Belarus - Atlantic Council

Belarus’s political prisoners must not be forgotten

Hanna Liubakova — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 17:32:28 +0000

As Belarus marked the fourth anniversary of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential election that sparked nationwide protects and a brutal crackdown, the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom all unveiled new sanctions targeting the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In a joint statement that was also signed by Canada, the three called on the Belarusian authorities to “immediately and unconditionally” release the country’s almost 1,400 political prisoners.

These steps are encouraging and indicate welcome Western awareness of the repression that continues to define the political climate in today’s Belarus. Nevertheless, there is still a sense that not nearly enough is being done by the international community to challenge the impunity enjoyed by Lukashenka and members of his regime.

These concerns were amplified recently when the largest prisoner swap between the Kremlin and the West since the Cold War went ahead without featuring any Belarusian political prisoners. Lukashenka himself was closely involved in the complex negotiations behind the exchange. The Belarusian dictator agreed to free German national Rico Krieger, who was being held in Minsk on terrorism charges, as part of efforts to convince the German government to release Russian secret service assassin Vadim Krasikov.

Many have questioned why prominent Belarusian pro-democracy leader Maria Kalesnikava, who had previously lived for many years in Germany, was not also freed as part of the trade. Kalesnikava was jailed amid nationwide protests following Lukashenka’s rigged 2020 election. One of the figureheads of the anti-Lukashenka protest movement, she has reportedly been suffering from deteriorating health for the past year and a half. Similar questions were also asked regarding fellow political prisoners Ales Bialiatski, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, and Ihar Losik, a prominent blogger and journalist for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.

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Four years since the sham ballot that sparked the biggest protests of Lukashenka’s three-decade reign, he appears more comfortable than ever with the idea of holding large numbers of political prisoners as hostages. This must change. With no regime-linked Belarusians in Western custody who are anything like as valuable as Krasikov was to Putin, other approaches are clearly needed to increase the pressure on Lukashenka and convince him to release political prisoners.

Economic measures can be used to target the largely state-controlled Belarusian economy, but this is more likely to have an impact as part of a long-term strategy. One alternative approach would be to engage third parties such as China, which has considerable influence in Minsk. Earlier diplomatic efforts succeeded in securing the release of US citizen Vital Shkliarau, indicating that negotiations of this nature can yield results.

Finding the right formula to keep up the pressure on individual members of the Lukashenka regime is crucial. At present, comparatively few of those involved in repressive measures are subject to international sanctions. For example, I was recently sentenced in absentia by a Belarusian court to ten years in prison alongside nineteen other independent Belarusian analysts and journalists. The judge in our case has a history of handing down lengthy sentences to prominent opposition figures, but has yet to be sanctioned.

During the past four years, only 261 Belarusians have been placed on the EU sanctions list. While the work of sanctions teams is commendable, their capacity is limited. Past experience has also demonstrated how sanctions can be sabotaged, as was the case in 2020 when Cyprus was accused of blocking the introduction of new restrictions against Belarus. There is also room to improve cooperation between Western partners, with a view to developing a more unified approach to sanctions.

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Strikingly, the quantity of Belarusians currently facing Western sanctions is far less the almost 1,400 political prisoners in the country’s prisons. According to human rights groups, tens of thousands of Belarusians in total have been detained in recent years for political reasons. Behind these arrests and prosecutions stands an army of enablers including government officials, security personnel, and judges. The vast majority of these people have yet to be held accountable by the international community for their role in the repressive policies of the Belarusian authorities.

There are some indications that Western policymakers are looking to broaden the scope of sanctions and increase individual accountability. However, while the recent round of sanctions included new measures targeting officials responsible for regime propaganda, other representatives of the Belarusian state media received international accreditation to cover the Olympics in Paris.

The West already has powerful tools at its disposal that can realistically make Belarusian officials consider the consequences of their actions. Standard personal sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes go far beyond mere symbolism and are capable of creating problems that can have far-reaching practical implications in everyday life. However, more leverage is required in order to maintain the pressure on the regime and on the individuals responsible for specific abuses.

Looking ahead, the West needs to make the issue of political prisoners far more uncomfortable for the entire Lukashenka regime. There is no single solution to this problem; instead, a range of options should be explored including broad economic restrictions, personal sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. Crucially, sanctions should be applied to thousands of officials rather than just a few hundred. The end goal must be to significantly raise the costs of the repressive policies pursued by Lukashenka and all those who enable his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

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Putin remains eager to exploit Belarus’s resources and strategic position to threaten Kyiv once more and to target Western supplies entering Ukraine from Poland. Belarus could also play an important role in the future, if Russia seeks to intensify hybrid hostilities against the Baltic states or to launch a direct attack. This looks unlikely as long as Lukashenka remains in power. The Belarusian dictator may therefore represent a status quo which fundamentally favors Ukraine and its allies more than Russia.

If Putin continues to fail in his immediate objective of occupying all of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, there is a real possibility that he will ultimately lose patience with Lukashenka and move to either replace him or otherwise compel Belarus to join the invasion. Moreover, it is almost certain that Putin will attempt to secure Belarusian human and material resources if Lukashenka dies before him.

Many Belarusians already know what would await them if Putin fully incorporated and militarized their country. They would experience an oligarchic raiding of businesses, covert or overt mobilization, and the extinguishing of the traditionally Western-looking aspect that is an important part of Belarusian national identity.

In contrast, if Belarusians manage to maintain their independence and empower a reformist leadership, they can begin moving towards European integration, with European Union membership an eventual possibility. In this context, it is vital that all Belarusians, including political elites along with members of the military and security forces, receive assurances that they have a viable alternative to the Kremlin vision for their country’s future.

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Articulating a European future for Belarus does not need to entail talk of NATO membership. Instead, it should involve acknowledging the possibility of removing sanctions, enhancing access to EU travel, education, and capital, and eventually embracing Belarus’s modest population of 9.2 million people under democratic leadership and after deep structural reforms.

From a purely practical standpoint, European integration would not be an insurmountable task. Lukashenka’s repressive regime has actually resulted in relatively good infrastructure conditions for Belarusians, especially in rural areas, compared to most other former Soviet republics. Belarus boasts a highly educated and comparatively young demographic. Prior to the 2020 protests, the country had burgeoning IT and entrepreneurial sectors.

A Belarus free of Russian military entanglements and increasingly aligned with the Euro-Atlantic community instead of the developing Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis of autocracies would contribute significantly to the security of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states. A Belarusian geopolitical pivot toward the West could also encourage transformation inside Russia itself and compel more Russians to embrace a post-imperial identity.

Failure to articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus leaves the Euro-Atlantic community at risk of being caught off guard without a plan when Belarus does, indeed, reach its fork in the road. This may come sooner than many are prepared for. By taking steps now to engage with Belarusian society, the EU can strengthen its own foreign policy credentials as a major geopolitical player, mitigate against the risk of a rapid Russian militarization of Belarus, and set the stage for a cooperative relationship with Belarusians in the years to come.

Richard Cashman is a nonresident fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia . . . The author of this article is among those convicted.

Even so, expect more rhetorical shifts as the 2025 Belarusian presidential election approaches and as Belarus tries to alleviate the economic pressures it faces from Poland and the Baltic states for Minsk’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. For example, newly appointed Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou has expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with Poland, stating earlier this month that “the ball is on the Polish side.” This came after a slowdown in truck traffic at the Kazlovichy checkpoint on the Polish-Belarusian border on July 10.

Minsk accused Warsaw of halting the acceptance of Belarusian cargo. Poland has hinted at potentially closing its remaining border crossings with Belarus to counter Lukashenka’s hybrid tactics, the migration crisis that the regime helped engineer on the Polish border, and the imprisonment of journalist and Polish minority activist Andrzej Poczobut. The stabbing death of a Polish soldier by a migrant on the border in June prompted Polish President Andrzej Duda to discuss migration and economic cooperation with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in late June, hoping that Beijing would exert its increasing influence on Minsk.

Recent developments may have influenced Lukashenka’s shift in rhetoric. These developments include threats from Poland and the Baltic states to close border crossings with Belarus, efforts to involve China in political pressure on Minsk, and new EU sanctions. Lukashenka now calls for “reciprocity” in diplomatic relations with Poland and Lithuania, a stark contrast to his comments in March. At that time, accompanied by his white Pomeranian, Lukashenka had inquired about the width of the Suwałki Corridor and told a commander, “You will have to confront the Baltic republics . . . And you will grab part of Poland.”

Lukashenka has also softened his rhetoric on Ukraine in recent days. June was a month of major rhetorical escalation between Belarus and Ukraine, as the Belarusian national intelligence agency accused Ukraine of amassing troops near the Belarusian border. This led to a sudden military readiness check in Brest and Homiel, including troop deployments to Belarus’s southern border and the establishment of new checkpoints. For weeks, Belarus’s Ministry of Defense warned of a Ukrainian threat, citing a drone interception and an explosives cache.

However, this escalation ended abruptly on July 13 when Lukashenka visited an air defense unit in Luninets, announced the resolution of border tensions, and ordered troop withdrawals. He appeared to resolve a crisis he had fabricated, saying that “we are not enemies for Ukrainians,” calling for urgent negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv.

Some hoped for a real shift when, in early July, the regime freed eighteen political prisoners in a rare amnesty, nearly four years after Lukashenka’s crackdown on the opposition, following his announcements to release “seriously ill” prisoners. One of those released, Ryhor Kastusiou, who ran for president against Lukashenka in 2010, had been diagnosed with cancer. The names of the other released prisoners have not been disclosed. Both the United States and the EU welcomed these releases but urged the regime to free all remaining political prisoners.

While the release of some political prisoners is positive, many more are still incarcerated. An estimated 1,400 political prisoners are still being held in Belarus, hundreds of them in urgent need of medical assistance.

Belarus may continue to make gestures of goodwill to Ukraine and the West, but it’s crucial to differentiate between rhetoric and reality. Repression in Belarus continues. As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia to between ten and eleven-and-a-half years by a Minsk court. The author of this article is among those convicted.

The regime accused me of four criminal charges, including an attempt to seize power, joining an extremist formation, harming national security, and inciting social discord. The regime-appointed lawyer never responded to my messages and emails. I was denied the right to a fair trial and refused legal assistance.

The regime is engaged in repression against Belarusians in exile, targeting their families abroad. In Belarusian jails, many prominent political prisoners are held incommunicado, and even their families don’t know whether they are alive. If the Belarusian regime wants to show Ukraine and the West that it is interested in real change, then it must take real actions to stop its brutal campaign of terror and repression at home.

Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

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I was sentenced to ten years in absentia for highlighting Belarus’s descent into dictatorship

Alesia Rudnik — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 19:48:25 +0000

At the beginning of July, I was one of twenty internationally-based Belarusian academics, analysts, and journalists to be sentenced in absentia by a court in Minsk on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government and taking part in an extremist group.

News of my ten-year sentence provoked very conflicting emotions. While many colleagues congratulated me on what they saw as tacit recognition of my efforts in support of a democratic Belarus, I have struggled to find the right words when explaining to my Belarusian relatives that we may never meet again.

The charges against me and my co-defendants did not come as a complete surprise, of course. Nevertheless, at a time when the struggle for Belarusian democracy is no longer in the international spotlight, it is important to reflect on how we arrived at this point.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

This is very much in line with the supporting role played by Belarus throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. When hostilities first began in February 2022, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka allowed the Russian military to use his country as a base for the invasion of northern Ukraine. Following Russia’s spring 2022 defeat in the Battle of Kyiv, Putin’s army then retreated back into Belarus to regroup.

While Lukashenka has so far been able to resist Kremlin pressure to enter the war directly, he has allowed Russia to conduct air strikes on targets across Ukraine from Belarusian territory. He has also been one of the few international leaders prepared to publicly align himself with Putin, meeting with the Russian dictator on multiple occasions.

Lukashenka’s slavish loyalty to his Russian patron comes as no surprise. The Belarusian ruler has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin since 2020, when Putin intervened to prevent the Lukashenka regime from collapse amid nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election. For the past four years, Russia has been steadily strengthening its grip on Belarus, a process some have likened to the creeping annexation of the country.

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With Russian influence in Belarus now at unprecedented levels, Lukashenka has had little choice but to back the invasion of Ukraine. Naturally, this support includes playing along with Putin’s nuclear intimidation tactics. Perhaps more surprising is Putin’s readiness to involve Russia’s small western neighbor in his incredibly reckless game of nuclear brinkmanship.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began almost two and a half years ago, Putin has become notorious for frequently issuing thinly-veiled nuclear threats. This trend was first evident during his initial address announcing the decision to invade, with Putin warning Western leaders that any attempts to intervene would lead to consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Four days later, he ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.

Perhaps the most infamous example of Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling came six months later. With the Russian army retreating in disarray in eastern Ukraine, the Kremlin ruler referenced his country’s nuclear arsenal and vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia. “This is not a bluff,” he declared.

With Western support for Ukraine regaining momentum in recent months, Putin has once again made regular references to a possible nuclear war. Western leaders “should keep in mind that theirs are small and densely populated countries,” he commented chillingly in late May.

Other Kremlin leaders have gone even further. Former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who currently serves as deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council, recently stated that it would be a “fatal mistake” for Western leaders to believe Russia was not ready to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO member states. “This is, alas, not an attempt at intimidation or a nuclear bluff,” he declared.

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While Ukraine has refused to be cowed by Russia’s repeated nuclear threats, many in the West have allowed themselves to be intimidated. Indeed, widespread alarm over the potential use of nuclear weapons is believed to be a key factor fueling the fear of escalation that has consistently hampered the international response to Russia’s invasion.

Putin is well aware of the low risk tolerance in many Western capitals and has used it to his advantage. He has skillfully exploited the West’s escalation phobia to reduce the flow of military aid to Kyiv, and has even managed to convince Ukraine’s partners to impose absurd restrictions on how the embattled country can defend itself.

Russia’s readiness to employ nuclear threats could have grave implications for international security that would be felt far beyond the battlefields of Ukraine. If nuclear blackmail enables Putin to succeed in Ukraine, he will inevitably use the same tactics again elsewhere. Other countries will then draw the logical conclusion and decide that they, too, must also possess nuclear weapons, sparking a scramble for nukes that will undo decades of nonproliferation efforts. The entire world will be plunged into an era of insecurity marked by a dramatically heightened risk of nuclear war.

If Western leaders wish to avoid this bleak future, they must finally stand up to Russia’s nuclear bullying. At this point, Putin evidently regards his nuclear bluster as an effective foreign policy tool. Far from being deterred, he appears determined to raise the stakes further by involving Belarus.

Putin will continue to pursue policies of nuclear intimidation until the costs outweigh the benefits. This can be achieved by increasing Western military support for Ukraine and lifting all remaining restrictions on Kyiv’s ability to strike back against Russia. Unless that happens, there is a very real danger that the international security climate of the coming decades will be defined by nuclear-backed expansionism and further wars of imperial aggression.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Ukraine’s Belarusian volunteers create headaches for Putin ally Lukashenka

Alesia Rudnik — Thu, 04 Apr 2024 00:58:45 +0000

In late March, Ukrainian MP Ihor Guz unfurled the flag of the Belarusian Kalinouski Regiment in the Ukrainian Parliament and paid tribute to the Belarusian volunteers helping to defend Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. This gesture was a reminder that Belarusians currently make up one of the largest contingents of foreign nationals fighting for Ukraine. Their growing presence is helping to shape the battlefield in Ukraine and has broader implications for regional security.

Belarusians have been part of the Ukrainian struggle against Russian aggression since 2014, when dozens joining the volunteer battalions that emerged in response to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. When Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in Febuary 2022, Belarusians responded by forming their own battalion and naming it after Kastus Kalinouski, a nineteenth century Belarusian national hero who led an uprising against imperial Russia.

This Belarusian battalion has since expanded to become a regiment, with representatives claiming as many as 5,000 volunteers. Belarusian troops have taken part in some of the biggest battles of the war including the fighting around Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Bakhmut. The Kalinouski Regiment now has its own recruitment and training structures, and has acquired a considerable arsenal of military equipment. While casualty figures are not publicly disclosed, there are reports of more than 40 Belarusian volunteers killed while defending Ukraine, with the total number likely to be significantly higher.

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The presence of so many Belarusians fighting alongside the Ukrainian military has long been a source of concern for Belarus’s pro-Kremlin dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Speculation over the potential dangers posed by Belarusian fighters in Ukraine has intensified in recent weeks amid a series of cross-border raids conducted by Russian volunteer units entering Russia from Ukrainian territory. Many are now asking whether Ukraine’s large Belarusian contingent may mount similar border zone operations inside Belarus.

For now, there is no sign of any plans for offensive activity along the Ukrainian border with Belarus. Instead, there are indications that Ukraine’s political and military leaders would rather avoid any escalation in the confrontation with Minsk at a time when they are fighting for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion.

In an October 2023 interview, Ukrainian Military Intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov spoke favorably of Lukashenka’s ability to prevent his country from becoming a direct participant in the Russian invasion. This caused considerable disquiet among the Belarusian pro-democracy opposition, with many viewing it as a signal of renewed readiness in Kyiv to deal with the Lukashenka regime.

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Despite the absence of any offensive operations against Belarus, Lukashenka clearly views the Belarusians fighting in Ukraine as a serious threat to his own regime. He is well aware that many Belarusian volunteers regard victory in Ukraine as a stepping stone toward the overthrow of the current pro-Russian authorities in Minsk. Unsurprisingly, volunteer fighters face criminal prosecution if caught inside Belarus. Some family members have also reportedly been detained by the Belarusian authorities.

Lukashenka has good reason to be wary. His position has been precarious since 2020, when nationwide protests over a rigged presidential election threatened to topple his regime until Kremlin intervention and a brutal crackdown enabled him to cling onto power. While there is only relatively limited cooperation between the domestic population and Belarus’s exiled pro-democracy opposition, the danger of renewed protests remains.

Some Belarusians have accused the country’s exiled opposition of not doing enough to confront the Lukashenka regime. Leaders of the Kalinouski Regiment have urged opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to play a more active role in efforts to mobilize support for the regiment and increase assistance for Belarusians fighting for Ukraine.

There are some indications that the Kalinouski Regiment may have political ambitions of its own. The regiment has strengthened ties with the Cyberpartisans hacktivist group, which is a member of the Belarusian opposition’s Coordination Council. In January 2024, Kalinouski Regiment leaders announced plans to visit 12 European cities to meet Belarusian supporters. While in Warsaw, they spoke of their interest in developing a “political track.”

The Kalinouski Regiment is playing a significant role in Ukraine’s armed struggle against Russian imperialism and its leaders clearly have ambitions to eventually liberate their own country. However, the regiment is currently far too small to challenge the Lukshenka regime on its own.

Meanwhile, there is little sign of any Ukrainian appetite to expand the war. On the contrary, the absence of cross-border raids and the softer tone adopted in recent months by some in Kyiv hints at a more pragmatic approach toward ties with Belarus. Until this changes, the Kalinouski Regiment may keep Lukashenka awake at night, but it is unlikely to orchestrate his downfall.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

The Atlantic Council and the Department of State’s Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues co-host a discussion with the 2024 International Women of Courage award recipients.

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The unjust imprisonment of women affects far more than those detained and their families, warned Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US representative to the United Nations.

“It’s devastating for entire communities,” she explained. “It hollows out civil society. It creates a culture: a culture of fear. It squashes hopes for a democratic future.”

Thomas-Greenfield spoke at an event last week cohosted by the Atlantic Council and the US Secretary of State’s Office of Global Women’s Issues designed to amplify the voices of women who have survived unjust imprisonment or other human-rights abuses.

“We all must do more to familiarize ourselves with the stories and with the facts regarding political prisoners, including women political prisoners,” said Geeta Rao Gupta, ambassador-at-large at the Office of Global Women’s Issues. “We must help give voice to those who remain unjustly behind bars and those whose voices are stifled.”

The event, moderated by Atlantic Council Executive Vice President Jenna Ben-Yehuda, gathered three recipients of the US State Department’s 2024 International Women of Courage Award to share their experiences and highlight the need for international support. Below are their stories.

Martha Beatriz Roque Cabello: Why it is now “very difficult” for prisoners

Roque, a Cuban political dissident and human-rights activist, talked about her experiences working with political prisoners and their families. “I cannot even distinguish which is worse, being imprisoned or being a relative of a prisoner,” she said.
Speaking from Cuba—having been blocked from traveling to the United States by the Cuban government since 2018—she added that the economic crisis there, which has led to severe shortages of food and other supplies, has made the situation “very difficult” for prisoners.
Roque herself has spent decades protesting against the Cuban government and was imprisoned twice. She now provides support to political prisoners. “I believe that being with them, even in thought, is something that will help them,” she said.

Fariba Balouch: “Pay attention” to minority groups and hold Iran’s regime responsible

Balouch, a London-based Iranian human-rights activist, recounted how—when she lived in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province—she had escaped an abusive marriage. She said she was “afraid to speak up about that” at the time, but then realized that, as women, “we have to raise that awareness.”
Balouch said that she felt it was her “duty” and “responsibility” to speak up for women in Sistan and Baluchestan Province; she also said that she had to make a “difficult choice” between being a mother and lifting the voices of marginalized people around her. “I decided to go with the people’s voice,” she said.
Balouch explained that in Iran, being a woman political prisoner comes with a lot of harassment. But “if you’re representing an ethnic minority,” she said, “that even doubles your problems and challenges.” As for being an activist: “That would make it even triple.”
She added that even once Baloch women leave Iran, they—and their families—continue to face similar threats and other pressures. She explained that she has received threats and that her son and her brother are currently imprisoned in Iran—her son was detained after having traveled to visit Balouch in the United Kingdom.
Balouch called upon the international community to support women activists and their families and to “pay attention” to minority communities “so the Islamic Republic of Iran knows that it has a responsibility” to ensure that no Baloch is killed in prison.

Volha Harbunova: This is a “global crisis”

Volha Harbunova, a Belarusian human rights defender, recounted how she fled Belarus after being released from prison and was later appointed the representative for social issues in the Belarusian United Transitional Cabinet, the government-in-exile led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. She called upon Belarusians who have fled and live outside of the country to keep up communication with people inside the country who face repression. The Lukashenka regime “doesn’t want [us] to have that communication,” she said. “They want to isolate us. They want to stop that solidarity.”
Harbunova argued that violence against women is a “global crisis,” which she said has recently been made clear by the rape and killing of a Belarusian refugee in Poland.
Harbunova recalled having faced psychological torture and violence after being imprisoned by the Lukashenka regime. She also noted that political prisoners are restricted from accessing medical care, food, and hygienic products—and that they are not allowed to communicate with family or their attorneys. LGBTQI+ people in prison, she added, often face more severe sexual violence. “The issue of political prisoners is a humanitarian issue; it’s a matter of life and death,” Harbunova said. “We really need help in securing the release of those prisoners.”

Katherine Walla is an associate director on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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No opposition candidates allowed in Belarus dictator’s “sham” elections

Hanna Liubakova — Tue, 27 Feb 2024 15:57:53 +0000

Sunday’s parliamentary and local elections in Belarus were among the most flawed in the thirty-year reign of the country’s authoritarian ruler, Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The ballot was completely cleansed of all opposition, with only loyalist candidates permitted to participate. The election was the first to take place in Belarus since the controversial presidential ballot of August 2020, when widespread accusations of vote-rigging sparked weeks of nationwide protests that briefly threatened to topple Lukashenka until Russian intervention rescued his regime.

With the events of 2020 still very much in mind, Lukashenka was clearly anxious to prevent any kind of renewed public mobilization. The February 25 vote took place amid a series of increased security measures including reports of Interior Ministry forces deployed near polling stations. Belarusian state media concealed the identities of election commission members and obscured the faces of some candidates during election coverage. Many polling stations reportedly lacked curtains on individual booths, while newly introduced restrictions on photography made it difficult to record evidence of protest votes “against all.”

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The election was widely dismissed as illegitimate by members of Belarus’s democratic opposition and Western officials. On the eve of the vote, activists hacked more than 2000 display screens in public spaces across Belarus and were able to broadcast an address by the country’s exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who branded the election a “senseless farce” and urged members of the public to stay home. Meanwhile, the election was widely condemned internationally, with the United States calling the vote a “sham” held in a “climate of fear.”

The Belarusian authorities initiated a crackdown on activists and their families during the election campaign, conducting home searches and detaining hundreds of people, according to human rights groups. In the month prior to the vote, legal proceedings were initiated against 20 Belarusian researchers and journalists (including this author) on charges of “conspiracy to seize power.” With Belarus’s last remaining pro-democracy political parties dissolved last year, only four parties were allowed to take part in Sunday’s vote. The pro-Lukashenka Belaya Rus party, which was registered in 2023, reportedly garnered a considerable amount of seats in the lower chamber, alongside a number of prominent pro-Russian activists and regime loyalists.

The draconian measures adopted ahead of Sunday’s vote may at first glance seem somewhat excessive, especially when considered in light of the ruthless crackdown on all opposition that had already taken place in Belarus over the past three-and-a-half years in the aftermath of the country’s 2020 pro-democracy protests. However, Lukashenka is clearly aware that many Belarusians remain discontented and fears a possible repeat uprising. By staging a loyalist election with no room for even symbolic opposition, he sought to demonstrate stability and reaffirm his grip on the country. This message was meant for domestic audiences and also for his patrons in the Kremlin.

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Last weekend’s highly orchestrated vote was in stark contrast to events in 2020, when a disputed election led to prolonged protests that erupted across Belarus before being forcefully suppressed in a brutal crackdown that saw tens of thousands of people detained amid widespread claims of human rights abuses including torture. In the aftermath of the protests, civil society organizations and independent media outlets were shuttered, while thousands of activists fled the country. Many who remained ended up in prison. In mid-February 2024, opposition activist Ihar Lednik became the fifth Belarusian political prisoner to die in jail since 2020, according to human rights watchdogs.

Belarus’s recent parliamentary elections took place in a climate of heightened political tension due to the ongoing Russian invasion of neighboring Ukraine. Lukashenka is widely seen as Putin’s junior partner in the invasion, having allowed Russian troops to use Belarus as a launch pad for the initial offensive into northern Ukraine in February 2022. The Belarusian dictator sought to justify the stifling atmosphere surrounding Sunday’s vote by claiming the country was under threat from “hybrid Western aggression.”

Sunday’s carefully choreographed vote was a dress rehearsal for next year’s far more significant Belarusian presidential election. As anticipated, Lukashenka confirmed on February 25 that he intends to run in 2025 for what would be his eighth consecutive presidential term. However, questions remain over whether he may yet seek to switch to a different role. In 2022, Lukashenka staged a referendum to rubber-stamp constitutional changes establishing the unelected All-Belarusian People’s Assembly as the country’s supreme authority. This potentially creates an opportunity for him to vacate the presidency while maintaining control over Belarus. Whatever he decides to do next year, meaningful change in Belarus looks to be out of the question as long as Lukashenka remains in charge of the country.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Today’s Belarusian authorities are widely seen as puppets of the Kremlin, with the country playing a significant role as a junior partner in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, there are ample indications of ongoing resistance to the Lukashenka regime. Exiled 2020 presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is widely recognized as the leader of the country’s democratic movement and travels extensively to rally international support for political change in Belarus. In Ukraine, significant numbers of Belarusians are currently fighting against the Russian invasion in the Kastus Kalinouski regiment and other volunteer units.

Inside Belarus itself, the draconian policies of the Lukashenka regime make any public opposition extremely difficult. Thousands have been jailed on charges of “extremism,” while nearly 1,500 individuals in Belarus are currently considered political prisoners. Nevertheless, activists have found ways to protest the policies of the Lukashenka regime via cyber attacks and the disruption of Russian military traffic on the country’s rail network.

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Giving more attention to the activities of the Belarusian democratic movement is particularly important at a time when some European Union governments are still maintaining dialogue with Lukashenka. Any unconditional attempts to reengage with the current Belarusian authorities would risk legitimizing the widespread repression of opposition-minded Belarusians since August 2020. It would also ignore the country’s role in the war against Ukraine. Moreover, the normalization of relations with Lukashenka would send a dangerous signal to Putin that the West lacks strategic patience and prefers unsustainable compromises to conflicts.

An enhanced international media spotlight could help the Belarusian opposition to counter the Lukashenka regime’s domestic disinformation efforts. Belarus is currently recognized as one of the world’s most hostile countries for independent media, and was ranked 157th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2023 World Press Freedom Index.

Belarus’s official state media outlets promote Kremlin-friendly narratives while claiming that the vast majority of an estimated 500,000 Belarusians who fled the country since August 2020 now want to come home. In February 2023, Lukashenka even signed a decree creating a commission to work with citizens who wish to return to their homeland. Belarusian democratic forces have countered these claims by highlighting the detention of returnees. According to human rights organization Viasna, at least 58 Belarusians were arrested after crossing the border in 2022 and early 2023.

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Crucially, Belarusian democratic forces have been drawing attention to growing Russian control over their country, a process many observers have likened to a “creeping annexation” by the Kremlin. Since the watershed events of August 2020, Russia has expanded its economic and political influence in Belarus, while also dramatically increasing its military presence in the country. In February 2022, Putin used Belarus as a base for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. More recently, Russian tactical nuclear weapons have reportedly been deployed in Belarus.

While the Kremlin’s tactics may differ, Russia is broadly pursuing the same imperial objectives in both Belarus and Ukraine. In addition to backing Lukashenka politically in Belarus, Moscow also supports the regime’s efforts to suppress the nation’s language and culture.

A December 2023 statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declaring the advancement of the Union State, a longstanding bilateral agreement which allows for deepening integration between the two states, indicates Moscow’s intention to further tighten its grip on Belarus in the coming period. Putin is widely believed to view control over Belarus and Ukraine as essential for his dreams of a revived Russian Empire.

It is abundantly clear that European security is impossible without peace in Ukraine. Stability throughout Europe is equally impossible without a free and independent Belarus. The Belarusian democratic opposition has been fighting for years to give voice to the aspirations of the Belarusian people and raise the alarm over Russia’s creeping takeover of the country. It is in the interests of the democratic world to support the Belarusian opposition and highlight their efforts whenever possible.

Tatsiana Kulakevich is an Associate Professor of Instruction at the University of South Florida School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies. Michael Berg is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Geotech Center.

The leader of Belarus’s democratic forces, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has urged exiled Belarusians not to return to Belarus if they face the risk of persecution. She has promised to raise the issue with officials in countries where Belarusians reside, while also seeking to secure international recognition for an alternative passport initiative launched recently by the country’s opposition movement in exile.

“Denying passports to Belarusians abroad is yet another ploy by Lukashenka,” tweeted Tsikhanouskaya. “It’s not just the regime’s revenge against those in exile but also an attempt to pressure the democratic nations hosting them. Encouraging Belarusians to return is an obvious trap. We won’t fall for it.”

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There is no precise data available for the number of people who left Belarus over the past three years. Estimates vary significantly, while official figures do not differentiate between those who left Belarus as political exiles and others who have moved abroad since 2020 for professional or personal reasons.

The latest Eurostat report on migration to the European Union stated that Belarusian nationals received approximately 309,000 EU residency permits in 2022, representing almost 9% of all permits issued. Research by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe indicates that as many as half a million Belarusians may have left the country since 2020. It is reasonable to assume that hundreds of thousands of Belarusians could now potentially face difficulties as their passports come up for renewal.

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The new restrictions on consular services are not the first example of Lukashenka targeting exiled Belarusians. In early 2023, he introduced new legislation making it possible to deprive Belarusians living abroad of their citizenship if found guilty of “extremism.” Meanwhile, a number of opposition leaders have been tried in absentia, with Tsikhanouskaya receiving a 15-year prison sentence.

Belarusians in exile have also been prevented from exercising their democratic rights as citizens. During a controversial February 2022 referendum on changes to the Belarusian Constitution, the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined to open polling stations at Belarusian embassies, citing Covid-related safety concerns and staffing shortages. Instead, Belarusians residing abroad were encouraging to return to Belarus in order to cast their votes.

Nobody within the exiled Belarusian democratic opposition movement is under any illusions regarding the dangers of returning to their homeland. Human rights watchdogs have already raised the alarm over mounting instances of returning Belarusians being detained. In some cases, detainees have been forced to record video confessions admitting their involvement in pro-democracy protests.

For the past three years, Lukashenka has consistently sought to downplay the significance of Belarus’s 2020 pro-democracy uprising while attempting to frame it as a foreign plot. He has publicly encouraged exiled citizens to return home and has even established a government commission to aid in the process. However, few appear ready to take him at his word. Instead, they view the recent ban on passport renewals as further confirmation that the Belarusian dictator still seeks to punish citizens who he earlier branded as “fugitives” and “traitors.”

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

John E. Herbst: The fact Prigozhin survived so long is evidence of cracks in Putin’s regime

Dan Fried: Like ‘something out of the Godfather series’

Ariel Cohen: Putin sent a message to anyone who contemplates challenging him

Brian Whitmore: To preserve the regime, Putin needs to preserve fear

Rama Yade: With or without Prigozhin, for Russia in Africa, it is business as usual

Joseph Webster: Expect Xi and Putin to move closer once again

Hanna Liubakova: The plane crash shows Lukashenka that Putin is still the boss

Andrew D’Anieri: Putin may have frozen further threats to his regime

Jeffrey Cimmino: Wagner mutiny’s last chapter has yet to be written

Vladislav Davidzon: If you come for the king, do not miss

Doug Klain: With Prigozhin’s apparent death and Surovikin’s dismissal, Putin is cleaning house

Harlan Ullman: Putin will seek plausible deniability by blaming Ukraine

John Barranco: Proximity breeds paranoia in men like Putin

Olga Khakova: It’s time for the West to tighten sanctions and global energy firms to pull out of Russia

The fact Prigozhin survived so long is evidence of cracks in Putin’s regime

Did the apparent death of the Wagner mercenary chief in a plane crash solve Putin’s Prigozhin problem? On the face of it, the answer is yes. Prigozhin had been publicly sparring with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov over their failures conducting the war in Ukraine since last fall. Then in late June he publicly challenged the official justifications for the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine—at least an indirect shot at Putin—and launched his mutiny, taking control in Rostov-on-Don and sending his troops to Moscow. While senior Russian officials denounced this as treason, within twenty-four hours the Kremlin made a deal that persuaded Prigozhin to end his march on Moscow in exchange for safe passage to Belarus. In short, Putin the strong man looked weak and vulnerable.

That perception only grew in the ensuing two months, as Prigozhin spent far more time in Russia than Belarus. He met with African leaders on the sideline of the Russia-Africa Summit in Saint Petersburg and even became the public face of Russian support for a coup in Niger. All this by a man who publicly questioned the stated reasons for Putin’s war on Ukraine.

So yes, Prigozhin had to go; and it could not wait, because each new public initiative he undertook was a reminder of the strong man’s vulnerability. And his reported demise was a warning that challenging the czar was a fool’s game. To underscore that, the Kremlin dismissed Surovikin, a reported Prigozhin pal, the same day the plane crashed.

This has certainly stanched the bleeding, but it has not solved Putin’s problem. He cannot undo the events of the past two months, and the Russian elite will not forget what they saw. Even if Prigozhin is gone, he is still admired—for Wagner’s relative success in Ukraine compared with the Russian army, for taking care of his soldiers, and for his willingness to say out loud his concerns about the wisdom of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The ultimate driver of Prigozhin’s rebellion, Putin’s flailing in Ukraine, remains. And while some senior players in Moscow may conclude that it is too dangerous to challenge Czar Putin, others may conclude that Prigozhin’s mistake was halting his forces’ march on Moscow.

—John E. Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

Like ‘something out of the Godfather series’

After June’s mutiny led by Wagner warlord Prigozhin, many observers were astonished by the gap between Putin’s denunciation of the mutiny on the day it occurred and the diffidence with which the Kremlin seemed to treat Prigozhin immediately after the fact. That mystery seems resolved. In what seems like an act of slightly delayed revenge, something out of the Godfather series, Prigozhin’s plane was shot down and all on board, Prigozhin included, were reportedly killed.

While the circumstances are not yet clear, it seems best to assume that this was not an accident, but a targeted hit. The only unusual feature is that Prigozhin was not pushed out of a window or shot on the street or in an apartment stairwell, like other Kremlin opponents, but apparently shot down from a plane in lurid fashion.

What does it mean? (What follows is speculation that will be tested and likely revised as additional information unfolds.)

First, Putin has exacted a price against those who move against him. Prigozhin appears to be dead and Surovikin, former commander of Russian troops in Ukraine and by many accounts a competent one, and who was seen as close to Prigozhin, has been dismissed, arrested, and may face charges (or worse). The strange spectacle of Prigozhin’s initial lenient treatment is over; the delay in going after him may have meant only that Putin needed to gauge the degree of Prigozhin’s support before acting.

Second, this latest affirmation of Putin’s style—keep cool in a crisis and kill your opponents on your terms and timing—probably strengthens his position in the short term. The inconsistency and apparent wavering on the day of and shortly after the mutiny, which generated speculation that Putin was vulnerable, has been superseded.

Third, a tyrant maintaining power through murder and fear can work in the short run. But such rule exacts a price on the country. Putin has made bad decisions, like starting a war with Ukraine that Russia cannot seem to win. He may pay no immediate price for that decision (or other bad ones) unless he fails, on the battlefield or otherwise. At that point, he could be vulnerable. A tyrant such as Putin, history shows, has agents and servants but no real allies or friends.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Putin sent a message to anyone who contemplates challenging him

Prigozhin looks to have died as he lived: violently. The Kremlin chef’s apparent fiery end, which some Russian sources say was brought by a missile fired by the Russian military, indicates that crossing his boss, Putin, is a deadly serious business. Reportedly, Dmitry Utkin, the Wagner founder and its military commander, also perished on board the Embraer jet.

Putin sent a message to anyone who contemplates challenging him, while earlier jailing his opponents from both the liberal and ultra-nationalist camps: Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Kara-Murza are jailed for nineteen and twenty-five years respectively, and Igor Girkin is under arrest and facing trial, to mention just a few.

The question now arises: What will happen with the Wagner Group assets in Russia, Belarus, African countries, and Syria? Integration into the Russian military will be bumpy, as many fighters are personally loyal to Prigozhin, and the state armed forces’ affiliation would even further dilute the already-tenuous plausible deniability the Russian state-supported mercenaries have enjoyed.

Clearly, Shoigu and Gerasimov won this round of the power struggle, but the jostling for power in Moscow never ends. Today what Winston Churchill called “the fight of bulldogs under the carpet” produced the dramatic pictures of the crashing business jet: Wagner’s Götterdämmerung.

In the future, there will be fights between the military and the Federal Security Service; the competent “system liberals” in the Central Bank of Russia against the economic nincompoops in the Duma; between the presidential administration and the security services; and among the different factions of the Kremlin-connected oligarchs. This struggle will escalate as the jockeying for Putin’s legacy proceeds to its inevitable end.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

To preserve the regime, Putin needs to preserve fear

At the risk of stating the obvious, it is highly unlikely that the airline crash that appears to have killed Prigozhin was an accident. If Prigozhin were not forced to pay a heavy price for his rebellion in June, Putin’s regime would have been severely weakened. This is because the Putin regime essentially operates according to the logic of a crime syndicate. Putin is the godfather. Prigozhin was a capo who apparently didn’t know his place. And in the immortal words of Omar Little of The Wire, “You come at the king, you best not miss.” Putin is famously vindictive and from the moment Prigozhin aborted his march on Moscow, he was a dead man walking.

Historically, political change comes to Russia when three factors are present: a divided elite (check), a dissatisfied public (check), and an absence of fear. If Prigozhin had been left unpunished, fear would have been removed from the equation and the regime would have been in peril.

A couple of other details are also worth noting. On the same day Prigozhin apparently died, his close ally Surovikin was relieved of his duties as chief of the Russian Air Force. And as news of the plane crash spread, Putin was busy presenting the Hero of Russia award to soldiers live on television. Russian journalists were quick to note that in June 2022, Putin gave the same award to Prigozhin. So the optics of Prigozhin’s elimination appear to have also been carefully choreographed.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and founder and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

With or without Prigozhin, for Russia in Africa, it is business as usual

After his rebellion, the question was: What will be Wagner’s future in Africa, its main ground, now that Prigozhin is exiled in Belarus? Three options were possible: its dissolution, its nationalization by the Russian state, or the appointment of a new leader.

The last two options would preserve Wagner’s achievements in Africa, which Moscow considers highly, including mining concessions and efficient anti-Western propaganda. None of these scenarios included Prigozhin. His apparent death would not change anything in Russians’ plans besides maybe getting rid of a potential future threat. For the Russians, it is very important that Wagner’s work in Mali and the Central African Republic “of course, will continue.” That is what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said after Prigozhin’s rebellion a few weeks ago to his African friends, who were very worried about the situation.

Prigozhin or not, the Russians wanted to keep their business and security interests in Africa. It is a primary goal. Putin was very clear about that when he said the mutineers “betrayed the country.” He could not trust Prigozhin, who was under investigation for armed rebellion, any more. Even after his exile, Prigozhin was a threat to Russian interests in Africa, maybe a competitor with rival interests. Surprisingly, he showed up in Saint Petersburg at the recent Russia Africa Summit. Clearly, the interests of the Russian government and the Wagner Group were not aligned any more. Africa is key in Putin’s strategy in Ukraine: to prove he is not isolated, to circumvent Western economic sanctions and rebuild his forces via Wagner. Prigozhin’s uprising required a clarification on the nature of Russia’s partnership with African countries. It’s done.

—Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Expect Xi and Putin to move closer once again

The apparent killing of Prigozhin and the ousting of Surovikin, who was rumored to have supported Prigozhin during June’s mutiny, is a show of force meant to deter other would-be domestic challengers and signal to outsiders that Putin remains in charge of the power vertical. The near-simultaneity of these major actions—which took place exactly two months after the June mutiny started—is not a coincidence.

Beijing will likely be pleased with Putin’s cold and lethal decisiveness, as well as its implications. Putin likely would not have liquidated Prigozhin unless he judged that the domestic political fallout would be minimal and that Russian forces can withstand any Ukrainian attempt to exploit an opening. Accordingly, Beijing may believe with greater confidence that Putin will survive domestic and foreign policy challenges.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially sought to institutionalize China-Russia relations in the wake of the mutiny but may be re-emphasizing personalistic ties.

Beijing appeared genuinely shocked by the intensity and duration of the Prigozhin mutiny and was slow to issue expressions of support for Putin. Moreover, on July 10, a little over two weeks after the failed mutiny, Beijing invited Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko to a meeting in China, where CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping framed Sino-Russian relations as a “strategic choice made by the two countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples.” This new rhetoric apparently sought to downplay the Xi-Putin personal relationship and formalize political ties.

With Prigozhin out of the way, however, Beijing may be willing to reemphasize leader-to-leader ties. On July 25, exactly a month after the mutiny concluded, the Russian side announced that Xi and Putin would meet in China in October. While the Prigozhin mutiny and Xi’s slow support for Putin in the crisis exposed the limits of the personal relationship between these two “best and bosom friends,” the two figures may be moving closer, once again.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report.

The plane crash shows Lukashenka that Putin is still the boss

Two months ago, Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka extended security assurances to Prigozhin. Throughout the uprising and its aftermath, Lukashenka adeptly assumed the role of a peacemaker, positioning himself as an essential player in resolving the tensions within Russia. His propaganda went as far as claiming that he had rescued the Russian people.

Wednesday’s plane crash in Russia’s Tver region has significantly compromised Lukashenka’s standing. Primarily, his image as a skillful mediator has taken a hit. This incident exposes a lack of autonomy on his part, confirming a subordinate connection to Putin. Both he and Belarus were used as instruments to facilitate the “agreement.”

If the plane crash was not a mere accident but a deliberate targeted action, it should serve as a stark reminder to Lukashenka and his associates of the Kremlin’s readiness to test the limits in its treatment of its allies—particularly those allies who have shown any form of opposition or resistance. Such actions will be interpreted as acts of betrayal. A response will follow.

The motivations for Wagner mercenaries to remain in Belarus are diminishing rapidly. The future course of action for them remains uncertain. Their presence in Belarus initially stemmed from Lukashenka’s effort to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin. It was then manifested through the intimidation of neighboring Western countries and Ukraine, a stance that found favor with Putin. Now, following Prigozhin’s apparent death, there is a possibility that the mercenaries could face pressure to leave Belarus.

Their departure is likely to bring a sense of relief to the Belarusian people. But once again, it’s evident that Lukashenka’s control is restricted. The Kremlin will dictate the schedule for their presence. This dynamic also extends to forthcoming developments concerning Belarus, where Lukashenka might be overlooked or regarded as a secondary figure.

—Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

Putin may have frozen further threats to his regime

In the Greek myth of Icarus, a man ignores warnings against flying too close to the sun and eventually falls straight from the sky, perishing on impact. Recent reports of Prigozhin’s death after allegedly being shot down in his private jet roughly three hundred kilometers from Moscow may be a new grisly parable for today’s Russia. Just two months earlier, Prigozhin led a mutiny against Russian military leadership and marched toward Moscow, only to halt on the M4 highway and reverse course after striking a deal with Putin, brokered by his Belarusian counterpart Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Armed with security guarantees and assurances that he would maintain some control over his Wagner Group paramilitaries, it looked like Prigozhin had gotten away with the whole thing. He popped up regularly over the next few weeks, claiming to be variously in Belarus, Saint Petersburg, and even with Wagner forces in Africa.

In the end, Prigozhin’s antics may have proved intolerable for the Kremlin. If Prigozhin really is dead, and if his plane was shot down, as has been alleged, then this is a major win for Putin. Despicable though Prigozhin is/was—leading thousands of Wagner troops against Ukraine, sponsoring violence in Africa, and sowing discord in the West—it is also true that he represented the most dynamic domestic threat to Putin’s power and to his more than two decades-long rule. The Kremlin has gone to extreme lengths to silence any sort of dissent at home, especially against Russia’s war on Ukraine. But Prigozhin not only chirped at the Russian military for months and questioned the war effort, he actively led a rebellion to change Russia’s military leadership. Putin’s authoritarian kleptocracy is largely based on the quiet assent of the masses and proved brittle when faced with armed resistance from Prigozhin and Wagner.

If Prigozhin really is off the chessboard, along with his Wagner number two Dmitriy Utkin, then the best-organized armed threat to Putin’s power may have been disarmed, at least for now. As more details come out, Prigozhin’s reported death will also likely have a chilling effect on any other pretenders to the Kremlin thinking of striking against Putin, few though they may be. The Russian dictator may not maintain complete control, but the apparent death of his most significant rival may very well freeze further domestic threats to his regime.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Wagner mutiny’s last chapter has yet to be written

Prigozhin’s apparent death represents a continuation of the storm that brewed in Russia two months ago during the Wagner Group’s mutiny. What comes next? A few important questions to ask:

Does evidence emerge clearly showing this was a deliberate act to down Prigozhin’s plane? Supporters of Prigozhin may not need definitive evidence to prompt their next move, but it would certainly further exacerbate tensions between Putin’s regime and Wagner forces/sympathizers if proof emerged showing this was a decapitation strike.

Can—and if yes, do—Wagner forces organize a formidable challenge to Putin and their opponents at the highest levels of Russia’s Ministry of Defense? Wagner forces were approaching Moscow two months ago; now, many of them are in Belarus and their leader appears to be dead. Their desire and capacity to organize a new challenge to Putin’s regime remains to be seen.

What happens in Ukraine? Should violence return in the near term, Russian morale on the front lines could deteriorate, while command-and-control weakens. If Prigozhin’s supporters bide their time, they could wait for continued, hard-fought Ukrainian successes to leave Putin in a more politically precarious state before launching a new challenge to the regime.

These are just a few of the questions worth asking in the days and weeks ahead. One thing is certain: The last chapter of June’s mutiny has yet to be written.

—Jeffrey Cimmino is deputy director of operations and a fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

If you come for the king, do not miss

When it became obvious that the Wagner mutiny had failed, it also became totally clear that there would be ramifications for Prigozhin and the top Wagner aides that had engaged in the insurrection against the Russian state. Putin—as everyone knows—is infamously unforgiving of betrayal. Many of us asked one another what it was exactly that Prigozhin possessed that was so useful to the regime that he could possibly assume he was safe. The most logical supposition, outside of kompromat, was that Wagner was far too powerful and important within Russia’s African operations and that he could not very easily be replaced as CEO of the corporation and its many subsidiaries without incurring transaction costs and losses to the Kremlin.

That answer has now proven itself to be incorrect. Putin and the regime that he oversees were wounded enough that a very public example needed to be made. Coupled with Surovikin being removed from his command for allegedly knowing what was about to transpire, the apparent killing of the maverick mercenary leader will send an unmistakable message to the Russian army and general population: If you come for the king, do not miss (and even if you make a deal do not expect to survive the next six months). In the long term, the apparent killing will likely make morale among the leftover Wagner men even worse and will likely mean that the mercenary organization has no future outside of the direct command of the Russian Defense Ministry. None of this makes the cohesion of the Russian state look particularly great, however.

—Vladislav Davidzon is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Since 2018, he has served as a co-producer for a television series on the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

With Prigozhin’s apparent death and Surovikin’s dismissal, Putin is cleaning house

This was a big day for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian S-400 air-defense system in Crimea, brought in a Russian defector and captured his helicopter, and shot down a Russian warplane over the Black Sea. But the best news of all was the downing of a plane reportedly carrying Prigozhin, who was responsible for the butchering of countless Ukrainians. Ultimate responsibility may rest with a vengeful Putin seeking to eliminate the man who openly challenged him two months ago, but there will be few tears shed for the warlord’s demise.

One reason Prigozhin may have lived as long as he did after his attempted rebellion is that Putin might still have needed him for Russian operations in Africa and to ensure that he wasn’t turned into a martyr by his Wagner fighters. Two months later, that no longer appears to be the case. Prigozhin’s apparent death is likely to be a signal to the rest of the Russian elite that challenging Putin’s rule is a death sentence.

Just the day before his plane was downed, Prigozhin posted a video claiming to be in Africa where he vowed to make “Russia even greater on every continent.” Especially with Prigozhin apparently dead, Russia’s operations in Africa should remain under close scrutiny.

Prigozhin’s apparent death also comes as Surovikin, who disappeared during the Wagner uprising and was reported to be under house arrest, was formally removed from his post as head of the air force under suspicion of aiding Prigozhin. In all likelihood, Putin is finally cleaning house.

—Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Putin will seek plausible deniability by blaming Ukraine

Assuming Prigozhin and his deputy Dmitry Utkin were killed aboard his jet, this was “no accident, comrade,” as Lenin observed. Most likely, it was purposeful sabotage engineered by one of Russia’s intelligence services, ordered by Putin. A missile strike would be detected, as with the 2014 attack on a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet, and would have been an act of supreme incompetence and stupidity, as it would have placed blame squarely on the Kremlin.

For Putin, this is a “hat trick” from hell. First, Russians will understand who was responsible and that this is a case of “shock and awe,” letting all know who is in charge. Second, Ukraine will be accused as the perpetrator, giving Putin plausible deniability that many Russians will accept. Last, whether or not this was revenge, Putin plays for keeps. Past and current US presidents failed to understand this.

The United States and NATO need to ask basic questions about how safe air travel is over Russia, and why and how this happened. Second, they need to send a consistent but low-key message that NATO maintains an overwhelming conventional military superiority over a desiccated Russian army. Teddy Roosevelt was right—speak softly and carry a big stick. But will we?

—Harlan Ullman is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the author of The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.

Proximity breeds paranoia in men like Putin

On July 4, 1943, all of Europe was at war. It was a clear day with perfect flying weather. A single Royal Air Force B-24 Liberator took off from Gibraltar on a routine transport flight, only to crash shortly after take-off, killing sixteen of the seventeen people on board. Among the dead was Wladyslaw Sikorski, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army and the prime minister of the free Polish government-in-exile. His death removed a powerful obstacle to the Kremlin’s plan to reassert its control over Eastern Europe. Though it was never conclusively proven, the crash was suspected to be the work of the Soviet intelligence services, a charge they vehemently denied.

Eighty years later, the largest war since World War II rages in Europe, and another threat to the Kremlin’s plan for reasserting Russian dominance in Eastern Europe appears to have been eliminated by a plane crash. Like the Gibraltar mishap, it is unlikely that we will ever know the truth about what happened, but Prigozhin’s apparent death seems too convenient to be a coincidence. Putin remains a KGB officer at his core, and like his predecessor Joseph Stalin his perceived enemies are eliminated, preferably in ways that give him plausible deniability.

Prigozhin was many things, but a student of twentieth-century Russian history was not one of them. Had he been, he would have realized that the dictator’s favor does not last long. Proximity breeds paranoia in men like Stalin and Putin, as so many of their former allies and comrades learned the hard way, especially if they had the audacity to publicly challenge them.

What does Prigozhin’s likely death mean for the Wagner Group and Putin’s hold on power? The Wagner Group may survive to be used as a future Russian proxy force in the Middle East and Africa, as it has been in the past, but it is unlikely ever to regain its prominence. Putin has sent a clear message to other would-be rivals that he remains firmly in control and that the consequence of betrayal is death. This may work for him in the short term, but if the war in Ukraine turns into a multi-year quagmire, Putin may not be able to find a plane large enough to shoot down all the enemies he will have made within Russia.

—Col. John B. Barranco (Ret.) was the 2021-22 US Marine Corps senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently executive vice president of Potomac International Partners and an adjunct professor at the Naval War College.

It’s time for the West to tighten sanctions and global energy firms to pull out of Russia

On the surface, there is little connection between Russia’s energy sector and Prigozhin’s apparent death. However, the way Putin seems to have dealt with his adversary should worry international partners with remaining investments in Russia, particularly those in the energy sector—the life raft of the Russian economy. This public display of revenge is a blunt reminder that Russia will choose violence over courts to resolve threats to Putin’s agenda. The importance of energy exports for Moscow cannot be overstated, and any business decisions that stray from helping Moscow generate the highest possible revenues are now a personal threat to Putin.

This should signal two messages to international players. First and foremost, energy companies should urgently decouple their operations from Russia. Second, Western allies should leverage the internal turbulence in Russia as an opportune time to tighten sanctions and lower the price cap on oil exports to crash Russia’s ability to sustain its bloody war.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

The post Experts react: What the Prigozhin plane crash reveals about Putin, the Wagner Group’s future, and the war in Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarus dictator Lukashenka must face justice for role in Russia’s Ukraine war

Katie LaRoque — Tue, 22 Aug 2023 15:03:00 +0000

It is time for a serious conversation on how to hold Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka accountable for his participation in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka has brutally terrorized his own people for decades, stealing elections, imprisoning tens of thousands, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee Belarus for their safety, and attempting to eradicate independent activism. Over the past eighteen months, he has become a key accomplice in Vladimir Putin’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka is not a passive actor on the fringes of this conflict; he is directly responsible for much of the devastation in Ukraine.

First and foremost, Lukashenka permitted approximately 30,000 Russian troops onto Belarusian territory prior to the full-scale invasion, which allowed Putin to attempt an ultimately failed blitzkrieg assault on Kyiv in early 2022. Not only could Russian troops stage their northern offensive from Belarusian land, but evidence also suggests that the country’s air defenses, air traffic control systems, and fueling stations were put under Kremlin military command. Belarusian hospitals were even used to treat injured Russian soldiers. The Russian atrocities that Ukrainian investigators have documented in Kyiv region towns such as Bucha, Irpin, and Borodyanka were only possible due to Lukashenka’s complicity in the war.

Second, through October 2022, Lukashenka routinely allowed Russian missiles to be fired from Belarus at targets across Ukraine, as he has publicly admitted. Hundreds of Russian missiles were fired from Belarus in the early stages of the full-scale invasion, with devastating consequences for the Ukrainian civilian population. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that at least 9,000 Ukrainian civilians have been killed since the start of the full-scale invasion, though the true figure is believed to be considerably higher. These deaths are not all a consequence of missile strikes launched from Belarus, but many are.

Third, there is a rapidly growing body of evidence that the Lukashenka regime is also engaged in the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied regions of Ukraine. Data presented by Belarusian democratic forces suggests that more than 2100 Ukrainian children were forcibly transferred to so-called health camps and sanatoriums in Belarus from September 2022 to May 2023. It bears reminding that the forcible transfer of children from one group to another is an act of genocide under the UN Genocide Convention.

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For the first two offenses, Lukashenka’s involvement would fall under the crime of aggression. According to the United Nations definition, the crime of aggression can be proven when a country “[allows] its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State.” As such, Lukashenka should be prosecuted alongside Putin for the crime of aggression in a special international tribunal.

Critically, the establishment of a special international tribunal for the crime of aggression would circumvent potential head of state immunity that could limit other accountability mechanisms and prevent the prosecution of Lukashenka. This approach has already garnered the support of several countries including the Ukrainian government. It has also been backed by a number of international bodies including the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

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When seeking justice for the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children, we must turn to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has already issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and the Russian Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova in response to their roles in the alleged mass abductions. Belarusian and Russian state media has openly covered a number of potentially incriminating statements by Lukashenka, in which he admits to his regime’s involvement in the forcible transfer of Ukrainian minors.

In June 2023, Lukashenka stated publicly: “I went to Putin, I said ‘let’s spend part of the Union budget on these children.’ That’s how we started to bring them.” Such an admission suggests a political agreement at the highest levels of Belarusian and Russian government to kidnap Ukrainian children. In response to mounting evidence, both the Ukrainian and Lithuanian Prosecutors General have launched investigations into the role of Belarus in child abductions. Further investigation is needed to fully scope the extent of the Belarusian regime’s role, but publicly available data supports the conclusion that the ICC should issue an additional warrant for Lukashenka’s arrest.

As we assess the litany of alleged human rights violations perpetrated by Lukashenka and his regime, it is essential to stress that the Belarusian people are not to blame. Belarusians also deserve accountability for the crimes committed against them by their leaders. The repression they have endured has been severe, inhumane, and ongoing. Justice cannot end with accountability for Lukashenka’s crimes against Ukraine; it must come full circle to address crimes committed in Belarus. In the meantime, full accountability for the war against Ukraine provides an opportunity to hold Putin and his accomplices, Lukashenka chief among them, accountable. We must seize this moment.

Katie LaRoque is the deputy director for policy and advocacy at Freedom House and focuses on Europe and Eurasia.

These actions are unsurprisingly consistent with provocations by Putin. In late July, he accused Warsaw of intending to take back territories Soviet leader Joseph Stalin seized from Poland during World War II, including “a good chunk of Ukraine . . . to take back the historic lands.” He added that “it’s well known that they dream of Belarusian lands as well.”

Putin has accompanied his heated rhetoric with military action. In addition to sending the Wagner Group to Belarus, he continues to use Belarusian territory to stage aggression against Ukraine and recently announced that Russia has deployed nuclear weapons to Belarus. In June, Russia conducted a mass military exercise in the Baltic Sea at the same time NATO conducted its annual and long-scheduled BALTOPS naval exercise. This month, Moscow announced the launch in the Baltic of Ocean Shield, an even larger exercise involving six thousand personnel, thirty warships and boats, and thirty aircraft.

Putin’s objectives are obvious. He seeks to probe the Alliance’s defenses. He is trying to seed dissension among the NATO allies. And he is trying to undercut Central European confidence in the Alliance.

The case for a snap exercise

Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia have responded by reinforcing their borders, with Warsaw sending some ten thousand military troops to its frontier with Belarus. But their response should be part of a NATO response to these provocations, one that goes beyond rhetorical condemnation and demonstrates the Alliance’s military readiness and capability.

NATO should conduct a no-notice exercise in the Suwalki Gap, deploying maritime, air, and ground assets from other Alliance member states. The purpose would be to demonstrate and test operational readiness in coordination with Polish and Lithuanian forces and NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battalions now stationed in those two countries.

The Alliance’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces (VTJF) would be an ideal element to serve as the core of this demonstration of force. This force, twenty thousand soldiers strong, features air, maritime, and special operations forces components as well as a multinational land brigade of five thousand troops. Leading elements are tasked to be ready to deploy within three days.

During the Cold War, NATO counterforce deployments exercises were a routine response to military provocations by the Soviet Union, including those similar to what Putin is doing in the region around the Suwalki Gap. NATO needs to do the same today.

A VTJF deployment would demonstrate that NATO does not fear conflict with Russia—an impression that allied leaders have unfortunately contributed to by repeating, mantra-like, that the West’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine must not “NATO-ize” the conflict to avoid World War III. That mantra has only led Putin to question the Alliance’s resoluteness.

Such a deployment would underscore the operationalization of NATO’s new military strategy, which was rolled out at the Alliance’s summit in Vilnius in July. The Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area is designed to enable the Alliance to more effectively respond to aggression, including provocations such as those that Putin is orchestrating near the Suwalki Gap.

Such a “snap exercise” would contribute to the ongoing rejuvenation of the Alliance’s war-fighting mindset and the practice of rapidly and assertively countering Russian provocations through rigorous demonstrations of resolve, unity, and force.

Some may argue that this would provoke Russia. But if there is anything to learn from Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it is this: The Alliance’s failure to conduct more forceful deployments to Central Europe in the months leading up to that attack, when Moscow massed forces on Ukraine’s frontiers, only further emboldened Putin. When considering provocations that warrant a snap exercise, recent events in the Suwalki Gap should be at the top of the list.

Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. Formerly, he served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

The post NATO must respond to Russia’s provocations in Belarus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Drones target central Moscow skyscrapers

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 03 Aug 2023 20:34:27 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Ukraine strikes critical bridge as Wagner trains Belarusian brigades

Wave of drone attacks target Moscow’s central business district

Media policy

TGStat restricts access to channel providing data on slain Russian soldiers

Ukraine strikes critical bridge as Wagner trains Belarusian brigades

Ukrainian armed forces announced on July 29 a successful attack on a railway bridge near Chonhar, along the M-18 Dzhankoi-Melitopol highway, which connects occupied Crimea with the occupied Kherson region. The bridge is a notable point along a critical ground line of communication for Russia.

Ukrainian officials circulated a photo purportedly documenting railway damage at one end of the bridge.

A photo of the Chonhar bridge after a Ukrainian strike on it on 29th July, 2023.

Ukrainian Armed Forces confirmed a strike on Chonhar bridge (one of the key elements in Russian military logistics in the South of Ukraine).

Russian media did not mention the strike at all.… pic.twitter.com/1cfi8JWpKB
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 31, 2023

Satellite imagery before and after the attack appears to show damage in the same location.

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1686030017916989441

The Ukrainian army continued to launch counteroffensive attacks in northwest and southwest Bakhmut and in the eastern and western parts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced on July 31 that Ukrainian forces took back two square kilometers of territory in the Bakhmut area over the past week, as well as twelve square kilometers in the direction of Berdyansk and Melitopol. Ukrainian troops reported forty combat engagements with Russian forces in Donetsk’s Mariinka, Pobjeda, and Staromaiorske, as well as east toward Berestove in Kharkiv and near Novoselivske in Luhansk. Ukrainian troops also claimed that they caught a Russian saboteur group attempting to enter the Chernihiv region, though this is not yet confirmed.

A drone attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet appears to have resulted in casualties, according to intercepted radio communications between Russian Ka-29 helicopters involved in an evacuation and coastal aviation services. The Russian defense ministry claimed to have successfully repelled three naval drones that targeted the patrol ships Sergey Kotov and Vasily Bykov. However, audio shared by the Telegram channel Babel purports that one person was killed and five injured. The DFRLab cannot independently verify the authenticity of the audio at this time.

Soldiers with Ukraine’s AREY Battalion, within the Territorial Defense Forces, spoke to CNN on August 1 about the tactical strategies Russia employs against Ukraine. They alleged that Russia often hides the bulk of its personnel in basements to avoid aerial reconnaissance. As a result, when attacking, Ukrainian forces may encounter an enemy many times larger than expected. In addition, the report claimed that Russian army commanders had adopted the Wagner tactic of taking prisoners to uncover Ukrainian firing positions.

Meanwhile, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin met with Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani on July 31 in Tehran. The pair signed a memorandum of understanding and a military cooperation plan. In May, the government-affiliated Ukrainian National Resistance Center reported, citing unnamed Belarusian rebels, that Iran was considering opening a Shahed drone production plant in Belarus. This report has not been confirmed. Russia is actively using Shahed drones across Ukraine. On August 1, several groups of Shahed drones were reportedly launched from Russia’s Primorsko-Akhtarsk area toward Ukraine; around this time explosions were reported in Kherson.

Ukraine has begun producing RUBAKA kamikaze drones, which are expected to be deployed by Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence. The drones reportedly have a range of five hundred kilometers. Unlike Iran’s Shahed drones, RUBAKA drones will carry a smaller warhead and cost about $15,000 per unit. According to a report from the New York Times, Shahed drones cost about $20,000 per unit.

On August 1, Ukrainian Telegram channels claimed that five medical personnel were reportedly wounded in an attack on a Kherson hospital. In addition, one person was reportedly killed and another injured in an aerial attack on Pershotravneve, Kharkiv Oblast.

On July 30, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced that Wagner soldiers conducted company-level training with multiple Belarusian mechanized brigades. The Belarusian military usually conducts such exercises with Russian trainers. This could signal a new role for Wagner; the DFRLab will continue to monitor Wagner’s buildup in Belarus.

Ukrainian Presidential Chief-of-Staff Andriy Yermak stated on July 30 that Kyiv and Washington will begin consultations on providing Ukraine with “security guarantees.” Yermak said the guarantees would remain in place until Ukraine acquires NATO membership. US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller confirmed the consultations during a press briefing on July 31. “Those talks are going to kick off this week,” he stated.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian military intelligence spokesperson Andrii Cherniak alleged on July 30 that since the beginning of 2022, Russia had forcibly mobilized 55,000 to 60,000 men in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Cherniak told Radio Svoboda that Russian forces “caught people on the street…and forcibly took people away.” Cherniak’s claims have not been independently verified.

According to a Financial Times report, the United States has signed contracts with Bulgaria and South Korea to supply 155mm shells to Ukraine. The report stated that the US government has also financed additional ammunition production facilities in Texas and Canada. Bulgaria recently opened a plant to produce 155mm projectiles. Negotiations toward a similar agreement with Japan are currently under way.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wave of drone attacks target Moscow’s central business district

Drone strikes in Moscow’s central business district on July 30 and August 1 targeted buildings housing government ministries. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin addressed the July 30 attack on his Telegram channel, reporting zero casualties. According to Russian independent outlet Meduza, one of three drones was intercepted by anti-air defense systems, causing it to crash into one of the OKO towers, a complex of two eighty-four-story skyscrapers built in 2015, damaging the facade on the first and fourth floor. The neighboring fifty-story IQ-Kvartal skyscraper had damaged windows on the sixth and fifth floors. Sobyanin identified the drones as Ukrainian in his Telegram post. Short of admitting responsibility, Adviser to the Head of the Office of President of Ukraine Mykhailo Podolyak tweeted about “[m]ore unidentified drones.”

#Moscow is rapidly getting used to a full-fledged war, which, in turn, will soon finally move to the territory of the "authors of the war" to collect all their debts… Everything that will happen in #Russia is an objective historical process. More unidentified drones, more…
— Михайло Подоляк (@Podolyak_M) August 1, 2023

Speaking with journalists, Russian government spokesperson Dmitry Peskov referred to the incidents as “terrorist attacks” and “desperate attacks amid failures.” The second comment is a possible reference to the frontline situation. Telegram channel SOTA posted social media pictures that allegedly show documents found near the damaged towers. SOTA’s Telegram post alleged the documents belong to the ministries of industry and commerce, economic development, and digital development and communications; the DFRLab has not verified the authenticity of the documents at this time. Russian outlet Astra shared footage on Telegram capturing the moment of impact at the OKO Tower. Astra also reported that windows shattered on the twenty-first floor, the location of Russia’s economic development office.

On the morning of August 1, another drone strike targeted Moscow’s business district. According to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), one drone was allegedly “suppressed by means of electronic warfare, and having lost control, crashed on the territory of a complex of non-residential buildings in Moscow City.” The MoD also said it intercepted two drones over the Odintsovo and Naro-Fominsk districts in western Moscow Oblast.

Previously on July 24, a Russian MoD building was reportedly damaged in an earlier drone attack. The location was identified by Bellingcat investigator Christo Grozev as the potential headquarters of Fancy Bear, a hacker group aligned with Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). As cited by Meduza, quoting Russian outlet Novaya Gazeta, the struck building was previously mentioned in an US indictment as the home of military unit 26165, which allegedly has ties to Fancy Bear.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

TGStat restricts access to channel providing data on slain Russian soldiers

Telegram analysis tool TGStat has restricted access to the channel “Don’t wait for me FROM Ukraine,” also known by its handle @poisk_in_ua (“Search in Ukraine”). When searching for the channel, the TGStat platform now displays a pop-up message with a 403 access restricted error that says forbidden content was found on the channel. The channel frequently shared death announcements for Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. It also reportedly posted data containing personal information and social media pictures of the deceased.

The DFRLab recently analyzed @poisk_in_ua’s posts about Russian fatalities to glean insights into the number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. The channel made nearly 20,000 posts about slain Russian soldiers, an estimate that is consistent with figures cited by other outlets, including the BBC and independent Russian media outlet Mediazona.

In a piece posted in early July 2023, Meduza indicated that it had confirmed more than 47,000 fatalities using reports of inheritance notices published since February 2022.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Drones target central Moscow skyscrapers appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Kremlin seeks stronger ties in Africa as Wagner eyes Niger coup

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 27 Jul 2023 19:42:35 +0000

Ukraine pushes Russian forces along multiple fronts

Fighting continues along different parts of the front line in eastern and southern Ukraine as Kyiv’s forces expand their counteroffensive operations. The Russian army retreated from its positions in Andriivka, south of Bakhmut, after a successful Ukrainian attack, according to a July 25 briefing by Andrii Kovalov, spokesperson for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. DFRLab monitoring of open source channels suggests that Ukrainian forces have now entered the village; fighting is still ongoing near Andriivka, however.

Ukraine is currently conducting offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut. Kovalov said that Russian units were unsuccessful in advancing south of Ivanivske and west of Klishchiivka. Fighting in Klishchiivka remains active, with the site increasingly becoming a frontline hotspot. Kovalov also noted that Russian troops “continue to put up strong resistance, move their units, and use reserves.” In a separate statement, Kovalov reported that Russian forces were pushed out from their positions near the village of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.

Meanwhile, Serhii Cherevatyi, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Military Command, told the Kyiv Independent that Ukrainian forces are “using the entire line of armaments provided to us by our partners.” Cherevatyi also confirmed that Ukraine had used US-provided cluster munitions in battle. The munitions were likely used around Bakhmut, given that’s where the fighting has been concentrated, but this is not yet verified.

On July 26, US officials told the New York Times that they believed Ukraine had initiated a significant push southward in Zaporizhzhia Oblast; a Russian defense ministry spokesperson noted that Ukraine had launched a “massive” assault south of Orikhiv and Robotyne. “Ukrainian officials declined to confirm that the assaults took place,” the New York Times added.

Ukraine is also considering a response to Russian strikes against grain infrastructure and cultural heritage, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on July 24 after a meeting with leading military staff. Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17, effectively terminating the deal that permitted Ukraine to export its agricultural goods. In addition, Russian forces have attacked the strategically important Odesa region, hitting grain silos and cultural heritage sites, including a cathedral.

Speaking to CNN, a Ukrainian defense intelligence official said Kyiv was responsible for the July 24 drone attack on Moscow. Russian authorities reported that Ukrainian drones targeted two buildings in the Russian capital. The Kremlin said it thwarted the attack and neutralized the drones. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs added that the drones were suppressed by “electronic warfare” and crashed, damaging two non-residential buildings. One drone detonated on Komsomolsky Avenue, located within the perimeter of a defense ministry compound and close to a building used by the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).

Also on July 24, the occupying Russian authorities in Crimea claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an ammunition depot in the Dzhankoi region, where the Russian army maintains an active presence. Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov said that unspecified unmanned aerial vehicles attacked the Crimean capital and warned that more UAV attacks would be carried out against Russia. Oleg Kryuchkov, an advisor to the occupying Russian authorities, said that officials would closely monitor social media for posts that could help Ukrainian forces identify targets in Crimea.

That same day, Agence France-Presse video journalist Dylan Collins was reportedly wounded in a drone attack while reporting from a Ukrainian artillery position near Bakhmut. Collins sustained non-life-threatening shrapnel injuries.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Increased tensions along Belarus-Poland border

On July 20, the Belarusian defense ministry reported that Wagner participated in joint drills with the Belarusian military at a training field in Brest, near the Polish border. In response, Poland relocated military units from the western part of the country to supplement units in the east.

Responding to Poland’s military movement, Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 21 accused Poland of having hostile territorial ambitions toward Ukraine and Belarus, and claimed that any aggression against Belarus would be considered an attack on Russia. He threatened that Russia “will respond to this with all the means at our disposal.”

Two days later, Putin hosted Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka in Saint Petersburg. During the meeting, Lukashenka asserted that Poland intends to annex western Ukraine, which he said was unacceptable. Lukashenka claimed that if western Ukraine asked for help, Russia and Belarus would support it against Polish aggression. Lukashenka also thanked Putin for confirming that an attack on Belarus is equal to an attack on Russia, stating that Putin is “the first person in Russia who spoke about this openly, clearly, and understandably.”

Lukashenka also noted that he brought Putin a map that allegedly shows the deployment of Polish troops along the borders of Russia and Belarus. According to Lukashenka, one Polish military brigade was positioned forty kilometers from the Belarusian city of Brest, while another brigade was one hundred kilometers from Grodno. Lukashenka also claimed that Wagner members in Belarus are pushing him to allow them to go “west”—in other words, Poland—saying that Wagner members want to “go on an excursion to Warsaw and Rzeszow.” He then clarified that he was aware of the fact that many Wagner fighters are belligerent toward Poland and he would keep them within the boundaries of Belarus.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Relatives of Wagner fighters share details about their current status

New details about Wagner’s deployment to Belarus appeared this week. Sibir.Realii, a service of the independent US-funded RFE/RL in Russian, investigated online chats involving family members of Wagner fighters. Chat members complained that there was no news from Wagner soldiers for almost a month prior to July 23. During part of this period, many Wagner fighters were at a military camp near Molkino in Krasnodar Krai, Russia, and any external communications were forbidden. Previous reporting by Zerkolo, a Belarusian independent media outlet in exile, corroborated their location, as its correspondents talked with people living near Molkino about their experience with Wagner soldiers who had maintained a presence there since at least 2017.

According to Sibir.Realii, Wagner fighters who had signed contracts prior to the invasion of Ukraine had transferred to Belarus, though no exact number was given. Other Wagner fighters reportedly returned home. These fighters might include convicts recruited in 2022; on June 28, a Russian court ruled that completing active service in the war in Ukraine would result in a pardon for their previous crimes.

Sibir.Realii cited relatives of Wagner fighters who stated that Wagner troops had relocated to a camp near Osipovichi, Belarus. This is most likely the recently renovated military camp in the village of Tsel, where Wagner fighters have reportedly trained with Belarusian soldiers. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin recently registered his company, Concord Management and Consulting, with an address in Tsel, listing its primary enterprise as “real estate management.”

Wagner family members additionally claimed that the fighters cannot leave the camp in Belarus, and that “they cannot withdraw money they allegedly received before the mutiny.” One chat member claimed that fighters would receive a salary of 150,000 rubles (USD $1,670) a month, and that their salary for July would be transferred to them in August. Sibir.Realii noted that a recent Wagner recruitment advertisement on Telegram had promised Wagner troops a monthly salary of 240,000 rubles (USD $2,670).

Family members in the chat also referenced Prigozhin’s recent statements on Central African Republic television that Wagner was expanding its presence there. They added that some Wagner fighters had returned to Russia to receive new passports for foreign travel, but faced a number of problems, including long processing times and official requests to not leave the country due to unpaid debts.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Putin releases op-ed prior to 2023 Russia-Africa Summit

Three days prior to this week’s Russia-Africa Summit and Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, the Kremlin published an op-ed written by Putin. The essay, “Russia and Africa: Joining Efforts for Peace, Progress, and a Successful Future,” detailed Russia’s vision for the future of its relations with African nations. It also outlined multiple Kremlin narratives routinely deployed across the continent.

In the essay, Putin reiterated the narrative of a Russia historically opposed to colonial oppression, while also underlining how Moscow has always supported the development of the continent. “We have consistently supported African peoples in their struggle for liberation from colonial oppression,” he wrote. “We have provided assistance in developing statehood, strengthening their sovereignty, and defense capability.”

Subtly referring to anti-Western narratives employed by the Kremlin, Putin said that contrary to Western powers, Russia has “always strictly adhered to the ‘African solutions to African problems’ principle” and has “never tried to impose on partners our own ideas about the internal structure, forms and methods of management, development goals, and ways to achieve them.”

In a reference to the emerging multipolar world order, Putin stated, “[T]here is no doubt that Africa, along with Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, will take its worthy place in it and finally free itself from the bitter legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism, rejecting its modern practices.”

Putin reiterated Kremlin narratives blaming Ukraine and the West for Africa’s food, grain, and fertilizer shortages. He specifically referenced the grain deal that Russia recently abandoned. “While it was publicly advertised by the West as a gesture of goodwill that benefited Africa, has in fact been shamelessly used solely for the enrichment of large US and European businesses that exported and resold grain from Ukraine.” Putin failed to note how Africa has directly suffered the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however.

The first Russia-Africa Summit, held in 2019, kickstarted a series of official visits, diplomatic initiatives, and arms deals to African countries. It also helped broaden the role of state-sponsored actors like the Wagner Group in African affairs, expanding Russia’s reach in the region. With Putin’s op-ed, his remarks seem to suggest that this week’s summit will continue in the same direction, with Russia will sparing no effort to reinforce its influence on the African continent.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Russian Telegram channel depict Niger coup as a new opening for Wagner

Russian Telegram channels are following events in Niger closely after Nigerien soldiers announced the removal of democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26. As the coup unfolded, the channels portrayed Bazoum as a vassal of the West, and Niger under Bazoum’s leadership as being “directly dependent on France” and “part of the remnants of the French neo-colonial empire.” The Telegram channels emphasized that Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso—countries in which Wagner is confirmed to be present or allegedly present—had extricated themselves from French military influence in recent years.

Some channels also claimed the coup leaders were associated with Wagner Group, alleging that Wagner supported the faction of Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, which seized control of the presidency. One Russian military blogger, Boris Rozhin, reported on his channel that Wagner would soon receive an invitation from a “free” Niger.

A Telegram channel run by Russian military blogger Boris Rozhin claimed that Wagner would receive an invitation from a “free” Niger soon. (Source: boris_rozhin/archive)

The coup is also seen as a confirmation of Prigozhin’s recent statements about expanding Wagner’s presence in Africa. The channels emphasized the importance of Niger’s uranium mines to France, possibly alluding to the fact that Wagner’s presence in African states is often linked to them receiving local mining concessions.

According to the Wagner Orchestra channel, “Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to strengthen the position and influence of Russia and Wagner in Africa. The coup in Niger is proof of that. Pro-French President Mohamed Bazuma is overthrown.” (Source: orchestra_w/ archive)

Bazoum insisted the day after the coup that “hard-won gains will be safeguarded.” But the coup will likely change Europe’s political calculus regarding Niger, which had become central to France and the European Union’s new approach to a region plagued by a growing Jihadist insurgency and political instability, particularly in the wake of French forces pulling out of Mali in 2022.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

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Liubakova quoted in Newsweek: Lukashenka looking to bolster his standing

Atlantic Council — Wed, 26 Jul 2023 19:21:00 +0000

original source

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Liubakova quoted in Business Insider: “Prigozhin’s armed rebellion … shatters the myth of Russia’s invincibility

Atlantic Council — Mon, 24 Jul 2023 19:08:00 +0000

original source

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Russian War Report: Wagner is still in business in Africa

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Thu, 20 Jul 2023 20:22:35 +0000

Security

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

Media policy

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

International response

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

Ukrainian attack damages Kerch Bridge

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting a drone strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge on July 17. The bridge, also known as the Crimean Bridge, connects Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula with Russia’s Krasnodar region. The bridge is used for civilian movement and as an essential logistical route for the Russian army.

Explosions were reported at around 3:00 a.m. local time. Footage of the aftermath indicates that a span of the bridge’s road had collapsed while another suffered damage but remained intact. Traffic reportedly resumed several hours after the explosion, but in the interim, occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes. Russian Telegram channels reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoi area and in the occupied Kherson region towards Melitopol.

Ukraine defense intelligence spokesperson Andrii Yusov told Suspilne News that damage to the bridge could create logistical difficulties for Russian forces, but said Kyiv would not comment on the cause of the explosion. CNN, citing a source in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), reported that the attack on the bridge was a joint operation of the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces. Ukrainian media outlet LIGA also reported that the SBU and Ukrainian naval forces were responsible for the attack, citing sources in the SBU. LIGA also noted that the strike was likely conducted with surface drones. The SBU said that information about the incident would only be revealed once the war ended. Some Russian military bloggers, including former Russian officer and pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, stated that Russian authorities had focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security. Alexander Kots, another prominent blogger and Kremlin-appointed Russian Human Rights Council member, also blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on land security.

Natalia Humeniuk, a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command, speculated without evidence that the attack may have been a provocation by Russia amid talks on prolonging the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The grain deal, brokered by Turkey and the United Nations in July 2022, has been essential for stemming a global surge in food prices. The agreement, necessitated after the Russian navy blocked all Ukrainian ports, permits Ukraine to export products. It has has been prolonged several times, with the last extension expiring on July 17. The Kremlin announced on July 17 that it had suspended its participation in the initiative but claimed that the decision was unrelated to the bridge attack.

Meanwhile, about twenty-four hours after the attack on the Kerch Bridge, explosions were heard in Odesa in southern Ukraine. Unconfirmed reports claimed the explosions were a response from Russia. The attack on Odesa continued for a second night on July 19, described by Ukrainian officials as “hellish.” Odesa is an essential port for Ukrainian exports and was allowed to remain open under the conditions of the grain deal.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Wagner moves soldiers to Belarus following apparent disbandment in Russia

The Wagner Group appears to have disbanded its operations in Russia and relocated to Belarus, according to footage reviewed by the DFRLab documenting the movements of Wagner military columns in the days following the mutiny through July 18. Additionally, satellite imagery captured the entry of troops and equipment at the Tsel military camp, located near the Belarusian town of Asipovichy.

On July 17, a video shared on Telegram depicted Wagner soldiers taking down the Russian flag and the Wagner flag at the group’s original military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, Russia. In another video published on July 19, Prigozhin addressed Wagner fighters as they left the Molkino base, describing the situation on the front as “a shame.” In addition, he declared that the group is relocating to Belarus and will focus on its activities in Africa. For the time being, he said, Wagner soldiers are no longer participating in Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, although they “will perhaps return to the special military operation at the moment when [they] are sure [they] will not be forced to shame ourselves.”

Russian "military correspondent" published a video of the flags taken down in a Wagner PMC camp in Molkino, Ryazan region.

The base is now officially closed. pic.twitter.com/d3tqVXzqr0
— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) July 17, 2023

Shortly after the mutiny ended, Russian authorities conducted raids on Wagner’s accounting divisions in Saint Petersburg, according to information purportedly shared by the wives and mothers of Wagner fighters in an online forum. Additional raids took place on Prigozhin’s residence. The movements of Prigozhin’s private jet also indicate frequent travel to Belarus over the past three weeks.

An investigation by Belarusian opposition media outlet Motolko.help revealed a photograph of a man resembling Prigozhin in his undergarments allegedly at the Tsel military base, where he reportedly spent the night on July 12. According to flight data posted on the online portal Radarbox, Prigozhin’s personal Embraer Legacy 600 jet, registration number RA-02795, completed four round-trip flights between Belarus’ Machulishchy air base and Russia.

Radar imagery acquired on July 17 also shows the tents where Wagner fighters appear to be housed and several places for vehicles parked inside the military base.

SAR imagery of Tsel military camp in Belarus, taken on July 17, 2023. (Source: DFRLab via Capella Space)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Wagner vehicle columns are seen driving from Voronezh to Belarus

On July 16, several videos emerged on Telegram documenting Wagner vehicles departing Voronezh Oblast along Russia’s M-4 Don highway. Utilizing social media footage, the DFRLab determined the location of the vehicles and identified forty registration plates. At least two-thirds of these vehicles displayed military registration plates from the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic. However, the Belarusian monitoring project Belaruski Hajun reported that many other vehicles used tape to cover their registration plates.

The columns are composed of various buses and trucks, of which only a few could transfer construction equipment. Most of the convoys consist of UAZ Patriot pickup trucks, Ural vans, and Lada cars. No heavy military equipment was observed at the time of writing.

Screenshots show a UAZ Patriot pickup truck (top) and a Mitsubishi pickup truck (bottom) bearing military registration plates from the Luhansk People’s Republic. A police car escorted the trucks one hundred kilometers south of Voronezh on July 14, 2023. (Source: Telegram/archive)

Another video shared on the Russian Telegram channel VChK-OPGU revealed a Wagner convoy of soldiers entering Belarusian territory. According to a post by Belaruski Hajun, at least sixty vehicles entered Belarus through Mogilev Oblast in the early hours of June 15 using the R-43 and M-5 roads. A photograph on Telegram showed the Russian and Wagner Group flags flying at a border outpost.

According to Belaruski Hajun, since July 14, nine distinct military convoys have entered Belarusian territory. They are likely located at the Tsel military camp near Asipovichy. The camp is home to military unit 61732 and was previously identified by Verstka Media as a potential site to accommodate Wagner soldiers. Further, the Belarusian military TV channel VoyenTV posted a video on July 14 showing Wagner soldiers arriving in Belarus and training local forces. According to updated estimates from Belaruski Hajun, as many as 2,500 Wagner members may have relocated to the Tsel military camp since last week.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian officials and state media change their tune about the Kerch Bridge attack after Kremlin announces terror investigation

In the immediate aftermath of the July 17 attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russian officials and state media were relatively mild in their initial language addressing the incident, referring to it as an “emergency.” However, once Kremlin agencies began referring to the attack as a “terror act,” state media and officials began changing their language to follow the Kremlin.

“Traffic was stopped on the Crimean bridge: an emergency occurred in the area of the 145th support from the Krasnodar territory,” Sergei Aksenov, the Russian-installed head of occupied Crimea, wrote on his Telegram channel at 4:21 a.m. local time. Notably, Aksenov did not use the words “explosion,” “attack,” or “terror” to describe the destruction of the bridge. Two subsequent posts, made at 5:03 a.m. and 6:59 a.m., also avoided these terms. It wasn’t until 1:51 p.m. that Aksenov used the phrase “terror act” to describe the attack.

In between Aksenov’s posts, Russia’s National Antiterrorism Committee reported at 10:04 a.m. that they had assessed the Kerch Bridge explosion as a “terror act,” according to Kremlin-owned news agency TASS. Several minutes later at 10:07 a.m., Russia’s Investigative Committee announced that it would open a criminal case investigating the “terror act” on the Kerch Bridge.

Several Kremlin-owned Russian media outlets, including RIA Novosti and TASS, also used the term “emergency” (“чрезвычайное прошествие” or ЧП) to first describe the bridge explosion before later pivoting to using “terror act.” Neither outlet referred to the destruction of the Kerch Bridge as a “terror act” prior to the official announcements from the Investigative Committee and Antiterrorism Committee. In the case of RIA Novosti, they published a story using the word “emergency” in the headline at 11:41 a.m., more than ninety minutes after the terror investigation announcement, while TASS used the term as late as 7:31 p.m., even though it had already published a report on the investigation. Similarly, many other Kremlin-controlled media outlets, like Komsomolskaya Pravda, Gazeta.ru, RBC, Lenta.ru, and Izvestiya used both “emergency” and “terror act” in their publications throughout the day interchangeably.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

FSB colonel alleged to be behind popular Telegram channel detained for extortion

According to Russian media outlet RBC, former Federal Security Service (FSB) Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, the purported administrator of the Telegram channel Kremlevskaya Prachka (“Kremlin Laundress”), was detained for suspected extortion. The press office for the Moscow court released a statement that said Polyakov is “suspected of extorting 40 million rubles [around $440,000] from JSC Lanit, the leader of the Russian industry of information technology.”

“According to the prosecution, from 2020 to 2023, Polyakov received a large sum of money from a group of IT companies for not publishing information (the so-called ‘negative block’) that could cause significant harm to the rights and legitimate interests of Lanit JSC and the management of Lanit JSC,” the Moscow court continued. The “negative block” is a guarantee that a channel will not mention a particular person or a company in a negative light in exchange for money; this is reportedly a popular practice among Russian Telegram channels.

The independent Russian media outlet Vazhnyye Istorii (“Important Stories”), citing a source close to Russian intelligence services, reported that Polyakov was behind the Kremlevskaya Prachka Telegram channel. According to the outlet, Polyakov supervised an unnamed service at the FSB’s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. In addition, he reportedly oversaw pro-government Telegram channels and was engaged in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda via media and social networks. According to Important Stories, he worked in coordination with Vladimir Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Sergey Kiriyenko.

Important Stories noted that the Telegram channel 112 also named Polyakov as Kremlevskaya Prachka’s administrator, along with the Telegram channels Siloviki, Nezigar, and Brief, which are not as staunchly pro-govern cited by Kremlin propagandists and proxies.

Kremlevskaya Prachka has not posted since the evening of July 13, corresponding with the reported detainment of Polyakov.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Wagner continues to advertise its services in Africa

On July 16, the Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel REVERSE SIDE OF THE MEDAL posted an advertisement offering Wagner’s services to African states. The post included an image from the Prigozhin-funded film, Granite, as well as an email address, seemingly for interested African countries to communicate with Wagner.

In French, the advertisement reads: “PMC Wagner offers its services to ensure the sovereignty of states and protect the people of African from militants and terrorists.” The fine print emphasizes that “various forms of cooperation are possible,” as long as the cooperation does not “contradict Russia’s interests.” Russia’s interests are not specified.

While the Telegram channel claimed the advertisement was replicated on African social media channels, the DFRLab has not found additional evidence to support this claim.

Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an advertisement for Wagner’s services in Africa, claiming it was widely circulated on the continent. (Source: rsotmdivision)

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Wagner troops arrive in Central African Republic ahead of critical referendum

Alexander Ivanov, director of the Officer’s Union for International Security (COSI), released a statement on COSI’s Telegram channel regarding the recent arrival of dozens of Wagner operatives in Central African Republic. According to US authorities, COSI is a front company for the Wagner Group in Central African Republic.

In the statement, Ivanov confirmed the Wagner troop rotation while stressing that the new personnel have no contract with Russia’s Ministry of Defense. He reiterated that both in CAR and across the continent, “security work is carried out by private companies that enter into contracts directly with the governments of sovereign states,” and that these private companies have nothing to do with official Russian state entities. Ivanov also indicated that this staff rotation should not impact the activities of Russia in Ukraine, and he claimed to have been in contact with Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Notably, Ivanov stated that despite the recent changes in the structure of Wagner’s “African business,” Prigozhin “intends not to curtail, but to expand his presence in Africa.” This is somehow consistent with what some analysts are observing: Wagner appears to be trying to expand its presence in West African coastal states increasingly threatened by a spillover of the jihadist insurgency from the Sahel, or possibly taking advantage of upcoming elections in several fragile African countries.

Although Ivanov has often remarked on Wagner activities in CAR and Africa in the past, this statement, coupled with other recent comments, suggest that the COSI director might be now exercising a wider role as spokesman for all Wagner activity in Africa, as Wagner reorganizes its structure in the wake of last month’s failed mutiny.

The statement comes as a U-turn in recent communications over Wagner’s presence in CAR. In past weeks both CAR and Russian officials stated that the African republic had an agreement with Russia and not with a private military company. Ivanov seems to be returning to earlier narratives in which Wagner claimed that the CAR government signed an agreement with the PMC and not the Russian government. This narrative seems to confirm DFRLab reporting in the June 30 edition of the Russian War Report, in which we noted that denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa has become more difficult for the Kremlin after recent events damaged the principle of plausible deniability, which had previously been a key aspect of Wagner’s success in Africa. However, Russia does not want to waste the network of influence built by its state proxy forces and is now attempting to reorganize, rebrand and develop a new narrative around Wagner and the Kremlin’s ability to conduct hybrid warfare.

The arrival of dozens of troops from Russia’s Wagner in CAR comes at a critical time as the country prepares to hold a constitutional referendum on July 30 that would eliminate presidential term limits and allow President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to extend his term. The CAR government stated earlier this month that Wagner operatives will help in securing the referendum. This could be seen as a strong signal from Moscow to reiterate the strategic importance of its influence in CAR and reassure local partners of its continued support, while sending a message of continuity and strength to other countries in the region where Wagner operates.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Lavrov to replace Putin at BRICS summit

The Office of South Africa’s Presidency announced on July 19 that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would replace President Vladimir Putin at the upcoming Summit of BRICS Nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) “by mutual agreement.”

In Russian media, pro-Kremlin and opposition news outlets alike posted articles claiming that Russia had refused South Africa’s proposal to send Lavrov as head of the country’s delegation on July 14. Quoting an interview with South Africa’s deputy president, the Russian pro-Kremlin news outlet RTVI suggested that “negotiations are still ongoing.”

Putin is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed during Russia’s war in Ukraine. A warrant for the arrest of both the Russian president and Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova alleges that they were involved in organizing and participating in the deportation of Ukrainian children. As a signatory to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, South Africa would have been obligated to arrest Putin had he attended the BRICS Summit in August.

South Africa’s largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, took to court in a petition to force the government to arrest Putin if he did attend. In a responding affidavit, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa stated that Russia would view South Africa arresting Putin as a “declaration of war.”

The Kremlin denied claims that Moscow had threatened South African authorities. However, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on July 19 that “it is clear to everyone in the world what an attempt to encroach on the head of the Russian Federation means.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, London, United Kingdom and Valentin Châtelet, Research Associate, Brussels, Belgium

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Experts react: What NATO’s Vilnius summit means for Ukraine and the Alliance’s future

Atlantic Council experts — Tue, 11 Jul 2023 19:48:24 +0000

The leaders were backed by a NATO banner, but it wasn’t NATO doing the backing. Group of Seven (G7) leaders on Wednesday announced plans for long-term security commitments to Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The new framework seeks to create bilateral security commitments between individual G7 member states and Ukraine, providing security assistance, modern military equipment, and economic assistance “for as long as it takes.” This announcement comes a day after NATO released its communiqué, drawing criticism from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and others because the Alliance did not establish a timetable for Ukraine to become a NATO member.

Below, our experts decode all the goings-on in Vilnius—and what they mean for Kyiv’s path to NATO membership, the war in Ukraine, Sweden’s forthcoming accession, the Alliance’s growing focus on China, and more.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Reactions from Wednesday, July 12

John Herbst: A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

Anca Agachi: A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Daniel Fried: The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

Hans Binnendijk: Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

Phillip Cornell: Energy issues took a backseat in the Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

Reactions from Tuesday, July 11

John Herbst: An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Christopher Skaluba: ‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

Daniel Fried: Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

Shelby Magid: Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

Rich Outzen: A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

Andrew D’Anieri: The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Rachel Rizzo: Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

David O. Shullman: The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

Ian Brzezinski: The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

A step forward for Ukraine’s security, but not a large one

There is significant overlap among the members of the G7, NATO, and the European Union (EU). Four of the G7 nations are in the EU and six are in NATO. It is therefore no surprise that the general approach of the three organizations to Moscow’s war on Ukraine share similar characteristics. All three organizations have actively supported Ukraine since Moscow’s aggression began in February of 2014, and much more so when it intensified in February of 2022. All assert Ukraine’s right to enjoy the peace and stability that should be provided by the liberal international order. With the United States in the lead in NATO and the G7, both organizations have provided significant support to Ukraine, ensuring that Russian President Vladimir Putin could not achieve his goal of establishing effective political control in the country.

At the same time, again with the United States’ decisive influence, the G7, like NATO, has avoided steps that might seem overly provocative to Moscow—a clear call for Ukraine’s victory against Moscow’s aggression or decisive steps that would lead to a faster Ukrainian victory. So the best way to look at the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine issued by the G7 on July 12 in conjunction with the NATO Summit in Vilnius is as a mostly US-influenced two-step.

The NATO Summit produced an uninspiring communiqué on the Ukraine-NATO relationship that moved only slightly beyond the language of the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit. The G7 Declaration was timed to the NATO Summit because the question of Ukraine joining NATO is linked with the issue of security guarantees. Both are meant to address the difficult question of how an independent Ukraine can live in peace and security alongside a hostile Russia. So it is no surprise that the G7 statement is a step forward toward enhancing Ukraine’s security but not a very large one.

The declaration affirmatively states Ukraine’s right to choose its own course, join the West, and be free from intimidation and aggression. But it does not offer collective G7 action that might provide greater protection against future Kremlin provocations; instead, it encourages bilateral arrangements between Ukraine and individual G7 states. It places emphasis on the provision of weapons to Ukraine to make it a less appetizing target for a predatory Kremlin. This is a reasonable concept, but less effective than an actual guarantee by the G7 countries to respond forcefully to future Kremlin aggression. Yet even this step is undermined by the fact that all the G7 countries—with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and, perhaps now, France—have been reluctant to send Ukraine the more advanced weapons it needs to deliver that decisive blow to Russian forces on its territory.

Russian commentators have dismissed the NATO communiqué as a disappointment for Kyiv, but expressed some dissatisfaction with the G7 Declaration. Their real ire, though, is aimed at Paris, after the French decision to send SCALP long-range missiles to Ukraine. This underscores France’s differences with Washington, which is still unwilling to send Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS). French President Emmanuel Macron’s boldness is welcome, but no substitute for strong US leadership.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

A mixed bag, but with signs of quiet progress

Overall, the Vilnius summit stuck the landing, and to continue the metaphor, the gymnastic feat was about as tough as it gets. This was indeed a summit of unity, as US President Joe Biden had hoped, and the breakthrough regarding Sweden’s NATO accession especially contributed to that sense. The Alliance also successfully positioned itself as a global actor that understands that the security environment has fundamentally changed, and the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are inextricably linked. The attendance of the Asia-Pacific 4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and language in the communiqué elevating the role of partners is crucial in this regard.

However, the summit’s results were mixed on a range of other issues. Despite high hopes and a strong moral argument, Ukraine was not offered the clear path and timeline it was hoping for to join the Alliance, even as its future in the Euro-Atlantic family was reconfirmed. This outcome, while not surprising, was also likely the best achievable outcome at the moment given Allied differences. This hints at a tough road for NATO in making the ambitious progress necessary by 2024, especially if Ukrainian battlefield advances slow down. Eastern flank reinforcements to brigade-level will only happen “where and when required,” and the language on China was modest in advancing proposals for action, as it was more intent on defining the challenge Beijing poses. The Alliance generally make the most important progress quietly, and here is where I saw encouraging signs: the focus on resilience and securing critical infrastructure; important mentions of Allied enablement and sustainment; and cooperation with the private sector and defense industry to deblock defense supplies.

While kicking the can down the road offers some time, Allies need to start to work with aplomb now to deliver. If anything, the NATO Summit in Washington in 2024 will be an even higher order to rise to—morally and strategically.

—Anca Agachi is an associate director and resident fellow for Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 Joint Statement is no Article 5, but it’s a start

The G7 Joint Statement on Ukraine is out. It’s no Article 5 security guarantee. It’s a framework for negotiations of bilateral and G7 arrangements with Ukraine to provide military and economic assistance, as well as unspecified security commitments for that country. It includes a promise of consultations with Ukraine in case of a future Russian armed attack that could generate military and other forms of support. For its part, Ukraine commits in the statement to continue its democratic and rule of law transformation, as well as its military reforms. Notably, the statement makes clear that it is no substitute for NATO membership but is intended to help Ukraine while it pursues that goal.

Cynics can make a meal of the statement. It provides little beyond what G7 countries are already doing. But there is another way to look at it. The big strategic question that NATO, the G7, and the United States have faced is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family and its institutions or whether it is part of a Kremlin sphere of domination. The Kremlin claims Ukraine as its own.There are many in Europe and the United States who tacitly (or overtly) agree and would cut a dirty deal with Moscow to that end.

Happily, that’s not where NATO and the G7 have come out. The NATO communiqué’s language on Ukraine could have been stronger and the G7 statement is no security guarantee. But they both rest on the premise that Ukraine is part of the European and transatlantic family. The details of how and when have yet to be worked out. The goal is clear: NATO membership for Ukraine. The G7 statement can serve as scaffolding for Ukraine while it works to get there.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Vilnius was a bridge to next year’s NATO summit in Washington

The NATO Summit in Vilnius was a success. But its success was limited, and it will be seen more as a bridging mechanism between last year’s Madrid summit and next year’s Washington summit. At Madrid, the allies agreed on the nature of the new threats and challenges emanating from both Russia and China. Madrid’s new Strategic Concept refocused the Alliance.

Vilnius was to be an implementation summit. And it was. It recorded progress in multiple areas, from enhanced deterrence to hybrid war to climate change. But it stopped short on several key issues like Ukraine’s membership, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, and managing the nuclear weapons threat posed by Russia and, increasingly, China.

The Vilnius summit took place in the midst of Europe’s most destructive war in nearly eight decades and a US effort to rebalance its relationship with China. This resulted in a degree of caution. Unity formed around lowest common denominator solutions. During the coming year between Vilnius and Washington, the bridge created this week will hopefully be strengthened enough to bear the weight that the Alliance will need to carry next year.

The most successful element of the Vilnius summit was enhancing NATO deterrence along its front line with Russia, from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea. With Finland in and Sweden soon to be in, there is a solid line of defense against Russian aggression. There is no clearer evidence of Russia’s strategic failure. NATO’s New Force Model, agreed upon last year, will provide clarity for nations with regard to their specific wartime responsibilities and incentives to meet NATO’s 2 percent of gross domestic product defense spending floor. NATO’s forward presence in eight front line states needs further strengthening to include a continuous brigade-level presence in each. And the readiness and mobility initiatives need further attention.

The greatest disappointment at Vilnius was the inability to provide a more concrete path for Ukrainian membership after the war ends. But cautious steps were taken. The NATO-Ukraine Commission became a Council, giving Ukraine a stronger voice in NATO political affairs. The Council will be used to plan for future Ukrainian membership, which was again solemnly committed to “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This shortfall for Kyiv was somewhat offset by the G7 joint declaration of support for Ukraine, which pledges additional long-term security commitments and arrangements. Hopefully by the Washington summit, that path can be paved with more concrete.

—Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Energy issues took a backseat in Vilnius communiqué, but loom large in NATO’s future

While the debate over membership (delayed for Ukraine, confirmed for Sweden) dominated the last-minute negotiations over the NATO Summit communiqué, the opening bulk of the document itself is rightly dedicated to reaffirming the traditional and newly relevant core tenets of NATO’s existence—collective defense, nuclear deterrence, and the production and logistics to achieve them. But about two-thirds of the way down, the communiqué turns to how the Euro-Atlantic security environment has shifted.

The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed that “emerging security challenges” (in NATO parlance) have arrived, from the weaponization of energy to the widespread “digitalization” of warfare and the importance of resilience.

Indeed, energy security and climate change are gaining renewed importance for the Alliance. Climate security issues are a personal priority of the secretary general, and a changing energy economy means that the pipeline politics of yesterday will look simple compared to the complex security implications of integrated power systems, critical digital infrastructure, supply chains for key inputs to transition, and the like. And while NATO wades into the tech innovation space with its own acceleration fund (DIANA), it has yet to grasp the power of military procurement for demonstrating, scaling, and standardizing technologies that will be key to mitigating emissions in the civilian space while also boosting military effectiveness. Meanwhile the energy transition itself will be a messy process, with pockets of volatility and economic mismatches that could directly impact political stability, popular support for a sustainable transition, and strategic relations.

The Vilnius summit is a turning point for many reasons, but perhaps the most fundamental for NATO as an institution is its shift from an internally focused bureaucracy with declining budgets fighting to justify its existence in the post-Cold War world, to one compelled to adopt a growth and ambition mentality. Where before it was simpler to ring-fence NATO’s military mission, concerns about climate change and strategic competition are imposing policy-driven global economic realignments. To fulfill its ambitions for leadership in that new environment, NATO needs the competence and reach to provide important security-related input to key decisions about infrastructure investment and managing new technology—and it needs to be convinced of its own relevance in those spaces.

—Phillip Cornell is a principal at Economist Impact and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

An uninspiring result for Ukraine

Talk about the eleventh hour! The NATO Summit communiqué was finally released at approximately 6:40 p.m. in Vilnius, rather late for a summit document. There was a good reason for this: clear disagreement between a large number of East European, Nordic, and some Western European allies on the one side and the United States and Germany on the other about how forthcoming the Alliance should be about Ukraine’s eventual membership in NATO. While the ad hoc coalition wanted clarity in hastening Ukraine’s membership, Washington and, to a lesser extent, Berlin were cautious. Given the weight Washington enjoys in NATO deliberations, this meant that the much larger number of allies could not get their preference. But given the importance of NATO unity, this meant that the United States and Germany had to move beyond their original position.

The end result was not quite inspiring. The communiqué notes that Ukraine no longer needs to meet a Membership Action Plan, and the NATO-Ukraine Commission will become a NATO Ukraine Council: small steps in the right direction. On the crucial membership issue, the communiqué states, “the Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.” This is not much movement beyond the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit language noting that Ukraine would eventually be a member.

It was no surprise that a few hours before the communiqué appeared, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted his dissatisfaction: “It’s unprecedented and absurd when [a] time frame is not set neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership. While at the same time vague wording about ‘conditions’ is added even for inviting Ukraine.” This is somewhat sharp, but perhaps understandable from a man whose country is facing an aggression designed to destroy “Ukrainianness.”

While this denouement does not add luster to the Vilnius summit, there are other developments that make this a historic occasion. The main thing, of course, is the admission of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance. This greatly strengthens NATO security in the north. But also important is NATO finally recognizing that “the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This is an important reminder that US and NATO support for Ukraine is not philanthropy, but the smart way to defend our vital interests. The communiqué also directly addresses the Belarus problem: “Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.”

These two items portend a further strengthening of NATO policy against the Kremlin threat and in support of Ukraine. Vilnius also foreshadows what is to come in NATO dynamics and policy. The seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance will be celebrated at the NATO Summit next year in Washington DC. That event will give US President Joe Biden a chance to establish a legacy as an outstanding national security president. For that to occur, he will need to listen closely to the United States’ newly active East European allies and 1) provide Ukraine all the weapons it needs to defeat the Kremlin on the battlefield and 2) move beyond caution to hasten the anchoring of Ukraine in NATO.

—John Herbst is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He served as US ambassador to Ukraine from 2003 to 2006.

‘Ambiguous’ ‘head-scratching and disappointing’ language about Ukraine’s NATO membership

The Vilnius summit is likely to be viewed as a landmark summit for two things that happened and two things that didn’t.

What did happen: The pending agreement by Turkey to ratify Sweden’s membership application will soon add a thirty-second ally to NATO’s ranks, making Vilnius, like Madrid before it, an enlargement summit. That every littoral Baltic Sea state, besides Russia, will be a member of the Alliance is a significant development for NATO’s defense of its northeastern flank. To that end, the adoption of some four thousand pages of classified regional plans for defense of NATO territory completes a shift, started in 2014 after Russia’s invasion of Crimea, to a deterrence-by-denial strategy absent since the waning days of the Cold War.

Missing from the Vilnius communiqué, however, is any clear pathway for Ukraine’s membership. Inside the geeky NATO universe, the upgrading of the NATO-Ukraine Commission to “Council” status and the removal of formal membership action plan requirements for Ukraine are significant developments. But neither packs a political punch, nor will either move be viewed as real progress on the membership question. In fact, communiqué language stating “we will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is as ambiguous as the infamous Bucharest statement from 2008 promising that Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. It is a head-scratching and disappointing formulation. Moreover, the bilateral security guarantees that were broadly promised in the runup to the summit were missing from the final statement. The combination of these things makes for an underwhelming package for Ukraine, though some small hope remains for better outcomes at tomorrow’s inaugural NATO-Ukraine Council meeting.

—Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former principal director for European and NATO policy at the US Defense Department.

Allies make clear Ukraine is firmly in the transatlantic family

It might have and should have been stronger. Nevertheless, the NATO communiqué language on Ukraine’s accession to NATO puts Ukraine within, and not outside, the transatlantic family. The “when” and “how” of Ukraine’s accession to NATO have yet to be worked out but, critically, the Vilnius summit has decided the “whether” of Ukraine’s NATO membership in the affirmative–something that the 2008 Bucharest summit did only at a high level of generality. “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when allies agree and conditions are met” is the key sentence from today’s communiqué. It’s weakened by the gratuitous qualifier “we will be in a position to” rather than a straightforward “we will extend an invitation.” Still, this offer—any offer—of an invitation to Ukraine is a step forward, and a big one compared to where the United States and most NATO member governments were even a few months ago.

Less noticed (and less debated) was the communiqué text that makes clear, without weakening qualifiers, that “we do not and will never recognize Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea.” That language, though it reaffirms long-held positions, helps kill the temptation by some to push Ukraine into surrendering its territory in exchange for a dubious “peace” on Putin’s terms.

While NATO has now set out the goal—Ukraine in the Alliance—much depends on continuing to provide robust military support to Ukraine to help it fight back, and win, on the battlefield. Paragraph twelve of the communiqué notes that allies at the summit agreed on a “substantial package of expanded political and practical support” for Ukraine. It doesn’t provide details, but hopefully they will be announced soon, either by NATO or separately by allies.

Zelenskyy and a number of NATO allies have pushed hard (and pushed the Biden administration) to get the most from this summit. They were right to do so. Now they need to consolidate their gains and prepare next steps, including for next year’s NATO Summit in Washington DC.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.

Calling out the ‘most significant and direct threat’—and its accomplice

The Vilnius summit communiqué rightly places the Russian Federation as the most significant and direct threat to allies’ security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area due to Moscow’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine, terrorism, war crimes, and horrific violations of international law and norms.

Just as Russia deserves to be so centrally acknowledged for its role as the critical threat to Euro-Atlantic security, Belarus deserves to be right beside it. Any disregard of the role Belarus plays as a threat to regional security and an accomplice to the unprovoked war in Ukraine would be a mistake. NATO smartly recognized the threat from Belarus, condemning Belarus’s instrumental support to the Russian war effort by allowing its territory and infrastructure to be used by Russian forces for attacks into Ukraine.

While the communiqué notes Belarus’s complicity in this aggression, it’s critical to remember these crimes are committed and abetted by the illegitimate regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The dictator, desperately clinging to power, has driven Belarus deeper into the Kremlin’s clutches. NATO’s firm declaration of concern for the situation in Belarus is in part due to Lukashenka deepening the military integration between Russia and Belarus, potentially allowing the deployment of “so-called private military companies” to Belarus (the Wagner Group), as well as (perhaps too mildly put) “malign activities” without respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and international law; the Alliance’s declarations are an important signal and sign of hope that Belarus will not be forgotten in the international agenda.

While it is good to see the declaration about threats within Belarus itself, what will surely frustrate many in the democratic forces (along with their supporters), is that there is no acknowledgement that these actions are taken by an illegitimate regime, nor mention of the democratic forces rallying against these actions, against the war, and against any deployment of Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory.

While the communiqué’s comments on Belarus could have been stronger, there is hope NATO leaders and experts in Vilnius have listened in on conversations featuring the democratically elected leader of Belarus and Lukashenka’s rival in the widely disputed 2020 election, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who has been boldly speaking in Vilnius in side-events calling for commitments to Belarus and reminding the world that the Lukashenka regime does not represent the Belarusian people.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

A clear-eyed snapshot that meets the geopolitical moment

The communiqué presents a clear-eyed snapshot of the Alliance in an era of great power rivalry and strategic competition. Russia receives thorough and excoriating attention as the shatterer of peace and a continuing threat. China is called out for challenging the norms, interests, and security of the Alliance and its members. New and prospective members in the room or at the doorstep (Finland, Sweden, and on a farther horizon, Ukraine) were appropriately hailed, as were Asian partners Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. NATO member Turkey will be pleased by paragraphs four and five, which appreciate Turkish support to Sweden’s accession process and mention Ankara’s preferred language on terrorism as a threat “in all its forms and manifestations” to the Alliance. Hard power, conventional deterrence, and readiness are key focal points, though emerging and nontraditional threats are treated as well. Surprisingly, energy security makes an appearance only in paragraph sixty-eight. All in all, though, the document shows energy, focus, and seriousness appropriate to the geopolitical moment.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY.

The NATO-Ukraine Council is a net positive step, but also the ‘bare minimum’

Much of the conversation immediately ahead of the NATO summit in Vilnius focused on whether the allies would take concrete steps toward Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. On Sunday, Biden dumped cold water on Ukraine imminently joining NATO, but whispers in expert circles in Washington suggested that an intermediate initiative toward membership might make a splash at Vilnius. In fact, the communiqué itself caused barely a ripple: a new NATO-Ukraine Council that will formalize consultations between Brussels and Kyiv on Ukraine’s “aspirations for membership in NATO.”

A NATO-Ukraine Council is certainly a net positive step toward Ukrainian accession, but the fact that this was the centerpiece of the communiqué suggests it was the bare minimum step upon which allies could agree. The Alliance should have gone further and instead established a defense and deterrence partnership to provide Ukraine lethal aid and training (the renewed Comprehensive Assistance Package will help Ukraine become more interoperable with NATO, but provisions only five hundred million euros for nonlethal aid).

The signers also left open the question of when Ukraine will join the Alliance, writing only that Ukraine will be invited “when allies agree and conditions are met.” This ambiguity may help prevent Russia from blocking specific preconditions to Ukraine’s accession, but it could also create further indignation in Ukraine and in the Baltics if allies continue to disagree on whether Ukraine is “ready” for NATO.

Pressure will grow on the White House and Western European capitals to elucidate their conditions for Ukraine’s membership, at least in private channels, as Kyiv no doubt campaigns for an invitation at the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC.

—Andrew D’Anieri is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Summit statement shows continued disagreement about Ukraine ‘at the highest levels’ of NATO

For many, the July 11 communiqué was along the lines of what was expected coming out of the NATO Summit in Vilnius. For others, hope was high that NATO allies would rally around Ukraine and show some clear steps not just in terms of whether the country will eventually join NATO, but exactly how and exactly when. NATO allies didn’t (and couldn’t) go that far, which shows continued disagreement at the highest levels as to Ukraine’s future relationship with the military alliance.

But it’s not all bad news—NATO allies were able to reaffirm their statements in the 2008 communiqué that Ukraine’s future is, indeed, in NATO. The problem with vague language like this is that it kicks the can down the road. The communiqué language basically says that Ukraine can join when all allies agree and when conditions are met. That leaves a lot of room for interpretation. My sense is that in the future—whether it’s in a year at NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, or five years from now, or ten—NATO allies will come face to face with the undeniable truth that all allies might not ever be on the same page regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership. That’s a tough pill for many to swallow, but it might just be reality.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué confirms NATO’s growing attention to Indo-Pacific security

While the communiqué naturally reflects NATO’s laser focus on the war in Ukraine and the proximate threat from Russia, it also confirms the Alliance’s renewed strength and growing attention to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Much attention will understandably be paid to the communiqué’s hedging on Ukraine’s eventual NATO membership. But for China, this week’s summit underscores that the war unleashed by its friends in Moscow has single handedly revitalized NATO, which Beijing only recently had viewed (happily) as sinking into irrelevance. This development throws a large wrench into China’s plans to dismantle the US-led alliance network, carve out a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific, and transform the rules-based global order.

The document reiterates language in last year’s Strategic Concept on China’s threat to NATO’s “interests, security and values;” “malicious” hybrid and cyber operations; disinformation; and efforts to control key tech sectors, critical minerals, and supply chains. The communiqué also builds on last year’s warnings about China’s “deepening strategic partnership” with Russia to call on Beijing to abstain from all forms of support for Russia’s war against Ukraine—particularly the provision of any lethal aid.

The call for China to condemn Russia and adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter—paired with a clear refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexations—throws cold water on any hopes that Beijing would be welcomed to facilitate peace negotiations based on Putin’s terms.

Beijing will be pleased that the document does not include a reference to the opening of a proposed NATO office in Japan, reflecting a lack of consensus on NATO’s role in Asia. But language on the importance of the Indo-Pacific to security in the Euro-Atlantic and specific praise for the contributions of the four Indo-Pacific countries whose leaders are present in Vilnius—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—reflect NATO’s growing recognition that the regions’ fortunes are linked. NATO cannot ignore the threat of war over Taiwan and, as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently put it, “China is watching to see the price Russia pays, or the reward it receives, for its aggression.”

—David O. Shullman is senior director of the Global China Hub at the Atlantic Council and former US deputy national intelligence officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council.

The Biden administration was ‘largely alone’ in blocking Ukraine’s roadmap to membership

NATO fell short of placing Ukraine onto a clear track to Alliance membership, but that cause for membership gained unambiguous momentum at the Vilnius summit. The assertion in the summit communiqué that “Ukraine’s future is in NATO” frustratingly provides no more clarity than the 2008 Bucharest declaration in which NATO first declared Ukraine “will become” a member of NATO. While the Alliance dropped the requirement for Ukraine to jump through the hoops of a membership action plan (MAP)—as was done for the fast-tracked accession of Finland and Sweden—the communiqué states that Ukraine must implement “additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required” which infers an unnecessary de jure MAP.

What we must not overlook or underestimate is the fact that allies brought to the Vilnius summit unprecedented support for Ukraine’s membership aspirations. The warmth with which Zelenskyy was greeted demonstrated how Ukraine is regarded as part of the transtatlantic community. While full allied consensus—a requirement in NATO decision-making—was not achieved, the Biden administration found itself largely alone blocking efforts to provide Ukraine that roadmap to NATO. Even Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that “without a doubt, Ukraine deserves to be in NATO.”

The key now is to ensure that Ukraine defeats Russia’s invasion quickly and decisively, and to build on the expanded and significant allied support behind Kyiv’s membership aspirations, leveraging the fact that Ukraine today meets the requirements. These are mutually reinforcing goals. Their achievement will make Europe more secure and NATO more powerful. The progress made in Vilnius should make us all the more determined to secure Ukraine’s accession to NATO at the Alliance’s 2024 Washington summit.

—Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.

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Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny

Jeffrey Cimmino — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 10:00:00 +0000

This article was updated on July 6.

The extraordinary march of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s forces to within a couple hours of Moscow ended abruptly on June 24. But Prigozhin’s decision to stand down and move to Belarus will not be the end of the story.

While the immediate crisis for Russian President Vladimir Putin may dissipate, what scenarios should US and allied officials prepare for in the coming days, weeks, months, and beyond? Here are four possible paths for Russia’s future.

1. A weakened Putin rules

Putin restores order and effectively reduces the ability of Prigozhin and the Wagner Group to challenge his rule. Prigozhin stays in Belarus with a diminished force, while other Wagner fighters go home or join the ranks of the regular Russian armed forces.

Nevertheless, even if Putin remains in power for the foreseeable future, the façade of order and stability that he has constructed over two decades in power has been shattered, with Russia’s would-be tsar showing himself to be vulnerable to competing actors. Quick action to sideline Prigozhin dissuades potential internal challengers from following Wagner’s example, but Putin still needs to pay extra attention to keep different oligarchical interests and power brokers in line.

Russia’s internal dynamics will also shape, and be shaped by, the war effort in Ukraine. Overcoming the mutiny and preventing severe immediate challenges to his authority allows Putin to refocus to some degree on the war effort.

In this scenario, Putin is better positioned to concentrate his security forces on preventing major gains for the Ukrainian counteroffensive. The rapidity with which the crisis was resolved, as well as the lack of successor crises within Russia, means that any effect on Russian soldiers’ morale is limited. Ukraine could still make some important gains in this counteroffensive, but its forces will receive less help from internal disarray in Russia.

The United States and its NATO allies see Putin as weak and potentially vulnerable, though they still must contend with him as Russia’s leader. Still, seeing his weakness, they are willing to continue supplying Ukraine and keep up the pressure on Moscow, with new weapons systems (e.g., long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS) possibly on the horizon.

Meanwhile, a weakened Putin grows more dependent on China, further reifying Russia’s status as China’s junior partner. China does not want to lose its primary strategic partner, and this scenario offers Beijing greater predictability, insofar as it is able to continue engaging with Putin. Chinese leader Xi Jinping may take note of Prigozhin’s mutiny and consider threats to his, and his party’s, rule in China; however, he also could feel reassured by how quickly the crisis passed.

2. A new regime rises

In the summer of 1991, Kremlin hardliners attempted a coup against Soviet President and General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev. The coup failed, but Gorbachev was weakened and out of power by the end of the year.

In this scenario, Putin suffers a similar fate. The Prigozhin challenge is sidestepped for the moment, but Putin’s political position is irreparable and rapidly deteriorates. Internal competitors line up, consolidating strength and waiting for the right opportunity to strike.

Faced with internal threats, Putin is distracted from the Ukraine war effort and even has to reallocate security forces to deal with his competitors. At the same time, the counteroffensive picks up steam. Ukrainian forces break through weak points in Russia’s lines, retaking substantial ground and severing the land bridge that Russia has created by occupying Ukrainian territory from the Russian border to Crimea. Morale flags among Russian troops, and disgruntled soldiers stream back into Russia, angry with the country’s political leadership for sending them to fight a bloody, failing war.

At this point, Putin’s adversaries strike. Perhaps Prigozhin and the Wagner Group reconstitute in Belarus and conduct another march on Moscow. In addition, or alternatively, other nationalist forces take advantage of discontented troops to build their own miniature armies outside the purview of the state. Regardless of the precise mechanism, political and military elites turn on Putin, who is killed or forced into “retirement.”

Even though chaos appears imminent, a new regime consolidates power quickly, preventing a civil war and restoring order in a post-Putin era. The war in Ukraine does not end immediately, but the exigencies of establishing order reduce the likelihood of any significant new Russian offensives in the near or medium terms, and the new regime instead focuses on salvaging some gains from the war while maintaining stability at home.

The United States and NATO adjust to this new reality, sizing up a new authoritarian regime. There might be an opportunity to ease tensions if a long-term peace agreement or ceasefire is reached in Ukraine, though a comprehensive thaw in relations is unlikely. Tough talk about the West may continue in propaganda outlets, but Russia’s weakened conventional military forces undermine its credibility to present a hard-power threat to NATO allies. Still dealing with the aftereffects of a power transition at home, the new regime is disinclined to conduct provocations abroad and instead could seek stability in its relations with external powers. Nevertheless, the behavior of the new Russian leadership is not wholly predictable, and NATO prepares to deter and defend against potential acts of aggression by the new regime.

This scenario presents unwelcome uncertainty for China, which must navigate relations with a post-Putin regime. The new regime may remain generally aligned with China, recognizing its need to rely more heavily on its foremost strategic partner. On the other hand, absent the strong Xi-Putin partnership, it is plausible that the new leadership chafes at being the junior partner vis-à-vis Beijing and the relationship between the two countries weakens, albeit while retaining a common distaste for the United States.

3. The tempest arrives

As in the previous scenario, there is a temporary pause in tensions, followed by a descent into civil war. Putin’s adversaries are emboldened by his apparent weakness, which is exacerbated by a deteriorating situation on the battlefield in Ukraine. In this case, however, no competitor is strong enough to consolidate power.

Russia fractures into competing power blocs. This could mean Putin retains power and loyalists in some parts of Russia, even as Prigozhin and nationalist leaders develop quasi-fiefdoms elsewhere. Further complicating this scenario would be the rise of secessionist movements that further divide Russia.

As one of the United States’ foremost geopolitical competitors fragments, this scenario raises other questions.

For example, what happens to Russia’s nuclear weapons? Russia has thousands of nuclear warheads, and a civil war opens up opportunities for different actors to take advantage of the chaos and access those weapons. Eager to avoid this proliferation, the United States and NATO seek to contain the civil war within Russia’s borders.

As for the war in Ukraine, an enduring civil war results in Russian lines quickly collapsing as command-and-control disintegrates. Competing power players vie for the loyalty of embittered but battle-hardened soldiers returning to Russia.

This scenario is particularly bad for China, as it witnesses its premier strategic partner reduced to disarray. Moreover, it compounds China’s regional nuclear proliferation concerns, while also creating instability at its border and a potential influx of refugees. China now needs to allocate substantial resources to securing a lengthy border that it previously did not have to worry too much about. Russia’s energy industry also suffers, meaning Beijing cannot rely on Moscow as much to meet its exorbitant energy demands and must look elsewhere. Furthermore, in this scenario especially, Beijing might become even more cautious regarding an invasion of Taiwan as it witnesses the regime-threatening internal instability that can be wrought by invasions gone awry.

4. Reformers seize the moment

A final scenario worth considering is the possibility of a reform-minded regime coming to power in Moscow. As in the previous two scenarios, the temporary reprieve in tensions following Wagner’s mutiny gives way to renewed challenges to Putin’s rule, accelerated by a declining situation on the battlefield.

Putin manages to keep power through the March 2024 Russian presidential election, which is marked by fraud and widely recognized among the populace as illegitimate. In this case, a more democratically inclined opposition, perhaps associated with Alexei Navalny, seizes the opportunity and manages to cultivate sufficient popular support, with rallies and protests across Russia promoting change. Under intense pressure, Kremlin elites express sympathy with the reformers, and Putin ultimately decides to step down. A reformist leader wins the ensuing constitutionally mandated presidential election.* After assuming and consolidating power, the new government seeks a quick end to the war in Ukraine, while focusing on implementing anti-corruption and political reforms in Russia.

For the United States and NATO, this scenario increases the likelihood of Russia becoming a more responsible member of the international system and reducing military tensions between the Alliance and Moscow. That said, change will not happen overnight, and a reform-minded Russia will have to wrestle with deeply entrenched corruption and economic issues. China, for its part, finds this scenario disastrous, as it faces a nuclear-armed state on its border that is ideologically more sympathetic to the West.

These scenarios do not exhaust all possibilities, but they account for four plausible futures US and allied policymakers should consider in their strategic planning. A scenario in which a reform-minded opposition comes to power is the least plausible, as Russia has long proven resistant to extensive political reforms, and it is unclear that there is a movement sufficiently organized and with broad enough support to take advantage of a power vacuum. The first scenario is the closest to the status quo, and Putin has been remarkably resilient as a leader; on the other hand, Putin has also never appeared weaker, and external pressure wrought by Ukrainian success on the battlefield could help to facilitate his downfall.

Jeffrey Cimmino is the deputy director of operations and a fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This article was updated to clarify the circumstances under which a reformist leader could come to power in scenario four.

The post Four scenarios for Russia’s future after the Wagner Group mutiny appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:00:00 +0000

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus.

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101^st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101^st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

—Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.”

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

—Daniel Suárez Pére z, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels.

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country.

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted.

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions.

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.”

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed.

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

—Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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Wagner drama drags Belarus deeper into Russia’s wartime turbulence

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 28 Jun 2023 22:06:15 +0000

Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka appears eager to take full credit for his role in countering Russia’s short-lived but hugely significant recent Wagner rebellion. Speaking on June 27 just days after the uprising came to an abrupt end, Lukashenka provided a detailed and highly flattering account of negotiations with Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin that contrasted his own strong leadership with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s apparent indecisiveness.

This was a bold move by Lukashenka, who has been heavily dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival ever since Russia intervened to prop up his regime during a wave of Belarusian pro-democracy protests in the second half of 2020. Clearly, Lukashenka feels emboldened by Putin’s apparent weakness and sees the Wagner affair as an opportunity to burnish his own credentials as both a wise ruler and a skilled negotiator.

Lukashenka’s version of events is certainly convenient but may not be entirely accurate. In reality, he is more likely to have served as a messenger for Putin. The Russian dictator had good reason to avoid any direct talks with rebel leader Prigozhin, who he had publicly branded as a traitor. It is also probably no coincidence that Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rather than Lukashenka announced news of Prigozhin’s subsequent departure for Belarus. This has reinforced perceptions of Belarus as a vassal state of Russia that serves as a place of exile for disgraced members of the Kremlin elite. Indeed, Putin himself went even further and offered thousands of Wagner troops who participated in the rebellion the choice of relocating to Belarus if they wish.

It is not yet clear whether significant numbers of Wagner fighters will accept Putin’s invitation and move to Belarus. For now, Lukashenka claims to have offered Wagner the use of an abandoned military base. He has hinted that Wagner troops may serve in a training capacity for his own military, praising their performance in Ukraine and hailing them as “the most prepared unit in the Russian army.”

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Many ordinary Belarusians do not share Lukashenka’s enthusiasm and worry that the potential arrival of Wagner fighters will drag Belarus further into the turmoil engulfing Putin’s Russia. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, research has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians oppose any involvement in the war. Belarusian railway workers and other activists have sabotaged the movement of Russian troops and military equipment across the country, while Belarusian military volunteers have joined the fight against Russia inside Ukraine.

News that Belarus may now serve as a place of exile for large numbers of Wagner fighters is certain to deepen existing concerns over the country’s role as a junior partner in Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka granted Putin permission to use Belarus as a springboard for an attempt to seize Kyiv during the initial stages of the war in early 2022. He continues to supply Russia with military equipment and ammunition, while also allowing Russian troops to train at Belarusian bases. Most recently, Belarus has reportedly begun the process of receiving Russian nuclear weapons.

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The delivery of Russian nukes and the proposal to host Wagner forces underscore the significance of Belarus in Putin’s regional strategy. The continued presence of Lukashenka in Minsk gives Moscow options in its confrontation with the West and enables the Kremlin to enhance its influence in the wider region. This appears to suit Lukashenka, who knows the Kremlin is unlikely to abandon him as long as he remains indispensable to the Russian war effort.

The outlook for Belarus as a whole is less promising. If large numbers of Wagner troops begin arriving in the country, this will dramatically increase Russia’s overall military presence and spark renewed speculation over a possible fresh Russian offensive from Belarusian territory to capture the Ukrainian capital. This would force Ukraine to strengthen its defenses along the country’s northern border and could potentially make Belarus a target.

The stationing of Wagner units in Belarus would also cause alarm bells to ring in nearby European Union and NATO member states such as Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Many of these countries have already taken steps to increase border security with Belarus. The arrival of Russia’s most effective and battle-hardened military units in the country would likely lead to a new iron curtain and the further isolation of the Belarusian population from their European neighbors.

In all likelihood, Lukashenka probably had very little say in the decision to use Belarus as a place of exile for mutinous Wagner forces. At the same time, he may view these troops as a means of protecting himself against any form of domestic opposition. Lukashenka remains vulnerable to the kind of widespread anti-regime protests that swept the country in 2020, and is well aware that his decision to involve Belarus in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is deeply unpopular. Having thousands of Wagner fighters on hand might be the perfect insurance against an uprising aiming to topple his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Atlantic Council experts — Sat, 24 Jun 2023 22:54:22 +0000

What a difference a day makes. In the past twenty-four hours, Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin announced a rebellion against Russia, claimed his forces seized the southern city of Rostov-on-Don, and marched his forces toward Moscow. However, after a deal brokered by Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, it appears the Kremlin has dropped its charges against the mutinying mercenary leader, with Prigozhin agreeing to withdraw his fighters and leave for Belarus.

How did Prigozhin’s rebellion get as far as it did? And how will its aftermath affect Putin’s hold on power and the war in Ukraine? Read analysis below from Atlantic Council experts on what these breakneck developments in Russia mean for the Putin regime, the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and the Moscow-Beijing partnership.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Brian Whitmore: If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Olga Khakova: Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Yevgeniya Gaber: The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Daniel Fried: Is it 1917 or 1991?

Ariel Cohen: Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

Doug Klain: In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Hanna Liubakova: For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

John “Buss” Barranco: Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

William F. Wechsler: “When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

John K. Culver: A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Joseph Webster: Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

Rama Yade: Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Jacob Mezey: What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Vladislav Davidzon: This is the start of the end of the war

If Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price, Putin’s regime is in serious danger

Prigozhin’s rebellion needs to be viewed in several contexts. First, the war against Ukraine has divided the Russian elite into two factions—hawks who want nothing short of the conquest of Kyiv and a military parade on the Khreshchatyk and kleptocrats who want to go back to the pre-February 24, 2022 world. Neither of these things are going to happen, so nobody is happy. Of these two factions, the hawks are by far the more powerful and the more serious threat to the regime. This has put Putin in a very precarious position regardless of how Prigozhin’s rebellion is resolved.

Second, Prigozhin’s rebellion also illustrates the perils of Putin’s “venture-capital foreign policy,” which outsources key tasks to nominally private-sector actors outside the normal chain of command. The Russian system is based not on institutions but on informal patronage networks with Putin as the ultimate arbiter. When Putin is strong, this approach works, to a point. But when Putin is weakened, it can spin out of control.

Third, Prigozhin’s kryshas in this informal system appear to be abandoning him. General Sergei Surovikin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov have already disavowed him. It is also hard to imagine another alleged ally, Rosgvardia leader Viktor Zolotov, siding with Prigozhin over Putin. This probably accounts for Prigozhin’s tactical retreat. But even if the immediate crisis is resolved, its underlying cause will continue to weaken the regime.

Fourth, if Prigozhin doesn’t pay a heavy price for his rebellion, it will put the Putin regime in serious danger. This is because political change comes to Russia when three factors are present: a divided elite (check), a dissatisfied public (check), and an absence of fear. If fear is removed from the equation, then the regime will be in peril.

Finally, this crisis will further undermine Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine just as Kyiv is ramping up its counteroffensive. The Russian elite is not behaving like it expects to win this war.

Russian instability further endangers Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

Despite the internal power struggle, Prigozhin and Putin are unified by their dedication to the continued assault on Ukraine, including crimes against humanity at scale, albeit through diverging approaches. This shared interest is of particular concern, as Ukraine is once again raising alarms about the ticking time bomb of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant’s unsafe conditions. Russia’s leadership instability is heightening these risks and could lead to contradictory or unclear orders for the plant’s illegal occupiers. Moreover, Russia has been emboldened by the weak response by the West to their destruction of the Kakhovka dam, and the absence of unity in calling out Russia’s culpability in the horrific incident, notwithstanding ample evidence pointing to Russia. Zaporizhzhia’s safety can only be guaranteed when the Russians give up control of the plant, which they are unequipped to manage. The international community must prioritize securing this transfer in order to prevent a looming catastrophe.

—Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center (GEC). She leads GEC’s portfolio on synchronizing climate and energy security efforts through transatlantic cooperation.

The Russian colossus is standing on feet of clay

Prigozhin’s mutiny has exposed Russia’s major defense blind spots and highlighted Putin’s weakening grip on power. The Kremlin’s strongman turned out to be a strawman; and a colossus of Russian military power appeared to be standing on feet of clay.

While this may sound reassuring to Ukrainians, who may have an easier time fighting against a demotivated army of conscripts and convicts rather than against well-paid professional mercenaries, Kyiv and the West must nevertheless face a sobering reality.

It took sixteen months of fighting, three successful Ukrainian counteroffensives (in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson), and occasional raids by pro-Ukrainian Russian groups into the Belgorod region to ruin the myth of Russian military power. It required the flagship cruiser Moskva to be sunk, Ukraine to spend months waiting for Western weapons and EU candidate status, and Finland to join NATO before the West began to question the credibility of the Kremlin’s “red lines.”

While the West has spent months trying to de-escalate, save Putin’s face, mitigate nuclear threats, and avoid provoking Russia, a rival warlord with a criminal past showed how easy it was to overtake the Russian military’s initiative and paralyze state structures. In its current state, Russia is likely to face an internal power struggle with more destabilization in sight. Putin will most likely use Prigozhin to present himself as the “best out of the worst,” and to redirect public attention from internal turmoil to more violence in Ukraine, including new acts of ecocide and nuclear saber-rattling. This must not be allowed.

The West’s choice is not between two Russian war criminals, who are equally engaged in the crimes of genocide and mass murder in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa. The choice is between maintaining illusions of European stability and taking the steps that are necessary to secure it. These include abandoning self-deterrence, developing a clear-eyed Russia strategy, and equipping Ukraine to win the war, with full-fledged NATO membership as a key element of Kyiv’s long-term victory.

The Russian colossus, as it is now, is likely to collapse sooner rather than later. Ukraine is the only country in the region that can protect NATO from its ruins when it finally falls apart.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey. She worked as a foreign policy advisor to the prime minister of Ukraine from February to December 2021.

Is it 1917 or 1991?

What does the fast and apparently ended Prigozhin mutiny mean for Putin and for Russia’s war against Ukraine? Was it a 1917 moment or a miserable failure like the attempted coup against the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991?

In terms of numbers of forces available, Prigozhin didn’t stand a chance. Putin commands the regular Russian army and airforce, the National Guard, and other armed groups theoretically at government command. But Tsar Nicholas II also had a preponderance of force when he fell in February 1917; so did the Provisional Government when it fell to Lenin’s Bolsheviks in November 1917. The problem the tsar and Provisional Government leader Alexander Kerensky faced was not the availability of forces in theory but forces in practice. The tsarist regime was decrepit, hollowed out by many things, but especially by its failure in World War I. Kerensky’s government stuck with that war and also failed. By the time they were overthrown, the tsar and Kerensky had lost the confidence of Russian society and huge portions of the state they nominally commanded.

That was Putin’s problem: Prigozhin mounted a mutiny in protest of another failing Russian war, Putin’s war against Ukraine.

And now Prigozhin has announced he is turning around his forces short of Moscow. He seems to have worked out some sort of deal.

But a deal with whom and for what? Does this deal include a change of Russia’s military leadership that had been prosecuting the Russo-Ukrainian War that Putin launched? Prigozhin has been attacking Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov for their failures in Ukraine. But why would Putin cave to pressure by accepting such demands? What does that do to Putin’s authority? It’s Putin’s war in any case.

Whatever arrangements Prigozhin has extracted, Putin’s authority is diminished, as was Gorbachev’s after Boris Yeltsin defeated the 1991 coup attempt. And this is worse: In 1991 the coup failed. But Prigozhin seems to have pulled off something.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has not been going well, and Prigozhin’s attack on it as unjustified and incompetently led is now stronger than ever.

It may not be a 1917 moment for Russia. But the hot breath of failure is coming closer to Putin.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US ambassador to Poland.

Frankenstein’s monster cooks up a coup

In his effort to bypass Russia’s regular military and governance structures, while personally dipping into the country’s military budget, it appears that Putin has created a monster that threatened the very foundations of his security services–based regime, and possibly the scope of his personal power.

Prigozhin, once known as “Putin’s cook” and head of the private military Wagner Group, demonstrated that he can run circles around Shoigu and Gerasimov. He and his Wagner military company quickly captured Rostov-on-Don, a large Russian city in the south, which is the headquarters of the Russian southern military district. Wagner then rapidly extended their control all the way up to Voronezh and to the boundaries of the Moscow region—850 kilometers.

During Wagner’s lightning advance, Russian ground forces failed to oppose them, and only minimal aerial attacks were conducted against them.

For a moment it appeared that Putin had left Moscow and Prigozhin might enter the city and finish off a coup despite the lack of outright support from any representatives of the Russian ruling circles. Yet, many Russian leaders, including the powerful Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev refrained from criticizing Prigozhin, suggesting that he may have at least some support at the highest echelons of power.

And then Prigozhin stopped. He turned around his troops, amid claims of a deal brokered by Lukashenka. Putin’s press secretary Dmitri Peskov confirmed that the criminal charges of incitement to armed rebellion against Prigozhin would be dropped, he would be allowed to move to Belarus (and pursue his African business), and the Wagner members would be pardoned.

The Wagner rebellion is the most serious challenge to the Russian state’s foundations since 1993, when the Supreme Soviet rebelled against Boris Yeltsin, who brought in tanks to suppress the attempted coup.

Prigozhin has demonstrated just how weak the Putin regime is and how the Russian president’s own “chef” could potentially put nuclear-armed Russia into the hands of a fragile and extremely dangerous dictatorship of former KGB officers and hardened criminals—Vory v Zakone.

Russia’s international stature, and its future military performance in Ukraine, are likely to suffer from these events, as will Putin’s power.

—Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

In the mutiny’s aftermath, Russia’s soldiers face a crisis of trust

Plainly, it’s difficult to tell what on earth happened in Prigozhin’s supposed twenty-four-hour rebellion, now apparently called off after negotiations with the Belarusian strongman Lukashenka. How Putin and his elites rally to reassert dominance after an open challenge will prove decisive for determining what comes next and whether Russian forces substantially waver in the battlefield in Ukraine. Authoritarian regimes like Putin’s rely on creating a sense of invulnerability, and challenges from warlords like Prigozhin call that myth into question.

While Prigozhin claims he called on his forces to stand down to avoid spilling Russian blood, it’s likely that the Wagner Group chief received significant concessions personally or serious enhancements to Wagner’s role in the war effort. At the end of the day, this “rebellion” was purportedly about a disagreement over how best to prosecute Russia’s unprovoked war of annihilation against Ukraine.

If Prigozhin’s challenge does indeed come to a speedy conclusion with Wagner returning to the front, Kyiv may not get the all-out chaos it was likely hoping to exploit for battlefield gains. But even so, the fact that a significant portion of Moscow’s fighting force is not apparently loyal to Russia and can be swayed will have real impact on the battlefield, with Russian army forces having to question to an even greater extent than before just how much they can trust those they’re supposed to be fighting alongside.

Putin’s regime may have survived Prigozhin’s challenge, but almost every aspect of this episode indicates that the Russian system is more brittle than ever. This all occurred because Russia is performing disastrously in its war—and Ukraine’s main effort in the counteroffensive is still to come.

—Doug Klain is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, where he focuses on Russia’s war on Ukraine, authoritarianism in Russia, and Ukraine’s democracy-building process.

For Lukashenka, a short-term win that could undermine his long-term standing in Belarus

In a stunning turn of events on Saturday, Lukashenka said he had negotiated with Prigozhin an end to the movement of his mercenary troops inside Russia in order to deescalate the situation.

Prigozhin himself confirmed the turning back of the Wagner columns of the mercenaries and returning them to field camps in the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

While Lukashenka’s position could be strengthened by this unexpected mediation, in the longer term, his regime will face the repercussions of the insurrection led by the Wagner paramilitary group.

The growing demotivation and demoralization regarding Russia’s actions may raise concerns among the power vertical, military, and elite circles within Belarus. Such chaotic developments in the neighboring country will lead to questioning Lukashenka’s policies and decision making. With Putin’s authority weakened, the regime in Minsk may find itself with reduced backing and support from Russia.

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Lukashenka has declared unwavering loyalty to the Kremlin, allowing attacks and using Belarusian territory as a training ground, disregarding the will of most Belarusians.

Lukashenka placed a risky bet on Russia’s swift victory in the war against Ukraine, essentially banking everything on that outcome. Pro-regime propaganda in Belarus claimed the notion that Russia was incapable of losing. However, this strategy could potentially have negative consequences. Prigozhin’s armed rebellion indicates a political crisis within Russia and shatters the myth of Russia’s invincibility and overwhelming power.

The Belarusian democratic forces and the Kalinouski regiment fighting in Ukraine against the Russian troops used these chaotic developments to appeal to the elites and the military to side with them. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, Lukashenka’s rival in the disputed 2020 election, has stated once again that this is an opportunity to free Belarus from dictatorship. The Wagner insurrection will become yet another argument for her to present Russia as a source of instability and conflict. It appeals to Belarusians who want to keep away from the war against Ukraine.

—Hanna Liubakova is a freelance journalist and researcher from Belarus. She is currently a journalist with Outriders, an international multimedia platform that produces in-depth multimedia and interactive reporting and focuses on solutions journalism.

Ukraine can take advantage of Russian confusion

Is the Wagner Group marching on Moscow or heading back to the front? Is Prigozhin attempting a coup d’etat, part of a false flag operation to allow Putin to purge his failing military leadership, or is he trying to change the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense, as he claims, perhaps to prevent them from absorbing his private militia into the Russian Army? It is impossible to know for sure, but we do know that the recent turn of events in Russia could not come at a better time for Ukraine.

Ukraine’s best chance for a successful counteroffensive is to attack deep behind the current Russian front line and force the Russians to fall back from their six hundred miles of layered defense-in-depth fighting positions to prevent Ukraine from cutting Russia off from its supply lines. It is unlikely even the most audacious among the Ukrainian military leadership ever envisioned launching an attack on Russia’s Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, where Russia’s war in Ukraine is being run, but that is precisely what the Wagner Group’s sudden rebellion has done.

Whatever Prigozhin’s real motivations are, or the outcome of his revolt and then apparent about-face, a few things remain clear: Massive amounts of confusion have been sown in Russia’s rear area, and whatever confidence rank and file Russian soldiers had left in their leadership is gone. Once an army loses confidence in its leaders, morale collapses and the will to fight goes with it. The Wagner Group will almost certainly be gone soon as well, and it was the most effective unit fighting for the Russians in Ukraine, admittedly a low bar. Whether it is absorbed into the Russian army or disbanded, its members reassigned piecemeal to various units, remains to be seen. Still, it is hard to imagine Prigozhin holding onto his private army or his life.

—John “Buss” Barranco was the 2021-22 senior US Marine Corps fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

“When you strike at a king, you must kill him.”

Some things are constants in this changing world, and one of them is that only a relatively small number of people make all of the important decisions in Russia, and they each have lots of money, lots of guns, or both. At certain points in history, these elites compete among themselves to determine who leads, resulting in one person in charge, some dead, and the others falling into line. Recent events should be understood as the latest episode in this centuries-long storyline.

But today’s agreement that halted the immediate Wagner threat to Moscow and consigned Prigozhin to Belarus is not likely to be the end of this story, but just the beginning. On the surface it may appear to be a victory for Putin, but he has been weakened by both the very fact that it occurred and the reality that it was resolved only through a negotiated compromise rather than a public demonstration of physical power. The military, historically the institution most esteemed by the Russian people, has been humiliated once again under Putin and shown to be corrupt, ineffective, and led by lackeys. As has been the case since his failure to take Kyiv last year, Putin’s primary focus must be to secure his standing, and thus his survival, among that small number of Russians who matter, with shows of strength. Thus, those who stubbornly hope for a negotiated resolution to Putin’s war in Ukraine will continue to be disappointed. As for Prigozhin, he will need to reflect on Ralph Waldo Emerson’s famous admonition, “when you strike at a king, you must kill him.” Indeed, for the time being he may want to steer clear of any upper-floor windows, as in recent years Putin’s adversaries tend to be especially clumsy around them. In any case, as this story continues to develop, the people behind the 2017 movie The Death of Stalin should be busy taking notes in case there’s soon need for a sequel.

—William F. Wechsler is the senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent government position was US deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.

A stumbling Russia means greater isolation for China

Chinese President Xi Jinping is famous for proclaiming that “the world is undergoing changes unseen in a century!” Yet his prognostication probably didn’t include Putin’s former caterer and mercenary army founder/funder Yevgeniy Prigozhin directing an armed assault toward Moscow.

I hesitate to call relationships between autocrats “friendships,” but to the extent either Putin or Xi has friends, their bond is certainly stronger and more substantive than others. They seem to share a view of the world as straining against “American hegemony,” and poised to accelerate toward a multipolar order where both Russia and China can dominate respective spheres of influence free of “Western interference.” But Xi—being more traditionally Marxist—saw this new world emerging over the course of this century, while Putin undertook direct actions—in Georgia, Syria, Ukraine, and Ukraine again—to hasten changes and reassert Russia’s position as a great power. Beijing’s reaction can be summarized as “Bold! But strategically incompetent!”

But as I noted in a recent Atlantic Council publication, “Beijing has deep strategic interest in ensuring that Moscow—and Putin personally—remains a viable ally in blunting US power… Most importantly, Beijing has a strategic need to keep Russia from internal turmoil or international setbacks that could result in the rise of a regime that is hostile to China. One of the greatest gifts to Beijing of the Sino-Russian rapprochement [has been] a passive 4,200-kilometer border.”

In that context, China will support Putin if he remains in charge in Moscow. If Putin falls, Beijing will wait for the dust to settle and cultivate the new power structure, perhaps with a fresh chance to counsel that Russia extricate itself from Ukraine and refocus on long-term competition with the United States/Western alliance.

But for Xi and China, Russian internal turmoil and stumbles in the face of successful Western-backed Ukrainian military opposition and sanctions will further threaten greater isolation. A pragmatic option would be to reduce tensions with the United States and Europe, but Xi has proven to be more ideological than his recent predecessors. The loss of China’s main strategic partner is more likely to deepen strategic mistrust of the United States rather than greater diplomatic or economic accommodation.

—John K. Culver is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) senior intelligence officer with thirty-five years of experience as a leading analyst of East Asian affairs, including security, economic, and foreign-policy dimensions.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know

While China has been preparing for a range of political and military outcomes amid the Ukrainian counteroffensive, it appears surprised by Prigozhin’s astonishing rebellion.

Beijing will seek to avoid taking any public side in the Russian domestic political struggle, at least explicitly. Still, authoritative state media such as the People’s Daily, are hinting that Beijing prefers that Putin prevail over Prigozhin. It’s not hard to understand why: Putin has been a reliable supporter of the relationship with China, has deep personal connections with the Chinese leadership, tacitly accepts Moscow’s “junior partnership” with Beijing, and has, up to now, largely maintained political stability within Russia.

Prigozhin is the devil Beijing doesn’t know. The head of the Wagner mercenary group has a mercurial (arguably volcanic) temperament which the Chinese leadership could find difficult to manage. Beijing was also likely troubled by his comment that Russia “needs to take a page out of North Korea’s book for a certain number of years,” as China can ill afford another nuclear-armed pariah state on its borders.

Beijing will struggle to find ways to assist Putin, however, although it appears, as of this writing, that he has prevailed over Prigozhin, who has reportedly accepted exile in Belarus.

People’s Republic of China (PRC) intelligence support for Putin seems risky and unlikely if Prigozhin resumes his apparent coup attempt. While Prigozhin has a complicated and often fraught relationship with the Russian security services, he appears to have ties with elements of the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service, as well as other elements of the force structures. Wagner Group’s stunning advance before Prigozhin’s about-face implies at least the tacit compliance of some figures in Russian military intelligence. Moreover, Wagner and the GRU shared a base in Russia’s Krasnodar district as late as 2020. Accordingly, if Chinese security services share intelligence with their Russian counterparts on anti-Putin coup plotters, they face a high probability of discovery and risk long-term damage to bilateral relations if an “anti-Putin” ascends to the power vertical in Russian politics. Moreover, sharing any intelligence on potential coup plotters would not only risk the compromise of methods and sources but also be an admission that PRC security services are spying within Russia.

If matters escalate again, Beijing might attempt to enable the Kremlin to rush troops back to Moscow from Central Asia, in a tacit, unspoken arrangement with Russia. Tajikistan hosts up to seven thousand Russian troops, while another five hundred are reportedly deployed to Kyrgyzstan (some troops have already been shifted to the front in Ukraine). China could offer security guarantees to Central Asian governments, indirectly enabling the Kremlin to further draw down in the region and shift forces to Moscow. This measure carries risks for the Kremlin and Zhongnanhai, however, and may be ineffectual. Putin’s fate will largely be determined by the loyalty of his subordinates, not the number of military personnel in Moscow.

If tensions between Putin and Prigozhin escalate again, Xi might decide that a direct or implied expression of support for Putin, perhaps through a phone call, is his best course of action. An intervention into Russian domestic politics would mark a bold step, however, and risks damaging bilateral relations with Putin’s eventual successor.

Unless it chooses to run significant risks, Beijing has little ability to influence events in Russia. Despite the considerable risks a Prigozhin regime would hold for the PRC, the Chinese leadership will likely observe events, rather than attempt to shape them.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, where he leads the center’s efforts on Chinese energy security. Webster edits the China-Russia Report, an independent, non-partisan newsletter exploring developments in Sino-Russian relations.

Without Wagner, Putin loses a substantial part of his African foothold

Prigozhin has not been defeated yet. The way he decided to turn around to avoid bloodshed gives the impression that he controls not only the narrative, but also the future of Putin’s twenty-three-year hold on power. Should Putin leave Prigozhin out there without arresting him? What about his actions and influence in Africa, where he has ongoing military operations?

Undoubtedly this rebellion will impact the African theater, particularly Mali, Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and Sudan where Wagner has settled its troops. Whereas until now the interests of the Russian government and the Wagner group aligned, it will now be necessary for these countries to do business with two Russian actors with rival interests. This rivalry will put their African allies in an awkward position.

Prigozhin’s uprising will lead to a clarification on the nature of Russia’s partnership with these African countries. Moscow, which knows how influential Wagner is in these countries, may be tempted to cut off its supplies on the continent. These governments born from military coups rely on Wagner mercenaries to keep their power and/or secure their countries against jihadist movements. Wagner made very profitable deals in Mali, Sudan, and CAR on everything from gold to coffee to sugar to diamonds.

The rebellion of Wagner’s boss and the need for Putin to show that he still has the situation under control could force Bamako and Bangui to distance themselves from Prigozhin in order to maintain their alliances with Moscow.

Indeed beyond Wagner, Moscow has become the leading exporter of arms in Africa, but also of wheat. Russian state-owned companies are also active in the mining, hydrocarbons, and even civil nuclear sectors. But if Russia seems to be a more reliable partner, what about Putin, whose power seems weakened?

Finally, Wagner’s most visible impact is actually on the information front: Prigozhin—who was closely tied with the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence service—used CAR and Mali to foster anti-Western sentiment, gain sympathy for Putin, and fuel his propaganda via RIA FAN, the flagship of Prigozhin’s Patriot Media Group. Without this powerful tool, I’m not sure that the Russian influence will remain strong in these countries.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

What does Prigozhin’s coup attempt mean for Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

How will Prigozhin’s brief mutiny against the Russian Ministry of Defense ultimately impact the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive? On the immediate frontline, many obstacles facing Ukrainian forces such as landmines, fortifications, and the Russian troops defending them will likely remain unchanged. However, Wagner’s disruption of Russia’s military command and logistics network may increase the possibility of a Ukrainian breakthrough on the battlefield.

Wagner’s seizure of the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, which has largely served as the forward command center for the Russian war effort, will degrade the timely command and control of Russian forces. A confused or disrupted chain of command will significantly impact the Russian military’s ability to conduct an effective defense-in-depth and prevent a coordinated response to Ukrainian offensive efforts. Roadblocks set up by the Russian government, and even deliberate damage to the M4 highway, designed to contain the Wagner group, will also restrict its military’s ability to shift forces and supplies between fronts in Ukraine. Evidence that Wagner fired on military helicopters will require Russian aviation in the area to operate more cautiously and complicate their ability to strike Ukrainian forces. Reports that some Russian units did not oppose Wagner’s initial march may also lower Moscow’s confidence in the loyalty of its forces and officers. While Prigozhin’s rebellion ultimately may be short-lived, his actions will create weaknesses within the Russian military’s command structure which Ukraine can exploit on the battlefield.

—Jacob Mezey is a program assistant in the Forward Defense program in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

This is the start of the end of the war

The attempted coup d’etat that the Wagner mercenaries sprung on the Kremlin in the middle of the evening on Friday has come to a rather unexpected and dissatisfying conclusion. What looks like a backroom deal allegedly brokered by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has turned the Wagner convoy around. The Wagner group had a serious battle plan with the Russian armed forces and security services seemingly unconsolidated enough to respond quickly. Prigozhin and the Kremlin both let loose the cry of war and stepped over their own self-proclaimed red lines before Prigozhin decided to fold the operation at seemingly the last moment. However, this rebellion has shown that the Putin regime was on its last legs (though they may now reconsolidate the power structures with Prigozhin holding a great deal more power than before).

That the rebel forces were even able to get as far as they did with little opposition and to take over Rostov-on-Don—which is also the headquarters of the Russian war against Ukraine—has shown the Putin regime to be weak and incoherent beyond all previous suppositions. It is hard to know how the Putin regime can regain its legitimacy after this. Putin had voiced his fears when he compared the situation to 1917, although 1905 may have been a better parallel. One way or the other, this is the payout stage of the gamble to invade Ukraine and this is the start of the end of the war. The Russian population and Putin’s elites had countenanced this war when it was far away—they will certainly think twice about doing so again after the conclusion of this farce.

—Vladislav Davidzon is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, based in France. Since 2018, he has served as a co-producer for a television series on the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

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China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all fear a Russian defeat in Ukraine

Taras Kuzio — Tue, 23 May 2023 14:44:33 +0000

There is no question that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dramatically undermined Russia’s global standing, but it is also true that international responses to the war have been far from uniform. The democratic world has almost universally condemned Russia’s invasion and has united in support of Ukraine, while many in the Global South have preferred to maintain a more neutral position.

Only a handful of countries have actually been prepared to stand with Russia and defend Moscow’s actions. Four nations in particular have emerged as key allies at a time when Vladimir Putin faces mounting international isolation. China, Iran, Belarus, and Armenia all have different motivations for supporting the Kremlin, but they are united by a common fear of what a Russian defeat in Ukraine might mean for their own countries.

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In recent months, China has sought to play an active role in efforts to negotiate a peace between Russia and Ukraine. However, many in Kyiv and throughout the West remain skeptical of China’s apparently contradictory views on the peace process. Critics have accused China of publicly supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity while also indicating the need for Kyiv to cede land as part of any potential settlement.

While stopping short of outright support for Russia’s invasion, China has adopted a public position that could be termed as Kremlin-friendly neutrality, and has accused the West of provoking the war. This posture is unsurprising. Beijing shares Moscow’s goal of challenging Western dominance and replacing it with what they see as a more multipolar world. China fears that if Russia loses the current war, it will greatly strengthen the West while undermining the global standing of China and other authoritarian regimes.

More specifically, a Russian defeat would considerably complicate any future Chinese efforts to invade Taiwan. If Western military aid helps Ukraine to secure victory over the once vaunted Russian army, this will increase the chances of similar Western support for Taiwan against possible Chinese aggression. The disastrous performance of Putin’s army in Ukraine has already undermined Russia’s claims to military superpower status and significantly boosted Western confidence. China is not eager for this unwelcome trend to gain further momentum.

On Russia’s western border, Belarus has emerged as something of a captive partner in the attack on Ukraine, with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka serving as the single most vocal backer of Russia’s war while also allowing his country to be used as a platform for the invasion. Russian troops flooded into northern Ukraine from Belarus on the first days of the war in February 2022; Russia continues to launch airstrikes on Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

Lukashenka has little choice but to back Putin. He only remains in power because Russia intervened in 2020 to prop up his regime in the wake of pro-democracy protests over a fraudulent presidential election. Lukashenka’s brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown against the Belarusian protest movement left him internationally isolated and heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would likely reignite domestic unrest inside Belarus and would almost certainly spell doom for the Lukashenka regime.

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While the failure of Putin’s invasion could lead to regime change in Belarus, some in Armenia sees the prospect of a Russian defeat in Ukraine in starkly existential terms. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reportedly warned Armenians recently: “If Russia loses the war in Ukraine, I have no idea what will happen to Armenia.”

Many Armenians remain heavily invested in the traditional view of Russia as a protector of the country against the perceived threats to national security posed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. This thinking has shaped Armenian politics and foreign policy for much of the post-Soviet era. The country is a founding member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and backed out of an association agreement with the EU a decade ago following Kremlin pressure, instead joining Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has dominated efforts to regulate the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan’s concerns are unsurprising but short-sighted. A Russian defeat in Ukraine would potentially allow Armenia to pursue a more independent foreign policy while expanding economic and political ties with the European Union. Alarm over the threat of renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan is understandable, but there is little prospect of Armenia itself being invaded, especially if US and EU-brokered talks produce a peace treaty that recognizes the Armenian-Azerbaijani border while providing satisfactory guarantees for Karabakh’s Armenian population.

As a staunch opponent of the West and critic of perceived Western influence over global affairs, Iran shares China’s geopolitical motivations for supporting Russia’s invasion. Many in the Iranian leadership are also fearful that a Russian defeat in Ukraine could increase demands for democratic change inside Iran itself and fuel a new round of domestic protests.

There are additional practical reasons for Tehran’s pro-Russian stance. Faced with tightening international sanctions and cut off from Western technologies, Russia has turned to Iran as an alternative source of military assistance. In exchange for Iranian drones and other supplies, Moscow is believed to be providing Tehran with everything from fighter jets to air defense systems, while also assisting Iran’s nuclear program.

This burgeoning military partnership between Russia and Iran is proving deadly for Ukraine, with Iranian drones regularly used to strike civilian targets across Ukraine. It also poses a significant threat to Israeli national security and has sparked heated debate over Israel’s apparent reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine. If cooperation between Moscow and Tehran continues to intensify, Russian air defense systems could limit Israeli operations in Syria and complicate any future preventative strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine now in its sixteenth month, there appears to be little chance of an outright Russian victory of the kind envisaged by Putin when he first gave the order to invade in February 2022. Instead, the most likely scenarios are now either some form of stalemate or a Ukrainian military victory.

If Russia is defeated in Ukraine, the consequences will reverberate around the globe. China is powerful enough to survive such a shock but would be geopolitically weakened. The Belarusian and Iranian regimes would face a far more uncertain future and might not survive. Meanwhile, Armenia may find that despite its current misgivings, the defeat of Russia could allow Yerevan to return to the path of European integration.

Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His latest book is “Genocide and Fascism. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

The strategic significance of this unequal alliance between Lukashenka and Putin increased considerably during the buildup to Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka acquiesced to the transportation of Russian troops and military equipment across Belarus, which served as the gateway for Moscow’s failed Kyiv offensive during the initial weeks of the war. The country has continued to play an important role in the ongoing conflict, providing logistical support, training Russian troops, and supplying weapons, while also serving as a launch pad for Russian airstrikes across Ukraine.

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Belarus’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine has led many to brand Lukashenka as Putin’s last remaining ally. While other leaders have refused to condemn the Russian dictator, Putin’s Belarusian counterpart remains one of the few still prepared to publicly defend him. However, while much of the outside world sees Belarus as Russia’s little brother, notions of a passive population fail to recognize the significant opposition Belarusians have already expressed over their country’s contributions to Russia’s war.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Belarusian opposition groups have employed a wide range of tactics to disrupt the Russian war effort. This has included a campaign to sabotage Belarusian railroads being used to transport Russian troops, equipment, and ammunition to Ukraine. Hackers have also accessed Russian military networks and logistical operations. In February 2023, Belarusian anti-war partisans claimed responsibility for an attack that caused significant damage to a Russian spy plane based at an airfield close to Minsk.

Belarusians are also fighting shoulder to shoulder with Ukrainians against the Russian invasion. Although exact numbers are difficult to determine, the Belarusian contingent is believed to be among the largest of the foreign volunteer forces fighting for Ukraine, and includes the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion. Many of the Belarusians currently fighting alongside the Ukrainian military believe that defending Ukraine is a stepping stone toward a free Belarus and are convinced that victory over Russia in Ukraine will lead to the fall of Lukashenka in Belarus.

Meanwhile, exiled Belarusian opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya remains an outspoken opponent of Lukashenka and has proven a staunch critic of his role as Putin’s junior partner in the invasion of Ukraine. Tsikhanouskaya has repeatedly underlined that Ukrainians and Belarusians share a common enemy in their struggle to shake off Russian authoritarianism and embrace European democracy. “The war won’t be over until both our countries are free,” she declared in March 2023.

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Moscow and Minsk are both well aware of the dangers posed by public opposition in Belarus to their country’s involvement in the invasion of Ukraine. Lukashenka’s violent suppression of anti-regime protests in 2020 succeeded in forcing activists to retreat from the streets of Belarus’s major cities, but discontent still simmers just below the surface. If Putin pushes Lukashenka to become more directly involved in the war, it could spark a new round of unrest with unpredictable consequences for both dictators.

Potential triggers include the planned deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus. The presence of Russian nukes would deepen existing Belarusian concerns over Moscow’s increasingly overt military presence in the country. This could potentially destabilize the Lukashenka regime at a time when Russia already finds itself overstretched in Ukraine and lacking the spare resources to rescue its ally once again.

Meanwhile, speculation continues over the possibility of Belarusian troops joining the invasion. So far, Lukashenka has resisted Kremlin pressure to send his army across the border into Ukraine, but Putin’s patience may eventually run out. Any attempt to force Belarusian troops to enter the war would represent a huge gamble for the two authoritarian rulers. Numerous commentators have questioned whether the Belarusian military could be relied upon to follow orders, with some arguing that many soldiers would be likely to mutiny or switch sides and fight for Ukraine.

Direct Belarusian participation in the Ukraine invasion would also dramatically increase the chances of domestic instability inside Belarus. Alyaksandr Azarau, who leads the BYPOL organization of exiled former Belarusian military and security service officers, believes wartime realities would rapidly reignite the flames of the 2020 protests. “If small Belarus starts getting coffins from Ukraine, it will inevitably stir up protests that the authorities barely managed to stifle with mass repressions,” he told the Associated Press in late April.

This represents something of a conundrum for Putin. Faced with mounting international isolation and struggling to advance in Ukraine, he is understandably eager to strengthen his grip on neighboring Belarus and force Lukashenka to join his faltering invasion. However, if Putin pushes too hard, the outcome could be disastrous for his last remaining ally.

Olivia Yanchik is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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While Belarus likely had little say in the matter of hosting Russian nuclear weapons, the country will experience significant consequences if Moscow proceeds as planned. Brussels has already warned Minsk of further sanctions due to what it terms as an “irresponsible escalation and threat to European security.” Belarus could also find itself a target for retaliatory strikes if the war in Ukraine spreads to neighboring NATO member states. In such circumstances, Belarusian nuclear weapons storage facilities, military airfields, and other military infrastructure could become potential targets.

Lukashenka has often been critical of his country’s early 1990s decision to hand over the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the USSR, and has suggested the international community would treat Belarus differently if it was still a nuclear power. Nevertheless, until the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he had consistently stated that nuclear weapons would only be based in Belarus in response to similar threats from the West.

The Russian attack on Ukraine has led to a dramatic change in Lukashenka’s position on the issue of nuclear weapons. Days after the start of the invasion, he staged a sham referendum on changes to the Belarusian Constitution which scrapped the country’s official nuclear-free status. This was followed by news that Russia was modifying Belarusian military aircraft to carry nuclear warheads and transferring nuclear-capable missile systems to the country.

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By agreeing to host Russian nuclear weapons, Lukashenka has strengthened perceptions of his country as an indivisible element of the military threat posed by Putin’s Russia. This is shaping attitudes toward Minsk throughout the democratic world. For much of Lukashenka’s almost three decades in power, Western policymakers had sought to cultivate ties with him in order to counter Russian influence in Belarus. That era now appears to be over. Instead, Lukashenka is seen as a Putin proxy who must be treated as such.

Lukashenka’s status as junior partner in Putin’s Ukraine War has also brought the curtain down on his clumsy attempts to act as peacemaker between Moscow and Kyiv. During the early stages of Russian aggression against Ukraine following the 2014 seizure of Crimea, Lukashenka positioned himself as a neutral figure and offered his country as a venue for peace talks. However, these claims to neutrality were undermined by Lukashenka’s growing dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to rescue his regime in August 2020 following nationwide protests in Belarus over a rigged presidential vote. Lukashenka repaid Putin for his support by allowing Belarus to become a platform for the invasion of Ukraine.

The deployment of nuclear weapons would be the latest in a series of steps since 2020 to expand Russia’s military presence in Belarus. Russian troops are already stationed across the country, with Lukashenka neither willing nor able to force their departure. The establishment of a fully-fledged Russian military base complete with nuclear weapons would significantly increase Moscow’s leverage over Belarus and cement Putin’s grip on the country. In such circumstances, any subsequent attempts by Lukashenka to distance himself from Putin or assert his independence from the Kremlin would be political suicide.

Although Lukashenka himself appears obliged to accept the gradual takeover of his country, the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus could have negative domestic consequences that neither he nor Putin can entirely disregard. While opinion polls are notoriously difficult to conduct in dictatorships, research carried out by Chatham House in 2022 found that around 80% of Belarusians opposed the idea of hosting Russian nukes. This tallies with other anecdotal evidence indicating strong opposition to the growing Russian military presence in Belarus and emphatic rejection of any Belarusian involvement in the invasion of Ukraine.

The terror tactics employed by Lukashenka in recent years make it unlikely that Belarusians will take to the streets in protest over Russian plans to place nuclear weapons in their country. However, this latest strengthening of Moscow’s already dominant position will further erode the legitimacy of the Lukashenka regime while highlighting Russia’s creeping annexation of Belarus. This could help fuel a new wave of Belarusian opposition, especially if Russia suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Webster in The China-Russia Report: China-Belarus trade surged in January and February

mzandi — Sun, 09 Apr 2023 14:11:36 +0000

original source

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Russian War Report: Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 07 Apr 2023 18:23:57 +0000

Security

Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

Documenting dissent

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

Tracking narratives

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

International response

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

Belarus accuses Ukraine of plotting terrorist attack against Russian consulate

On April 4, Belarusian state-controlled TV channel ONT aired a documentary titled “Loud failures of the Ukrainian special services in Belarus. Gaspar did not get in touch.” Reports from Belarus’ State Security Committee (KGB) informed much of the program, which asserted that, under the leadership of Ukrainian special services, a network of Russian and Belarusian citizens planned several terrorist attacks in the Belarusian city of Grodno. The alleged perpetrators reportedly planned to target several facilities, including the Consulate General of Russia, a military enlistment office opposite Zhiliber Park, a military unit in southern Grodno, and two oil depots.

The KGB claimed that Vyacheslav Rozum, an alleged employee of the Main Directorate of Intelligence in the Ukrainian defense ministry, planned the attacks. Ukrainian authorities had not commented on the accusations at the time of writing. According to the documentary, Rozum asked Russian citizen Daniil Krinari, known as Kovalevsky, to form a network of people to carry out terrorist acts. Krinari was reportedly arrested in Grodno in December 2022 and extradited to Russia at the request of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). He was charged in Russia for cooperating with Ukraine and acting in the interests of Ukraine. The Belarusian KGB asserted that, before his extradition, Krinari managed to recruit at least two people, Russian citizen Alexei Kulikov and Belarusian citizen Vadim Patsenko. Kulikov had allegedly fled Russia in 2022 to avoid conscription and moved to Belarus.

The ONT documentary includes interviews with Kulikov and Patsenko, who argue that Rozum asked them to take photos and videos of the target facilities in Grodno. Moreover, Patsenko argued that Vyacheslav tasked him with blowing up an oil depot with a drone. The program claims Ukrainian special services promised Kulikov and Patsenko $10,000 each. While Patsenko and Kulikov allege that Ukrainian security services were involved in the operation, the ONT program does not include concrete evidence to prove this claim.

The documentary also contains an interview with Nikolai Shvets, the main suspect behind a February 26, 2023, attack on an AWACS A-50 Russian military aircraft at Machulishchy airfield in Belarus. Shvets is reported to be a Russian-Ukrainian dual citizen and served in the Ukrainian army. In the ONT interview, he claimed he was working with a person from the Ukrainian security service while planning the sabotage. The Belarusian independent media outlet Nasha Niva reported that Maxim Lopatin, one of arrested suspects in the Machulishchy attack, had a broken jaw when he filmed the ONT doumentary. Nasha Niva suggested that he was possibly beaten by Belarusian law enforcement authorities. Belarus arrested more than twenty people in connection to the February aircraft incident and announced on April 3 that the suspects were charged with committing an act of terrorism, for which the maximum sentence is capital punishment. However, the ONT program again provides no concrete evidence linking Shvets to Ukrainian security services.

In addition, the ONT documentary aired on the same day that Alyaksandr Lukashenka met Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, in Minsk to discuss joint counterterrorism measures undertaken by Belarus and Russia.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Identifying potential host sites for Russian tactical nuclear weapons

On March 28, Belarus confirmed it would accept Russian tactical nuclear weapons. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 25 plans to store tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, promising to build a nuclear weapons storage facility in the country. Putin made the comments after the United Kingdom said it would supply Ukraine with ammunition containing depleted uranium. “The heavy metal is used in weapons because it can penetrate tanks and armour more easily due to its density, amongst other properties,” Reutersreported. On April 4, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu reported the transfer of Iskander-M tactical missiles, which are nuclear capable and have been utilized by the Russian military against Ukraine.

Two days after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 26, 2022, Belarus approved via referendum constitutional amendments to remove the country’s non-nuclear status. The constitutional change allows Belarus to host nuclear weapons for foreign states.

Amidst the speculation surrounding Russia’s nuclear deployment to Belarus, the most pressing questions concern the potential location of airfields capable of nuclear deployment and which type of equipment is nuclear capable in terms of maintenance and modernization efforts.

Along with the confirmed transfer of the Iskander-M missiles (a mobile, short-range ballistic missile system with a range of up to 500 kilometers), Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets are also a top contender in the Russian and Belarusian aviation arsenals. This aircraft is capable of carrying two nuclear bombs, which the Russian military categorizes as “special aviation bombs.” In June 2022, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka personally called on Putin to help upgrade and retrofit the Belarusian Su-25 fleet to be nuclear-capable. This resulted in a long-term project to enable Belarusian nuclear capabilities, legalize hosting Russian nuclear technology and nuclear-capable craft, enable joint-training programs for aviation sorties, and direct training for Belarusian pilots.

In conjunction with the Su-25’s capabilities against Ukraine’s current air defence networks and Russia’s non-strategic nuclear policy, Belarus’ acceptance of Russian tactical nuclear weapons can be viewed as escalatory. Video footage showed the Su-25’s capacity to evade Ukraine’s man-portable air defence system (MANPAD).

Промах двох ракет ПЗРК по російському штурмовику Су-25. pic.twitter.com/81PCZNpC21
— Ridnа_Vilnа #Rescue_Azovstal_Defenders (@ua_ridna_vilna) September 11, 2022

Video footage from the cockpit of a SU-25 aircraft demonstrating its maneuverability and evasion of MANPAD systems. (Source: ua_ridna_vilna/archive)

On April 2, the Russian envoy to Minsk announced that the nuclear weapons deployment would occur along Belarus’ western border. The exact location has not been specified, but Belarus has a number of bases along its western border, including Osovtsy, Ross, and Bereza. However, Lida is a primary staging base for the Belarusian fleet of SU-25s, and open-source researchers have confirmed a large presence of the aircraft on the base. Currently, Osovtsy is not one of the highly utilized bases in Belarus, but its proximity to the western border, especially in terms of proximity to Poland and the northern border of Ukraine, makes it a primary location to watch for potential signs of development, land-clearing operations, and heightened military activity.

Map showing Belarus’ western border and highlighting the locations of the Lida, Ross, and Osovtsy airbases. (Source: DFRLab via Google Maps)

—Kateryna Halstead, Research Assistant, Bologna, Italy

Individuals linked to Russian army form ‘angry patriots club’

On April 1, former Russian army commander Igor Strelkov (also known as Igor Girkin) published a video announcing the formation of the “angry patriots club” (Клуб рассерженных патриотов). According to Strelkov, the club aims “to help Russian armed forces” and “meet the stormy wind that will soon whip our faces as one team.” In the video, Strelkov says that Russia “is moving toward military defeat” because “we got into a long, protracted war for which our economy turned out to be completely unprepared. Neither the army nor the political system was ready for it.” In a Telegram post, Strelkov said the club “was created two weeks ago. So far, organizational issues have not been resolved publicly.” Strelkov previously played a crucial role in forming a separatist movement in the Donbas region.

The video also featured a statement from Pavel Gubarev, who in 2014 proclaimed himself the commander of the Donbas People’s Militia. In the video, he says, “We are angry that we are going from one defeat to another, and nothing changes.” He called the system in Russia “thievish and corrupt” and said the Russian elite are “elite in catastrophe.”

The video further featured Vladimir Grubnik, who in 2015 was arrested in Ukraine in connection to an explosion near a Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) building in Odesa; in 2019, he was part of a prisoner exchange and returned to the Russian forces in Donbas. Grubnik said that defeat would lead to Russia falling apart.

Vladimir Kucherenko, an Odesa-born Russian propagandist better known by his pen name Maksim Kalashnikov, said, “We are not afraid to criticize the actions of the government. Why? Because it can somehow help victory. Otherwise, they will do nothing, they will not move.” He called the Russian elite “looters,” “resource grabbers,” and “corrupts.” He predicted the war would turn into “carnage to death” and that the “corrupt Russian elites” would organize a coup that would “betray the country” by agreeing to Russia’s “separation” and “giving up of nuclear arms” in order to “earn the forgiveness of the West.” In 2015, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture included Kucherenko in the list of Russians “threatening national security.”

Another figure in the video is Maksim Klimov, a pro-Kremlin military expert, who said, “The authorities do not know the real situation.” He added, “They do not hear nor see what is happening in the special military operation zone.” Klimov also did not rule out Russia’s defeat.

The video gained some traction online, garnering 177,000 views on YouTube at the time of writing and 623,600 views and 2,500 shares on Strekov’s Telegram channel. According to TGStat, most of the shares on Telegram came from private accounts. Many Ukrainian media outlets reported on the newly founded club. The DFRLab did not identify any mainstream Russian media outlets reporting on the club besides Kommersant, a Kremlin-approved media outlet focused on business.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Resident Fellow, Riga, Latvia

Russian propaganda reaches Ukrainian users via Facebook ads

This week, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) and Ukrainian civil society members reported that Facebook advertising campaigns are being used to spread negative content about Ukraine. The ads range from posts that claim “Romania wants to annex Ukrainian territories” to videos that claim “This is the end. There are no men to fight for Ukraine.” While these campaigns were quickly de-platformed and the pages sharing them were banned, the DFRLab was able to investigate some of the ads via the Facebook Ad Library. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook ads promoting pro-Russia disinformation to Ukrainian users.

The ads included links to the website luxurybigisland.net, with some ads sharing variations of the URL, such as luxurybigisland.net/rbk or luxurybigisland.net/pravda. The website was built using the Russian website builder Tilda, and its the landing page featured German text that translates to, “Nothing that can’t be removed. We care for your textiles as gently as possible with the utmost care, iron and steam, so that you can enjoy your clothes for a long time. We care.” The same phrase appeared on the now-defunct Tilda-made website google-seo-top.com and the website of a German textile care company. Registration data for luxurybigisland.net is redacted, but WhoIs data for google-seo-top.com shows that the website was registered in Russia. Both luxurybigisland.net and google-seo-top.com include metadata, shown in Google results, that states, in German, “the USA are against the entire world.”

A composite image of a Google search result showing google-seo-top.com (top) and an archive of luxurybigisland.net (bottom) sharing an identical German phrase in their metadata. (Source: Google/Google cache, top; Luxurybigisland.net/archive, bottom)

One URL shared in the ads, luxurybigisland.net/pravda, remained online at the time of writing. The URL redirects to a forged article mimicking the Ukrainian news outlet Pravda. The article shared in the ads never appeared on the authentic Pravda website, but its byline cited a genuine journalist working at the outlet. The DFRLab confirmed the article was a forgery by reviewing the journalist’s author page on the authentic Pravda website, reviewing Pravda’s archived section, conducting a Google search for the forged headline, and then a more specific website search via Google.

Visually the forged website is identical to the authentic one and even features links to contact information copied from the original website. However, the forged website’s image format is different. The text of the forged article claims that the Ukrainian economy is heavily damaged and that “continuation of the war will lead to even greater losses in the economy.” The data shared in the article appears to be copied from multiple media sources and is not false, but the article’s framing contains pro-Russian sentiments as it calls for Ukraine’s surrender.

A second forged article, discovered by CSCIS, was shared on the now-offline URL luxurybigisland.net/RBK. The article mimicked the website of the reputable Ukrainian outlet RBC.

Meta itself has taken – and continues to take – action against similar cross-platform, pro-Russia networks that push users to websites designed to impersonate legitimate news organizations. The DFRLab could not tie its identified assets to those previous Meta actions, but there is some probability that they were related given the similarity of behavior.

A Facebook page with “Cripto” in its name shared some of the ads. The DFRLab identified another Facebook page with the word Cripto in the name sharing pro-Kremlin narratives via Facebook ads. The ads pushed a false story claiming there was a “riot in Kyiv over losses.” CSCIS previously debunked another narrative pushed by a similarly named page that also fomented anti-Ukrainian military sentiment.

A composite image of two ads from pages with “cripto” in the name. The first, at left, is the Facebook page identified by the DFRLab, while the second, at right, is an earlier ad previously identified by CSCIS. (Source: Cripto ukijed, left; Cripto nucergeq, right)

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poland and Ukraine sign cooperation deal for production of tank shells

During Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Poland, Polish manufacturer Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Ukroboronprom signed a cooperation agreement for the joint production of 125-mm tank ammunition. The agreement assumes that the deployment of new production lines will be in Polish cities and the agreement indicates that they plan to produce a large amount of ammunition for 125-mm guns. The decision to start production in Poland was made due to the high risks of Russian missile attacks on production facilities if they were to be based in Ukraine. In place of locating the production in the country, the Ukrainian side will provide technologies and highly qualified specialists with experience in production. This will be the second factory that will produce 125-mm tank shells.

The supply of shells is of particular importance to Ukrainian forces, which are preparing a counter-offensive in southern and eastern Ukraine as heavy fighting with the Russian army continues in the Bakhmut and Donetsk regions.

Separately, German manufacturer Rheinmetall is building a service center for Western military equipment used by Ukraine’s armed forces in Romania, Reuters reported on April 2. The construction for the center is already underway in the Romanian city of Satu Mare, close to the country’s border with Ukraine. The hub is expected to open later this month.

This development is happening against the background of diplomatic activity and statements. Ukraine is not ready to sign any peace agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, but the war could end as early as this year, according to an April 5 interview with Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksii Rezniko, who said, “I think this war will end soon. Of course, I would like it not to start, but I personally believe in this year as a year of victory.”

Rezniko also commented on a statement made in March by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel, who claimed that Ukraine had only one chance to conduct a successful counter-offensive this year. “I think that the president of the Czech Republic now speaks more like a military man than a politician, and the logic of the military is such that they constantly calculate the worst options. But even if this is his assessment, it is subjective, and he still lays down useful for us. The message is that European countries should unite more powerfully and strengthen assistance to Ukraine,” said Reznikov. Later, Andriy Sybiha, an adviser to Zelenskyy, told the Financial Times that Kyiv is willing to discuss the future of Crimea with Moscow if its forces reach the border of the Russian-occupied peninsula.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

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Putin’s plan for a new Russian Empire includes both Ukraine and Belarus

Taras Kuzio — Wed, 29 Mar 2023 14:45:58 +0000

Over the past year, Vladimir Putin has compared himself to empire-building eighteenth century Russian Czar Peter the Great, and has attempted to annex entire regions of Ukraine while declaring that he is “returning historically Russian lands.” A recently leaked document purportedly detailing Russian plans to absorb neighboring Belarus now provides further insight into the imperial ambitions that are also driving the invasion of Ukraine.

Allegedly produced by Putin’s Presidential Administration with input from the Russian intelligence services and armed forces, the 17-page internal strategy paper was made public in early 2023 by an international consortium of journalists. It serves as a comprehensive guide to the unofficial annexation of Belarus via a combination of economic, military, political, and social measures, with the objective of full absorption into a so-called “Union State” with Russia by 2030.

The Russian takeover of Belarus as outlined in the document appears to closely mirror Moscow’s plans for Ukraine, albeit by less direct means. “Russia’s goals with regard to Belarus are the same as with Ukraine. Only in Belarus, Russia relies on coercion rather than war. Its end goal is still wholesale incorporation,” commented Michael Carpenter, the US Ambassador to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, following publication of the leaked document.

The strategy document for Belarus envisions the comprehensive russification of Belarusian society along with a sharp reduction in the influence of nationalist and pro-Western forces, which are viewed by Russia as virtually indistinguishable in relation to both Belarus and Ukraine. The Belarusian political, financial, business, and education systems would be fully integrated into Russia, with a network of pro-Russian media, NGOs, and cultural institutions established to aid this integration process.

In the military sphere, the Belarusian army would become de facto part of the Russian military, with Belarus increasing the number of Russian bases in the country and allowing Moscow to dramatically expand its military presence. Putin’s recently announced intention to base Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus are an indication that this plan is already advancing.

The publication date of this alleged Russian blueprint for the takeover of Belarus is particularly interesting. It was reportedly produced in summer 2021 at a time when Putin’s mind seems to have been turning toward grand visions of imperial conquest. Increasingly isolated due to the Covid pandemic and surrounded by a shrinking circle of imperial hardliners and sycophants, Putin appears to have made the fateful decision in mid 2021 to extinguish Belarusian and Ukrainian independence once and for all.

Efforts to unofficially annex Belarus were well underway by this point. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was already heavily reliant on Russia following a Kremlin intervention to prop up his tottering regime in the wake of nationwide protests over the country’s rigged August 2020 presidential election.

As Kremlin officials were busy drawing up plans to incorporate Belarus, Putin himself was penning a 6000-word treatise outlining his denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood and his insistence that Ukrainians were really Russians (“one people”). Putin’s July 2021 essay was widely seen as a declaration of war against Ukrainian independence. His lengthy article laid the ideological foundations for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began seven months later.

Putin’s plans for a subjugated Ukraine share many common features with his vision for the takeover of Belarus. Following the anticipated military conquest of Ukraine, Russia intended to install a puppet ruler in Kyiv who would replace Zelenskyy and play the same role as Lukashenka in Belarus. For both countries, Moscow’s ultimate goal is the same: Complete absorption into a new Russian Empire.

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Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire have been evident since his first term in office but became more obvious following his formal return to the presidency in 2012. From this point onward, Putin began to openly embrace an imperialistic brand of nationalism that positioned him as the latest in a long line of Kremlin rulers celebrated as “gatherers of Russian lands.” In the contemporary context, this meant incorporating fellow East Slavic states Belarus and Ukraine into a new Russia-led union.

The idea of a union between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine was not new and first gained prominence during the collapse of the USSR when promoted by Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. East Slavic unity had both ideological and practical appeal for Putin. It would secure his place in Russian history while also creating a solid basis for the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Putin’s alternative to the EU.

Initially, Putin hoped to absorb Ukraine without a fight. Indeed, in 2012 and 2013, the Kremlin adopted many of the same tactics later used in Belarus to strengthen Russia’s grip on the country. However, post-Soviet Ukraine had a far stronger sense of national identity than Belarus, with a majority of Ukrainians seeing themselves as Europeans and embracing the country’s fledgling democratic traditions. This was to prove a major obstacle for Putin’s imperial project.

As Ukraine prepared to sign a long-anticipated Association Agreement with the European Union in last 2013, Moscow unleashed a trade war and began pressuring Ukraine’s pro-Kremlin president Viktor Yanukovych to reject Brussels in favor of Moscow. When Yanukovych attempted to do so, mass protests erupted in Ukraine that escalated into a full-scale revolution in support of democracy and European integration. Within three months, Yanukovych found himself deserted by his allies and escaped to Russia.

Russia responded to the success of the Euromaidan Revolution by occupying Crimea and attempting to orchestrate uprisings throughout southern and eastern Ukraine. Targeted regions of Ukraine were rebranded by the Kremlin using the old Czarist-era imperial term of “Novorossiya” or “New Russia.” This strategy was only partially successful, with Kremlin-backed uprisings defeated in most major Ukrainian cities except for Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, where Kremlin control was secured with the assistance of the invading Russian army.

Over the next eight years, Putin attempted to rebuild Russia’s political influence inside Ukraine while pressuring the country to accept a Kremlin-friendly interpretation of the February 2015 Minsk Accords, which had brought the worst of the fighting to an end in eastern Ukraine without establishing a durable peace. Moscow’s vision for the implementation of the Minsk Accords would have transformed Ukraine into a dysfunctional Russian satellite, but this outcome met with resistance from successive Ukrainian presidents.

By early 2021, Putin had come to the conclusion that his strategy was failing and appears to have recognized that Ukraine was slipping irreparably out of the Russian orbit. At this point, he and other Kremlin leaders began referring to Ukraine as an “anti-Russia” and portraying the country as an intolerable outpost of NATO and US interests on Russia’s borders. The available evidence suggests that by the time Putin published his notorious essay in summer 2021, he was already fully committed to crushing Ukrainian independence by military means.

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In a clear echo of the strategy adopted for Belarus, Russia’s FSB security service was tasked in 2021 with preparing plans for the military occupation and pacification of Ukraine. However, a combination of FSB corruption, wishful thinking, and misplaced stereotypes about modern Ukraine resulted in a series of disastrous miscalculations.

Collaborators within the Ukrainian government told FSB agents what they wanted to hear with no regard for the realities on the ground, while the Kremlin’s networks of Ukrainian informants, NGOs, and other “experts” assured their Russian colleagues that the invading Russian army would be welcomed. Meanwhile, FSB officers confidently predicted that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would soon be captured or forced to flee, with organized Ukrainian resistance unlikely to last longer than a few days.

These intelligence failures persuaded Putin to embark on the biggest gamble of his presidency with a wholly inadequate force of less than 200,000 troops. This was regarded as sufficient to install a pro-Russian regime and place Ukraine on the same path as Belarus toward absorption into the Russian Federation.

Captured documents, prisoner accounts, and the actions of the Russian occupation forces in regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control now make it possible to produce a comprehensive picture of Russia’s plans for the subjugation of the country. These plans share many features with Moscow’s approach to the creeping annexation of Belarus, while employing infinitely more direct and brutal methods.

The events of the past year make clear that Russia’s stated invasion objective of “de-Nazification” actually means the execution, imprisonment, deportation, or otherwise silencing of anyone deemed to be a Ukrainian patriot. Those targeted since the invasion began in February 2022 have included elected officials, civil society activists, educators, journalists, army veterans, and cultural figures.

The systematic suppression of Ukrainian national identity has been undertaken alongside intensive russification efforts, including the introduction of a Kremlin-approved Russian school curriculum and the promotion of an imperial identity. In parallel, local businesses have been forced to integrate into the Russian economy, with the wider population in occupied Ukraine obliged to accept Russian citizenship.

The obvious similarities between the Kremlin’s long-term Belarus strategy and the tactics being employed in occupied Ukraine undermine Russian efforts to portray the ongoing invasion as a defensive measure driven by valid security concerns. Instead, a picture emerges of Vladimir Putin’s overriding ambition to absorb both countries and secure his place in history as a “gatherer of Russian lands.”

While his approach to each country may currently differ in the details, Putin clearly aims to bring both Ukrainian and Belarusian independence to an end, and has placed these imperial ambitions at the heart of his entire reign. This makes a mockery of calls for a compromise with the Kremlin. Instead, Western leaders must recognize that peace in Europe will remain elusive until the Russian dictator is forced to abandon his dreams of empire.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the newly published “Fascism and Genocide. Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Arman Mahmoudian — Thu, 09 Mar 2023 21:07:04 +0000

As the full-scale invasion of Ukraine entered its second year last month, Western leaders were keen to demonstrate their continued determination to prevent a Russian victory. At the same time, with no end in sight to what is already by far the largest European conflict since World War II, calls are mounting for a compromise that would end the fighting. Such proposals typically assume a land-for-peace formula that would see Ukraine surrendering part of its sovereign territory and millions of its citizens to permanent Russian occupation.

While the desire for peace is perfectly understandable, calls to appease Putin by handing him a partial victory in Ukraine ignore the lessons of history and would almost certainly lead to more war. If the experience of the 1930s taught the world anything, it is that appeasement merely encourages dictators to go further. Like Hitler before him, Putin will not stop until he is stopped.

Long before last year’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, observers were already noting the obvious parallels between Russia’s trajectory under Vladimir Putin and the rise of Nazi Germany. Both regimes were deeply revisionist, with Hitler’s quest to avenge German defeat in World War I mirrored by Putin’s bitter resentment over Russia’s perceived humiliation following the Soviet collapse.

In foreign policy, the similarities were even more striking. Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 occupation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula drew widespread comparisons with Hitler’s early foreign policy successes, such as the Anschluss with Austria and the annexation of the Sudetenland. In an alarming echo of 1930s diplomacy, these early examples of Russian aggression met with a similarly underwhelming international response. Just as Hitler was encouraged by the appeasement policies of the West to swallow the rest of Czechoslovakia and invade Poland, the weak Western response to Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine set the stage for last year’s full-scale invasion.

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Like Hitler before him, Putin has framed his attack on Ukraine as a campaign to defend ethnic compatriots who have found themselves beyond the borders of the motherland. Given the extent of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR and beyond, this creates considerable scope for further expansionist wars.

Putin’s self-assumed position as guardian of Russians abroad, along with the Kremlin’s conveniently flexible interpretation of who qualifies as “Russian,” potentially endangers a long list of countries with significant Russian minorities including Kazakhstan, Moldova, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia. All have prior experience of the Russian and Soviet empires; all remain vulnerable to Kremlin influence and potential military intervention.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has been promoting its imperial agenda via the so-called “Russian World” ideology, which envisions Russia as the guardian of a unique civilization extending beyond the borders of today’s Russian Federation and united by the Russian language, Slavic ethnicity, and the Orthodox faith. In 2007, the Kremlin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) to serve as a platform for Russia’s influence operations. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev referred to the RMF as the “key instrument of Russian soft power.”

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If Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, the countries most immediately at risk are Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The latter two both have authoritarian regimes that currently enjoy Moscow’s support but are nevertheless nervous about Russia’s expansionist ambitions.

Kazakhstan is vulnerable due to its isolated geographical position between Russia and China as the world’s largest landlocked country. Russian nationalists have long identified border regions in northern Kazakhstan with large ethnic Russian populations as potential targets for a new imperial adventure. With the Kazakh leadership refusing to publicly back the invasion of Ukraine, Kremlin propagandists have recently begun discussing the possibility of future military intervention.

Belarus is already deeply involved in the attack on Ukraine and served as a launch pad for the invasion in February 2022. This role as junior partner in Putin’s war reflects Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dependence on the Kremlin, which intervened to prop up his regime following a pro-democracy uprising in August 2020. Members of Belarus’s exiled opposition argue that the country is already effectively under Russian occupation. While some would question this conclusion, today’s Belarus is clearly in danger of being either officially or unofficially annexed by Russia.

Meanwhile, undeterred by Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine, the Kremlin has recently begun escalating its rhetoric against Moldova. In early February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that the West seeks to turn the country into an “anti-Russian project” and warned that Moldova could become “the next Ukraine.” Weeks later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu accused Russia of plotting to overthrow her pro-EU government.

At present, it is difficult to predict where Russia is most likely to strike next. The one thing that can be said with any degree of certainty is that if Moscow is not defeated in Ukraine, it will continue to pursue expansionist policies. In other words, the future peace and stability of Eurasia hinges on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

All those currently calling for compromise with the Kremlin in Ukraine would be wise to recall that policies of appeasement toward Hitler were widely popular at the time among populations desperate to avoid another world war. We now know how disastrously misguided those policies were and have no excuses for repeating the mistake. Defeating Putin in Ukraine will not be easy, but it is the only way to secure a lasting peace and convince Moscow that the era of easy victories over vulnerable neighbors is over.

Arman Mahmoudian is a PhD candidate and international affairs researcher at the University of South Florida.

Atlantic Council — Mon, 27 Feb 2023 19:47:00 +0000

original source

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The Belarusian opposition can help defeat Putin in Ukraine

Stephen Nix, Mark Dietzen — Tue, 07 Feb 2023 17:52:46 +0000

One of the underappreciated aspects of Russia’s war on Ukraine has been the strategic role of Belarus in both the initial invasion and subsequent conduct of the war. In his quest to shore up his own position following the mass pro-democracy protests of 2020, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has positioned Belarus as a vital component in the Kremlin’s war effort; in so doing, he has contributed directly and deliberately to attacks on Ukrainian soldiers and civilians as well as the destruction of Ukrainian cities, towns, and villages.

Lukashenka’s support for Moscow covers five key areas: providing logistical and material support for Russian forces; acting as a launchpad for missiles against Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory; broadcasting propaganda and disinformation against Ukraine; hosting Russian military hospitals on Belarusian soil; and the suspected regime-sponsored orchestration of cyberattacks against Ukrainian infrastructure.

The impact of this support has been significant. Russian troops deployed to Belarus on the eve of the invasion played a key role in the Kyiv offensive during the first month of the war, with the horrendous atrocities in Bucha and other Kyiv suburbs carried out by Russian units which had crossed over from Belarus. During the initial assault on Kyiv, logistical support from Belarus allowed Russia to resupply and replenish its troops as they fought to capture the Ukrainian capital.

Since the Russian retreat from northern Ukraine in late March and early April 2022, Belarus has continued to provide safe harbor to Russian soldiers while supplying Russia with weaponry and other military equipment. Lukashenka has also hosted joint military exercises and provided training facilities for mobilized Russians.

Belarus has helped to spread propaganda and disinformation about the war, often echoing Kremlin narratives defending Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade and backing his false justifications for the conflict. Indeed, the propaganda is so pervasive and the information space so controlled inside Belarus that many Belarusians still do not realize the true scale of the war. Instead, many view it as a “special military operation,” seemingly distant from Belarus.

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The Belarusian pro-democracy movement is fighting back, confident that Putin’s defeat in Ukraine will weaken Lukashenka’s ability to maintain his hegemony over his own people. By disrupting Russia’s war effort and exhausting its resources, the Belarusian pro-democracy movement is chipping away at the edifice of the Putin-Lukashenka axis and eroding the very resources Russia needs in order to prop up its dependent ally.

As Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya argues, there is a clear connection between the fate of Ukraine and the fate of Belarus. She contends that when the people of Ukraine prevail over Russia, Belarusians will see Putin’s feet of clay and will be inspired to reject the vassal status that Russia has imposed on their own country.

For this reason, Belarusian democratic activists are contributing to anti-war activities. The Cyber Partisans initiative has disrupted the Belarusian regime’s technical infrastructure, while the railway partisans movement complicated Belarusian logistical support for Russian forces during the early months of the war. Activists are also working to combat disinformation and propaganda by communicating the truth about the war to Belarusian citizens.

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It is imperative that Ukraine’s friends and allies in the West punish Lukashenka’s regime for its role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Doing so will help support Ukraine’s defense by imposing greater costs on Belarus and forcing Minsk to think twice before carrying out instructions from Moscow. It will also help the Belarusian pro-democracy movement in the battle for the hearts and minds of the Belarusian people by exposing how Lukashenka’s support for the war is directly responsible for growing insecurity and economic hardship in Belarus.

To begin with, the US and other democratic partners should continue to provide robust support for the Belarusian democratic movement, which is making significant contributions to the anti-war effort in Belarus. Historically, resources to support the Belarusian democracy movement have come in peaks and valleys, often surging following key political events only to dwindle in subsequent periods. Support has remained strong since 2020, when a fraudulent presidential election brought hundreds of thousands of Belarusians to the streets in protest. Now that the country’s democratic forces have embarked upon a longer-term movement for change, consistent and strong financial support is all the more crucial.

This investment must be paired with a high-level diplomatic initiative to signal both to the Lukashenka regime and to the Belarusian democratic opposition that the US and EU commitment to a democratic Belarus will not waver and is linked directly to the defense of democracy throughout the region. To this end, the US should assign another Special Envoy for Belarus at the ambassadorial rank to continue the important work of former US Special Envoy to Belarus Ambassador Julie Fisher, who was a steadfast supporter of the democratic movement during her tenure from 2020-2022.

In light of the fact that the Belarusian authorities refused to renew the visa and accreditation of the EU’s former Head of Delegation to Belarus, Dirk Schuebel, the EU should consider appointing a remote-based Special Representative for Belarus instead. These new envoys would serve as crucial interlocutors between Washington, Brussels, and the leaders of the Belarusian opposition.

Targeted support should also be leveraged for Belarusian volunteers fighting against Russia in Ukraine. Greater material support for the more than 1,000 Belarusian volunteers fighting under Ukrainian military leadership would serve to strengthen their ability to aid in the defense of Ukraine at a time of increasing risk of further attacks from Belarusian territory. It would also show members of the Belarusian military that there is an alternative outlet to serve for those who recognize the risks posed to their country and do not wish to be dragged into an unjustified war against a peaceful neighbor.

As the specter of greater Belarusian involvement in the war grows, so too does the imperative for Washington and Brussels to act now to support the Belarusian democratic forces in undermining Belarusian support for Russia’s war machine, countering propaganda and disinformation, and joining Ukrainian forces on the frontline of democracy. The Belarusian democratic movement understands that their fate will now be decided on the battlefields of Ukraine. They have the will and capacity to aid their Ukrainian compatriots in securing victory as soon as possible. They just need the tools to do so.

Stephen Nix is the senior director for Eurasia at the International Republican Institute (IRI). Mark Dietzen is the IRI resident program director for Belarus, based in Vilnius, Lithuania.

The hundreds of thousands of Russians who fled the country over the past year have not staged any major anti-war rallies while in exile, despite no longer being subject to draconian Kremlin restrictions. Inside Russia itself, there have been no significant protests since the first weeks of the war. The contrast provided by mass anti-government rallies over the past twelve months in other repressive dictatorships such as China and Iran has cast the silence of the Russian population in an even more unfavorable light.

This apparent lack of empathy for the victims of Russian imperial aggression is nothing new. Many Russians displayed similar attitudes toward the two Chechen wars of the early post-Soviet era and the 2008 invasion of Georgia. More recently, the 2014 invasion of Crimea was widely cheered and remains arguably the most popular single event of Putin’s entire 23-year reign. Such thinking reflects the unapologetically imperial identity which the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet and Czarist eras.

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Modern Russian national identity remains firmly rooted in notions of a sacred imperial mission that perceives Russia as being a unique civilization locked in an eternal struggle against various constructed foreign enemies. Hundreds of years ago, the messianic vision of the czars gave rise to the idea of Russia as the Third Rome and leader of Orthodox Christianity. In the twentieth century, this belief in imperial exceptionalism was harnessed to identify Russians as the nation that would save the world from capitalism and lead a global communist revolution.

Under Putin, the lyrics may have changed but the tune remains largely the same. Indeed, it is telling that while Soviet communism has long since been consigned to the ash heap of history, today’s Russia has seamlessly inherited the USSR’s Cold War-era animosity toward NATO, the United States, and the Western world in general.

The sense of imperial mission pervading modern Russian society has helped nurture values of sacrifice and obligation at the expense of individual human rights. Many Russians take it for granted that they are destined to rule over other nations and interpret their colonialism as fundamentally benevolent, even when it is obviously unwelcome. Russia’s victims must be liberated, whether they like it or not.

Whether driven by the Orthodox faith, the communist ideology, or Putin’s far vaguer notions of a “Russian world,” this highly paternalistic brand of imperialism grants Russians the right to speak on behalf of their subject peoples. Accordingly, there is no need to actually listen to these conquered peoples or empathize with them, even while proclaiming them as “brothers.” Those who oppose this holy crusade are logically understood to be representatives of evil. It is no coincidence that a whole host of senior Russian officials include Putin himself have sought to frame the invasion of Ukraine as a battle against Satanists.

While Russian opposition figures are often critical of the Putin regime, they are typically far less outspoken on the topic Russian colonialism, the root cause of the current genocidal Ukraine invasion. Instead, some seek to portray themselves as the real victims of the Kremlin while failing to make the obvious connection between the authoritarianism they claim to oppose and the imperialism they choose to ignore. By blaming everything on Putin, they embrace the same convenient victimhood that the Kremlin itself promotes when faced by the negative consequences of its imperial policies.

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The national mythologies of today’s Russia and Ukraine could hardly be more different. While many Russians readily embrace their country’s imperial identity, imperial ideas do not resonate in Ukraine. Even before the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion one year ago, Ukrainians already tended to define their national identity in terms of resistance to the narrative of submission, while prioritizing personal freedoms over obligations to the state.

Since the early 1990s, Ukraine’s post-Soviet nation-building journey has been shaped by a struggle for true independence. This has led to the merging of civic and anti-colonial resistance movements, with the country’s two Maidan revolutions serving as important landmarks on the road toward internal and external freedom.

For almost two decades, Ukraine’s trajectory has been viewed with mounting anger and alarm in the Kremlin. Haunted by the Soviet collapse of the late twentieth century, the Putin regime regards Ukraine’s democratization as an existential threat to its own authoritarian model and a potential catalyst for the next stage in Russia’s imperial retreat.

For the time being, other post-Soviet states such as Belarus and Kazakhstan act as alternatives to Ukraine’s anti-colonial identity. In these countries, domestic democratic development has been stifled by Kremlin-backed regimes that have chosen not to break decisively with the imperial past. However, there are signs that the current status quo may not be as stable as Moscow would like to think.

Ukraine’s defiant resistance to Russia’s invasion is energizing civil society throughout the former USSR and fueling unprecedented debate over the role of Russian colonialism. On the international stage, the war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has introduced contemporary global audiences to the realities of modern Russia’s imperial identity.

Commentators around the world are now actively discussing the practical implications of a post-colonial Russia. Such talk is no longer considered entirely fanciful. On the contrary, many now believe that defeat in Ukraine would deal a decisive blow to hopes of a new Russian Empire and transform the entire Eurasian political landscape. Ultimately, It is up to Russian society itself to dismantle the country’s imperial identity in order to reckon with the horrors of Russia’s past and address the crimes of the current genocidal war.

Botakoz Kassymbekova is Assistant Professor of Modern History at the University of Basel.

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Tracking narratives

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

International response

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Reports emerge of internal power struggles between Wagner and Russian defense ministry

On January 13, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed its forces had taken control of Soledar and could encircle Bakhmut, threatening Ukrainian supply lines. In the statement, the MoD praised the efforts of aviation, artillery, and airborne troops, but did not mention the notable role Wagner played in securing Soledar.

Moscow’s announcement highlighted a long-simmering tension between Wagner and the official structure of the Russian MoD. On January 17, an old letter written by Valery Gerasimov, commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, re-circulated online. The letter, dated December 29, 2022, stated that Wagner is not included in the structure of the Russian armed forces. Gerasimov wrote the letter in response to an inquiry to the Russian MoD made by Evgeny Stupin, a lawyer for the Moscow City Duma. On January 15, President Vladimir Putin also attributed the Soledar success to the MoD.

On the day that Russia claimed Soledar, military bloggers affiliated with the Kremlin claimed there was an ongoing conflict between the MoD and Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin. On January 15, Prigozhin awarded medals to Wagner soldiers for the capture of Soledar. On January 16, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dispelled reports of an ongoing conflict between Prigozhin and Russian army command, claiming the reports are “products of information manipulation.” Later in the day, when asked about Peskov’s comments, Prigozhin also dispelled the reports, saying, “I see no reason not to trust Peskov.”

On January 19, Prigozhin said that Wagner soldiers were concentrating on taking the suburban city of Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut. This information has yet to be confirmed by the Russian MoD.

Elsewhere, on January 14, Ukrainian officials reported that Russia conducted fifty missile and three air strikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsia, and other settlements in West Ukraine. Ukrainian forces said that Russia used S-300 and S-400 systems against ground targets in Kyiv in the morning and later launched high-precision weapons, including twenty-eight cruise missile strikes using Kh-101, Kh-555, and Kh-59 guided air missiles and the sea-based 3M-14 Kalibr.

In Marinka, the Ukrainian army repelled renewed Russian attacks on January 17 and 18. Russian forces have been storming the settlement since last March, resulting in widespread destruction. The Russian forces also conducted raids in the area of Bilohorivka in Luhansk oblast and Krasna Hora, Bakhmut, Klischiyivka, Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pobieda in Donetsk oblast.

Chechen volunteer forces have become increasingly active in the fight around Bakhmut. There are at least two battalions of Chechens—the Sheikh Mansur Battalion and Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion—fighting for the Ukrainian army on the Bakhmut frontline. On a tactical level, the Chechen battalions are working together in some areas, like in Opytne, where they attacked Russian positions. The Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion also maintains a reconnaissance unit, “Adam,” currently located in Donetsk oblast.

On January 16, a Russian rocket struck a civilian building in Dnipro, killing at least forty-five people, including six children, marking the single deadliest civilian attack since the war began. Ukraine said it does not have air-defense systems that can intercept Russian KH-22 missiles; to ward off future missiles would require Western partners to donate advanced air defenses such as the US MIM-104 Patriot missile system.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Russian forces allegedly use incendiary munitions in Kherson, youth center burns

On January 18, Russian shelling intensified on the southern frontline in Ukraine, which stretches from Kamianske in the Zaporizhzhia region to Vuhledar in the south of Donetsk oblast. After a night of heavy shelling, videos and photos emerged online showing that the Russian army had used what appears to incendiary ammunition in city of Kherson and nearby Beryslav.

The morning after the strike, videos and photos shared online showed the resulting damage. A local Kherson newspaper reported that a religious youth center had burned down as a result of the shelling. The DFRLab geolocated the youth center and confirmed that it was along the pathway of the airstrike but cannot confirm whether incendiary munitions were involved.

Top left: Screenshot of footage showing the burning youth center. Top right: Google Street View image of the youth center prior to the incident. Bottom left: Google map view of the building from above. Bottom right: Google map view from a higher altitude. Green boxes show the front of the building while blue boxes show the building’s windows. (Source: Kherson Online, top left; Google Maps, top right, bottom left, and bottom right)

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Missile fragments, rocket warhead fall on Moldovan territory

Fragments of a Russian missile targeting Ukraine fell on Moldova territory on January 14 in the town of Larga, Briceni district. According to Moldova’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, a warhead fueled with approximately eighty kilograms of explosive material was also discovered among the debris. The next day, authorities reported that specialist teams had carried out controlled detonations of the remaining explosives. The Ministry of Defense noted that the army’s aerial surveillance system did not record a violation of Moldovan airspace, however.

Authorities in Chisinau have strongly condemned the attacks on neighboring Ukraine. “This is the reality of war, imposed by the aggressor, right here in our region,” stressed Moldovan President Maia Sandu. “The missiles reach Moldova as well—the fragments discovered yesterday in the Briceni district testify to this. We strongly condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Attacks on urban infrastructure and the killing of civilians are war crimes; they have no justification.”

Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita also condemned Russia’s January 14 missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. “There is no political, historical, and even more so moral justification for killing civilians and attacking the infrastructure that ensures the survival of the population,” she said. “I express my deep indignation at the new massive attack on Ukraine. I express my support for the heroic Ukrainian people and our support for the victims of Russia’s barbaric attacks.”

This is the third time missile fragments have landed in Moldova, which is not a member of the European Union or NATO. On December 5, Moldovan border police discovered a missile in an orchard, also in the Briceni district. In October 2022, a Russian missile shot down by a Ukrainian anti-aircraft system fell in the village of Naslavcea, located along the border with Ukraine, shattering windows of several residences as a result of the explosion.

—Victoria Olari, research assistant, Chisinau, Moldova

Animation depicts Wagner forces fighting French “zombies” in West Africa

An animated video showing a Wagner operative helping West African countries defeat zombie French soldiers began circulating on social media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels this week. While the origin of the video is currently unknown, it appears to have first shown up on Twitter on January 14th, then migrated to alternative video platforms before being shared across pro-Russian Telegram channels.

Après le rat, une nouvelle animation où le groupe #WagnerGroup apparaît en sauveur du #Mali et #BurkinaFaso contre la #France qui est cette fois dépeinte comme un serpent / new anti French / pro #WagnerGroup cartoon emerging on social media https://t.co/Nxi5Esn2Oo
— alleyesonwagner (@alleyesonwagner) January 14, 2023

By depicting Wagner forces as heroes, the video promotes a pro-Russian, anti-French narrative that has spread in recent years across West African social media. The animation depicts Wagner soldiers assisting local militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso in removing French forces, represented in the animation as hordes of zombies and a giant cobra. In Mali, a Wagner operative parachutes into the zombie horde and provides ammunition to a Malian soldier who is subsequently able to defeat the undead, while in Burkina Faso, Wagner provides a rocket-propelled grenade to kill the French cobra.

A screenshot of the video shows a Malian soldier and Wagner operative grasping hands after successfully defeating French zombies, likely an homage to the Arnold Schwarzenegger film Predator and the many memes it spawned.

Russia’s involvement in West Africa does not come in the form of simple weapons deliveries, however. Recent reports indicate that since Russia’s deployment in Mali more than one year ago, violence against civilians has significantly increased, and extremist forces have grown stronger.

The final shots of the animated video show Wagner operatives driving from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire, which is also under siege by French zombies.

The video ends with Wagner forces heading towards Côte d’Ivoire, where French zombies overwhelm an Ivorian soldier. The imagery implies that Wagner aims to send forces to the coastal country.

This is not the first time Wagner has created animated propaganda. In another animation, France was represented as a rat killed by Wagner. And in a comic strip spread in Central African Republic (CAR), Wagner operatives are again depicted fighting zombies, however in the case of CAR the zombies do not represent the French.

Support for France has declined significantly in Francophone Africa, while calls for Russian assistance to fight jihadists has increased.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Flurry of conflicting theories circulate among pro-Kremlin sources following deadly helicopter crash

On January 18, a helicopter crash in Brovary, near Kyiv, killed sixteen people, including three children, Ukraine’s interior minister, his deputy, and the ministry secretary. The helicopter crashed near a kindergarten. Ukrainian security services investigating the crash are considering three possible scenarios, including a violation of flight rules, a technical malfunction, or intentional sabotage. In the meantime, pro-Kremlin sources are already sharing conflicting narratives about the incident.

One of the first narratives to emerge suggested that Ukraine’s air-defense systems shot down the helicopter. The claim was amplified by pro-Kremlin TV host Olga Skabeyeva on her Telegram channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel added more details to the claim, saying that “unofficial Ukrainian sources” said the aircraft was shot down by the Stinger or Igla air-defense systems. The claim was also shared on Twitter by a pro-Kremlin account, spreading the narrative to English-speaking audiences. At the time of writing, the English tweet had more than one million views.

Ukrainian air defense shot down Ukrainian helicopter with Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs and his deputy onboard. The helicopter crashed in residential area, killing 16 people, incl 2 children. pic.twitter.com/5bFn7jc8Dg
— Vera Van Horne (@VeraVanHorne) January 18, 2023

Other sources took the claim further. The pro-Kremlin Russian outlet Regnum hypothesized that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was behind the crash, publishing a story with the headline, “The crash of the helicopter of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine in Brovary – executed by Zelenskyy?”

Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin reporter Sasha Kots reported that European countries had suspended the helicopter model, either a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma or a H225M, after a 2016 crash in Norway. While it is true that the European Aviation Safety Agency grounded both aircraft type after the Norway crash, it allowed flights to resume roughly six months later. Helicopters of this type are used by both military and civilian operators in France, Brazil, Vietnam, and many other countries. Kots also claimed that after the two models were grounded, France sold its supply to Ukraine, implying that France is also responsible for the tragedy.

In December 2021, Romania and Ukraine entered into an agreement to upgrade five of these helicopter models.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Belarusian state TV accuses Ukrainian embassy of recruiting foreign fighters

On January 16, the state-controlled TV channel Belarus 1 reported that Belarusian security services had arrested Georgian citizen Giorgi Zirakishvili for allegedly trying to enter Ukraine via Belarus to fight against Russia. Belarus 1 reported that the Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia had advised Zirakishvili to travel from Georgia to Ukraine through Belarus. The broadcaster also claimed that Zirakishvili had planned to meet Igor Kizim, Ukraine’s ambassador to Belarus, upon arrival to receive instructions on how to reach Ukraine and join the Georgian Legion, a paramilitary unit mostly comprised of ethnically Georgian volunteers who fight for Ukraine. Belarus 1 also broadcast an alleged recording of a phone conversation in which Zirakishvili believes he is speaking to representatives from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. However, Belarus 1 reported that Zirakishvili was actually speaking to representatives from Belarusian security services, who discovered Zirakishvili’s alleged intentions and connected with him by impersonating Ukrainian embassy staff. The report also contains a video recording of Zirakishvili’s meeting with representatives from Belarusian security services, who he apparently believed were representatives of the Ukrainian embassy.

Belarus 1 did not provide any concrete evidence that Zirakishvili had communicated with anyone from the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus. Despite this, the report claims that Kizim is actively recruiting foreign fighters to send to Ukraine. The ambassador responded to the allegations, saying the Belarus 1 story was “nonsense” and “lies, manipulation, and hypocrisy.” He added that the Ukrainian embassy was in contact with the Belarusian foreign affairs ministry regarding the matter.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian media amplify and exploit Wagner story about French Foreign Legion deserter killed in Ukraine

A January 17 Telegram post published on Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel claimed that Wagner forces tracked down and killed a Ukrainian member of the French Foreign Legion in Donetsk. The channel also shared identity cards belonging to a YevheniiKoulyk, including a Ukrainian driver’s license, a French military card, and a French train card.

Yevgeny Prigozhin’s press channel shared Yevhenii Koulyk’s French and Ukrainian identity documents. (Source: Press Service of Prigozhin)

The post was reshared by the Telegram channel WarDonbass and the pro-Russian news outlet DonbassInsider. The Russian press agency TASS also reported on the claim. Several Russian-owned media outlets and Telegram channels shared the post, garnering at least 647,000 views at the time of writing.

The story was then picked up by the Russian news outlet Argumenty I fakty (Arguments and facts), which claimed Koulyk was a NATO agent. One VK post suggested Koulyk was a foreign mercenary and accused Ukraine of not disclosing the number of foreign soldiers killed in the war. The author compared Koulyk’s death to that of Hryhorii Tsekhmystrenko, a Ukrainian-born Canadian volunteer reported killed in Ukraine this week.

According to French journalist and military expert Philippe Chapeleau, the French Foreign Legion allowed its Ukrainian-born fighters a period of leave so they could safely resettle their families in neighboring countries. Those who did not return would be considered deserters. According to that same source, Koulyk had been missing since August 2022 and was therefore considered a deserter.

Koulyk’s death was previously reported as early as January 12. As of January 19, there were a total of 189 posts across news outlets and social media discussing Koulyk.

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

Serbian president accuses Wagner of recruiting Serbian citizens

In a TV interview on January 16, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic criticized Wagner Group for its attempts to recruit Serbian citizens to participate in the Ukraine war. Vucic slammed Wagner, saying, “Why do you do that to Serbia? Why do you, from Wagner, call anyone from Serbia when you know that it is against our regulations?” He also noted that Serbian legislation prohibits its citizens from participating in foreign armed conflicts and denied recent allegations that Wagner has a presence in Serbia. On January 17, Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that there are no Serbian citizens active in Wagner and that Wagner has never been active in Serbia. The DFRLab previously reported on claims made by Wagner that it was establishing a presence in Serbia.

Vucic also condemned a Wagner advertisement published by the newly established Serbian arm of RT. On January 5, RT Balkan reportedly published an article with the headline, “Wagner published an ad for volunteers, the conditions are more than tempting.” The article, which is no longer available on RT Balkan’s website, allegedly said that Wagner was looking for volunteers ages twenty-two to fifty who are not citizens of Ukraine or any EU or NATO member states. Volunteers were required to be physically healthy, interested in learning, patriots, and strong in spirit; in turn, “everything else will be taught by Wagner members.”

A Google search for the original headline, “Vagnerovci objavili oglas za dobrovoljce, uslovi više nego primamljivi,” retrieved an article with the same title, but the original URL now leads to a different article about Russian prisoners who joined Wagner, fought in Ukraine, and peacefully returned to Russia, where all charges against them were dropped.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Ukraine’s allies continue to send military aid, including heavy equipment

Ukraine will receive an unspecified number of Archer systems from Sweden, with Swedish media reporting that Kyiv will receive twelve units. Stockholm will also send fifty CV90 vehicles. Latvia will deliver another military aid package to Ukraine that includes Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, helicopters, small arms, and drones.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced on January 10 that the country would donate more NASAMS air-defense systems to Ukraine. These systems will enable Ukrainian forces to enhance ground protection around troop deployments and civilian infrastructure. Canada will also transfer another two hundred armored LAV ACSV Super Bison vehicles to Ukraine.

According to the New York Times, the Pentagon is tapping into a stockpile of US ammunition in Israel to help meet Ukraine’s need for artillery shells. The arms and ammunition stockpile is typically reserved for the Pentagon to use in the Middle East. Meanwhile, on January 19, the Pentagon announced a $2.5 billion security package for Ukraine, including for the first time ninety Stryker armored personnel carriers. These mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles could help infantry advance further into the frontlines. Additionally, the US will provide energy equipment to help Ukraine deal with energy shortages. The $125 million support pack would include turbines, backup power banks, and high-voltage transformers.

On January 14, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and announced that the United Kingdom will send Ukraine fourteen Challenger 2 battle tanks and artillery systems. As of 2021, the British army possessed 227 battle tanks. Sending additional tanks is likely to increase pressure on Germany to send its own Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, though Germany’s defense minister said Friday that Berlin has not yet decided on the Leopard 2.

Russian citizens living in Bulgaria donated three pickup trucks to the Ukrainian army. They will be used by the Freedom of Russia Legion, a battalion made up of Russian citizens who defected to fight for Ukraine’s Foreign Legion.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

—Valentin Châtelet, research associate, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Wagner Group fights French ‘zombies’ in cartoon propaganda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will Putin force Belarus to join the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

Alesia Rudnik — Thu, 22 Dec 2022 21:49:54 +0000

Vladimir Putin visited Minsk for the first time in three-and-a-half years on December 19. This rare international trip sparked speculation that the Russian dictator may be seeking to personally pressure his Belarusian counterpart into joining Moscow’s faltering invasion of Ukraine.

Monday’s meeting between Lukashenka and Putin came following weeks of reports indicating a growing Russian troop presence in Belarus, and as the Belarusian military was completing national battle readiness exercises. Ukraine is certainly taking the issue seriously, with Kyiv strengthening its defenses along the Belarusian border on the eve of Putin’s Minsk trip.

Ukrainian officials are increasingly voicing concerns that Moscow may be preparing to repeat the February 2022 offensive against Kyiv, which saw Russian troops use Belarus as a launchpad for an assault on the Ukrainian capital. In a recent interview with Britain’s The Economist magazine, Valery Zaluzhny, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, said he had no doubt Russia “will have another go at Kyiv” in the first few months of 2023.

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Following their three-hour meeting, Putin and Lukashenka did not make any major announcements. Instead, they spoke of ongoing negotiations over a series of bilateral trade, economic, and defense issues. Putin noted that both countries would proceed toward deeper security integration and said they would continue intensifying joint military exercises. Meanwhile, Lukashenka confirmed that Belarus has received Russian missile and air defense systems.

Both strongmen played down earlier suggestions that Russia was poised to annex Belarus or was planning to force the country to join the invasion of Ukraine, with Putin instead speaking of the strategic partnership between the two authoritarian regimes. These denials were echoed by Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, who appeared to rule out the possibility of full-scale Belarusian involvement in Russia’s ongoing invasion.

There remains no real clarity over what was discussed behind closed doors in Minsk. Many observers believe talks regarding a possible join offensive against Ukraine must have been the focus of negotiations and note that Putin’s presence would hardly have been required for the official agenda of relatively routine discussions on non-essential matters. However, others have suggested that the Minsk meeting may have been nothing more than an opportunity for both parties to demonstrate their loyalty to each other at a time when each ruler is confronted by deepening international isolation.

If military matters were indeed discussed, this does not necessarily indicate plans for Belarus to directly participate in a new Kyiv offensive. Other options could include an expansion of the current Belarusian role as a base of operations for the Russian military or the provision of armor and ammunition from the Belarusian arsenal. Alternatively, the entire episode may be part of an elaborate ruse to pin down Ukrainian forces and prevent their redeployment to current invasion hot spots in southern and eastern Ukraine.

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Lukashenka is already widely seen as a party to the conflict after allowing Putin to use Belarus as a gateway for the initial invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For the past ten months, he has permitted Russia to base troops in Belarus and launch airstrikes from the country against Ukrainian targets. Following the announcement in September of Russia’s first mobilization since World War II, Belarus also began to serve as a training base for mobilized troops.

Despite this obvious involvement, the Belarusian leader bristles at claims that he is a junior partner in Putin’s invasion. Ever since the outbreak of hostilities, he has denied that Belarus is actively participating in the conflict and has instead sought to position himself as a potential mediator. At the same time, in an apparent nod to his Kremlin patrons, Lukashenka has made a number of public declarations acknowledging the need to support neighboring Russia.

This awkard balancing act is understandable. There is little public enthusiasm in Belarus for the invasion of Ukraine, leading to doubts over the reliability of the Belarusian army if Lukashenka does give the order to cross the Ukrainian border. However, the Belarus dictator is almost entirely dependent on Moscow for his political survival and risks becoming expendible if he refuses direct Russian demands to join the war.

For the time being, Putin and Lukashenka’s intentions remain shrouded in mystery. Few are prepared to take their denials at face value, but it is still too early to identify any specific preparations for a major new offensive. Ukrainian military planners certainly cannot afford to dismiss this threat. They will be spending the Christmas holiday period watching the situation closely while preparing for a potential escalation on the northern front.

For Putin, forcing Belarus to join the war would be a desperate gamble that could easily backfire. He has already suffered catastrophic losses in Ukraine and can ill afford another humiliating military defeat. However, with his invasion plans rapidly unraveling and his options narrowing, Putin may decide that it is worth the risk.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

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Putin’s woes can be traced directly to the battlefields of Ukraine. His invading army has performed disastrously over the past ten months and has lost a series of key engagements including the Battle of Kyiv, the Battle of Kharkiv, and the Battle of Kherson. More than one hundred thousand Russian soldiers are believed to have been killed or wounded, while thousands of Russian tanks and armored vehicles have been captured of destroyed. These losses have forced Putin to launch his country’s first mobilization since 1945, a move that has destabilized Russia and brought the war home to previously supportive domestic audiences.

Russia’s international image has also been badly tarnished by revelations of widespread war crimes committed against the Ukrainian civilian population. Russian troops stand accused of carrying out mass executions and engaging in sexual violence, abductions, and torture throughout occupied Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have been subjected to forced deportation, while policies of indiscriminate bombardment have left tens of thousands dead and reduced dozens of Ukrainian towns and cities to rubble. In recent months, Russia has begun the methodical destruction of Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure with the express intention of depriving Ukrainians of access to heating, electricity, and water during the depths of winter.

Many international observers see these policies as nothing short of genocide, especially as they have been accompanied by a steady stream of openly genocidal invective from regime propagandists and Kremlin officials in Moscow. Others have been appalled by Putin’s readiness to engage in nuclear saber-rattling. On multiple occasions, the Russian leader has issued thinly veiled threats alluding to the possible use of his country’s vast atomic arsenal. This nuclear blackmail has provoked a strong backlash, with US officials promising “catastrophic consequences” and even the normally supportive Chinese rebuking Russia.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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All this has left Russia more internationally isolated than at any time since the immediate aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution a century ago. In a revealing recent exchange, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov admitted, “nobody likes us and they don’t intend to start liking us.” Peskov may have had the Western world primarily in mind, but his comment also reflected the wider reality of Russia’s increasingly unfavorable international position. Moscow’s isolation is most immediately obvious at the United Nations, where a series of General Assembly votes condemning the invasion of Ukraine have passed with resounding majorities. Tellingly, only a handful of fellow pariahs such as North Korea and Syria have been prepared to stand with Russia.

Closer to home, the Kremlin is visibly losing influence throughout the former Soviet Empire. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan is openly distancing itself from Russia while strengthening ties with China, Turkey, and the West. In the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan is increasingly ignoring Russia’s nominal role as regional peacekeeper while Armenia bristles over Moscow’s failure to provide any meaningful protection. Even Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who depends almost completely on the Kremlin for his political survival, has so far managed to resist Russian pressure to directly participate in the invasion of Ukraine.

On the wider international stage, the United States has succeeded in consolidating Western support for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Putin’s efforts to weaponize energy exports have backfired and forced European countries to turn decisively away from reliance on Russia. The BRICS nations (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa) continue to purchase Russian resources, but are now doing so on their own heavily discounted terms. Beyond this pragmatic trade, they have refused to back Russia or provide Moscow with much-needed weapons. This has forced the Kremlin to seek replacement tanks, artillery shells, drones, and missiles from the likes of Iran and Belarus.

What can Putin look forward to in 2023? He appears to believe the international alliance opposing his invasion may still eventually lose interest and is pinning his hopes on Western leaders forcing Kyiv into some kind of compromise deal that would allow Russia to snatch a victory of sorts from the jaws of defeat. However, with most of Ukraine’s backers publicly stating that they will let the Ukrainians themselves decide when to negotiate, this outcome looks unlikely. After all, no Ukrainian government could conceivably condemn millions of their compatriots to the horrors of indefinite Russian occupation.

A far more realistic scenario would see the well-armed and highly motivated Ukrainian military continue to steadily liberate occupied territory while Russia suffers heavy losses among poorly trained and badly equipped conscript troops. This is a recipe for disaster for the Putin regime. The Russian army in Ukraine is already deeply demoralized and struggling to mount localized offensives. Further attrition in the coming months will raise the prospect of a more comprehensive military collapse that could have grave consequences for the future of the Russian Federation itself.

As 2022 draws to a close, it is already obvious that Putin’s fateful decision to invade Ukraine was one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of the modern era. His dream of shattering the post-1991 settlement and rebuilding the Russian Empire has made him the single greatest threat to global security and placed him in direct confrontation with a formidable coalition of the world’s most powerful nations, who have reluctantly come to recognize the necessity of his defeat. Putin enters 2023 with few friends and fewer options. The coming year is shaping up to be the darkest of his entire reign. It may also be the last.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert Service.

Shaping the Order. Xi’s consolidation of power and his remarks prioritizing national security issues over economic growth suggests that China will likely play an increasingly disruptive role in the global order over the foreseeable future. Beijing’s determination to seek unification with Taiwan could lead to a military confrontation – a concern magnified by CIA Director William Burns’ recent assessment that Xi has instructed the Chinese military to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan before 2027.
Hitting home. With Xi pursuing a policy of dual circulation – prioritizing increased self-reliance while still engaging in foreign trade – and US officials encouraging greater supply chain resilience, American businesses will need to prepare to reduce trade dependencies on China, especially in critical sectors.
What to do. Washington should coordinate closely with allies, both in Europe and Indo-Pacific, on a common strategy to deal with Beijing, while taking more pro-active measures to deter a potential Chinese attack against Taiwan.

Ukraine in the Dark. Russian forces initiated an intense aerial bombardment campaign across Ukraine, targeting power systems and other critical infrastructure and leaving large portions of the country without water or electricity. Separately, in calls with his American, British, and French counterparts, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu accused Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb,” a claim rejected by Western officials as a pretext for possible further Russian escalation. G7 leaders warned that any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with “severe consequences.”

Shaping the Order. Facing significant battlefield setbacks, Russian president Vladimir Putin appears to have embarked on a new strategy aimed at demoralizing the Ukrainian civilian population by denying them water and power and instilling fear over the potential use of a radiological or nuclear device. Russia’s approach so far has failed to break the will of the Ukrainian people and appears unlikely to impact Ukraine’s steady advances on the ground. But Putin may be hoping that Western support for Kyiv will weaken, as energy prices rise with winter approaching and political winds potentially shift.
Hitting home. Russia’s use of a nuclear or radiological device would mark a major escalation and could trigger a military response by the United States and its allies.
What to do. While continuing to provide military equipment to Ukraine, the US and NATO should offer assistance to help repair damaged power and water systems. At the same time, Washington and its allies should continue to stand up to Putin’s threats of escalation, nuclear and otherwise.

Biden’s New Strategy. In his new National Security Strategy (NSS), President Joe Biden made clear that the primary goals of the United States over the coming years will be “outcompeting China and restraining Russia.” To deal with these and other transnational challenges, the strategy sets forth a “dual track-approach” that involves deepening US cooperation with democracies and like-minded states, while seeking the broadest possible coalition to tackle any given issue. The administration also released its National Defense Strategy, outlining US defense priorities for dealing with Russia, China, and other major security threats. In response to the NSS, Beijing accused Washington of “Cold War thinking.”

Shaping the Order. The new strategy embraces the notion that the world has entered an era of strategic competition between democracies and autocracies, rooted in alternative visions of the global order. But it also calls for the US to work with all nations, including non-democracies, that support the rules-based order. In implementing the strategy, the US will need to grapple with how to seek cooperation and competition with rival powers at the same time and how to gain the support of nations in the global South, including many, such as India, that prefer to remain “non-aligned.”
Hitting home. The strategy also prioritizes action on the home front, arguing that the source of American strength in this global competition will come from reaffirming the nation’s democratic traditions and making new investments in industry and innovation.
What to do. The Biden administration should ensure that the strategy is backed by the resources necessary to successfully implement it, especially defense and technology investments.

Quote of the month

“We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order… Autocrats are working overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at home and coercion abroad… We will partner with any nation that shares our basic belief that the rules-based order must remain the foundation for global peace and prosperity.”

– President Joe Biden, foreword to the National Security Strategy, October 2022

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↑)

Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, who governed on a populist agenda that critics suggested had undermined the country’s democratic norms, was narrowly defeated by former president Lula da Silva in a runoff election. Bolsonaro had made unsubstantiated claims of widespread election fraud during his campaign, but tacitly acknowledged defeat as his government began to facilitate an orderly transition of power.
The UN Human Rights Council voted against a resolution sponsored by the US, France, Germany, and other democracies that would have allowed debate on China’s widespread human rights abuses against the Uyghurs in Xingang. Eighteen nations joined Beijing in voting down the resolution, while India, Brazil and Mexico were among those that abstained.
Widescale anti-government protests continued in cities and universities across Iran, despite the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ultimatum warning against any further demonstrations, as security forces deployed tear gas and gunfire in an effort to violently suppress the uprisings.

On balance, with the electoral developments in Brazil, the democracy pillar was strengthened.

Security (↓)

Russian forces initiated an intense aerial bombardment campaign targeting critical infrastructure across Ukraine, while concerns over Russia’s potential use of a nuclear or radiological weapon increased after Moscow bizarrely accused Ukraine of planning to use a “dirty bomb” on its own territory.
In another sign of its military difficulties, Russia began recruiting former Afghan security forces, including those trained by the US military, to join what some have referred to as a Russian “foreign legion” to fight in Ukraine.
A potential Chinese military invasion of Taiwan appeared more likely in the coming years as CIA Director William Burns stated that Xi Jinping has instructed the Chinese military to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan before 2027.
North Korea test fired a ballistic missile over Japan potentially capable of reaching the US territory of Guam in the western Pacific – reportedly, the longest test ever conducted by Pyongyang.
In a bid to counter Chinese regional influence, President Biden hosted a summit with the leaders of 14 Pacific Island nations and announced a partnership agreement that included stronger security and economic ties.

On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

The US announced sweeping new restrictions on the sale of semiconductor technology to China, a move aimed at preventing China’s military, intelligence, and security services from acquiring sensitive technologies with military applications.
After a drone attack on Russia’s Black Sea naval fleet, Moscow withdrew from, and later returned to, a UN-brokered deal to allow grain shipments through the Black Sea.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined Russia in an OPEC decision to cut oil production by 2 million barrels a day – a move that could raise gas prices worldwide and bolter Russia’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine

On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

Ahead of the opening of a global climate summit in Egypt, the UN issued a report assessing that under current pledges, there is “no credible pathway” to keep the rise in global temperatures below the key threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius.
Russia was voted off the International Civil Aviation Organization’s governing council, a measure aimed at holding the Kremlin to account for violating Ukraine’s sovereign airspace and other core principles of global aviation.

Overall, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

Meeting virtually with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, G7 leaders maintained their strong solidarity with Ukraine, warning that any use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with “severe consequences.”
The defense ministers from the US, Japan, and Australia jointly condemned China’s recent ballistic missile launches across the Taiwan Strait and agreed to strengthen defense ties amid the ongoing threats from Beijing.
Hungary and Turkey remained the only two NATO members yet to ratify the applications of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, as Ankara insisted it would not move forward without further extraditions of suspects it considers terrorists.

Overall, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, speaking at Brookings, calls for a new economic “alliance of democracies” to counter authoritarianism and facilitate friend-shoring in the face of economic bullying from the world’s dictators.
John Austin and Elaine Dezinkski, in Foreign Policy, contend that the US and its allies need a shared global agenda, including a robust ally-shoring plan, to maintain a democratic rules-based order.
Thomas Mahnken, in Foreign Affairs, argues that the US needs to restructure its defense planning to prepare for the possibility of being drawn into simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Fred Kempe, in the Atlantic Council’s Inflection Points, suggests that while there is a growing consensus among global leaders on the historic dangers facing the world, common action is falling far short of what is needed.
Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, present viable economic and political options for the United States and its allies to pursue if Russia uses a nuclear weapon against Ukraine.
Matthew Kroenig, Amanda Rothschild, Paul Miller, Ash Jain, Jeffrey Cimmino, and other Atlantic Council experts assess and comment on the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy.

Hung Tran, in an Atlantic Council Issue Brief, provides a comprehensive guide to friend-shoring in five critical sectors.
The Atlantic Council, in cooperation with the US State Department, hosted the ninth meeting of the D-10 Strategy Forum, which brings together policy planning and strategy officials from ten leading democracies to bolster unity and cooperation. The meeting took place amid a range of pressing global challenges, including those posed by Russia and China.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Jeffrey Cimmino – Associate Director
Danielle Miller – Program Assistant
Otto Hastrup Svendsen – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing October 2022 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Heavy fighting expected in Kherson as Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 28 Oct 2022 18:15:00 +0000

Security

Heavy fighting expected in Kherson, Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations

Tracking narratives

Russia again accuses Ukraine of plotting to use a “dirty bomb”

Facebook ads spread pro-Russian narratives

Polish Senate declares Russia a terrorist regime

Heavy fighting expected in Kherson, Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated on October 21 that Russian forces are actively transferring ammunition, military equipment, and units from the Dnipro River’s west bank to the east bank. Russian forces are likely not fully withdrawing from the upper Kherson region but preparing to defend the city. Humanitarian facilities in Kherson have also reportedly ceased operations.

Russia continues to use missiles and drones against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that on October 23 Russia conducted at least two missile strikes and twenty-five airstrikes. Ukrainian forces also said they shot down twelve Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones. Civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Novotavrycheske were among the targeted areas.

Meanwhile, Russian bloggers reported that Yevgeny Prigozhin, the main financier of the Wagner Group, is sponsoring the formation of a volunteer battalion, with recruitment led by former Russian officer Igor Girkin. Girkin is a critic of the Russian military command and a prominent figure among the Russian nationalists who participated in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Russian army is depending more heavily on Wagner fighters to gain territory in Bakhmut, which Russia has been trying to seize for months. Additionally, according to Russian sources, Wagner is recruiting crews for Pantsir-S1 and S-300 missile systems, Man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), electronic warfare, Su-25 aircraft, and other equipment. While Wagner fighters utilize the infrastructure of the Russian military, the group’s equipment and operations are funded separately. It appears that Wagner’s command wants to strengthen the unit’s independence on the battlefield.

There is also an increasing possibility of ethnic conflicts among soldiers as racial discrimination emerges among Russian military ranks. Footage released on October 24 showed a Russian officer beating a Muslim soldier allegedly for attempting to pray. Russian commentators have denied the authenticity of the clip. However, this is not an isolated case, as two Tajikistan nationals are suspected of being behind a deadly shooting at a training ground in Russia’s Belgorod region on October 15.

In addition, General Oleksiy Gromov, a senior Ukrainian military official, said on October 27 that Belarus is preparing for an escalation. As evidence, he said that Russian officers are now checking the degree of combat readiness of Belarusian military units and that “secret transfers of personnel, equipment and military maneuvers continue in the country.”

Gromov’s claims have not been independently verified.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia again accuses Ukraine of plotting to use a “dirty bomb”

Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on October 27 that Ukraine is plotting to use a “dirty bomb,” reigniting a narrative that has spread through pro-Kremlin sources since the early days of the war. Russian state media outlets amplified the latest iteration of the claim.

In remarks delivered to the Kremlin-associated Valdai Discussion Club, Putin acknowledged that Russian intelligence services intentionally published information about Ukraine’s “dirty bomb.” He said that Kyiv authorities “are doing everything to cover up the traces of the preparation.” Putin also stated that he “instructed [Russian Defense Minister] Shoigu to call all of his colleagues and inform them.” Shoigu indeed called his Western counterparts on October 23 to warn that Ukraine was planning to use a “dirty bomb.”

Along with Putin, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed that Ukraine’s goal “is to blame Russia for using weapons of mass destruction,” while simultaneously planning to use WMDs against Russia.

On October 26, the Kremlin-owned outlet RIA published an article, based on an anonymous source, that claimed Kyiv had “already completed the technical preparations for the dirty bomb provocation.” The article stated that Ukraine’s state-owned rocket manufacturer “prepared a mockup of a rocket, which is planned to be filled with radioactive material, then supposedly to shoot it down over the exclusion zone of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and announce the launch of a nuclear charge by the Russian armed forces.”

On October 24, Igor Kirillov, chief of the radiation, chemical and biological defense forces of the Russian army, claimed that “Kyiv possesses the scientific base for creating a dirty bomb.” According to Kirillov’s comments, the “dirty bomb” can be prepared at the research base research base of the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology. He added that this institute participated in the nuclear program of the Soviet Union.

Along with these statements from Russian officials, Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin media outlets have amplified the accusation. While some outlets explained the mechanics and usage of dirty bombs, others claimed that the United Nations Security Council has already stopped Ukraine from deploying a “dirty bomb.”

The DFRLab has previously reported on Russia’s attempts to propagate the narrative that Ukraine plans to utilize “dirty bombs.”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Facebook ads spread pro-Russian narratives

This week, the DFRLab observed multiple Facebook ads spreading pro-Russian narratives that criticized Ukrainian anti-air defense systems, claimed that Ukraine is under external control, called for the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and discredited the Ukrainian government. User comments responding the ads expressed anger towards their content, with some accounts saying they were reporting the ads. The narratives are another example of how ad platforms can be exploited in influence operations. The DFRLab has previously reported on how Facebook ads are used to spread disinformation.

A composite image of three pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukraine ads (Source: Jsc Performance, left; Rulleonto, top right; For You 2, bottom right)

The DFRLab identified at least four different pages that amplified disinformation through Facebook ads. The pages have abstract names and profile pictures. They published and advertised a single post in Russian featuring poorly made caricatures, usually stolen from Russian or Belarusian sources. The pages have only a few followers but are not newly created, with some dating prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24.

A composite image of two Facebook posts (top left and right) and the source images, one from the Russian state-owned outlet Minskaya Pravda (bottom left), and another from the pro-Kremlin outlet Regnum (top right). (Sources: Ruliop, top left; Rulleonto/archive top right; Minskaya Pravda, bottom left; Regnum, bottom right)

As all of the ads and pages were removed at the time of publication. As all of the ads and pages had been removed at the time of writing, the DFRLab could not establish its precise reach, but one ad in the library received between 200,000 and 250,000 impressions. Other ads received between 800 and 1,000 engagements.

The Facebook ads and pages appear to be linked to a network based in Russia identified by the DFRLab and other outlets earlier this fall. According to a spokesperson for Facebook’s parent company, Meta: “We detected and removed these ads and the associated Pages. We’ve also blocked hundreds of domains as part of our ongoing work to prevent the networks we took down from reconstituting on our platform. As we said last month, this operation is persistent in trying to set up new domains spoofing news organizations and drive people across social media to these websites. The majority of this operation’s accounts, Pages and ads on our platforms were detected and removed by our automated systems. We keep updating our threat report, including the list of spoofed domains, to help inform open-source research by security researchers and our industry peers.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Polish Senate declares Russia a terrorist regime

On October 26, the Polish Senate passed a resolution declaring Russia a terrorist regime. Eighty-five senators voted in favor of the resolution while fifteen others abstained. The resolution states that Russian armed forces “unleashed a brutal war with Ukraine” and that the purpose of the conflict is to “wipe out a sovereign country from the map and destroy the Ukrainian nation.” The Senate condemned Russian aggression and called “all countries in favor of peace, democracy and human rights to recognize the authorities of the Russian Federation as a terrorist regime.” The Senate also praised all institutions and organizations that undertake research and document war crimes committed against Ukraine.

On October 27, Senate Marshal Tomasz Grodzki announced that a “strong” cyberattack on Senate servers was underway and added that he did not know if the attack was related with the adoption of the resolution on Russia or whether it was a coincidence.

On October 18, the Parliament of Estonia also adopted a resolution declaring Russia a terrorist state, following Lithuania and Latvia, who have also designated Russia as a terrorist state. On October 13, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe also passed a resolution declaring Russia a terrorist regime.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

The post Russian War Report: Heavy fighting expected in Kherson as Prigozhin aims to boost Wagner operations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 21 Oct 2022 17:55:43 +0000

Security

Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support

Russian troops arrive in Belarus as joint force announced

Belarusian Telegram channels say a flurry of increased military personnel activity is raising concerns of a possible mobilization

War crimes and human rights abuses

Putin declares martial law in annexed parts of Ukraine

Russian deputy prime minister boasts of forced deportations from Kherson

Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support

The DFRLab is continuing to monitor reports of Wagner Group activity in Ukraine, where the Kremlin-aligned private military company is assisting Russian forces in fighting and fortifying positions in the Donbas. A video posted on October 13 shows Russian servicemen of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet in the Kherson region complaining that they have been fighting in the area since the beginning of the war without relief or troop rotation. After the video circulated, a Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel announced on October 14 that Wagner fighters would transfer vehicles to the 126th Coastal Defense Battalion in support of their efforts to hold the frontline in Kherson.

There are also signs of a possible rift between the Russian military and pro-war bloggers. On October 14, Russian military blogger Semyon Pegov announced the existence of “hit lists,” reportedly originating with the Russian Defense Ministry, that target bloggers and journalists for their coverage of the war in Ukraine. Pegov, who is part of the WarGonzo Telegram channel, accused “individual generals and military commanders” from the Russian defense ministry of developing a list of bloggers who the ministry intends to prosecute for “discrediting” Russia’s handling of the war in Ukraine. One day later, he retracted the claim. At the time of writing, Pegov’s original post had garnered more than 2.8 million views. His claim was amplified by several other prominent pro-war bloggers and generated a discussion about censorship.

Further, new revelations this week indicate that Iran is playing an increasingly large role in aiding Russia’s war against Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian Telegram channels reported that Russia has purchased an unknown number of Arash-2 drones, which are purportedly faster and more destructive than the Shahed-136 drones that are currently in use by Russian forces against critical infrastructure in Ukraine. Reports that the Russian army is receiving munitions from Tehran are in line with a report from the US Treasury Department stating that Russia is running out of microelectronics, essential to maintaining its military operations, due to the impact of sanctions. The US warned it will sanction “people, companies, or countries” that provide ammunition or support to Russia’s military. It also alleged the presence of Iranian trainers on the ground in Crimea, assisting Russia in drone operations, though this has not been independently verified. Iran, meanwhile, also promised to provide Russia with surface-to-surface missiles, in addition to more drones.

On October 19, the US Department of Justice charged five Russians with sanctions evasion, oil smuggling, and organizing a money laundering scheme. One of the accused is Artyom Uss, the son of the governor of Krasnoyarsk. The other accused are Yury Orekhov, Svetlana Kuzurgasheva, Timofey Telegin, and Sergey Tulyakov. Orekhov was detained in Germany on October 17 and Uss in Italy, both at the request of the US, which will seek extradition. In addition to the Russians, the scheme allegedly involved two Venezuelans, Juan Fernando Serrano Ponce and Juan Carlos Soto, who reportedly helped broker the sale of oil, organizing illegal transactions with Venezuela’s state owned oil company PDVSA, in violation of sanctions. According to the US Department of Justice, Orekhov and Uss were co-owners of the German company Nord-Deutsche Industrieanlagenbau GmbH (NDA GmbH).

In addition, a Russian citizen on his way to Svalbard was detained by Norwegian police after taking photographs at the Tromsø and Kirkenes airports. The arrest comes only days after another Russian, found with two drones in his possession, was detained at the Storskog border checkpoint. Norway also arrested the son of Vladimir Yakunin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, for illegally flying a drone at Svalbard.

Lastly, a hack targeted Bulgaria in the early hours of October 15, which prosecutor general Ivan Geshev said came from Russia. The cyber attack comes after Russia accused Sofia of being involved in the Kerch bridge explosion. The hacker collective KillNet, which has carried out similar hacks against other European and NATO countries in the past few months, is believed to be behind the attack, which affected Bulgarian government websites.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian troops arrive in Belarus as joint force announced

On October 10, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka announced that Belarus had reached an agreement with Russia to deploy a joint Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops on Belarusian territory. He said the formation of this group began two days before the announcement and that more than 1,000 Russian troops would be deployed to Belarus. To justify the joint military group, Lukashenka alleged that Ukraine was preparing strikes against Belarus. One week before the announcement, Lukashenka claimed that Ukraine had moved 15,000 service members to the Belarusian border. According to the BBC’s Russian service, the number of the permanent Russian service members stationed in Belarus was around 1,000 people until recently.

On October 15, the first group of Russian forces arrived in Belarus, reportedly accompanied by MiG-31 fighter interceptors. According to the independent Belarusian Hajun Project, Russian military groups arrived at the Palonka, Zaslonava and Losvida rail stations, none of which are close to the border with Ukraine.

Valery Revenko, head of international military cooperation for the Belarusian defense ministry, said on Twitter, “The total number [of] arrived military personnel in Belarus will be up to 9,000 personnel, about 170 tanks, up to 200 armored combat vehicles and up to 100 guns and mortars with a caliber of more than 100 mm.” Belarusian journalist Tadeusz Giczan reported that the Russian trains arriving in Belarus weren’t carrying heavy equipment – “only trucks, petrol tankers and passenger cars with soldiers.” On October 16, Gazeta.ru published a video supporting this claim, showing the arrival of a Russian train in Belarus with only military trucks visible on the train. On September 29, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence stated that Belarus was preparing facilities to accommodate 20,000 mobilized people from Russia.

According to Meduza, the motives behind the Belarus-Russia joint group include distracting Ukraine’s army away from other fronts; allowing Russia to conduct more precise aerial attacks from Belarusian territory; preparing for any provocations from the West; and allowing Russia to open new fronts in the north or west of Ukraine.

After the announcement, Poland recommended its citizens leave Belarus “with available commercial and private means” as soon as possible. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked G7 countries to send international observers to the Belarusian border to monitor the security situation. He also stated that Ukraine is not planning military actions against Belarus.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Belarusian Telegram channels say a flurry of increased military personnel activity is raising concerns of a possible mobilization

On October 15, Belsat, an independent Belarusian media outlet, reported that military-eligible men in Rogachev and Gomel Oblasts received letters asking them to report to military enlistment offices to verify their personal information. Some men reportedly received a call to attend “urgent gatherings” (срочные сборы); according to Pavel Latushka, a Belarus opposition activist in exile, President Lukashenka employs the phrase to avoid referring to a “mobilization.” The Telegram channels Realynaya Belarus and Basta! also published similar information about men receiving letters from military offices in Gomel Oblast. The Realynaya Belarus channel noted that “men who previously served in interior troops and air forces” received the notes. The Basta! channel cited an anonymous source who works in the agriculture industry in Gomel, who claimed that department heads were told to send men under the age of fifty to report their personal information. “These are almost all drivers and tractor operators,” the source said.

The Motolyko Pomogi Telegram channel published similar observations. The post noted that all of the men who served in the 5th brigade of the Belarusian special operations forces in Marina Gorka, Minsk Oblast, had received letters to gather for “retraining.” On October 17, the Realynaya Belarus channel said seventeen special forces service members had mustered in Pinsk.

Additionally, on October 15, Motolyko Pomogi reported that some Belarusian companies received orders to provide a list of eligible conscripts to authorities. The authorities reportedly asked one company in Brest Oblast to provide information about vehicles that the company could provide for “transportation of the mobilized.” The post also mentioned the creation of an “alert headquarters” at one unnamed Belarusian company in Brest. All mobilization notices would be sent to the headquarters, which would carry the duty of alerting conscripted employees. The involvement of state-owned companies and other types of organizations in military conscription is a legally mandated procedure in Belarus.

Belarus holds an annual military record verification process. On October 19, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense claimed on its Telegram channel that latest actions were part of the annual military record verification and not part of a mobilization effort. The DFRLab could not verify reports of individuals being forced to join Belarusian military. While Belarusian authorities are seemingly acting within legal bounds, questions arise when considering that Belarus recently announced it will join Russians in the war against Ukraine.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin declares martial law in annexed parts of Ukraine

During a meeting of Russia’s Security Council on October 19, President Putin announced he had signed a decree implementing martial law in illegally annexed Ukrainian territory. Martial law would apply in four Ukrainian regions – Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson – in the wake of sham referendums held last month that have not been recognized by Ukraine or the broader international community.

According to pro-Kremlin outlet Kommersant, martial law “is introduced in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or a direct threat of aggression.” According to the outlet, martial law provides Russia with the authority to impose curfews; compulsory screening of citizens and detention for up to thirty days; seizure of property; military censorship of postal services and the media; control of phone conversations; expulsion of foreigners; suspension of the activities of political parties, foreign and international organizations “whose propaganda undermines the security of the country”; and restriction of entry, exit, and freedom of movement. Kommersant added that Russia will suspend its obligations under international treaties regarding the rights of citizens after the introduction of martial law.

The last time Russia implemented martial law was during World War II, when the Soviet Union imposed it in 1941.

In addition to martial law, Putin declared the Kremlin would apply security measures based on three different tiers – basic, medium, and increased. Russian regions close to the Ukraine border require a medium response level, while Moscow falls under the increased category. According to these response levels, Russia can gain control over different sectors like communications and automated systems and repurpose them for the military needs.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian deputy prime minister boasts of forced deportations from Kherson

Russia continues to conduct massive, forced deportations of Ukrainians. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated on October 14 that “several thousand” children from the Kherson region are “already in other regions of Russia, resting in rest homes and children’s camps.” As noted by Human Rights Watch, “deportation has been recognized as a crime against humanity in each of the major international criminal instruments.”

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

The post Russian War Report: Wagner sends vehicles to Kherson while Iran increases military support appeared first on Atlantic Council.

State of the Order: Assessing September 2022

ibayoumi — Fri, 14 Oct 2022 18:51:53 +0000

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Putin Annexes Parts of Ukraine. In a choreographed ceremony at the Kremlin, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed decrees claiming annexation of four Ukrainian provinces in the south and east of the country, even as Russian troops continued to lose ground in these areas. Despite apparent doubts about the war from the leaders of China and India, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 additional troops, committing to defend the claimed territories and hinting at the possible use of nuclear weapons, a prospect that US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan warned would result in “catastrophic consequences” for Russia. The G7 issued a strong statement vowing never to recognize the annexations or the “sham” referendums that preceded them.

Shaping the order. Putin’s actions represent a doubling down on the war in Ukraine, indicating that he is prepared to risk escalating causalities and domestic political unrest in what appears to be an increasingly desperate effort to achieve his war aims. But with Russia’s continuing military setbacks, the moves also suggest that Putin has been forced to narrow his immediate aims, at least for now, from “denazification” and regime change to defending territory that Russian troops have attempted to seize. At the same time, Putin’s 37-minute diatribe against the “imperialist West” could mark a potential expansion of the conflict and a deepening of Cold War-like tensions with the United States and its allies.
Hitting home. Polls indicate continued bipartisan support for Ukraine among the American public, as Congress approved its third significant aid package that expands the delivery of advanced weapons systems to Kyiv.
What to do. The US should provide the weapons that Ukrainian forces need to reverse Russia’s territorial gains, while continuing to warn against the use of nuclear weapons. At the same, Washington and its allies should prepare for potential responses if discuss Moscow resorts to a nuclear strike in Ukraine or engages in disruptive, asymmetric attacks against the US or its NATO allies.

Axis of Autocracy. Meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Uzbekistan, Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping renewed their commitments to expand bilateral cooperation. While Putin publicly recognized China’s concerns about the war in Ukraine, Xi underscored Beijing’s “strong support on core interests” of Russia. The SCO summit brought together the leaders of China, Russia, Iran, Belarus, and other anti-Western autocracies, but also India and Pakistan, and resulted in a joint statement of cooperation on counter-terrorism and other issues. Earlier, Chinese military forces participated in Russian-led exercises in the Sea of Japan, and North Korea offered to provide weapons to Russia to support the war in Ukraine.

Shaping the Order. Despite Beijing’s apparent uneasiness over Russia’s struggling miliary efforts in Ukraine, the meeting between Putin and Xi reinforced the strategic partnership announced by the two leaders in February and their joint determination to push back against the rules-based democratic order. The SCO summit served to undercut efforts by the West to isolate Putin, though some of Russia’s Central Asian partners, including Kazakhstan, appeared reluctant in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Hitting home. The efforts by China and Russia to undermine the US-led global order could lead to a world that is more dangerous for US citizens and less hospitable for American businesses.
What to do. The US and its allies should increase penalties on states that provide material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, and seek new approaches to incentivize India and other democracies to join in Western sanctions and pressure Russia to end the war.

Iran’s Nationwide Protests. In the country’s largest anti-regime protests since 2009, Iranians took to the streets following the death of a young woman who died in the custody of Iran’s “morality police” after failing to comply with strict veiling laws for women. In response to the protests, which were led by students across more than 45 cities, many shouting “death to the dictator,” Iranian security forces killed scores of protestors. With the Iran nuclear talks stalled, President Biden stated that the United States stands with the “brave women of Iran,” and the US and the EU considered new sanctions against the regime.

Shaping the Order. The potential downfall of Iran’s fundamentalist Islamic regime, which has ruled the country since 1979, would mark a significant turning point for the future of the democratic world order. But as the world enters its 16^th consecutive year of democratic recession, autocratic regimes have learned from each other, employing effective countermeasures to clamp down on pro-democracy movements, and the Iranian government may well be able to ride out the storm.
Hitting home. American values are better protected in a world where democratic norms and human rights are respected.
What to do. Working closely with allies, the Biden administration should seek to bolster support for Iranian opposition groups, including by ensuring that they have continued access to the internet, as part of a broader strategy to constrain authoritarian governments and assist non-violent civil resistance movements across the world.

Quote of the month

“This is not only a war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine. This is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future. This is about autocracy against democracy.”

– EU President Ursula Von der Leyen, EU State of the Union Address, September 14, 2022

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ()

After holding sham elections, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the purported annexation of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk, four Ukrainian regions that Russia has partially seized during its seven-month long invasion.
Protests continued in several cities across Iran over the killing of a young woman while in police custody because she refused to wear a hijab, while human rights groups estimated scores of casualties as Iranian security forces sought to suppress the demonstrations.
The European Commission moved to suspend certain funding to Hungary over allegations of widespread corruption, and the European Parliament declared that Hungary can no longer be considered a “full democracy” and was “in serious breach” of EU democratic norms
Giorgia Meloni was set to become prime minister of Italy, after her Brothers of Italy party won the most seats in the country’s parliamentary elections. While the party has roots in the neo-fascist supporters of Benito Mussolini, Meloni has branded herself as a mainstream conservative who will stand up to Moscow and support NATO and the EU.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

Following several successful Ukrainian counteroffensives, Putin announced the mobilization of 300,000 reserve troops to help Russia defend the newly annexed territories.
North Korea joined Iran in offering to provide Russia with military supplies for its war in Ukraine, including millions of artillery rockets and shells, while the Pentagon indicated it was providing an additional $1.1 billion in security aid for Ukraine, including 18 more HIMAR rocket systems.
Moscow was suspected of causing the mysterious gas leaks in the Nord Stream One and Two pipelines, which NATO concluded was the result of deliberate sabotage.
In their first meeting since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan and pledged their mutual cooperation, though Beijing has stopped short of providing military assistance for Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Despite Moscow’s war of aggression in Ukraine, China, India, and four other nations joined Russia for a series of military exercises in the coastal areas around the Sea of Japan and the western Pacific, including around 50,000 personnel.
For the fourth time as president, Joe Biden stated explicitly that American forces would defend Taiwan if China invaded the island, though the White House later indicated this did not represent a change in US policy.
In an bid to counter Chinese regional influence, President Biden hosted a summit with the leaders of 14 Pacific Island nations and announced a partnership agreement that included stronger security and economic ties.
On balance, the security pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

Seeking to limit the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war in Ukraine, the G-7 announced an agreement to cap the import price of Russian oil, and will seek to use insurance and shipping markets to force down the price of oil purchased by other importers, including China and India.
Officials from the United States and 13 other member states of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework met in Los Angeles to launch formal negotiations on the four pillars of the initiative – trade, supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy — though India indicated it would not participate in the trade pillar.
On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

With broad bipartisan support, the US Senate ratified a global treaty that would sharply limit the emissions of hydrofluorocarbons — pollutants from air conditioners and other types of refrigeration that have played a significant role in accelerating climate change.
Concerned about the ruptures to the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, the United Nations Environment Programme estimated that the leaks likely represent the biggest single release of climate-damaging methane ever recorded.
Overall, the global commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances ()

The US and its G7 allies issued a joint statement vowing never to recognize Russia’s “sham referenda” in Ukraine.
In response to Russia’s annexation, Ukraine formally requested an “accelerated accession” to join NATO, though it appeared unlikely that NATO members would take up the request anytime soon.
While Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared to criticize Russia for its war in Ukraine, telling Putin publicly this “is not an era of war,” India later abstained on a resolution at the UN Security Council condemning Russia’s proclaimed annexation of Ukrainian territories.
Overall, the alliance pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Larry Diamond, in Foreign Affairs, contends that the world needs the United States to support democracy, and despite its problems at home, the United States needs a more muscular and imaginative approach to spreading it.
Anne Applebaum, in The Atlantic, argues that the West needs to have a plan for the day after a Ukrainian victory and the potential downfall of Vladimir Putin.
Dan Sullivan and Dan Twining, in Foreign Affairs, suggest that to engage in a generational struggle to defend the free world, the United States must build a bipartisan foreign policy consensus around the imperative of countering authoritarian aggression.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

Matthew Kroenig, in an Atlantic Council Memo to the President, sets forth how the United States can deter Russia from employing nuclear weapons in Ukraine and should respond in the event that deterrence fails.
Dan Fried, in Just Security, argues that Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine cannot be dismissed, the US and its allies should not give in to Putin’s nuclear blackmail.
Fred Kempe, in CNBC, suggests that Russia’s battlefield failures represent an opportunity for world leaders to accelerate efforts to ensure Putin’s defeat and Ukraine’s defense.
Sayeh Isfahani, in the Atlantic Council’s IranSource, contends that the current protests in Iran are a watershed moment as a women’s revolution spanning class and ethnic divides could spur the toppling of the Islamic Republic.

__________________________________________________

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Will Putin send mobilized Russians to Belarus for a new Kyiv offensive?

Alesia Rudnik — Mon, 03 Oct 2022 20:05:04 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s decision to order Russia’s first mobilization since World War II is fueling fears in neighboring Belarus that the country could once again become a focal point for the ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

With hundreds of thousands of Russians now being called up for military service, there are growing concerns that Moscow may send a significant portion of these newly mobilized forces to Belarus in order to launch a second assault on Kyiv. Russian troops marched on the Ukrainian capital from Belarus during the first month of the invasion in early 2022 but suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat. Nevertheless, the capture of Kyiv remains central to Putin’s goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood.

Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has played a supporting role in the attack on Ukraine ever since the weeks preceding the February 24 invasion. He allowed his country to serve as a gateway for invading Russian troops, and has also permitted Russia to launch air raids and missile strikes against Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory.

This role has not been entirely voluntary. For the past two years, Lukashenka has depended on the Kremlin for his political survival after Putin intervened in 2020 to save his neighbor when Belarus was rocked by anti-regime protests. In exchange for Moscow’s support, Lukashenka has agreed to abandon his earlier criticism of Russian aggression against Ukraine and has instead become something of a junior partner in Putin’s war.

Despite this limited room for maneuver, Lukashenka has so far managed to avoid direct involvement in the war and has resisted Kremlin pressure to send the Belarusian army into Ukraine. In public, he has played down his involvement in the conflict and has instead sought to portray himself as a potential peacemaker, telling the Associated Press during a May interview, “I want to stress one more time: I feel like this operation has dragged on.”

At the same time, Lukashenka remains one of Putin’s most frequent guests and appears obliged to regularly demonstrate his loyalty. On September 28 he visited Abkhazia, a region of Georgia controlled by the Kremlin and recognized by Russia as an independent state. This controversial visit was downplayed by the Belarusian state media but was widely interpreted as the price of Putin’s continued backing. The next test will be whether Lukashenka officially recognizes Russian attempts to annex Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions.

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If Russia does decide to deploy large numbers of troops to Belarus with a view to opening up a new northern front in the invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka would find himself under enormous pressure to crush any domestic dissent. During the initial stages of the war when Russia used Belarus as a key staging post for the invasion, grassroots Belarusian opposition included cyber-attacks and a group known as the railway partisans who sabotaged the country’s train network to disrupt the transit of Russian troops and military equipment.

In May, Lukashenka responded to this sabotage campaign by introducing the death penalty for partisan attacks on railways. While repressive measures against political opponents are regarded as routine in today’s Belarus, the crackdown would likely intensify significantly if the country plays host to a new Russian invasion force in the coming months.

There are also fears that Lukashenka may order mobilization in Belarus itself if pressured to do so by Putin. According to recent data from Narodny opros, which surveys opposition supporters in Belarus, 40% are already concerned about the possibility of a mobilization, while 67% believe mobilized men would either flee the country or go into hiding rather than joining the military.

Any attempt to force Belarusians to join the invasion of Ukraine would be fraught with dangers for the Lukashenka regime. An August 2022 poll conducted by Chatham House found that just 3% of Belarusians supported their country’s participation in Russia’s war. Numerous experts have argued that currently serving Belarusian military personnel would either refuse orders to invade Ukraine or would switch sides and join the Ukrainians. Meanwhile, exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has recently called on military officers and other personnel of the Belarusian army to sabotage any offensive actions and report plans for mobilization to the independent media.

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While Belarusians worry about their country being dragged into Putin’s faltering invasion, some Russians who are seeking to avoid a similar fate are making their way to Belarus. The most popular destinations for draft-dodging Russians appear to be Georgia, Armenia, and Kazakhstan, but anecdotal evidence indicates significant numbers of Russians are also using Belarus as a safe haven or transit point for destinations within the EU.

This has not gone unnoticed by the authorities. Details have emerged in recent days of an enhanced law enforcement presence on the streets of Minsk in order to detain Russian citizens fleeing mobilization. On September 27, five Russian men were reportedly removed from a train entering Belarus. This would seem to indicate that Lukashenka has agreed to aid Putin in rounding up draft-dodgers and returning them to Russia.

It is not yet clear whether Putin’s decision to proceed with mobilization will once again place Belarus at the heart of Russia’s Ukraine invasion. Any attempt to launch a new assault on Kyiv via Belarus would likely encounter domestic opposition and could create a range of new threats for Lukashenka’s fragile regime. Nevertheless, with Russia now clearly losing the war and Putin increasingly desperate to regain the initiative, Lukashenka may ultimately find himself with little choice but to support his patron.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

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Evidence of Russia’s declining influence can be seen throughout the post-Soviet world. On the frontlines in Ukraine, Putin’s invasion force is suffering from increasingly obvious manpower shortages that make a mockery of attempts to portray Russia as the world’s number two military power. Moscow has been forced to withdraw troops from deployments across the former USSR while also recruiting soldiers from among the Russian prison population.

Russian military withdrawals from Central Asia have led to renewed border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The changing dynamic in the region was also on display at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Uzbekistan, with the leaders of India and China both expressing concerns over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the President of Kyrgyzstan keeping Putin waiting prior to their bilateral meeting. Putin was once notorious for making world leaders wait, but the shoe is now on the other foot.

Russia’s withdrawal of nearly 1,000 troops from Armenia to bolster the faltering invasion of Ukraine was a signal to the countries of the South Caucasus that Kremlin influence in the region is in decline. Armenia has so far refused to see the writing on the wall and continues to place all its eggs in the Russian basket. Azerbaijan, which has pursued a multi-vector foreign policy and has not joined Russian-led initiatives, has used Moscow’s waning influence to launch a military operation against Armenia.

The European Union has tried but so far failed to broker a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would recognize the border separating the two nations and end three decades of intermittent conflict. Meanwhile, Armenians have protested in Yerevan over the possible signing of a peace treaty, but it is difficult to see how Armenia could hope to defeat its wealthier and militarily stronger neighbor without Russian support.

Russia’s retreat from the region also has major implications for nearby Georgia and the country’s dominant figure, pro-Kremlin oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. Under Ivanishvili’s influence, Georgian democracy has stagnated. Notably, the country was not offered EU candidate status alongside Ukraine and Moldova in summer 2022.

Georgia has not officially backed Ukraine over the Russian invasion and has instead joined Armenia in helping Moscow evade sanctions. This stance is out of step with Georgian public opinion, with a clear majority of Georgians supporting Ukraine. Indeed, the largest international military unit fighting Russia in Ukraine is the Georgian Legion. Georgia is now believed to be contemplating whether to use the collapse in Russian power to intervene against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two Kremlin-controlled breakaway Georgian regions recognized by Moscow as independent states.

Moldova is also watching events in Ukraine closely and eyeing its own Kremlin-orchestrated frozen conflict. Russian troops have been stationed in the Transnistria region of Moldova since the early 1990s. Ukraine’s military successes are now sparking debate over whether the time has come to challenge the continued presence of this small and isolated Russian army outpost.

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Russia’s retreat is nowhere more immediate or obvious than in Ukraine. Putin’s brutal invasion was supposed to derail Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and force the country firmly back into the Kremlin orbit. Instead, it has turned Ukrainian public opinion decisively against Russia while also uniting Ukrainians. Polls now consistently indicate similar attitudes throughout both western and eastern Ukraine toward Russia, national identity, language, and foreign policy. Rather than destroying the Ukrainian nation, Russian aggression has dramatically accelerated the country’s nation-building progress.

Throughout the former USSR, Russia’s only remaining loyal allies are Belarus and Armenia. The Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union no longer appear to be functioning in any meaningful sense.

Ukraine and Moldova are now firmly within the EU sphere of influence. Azerbaijan has cemented a strategic alliance with Turkey and is a rising economic and military power whose energy resources will become increasingly important to the EU as Europe seeks to end its dependency on Russia. Georgia’s unnatural pro-Russian stance is crumbling. Meanwhile, China has replaced Russia as the preeminent power in Central Asia. Russia’s humiliating military setbacks in Ukraine and economic isolation from the Western world have confirmed its status as China’s junior partner.

Thirty years on from the disintegration of the USSR, Russia is in the midst of another imperial collapse. Countries that spent the past three decades as part of Moscow’s informal empire are now turning away from Russia and taking control of their own destinies. Unsurprisingly, Europe, Turkey, and China are now all seen as more attractive partners.

Once again, it is Ukraine that is serving as the catalyst for Russia’s retreat. Putin’s invasion was meant to extinguish the Ukrainian state once and for all. Instead, Russian imperial influence is in danger of receding to levels not witnessed in hundreds of years.

Taras Kuzio is professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy and author of the forthcoming “Fascism and Genocide: Russia’s War Against Ukrainians.”

Decisions taken recently in Vilnius highlight how Belarusian opposition leaders are now addressing the effectiveness of peaceful protests and exploring their options in light of the war in Ukraine. A key outcome of the conference was the formation of a transition cabinet including a number of more militant figures who had previously been relegated to the fringes of Belarus’s anti-Lukashenka movement.

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The new transition cabinet follows on from the creation of an anti-war movement to unite all Belarusians in support of Ukraine, which was announced by Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during the first days of the Russian invasion. This initiative sought to unite Belarusians in Belarus itself with members of the diaspora and opposition figures in exile.

Others have already gone further in their opposition to Belarusian participation in Putin’s war. The most effective domestic opponents so far have been the railway partisans, a group of Belarusian activists who sabotaged the country’s rail network to prevent the transit of Russian troops and military equipment to Ukraine. Their activities proved hugely embarrassing for Lukashenka and led to legislative changes in late May that made attacks on rail infrastructure potentially subject to the death penalty.

Belarusian volunteers are also fighting for Ukraine in a number of units including the Belarusian Regiment of Kastus Kalinouski. Many of these volunteers believe a Ukrainian victory will open the way for a free Belarus. They also recognize that if Putin achieves his goal of extinguishing Ukrainian statehood, this would condemn their own country to a new era of Russian domination.

The growth of both the railway partisan movement and Belarusian volunteer participation in Ukraine has helped spark a broader debate over the need to embrace a more direct approach to opposing the Lukashenka regime. Other more militant groups such as the Supraciu (“Resistance”) movement and the ByPol organization of former Belarusian police officers have also seen their profiles rise in recent months against the backdrop of the Ukraine war. A recent independent opinion poll by Narodny Opros found that Belarusians view ByPol and the Belarusian Regiment as being five times more relevant for the opposition movement than recognized opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya.

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The recent shift within the ranks of the Belarus opposition towards a more militant stance was evident in the composition of the transition cabinet created in Vilnius, which will feature input from ByPol, Supraciu, Cyberpartisans, and the Pahonia Regiment. The cabinet member responsible for defense and security is Valery Sahashchyk, a former Belarusian army officer who is best known for a video address calling on members of the Belarusian military to change sides.

There is an understanding among members of the Belarusian opposition that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed their country’s fragile independence in grave danger. Lukashenka has already allowed Putin to invade Ukraine via Belarus. He has also permitted the use of his country as a platform for air raids and missile strikes against Ukrainian targets. Opponents of the Lukashenka regime now fear that Moscow may seek to officially consolidate its current informal control over Belarus.

As the Russian invasion of Ukraine approaches the six-month mark, it is clear that the war is having a profound impact on the political climate in neighboring Belarus. Members of the Belarusian opposition are rethinking their former commitment to exclusively non-violent protest and are now increasingly acknowledging the need to prepare for more active forms of resistance.

At present, this change in tone is most immediately evident in the activities of groups like the railway partisans and the volunteers who have travelled to Ukraine to fight against the Russian invasion. If the mood of militancy continues to spread to the wider opposition movement, it will likely be met with harsher domestic repression. Ultimately, the fate of the Lukashenka regime may hinge on the outcome of the war in Ukraine.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

The wave of air and missile strikes against Ukraine from Belarusian territory this past weekend are the latest indication that, despite frequent protestations to the contrary, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s autocratic regime is a full and willing combatant in Vladimir Putin’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.

The strikes from Belarus came as Lukashenka and Putin met in Saint Petersburg. During their meeting, the Kremlin leader announced that Russia would soon transfer nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile systems to Belarus and also upgrade Minsk’s Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets to allow them to carry nuclear weapons. Moscow and Minsk say the moves are ostensibly to counter an alleged threat to Belarus from Poland and Lithuania.

The bellicose moves by Russia and Belarus came as G7 leaders were meeting Germany and as NATO was preparing to hold its summit in Madrid. They also reflected rising tensions between Russia and Lithuania as Vilnius moved to impose European Union sanctions against Moscow by blocking the shipment of some goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.

Russia has already positioned its own Iskander missiles in Belarus. The Ukrainian General Staff announced on May 24 that Russia had deployed a division of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles to the Brest region of Belarus near the Ukrainian border. The missiles have a range of 400-500 kilometers, which puts large parts of central and western Ukraine within striking distance. Ukraine’s General Staff announced that in addition to the Iskanders, Russia has also deployed Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft gun systems and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in Belarus.

Offering up Belarusian territory as a platform for Russia to kill Ukrainian civilians isn’t the only way Alyaksandr Lukashenka has become Vladimir Putin’s partner in war crimes. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces announced on June 27 that Belarus is resupplying Russia’s war effort in Ukraine with ammunition. The most recent consignment involving up to 20 wagon loads of ammunition was recently sent to Russia’s Belgorod Oblast near the Ukrainian border.

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Speaking after the latest escalation in deadly airstrikes, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made it clear that Belarusians who aid and abet Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, from Lukashenka down to rank-and-file troops, would be held accountable.

“All pilots, dispatchers, mechanics, and other people who ensure the launch of missiles at Ukraine must understand: We will find you all. Each of you will be held responsible for these strikes. And if someone thinks they will evade responsibility by saying that they were just following orders, they are mistaken,” Zelenskyy said in a speech on June 26.

“When your missiles hit residential buildings, these are war crimes. Trial is what awaits you all. And there will be nowhere to hide for you, neither on the shores of the Caspian Sea, over which your missiles are launched, nor in Belarus. Nowhere.”

These latest attacks demonstrate not only that Lukashenka is a full and willing participant in Putin’s aggression against Ukraine and that his collusion with the Kremlin is escalating, but also that the two autocrats are conspiring to terrorize and kill innocent Ukrainian civilians. Both Putin and Lukashenka, as well as the relevant officials and soldiers in their respective chains of command, should be charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.

The United States and its allies should also designate Russia and Belarus as state sponsors of terrorism. Zelenskyy has long asked Western nations to apply this designation to Russia. And a bipartisan group of US lawmakers in both the House and Senate have called on the administration of US President Joe Biden to do so.

But why stop with Russia? Just as aiding and abetting a war criminal is a war crime, aiding and abetting a state sponsor of terrorism is terrorism. Lukashenka and his regime need to be held fully accountable for assisting Putin’s campaign of terror against Ukraine.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Underlining the threat posed Russia’s unofficial annexation of Belarus, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda last week called for a more visible NATO presence in the Baltic region. Speaking to Politico on June 24, he described Belarus as an “additional province” of Russia and warned that Putin’s military could now do whatever it wants in the country.

With fears rising over a new flashpoint in the Baltic, it is important not to underestimate the possibility of Belarus entering Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Belarus served as a platform for the northern front of the initial invasion in February 2022. Lukashenka has since allowed Russia to launch hundreds of airstrikes against Ukrainian targets from Belarusian territory and the country’s airspace. The recent escalation in Moscow’s air war on June 25-26 saw dozens of missiles fired from Belarus.

Speculation continues that Belarus may soon join the ground war with troops entering Ukraine from the north. The Belarusian military began a new round of nationwide exercises on June 22 with a focus on the transition from peacetime to wartime. The drills inevitably sparked comparisons with the early 2022 joint exercises with Russia that served as cover for preparations ahead of Moscow’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine.

Independent observers have also noted heightened military activity in the Homiel region of southern Belarus close to the Ukrainian border. This has included the deployment of Russian missile systems. Ukrainian defense officials have recently claimed that work is underway on the construction of a Russian army base in the region amid an increased Belarusian military presence throughout the border area.

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Putin sparked concerns over a possible further escalation during his June 25 meeting with Lukashenka in Saint Petersburg. The Russian dictator promised to deliver nuclear-capable Iskander-M tactical missile systems to Belarus in the coming months.

The two authoritarian leaders are expected to meet again on June 30-July 1 at the Regional Forum of Belarus and Russia. The event will take place in Belarusian city Hrodna, just a few kilometers from the border with Lithuania. This will be Putin’s first trip outside Russia since he launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and will underline Belarus’s status as Russia’s last remaining reliable ally.

While details are not yet available, there are expectations that a range of cooperation and integration agreements will be signed at the Forum related to aspects of the Union State agreement between Belarus and Russia. This bilateral pact has been in place since the late 1990s but has remained somewhat vague. However, with Russia now locked into a long-term confrontation with the Western world and Lukashenka no longer able to detach himself from the Kremlin, Putin may seek to place the merger of the two countries on a more official footing.

Many Belarusians will view their country’s involvement in the escalating confrontation between Russia and Lithuania with dread. There is already widespread disquiet and anger within Belarusian society over Lukashenka’s junior role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Numerous polls have indicated strong anti-war sentiment in Belarus, while opposition has also resulted in efforts to sabotage the Belarusian railway network in order to prevent the transit of Russian troops and military equipment.

The unpopularity of Russia’s Ukraine war among ordinary Belarusians is believed to have helped discourage Lukashenka from directly participating in the invasion. The Belarus dictator is anxious to avoid upsetting the country’s military and fears potential mutiny if he gives the order to invade. He is also acutely aware that the anti-regime mood that sparked nationwide protests in 2020 has been suppressed but not extinguished, despite the presence of over 1,200 political prisoners currently languishing in Belarusian prisons.

Lukashenka has good reason to avoid deeper involvement in further Russian acts of international aggression but he may ultimately have little choice. This poses grave security challenges for both Ukraine and Lithuania. It is also potentially disastrous for the Belarusian population, which continues to face the grim consequences of Lukashenka’s surrender of sovereignty to the Kremlin.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 22 Jun 2022 00:54:21 +0000

Vladimir Putin will travel next week to one of the only countries in Europe where he is still welcome in order to meet with one of his few remaining international allies.

Russian media reported that Putin will visit the western Belarusian city of Hrodna on June 30 to attend the Union State Regions Forum with Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Both the symbolism and timing of the trip are significant and revealing.

First the symbolism. Putin’s trip to Belarus will be his first in three years. In contrast, Lukashenka has made numerous trips to Russia, visiting Sochi, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and even a cosmodrome in the Russian Far East, in order to show his fealty to the Kremlin leader. This asymmetry reflects the true balance of power within the Putin-Lukashenka axis of autocrats.

The fact that Putin will now travel to a provincial Belarusian city to meet Lukashenka does not necessarily suggest a change in power dynamics between the two dictators. But it does indicate that with his troops bogged down in Ukraine’s Donbas region, his international isolation increasing, and his conflict with the West intensifying, Putin needs Lukashenka more than he would probably care to admit.

In terms of symbolism and timing, Putin’s visit will also come as the European Union is moving quickly to grant EU candidacy status to Ukraine and Moldova. The EU is scheduled to vote on candidacy status for the two countries at the 27-nation bloc’s summit on June 23-24, in what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called a “historic week” for his country.

The juxtaposition of Ukraine and Moldova triumphantly achieving their long-coveted goal of EU candidacy with the image of two aging, ailing and isolated dictators meeting at a meaningless conference in Belarus provides an apt split-screen moment that illustrates the growing gap between democratic Europe and the continent’s autocratic outliers in Moscow and Minsk.

It also illustrates Lukashenka’s utter lack of legitimacy as his country’s ruler. As Lukashenka grovels before his only patron, himself an international pariah, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is justifiably being treated in Western capitals like an honored head of state. She addressed the Kalinowski Conference at the European Parliament in Brussels on June 21, a meeting also attended by prominent members of the Belarusian opposition. The group was established by European lawmakers as a forum to advance the cause of a democratic Belarus.

As I have previously written in this space, the United States and its allies should get ahead of the curve and recognize Tsikhanouskaya’s government in exile as the legitimate government of Belarus.

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Putin’s trip to Belarus will coincide with the NATO Summit in Madrid, which Zelensky will address via video link. The summit, the alliance’s first since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, will be historic for several reasons, not least of which are the membership applications of Sweden and Finland. It will also come at a time when Moscow is threatening NATO member Lithuania over Vilnius’s enforcement of EU sanctions by blocking the transit of some goods to Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad.

This is yet another juxtaposition and split-screen moment that does not favor the Putin-Lukashenka axis of autocrats. We can likely expect the 30-member Western alliance to demonstrate unity and resolve in Madrid. The alliance will almost certainly stand behind Lithuania which, after all, is only enforcing sanctions that have already been enacted by the EU. And despite Turkey’s concerns, we can also ultimately expect unity over Finland and Sweden’s membership applications.

Whatever photo ops, announcements, or declarations come out of the Putin-Lukashenka meeting in Hrodna, they will appear weak compared to the Western unity and resolve that is likely to be on display in Madrid.

The contours of the new Europe are coming into focus. The EU is set to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidacy. The European Parliament is demonstrating its strong support for democratic change in Belarus. Tsikhanouskaya is being treated like the legitimate head of state she may soon become. And NATO is poised for an historic enlargement in response to Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. Meanwhile, two washed-up dictators are planning to meet at a meaningless conference in Hrodna.

A democratic Belarus is vital for Ukrainian and European security

Alesia Rudnik — Mon, 20 Jun 2022 12:44:50 +0000

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called a security meeting in Kyiv on June 16 to assess the risk of a possible renewed invasion of the country from Belarus. Zelenskyy raised the alarm following mounting evidence of a Belarusian military build-up close to the border with northern Ukraine.

The move highlighted continuing concerns in Kyiv over the threat posed by Putin’s closest ally, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In his latest hint at a possible forthcoming military intervention, Lukashenka warned on June 17 that he may be forced to “defend” western Ukraine from Poland.

Menacing rhetoric of this nature is nothing new. Nor can it be written off as mere saber-rattling. When Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, the main thrust of the attack came from Belarus toward Kyiv. Throughout the first month of the war, Belarus continued to serve as a launch pad for Russia’s ultimately failed attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital.

Members of the Belarusian opposition have long argued that the underwhelming international reaction to Lukashenka’s ruthless crackdown on the country’s 2020 pro-democracy protest movement was a dangerous mistake that has left Europe significantly less secure. They claim this inadequate response set the stage for Belarus’s current supporting role in Putin’s Ukraine War.

At the time, the Ukrainian authorities condemned Lukashenka’s brutal response to the protests and welcomed fleeing Belarusians. However, Kyiv also maintained economic ties with the regime and adopted a cautious approach towards exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

There are indications that this strained relationship with the Belarusian opposition persists. In a recent interview with the independent Belarusian media, Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak claimed Ukraine did not understand Tsikhanouskaya’s position on Russia. He accused the Belarusian opposition leader of making “rather strange statements that, to put it mildly, were no different from the statements coming out of official Minsk and in some aspects were even more pro-Russian.”

Podolyak’s comments reflect lingering disquiet in Kyiv over Tsikhanouskaya’s initial attempts in 2020 to avoid criticism of the Kremlin in a bid to deter Putin from backing Lukashenka. His claims angered many Belarusians who accused Podolyak of ignoring the opposition leader’s more recent pro-Ukrainian statements. Since the invasion began in February, Tsikhanouskaya has spoken out frequently in support of Ukraine while attacking Russian aggression and condemning Lukashenka’s support for the war.

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Tsikhanouskaya is one of many Belarusians who have demonstrated their opposition to the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the threat of severe penalties, hundreds of Belarusians used the occasion of a February 27 national referendum to protest the war in Ukraine. Throughout Europe, the Belarusian diaspora has mobilized to support Ukrainian refugees.

Meanwhile, hundreds of Belarusians have travelled to Ukraine to join the fight against Russian aggression, with Tsikhanouskaya recently estimating the overall number of volunteers at 1,500. The presence of so many Belarusians within the ranks of the Ukrainian military has drawn praise from Kyiv. For example, presidential advisor Oleksiy Arestovych called the Belarusian battalion one of the most effective units in the Ukrainian army and praised them as “examples of personal courage, bravery and military conduct.”

On the domestic front, significant numbers of Belarusians have joined an underground anti-war movement that has targeted the country’s rail network and is credited with significantly disrupting Russian military logistics moving through Belarus. This sabotage campaign proved so embarrassing for Lukashenka that he introduced changes to the country’s capital punishment legislation in May allowing the death penalty for railway partisans.

Ukraine’s mixed messaging on Belarus has created the impression that there is still some reluctance in Kyiv to cut all ties with Lukashenka despite his deep involvement in Putin’s invasion. However, attitudes may now be hardening. As the international community seeks solutions to the mounting global food crisis sparked by the Russian blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, Zelenskyy recently ruled out the possibility of sending Ukrainian grain to Baltic ports via Belarus. “We understand why we were offered this but we are not ready to help our “friendly” neighbors,” he noted sarcastically.

This was an encouraging step that suggests a more uncompromising stance toward Belarus. The international community must now maintain this pressure on the Belarusian authorities while supporting the country’s democratic opposition and imposing further costs on Lukashenka for aiding Putin’s war effort and engaging in domestic human rights abuses.

Lukashenka’s participation in the Russian invasion of Ukraine has underlined the security threat posed by the authoritarian regime in Minsk. Without a fundamental political transition in Belarus, the country will continue to provide support for Putin’s policies of imperial aggression and will remain a source of regional instability.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Renewed Belarus military buildup is a sign of Lukashenka’s desperation

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 15 Jun 2022 12:45:45 +0000

With war raging in Ukraine’s east and south, there are mounting concerns that the threat to the country’s north and west, including the capital Kyiv, could soon return.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka said on June 10 that Belarus may be forced to enter the war to fight for the west of Ukraine so that it is “not chopped off” by NATO. The Belarusian dictator’s remarks came as Minsk was reinforcing its electronic warfare capabilities along the Ukrainian border, according to a Facebook post by the Ukrainian General Staff. “Combat engineering tasks are being performed to reinforce checkpoints and deploy additional electronic warfare equipment in the areas near the border between Belarus and Ukraine,” the General Staff wrote.

Additionally, Belarus has been conducting military exercises in the area and Lukashenka has announced the creation of an operational command for troops on the border with Ukraine. Russia has recently deployed nuclear-capable Iskander missiles, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft gun systems, and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems near the frontier. Alongside these developments, Lukashenka has announced the purchase of S-400s and Iskanders from Russia. The Belarusian autocrat has also ordered the creation of a “people’s militia.”

According to a confidential unpublished report by the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, Lukashenka met in early June with Ihar Shunevich, the former Interior Minister who now heads the Belarusian Society of Hunters and Fishermen, and ordered him to provide five thousand men for the militia. The report also noted that Russian Private Military Companies like the Wagner Group have been actively recruiting Belarusians recently.

There is much speculation over whether this heightened military activity in Belarus indicates that Russia is preparing to launch a new offensive into northern Ukraine. The Atlantic Council’s Peter Dickinson wrote recently in this space that “skeptics see the moves as an elaborate Kremlin-choreographed Belarusian bluff with the objective of forcing Ukraine to strengthen its northern defenses while preventing the redeployment of Ukrainian troops to the current focal point of the war in the country’s eastern Donbas region.”

Likewise, Scott Rauland, the former chief of mission at the US Embassy in Minsk, told The Daily Beast that Lukashenka appears to be staging an elaborate show of loyalty to Putin. “The only explanation for him taking whatever action has been taken or that is being contemplated is that he is under duress from Putin to demonstrate loyalty and that he is probably expecting additional financial support from the Kremlin,” Rauland said.

Nevertheless, the authorities in Kyiv appear to be taking the threat seriously. Mykhailo Podoliak, an advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, said in an interview with the Belarusian newspaper Zerkalo that Kyiv is preparing “for different scenarios” and that Ukrainian intelligence is “monitoring all movements, initiatives, training, and distribution of weapons to hunters.” Podoliak added that “if Belarus wants to see what mass deaths of military personnel look like, then perhaps it should enter Ukraine.”

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Regardless of whether Belarus is preparing to enter the war, is engaged in an elaborate bluff, or if Lukashenka is simply performing an over-the-top ritual to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin, the recent military activity highlights the impossible position the Belarusian dictator now finds himself in.

If Russia’s war in Ukraine is successful and Putin is strengthened as a result, Belarus’s sovereignty and independence will likely be in grave danger and Lukashenka will become dispensable. Alternatively, if Russia loses the war in Ukraine and Putin is weakened, Lukashenka will lose his only patron and protector making him vulnerable to the wrath of his own people. Either way, Lukashenka is poised to lose out and he likely understands this.

In an interview with Newsweek, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said the same guerilla tactics Belarusian dissidents used to disrupt Russia’s war against Ukraine, which included hacking and sabotaging rail lines, can also be used in what she called “the last fight” against Lukashenka. The dictator “understands that more and more people are against him because he is selling our independence. I’m sure that when we feel this moment, at the weakest point of the regime, people will rise up again,” she said.

In this sense, the battle for Ukraine is also a battle for the future of Belarus. The United States and its allies should get ahead of the curve and recognize Tsikhanouskaya’s government in exile as the legitimate government of Belarus.

The move is seen by many as an indication of regime concerns over possible industrial action after union leaders spoke out against the war in Ukraine and called for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus.

Lukashenka has allowed his country to serve as a staging post for the invasion of Ukraine and has also permitted Russia to use Belarus as a platform for hundreds of airstrikes against Ukrainian targets. This has not proved popular. Many Belarusians oppose their country’s supporting role in Putin’s war, with opposition extending to sabotage attacks on the Belarusian rail network to prevent the transit of Russian military personnel and equipment. Lukashenka recently expanded the country’s capital punishment legislation to include those engaged in such acts.

Belarus’s trade unions have been under mounting pressure from the regime ever since the outbreak of a nationwide pro-democracy protest movement in the wake of the country’s deeply flawed August 2020 presidential election. Many employees of state-controlled institutions ranging from TV stations to fertilizer producers responded to the rigged vote by organizing strikes and walkouts while demanding Lukashenka step down.

The regime responded with a comprehensive crackdown. Strike leaders were targeted and threatened with dismissal, while some members of strike committees were reportedly abducted and pressured by the KGB. At least 13 prominent figures from within the strike movement have faced accusations of state treason. Many others fled the country.

While the authorities succeeded in suppressing the strike committees that sprung up in late summer 2020, Belarus’s independent trade unions enjoyed a modicum of protection due to their official status and were able to continue operating despite threats, arrests, and instances of intimidation. However, they now appear to be among the targets as Lukashenka seeks to stamp out any potential renewal in protest activity fueled by anti-war sentiment.

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On April 18, Lukashenka held an emergency meeting with Belarusian police and other law enforcement agencies to complain about an alleged lack of loyalty and stability. The response was immediate. The following day, police raided the offices of three independent trade unions.

The targets of these raids included the Belarusian Congress of Trade Unions, which is part of the International Trade Union Confederation and brings together the country’s independent trade unions. It has a membership of about 10,000 people. More than 20 union leaders were detained and accused of “organizing actions that grossly violate public order.” If convicted, they could face up to four years in prison.

In a further apparent attempt to criminalize the activities of independent trade unions, the Belarusian KGB labelled one union an extremist organization despite the fact that it is officially registered with the relevant state authorities. In recent months, hundreds of union members claim to have been subjected to harassment and intimidation while being pressured to leave their unions. Activists have been interrogated and union offices have allegedly been bugged.

These actions have not gone unnoticed internationally. During the recent annual conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Lukashenka regime was heavily criticized for the use of extreme violence to suppress peaceful protests and was accused of violating the labor rights of Belarusians.

There are now calls for greater international pressure on the regime as opposition figures warn that Lukashenka is seeking to suppress Belarus’s independent trade unions and shut down one more avenue of expression for ordinary Belarusians. The crackdown that began in 2020 appears to have gained new impetus following the onset of Putin’s Ukraine War. Further restrictions are now anticipated.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Belarus bluff? Putin’s only ally sparks fears of possible new Kyiv offensive

Peter Dickinson — Wed, 08 Jun 2022 17:25:50 +0000

Belarus announced the start of major nationwide military exercises on June 7. The drills, which will involve all branches of the Belarusian armed forces, are reportedly designed to prepare the country for the transition “from peacetime to wartime.” These new exercises form part of a recent pattern of heightened military mobilization in southern Belarus that has fueled speculation over the possibility of a renewed cross-border offensive into northern Ukraine as part of Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Not everyone is convinced that the threat from Belarus is genuine. Skeptics see the moves as an elaborate Kremlin-choreographed Belarusian bluff with the objective of forcing Ukraine to strengthen its northern defenses while preventing the redeployment of Ukrainian troops to the current focal point of the war in the country’s eastern Donbas region. Nevertheless, there is no denying the uptick in activity.

In recent weeks, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has announced the creation of a Southern Operational Command for the Belarusian army, which will be based close to the Ukrainian border. Ukrainian officials have noted intensifying reconnaissance and the deployment of additional units to border districts. Lukashenka has also recently permitted Russia to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles and other missile systems to southern Belarus. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s General Staff reported in early June that preparations are currently underway to increase the overall size of the Belarusian army from 45,000 to 80,000 troops.

Some believe this Belarusian saber-rattling is an indication that Moscow may be considering a new assault on Kyiv. In a June 3 interview with Current Time, Ukrainian MP and Special Forces commander Roman Kostenko said a second Russian attack on the Ukrainian capital was now being viewed as increasingly likely. “We regard this threat as high. Either the Russians will be able to enter there if they gather forces and announce a mobilization, or they talk the Belarusians into taking part.”

Kyiv was the initial priority target when Russia first invaded Ukraine on February 24, with a number of elite Russian military units ordered to seize the city and decapitate the Ukrainian government. However, Putin’s invasion force encountered unexpectedly fierce Ukrainian opposition and soon became bogged down in the towns and villages to the north of Kyiv. Following a month of minimal progress and heavy losses, the Russian military was forced to retreat entirely from northern Ukraine.

Belarus played a vital role in this failed offensive. The country served as a staging ground for the majority of Russian troops entering Ukraine from the north. It then acted as an ongoing logistical hub as the invasion unfolded and ultimately unraveled.

With battlefield casualties mounting throughout March, Belarusian hospitals and morgues were soon full of Russian dead and wounded. Many of the Ukrainian soldiers and civilians taken prisoner by Russian forces on the northern front of the invasion reported being brought across the border and held in Belarus. Throughout the conflict, Lukashenka has also allowed Russia to use Belarus as a launch pad for hundreds of airstrikes against Ukrainian targets.

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Despite his obvious involvement in the Russian invasion, Lukashenka has continued to protest his innocence while claiming non-combatant status. These denials are in part motivated by a desire to avoid further international sanctions, but the Belarusian dictator is also acutely aware that Putin’s war is deeply unpopular among the Belarusian public.

Polls have consistently indicated that most Belarusians oppose the war and are particularly adamant in their opposition to the participation of the Belarusian military. Some Belarusians have even engaged in active sabotage of the Russian war effort including attempts to disrupt the passage of Russian troops and military equipment via the Belarusian rail network. Others have travelled to Ukraine and joined volunteer battalions fighting against Putin’s invasion.

Public disquiet over the war and awareness of the catastrophic casualties suffered by Russian forces in northern Ukraine have helped raise serious doubts over the readiness of the Belarusian military to join the invasion. There have been numerous unconfirmed reports of senior Belarusian commanders resigning in protest over plans to participate in Putin’s war, while exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stated in a June 3 interview that Belarusian military chiefs had directly refused orders to invade.

This places Lukashenka in a very difficult predicament. He knows that direct participation in the invasion of Ukraine would be deeply unpopular among Belarusians and must also fear that many soldiers would likely desert as soon as they crossed the Ukrainian border. At the same time, his hardline crackdown on the Belarusian pro-democracy movement since 2020 has made him and international pariah and left him almost entirely reliant on the Kremlin for his political survival. Lukashenka must therefore find a way to please his patron Vladimir Putin while resisting Russian pressure to join the war.

Defeat in the Battle for Kyiv was a humiliating blow for Putin that he is no doubt eager to avenge. However, his only ally Alyaksandr Lukashenka is in all likelihood neither willing nor able to participate in any fresh attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital. While it would be reckless to completely write off the chances of a new Kyiv offensive, it is more probable that the recent bluster in Belarus is Lukashenka’s way of demonstrating his usefulness to his Kremlin sponsors while tying down Ukrainian forces which might otherwise be used to oppose advancing Russian troops in the east.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s BelarusAlert Service.

Putin’s threat, coupled with the recent deployments of military hardware to the Belarusian-Ukrainian border and the first airstrikes in weeks against Kyiv, have raised alarms that Russia may be about to renew its assault on the Ukrainian capital and revive its earlier more expansive war ambitions. These steps have also starkly illustrated the absurdity of Lukashenka’s frequent protestations that he is not a co-aggressor in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

As the Minsk-based political analyst Artyom Shraibman wrote recently, “on every possible occasion, Lukashenka reiterates that he has always been against the war and wants it to end as soon as possible.” Yet at the same time, “Russian troops, jets and missile systems have not been fully withdrawn from Belarus.”

Not only have they not been withdrawn, they are being augmented.

It is also worth noting that as Putin was threatening to expand the war in Ukraine and deploying nuclear-capable missiles and anti-aircraft systems to Belarus to make good on that threat, he was also seeking to leverage the escalating grain crisis he created by blockading Ukraine’s Black Sea ports in order to get Belarus relief from Western sanctions.

In remarks to Russian media on June 3, Putin said “the easiest and cheapest way” to export Ukrainian grain to the world is through Belarus. “From Belarus it can go directly into the ports of the Baltic states, to the Baltic Sea, and anywhere else in the world,” Putin noted. “But in order for this to happen, the sanctions against Belarus must be lifted. It’s not our call, but that’s how President Lukashenka would put it.”

This could easily be dismissed as trolling. But it also illustrates the degree to which Lukashenka’s Belarus has effectively become an appendage of Putin’s Russia.

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Lukashenka’s fate is now inexorably tied to Putin’s and to the outcome of his war against Ukraine. This is something the Belarusian opposition is very aware of as it plots its course in the event of a Russian defeat. If the war leaves Putin diminished, it will also leave Lukashenka vulnerable.

“If the Putin regime is somehow weakened to the point where it cannot subsidize its remaining allies and project military power in its immediate neighborhood, Belarus may well repeat the process seen in the region in the late 1980s,” Shraibman wrote. “Just as Central European communist regimes fell apart when the Soviet Union showed itself unable to prop them up, Belarus will be forced to reform and Westernize if Putin’s Russia becomes weak enough. Provided, of course, that Minsk has managed to keep its statehood intact up until that moment arrives.”

Which means that if Ukraine can defeat Russia and preserve its sovereignty and independence, this may also have the added benefit of sparking political change in Belarus as well. All the more reason for the West to stay the course in supporting Ukraine with all the weapons, training, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic assistance that it needs, Putin’s threats and Lukashenka’s enabling notwithstanding. This is not the time to worry about humiliating Putin or to press Ukraine into making concessions.

Putin began this year, the centenary of the founding of the Soviet Union, with dreams of restoring the old empire through a soft annexation of Belarus and the military subjugation of Ukraine. He may yet succeed. But with the year almost half over, it is not outside the realm of possibility that he could wind up with neither.

Russian War Report: Signs of renewed Belarusian troop movements towards Ukrainian border

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 03 Jun 2022 15:21:52 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Signs of renewed Belarusian troop movements towards Ukrainian border

Tracking narratives

Kremlin media spread claims of NATO officers being captured and murdered in Mariupol

Kremlin shifts blame to Western sanctions for growing global food crisis

Media Policy

Russia attempts to limit the use of VPNs and Tor

Signs of renewed Belarusian troop movements towards Ukrainian border

On May 26, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka ordered the creation of a new military command center in southern Belarus, which borders Ukraine. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on the new command post, saying that Belarus “has to practice defending its southern frontiers quickly.”

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense said on May 25 that it had received intelligence that Belarus was taking practical actions to check “the combat readiness” of its armed forces and that exercises were planned at ten training grounds in Belarus, including Brest, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk. “As part of the same exercises, it is planned to remove weapons and military equipment from storage, as well as to carry out marches,” said Oleksandr Motuzianyk, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

On June 2, videos of Belarusian military equipment being transported via railway appeared online. Ukrainian journalist and former presidential spokesperson Iuliia Mendel said the video captures more than fifty units of military equipment being transported from Grodno in the north to Brest in the south. Mendel said the train carried thirty-seven infantry fighting vehicles and anti-aircraft missile systems. However, the DFRLab could not confirm these figures as the video features cuts and transitions that make it difficult to accurately assess the amount of equipment visible.

https://twitter.com/AZmilitary1/status/1532320736483975168

A video that surfaced on June 2 shows Belarusian military vehicles being transferred via railway. The DFRLab geolocated the footage to Baranavichy, Belarus. (Source: @AZmilitary1/archive)

The DFRLab geolocated another June 2 video of military equipment in transit to an area near the rail station in Baranavichy, in the western Brest region.

Geolocation confirms the Belarusian military vehicle transport passed through Baranavichy. The image on the left is a screenshot from the video, and the image on the right is a stock image taken of Baranavichy train station. (Source: @AZmilitary1/archive, left; alchetron.com/archive, right)

It remains unclear how many Belarusian forces are being relocated to the Ukrainian border, what their purpose is, or how long their deployment will be.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin media spread claims of NATO officers being captured and murdered in Mariupol

On May 19, Veterans Today, a US-based website with a history of circulating antisemitic and conspiratorial content, published an article titled, “NATO Officers in Azovstal Murdered & Mutilated by Azov to Spare Western Governments Embarrassment?” The article suggests that the “Azov Brigade and other associated neo-Nazi groups” killed and disposed of the bodies of NATO officers who were trapped inside Mariupol’s Azovstal steelworks. After a three-month siege, Russian forces took control of the Azovstal plant on May 20. The article claimed the Russian army would not be able to find evidence of the NATO officers’ presence as “Moscow doesn’t have access to the DNA databases of Western military institutions,” and “it’s not clear that the stakes would be worth the bother.”

Pro-Kremlin media outlets in Russia reported on the article, including Pravda.ru, Krasnaya Vesna, Narodnye Novosti, Yuzhny Federalny, Kurer Sreda, Yakutsk.ru, Politichesky Vestnik, OSN, and Gals.ru. Pravda.ru translated and published large excerpts on May 20. The rest of the listed publications published articles about the column the following day, except for Kurer Sreda, which reported on the article on May 25.

The article also spread on Telegram. TGStat, a Telegram analysis tool, identified seventeen original posts and the reposts mentioning “Michael Brenner,” the person listed as the author of the article, in Russian from May 18 to May 25. Thirty-four channels that amplified the story were in Russia, while three channels were in Belarus and two in Ukraine. While most pro-Kremlin media wrote about the article on May 21, on Telegram, Brenner garnered the most mentions on May 23.

Screenshot of a TGStat query showing the increase in posts about Michael Brenner on Telegram. (Source: nikaaleksejeva/DFRLab via TGStat)

In late March, the narrative claiming that NATO officers were trapped inside the Azovstal steelworks first started to spread on pro-Kremlin Telegram channels and in pro-Kremlin media. On March 31, Tsargrad, a right-leaning pro-Kremlin media outlet, cited the Telegram channel Ukraina/Open Ukraine to claim that a “group of twenty American and British military advisors…did not manage to leave the city [of Mariupol] in time.” On April 1, Thomas Gast, a German YouTuber, claimed “High ranking NATO commanders” were in the Azovstal steelworks. On April 3, Gast’s video was translated and cited in a post on LiveJournal, a Russian-owned blogging platform.

On April 5, English and Russian pro-Kremlin Telegram channels asserted there were “French, German, British and ‘neutral’ Swedish NATO officers” in the Azovstal plant. Pro–Kremlin media and fringe English-language media also spread the rumor.

On April 6, false information began to circulate about the capture of Lieutenant Roger Cloutier, the chief of NATO’s Allied Land Command in Europe. The claim spread on social media, in English and other languages, and in Russian pro–Kremlin media. Reuters and Vox Ukraine debunked the claim.

On May 22, Tsargrad falsely claimed that US Admiral Eric T. Olson and British Lieutenant Colonel John Bailey were captured alongside Ukrainian fighters inside the Azovstal steelwork. France 24 and Techarp debunked these claims.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin shifts blame to Western sanctions for growing global food crisis

As Russia blocks trade routes in the Black Sea halting all Ukrainian exports, Kremlin officials sought to blame sanctions imposed by Western countries for the growing threat to food security. On June 1, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the world was facing a food crisis “linked to the introduction of illegal restrictions against us [Russia] and the actions of Ukrainian authorities.” On May 18, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said that the “rise in global food prices is a direct result of the senseless buildup of unilateral anti-Russian restrictions.”

Russian Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin also echoed these claims. “By imposing illegitimate sanctions against Russia, these countries pushed up energy and food prices, and they are to blame for the current problems and future crises globally,” he said. On his Telegram channel, Volodin went so far as to claim that the US wanted to organize a “Holodomor” in Ukraine, in reference to the Soviet Union’s mass starvation campaign against Ukraine in the 1930s, because the US wants to sell Ukrainian grain to recoup its financial losses from investing in Ukraine’s defense.

In May, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the war in Ukraine was “amplifying and accelerating” food insecurity and global hunger. The UN World Food Programme recently said, “When a country like Ukraine that grows enough food for 400 million people is out of the market, it creates market volatility, which we are now seeing.” 

Western officials have dismissed the claim that sanctions are to blame for rising food insecurity. United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the US and many other nations have exempted food, fertilizer, and seeds from sanctions. In May, Russia’s Union of Grain Exporters stated, “Sanctions and export controls against Russia do not and will not target essential exports of food and agricultural inputs to developing countries.”

In reality, the growing food crisis can be linked to Russia’s decision to block all of Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea, effectively halting all Ukrainian exports. “The food supply for millions of Ukrainians and millions more around the world has quite literally been held hostage,” Blinken said. UK Foreign Minister Liz Truss added, “It is completely appalling that Putin is trying to hold the world to ransom, and he is essentially weaponizing hunger and lack of food amongst the poorest people around the world.”

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia attempts to limit the use of VPNs and Tor

On May 31, Russian communications regulator Roskomnadzor demanded that Google Play remove the Tor browser, a tool used to anonymize internet browsing, from its app store. Tor was banned in Russia in 2017 when the Saratov regional court ruled that the “anonymizer” makes it possible for an internet user to access illegal content in Russia. The ruling did not impact the availability of Tor in Russia until December 2021, when Roskomnadzor banned the Tor website. Weeks later, German public broadcaster Deutsche Welle’s Russian branch reported that Tor was still working in Russia due to user-generated “bridges” that served as proxies to help circumvent the blocks enacted by internet providers.

In addition to Tor, Russian residents have used virtual private networks (VPNs) to access content restricted by Russian authorities. On May 29, Global Check, a service for monitoring outages and availability of online resources, said on Telegram that it had observed problems in some Russian regions with IPsec and IKEv2, the encrypted internet protocol technology used by VPNs. Global Check said that on some operators, including Rostelekom, one of Russia’s largest internet providers, “IPsec does not even pass between the server and the client in Russia. This is a big blow, including to corporate networks – many administrators of such networks are now urgently looking for solutions to bypass.”

On June 2, Proton VPN tweeted, “The Russian government has blocked ProtonMail and ProtonVPN within Russia.” The company added, “It is likely that the local ISPs and the authorities are interfering with VPN connections, in which case it may not be possible for us to solve such issues.”

This is not the first time Russian authorities have cracked down on VPNs. In March 2019, Roskomnadzor demanded that ten VPN services connect to federal government IT systems. Only one company, owned by Kaspersky Lab, complied with the request. In September 2021, Roskomnadzor demanded that six VPN services be blocked.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

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Putin’s Black Sea blackmail sets stage for Belarus “deal with the devil”

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 01 Jun 2022 22:16:58 +0000

He allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a platform to attack Ukraine and permitted Moscow to deploy nuclear-capable missiles near the Ukrainian border. He hijacked a European airliner and manufactured a migrant crisis. And he has carried out a brutal crackdown on dissent that includes the torture of opposition figures.

But despite all this, Belarusian autocrat Alyaksandr Lukashenka may have just discovered the perfect little escape hatch to free his regime from Western sanctions and international isolation. The key to Lukashenka’s potential liberation and rehabilitation lies in a problem that was created by his ally and patron, Vladimir Putin: the looming global food crisis that has resulted from Russia’s Black Sea blockade on Ukrainian grain.

Speaking at an extraordinary summit of EU leaders in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the food crisis is “only the fault of Russia,” accusing Moscow of blocking 22 million tons of grain from being shipped out of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

In an effort to alleviate the crisis, European leaders are seeking alternative routes to bring Ukrainian grain to global markets. One option being considered is shipping the grain via rail to ports on the Baltic Sea. And therein lies the catch. To get to Baltic Sea seaports like the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda, most of that grain would need to pass through Belarus.

In remarks to reporters on May 10, Lithuanian Transportation Minister Marius Skuodis said the West needs to either confront Russia and “dare to unblock the ports” or “use the existing infrastructure and to transport grain via Belarus, which would allow us to use the full capacity of the port of Klaipėda, as well as the capacity of Latvian and Estonian ports. This would require a certain humanitarian corridor via Belarus.” Skuodis added that “if a Ukrainian shipment came from Belarus, we would accept it.”

And therein lies the unsavory dilemma. In order to solve a potentially catastrophic world food crisis that has been manufactured by Putin, the West may need to make a deal with Lukashenka.

Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš summarized the deal-with-the-devil problem succinctly, noting that on the one hand, Belarus would be the most efficient route to get grain to Baltic ports, which “have a lot of capacity.” But on the other hand, he added, “the question is what Belarus will ask in return. And that price may be too high.”

The price demanded by Minsk would almost certainly involve the easing of international sanctions against the Lukashenka regime. Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Xavier Bettel called the idea of making such a deal with Belarus “a bit tricky.”

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There are alternative options available other than the Belarusian route for Ukrainian grain.

Officials have noted that some grain can be shipped from Ukraine to Baltic seaports via Poland, but capacity on this route would be limited due to logistical issues including a backlog of traffic, a shortage of suitable wagons, and the fact that Ukraine and Lithuania still use Soviet-standard rail gauges which are wider than the European-standard gauges Poland uses. As a result, according to Skuodis, only two or three trains per day can travel to Lithuania from Poland.

The Polish port of Gdansk and the Romanian port of Constanța are also being looked at as alternatives, but those options include the same logistical problems of shipping the grain to Lithuania via Poland. The most viable option from a logistical perspective is opening a corridor through Belarus, but this is also the most politically unsavory.

As Western leaders ponder their options, the Lukashenka regime continues to act like a facilitator and co-aggressor in Putin’s illegal and unprovoked war against Ukraine. Just days after allowing Russia to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles that could strike Ukraine from Belarusian territory, Lukashenka ordered the creation of a new military command in southern Belarus near the Ukrainian border.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has correctly said that Russia is trying to leverage the grain crisis it created in order to “blackmail” the West into lifting sanctions. Given Belarus’s near absolute economic and political dependence on Russia, easing sanctions on Belarus in exchange for helping export Ukrainian grain would, in effect, be the same as easing sanctions on Russia.

A deal with the devil to address the looming world food crisis may be tempting. But it is a temptation that should be avoided.

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya welcomed the Norwegian gesture, which she praised as “more than just symbolic.” Belarusian journalist Hanna Liubakova shared this sentiment, commenting that she saw Norway’s step as a sign of growing international recognition that referring to modern Belarus as “White Russia” was anachronistic and misleading.

Norway’s decision to begin using the name Belarus in official documents is part of a regional trend, with fellow Scandinavian countries Sweden and Denmark also making similar switches from their own outdated versions of “White Russia” in recent years. This reflects broader changes in international perceptions of the country following a 2020 pro-democracy uprising that thrust Belarus into the global headlines following decades spent in the post-Soviet shadows.

For much of the post-Soviet period, Belarus was perhaps best known internationally as the last dictatorship in Europe. It owed this dubious honor to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who won election in 1994 before proceeding to dismantle the country’s fledgling democracy and reestablish a Soviet-style one-party state.

For over a quarter of a century, Lukashenka was able to successfully suppress all domestic opposition and strengthen his grip on power while maintaining close ties with neighboring Russia. He faced the first serious challenge of his entire reign in August 2020 when heavy-handed attempts to rig the country’s presidential election served as a focal point for simmering public frustrations, leading to the eruption of mass protests across the country on the evening of the vote.

This pro-democracy protest movement gained momentum in subsequent weeks and caught the world’s imagination. It dominated international news coverage for much of late summer and early fall 2020, with many seeing the unprecedented people power uprising as the latest chapter in the slow-motion collapse of the Soviet Empire. The Lukashenka regime looked destined to fall until Russia intervened with a financial lifeline and a promise to send in the Russian security services if necessary.

Lukashenka has remained entirely dependent on Russian support ever since. In return, he has gradually surrendered his country’s sovereignty to the Kremlin, allowing Moscow to expand its political, economic, and military footprints in the country. In February 2022, Lukashenka permitted Putin to use Belarus as a platform for the invasion of Ukraine. Thousands of Russian troops flooded across the Belarusian border into Ukraine as part Putin’s failed attempt to seize Kyiv. The country has also served as a launch pad for the bombardment of Ukrainian towns and cities.

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Moscow’s role in propping up the Lukashenka regime has had a negative impact on traditionally friendly Belarusian attitudes toward Russia. It has also encouraged international audiences to rethink earlier impressions of Belarus as being virtually indistinguishable from Russia.

The recent renaming of Belarus by the Norwegian government is very much part of this ongoing process. For hundreds of years, countries like Belarus and Ukraine have been viewed by the outside world almost entirely through a Russian lens and have typically been regarded as regions of Russia itself. Decolonizing the spelling of people, places, and entire countries is a small but significant and long overdue step toward the international rejection of this Russian imperial narrative.

The crusade to derussify official spellings has been a particularly prominent feature of nation-building efforts in independent Ukraine. Indeed, in recent years the #KyivNotKiev social media campaign to secure recognition for the Ukrainian-language transliteration of the country’s capital city has attracted considerable international interest and helped fuel a lively debate over national identity and the legacy of Russian imperialism.

It remains to be seen whether the rejection of “White Russia” could play a similar role in Belarus’s own efforts to emerge from centuries of Russian domination and assert a more independent identity on the international stage. However, the fact that countries like Norway recognize the symbolic importance of ditching “White Russia” is a welcome indication that attitudes toward Belarus are already changing.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s BelarusAlert Service.

Putin deploys nuclear-capable missiles to Belarusian border with Ukraine

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 25 May 2022 21:13:08 +0000

In a rambling letter to United Nations Secretary General António Guterres on May 23, the Belarusian autocrat wrote that the West’s “disrespect for” what he called Russia’s “legitimate interests” led to the current East-West tension and “provoked a heated conflict on the territory of Ukraine.” Lukashenka also called on the West to “refrain from the supply of weapons” to Ukraine in order to “prevent a regional conflict in Europe from escalating into a full-scale world war.”

In the letter, which was delivered as Lukashenka was meeting Putin in Sochi, he also decried the fact that much of the world views him as a co-aggressor in the war. “We are not aggressors, as some states try to present us. Belarus has never been the initiator of any wars or conflicts,” he wrote.

The Belarus dictator’s protestations have repeatedly proven to be hollow given that Lukashenka has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a platform to attack Ukraine, and this time was no exception. With Lukashenka, it is always best to watch what he does rather than listening to what he says. Shortly after warning the West about escalation and protesting that he was not a co-aggressor, Lukashenka proceeded to act like an aggressor and help Putin escalate the war in Ukraine.

One day after Lukashenka’s letter, on May 24, the Ukrainian General Staff announced that Russia had deployed a division of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles in the Brest region of Belarus near to the Ukrainian border. “There is a growing threat of missile and air strikes on our country from the territory of the Republic of Belarus. The aggressor has deployed a battery of Iskander-M mobile short-range ballistic missile systems in the Brest region, approximately 50 kilometers away from the Ukrainian state border,” the Ukrainian General Staff wrote in a post on Facebook.

The missiles have a range of 400-500 kilometers, which puts large swaths of central and western Ukraine within striking distance. Lukashenka also announced the previous week that Belarus had purchased Iskanders and S-400 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia.

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The missile deployments and sales came as Belarus conducted military exercises near the Ukrainian border and Kyiv warned about increased troop levels and military activity. In a situation report on May 23, the Ukrainian General Staff warned that “the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus are intensifying reconnaissance and additional units are being deployed in the border areas of the Homel region.”

The Russian missile deployments to Belarus and the uptick in Belarusian military activity suggests that while the fighting in Ukraine may currently be concentrated in the east of the country, Moscow still intends to pressure Ukraine from the north.

The military build-up on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border has been mirrored by similar activity along Ukraine’s nearby northern frontier with Russia. Seven weeks after Russia withdrew from the Chernihiv and Sumy regions in northern Ukraine, Ukrainian officials have recently noted an uptick in cross-border rocket and artillery fire and an increased Russian troop presence. “In any case, we are preparing for a possible reinvasion,” Oleksandr Vadovsky, deputy commander of Chernihiv’s border guards, told The Washington Post.

The Russian deployment of Iskander missiles to Belarus also starkly illustrates that despite his claims to the contrary and his half-hearted attempts to distance himself from the conflict, Lukashenka remains Putin’s chief enabler in the war against Ukraine and is very much a co-aggressor.

He allowed the Kremlin autocrat to use his country’s territory to stage an illegal invasion of a sovereign and democratic country. Lukashenka let Belarus become a platform for Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities and villages. He is directly responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent Ukrainian civilians. And now he is allowing Putin to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles near Ukraine’s border.

The blood of any Ukrainians who may be killed by those missiles will also be on Lukashenka’s hands and he should be held accountable for it.

The decision to become an accomplice in Russian aggression against Ukraine is unpopular with many in Belarus. Polls indicate that a majority of Belarusians oppose Putin’s invasion and do not want their country to play any part in the war.

Some Belarusians responded to Lukashenka’s support for the war by sabotaging the country’s rail network in a bid to prevent Russian troops and military equipment from reaching Ukraine. These efforts succeeded in disrupting the invasion and proved deeply embarrassing for Lukashenka, who is dependent on Russia for his political survival and can ill afford to let his Kremlin patron down.

The new amendments to the Belarusian criminal code do not specifically refer to recent incidents of railway sabotage but activists believe the changes are a direct response to the anti-war partisan campaign.

The implications of the recent amendments are expected to become clearer in the coming weeks as a number of Belarusian suspects accused of railway sabotage go on trial. Those currently facing prosecution do not fit the standard profile for political activists. Most are residents of provincial towns and come from traditional working class backgrounds. Some are railway employees.

Lukashenka’s death penalty threats may not be limited to Belarusian anti-war activists. Human rights campaigners fear the recent amendments could also be used more broadly against the country’s pro-democracy opposition. The emphasis on terrorist offenses is very much in line with previous efforts to target political opponents.

During the crackdown on nationwide anti-regime protests that came in the wake of Belarus’s flawed August 2020 presidential election, numerous activists, journalists and politicians were accused of terrorism. For example, prominent Belarusian blogger Anton Matolka was placed on a register for people involved in terrorist activity.

Meanwhile, exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stands accused of planning acts of terrorism. Tsikhanouskaya and other members of the political opposition could potentially face the death penalty if they return to Belarus. It remains unclear how many other terrorism-related cases involving opposition figures are currently under investigation.

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Tsikhanouskaya responded to news of the death penalty amendments by accusing Lukashenka of Orwellian attempts to suppress opposition in Belarus. “It is no coincidence that the death penalty for “attempted” terrorism was introduced on the same day when Orwell’s book “1984” was banned in Belarus. The co-aggressor wants to fool us that war is peace and dissent is terrorism. But I see dread not strength,” she tweeted.

Belarus is the only country in Europe to currently impose the death penalty. Human rights defenders claim more than 300 executions have taken place in Belarus since 1994.

High-profile cases in recent years have included the execution Dzmitry Kanavalau and Uladzislau Kavaliou, who were accused of carrying out a 2011 terror attack in the Minsk metro. The case sparked widespread public unease due to a lack of conclusive evidence and concerns over trial procedures. Despite regime claims that most Belarusians support the death penalty, a poll conducted by Chatham House in 2020 found that only 21.3% actually backed the policy.

Harsh prison sentences for political activism have long been a routine aspect of the repressive regime in Lukashenka’s Belarus. Nevertheless, the recent changes to legislation governing capital punishment indicate a significant escalation in the political crisis that has gripped the country since summer 2020.

It is now clear that Lukashenka’s decision to back Putin’s Ukraine War has sparked a new wave of domestic resistance to the regime. The Belarus dictator has responded in typical fashion with threats of draconian new punishments. This is likely to fuel further anger among ordinary Belarusians, especially given widespread public opposition to the invasion of Ukraine.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

But apparently there were no takers. Other than Putin and Lukashenka, no other leaders raised the war in Ukraine during their public remarks. According to a report in Meduza, the conflict was discussed behind closed doors but a joint statement issued after the summit did not mention Ukraine at all, nor did it refer to Russia’s so-called “special military operation” there.

CSTO Secretary General Stanislav Zas told reporters that the prospect of deploying troops from alliance members to Ukraine was not discussed. Kazakhstan, which has the second largest military in the bloc after Russia, has repeatedly ruled out sending CSTO troops to Ukraine. Kazakhstan has also refused to help Russia evade Western sanctions imposed in response to Putin’s invasion.

The lack of support from the six-member bloc underscored Russia’s deepening international isolation, something that is becoming clear even to the Kremlin’s staunchest supporters. “We are in total geopolitical isolation and the whole world is against us, even if we don’t want to admit it,” Mikhail Khodaryonok, a retired colonel and a pro-Kremlin columnist, said in a remarkable show of candor on Russian state television earlier this week.

Nevertheless, as the CSTO summit wrapped up, Lukashenka moved to demonstrate his usefulness and loyalty to Putin by massing his own troops along the Belarusian border with Ukraine. The move appeared to be an attempt to distract Ukrainian forces away from opposing Russia in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, a report by British military intelligence stated.

“Following exercise activity earlier this month, Belarus has announced the deployment of special operations forces along the Ukraine border, as well as air defense, artillery and missile units to training ranges in the west of the country,” the UK Defense Ministry said in a public bulletin. “The presence of Belarusian forces near the border will likely fix Ukrainian troops, so they cannot deploy in support of operations in the Donbas.”

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While Lukashenka may be Putin’s last remaining ally in the former Soviet space, he is also an erratic one.

As I have written in this space, Lukashenka’s survival instincts simultaneously drive him in opposite directions on the Ukraine war. His near total dependence on Putin for political survival drives Lukashenka to embrace the war. At the same time, the fact that the war is going poorly, is unpopular in Belarus, and exposes him to additional sanctions and deeper international isolation encourage Lukashenka to distance himself from the conflict.

According to British intelligence, the Belarusian dictator is walking a very thin line. Lukashenka is “likely balancing support for Russia’s invasion with a desire to avoid direct military participation with the risk of Western sanctions, Ukrainian retaliation, and possible dissatisfaction in the Belarusian military,” British military intelligence concluded.

Being one of Putin’s few remaining friends has already proven costly for Belarus. Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko said on May 15 that Western sanctions have cost Belarus at least USD 16 billion and possibly as much as USD 18 billion in export revenues. “Because of the sanctions, almost all of Belarus’s exports to the countries of the European Union and North America have been blocked,” he commented.

The discord that was evident at the CSTO summit in Moscow demonstrates how Western sanctions and pressure on Russia and Belarus are working. Lukashenka himself appeared to acknowledge this in his remarks at the summit, complaining about “hellish sanctions” and saying, “Belarus and Russia are being defamed and excluded from international organizations at the whim of the West.”

After witnessing the pain and isolation that Belarus is suffering for supporting Putin’s war, with costs ranging from economic sanctions to exclusion from international sporting events, Russia’s other erstwhile allies in the CSTO are clearly thinking twice about giving the Kremlin even token support.

The Belarusian dictator’s dilemma

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 11 May 2022 18:36:58 +0000

With Alyaksandr Lukashenka, it is often difficult to separate the signal from the noise.

One day he is lamenting that Russia’s war in Ukraine “has dragged on” for too long, is not going according to plan, that Belarusians “categorically do not accept any war,” and that “the West can sleep peacefully.” Those remarks, made by Lukashenka in an interview with the Associated Press on May 5, seemed to be a thinly veiled criticism of Moscow and an attempt to distance himself from Vladimir Putin’s flailing war.

But just days later, on May 10, Lukashenka boasted that Russia had agreed to help Minsk produce mobile ballistic missiles similar to the Iskander. At the same time, his military chief Viktor Gulevich announced the deployment of special forces to the Ukrainian border to counter the West’s “build-up of their military presence on the state borders of Belarus.”

For the famously mercurial Lukashenka, of course, the bar for what constitutes erratic behavior and over-the-top contradictory rhetoric has always been exceedingly high. But in recent weeks, he seems to be clearing it with ease.

Lukashenka’s dizzyingly conflicting words and deeds are a function of his preternatural instinct for self-preservation operating in the context of the fog of war. He has repeatedly demonstrated in the past that he is a ruthless and cynical survivor. But in the current wartime environment, he does not appear to know what he needs to do in order to survive.

Lukashenka understands that Putin’s war is going poorly and is unpopular in Belarus. He also understands that he is viewed in Western capitals as a co-aggressor in the conflict for allowing Putin to use his territory as a platform and staging area to attack Ukraine. This could leave him vulnerable to prosecution for war crimes.

In their May 8 statement, G7 leaders made clear that Lukashenka must answer for his role in the war. “We will spare no effort to hold President Putin and the architects and accomplices of this aggression, including the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, accountable for their actions in accordance with international law.” Writing on his Telegram channel, political commentator Siarhei Naumchyk said this statement constituted “a black day for Lukashenka.”

The Belarusian autocrat’s survival instincts therefore tell him he needs to distance himself from Putin’s war.

But at the same time, Lukashenka also understands that he has no allies other than Putin. He knows that his brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests along with the hijacking of a Ryanair flight in May 2021 and his manufactured migrant crisis have made him a pariah in the West.

Lukashenka is well aware that even before the war, in an act of desperation, he allowed the Kremlin leader to expand Russia’s economic, political, and military presence in Belarus resulting in an effective soft annexation of his country. He is stuck in a shotgun marriage with Vladimir Putin, has little agency of his own, and is at the Kremlin’s mercy. So Lukashenka’s survival instincts are also telling him that he needs to embrace Putin and his war.

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The result of these contradictory survival instincts is the geopolitical schizophrenia we have recently been witnessing from Lukashenka and will continue to witness. It is the inevitable outcome of a dictator’s dilemma of his own making.

In the coming weeks and months, Lukashenka will continue to bob, weave, and send contradictory and bewildering signals. He may even try to revive the maneuver he pulled off in the aftermath of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas, when he presented himself as a friend of the West and an honest broker in the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv.

Nobody should be fooled this time by such posturing. Lukashenka is a co-aggressor in Putin’s war. He allowed the Kremlin autocrat to use his country’s territory to stage an illegal invasion of a sovereign and democratic country. He let Belarus become a platform for Russia to bomb Ukrainian cities and villages.

Lukashenka is directly responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent Ukrainian civilians. Like Putin and others in the Russian chain of command, he should be held accountable. Separating the signal from the noise with the Belarusian dictator is never easy. But it is absolutely necessary.

In addition to the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, Belarusians are also fighting in the Pahonia unit, which was founded by Belarusian former businessman and army officer Uladzimir Prakopieu. This formation is composed of men with military backgrounds and is primarily located in the Kyiv region. There is also a Belarusian contingent within Ukraine’s Brotherhood Battalion which includes one fighter from Belarus whose distinctive moustache has helped make him something of a front line celebrity with popular Instagram and TikTok accounts covering daily life at war.

Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s support for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has made it practically impossible for Belarusian volunteers to cross from their own country into Ukraine via the shared border connecting the two countries. Instead, a coordination network has sprung up with Polish capital Warsaw serving as a key hub.

Belarusians wishing to join must apply to coordination centers located within the EU. They then undergo verification and preparation before travelling to Ukraine. Representatives of Belarusian volunteer units have established procedures in cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities to allow verified Belarusian nationals into the country.

Many of the Belarusians currently fighting for Ukraine are recent recruits. Others were involved in the simmering eight-year conflict in eastern Ukraine conflict prior to the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022. One such example is Dzianis Kit, who is currently responsible for training the soldiers of the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion and who previously served in eastern Ukraine.

Some of the Belarusian fighters have military backgrounds and served abroad prior to volunteering in Ukraine. Others are political emigres who left their homeland in the aftermath of Belarus’s suppressed 2020 pro-democracy protest movement. For example, social media activist Siarhei Biaspalau joined the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion at the beginning of the war.

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The presence of growing numbers of Belarusian nationals fighting against Russia in Ukraine has not gone unnoticed in Minsk. On the contrary, the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs is monitoring the situation closely and has already opened 50 criminal cases against members of the Kalinouski Battalion.

This caution reflects fears that the Belarusians currently fighting for Ukraine could eventually lead a movement for change inside Belarus itself. Indeed, many Belarusian volunteers make no secret of their hopes that the war in Ukraine will lead to the fall of the Lukashenka regime.

In interviews with the Ukrainian and independent Belarusian media, Belarusians fighting in Ukraine have repeatedly stated that they are fighting against the common enemy of Belarus and Ukraine. Most believe that defending Ukraine is a stepping stone towards a free Belarus and are convinced that the defeat of Russia in Ukraine will lead to defeat for Lukashenka in Belarus.

It is not clear exactly how the outcome of the war in Ukraine will impact events in neighboring Belarus. Some volunteers have spoken of using the military experience gained in Ukraine in order to overthrow the authoritarian regime back home in Belarus. Others feel that a Ukrainian victory would dramatically weaken Putin’s domestic position in Russia and create opportunities for a political transition toward democracy in Belarus.

For these Belarusian volunteers, the stakes could hardly be higher. No longer able to return to Belarus, they are fighting in a foreign war that could decide the fate of their homeland. Ukrainian success on the battlefield would transform the geopolitical balance of power throughout the former USSR and potentially pave the way for historic changes in Belarus. However, if Putin succeeds in subjugating Ukraine, any hopes for a free and democratic Belarus will be extinguished for a generation.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Belarus has good reason for concern over Putin’s nuclear intimidation

Steven Pifer — Tue, 10 May 2022 17:26:18 +0000

In a May 5 interview with the Associated Press, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka expressed concern that the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War could see the use of nuclear weapons. Lukashenka called such use “unacceptable because it’s right next to us.” He has good reason for concern.

Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24. With the war now in its eleventh week, the Russian military has failed abysmally in what appear to have been its original objectives of taking Kyiv, deposing the government, and occupying the eastern half of Ukraine. The Russian army is now struggling against fierce Ukrainian resistance to attain a down-sized goal of securing the Donbas region in Ukraine’s east while holding on to gains in the south of the country.

Lukashenko was no innocent bystander in this war. On the contrary, he allowed Russian troops to enter Belarus, from which they launched their aborted assault on Kyiv. Belarus has also served as a platform for hundreds of Russian airstrikes against Ukrainian targets.

As for the Belarusian autocrat’s concern, the only threats of nuclear use since the war began have come from his ally, Vladimir Putin, and other senior figures in Moscow. On February 27, for no apparent reason, Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces had been placed on “special combat readiness.” On April 25, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the nuclear threat should not be underestimated.

Meanwhile, on one of Russia’s flagship television shows, leading propagandist Dmitry Kiselyov gleefully depicted a Russian nuclear weapon devastating the United Kingdom. This was one of several recent references by Kremlin TV pundits to Russia’s nuclear arms and the use of nuclear weapons. It is worth noting that none of these pundits has addressed what would happen to Russia when the inevitable retaliation arrived.

Despite the worrisome words from Moscow, the Pentagon has said that it currently sees no change in Russia’s nuclear posture.

So far, senior Russian military leaders have remained largely silent on the nuclear issue. Perhaps they understand better than Putin, Lavrov and Kiselyov that Russia’s introduction of nuclear weapons into the current war with Ukraine would open a Pandora’s Box full of unpredictable, nasty and potentially catastrophic consequences, including for Russia.

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Lukashenka cannot comfortably distance himself from the nuclear issue. He is heavily dependent on Moscow’s support and recently oversaw a contrived referendum to approve a new Belarusian Constitution which permits nuclear weapons, presumably Russian, to be deployed in Belarus. Putin and Lavrov’s irresponsible attempts at nuclear intimidation should therefore worry Lukashenka, who also recently professed to be troubled that the war in Ukraine had “dragged on” longer than expected.

During much of the Cold War, NATO faced off against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Both sides arrayed against one another large conventional forces backed by nuclear weapons. NATO periodically war-gamed how a conflict with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces would play out. These war games were sometimes designed with a nuclear element in order to give players a feel for the kind of consultations that would have to occur in the event of a nuclear war.

In those war games, if NATO decided to go nuclear, several questions arose. Perhaps the most important question was the choice of target for a nuclear strike. NATO of course did not want to target its own territory, but targeting Soviet territory could prove too escalatory. One other option presented itself: a strike against Soviet forces and other targets in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

Fast forward to 2022. If the Kremlin were now to make the extremely reckless decision to use a nuclear weapon and NATO deemed a response necessary, the alliance would have a variety of options. One would be an overwhelming conventional counter-attack.

However, if the alliance considered a nuclear response, similar thinking as during the Cold War would likely apply. NATO would not want to target a nuclear weapon on NATO territory and might regard immediately striking Russian territory as too escalatory. As the victim of Russia’s invasion and a recipient of strong political support and major military assistance from NATO members, Ukraine would also be ruled out. This would leave Belarus. And Lukashenka has allowed the Russians to deploy plenty of possible military targets on his country’s territory.

Russia will hopefully not be foolish enough to use a nuclear weapon. However, the Belarusian autocrat might want to think about the potential implications for his own country. If the war drags on and the Kremlin, which has already made a series of miscalculations, were to make another regarding nuclear use, Lukashenka could well find that he has dragged Belarus into far more than he bargained for.

Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a retired Foreign Service officer.

Belarus dictator: Putin’s Ukraine invasion is not going according to plan

Peter Dickinson — Sun, 08 May 2022 17:02:01 +0000

In a fresh blow to Vladimir Putin, the Russian dictator’s closest ally Alyaksandr Lukashenka has declared that the invasion of Ukraine is not going according to plan and should be brought to an end as soon as possible.

Speaking to the Associated Press on May 5, Lukashenka acknowledged that the invasion had run into unexpected problems and admitted he had not anticipated the ten-week conflict would “drag on in this manner.” The Belarus dictator emphasized that while Russia continues to claim everything is proceeding as planned, he does not share this optimistic outlook. “I want to stress one more time: I feel like this operation has dragged on,” Lukashenka commented.

During his interview, Lukashenka repeatedly called for an end to the war in Ukraine while seeking to position Belarus as an intermediary rather than an active participant. “We categorically do not accept any war,” he stated. “We have done and are doing everything now so that there is not a war.”

The Minsk strongman’s efforts to distance himself from the conflict are the latest indication that Putin’s invasion is in danger of unravelling. Lukashenka is widely seen as a junior partner in the Russian attack on Ukraine, having allowed his country to serve as a staging post for Russian troops to invade northern Ukraine and as a platform for ongoing airstrikes against Ukrainian targets. However, he has so far stopped short of ordering the Belarusian army to join the invasion despite significant Russian pressure to do so.

This reluctance is in part due to the punishing losses sustained by Russian troops during the first weeks of the conflict as the advance on Kyiv stalled. Belarusian hospitals and morgues were soon overflowing with Russian casualties, leaving Lukashenka in no doubt regarding the scale of the difficulties Moscow was encountering. Putin’s invasion force was eventually forced to admit defeat in the Battle for Kyiv and withdraw entirely from northern Ukraine.

The unpopularity of Putin’s war among the Belarusian public has also helped persuade Lukashenka not to order his military into Ukraine. Polls have consistently indicated that a majority of Belarusians object to their country’s role as a base for Russia’s invasion and are firmly opposed to any direct involvement. This public opposition has helped fuel a campaign of sabotage targeting the Belarusian rail network in order to disrupt the transit of Russian troops and military equipment via Belarus to Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Lukashenka’s thinly veiled criticism of the faltering Russian invasion marks a dramatic departure from his earlier backing for Kremlin aggression toward Ukraine. In the run-up to the war, the Belarus dictator frequently blamed the West for rising geopolitical tensions in region while echoing Russian propaganda tropes championing “brotherhood” between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. “We will return Ukraine into the fold of our Slavdom. We will definitely do it,” he stated in a January 28 address to the Belarusian parliament.

This support reflected Lukashenka’s increasing reliance on Russia following his heavy-handed response to a domestic pro-democracy protest movement that sprung up in the wake of the rigged August 2020 Belarusian presidential election. The brutality of the crackdown in Belarus transformed Lukashenka into an international pariah and left him almost completely dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival.

In exchange for propping up the regime in Minsk, Russia sought to expand its economic, political and military presence in Belarus while advancing longstanding plans for the integration of the two countries within the framework of a vaguely defined “Union State.” This makes Lukashenka’s recent departure from the Kremlin script all the more significant, given that he risks losing power if Putin withdraws his support.

Opponents of the authoritarian regime in Belarus have argued that Lukashenka’s comments are an attempt to avoid international accountability for his participation in Putin’s war. The exiled leader of the Belarusian pro-democracy opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, labelled the interview “a desperate attempt to save face” and warned audiences not to be fooled by the dictator. “He is a pathological liar, Putin’s accomplice, and must be brought to justice for what happens in Ukraine,” she tweeted.

Regardless of Lukashenka’s personal motivations, his negative assessment of the war underlines the mounting problems Putin is experiencing in Ukraine. While many in Moscow anticipated a rapid and triumphant campaign, Russian troops now find themselves struggling against a supremely motivated and highly skilled force fighting on home soil and supplied by an array of the world’s leading military powers. Kremlin officials still insist the “special operation” is on schedule, but the Russian military’s current predicament was surely not part of the original plan.

Peter Dickinson is Editor of the Atlantic Council’s BelarusAlert Service.

Continuous Russian attacks pound Azovstal

Tracking Narratives

Russia promotes Ukrainian grandmother with Soviet flag, while she says that they distorted her motives

Russia denies mobilization plans as state agencies search for “mobilization experts”

Kremlin drops the use of term “denazification” as many Russians did not understand it

Pro-Kremlin influencer in Latin America resigns from RT but sticks to old narratives

Media Policy

Yandex News aggregator whitelisting Kremlin-approved outlets

Belarus launches “combat preparedness test”

On May 4, the Belarusian military started unannounced combat drills. The Belarusian opposition reported on the “sudden combat preparedness test,” which is outside the usual cycle of Belarusian military exercises. A similar exercise was conducted in May 2021, when numerous Belarusian military units were put on high alert as well. The current unannounced exercise is likely a response to Defender Europe 2022, a large-scale military exercise conducted by the US and nineteen European countries over the course of May, as well as NATO exercises in Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, and Norway.

The day after the start of the Belarusian combat drills, videos started surfacing showing Belarusian forces on the move. These videos documented large military formations allegedly moving towards its borders with Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania. A British intelligence report suggested that Russia may use the military exercise in Belarus to deter Ukrainian forces. Although the report did not observe any specific threat from in the exercise, Russia will “likely seek to inflate the threat posed to Ukraine” by the training, it said.

The Armed Forces of Belarus announced a surprise check of the rapid reaction forces! pic.twitter.com/BHjJpwvEjL
— Spartackus (@elskorpione) May 5, 2022

A video showing Belarusian forces on the move. (Source: @elskorpione/Archive)

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Continuous Russian attacks pound Azovstal

The Ukrainian garrison at the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol continues to hold its ground despite relentless Russian bombardment. New footage of the factory being shelled surfaced on May 6, showing Russian artillery attacks from multiple angles. That same day, Ukrainian presidential adviser Andriy Yermak announced that another five hundred civilians were evacuated from Mariupol.

https://twitter.com/SputnikATO/status/1522480445639823360

May 6 video of Azovstal being shelled by the Russian forces. (Source: SputnikATO/Archive)

On May 5, photos surfaced showing workers changing street signs in Mariupol from Ukrainian into Russian. Meanwhile, a video that surfaced on May 4 showed that there are still Ukrainian troops inside the factory with combat capabilities. However, a video appeal from a military medic in Azovstal reported on a dire situation of people dying of diseases, due to the lack of antibiotics and other medicine. The medic, a Crimean Tatar of Turkic Giray descent, directed his appeal at Turkey.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russia promotes Ukrainian grandmother with Soviet flag, while she says that they distorted her motives

In early April, a video of a grandmother greeting Ukrainian soldiers with the Soviet flag surfaced on the web. She had apparently thought that they were Russian soldiers, and greeted them with the Soviet flag. When the soldiers gave her food but stomped on the flag, however, she refused to take the food, claiming that her parents had fought for that flag. The grandmother became a prominent figure for Russian propagandists, who started erecting sculptures, and commissioning murals and banners.

On May 5, the Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications found her and conducted an interview. After Russians shelled her yard, Ukrainian soldiers evacuated her and her husband to a nearby city. “Things are lousy, of course, since Russia went so evil on us, it’s very lousy,” she said, adding, “I did not think they would be bombing us this way.” While asked about her recent prominence in Russia, she replied, “It would’ve been better if I had not become famous and there was no war.” She also thought that she could “placate” Russians, she said, which is why she greeted the soldiers with the Soviet flag, hoping it could help avoid additional shelling and nudge them to resolve issues diplomatically. Russian propaganda tried to twist the interview by groundlessly claiming that Ukraine bombed her house and pressured her into these statements.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia denies mobilization plans as state agencies search for “mobilization experts”

Amid Kremlin denials of planning to declare a full-scale mobilization in Russia, several Russian state agencies have started opening vacancies for “mobilization experts.” The job listings, which have appeared in Russian online job portals, were placed by various Russian state agencies, including the Russian Postal Service, the Federal Tax Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Federal Service for Alcohol Market Regulation.

Kevin Rothrock, managing editor of Meduza, tweeted the screengrabs initially shared by the SOTA Telegram channel, which identifies itself as Russian news platform.

Russian news Telegram channel SOTA shared screengrabs of job postings for “mobilization experts” placed by various Russian state agencies. (Source: SOTA)

The DFRLab verified the job listings and found that they have mostly appeared on the Russian online job portal nn.hh.ru. Some vacancies state in their titles that they are searching for mobilization experts and civil defense specialists. Other vacancies, such as a consultant on electronic signatures and electronic document storage, indicate in their job description that a person should be capable of “organizing and carrying out activities for the preparation of mobilization” in wartime or a state of emergency.

Some of these vacancies were placed on April 29, while the latest ones were announced on May 4 and May 5. All of the listings include a requirement that candidates must be able to carry out mobilization activities.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington, DC

Kremlin drops the use of term “denazification” as many Russians did not understand it

Proekt, an independent investigate journalism outlet in Russia, learned from four sources close to Kremlin propaganda planning, that regular Russians did not understand the term “denazification,” which has been used by Vladimir Putin to justify his full-scale invasion into Ukraine. This conclusion was made after telephone surveys showed respondents having difficulties explaining the term. Proekt also cited the example of Kremlin propagandist Dmitry Kiselov attempting to explain the term during his TV show on February 27 and March 6, then later dropping the term altogether.

The DFRLab confirmed a decrease in use of the keyword “denazification” by Russian media outlets soon after the start of the invasion of February 24, using online content analysis tool Meltwater. The decrease began in the beginning of March, around the same time the telephone surveying reportedly took place. The graph below displays usage of the term over time by Kremlin-owned media, pro-Kremlin media, and independent Russian outlets.

Number of “denazification” keyword mentions in Russian media from February 24 to May 6, 2022. (Source: Meltwater Explore)

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Pro-Kremlin influencer in Latin America resigns from RT but sticks to old narratives

On May 3, Inna Afinogenova, a Russian journalist previously associated with RT en Español and the RT-affiliated channel Ahí Les Va! (“There it goes!”), published a video on her personal YouTube account in which she explained that she has left RT and would no longer appear in Ahí Les Va! videos.

According to Afinogenova, “I do not agree with this war…. Who can agree with a war? Just a few, [but] I am not among them….I have never agreed with any war because I know – and I know it from having suffered it myself – how these actions affect civilians above all.”

Despite Afinogenova’s disagreement over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, she continued to push anti-NATO and anti-EU narratives that she previously highlighted as an RT journalist. She cited “NATO’s aggressiveness” and “Ukrainian ultranationalists,” as well as narratives around Ukraine receiving weapons from other countries. Her latest remarks reflected similar statements from a March 1 video she made for Ahí Les Va!.

At the time of writing, her latest video has reached more than 135,000 views. Afinogenova’s YouTube channel, which she created the day before posting the video, has amassed more than 28,000 subscribers. The video has garnered more than 4,500 interactions on Facebook and around 15,000 interactions on Twitter.

Screenshot of Afinogenova’s YouTube channel and metrics. (Source: DFRLab)

—Esteban Ponce de León, Research Associate, Bogota, Colombia

Yandex News aggregator whitelisting Kremlin-approved outlets

Yandex, the equivalent of Google for the Russian online market, has been whitelisting fifteen Kremlin-approved media outlets in Russia to display their news most prominently, according to an investigation by Meduza. The known outlets are: Izvestiya, RIA Novosti, TASS, Interfax, Rosiyskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Vedomosti, RBK, Gazeta.ru, RT, Lenta, Regnum, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and Vzglyad. The DFRLab has routinely spotted these outlets spreading Kremlin propaganda and disinformation on a regular basis.

Meduza journalist Svetlana Reyter talked with current and former Yandex employees, who told her that the list was created in 2015 by order of Russia’s office of the president, then activated in 2016 when Russia passed a law regulating the activity of online news aggregators.

Following Russia’s February 2022 invastion of Ukraine, Lev Gershenzon, the former head of Yandex News, called on his former colleagues to stop promoting propaganda outlets. This reportedly started a discussion in Yandex that resulted in a decision to sell Yandex News and Yandex Dzen, the company’s blogging platform. The decision to sell both products went public in mid-March. By the end of April, it became known that VKontakte (VK), Russia’s largest social network, is buying both products. VK is under direct influence of the Kremlin. The head of VK, Vladimir Kirienko, is also the son of Sergey Kirienko, first deputy chief of staff to the office of President Putin.

On April 26, Meduza cited multiple anonymous sources from Yandex saying that the company is planning to split into two parts. One part will continue working within the Russian market, while other will focus internationally. Yandex’s PR department has denied the claim.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Belarus launches “combat preparedness test” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Putin’s Ukraine War: Desperate Belarus dictator strikes back

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 04 May 2022 19:08:35 +0000

The autocratic regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka has apparently decided to take off the gloves when dealing with Belarusian citizens who have been acting to disrupt Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The Belarusian parliament is considering legislation that would impose the death penalty on those convicted of attempted acts of terrorism, including the sabotage of rail lines to disrupt the movement of Russian troops to Ukraine. If enacted, this would mark a dramatic expansion of Belarus’s existing death penalty law, which currently restricts capital punishment to a small number of serious offenses including acts of terrorism that result in loss of life, particularly brutal killings, and multiple murders.

Vladimir Andreychenko, the speaker of Belarus’s lower house of parliament, made clear whom the change in the death penalty statute was directed against. “Destructive forces are continuing terrorist extremist activity by trying to rock the situation in Belarus, provoking domestic instability and conflicts,” Andreychenko said. “Actions are being taken to disable railway equipment and tracks, objects of strategic importance. There can be no justification for the actions of terrorists.”

The measure passed Belarus’s lower house of parliament on April 27. It must still pass the upper house and be signed by Lukashenka before it becomes law.

The threat of capital punishment for railway saboteurs is not the only way the Lukashenka regime is seeking to deter anti-war activists. Ukrainian military intelligence says that internet connections in Belarus are being disabled in some regions in order to conceal the movement of Russian military equipment through the country, Ukrayinska Pravda reported. This appears designed to make it more difficult for Belarusian activists to monitor, expose and disrupt the movement of Russian troops and military hardware.

“The KGB of Belarus and the FSB of Russia are trying to limit the communication of patriotic citizens and prevent the dissemination of information on social networks about the movement of Russian military equipment across the territory of the republic,” the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced on Telegram.

In one sense, the latest moves by the Lukashenka regime are a case of the dictator striking back against the surprising, and surprisingly effective, campaign by Belarusian citizens to disrupt Vladimir Putin’s ability to use Belarus as a platform for his war in Ukraine. In addition to railway workers sabotaging rail lines carrying Russian troops, activist groups like the Cyber Partisans have hacked the country’s transport system. Meanwhile, hundreds of Belarusian volunteers have joined brigades to fight on the Ukrainian side in the war.

Lukashenka’s recent steps are also an act of desperation. Public opinion polls consistently show that Belarusians are opposed to Russia’s war in Ukraine and staunchly object to Belarus facilitating or participating in the invasion. Lukashenka’s supporting role in Putin’s war has breathed new life into the Belarusian opposition, which had been largely muzzled by a brutal Kremlin-backed crackdown in the wake of massive street protests following the stolen Belarusian presidential election in August 2020.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

The Belarusian opposition is clearly aware of the opportunities presented by domestic disquiet over Putin’s war. “The fate of Ukraine and the fate of Belarus are interconnected and we will stand with Ukrainians through these perilous times,” exiled opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said in a speech at the Ottawa Conference on Defense and Security in March. “History will judge us, not for our words but for our deeds. History will show whether the world united in defense of freedom and democracy, or whether we allowed aggression to win because we acted too late or too little. Let’s write history today and stand together against darkness.”

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has shifted the tectonic plates of geopolitics. This is most immediately apparent in the former Soviet Union. The war is shifting and recalibrating the calculus of authoritarian regimes like Lukashenka’s as well as the activists who oppose them. And it is changing everybody’s estimation of Russia’s real power in the region.

Being the wily survivor that he is, Lukashenka certainly understands this. He’s been a master gamer for decades, but the game has suddenly changed. Having thrown in his lot with Putin since August 2020, Lukashenka is now stuck with him. His old tactic of pretending to cozy up to the West is no longer an option. If Putin fails in Ukraine, Lukashenka almost certainly understands that the game will also be up for him.

“Mr. Lukashenko is an accomplice to Mr. Putin’s war, and should end up in the dock with him as a war criminal,” The Washington Post opined in an editorial on May 2. With nowhere else to turn, Lukashenka is now reverting to his default setting of repressing his own people and tightly embracing his master in the Kremlin.

Putin’s Ukraine War leaves Lukashenka with nothing but bad options

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 27 Apr 2022 20:01:44 +0000

Alyaksandr Lukashenka has gotten himself into a tight spot.

Like his masters in the Kremlin, the Belarusian autocrat was counting on a quick and decisive Russian victory in Ukraine. Lukashenka apparently calculated that aiding, abetting, and facilitating Vladimir Putin’s aggression would pay off for him.

By allowing Putin to use Belarusian territory as a staging area for Russian troops and as a platform to launch airstrikes against Ukrainian cities, the dictator in Minsk hoped that a grateful Kremlin leader would shower him with aid and let him remain in power.

Lukashenka, of course, calculated wrong. Instead of a rapid and triumphant campaign, Russia’s blitzkrieg has turned into a quagmire.

As Putin shifts the focus of the war away from taking Kyiv and toward gaining complete control of the Donbas region in the east of the country, the platform Lukashenka provided Putin to attack the Ukrainian capital is no longer so useful. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, “all battalion tactical groups that have so far been amassed in Belarus, near our northern borders, are now redeployed to eastern Ukraine.”

If Moscow no longer relies on Belarus for its invasion, one has to wonder how much longer Lukashenka himself will be seen as useful by the Kremlin. “The Belarusian dictator understands this well, and therefore he tries to prove to the Russian leadership and Putin personally that he is needed,” political analyst Pavel Usov wrote in a recent commentary for Deutsche Welle. “Lukashenka understands that the main resource supporting his political survival is serving the Kremlin’s domestic and international agenda.”

Lukashenka now appears to be trying hard to prove his usefulness. The Belarusian Defense Ministry announced that it would be holding joint air defense exercises with Russia from April 26-29. But even as he tries to please and placate Russia, Lukashenka is increasingly at odds with Belarusian public opinion.

According to a new poll by the independent Belarusian sociologist Andrei Vardomatsky, two-thirds of the country are opposed to the use of Belarusian infrastructure for Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and just 11 percent support Belarusian troops entering Ukraine.

Significantly, 50.4 percent of Belarusians disapprove of Russia’s actions in the war while 42.7 percent approve. Nearly half of Belarusians, 45.2 percent, sympathize with Ukraine. Public opinion in Belarus is divided over who is responsible for the war, with a 24 percent plurality blaming Russia, 20 percent blaming the United States, and 17 percent blaming Ukraine.

And therein lies Lukashenka’s conundrum. In order to please his masters in the Kremlin and preserve his political skin, Lukashenka is forced to go against the clear wishes of his population.

With its economy contracting and Russian subsidies shrinking, Belarus is also subject to crippling Western sanctions. The Belarusian Economic Ministry says the economy showed zero growth in the first quarter of 2022. Some estimates forecast that it could contract by as much as 6.5 percent this year.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a paradigm-shifting event that will have knock-on effects across the former Soviet space, not least in Belarus.

For decades, Lukahshenka has been the master gamer, surviving on subsidies from Russia while maintaining a degree of independence from Moscow by courting the West when it suited his purposes. But his brutal crackdown on dissent following the August 2020 presidential election, his subsequent tight embrace of Putin, and his facilitation of Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine have upended the game for the Belarusian dictator.

He has sold his soul to Putin and in the process alienated his own population, but his usefulness to the Kremlin leader is now also a diminishing asset. Sooner or later, Putin will likely seek to replace him with a more pliant and less mercurial figure. Unlike in the past, the option of courting the West is no longer available.

Meanwhile, if Russia suffers a humiliating defeat in Ukraine and Putin is politically weakened, Lukashenka will be left without a patron and vulnerable to the wrath of his own people. Regardless of how the Ukraine war ends, Lukashenka appears destined to emerge from the conflict as a weakened and diminished figure.

BelarusAlert Mar 30, 2022

Hundreds of Belarusians join Ukraine’s fight against Russian imperialism

By Brian Whitmore

Hundreds of Belarusians have volunteered to fight for Ukraine in the war against Putin’s Russia as anti-imperial forces across the former USSR seek to shake off authoritarian Kremlin influence.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert Mar 22, 2022

Belarusians are sabotaging plans to join Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine War

By Brian Whitmore

As Vladimir Putin pressures Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to join Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ordinary Belarusians are taking action to sabotage the war effort and prevent Russian troops from reaching Ukraine.

Belarus Conflict

BelarusAlert Mar 16, 2022

Ukrainian military successes force Belarus to rethink role in Putin’s war

By Brian Whitmore

The fierce Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s invasion is getting inside the heads of Belarusian military leaders and causing them to question the wisdom of joining Vladimir Putin’s war.

Belarus Conflict

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Russian War Report: Geolocating fires in Bryansk

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Tue, 26 Apr 2022 19:57:35 +0000

As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Russian infrastructure damaged in Bryansk fires

Tracking Narratives

Putin at Orthodox Easter service: Independent media in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia raise skepticism, fact checks say otherwise

Russians attempts to discredit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by portraying him as a drug addict, again

Pro-Kremlin sources continue to distort narratives around delivery of new weaponry and aid to Ukraine

Russia’s security service seemingly fabricated evidence of Ukrainian plot to kill Russian propagandist

Russian infrastructure damaged in Bryansk fires

On the morning of April 25, a Kyiv Independent journalist reported large fires in Bryansk, a Russian city 100 kilometers from the Ukraine border. Footage and photos of the fire, filmed from various locations in the city, circulated on social media. Bryansk sits along the Druzhba pipeline, which is the only pipeline exporting Russian oil to Europe.

The DFRLab geolocated the images to southern Bryansk, where the footage suggested a Russian armed forces fuel depot (in blue below) and a Rosneft oil depot (in purple below) had both caught fire. Open-source researchers reported that some fires burned for at least 12 hours.

Geolocation of a burning fuel depot of the Russian Armed Forces (marked in blue) and a Rosneft oil depot (marked in purple). Additional geolocation details: large industrial chimneys marked in green, a residential high-rise with a distinct shape, marked in yellow. (Source: @SputnikATO/archive, top; GoogleMaps, bottom)

The cause of the fire has not been confirmed. Footage showing the fires igniting suddenly was posted online, the audio for which some have speculated indicates a possible missile strike. Bryansk is a key city along the Druzhba pipeline, which is the only pipeline exporting Russian oil to Europe.

Screenshot of a Telegram post including a video showing the supposed moment of impact on the Rosneft oil depot. (Source: breakingmash/archive)

Additionally, another video surfaced on the same day, allegedly from Bryansk, showing derailed train cars with fallen military vehicles, but the DFRLab was not able to confirm its location by the time of publishing. The cause of the alleged accident is unknown.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Putin at Orthodox Easter service: Independent media in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia raise skepticism, fact checks say otherwise

Independent media in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia reported on inconsistencies spotted during Russia’s televised Orthodox Easter service, which took place on April 24 at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The reports all suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s presence at the service had been staged. This allegation fits into an anti-Kremlin narrative that Putin is paranoid and avoids large gatherings. Fact checks of the media reports, by the DFRLab and others, point to the inaccuracy of the claims.

NEXTA Live, a pro-democracy Belarusian outlet, and Telegram channel Bystry Fokus cited social media sources, such as Igor Sushko’s account on Twitter, that pointed out that in one shot Putin is visible standing in front of a painting of a crown but in the following shot he is not visible.

Though it is true that Putin cannot be seen in the second shot, it could be the result of the different camera angle. In the zoomed-out shot, a figure is standing in the same position where Putin stood, to the right of Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, but the footage is too low-resolution to identify definitively that the individual was Putin.

Visual analysis of Putin’s appearance at the 2022 Orthodox Easter service. Pink boxes mark Putin, or where some internet users said he should be standing; green boxes mark the painted crown; and blue boxes mark the zoomed-out angle in which a figure in the same previous position as Putin is visible. (Source: BEST MUSIC/archive)

Sushko threw doubts on Putin’s presence at the service, however, when he posted an anonymous video supposedly showing the pre-recorded appearance of Putin, saying that the church was “emptied.” At the outset of the video, however, a fleeting glimpse of a crowd of people is captured in the background. And Sushko, in designating the church as “emptied,” fails to account for the cordoned off space directly in front of the altar, across which the video was filmed. The candid video was possibly showing the events prior to the beginning of the televised religious service.

Screenshot of Igor Sushko’s tweet declaring the church to be “emptied” that failed to account for both the large cordoned off section in the foreground and the crowd of people in the background (red box). (Source: Igor Sushko/archive)

Ukrainian media outlets Antikor and Unian, along with Russian independent outlet The Village, furthered the narrative, alleging that Putin’s office reused old photos from the 2021 Orthodox Easter service and supporting their claims with an allegation that Putin and Sobyanin appeared to be wearing the same clothes in the 2022 broadcast as they wore in 2021.

The DFRLab compared photos, published on the Kremlin’s website, from the Orthodox Easter service on May 2, 2021, and on April 24, 2022. The photos were similar but not identical.

Comparison of photos published on Kremlin.ru of Putin’s attendance at the Orthodox Easter service in 2021 (pink boxes) and 2022 (blue boxes). (Source: Kremlin.ru/archive, left; Kremlin.ru/archive, right)

One theory suggested that Kremlin.ru changed the photos after media started pointing at the consistency, and thus the “same-ness,” of the images, but an archived version of the April 24 photos does not corroborate this theory.

There is a possibility that the footage for 2022 was deliberately darkened – as alleged by Sushko – to obscure reuse of footage from 2021, and such a tweak would account for Putin’s darker seeming suit and tie. There is, however, one piece of evidence that shows a clear difference: in the footage and photos from 2021, Putin holds a red candle without a drip protector; in the footage and photos from 2022, he holds a candle with a drip protector.

Visual comparison of the 2021 and 2022 photos shows that Putin is holding different candles (pink and blue boxes), the earlier without a drip protector and the later with one, and possibly wearing a different tie (yellow and green boxes) and a different suit (orange and grey boxes). (Source: Kremlin.ru/archive, left; Kremlin.ru/archive, right)

The Associated Press issued a fact check of the claim that the Kremlin had reused old images and video, determining it to be false, in part supporting his attendance by direct evidence: “an Associated Press photographer was at the service and captured pictures of Putin at the event.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Russians attempts to discredit Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy by portraying him as a drug addict, again

Russian Telegram channels recently circulated a manipulated video of a call between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and billionaire entrepreneur Elon Musk that allegedly showed evidence of the former’s drug use. In the manipulated video, white powder is seen on the desk next to Zelenskyy, which commenters on the posts claimed to be cocaine. In the original video published to Zelenskyy’s official Instagram channel on March 6, however, no white powder is visible, confirming that someone had edited the powder into the version found on Telegram. The fake video was subsequently debunked by AP and the Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications.

Comparison of the two videos, with the original video as posted to Zelenskyy’s Instagram account at left, without any visible drugs, and the altered video at right, with the inserted image of cocaine. (Source: @zelenskiy_official/archive, left; Спецоперация на Украине. Правдивые новости/archive, right)

The attempt to portray Zelenskyy as a drug addict was not a one-off event, as Russian President Vladimir Putin used the claim as one excuse for invading Ukraine at the war’s outset and Russian media continue to smear the Ukrainian president with the label.

Earlier, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels claimed that cocaine was supposedly visible in another video published to Zelenskyy’s official Instagram page. In the video, Zelenskyy looks tired, but the video seems to have been filmed in the evening and published at 8:38 p.m. Commenters claimed to have spotted supposed traces of powder on the table. With high-resolution video, however, it was evident that those “traces” were ornamentation on the table and a reflection of a photo frame on the polished table surface, as confirmed by other fact-checking organizations. This did not stop at least one Russian commenter from amplifying a fringe German website that amplified the claim.

Previously, to support the allegations of Zelenskyy’s supposed drug addiction, Russian media quoted disgraced former member of the Ukrainian parliament Ilya Kyva, cited a Russian narcology expert, and quoted random commenters, but none of their claims contained any actual evidence to support the claim. The head of Russia-annexed Crimea, Sergey Aksenov, also commented on a different video that Zelenskyy is a “junkie,” a mention that was later picked up by Radio Sputnik.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Pro-Kremlin sources continue to distort narratives around delivery of new weaponry and aid to Ukraine

Kremlin-tied Telegram channels continue attacking the credibility of Ukrainian authorities with a focus on their handling of weapons and supplies from – and the doubt that handling supposedly conveys among – Ukraine’s Western allies.

In a post on April 23, MediaKiller, a Telegram channel that pushed a fake BBC video a few weeks ago, declared that “the US is seriously worried about the humanitarian aid it has sent to Ukraine.” To support this statement, the channel quoted two CNN pieces: an article and a video on the challenges around the logistics of transfer and trackability of weapons due to their size and portability. The Telegram channel subsequently distorted those pieces to portray the United States as being “seriously concerned.” While the CNN video does start with the anchor asking “is the worry that these weapons could potentially fall into the Russians hands?,” reporter Katie Bo Lillis, who covered the story, immediately rebuts that idea, saying “not exactly” before giving a lengthier explanation about why traceability is difficult during times of war. During Lillis’s segment, a chyron below her reads “it appears to be a risk the [US President Joe] Biden administration is willing to take.”

Screencap of CNN report on US provision of weapons to Ukraine. The chyron at the bottom states that, despite the difficulty of tracking the provided weapons, “it appears to be a risk the [US President Joe] Biden administration is willing to take.” (Source: CNN)

To support its argument, however, MediaKiller isolated a passage on the weapons in Afghanistan that ended up on the black market to draw a comparison to Ukraine but failed to mention that both CNN pieces state that US officials perceive the long-term risk in supplying Ukraine with weapons to be an acceptable one. In the same passage, the channel provided unsubstantiated claims that cases of humanitarian aid had been stolen or misused, basing these assertions on three blogposts in which the authors claimed without evidence that Ukraine is selling the aid.

Elsewhere, pro-Kremlin Telegram channel “Legitimniy” claimed that NATO-supplied weapons would be placed exclusively in the Western part of Ukraine to replenish the Soviet era equipment being moved to the frontline. The primary rationale, it claims, was that new equipment requires ammunition manufactured in NATO countries that would be hard to deliver to the warzone. While the statement sounds like a truism, the channel elides the fact that the old equipment would also require deliveries of ammunition as well, regardless of the equipment’s provenance. The post received 1.9 million views, which is eight to nine times higher than the engagement the channel’s other publications normally receives, and – because it was on Telegram – it is difficult to determine whether those views were legitimate or comprised some form of artificial amplification.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia’s security service seemingly fabricated evidence of Ukrainian plot to kill Russian propagandist

On April 25, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that it had foiled a Ukranian plot to kill Vladimir Solovyov, a prominent Kremlin propagandist. In its statement, the FSB claimed that it had arrested Russian nationals – a group of “neo-Nazis” – who had allegedly been hired by Ukraine’s State Security Service (SBU).

Russia’s Investigative Committee released a four-minute video that allegedly showed the arrests as well as the raid on the suspects’ apartment. In the video, the FSB agents appeared to seize property allegedly belonging to a supposed neo-Nazi group. Some parts of the video were blurred – including the faces of the detainees and a portion of the seized belongings. Separately, Kremlin-owned outlet ria.ru released a longer video of the FSB operation that did not blur the seized belongings. The unveiling of the the supposedly seized belongings in this longer video sparked a widespread (and often humorous) discussion on social media. As detailed in the FSB statement, among the items allegedly seized were drugs, a photograph of Adolf Hitler, a wig, a t-shirt with a swastika on the front, and fake Ukrainian passports and “nationalist literature and paraphernalia.”

Also visible in the footage were a number of copies of video game Sims 3, which open-source researchers believe were allegedly “confused [with] three mobile phone SIM cards” and comprised evidence that the whole endeavor was a fabrication, given the relatively amateur mistake.

Screencap showing the supposedly seized belongings of an alleged Ukrainian “neo-Nazi” group from a raid by Russia’s FSB. The belongings include a wig, new t-shirts, and copies of video game Sims 3. (Source: @francska1/archive)

Calling it “another creative [operation] by the FSB,” the Ukrainian SBU stated that “the SBU has no plans to assassinate V. Solovyov.” The statement compared Solovyov to Joseph Goebbels, Nazi Germany’s minister of propaganda, and noted that the Kremlin propagandist “will be held accountable for his crimes in international courts following the victory of Ukraine” in its war with Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

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Wily Belarus dictator sees Putin’s war as an opportunity to end his isolation

Alesia Rudnik — Mon, 25 Apr 2022 17:57:04 +0000

Vladimir Putin’s only international ally Alyaksandr Lukashenka is actively seeking to distance himself from Russia’s faltering invasion of Ukraine and sees the conflict as an opportunity to rebuild ties with the West, says Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych.

In an April 24 interview with Meduza, Arestovych claimed the Belarus dictator is currently conducting secret negotiations with the West while protesting his innocence over his country’s status as a partner and accomplice in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. According to Arestovych, Lukashenka’s key message is “It’s not my fault. He [Putin] came to me.”

Reports of ongoing talks between Lukashenka and Western officials are the latest indication that the Belarus ruler is no longer comfortable playing a junior role in Putin’s war. Instead, he is trying to exploit the conflict in order to rehabilitate himself and bring an end to an extended period of international isolation dating back to the rigged Belarusian presidential election of August 2020.

Lukashenka’s heavy-handed response to Belarusian protests over the disputed election made him a global pariah and left him increasingly dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival. This brought the curtain down on a longstanding geopolitical balancing act that had seen the Belarus strongman skillfully plot a course between Russia and the West. Since August 2020, Lukashenka has found himself obliged to grant Moscow far greater political and economic influence in Belarus while also permitting the unofficial merger of the Belarusian and Russian militaries.

Putin’s February invasion of Ukraine was partially launched from Belarus, with Russian troops advancing on Kyiv from bases just across the Belarusian border. Lukashenka also allowed Russia to use his country as a platform for air raids and missile strikes against Ukrainian targets, effectively turning Belarus into an active participant in the conflict.

Despite Lukashenka’s reliance on Russia, Putin has not been entirely successful in his efforts to involve Belarus more directly in the war. Crucially, Lukashenka has withstood considerable Kremlin pressure and refused to send his troops into Ukraine.

This reluctance reflects widespread anti-war sentiment in Belarus along with alarm among serving Belarusian officers over the scale of the military setbacks suffered by Putin’s army during the opening weeks of the conflict. Public opposition to Belarus’s supporting role in the war has led to activism including efforts to sabotage the country’s rail networks and prevent Russian military personnel and equipment from reaching Ukraine.

From the very start of the invasion, Lukashenka has publicly denied participating directly in the war and has sought to present himself as a possible mediator. He hosted the first three rounds of talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials on Belarusian territory, leading to personal thanks from Putin for making the negotiations possible. Lukashenka also spoke directly with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy prior to the first meeting of Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Belarus.

Zelenskyy is not the only international leader who has called Lukashenka since the outbreak of hostilities. The Belarus dictator has also spoken with French President Emmanuel Macron, the first such contact since the beginning of the Belarusian political crisis in August 2020. Regime officials in Minsk reported that Macron and Lukashenka discussed “the future of Europe and Belarus’s place in this world order.”

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Belarusian diplomats are now actively seeking to use the war in Ukraine to re-establish the legitimacy of the Lukashenka regime. On April 6, Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei appealed directly to the EU for a renewal of dialogue. “In the current situation, we all need to abandon accusations and labeling, inflammatory rhetoric, and unilateral restrictive measures and rethink the paradigm that will determine the future of Belarus–EU relations and that of European security for the years ahead,” he wrote.

Despite Lukashenka’s aggressive rhetoric toward the EU, he has also recently implemented a number of measures that seem designed to improve relations with Brussels. The Minsk strongman has relaxed the detention measures of some political prisoners and allowed their release from prison to house arrest. The Belarusian authorities have also announced a visa-free regime for citizens of Latvia and Lithuania.

Franak Viachorka, who serves as an advisor to exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has cautioned against any Western efforts to bring Lukashenka in from the cold. Viachorka argues that it is naïve to believe the Belarus dictator can realistically end his reliance on Russia. He also warns that the Lukashenka regime is cynically seeking to exploit Western concerns over the war in Ukraine.

Western attempts to dissuade Lukashenka from supporting Putin’s war risk legitimizing the discredited dictator and pose a threat to the future development of a democratic Belarus. This can already be seen in media coverage of the country, which has shifted from focusing on the Belarusian opposition to discussion of Lukashenka’s latest statements on the war.

Meanwhile, phone calls with Western leaders such as Macron and Zelenskyy position Lukashenka as a decision-maker and a potential partner in negotiations geared toward ending the war. This kind of engagement also underlines the fact that the democratic Belarusian opposition has no leverage over the military situation, whereas Lukashenka remains commander in chief, regardless of his international isolation and lack of legitimacy.

Western leaders need to be aware of these dangers as they seek ways to end the war in Ukraine. Rehabilitating Lukashenka may seem like a risk worth taking if it weakens Putin’s position in Belarus. However, this would mean ignoring the concerns of the democratic Belarusian opposition and may revitalize the Lukashenka regime, leading to further destabilization of the region for many more years to come.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University (Sweden) and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

The document outlined a “plan to regroup the formations and military units of the First Tank Army in the vicinity of the mission” to invade Belarus. According to the plan, the troops would deploy “under the cover of participating in a joint exercise with the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus.”

The authenticity of the information made public by Ukraine could not be independently verified. If accurate, the Ukrainian intelligence claims suggest that a full-scale invasion of Belarus was a very real possibility in the summer of 2020, less than two years before Russia did conduct a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The existence of a Russian plan to invade Belarus is plausible considering the tense state of relations between Moscow and Minsk in the period leading up to the August 2020 presidential election in Belarus. In contrast to today’s close strategic alliance between Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka, there was significant tension in the relationship throughout 2019 and in the first half of 2020.

Facing sanctions and a struggling economy, Putin had scaled back Russian subsidies and economic assistance to Belarus. Moscow was also pressuring Belarus to make a range of concessions such as hosting a new Russian military base on its territory, integrating the country’s armed forces more deeply, and accepting a revived economic integration project that would have effectively ended Belarusian sovereignty.

For his part, Lukashenka was resisting these efforts and attempting to mend Minsk’s relations with the West. In early 2020, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo traveled to Belarus in an effort to “normalize” strained ties with the country.

During a meeting with Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimer Makei at the time, Pompeo said: “The United States wants to help Belarus build its own sovereign country. Our energy producers stand ready to deliver 100 percent of the oil you need at competitive prices. Your nation should not be forced to be dependent on any one partner for your prosperity or for your security.”

There were indications at the time that Russia’s military intelligence, the GRU, and its Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR, were alarmed by Lukashenka’s efforts to preserve Belarusian independence by attempting to move the country closer to the West.

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The geopolitical situation has changed dramatically over the past two years in Moscow’s favor. Lukashenka’s brutal crackdown on dissent following the August 2020 Belarusian presidential election and his resulting alienation from the West have led to growing dependence on the Kremlin. This appears to have removed the need for a full-scale Russian invasion of Belarus.

Putin has gained everything he wants in Belarus without firing a shot. Lukashenka is completely reliant on the Kremlin, which has enabled Russia to pull off what amounts to a “soft annexation” of the country. Belarus has become a de facto extension of Russia’s Western Military District, with Moscow able to expand its economic and political footprints in the country.

Belarus has also found itself caught up in Putin’s Ukraine War. While Minsk has not yet contributed troops to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Lukashenka has allowed Russia to use Belarus as a staging area for Russian troops and let Putin launch airstrikes against Ukrainian cities from Belarusian territory.

This supporting role in the conflict has sparked concerns that Russia’s dominant position in Belarus could come under threat. Public opinion in Belarus is strongly opposed to the war in Ukraine, with efforts underway to disrupt the transit of Russian troops via sabotage of the country’s railway network. Meanwhile, hundreds of Belarusians have joined volunteer battalions fighting on Ukraine’s side. As the war drags on, the possibility for domestic destabilization within Belarus could rise significantly.

For the time being, Putin finds himself bogged down in Ukraine. However, he could yet turn his attention once again to a full-scale military takeover of Belarus if public opposition to Belarusian involvement in the invasion of Ukraine continues to mount and threatens to undermine Russian influence. Based on recent Ukrainian claims, the plans for such an operation may already be in place.

Russian War Report: Russia falsely accuses Ukraine of provoking conflict even after it knew war was coming

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Mon, 18 Apr 2022 19:51:08 +0000

Tracking narratives

Statements from Ukrainian officials misrepresented in pro-Kremlin media, used as evidence of Ukraine provoking war

Russia presents new “evidence” of Ukrainian biolabs “activity”

International response

Leader of Georgian breakaway region announces referendum to join Russia

Statements from Ukrainian officials misrepresented in pro-Kremlin media, used as evidence of Ukraine provoking war

Telegram channel MediaKiller, which was among a broader set that published a falsified BBC video on April 13, deliberately distorted a Ukrainian official’s comments in order to blame Ukraine for Russia’s invasion.

In an April 13 interview with BBC Ukraine, Oleksiy Danilov, the head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, said the country anticipated Russia to start its invasion on February 22. “To accuse us of not preparing is completely incorrect. We could not go out and publicly say to the population: ‘Friends, on February 22, the war begins.’ These are unacceptable things from the point of view of public administration. But we were preparing,” he said. However, Danilov said Ukraine did not expect Russian forces to attack from Belarusian territory.

In the interview, Danilov also said that Ukraine had not expected Russia to attack civilian targets. “We could not even imagine in a nightmare that they would kill our women and children, pregnant women, the elderly… If you are an army, you have to fight the army, not the civilians.”

Following the interview, MediaKiller cited Danilov’s comments in a post that blamed the Ukrainian government for the war. The channel said Ukraine knew the war would happen yet continued to provoke Russia by allowing protests and insulting it in the media. After MediaKiller published its post, Kremlin–tied Telegram channel Rezident forwarded it and added an allegation that Ukraine received advance notice of the war from the United States and the United Kingdom, allowing authorities to evacuate their relatives ahead of the invasion.

In another attempt to discredit the Ukrainian government, multiple pro–Kremlin media outlets cited an April 14 BBC Russia interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. During the interview, Zelenskyy said that Ukraine’s war with Russia started in 2014. “That is why we wanted to join NATO…. We started this war even earlier,” he said. As the fact-checking organization StopFake noted, the quotes from Zelenskyy’s interview were taken out of context by pro-Kremlin media, which cited the quotes as evidence that Ukraine had been preparing an offensive against the separatist regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, Crimea, and Belarus. Another pro-Russian Telegram channel cited Zelenskyy quotes while blaming Ukrainian authorities for “not evacuating civilians and using them as a living shield.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia presents new “evidence” of Ukrainian biolabs “activity”

An official from Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) for the first time presented a list of names for those involved with laboratories in Ukraine that are allegedly being used to develop biological weapons. Along with the list, the MoD also claimed – without any evidence to support its allegations – that the United States planned to infect Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Moldova with typhus and hepatitis.

In a press briefing, Igor Kirillov, Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, declared that the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) is one of the elements in the “[US] scheme for coordinating the activities of biological laboratories and research institutes in Ukraine.” It seems, however, that Kirillov used transparent and public information found on the organization’s website as a basis to gin up new, unsubstantiated allegations to support the Kremlin’s broader claim of US bioweapon research on Russia’s borders.

According to Kirillov, STCU publicly presents itself as a nonprofit organization unrelated to the Pentagon, but “it turned out to be an international intergovernmental organization created for preventing the dissemination of knowledge and experience related to weapons of mass destruction.” For its part, STCU also does not hide its affiliation with the United States, the European Union, or Ukraine: its website lists US, European Commission, and Ukrainian officials as a part of its governing board, and board minutes indicate the participation of many different departments and ministries within partner governments.

Kirillov added that the offices for the STCU are located in Baku, Azerbaijan; Chisinau, Moldova; Tbilisi, Georgia; as well as in Kharkiv and Lviv, Ukraine, implying that each location is complicit. The STCU website lists offices in Baku, Chisinau, Tbilisi, and Kyiv.

Screencap of the STCU website showing its transparent listing of field offices in Baku, Azerbaijan; Kyiv, Ukraine; Chisinau, Moldova; and Tbilisi, Georgia. (Source: STCU/archive)

Kirillov also presented new “findings,” again without evidence, that US and European scientists were taking water samples from the major rivers of Ukraine in order to find pathogens of cholera, typhoid fever, hepatitis A and E, and “spread infection by water not only in the territory of Russia, but also to infect the entire water area of the Black and Azov Seas and even Belarus, Moldova, and Poland.”

In his unsupported claims, Kirillov stated that the United States has spent more than $350 million on STCU projects in recent years and that the US Departments of State and Defense, in particular, are sponsors. That numerical value, however, was possibly an inflation of one found on STCU’s website, the landing page for which includes an animated graphic that, at one point, declares that it has received “over $300 million USD” in total, with no mention of source, over its lifetime.

Screencap of the STCU website indicating, in part, that it has coordinated more than $300 million USD in research over its lifetime. The website, however, does not clarify the source of that funding. (Source: STCU/archive)

In a readout of the briefing by Kremlin-owned media outlet RIA, the outlet mentions that the identities of people involved in “experiments” had been discovered as a result of what the Kremlin still refers to as a “special military operation in Ukraine.” The article named people who are all listed on the STCU website in some fashion but whom the DFRLab will not name, as the organization appears primarily to function as coordinating funding for scientific research between researchers and governments.

There is no evidence that STCU is aiding in biological warfare research, as implied by both Kirillov and RIA. As such, this represents only the latest statement by Russian MoD attempting to justify Russia’s war on Ukraine using false-flag narratives that the latter was planning to use biological research laboratories to produce bioweapons.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC, and Iain Robertson, Deputy Managing Editor, Washington DC

Leader of Georgian breakaway region announces referendum to join Russia

On April 17, Anatoly Bibilov, the “president” of Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia – the head of the separatists is elected as “president” of the region, but the elections occur outside the bounds of Georgia’s official constitution – announced plans to hold a referendum to approve the region’s incorporation into Russia. According to Bibilov, more than 3,000 signatures supporting the referendum have already been collected. “When many turn their backs, we are heading [toward Russia] because this is our world. Russia is our historical homeland, and we must never forget this,” said Bibilov.

The group seeking to hold the referendum comprises twenty-six individuals, all of whom registered with South Ossetia’s election officials on April 6. The group includes Bibilov and former presidents Ludvig Chivirov, Eduard Kokoity, and Leonid Tibilov, Civil.ge reported.

The process to hold a referendum was outlined by Civil.ge: the group has three months to collect signatures; election officials review the signatures before being sending them to the “president;” the “president” forwards the documents to South Ossetia’s top court to determine whether the request is compliant with the region’s extralegal “constitution;” and, if the referendum is approved, the “president” sets a date for the referendum within ten days.

Bibilov voiced his support for South Ossetia joining Russia on March 30, ten days before the region’s election for “president” were held; many considered this a strategic pre-election tactic. After the first round of elections on April 10, opposition candidate Alan Gagloev received 38.55 percent of the votes, while Bibilov garnered 34.95 percent. The second round of voting is set for April 28.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

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Putin’s Ukraine War: Belarus dictator switches from arsonist to firefighter

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 13 Apr 2022 22:05:33 +0000

When Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka met at a space launch facility in the Russian Far East on April 12, the carefully choreographed press conference was full of the predictable agitprop, lies, and disinformation.

The Belarusian dictator claimed that the atrocities committed by Russian forces in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha were actually faked as part of “a psychological operation staged by Englishmen.” For his part, the Kremlin autocrat declared that the Russian war against Ukraine was proceeding as planned and insisted Moscow’s “goals are absolutely clear and noble.”

But the gaslighting and falsehoods masked an important truth about why Putin and Lukashenka were meeting now. As Russia shifts its tactics, abandoning for the time being its efforts to take Kyiv in favor of an assault on eastern and southern Ukraine, Belarus’s role in the war is also undergoing a transformation.

In the run-up to the meeting, Lukashenka, who has allowed Russia to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for its assault on Ukraine, complained bitterly about being labeled “an accomplice of the aggressor.” He also repeatedly demanded that Belarus be a party to any talks to resolve the war. Meanwhile, Belarus recently published a list of unfriendly countries that pointedly did not include Ukraine.

The Kremlin is also playing along with these apparent attempts to reframe the Belarusian role in the war. In recent days, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested, apparently with a straight face, that Belarus should be one of the “neutral” countries that could provide security guarantees to Ukraine in the event that Kyiv declares its neutrality.

According to an unpublished confidential report by the Minsk-based Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies, Lukashenka has recently been promoting a change in the Belarusian position toward the war. Belarus will remain Russia’s ally and will not criticize the war, but Lukashenka does not want to be viewed as a co-aggressor in the conflict. Toward this end, Belarus will intensify diplomatic efforts to end the war and will insist on participating in any peace negotiations.

In other words, after assisting and enabling an arsonist, Lukashenka now apparently wants to pretend he is a firefighter.

Lukashenka’s efforts to shift perceptions of Belarus’s involvement in the war are being largely driven by domestic politics. According to a recent poll by Chatham House, just three percent of Belarusians support the idea of Belarus participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine. At the same time, 67 percent oppose Russia shelling Ukrainian cities from Belarusian territory and 52 percent oppose allowing Moscow to use Belarusian territory as a staging ground for the war.

Moreover, Belarusian railway workers have engaged in a campaign of sabotage to prevent Russian troops and military hardware from reaching Ukraine via Belarus. The Cyber Partisans hacking group has also launched attacks to disrupt the Belarusian railways. And hundreds of Belarusian citizens have joined volunteer battalions to fight on the Ukrainian side of the conflict.

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For its part, Russia appears to find this Belarusian attempt to reorient its role in the war somewhat useful, at least for the moment.

According to the Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies report, “the Kremlin hopes to use the position of Belarus in the negotiation process and include the country among the guarantors of Ukraine’s security for its own interests. This is simply to prolong the negotiations because Moscow wants to approach the final phase of talks in a strong position, meaning after military victories.”

Lukashenka may be dreaming about reviving the role he played following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas. At the time, he was able to position himself as an honest broker and host of the Minsk peace talks. But that horse has clearly left the barn.

Lukashenka’s status in 2014 was bolstered by his refusal to recognize the annexation of Crimea, his ridiculing of Putin’s notion of a “Russian world,” and his pledge not to allow Belarusian territory to be used to attack Ukraine. In recent months, however, he has gone all in with Russia’s imperial designs. This makes any attempt to backtrack virtually impossible.

Moreover, Putin is clearly prepared to exploit Lukashenka’s posing and posturing as a peacemaker for his own cynical purposes.

This is Lukashenka’s war too. Ukrainian cities have been shelled from Belarus. Russian troops invaded Ukraine from Belarus and are now regrouping and resupplying in Belarus. Despite his protestations, Lukashenka has turned his country into a belligerent. You can’t become a firefighter after being an arsonist’s apprentice.

Russian War Report: Russia promotes misleading video accusing Ukraine of using mannequins as casualties

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 13 Apr 2022 15:45:23 +0000

Tracking narratives

Rossiya 24 broadcasts misleading video accusing Ukraine of using mannequins to stage war casualties

Falsified BBC News video spreads in Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels

Security

Situation intensifies in Mariupol

Media policy

Russian MP suggests 10-year YouTube ban

Kremlin accuses Google of displaying phrase “dead Russians” in translation results

Facing widespread social media restrictions, Kremlin creates new Telegram channel

Rossiya 24 broadcasts misleading video accusing Ukraine of using mannequins to stage war casualties

On April 7, Kremlin-controlled TV channel Rossiya 24 broadcast a video that it claimed was evidence of the Ukrainian military using mannequins to stage war casualties. However, the video was taken in Russia on a set of a TV series.

In the video, two men, one in a camouflage outfit resembling a military uniform and one in a green jacket, wrap a mannequin in tape. When Rossiya 24 aired the video, the anchor said it had been staged by Ukraine. “This is how preparations are going for the theater, in the truest sense of the word, military operation in Ukraine,” the anchor explained. “It seems everything is quite straightforward, two people in military uniform carefully wrap the mannequin with tape and, obviously, are going to pass it off as a corpse. However, this is not surprising, dozens of fakes with similar mannequins regularly appear in Ukrainian Telegram channels.”

The Rossiya 24 segment, “Crimes in Ukraine are disguised as ‘atrocities’ of the Russian army,” was reportedly also available on the streaming platform of the state-owned All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company. The video disappeared from the platform on April 8.

The segment includes a watermark for the Russian pro-Kremlin Telegram channel U_G_M, which posted the video on April 6 with the caption, “This is how armed forces of Ukraine prepare their staged videos… these toys will be scattered along the streets of Kyiv or Nikolaev.” In the video, a man can be heard saying, “The dude will fly from the window, poor fellow.” Before Rossiya 24 aired the video, it was reposted in at least two other Telegram channels.

The day that Rossiya 24 aired the footage, it was revealed that the video was not filmed in Ukraine, but came from a TV series filmed in Vsevolozhsk, Russia, near Saint Petersburg. On April 7, Nadezhda Kolobaeva, the assistant director of the series, wrote on Facebook that the video aired by Rossiya 24 was recorded on March 20 as the TV crew prepped mannequins to fall from a window. Kolobaeva also posted behind-the-scenes photos and a video from the film set, referring to the dummy as “the most famous mannequin in the Russian Federation.”

Video from assistant director Nadezhda Kolobaeva showing a mannequin being dropped from a building while filming a TV series. (Source: Facebook)

On April 8, Russian journalist Roman Super said that he contacted Rossiya 24 requesting details about their report. He received a response stating that the channel director and editorial team did not “know that this was not Ukraine” and the video was “brought” to them. At the time of writing, Rossiya 24 had not publicly acknowledged the error.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Falsified BBC News video spreads in Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels

A graphic video purporting to be a BBC News report is being shared on pro–Kremlin Telegram channels. The BBC confirmed the video is fake. “We are aware of a fake video with BBC News branding suggesting Ukraine was responsible for last week’s missile attack on Kramatorsk train station,” the BBC News Press Team tweeted. “The BBC is taking action to have the video removed.”

The video in question falsely asserts that a missile’s serial number proves Ukraine shelled the Kramatorsk train station on April 8. The video claims that the “serial number of the Tochka-U missile” is identical to those used by the 13th Missile Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Ukrainian fact-checking organization StopFake debunked this narrative on April 10.

The video claims that Ukrainian forces used missiles with the same serial number in Khartsyzsk, Berdyansk, Melitopol, and Logvynovo. It also falsely states that when the missile’s serial number was publicized on social media, Ukrainian media stopped reporting on the topic. The video cites “military experts” to claim that Ukraine “uses fake news to promote its position.”

The video includes an animated BBC logo, as well as a prompt at the end of the clip to download the BBC News app. It also features a number of oddities. For example, there are English spelling and grammar errors, such as “Ukraine has often started using fake news.” The BBC logo is placed suspiciously low in the video frame. The video also includes footage from TG LA7, an Italian news channel that was cited in a previously debunked disinformation narrative.

On Telegram, the DFRLab found at least thirty different channels sharing the video or screenshots of it. Kremlin–connected Telegram channels in Ukraine used the video to claim that the publication of the serial number forced Ukraine to stop discussing the matter. One channel urged a thorough investigation to take place to prevent such behavior from the Ukrainians.

Other pro-Kremlin channels shared the video as evidence that the BBC had acknowledged Ukrainian soldiers were behind the shelling. Another channel claimed that Ukraine has become toxic to its international partners, and this type of “proof” is the reason why the shelling of Kramatorsk train station was not a major news story in the West, suggesting Western media intentionally curtailed coverage of the incident. The attack received significant coverage for multiple days in Western media outlets.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Situation intensifies in Mariupol

The situation in Mariupol continues to intensify as the Russian military increases pressure on the city’s remaining defenders. On April 12, a number of Ukrainian marines from the Rear Admiral Belinsky 36th Separate Brigade released a farewell video as they were running out of food and ammo. Reporting from Trukha News on the same day, however, suggested that several hundred marines, including the wounded, managed to break out of the enemy encirclement and connect with the Azov regiment in other parts of Mariupol.

https://twitter.com/TpyxaNews/status/1513962857334980612

Reporting of successful Ukrainian Marine 36th separate brigade break-out in Mariupol. (Source: @TryxaNews/Archive)

Pro-Kremlin social media accounts also disseminated videos of Ukrainian soldiers surrendering, claiming they depict Ukrainian forces captured in Mariupol. The number of POWs vary from 160 to more than a thousand in these reports. The actual number of POWs remains unknown, however, and Kremlin sources may be exaggerating statistics.

On April 11, meanwhile, the Kyiv Independent and other Ukrainian sources reported that Russia deployed a poisonous substance against Ukrainian soldiers in Mariupol, allegedly distributed by a drone. While the incident is under investigation, no footage or forensic evidence of a chemical attack has emerged. Ukrainian sources also noted that on the same day, RIA Novosti quoted DNR politician Eduard Basurin saying that Russia needed to turn to “the chemical troops” to “lure the moles” in Mariupol.

On April 12, Vladimir Putin called out claims of chemical weapons use as “fake.” That same day, US President Joe Biden said that US would have a “proportional response” if Russia were to use chemical weapons.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian MP suggests 10-year YouTube ban

According to the Kremlin-owned outlet RIA.ru, Russian State Duma member Alexey Chernyak plans to propose a draft law that would ban access to YouTube in Russia for ten years.

This comes after YouTube blocked the Russian parliament channel Duma TV for violating the video platform’s terms of service. Russian communications regulator Roskomnadzor requested YouTube restore access to the channel and explain why they blocked it.

Chernyak stated that YouTube’s block of Duma TV can be regarded as “censorship and a provocative violation of rights and freedoms, as well as a monopoly on the promotion of information.” Chernyak alleged that outlawing YouTube in Russia would result in “multi-million-dollar damage” for the company. He added that Duma TV will continue to convey information to Russians on domestic platforms.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Kremlin accuses Google of displaying phrase “dead Russians” in translation results

On April 11, Roskomnadzor accused Google of “a violation of an extremist nature,” demanding the organization take immediate measures to remove “threats against Russian users.” Russia’s communications regulator claimed that when internet users entered the phrase “dear Russians” into Google Translate, the service offered to replace it with a translation of the phrase “dead Russians” instead.

According to Roskomnadzor, they “demanded that the American company take comprehensive measures to prevent such situations in relation to Russian users, as well as inform the agency about the reasons for such messages.” Both Reuters and the DFRLab attempted to replicate Roskomnadzor’s claims without success.

—Danielle Dougall, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

Facing widespread social media restrictions, Kremlin creates new Telegram channel

As social media platforms move to restrict access to Russian state-affiliated channels, the Kremlin has announced the creation of a new Telegram channel. The channel, Кремль. Новости (“Kremlin. News”), was created on April 4 but only became active on April 11.

Kremlin media outlets noted that the channel received a blue badge, signifying that Telegram had verified it. The channel primarily reposts information from the official Kremlin website. At the time of writing, the channel had 166,000 subscribers.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Russia promotes misleading video accusing Ukraine of using mannequins as casualties appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Facebook takes down inauthentic networks targeting Ukraine

ebaker — Mon, 11 Apr 2022 19:19:58 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Media Policy

Facebook takes down inauthentic networks targeting Ukraine

After being limited on Twitter, Russian government accounts look to Telegram, VK

Tracking narratives

Kremlin-linked Telegram channels claim the West is forcing Ukraine into a long war

Russian troll factory promotes hotline for reporting “Ukrainian Nazis”

Facebook takes down inauthentic networks targeting Ukraine

On April 7, Facebook announced that it had de-platformed a network targeting Ukraine that originated in Russia and Belarus. According to the announcement, the influence campaign dubbed Ghostwriter had intensified efforts to hack the social media accounts of Ukrainian military personnel. In some cases, the Ghostwriter operation successfully intercepted military accounts and posted videos asking Ukrainian soldiers to give up. Facebook said it had blocked these videos and prevented other users from sharing them. The cybersecurity firm Mandiant had previously assessed with high confidence that the Belarusian government is connected to the Ghostwriter operation.

Facebook also said it had disrupted government-linked actors from Russia and Belarus engaging in cyber espionage and covert influence operations against Ukraine. Some of these actors, who are connected to the Belarusian KGB, reportedly disseminated false information about Ukrainian soldiers. For example, posts claimed that Ukrainian political leaders left the country on the first day of the invasion and Ukrainian soldiers had given up without a fight. Facebook also noted that the network created an event in Warsaw to organize a protest against the Polish government on March 14.

Additionally, Facebook de-platformed a previously removed network linked to individuals associated with Russia’s Internet Research Agency who added new accounts in late 2021 and January 2022. Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the network published content that blamed Russia’s invasion on NATO and accused the Ukrainian military of targeting civilians.

Facebook also removed a network originating from Luhansk. The actors behind the network allegedly promoted two pro-Russian websites targeting the Caucasus and Ukraine, kavkazru.press and politica.in.ua. Facebook said the website politica.in.ua appeared to have been “taken over” in March, as the audience was directed towards a Telegram channel where photos of Russian casualties were available. The website currently displays a banner message with phone numbers for those searching for lost Russian soldiers in Ukraine to call. It also directs visitors to a Telegram channel called Ishchi Svoikh (“Ищи своих,” or “Look for yours”).

Facebook said it also de-platformed a small group of Facebook and Instagram assets exhibiting coordinated inauthentic behavior against Ukraine. This network reportedly ran several false news websites to spread anti-Ukrainian messages. Accounts within this network pretended to be based in Kyiv. The network used fake accounts, AI-generated profile photos, and fictitious personas to mislead users. Facebook said the network was connected to a previously removed network linked to the propaganda outlets News Front and South Front websites. The DFRLab previously reported on Facebook’s April 2020 takedown of News Front and South Front networks.

Finally, Facebook removed about 200 accounts that falsely reported Facebook users’ content for various violations. The main objective was to convince Facebook to remove posts or accounts. Both fake and authentic accounts were used to submit thousands of complaints via Facebook’s abuse reporting tools. The reports mainly targeted individuals in Ukraine and Russia. The people behind this network used a cooking-themed group to coordinate reporting activities. The network reportedly became more active in mid-February prior to the invasion. Facebook said the network was linked to a Russian network removed in 2019.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

After being limited on Twitter, Russian government accounts look to Telegram, VK

Twitter accounts run by the Russian government are asking users to follow them on Telegram and VKontakte (VK) to receive official updates. This comes after Twitter announced last week that it would limit content from more than 300 official Russian government accounts.

On April 10, the Twitter account of the Russian embassy in Ghana pinned a tweet in which they accused Twitter of waging a campaign to silence Russia’s official accounts. The account urged users to subscribe to “reserve social networks” on Telegram and VK. The tweet was promoted by the official Twitter account of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Both the Telegram channel and VK account of the Russian embassy in Ghana were created on February 28, 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. At the time of publishing, the accounts had 659 subscribers and 35 followers, respectively.

Official Kremlin Twitter accounts have a documented history of manipulating Twitter and using the platform to spread disinformation.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Kremlin-linked Telegram channels claim the West is forcing Ukraine into a long war

Kremlin–tied Ukrainian Telegram channels are continuing their attempts to shift blame for the war from Russia to other actors. The Telegram channel Rezident wrote on April 9 that the West is “easily throwing us into war with Russia” but is only supplying financial loans rather than weapons. The claim that the West is not supplying weapons to Ukraine is inaccurate. Rezident then alleged without evidence that the US and UK “warned Ukraine not to sign off on any peace treaties with Russia.” The Telegram post quoted the Kremlin-tied channel ZeRada, which claimed that Josep Borrell, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, believed the war must be one militarily rather than diplomatically. “[W]ar must be won on the battlefield,” the Telegram post quoted Borrell. While the EU diplomat did tweet this phrase, he has also tweeted about his support for diplomacy.

Another pro-Kremlin channel, Spletnitsa (“Сплетница,” or “Gossip Girl”), claimed that UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson nudged President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to “postpone peace talks” during his recent visit to Ukraine. As evidence, the channel quoted Zelenskyy adviser Mykhailo Podolyak. On April 9, Podolyak said that great battles were still to come, including in the Donbas, and only after Ukraine wins them will it “get a more substantial negotiating position from which it can dictate certain terms.” The channel suggested that Johnson influenced Podolyak’s statement but did not provide evidence. The Rezident Telegram channel forwarded this message and commented, “[T]he UK and the US are against any peace treaties with Russia,” adding, “the preliminary agreements have reached their finale, and the war will be long.”

In recent weeks, Rezident has published various “inside” scoops about the US and the UK’s influence over Ukraine-Russia negotiations. The channel posted that Johnson’s visit indicates a change in Ukraine’s public position, and continues to heavily promote debunked narratives claiming Western countries have control over Ukraine.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russian troll factory promotes hotline for reporting “Ukrainian Nazis”

RIA FAN, a website published by the Internet Research Agency, is running a hotline for reporting “Ukrainian Nazis” and promoting movies on Russian mercenaries in support of the Kremlin’s pro-war campaign. The Internet Research Agency is a troll farm financed by oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who was sanctioned for the agency’s role in meddling with the 2016 United States presidential election.

On its website, RIA FAN has a section called “Z Heros” to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. The section lists Russian military personnel who were awarded the highest Russian state medal and tells the stories of their achievements in what the Kremlin still refers to as its “military operation in Ukraine.” In the same section of the website, RIA FAN runs a “Stop Nazism” hotline “for everyone who has something to tell about the facts of any discrimination or Nazism in all its forms.” In partnership with the Patriot media group, the site urges Ukrainian citizens to report “crimes that have been happening for eight years,” including information about “illegal weapons.”

RIA FAN’s “Stop Nazism Hotline” logo. (Source: RIA FAN)

In addition to “Z Heroes” and “Stop Nazism,” RIA FAN promotes a movie produced by Prigozhin about Russian mercenaries fighting in eastern Ukraine. Prigozhin has previously financed propaganda movies showing Russian mercenaries in a positive light, and is believed to finance the mercenary company known as the Wagner Group.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Facebook takes down inauthentic networks targeting Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia makes false claims while blaming Ukraine for Kramatorsk railway station attack

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 08 Apr 2022 18:06:08 +0000

Tracking narratives

Russia makes false claims while blaming Ukraine for Kramatorsk railway station attack

Ukraine accuses Russia of using mobile crematoria in Mariupol

Kremlin-linked accounts promote Telegram channel spreading disinformation under the guise of fact-checking

Media policy

Inconsistent messages from Russia on the use of VPNs

Security

Tracking Russian mercenaries in Ukraine

War crimes and human rights abuses

Amid reports of looting, Russian soldiers may be stealing civilian cars

Russia makes false claims while blaming Ukraine for Kramatorsk railway station attack

On April 8, missiles landed near Kramatorsk railway station, killing dozens of people and injuring more than 100. The exact scale of casualties is still being investigated. According to local authorities, at least four children died. One of the missiles found on the scene had the phrase “За детей” (“for the children”) scrawled on it. While the phrase is open to interpretation, some have speculated that it was intended to mean “for the children of Russia,” and thus part of Russia’s attempt to paint Ukraine as the aggressor.

Ukrainian authorities had urged residents of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, including the city of Kramatorsk, to evacuate while it was still possible. Ukraine brought in multiple trains to bring residents away from the conflict, but the evacuation faced problems. On April 7, for example, three evacuation trains got stuck after Russia bombed railways near Barvinkove, the primary route westward from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The trains eventually departed after a delay of several hours. Meanwhile, buses from Vuhledar came under fire during an evacuation.

At least six trains were scheduled to depart Kramatorsk on April 8, each leaving the station as soon as they reached capacity.

Russia tried to blame Ukraine for attacking its own citizens. Russian Telegram channel Siloviki prematurely published information that Russians are “working on a cluster of armed forces of Ukraine at Kramatorsk railway station” and celebrated casualties among Ukrainian combatants. A few minutes after the initial post, they edited it, presumably after reports of civilian casualties proliferated. In the edited post, they said that when the Kramatorsk railway station was hit, “It was possibly a Tochka-U [missile] that the Armed Forces of Ukraine use.” Both posts were subsequently deleted, but the original post and the edited message were archived as a forwarded message on another pro-Kremlin channel. Another pro-Kremlin Telegram channel, Veteran Notes, published an ominous message on the evening of April 7, suggesting people who evacuate from Kramatorsk and Sloviansk not use railway transport.

Kremlin-owned mainstream media picked up the narrative and continued claiming Ukraine had attacked its own civilians, insisting that Russia does not use the Tochka-U missile system. While it might not be on official lists of Russian equipment, researchers previously spotted footage of Tochka-U systems being deployed in Belarus over the course of March, disproving Russia’s claims of not using them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine accuses Russia of using mobile crematoria in Mariupol

On April 6, the Mariupol City Council released a statement on Telegram accusing Russian forces of using mobile crematoria to cover up war crimes. According to the council’s statement, Russian leadership ordered troops to destroy evidence of crimes in Mariupol following the public backlash against the Bucha massacre. They alleged that Konstantin Ivashchenko, the self-appointed separatist mayor of Mariupol, coordinates the mobile crematoria with the help of local special brigades recruited by Russians. The council speculated that Mariupol’s death toll could be in the tens of thousands, though the scale of civilian casualties remains unknown. Turkey has offered to help evacuate the wounded and dead from Mariupol by sea, but the initiative requires Moscow’s approval. The council suggested that the Kremlin has yet to sign off on the plan because of the high number of civilian casualties. Ukrainian authorities have not provided evidence of Russian forces using mobile crematoria in Mariupol.

Before the invasion, Ukraine and other countries noted the presence of Russian mobile crematoria near the Ukrainian border. On February 23, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace announced that Russia would deploy mobile crematoria in Ukraine to hide evidence of casualties. On March 3, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the Russians had brought mobile crematoria into Ukraine to burn the bodies of their dead service members. Zelenskyy argued that the Kremlin would not want Russian families to know that their children died fighting in Ukraine.

In 2015, after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas region, Ukrainian authorities raised the issue of Russian mobile crematoria. On January 29 of that year, the head of the Ukraine Security Service stated that Russia brought several mobile crematoria into militant-held areas of Ukraine. At the time, US Reps. Mac Thornberry (R-TX) and Seth Moulton (D-MA) also noted that they had seen evidence of Russian mobile crematoria in Ukraine.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin-linked accounts promote Telegram channel spreading disinformation under the guise of fact-checking

The War on Fakes Telegram channel continues to amplify Russian disinformation under the guise of fact-checking, according to DFRLab monitoring. First reported on by the DFRLab in early March, War on Fakes now has over 720,000 subscribers, despite losing about 30,000 from March 19 to April 2. On April 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense amplified a post by War on Fakes to discredit information about the Bucha massacre.

The DFRLab has seen increased promotion of War on Fakes’ English-language content through new Telegram channels and Russian government Facebook accounts. Using the Meta-owned analysis tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab examined accounts sharing links to War on Fakes’ English-language website. Throughout March and into April, Russian embassies and other government-affiliated accounts shared links to the website hundreds of times on Facebook. The combined reach of these accounts includes millions of users.

A screenshot of CrowdTangle results for accounts that have shared a link to War on Fake’s English-language website. (Source: DFRLab via Crowdtangle)

Although War on Fakes also has websites in Chinese, Arabic, French, and Spanish, none of these URLs were shared as widely; however, there were at least a few shares by Russian embassy accounts for each of these other language options.

The War on Fakes Telegram channel has also begun promoting a similar channel called “For the Truth,” which describes itself as “created to refute fakes and bring the truth to the West in their language.” The channel posts in Russian and English, and appears to be writing longer-form articles, which it shares via the web publishing tool Telegra.ph. One of War on Fakes’ secondary channels also publishes long-form articles via Telegra.ph in Russian. For the Truth admits that they coordinate with War on Fakes in some of their posts.

The DFRLab also identified what appears to be state-organized promotion of War on Fakes through Russia’s social media platform VKontakte. Hundreds of accounts and pages shared identical copy-and-pasted versions of a post promoting War on Fakes to Russian parents; most of the posts were published on March 9 and 10. The post’s text includes an emotional appeal to parents about the safety of their children and the need to protect them from false information about the war.

Screenshot of a post made by a municipally funded secondary school in Russia on March 10. The screenshot has been auto-translated. (Source: VK.com/archive)

A significant portion of the pages sharing this post are government-funded schools or clubs, including the Young Guard program of Murmansk and numerous secondary schools, kindergartens, and preschools. The DFRLab has previously witnessed municipal VK accounts being used to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Other groups sharing the text include a step aerobics group, the Karate Federation of Murmansk, and a youth soccer organization. The DFRLab also identified another grouping of local government and news accounts sharing a different copied-and-pasted text promoting War on Fakes. This data set includes thirty separate accounts that all shared posts on February 27 within an hour of each other. Included in the posts was a video—which appears to have been taken down—refuting the claim that a Russian rocket hit an apartment building in Ukraine.

Screenshot of the same post shared by two different accounts on February 27. The posts have been auto-translated. (Sources: VK.com/archive, left; VK.com/archive, right)

There appears to be some level of coordinated behavior behind these posts. When considering that the accounts have a connection to the Russian government, this provides evidence that the Kremlin is connected, or at the very least promoting, the War on Fakes operation.

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

Inconsistent messages from Russia on the use of VPNs

Over the last several weeks, virtual private networks (VPNs) have become a popular tool to help Russian internet users connect to Western online platforms blocked by the Kremlin. In mid-March, several outlets began reporting on the increased demand for VPNs in Russia. According to WIRED, “Almost a million people from Russia had signed up since the war started, 20 times the usual rate.” Pro-Kremlin outlet RBC.ru also noted that the sudden proliferation of VPNs likely explained why Russian use of western social media platforms had not dropped off entirely.

The Kremlin has not been supportive of the recent surge in VPN use, but messaging and enforcement has been inconsistent, as can be seen in this timeline put together by the DFRLab:

March 15: Alexander Khinshtein, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Information Politics, stated that twenty VPN services had been blocked in Russia, and federal censor Roskomnadzor would continue blocking others.

March 17: TASS published a report by the cybersecurity firm Group-IB, which stated that blocking VPNs is “a very abstract task” and represents a technological challenge.

March 18: The Russian Fund for the Development of Digital Economy misleadingly “warned” Russian internet users that VPN services are a threat to their data security.

March 21: Russian outlets reported that many blocked VPN services continue to work in Russia, but at a slower speed.

March 22: Alexander Khinshtein stated that a legislative ban on VPNs was not being considered in Russia.

March 22: Andrei Klishas, head of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation and State Building, stated there would be no punishment for using VPNs, even if the services are officially are banned.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Tracking Russian mercenaries in Ukraine

Kremlin-backed Wagner Group mercenaries have been documented for the first time in Ukraine, after reports stating that over 1,000 fighters had being deployed in the war. Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, intercepted Russian communications, which according to Der Spiegel suggested that “members of the Russian mercenary unit called the Wagner Group played a leading role in the atrocities in Ukraine.” The group became infamous for its atrocities in Syria and other conflict zones.

Recently surfaced images suggest that Wagner forces are back in Ukraine, where there are fears they may commit war crimes. (Source: @grey_zone/Archive)

One of the individuals seen in the photos appears to be Yan Petrovskiy a.k.a. Velikyi Slavyan, serving in Wagner’s Rusich unit. In 2020, the DFRLab consulted with Norwegian journalists from NRK.no to identify him in Syria. Despite his efforts to conceal himself with a blurred face, Petrovskiy can be identified through distinctive features such as tattoos on his wrists, as well as his black watch, the side arm on his leg, and a “Valknut” patch on his chest made of three interlocking triangles. The Valknut, also known as the “knot of the slain,” represents the afterlife and is commonly used by the far right.

The distinctive features in the photo suggest that the individual posing for the photo is Yan Petrovskiy. (Source: @grey_zone/Archive)

Meanwhile, according to the additional reporting, Rusich unit commander Aleksey “Fritz” Milchakov was recently wounded, and Yan Petrovsky is reportedly now in charge.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Amid reports of looting, Russian soldiers may be stealing civilian cars

The monitoring group Belaruski Gayun published a new investigation on April 8 alleging that Russian soldiers are driving stolen Ukrainian vehicles. After receiving multiple requests from Ukrainian residents seeking help to find their stolen cars, Belaruski Gayun investigated civilian cars marked with a “V,” a symbol used by Russian troops to identify friendly forces. They discovered multiple cars in Belarus with this symbol and concluded that at least some of the vehicles were likely stolen from Ukrainian residents.

Belaruski Gayun spotted civilian cars without registration plates that were part of a large convoy of Russian military equipment. One of the cars in the convoy featured the logo of Havrylivski Kurchata (“Havryliv Chickens”), a domestic Ukrainian brand sold by the agriculture holding company Agromars.

Meanwhile, Russian Mediazona published a story about Dmytro Mayboroda, a Ukrainian mobile app developer, who lived under Russian occupation in Bervitsa, Kyiv Oblast. To ensure Russian soldiers would not steal his personal phone, he gave them phones he uses for app testing. After the withdrawal of Russian troops, Dmytro checked the phones locations and found out that more than one of them was now in Russia, including one he geolocated to a Russian military hospital in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

The post Russian War Report: Russia makes false claims while blaming Ukraine for Kramatorsk railway station attack appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Ukraine accuses Georgia of allowing Russian smuggling through its territory

ebaker — Wed, 06 Apr 2022 20:05:23 +0000

Tracking narratives

Ukraine accuses Georgia of allowing Russia to smuggle illegal goods through its territory but lacks evidence

False Flag: Russia claims Ukraine is planning attacks on civilians in Kherson

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russian opposition leader Navalny calls for Kremlin propaganda to be treated as a war crime

Russian soldiers appear to have shipped two tons of stolen goods from Ukraine to Russia

Security

Video evidence of Belarus’s violent crackdown on rail-targeting partisans

Ukraine accuses Georgia of allowing Russia to smuggle illegal goods through its territory but lacks evidence

On April 4, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Russia was working to establish smuggling routes as means of circumventing international sanctions that have obstructed the Kremlin’s ability to import military and civilian goods. The statement said specifically that one such smuggling route would pass through Georgia. The Ukrainian MoD also asserted that Georgia’s political leadership had allegedly instructed the special services not to intervene or hinder the activities of the smugglers.

After the statement’s release, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Iryna Vereshchuk addressed the people of Georgia, asking them to help pressure their country’s government to cease allowing smuggled weapons to transit through Georgian territory. Ukrainian authorities, however, did not provide evidence to corroborate the MoD statement.

Georgian authorities promptly denied Ukraine’s allegations and demanded that Ukraine provide additional details to support the accusation. On April 4, the Georgian Ministry of Finance stated, “Georgia has been pursuing most severe control at every check-point of the country and has been tightly monitoring the inbound and outbound transportation of cargo through the sovereign borders of the country.” The State Security Service of Georgia called on Ukraine to provide evidence to support its claim that Georgia was aiding in smuggling illegal cargo and added that, if Ukraine fails to provide evidence, Georgia would consider the MoD statement as “deliberate misinformation” that “represents an extremely unfriendly and provocative step and aims at stirring domestic unrest in Georgia.”

Representatives of Georgia’s ruling party, Georgian Dream, expressed disappointment with the Ukrainian MoD statement and argued that Ukraine did not have any evidence to support the claim. Georgian Dream members blamed people from Georgia’s previous government, who currently work for Ukrainian government, for orchestrating the statement.

Some leaders of the Georgian opposition also expressed skepticism toward Ukraine’s statement. David Usupashvili, a Member of Parliament from the opposition Lelo party, argued that the allegations from Ukraine would “be impossible to be correct.” Giorgi Vashadze, leader of the Strategy Agmashenebeli party, stated that, if Ukraine does not present evidence to back up its statement, it should apologize. Representatives from the main opposition party, the United National Movement, argued that Ukraine would not make such a statement without having evidence.

On April 5, Teimuraz Janjalia, Georgia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with Chargé d’Affaires of Ukraine Andrei Kasyanov to express concern about the Ukrainian MoD’s statement. Following the meeting, Janjalia told local media that Kasyanov could not provide evidence to back up the claims. On April 5, US Department of State Spokesperson Ned Price was asked about the MoD claim but said he was “not in a position to substantiate or speak to the allegation.”

In response to Georgia’s request for evidence, on April 5, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmitry Kuleba argued that Georgia must provide evidence and convincing arguments that the country is not helping Russia to organize smuggling channels. He added that, if Ukraine had not already influenced Georgia and other countries through which Russia is trying to bypass sanctions, these countries would have allowed Russia to circumvent sanctions a long time ago.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

False Flag: Russia claims Ukraine is planning attacks on civilians in Kherson

Kremlin-owned outlet RIA.ru reported that Ukraine is planning deadly activities in the Kherson village of Oleksandrivka as a provocation against Russia. The article cited an anonymous source in “Russian law enforcement agencies in Kherson,” who said they had received their information from “informants among the Ukrainian troops” in Mykolaiv. The article claims without evidence that Ukraine is deploying saboteurs tasked with the “organization of shelling, mining houses, and schools, which can lead to a large number of civilian casualties.” This appears likely to be the latest false flag operation from Russia.

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has used false flags to justify its actions in Ukraine. In one false flag operation, a Russian military official stated that “Ukrainian Nazis” planned to blow up the Sumykhimprom chemical plant. Two days later, Russian troops shelled the plant.

The Kherson false flag allegation may indicate Russia’s next target, or it could be an attempt to obscure the truth behind civilian killings or other war crimes in the region that have already occurred.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian opposition leader Navalny calls for Kremlin propagandists to be treated as war criminals

On April 5, jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny released a statement calling on the international community to treat the owners and operators of Russian state propaganda outlets as war criminals. “Putin’s propaganda has long ceased to be a tool,” he wrote. “They are actual warmongers and have become a party in their own right,” and Russian propaganda “create[s] the kind of public opinion that no longer simply allows Putin to commit war crimes but demands them of him.”

In the Twitter thread, Navalny also described how Kremlin-owned media presented the war in Ukraine to Russian viewers. “The monstrosity of lies on federal channels is unimaginable,” wrote Navalny. As an example, Navalny cited a narrative shared by Channel One Russia that claims NATO was “preparing the provocation in Bucha for a long time and at the highest level. It is also confirmed by the fact that President Biden called Putin a ‘butcher’ not long ago.” Navalny says Channel One Russia reported that Biden used the word “butcher” intentionally because it sounds similar to Bucha, thus “subconsciously” preparing Western audiences for the “provocation.”

Navalny’s message comes after Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said Russia categorically rejected all accusations that the Russian military killed Ukrainian civilians in Bucha. Peskov claimed that experts with the Russian Ministry of Defense “identified signs of video fakes and various fakes” in Bucha but failed to provide any evidence that actually backed those claims. These claims also contradicted satellite imagery of Bucha, which appeared to show bodies lying in the streets two weeks before Russian troops withdrew from the town.

In a call to action, Navalny outlined steps to disrupt Kremlin disinformation campaigns, including a total ban on the supply and service of equipment and identifying Russian state assets in the West and placing them on “visa blacklists.” These steps echo statements from Mykhailo Federov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation.

—Danielle Dougall, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

Russian soldiers appear to have shipped two tons of stolen goods from Ukraine to Russia

Earlier this week, the DFRLab reported on a three-hour CCTV video, released by a Belarusian Telegram channel, showing Russian troops at the Mozyr branch of CDEK, a Russian delivery company, appearing to be shipping stolen goods to Russia. The same Telegram channel, Belaruski Gayun, has now published a report – which security-reporting website Motolko Help subsequently provided English-language coverage of – purportedly containing leaked information about the packages’ senders, receivers, and contents. The documents allege that, on April 2, Russian soldiers used CDEK’s Mozyr branch to ship more than two tons of goods, most of which appeared to be stolen. Many of the packages were sent to Rubtsovsk in Altai Krai, Russia.

Belaruski Gayun’s list included an accounting of the weight and contents of the packages. One individual sent 450 kilograms of goods, including music speakers, tools, a table, and a tent. Another person sent a 255-kilogram package containing spare tools and an e-scooter.

Mediazona Belarus created a map to visualize the packages’ destinations and total weight. Belarusian media outlet Zerkalo contacted CDEK, which confirmed that, on April 2, people in military uniforms with Russian passports sent a large number of packages. The company also confirmed that the number of visitors to the Mozyr branch on April 2 was unusual. In addition, Mediazona published a video of Russian soldiers at a Russian branch of CDEK in Novozybkov, near the Ukrainian and Belarusian borders. In this video, soldiers can also be seen shipping goods.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Video evidence of Belarus’s violent crackdown on rail-targeting partisans

On April 6, videos showing a brutal arrest of three Belarusian partisans from Babruisk surfaced online. The Belarusian Ministry of Interior Affairs alleged that the partisans were attempting to sabotage the country’s rail network broadly as an act of “armed terrorists” who were “endangering the security” of Belarusians.

The arrest took place on March 30 according to the watermarks on the videos, which were taken by the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The videos showed that the arrested men had seemingly been beaten, some covered in blood. According to activist reports, the Belarusian military has been using live munitions against them. Graphic visual evidence suggests that one of the railway partisans was shot in both kneecaps after the arrest.

https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1511062204119977985

A map showing all known railway partisan attacks as of April 4, 2020. (Source: @franakviacorka/archive)

According to the Senior Advisor to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya Franak Viačorka, at least 38 Belarusians have been captured due to their activities against Belarusian railways. They face up to 15 years in prison for their actions.

News that the railway system will be guarded by Belarusian special forces against sabotage appeared as early as March 24. This is, however, one of the few pieces of visual evidence of partisans being arrested.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Ukraine accuses Georgia of allowing Russian smuggling through its territory appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Belarusian railway rebellion disrupts Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine War

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 06 Apr 2022 19:32:17 +0000

The slickly produced video opens with an unlikely scenario. The year is 2023. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya is the president of Belarus. And Belarus has been invited to join the European Union.

“Fantasy? Not at all. The war Vladimir Putin started against Ukraine gives us a unique chance to change history,” the narrator says. “Russia is already losing. And without our bases, railways, and borders, Putin’s defeat will be significantly hastened.”

The video calls on Belarusians not only to demonstrate against the war, but also to deny Russia the assets they need to prosecute it from Belarusian territory. “Blockade the aggressor at bases and supply routes. Deny them food, fuel, and freedom of movement,” it says.

In fact, this is more than a call for action. It is actually describing something that is already happening. Since Putin’s Ukraine War began on February 24, at least 52 Belarusians including 30 railway workers have been arrested on charges of treason, terrorism and espionage for disrupting the movement of Russian troops and military hardware, according to the Belarusian human rights group Viasna.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s autocratic regime in Minsk is so concerned with what has become known as “The Rail War” that it has also declared the Telegram channel of the “Association of Railway Workers of Belarus” an extremist organization.

This railway rebellion is the most dramatic example of how Putin’s war against Ukraine is changing the political dynamic in Belarus. Lukashenka’s slavish submission to Putin, allowing the Kremlin leader to use his country as a staging ground for Russia’s assault on Ukraine, has unnerved and angered this nation of 9.4 million people.

Belarusians are deeply averse to war, have long had warm feelings toward Ukrainians and, like much of the world, are disturbed by atrocities like the mass executions of civilians in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha.

Lukashenka’s enabling of Putin’s aggression has also subjected Belarus to Western sanctions which are battering its already fragile economy and causing living standards to plummet. Moreover, the poor performance of the Russian armed forces and Lukashenka’s erratic and inconsistent statements about whether or not Belarusian troops would join the offensive are undermining the dictator’s carefully curated image as a strong leader.

Writing in The Guardian, Belarusian journalist and television host Sasha Filipenko noted that for decades Lukashenka has repeated the same mantra to Belarusians: “While I am your president, there will be no war in Belarus.” In a country that throughout its entire history has frequently suffered as a result of someone else’s conflicts, this promise previously proved persuasive. However, commented Filipenko, Lukashenka’s obligations to Putin have now turned Belarus into an aggressor, leaving his own people completely bewildered.

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In addition to the railway rebellion, a Belarusian hacking collective called the Cyber Partisans has been attacking the country’s railway network in an effort to prevent Russian troops from reaching Ukraine. The group has also distributed videos urging Belarusian soldiers not to take part in Russia’s war.

Meanwhile, hundreds of Belarusian volunteers have joined Ukraine’s struggle to defend itself against Russia by signing up for a paramilitary group called the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, named after the nineteenth century Belarusian leader of an uprising against the Russian Empire.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a paradigm-shifting event in more ways than many observers initially imagined. It has united NATO, ended the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, caused Europe to retreat from its dependence on Russian energy, and led Germany to dramatically increase defense spending. All of these things seemed unimaginable just a few months ago.

And in the former Soviet space, unexpected ripple effects are only beginning to appear. As we entered 2022, the centenary of the founding of the Soviet Union, it seemed that Putin was well on his way to reestablishing part of the old empire. He had pulled off a soft annexation of Belarus without firing a shot and appeared poised to seize Ukraine by force.

Putin’s war has not gone according to plan thanks to a combination of fierce Ukrainian defense of their homeland, the incompetence of the Russian military, and surprisingly strong Western unity. Against all odds, Ukraine is fighting Putin’s war machine to a standstill. And the even more surprising resistance within Belarus might yet free that country from the grip of the Kremlin and its quisling client Lukashenka.

If the sheer brutality of the Russian atrocities in Bucha has shown the world the human cost of defeat, the brave resistance of Ukrainians and Belarusians demonstrate what is possible in the event of victory. The United States and its allies now need to impose even tougher sanctions, including a complete embargo of Russian energy exports to Europe, and give the Ukrainians all the weapons and support they need to defend themselves. Too much is at stake to do anything less.

Pro-Kremlin accounts denying Bucha ‘massacre’ dominate VKontakte conversations

Kremlin attempts to reboot pro-war symbols online and offline

Russian soldiers allegedly sent stolen goods from Ukraine to Russia

Security

Russian troops abandon Hostomel Airport, leaving destruction behind

Signs of Russian forces preparing to re-deploy from Belarus

Cyber warfare

Roskomnadzor warns of spearphishing attacks using agency’s identity

Kremlin claims Bucha massacre was staged by Ukraine

Over the weekend of April 2, journalists and Ukrainian authorities reported on dozens of dead civilians found in Bucha, northwest of Kyiv, after Russian troops left the area. Images captured by multiple sources documented how some of the dead had their hands tied. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of committing genocide in Ukraine, while Charles Michel, president of the European Council, used the hashtag #BuchaMassacre when he announced the EU was preparing further sanctions against Russia.

Despite the overwhelming evidence of mass civilian casualties in Bucha, the Kremlin is trying to cover up the killings through false claims and distortion. On April 3, Russia’s Ministry of Defense shared a post from the pro-Kremlin War on Fakes Telegram channel that called the massacre a “coordinated media campaign.” The post claimed that Russian forces left Bucha on March 30, and footage of the dead only appeared four days later as a result of shelling by Ukraine. The Telegram post also included a graphic video that it claimed was proof that bodies had been placed in the streets to generate public outrage, and that some of the bodies were actually actors pretending to be dead.

A few hours later, the Ministry of Defense posted an official statement claiming that “not a single local resident has suffered from any violent action” during the Russian occupation of the city. It reiterated the narrative that footage of dead civilians only emerged four days after Russian troops left the city, and asserted that locals had been allowed to leave beforehand. The statement also claimed that the bodies did not show any signs of stiffening or decomposition. It concluded that the scenes in Bucha had been staged by “the Ukrainian regime” for Western media, and that Ukraine had done the same in Mariupol and other cities.

The Twitter account for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs disseminated a summary of the Defense Ministry statement and called that the Bucha massacre “another hoax by the Kyiv regime for the Western media.” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova claimed that Ukraine staged the massacre to scuttle peace negotiations and escalate the conflict. Russia then demanded a meeting of the UN Security Council to be convened on April 4 to discuss the events in Bucha.

Notably, Kremlin media’s own reporting undermines the narrative that Russian troops had departed Bucha four days before the bodies were documented. On April 1, Zvezda TV reported that Russian Marines were still conducting “clean-up” operations in Bucha and other cities to regain a foothold in the region. That same day, the Kyiv Oblast administration still included Bucha in its list of the most dangerous areas due to Russian forces retreating from there. These reports seemed to align with a Kyiv military administration statement the previous day, which reported that Bucha was still under the control of Russian armed forces. All of this suggests that Russia’s claims of having evacuated the city on March 30 are false.

Additionally, April 3 was not the first day that reports of civilian deaths surfaced, as the Kremlin suggested. On April 1, graphic footage from Bucha appeared on the Irpin Bucha Gostomel Telegram channel (“Ирпень | Буча | Гостомель”) in which a car is seen driving around corpses on the same street featured in the War on Fakes Telegram channel video. One of the corpses seen in the April 1 video matches a body in the April 3 War on Fakes video, despite the fact that the Telegram channel claimed the body in question was moving. On April 2, AFP reported that bodies of at least 20 men in civilian clothes had been found on a single street in Bucha. The Ukrainian fact-checking outlet StopFake also cited a graphic YouTube video filmed on April 2 by Ukrainian journalist Dmitry Komarov documenting civilian deaths in the city.

As for the War on Fakes Telegram post showing footage it claimed proved the bodies were actually actors, Russian independent outlet Mediazona analyzed the video and concluded that the “movement of a corpse’s hand” alleged in the original post was actually a visual distortion caused by a drop of water or a scratch on the windshield of the car from where video was filmed. Mediazona also debunked the War on Fakes Telegram claim that one of the alleged corpses was attempting to stand up, concluding that the “movement” seen in the footage was due to distortion from capturing the footage through the car’s rear-view mirror.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Pro-Kremlin accounts denying Bucha massacre dominate VKontakte conversations

Pro-Kremlin accounts dominated conversations about the Bucha massacre on the Russian social media platform VKontakte (VK), denying and deflecting any Russian responsibility. Ekaterina Gubareva, a former politician in the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the wife of Donetsk separatist leader Pavel Gubarev, wrote on VK that the Russian soldiers in Bucha treated the local population “with love.” The post received more than 25,000 views. Reuters reported that civilians in Bucha were told by the Russian forces to use white armbands to identify themselves. However, Russian soldiers have also previously worn white armbands. Ukrainian military sources have reported that the Russians are deliberately marking civilians with white armbands to confuse Ukrainian forces. Gubareva suggested that any dead civilians wearing white armbands were killed by the Ukrainian military, who she claimed shot at civilians while liberating the city.

In addition, Denis Tukmakov, a pro-Kremlin columnist, and Igor Levitas, an author at the pro-Kremlin EADaily, stated that the Bucha killings were staged. Tumakov claimed that the bodies were not stiff and that Russian commanders would not leave the bodies behind. In his post, Tumakov listed atrocities that the West has accused Russia of committing and concluded that there would be no more peace talks. “So Russia has no other option but to win,” he wrote. “Otherwise, we will not just lose – we will be turned into Hitler.”

Other VK posts that received less attention expressed shock, but did not condemn Russia. For example, Nikolay Rybakov, a member of the liberal Russian party Yabloko, wrote, “I am shocked by the horrifying photographs of murdered civilians from the city of Bucha, Kiev region.” Similarly, a pro-Alexei Navalny user, Vadim Orlov, posted an image with a crying statue and wrote: “Bucha. F*cked up. I saw it.”

In contrast, Russian writer Dmitry Glukhovsky re-posted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s speech addressing Russians and condemning the Russian military’s atrocities in the Kyiv suburbs. The post received more than 22,000 views.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Kremlin attempts to reboot pro-war symbols online and offline

On March 30, Kremlin-owned outlet RT reported on the popularization of pro-war symbols in Russia. According to RT, Russian entrepreneurs became interested in branding their products with the letters V and Z, which are now considered “patriotic symbols” in the country. The letter Z has become almost ubiquitous among Kremlin media, officials, and supporters rallying support for the war in Ukraine, as well as a tool for spreading propaganda.

RT reported that since the start of Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine, the Russian patent and trademark office has received “dozens of applications for the registration of various trademarks using the symbols V and Z.” Russian entrepreneurs are rushing to register their right to use pro-war symbols exclusively on various products, ostensibly because trademark pirates might want to hijack the symbols.

RT also reported on requests to register pro-war hashtags, including #своихнебросаем (“we don’t leave ours [behind]”), #мненестыдно (“I am not ashamed”), and #ярусский (“I am Russian”). The combination of the letter Z and the “I am not ashamed” hashtag has already appeared on t-shirts of pro-war campaigners.

The DFRLab previously reported on the failed attempts to popularize the “I am not ashamed” hashtag on Twitter and Facebook. Examination of #МнеНеСтыдно showed that engagement with the hashtag on social media was minor and decreased dramatically in the period of February 26 to March 2.

Further analysis of the hashtag over the last month shows that engagement remains very low. Russia’s attempts to block Western social networks might explain some of the limited engagement. However, a recent report analyzing blocked social media outlets published by the pro-Kremlin online outlet RBC.ru showed that millions of Russians are still using Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, likely through the use of VPNs.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian soldiers allegedly sent stolen goods from Ukraine to Russia

The Security Service of Ukraine published what it claimed were numerous intercepted phone calls between Russian soldiers and their relatives in Russia in which they boast about looting and theft. Evidence of Russian looting has previously emerged, such as when Ukrainian troops captured a Russian infantry fighting vehicle containing an assortment of items, including a toy car, frying pan, and Ukrainian coupons that had not been in use since the 1990s. Previously, the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported that Russian soldiers received instructions to establish self-sufficiency until further notice, essentially condoning looting to make up for Russia’s logistical problems.

The most substantial evidence of Russian looting emerged on April 3, when the Belarusian Telegram channel Belaruski Gayun published a three-hour-long CCTV video from the Mozyr branch of CDEK, a Russian delivery company. In the video, Russian troops with the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade are seen mailing stolen goods to an unconfirmed location. The destination is likely Russia, however, as the receiver’s phone number and last name are briefly seen in the video. Among the stolen goods captured in the CCTV footage are a video card, an e-scooter, liquor, four air conditioners, car batteries, and dry rations from the Russian Army. Some of the goods were wrapped in packaging from the Ukrainian supermarket chain Epicentr.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russian troops abandon Hostomel Airport, leaving destruction behind

On March 31, local and government reports first indicated that Russian troops were repositioning from the outskirts of Kyiv. As Ukrainian troops regained control of the area, footage emerged showing the extent of the damage at Hostomel Airport, which Russian troops maintained control of after an intense battle from February 24 to 26.

On April 1, CNN released photos confirming the Russians’ departure from the airport. Footage taken by Ukrainians on the ground show the airfield is clear of hostilities.

Comparison of Sentinel Hub imagery from January 2—prior to the Russian invasion—and March 23—showing the extent of the damage and scorched earth around the airport. (Source: Sentinel Hub EO Browser)

On March 31, Babylon’13, a Ukrainian documentary group, released drone footage of the airport. The footage captured demolished buildings, discarded military vehicles, and numerous planes in ruins, including the An-225 Mriya, the world’s largest aircraft. The video showed no sign of Russian troops.

By April 1, photos and videos began appearing on Telegram that appeared to be taken by Ukrainians on the ground in Hostomel. One post showed an image of the destroyed An-225 Mriya.

A screenshot of a Telegram post showing the An-225 Mriya in its current state. (Source: @irpinonline)

Another video posted on Twitter showed multiple destroyed Russian BMDs located in the airport parking lot, which the DFRLab geolocated to Avtodorozhnia Street, along the edge of the airfield.

Although more images and videos continue to emerge from around Hostomel, it is still unclear if the Russian military is truly abandoning its war aims in the outskirts of Kyiv, or if this merely an attempt to regroup.

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

Signs of Russian forces preparing to re-deploy from Belarus

New footage surfaced on social media showing growing numbers of Russian troops in Gomel, Belarus. An increasing numbers of social media posts documented large Russian military formation movements in the city, likely moving towards the train station for re-deployment. Some videos show Russian VDV airborne troops rolling through Gomel, which the DFRLab geolocated to Bahdan Chmialnicki Street.

Russian troops rolling through the streets of Gomel, Belarus (top left and top center). The video in question was geolocated near Bahdan Chmialnicki Street, house 91 (top right and bottom).(Source: @YWNReporter/Archive; Google Maps)

Additional videos that surfaced on April 4 show military equipment being loaded on trains. These videos were geolocated and verified to be in the southern railway station in Gomel. Other footage showed destroyed Russian equipment already on trains departing in an unknown direction.

Geolocation of Russian troops loading their vehicles onto trains in Gomel, Belarus. The video in question was geolocated to the south train station in Gomel.(Source: GoogleMaps, bottom, right; @MarQs__/Archive, left, center)

These logistical movements are thought to be preparation for increased operations in the Donbas region. On April 4, the head of the Luhansk regional military administration said that Ukrainians are seeing that “Russian accumulation is very, very powerful in the vicinity.” According to the Pentagon, troops from Belarus are likely to be redeployed in the southern front as well.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Roskomnadzor warns of spearphishing attacks using agency’s identity

On April 1, Russian censor Roskomnadzor issued an unusual alert about fraudulent emails sent under its name. It warned that such emails could be used for spearphishing attacks. Roskomnadzor did not mention a specific security incident that precipitated the press release, nor have any such incidents been reported in the Russian media.

Roskomnadzor has risen to international prominence through its frequent condemnations of Western social media companies and increasingly aggressive censorship of Russian civil society. This higher profile has also made the agency a target. On March 10, Distributed Denial of Secrets, a “transparency collective,” released 360,000 hacked files from Roskomnadzor. These files, totaling 526.9 GB, provided significant insight into the agency’s technical and legal processes as well as its administrative structure. The source of the hack claimed to be associated with Anonymous.

The compromise of Roskomnadzor’s internal data and emails, coupled with its unprecedented enforcement actions and public visibility, have created a perfect storm for spearphishing attacks co-opting the agency’s identity to target Russian individuals and media organizations.

—Emerson T. Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin claims Bucha massacre was staged by Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 01 Apr 2022 19:47:04 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot

South Ossetian soldiers depart Ukraine, returning to Georgia

Tracking narratives

Accusations fly as Russian deputy threatens Azerbaijan with nukes and Azerbaijan puts him on Interpol wanted list

Russia falsely accuses Hunter Biden of funding Ukrainian biolabs – again

Poll suggests Putin’s popularity is rising in Russia

Media policy

Russia’s IT regulator attempts to silence Wikipedia for the second time

Documenting dissent

Russians condemning the war in Ukraine face harsh backlash

International response

South Ossetia announces plans to unify with Russia as Abkhazia intends to remain independent

Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot

On April 1, reports and videos surfaced online showing a possible attack on Russia’s Belgorod oil depot. The facility in question is located roughly thirty-five kilometers from the border with Ukraine. While facility owner Rosneft gave no information about the cause of the fire, Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov blamed the attack on the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Reuters reported. “Ukraine’s foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, said he could not confirm or deny reports of Ukrainian involvement in the strike as he did not have military information,” the report added. “The Ukrainian Defense Ministry and the general staff did not respond to requests for comment.”

In one video, several missiles appear to strike the facility as two helicopters fly over it. The DFRLab geolocated the video and confirmed that it was filmed just north of the Belgorod oil refinery. According to timestamps on CCTV footage from the scene, the attack was carried out around 5:43am local time.

Geolocation of the video showing a possible attack on the Belgorod oil refinery. The video recording was taken just north of the facility. (Source: Google Maps, left, bottom; @RaLee85/archive)

Other videos and drone footage of the oil depot showed several fires at the site. There is speculation that an attack was carried out by two Mi-24 attack helicopters, launching multiple S-8 unguided missiles. This is supported by footage that shows helicopters flying at a low altitude.

#Ukraine: Early today, 2 Ukrainian Mi-24 attack helicopters flew at extremely low level over the border with Russia & struck the large oil facility in the city of #Belgorod with multiple S-8 series unguided rockets, causing a major fire. Here is the strike/escape in slo-mo. pic.twitter.com/oGs5eayc1c
— Ukraine Weapons Tracker (@UAWeapons) April 1, 2022

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

South Ossetian soldiers depart Ukraine, returning to Georgia

On March 31, reports emerged in Georgian Telegram channels that up to 300 South Ossetian soldiers left their posts and hitchhiked back home after being sent to fight against Ukraine. The former president of the Russian-occupied region of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, confirmed that some soldiers had traveled back to South Ossetia. “Nobody has the right to judge these guys or accuse them of cowardice,” Kokoity said. “We need to look at the root causes of what happened and find out how their participation was organized. We will deal with this in the most serious manner.”

Images circulated in Telegram channels allegedly depict the returned South Ossetian soldiers near the Russia-South Ossetia border. The DFRLab geolocated the images to Nizhny Zaramag, a border checkpoint between South Ossetia and North Ossetia.

300 Russian-Ossetian soldiers reportedly left Ukraine on their own and returned to Tskhinvali region.

According to Ukraine's General Staff in total, 1200 troops (3 BTG) from "South Ossetia" and 800 (2 BTG) from Abkhazia were deployed in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/mo3B7yNsWV
— Visioner (@visionergeo) March 30, 2022

The Telegram channel VChK-OGPU (ВЧК-ОГПУ), which describes itself as a platform exposing the “secrets of officials, oligarchs, gangsters, and strongmen,” offered an explanation for the South Ossetian soldiers’ return. According to the channel, the soldiers did not run away but were brought back by Kokoity. The channel claims that the soldiers sent to Ukraine were listed as volunteers and not as servicemen of the Russian 58th Army. In addition, the soldiers reportedly lacked bulletproof vests and traveled to Ukraine without weapons or equipment. At this time, the DFRLab cannot independently verify these claims.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Accusations fly as Russian deputy threatens Azerbaijan with nukes and Azerbaijan puts him on Interpol wanted list

On Monday, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would launch an investigation into the actions of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh. The decision came after the Russian Ministry of Defense accused Azerbaijan of violating the Nagorno-Karabakh peace agreement by occupying the village of Parukh (Farukh in Azerbaijani) before eventually evacuating it. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense accused Russia of spreading false claims, saying they had not evacuated the village, while Armenia expressed frustration at Russia for making the same claim. This indicates that Armenia and Azerbaijan both have concerns about Russian peacekeepers, who have been deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh since November 2020, following a six-week war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The previous day, Mikhail Delyagin, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Economic Policy in the Russian State Duma, escalated matters when he told the Rossiya24 TV show “60 Minutes” that Russia needed to “punish Baku” because Azerbaijan aggravated the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh while Russia is occupied with Ukraine. Following the broadcast, Delyagin posted a poll on his Telegram channel with the question: “Do you think it would be justified to use tactical nuclear weapons to eliminate the oil industry of Azerbaijan due to its aggression triggered by belief in the powerlessness of Russia, whose military resources are diverted to Ukraine?” As of March 31, more than 21,000 users had voted in the poll, with 56 percent of them selecting “no, it is unacceptable” and 31 percent selecting “yes, this is necessary – Turkish proxies in Baku will not understand anything else.”

In response to the provocative poll, Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office has opened a criminal case against Delyagin and added him to an international wanted list through Interpol. Azerbaijan is charging Delyagin with using the media to call for aggressive war; threats to commit an act of terrorism; and incitement of national hatred by threatening the use of force. The prosecutor’s office stated that Azerbaijan had sent requests to several partner countries to arrest and extradite Delyagin if he traveled to their territory.

Delyagin has since apologized for his statement and claimed the comments and Telegram poll were not addressed to the Azerbaijani people or state, but targeted at a part of the Azerbaijani bureaucracy, which he said had decided to take advantage of Russia’s focus on Ukraine and neglect its peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.

On March 28, the Press Council of Azerbaijan criticized Russia for blocking Azerbaijani media outlets due to their reporting on Ukraine. The council said that Azerbaijani media websites were blocked because Russia is unhappy with them taking an objective position on the Russia-Ukraine war. The council underlined that Russia neglects freedom of speech and expression and prevents Russians from receiving objective information. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Russian censor Roskomnadzor blocked access to four Azerbaijani media websites, including Haqqin.az, Minval.az, baku.ws, and Oxu.az. Some news organizations said their websites were blocked without any formal notice from Roskomnadzor. In response to Roskomnadzor’s actions, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Digital Development and Transport hinted that it might block Russian media websites if they disseminate information against Azerbaijan’s interests and territorial integrity.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russia falsely accuses Hunter Biden of funding Ukrainian biolabs – again

The Russian Ministry of Defense is attempting to breathe new life into the debunked conspiracy theory that the US and Ukraine are using biolabs to weaponize deadly viruses. In the latest iteration of the conspiracy, the Russian MoD claims that Hunter Biden, son of US President Joe Biden, is working with the Pentagon to fund a “military biological program in Ukraine.” The Russian MoD prepared slides that allegedly connected the US president’s son with “secret biolabs” in Ukraine.

In the slides, the Russian MoD shared biographies of Americans it believes are working on the biolabs program, including US Defense Threat Reduction Agency staff. The slides also included several images of documents that are difficult to read due to their size. Among these were one titled, “Risk evaluation of dangerous pathogens transmitted by birds during migration,” while another focused on the potential epidemiological threat of laboratory research taking place in Kherson. The slides also shared an authentic US patent for a mosquito-delivering drone called a “toxic mosquito aerial release system.”

Another slide discussed Baykar, the Turkish company that produces the Bayraktar TB2 drone. A question-and-answer style document alleges to show responses from Baykar to Motor Sich, a Ukrainian airplanes engine manufacturer. The Russian MoD highlighted a question about the ability of the drone to carry and spray liquid or aerosols from a 20-liter container, implying the Ukrainians intend to use the drones to spray biological weapons. While the document’s legitimacy is questionable, Baykar’s response to the question was simply “No.” Furthermore, the document is written in Russian and English, which suggests it is not authentic as a genuine copy would more likely be written Ukrainian and English.

The biolabs conspiracy has been widely debunked. Hunter Biden’s alleged involvement was also debunked by the Washington Post. The US Embassy in Ukraine has also addressed the conspiracy by noting that its partnership with Ukraine aims to reduce biological threats.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Poll suggests Putin’s popularity is rising in Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating in the country has increased since the start of the war, according to independent Russian pollster Levada Center. The center, which Russia has labeled a foreign agent, published its latest poll on March 30.

According to the poll, Putin’s approval rating had reached 83 percent, a twelve-point rise since February. It is Putin’s highest rating since 2017, after which his popularity dropped due to pension reforms. Only 15 percent of Russians currently disapprove Putin, a 12-point decrease from February.

Meanwhile, the amount of respondents who believe that the country is generally moving in the right direction increased from 52 percent in February to 69 percent in March, while those who think it is moving in the wrong direction decreased from 38 percent to 22 percent.

Trust in Putin rose from 34 percent to 44 percent. He remains the most trusted individual in the country, followed by Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, whose trust rating increased from 12 percent to 28 percent. Trust in Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and ultranationalist lawmaker Vladimir Zhirinovsky also rose in the latest poll.

For the first time since October 2015, the share of those who approve of the State Duma (59 percent) surpassed the share of those who do not (36 percent). Seventy percent of Russians approve of the government’s activities, while 27 percent did not, a change of 15 points in each direction since February.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russia’s IT regulator attempts to silence Wikipedia for the second time

Russian communications watchdog Roskomnadzor announced on March 31 that it is fining Wikipedia RUB 4,000,000 (more than USD $48,000) for not deleting “false information on the subject of a special military operation of the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine, aimed at misinforming Russian users.” Wikipedia’s Russian branch said that it was not clear who would be the recipient of the fine. “Perhaps it will be the Wikimedia Foundation,” the local branch speculated. Earlier, on March 29, Wikipedia’s Russian branch said it had received a notification demanding it delete the article “Russia’s Invasion in Ukraine (2022).”

This is the second time Roskomnadzor has demanded that Wikipedia delete an article about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On March 1, the Russian Wikipedia branch published the first notification they received from Roskomnadzor, which threatened to block Wikipedia in Russia. In response, Wikipedia published an article in Russian explaining what to do if Wikipedia is blocked.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Russians condemning the war in Ukraine face harsh backlash

On March 31, various Telegram channels belonging to independent media outlets in Russia reported on a schoolteacher facing ten years in prison for condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine. On March 18, Irina Gen reportedly tried to explain to two of her eighth-grade students why they were prohibited from attending karate and swimming competitions in Europe. Gen became emotional and condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, saying that it was “right” to ban Russia from sports competitions in Europe. “Until Russia starts behaving in a civilized way, this will continue forever,” she said.

Someone in the classroom recorded Gen’s words and submitted the audio recording to local police. On March 30, police reportedly detained her. Gen pleaded guilty and is now facing a ten-year sentence.

Elsewhere in Russia, on March 31, the documentary festival Artdocfest opened with the theme “No war!” According to Current Time, an independent television program now banned in Russia, a festival theater was evacuated fifteen minutes prior to the start of a documentary. As attendees filed out to the street, an unknown man with a coffee cup approached festival organizer Vitaly Mansky and said provocatively, “I suggest that you hold this festival in the Donbas, where people have been dying for eight years…Why didn’t you do anything there?” Mansky turned away and did not respond. The unknown man proceeded to throw a red substance from the coffee cup on Mansky’s back, as seen in a video on the pro-Kremlin RTVI Telegram channel. Later, Mansky published a video from a kitchen where the festival organizers had gathered after the incident, announcing the immediate closing of the festival. “There is no freedom beyond the kitchen in Russia,” Mansky said. The festival has faced pressure from Russian authorities since 2014.

On March 31, Anna Netrebko, a Russian opera singer, wrote on Facebook: “I expressly condemn the war on Ukraine, and my thoughts are with the victims of this war and their families.” Two days later, the Novosibirsk State Academic Opera and Ballet Theater announced that Netrebko’s June 2 concert had been canceled due to her condemnation of Russia. “We are sure that the truth is with us,” the theater’s announcement concluded. “We should not be afraid that there are cultural figures who renounce their homeland. Our country is rich with talents, and yesterday’s idols will be replaced by others with a clear civic position.”

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

South Ossetia announces plans to unify with Russia as Abkhazia intends to remain independent

On March 30, Anatoly Bibilov, the Kremlin-backed leader of the Russian-occupied region of South Ossetia, said that the region will take “appropriate legal steps in the near future” to ensure unification with its “historic homeland – Russia.”

Andrei Klimov, deputy head of United Russia’s international cooperation commission, said that South Ossetia should hold a referendum to unite with Russia, Civil.ge reported. Following Klimov’s statement, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow would treat the proposed referendum with respect. “We have not taken any legal or other actions in this regard. But at the same time, in this case, we are talking about expressing the opinion of the people of South Ossetia, we treat them with respect,” said Peskov.

On March 31, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the US would not recognize any results “of any effort by Russia or its proxies to divide sovereign Georgian territory.” He added, “Just as the United States did not recognize Russia’s illegal seizure and attempted annexation of Crimea in 2014 and just as we did not recognize the Kremlin’s cynical attempt to recognize independence of the so-called DNR [Donestk People’s Republic] and LNR [Luhansk People’s Republic] in eastern Ukraine, just before it launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, we will not recognize the results of any effort by Russia or its proxies to divide sovereign Georgian territory.”

Following the South Ossetia announcement, Aslan Bzhania, the head of occupied Abkhazia, stated that Abkhazia does not plan to join Russia and will remain independent. “Sovereign, independent Abkhazia is growing and will continue to grow brotherly, allied relations with Russia,” he added.

The previous day, RT editor-in-chief and Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan visited Abkhazia. She stated in her Telegram channel that she met with Bzhania and opened a media center. She then questioned why Russia and Abkhazia needed a border crossing. “Millions of Russians who annually cross this border and our allies are now shedding blood for us,” she added. Telegram commenters supported Simonyan, replying that there should be no border between Abkhazia and Russia and that Abkhazia should follow the example of South Ossetia on becoming part of Russia. The post garnered 968 comments. Margarita Simonyan’s Telegram channel has more that 219,000 subscribers.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Videos appear to show missiles striking Russian oil depot appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Hundreds of Belarusians join Ukraine’s fight against Russian imperialism

Brian Whitmore — Wed, 30 Mar 2022 21:21:29 +0000

If Alyaksandr Lukashenka ever sends Belarusian troops to join Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, there is a pretty good chance that they could end up fighting against other Belarusians.

That is because hundreds of Belarusian volunteers have already joined a paramilitary group in Ukraine called the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, named after the nineteenth century Belarusian leader of an uprising against the Russian Empire. Hundreds more have expressed interest in joining and the group is using its Telegram channel to recruit fighters.

In a post on March 21, the group declared: “the voice of conscience called us to fight, because we could not be on the sidelines when fraternal Ukrainian people were being killed. Today the fate of our people is being forged in battles with the Moscow aggressor. With our blood we lay the foundation for freedom and the revival of our Motherland, a successful Belarusian breakthrough in the future.”

On March 26, the group posted a video of its members taking an oath to become part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It has also posted videos showing seized and burned out Russian tanks. “Here is captured equipment and there is destroyed equipment. There are a lot of trophies,” a fighter says on the video.

The participation of Belarusian volunteers fighting against the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates that the stakes of Vladimir Putin’s war extend far beyond the current battlefield. Ukraine’s David-and-Goliath struggle to defend its sovereignty and independence has become an inspiration for many in the former Soviet Union who seek to resist Russian imperialism and autocracy in favor of Western-style liberal democracy.

Just as the 1936-39 Spanish Civil War became a battleground for the competing ideologies in Europe in the early twentieth century, Russia’s war on Ukraine has become a proxy, a metaphor, and a lightning rod for the political struggles of the former Soviet space. And nowhere is this truer than in Belarus.

“If Ukraine should fail, and I hope that will not happen, Lukashenka’s line to the Kremlin will feel much stronger and our fight will be very difficult. But when Ukraine wins it will be much easier for people in Belarus to realize that we can change a lot in our country and we will have this window of opportunity,” Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya recently told The Independent.

Likewise, Sergei Bespalov, a former dissident journalist from Minsk who went into exile in Kyiv and joined the Kalinouski Battalion, told The New York Times: “We have a common enemy, Putin and Lukashenka. These are the two people who unleashed this war. If Kyiv falls, it will be bad for everyone, including Belarus.”

Put simply, it is not only the fate of Ukraine hanging in the balance of Putin’s war, it is also the fate of Belarus.

If Putin’s campaign to subjugate Ukraine fails, it will severely undermine his reputation in the region. Defeat in Ukraine would blunt the attractiveness of Russia’s autocratic model while emboldening liberal and democratic forces. It may also weaken Putin’s standing at home, as Russia has historically not been kind to leaders who lose wars.

“Kyiv is being bombed and we realized this is probably the only such chance, the last chance, to win back Belarus, protect Ukraine, and actually make this world a better place,” Konstantin Suschik, a Belarusian graphic designer who joined the fight in Ukraine, told The New York TImes.

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Belarusians are not the only citizens of former Soviet states to join Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression. Hundreds of volunteers from Georgia, which itself was invaded by Russia in August 2008, are also fighting in Ukraine. The Georgia Foreign Legion, commanded by Mamuka Mamulashvili, has recruited soldiers from dozens of countries including his native Georgia. “I need only one motivation, to save people and save civilians,” Mamulashvili told Politico.

The volunteers from Belarus and Georgia are fighting for Ukraine in defiance of their own governments.

Wary of antagonizing Moscow, the Georgian government, despite claiming to be pro-Western, has been hesitant to provide support to Ukraine and has not joined Western sanctions against Russia. On February 28, the Georgian authorities prevented a charter flight from landing in Tbilisi that was set to take volunteers to Ukraine. The Georgian volunteers were then forced to take a bus, delaying their arrival by several days and prompting Mamulashvili to call his government “slaves of Putin.”

In Belarus, where the Lukashenka regime is actively supporting and enabling Putin’s war, volunteer fighters face arrest should they be caught trying to join the fight on Ukraine’s side.

Putin launched his war in Ukraine on the false pretense of protecting Russian speakers and ethnic Russians. In reality, at its most basic level, the war is about Ukraine preserving its sovereignty, independence, and resistance to imperial expansion. But at another level, it is a struggle between those who support democracy across the former Soviet space and those who oppose it.

Brian Whitmore is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, an Assistant Professor of Practice at the University of Texas at Arlington, and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.

Russian War Report: Contradictory reports of Russian vehicles returning to Belarus

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 30 Mar 2022 19:03:31 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Contradictory reports of Russian vehicles returning to Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in Ukraine aim to undermine peace talks

Questions swirl regarding explosions at Russian ammunition depot near Belgorod

Pro-Kremlin commentators accuse Azerbaijan and Turkey of attempting to open a “second front” against Russia in the South Caucasus

Media policy

Millions of Russian internet users still use Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter

War crimes and human rights abuses

Russia falsely claims to have captured Ukrainian soldiers accused of shooting Russian POWs

Contradictory reports of Russian vehicles returning to Belarus

On March 29, video evidence emerged suggesting that some Russian forces were returning to the territory of Belarus. A video showed Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) moving northward from the Belarusian border town of Rechitsa toward the city of Gomel, where they were loaded onto railway platforms. The second part of the video showed large Russian military formations, allegedly in Gomel, near railway tracks. While the exact location of the military vehicle formation is unknown, it was accompanied by a Belarusian police car, suggesting it was filmed in Belarus. Additional videos of alleged Russian withdrawal have surfaced over the past few days on social media, though they have yet to be confirmed.

Russian lines in the North of Ukraine are starting to collapse. Surviving Russian vehicles withdraw to Belarus. Ukraine must keep the momentum. #Ukraine #Kyiv pic.twitter.com/YJKds2Wt8b
— (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) March 29, 2022

In contrast, Twitter user @MarQs__ noted another video, originally posted by MotolkoHelp, appearing to show Russian vehicles going in the opposite direction, heading south to Rechitsa. “The convoy consists of mostly of trucks so either they will pick up soldiers in #Ukraine or they move in soldiers / supplies,” they wrote. MotolkoHelp later reported an additional video showing a column of Russian trucks heading toward Rechitsa.

This Russian convoy is moving towards Rechitsa, so the other way. The convoy consists of mostly of trucks so either they will pick up soldiers in #Ukraine or they move in soldiers / supplies. pic.twitter.com/P3g908cmsN
— marqs (@MarQs__) March 30, 2022

Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Arestovych said that a withdrawal would demonstrate that Russia was unable to persuade Belarus to send its own troops into Ukraine. According to Arestovych, the probability of Belarus joining the war is currently low.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Kremlin Telegram channels in Ukraine aim to undermine peace talks

Multiple pro–Kremlin Telegram channels are spreading narratives that downplay or discredit the ongoing peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia in Turkey. The Telegram channel Legitimniy (“Legitimate”) published a post stating that talks between Ukraine and Russia had ended and “there will be no results.” Seven minutes later, the channel published a rumor claiming that if the diplomatic negotiations did not bring any results, Russia would launch a massive attack in all directions.

As the Ukrainian delegation in Turkey outlined its proposals, pro-Kremlin Telegram channels tried to diminish them. The Legitimniy channel said that even though the bombardment of the Ukrainian cities continues, “the Ukrainian side started accelerating news of victory.” The channel claimed that Russia had established a police force within its occupied territories, concluding that it is not “profitable for Russia to make concessions now.” Finally, the channel argued against the peace negotiations by claiming that sanctions relief would not happen unless Russia admitted defeat and paid reparations to Ukrainian authorities.

Another Kremlin-linked Telegram channel, ZeRada, claimed that the Kremlin agreed to hold peace talks in Turkey to postpone Turkish ally Azerbaijan from launching an offensive against Armenia. The channel argued that Turkey would not support another conflict while the peace talks were happening. It also questioned Ukraine’s intentions to hold a referendum to finalize the country’s security status. The channel accused Ukraine of lying and questioned why Ukraine would suggest a referendum if it was winning the war.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Questions swirl regarding explosions at Russian ammunition depot near Belgorod

On March 29, videos surfaced of a blast at an ammunition storage facility near the Russian city of Belgorod. The videos show large explosions and detonating munitions in the town of Oktyabrsky, fourteen kilometers away from the Ukrainian border.

Rumors swirled on social media that the explosion resulted from a Ukrainian missile attack. However, Belgorod emergency services said the blast was caused by “a human factor,” suggesting human error.

Russian-owned news outlet TASS reported on its Telegram channel that four servicemen were injured after a projectile hit a military camp and that “according to preliminary information, the shelling happened from the Ukrainian side.” A pro-Kremlin Ukrainian Telegram channel repeated that narrative. Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin outlet RIA confirmed the injury of four servicemen, citing the “human factor” explanation.

While Russia has not provided any additional information about the explosion, spreading multiple explanations about an incident aligns with the Kremlin’s tactic to distract both its citizens and external observers by polluting the information space with numerous explanations that blur the line between truth and fiction.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Pro-Kremlin commentators accuse Azerbaijan and Turkey of attempting to open a “second front” against Russia in the South Caucasus

On March 24, various reports emerged about the renewal of clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenian forces, which Armenia claims resulted in the death of three soldiers and fifteen wounded. Azerbaijani forces reportedly entered the village of Farrukh (Armenian name Parukh), which is currently under the control of Russian peacekeepers. The peacekeepers were deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020, after a six-week war between Azerbaijan and Armenia ended with a peace deal brokered by Russia.

On March 26, the Russian Ministry of Defense accused Azerbaijan of violating the Nagorno-Karabakh peace agreement, stating that the Azerbaijani military entered the area and fired at units of the Nagorno-Karabakh army from Turkish drones. The following day, the defense ministry reported that Azerbaijan had withdrawn its military units.

However, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense argued that Russia’s statement did not reflect reality, claiming that it had not changed positions near the village. Azerbaijan also denied violating the ceasefire and reminded Russia that the use of the term “Nagorno-Karabakh” was “disrespectful to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” and that it had disrespected the Declaration on Allied Interaction signed by the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan on February 22, 2022.

In view of this, the latest reports about escalation between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been assessed by pro-Kremlin commentators as an attempt by Azerbaijan and Turkey to open a ”second front” against Russia in the South Caucasus. Tsargrad claimed that Azerbaijan, under Turkey’s influence, is trying to test Russia to see if it had enough military strength to engage in the region. It also reported that by opening a second front, Turkey and the United States want to significantly weaken Russia’s forces while it is focusing on “liberating Ukraine from neo-Nazis.” Pro-Kremlin outlet Reporter asserted that Azerbaijan is abetted by Turkey, and given that the latter is the largest supplier of drones to Ukraine, Russia should expect unfavorable moves from Turkey at any time. Regnum wrote that Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the West are trying to create a second front for Russia in the South Caucasus, and that the Armenian government is also helping under the pressure from its “Western sponsors.” Rossiya 24 TV host Olga Skabeeva, meanwhile, also discussed the topic of a second front in the South Caucasus and asserted that Azerbaijan’s denial need to be clarified.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Millions of Russian internet users still use Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter

Millions of Russians are still using Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, despite the social media platforms being blocked in the country. An analysis published by the pro-Kremlin online outlet RBC.ru analyzed social media usage over a period of nearly three weeks, including the ten days following Russia’s ban on Western social networks.

At the request of RBC, the research company Mediascope calculated the daily audience of the most popular social networks in Russia from February 24, the day when Russia invaded Ukraine, to March 15. According to the report, the number of daily users decreased following the ban, with a drop of approximately five million users on Instagram and four million on Facebook. Despite the decrease, Instagram had retained approximately 34.2 million daily users, while Facebook had retained around 5.5 million users. Twitter use dropped by more than 50 percent, from 2.6 million users to fewer than 1.3 million after the blockage. The research also showed an increase in the use of Russian social networks Vkontakte, Telegram, and Odnoklassniki. Telegram experienced the most dramatic jump, growing from 31.2 million users to 45.5 million users over the tracking period, a jump of more than 45 percent. TikTok remained relatively unchanged with more than 33 million daily users.

RBC concluded that the proliferation of virtual private networks (VPNs) in the country explained the continued activity of Russian users on Western social media platforms, as VPNs allow users to route their internet connections anonymously through other countries. The DFRLab has previously reported on the increased demand for VPNs in Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russia falsely claims to have captured Ukrainian soldiers accused of shooting Russian POWs

On March 29, Vladimir Shamanov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Committee for the Development of Civil Society, claimed that Russian special forces had captured the Ukrainian soldiers accused of shooting Russian prisoners of war in the legs. Shamanov said the captured Ukrainians were Sergey “Chili” Velichko and Konstantin Nemichev, who are battalion commanders of the Kharkiv branch of the Azov territorial defense.

Later that same day, Velichko and Nemichev released a video to prove they were not being held captive. In the video, Nemichev stated without evidence that the footage showing the Russian soldiers being shot was “propaganda” and that all Russian prisoners of war are being treated “humanely.”

The DFRLab could not confirm whether Velichko or Nemichev are in the graphic five-minute video, that appears to show Russian POWs being taunted and shot in the legs at close range.

Additionally, Vladimir Medinsky, the head of the Russian delegation attending peace talks in Turkey, said that Russia raised the video with the Ukrainian delegation. Ukraine “promised to take the hardest measures if they find them first – those who did these war crimes,” he said.

Previously, Oleksiy Arestovich, an adviser to the Ukrainian President’s Office, wrote on Telegram that the video was being verified.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Contradictory reports of Russian vehicles returning to Belarus appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Deep unease in Belarus over country’s role in Russian invasion of Ukraine

Alesia Rudnik — Tue, 29 Mar 2022 15:24:27 +0000

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine now in its second month, there are growing indications that Belarusians are deeply opposed to their country’s involvement in the conflict. Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka has allowed Vladimir Putin to use Belarus as a platform for Russia’s offensive against Ukraine and as a launch pad for air raids and missile strikes on Ukrainian targets. This has sparked widespread unease and led to warnings from the country’s exiled opposition that Belarus is now effectively under Russian occupation.

Any attempts to gauge public opinion in authoritarian Belarus are challenging, but the available data is consistent and indicates that Belarusians resoundingly reject any role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to a recent Chatham House poll, less than 3% of Belarusians favor offering military assistance to Russia, while around two-thirds (67%) object to Russian forces bombarding Ukraine from Belarusian territory.

Meanwhile, a National Poll surveying opponents of the Lukashenka regime found that 91% viewed military support for Russia against Ukraine as catastrophic for Belarus, while half feared that the war would encourage Ukrainians to view Belarusians as enemies. This transformation in perceptions between formerly friendly Ukrainians and Belarusians is already becoming evident. Recent data from Ukraine indicates the 84% of Ukrainians now perceive Belarus as a hostile country.

If opposition to Belarusian involvement in Putin’s war is so strong, why are mass protests not taking place in the country? This is largely due to the oppressive apparatus long established by the Lukashenka regime and considerably enhanced during the crackdown on protests that followed the rigged August 2020 Belarusian presidential vote.

In the wake of the nationwide opposition movement that erupted across Belarus in late summer 2020, the Lukashenka regime introduced a range of draconian measures to prevent protests from gaining ground. Today, 1,101 Belarusians are recognized as political prisoners, while over 45,000 have been detained and given fines or short prison terms. Many detainees have reported instances of torture and other grave human rights abuses. Members of the political opposition have been forced to flee the country, while independent media outlets and civil society organizations have been shut down.

Despite these challenging circumstances, Belarusians are still finding ways to express their discontent. Many used a late February referendum on constitutional changes to protest against the Lukashenka regime by spoiling ballot papers in line with a strategy proposed by the country’s pro-democracy opposition. Others took advantage of this rare opportunity for public gatherings to voice their disquiet over the war in Ukraine.

The Belarusian diaspora has also mobilized since the outbreak of hostilities on February 24 in support of Ukraine’s refugee community. With millions of Ukrainians forced to flee the war, Belarusians in a host of countries have created tailored IT services providing help with accommodation and free legal support.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Some Belarusians have already made their way to Ukraine and joined a Belarusian regiment fighting alongside Ukraine’s armed forces. This unit currently numbers several hundred and has received significant media coverage. More recruits are expected.

There is growing evidence of resistance within Belarus itself. Reports continue to emerge of attacks on Russian military equipment close to the Ukrainian border. There have also been significant efforts to sabotage the Belarusian railway network and prevent Russian troops from being transported to the border with Ukraine. This sabotage campaign has been attributed to Belarusian railway workers, hackers from the Cyber-Partisan community, and ordinary Belarusians who oppose the war.

In an effort to further distance the country from the actions of the Lukashenka regime, members of the Belarusian opposition in exile have asked for Belarus to be recognized as being under Russian occupation. “I call on the international community to acknowledge that Belarus is under de-facto occupation and demand that Russia withdraw its forces,” Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya recently stated. “We need to stop this shameful participation in Russian aggression against Ukraine that threatens the whole of Europe.”

Tsikhanouskaya’s appeal is unlikely to be successful. While Lukashenka has suffered a dramatic loss of legitimacy as a result of his reliance on the Kremlin, he remains the official head of state and as such has the authority under international law to invite the Russian military into the country.

This means Belarus is likely to face future international accountability for its role in the Russian invasion. Belarusians have shown very little enthusiasm for any involvement in Putin’s imperial crusade and have demonstrated their opposition in a number of ways. Nevertheless, the country will struggle to shift the stigma of its role as a key supporter in a war that has outraged global opinion.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University (Sweden) and a Research Fellow at Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Lukashenka’s apparent reluctance to join the invasion of Ukraine may reflect concerns in Minsk over the possibility of mutinies or desertions if Belarusian troops receive orders to cross the border. The Ukrainian military has reported that a large number of Belarusian soldiers and commanders have already refused to participate in the invasion. Rumors have even circulated of entire units disobeying orders to join the fighting in Ukraine.

This would be entirely in line with Belarusian public opinion. A recent poll conducted by Britain’s Chatham House on the eve of the war found that an overwhelming majority of Belarusians did not want their country to participate in the conflict.

This opposition is fueling increasingly bold acts of resistance. Since the war began, Belarusians have begun sabotaging the country’s railway network to hinder the movement of Russian troops and military equipment to Ukraine. Police have reportedly detained at least four railway employees and a number of private citizens in line with these activities. In response, Belarusian Special Forces have begun guarding key railway infrastructure.

Belarusian troops are well aware of the significant setbacks Russian forces are encountering in Ukraine. Strengthening cooperation between Minsk and Moscow in recent years has led to what many have termed as a “military merger” between the two countries. As a result, Belarusians are intimately familiar with the shocking scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and the shortcomings of Moscow’s so-called “special military operation.” Understandably, this has served to further demotivate the Belarusian military.

There are also significant doubts over the readiness of the Belarusian army to conduct offensive operations in Ukraine. Belarusian troops have no experience of operating in hostile territory, while the country’s military doctrine has long focused on defense. Morale could rapidly plummet if inexperienced units found themselves coming under fire and suffering heavy losses in somebody else’s war.

The lack of enthusiasm for Putin’s invasion within the Belarusian military comes as no surprise to the Lukashenka regime. Indeed, for the past year and a half, a campaign has been underway to weed out members of the military viewed as potentially disloyal. This has been accompanied by systematic efforts to promote the regime’s ideology throughout the country’s armed forces.

We may soon see how successful these efforts have been. With Russia suffering grave losses in military personnel and struggling to find replacements, Putin is now pressuring Lukashenka to contribute much-needed troops and help Moscow regain the military initiative in Ukraine.

Eurasia Center events

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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For now, the Belarus dictator is trying to keep his options open by deploying elements of his military along the border with Ukraine while offering his services as a potential peacemaker. However, given Lukashenka’s almost complete dependence on the Kremlin, most observers believe he will eventually be forced to join the war and test the loyalty of his troops.

Since the mass protests that followed Belarus’s rigged August 2020 presidential election, Lukashenka has become increasingly dependent on continued Kremlin support. In recognition of this reliance, he has allowed Russia to dramatically expand its military, economic, and political presence in Belarus.

Lukashenka’s current position is in stark contrast to his earlier geopolitical balancing act, which saw him foster strong ties with Russia while engaging the Western world as a counterweight to Moscow. In the early stages of the Russian attack on Ukraine following the spring 2014 seizure of Crimea and military intervention in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region, Lukashenka was openly critical of Putin’s imperial ambitions and vowed to play no part in Russian aggression against Ukraine. Such talk is now a distant memory as the Belarus strongman publicly backs Moscow’s revisionist agenda.

Lukashenka is currently facing the consequences of putting all his eggs in one basket. When he agreed to let his country be used as a platform to wage war against Ukraine, his whole strategy seems to have been based on the assumption that Russia would win within a matter of days. This would have enabled the famously wily Lukashenka to emerge victorious as Putin’s closest ally while avoiding any active role in the fighting. Instead, he is now being pushed by his patron to commit his own forces and participate directly in an unfolding military disaster.

The Belarus dictator is acutely aware that his troops may not follow orders to fight in Ukraine. He also recognizes that losing the support of the military could further undermine his already vulnerable position on the domestic front. If elements of the army are butchered in Ukraine or turn against the regime, the nationwide protest movement that first erupted in August 2020 could be revitalized. Nevertheless, if Putin’s predicament continues to worsen and he insists on Belarusian military support, Lukashenka will ultimately have little option but to obey.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council. She tweets @HannaLiubakova.

Russian War Report: Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Mon, 28 Mar 2022 20:31:16 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive

Ukraine Army claims units of Russian forces retreating and regrouping in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Luhansk separatist leader announces plans to hold referendum joining Russia

Russian officials, media propose going beyond Ukraine and target other countries, including NATO states

Media policy

Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta suspends operations after warnings from state censor

Spotify ends all service in Russia after a month of compromises

War crimes and human rights abuses

Ukraine launches investigation into video alleged to show soldiers shooting Russian POWs

Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive

On March 25, Vladimir Anua, de-facto defense minister of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia, confirmed that Abkhazia would provide military support to Russia. The statement was released after Abkhazian leader Aslan Bzhania met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow.

On March 26, an additional 150 troops were sent to Ukraine from Tskhinvali, the occupied capital of the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Over the past week, footage has emerged online depicting the movement of military units from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

On March 19, TikTok footage depicted the mobilization of military units from Russia’s 7th military base in Gudauta, Abkhazia. The DFRLab geolocated the footage to Gudauta central railway station, moving northwest towards Russia. The convoy appears to have arrived in Russia by March 24, as the Telegram channel ДвіЩ (“two” in Ukrainian) posted a video reportedly of the same convoy heading to Ukraine via Sochi, Russia.

The DFRLab geolocated the video to an area near the village of Chemitokvadzhe in Russia’s Krasnodar Krai region.

Geolocation of troops from Abkhazia near the village of Chemitokhvadzhe in Krasnodar Krai, Russia. (Source: ДвіЩ, left; Google Earth, top right, bottom right)

Google map showing the distance that units from Russia’s 7th military base traveled. The military convoy was first spotted at Gudauta railway station in Abkhazia, Georgia. Five days later, the convoy was spotted in Chemitokvadzhe, Russia. Note that the time depicted is for civilian trains; trains carrying military equipment would likely move slower. (Source: Google Maps)

Images published by Yuriy Butusov, a Ukrainian journalist and editor at Censor.net, suggest that some units from Russia’s 7th military base were in Ukraine as of March 21. According to Butusov, documents from Russia’s 7th military base were discovered after a Ukrainian airstrike targeted Russian units near the villages of Pisky and Konstyantynivka in Mykolaiv Oblast.

Meanwhile, on March 26, footage appeared on South Ossetia Telegram channels and Facebook pages showing a military convoy leaving Russia’s 4th military base in Tskhinvali. That same day, a tank with an Ossetian flag was spotted in Melitopol, Ukraine. The Twitter user @visionergeo geolocated the footage to the city’s southern entrance. The tank is likely heading towards Mariupol or Huliaipole, according to Kirill Mikhailov, a researcher with the Conflict Intelligence Team.

A tank with an Ossetian flag was spotted in occupied Melitopol. pic.twitter.com/vtFYQbOlEN
— Visioner (@visionergeo) March 26, 2022

On March 27, another video allegedly depicting South Ossetian fighters appeared on Telegram channels. The video caption said that South Ossetian fighters fired a 9M113 Konkurs anti-tank guided missile at Ukrainian positions. The exact date and location of the alleged strike are unknown.

North Ossetian units are also fighting in Ukraine. North Ossetia is firmly part of Russia, while South Ossetia is a Georgian region that Russia recognized after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. The Ossetian tricolor flag is used by both North and South Ossetia. This means that it is challenging to attribute emerging footage to North or South Ossetian units without further details.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukraine Army claims units of Russian forces retreating and regrouping in Belarus

On March 27, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that Russian units in northern Ukraine were withdrawing to Belarus to regroup. According to the report, Russian units from the 35th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District have retreated to Belarus through the Chernobyl exclusion zone. The Ukrainian Army said Russian troops were regrouping and restoring armor capabilities because of “significant losses inflicted by Ukrainian forces.”

There is limited open-source evidence to confirm the Ukrainian Army’s statement. However, some civilian footage surfaced online on March 27, showing the Russian military moving toward Mazyr, Belarus, along the R-31 highway. These vehicles may be coming from Naroulya, a Belarusian town close to the border with Ukraine, but at the time of writing, the DFRLab could not confirm whether these units came from Ukraine or had remained in Belarus. Western media outlets, including The Hill and the New York Times, reported on the alleged Russian retreat.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russian military leaders not Luhansk separatist leader announces plans to hold referendum joining Russia in public for weeks

Leonid Pasechnik, head of the separatist Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) said on March 27 that the republic plans to hold a referendum on the region joining Russia. However, after Pasechnik’s statement, his foreign policy advisor, Rodion Miroshnik, clarified that it could be challenging to conduct a referendum amid ongoing military activities. Miroshnik said that despite 90 percent of LNR territory being “liberated,” some large cities remain under the control of the Ukrainian army, and LNR authorities want all residents to have the opportunity to participate in the referendum, which at the moment seems to be impossible.

Russian officials have differed in their response to the supposed LNR referendum. Russian Senator Andrey Klishas argued that since Russia has recognized the LNR as an independent state, it has the right to make independent decisions based on its constitution. Meanwhile, Leonid Kalashnikov, head of the Duma’s committee on relations with the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States, believes “it is not the right time” to hold a referendum in the LNR. He argued that holding a referendum was unwise because most of the population of LNR and the People’s Republic of Donetsk (DNR) had been evacuated.

On March 25, General Sergei Rudskoy, Deputy Chief of Russia’s General Staff, announced that Russia had completed the “first stage” of its military “operation” in Ukraine. Rudskoy said the focus would shift to “achieving the main goal – the liberation of Donbas.” He also shared the misleading claim that Russia attacked Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities to prevent Ukrainian forces from “strengthening their grouping in Donbas” until Russia could completely liberate the DNR and LNR. Russia may give the green light to hold a referendum if the separatists gain control of the Donbas territories currently under Ukrainian control.

Crimean authorities held a similar “referendum” in 2014 on the reunification of Crimea with Russia, which led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia. The Crimean referendum was declared illegitimate by Ukraine, and most countries have not recognized the results.

A 2019 poll conducted by the Centre for East European and International Studies found that 55 percent of people living in the separatist-held areas of Donbas expressed an interest in becoming part of Ukraine, while 27 percent preferred to join Russia but maintain a special autonomous status.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Russian officials, media propose going beyond Ukraine and target other countries, including NATO states

Deputy of the Moscow City Duma Sergei Savostyanov proposed that Russia should expand its “special operation for denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine” and include the Baltic countries, Poland, Moldova, and Kazakhstan. According to Savostyanov, “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine” would improve security for the people of Russia, but targeting additional countries would ensure Russia’s security even more so.

Kremlin media and commentators have previously suggested going beyond Ukraine and targeting NATO countries. On the TV show hosted by the Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyev, Kremlin commentators recently threatened Europe with a nuclear strike if NATO deployed a peacekeeping contingent to Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta suspends operations after warnings from state censor

On March 28, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta announced it was suspending operations until the end of Russia’s “special operation on the territory of Ukraine” after Russian watchdog Roskomnadzor issued it a second warning for violating Russian law. Roskomnadzor stated that Novaya Gazeta was issued the second warning due to publishing a material on its website in which the outlet had failed to properly mark a non-profit organization listed as a “foreign agent” in Russia.

Roskomnadzor issued its first warning to Novaya Gazeta on March 22 for the same reason and demanded from the outlet to immediately edit text and identify an NGO as a “foreign agent” organization in accordance with Russian legislation. After receiving the first warning, Novaya Gazeta commented that they were not aware of what Roskomnadzor was referred to in its warning. According to Russian legislation, receiving two warnings from Russian watchdog within a one-year period can result in Roskomnadzor revoking an outlet’s publishing license. Novaya Gazeta has previously complied with Russian media restrictions and abstained from using the word “war,” replacing it with “special operation” in quotes in its coverage of the war in Ukraine.

On March 22, before the outlet received the first warning, Novaya Gazeta editor-in-chief of Dmitry Muratov announced he was planning to auction his Nobel Peace Prize medal to support Ukrainian refugees. And the day prior to suspending operations, Muratov asked several Russian journalists interviewing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to ask a number of questions on behalf of himself and Novaya Gazeta. Roskomnadzor and Russia’s prosecutor’s office prohibited Russian media outlets from publishing Zelenskyy’s interview.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Spotify ends all service in Russia after a month of compromises

On March 25, the music streaming platform Spotify announced that it would be suspending all service in Russia. Spotify launched in Russia in July 2020. As of late 2021, the Spotify smartphone app was receiving more than 600,000 downloads per month in the country. Spotify cited Russia’s March 11 “fake news” law as the impetus for this decision, which criminalized speech against the Russian military with up to fifteen years in prison. Complying with this law would likely have required significant censorship of Spotify’s catalogue of music and podcasts.

This decision marks the end of a month-long balancing act in which Spotify had weighed mounting boycott pressures against its desire to maintain the “global flow of information” for Russian users. On February 26—two days after the invasion began—Spotify was still committed to establishing a legal entity in Russia in compliance with the demands of the Russian state censor. By March 3, Spotify had reversed course, closing its Russian office and removing RT and Sputnik content from its service globally. And on March 10, Spotify demonetized all Russian services in order to ensure compliance with US sanctions. With its March 25 announcement, Spotify has ceased streaming entirely.

In early March, Spotify emerged as an unlikely front in the information conflict between Russia and Ukraine. USA Today reported on the rise of seemingly pro-Russian playlists with titles like “Ukraine will have to be bombed” and “Songs that hit harder than Russia’s nuclear weapon in Ukraine.” The Ukrainian government, meanwhile, pressured Spotify to allow artists to re-upload their album covers with Ukrainian flags.

—Emerson T. Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Ukraine launches investigation into video alleged to show soldiers shooting Russian POWs

On March 27, a graphic video began to circulate on Telegram allegedly showing Ukrainian soldiers mocking and shooting Russian prisoners of war in the legs. The earliest instance of the video, identified by Mediazona, an independent Russian media outlet now banned in Russia, appeared on the subreddit Ukraine War Report at about 2am GMT.

Journalists working for Kremlin-owned media outlets, such as Aleksandr Kots, Yevgeny Poddubniy, and Andrey Medvedev, wrote about the video on their personal Telegram channels, describing it as a war crime conducted by “Ukrainian Nazis.” All three journalists published their opinions on March 27 between 9am and 10am Moscow time.

Later, the video was shared on Twitter by Maria Dubovikova, a pro-Kremlin political analyst. Eliot Higgins, the founder of Bellingcat, quote-tweeted Dubovikova saying, “A very serious incident that will require further investigation, maybe the videos in this thread can be geolocated?” Twitter user @zcjbrooker geolocated the possible location to Malaya Rohan, a village close to Kharkiv. The user corroborated his assessments with open-source reports about the village’s liberation on March 25.

On March 27, the Investigative Committee of Russia launched an investigation into the possible war crime. The announcement on the committee’s website speculates that the video was filmed in Kharkiv Oblast.

On the evening of March 27, Valery Zaluzhny, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, wrote on Facebook that the video was “staged” and urged everyone to “consider the realities of information and psychological war.” Later, Oleksiy Arestovich, an advisor to the Ukrainian President’s Office, wrote on Telegram that the video was being verified. “If not fake, the guilty will be punished. If it’s fake, we’ll be more vigilant. Materials like this, and other kinds, have been seen already,” he wrote.

Julian Röpcke, the managing editor for politics at German tabloid BILD, said on Twitter that he believed the video to be real. Ropcke debunked the argument that there was no visible blood by sharing a segment of the footage where blood is clearly seen streaming from the injured men. Olga Skabeeva, the host of the Kremlin propaganda show 60 Minutes, cited BILD’s report and Ropcke’s Twitter account on her Telegram channel.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

The post Russian War Report: Additional units from Georgian breakaway regions join Russian offensive appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russia produces “evidence” claiming Ukraine will attack Crimea

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 25 Mar 2022 17:02:52 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Tracking narratives

Russia produces “evidence” claiming Ukraine will attack Crimea

Russia accuses Hunter Biden and George Soros of funding Ukrainian biolabs

Russian military leaders not seen in public for weeks

Security

New videos suggest Russia is sending additional missiles to Belarus

Media policy

Russia blocks access to Google News, leveraging increasingly restrictive moderation laws

Russia produces “evidence” claiming Ukraine will attack Crimea

On March 24, the pro-Kremlin Telegram channel Оперативные сводки (“Operative news”) published photos of medals and certificates that it alleged were going to be used to reward Ukrainian troops “for the capture of Crimea.” The post said the medals and documents were found in Ukrainian conscription offices. Another Telegram channel, Kremlin Z, claimed that these items were discovered in the city of Kherson, currently occupied by Russia. Russian media amplified this message, claiming that the medals were evidence that Ukraine, with the help of NATO, was planning to attack Crimea.

This appears to be the latest in a string of Russian false-flag allegations, due to the alleged evidence’s incorrect use of official Ukrainian terminology. Ukraine considers Crimea to be temporarily occupied or annexed by Russia, so if such materials were to exist, they would likely reference the “liberation” of Crimea rather than its “capture.” Further, official Ukrainian documents refer to Crimea as “the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” or “AR Crimea,” while materials allegedly found by Russia did not. The certificates also mention that the medal would be awarded under a Ukrainian presidential “order,” even though Ukrainian military personnel only receive awards via presidential “decree.” Notably, Russia itself uses the word “order” to describe ministerial awards and decrees for presidential awards, as documented in an investigation by Bellingcat.

Lastly, the initials of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy are incorrect in the materials. The certificates state that his first two initials are “ВА,” which is correct in Russian Cyrillic, which spells his full name as Влади́мир Алекса́ндрович Зеле́нский, or Vladimir Aleksandrovich Zelenskiy. However, this does not correspond with Zelenskyy’s first two initials in Ukrainian Cyrillic. In Ukrainian, his name is spelled Володимир Олександрович Зеленський, or Volodymyr Oleksandrovich Zelenskyy, so the correct Ukrainian Cyrillic abbreviation for his first two initials is “ВО.”

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia accuses Hunter Biden and George Soros of funding Ukrainian biolabs

Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused investment firm Rosemont Seneca, headed by Hunter Biden, and philanthropist George Soros of financing Ukrainian biolabs. TASS quoted Igor Kirillov, Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces of the RF Armed Forces, who stated that Russia has traced “the scheme of interaction between US government agencies and Ukrainian biological programs. Attention should be drawn to the involvement in the financing of these activities of structures close to the current US leadership, in particular the investment fund Rosemont Seneca, led by Hunter Biden.” He added, “The US Agency for International Development, the George Soros Foundation, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are directly involved” in financing the labs.

Kremlin outlets have amplified Kirillov’s statement in articles using variations of titles accusing Hunter Biden, son of US President Joe Biden, of funding Ukrainian biolabs. Russia’s State Duma speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, stated that President Biden now “is obliged to explain to the world community the evidence concerning the activity of biological laboratories discovered in the course of the military operation in Ukraine.”

The latest Kremlin statements represent the latest expansion of Russia’s attempts to justify war in Ukraine with false-flag narratives claiming that Ukraine was planning to use biological research laboratories to create and deploy bioweapons against Russia.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Washington DC

Russian military leaders not seen in public for weeks

On March 22, Dmitry Treschanin, a Russian journalist working for banned independent Russian media outlet Mediazona, tweeted that Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu had not been seen in public since March 11. Another Russian independent media outlet, Agenstvo, published a timeline listing all of Shoigu’s public appearances since February 24, the day Russia invaded Ukraine. Agenstvo confirmed that the last verifiable Shoigu appearance was on March 11. There are reports that Shoigu met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 18 and later handed out medals to war heroes, but neither instance has been confirmed.

Kremlin-controlled media outlets and Telegram channels disregarded the claims about Shoigu as “Ukrainian fakes.” On March 24, Rossiya 24 interrupted its program to air footage from a Russian Security Council video call in which Shoigu allegedly participated; a similar video appeared on RIA Novosti’s Telegram channel. The Moscow Times, an independent media outlet, posted a side-by-side video comparing the March 24 footage with video from a March 11 call.

On the supposed reappearance of Russia’s defense minister, Sergey Shoigu, @MoscowTimes points out that today’s teeny tiny footage seems to match what we saw on March 11, his last sighting. Background, necktie, and clothes. https://t.co/ZMftiUvLwK pic.twitter.com/1zlQNlZ1BP
— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) March 24, 2022

In both videos, Shoigu appears to be wearing the same outfit, and his tie even tilts to the same side in both clips. However, Shoigu’s movements in the videos are not identical, so it is unclear if the video was taken from additional footage during the March 11 event that had not been previously released. Earlier, the fringe outlet Sensaciy.net claimed, “Facts from Russian media confirm that Shoigu, Gerasimov, and others have not disappeared.” The article linked to footage of Shoigu, but it too was recorded on March 11, the day he was last documented publicly, showing Shoigu handing out war medals.

Agenstvo also reported that Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valeriy Gerasimov had not made any public appearances since March 11. Advisor to the President of Ukraine Mihailo Podolyak noted on his Telegram channel that other “heavyweights” from the Kremlin regime, such as Nikolai Patrushev (Secretary of Russia’s Security Council), Aleksandr Bortnikov (Head of Russia’s Federal Security Service), and Sergey Naryshkin (Head of Russia’s Intelligence Service), had also not made any recent public appearances. Additionally, the Washington Post reported on March 24 that US defense and military leaders could not reach Russia’s military leadership on the phone.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

New videos suggest Russia is sending additional missiles to Belarus

Newly released videos suggest that Russia has deployed additional mobile short-range ballistic missile systems to Belarus. A March 24 video shows Russian military Kamaz trucks on Belarus’s M10 highway carrying at least fourteen missiles, used for Iskander missile systems. According to reports, the missiles were on the move from Rechitsa towards the city of Gomel. Large boxes used to transport Iskander missiles are visible on the trucks. Iskander missiles have the capability of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Comparison of standard Russian military boxes that are used to carry Iskander missiles (left) with the boxes seen in the video (right). Source: (@Coupsure/Archive, left; @MotolkoHelp/Archive, right)

Another video surfaced on the same day showing nine Kamaz trucks, allegedly near the village of Dudichi in the region of Grodno. Similar to the first video, the convoy was travelling with a loading vehicle, with each truck carrying two missile boxes. The DFRLab has not yet geolocated these videos or verified whether these two videos show the same convoy.

On March 23, additional footage showed alleged Iskander missiles being fired from Belarus toward Ukraine. The videos could not be geolocated at the time of writing, though the comments on the video claim that the missiles were launched from the Lipov area in Gomel Oblast, southern Belarus. According to Google Maps, the Bobrovichi airport, which has reportedly been used for attacks against Ukraine, is sixteen kilometers away from the village of Lipov.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Russia blocks access to Google News, leveraging increasingly restrictive moderation laws

On March 23, Interfax confirmed that Russian communications regulator Roskomnadzor had blocked access to Google News in the country. According to the Interfax report, the decision cited claims that numerous articles on Google News provided “publications and materials containing unreliable, publicly significant information” about the war in Ukraine.

Roskomnadzor’s action confirms earlier reports from users in Russia and a Google spokesperson who noted people were having difficulty accessing the Google News app and website in Russia, and it was not due to any technical problems. Additionally, TechCrunch reported that a source inside Russia had confirmed to the outlet that the service had been blocked.

The Google News ban came hours after Google published updated advertising guidelines announcing that it would not allow global users to monetize online content that “exploits, dismisses, or condones” the war in Ukraine. Google’s new policy applies to all websites, apps, and YouTube channels that earn profits from Google advertising services. The ban also followed numerous news releases by Roskomnadzor reprimanding Google, though most have been focused on the activities of its subsidiary, YouTube. One release published on March 18 claimed that Google has taken “a clear anti-Russian stance,” and that its actions “not only violate Russian law, but also contradict generally accepted norms of morality.”

Russia’s decision to ban Google News draws on both long-standing and new laws. A 2012 law allows Roskomnadzor to request that internet service providers block access to a domain if it contains materials promoting drug use, child pornography, or calls for “extremism” or “mass riots.” The broad wording of this law has been used repeatedly since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to block access to sites Russia deems anti-war. In 2017, Russia passed federal law No. 208-FZ, which holds news aggregators like Google or Yandex accountable for the accuracy of the information “of public significance” that they host, and ostensibly seeks to prevent the “dissemination of false news.” The phrasing used in this law closely matches that of Roskomnadzor in its decision to ban Google News.

More recently, Russia passed amendments criminalizing public dissemination of false information about Russia’s Armed Forces. Multiple Russian state news outlets referenced this updated law, Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code, in their reporting on the Google News ban. Working in conjunction, these laws can be used by Russia to block access to Google News—and possibly Google itself if the Kremlin chooses—with minimal obstacles.

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

—Danielle Dougall, Young Global Professional, Washington DC

The post Russian War Report: Russia produces “evidence” claiming Ukraine will attack Crimea appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Slavin quoted in CGTN on the Russia-Ukraine conflict’s potential to impact Iran nuclear talks

Atlantic Council — Thu, 24 Mar 2022 18:03:00 +0000

original source

The post Slavin quoted in CGTN on the Russia-Ukraine conflict’s potential to impact Iran nuclear talks appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Russian War Report: Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Wed, 23 Mar 2022 19:35:11 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Tracking narratives

Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons

Undercover Russian reporter identifies anti-Ukraine “troll farm”

South Ossetian officials spread Kremlin bioweapon narratives in Georgia

Russian tabloid publishes and deletes casualty figures, blaming hack

Media policy

VK reports sharp user growth even as it intensifies censorship of anti-war content

Security

Troops from Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia arrive in Donbas

Documenting dissent

Activists in Poland, Lithuania block cargo trucks from entering Belarus

War crimes and human rights abuses

International Criminal Court seeks to charge South Ossetian officials with war crimes over 2008 war

Russian Duma members falsely claim Ukraine is creating ethnicity-targeting bioweapons

On March 22, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia proposed an investigation into Ukraine’s supposed role in the COVID-19 pandemic and accused the country of creating bioweapons. The LDPR faction in the Russian Duma unanimously supported the initiation of a parliamentary commission to investigate the activities of biolabs in Ukraine. The false narrative claiming Ukraine was involved in the creation of COVID has been debunked.

Aleksey Didenko, a deputy leader of the LDPR, falsely claimed, “Ukrainian traces can be found in the dissemination of COVID in recent years.” He added that the Pentagon funds COVID-19 related research in Ukrainian biolabs. Didenko said that Americans should pay for the economic damages caused by COVID-19, arguing that the US should be a co-defendant alongside Ukraine for “encouragement of anti-humanity activities.”

Sergey Leonov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Healthcare Committee, alleged that Ukraine is preparing biological weapons and claimed that Ukraine was researching “regional infections aimed at Russian regions.” He mentioned “Crimean fever” as an example, likely referencing Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, which was first documented in Crimea in 1944. The World Health Organization has reported that Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever “is endemic in all of Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia,” contradicting Leonov’s statement. He also amplified the debunked claim that a recent spike in tuberculosis cases in separatist areas is connected to Ukrainian biolabs. Leonov stated that Ukraine is researching ethnicity-targeting biological weapons, another disinformation narrative that echoes the Soviet-era campaign Operation Infektion. Viruses cannot be controlled or restricted to targeting a specific region or ethnicity.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Undercover Russian reporter identifies anti-Ukraine “troll farm”

An investigation by Fontanka.ru, a pro-Kremlin media outlet in St. Peterburg, has uncovered details of a coordinated information campaign intended to counter “Ukrainian fakes.” An undercover reporter responded to an advertisement on the Telegram channel Kiber Front Z (“Cyber Front Z”), seeking people to “fight back in the information field.” The undercover reporter contacted a Telegram user named Aleksander Kapitanov and met him for a job interview the next day. The job was “unofficial” and without a contract. The monthly salary was RUB 45,000 ($431.96). The schedule consisted of two working days followed by two days off. The job entailed writing about 200 comments per day addressing “Ukrainian disinformation” on social media platforms like YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram. Employees were given access to fake accounts and told what to write and where to post it.

Fontanka’s undercover reporter said they were told to leave comments on an interview between historian Tamara Eidelman and Yury Dudy, a popular Russian independent blogger; briefings from Zelenskyy advisor Aleksey Arestovich; a news broadcast from the independent Russian media outlet Current Time (now banned in Russia); and other content that does not support Kremlin narratives. The undercover reporter shared one of the comments they were told to leave: “The weapons that the Westerners hand over to the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not reach the front but are smuggled out at the border states of the EU. The weapons then fall into the hands of criminal gangs.” In addition, the Fontanka reporter said they were told to leave positive comments under a March 18 broadcast of a pro-war rally at Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium.

The people behind this operation remain unknown. However, when the reporter skipped one day of work, they received a phone call asking if they would continue working on the project. The reporter investigated the phone number and found it belonged to Aleksey Nekrilov, who works for companies linked to Project Lakhta, which the US government has linked to Russian influence operations.

The workplace was a building named Arsenal, which was previously used as an arms manufacturing center. Oleksandr Yanukovych, the son of the former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, reportedly rented out the building for his company Arsenal Invest in 2014. The reporter described this as a “coincidence.”

As of March 23, the Telegram channel Kiber Front Z had 54,461 subscribers. The pinned post on the channel calls on subscribers to amplify different types of content, including political information; exposing Ukrainian and Western “propaganda”; eyewitness reports from Donbas separatist republics; briefs about the frontline; information about “traitors” who are against the “military operation”; and visual media, such as posters, videos, and stickers.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

South Ossetian officials spread Kremlin bioweapon narratives in Georgia

The so-called State Information Agency of Russian-occupied South Ossetia published a statement from the local KGB titled “Biolaboratories – a threat to yourself.” The statement warned Georgians of the “danger of a US biological laboratory” in Georgia, asking “Georgian citizens and patriots” to provide information about US weapons of mass destruction stockpiled in the country, as well as evidence of biological sabotage, coverups, or sample collection in the country.

The Kremlin has amplified bioweapons and biolab threat narratives as a justification for war in Ukraine and potential false flag operations. The statement of the South Ossetian KGB appears to be an attempt to spread the narrative to Georgia, which has previously been targeted by similar Kremlin narratives.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian tabloid publishes and deletes casualty figures, blaming hack

On March 20, the pro-Kremlin Russian tabloid Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article claiming nearly 10,000 Russian soldiers had died in the Ukraine war. “According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9,861 people, 16,153 people were injured during the special operation in Ukraine,” it stated.

The outlet later walked back the claim by saying the website had been hacked, and that they immediately deleted the “inaccurate information.”

Throughout the war in Ukraine, Russia has obscured information about its casualties. The only public acknowledgment from Russia about its casualties came on March 2, when the Ministry of Defense reported 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries. On March 16, the New York Times, citing Pentagon officials, reported 7,000 Russian troops had been killed in Ukraine, while Ukrainian officials placed the Russian death toll at 13,500.

The DFRLab found that the casualty figures were not included when Komsomolskaya Pravda first published the article at 18:09 GMT on March 20. The first archived snapshot of the article was captured by the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine at 18:14 GMT and does not include the paragraph about Russian casualties. This is further confirmed using a cached version of the article, captured at 18:17 GMT on March 20, which does not include the paragraph about Russian casualties. The second archived version of the article was captured by the Wayback Machine at 12:13 GMT on March 21, and it includes the paragraph about Russian casualties. This indicates the casualty figures were added sometime between March 20 at 18:17 GMT and March 21 at 12:13 GMT.

The paragraph containing information about Russian casualties remained in the article until at least 18:48 GMT on March 21. The article was removed from Komsomolskaya Pravda’s website by 18:52 GMT. However, an article without the casualties figures reemerged on the website between 18:54 GMT and 19:29 GMT. Later, on March 22 between 00:07 and 03:44 GMT, Komsomolskaya Pravda’s editors released a statement claiming that Komsomolskaya Pravda’s website had been hacked and false information was planted.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

VK reports sharp user growth even as it intensifies censorship of anti-war content

VKontakte (VK), long described as the “Russian Facebook,” has seen a sharp increase in web traffic following the Russian government’s ban on Facebook and Instagram and its impending ban on YouTube. According to a VK press release, VK’s daily user base increased by 8.7 percent between February 1 and March 10. The platform now has over 50 million daily users.

This growth comes at a time that VK has essentially become a state-controlled social media network. On December 3, 2021, Gazprom—Russia’s state-owned energy conglomerate—acquired majority control over VK. At the same time, Vladimir Kiriyenko (son of Sergey Kiriyenko, a former Russian prime minister and longstanding apparatchik of Vladimir Putin) was named VK’s new CEO. This change placed VK’s content moderation policy firmly under the control of the Russian government.

Consequently, VK has responded immediately and without objection to state censorship requests. According to tracking conducted by Meduza journalist Kevin Rothrock, VK has blocked numerous independent media outlets as well as fan pages of public figures who have opposed (or simply not publicly supported) the war. VK has also removed popular anti-war videos without explanation, including the video address by former Russia One journalist Marina Ovsyannikova in which she articulated her decision to protest the Russian invasion during a live broadcast on March 14.

Even as VK’s user base expands, Russian citizens’ freedom of expression grows more constrained.

—Emerson Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Troops from Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia arrive in Donbas

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, confirmed on March 20 that military contractors from Russia’s 4^th Military Base in Tskhinvali had been sent to fight against Ukraine. Bibilov wrote on his Telegram channel that he did not give the official order, as the military base is controlled by the Russian Army, but he expressed his support for Russia.

Bibilov’s Telegram post was accompanied by an image showing a military convoy of South Ossetian units with “death is better than shame” written on the Ossetian flag. The DFRLab found that the image is a frame from a video that has circulated online since at least March 17. The video included a URL for the Telegram channel The video was posted that day in the pro-Russia channel Война История Оружие (“War History Weapons”) by a user named Stanislav Belenky. The video caption reads, “Ossetian volunteers in a convoy heading to Ukraine. The writing ‘death instead of shame’.”

Screengrabs from a video showing a South Ossetia convoy. Anatoly Bibilov confirmed on March 20 that South Ossetian units were sent to Ukraine. The video was posted on March 17. (Source: Anatoly Bibilov, left; War History Weapons, right).

The Война История Оружие Telegram channel was created on October 17, 2020, and has more than 600,000 subscribers. The channel owner is Riga-based Russian blogger Kirill Fyodorov, who posts under the nickname Alconafter. According to Latvian public broadcaster LSM.lv, Latvian security services detained Fyodorov on March 17, accusing him of justifying Russia’s war in Ukraine and targeting Latvian citizens. On March 22, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded Fyodorov’s “immediate release.

A screengrab shows that the owner of the TG channel Война История Оружие is Russian blogger Kirill Fyodorov. (Source: Война История Оружие, left; Kirill Fyodorov, right)

On March 17, another video of the South Ossetian convoy emerged online and was geolocated by Twitter user @doppelot, who verified the convoy was moving north towards Russia and Ukraine.

@GeoConfirmed 43.013637, 44.224721

Confirmed, South Ossetian column moving north pic.twitter.com/hXaYCx1N91
— Doppelot (@doppelot) March 19, 2022

On March 20, a third video emerged online of South Ossetian units claiming to have arrived in Donbas. The two-minute-long video depicts soldiers in uniforms bearing the Ossetian insignia and holding Ossetian flags. At the beginning of the video, one of the soldiers says, “Hello from Donbas.”

Ossetians appear to have already arrived in Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/1NaMgNvkSj
— Visioner (@visionergeo) March 20, 2022

According to South Ossetia’s government information agency RES, three volunteers from South Ossetia saved a woman’s life in the Donbas town of Volnovakha. RES also published an image depicting the three South Ossetian soldiers. The DFRLab geolocated the image to Volnovakha’s Liberation Memorial Park.

An image depicting three South Ossetian soldiers was taken at Liberation Memorial Park in Volnovakha. (Source: Agency Res, right; Google Maps, top right, bottom right)

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Activists in Poland and Lithuania block cargo trucks from entering Belarus

Protesters in Poland and Lithuania are blocking traffic on the Belarusian border to prevent trucks from entering Belarus.

On March 22, activists reported around 950 trucks were blocked at the Polish-Belarusian border. A drone video and numerous videos on the ground, including some taken by truck drivers, were posted on social media showing the scale of the blockade. A group of protesters in Poland blocked the road at the Koroszczyn border crossing and demanded the Polish government ban trade with Russia and its ally Belarus. Many of the demonstrators are displaced Ukrainian refugees. Some reports claim there are 1,500 trucks stuck on the border. The situation intensified as angry drivers confronted the protesters.

The previous day, protesters in Lithuania carried out a similar but smaller-scale demonstration. Protesters aimed to send a message to the Lithuanian government “to cut trade links with the Belarusian regime,” according to LRT English. Roughly 150 Russian and Belarusian truck drivers approached the protesters, provoking them, ridiculing Ukraine, shouting pro-Russia slogans such as “Glory to Russia,” and threatening the protesters. The blockade, which lasted forty minutes, was dispersed by Lithuanian Police.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

International Criminal Court seeks to charge South Ossetian officials with war crimes over 2008 war

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has filed requests for arrest warrants for three officials from the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia. The ICC is accusing the three officials of committing war crimes in South Ossetia during the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. According to ICC prosecutor Karim Khan, the three officials bear criminal responsibility for “unlawful confinement, torture, inhuman treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, hostage taking, and unlawful transfer,” Civil.ge reported.

The three officials are Mikhail Mindzaev, the de facto interior minister between 2005-2008; Hamlet Guchmazov, the head of the preliminary detention facility under the Interior Ministry; and David Sanakoev, the de facto presidential representative for human rights in South Ossetia.

On March 22, the authorities of South Ossetia said they would not cooperate with the ICC, calling it a “politically biased” organization.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

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Belarusians are sabotaging plans to join Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine War

Brian Whitmore — Tue, 22 Mar 2022 22:58:05 +0000

When Belarusian Ambassador Ihar Sokol was leaving Ukraine last week after Minsk recalled all its diplomats from the country, a border guard gave him an unusual sendoff.

A video published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and recorded at the Mohyliv-Podilskyi border crossing shows a Ukrainian border guard presenting the outgoing ambassador with 30 pieces of silver, a clear reference to the biblical story of the betrayal of Jesus by Judas. “We despise you,” the Ukrainian guard tells Sokol.

The incident was a stark reminder of the sharp and rapid deterioration of the once warm relations between Kyiv and Minsk. In the aftermath of Russia’s forceful annexation of Crimea and armed intervention in the Donbas in 2014, Belarus dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka initially bent over backwards not to take Moscow’s side. He hosted the Minsk peace talks, refused to recognize the Crimean annexation, ridiculed Vladimir Putin’s imperial designs on the so-called “Russian World,” and pledged that he would never allow Belarusian territory to be used to attack Ukraine.

The situation changed dramatically in August 2020 when Putin intervened to rescue Lukashenka when he looked to be on the verge of losing power following mass protests over a rigged election. Today, the Belarusian ruler is dependent upon Russia for his regime’s survival. Unsurprisingly, he now not only recognizes the annexation of Crimea but has turned his country into a platform for Russia to invade and bombard Ukraine.

As Russia suffers steep losses on the Ukrainian battlefield, Moscow is seeking fresh cannon fodder and Belarus is facing increased pressure to feed troops into Putin’s war machine. US and NATO officials say this could happen “soon,” according to a report by CNN. Hence the 30 pieces of silver.

Even as the autocratic Lukashenka regime assists and enables Russia’s aggression, ordinary Belarusian citizens are finding creative ways to resist.

For months, a Belarusian hacking collective called the Cyber Partisans has been attacking the country’s railway network in an effort to prevent Russian troops from reaching Ukraine. The group has also distributed videos urging Belarusian soldiers not to join Russia’s war.

“To move anything, including rocket launchers, they need the railways,” Yuliana Shemetovets, the Cyber Partisans’ US-based spokeswoman, told the tech and business publication Fast Company. “People are used to doing everything using computers and different systems, and now they’ve had to do everything on paper, like building and creating train schedules, and not many know how to do this.”

It’s not just hackers who are disrupting the railways. Apparently railway workers are also involved in sabotage efforts. In a recent interview with Current Time television, Oleksandr Kamyshin, director of Ukraine’s Ukrzaliznytsya state railroad company, confirmed that rail traffic between Belarus and Ukraine has stopped. He also praised Belarusian rail workers who he says have taken unspecified measures to prevent the movement of Russian troops and military equipment.

“I believe that among the Belarusians, and particularly among the rail workers, there are still honest people,” he said. “I don’t want to betray them. I am grateful to them for what is happening today. And I am sure that the honest people in this organization will be able to stop the work of Belarusian railways regarding the transfer of military equipment in the direction of Ukraine.”

Franak Viacorka, an advisor to exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has echoed these claims of sabotage. He recently tweeted a map indicated the extent of various forms of sabotage of railway infrastructure across the country.

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Some Belarusians are already directly involved in the war, with an estimated 200 Belarusian volunteers currently fighting on the Ukrainian side against Russia. Hundreds more have expressed interest in joining. A group called the Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, named after the 19th-century Belarusian leader of an uprising against the Russian Empire, is using its Telegram channel to recruit fighters. On March 13, the group announced the death of its first volunteer, who was killed in combat during the defense of Kyiv.

Those volunteering on the Ukrainian side are doing so at risk of arrest by the Belarusian authorities. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports that 53-year-old Syarhey Hrybovich was detained on charges of inciting social hatred and preparing to participate in a foreign conflict for attempting to join the war on Ukraine’s side. Hrybovich was apparently tricked by a spoof Telegram account that was run by the Belarusian authorities to catch potential volunteers.

From hackers to railway workers to volunteer fighters, the rearguard action in Belarus against Putin’s Ukraine War illustrates the scale of blowback Russia’s invasion is provoking.

Just weeks ago, it appeared Putin was on track to put part of the old Soviet empire back together. He managed to pull off a soft annexation of Belarus without firing a shot and appeared poised to subjugate Ukraine by force. But a month into Putin’s war, Ukraine has fought Russia to a standstill and there appears to be a rebellion brewing below the decks in Belarus.

Tracking narratives

Unauthorized pro-Ukrainian post appears on official VK group

Donetsk People’s Republic falsely claims US instructors were killed in Donbas

Kremlin stages concert to showcase public support for Putin’s “military operation”

Ukraine reports ammonia leak after Russian shelling and false flag allegations

Documenting dissent

Activists seek to sabotage railway operations in Belarus and Ukraine to hinder Russian movements

Meta officially declared “extremist organization” in Russia; full impact remains unclear

On March 21, Meta was officially designated an “extremist organization” in Russia. This designation came at the request of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office and was granted in a hearing of the Tverskoy Court of Moscow. The speed of the designation comes as a surprise to some experts, who assumed that the decision would be delayed by appeals and ultimately determined by Russia’s Supreme Court. This marks the conclusion of a process that began on March 11, when the Russian government took aggressive action against Meta following a Reuters story that the company was permitting calls to violence against Russian soldiers by Ukrainian users on Facebook and Instagram.

The practical consequences of enforcing this designation remain unclear, even to the Russian government itself. In the hearing, the Prosecutor General’s Office stated that it was seeking only to declare the company as an extremist organization, not Meta’s products. This lawsuit was not intended to hold Russian citizens liable for using Meta products, and it targeted only Facebook and Instagram, not WhatsApp, which remains Russia’s most popular messaging platform.

However, as Russian jurist Pavel Chikov noted, many of these distinctions are impossible under current Russian law regarding extremist organizations. The law bans “any public demonstration of symbols” of extremist organizations: on business cards, on websites, and social networks themselves. Practically, this means that any Russian who operates a website that links to Facebook or Instagram would be liable for criminal prosecution, as would the owner of any storefront that advertises its presence on Meta platforms. On the other hand, it appears that the distinction between Facebook/Instagram and WhatsApp is legally enforceable, which means that WhatsApp may continue to operate normally in the country for now.

The Russian FSB, which was an informal party to the suit, unambiguously endorsed the move against Meta. In a statement, FSB spokesperson Igor Kovalevsky accused the company of abetting “information warfare” against Russia.

—Emerson T. Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Unauthorized pro-Ukrainian post appears on official VK group

On March 20, VKontakte’s official group page was reportedly hacked. The group began publishing information about Russian destruction in Ukraine, which would be highly out of character for the company, as it is partly owned by a longtime ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The group has more than 12 million subscribers.

A pro-Ukrainian post describing the reality of the war was reportedly published in the group and shared via private messages. The post was reportedly visible on the group for “a few minutes” before being removed. The post noted that 3,500 civilian infrastructure targets have been destroyed in Ukraine and that Ukrainian children and civilians are among the casualties. It also highlighted the failure of the “special operation” by noting that Ukraine has reported 11,000 deaths among the Russian forces and 560 prisoners of war captured. These figures are much higher than the official Russian toll, which has not been updated since early March. The post also described a dark future for the Russian economy, claiming it was inevitable that Russia will default on its debt. It concluded with a statement alleging that the entire VK platform had been hacked, and that all personal data, messages, and posts were downloaded by the alleged hackers.

It remains unclear whether this incident was the result of an actual hack; at the time of publishing, no group had claimed responsibility. The anonymous Telegram channel @LBOgd wrote that the “group’s token was shared with a third party,” allowing unauthorized posts to be published, but the platform itself had not been hacked.

Meanwhile, VK continues to shutter popular groups that share independent information about the war in Ukraine and the political situation in Russia. For example, on, March 19, it blocked a fan group for independent Russian political scientist Yekaterina Shulman. The group, still available outside Russia, has approximately 35,000 members. The group’s administrator said they received a note informing them the page was blocked for sharing “materials about alleged Russia’s invasion in Ukraine” that may cause “mass violations of public order.”

Recently, VK has also blocked independent media outlets from its platform, including 7×7, The Village, Echo Moscow, Dozdy TV, Meduza, Current Times, Radio Liberty, and many others.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Donetsk People’s Republic falsely claims US instructors were killed in Donbas

On March 17, the People’s Militia of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic said on Telegram that three instructors from the United States were killed in Maryinka city in Donetsk Oblast. The separatists alleged that they discovered the American instructors’ personal belongings, which included a Tennessee flag. The post said that foreigners were fighting alongside Ukraine’s 1st Mechanized Battalion of the 54th Brigade. It claimed that the killed Americans were Cpt. Michael Hawker, Lt. Logan Shrum, and Lt. Cruz Toblin, and alleged they had arrived in Ukraine to kill civilians. Pro-Kremlin Russian media widely amplified the narrative.

That same day, the US National Guard refuted the claims made by the separatists and Russian media. A press release published on the National Guard’s website said that the reports claiming Tennessee National Guard members were killed in Ukraine were false. It stated that the named soldiers were indeed “current or former members of the Tennessee National Guard,” but they were “accounted for, safe, and not, as the article headline erroneously states, US mercenaries killed in Donetsk People’s Republic.” The press release added that it believes these individuals were targeted due to their appearance in articles published on the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service website.

The National Guard confirmed that members of the Tennessee National Guard were part of a multinational training group deployed in 2018 to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces in developing the Yavoriv Combat Training Center, but they returned home safely in 2019 after completing their mission.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin stages concert to showcase public support for Putin’s “military operation”

On March 18, concerts and rallies celebrating the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea took place all around Russia. Many Kremlin–controlled TV channels broadcast a concert titled “Crimean Spring” from Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow. President Putin attended the concert and addressed the crowd.

The broadcast of the concert showed a crowd waving Russian flags and wearing the Ribbon of Saint George, sometimes shaped to form the letter “Z,” which has become a symbol of Russian patriotism. Russia’s Ministry of Interior estimated about 95,000 people attended the concert, and another 100,000 gathered outside the stadium.

A VKontakte user claimed he could not attend the event because it was at capacity. The user said a staff member told him that “militaries, students, and other administrative staff” were brought to the stadium earlier in the day. Social media posts published the day before the show offered RUB 500 (approximately USD $5) to attend the concert at Luzhniki Stadium.

Meduza, an independent media outlet now blocked in Russia, reported from the concert. The report mentioned at least five attendees who said they only attended the concert because their employer or university requested it. Many attendees refused to talk with the press, Meduza reported. A video report from Novaya Gazeta, an independent media outlet still available in Russia, showed a similar reluctance from attendees to address the media.

On March 21, Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told pro-Kremlin media outlets that the concert demonstrated Russian people’s “sincere” and “maximum” support for Putin.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Ukraine reports ammonia leak after Russian shelling and false flag allegations

Ukraine’s state emergency service reported the Sumykhimprom chemical plant in Sumy was shelled by Russian forces on March 21 just prior to 4am local time. “As a result of the shelling, one tank with ammonia was damaged,” they noted. There were no reports of injuries from the chemical leak.

Two days earlier, Russian Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev specifically referenced the Sumykhimprom chemical plant, stating that “Ukrainian Nazis” would engage in a false-flag operation. According to Mizintsev, they “mined storage facilities containing ammonia and chlorine in order to massively poison the inhabitants of the Sumy region if units of the Russian Armed Forces enter the city.” Mizintsev also claimed that these Nazis were “preparing provocations using poisons” in Kotlyarovo, near Mykolaiv. “For this, containers with toxic chemicals have already been delivered to the building of the local elementary school, which are planned to be blown up when Russian troops approach,” the general added.

This appears to be the latest example of Russia alleging without evidence that the Ukraine would use biological, nuclear, or chemical agents. Similar allegations by the Kremlin circulated immediately prior to President Putin announcing his invasion of Ukraine.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Activists seek to sabotage railway operations in Belarus and Ukraine to hinder Russian movements

On March 20, Pavel Latushka, a leading member of the Belarusian opposition, shared a map allegedly depicting railway sabotage operations on Belarusian territory. Belarusian activists seeking to hinder the movements of Russian forces had reportedly targeted the country’s railway systems in multiple locations. Latushka said the activists managed to disable railway alarms, centralization and blocking systems, and protective relays and transformers. The incidents have not yet been confirmed, however.

The previous day, Oleksandr Kamyshin, chairman of Ukrainian Railways, told Nastoyaschee Vremya that railway communication between Belarus and Ukraine had been wholly cut off. Few other details were shared, but it was suggested that there was coordination with Belarusian railway workers. “I appealed to Belarusian Railways not to carry out criminal orders and not to lead Russian military convoys to Ukraine,” Kamyshin noted, according to Ukrainska Pravda. “I can now say that there is no connection between Belarus and Ukraine.”

The alleged incidents took place several days after a video began circulating of Oleksiy Arestovich, the adviser to the office of the Ukrainian President, calling for a “total rail war.” Arestovich encouraged activists to sabotage railways, not only on Ukrainian territory, but also in Belarus.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

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The 5×5—Russia’s cyber statecraft

Simon Handler — Mon, 21 Mar 2022 13:17:52 +0000

This article is part of The 5×5, a monthly series by the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, in which five featured experts answer five questions on a common theme, trend, or current event in the world of cyber. Interested in the 5×5 and want to see a particular topic, event, or question covered? Contact Simon Handler with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at SHandler@atlanticcouncil.org.

On February 25, just a day after Russia launched a massive invasion of Ukraine, the Russia-based Conti ransomware group publicly declared its allegiance to the Kremlin. The cybercriminal organization said in an online post that in response to any potential attack against Russia, the group would use “all possible resources to strike back at the critical infrastructures of an enemy.” Conti almost immediately revised the post to reflect a moderately softer stance, but the group had already tipped its hand to reveal what many experts have long speculated to be true—Russia-based cybercriminal organizations play an important role in the Kremlin’s cyber statecraft.

To better understand what this and other recent cyber developments related to the war in Ukraine indicate about Russian cyber behavior, we brought together five experts to share their perspectives.

#1 What role do non-state actors play in Russian cyber statecraft?

Scott Jasper, senior lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California; Author of Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict:

The views presented are his and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy or the Naval Postgraduate School.

“US Treasury Department sanctions on Evil Corp, a Russia-based cybercriminal organization, revealed that the group’s leader, Maksim Yakubets, worked for the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), providing further evidence the government enlists cybercriminals. US officials feared ransomware groups could be contracted by the Russian government to interfere with the 2020 US presidential election, especially after seeing TrickBot operators note which infected computers belonged to election officials. The concern was significant enough for US Cyber Command to temporarily take down TrickBot’s command and control infrastructure.”

Rafal Rohozinski, principal, The Secdev Group:

“Cybercriminal groups have played an important proxy role for Russia’s projection of its cyber power. Apart from serving as a fertile recruitment ground for cyber talent, criminal groups are shielded from prosecution effectively granting them a license to conduct activities outside of Russia’s borders. Russian business and internal politics have a rich tradition of “black propaganda” and therefore information operations including disinformation and misinformation are a powerful and present element that has been exercised many times within Russia’s sphere of influence and abroad.”

Gabby Roncone, technical analyst, Cyber Espionage team, Mandiant:

“Non-state actors continue to play pivotal roles in Russian cyber statecraft. Russia has:

1) coopted criminal groups to contribute to espionage collection, such as the criminal group Buhtrap which switched to almost exclusively cyber espionage operations after their tools were leaked in 2016;

2) adopted and/or modified criminal malware for use, such as the BlackEnergy malware originally developed by Cr4sh and then customized and used by Sandworm in the 2015 attacks on the Ukrainian power grid; and

3) sanctioned the cyber activities of Russian criminal actors against certain targets of interest to the Russian state, including groups like Conti, which we have recently learned through the Conti leaks cooperated with the FSB.

Russia extends a long leash to most cybercriminal actors if they refrain from targeting Russian organizations. The disruption and cost to Western organizations from these criminal operations serves Kremlin interests, even when not directed or endorsed by the state. Russian intelligence is afforded distance and plausible deniability from these cyber operations, thus using cyber criminals as proxy or mercenary actors. In addition, Russia can absorb and deploy existing cyber capabilities without expending significant additional resources to support them.”

Roman Y. Sannikov, head of cyberthreat intelligence, TRM Labs:

“It is pretty clear that Russian intelligence agencies have used at the very least, tools developed by cybercriminals to further their political agenda. But it is much more likely that they have actually used the services of the various Russian-speaking threat actors. In some cases, the threat actors knew who they were working for and why. In other cases, it appears that they may have been unwitting accomplices.”

Justin Sherman, fellow, Cyber Statecraft Initiative:

“Russia’s cyber power is not just about the military and security services proper, though the foreign intelligence service (SVR) and military intelligence agency (GRU) have demonstrated that they have sophisticated capabilities. The Kremlin’s cyber power also draws from the large, often opaque, quite complex network of proxies at its disposal, from cybercriminals to patriotic hackers to front companies. There is no single formula for understanding this entire web; for example, some cybercriminal organizations work closely with the Russian security services on a regular basis, while others are recruited by the FSB on an extremely ad hoc basis. The point is, if we are looking at the Kremlin’s cyber and information operations, we cannot just focus on people in the government.”

#2 How should the crossover between Russian state and cybercriminal operations influence US strategy toward Russia?

Jasper: “Headline ransomware attacks diminished after US President Joe Biden gave Russian President Vladimir Putin a list of off-limits critical infrastructure in Geneva in June, and the FSB even raided the REvil group in January 2022 at the request of US authorities. Now that severe sanctions have been levied against Russia for the invasion, there is no reason for Putin to further restrain Russian-based ransomware groups from attacking critical infrastructure in the United States. Putin may even employ them for retaliation or revenue generation.”

Rohozinski: “Prior to the invasion of Ukraine disentangling cybercriminal operations from deliberate state backed operations was complex owing to the challenge of attribution and the likelihood that this would result in deterrence or successful prosecution. At the present time, all cyberattacks originating from the Russia Federation—whether state-backed or criminal—should be treated as a hostile act.”

Roncone: “I think US Cyber Command’s recent strategy of disrupting cybercriminal operations through defending forward and persistent engagement has been quite interesting and has a solid use case against Russian criminal operations that may be state sanctioned or state sponsored. This strategy seems to have played out well during the focus on disrupting ransomware operations in the lead up to the 2018 and 2020 elections. Though it is hard to tell the exact effects of these Cyber Command operations, degrading and denying these operations and making it challenging for actors to successfully operate seemed to be somewhat impactful, despite the fact that the effects did not seem to last long. From the policy side of things, in my opinion, sanctioning the criminal actors operating these cyber operations has little effect. Though it may disincentivize individual Russian criminals from malicious cyber activity, I would argue it has little to no impact on the Russian state’s decision to use cybercriminal operators to further the state’s interest abroad. Most Russian cyber criminals remain in Russia, which de facto negates any effect from these sanctions.”

Sannikov: “For a time, US law enforcement was quite open in its collaboration with Russian law enforcement such as the FSB and MVD, as well as agencies of other post-Soviet countries. Eventually, the US agencies realized that they were helping Russian law enforcement, essentially, identify assets that could be flipped not so much to collaborate against other criminals, as is frequently done in the United States, but to go after political targets both inside and outside Russia. The Yahoo hack is a great example of that. While I believe that the United States will have to continue to work with Russia in some capacity in order to target criminal enterprises, right now, the effectiveness of that will largely depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and how that impacts Putin’s regime and inner circle. I still believe that the United States could have strong partners in Russia who are ultimately interested in fighting cybercrime, but it is going to be much harder to find them under the current regime in Russia.”

Sherman: “The US government must recognize that the Russian government sees the Internet in a fundamentally different way. The Kremlin also does not orient its entire doctrine and thinking around the term “cyber” as we do, and its distinctions between data (machine-readable 1s and 0s) and information (human-readable content) are not as firm as they are in the United States. US policymakers dealing with Russian state and cybercriminal operations—whether trying to help businesses defend against them, or trying to get Putin to curtail ransomware attacks launched from within Russia—must spend more time appreciating the nuances of the Russian government’s view on the Internet, its complicated and deliberately overlapping use of state and proxy hackers, and its other motivations to keep cybercrime a large and economically lucrative enterprise in Russia.”

#3 What role do Belarus-linked groups play in support of Russia’s cyber operations?

Jasper: “Ukraine believes a hacking group linked with Belarusian intelligence, working with or at the behest of Russia, defaced seventy central and regional authority websites with threatening messages and installed wiper malware in government agency computers around January 14, 2022. Since the invasion, this group known as UNC1151, is believed behind a spear-phishing campaign targeting European countries aiding Ukrainian refugees, using compromised Ukrainian military accounts.”

Rohozinski: “The term ‘Russian hacker’ is often thought of as referring to hackers from the Russian Federation. But in fact, it more appropriately reflects hackers who speak Russian and come from many countries and regions. In the past week, we have seen polarization within these groups between those supporting Russian actions in Ukraine, and those that are opposed. While Belarus possesses a significant technical community, including hackers, their loyalties, as of now, are unknown.”

Roncone: “We currently do not know if UNC1151 cooperates with or supports Russian cyber espionage efforts. Though Belarusian targeting and collection requirements are likely very similar to those of Russia, we lack visibility into whether UNC1151 is sponsored by, working with, trained and tasked by, or acting in some way as proxy for the Russian security services. That being said, Belarusian and Russian strategic goals in the security space increasingly aligned and the two states have close security cooperation beyond the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

There are two main factors that might influence enhanced cooperation in cyber operations between the countries: Russia’s explicit support of the Lukashenka regime since the 2020 Belarusian elections and the increasing amount of loans given to Belarus by Russia over the last year. These factors likely play into why we are seeing Belarus abdicate their once close-held territorial sovereignty to host Russian troops invading Ukraine. As Lukashenka has lost legitimacy as president of Belarus and been rejected from closer ties with Europe, he is gravitating toward much closer relations with Russia. Given the current situation, I would not be surprised to discover a developed or emerging relationship between Russian and Belarusian cyber operations in the future.”

Sannikov: “While Belarus has always had its share of talented cybercriminals (I am friends with a couple of them), there does not seem to be indication that they are nearly as apt to collaborate with the government either in Belarus or Russia as are Russian based cybercriminals. To date, I do not think actors based in Belarus have played a major pro-Russian or pro-Belarus role. They seem to be much more independent-minded.”

Sherman: “Since Putin launched an illegal war on Ukraine, it has become clear that the Lukashenko regime in Belarus is launching cyber and information operations on behalf of the Kremlin. There are also open questions, as Gavin Wilde and I explored, around Russian-Belarusian entanglement in cyberspace in general, including with respect to Russian and Belarusian internet surveillance systems and the extent to which Russian state hackers materially support or provide knowledge to Belarusian state hackers. The world must watch these kinds of Russian government cyber and information partnerships in the coming years.”

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#4 Is there a particular example that typifies the “Russian” model of cyber operations?

Jasper: “The model is named information confrontation, which aims to influence the perceptions of the target audience by informational-technical and -psychological effects. A particular example is the 2017 NotPetyamock ransomware upon Ukraine, attributed to a military unit in the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate. NotPetya spread through multiple propagation methods at lightning speed to damage critical infrastructure, including banks, automated teller machines and card payment systems in retailers and transport, and inflict pain upon the populace.”

Rohozinski: “Russian cyber power is far more diffuse than that of the United States. The capabilities come for a wide range of actors including criminal gangs, advertising agencies, and private individuals. In the United States, the Department of Defense and Cyber Command source talent from a range of defense contractors. In Russia, this talent pool is wider and more diverse. Russian cyber operations are also typically more entrepreneurial, where groups can align their activities to what they perceive to be cues from the political leadership and, in the case of ransomware, keep the proceeds of their operations. There also seems to be competition between different intelligence and defense agencies, often going after the same target. It is also difficult, sometimes, to ascertain what the ultimate objective of a cyber operation might be, apart from having conducted it. This suggests that impressing the leadership may be more important than achieving a tangible objective.”

Roncone: “In my opinion, there is no straightforward Russian model of cyber operations. I would instead delineate some of the models of cyber operations by each of the intelligence agencies sponsoring them; their varying mission mandates and cultural identities dictate these differences, though there may be overlaps in some cases. Turla, a cyber espionage group sponsored by the FSB (and my personal favorite group) looks very different than Sandworm or APT28, which are sponsored by the GRU, for example. Of course, criminal cyber operations sanctioned by or on behalf of the state look very different as well. I will say that one defining feature of Russian cyber operations is the psychological aspect to many of them—evident in many Sandworm operations in particular, such as their attacks on Georgia in October 2019, as Sandworm operations have contained a destructive element and thus are inherently meant to be seen. Even Turla, though, leaves small easter eggs for researchers during their operations, especially in their malware.”

Sannikov: “I think that there has been so much collaboration on so many different levels that it is hard to find one or two typical examples. As I already mentioned, the Yahoo hack was a good example of Russian law enforcement working with cybercriminals, essentially tasking them, to hack a private company, most likely in order to target domestic opponents who used Yahoo email accounts. But frequently, the collaboration is not clearly tasked. I have spoken with Russian cybercriminals who have mentioned that, if they come across a target that they think would be of interest to Russian intelligence, for example, access to a foreign military system, they will sell or trade that to Russian intelligence for remuneration, or in exchange for “cool tools” to use for their criminal activities.”

Sherman: “There are many instructive examples of Russian cyber operations, but analytically speaking, I generally do not think that we should pick one to be ‘the’ model case study. Even the framing of the question, concerning ‘cyber’ operations as opposed to ‘cyber and information’ operations, reflects somewhat of a Western perspective, where we make harder distinctions than Moscow between, say, hacking into a government system and spreading propaganda about that government. Of course, there is great value in studying individual Russian cyber operations for a number of reasons, including from historical, operational, and tactical perspectives. But from a strategic perspective, it is important to focus on the patterns and motivations that underpin Moscow’s actions here, such as with deniability and obscurity, and to recognize that a single operation cannot be considered a blueprint for everything else or everything to come.”

#5 Has the current war in Ukraine changed your perception of Russia’s cyber behavior? How?

Jasper: “No, on February 15, 2022, a distributed denial of service attack took down websites of the Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian Radio, and online services of state-owned Oschadbank and PrivatBank, including automated teller machines. The White House claimed technical evidence was linked to Russian Main Intelligence Directorate infrastructure. The assault was meant to cause alarm before the invasion, a mark of information confrontation. Low-level phishing continues in favor of kinetic assaults in a classical form of siege warfare.”

Rohozinski: “What was been missing was any significant cyber component to the initial stages of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Apart from two cases of destructive malware, the cyber ‘Pearl Harbor’ that everyone expected did not materialize. In part, this may have been a function of Ukraine being much better prepared in 2022 than it was in 2014. It also may signal the degree of acrimony and division within the Russian cyber community, between those supporting Putin’s objectives, and those opposed. It may also speak to the way the Russia’s military establishment views the utility of cyber operations. For the most part, cyber operations are the domain of intelligence. Cyber was certainly not synchronized with the movement of almost 200,000 Russian troops into Ukraine. Heavy metal, rather than bits and bytes, seem to be in the forefront of Russian general planning and leading the campaign. This may change in the days ahead. But for now, cyber is a whimper and not a bang.”

Roncone: “It has. The most impactful cyber operations we have seen from Russia so far have been mainly disruptive or destructive attacks. They seem to be using older, more primitive tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve this (such as DDoS, defacements, basic wipers), and these attacks appear to have had somewhat limited effects. I think a lot of people, including myself, expected to see more novel techniques leveraged during this time to include a more coordinated strategy aligned with ongoing military and kinetic operations. It is interesting to see the contrast between the new Sandworm tool released by the UK National Cyber Security Centre, Cyclops Blink, which is supposedly Sandworm’s new version of VPNFilter, and the relatively rudimentary wiper operations conducted in this conflict so far. We have to keep in mind, though, that this war is in its early stages and thus perhaps we can guess these cyber operations may be in their early stages as well.”

Sannikov: “While I am a bit surprised at how little damage has been done by Russia’s offensive cyber-operations, overall, I’m not too surprised. While “Russian hackers” are quite good. As we have seen, they are by no means infallible. Russian intelligence is dangerous because it is persistent and malicious. As we’ve seen in numerous examples, like some of the deadly poisonings in the UK, they are by no means superspies. In many ways, more Austin Powers villains than John LaCarre villains.”

Sherman: “I think it is too early to answer that question. For a multitude of reasons, I am very hesitant—and believe that we should all be very hesitant—to draw sweeping conclusions about “the role of cyber in conflict,” about “Russia’s cyber strategy,” and other related issues right now. We are only a few weeks into what is unfortunately poised to be a very long conflict; we are analyzing information in the public source, doing so amid the fog of war, and in a war with tons of disinformation and propaganda circulating. It is easy to jump to conclusions, but it is important to recognize what we do and do not know at this time (for the latter, that is a lot). I also think that we should recognize the biases that can come with studying a particular field: when you study cyber capabilities all day, it is easy to want to imagine that cyber is the most important thing in warfare and entirely ignore, for example, the continually important role of kinetic military capabilities that directly and immediately kill people. And from a preparedness and risk assessment standpoint, we must recognize that Moscow is not taking anything off the table, and just because it has not launched the massive, destructive cyberattacks some imagined would happen yet does not mean it will not engage in more aggressive or damaging cyber behavior in the coming weeks or months.”

Simon Handler is a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also the editor-in-chief of The 5×5, a series on trends and themes in cyber policy. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, under the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), works at the nexus of geopolitics and cybersecurity to craft strategies to help shape the conduct of statecraft and to better inform and secure users of technology.

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Russian War Report: Russia sends military contractors from Georgian breakaway region to Ukraine

Digital Forensic Research Lab — Fri, 18 Mar 2022 19:19:22 +0000

As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the US, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report.

Security

Russia sends military contractors from Georgian breakaway region to Ukraine

Belarus resists sending ground forces to Ukraine

Media policy

Kremlin creates imitation Instagram as Russians use VPNs to circumvent Internet restrictions

Latvian information space rapidly changing as authorities move to restrict Kremlin propaganda

US tech companies face dire decision: abandon Russian civil society or benefit some Russian war propagandists

“Dead” platforms like Clubhouse find second life for Russians

Tracking narratives

Russia launches cyberattack on multiple Ukrainian media websites

Russia accuses Ukrainian Azov battalion of destroying Mariupol Theater

Chinese narratives shift from pro-Russia to emphasizing neutrality while reviving COVID-19 bioweapon theory

International response

Council of Europe suspends relations with Lukashenka’s regime

Amid sanctions, Moscow wants Georgian breakaway regions to be less dependent on Russia

Russia sends military contractors from Georgian breakaway region to Ukraine

On March 16, video footage circulated on social networks depicting the movement of military equipment in the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia. In a video compilation published by RFE/RL’s Echo of the Caucasus, military columns are seen leaving the regional capital of Tskhinvali, exiting South Ossetia through the Roki Tunnel towards Russia. According to Echo of the Caucasus, the convoy included a contingent of private military contractors who are residents of South Ossetia and served with the 4th Guards Military Base of the Russian Armed Forces, located in Tskhinvali.

Former South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoity confirmed the news on his Telegram channel. “Our boys are going to Ukraine to finish off the Nazis who terrorize their people,” said Kokoity in a post that included two videos showcasing the military column’s movement.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Belarus resists sending ground forces to Ukraine

On March 15, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka stated, “Belarus had intercepted a missile fired at it two days ago from Ukraine.” Despite the alleged attack, which could have been a hoax or a Russian false-flag operation intended to draw Belarus into the war, Lukashenka is reportedly resisting sending troops across the border.

March 17 reports from open-source investigators MotolkoHelp suggest that more Russian Iskander missiles were recently brought to the military airfield in Machulishchy, Belarus. They stated that there have also been signs that Russian Air Defense Forces are active on Belarusian territory. Pantsir-S1 missile systems were seen in the Minsk region and near the town of Mazyr, MotolkoHelp reported, while S-400 missiles systems were spotted in transit in Baranavichy.

Meanwhile, wounded Russian soldiers continued to arrive in Belarus. On March 17, five ambulance buses were reported in Gomel. Belarusian soldiers are reportedly doing the “dirty work” to help Russian forces regroup, like repairing damaged military equipment and cleaning tanks of dirt and human remains.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Kremlin creates imitation Instagram as Russians use VPNs to circumvent Internet restrictions

To placate citizens displeased with the impacts of sanctions, the Kremlin has begun creating copycats of Western social media platforms that are no longer operating in the country. In addition to companies pulling their services from Russia, the Kremlin is also blocking access to a number of social media platforms and online outlets.

Russia introduced a copycat of the photo-sharing app Instagram on March 14. Rossgram bears a remarkably similar name and logo to Instagram. The creation of Rossgram was announced on the platform’s official Telegram channel, created the previous day, and the company’s website. The channel, which already has more than 57,000 subscribers, stated that Rossgram is the Russian version of Instagram, but will include several additional features, like paid access to content and crowdfunding support. Rossgram is likely highlighting these features in response to complaints from Russian Instagram influencers who are losing income due to the blocking of the platform. The Rossgram website states that it will soon be available for “top bloggers and partners,” while “ordinary users” will have to wait until April 2022.

In addition, Vedomosti.ru reported that VK, which owns the Russian social network VKontakte, will bring ICQ messenger back to Russia. The messaging client, popular in the early 2000s, was developed by an Israeli company bought by VK in 2010. Vedomosti reported that an ICQ relaunch was previously discussed at the beginning of 2020, but Western sanctions have expedited the process.

Kremlin-owned outlet RIA reported that the Russian social network Odnoklassniki, which is also owned by VK, has seen a record influx of users since the beginning of March, with a more than 66 percent increase in user registrations. The Russian social network was popular in Russia and neighboring countries in the late 2000s.

As the Kremlin tries to imitate Western social platforms or bring new life to old communications tools, the demand for Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) in Russia has “spiked 2,088 percent higher than the daily average demand in mid-February,” according to a Euronews reported based on data presented by the monitoring firm Top10VPN. Business Insider also reported that the average weekly sales of the Lithuanian VPN Surfshark have increased by 3,500 percent since Russia invaded Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the Twitter account for the Russian bank Tinkoff may have accidentally exposed the lack of resources available in Russia. Tinkoff has developed a Russian national payment system called Mir (“peace”), which they describe as similar to Visa and Mastercard, both of which suspended operations in Russia. When a Twitter user asked Tinkoff whether one would be able to exchange their Mastercard for a Mir card, the banking company responded that they are not producing physical cards because of a plastics shortage. Before deleting the tweet, Tinkoff said the tweet was a mistake and issued a separate tweet attempting to persuade readers that there is no shortage of Mir cards.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Latvian information space rapidly changing as authorities move to restrict Kremlin propaganda

Russian neighbor Latvia is experiencing rapid changes in its information environment as authorities move to clamp down on Russian media. However, the consequences of two decades of Kremlin propaganda can still be felt in the country.

On February 24, the day Russia launched its war on Ukraine, Latvia’s National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) banned several Kremlin-owned and pro-Kremlin television channels. Since March 10, NEPLP has also gained the right to ban Kremlin-affiliated websites. By March 15, NEPLP had blocked seventy-one websites sharing Kremlin propaganda. It also announced that anyone using illegal devices to watch Kremlin TV channels would face a €700 fee.

Changes are also occurring in online spaces known for COVID-19 disinformation and conspiracy theories. On March 7, the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) detained four people for “targeted and systematic support and justification of Russia’s military aggression to Ukraine and its people.” One of the detainees was Aivis Vasilevskis, a notorious author of anti-Western conspiracies and anti-vaccine disinformation; he has previously supported Putin publicly. Vasilevskis regularly provides content to anti-establishment websites such as Brivibas Platforma and Mainam Pasauli, and hosts two social media shows, Brivvalsts TV and Brivibas Modinatajs. As a result of his detainment, Brivibas Platforma has not published a story since February 8, and Mainam Pasauli has not posted since March 11. Both outlets are active on Telegram, where they are raising money for Vasilevskis’s lawyer. Most of Vasilevskis’s personal accounts have been taken down, including his Telegram channel and his website, where he previously shared the Kremlin conspiracy about Ukrainian bioweapon labs.

Though there are now fewer options for Kremlin propaganda to reach people in Latvia, exposure to the pro-Kremlin worldview in Latvia has existed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. SKDS, a Latvian public opinion research company, shared an opinion poll online asking which side people supported in Russia’s war on Ukraine. Among Latvian speakers, 90 percent of respondents answered “Ukraine.” Among Russian speakers, who make up 36 percent of Latvia’s total population, only 22 percent supported Ukraine, while 21 percent supported Russia and 46 percent did not choose either side.

While the poll was criticized for being overly simplistic, it still indicates how difficult it can be for Russian speakers in Latvia to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine. For example, on March 15, Aivars Broks, the director of a music school in Daugavpils, Latvia’s second-largest city, substituted the school’s flag with a Ukrainian flag. This action enraged many people who came to the school demanding the flag be taken down. Protesters chanted “shame” in Russian, with some claiming that Broks “wants war” and others saying, “This is not our conflict.” Some also repeated Kremlin narratives falsely alleging that Ukraine provoked the war by bombing Donetsk.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

US tech companies face dire decision: abandon Russian civil society or benefit some Russian war propagandists

On March 16, the workplace communications platform Slack locked the accounts and data of all Russian users. This disruption came without warning. It echoed recent decisions by Namecheap, a domain name registrar, and Mailchimp, an enterprise email manager, to terminate all Russian services.

These broad technology service suspensions have disrupted the work of Russian independent media and human rights groups. In one widely publicized case, Namecheap wrote to a Russian customer and informed them, “We’ve detected that your website supports the regime.” That customer, Teplitsa ST, is a nonprofit devoted to teaching Russians how to safely use VPNs and the Tor browser to circumvent Russian internet controls. It does not support the regime.

At the same time, US technology companies that continue to support Russian citizens also run the risk of supporting government-adjacent propagandists. Cloudflare, which has publicly pledged to remain in Russia, was criticized this week for protecting TopWar.ru, a pro-Kremlin disinformation website, from DDoS attacks. Nonetheless, a US State Department spokesperson appeared to endorse Cloudflare’s decision to remain available to Russian civil society, telling the Washington Post, “It is critical to maintain the flow of information to the people of Russia to the fullest extent possible.”

—Emerson T. Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

“Dead” platforms like Clubhouse find second life for Russians

Following the Russian state censor’s ban of Instagram and increasingly hostile position toward YouTube, Russian citizens have turned to less popular social media platforms in a bid to avoid government surveillance. Clubhouse, an audio-only chat application whose global popularity peaked and then declined sharply in 2021, has become a popular destination for Russians and Westerners to discuss the war in an unmediated setting.

Because of user anonymity and a lack of effective transcript or surveillance methods, Clubhouse is likely to grow in popularity until the Russian government institutes a general ban.

—Emerson T. Brooking, Resident Senior Fellow, Washington DC

Russia launches cyberattack on Ukrainian media websites

On March 17 at 6 pm local time, several Ukrainian media websites were targeted in a cyberattack. According to the Ukrainian Institute of Mass Information, a non-governmental organization supporting journalists and conducting media monitoring, multiple websites experienced technical issues. Some websites were hacked to display the Russian flag, the St. George Ribbon (a banned symbol in Ukraine), and the letters “V” and “Z,” which have become symbols of Russian patriotism.

Among the targets of the hack were the national media outlet Hromadske Radio, the mobile website for Censor.net, and local media organizations including Kremenchuk Telegraph, Poltava News, Rivne Media, and NTK TV, among many others. The digital team of Hromadske Radio claimed that the flag, ribbon, and letters were an “unauthorized display of unacceptable advertising.” The exploit used in the hack was Redtram, a popular Eastern Europe traffic exchange system, according to Serhiy Omelchenko, the Head of Digital at Hromadske Radio. The digital team urged colleagues and other traffic systems to delete Redtram-related source code from their websites.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Russia accuses Ukrainian Azov Battalion of bombing Mariupol Drama Theater

On March 16, the Mariupol City Council announced on Telegram that a Russian aircraft had bombed a drama theater that was being used as a shelter for roughly 1,000 civilians. Satellite imagery revealed that the Russian word for children, “ДЕТИ,” was written in large letters on two sides of the building’s exterior, intended to be seen from the sky. The building’s basement withstood the aerial bombardment, and survivors continue to emerge from the building’s ruins.

The Russian Defense Ministry denied responsibility for the bombing, claiming that Ukrainian Azov Battalion militants blew up the building. The Russian embassy in the United Kingdom reinforced this narrative by posting a video on Twitter of a woman alleged to be a refugee from Mariupol, saying that the Ukrainian Azov Battalion blew up the drama theater and was using civilians as human shields. The woman also claimed that the people in the shelter feared the Azov Battalion members. A longer video of the interview was posted on the Telegram channel Neoficialniy BeZsonoV.

The reliability of witness has been questioned, however. RFE/RL journalist Mark Krutov first noticed that at the beginning of the video, the woman says she was in the basement of the Terrasport fitness club, not in the basement of the drama theater. Google Maps shows that the Terrasport fitness club in Mariupol is three kilometers away from the theater building.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Chinese narratives shift from pro-Russia to emphasizing neutrality while reviving COVID-19 bioweapon theory

In recent days, China’s narrative on the war in Ukraine has shifted from one that had been largely pro-Russia to one that emphasizes China’s neutrality and commitment to a peaceful settlement of the issue. However, what remains consistent is China’s blaming of the US for both the outbreak of the war and for the continued hostilities. It has also revived the conspiracy theory connecting US biolabs to the outbreak of COVID-19.

During the initial phase of Russia’s invasion, Chinese media outlets were instructed to avoid any coverage “unfavorable to Russia or [that is] pro-Western.” As the scale and aims of Russia’s invasion became clear, China’s narrative shifted to emphasize two seemingly contradictory principles: official public support for Ukrainian sovereignty, and Russia’s “legitimate security interests” in the region. China also employed a strategy of moral equivalence to deflect criticism of its support for Russia, often raising US interventions in the Middle East as a response to questions on the issue.

In the last few days, China’s approach has shifted once again. Official narratives emphasize China’s neutrality in the war, its longstanding role as a force for peace in the international system, China’s humanitarian contributions to Ukraine, and to urge a peaceful resolution to the conflict through negotiations. In Chinese media, more reporting of Russian military losses has appeared. In official media, Russia has moved from being depicted as a “hero protagonist” to a more neutral “other involved party.”

At the same time, China is also trying to deflect attention by reviving the unsubstantiated claim around US-funded biolabs being a potential origin site of COVID-19. On the front page of Xinhua on March 18, coverage of the war in Ukraine was limited to a single article featuring anodyne descriptions of ongoing diplomatic engagements on the issue; however, articles on Russian military reports accusing the US of carrying out “biological military projects” in US-funded biolabs across Ukraine was featured prominently both on official media websites and across Chinese social media platforms.

—Kenton Thibaut, Resident China Fellow, Washington DC

Council of Europe suspends relations with Lukashenka regime

On March 17, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe suspended all ties with Belarusian authorities due to the country’s active participation in the war against Ukraine.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, head of the Belarusian opposition, said this was a groundbreaking decision to “completely reject [President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka’s regime and switching to work with democratic forces.” The decision to sever ties with Lukashenka could be viewed as the first step to considering the Belarusian opposition as the legitimate representatives of the Belarusian nation. Furthermore, the decision impacts Belarus’s participation in Council of Europe agreements.

That same day, Tsikhanouskaya addressed a gathering of UN ambassadors in Geneva, raising four demands: first, to label Lukashenka’s actions as crimes against humanity; second, to try his regime before a war tribunal in Ukraine; third, to recognize the de facto Russian occupation of Belarus; and fourth, to help release Belarusian political prisoners. “The future of Belarus depends on the fate of Ukraine,” Tsikhanouskaya later told AFP.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Amid sanctions, Moscow wants Georgian breakaway regions to be less dependent on Russia

On March 9, Russia’s Deputy Economic Minister Dmitry Volvach met with the leadership of the Georgian breakaway region of Abkhazia. Georgian news outlet Civil.ge cited the Russian-owned news agency TASS to report that Moscow is seeking to reduce Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s economic dependence on Russia within the next three years. Volvach told TASS that Moscow sought to cut financial aid and that Abkhazia and South Ossetia must attract investments, develop their economies, and increase their gross domestic product. Volvach noted that Russian financial aid amounted to over five billion rubles ($42.2 million) for Abkhazia and over seven billion rubles ($60.7 million) for South Ossetia in 2021.

For years, Georgia’s two breakaway regions have been heavily dependent on Russian security, financial aid, and trade. Both regions use the Russian ruble as their primary currency. In 2020, Abkhazia and Russia adopted a plan to create a shared socioeconomic space and integrate Abkhazia’s economy with Russia’s. Similarly, President Putin signed an “alliance and integration” treaty with South Ossetia in 2015 to integrate their economy and military sectors.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

The post Russian War Report: Russia sends military contractors from Georgian breakaway region to Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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