It has been more than thirteen years since the outbreak of the 2011 Libyan revolution and the moment when Italy reluctantly supported the NATO-led intervention that imposed a no-fly zone over Libya purportedly to protect the population from Muammar Gaddafi’s retaliation.
The overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime led to more of a decade of intermittent civil war and conflict, dismantling of state institutions, and rampant kleptocracy, turning Libya into a battleground for competition between external powers. Meanwhile, Italy has seen nine governments since the Libyan revolution. These governments have come to power against a backdrop of political instability and economic uncertainty, the rise in populism and “sovranismo” (sovereignism), and geopolitical tensions in Italy’s eastern and southern neighborhoods. Irrespective of Rome’s different ruling coalitions, the crisis in Libya resulted in a rethink of Italy’s geopolitical posture and strategic orientation toward the North African country, questioning Rome’s approach to international intervention and national priorities, the resources and tools of its foreign policy, and its projection of power over the wider Mediterranean region. The conclusion of the debate has been that a stable Libya is strategically crucial for Italy, for political, security, and economic reasons.
However, the last decade has seen the gradual fading of Rome’s influence over Libya and the downsizing of its ambitions. The political leverage Italy historically possessed in Libya dwindled over the years. How did Italy squander its political capital and credibility in Libya? How could a country with prominent interests and a strong economic interest fail in Libya? The focus on short-term gains over long-term strategy played a pivotal role. Understanding the root causes of this marginalization is crucial for reshaping Italy’s approach to Libya and revitalizing its role in the region.
Migration policies have undermined Rome’s credibility in Libya
Between 2014 and 2017, over six hundred thousand migrants arrived in Italy, most departing from Libyan shores after enduring extensive journeys across Africa. Many suffered violence, forced labor, and sexual exploitation in both formal and informal Libyan detention centers. The migration issue became a focal point in Italian politics for several reasons: from challenges in managing the reception and integration of migrants once they arrived, to political exploitation of unfounded fears about terrorist infiltration and cultural clashes, to concerns about the country’s democratic stability during a period of economic uncertainty.
In 2017, amidst peak concerns about a surge in migrant arrivals and with Italy gearing up for elections, Interior Minister Marco Minniti introduced a new strategy for addressing the Libyan crisis. Stabilizing Libya became not just a priority in itself, but a means to control migration flows and counter transnational threats. Rome engaged extensively: it worked closely with the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj, signing agreements, providing financial aid and technical support, and becoming the first Western nation to reopen its embassy in Tripoli. Italy also established connections with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the east; engaged with southern tribes, cities, and municipalities; and even interacted with less-transparent groups like militias and armed factions, despite their involvement in smuggling and trafficking, which Italian authorities publicly denied but independent investigations corroborated. This approach proved effective as migrant arrivals dropped dramatically from July 2017, as evidenced by arrival data.
Despite changes in leadership and shifting political coalitions in Rome, the core strategy remained consistent even after the Government of National Unity, led by Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, took office in Tripoli in 2021. Italy saw different governments come and go: Giuseppe Conte’s “yellow-green” government (2018–19), Conte’s “yellow-red” government (2019–21), followed by Mario Draghi’s national unity government (2021–22), and now Giorgia Meloni’s leadership since October 2022.
However, new dynamics emerged as migrant departures shifted from the west to the east of Libya in recent years. Rome responded by increasing engagement with eastern Libyan authorities both politically and economically. This shift was highlighted by Haftar’s visit to Rome in May 2023 and a subsequent meeting held by Meloni in Benghazi on May 7.
So far, Italy, along with EU funds, has allocated almost €479 million to the “externalization” of its border to Libya, i.e. the act of empowering foreign actors to stop migrants from reaching Italy. However, this strategy of externalizing migration management—funding patrols and technology, and investing significant political attention and resources—has had significant unintended consequences. By treating militias as interlocutors, even indirectly through recognized institutions or actors with national ambitions, Italy inadvertently empowered and legitimized ambiguous players. This has altered local power balances and undermined prospects for peace in Libya. Since the implementation of this policy, evidence has emerged of its destabilizing effects and distortions of local equilibria, influenced by Italy’s perception of threats and insecurity stemming from migration policies.
Italy’s leverage of foreign actors was not aimed at stabilizing Libya but rather at addressing Italian perceptions of insecurity
Despite its interactions with local actors, Italy has not been among the most influential players shaping Libya’s dynamics. Other countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Russia, France, and Qatar have exploited Libya’s internal divisions to advance their own domestic and international agendas. This interference has spoiled prospects for the establishment of stable Libyan institutions, state reconstruction, and durable peace.
In this complex scenario, Rome has struggled to effectively stabilize Libya or facilitate consensus among Libyan factions based on international law and the desires of the Libyan people. Instead, Italy has mainly offered symbolic support for UN efforts without substantial mediation efforts or concrete peace proposals following the underwhelming results of the Palermo conference, a two-day conference in November 2018 intended to advance the UN-sponsored stabilization process for Libya.
In the complex web of Libyan, regional, and international agendas, Rome has primarily used foreign relationships to advance its migratory policies and address minor issues. For instance, with the UAE, one of the most involved foreign players shaping Libyan internal dynamics through its strong support to Haftar, Italy leveraged its influence to secure the release of fishermen arbitrarily detained by Haftar’s forces. Last year, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani visited the UAE twice, with migration from Libya featuring prominently in his discussions. The UAE’s president, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, then took part in the International Conference on Development and Migration in Rome, marking the start of the “Rome Process.”
Even with Ankara, Rome sought to align on its priorities in Libya. In 2020, Turkey emerged as a decisive actor in countering Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, supporting western Libyan authorities, under both the Sarraj and Dabaiba governments. Despite initial concerns about Ankara’s growing influence exerted over Tripolitania, and despite political competition and overlapping economic interests, Rome sought Turkey’s “solidarity” on the migration issue, which emerged as a central point of recent Italy-Turkey bilateral meetings.
Interestingly, Turkey’s recent imposition of visas for Bangladesh citizens entering the country was cited as an example of cooperation between Rome and Ankara. In 2022, more than 15,200 Bangladeshis arrived in Italy, with many transiting through Libya, about a third of whom travelled through Turkey. To avoid tensions with Ankara, Rome refrained from taking a more assertive stance on other contentious strategic issues, such as energy resource exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and maritime borders.
Another significant aspect of the Rome-Ankara entente involves Egypt, another key player in Libya. Rome leveraged recent regional diplomatic efforts to establish a triangular dialogue with Egypt and Turkey on Libyan issues, aiming to bridge differences and engage major supporters of the two rival power centers in Libya’s west and east.
Ambiguity between western and eastern authorities marginalized Rome’s ambitions in Libya
To control migration flows, Rome has blurred the lines between Libya’s western and eastern authorities. Initially a staunch supporter of the Skhirat Agreement, which led to the establishment of the GNA at the beginning of 2016, Italy found itself dealing with a divided country as Libya remained split between competing centres of power. This situation prompted then Italian minister of interior Marco Minniti to establish connections with Haftar during his tenure, integrating him into Italy’s new approach to the Libyan crisis.
This trend was further strengthened under the following two governments led by Conte (2018–21). Haftar’s presence at the Palermo conference in 2018, originally aimed at reconciling Libya’s factions, was seen more as a personal gesture to Conte than a genuine effort to forge an agreement with Tripoli.
Italy’s ambiguity peaked in April 2019 when Haftar attacked Tripoli. Conte declared that “Italy is neither in favor of Sarraj nor of Haftar, but of the Libyan people.” When Sarraj requested Italy to send troops and support, Rome did not officially respond, prompting Tripoli to seek and ultimately received crucial support from Ankara. Turkey’s military backing of the GNA gave Ankara significant political and economic influence over Tripolitania, sidelining Italy and diminishing its presence, role, and ambitions in Libya.
As another sign of Italy’s waning influence, the Bilateral Assistance and Support Mission in Libya (MIASIT), which includes the “Hippocrates” Task Force and the military field hospital in Misrata, has been downsized.
Rethinking a new Libya policy for Italy
Over the past decade, Italy’s influence over the Libyan crisis has steadily declined. This decline can be attributed to two main factors: first, Italy prioritized managing migration over consistent efforts to stabilize Libya. Second, Rome played an ambiguous role by engaging with both western and eastern Libyan authorities, which complicated its diplomatic and strategic approach.
Today, Italy seems willing to revitalize its role in North Africa (as well as in the Sahel and the rest of the continent) with the “Piano Mattei” (Mattei Plan), named after the founder of Italy’s ENI energy group. The late Enrico Mattei was known for advocating fairer relations across the Mediterranean. A steering committee has been formed, and initial pilot projects in nine African countries are set to begin soon. Notably, Libya is not among these countries, although during Meloni’s visit to Tripoli in May 2024, memoranda of understanding on health, education, and sport were signed under the Mattei Plan’s framework. However, merely enhancing development cooperation is insufficient to reestablish Italy’s influence in Libya.
To achieve this, the Italian government needs to fundamentally rethink its approach to migration. This involves moving away from polarizing political debates and shifting focus from securitizing migration to recognizing its political, demographic, and economic potential for Italy’s future. Instead of solely emphasizing police and border controls, Italy should centralize discussions on these broader impacts.
In Libya, this shift would diminish the economic power and political legitimacy that Italy unintentionally bolstered among various local and regional “spoilers of peace.” Moreover, Italy’s reduced dependence on Libyan energy resources—marked by the lowest natural gas exports in thirteen years in 2023—should embolden Italian leadership. This could open up opportunities to propose innovative pathways to peace and national reconciliation with its southern neighbor.
Italy and Libya share deep historic ties. Rome played a crucial role in Libya’s international rehabilitation in the 1990s and has a longstanding tradition of political, economic, social, and cultural connections with Libyan counterparts. This relationship reached a symbolic peak when Italy decided to reopen its embassy in Tripoli in 2017, despite the exodus of many other international actors. Today, it’s time for Italy to make up for lost opportunities and strengthen its ties with Libya.
Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. Mezran holds a PhD in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, a JD in comparative law from the University of Rome (La Sapienza), an LLM in comparative law from the George Washington University, an MA in Arab studies from Georgetown University, and a BA in management from Hiram College.
Aldo Liga is a research fellow for the Middle East and North Africa Centre at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. He is also a PhD candidate at the Institut Français de Géopolitique (University of Paris 8). He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the “Cesare Alfieri” (University of Florence) and a master’s degree in international security from Sciences Po Paris.
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