacement—of the unelected House of Lords, as well as stricter rules around the conduct of ministers and members of parliament. Its manifesto also includes lowering the voting age to sixteen in all elections and fixes to uneven voter identification requirements. This expansion of representation is a welcome change given the threats to democracy across the world, and the United Kingdom could emerge as a leader in this regard if Labour manages to implement this agenda. 

To be clear, this is the Labour win through rose-colored glasses. The new government has an uphill battle to fight after the last several years of chaos. Its biggest challenge will be to maintain its will and focus amid both local and global crises. By solving immediate cost-of-living and economic concerns, Labour can establish trust with a jaded electorate and then tackle the major changes the party has campaigned on. But its members have to fend off political distraction to do so.

—Livia Godaert is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The UK will get closer (but not too close) with Europe

Labour’s victory in this election sends a clear signal to the European Union (EU): The United Kingdom is willing to improve its relationship with Europe. How far relations between the two partners develop will depend on the Labour government’s ambitions and what the EU is willing (or unwilling) to accept when it comes to trade. While Labour has expressed its intentions to restore relations with Europe after eight years of strained ties resulting from Brexit, it has not been very specific about its goals. If anything, what Labour has been clear about is not rejoining the EU’s single market or customs union, or allowing for the free movement of people between the UK’s borders with the EU.

Nonetheless, Labour has campaigned as the pro-business choice for Britain and will likely seek to remove remaining trade barriers with Europe for the benefit of Britain’s small and medium-sized enterprises. The EU, however, is unlikely to accept these terms if it means the United Kingdom will “cherry-pick” access to its single market. This poses a problem for Labour’s intentions to revisit the Brexit deal, which Starmer in the past has referred to as “botched.” With little appetite to renegotiate a Brexit trade deal, the EU won’t accept any new deal without receiving some concessions. The EU likely will push on the free movement of people (particularly a youth mobility scheme) as a quid pro quo. It will be important for the Labour government to strike the right balance in its trade relationship with the EU, which remains the United Kingdom’s largest trading partner. Labour at minimum has agreed to recognize certain professional qualifications and negotiate a veterinary agreement with the EU to avoid extra checks on animal products, which could be beneficial for both parties. The latter would inevitably invite at least some level of oversight by the European Court of Justice, however, which Conservatives argue could “unravel” Brexit and undermine British sovereignty. 

If the United Kingdom seeks to build trust and make the EU-UK relationship more productive, it will need to look beyond trade deals and market access. Labour’s plans for a joint EU-UK defense pact, which would formalize bilateral security cooperation, could be a step in the right direction. If successful, it may open the door for further cooperation between the two partners, particularly at a time when Europe is becoming more isolated under geopolitical pressures.

—Nicole Lawler is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Starmer’s first act toward national renewal is ensuring stability

Change means stability. That’s the paradox at the heart of Starmer’s accession to office as prime minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. To the rest of the world, stability is the key. There will be no change to UK policies regarding its belief in the importance of a strong relationship with the United States, its role in NATO, and its support for Ukraine. But change means stability precisely because the last several years of Conservative rule have been so erratic, including five changes of prime minister in the last nine years. 

With an electoral mandate backed by 412 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons, and with none of the personal foibles that destroyed the premiership of Boris Johnson, Starmer can likely look forward to five years in office before calling the United Kingdom’s next general election. And if the precedent of Tony Blair, the last Labour leader to take his party from opposition to government, is any guide, Starmer has a good prospect of winning the next election, too. All of this prepares the ground for the Labour government to deliver what Starmer has termed “a decade of national renewal.”

Starmer inherits a Treasury that has almost certainly no spare cash whatsoever for ambitious programs to boost welfare or invest in new infrastructure or enterprises. So he will need to focus his economic policy on promoting economic growth in order to secure the funds necessary to rebuild Britain’s stretched and crumbling services and infrastructure without resorting to the imposition of tax increases on working people. 

As for climate change, Starmer remains committed to the United Kingdom’s legally mandated task of delivering net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. The difference with his predecessors is that Starmer’s team appears committed to promoting the primacy of reliance on renewable energy sources and energy efficiency, whereas recent Conservative governments have sought to include fresh production of oil and gas from Britain’s offshore fields—and even a new coal mine—while backtracking on environmental regulations.

Upon taking office on Friday, Starmer said that his mission is to deliver “a calm and patient rebuilding,” carried out by a government of service “for a mission of national renewal.” It won’t be easy. But he has already reassured the markets, with the arrival of this first Labour government in fourteen years prompting small but healthy boosts to the stock market and to the pound sterling in currency markets.

—John M. Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow at Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and a resident of Jedburgh, Scotland, United Kingdom.

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The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed new federal regulations to protect workers. When the heat index reaches or exceeds 80 degrees Fahrenheit, employers would be required to monitor workers and provide water and rest areas. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit, more protections kick in, including mandatory fifteen-minute rest breaks every two hours and monitoring employees for signs of heat-related illnesses.

Heat-related illnesses have been recognized as occupational hazards for a decade, with an estimated 2,300 workers in the United States dying from extreme heat exposure last year alone. However, this number is likely an undercount and does not capture the many more who suffered nonlethal or chronic heat-related illnesses, as well as workers who injured themselves on the job due to the heat. For instance, researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles found that workers in California are up to 9 percent more likely to suffer a workplace injury on days with temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than on days that are between 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This is a problem that will only get worse. The summer is only a few weeks underway in the Northern Hemisphere, and already more than one hundred million US residents have been exposed to extreme heat.

What comes next?

Despite the need for action, OSHA’s proposal will have significant opponents. Industry groups are gearing up for battle, arguing that the rule will be both administratively cumbersome and costly. This is a sentiment that some political leaders have already embraced. Earlier this year, both Florida and Texas enacted state-wide bans to prevent localities from instituting their own worker-protection ordinances. Both state governments are unlikely to accept OSHA’s proposal without protest. In fact, despite the persistent threat of extreme heat, only five states have extreme heat worker protections: California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.  

The argument that extreme heat worker protections will come at a cost often ignores the very real cost of maintaining the status quo under dangerously high temperatures. Aside from the price that workers pay with their health, extreme heat in the workplace has significant economic impacts, from lost labor productivity to healthcare costs. The high and growing price of extreme heat on US residents’ lives and livelihoods illustrates not only that this new rule is necessary, but also that, on its own, it is not enough.

Since 2021, the Biden administration has worked to reestablish the role of the United States as a leader in the fight against climate change, both domestically and abroad. This new rule could help cement the United States’ leadership role on climate—but only if it is properly enforced and expanded upon. For the rule to be effective, the administration should continue significantly utilizing OSHA’s National Emphasis Program for Outdoor and Indoor Heat-Related Hazards, which gives it latitude to direct resources toward both employer education on heat safety protocols and inspections that will better ensure compliance.

The Biden administration should also leverage existing funds to ensure that workers remain safe even when they head home for the day. As temperatures rise across the United States and the world, workplace regulations alone will not be enough to adequately protect workers. Federal agencies should incentivize states to direct Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) funding toward cooling assistance in vulnerable households, and lawmakers should ensure that LIHEAP is funded adequately to cover energy needs during both the summer and winter months. Currently, only approximately 5 percent of LIHEAP’s four billion dollars in funding goes to cooling assistance (heating receives ten times as much), despite the accelerating demand for relief from high nighttime temperatures that place a significant burden on the human body, and which can lead to heat exhaustion while on the job.  

Ultimately however, this issue cannot be solved at the federal level alone. It also requires efforts at the state and local level to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and individuals are being identified and solutions tailored to local contexts are being implemented. The appointment of a Chief Heat Officer (CHO), at the city, county, or state level, is one tool that can address the local challenges of extreme heat. Local governments such as Miami-Dade County, Phoenix, and Los Angeles have already taken this approach. Local climate leaders—like CHOs—are well positioned to work closely with their communities to tailor solutions to meet their specific needs and to create a unified response to build resilience to extreme heat both during the workday and off the clock.

Catherine Wallace is the associate director of strategic partnerships and advocacy for the extreme heat resilience pillar of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

Owen Gow is the deputy director for the extreme heat resilience pillar at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

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Unfortunately, this is a familiar scene for the region, which routinely battles the effects of extreme weather events and climate change. Hurricane Beryl once again spotlights why focusing on the mitigation of climate change, through such methods as cutting carbon emissions, alone is insufficient. Caribbean countries must prioritize climate adaptation as the primary mechanism to withstand hurricanes and other baked-in effects of climate change.

Climate adaptation is the answer to these extreme weather events, but it requires significant investment that governments in the Caribbean cannot afford. International support, including private finance, is needed. In five months, the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29, will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. It has been dubbed the “finance COP,” and there governments and the private sector should come together and show the commercial utility of prioritizing climate adaptation. Doing so can unlock new financing and create project pipelines that are commercially attractive to global investors.

The Caribbean is often categorized as the world’s most vulnerable region to climate change. Seventy percent of the region’s population lives or works on the coast, meaning that storm surges from hurricanes affect businesses, lifestyles, and government operations. Hurricanes and strong storms also bring the tourism industry to a halt, disproportionately affecting the region’s tourism-dependent economies and severely slowing economic growth. Hurricane Maria in 2017 cost Dominica an estimated 225 percent of its gross domestic product, while Hurricane Irma in the same year cost Antigua and Barbuda more than $136 million in damages, of which the tourism industry represented 44 percent.

Strong storms damage critical infrastructure. Downed power lines cause widespread power outages, while flooded roads and bridges can prevent rescue operations. Already, Hurricane Beryl has caused power outages in Saint Lucia, and homes in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have lost their roofs. And stronger storms lead to longer recovery periods, which can increase governments’ public debt as they borrow at high interest rates from multilateral institutions to rebuild after the storm has passed. Six years after Hurricane Maria, for example, citizens in Dominica are still rebuilding.

Withstanding strong storms and other effects of climate change requires new climate adaptation projects. For hurricanes with high wind speeds (such as Beryl, which sustained wind speeds of 150 mph at its peak), it is necessary to retrofit infrastructure to be resilient. To achieve this, governments need to require building codes for new homes and infrastructure that ensure sufficient resilience across structures. To brace for storm surges, governments need to move water and energy infrastructure underground where possible to avoid damage. New sea walls and flood protection systems also need to be built.

In all, the region needs more than $100 billion dollars in investment to meet its climate adaptation goals, but it has only been approved for less than one billion dollars from various climate funds. Governments are often left to fend for themselves, taking high-interest loans (due to the classification of many Caribbean nations as middle- and high-income economies by the World Bank) since they often do not qualify for concessional financing. At the same time, governments have borne the brunt of the responsibility because these types of climate adaptation projects are not always attractive to the private sector. Retrofitting infrastructure and other climate adaptation projects, for example, have high upfront costs with little return on investment.

COP29 is an opportunity to bring the public and private sector together to unlock new financing and advance climate adaptation projects. The private sector—both in the region and around the world—has access to needed technologies and has the capacity to undertake climate adaptation projects, from providing drainage on roads and bridges to help ease flash flooding to building decentralized energy grid infrastructure to limit widespread blackouts. Climate adaptation is, after all, in the private sector’s interest. If the effects of hurricanes and climate change worsen and the region’s economies slow, then businesses’ profits will be affected.

What will it take to get the private sector more involved? Attracting private sector participation requires regulatory reforms and carve outs by governments to ensure that companies yield a return on projects. Governments can provide incentives, such as giving exclusive benefits to companies participating in projects and providing subsidies or tax exemptions on materials used. Equally important is access to low-cost finance and capital. Governments can work with institutions such as IDB Invest and global donors that provide grant finance to funnel capital to companies undertaking long-term developments while engaging with insurance agencies that can underwrite riskier projects. 

Caribbean leaders have begun to explore private sector participation in climate adaptation projects, notably through the Bridgetown Initiative and the Blue Green Investment Corporation, but there is still work to be done. COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community. Doing so requires flexibility from both sectors and a focus on projects that are investment-friendly and can attract global donors. 

In the lead-up to COP29, governments will need to begin laying the regulatory groundwork and soliciting the required technical assistance from development institutions to encourage private sector participation. Moreover, Caribbean governments should consider adding or increasing the size of the private sector groups to their delegations for COP29 to ensure they have a seat at the table and are bought into any signed agreements. Building these public-private relationships can go a long way toward showing global donors and companies the viability of investing in climate adaptation projects in the Caribbean and unlock needed capital that can save lives in the long run.

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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