Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? The European Union’s recent memorandum of understanding with Serbia on raw materials has sparked debate across the Balkans. Signed during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit, the MoU revives a controversial lithium mining project, drawing opposition from many Serbians.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and Head of Europe’s Futures Project in Vienna, to dissect this complex issue.

Does Mr. Vejvoda share the criticism that the EU and Germany are prioritizing lithium access in Serbia over essential democratic principles like environmental protection, rule of law, and independent media?

With concerns about weak independent institutions and a critical public sphere in Serbia, can the country uphold high environmental and social standards?

How can the EU ensure that such agreements maintain rigorous environmental and social principles?

Could this agreement reduce Serbia’s reliance on China, and what might be the broader geopolitical implications?

Join #BalkansDebrief for an in-depth discussion on the potential impacts of this deal and the geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the EU in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? A Debrief with Ivan Vejvoda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? Why should Europe focus on the Balkans? What are the potential opportunities and challenges for EU enlargement and the Growth Plan for this region?

Join Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare in this episode of #BalkansDebrief as she interviews Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy and current President of the Institut Jacques Delors. With his extensive experience in European Union affairs and his recent influential report on the future of the Single Market, Mr. Letta provides deep insights into the necessary reforms for successful EU enlargement.

In this episode, Mr. Letta discusses his advocacy for the “Regatta Method” over the “Big Bang” approach for EU enlargement, emphasizing the importance of allowing each country to join when ready rather than waiting for the slowest in the region. He also elaborates on his proposed blueprint for EU enlargement success, which includes critical reforms such as on veto rules and the creation of a “solidarity enlargement facility.”

Discover the future of the EU and the vital steps needed to integrate the six Western Balkan countries into the new Single Market, as envisioned by Enrico Letta, a staunch advocate of enlargement in the Western Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? A Debrief with Enrico Letta appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For decades, the United States and Serbia have engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance. Recently, Serbian think tank representatives visited Washington, DC, for critical talks with US policymakers.

Their agenda? Navigating the complexities of Serbia’s democratic health and evolving foreign policy, including unpacking its shifting alliances with Russia and China, and how these relationships impact Serbia’s aspirations for membership in the European Union (EU).

Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Igor Bandovic, Director of the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, and Nikola Burazer, Program Director at the Center for Contemporary Politics, to discuss their main concerns regarding Serbia’s state of democracy, nationalistic rhetoric, and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina.

What are the top foreign policy and security challenges facing Serbia currently?

The All-Serb Assembly reignited nationalist sentiment across the region. How significant is this, and what potential consequences could it have for Serbia and regional stability?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Where next for Serbian foreign policy? | A Debrief with Igor Bandovic and Nikola Burazer appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? Football and politics are deeply intertwined, especially in the Balkans, where the mix can be volatile. At the UEFA Euro Cup in Germany this year, nationalistic chants and provocative acts highlighted the ongoing tensions among Balkan nations. Serbia, Albania, and Croatia clashed not only in the stadiums but also in a display of ethnic rivalries.

In this episode Ilva Tare is joined by Florian Bieber, a renowned historian and professor at the University of Graz, specializing in inter-ethnic relations and nationalism in the Balkans. They discuss the complex role of football as both a catalyst for rivalry and a potential bridge for unity in the region.

How does football act as a double-edged sword, fueling both rivalry and potentially fostering unity in the Balkans?

How do nationalistic rhetoric and historical narratives shape the current tensions?

Can the younger generations break the cycle of resentment, or are they destined to inherit past grievances? What role can they play in reconciliation?

Given the political landscape, is peace in the Balkans a realistic goal? What concrete steps can governments and the international community take to foster stability?

Join #BalkansDebrief for a thought-provoking discussion on the dynamics of football, nationalism, and the quest for peace and reconciliation in the Balkans.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Do Balkan nationalist chants at EURO 2024 fuel ethnic tensions? | A Debrief with Florian Bieber appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why is distrust in institutions alarming for the Balkans? The recent International Republican Institute (IRI) poll on the Western Balkans has revealed some concerning trends for the region’s aspirations of joining the European Union. While the war in Ukraine presented a potential opening, the path to membership appears to be facing significant challenges. 

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Amila Karačić, Director of Programs of IRI in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who also oversees the Western Balkans regional programs, to discuss the main takeaways of the poll conducted in the six countries. 

Is there evidence that pro-Russian narratives are gaining traction outside of Serbia?

Why are citizens in the Western Balkans less likely to push for political change, despite wanting EU integration? How deep is their distrust in politicians and institutions?

Why does it seem that citizens prefer strongman leaders despite their potential to undermine the path towards the EU? 

Is nationalism a concern in the region? In which country is it most pronounced?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is distrust in institutions alarming for the Balkans? | A debrief with Amila Karačić appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Western Balkans stand at a pivotal moment. Regional stability, security, and prosperity require a more robust US engagement. EU accession remains the goal but simmering ethnic tensions and resurgent nationalism demand a comprehensive US strategy that includes specific and actionable commitments.

In the light of Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine that has shaken European security foundations, how can the US enhance its collaboration with the EU to develop a unified approach regarding the future of the Western Balkans?

Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, discusses with outgoing US Deputy Assistant Secretary and Special Representative for the Western Balkans Gabriel Escobar, at the end of his term, the most pressing issues for the region’s EU prospects, the challenges with corruption and economic growth, and the main concerns for increased tension and risks for stability.

Tare asks DAS Escobar if prioritizing the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities on the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia was the most effective strategy, and what is the path forward on this issue?

Is the US considering alternative approaches towards Serbia to achieve progress on EU alignment, especially after the composition of the new government? 

Can the US prevent a fracturing of the fragile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

How concerning is Russian influence in the Western Balkans? Specific questions on Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania will also be covered in this #BalkansDebrief episode.

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the US role amidst fragility in the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Gabriel Escobar appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What were the main outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris, Belgrade and Budapest? How successful was President Macron in demonstrating European unity on China? How concerned should the EU be with China’s economic and bilateral relationship with Hungary? What are the implications of growing Serbia-Chinese relations for the Western Balkans and the region’s European integration?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Valbona Zeneli, Europe Center Nonresident Senior Fellow, to discuss the significance and impact of Xi’s visit and implications for EU-China relations and transatlantic cooperation on China.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Staff

Jörn Fleck

Senior Director

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Digital Policy Economy & Business

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What was the outcome of Xi’s visit to Europe? | A Debrief from Valbona Zeneli appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Wrapped up in this electoral contest is the issue of a constitutional amendment. In 2020, Bulgaria vetoed North Macedonia’s EU accession. Sofia has since demanded the inclusion of language in North Macedonia’s constitution recognizing ethnic Bulgarians as one of the country’s founding peoples as a prerequisite to restarting EU accession negotiations. The proposed amendment is but one in a series of disputes over identity and history that have plagued relations between the two countries and halted North Macedonia’s progress toward EU membership. Polling has found that over two-thirds of North Macedonia’s citizens are against the constitutional changes. The ruling SDSM and the parties from the Albanian bloc (DUI and VLEN) are in favor of the amendments, whereas the opposition VMRO-DPMNE, ZNAM, and Levica are opposed.

First impressions from the first round

To get a better sense of what might happen on May 8, it is worth looking at the April 24 results. According to North Macedonia’s State Election Commission, Siljanovska-Davkova received 40 percent of the vote, more than double that of Pendarovski, who received just under 20 percent. Siljanovska-Davkova outperformed polls, and her victory will be wind in the back of VMRO-DPMNE heading into the general election next week. In contrast, Pendarovski’s performance is the worst result by a Social Democrat candidate since the country’s independence in 1991, indicating voter dissatisfaction with the SDSM-DUI coalition government of the past seven years.

Aside from VMRO-DPMNE’s better-than-expected performance and SDSM’s lackluster result, there were several surprises from the first-round vote.

Some analysts thought before the election that voter apathy, a lack of interest in politics, and disillusionment with the current government and the unreformed opposition would result in low voter turnout. However, turnout stood at nearly 50 percent, which was higher than the 42 percent first-round turnout in 2019. With seven candidates running, the high number of options likely helped drive voters to the polls. Since the runoff vote is paired with parliamentary elections, turnout is expected to remain stable. However, a possible boycott by ethnic Albanian voters could threaten the 40 percent presidential turnout threshold.

Another surprise was the strong showing of Kumanovo Mayor Maksim Dimitrievski, backed by his newly formed ZNAM movement. Dimitrievski overperformed the polls, raking in more than 83,000 votes (9.26 percent of the vote), putting him in fourth place. This positioned the ZNAM movement as an influential third option ahead of the parliamentary election. A former Social Democrat, Dimitrievski peeled off the more conservative wing of SDSM, with many former party members now running on his ZNAM ticket.

Amid speculation that the united Albanian opposition, VLEN, might finally outperform the ruling Albanian Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), the result did not live up to expectations. Despite a bitter battle, DUI’s candidate, Bujar Osmani, defeated VLEN’s Arben Taravari by some 37,000 votes. While VLEN weaved together the main opposition voices in the Albanian political bloc, the DUI still had the state apparatus in its corner and brought into its fold Menduh Thaçi’s DPA, Ziadin Sela’s wing of Alliance for Albanians, as well as several parties from the Roma, Turkish, and Bosniak communities, giving them enough to eke out a win.

Finally, the left-wing Levica party fell flat, with Biljana Vankovska Cvetkovska getting just a little more than 41,000 votes, or about 4.5 percent. But this result could be evidence that the party has stabilized its base, as it received around 37,000 votes in the 2020 parliamentary election and around 50,000 votes in the 2021 local election. Vankovska Cvetkovska’s poor performance could harm the party in the general elections, though its parliamentary candidates could have stronger showings since some other party members enjoy higher popularity.

VMRO-DPMNE’s Siljanovska-Davkova remains favored to defeat SDSM’s Pendarovski in the runoff, but all eyes are on the losing candidates and which camp they will throw their weight behind. So far, mum’s the word.

The coalition-building process

There are seventeen parties or coalitions running in the parliamentary elections on May 8, but only VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DUI, VLEN, ZNAM, and Levica are projected to pick up seats. The most likely coalition to form a government would be among VMRO-DPMNE, VLEN, and ZNAM. Based on recent polls, they would likely have a comfortable seventy-five-seat majority in the 120-seat parliament. VMRO-DPMNE has shown openness to working with both VLEN and ZNAM for some time now. However, the multiparty composition of VLEN will complicate the coalition-building process.

Furthermore, VLEN’s stance in favor of the constitutional amendments and VMRO-DPMNE and ZNAM’s opposition is another challenge. VLEN has made other demands for policies that VMRO-DPMNE opposes, and these demands could become a factor. First, VLEN wants the president to be elected by parliament rather than via direct elections. Second, it wants to reformulate the Ohrid Agreement, signed in 2001, so that Albanian is explicitly an official language of North Macedonia, replacing the current policy in which “any language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language.”

Whatever coalition ultimately forms, however, it is unlikely that there will be enough votes in parliament to pass the constitutional amendments, which would require a two-thirds majority. The parties in favor of the amendments (SDSM, DUI, and VLEN) are projected to win as few as fifty-three seats and would need to convince almost thirty other members of parliament to change their position to pass the amendments. This would be a daunting task given that the parties in favor of the amendments now have more than sixty members in parliament and have been unable to complete the task.

As the constitutional amendments remain front and center in the election campaign, political parties have ramped up nationalist rhetoric. With VMRO-DPMNE poised to rise to power, the country’s EU accession is in flux. It is unlikely that the next government will succeed in either renegotiating the EU’s accession framework or stalling the constitutional changes until the country is on the cusp of joining the EU.

Recent history has shown that when progress toward accession halts due to international disputes, North Macedonia can take an undemocratic turn and lose years in the EU waiting room. As the election approaches, the everyday concerns of citizens—such as healthcare, the economy, youth emigration, the environment, and the fight against corruption—are being pushed to the background. Regardless of the election outcome, however, political polarization will persist, and North Macedonia’s EU integration will likely remain at a standstill for the foreseeable future.

Aleksej Demjanski is a political analyst and editor of the “Macedonian Matters” weekly newsletter.

The post What will North Macedonia’s upcoming elections mean for its EU accession prospects? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On May 8, voters in North Macedonia will go to the polls in a pivotal parliamentary election that will chart the nation’s course towards European Union integration, alongside the decisive second round of the presidential election. The outcomes are anticipated to signal a shift in the electorate’s mood, reflecting their discontent with the stalled EU accession progress since the 2019 name change and the tensions with Bulgaria over demanded constitutional amendments.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare and political analyst Aleksej Demjanski, editor of the MacedonianMatters newsletter, discuss in this episode of #BalkansDebrief the significance of these elections for North Macedonia’s European aspirations.

They explore what Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova’s lead in the presidential election’s first round, securing 40.1% of the votes, reveals about the public’s appetite for change. The conversation will also cover the core messages and strategies of the incumbent SDSM party’s campaign, as well as the resonating themes of the opposition VMRO-DPMNE’s efforts, and how they align with the citizen’s concerns.

Furthermore, the conversation covers the potential post-election alliances. Could we witness a coalition between VMRO-DPMNE, ZNAM, and VLEN, or will the SDSM and DUI maintain their coalition? How will the political landscape and impact North Macedonia’s EU path?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why do North Macedonia’s elections matter for its EU future? | A debrief with Aleksej Demjanski appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 21st, Global China Hub Senior Director David O. Shullman was featured on the podcast “Novi Magazin,” for a discussion on Serbia’s close relationship with China and the United States’ perspective on this cooperation.

The post Global China Hub Senior Director David O. Shullman in “Novi Magazin” Podcast appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Western Balkans remain a security concern, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recently, France has deployed a battalion as part of the Strategic Reserve Force to assist the EUFOR mission and exercise a level of deterrence in Bosnia and Kosovo, two countries with security issues, where France wants to see progress.

Ilva Tare, a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Europe Center, discusses regional security issues with Alexandre Vulic, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, International Security, and Arms Control at the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs.

Why does France consider the situation in Bosnia as stable yet fragile? What are the main concerns that threaten security in the region? How do cybersecurity, disinformation, and false narratives affect the Western Balkans? And how can France counter Russia’s influence, which is exercised via proxies and nationalist forces?

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is France refocused on security in the Balkans? | A debrief with Alexandre Vulic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the Ukraine war underscoring security risks in the Western Balkans, the United Kingdom has doubled down on its commitment to the region’s stability. In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Lord Stuart Peach, the UK’s Special Envoy for the region.

Tare asks Lord Peach about the reasons for optimism and pessimism in the region. How do the old issues such as nationalism, Russian influence, and a media landscape rife with misinformation impact the lives of citizens, particularly the younger generation? Why is the UK prioritizing reconciliation efforts in the Balkans?

What are the UK’s expectations for the ongoing dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia? What concrete steps should the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić and Prime Minister of Kosovo Albin Kurti take to achieve progress? How concerned is the UK about calls for secession of the Republika Srpska by Milorad Dodik? Why are free and fair elections crucial for the EU aspirations of the Western Balkan countries?

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why is the UK focused on reconciliation in the Balkans? | A debrief with Lord Stuart Peach appeared first on Atlantic Council.

North Macedonia, a small nation of 2 million, in the Western Balkans, gained international attention in 2019, when it agreed to the seemingly impossible: changing its name in exchange for EU negotiations and NATO membership. While NATO membership was secured, EU accession talks have stalled for years. This is largely due to Bulgaria’s demand for Constitutional changes recognizing a Bulgarian minority.

For North Macedonians, Sofia’s veto was a bitter pill to swallow resulting in public support for the EU dropping sharply, according to surveys. On May 8, the country faces critical elections that will decide its future in relation to the EU.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare sits down will Marko Troshanovski, President of the Institute for Democracy, to discuss the importance of the elections and the key issues debated by the main two opposing political camps.

Can the North Macedonian public regain trust in the EU accession process? What do the surveys suggest about the winner of the political elections? How will a potential victory by the center-right VRMNO-DPMNE opposition affect the country’s foreign policy and its EU path? What role will Albanian parties play in the winning coalition? How should the new government address the problem of corruption?

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why are elections in North Macedonia critical for its EU path? | A debrief with Marko Troshanovski appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kosovo’s recent ban on the dinar, aimed by the Kurti government at curbing illegal cash flow, has sparked tensions with US and the European partners and raised concerns about its impact on the Kosovo Serb community, on the normalization dialogue with Serbia, and Kosovo’s wider relationship with its Western allies.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare discusses the reasons behind this controversial move with two esteemed guests; Arian Zeka, Executive Director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Kosovo and Dragisa Mijacic Executive Director of InTER Institute for Territorial Economic Development.

Key questions: Why did the Central Bank of Kosovo announce the euro-only policy on February 1st? How does this decision impact the daily lives of Kosovo’s Serb community considering pensions and welfare concerns raised by the local NGO’s? Should Westerns partners have been consulted by the Kosovo government before the ban? What are the potential implications for US-Kosovo relations after the call to reverse the ban? Can the Association of the Serb Majority Municipalities address the issue of financing and dinar use, as some suggest?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why did the dinar ban spark Kosovo-US tension? | A debrief with Arian Zeka and Dragisa Mijacic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Western Balkan energy: Too little competition, too much coal, and too much Russia

Energy sectors across the Western Balkans are dominated by state enterprises whose non-transparency and mismanagement have hampered competition, enabled Russian meddling, and slowed investments in the energy transition.

Privatizations of electricity networks in Serbia in the mid-2000s and Montenegro in 2009, for example, were marred by allegations of undervaluing state assets to benefit politically connected investors and thereby defrauding state budgets. The European Commission, meanwhile, recently criticized a lack of transparency in access to North Macedonia’s natural-gas transit infrastructure, as well as the country’s illiquid gas market. And concerns about corruption, mismanagement, and environmental degradation regarding the Kalivac hydropower project in Albania have resulted in major delays and cost overruns, with the project ultimately scaled back significantly.

Russia exploits these energy-sector weaknesses for both economic and geopolitical gain. The 2007 Comprehensive Energy Agreement Between Serbia and the Russian Federation, for example, outsources much of Serbia’s energy security and fiscal control to Russia.  Under this framework, Russia’s Gazprom Neft acquired 50 percent of shares in Serbia’s national oil company, Naftna Industrija Srbij (NIS), while Gazprom gained 6.15 percent, yielding a controlling stake of 56.15 percent for Russia’s majority state-owned Gazprom group. Moreover, this arrangement grants Gazprom control over NIS revenue payments to the Serbian government that account for approximately 25 percent of national budgetary revenues.

Serbia is also a key player in the Balkan Stream pipeline, an extension of the TurkStream pipeline that exclusively carries Russian gas under the Black Sea to Turkey, then across Bulgaria to Serbia and Hungary. Moscow has pursued this project, previously called South Stream, since 2007 to resist competition from Azerbaijani gas while bypassing Ukraine as a transit route into Southeast Europe.

Today, Balkan Stream reinforces the efforts of both Serbian President Aleksander Vucic and Hungarian President Viktor Orban to balance relations between the EU and Russia.

Meanwhile, governments across the Western Balkans have also failed to make concerted efforts on perhaps the quickest and most cost-effective way to reduce carbon emissions in their countries’ energy sectors: switching from coal to natural gas as a primary fuel for electricity generation.

Though also a fossil fuel, natural gas emits only one-half to one-third the amount of carbon dioxide when burned that coal does. Moreover, switching to natural gas is a cost-effective way to maintain sufficient electricity volumes to sustain economic growth, even as countries muster the massive investments required to transition fully to renewable energy.

Germany provides an illustrative case. For the past four decades, the German government has been a global leader in transitioning to renewable energy under its Energiewende program, through which it has invested hundreds of billions of euros in wind and solar-power technologies, electricity-grid upgrades, and other elements of the green-energy transition.

Germany chose affordability over sustainability, however, when the US “Shale Revolution” took off in 2008, as new horizontal-drilling and rock-fracturing technologies unlocked vast new quantities of natural gas. This large increase in supply caused the price per unit of energy of natural gas in the United States to drop beneath that of coal. As a result, many US electricity companies switched from coal to gas as a primary fuel. This freed up US coal for export, causing its price per unit of energy in Germany to fall below that of natural gas. Many German electricity producers therefore moved in the opposite direction of their US counterparts, shifting back to “dirty” coal. Germany consequently missed its targets under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol for reducing its greenhouse-gas emissions while the United States, which never ratified the protocol, met its Kyoto targets thanks to its increased use of natural gas rather than coal.

Despite Germany’s short-term reembrace of coal but long-standing pursuit of renewable energy, German industry still chooses to depend significantly on natural gas to cover approximately 27 percent of the country’s fuel demand, second only to oil and significantly more than renewables’ share of 16 percent.

Before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia provided 70 percent of Germany’s natural-gas supply. When Russia subsequently slashed those supplies, Berlin did not double down on renewable energy. It instead replaced Russian gas supplies with liquid natural gas (LNG), largely from the United States, after executing an unprecedentedly quick investment program to develop four import terminals to re-gasify LNG and deliver it into Germany’s pipeline network.

Western Balkan countries, however, have so far not chosen to follow Germany’s lead in relying on natural gas as a key transition fuel to a renewable-energy future. As the table indicates, Kosovo, a potential EU candidate country, uses coal for 95 percent of its power generation—primarily lignite, which is locally plentiful but the dirtiest variety of the dirtiest primary fuel. In North Macedonia, coal is responsible for generating 75 percent of the country’s electricity, while the figure is 70 percent in Serbia and 63 percent in Bosnia.

Montenegro and Albania use less coal and more hydropower. Coal is responsible for 43 percent of electricity generation in Montenegro, hydropower provides 47 percent of its electricity, and wind and solar provide the remaining 11 percent. In Albania, hydropower generates 99 percent of the country’s electricity, but the supply is insufficient, which requires electricity purchases from neighboring countries, most of which are generated from coal.*

Many climate activists are pleased that none of the Western Balkan countries relies on natural gas to generate significant volumes of electricity, and they advocate for the EU to press these aspirant countries to jump directly from coal to renewables. This is precisely what Kosovo plans to do. It is difficult to understand, however, how Kosovo will be able to attract the massive investments necessary to generate sufficient volumes of renewable electricity quickly enough to alleviate serious electricity shortfalls and affordably enough to maintain political stability, especially with 40 percent of its population living below the poverty line.

The government of Serbia, in contrast, is planning to increase the role of natural gas in its economy. Serbia has been buying Russian natural gas for decades. It now plans to increase those purchases via the Balkan Stream pipeline. In addition, Bulgaria and Serbia are finalizing a separate gas interconnection that could theoretically provide non-Russian supplies, but in practice may deliver exclusively Russian gas—albeit disguised as “Turkish gas”—via a recent agreement between the state-owned natural gas monopolies of Turkey and Bulgaria.

At the same time, Belgrade is also planning to diversify its supplies of natural gas to try to reduce its dependence on Russia.  Serbia thus hopes to purchase Azerbaijani gas via the EU-supported Southern Corridor.

The Southern Corridor consists of the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline across Azerbaijan and Georgia, which then connects with the Trans-Anatolia Pipeline (TANAP) across Turkey, which in turn feeds into the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) across Greece and Albania and under the Adriatic Sea to Italy. The Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (ICGB) will divert gas from TANAP at the Turkey-Greece border and deliver it into Bulgaria; from there it will soon be able to enter Serbia via a new Bulgaria-Serbia interconnection.

Albania is also weighing whether to introduce natural gas into its economy to expand electricity generation in a more cost-effective way than building new hydropower plants, which have sparked sharp environmentalist protests in the past, such as at the aforementioned Kalivac dam project. Thus, the government of Albania is considering whether to develop localized natural-gas grids in two cities, perhaps as precursors for a national natural-gas grid.

North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro are also considering significant investments in natural-gas infrastructure. Moscow, however, is working to lock these countries and their neighbors into dependence on Russian natural gas, with Russia now developing seven natural gas power plants, in tandem with Chinese financing and technology, in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia.

Bulgaria: State monopolies and coal crowd out the private sector and gas

In contrast to plans by five of the six Western Balkan countries to adopt natural gas as a cost-effective way to sustain economic growth and reduce carbon emissions, Bulgaria has been moving in the opposite direction for the past thirty years. Natural-gas consumption has decreased from 7 billion cubic meters (BCM) in 1993 to approximately 3 BCM today. As a result, coal remains the primary fuel for generating 56 percent of Bulgaria’s electricity. In contrast, during the same period, natural-gas consumption increased in Greece from zero to 7 BCM, and in Turkey from 15 BCM to 70 BCM.

To make matters worse, Bulgaria’s electricity system remains so inefficient that 80 percent of the energy released by burning coal in power plants is lost before the electricity reaches customers. This creates a double blow to the EU’s greenhouse-gas reduction targets: excessive use of fuel in general, and over-reliance on the dirtiest fuel, coal.

Bulgaria, like Serbia, consequently consumes more than three times as much energy and emits three times as much carbon per unit of GDP as do the EU’s original member states, which have been consuming significant volumes of natural gas for decades. It is, therefore, no coincidence that the energy intensity of Bulgaria’s economy today is roughly equal to that of Germany and the Netherlands in the 1970s, when they first began to adopt natural gas. Rather than emulating the Netherlands and Germany in switching from coal to natural gas, however, the Bulgarian government continues to subsidize coal-fired electricity, perpetuating decades of non-transparent revenue streams acquired and distributed via state-owned energy monopolies.

Moreover, with the lowest per-capita GDP in the EU, Bulgaria’s energy investments must be affordable, which rules out the enormous capital investments required for a direct jump from coal to renewables. The most cost-effective—and therefore politically sustainable—way for Bulgaria to slash carbon emissions would be to encourage private investment in a shift from coal-fired electricity to natural gas.

Unfortunately, this is not happening. Instead, Bulgaria’s state-owned energy monopoly, Bulgaria Energy Holdings (BEH)—which includes natural-gas supplier Bulgargaz and transmission-system operator Bulgartransgaz—has been crowding out private companies that are eager to invest in Bulgaria’s natural-gas infrastructure.

In 2012, for example, BEH prevented private companies from using Bulgaria’s natural-gas transmission pipelines. The European Commission fined BEH 77 million euros for this anticompetitive behavior. BEH continues to fight that fine in court, while private companies struggle to carve out space to compete with the state monopoly.

Punished for doing the right thing

Bulgaria’s private natural-gas suppliers are under severe financial strain after obeying EU regulations to fill Bulgaria’s underground gas storage (UGS) to 80 percent capacity by November 2022 to ensure security of supply in case Russia cut off gas to the EU following its invasion of Ukraine. This required Bulgarian gas suppliers to buy natural gas last summer at all-time peak prices and inject it into Bulgaria’s natural-gas storage facility at Chiren. Once the winter heating season concluded, natural gas prices in Europe fell to a fraction of the price suppliers paid to fill Bulgaria’s UGS. Normally, Bulgaria’s gas suppliers would have purchased hedges to protect against such dramatic seasonal price shifts. In this instance, however, there appeared to be no reason to do so because the European Commission had directed member-state governments with gas in storage to take “all necessary measures” to protect gas suppliers against such financial losses, as per Regulation (EU) 2022/1032.

Unfortunately, as of February 2024, the Bulgarian government had not yet promulgated the compensation mechanism it promised in accordance with the EU regulation. Private buyers of the stored gas therefore face a brutal financial dilemma: either sell now at enormous losses or hang onto the gas until prices rise, denying them the revenues required to service their loans. Either way, private Bulgarian gas suppliers face a severe liquidity squeeze, which could bankrupt them. As a result, they would likely be unwilling and/or unable to make emergency gas purchases again for this coming winter in case of another supply crisis.

Sofia did, however, extend a highly concessional 400-million-euro loan to Bulgargaz to compensate for some of its unhedged losses. However, the government then rejected requests by the country’s private gas suppliers for an analogous loan. The government’s loan to Bulgargaz would therefore appear to be an example of illegal state aid and another example of the state crowding out private companies in Bulgaria’s energy sector. The European Commission, however, decided to permit the market-distorting example of state aid because of what it terms an “energy” crisis caused by Russia’s sharp curtailment of natural gas deliveries into the EU.

Bulgaria’s nexus among corrupt energy officials and Russia

BEH’s non-transparent and anti-competitive behavior also undercuts the EU’s geopolitical goal of reducing energy revenues on which Russia relies to finance its war against Ukraine.

Bulgaria is infamous for murky ties between its government officials and their Russian counterparts. One former Bulgarian minister of energy, Rumen Ovcharov, is sanctioned under the US Global Magnitsky Act for participating in corrupt deals with Russian natural-gas and nuclear-fuel suppliers, as are Aleksandar Nikolov and Ivan Genov, two former chief executive officers (CEOs) of Bulgaria’s Kozloduy nuclear-power plant.

Today, Russia’s enduring presence in Bulgaria’s energy sector is evident at the country’s most valuable industrial asset, the Neftochim oil refinery in Burgas, which is owned by Russia’s Lukoil. While Bulgaria’s current government may be planning to nationalize and then privatize the refinery via non-Russian investors, its predecessor caretaker government secured a derogation from the EU’s ban of Russian oil imports to feed the refinery until 2027.

Meanwhile, Russia’s role in Bulgaria’s natural-gas sector appears to be growing, thanks to a January 2023 confidential agreement between the state-owned natural-gas monopolies of Bulgaria and Turkey. That agreement, the terms of which were leaked to Bulgarian media and subsequently confirmed by the current Bulgarian government, define a thirteen-year contract that reserves the entire capacity of the gas interconnection between Turkey and Bulgaria for BOTAS and Bulgargaz, locking out all competitors. Moreover, the agreement obligates Bulgargaz to accept any gas from BOTAS without BOTAS having to disclose the origin of that gas, while obligating Bulgartransgaz to deliver that gas to any exit point from Bulgaria via the country’s transmission pipeline system.

These unusual contractual obligations by Bulgargaz and Bulgartransgaz are now reportedly under investigation by the European Commission as potential violations of EU competition rules. The commission is also exploring whether the contract provides a potential “backdoor” for Russian gas to enter the EU even after the EU’s 2027 cutoff date for ending all imports of gas and oil from Russia, a suspicion reinforced by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s proposal to establish what he termed “a Turkish hub for Russian natural gas” during his September 4 meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Erdogan, in contrast, is pressing for a genuine natural-gas trading hub in Turkey, where supplies converge from multiple directions and prices are set by market forces.

Conclusion: Set the right example in Bulgaria for the EU’s enduring integrity

Analogous versions of these Bulgarian energy problems are prevalent across the Western Balkans. They are almost certain to persist as long as government-owned companies dominate these countries’ energy sectors. Although it will take years to eliminate these state-led market distortions, there are significant steps the European Commission can take now in Bulgaria to strengthen private-sector competition, reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, mitigate corruption, and thwart Russian meddling, thereby setting examples for the EU aspirants in the Western Balkans. The European Commission should therefore press the Bulgarian government to:

• Encourage the Bulgarian government to end subsidies for coal-fired electricity and instead support increased use of natural gas as a transition fuel to renewable energy, while also creating an operating environment that is conducive to investments in natural gas infrastructure by non-Russian and non-Chinese parties;

• penalize the Bulgarian government for illegal state aid that crowds out the private sector and reduces competition, such as the 400-million-euro loan to Bulgargaz;

• enforce Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 by insisting that the Bulgarian government finalizes and implements its “necessary measure” to protect against significant financial losses incurred by suppliers that injected gas into storage ahead of the 2022–2023 winter heating season, as required by the European Commission;
• and demand the same level of transparency regarding the origins of natural gas at entry points into the EU (such as at the Turkey-Bulgaria border) as the European Commission already requires inside the EU at interconnections between member states.

Taken together, these measures would set a powerful example for political and business leaders across the Western Balkans and stress that they must take seriously the EU’s rules pursuing more transparent, efficient, and competitive energy sectors within its member states, which are are driven by well-governed private companies that invest in the energy transition and are free from Russian influence. Absent such steps in Bulgaria, however, Brussels risks signaling to leaders across the Western Balkans that the reform commitments they make today to secure EU membership can be ignored tomorrow. Such disregard for EU requirements risks undermining the credibility, and eventually even the viability, of the European Union as the world’s premier rules-based organization.

Matthew Bryza was a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center and the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY. Bryza was formerly the US Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Follow him on X (formerly known as Twitter) @BryzaMatthew.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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On February 1, Transatlantic Security Initiative nonresident senior fellow Valbona Zeneli was quoted by Voice of America on Russia’s and China’s influence in the Western Balkans. 

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The post Zeneli quoted by Voice of America on Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

“We need development. And one of the most important factors for that development is connectivity,” said Polish President Andrzej Duda on January 17 at the Atlantic Council’s Three Seas Hub on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Duda spoke alongside Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs, and Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković as the heads of state took stock of the Three Seas Initiative at age nine, with an eye toward what’s next for the group at a time of war and uncertainty.

The Three Seas Initiative, established in 2015 by Duda and Croatia’s then President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, is a forum of thirteen European Union (EU) member states running north to south from the Baltic to the Black and Adriatic seas. The initiative is dedicated to advancing connectivity, security, and foreign investment in the Central and Eastern Europe region.

The initiative’s founding mission “to establish north-south access” in Central and Eastern Europe required “a visionary approach,” said Nausėda. Today, amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has led to Moscow’s isolation, “it’s very important to replace west-east access with north-south access.”

Below are more highlights from this discussion, which was moderated by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

Integrating Ukraine

• When it comes to cooperating on projects under the Three Seas Initiative, Nausėda said, “I am looking not only at the member states of the European Union,” but also potential future members of the bloc—especially Ukraine and Moldova. The initiative’s agenda is “also about the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine,” said Nausėda, who will host the next Three Seas Summit and Business Forum on April 11 in Vilnius.

• Building more infrastructure and increasing connectivity also has implications for Ukraine’s war effort. “We need excellent infrastructure, motorways, railways to deliver military equipment” to Ukraine, said Duda.

• Ukraine and fellow EU candidate Moldova were made associate states of the initiative at the Three Seas Summit in Bucharest last September. Membership in the initiative is reserved for EU member states, and there is no plan to change this rule, Duda said. However, he said, “We hope Ukraine will be a full member of Three Seas Initiative because we all support Ukrainian efforts to join the European Union.”

Jumpstarting investment

• Nausėda said the initiative needs to make its projects “economically interesting” to private businesses and foreign investors. “Otherwise it will be very difficult to implement these projects” only with state and EU resources, he said. “Those are also important, but they cannot cover all the financial gaps we have with the Three Seas Initiative.”
• Looking at ways the initiative can attract more outside investment, Plenković said that “we should all strengthen our judiciary. We should all fight corruption.”
• “It will take several multi-annual financial frameworks and investments” to attain the level of economic development of the EU’s founding members, said Plenković. “And this catching up policy is not something you can do overnight.”

Raising ambitions

• The countries in the initiative “need to get more attraction also outside this region” to increase foreign investment, said Rinkēvičs. “While there is a profound interest” for cooperation within the Three Seas region, he said, “there is also an interest to attract more investment, trade relations with the outside world.”
• There is also room to increase security cooperation with outside countries, including the United States, through the Three Seas Initiative, argued Rinkēvičs. “When we talk about military security, energy security, cyber security, we need to put more effort into working with our transatlantic partners,” he said.

Daniel Hojnacki is an assistant editor on the editorial team at the Atlantic Council.

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2024 has already plunged the Western Balkans into a maelstrom of complex developments. Serbia’s post-election protests, the precarious Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, and the Kremlin-aligned Dodik’s paramilitary parade all raise critical questions about the region’s stability.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, welcomes Damir Kapidžić, Political Scientist and Associate Professor at the University of Sarajevo, and a Weatherhead Visiting Scholar at Harvard. Together, they dissect the critical crossroads facing the region as U.S. and EU elections loom on the horizon.

Key questions: How will the new U.S. and EU administrations engage with the Balkans? Can the region still harbor hopes for progress towards EU membership? And how can the newly proposed EU Growth Plan translate from promises into tangible advancements, paving the way towards economic integration?

From unexpected twists in the electoral landscape to the ever-shifting sands of regional politics, this year promises to be a rollercoaster. Tune in to hear Krastev’s insights into the key forces at play and why the Balkans and not only, are poised for a turbulent year. 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Resident Senior Fellow

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What awaits the Balkans in 2024? | A debrief with Damir Kapidzic  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As 2024 dawns, the Balkans cling to a fragile dream: EU membership. But the region and the Union itself are beset by internal tremors. From simmering protests in Serbia to looming threats and economic storms, the region braces for a year of turbulence. Can they emerge resilient from this crucible?

Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow, delves into these questions and more with Ivan Krastev, chair of the Center for Liberal Strategies and Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. 

Krastev casts a cautious eye on EU reform prospects, outlining potential timelines and highlighting the factors that could determine success or failure. He also analyzes how the November US elections might reshape Washington’s engagement with the Balkans, with implications for the region as a whole and, in particular, the fragile Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

From unexpected twists in the electoral landscape to the ever-shifting sands of regional politics, this year promises to be a rollercoaster. Tune in to hear Krastev’s insights into the key forces at play and why the Balkans and not only, are poised for a turbulent year. 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – How will the US&EU elections reshape the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Ivan Krastev appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Serbia witnessed a tumultuous end to 2023, with protests erupting in Belgrade following the December 17th elections. Thousands demand the annulment, alleging President Vučić’s Progressive Party fabricated results through cross-border voting. Despite claiming a “cleanest and most honest” victory, international observers have condemned widespread fraud and manipulation. The West, has been criticized for turning a blind eye to Vučić’s actions. But with renewed protests and whispers of regional conflict, will the honeymoon end?

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Rasa Nedeljkov, Program Director of the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability which has monitored closely the election with particular focus on the capital, Belgrade. 

International observers have condemned the irregularities, while Brussels and Washington demand a response from the government. What role can the international community play in mitigating these tensions? How should the West engage moving forward? Were the alleged manipulations significant enough to alter the outcome? If a rerun were to occur, particularly in Belgrade, could a different outcome be anticipated?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Unrest in Serbia after elections: is democracy at risk? | A debrief with Rasa Nedeljkov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On December 23, GCH Nonresident Senior Fellow Wawa Wang co-authored a piece in The Diplomat on China’s new Free Trade Agreement with Serbia and the security concerns the agreement poses for the region.

The post Global China Hub Nonresident Senior Fellow Wawa Wang Featured in The Diplomat appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Dinaric Alps that span the Balkans have the highest precipitation levels in Europe. The significance of this natural resource was recognized by the Marshall Plan for Europe in 1947, but its potential has been systematically undermined since the 1970s in favor of lignite-fired power plants. Today, the area’s existing and potential hydropower capacity will determine Central Europe’s ability to deploy intermittent renewable energy to (sustainably) reduce its dependency on Russian natural gas. Use of this massive strategic resource depends on a self-sufficient local electricity market and reforestation of the territory, both of which are dependent on the quality of local governance, which is influenced by external interests. This article highlights the massive opportunity of unlocking the Balkans’ capacity to bolster European energy security and the unfathomable cost of the failure to act.

An actionable plan

The Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) has thus far failed to deliver on its critical material obligations. However, it provides the only legal framework that (at least nominally) links the Western Balkans to the EU energy market. It is crucial to preserve the EnCT and restore its material obligations in a context that includes the Paris Agreement (reached at a UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties in 2015), and with a refreshed understanding encompassing environmental impacts and human rights, the current and likely future energy security situation, and geopolitical realities. A thorough evaluation of reality and a newly upgraded and relevant treaty are urgently required. The UN, the United States, the World Bank, and the EU—which convened in 1999 to 2005 within the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (the predecessor to the RCC) to create the EnCT—have the capacity to initiate this process.

In its role to decarbonize the Western Balkans and rebuild Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, the EnCT will need to facilitate the largest investment undertaking in a generation with the potential to alter Europe’s energy supply for a more resilient and sustainable future. To make this sensitive task more feasible, the EnCT Secretariat, currently in Vienna, should be relocated to a NATO member state to ensure that delicate planning can take place in a secure environment.

A roadmap of the accession of the Western Balkans to EUETS by 2026 and use of the carbon-credit allocation mechanism through 2034 is necessary to overcome uncertainties and facilitate investments. In order to avoid the shortcomings evident in use of a similar mechanism with Central Europe, allocation of EUETS allowances for decarbonization (or, effectively, coal phaseout) of the energy sector within the EUETS system must be handed over to particular plant operators in the Balkans, in line with effective decarbonization plans and commercial commitments to execute them. Following the principle of additionality, these plans should combine into a much higher ambition of decarbonization than is currently expressed by the national energy and climate plans (NECPs). Once a carbon-intensive plant is phased out, a proportion of allowances could be sold at the EUETS market to European operators, who are making five times more economic value per ton of CO2 than in the Balkans. Sustainable energy portfolios would emerge rapidly. It is only sustainable energy—not simple combustion of lignite—that is suitable to support “nearshoring” of both manufacturing and provision of strategic materials and rare earths to the Balkans.

There is a hope that, this time, the EU is going to “walk the walk” following the president of the European Commission’s announcement of “Rule of Law Reports” for countries in the accession process. Addressing the rule of law, fiscal discipline, and the environmental violation of human rights may set the stage for an improvement in the quality of governance.

However, proper facilitation and conditions for investments are not enough. An EnCT decarbonization roadmap needs to be augmented by actual physical interventions. Actual investment opportunities must be formulated to ambitiously exceed the nominal NECP. It will require the leadership of the transatlantic community, a keen understanding of strategic implications, and deployment of the most modern technologies and commercial wisdom to make it happen. Herein lies a call to action: bring the public and private power generation companies of the Western Balkans to the table. Present them with the opportunity to be a critical part of the solution. Operators of the region’s power systems have suffered from systemic underinvestment, with technical failures getting more frequent. These stakeholders, not their governments, are now struggling for survival. For them, the fight for energy security is one that impacts the future of their families, their communities, and their employment. They have skin in the game to make the best use of domestic resources, avoid import dependencies, bring hydropower to the European market, deliver heat and power to domestic customers, and fight bad governance. They need a commercial opportunity beyond “just transition funds.” They need the opportunity to secure meaningful investment. Funding private sector-led opportunities from existing commercial export credit and decarbonization funds is a realistic option.

European public funds and the Regional Climate Partnership involving Germany and six Western Balkans states present a great opportunity to overcome energy poverty in the region. If effectively planned and executed, it could reduce network losses by one-third and introduce sustainable and clean energy to households and local communities: this would improve the lives of millions of people and bring them toward European integration. It is not about raising awareness further but about actual projects that will clean the air.

Synchronized deployment of these commercial and public funds would create an opportunity for European industry as well. It would respond to the EU Economic Growth Plan for the Western Balkans by better targeting and further mobilizing commercial funds. It would increase technological sophistication while raising demand for advanced technology and equipment that US, UK, Japanese, South Korean, and European industry could deliver. It is a real opportunity for reindustrialization.

It is now time to cancel the alternative that involves outsourcing energy security. It is up to key stakeholders to devise specialized institution and give birth to a framework that will deliver this much-needed change.

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A sigh of relief, perhaps even cautious optimism, has swept across the Western Balkans. The EU Council’s decision to open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova, alongside a conditional green light for Bosnia and Herzegovina, signals renewed engagement with the region. But is this truly a new dawn, or just a flicker of light in persistent uncertainty?

The stakes are high, with implications for political stability, economic growth, and ultimately, the future of the Western Balkan six countries.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Balkans Forward team: Maja Piscevic, Amb. Cameron Munter, and Valbona Zeneli about the impact the future of EU enlargement process.

Will the renewed EU enlargement commitment mark the long-awaited entry point for the Balkans onto the European stage? While the Council’s decision marks a step forward, is it enough to sustain the momentum for Western Balkan accession, or are there still significant hurdles to overcome before reaching the European stage? Will the EU reform the enlargement process, and how possible is it to achieve the ambitious goal of doubling the region’s economic growth in a decade?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What’s next for the Balkans after EU enlargement decision? | A debrief with #BalkansForward team appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I. Introduction

February 17, 2023, marked fifteen years since the Republic of Kosovo declared its independence, supported by many of its Western partners. Since then, the Balkan country has made a lot of strides and hit many roadblocks in its popularly supported path toward joining Euro-Atlantic structures like NATO and the European Union (EU), as well as in its pursuit of development objectives. Since February 2008, the security and political environment surrounding Kosovo has also changed in decisive ways, and mostly in a negative direction. The new global security environment shaped by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the rise of China has redefined and reshaped the parameters within which Kosovo attempts to achieve its strategic external and domestic goals, including the threat of renewed violent conflict. This paper attempts to take stock of the current state of play on both the domestic and external fronts, and to offer a few guiding principles to observers and decision-makers in Kosovo, as well as to its friends and supporters in the international arena, on how to move forward.

In the new global security environment, smaller regions like the Western Balkans tend to become afterthoughts for Western observers and decision-makers, and individual countries of these smaller regions even more so. This is reflected in the EU’s enlargement fatigue, which has largely been responsible for the region’s stalled accession process over the past decade. Yet the Western Balkans are precisely the type of region in which tectonic geopolitical shifts have the greatest impact, and where their currents hit the hardest. As such, developments in Kosovo and the Western Balkans represent a broader vulnerability to European security as well as a microcosm of what a world shaped by global power competition looks like. This paper portrays how things look in one of the global battlegrounds—a small but important one for European security.

The paper aims to achieve three main objectives. First, it aims to summarize the key challenges Kosovo faces as it tries to consolidate its external position and get to a new development level. It is written with a bird’s-eye view and, as such, it may omit a lot of important issues while zooming in with granular detail on a few others that are central to the topic. Second, the paper is written with the dual aim of both informing and updating foreign audiences who have a less detailed understanding of the region and Kosovo, while also being sufficiently thorough and informative for seasoned observers and decision-makers in Kosovo and in the Balkans. As such, the paper strives to achieve the balance of restating many basic facts while also hoping that others may be self-evident. Finally, the paper seeks to be forward-looking, and not to get bogged down in the abyss of immediate developments. The tensions and violent episodes witnessed during the past two years in Kosovo’s north make it particularly challenging to engage in an analytical exercise that looks at Kosovo’s medium- and long-term situation beyond day-to-day relations with Serbia. Yet, these developments illustrate the urgency and unsustainability of the status quo in the affairs between the two countries, which the paper deals with at length.

The paper is structured in three main sections and makes ten (numbered) central arguments, which are then elaborated in more detail. The first section, titled The Story So Far (points one to three), offers a brief overview of the political and economic context of how things have played out since independence. It tells the story of how Kosovo managed to demonstrate resilience to a wide range of political and economic challenges, and how it also has hit major roadblocks in the pursuit of its Euro-Atlantic and development agenda. The second section, Forward View 1 (points four to seven, outlines a forward view of how Kosovo can consolidate its statehood and security over the next decade. It looks at the state of play and offers a blueprint for how Kosovo, with the help of its international partners, can get closer to being recognized and able to join multilateral organizations in the new geopolitical environment shaped by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The third section (points eight to ten) is a forward view of Kosovo’s development challenges and perspectives. It outlines some of the key elements that need to be in place for Kosovo’s economy to accelerate to a new level of sophistication, and for its institutions to deliver effectively.

II. The story so far: Resilience beats vulnerability

• 1. Kosovo declared its independence and obtained wide recognition, largely by riding on the coattails of Western power and the liberal international order that is currently facing a systemic challenge from Russia and China.

The Republic of Kosovo as a state is not just a product of the self-determination aspiration of its 90 percent majority Albanian population. It also is a byproduct of the post-Cold War era of Western dominance and the doctrine of liberal interventionism, which enabled Kosovo—a former autonomous entity with republic-level powers—to de facto break away from the rump Yugoslavia in 1999. The NATO bombing campaign to prevent ethnic cleansing led to a United Nations Security Council resolution that effectively suspended Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and put a NATO-led peacekeeping force in charge of security. The West—the United States in particular—later played a decisive role in supporting Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, after a UN-mandated dialogue failed to persuade Serbia to formalize the secession. The West supported Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) as a sui generis case, conditioned by a set of regional security guarantees and wide-ranging rights for Kosovo’s 5 percent minority.¹

These are manifested in Kosovo’s constitutional commitment not to join other states (i.e., Albania); ethnically neutral state identity; official bilingualism; ethnic decentralization; and guaranteed seats for minorities in parliament and government, as well as their veto power over constitutional changes. Kosovo’s postwar political elite, whose most powerful and prominent figure was Hashim Thaçi—who served as prime minister and later president—succeeded in persuading the public that these were necessary compromises.

Riding on the coattails of Western power and with its security underwritten by NATO, Kosovo was able to establish itself in the international arena by obtaining a high number of bilateral recognitions, as well as membership in multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It also was able, in 2010, to obtain a favorable advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled that Kosovo’s UDI did not violate any applicable rule of international law. ² Yet, due to Russia’s support for Serbia’s position at the UN Security Council, Kosovo was unable to join the UN. The lack of recognition from four NATO and five EU states—Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus—also meant that Kosovo had no open path toward membership in these European political and security institutions, despite overwhelming and continued public support for membership. ³ The lack of full international legality, and of an open path toward NATO and the EU, proved to be the central points of Kosovo’s vulnerability, particularly when revisionist powers like Russia and China began to contest the liberal international order upon which Kosovo’s statehood was built. In the case of Vladimir Putin, this was often done by using Kosovo as a moral grievance and precedent to justify aggression against Georgia and Ukraine.

• 2. Over the past decade, shifts in global geopolitical currents dealt a considerable blow to Kosovo’s efforts to consolidate its statehood internationally and join Euro-Atlantic structures. They also exposed many of Kosovo’s domestic vulnerabilities, while also fueling political instability and grievances with Western partners.

Since around 2010, Western supporters of Kosovo viewed the EU-accession process of the Western Balkans and its instrument of conditionality as key carrots to persuade Serbia to normalize relations with Kosovo. However, the EU-facilitated dialogue on normalization of relations, initially centered on technical issues like telephone codes and managing border crossings, stumbled over the years as topics became political and the region’s EU accession came to a halt. The geopolitical winds that pushed Kosovo’s statehood forward lost steam, and the urgency of resolving the dispute with Serbia dissipated in the West. While the West was too busy juggling multiple crises like the global financial crisis and Brexit, revisionist powers like Russia and China threw their weight into the region, particularly in militarily neutral and nonaligned Serbia. Russia, in particular, sought to use its sway over Serbia to play spoiler in the region—by obstructing EU and NATO accession and the resolution of bilateral disputes—seeking to gain leverage in its broader confrontation with the West. ⁴

In this new geopolitical environment, Kosovo failed in membership bids to join various international organizations like the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). Serbia (with Russia’s decisive support) mobilized sufficient blocking votes in multilateral organizations, and also pursued an active bilateral derecognition campaign.⁵ Serbia also established stronger control over Kosovo Serb politics, especially in the Serbian-majority north.

Within the EU-facilitated negotiating process, Kosovo faced pressures to compromise that started to go beyond what was politically feasible domestically. This included proposals for new layers of power for local Serbs, through an Association of Serbian-Majority Municipalities (ASMM)—which many in Kosovo view as a threat to state functionality—or in the form of border adjustments.⁶

These developments bolstered the political narrative of, and public support for, Kosovo’s then leading opposition figure (and current prime minister), Albin Kurti. His antiestablishment Self-Determination Movement was the only force to have rejected Kosovo’s concessions in the Ahtisaari package of 2008,⁷ and protested Kosovo’s participation in the EU-facilitated dialogue on normalization of relations. Kurti had long suggested that Kosovo’s constructive approach with the West would lead to demands for further and crippling compromises.

The decade-long dialogue with Serbia disproportionately consumed Kosovo’s domestic politics. It crowded out attention from development issues, and fueled political volatility and broader regional insecurity.

Within the last seven years, Kosovo had four changes of government. Most of this was due to domestic power struggles, fueled by wide public grievances with corruption and clientelist governance. Yet disagreements over how to deal with the dialogue with Serbia took center stage in public discourse. Between 2015–2017, mass protests over the EU-facilitated dialogue (primarily Kosovo’s agreement to adopt the ASMM) led to a blockade of political life—including the throwing of tear gas in parliament and Kurti’s arrest.

Tensions also were a regular feature in relations with Serbia, including trade blockades and, after Kurti won the 2021 elections in a landslide, disputes over things like the use of Serbian ID cards and license plates in Kosovo’s north. Eventually, in the fall of 2022 a power vacuum was created in the north after local Serbs (directed and backed by Belgrade) boycotted Kosovo institutions. This generated an escalation spiral, such as when an armed insurgency by Serbian militants in the north was thwarted by Kosovo’s police in September 2023, and increased the prospects of a war.

Over the past few years ethnic relations within Kosovo deteriorated. So did Kosovo’s amicable relations with its Western partners, as Kosovo’s governments increasingly embraced a more inward-looking posture emphasizing its sovereignty.⁸ The postwar political elite who had been a more predictable security partner to the West not only lost elections, but its central figure: Thaçi, was indicted by a Western-sponsored court for alleged command responsibility in war crimes.⁹ These dynamics—coupled with the effective lack of a Euro-Atlantic perspective, particularly endless delays in getting visa liberalization for the EU (see text box)—have brought anti-Western discourse and narratives into Kosovo’s mainstream.

• 3. Despite big external and domestic challenges, Kosovo has seen impressive economic, social, and institutional transformation—its resilience factors have been able to counterweigh the vulnerabilities of a nascent state and market.

Kosovo is a vastly different place than it was in 1999. Once Yugoslavia’s poorest entity, Kosovo experienced economic growth between 2010 and 2019, averaging 4.6 percent per year, which translated into an almost 50 percent increase in per capita income and 35 percent poverty-rate reduction. The World Bank assesses that this growth was “robust compared to peer countries of similar or higher income per capita.”¹⁰ Annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth has also been higher in Kosovo (6.4 percent) than the Western Balkan average (4.5 percent) in the coronavirus postpandemic years (2021 to 2023).¹¹ This economic growth was largely consumption driven, supported by high levels of diaspora remittances as well as by public investments in infrastructure such as a new highway system and health and school facilities. Supported by a favorable macroeconomic environment (a stable currency and low public debt), Kosovo has only now started to see the fruits of a process of reindustrialization, as demonstrated by recent manufacturing export growth and the rise of new innovative service industries. Remittances and tightly knit family structures have, in the meantime, served as important social buffers—effectively, an informal welfare state.

Institutionally, with considerable international assistance, Kosovo underwent the difficult process of building an entire state apparatus from scratch, with mixed results and often underwhelming capacities. The brightest spot has been Kosovo’s democracy: there is wide pluralism in the media space, and free and fair elections have led to smooth transitions of power, including a landslide win by an antiestablishment party in 2021.

Nevertheless, Kosovo’s progress remains fragile on many fronts. On the institutional side, state capacity continues to impede effectiveness and service delivery, while weaknesses in the rule of law fuel social grievances. The new political elite that took power on an anticorruption agenda have managed to reduce public perception of the prevalence of corruption, and to increase trust in the independence of institutions like the judiciary.¹² However, public satisfaction with the effectiveness of the judiciary remains low. ¹³ As for the economy, investments remain deterred by Kosovo’s international limbo, market size, and weak connectivity (including with regional markets), as well as by energy insecurity and labor skills. One of the main structural challenges is demographic. Kosovo’s youthful population (the youngest in Europe) has its development advantages, but it also creates short-term liabilities that stem from the challenge of meeting socioeconomic demands at the required speed.

Combined with the unresolved dispute with Serbia, this has been a key source of political volatility. Kosovan politicians are forced to deliver a lot and very fast, despite having insufficient means and capacities. The result is not just volatile politics, but continued high levels of out-migration, including by the highly skilled, who are the key to Kosovo’s success going forward.

III. Forward view 1: Consolidating statehood and security

• 4. Unlocking Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic perspective goes hand in hand with, and is a precondition for, unleashing its economic development. The new geopolitical context created by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine necessitates a rethinking of the strategy toward the endgame.

Kosovo’s security and progress are considerably con- strained by its current international position, in which its independence is irreversible, but not fully recognized due to Serbia’s and Russia’s active roles in preventing Kosovo from obtaining further recognitions and memberships in international organizations. The opportunity costs of this limbo have grown bigger with time, as have the risks created by the new and highly volatile global security environment. These risks became evident in the most recent escalation of violence in Kosovo during 2023. Most importantly, the limbo prevents Kosovo from achieving its NATO membership aspiration due to the four nonrecognizers, which have made clear that they will not recognize Kosovo without some sort of an agreement with Serbia. While the presence of a NATO peacekeeping mission is key to resilience, it does not offer the same long-term security guarantee as NATO membership—especially considering Kosovo’s dispute with a more powerful and militarily neutral neighbor.

The limbo also creates obstacles for the political and eco- nomic integration processes needed for development. No matter how long the EU-accession process for the Western Balkans takes, Kosovo will not be able to advance in accession stages and reap their benefits for as long as there are five EU nonrecognizers able to create obstacles at any accession step. It will also face similar challenges in regional-cooperation and market-integration mechanisms—not just because of Serbia, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina, which does not recognize Kosovo due to the veto power of Bosnian Serbs. This is not to mention what the current limbo does to deter bigger strategic investments.

To overcome these obstacles, Kosovo faces an external environment very different from the one that got it to its current position in the international arena. First, due to the systemic nature of the challenge that Russia and China pose to world order, the West does not have the kind of political capital and leverage needed to get Kosovo the recognition and membership in multilateral institutions, especially the UN—a body where decision-making has been paralyzed by Russia’s aggressive posture. In fact, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its territorial demands currently make it improbable that Kosovo’s path toward the UN is open, even with Serbia’s formal recognition.

Second, since the process of EU accession has been delayed for an unforeseeable time—mostly due to continued EU skepticism about enlargement—the West has lost a key source of leverage over Serbia to demand the formal recognition of Kosovo. Third, the security context in Europe shaped by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine created both the need and an opening for the West to weaken Russia’s grasp over the region. This necessitated that NATO and the EU seek some form of cooperation with Serbia on regional security issues to prevent regional spillovers, while remaining wary of its double dealing.

• 5. The new geopolitical context has increased the West’s leverage in the Western Balkans, creating an opening for Kosovo to consolidate its statehood in the European political and security architecture. Yet the West is finding it hard to get agreements between Kosovo and Serbia to stick.

The EU-facilitated dialogue remains the most optimal instrument through which Western partners can help Kosovo get out of its international limbo. Russia’s leverage and power over Serbia—and by extension over the entire Western Balkans—remains a key spoiler in preventing Kosovo and Serbia from reaching a normalization agreement, or at least serves as a convenient excuse for Serbia to derail the process. Yet the decline of Russian sway over the Balkans after its aggression against Ukraine has created both the sense of urgency and the space for the West to push for a resolution which helps Kosovo reach its endgame, while also keeping the space open for Serbia to move toward the West (when and if it chooses to do so). Western powers seem to have belatedly realized that they need to move away from being a mere facilitator of the dialogue and assume the role of an arbiter and enforcer.

Such geopolitical considerations seem to inform the logic of the so-called French-German diplomatic initiative launched in the fall of 2022. This initiative culminated on February 27, 2023, with an endorsed final text of a basic agreement between Kosovo and Serbia,¹⁴ as well as a subsequent implementation plan agreed in Ohrid, North Macedonia, on March 18. Both are seen by the EU and United States as interim agreements en route to a comprehensive one and are considered legally binding even though unsigned—attached as conditions to the countries’ respective paths toward EU accession. Yet the sides clearly do not view or treat them in the same spirit. Disagreements on the sequencing of implementation steps has fueled such deep mistrust that the immediate outcome of the agreements has been the eruption of violence.

In principle, the French-German initiative—despite the violence exposing its weaknesses—retains considerable logical merit. It aims to achieve what is politically feasible at this moment in both countries by eliminating some of the most contested elements, yet moving things irreversibly forward in the right direction. For Serbia, the key stated political sensitivity is the formal act of recognition and its agreement to Kosovo’s seat at the UN. Yet in a context in which UN membership for Kosovo is out of reach due to Russia’s veto, the focus on a de facto recognition of Kosovo—namely, Serbia’s acknowledgement of the existence of Kosovo in the international arena—may achieve the same results as formal recognition on key fronts. Most importantly, it opens the space for Kosovo to seek full recognition in the European space, including the opening of a membership path to NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe (which is already underway).

The French-German approach also seemingly reduces Kosovo’s burden in terms of expected concessions. The ASMM, which is to be created, is seen by the mediators as being in tune with Kosovo’s constitutional limits. Most importantly, there is an understanding of Kosovo’s position that the implementation of the ASMM should go hand in hand with the unlocking of Kosovo’s external position. This is reflected in a recent official statement by Germany, France, and Italy in which Serbia’s de facto recognition and Kosovo’s key concession—the ASMM—are seen as equal and interrelated components of the deal to be implemented in parallel.¹⁵ The French-German approach, as designed, would not solve the problem for Kosovo entirely, but would improve its position substantially as an intermediary step. While it does postpone Serbia’s full formal recognition closer to the date of its EU accession (whenever and if it happens), it also creates space for Kosovo’s prospects to no longer be held hostage by it.

The French-German initiative is seemingly driven by the belief that additional incentives could be provided to Kosovo and Serbia in the meantime through a revival of the process of EU enlargement,¹⁶ which may also see a model of staged accession. This means that Western Balkan countries would be able to receive many of the financial benefits of membership during accession stages. The EU-supported creation of a regional market is also perceived as an incentive. This would, among other things, reduce the impact that firm borders have on the freedom of movement of ethnic-minority communities throughout the Western Balkans, including Albanians in south Serbia and Serbs in Kosovo. US investments, particularly in reducing Serbia’s reliance on Russian energy, have also been floated as part of a potential incentive.

While the French-German initiative and its multiple components have merit, the episodes of violence in the past year have shown that they are very vulnerable and based on many shaky assumptions. First and foremost, the deep mistrust between the sides and the vagueness of many of the agreement provisions—including the lack of mutually agreed sequencing of steps and timelines—leaves space for stalling and differences in interpretations. Yet, perhaps the main vulnerability remains the credibility of the EU as a guarantor and enforcer, which has been considerably damaged in the Western Balkans over the past decade. By making the agreements a formal condition in Serbia’s EU accession path, the agreement relies on the questionable assumption that a Serbia under President Aleksandar Vučić will continue to pursue an EU-path and be willing to subject itself to such conditionality.

Going forward, much will also depend on whether there will continue to be transatlantic unity and cohesion within the EU to provide tangible incentives to the Western Balkans as a whole. Recent history has shown that policy cohesion in the West can easily dissipate due to election cycles and many such elections are nearing. The potential of a new populist wave in Europe and the unpredictability of US foreign policy make the use of the current window of opportunity an even greater matter of urgency.

• 6. For Kosovo to be able to use the current window of opportunity, it would need to modify its posture on the dialogue by emphasizing the agreements’ benefits and taking steps toward implementation. This requires taking a leap of faith on the Western partners who serve as guarantors of Kosovo’s sovereignty and security, as well as increasing efforts to reach out to Kosovo’s Serb community.

Kosovo’s PM Kurti has endorsed the full content of the February and March agreements, but has expressed mistrust in Serbia’s intentions to implement its side of the bargain if the agreement is left unsigned. Kosovo also has legitimate concerns about the guarantees that implementation will indeed pave Kosovo’s path toward NATO and the EU, as well as about how the implementation of Kosovo’s side of the bargain will impact its functionality and prospects as a state.  

Kurti has expressed particular reservations about the nature and potential powers of the ASMM, which is a legal commitment his predecessors made at the EU-facilitated dialogue. This issue is particularly sensitive due to Kurti’s staunch objection to the ASMM when he was in opposition.

As a result of such reservations, Kosovo’s government has over the past two years pursued a parallel policy to the dialogue, through which it aimed to strengthen Kosovo’s effective control over the Serbian-majority north. This effort to weaken the hold of Serbian parallel structures and the organized crime elements present there that had necessitated the use of special police forces has often caused tension between Kurti and Western allies. It even led to punitive economic and political measures taken against Kosovo by the EU. Yet Kurti’s approach toward the north has also been popular in Kosovo, even beyond his political base, regardless of Western criticism. 

Kosovo’s concerns and its problems can ultimately be best addressed through the political process in Brussels. The negotiating table is where Kosovo’s leverage is the strongest and where it can work to unlock its international position. Kosovo’s focus should be on the guarantees from international mediators that the implementation of its side of the bargain would lead in the direction of an open path toward NATO, the Council of Europe, and EU membership.

This means working on a bilateral process with key Western powers and the nonrecognizers in Europe to ensure that their change of posture toward Kosovo would follow. An open path to NATO membership is the central element of security that would enable Kosovo to implement an agreement which does not guarantee UN membership. Kosovo can also continue to insist that the process of establishing the ASMM would go hand in hand with the improvement of its external position—a position which is now formally endorsed by Germany, France, and Italy.

Kosovo’s new leadership enjoys considerable trust and political capital to assuage public insecurities. The major opposition parties also have largely committed themselves to a constructive role. Yet to ensure greater political feasibility, Kurti and President Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu would need to continue to reframe the debate about the dialogue from one that emphasizes moral arguments about the past and grievances against Serbia to one focusing on Kosovo’s future gains and increasing outreach to the Kosovo Serb community, which has been outstripped of any agency in this process. 

Like many other disputes marred by a history of conflict, the Kosovo-Serbia dispute is an emotionally charged one involving deeply entrenched societal grievances.

Even with mutual recognition, sustainable peace between Kosovo and Serbia is not possible without a process of dealing with the past. However, a clearer distinction needs to be made between the normalization of relations between states in an international order and one of societal and state reconciliation. The EU-facilitated dialogue is about the first. So far, it has focused on resolving issues like missing persons cases from the war period and could add elements like the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions in the future. Yet one should not expect political agreements to settle all historical narratives in advance, but only to create the political space for them.

Going forward, Kosovo also needs to restore a sense of mutual trust with its Western partners by not undertaking any uncoordinated initiatives that have major security and political implications. Such episodes have been common during the past years in the north on issues such as the enforcement of laws related to license plates, ID cards, or efforts to guarantee the security of elected mayors.

Insecurities about the direction of the dialogue with Serbia has often clouded the fact that key NATO and EU countries are security creditors with a vested interest in Kosovo’s statehood and success. They also are a key source of strength, breaking Kosovo’s asymmetry of power with Serbia, and they will be necessary partners to guarantee any agreement. Pursuing a coordinated security agenda with the West does not mean that Kosovo lacks its own agency or neglects the rule of law; it only means that it would be maximizing its leverage and further strengthening its agency, by enabling Kosovo to become a fully recognized member of the international community.

• 7. A normalization agreement that makes borders firmer needs to be associated with deeper regional integration that softens their impact. This would also create the necessary regional synergy for development and faster EU accession.

The appeal of EU accession as a conflict-resolution instrument in the Balkans was always that it could do to the region what it did for Western Europe decades ago. It would make state borders invisible, and allow ethnic communities to move freely within their historic geographic spaces—all of this underwritten by faster economic development and security provided by NATO. The EU membership perspective was believed to be a central instrument of keeping at bay the ethnic-nationalist projects dissatisfied by the security architecture that emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Yet, with this perspective now in doubt—at least for the foreseeable future—intermediate solutions are needed to achieve similar effects, in the form of regional integration that precedes, or serves as a stepping stone to, EU accession.

This would allow Albanians and Serbs—two ethnicities with arguably the highest degree of mutual antagonism and the highest share of ethnic kin residing outside of the borders of “ethnic states”—the space and incentives to settle political disputes and develop mutual economic interests, all while being anchored in a Western economic and security architecture.

To this end, the Berlin Process that was established under the leadership of the key supporters of the Western Balkans’ EU accession has over the past decade had an ambitious agenda aiming to establish a common regional market (CRM) and effectively replicate the four freedoms of the EU within the region’s six countries.¹⁷ The process has moved slowly over the past few years, largely due to the bilateral dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. Political and legal obstacles emerged as Kosovo sought to remove status-neutral designations, which Serbia insists should remain. The countries seeking to move faster in regional integration, unhappy with the pace of the Berlin Process—namely, Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia—attempted to move faster on some of the issues through the Open Balkan initiative. Several countries—especially Kosovo—have openly opposed the Open Balkan initiative. Currently, after the Berlin Process achieved some breakthroughs on a few regional agreements and held its first major summit in Tirana in October 2023, it has regained the status of the main regional initiative.

Looking forward, Kosovo should recognize the benefits of moving faster on regional integration. First, a CRM is essential to Kosovo’s development policy agenda (see points eight through ten below). Second, through regional integration, Kosovo stands to obtain another instrument of leverage against Serbia in the ongoing normalization dialogue, as the latter, being the largest country in the region, is also the country with the greatest interest in a regional market. Third, Kosovo would stand to gain from the opportunities and synergies in deepening the natural economic and political ties with Albania and ethnic Albanian communities in other parts of the Western Balkans.

IV. Forward view 2: Unleashing domestic potential

• 8. Kosovo will need to find ways to meet the economic and political expectations of its large mass of young people, particularly the skilled middle classes at high risk of out-migration. A certain degree of trust in the capacity of institutions to deliver will be key in building human capital, growing the economy, reducing political volatility, and sustaining democratic gains.

One of the biggest challenges facing southeastern Europe is the demographic hemorrhage from aging populations and westward migration.¹⁸ Kosovo is aging less than neighboring countries, but Kosovars continue to move west. More than ten thousand people have left Kosovo on average per year since 2009; by 2020, the total size of the diaspora reached almost half of the estimated resident population.¹⁹ Kosovo has historically seen many benefits from migration, as it provided those without jobs (usually young, unskilled, single males) with an opportunity to send remittances (17.1 percent of GDP in 2022), and many returned with skills and assets.²⁰ However, the new wave of migration is also drawing away many skilled and employed professionals who are very much needed for development, many of them leaving together with their nuclear families.²¹

Much of this is due to pull factors like the targeted recruiting of certain professionals by EU countries, especially Germany, but it also is a symptom of push factors like pessimism about the future in the area.²² A regional poll done by the International Republican Institute (IRI) showed that people in the Western Balkans (Kosovo included) rate the state of their countries’ economies much worse than the current financial situation of their own households.²³ This suggests that economic pessimism derives not only from personal experience, but from a comparison with neighboring Western standards, which many view as being within reach through migration.

For established middle-class professionals with children, the calculus of whether to stay in Kosovo or leave involves thinking not just about jobs, but also about things like good social services and the rule of law. Recent surveys on motivations for migration show that a higher share of the youths wanting to migrate (37 percent) say they want to do so for a better quality of life than the share that want to do so for jobs (33 percent).²⁴ For many of those who have jobs and still want to migrate, poor working conditions, such as a lack of contracts, remain an important push factor.²⁵ A biannual United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) tracking poll also shows that typical middle-class priorities such as the environment (especially air pollution), urban space problems, and healthcare services have gained traction as top priorities, right after employment and poverty.²⁶ The attainment of Western standards on such issues will take time. Whether young and skilled professionals will decide to stay or migrate during the next decade will largely depend on whether they trust that politics is moving things in the right direction, and whether institutions are delivering effective services to address key concerns.

Trust in Kosovo’s political institutions has grown over the past few years, particularly after the 2021 elections, which saw a new generation of leaders—Kurti and Osmani-Sadriu—rise to power with 51 percent of the vote.²⁷ After almost three years of governing, however, the new elite is facing a backlash and running against the clock to meet high expectations, because the main challenges Kosovo faces are structural and not easily addressed within political mandates. Take, for example, the issue of youth unemployment (19 percent in 2022) and especially inactivity (33 percent of youth are classified as not pursuing any work or education).²⁸ The youthful demographic structure of the population (see figure 1) means there are too many young people for the labor market to accommodate. The challenge is compounded by the mismatch between workforce skills and market needs, as well as weak systems for on-the-job-training.²⁹

The questions Kosovo will have to answer, and with a sense of urgency, are: where are the new and better-quality jobs going to come from, and will there be sufficient skills to fill them? Failure to answer these questions will not only continue to fuel out-migration, but could also put pressure on the government to revert to the use of the public sector as a source for the distribution of contracts, jobs, or benefits—thereby increasing the potential of social grievances. For example, even with the new government in power, public-sector employment continues to be seen as merit based by only 27 percent of the population.³⁰ Considering its other political problems, Kosovo will need to find ways to deliver on the economy and improve public services if it is to avoid a return to political volatility, and to sustain the public belief in democratic accountability that was gained over the past decade.

• 9. Kosovo’s new export-oriented industries have had considerable success and shown promise. Yet a leap into a higher level of economic sophistication, growth, and job creation will not be possible without more “pull factors” for foreign direct investment (FDI)—including the creation of a regional market, as well as an increase in EU transfers.

Looking forward, Kosovo will need to move toward more sustainable sources of growth, and job creation that is led by new private-sector industries. Trends have been positive on both these fronts. In the years preceding independence, Kosovo used to export a mere €200 million in goods annually. By the end of 2022, the value was estimated at €950 million (see export trends in figure 2).³¹  In 2021, a single new manufacturing operation shipping mattresses to the United States added €155 million to annual exports.³²  The value of exported goods and services from Kosovo increased from 17 percent of GDP in 2008 to 38 percent in 2022.³³  Despite the progress, that share is still far from Eastern European peers like Slovakia, Slovenia, and Estonia, where exports make up more than 80 percent of GDP.³⁴ Exports of professional services, such as information technology (IT) and business processing operations (BPO), have increased over the years to reach €99 million in 2021, but its share of GDP remains lower than in other Balkan countries.³⁵

Several factors remain obstacles for Kosovo to reach the next level of growth and sophistication. Economists largely emphasize labor-force productivity and costs, as well as a low degree of automation in existing industries, yet the external trading framework also plays a role.³⁶  As a small market, Kosovo loses out from constraints to regional trade caused mostly by nontariff barriers.³⁷ Unlike other regional countries that export most of their goods into the EU, the biggest export destination for Kosovo is the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) area (see table 1). That is because the structure of intraregional trade “remains concentrated in goods with low value added . . . dominated by minerals, base metals, and foodstuffs”—precisely the things Kosovo can produce.³⁸ Kosovo’s small size and the fragmented regional market are serious deterrents to larger-scale and innovative FDI. Economists have suggested that the Balkans are likely to benefit from Western firms’ “nearshoring” production processes to neighboring regions after disruptive events like COVID-19.³⁹ However, this will likely not materialize if the Balkans do not invest in “pull factors” like better governance, a regional market, and overall political stability.⁴⁰

An economic leap will also depend on external factors including the future and depth of the region’s ties with the EU, as uncertainty on that front remains a serious deterrent for big investors who want a greater degree of predictability. A recent study on the lessons learned from the EU accession of Central and Eastern European countries concluded that the EU relationship will also be a key factor for greater regional integration.⁴¹ The report notes that EU transfers were the key determinant that increased intraregional trade and investment by increasing demand and supply from the region. The economic convergence trend of the Western Balkans is not going the same way—the region remains at only one-third of the average GDP per capita of the EU. Part of it is related to the widening gap of EU transfers between the Western Balkans and other parts of Europe, despite massive investment needs. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimated the infrastructure-investment needs of Western Balkan countries to be up to 12 percent of GDP per year—well above the levels of even the poorest EU member states. The Western Balkans Economic Investment Plan announced by the European Commission is insufficient to meet these needs.⁴² Perhaps more could be done through the proposed model of staged accession, which could potentially release bigger EU funds earlier to reward reforms.

• 10. A better trading framework will be less effective at attracting investments if key strategic infrastructure is missing. Kosovo needs to ensure its short- and medium-term energy security and better access to strategic transport networks.

As the IMF recently noted, Kosovo’s gaps in physical and social infrastructure continue to limit its attractiveness as an FDI destination.⁴³  Energy security remains a central issue. Kosovo currently generates enough electricity to meet around 80 percent of its needs, which is better than a few neighboring countries.⁴⁴  It also has a well-connected and modernized transmission infrastructure to secure imports. However, in the short term, it continues to have issues with technical failures in the aged coal-based power plants that provide around 92 percent to 93 percent of Kosovo’s electricity generation. These crashes cause fluctuations in supply and increase risks of price shocks, particularly during peak demand (winter) and periods of global price hikes like the one caused by the war in Ukraine. In the medium to long term, considering that the coal-based power plants built in the 1960s and 1980s are extremely polluting and well past their life cycles, as well as considering the introduction of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (which puts a price on the carbon emissions of producing goods entering its market), Kosovo faces both environmental and economic pressures to diversify sources of energy generation.

Kosovo’s previous governments sought to pursue the energy transition by adding gas into the energy mix, a strategy that the Kurti government has reversed by questioning its economic feasibility. A draft energy strategy by the government aims to extend the life cycle of the coal-based Kosovo B power plant, built in the 1980s, through an investment of around €300 million to gain an additional twenty years of operation—while also focusing on an ambitious program of new investments in wind and solar, which would eventually phase out coal.⁴⁵ The Kurti government directed a recent $202 million grant agreement with the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)—which previous Kosovo governments had planned to use for a gas interconnector to North Macedonia and Greece—toward the construction of an electricity storage battery.⁴⁶  The latter aims to, among other things, make electricity from renewables more flexible to dispatch. However, these sources may be insufficient to secure wintertime supply, when demand doubles. To this end, Kosovo’s government also seems intent on investing to keep the Kosovo A coal plant, built in the 1960s, functional as a strategic reserve. However, this raises questions about economic and environmental feasibility.

A better strategy seems to be to also focus on managing highly inefficient energy demand; diversifying sources by adding gas into the energy mix; and deepening the integration of the regional energy market. In terms of consumption, far too much of the electricity demand in winter is used for heating households that could be covered by expanding thermal heating in major urban areas. In terms of generation, Kosovo should seriously explore the possibility of using gas for electricity generation or as a source for energy-intense industries and public heating companies. Kosovo currently has no gas-related infrastructure or market, but it could reconsider the idea of building the interconnectors with North Macedonia and Albania. This would enable supply of natural gas primarily through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or ports for liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Greece, Croatia, and potentially Albania.⁴⁷ An alternative proposed by the local think tank Riinvest would be to use Albania’s access to the TAP and its planned LNG port in Vlora to build a joint gas-based power plant in Albania.⁴⁸ Whatever options are chosen, it seems clear that adding gas into the energy mix could facilitate Kosovo’s energy transition, though this solution also relies on regional cooperation.

In the context of a potential regional market and advanced ties with the EU, Kosovo would also need to improve key transport links. To this end, Kosovo has already completed highway connections to Albania and North Macedonia, providing better links to seaports in Durrës (Albania) and Thessaloniki (Greece, via North Macedonia). Plans are under way to finalize a missing component of a highway (most of it in Serbia) that would connect it to Corridor 10 and Central Europe. And Pristina Airport has grown into a major regional airport, serving just shy of three million passengers in 2022 (ranking third after Belgrade and Tirana).⁴⁹ Yet poor access to rail networks remains a missing piece of the puzzle. The old railway network connecting Kosovo to Pan-European Corridors VIII and X via North Macedonia and Serbia is already being modernized with EBRD financing and EU grants.⁵⁰ The newly proposed deep seaport in Durrës, which would form a direct rail connection with a “dry port” in Pristina, is a potentially transformative project that would change the geoeconomic landscape for Kosovo and the wider region.⁵¹ The proposed project could potentially turn Pristina into a logistics hub for the entire region, and provide a decisive boost to manufacturing investments.

V. To sum up

• Despite all the challenges it faces, Kosovo has proven that it stands out as a comparatively successful case of Western-supported state building. In the current age of historical revisionism, when many are questioning whether the West misused the “unipolar” moment of the 1990s and 2000s by investing too much in failed liberal interventionist projects of democracy promotion and state building, there is also the minor case of Kosovo, which begs to differ. Kosovo has a good chance of becoming a true success story if it manages to address its key vulnerabilities and use the opportunities highlighted in this paper.

• Kosovo’s future success will depend on whether its political elites can capitalize on the opportunities of the new geopolitical environment to resolve the thorny issue of relations with Serbia. The fact of the matter is that Kosovo is missing out on a lot of opportunities—in terms of its integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, economic development, and domestic political stability—because of its long-standing dispute with Serbia. The discourse of political elites in Kosovo needs to reflect this with a greater sense of urgency. Kosovo’s political elites also need to reframe the discussion away from what Kosovo would stand to lose from a comprehensive settlement in the EU-facilitated dialogue and toward what it stands to gain.

• Kosovo’s success is intertwined with the fate of the Western Balkans as a whole: the tide will rise or fall for all. The issues that stand out horizontally in almost all the issues raised in the paper are regional cooperation and integration. In a small region riddled with ethnic and political disputes, they provide key incentives for settling the political and security architecture. They also are the key framework for economic development and anchoring the region to the EU, whatever shape that will take. Yet the fact that cooperation and integration remain hostage to bilateral political disputes reemphasizes the importance and urgency of resolving these disputes.

• Kosovo’s more evident problem is external, yet its main and more important challenges remain domes- tic. Kosovo’s domestic success is considerably con- strained by its external challenge of obtaining full recognition, which takes up a lot of attention, but the country will need to learn to juggle two balls. Its institutions need to capitalize on the demographic dividend by creating more opportunities for young people and middle classes, as well as delivering better services. Investments in human capital and other key physical infrastructure, coupled with the deepening of regional market integration, will be key in attracting more FDI and taking the economy to another level. A successful domestic agenda will also be needed to sustain Kosovo’s faith in democracy.

• Kosovo and the Western Balkans will need decisive action and support from the West to be nudged, and, if need be, pushed forward to make bold moves. As the developments of the past few months have shown, NATO’s presence in Kosovo has been a key factor preventing the escalation of ethnic tensions. Yet the West needs to comprehend the urgency of finding lasting solutions and giving the Western Balkans a clearer perspective, as well as access to transformative financing. Unlike many other parts of the world, where it faces more robust competition, the West continues to have the political and economic weight and incentives to move things in the right direction in the Balkans. Using these tools will be key to strengthening European security, among other things.

VI. Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council would like to extend special thanks to Limak Holding for its valuable support for this report.

VII. About the author

Agon Maliqi
Political Analyst and Media Writer

Agon Maliqi is a political analyst and media writer from Kosovo. He was the co-founder and until recently the chairman of the board of Sbunker, an analytical media platform and think tank based in Pristina which works on democracy, human rights, and security issues in the Western Balkans. Maliqi currently works as an independent analyst and consultant on these issues in the Balkans and South Caucasus. Previously, he was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. He graduated from the American University in Bulgaria in 2006, where he studied political science and European studies, and obtained a master in international development policy from Duke University in the United States in 2012.

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In a groundbreaking agreement, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her Albanian counterpart Edi Rama have agreed to establish a migrant processing center in Albania. The center will be funded by Italy and operate under Italian jurisdiction.

This unprecedented move, with funding from Italy and operation under Italian jurisdiction, has sparked a heated debate, raising concerns about its adherence to international and European legal frameworks governing asylum rights. While the European Commission has maintained that the deal does not contravene EU asylum law, human rights groups remain wary of its potential impact on the rights of migrants.

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Online Event Mon, November 27, 2023 • 9:00 am ET

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Today’s biggest conflicts—Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war—could have “dire” implications for already high tensions in the Western Balkans, said Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama.

At an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s Europe Center on Monday, Rama called Hamas and its supporters “true agents of chaos” and said that if the chaos spreads wider, simmering tensions in the Western Balkans could boil over.

The six countries that make up the Western Balkans thus must “work day and night to keep the conflict out of the borders of our region,” Rama asserted.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which touched upon the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, Albania’s new migrant deal with Italy, and Albania’s path to the European Union (EU).

Regional tensions

• On September 24, thirty armed and masked Serbs sparked a gun battle and barricaded themselves inside an Orthodox monastery in northern Kosovo, in an event that saw an officer and three of the attackers killed. Rama said that the event was a “strong sign” and “[alarm] bell” indicating how this unresolved issue can be a “detriment” to regional cooperation and peace.
• Rama explained that while the situation has somewhat improved, the region must work together to secure both “full recognition of Kosovo” and “final peace.”
• Rama said he is encouraged by Kosovar authorities warming to a proposal to establish an Association of Serb Municipalities, which would work on education, health care, and economic development for populations that are majority Serb. It would also unblock normalization talks with Serbia. If Kosovo agrees to the plan, “this will be huge,” Rama said. “Huge for the sake of Kosovo [and] huge for the sake of the region.”
• While Albania, which is celebrating 111 years of independence, and the region have come a long way, Rama said they need to do “a lot more” to address challenges that remain. With the world so “interconnected,” as Rama argued, each of the six Western Balkan countries has a responsibility to “improve our countries and improve our region and improve the world. One without the others does not really work.”

Migration crisis

• Tirana recently struck a deal with Rome to stand up centers under Italian jurisdiction in Albania for holding migrants seeking asylum in Italy. The deal has been criticized, with rights groups arguing that the agreement is unlawful. It has also sparked comparisons to the United Kingdom’s plan to send some asylum seekers to Rwanda.
• In response to those criticisms, Rama argued that the deal is “100 percent within the frame of the European Union and international law criteria” and that the migrant centers would be built and operate according to EU standards.
• He claimed that the deal has received such criticism because it is a deal between an EU member and non-member. “It shows the prejudice” against European countries not in the European Union, he said.

EU accession

• Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been a “major change” in the European Union’s attitude toward the Western Balkans, Rama argued. “The idea of the region as a very important geopolitical asset for the EU has practically materialized,” he explained.
• However, he cautioned, the EU’s new outlook on the Western Balkans doesn’t mean that full integration and membership for Albania and others will come swiftly; “it will take time,” he said.
• Last month at the Berlin Process Leaders’ Summit, which Rama hosted in Tirana, the EU rolled out a new growth plan to grant the six Western Balkans countries access to the EU single market—and require them to implement reforms, which would be rewarded with investments.
• “We are in a completely new phase of relations with the EU,” Rama said, explaining that a few years ago, this proposal would have been “really utopistic.” The EU and Western Balkans, he argued, are growing deeper and deeper in “partnership,” “dialogue,” and “mutual respect.”
• “I hope this will bring new energy and will bring more reasons to never, ever give up on the European Union,” the prime minister said.

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1. What did the European Commission recommend and what effect will it have?

Politically and symbolically, Wednesday’s European Commission recommendations are major milestones for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. But the path to full EU membership for all three countries remains a long and laborious one. The call for the opening of accession talks with Kyiv and Chisinau, as well as candidacy status for Tbilisi, are conditional upon fulfillment of further rule of law and anti-corruption measures. That is in line with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s tightrope walk on expectations management in recent months. Von der Leyen has sought to provide Kyiv in particular with a real EU perspective while stressing that the enlargement process will remain merit-based—both to maintain leverage in the process and to assuage concerns among EU members. 

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

2. What are the next steps for the EU?

The Commission’s recommendations shared on Wednesday are a key step, albeit one that is quite early in the accession process, toward these countries’ EU ambitions. But these recommendations do not, themselves, start negotiations. That can only happen once EU member states vote (unanimously) on the Commission’s suggestions at the European Council meeting this December. The vote is expected to pass as the Council traditionally follows the recommendation of the Commission, but before a unanimous “yes” there will likely be robust debate about the budgetary reform and the common agriculture policy reform that will largely define the way that enlargement will work.

Once aspiring new members receive unanimous support to be given candidate status (Georgia) and then to open accession negotiations (Ukraine, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), the real work begins. Once a negotiating framework is established, aspiring members work through more than thirty negotiating chapters organized into six thematic clusters to prepare countries to implement EU laws and standards (acquis). And, again, member states must agree unanimously that all requirements have been met. Only then can there be the final round of Commission recommendations, member state votes, and European Parliament sign-off that precedes the ratification of an accession treaty which finalizes the process.

Needless to say, the process is long and technical. And a recurring complicating factor is the need for unanimous member state approval at numerous intervals throughout. With European Parliament elections coming up in June 2024, and a number of national elections in the same time period, the composition of the Parliament, and the priorities of member states toward enlargement (and, relatedly, EU reform) may shift significantly during the same timeframe these aspiring members are working through negotiations.

Despite a consensus in Brussels that enlargement has significant geopolitical momentum, the historic scope of this ten-country enlargement package will necessitate EU reform negotiations to happen in parallel, and it is not yet clear how these reforms will shake out.

—Lisa Homel is an assistant director of the Europe Center.

3. What does this mean for Ukraine?

The European Commission’s recommendation that the bloc open accession talks with Ukraine is a significant step toward the country’s eventual membership. Russia initially attacked Ukraine in 2014 in part because Ukrainians wanted closer ties with Brussels, rather than Moscow, which rankled Russia President Vladimir Putin’s imperial view of Ukraine as “Little Russia.” Kyiv’s dogged determination to continue its Euro-Atlantic trajectory in the face of Russia’s full-scale invasion is impressive and was repeatedly noted in the Commission’s recommendation report card.

Indeed, Ukraine’s post-2014 reforms have helped the country fight back more effectively against Russia and helped push the country further down the path toward EU membership. Decentralization reform, privatization initiatives, digitalization of state services, and improved anti-corruption efforts have all made Ukrainian society more resilient and brought the country more in line with EU standards.

Yet Kyiv still has many ways it can improve its case for EU accession. As the Commission noted, Ukraine still needs to implement comprehensive judicial reform to root out shady judges and improve oversight. Ukraine’s anti-corruption authorities have made strides in combating graft, but they need to be truly independent to fully uphold their mandates. Both of these will make the Ukrainian economy more competitive and resilient and improve its attractiveness to foreign investors, all of which are key to mitigating some of the structural deficiencies the Commission noted in its report. 

The recommendation for opening accession talks with Ukraine is a win for Kyiv and for its partners that want to see the country defeat Russia and formalize its integration with the European Union.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The start of accession negotiations—if approved by the twenty-seven EU leaders in December—is a major step for Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has clearly infused the EU enlargement process with some much-needed geopolitical meaning and urgency. Combined, the geopolitical moment and Kyiv’s impressive progress on domestic reforms while fighting a war have led to a promising change in Ukraine’s accession prospects over the long term. 

But the transformations required on both sides—within the EU and for Ukraine—are too complex to allow for any more fast-tracking in the process. Ukrainian policymakers will have to sustain ambition and public support in the demanding process of aligning with EU standards. This ranges from judicial and public sector changes to deep economic, tax, and budgetary reforms across more than thirty so-called chapters, organized into six thematic clusters. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states will have to not only navigate contentious reforms of some of the pillars of the union but also find creative ways to offer Ukraine some quick wins and visible progress to maintain momentum for reforms on the path to full membership.

—Jörn Fleck

4. Where does this leave Moldova and Georgia?

The Commission’s recommendation to open accession talks with Moldova is another notch in President Maia Sandu’s sterling record of furthering her country’s aspirations for European integration. Chisinau and Kyiv are now in very similar places on their EU accession path, having made significant progress since gaining candidate status in July 2022 but with discrete reform priorities left to fulfill in the coming months. For Moldova, that means taking comprehensive measures to clean up its judicial system, continue to fight the oligarchs that preside over an entrenched system of high-level graft and organized crime, and make further progress on strengthening the country’s democracy and human rights protections. The stakes are high: Fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor and pro-Russian cadres reportedly met with Kremlin officials in Istanbul immediately after the Commission’s decision, as Moscow-oriented opposition parties in Moldova prepare to challenge Sandu in next fall’s presidential election.

The European Commission’s recommendation of candidate status for Georgia comes roughly eighteen months after Moldova and Ukraine officially became EU candidates. Tbilisi has fallen behind Chisinau and Kyiv on the path to EU membership largely because it can’t seem to get out of its own way. The ruling Georgian Dream party, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, has poisoned the country’s politics over the past several years by consolidating power, harassing civil society leaders, and playing footsie with Moscow while Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of the country’s territory and is conducting a major war of aggression against Ukraine. These policies have deeply polarized Georgia. Even so, 83 percent of Georgians want to join the EU, which the Commission noted in its report, but they are held hostage by political infighting in the capital and the government’s counterproductive policies.

—Andrew D’Anieri 

5. What about Western Balkans countries?

The Commission report paints a mixed picture for the countries of the Western Balkans, some of which have been in the EU’s anteroom for two decades. Frustration among some in the region that Ukraine appears to have been fast-tracked by the EU for political reasons compares with Commission assessments of modest progress in reforms, at best, even among the most forward-leaning countries. If Albania and North Macedonia meet further EU demands and previous commitments, the Commission suggests opening negotiations on the first cluster of so-called “fundamentals” relating to public sector, judicial, and fundamental rights reforms. Self-proclaimed accession frontrunner Montenegro and the surprise winner of candidacy status last year, Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been left largely empty-handed after what Brussels considers limited progress.     

—Jörn Fleck

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After four and a half months of negotiations, a new pro-EU government led by the “Europe Now” leader, Milojko Spajic, was voted in by Parliament. The government includes a coalition of pro-European and pro-Serbian parties. In reaction to the appointment of Andrija Mandic, head of a pro-Serb and pro-Russia alliance called “For a Better Montenegro,” protests emerged in Podgorica.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks to political analyst and the director of the Institute for SocioPolitical Research – Analitico, Ana Nenezic.

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Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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The European Parliament’s (EP) resolution condemning Serbia’s actions in northern Kosovo marks a significant development in the ongoing crisis between the two countries. The resolution calls for a freeze on funding for the Serbian government if it is found to have been directly involved in the recent attack in Banjska.

In a debrief with Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare, Viola von Cramon, a member of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee and the Rapporteur on Kosovo, discusses the implications of the resolution and the EU’s role in ensuring that Serbia cooperates fully with the investigation into the Banjska attack.

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Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

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Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The recent murder of a Kosovar Albanian police officer by dozens of Serbian gunmen in the north of Kosovo is a reminder of the increasing security concerns between the two nations and the region at large. Given that the EU-led Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue for comprehensive normalization has reached a dead end, how should the international community respond to the violence and reconvene a dialogue? 

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What is the future of the normalization dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo? How will the EU respond to Serbia’s role in the attack in northern Kosovo led by Kosovo Serb Milan Radoicic? What actions can the UK and the international community at large take to promote inter-ethnic understanding in Kosovo? Should Kosovo uphold its commitment to implement the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM)? 

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The war in Ukraine has renewed interest in EU enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. The Berlin Process, which has been working to revitalize ties between Western Balkan candidate countries and the EU for the last 10 years, is now seeing its efforts pay off.

The 2023 Tirana Civil Society and Think Tank Forum is playing a key role in the conversation on EU Enlargement into the Balkans. The forum, organized by the Open Society Foundation Western Balkans (OSF-WB), the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), and the Cooperation & Development Institute (CDI) as part of the Berlin Summit, will be held in Albania on October 14th–15th. Regional experts will gather to develop strategies for cooperation, accelerated EU reforms, and accession processes.

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What role can civil society organizations play in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the region? How can civil society and think tank experts hold decision-makers accountable and influence the direction of Western Balkans accession processes?

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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What would help the Western Balkans most is an EU-driven economic growth plan. A small market of six countries with fewer than eighteen million consumers and a total gross domestic product (GDP) of $144 billion, or less than 1 percent of the EU’s GDP, the Western Balkans could easily be embraced in the EU single market. At the same time, the region still lags behind the rest of Europe, with an average per capita income of just $7,650, only 14 percent of the EU average ($54,100), according to International Monetary Fund data. Convergence with the EU has been slow over the last twenty years.

In part to narrow this gap, EU Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen proposed a four-pillar growth plan for the Western Balkans in May. The plan’s aims include bringing the region closer to the EU single market, deepening regional economic integration, accelerating fundamental reforms, and increasing pre-accession funds. With the Western Balkans representing Europe’s soft underbelly and talk about EU expansion returning, now is the time for focused attention on advancing the goals of this plan and accelerating the region’s EU accession.

Access to the EU single market

The EU is the Western Balkans’ main trading partner, accounting for more than two-thirds of the region’s total trade. All Western Balkan countries enjoy access to the internal market for goods through the Stabilization and Association Agreements, but they are not deep enough, even compared to the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements the EU has with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. 

The EU should work to deepen its integration with the region ahead of full EU accession. To do so, it should gradually phase these countries into all economic sectors by granting them full access to the single market and its four freedoms (goods, people, services, and capital). This would foster convergence and build institutional capacity, and it would give the EU better leverage in ensuring compliance with rule-of-law reforms. This would be similar to the EU’s economic relationship with Norway and Iceland, where the European Economic Area extends the laws of the single market to both countries (with the exception of agriculture and fisheries). While the agreement with Norway and Iceland is intended to be an end in itself, for Western Balkans countries it could instead be a gradual deepening toward full EU membership.

Since March 2022, Ukraine has enjoyed the four freedoms through the Temporary Protections Directive, further proving that this level of market access for non-EU states is feasible. The benefits for Western Balkans countries of increasing participation in the single market are clear. Croatia’s GDP, for example, has increased by 75 percent (from $59 billion to $79 billion) since it joined the EU in 2013, translating into higher incomes for its citizens, with an average increase in per capita GDP of 67 percent (from $13,900 in 2013 to $20,537).

Financial support is key to reducing the economic and infrastructure gaps between EU members and the Western Balkans. The EU has been the largest provider of financial and development assistance in the Western Balkans, supporting reforms with financial and technical assistance via the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which allocated 12.8 billion euros between 2014 and 2020. But the commitment for the IPA under the current EU long-term budget is 14 billion euros, less than 1 percent of the total long-term budget and Next Generation EU funds for 2021-2027 (2.02 trillion euros).

Given the importance of the Western Balkans, EU financial support to the region should be increased to speed up its countries’ socioeconomic convergence with the bloc and increase socialization with EU rules and its organizational culture. This will help smooth the way for the countries to join the single market.

Western Balkans ‘nearshoring’

Becoming part of the EU single market is not just about trade—it’s about investment, economic modernization, democratic progress, rule of law, and better regional cooperation. In recent years, several initiatives have been adopted to foster regional economic integration, including the Common Regional Market Action Plan 2021-2024. These initiatives aim at building a common regional market based on EU rules and regulations and on the four freedoms. They are intended to be a stepping stone for Western Balkan economies to better integrate into European value chains and improve their competitiveness. The initiatives have focused on four main regional areas: trade, investment, digitalization, and industry and innovation. The establishment of “green lanes”—streamlined border crossings for freight vehicles—during the COVID-19 pandemic was a successful example of regional cooperation.

The Berlin Process, a very important initiative that has pushed for faster economic integration with the EU, has also been revitalized, and the next meeting will be held in Albania in October. The Open Balkans Initiative, another project that started as an economic cooperation agreement among Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania in 2021, has also offered some practical steps for better economic cooperation in the region. 

Regional economic integration is imperative for the Western Balkans to benefit from bigger markets and greater competition by fostering cross-border production chains and leveraging regional comparative advantages. To attract the interest of serious foreign investors, it is necessary to cooperate in a “pooled” competition for foreign direct investment. This will help countries to improve their competitiveness by incentivizing technological and industrial clusters, as well as help modernize their economies, facilitate innovation, and improve skills and productivity.

As European companies are looking to relocate their supply chains closer to home, investing in the Western Balkans for the production of critical goods would contribute to the EU’s strategic economic autonomy, following through on the “de-risking” goals that occupy a key place in the EU’s newly published European Economic Security Strategy. 

Developing European industrial clusters in the Western Balkans would increase EU’s competitiveness, including in key areas such as green and solar industries, biotech, and electric vehicles. Ports in the Adriatic Sea are important for the resilience of trade routes and hold potential for investment in liquefied natural gas transportation as well. 

Lower labor costs in the Western Balkans and strategic connectivity in terms of energy and transport make the region attractive, but what is needed is more EU investment to improve infrastructural networks. EU investment in strategic infrastructure projects in the Western Balkans to boost interconnectedness would also counter China’s increased economic and diplomatic footprint in the Western Balkans. This growing footprint challenges European business interests and fuels practices that hinder the EU’s to enhance promotion of Western norms and standards.

A two-way street for investment and reforms

To meet the 2030 aspiration timeline for enlargement, the EU should redouble its efforts now to help prepare the countries of the Western Balkans for accession. Increased European investment in the Western Balkans is needed to foster the creation of industrial clusters, while also promoting better economic standards and accelerating important economic reforms.

But this must not be a one-way undertaking in which the EU steps up but the status quo deficiencies in the region go unchallenged. Governments in the Western Balkans should be prepared to offer a serious platform for relocation of EU investment from China and other countries in Asia to the region. A friendly business environment based on EU standards, the rule of law, transparency, and regional integration are the baseline conditions to attract serious investment.

A focus on rule of law and fundamentals also needs to be at the core of the EU enlargement process. Von der Leyen announced this month in her State of the European Union speech that the EU will introduce rule-of-law reports for candidate countries. This is a welcome step. Without a commitment and a high degree of accountability on the part of the elected leaders in the Western Balkans, any investment of resources, time, and attention by the EU will only result in marginal returns. 

It is the right moment for a shift in the enlargement mentality, and it is in the interest of the EU to consider the Western Balkans as an integral part of European solutions to global challenges.

Valbona Zeneli is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

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As the EU-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina in Brussels faces a critical juncture, the pressing question arises: How do we navigate this impasse?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare talks to two civil society leaders, Milica Andric Rakic, program manager at the New Social Initiative, and Shpetim Gashi, Vice President of the Council for Inclusive Governance, to discuss steps needed for integrating the Serb community in the north of Kosovo.

In their op-ed for the New Atlanticist, Gashi and Andric Rakic proposed delinking the issue of integration from the broader status dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. How feasible is this approach? What role can the international community play in facilitating a resolution to the crisis in Kosovo?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – How to integrate Serbs in Northern Kosovo? | A debrief with Shpetim Gashi and Milica Andric Rakic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Kosovo’s leaders now insist on the north’s unconditional integration. Kosovo Serbs equate such integration with subordination, insisting instead on autonomy in local affairs as a precondition for integration, a position Belgrade supports and the international community sympathizes with.

The new stalemate is untenable and, if left unchecked, could spark a series of confrontations between Kosovo and Serbia and between Kosovo’s authorities and local Serbs.

There are at least four major sources of tensions that need attention.

First, small incidents could lead to uncontrollable violence. The relations between the predominantly Albanian police and local Serb population in the north are tense. The Serbs say they feel intimidated by the large and monoethnic police presence—an overwhelming majority of police are Albanian in a territory with over 90 percent Serbs. A small incident could escalate this tense relationship into widespread violence.

Second, Serbs in the north feel disenfranchised. Though constituting an overwhelming Serb majority, the four municipalities in the north are now run by Albanian mayors elected in an election the Serbs boycotted, with a total turnout of below 4 percent. Furthermore, thousands of Serbs resigned last year from Kosovo’s institutions. Though Albanians and Serbs disagree over the reasons behind the boycott—Albanians say Belgrade orchestrated it while Serbs say Kosovo’s discriminatory policies pushed them out—Serbs’ feelings of disenfranchisement could undermine diplomatic efforts to reintegrate the region. This feeling could also fuel resentment that could subsequently drive active Serb civil disobedience, which could escalate into violence. Though not in a position to secede, Serbs in the north have the capacity to derail Pristina’s efforts to establish its authority there, as demonstrated this summer by their boycott of Kosovo’s local elections and institutions and their violent demonstrations.

Third, tensions in and over the north have triggered a new wave of nationalism in Serbia and Kosovo that could further intensify, jeopardizing not only the gains of the past decade but also undermining future peace efforts. So far, the leaders of both countries have had control over this radicalism. But if nationalism rises to uncontrollable levels, the leaders will likely feel compelled to respond to increasingly extreme public expectations by undertaking risky actions. Nationalism and resentment combined could guide Kosovo’s and Serbia’s governments and publics towards inevitable confrontation.

Fourth, Kosovo might take more steps to establish its control in the north that could further alienate the Serb population. Pristina seems intent on removing from public premises the Serbian-funded institutions that offer services to the Serb population, such as pensions and salaries for thousands of teachers and doctors employed in the Serbian-funded system

The way forward

Kosovo and Serbia could take immediate action to ease the tensions and create the conditions for reintegration of the Serbs in Kosovo’s north. The key will be for Kosovo and Serbia to delink the north’s integration from the seemingly intractable status dispute—consider the north’s integration as a non-status issue—and commit to implement all the agreements on Serb integration by the end of the year. This includes implementing the Association/Community of the Serb-Majority Municipalities, a proposal for greater Kosovo Serb control on local affairs in the ten Serb-majority municipalities first agreed to between Belgrade and Pristina as part of the 2013 Brussels Agreement.

Kosovo should take the initiative, as its own citizens and territory are at stake. Kosovo should not consider eventual additional rights for the Serbs through the Association/Community as concessions to Serbia, but as part of an integrationist policy to accommodate a portion of its own citizens who for various reasons are reluctant to integrate into a state their mother country, Serbia, does not recognize. Serbia, in turn, should unequivocally support the Serb reintegration into Kosovo’s institutions. Serbia should not consider this a concession to Kosovo, but as a way to improve the position of this rather small and poor Serb community caught in the crossfire. Serbia and Kosovo can have their confrontations on other fronts, and they have plenty. And the Kosovo Serb leadership should operate autonomously of Belgrade on local affairs.

How might this be accomplished? The parties should first agree on new local elections in the north, with Kosovo Serbs committing to participate. Simultaneously, Kosovo should draft a statute for the Association/Community to be formed as soon as the new mayors are voted into office. Another important step is facilitating the return of the thousands of employees who quit—especially the police—to their workplaces.

Though a controversial policy, if formed in good faith, the Association/Community would not lead to the north’s partition, as Albanians fear, but could instead serve as a path to Serbs’ sustainable integration. A permanent minority in central institutions—all top positions are held by Albanians—the Serbs want a bigger say in local affairs in municipalities where they constitute a majority. Specifically, the Serbs want Pristina to grant them more autonomy in local economic development, urban planning, education, and healthcare. Such demands might be considered normal in developed democracies, but this is not the case in Kosovo, a country with deep ethnic divisions where even trivial transfers of power appear to have high stakes. Albanians could, for instance, offer the Serbs in the north a significant national position, such as parliament speaker—an integrationist technique frequently applied in other countries with similar ethnic challenges—to make them feel like a stakeholder in Kosovo’s future.

To aid Serb integration, all Kosovo’s Albanian political parties need to support the formation of the Association/Community. No party—no matter how strong it is—can afford to form it alone given the likely painful political costs. Not because the Association/Community is necessarily bad for Kosovo—in fact, it would phase out the Serbian institutions with more than ten thousand employees and facilitate their integration into Kosovo’s system—but because most Albanians seem to believe it is. Therefore, bipartisanship is a must. And it shouldn’t be difficult. After all, all parties agreed to the Association/Community in one form or another during the decade-long negotiations with Serbia. Furthermore, Kosovo’s parliament has already adopted this piece of policy. Serb integration is a key test of the ability of the Albanian political leadership—both governing and opposition parties—to build a liberal democratic state with the capacity to find a balance that satisfies both the majority and minority communities.

For such an integrationist approach to work, Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic would have to transform their belligerent interactions into a working relationship. Some reconciliatory messages have begun to gain ground. Kurti has agreed to offer more self-management to the Serbs, reversing his previous position. Meanwhile, Vucic has recognized that peace with Albanians is beneficial for Serbia. But in general, the leaders continue to speak in ways that produce more ire than reconciliation. Of course, it will take a shift in attitude both in the leaders and in the broader public. Though public opposition to normalization of relations is widespread, it is shallow. It is not based on fundamental political positions or ideological views.

So, public sentiments could shift quickly toward greater support for reconciliation if leaders in Belgrade and Pristina advocate for it. As European Union-led talks between Serbia and Kosovo continue this week, it is imperative that Kurti and Vucic take the necessary steps to reduce tensions and facilitate Kosovo Serb reintegration.

Shpetim Gashi is vice president of the Council for Inclusive Governance.

Milica Andric Rakic is program manager at the New Social Initiative.

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Ahead of a crucial vote to amend its constitution, Skopje’s political landscape remains sharply divided. The current government strongly supports the changes, which will add language in recognition of the country’s Bulgarian minority, while the opposition remains vehemently opposed. Even a pro-amendment campaign by EU and US diplomats has yet to tip the scales in favor of the amendment’s adoption.

Just as the country voted to change its name before becoming a NATO member, adopting this constitutional amendment is considered to be North Macedonia’s exclusive path to EU membership. The government is therefore engaging in an open dialogue with opposition members in the hopes that a difficult compromise can be reached for the sake of progress.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs Bojan Maricikj on the pressing questions surrounding North Macedonia’s accession to the EU. What is the public’s sentiment regarding the constitutional changes, and are North Macedonian politicians prepared to make tough choices to further EU integration? Does Skopje’s government have any contingency plans in case the amendment is defeated by the Parliament? How credible is the indicative date of 2030 as the deadline for accession of the Western Balkan countries? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Will North Macedonia change its constitution? | A debrief with H.E. Bojan Maricikj appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Berlin Process, led by EU member states under German leadership, was revitalized last year to promote economic regional cooperation among the Western Balkans’ six countries. Albania currently holds the chairmanship of the Berlin Summit, which is scheduled for October 16 in Tirana, with the participation of EU leaders.

Ahead of the summit, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews Dr. Odeta Barbullushi, advisor to Albania’s Prime Minister on European issues and regional cooperation.

Central to the Berlin Process is the ambitious “Common Regional Market,” which aims to enhance economic convergence and potentially achieve a growth rate of 6-7% of the region’s GDP. While the EU remains the primary trading partner for the Western Balkans countries, the region’s economic potential remains untapped.

The expectations of the Western Balkans countries for the Berlin Summit are high. Will the Western Balkan countries receive substantial EU funding to support regional connectivity in key sectors such as infrastructure, energy, digital, and cyber security? What is the US stance in supporting and promoting security and economic cooperation in the region?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What to expect from the October Berlin Process Summit? | A debrief with Odeta Barbullushi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Home to 18 million people in the heart of Europe, the Western Balkans have enormous potential to catalyze economic growth through greater market openness. Ongoing regional cooperation efforts aim to address economic challenges such as high rates of unemployment and poverty, issues regarding corruption and upholding the rule of law, and stemming the region’s “brain drain” and resulting labor shortages.

Recent events are also pushing EU leaders to recognize the importance of the Western Balkans to EU security. As a result, there has been a shift towards expediting the enlargement process, including early access to the EU single market and pre-accession funds to support economic reforms and transformative projects.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to the President of American Chamber of Commerce of Serbia Stefan Lazarevic and President of American Chamber of Commerce of Albania Enio Jaco on the region’s business climate. Are international investors attracted by the potential that the region holds as a common market? What are their main challenges, and why call for more cooperation to remove barriers and decrease political polarization?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Benefits of regional economic integration | A debrief with Stefan Lazarevic and Enio Jaco appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Following snap parliamentary elections on June 11th, Montenegro finds itself in a new phase of political uncertainty. The Europe Now Movement (PES) won a plurality of the vote but failed to secure enough seats to form a government. More alarmingly, voter turnout hit a historic low of 56.4 percent due in part to election fatigue and a lack of political change. Now more than ever, the country needs consensus if it is to continue necessary reforms on its path to EU membership.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare discusses the post-election political landscape in Montenegro with Petar Popovic, associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb.

Will these elections bring the political stability Montenegro requires? Who are potential allies for leading contender PES to form a governing coalition? What factors depressed voter turnout? Finally, what lies in store for former President Djukanovic after dominating Montenegrin political life for over three decades? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will Montenegro form a new government? | A debrief with Petar Popovic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will Kosovo and Serbia make the needed concessions towards normalization?

After the recent escalation of tensions in northern Kosovo, Senator Murphy played a crucial role in urging for de-escalation between Kosovo and Serbia. Thanks to broad bipartisan support in the US Senate, both Serbia and Kosovo were called upon to address the fragile security situation in the north and resume the normalization dialogue facilitated by the EU and supported by the United States.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Hon. Chris Murphy, United States Senator (D-CT), to discuss his recent trip to the region, the messages he delivered to the leaders in Pristina and Belgrade, and the concessions that Kosovo and Serbia should make in order to progress on their respective paths.

How does he view Kosovo’s concerns about an unbalanced response by the US and the EU, placing the main responsibility on Kosovo for the crisis in the north? What role could the Association of the Serb Majority Municipalities play in achieving a meaningful resolution? How do the protests in Belgrade and the recent reports on his connections with organized hooligans affect the credibility of Serbia’s President Vučić?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will Kosovo and Serbia make the needed concessions towards normalization? | A debrief with Sen. Chris Murphy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July is an opportunity for leaders to mitigate geoeconomic risk within the Alliance and in southeastern Europe in particular. Specifically, all allies should commit in the communiqué to the prompt adoption of investment screening legislation—particularly the Balkan nations of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, where legislation is largely absent. While the European Union (EU) is Europe’s lead institution on investment and trade issues, its technocratic approach has up to now failed to generate the necessary political will with all members of the Alliance to take investment security issues seriously. Putting the issue of investment screening on the wider transatlantic agenda will increase pressure on lagging allies to elevate investment security and accountability on NATO’s southeastern flank. The Alliance can look to how 5G security was put on the agenda a few years ago as a case study of how it can generate political will among allies to address gaps in national security that are notionally economic in nature.

Because the implementation of economic security regulations carries risks of abuse and corruption, NATO, the EU, and key member states from both organizations should support those nations in the development of inclusive and effective legislation that mitigates against economic risk while protecting the democratic process.

Economic security underpins military security

Members of the EU and NATO face a number of threats from authoritarian corrosive capital and critical economic dependencies. Whether originating from private or state-owned enterprises, unaccountable investments lack transparency, accountability, and market orientation. Corrosive capital largely originates from authoritarian states and exaggerates governance gaps to influence economic, political, and social developments in recipient countries. For example, authoritarian regimes, particularly China, use subsidies and other uncompetitive practices to invest in critical or other digital infrastructure that can have a dual military-civilian purpose, such as in port infrastructure in southeast Europe which could be used to transit military gear in support of NATO operations. Nontransparent investment flows, particularly in Bulgaria and the Western Balkans, undermine transparency and abet corruption. In the higher value-added sectors of the economy such as the thriving information and communications technology sectors in Bulgaria, unaccountable investments threaten the valuable intellectual property of Europe’s established firms and emerging start-ups alike. Last year, China weaponized Europe’s critical trade and supply chain dependency on the huge Chinese market to block Lithuanian imports to China, seeking to punish Vilnius for its foreign policy choices. Europe’s urgent transition in the last year away from Russian natural gas to renewable resources such as solar and wind power, which are dominated by China, risks replacing one set of strategic energy dependencies for another. 

To address these challenges, many European countries have developed new EU-wide investment screening regulations and the European Union has proposed legislation to counter economic coercion. Since 2020, EU member states are required to have an investment screening mechanism in place as part of the EU-wide investment screening coordination framework—but the details are left up to the individual countries, which are responsible for their own national security. 

NATO’s southeastern flank is the most vulnerable and least-prepared region to protect its economies from authoritarian corrosive capital. Montenegro has become famous for its “white elephant” Chinese-funded infrastructure projects. Croatia is host to the Chinese Southeast European Business Association and has actively courted Chinese investments in critical infrastructure, including ports and the EU-funded and China-built Peljesac bridge, the first example of subsidized Chinese firms beating out European firms for EU-funded projects in Europe. Bulgaria and North Macedonia have more pronounced links to unaccountable flows of Russian capital, including in the energy sector. 

Among these countries, only Croatia is in the early stages of exploring the development of an investment screening law, and it is doing so at a leisurely pace. Bulgaria is in an even earlier stage than Croatia, but has an opportunity with its new government to make progress. North Macedonia, Albania, and Montenegro also lack an investment screening mechanism, leaving NATO’s most vulnerable members and economies open to the risk of corrosive capital and unaccountable investment. These governments have largely failed to put investment security legislation and processes on the table because of a lack of political will. An initiative by key allies to put this issue on the table at NATO would help push lagging governments in southeast Europe to prioritize this issue. Yet, a push by NATO allies to close the investment security gap in southeast Europe should also be coupled with practical assistance to help those allies develop inclusive, transparent legislation on investment screening.

The risks of regulating economic activity in fragile democracies

Emerging markets in NATO’s southeastern flank, including Albania, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Croatia, face some of the greatest challenges to equipping themselves with the tools to protect their economies from national security threats. These allies face capacity and governance challenges that will require coordinated support from NATO, the EU, and key bilateral allies to help implement effective investment screening legislation.

First, the economies of southeastern Europe are among the least developed within NATO. As a result, most business leaders in these countries are desperate for any investment they can attract and are instinctively hostile to the idea of screening any investment. Coaxing the private sector into compliance with any relevant legislation will require an intentional and transparent process of policy dialogue between government and business to reassure business that legislation will not meaningfully harm the economy.

Second, these countries largely lack governmental capacity to effectively screen foreign investments, a highly technical process requiring competent bureaucrats armed with both economic and national security data and expertise. A related challenge is the need for the bureaucracy to maintain the confidentiality of proprietary corporate data during the screening process; leaks of government deliberations to tabloids are a pervasive problem in southeast European policymaking.

Third, the democracies of southeastern Europe are by and large low-trust societies with weak public-private dialogue and an often fragile rule of law, making effective and informed policy formulation a challenge. To ensure economic fairness and guard against regulatory abuse, any new tools allowing governments to regulate economic activity will need proper transparency, checks and balances, and oversight.

NATO and the EU face a conundrum in dealing with the geoeconomic challenges to southeastern Europe’s market, particularly in Bulgaria and Croatia, which are already in the European common market. On the one hand, failure to develop screening mechanisms and other tools in these economies leaves both the EU and NATO vulnerable to economic risk that could impact the wider single market. On the other hand, given the governance and capacity challenges in these countries, a rushed or opaque policy process could result in lack of awareness and compliance by the private sector or the emergence of unintended consequences such as barriers to legitimate competition.

What the EU, NATO, and Three Seas Initiative can do

To address these challenges, NATO, the European Union, and individual allies can play complementary roles.

Through its regulatory role, the EU should take the lead in supporting these countries in developing economic security legislation. The European Commission can provide technical support to help governments align their investment screening legislation with EU standards, particularly countries that are candidates for accession, such as Albania and North Macedonia. Meanwhile, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development can provide technical support to member governments such as Croatia to help them understand the likely impact an investment screening law will have on its economy and competitiveness as an investment destination.

Because the EU leads on economic and trade issues, NATO’s role will involve helping allies assess national security implications of investment risk in dual-use economic assets that can have a military or other national security purpose. Here, planning groups within NATO’s Resilience Committee can provide guidance on how to ensure that screening mechanisms meet compliance with NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience. In the interest of building political will, the NATO summit communiqué at Vilnius could set a deadline to have investment screening legislation in place by the seventy-fifth anniversary Washington summit next year.

Finally, select allies can provide bilateral mentorship and support for these southeast European nations on best practices for securing business buy-in and compliance with screening mechanisms. A system modeled after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States may not align with the needs, economic structure, or capacities of smaller countries in southeast Europe. Smaller allies such as the Czech Republic can advise southeastern European governments on the lessons learned from their experience, perhaps bringing in chambers of commerce and business associations to share their experiences on compliance with the law. 

The Three Seas Initiative, an informal gathering supported by the Atlantic Council and including twelve Central and Eastern European member states focused on north-south infrastructure development, could also help. It could serve as a venue for members to coordinate economic-security regulations to ensure wider harmonization of economic policy. Differences in investment security regulations across countries complicate the kind of cross-border investments that the Three Seas Initiative is designed to attract and finance. The Three Seas business forums in particular can serve as a channel for business associations and chambers from within the Three Seas region and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. The forums offer a place for parties to share their experiences, challenges, and concerns about complexities caused by differences in screening legislation within the region and to formulate recommendations on how to minimize the impact on the investment environment.

Ultimately, the national governments of Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro will have to do the hard work themselves to adopt these best practices and craft successful legislation. Governments will need to consult with the business sector before legislation is drafted to help promote understanding of these processes, incorporate recommendations to streamline red tape, and raise awareness in the business community of critical threats that can allow them to adapt their internal due diligence. But this will require a balance to ensure that economic security is not traded away for the sake of economic development. Including civil society is also essential to ensure effective transparency and monitoring of review processes to make sure they are not used for corrupt purposes or overlook key threats.

As NATO heads into its seventy-fifth year, its member states and partner institutions need to adapt to new challenges. Robust investment screening across the whole of the Alliance will help strengthen NATO against economic weapons that are increasingly central to today’s conflicts.

Jeffrey Lightfoot is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is the Bratislava-based program director for Europe at the Center for International Private Enterprise.

John Kay is a program manager at the Center for International Private Enterprise and worked previously in the Balkans with the US Agency for International Development.

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1. How did we get here?

Based on all the information we received from our contacts in civil society, including both Kosovo Serbs and Albanians, the question was not so much “if” but rather “when” the long-lasting crisis would escalate. There were numerous potential triggers for escalation that were plainly evident to those willing to acknowledge them. Many of these triggers stemmed from a series of escalatory decisions made by political leaders on both sides. 

Just to highlight a few examples: the withdrawal of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo institutions, particularly the police force; the deployment of Kosovo special police forces to the streets in the northern region; the expropriation of land in municipalities predominantly inhabited by Serbs; the refusal to participate in the elections; and ultimately, violent clashes between the Serbian minority and NATO soldiers this week triggered by four newly elected Kosovo Albanian mayors taking office in northern Kosovo after April elections that were boycotted by Kosovo Serbs.

—Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and representative of the Center in the Western Balkans.

The Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo have long been the flashpoint in the protracted dispute between Kosovo and Serbia. The escalation earlier this week followed a series of tit-for-tat actions on both sides after the most recent tense standoff over license plate enforcement on the Kosovo-Serbia border in late 2022.

What is different this time is the series of political miscalculations the government in Pristina seems to have made about its US and European allies’ postures. Having invested significant political capital into the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue led by the European Union (EU) for normalizing relations between both sides, Washington and its allies from Brussels to Paris and Berlin warned Pristina not to escalate the situation further. Instead, US and EU partners wanted to focus on progress in the dialogue. The government’s decision to double down on enforcing the outcome of the April local elections, which the Serb majority boycotted and in which less than 3.5 percent of the population in northern Kosovo participated, added fuel to the fire. With this escalation, Kosovo now risks losing part of what used to be largely unqualified US and European support.

—Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Europe Center at the Atlantic Council.

The situation in the north of Kosovo reached its current point due to a combination of factors and events. The lack of implementation of the Ohrid agreement to normalize relations and the failure to deliver on the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities created a growing frustration in the international community. One crucial factor is the lack of maturity displayed by leaders involved in the dialogue process and their challenges in engaging and moving forward through strong political will. It appears that the incentives for both sides to adhere to the agreements were not strong enough and therefore progress was hindered.

The catalyst for the situation in the north can be traced back to Kosovo Serbs’ deliberate withdrawal from local institutions, including by mayors and police officers. This helped create a vacuum which Kosovo’s government seized upon—by insisting on holding local elections and enforcing the mayors’ taking office to demonstrate that the north exists as a separate political reality outside Kosovo’s institutional framework.

—Ilva Tare is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and was most recently a broadcaster with EuroNews Group.

2. What could tip this into a more serious conflict?

Even if it seems that all sides are trying to lower the temperature in recent days, a combination of factors could further escalate the situation. Russia has long been an opportunist meddler in the region with significant disinformation tools, especially among Serbian media and audiences. A rally-around-the-flag effect among Kosovo’s majority Albanian population could put government decisionmakers in Pristina on the spot. They repeatedly seem to have chosen standing on principle over politically constructive solutions and have doubled down on symbolic actions, despite warnings by Western allies to avoid escalation. That could make it harder for them to back down. And Serbia has influence over gangs that can inflame the situation if they choose—or are instructed—to.

—Jörn Fleck

There are any number of potential flashpoints, but it is important to focus on the region, to recognize what the citizens of the area see as their grievances, and seek, in good faith, long-term solutions. The recent events are clearly a setback to this process.

—Cameron Munter is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and Europe Center. He spent three decades in the US Foreign Service, where he served as US ambassador to Serbia during the Kosovo independence crisis.

3. What should EU countries and the US do right now?

First of all, the United States and the EU should stop considering the Western Balkans as a peripheral issue, which they have for the last decade. Some progress has been made, but, for example, the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) should not be allowed to simply pretend their actions do not make a difference. They, along with their fellow EU members, should make new efforts to seek resolution and not simply wait for someone else to address the issues.

—Cameron Munter

The current status quo in the north is unsustainable, as it is dominated by parallel structures, as the Kosovo government states. Addressing this issue and stopping the violent elements from the north should not distract from the broader political dialogue, which is brokered by the EU and supported by the United States. 

The escalation of events in the north of Kosovo in recent days was an unfortunate distraction for Kosovo and Serbia in their efforts to normalize relations through political dialogue. The situation is back to square one, with the same requests for both sides and the urge for the parties to demonstrate loyalty to their Western allies and show that they can be credible and trustworthy partners in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations—especially for Kosovo, which cannot afford to lose the support of the United States or of key members of the EU. 

—Ilva Tare

The United States and Europe should not reward spoilers of the progress made in the normalization process in recent months, following significant US and EU political investment. The current escalation is helping leaders in Pristina and Belgrade avoid executing on some tough steps toward normalization and dealing with domestic political challenges. Europe and the United States should make clear that the only way out of the current situation ultimately runs through the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.   

—Jörn Fleck

4. Will new elections defuse this situation?

In order to move toward a resolution, new elections should be held with preconditions such as the involvement of Kosovo Serbs, the establishment of working conditions for Kosovo police and mayors, and the complete withdrawal of special police units of the Kosovo government deployed in the north, which is one of Kosovo Serbs’ stated requirements to take part in local elections. Progress with the Association of Serb Municipalities by mid-November is now a concrete condition with a deadline for the Kosovo government to deliver.

—Ilva Tare

It’s worth discussing. Clearly, new elections would have to be conceived and implemented very carefully, to ensure their result would be recognized by all sides as legitimate. Thus, it’s not a guarantee of solving the problem, but it’s one possible way to address it.

—Cameron Munter

5. Are there any more creative solutions for Serbia and Kosovo to get to more stable relations?

In the current atmosphere of deep-seated distrust and personal animosity between the two political leaders, it is challenging, if not impossible, to envision any innovative solutions. This is a harsh reality that the West still appears hesitant to acknowledge, despite the events unfolding over the past two years involving Prime Minister Albin Kurti of Kosovo and President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia. It is becoming increasingly clear that, at some point, the West will need to pause and reconsider its approach, asking itself a crucial question: Are the current political leaders genuinely willing and capable of achieving and ensuring a lasting normalization between the Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo?

—Maja Piscevic

If the context is right, other initiatives, such as those described in the Berlin Process and discussed as part of Open Balkans, might make a difference. They would open the aperture, so to speak, going beyond the tense immediate points of contention to the larger, more substantive solutions to the local problems. But these more strategic and long-term solutions are hard to develop if the situation on the ground remains as tense as it now is.

—Cameron Munter

The post Five questions (and expert answers) about the recent clashes in Kosovo appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Violent protests in the north of Kosovo have escalated the situation, leaving 50 KFOR troops wounded when newly elected Albanian mayors entered the municipality buildings in areas with a Serbian majority, protected by an increased presence of Kosovo police. NATO has deployed 700 additional troops to ensure territorial security.

The decision of Kosovo’s Prime Minister to deploy the new mayors in the municipality buildings in the north has led to growing international frustration, causing the Pristina government to alienate strategic allies, including the United States and key members of the European Union. The United States has urged Kosovo’s PM to de-escalate the situation by withdrawing the police and relocating the mayors to alternative buildings.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Jovana Radosavljevic, a Kosovo Serb who resides in the north of Kosovo and the Executive Director of the New Social Initiative, and to Agon Maliqi, an analyst from Kosovo.

What steps should be taken to calm the situation and restore the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia? Why are the Kosovo Serbs protesting, and will the establishment of the Association of the Serbs Majority or new elections offer a possible compromise? What potential implications for Kosovo government and its Euro-Atlantic aspiration after the latest stances from the strategic allies?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What’s behind the escalation in Kosovo? | A debrief with Jovana Radosavljevic and Agon Maliqi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a new European security order is being designed. After years of enlargement impasse, Brussels has recognized the pivotal role of the EU membership of the six Western Balkan countries. What future will the region have, and how can the influence of Russia be challenged in the Western Balkans?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare talks to former Prime Minister and former President of Slovenia Borut Pahor, a friend and unrivaled connoisseur of the region about region’s main challenges. What place will the six Western Balkan countries have in the new European security order?

Why is the EU enlargement process vital for the region, and what can be done to boost the confidence of the aspiring countries into the EU membership? Why is Serbia’s decision to remain with the West rather than join Russia crucial for the region? Why is the implementation of the agreement to establish an Association of Serbs Municipalities important, and what impact will this agreement have on the relations between Serbia and Kosovo?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why the European future of the Balkans depends on Serbia? | A Debrief with Borut Pahor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For the first time since the beginning of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, discussions in Brussels are currently underway as Belgrade and Pristina negotiate the content of draft statute which will create the legal structure for the nascent Association of Serbs Municipalities in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the EU and the US officials remain concerned about the fragile situation in the north of Kosovo, where Kosovo Serbs have yet to return to civic institutions and small incidents could spark political instability.  

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Miodrag Marinkovic, an activist from the north of Kosovo and Director of the Center for Affirmative Social Actions (CASA), as well as Naim Rashiti, Executive Director of the Balkans Policy Research Group in Pristina, to provide on-the-ground insight into the latest developments in the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. 

Now that the process of negotiations of the statute of the ASM has started, what are the main challenges ahead? How will the ASM function? What is the potential legal and bureaucratic framework for this structure that will be accepted by both parties? Will the normalization dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia lead to a durable agreement? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What challenges face ASM? | A Debrief with Miodrag Marinkovic and Naim Rashiti appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Anti-Roma Sentiment in the Western Balkans | A Debrief with Sonja Licht and Zeljko Jovanovic

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority, an estimated 10 to 12 million people, of whom over two thirds live in Central and Eastern Europe according to the World Bank. Despite their many contributions to European society, Roma communities continue to face extreme social, economic, and political exclusion while suffering disproportionately from environmental racism and shorter life expectancies.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare discusses the current challenges and potential changes for Roma communities in the Western Balkans with Sonja Licht, the President of Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society in Belgrade and Zeljko Jovanovic, the Director of Roma Initiatives Office for the Open Societies Foundation in Berlin. 

Along with a brief overview of the history of the Roma people in the region, Tare poses the following questions to the guest experts in this important discussion: What are the root causes of anti-Roma sentiment and what practical steps can be taken to combat discrimination and promote a more inclusive society? What are the major institutional barriers in the Western Balkans preventing the full integration of Roma communities socially, politically, and economically? How does ending Anti-Roma Sentiment promise critical economic benefits for Western Balkan economies? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Anti-Roma Sentiment in the Western Balkans | A Debrief with Sonja Licht and Zeljko Jovanovic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What’s next after Bulgarian elections? A Debrief with Dimitar Bechev

Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary elections marked a significant moment for the country after a two-year political deadlock, which had resulted in the need for a technocratic government. This election is seen as potentially having a significant impact on Bulgaria’s relationship with the EU, particularly in terms of addressing corruption and upholding the rule of law.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Dimitar Bechev, Lecturer at Oxford School of Global and Area Studies on implications of another caretaker government for Bulgaria’s economic and European outlooks.

What can be expected of the Bulgarian elections? What are the factors that contributed to political instability in Bulgaria? What is the public perception of the political deadlock? Can the outcome of the election impact bilateral dispute with North Macedonia?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What’s next after Bulgarian elections? | A Debrief with Dimitar Bechev appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With a population of just over six hundred thousand, Montenegro plays a crucial role in maintaining stability in the Western Balkans and is a key factor in ensuring NATO’s full control of the Adriatic coast. The country’s accession to NATO in 2017 reinforced the security and stability of the region and signaled to other Western Balkan countries that NATO’s door remains open to them. But beyond that, NATO membership also signaled that Montenegro is ready and able to implement the necessary reforms that would lead to European Union (EU) membership.

While the country enjoyed a long-held status as a regional frontrunner for EU accession, events of the past two years have cast doubt on this prospect. Last summer, the government signed a controversial property agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which does not fully recognize Montenegro’s independence from Serbia or an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church, triggering an extended period of ethnic tensions and political instability. This resulted in Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic losing a no-confidence vote and a blockade of the constitutional court.

Relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church have long divided Montenegro into two camps, one that seeks close connections between the state and the church and one that advocates for further distance based on the contention that the church embodies an ongoing Serbian influence. As a result, the prospect of Montenegro’s EU membership now seems weak, with the European Commission expressing concern over political volatility, government instability, and lagging reform implementation in its yearly assessment of Montenegro’s progress toward accession benchmarks.

Russian meddling in the upcoming election is of great concern, as well. The Kremlin is no stranger to weaponizing cultural and religious connections in Montenegro. In 2019, fourteen people, including two alleged Russian intelligence agents, were convicted of attempting to overthrow the government in Podgorica and prevent the country from joining NATO.

The US State Department has warned of expected Russian attempts to stir ethnic tensions ahead of the election. Domestic sympathy in Montenegro for Russian aims could provide an opportunity for Russian interference, as some candidates are openly pro-Russian and seek to distance Montenegro from NATO and the European Union. As such, Montenegro risks becoming another victim of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fight against the West.

While the Montenegrin president’s role is chiefly ceremonial, the office does have the power to accept or reject candidates for the prime minister’s job. The current president, Milo Djukanovic, for example has used that power to block a candidate in the past year, demanding instead that a new prime minister be chosen through new parliamentary elections, a move previously encouraged by US officials to break the political deadlock and refocus on delivering key reforms. It took until the prime minister-designate’s three-month constitutional deadline to form a government expired, but Djukanovic dissolved parliament on Thursday and called for extraordinary elections to take place as early as May or June.

Key candidates running for president of Montenegro:

• Milo Djukanovic is the incumbent who has served as Montenegrin prime minister six times and as the country’s president twice. He is the longest-running European leader. Djukanovic and his party are pro-EU but he is associated with a range of corruption scandals.
• Andrija Mandić, a main challenger to Djukanovic, is a leader of Democratic Front, a pro-Russian party and pro-Serbian party with close ties to Belgrade.
• Aleksa Bečić comes from the Democratic Montenegro party. He labels himself a civic politician, but his politics and those of his party are largely seen as pro-Serbian.
• Jakov Milatović, a political newcomer from the Europe Now party, is trying to prove his pro-EU credentials. He previously served as the minister of economy under a government with strong ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church.
• The other three candidates do not appear to stand a realistic chance of getting to a second round.

This high-stakes election will help determine whether Montenegro and the region will fall further under Russian influence or if the prospect of EU membership provides a strong enough incentive for voters to remain committed to a European perspective. The international community should closely watch Montenegro to see whether Russian influence is on the rise in the Western Balkans or whether a heartening political trend will continue. 

Luka Ignac is a program assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Kevin Morris is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center

The post Montenegro’s presidential election is a litmus test of Russian influence in the Western Balkans appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Mediated by the European Union and supported by the United States, the Ohrid summit between Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić is a historic opportunity to resolve a long-standing dispute between Serbia and Kosovo and accelerate the Euro-Atlantic integration process for both countries.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Jovana Radosavljevic, Executive Director of the New Social Initiative based in Mitrovica, in the north of Kosovo, and Visar Ymeri, Executive Director of the Institute for Social Policy “Musine Kokalari,” to discuss the challenges of implementing a proposed agreement for normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia and the expectations for the upcoming Ohrid Summit on March 19.

Why is a deal on normalizaiton of relations between Belgrade and Pristina important for the future of citizens in both countries? How should the Association of Majority-Serb Municipalities (ASM) in Kosovo function? What will the successful implementation of an agreement mean for Kosovo, Kosovo Serbs, and Serbia? How should the everyday needs of citizens be prioritized in the implementation process?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What challenges faces the Kosovo/Serbia agreement | Debrief with Jovana Radosavljevic and Visar Ymeri  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On February 27th, Serbia and Kosovo agreed that no further discussion are needed on the EU proposal for normalization of relations, which could potentially pave the way for the resolution of an unfinished conflict. The agreement was a step forward in normalizing relations between Serbia and Kosovo with focus on guarantees and protection of legitimate rights of the Serbian community across the territory of Kosovo. 

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Miroslav Lajčák, EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkan regional issues, on this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the latest meeting in Brussels, details of the EU brokered plan, implementation of any future agreement, and the path forward.

What is expected from Serbia and Kosovo? Will these negotiations normalize the relations between the two countries? What are the main stumbling blocks? Is the establishment of the Association of Serb Municipalities based on any European model? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Is a deal on normalization between Kosovo & Serbia possible? | A debrief with Miroslav Lajčák  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Online Event Wed, February 22, 2023 • 9:15 am ET

A conversation with Prime Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—Plenković joined the Atlantic Council to share his perspective on the implications of Russia’s war in Ukraine for Europe and the Western Balkans, Croatia’s foreign-policy objectives, its entry into the eurozone and the Schengen area, and how his country’s Euro-Atlantic journey can serve as a source of inspiration for the Western Balkan countries and Ukraine.

Europe & Eurasia Eurozone Politics & Diplomacy Southern & Southeastern Europe

As Ukraine fights to maintain its national autonomy while pushing for European integration, it has found an ally in Croatia, which has faced similar challenges since achieving independence just three decades ago.

“There are many parallels from Croatia to Ukraine today, from Vukovar to Mariupol for instance,” said Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković at an Atlantic Council Front Page event on February 22, naming two cities that were the target of significant siege and urban warfare.

Despite intense periods of conflict that devastated its economy and its citizens, Croatia has proven itself a success story—and can now serve as a beacon for other nations that, like Ukraine, will continue to navigate the tricky process of European integration and nation building.

Plenković noted how on January 1, Croatia became the first country to simultaneously join the eurozone currency union and visa-free Schengen area, and it’s now one of only fifteen members of those two groupings plus NATO. “In the span of three decades, from a country which was not even recognized, we managed to enter this core group,” he said. 

Plenković is the longest-serving prime minister in Croatia’s history, with more than six years in office, a time that has seen the ongoing migrant crisis, stalled European Union (EU) enlargement, and now the invasion of Ukraine. The latter, he said, should serve as a “lesson” for Western leaders “about recognizing the threats as they are for international law, for international security, for the global system of governance. And also to completely abandon the politics of naïveté.”

Read on for more highlights from his remarks and conversation with Paula J. Dobriansky, vice chair of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

The newest member of the club

• Plenković acknowledged his country’s relatively fortunate position within the EU right now. It is, alongside Slovenia, the only former Yugoslavian country to be accepted into the EU and has joined the eurozone and Schengen area faster than Bulgaria and Romania—even though they joined the EU before Croatia did.

• Plenković noted that Croatia is “a net beneficiary country” that brings in more EU funds than it contributes. It “enables the government to invest in areas that need to catch up,” he said, such as infrastructure, environmental protections, and “elevating the living standards of our people.”

• But Plenković acknowledged that European integration has been a difficult thing for some Croatians to grapple with. “People who are living in Croatia today knew how it was not to have our state,” he said. “Some of them are wary of the impact of other actors into what we decide what to do. My point was that by joining NATO and the EU, we have only become stronger. Some people appreciate [it], others less.”

A model for the rest

• Plenković envisioned Croatia’s speedy integration as a model for other countries that want to join the club. “No one has more knowledge of the most recent accession process than we do.”

• Plenković confirmed that Croatia is supportive of Ukraine’s efforts to join the EU going forward: “There is strong political pressure coming, especially from Poland and Baltic countries, to move forward with Ukraine.”

• As for Serbia’s EU candidacy, Plenković was a little more careful with his words. “When it comes to Serbia, our relationship has been burdened by the events of thirty years ago,” he said. “After our session now, I will even go and visit an area near Vukovar where we are still looking for the remnants of missing persons who died thirty years ago, so there are many sensitivities. But we are determined to normalize our relations.” Plenković has continued to meet with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, including at Davos, and the nation’s foreign ministers have met on multiple occasions as well. 

• Plenković was steadfast in his belief that current candidate countries will benefit from EU membership. “EU membership is the only attraction, the only real source of transformative power and the political will to change in many of the polities which are not yet in the EU.” 

A shared history of conflict

• Plenković is a firm supporter of ongoing efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defenses and economy. “My government was swift and articulate in condemning Russian aggression and in extending solidarity to Ukraine in all potential ways,” he said. Plenković summed up his vision of aiding Ukraine with one word: sustainability. “Sustainability of Ukrainians to resist, sustainability of Western assistance of Ukraine, and sustainability of the Western governments to live up to the challenges that we are faced with, which are prices of energy, inflation, food, and keeping the social cohesion in our countries.”

• Plenković also noted Croatia’s role in housing Ukrainian refugees. “We are hosting around twenty-two thousand refugees from Ukraine, and they are well integrated. Children are going to our schools. Due to the proximity of Slavic languages, it is even easier in a Slavic country than somewhere else.”

• Plenković saw some glimmers of hope in the situation, too, particularly in the way that Russian aggression has spurred increased European unity. “The unity of the EU is really unprecedented. This unity is unique in international affairs for the last three decades. I can’t recall of any remotely similar scenario where international support was so strong.”

Nick Fouriezos is a writer with more than a decade of journalism experience around the globe.

Watch the full event

The post Croatia’s prime minister: There should be fewer roadblocks for EU enlargement to the Balkans—and Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the wake of vigorous shuttle diplomacy meant to jumpstart the adoption of an EU-designed proposal to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo, the United States is pushing Prishtina to fulfill its prior commitment to create the Association of ethnic Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM).  

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Tatjana Lazarevic, the Editor-in-Chief of the KoSSev news portal and a resident of the Kosovo Serb-majority city of Mitrovica in the north of Kosovo. 

Lazarevic addresses the challenges faced by the Kosovo Serb community in the northern part of Kosovo, explaining why more families and young intellectuals are moving to cities across the border in Serbia.   

Ilva Tare poses key questions on the debate surrounding inter-communal relations and local government autonomy in Kosovo. Do Kosovo Serbs want the ASM? What is the role of Belgrade and Prishtina in the daily lives of Kosovo Serbs? Will the creation of the ASM result in an entity in Kosovo akin to a Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the future for Kosovo Serbs in the north? | A Debrief with Tatjana Lazarevic  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

North Macedonia’s accession to the European Union has been delayed in the last two years due to disagreements with Bulgaria. The dispute centers around the identity of the Slavs in Macedonia and whether there is a istinctly Macedonian ethnicity and language.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Petar Todorov a historian and a member of the Bilateral Multidisciplinary Expert Commission for Historical and Educational questions between Republic of North Macedonia and Republic of Bulgaria.

After 22 meetings of the joint Commission is a final agreement close? What are the chances of finding a “common ground” on historical narratives? Is it possible to adopt a pluralist view of history for north Macedonia and Bulgaria while maintaining the political legitimacy and national sovereignty? Why is the distinction between language and dialect so controversial between the two countries?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – How can Bulgaria and North Macedonia overcome their differences? | A debrief with Petar Todorov appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Even though the situation between Serbia and Kosovo is more tense than in recent memory, with the war in Ukraine as a backdrop, the broader situation in the region remains unchanged. As EU enlargement remains stalled, the best prospect for improving the lives of citizens in the region appears to be the private sector investment in economic development.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined in this episode of #BalkansDebrief by Diana Gligorijevic, the co-founder of Telegroup Solutions, an IT Provider and telecommunication company in Serbia, and Mergim Cahani, the co-founder and the CEO of Gjirafa, US-registered company operating across Southeast Europe. 

In this episode, Tare poses key questions on the regional investment climate, economic development, and the critical role of the private sector. What are main weaknesses and strengths of investing in the region, especially with unresolved bilateral issues? How do politics play a role in the investment climate? Have their businesses felt any impact from the heated political rhetoric? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – How can investment drive regional prosperity? | A debrief with Diana Gligorijevic and Mergim Cahani appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Another end-of-year flare-up in the north of Kosovo was just the latest in a cycle of crisis that repeats itself every time a deadline for normalization is approaching or a new agreement is about to take effect between Kosovo and Serbia.

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews Tim Judah, a journalist and author, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the role played by the Serbian President and the Prime Minister of Kosovo in reaching a normalization agreement acceptable to both parties. Tim Judah recently wrote an article titled “Will Kosovo war ever end?”, analyzing the cycle of instability and the role of regional leader’s in perpetuating it. 

With the West appearing to pressure Prishtina to implement the Association of Serbian Municipalities, will Kosovar government agreed to the Western demands? What is the likelihood that parties agree to the Franco-German proposal? Beyond the Serbia-Kosovo standoff, what is the biggest challenge that the Western Balkans are currently facing?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will relations between Kosovo and Serbia normalize?| A debrief with Tim Judah appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Eser Özdil joins TRT World to the Turkey-Bulgaria gas interconnector appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are some of the Europe Center’s key takeaways for Europe and transatlantic relations in 2022? Looking back at this year, what were some of our favorite debrief episodes and speakers? As the Euro-Atlantic faces crises on multiple fronts, what predictions can we make for 2023?

On this year-end episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Atlantic Debrief co-host Damir Marusic, Britain Debrief host Ben Judah, and Balkans Debrief host Ilva Tare, all Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, for a review of 2022 and a look ahead to 2023.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

Fellow

Rachel Rizzo

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Europe Center Transform Europe Initiative

Economy & Business English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #AtlanticDebrief – What happened this year? | A Debrief from the Debrief hosts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will the regional crises turn into opportunities? A debrief with Maja Piscevic and Damir Marusic

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has largely defined the year with the crises across the Western Balkans shaping against this grim backdrop. Even though the year-end leaves the region in an uncertain place, with tensions between Serbia and Kosovo at an all-time high, some positive developments ought to be noted.

Ilva Tare, Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, speaks with Maja Piscevic, Nonresident Fellow, and Damir Marusic, Senior Fellow, at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the high and low points of the year and the challenges ahead for the region.

How significant is the EU’s renewed commitment to the region’s enlargement perspective? Is there a way out of the deadlock between Kosovo and Serbia? How can the United States and the EU work together in region? What are the chances for the Common Regional Market to be realized? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Will the regional crises turn into opportunities? | A debrief with Maja Piscevic and Damir Marusic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why should the EU speed up the integration process in the Western Balkans? A debrief with Paul Taylor

The recent EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana, Albania, was seen as a step in the right direction for reinvigorating the EU enlargement process. Is there a new political will for enlargement among the EU member states? How did the new geopolitical momentum following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine affect the membership prospects of the Western Balkan countries?

Ilva Tare, Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow, speaks with Paul Taylor, Senior Fellow for Peace, Security and Defence at Friends of Europe, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the outcomes of the EU-Western Balkans summit.

Is the EU able to give the region a clear and realistic timeline for enlargement? Why is the region lacking developments funds? How can investments be used as a tool to encourage reform? What are the prospects for normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo? 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why should the EU speed up the integration process in the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Paul Taylor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has promised to put the EU enlargement process back on track, vowing to make the Western Balkans’ future a foreign-policy priority for his government. “The stability and prosperity of your region cannot be detached from the stability and prosperity of Europe as a whole,” Scholz said at the summit.

Enlargement hit a roadblock in 2019, when France blocked opening negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia, with President Emmanuel Macron demanding reform of the enlargement process before considering new members. This occurred just after North Macedonia had settled its long-running name dispute with Greece, expecting to have these compromises unlock its EU path. As soon as new EU procedures were drawn up and adopted and Macron dropped his objections, Bulgaria blocked the opening of North Macedonia’s candidacy for arcane reasons related to language and history—only to relent this past May when France finally brokered a compromise. Thursday’s summit was a serious attempt to build on this breakthrough.

The EU enlargement agenda needs all the help it can get. Though there has been a lot written about how the EU is stepping up to the moment by granting Ukraine and Moldova candidate status in the shadow of Russia’s aggression, the reality is much less sunny. Many countries in the EU have long been committed to slow-rolling the process. And in private conversations with political and civil-society leaders across Europe this year, we have heard concerns voiced about how little has really changed. Indeed, there is a sense that with Ukraine and Moldova, the EU is making promises it has no ability to keep.

The Western Balkans countries’ unmet promise of EU membership was first extended at Thessaloniki in 2003. While it’s true that necessary democratic reforms, including on media freedoms and the rule of law, have stalled across the region, it’s also true that EU member states have shown a real political hesitancy on enlargement—and people on the ground in the Balkans can feel it. “They pretend that they want to let us in, and we pretend to reform,” is a frequent refrain from dispirited activists across the region. Many enlargement advocates across the EU fret that a similar mistake was made earlier this year in raising unrealistic hopes in Kyiv and Chișinău.

Berlin’s lead role

In this context, renewed German engagement in the Western Balkans is to be applauded and welcomed. Given that actual accession is still many years away even in the most optimistic scenarios, Scholz has focused his energies on reviving efforts at establishing a Common Regional Market (CRM) to implement the “four freedoms”—the freedom of movement for goods, capital, services, and people—across the region’s economies, firmly based on EU standards. Doing so will go a long way toward preparing the region for full membership, the thinking goes. It will also provide tangible benefits to the region’s citizens by creating a more attractive destination for Western capital, especially as global supply chains struggle to adapt to political imperatives for near- and friend-shoring. The agreements signed this week represent a meaningful step in re-establishing the initiative, which had foundered over disputes between Serbia and Kosovo at a Berlin Process summit in Sofia in 2020.

The Berlin Process was launched by then German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 at a time when hopes for enlargement had first started to fade. It has been criticized for talking big but delivering little. Early efforts at establishing the CRM yielded an agreement guaranteeing free cellular roaming across the region—and little else. Transformative infrastructure investments, an important plank of the initiative, failed to meaningfully materialize and suffered from delays in matching funds to projects.

But the Berlin Process’s annual summit schedule did generate a previously scarce commodity: a shared political consciousness and familiarity among the region’s leaders. When tensions and disputes halted progress on CRM in Sofia (with Kosovo refusing to sign agreements that allow Serbia to persist in not recognizing its statehood) three of the region’s six countries—Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania—forged ahead on realizing the four freedoms among themselves.

In launching the Open Balkan initiative last year, the three have made progress in signing several agreements. Implementation of measures that would allow citizens the freedom to work in any of the three participating countries is currently held up in North Macedonia’s parliament. But expedited customs “green lanes” for the transportation of goods among the three have been opened, and tourism and cultural exchange has increased. The thaw between Serbia and Albania has been most pronounced, but relations between Serbia and North Macedonia have also markedly warmed.

A cottage industry sprung up among think tanks and civil society, with people arguing over whether Open Balkan represented a dangerous alternative to European-mediated efforts such as the Berlin Process, or whether it was a healthy sign that the region was maturing and taking initiative on its own. In their efforts to reboot the Berlin Process, the Germans have admirably steered clear of this ultimately academic debate. They have renewed their efforts at using the institutional weight of the EU to make progress with all six countries. If a subset of the countries gets ahead of the pack on their own initiative, all the better—as long as their integration efforts are fully in line with European standards.

Politics at the fore

In our conversations in Berlin this autumn, we were told that the big lesson learned from previous rounds has been the importance of political engagement, especially on the European side. No longer can progress on European integration be treated as a dry technocratic problem, a question of sequencing reforms in just the right way. Political commitment from the region’s leaders will be met, and tested, by reciprocal political goodwill at the highest levels on the European side. Getting things done will depend on both sides doing their part. The personal engagement by Scholz, both in the run-up and at the summit, is a testament to this new approach.

And that level of engagement will be necessary for tackling issues on the horizon. The coming winter’s privations will likely strain the impoverished region’s economies. EU leaders, aware of how poorly the Balkans were integrated into the continent’s COVID-19 response (and the residual bitterness that experience has engendered), are keen not to repeat the mistake. Immediate food and energy needs were discussed in Berlin this week, as were ambitious plans for financing the region’s transition to a more sustainable, greener energy mix.

The agreements signed this week are a long-overdue and important step in the right direction. Follow-through will be very important. The next Berlin Process summit will be held in Tirana, and the 2024 edition in Vienna. And progress will not just be measured in how well the region is integrating, but also on resolving outstanding disputes, especially between Serbia and Kosovo. “It is high time to overcome regional conflicts that have continued for far too long—conflicts that divide you and hold your countries back on your European path,” Scholz said on Thursday. Serbia’s reluctance to fully align itself with the EU’s common foreign policy on Russia is another bone of contention. Expect political pressure to pile on Belgrade even as Europe opens its coffers to help the region through a difficult time.

The most hopeful sign is that Europe seems to have embraced political engagement. The Berlin Process will succeed if it is used as a problem-solving and action-forcing tool in the region. The changes must be seen to be happening, not just felt after the fact. Visible summitry is an important component of success, but it alone is not a magic formula. Much work remains to be done.

Damir Marusic is a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center who works on the Council’s Balkans Forward Initiative.

Maja Piscevic is a nonresident senior fellow at the Europe Center and representative of the Council in the Western Balkans.

Jörn Fleck is the acting director of the Europe Center.

The post Germany steps up in the Western Balkans. Will the EU follow its lead?  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What challenges do the Western Balkans face after the Berlin Process? A debrief with Milan Nič

With the Berlin Process summit in sight, the first headlines coming from Germany indicate that Berlin will deliver agreements signed by all six Western Balkans countries. Will these new regional dynamics produce long-term meaningful changes?

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks with Milan Nič, Senior Fellow at the German Council on the Foreign Relations, in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the next steps for the Balkan countries following the implementation of these agreements.

Can we expect an update on the Common Regional Market? Can the Open Balkan initiative work in tandem with the Berlin process, even though some countries oppose it? Is there a role for the US in the Berlin process?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What challenges do the Western Balkans face after the Berlin Process? | A debrief with Milan Nič appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the problem with democracies representing people’s interests? | A Debrief with Lea Ypi

The quest for freedom has long been the interest of political scholars and philosophers. Yet an 11-year-old girl in Albania began debating the issue with her parents while the streets of Tirana erupted with protests demanding freedom. That girl is Lea Ypi, a political theory professor at the London School of Economics and the author of the internationally acclaimed novel, “Free, coming of age at the end of Communism.”

Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare talks with Lea Ypi in this episode of #BalkansDebrief about the meaning of democracy and why some democracies backslide into autocracies. How did people in Eastern Europe deal with the challenges of representation and democracy in the 1990s?

What can history reveal about how post-communist countries dealt with the issue of memory? How can the recent rise of nationalism and populism in so-called established democracies be explained?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the problem with democracies representing people’s interests? | A Debrief with Lea Ypi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What will the Berlin process bring to the Western Balkans? A Debrief with Manuel Sarrazin 

When German Chancellor Olaf Scholz broke the news of a Berlin Process 2.0, the Western Balkans’ hopes for a revival of European enlargement were revived. The Common Regional Market and the ‘four freedoms’ are at the heart of Berlin process, but previous negotiations broke down in Sofia due to differences between Serbia and Kosovo. 

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks with Manuel Sarrazin, the German Special Representative for the Western Balkans, about a potential breakthrough in November’s summit in the hopes of seeing concrete results and signed agreements between the six countries. 

What are the challenges if there is a Common Regional Market deal? How will implementation work? Does the Open Balkan initiative have any role if Common Regional Market is adopted? Will the Berlin Process 2.0 provide support for youth and professionals from the region who are leaving the Balkans? Learn more on this episode of #BalkansDebrief with Ilva Tare. 

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What will the Berlin process bring to the Western Balkans? | A Debrief with Manuel Sarrazin  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian deepfake attempt targeting Bayraktar drones CEO disrupted

Russia blames Ukrainian military intelligence for Kerch bridge explosion 

Bulgaria investigates claims of involvement in Kerch bridge blast

Media policy

Russia adds Meta to its ‘terrorist’ organizations list, blocks EUvsDisinfo website

Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine

Russia escalated its war against Ukraine this week with missile attacks and airstrikes on cities across the country, including the first serious attack in the capital Kyiv in months. The Russian army reportedly launched at least ten missile strikes, nineteen airstrikes, and ninety artillery attacks targeting more than thirty settlements across Ukraine, including Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Odesa, Sloviansk, Novobakhmutivka, Sieversk, Bilohorivka, Nikopol, and Blahodativka, according a Facebook post from the Ukrainian General Staff. Russia shelled twenty-five settlements in the direction of the Pivdennyi Buh river, across the frontline, they added. In the direction of Novopavlivka and Zaporizhzhia, the Russian army shelled twenty villages, including Vuhledar, Novopil, Shakhtarske, Mali Scherbaky, Velyka Novosilka, Malynivka, and Mala Tokmachka. As a direct result of the strikes, five regions were left without power for days, while elsewhere the power supply was partially damaged, according to the Ukrainian state emergency service. It specified that Lviv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Ternopil regions were completely deprived of electricity. 

According to a United Nations assesment, “Explosions were reportedly heard, and missiles and drones were reportedly intercepted in the western Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, and Rivne regions, in the northern Kyiv region, and in the southern Mykolaiv and Odesa regions, as well as in the central Dnipropetrovsk region.”  

In the central Vinnytsia region, the Ladyzhyn thermal power plant was reportedly hit with Iranian-made Shahed drones. Soon after, the Ukrainian energy ministry stated that it was halting its electricity exports in order to stabilize its energy systems. This halt has a significant impact on Moldova, which purchases approximately one-third of its electricity from Ukraine, including twenty percent from Ukrhydroenergo and ten percent from Energoatom. 

According to Serhiy Bratchuk,  spokesperson for the Odesa military administration, Russian forces brought Iranian instructors to Dzankoi in Crimea, as well as Zaliznyy and Lanivtsi in Kherson, to train Russian forces on how to use the Shahed-136 kamikaze drones. This claim has not been independently confirmed. 

In yet another signal of a broader escalation by Russia, on October 8 the Ukrainian ambassador in Belarus received a note accusing Ukraine of “preparing an attack on Belarus.” The letter can be interpreted as providing a pretext for attacks on Ukraine from Belarusian territory. On October 10, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced Russia and Belarus had agreed to deploy a “joint regional group of forces.” This raises concerns about whether the northern fronts in the regions of Chernihiv and Kyiv would be reactivated.  

Meanwhile, Moldova said Russian missiles that targeted Ukraine crossed Moldovan airspace, prompting the Foreign Ministry of Moldova to summon the Russian ambassador. Moldova also announced that it is considering the possibility of declaring a partial mobilization. Moldovan Minister of Defense Anatolie Nosatîi said that Moldova would have to close its airspace due to the launch of Russian missiles. Later in the day, however, the Moldovan Ministry of Defense denied that a Russian missile had entered the country’s airspace. 

The Russian army continues to experience difficulties with new recruits and the mobilization process. According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty journalist Mark Krutov, more than one hundred Russian conscripts from Bryansk allegedly refused to go to Ukraine, stating that they lacked training and new equipment. “One of the soldiers reached out to journalists with his complaints,” Krutov reported. “He says commanders told them they will be sent in a few days ‘to retake Lyman’, while only one man from the previous group of 100 mobilized soldiers sent to Ukraine returned.” 

According to a report by Middle East Eye, “Money and menace are being used to recruit Muslims in the Caucasus….Parents in the deprived region are encouraging their sons to fight out of fear that local authorities could retaliate if they refuse.” The report stated that around one thousand Chechen fighters have lost their lives in Ukraine.

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russian deepfake attempt targeting Bayraktar drones CEO disrupted

The Ukrainian defense ministry’s intelligence department (GUR) has claimed that Russian operatives used deepfake technology in an attempt to discredit Ukraine’s partnership with Turkey.  

According to a GUR Telegram post from October 9, Russian intelligence services attempted to use deepfake technology to call Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of of Baykar Defense, the Turkish defense company providing Bayraktar drones to Ukraine. The GUR claimed that Russian intelligence services tried to impersonate Ukraine’s Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in the video call with Bayraktar. However, instead of speaking with the Bayraktar executive, GUR said the Russian intelligence service was connected to an “equally fake” individual impersonating a Bayraktar employee. The GUR added that the Russian intelligence service made pronunciation errors when speaking in the Ukrainian language. Specifically, the speaker used the Ukrainian expression babyne lito (бабине літо, “Grandmother’s summer” or “Indian summer”), but used the Russian pronunciation bab’ye lyeto (бабьє лєто) instead.

The GUR stated that the purpose of the operation was to discredit the cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey. “At the end of the conversation, the Russian operatives were informed that they had been exposed and would be prosecuted,” it said. 

There have been several instances of deepfakes used since the beginning of the Russian invasion. In the early days of the war, Kremlin supporters circulated a deepfake of Zelenskyy urging the Ukrainian military to surrender. The latest incident demonstrates how pro-Russian deepfakes have moved beyond recorded footage to livestream deepfakes, in which a synthetic face can overlay an individual’s face in real time, creating an additional illusion of authenticity.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia blames Ukrainian military intelligence for Kerch bridge explosion

Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed that a truck with explosive materials caused the detonation on the Kerch bridge on October 8, and accused Ukrainian military intelligence of carrying out what it called a “terrorist attack.” The blast resulted in two road spans partially collapsing and seven fuel tanks catching fire. The FSB said that four people were killed as a result of the explosion. On October 12, the FSB said it had detained eight people in connection with the incident, including five Russian citizens as well as three Ukrainian and Armenian nationals. 

According to the FSB, explosives weighing 22.7 tons were camouflaged in plastic film rolls and sent from the Ukrainian port of Odesa to Bulgaria’s Ryse port in early August. They allege the cargo was sent to a Georgian port in Poti; from there it traveled to Yerevan and cleared customs at the Trans Alliance terminal. According to Russia’s version of events, the cargo left Yerevan on a Georgian registered DAF truck and crossed the Russia-Georgia border via the Upper Lars checkpoint on October 4. The FSB claimed that the truck was unloaded at the Armavir wholesale base in the Krasnodar region of Russia on October 6. The next day, the cargo was allegedly loaded on to a different vehicle, owned by a Russian citizen, and left for Simferpol. The explosion took place at 6:03am Moscow time on October 8.

On October 12, Kremlin-controlled media outlet Ria Novosti published a CCTV video on Telegram allegedly depicting Russian police inspecting the truck. The Telegram post included x-ray style photos from the customs checkpoint showing the contents of the truck. However, the truck seen in the CCTV video has at least two elements that are not visible in the x-ray image. The truck in the CCTV video has two front wheels, whereas the truck in the x-ray image does not. In addition, the truck seen on the CCTV camera has a spare wheel, and while the x-ray photo shows a holder for a spare wheel, it appears to be empty. This indicates that the CCTV video and x-ray photo depict different trucks, which Ria Novosti did not acknowledge. 

On October 12, the Russian Telegram channel Baza published two x-ray photos of a truck, alongside another photo showing the contents of the truck. The photos were reportedly taken in Armenia. The DFRLab used Google reverse image search and found that both photos were first published in an article by Armenpress, which stated that according to Armenian customs control, the truck went through the customs clearance procedure “duly and legally and no risk factors were detected.” The article contained photos taken during the inspection, stating that the x-ray examination of the truck “did not reveal any risk factors”. The x-ray photos published by Ria Novosti and Baza appear to be similar, based on the placement of plastic rolls inside the truck. It is possible that Ria Novosti’s photo is also from Armenian customs control. 

On October 10, the Baza Telegram channel also published a photo of a DAF truck with a Georgian license plate. The post claimed that the pictured truck was used to transport the explosives to Russia. On a same day, the Russian Telegram channel Mash Gor published another photo of a similar truck and claimed that Russian police were searching red DAF trucks with Georgian license plates and found the vehicle in Vladikavkaz, Russia. The post said there was no driver in the vehicle when police arrived, but soon after a driver appeared and was arrested. According to Armenpress, the arrested driver is Artur Terjanyan, a dual citizen of Armenia and Georgia.

Georgian and Bulgarian authorities have denied Russia’s accusation that the truck traveled through their territories.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Bulgaria investigates claims of involvement in Kerch bridge blast

Russian media outlets claimed that Bulgaria was complicit in the October 8 explosion targeting the Kerch bridge. While many details about the explosion are still unknown, and speculation is rife, pro-Kremlin media exploited the incident to spread rumors about the role of Bulgaria, a NATO member, in the attack. Bulgaria’s main intelligence agency DANS launched an investigation into Russian claims that the truck that blew up on the bridge came from Bulgaria. Investigations began immediately after the Kremlin released the claim, following an order by acting Prime Minister Galab Donev. The agency has also notified the Bulgarian prosecutor’s office.  

Ukrainian analysts previously proposed three possible explanations for what happened, including mines detonating on the bridge, a truck bomb, or a rocket attack. While the cause of the blast has not been confirmed, a truck bomb is believed to be the most likely explanation. 

In a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Alexander Bastrykin, head of the Russian Investigative Committee, announced that the route of the truck that allegedly blew up the Crimean bridge started in Bulgaria and then passed through Georgia, Armenia, North Ossetia, and Krasnodar. The European Commission spokesperson Peter Stano said Bastrykin’s words were unreliable. Kiril Petkov, former Bulgarian prime minister and leader of the We Continue the Change party, called on the caretaker government to reject the Kremlin’s suggestion that there was a Bulgarian connection to the bridge bombing. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s pro-Russian political parties insisted on an investigation, prompting angry reactions in the media. This is not the first attempt by Russia to discredit Bulgaria. 

Sofia is in a difficult position because of political differences over the provision of military aid to Ukraine; there is already evidence of Bulgarian weapons in Ukraine. However, the topic has become a major dividing line between political parties in the country, as pro-Kremlin politicians insist that Bulgaria should not be drawn into a war with Russia by providing weapons to Ukraine. In this context, the pro-Kremlin military channel Rybar alleged that Bulgaria had delivered a new shipment of weapons to Ukraine. The channel shared blurry photos, reportedly taken on October 9, of an Antonov An-124 aircraft at an airfield in the city of Burgas. Just one day earlier, the far-right Russian paramilitary group Rusich, which is accused of carrying out executions and war crimes in Ukraine, shared on its Telegram channel a photo of a Bulgarian and Polish passport with the text, “Different people, different countries, one goal.” 

—Ruslan Trad, Resident Fellow for Security Research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Russia adds Meta to its ‘terrorist’ organizations list, blocks EUvsDisinfo website

On October 11, Russia added Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, to its list of terrorist and extremist organizations. While Facebook and Instagram are blocked in Russia, WhatsApp remains available.  

The latest designation by Russia’s financial monitoring agency means that Russian citizens and companies who buy advertisements on Facebook or Instagram could face imprisonment on charges of “sponsoring extremism” or “terrorism.” According to the pro-Kremlin outlet Interfax, Russian law requires banks to freeze funds and stop serving citizens and organizations on the list. 

Russian human rights lawyer Pavel Chikov reported that a Russian prosecutor’s office is already sending letters to Facebook and Instagram users “threatening administrative and criminal liability for posting posts on social networks.”  

Russia declared Meta an extremist organization in March 2022. Following the Kremlin’s crackdown on Western social media platforms, Russian citizens have been using virtual private networks (VPNs) to bypass official bans and access the platforms. In light of the latest designation, it is possible that Russian citizens could face criminal charges for accessing Meta’s products through a VPN. 

In addition, on October 8, Russian internet censor Roskomnadzor blocked the website of EUvsDisinfo, a counter-disinformation project of the European Union. For years, EUvsDisinfo has exposed the Kremlin disinformation campaigns. Roskomnadzor’s move is a continuation of the Russian policy to restrict Western online media and social networks in an attempt to suppress factual information about Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

The post Russian War Report: Russia escalates war by targeting cities across Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Atlantic Council’s Regional Clean Energy Outlook Conference covered by Anadolu Agency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How can US bipartisan legislation help the Western Balkans? A debrief with Senator Jeanne Shaheen 

While the United States is expected to bolster its political commitment to the Western Balkans through economic support, a bipartisan bill introduced in Congress aims to enhance those efforts by providing increased funding and technical assistance.  

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Senator Jeanne Shaheen, U.S. Senator for New Hampshire, who is leading this bipartisan effort to bolster American leadership in the region, all the while  keeping a close eye on events in the Western Balkans. The Senator addresses concerns about Bosnia’s future, questionable extension of the EUFOR mandate, and shares her impressions of the region after returning to the Western Balkans for the second time this year.  

What is the view in the Senate on Serbia now that Serbia and Russia have agreed to align their foreign policies? How can the United States ensure Serbian alignment with the West? What is the United States doing to ensure renewal of the EUFOR mission. What role will the United States play in assisting Albania following the cyber-attacks launched in retaliation for the Iranian MEK’s presence in the country?  

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – How can US bipartisan legislation help the Western Balkans? | A debrief with Senator Jeanne Shaheen   appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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What to expect in Bosnia following the elections? A debrief with Damir Marusic

Bosnian citizens voted for new representatives on October 2. Immediately after the polls closed the Office of the High Representative, led by Christian Schmidt, imposed a new election law requiring immediate implementation.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Damir Marusic, Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, about the main takeaways of the elections.

What is next for Bosnia? Are the Dayton’s accords still relevant? Can Bosnia become a liberal non-ethnic democracy? Why is the West backing the OHR’s decision, seen by critics as giving more power to the nationalists?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What to expect in Bosnia following the elections? | A debrief with Damir Marusic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the four most likely scenarios for Kosovo-Serbia relations by 2027? A debrief with Milica Andric Rakic and Agon Maliqi.

After a decade of attempts to reach an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, the EU and the US appear to have joined forces to find solutions for a long-lasting deal for the future of both countries. Thirteen policy experts from Serbia and Pristina authored a document proposing four likely scenarios.

Two political analysts who took part in the working group “Kosovo and Serbia by 2027” are interviewed by Ilva Tare in this edition of #BalkansDebrief. 

Should we expect Prime Minister Kurti to settle for anything less than a full recognition of Kosovo? Will President Vucic give up the claim that Kosovo is Serbia? Can the West still act as a guarantor of a final deal between the two?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What are the four most likely scenarios for Kosovo-Serbia relations by 2027? | A debrief with Milica Andric Rakic and Agon Maliqi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Will Montenegro hold a general election or find a new majority? A Debrief with Zeljko Pantelic

What is the likelihood that a new government will be formed in Montenegro following the vote of no-confidence? Why did Prime Minister Abazovic lose the parliamentary support? Did President of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic play a role in the country’s recent political unrest?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks with Zeljko Pantelic, a Montenegrin foreign policy expert about the current political developments in Montenegro, country’s EU path, and the Open Balkan Initiative.

Can the EU’s negotiations be completed by 2025? Is there political will to fight organized crime and corruption? Is Russia a destabilizing force in Montenegro?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Will Montenegro hold a general election or find a new majority? | A Debrief with Zeljko Pantelic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the outlook for normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia? A Debrief with Ambassador Christopher Hill

Another crisis between Kosovo and Serbia was averted following close involvement of the EU and the US officials in facilitating reciprocal recognition of ID cards. Conversation now moves forward under the auspices of the EU-facilitated Dialogue.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to the US Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill, about Serbia’s EU path, issues affecting the EU-facilitated dialogue, Serbia’s choice between the West and the East & the US support for the Open Balkan initiative.

Will the United States push Serbia to fully align with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, and in particular, its stance on Ukraine? What is the sentiment in Belgrade about the recognition of Kosovo’s independence? How can the Open Balkan initiative facilitate regional cooperation and attract those skeptical countries in the regions to join?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What is the future of Kosovo-Serbia relations? | A Debrief with Ambassador Christopher Hill appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why does Russia want instability in the Western Balkans?

Increased Russian intelligence activity and security threats over the last few weeks across the Western Balkans have troubled some NATO allied countries. Has Russia increased its activity in the region as a result of the war in Ukraine?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Fabian Zhilla, a Senior Fellow of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, about the national security threats posed by Russian intelligence activities and cyber attacks.

Are the Balkans prepared to fend off a hybrid war? Should the visa regime for the Russian citizens be revisited across the Balkans?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Why does Russia want instability in the Western Balkans?| A debrief with Fabian Zhilla appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Another round of discussions between Serbia and Kosovo ended inconclusively Thursday in Brussels, even as tensions between the two countries continue to spiral. The stakes are high: Violence almost erupted two weeks ago in the north of Kosovo, with local Serbs raising barricades and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić warning that open conflict was imminent. 

The failure of the dialogue has ominous implications not just for the region, but for Europe’s longstanding approach to peacemaking. The war in Ukraine has ushered in a new era on the continent and emboldened local leaders to test the limits of brinksmanship. Merely facilitating dialogue between the two sides may no longer be sufficient.

The cause of recent tensions was Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s move to implement requirements that anyone entering Kosovo with Serbian identification documents needs to be provided a declaration sheet at the border crossing to temporarily replace the Serbian documents, and that cars bearing Serbian license plates for cities in Kosovo be replaced by plates issued by Prishtina. Belgrade continues to claim that Kosovo is a part of Serbia, so it sees acquiescing to Prishtina’s move as de facto recognizing Kosovo’s independence. Kosovo sees the move as reciprocal and fair, as Kosovars traveling to Serbia need to have Belgrade-issued documents on hand at all times.

Western leaders, with the United States in the lead, temporarily defused this most recent crisis by convincing Kurti to postpone implementing the reciprocity measures. The meeting Thursday in Brussels was supposed to make progress toward a solution that would head off a renewed standoff next month. But there was little pragmatism to be found, and European Union (EU) foreign policy chief Josep Borrell gave a curt statement, saying discussions will continue even though the summit failed to deliver a breakthrough.

Heading into Thursday’s talks, neither Kurti nor Vučić signaled any flexibility. The former insisted that pressure be applied to Serbia by Europe and the West. Belgrade has thus far failed to align itself with Western policy on Russia, refusing to fully implement sanctions tied to the war in Ukraine. Kurti says the measures being proposed are only fair, and that nationalist and pro-Russian rhetoric rampant in Serbia’s unfree media shows the true face of the Vučić regime—one that must not be propitiated and appeased.

Vučić, meanwhile, demanded that his Kosovar counterpart grant a measure of autonomy to Serbian communities in Kosovo—to bring into being the so-called Association of Serbian Municipalities. These were agreed upon in previous rounds of negotiations by Kurti’s predecessors, but Kurti ruled out implementing them once he was elected. Prishtina has also recently walked back another one of its previous commitments by disallowing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to facilitate Kosovar Serbs voting in Serbian elections. Vučić claims that all this shows Kurti is acting in bad faith. He insists that Serbia is committed to a peaceful resolution to the crisis and calls the move on license plates and ID papers a senseless, destabilizing provocation.

For ten years, EU officials have been tasked with mediating the conflict and trying to achieve “a comprehensive legally-binding normalization agreement” through the EU-facilitated dialogue. The EU sees itself as playing a neutral pacifying role in the region every time tensions emerge, working as an honest broker and providing the two sides a forum in which to work out their differences. That role may no longer be sustainable. 

Russia’s war in Ukraine has changed dynamics in the Western Balkans. The Kremlin is actively inflaming Serbian voters’ anti-Western grievances and pro-Russian sentiment so that a compromise becomes exceedingly difficult for Belgrade. This constrains Vučić’s room for maneuvering. His time in office has been marked by successfully balancing between the West and revisionist anti-Western powers—but that, too, may no longer be sustainable. Kurti sees all this and is moving ahead precisely to force Vučić, and by extension the EU, into choosing sides. 

Diplomatic successes often come at the very moment that tensions rise to unbearable levels. Those levels could, unfortunately, involve localized violence after September 1, when Kosovo is set to implement its measures for local Serbs. Though a wider war appears unlikely at this juncture—the NATO peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo is prepared to step in forcefully and increase troop numbers—riots and bloodshed are not out of the question.

Crisis, they say, breeds opportunity—and amid such a scenario, there may be a path forward. But it will involve the EU abandoning its neutral position as a facilitator and instead working hard to come up with creative solutions—and forcing them on both Serbia and Kosovo to an extent that it has never tried to do before. A grand bargain probably involves some sort of meaningful autonomy for Serbian minorities in Kosovo, granted in exchange for full and unconditional recognition by Serbia of Kosovo’s statehood. 

None of these are new ideas. But we are in new times that require new vigor in pursuing ambitious statesmanship. Obviously, both Kurti and Vučić will ultimately need to make painful concessions. But the time for dialogue just for the sake of dialogue is behind us. The West must try to break the impasse. Doing anything less may prove disastrous.

Damir Marusic is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Luka Ignac is a program assistant at the Europe Center.

This article was updated to more accurately reflect the nature of the Kosovo authorities’ requirements.

The post The Western Balkans need a problem-solver, not a facilitator appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Why did the proposed amendment of the electoral law in Bosnia set off protests and heated political rhetoric? 

With general elections set to take place in October, the Bosnian political spectrum still has to reach an agreement to revise the electoral law. Why did the Office of High Representative’s proposed changes to the electoral law start protests in Sarajevo?

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Adnan Huskic, President of the Center for Election Studies, who says that implementing changes to the election law so late in the game would be a mistake, as the campaign has already started.

Is Bosnia facing a crisis again? Will the EUFOR mandate be extended in November? Are the US and the UK sanctions against Bosnian officials having an effect?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – What set off protests and heated political rhetoric in Bosnia? | A debrief with Adnan Huskic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What happened on the border between Kosovo and Serbia?

Another escalation of tensions on the border between Kosovo and Serbia raised concerns in Europe and in the US about a potential spillover to the rest of the Balkans.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare speaks to Petrit Selimi, Former Foreign Minister of Kosovo, who says that the crisis has not been averted but only postponed for a month.

Will the involvement of EU Commission Vice President Borrell ensure continued dialogue between President Vucic and Prime Minister Kurti? Has Russian support for Serbia made the dialogue more difficult? How can regional cooperation in the Western Balkans be unlocked?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What triggered tensions on the border between Kosovo and Serbia? | A debrief with Petrit Selimi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

For Western governments already jittery over the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, fresh Balkan violence was the last thing they needed. Through quick-action diplomacy, they seemed to have averted the worst—but shouldn’t keep their eyes off what could still grow into a serious issue.

The fact that a spat over official documentation—requiring local Serbs to obtain Kosovan IDs and car registrations—sparked such tensions is a testament to the fragility of the situation.

The issue has been discussed for more than a decade as part of the ongoing dialogue facilitated by the European Union (EU). Moreover, the recent decision by the Kosovo government to require new documentation was fully reciprocal to what the Serbian government has been doing to Kosovars for fifteen years. But as the deadline for the implementation of these decisions loomed Sunday, Russia-friendly Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies—backed up by state media—accused Kosovars of preparing attacks on the north and hunting Serbs.

Things quickly began spiraling out of control. As local Serbian militants erected barricades with heavy machinery and trucks, Kosovan police and NATO troops reinforced their positions at the border crossings. Officials confirmed shootings and attacks against police and Albanian civilians. Serbia’s interior minister has even been spotted wearing the notorious “Z” insignia synonymous with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Journalists, experts, and Ukrainian lawmakers scrambled to react to what appeared to be an attempt by Belgrade to purposely inflame tensions. That fear was not baseless: For months, Western officials and Balkan leaders have worried that the region might become fertile ground for Russian meddling. 

In the end, both the EU and United States pressured Kosovo to postpone the “reciprocity decision” for a month. But while an immediate crisis was averted, a lasting solution has not been found. In the medium to long term, it’s clear that something must immediately change in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, which is facilitated by the EU but also supported by the United States. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Karen Donfried recently stated: “The status quo is unsustainable; not only does it hinder Kosovo and Serbia’s European futures, but it benefits the Kremlin.”

Kosovo can’t expect recognition by the remaining five EU countries that don’t recognize its statehood without a comprehensive normalization of relations with Serbia. Spain, for one, has already indicated this would unlock its recognition—which would in turn allow for Kosovo to become a signatory of the Partnership for Peace and pave the way for its eventual membership in NATO (which Washington supports). Bringing investments, tourism, and much-needed integration into the Council of Europe, NATO, and other bodies where Russia does not have a veto is contingent on this normalization.

Meanwhile, Serbia must stop its belligerent actions toward Kosovo. Its media landscape, under full control of the government in Belgrade, has been spewing hate speech against my country for far too long. For their part, the EU and the United States must be more forceful in compelling Serbia to once and for all choose its geopolitical orientation rather than attempting to play both sides. There are some indications that this has already begun; but dancing around the thorniest problems in the Balkans won’t suffice to prevent crisis and bloodshed.

Brussels and Washington must change their formula of ineffective, last-minute shuttle diplomacy to solve crises. The pay-off—lasting peace in the Balkans—is far greater than the political capital needed to finally close this fractious chapter between Kosovo and Serbia. 

Petrit Selimi is the former foreign minister of the Republic of Kosovo.

The post Former Kosovo foreign minister: How to stop Serbia spat from spiraling out of control appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How will the new EU enlargement methodology affect the Balkans?

The start of membership talks with Albania and North Macedonia marked a milestone in the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans after many years of disappointment.

In this episode of #BalkansDebrief, Ilva Tare interviews Pierre Mirel, Honorary Director General of the European Commission, on the impact of the new EU methodology in the accession talks. Has the EU’s credibility been restored? Will the reversibility of the enlargement process work in practice? What is the staged accession approach, proposed by Mirel?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Will the new EU enlargement methodology facilitate the Balkans accession to the EU? | A debrief with Pierre Mirel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How can the West support the Balkans to shape their European future?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused a tectonic shift in Europe and its periphery. It is time for decisive action from EU leaders to engage strategically in the Western Balkans. Ilva Tare interviews Damon Wilson, President and CEO of the National Endowment for Democracy, on the opportunity for Western support in the region.

Can the United States engage more actively in the region? What role can the United States play in encouraging reforms in the Western Balkans? How can the next generation of young politicians and entrepreneurs committed to democratic values in the region be supported and encouraged by EU and US partners?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – How can the West support the Western Balkans to shape their European future? | A debrief with Damon Wilson appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Is a compromise possible in the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia?

While Sofia accepted the French proposal to find a solution between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, protests erupted after the Skopje government decided to consider approving the demands before beginning EU accession talks.

Ilva Tare discusses the origins of this dispute and the path forward for both countries with Dimitar Bechev, lecturer at Oxford’s School of Global & Area Studies. Is it possible for Bulgaria and North Macedonia to create a model for non-provocative national identity expression? Is the current crisis setting a precedent for future rounds of regional enlargement? Can the EU act as a guarantee for bilateral talks?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Is a compromise possible in the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia? | A Debrief from Dimitar Bechev appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Western support for the Southern Corridor and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline has long been an important element of European gas diversification efforts. Although a very minor consumer of Russian natural gas, the Western Balkans is an area in which Russia has sought to oppose NATO and EU expansion and counter Western gas diversification efforts. The West needs to maintain a strong and supportive posture in this important southern flank of NATO.

Russia’s role in the Western Balkans

During the Ukraine war, Russia has continued its efforts to destabilize the Western Balkans using its pro-Russian allies, especially in Serbia and the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose governments have not joined the Western sanctions process against Russia.

Gazprom exports natural gas to Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Bulgaria. As part of its strategy to bypass Ukraine and discontinue use of the Trans-Balkan pipeline through Ukraine and Moldova, Russia built with Turkey the two-line TurkStream pipeline with one line a 15.75 billion-cubic-meter (bcm) pipeline to Bulgaria with onward links to Serbia, North Macedonia, and Hungary. Gazprom began shipping gas through TurkStream to Bulgaria, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in early January 2020, and Hungary is now importing Russian gas from Serbia through a pipeline with a capacity of 8.5 bcm per year.

Serbia is the cornerstone of Russia’s strategic interests in the region and Russia has supported Serbia in its non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence as well. Serbia has also expanded its imports of Russian military equipment, including MiG fighters, tanks, air defense, and missiles, a strategy of growing concern to the six NATO members that neighbor Serbia.

Gas diversification and transit

Western Europe’s efforts to reduce dependence on Russian gas have important implications for the Western Balkans. First, they enhance the importance of the Trans Adriatic (TAP) gas pipeline that brings Azerbaijani gas from Turkey’s TANAP pipeline through Greece and Albania to Italy, which was 40 percent dependent on Russian gas in 2021 and is currently being driven by Gazprom reductions to find alternative supplies. TAP began operating in 2021 and is expected to operate at its full capacity of 10 bcm per year in 2022 and 2023. The potential expansion of TAP is being considered by Azerbaijan’s SOCAR and other companies and may be put on a fast track.

A second prong of Western Europe’s gas diversification initiative, involving the completion of the IGB (a Greece-Bulgaria interconnector expected to be operational in July 2022) as well as the construction of a new $378 million liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving terminal at Alexandropoulos by 2023 linked with both IGB and TAP, would break the Russian hold on gas supplies to Bulgaria and North Macedonia. Thirdly, the Croatian government is pursuing the expansion of the Krk Island floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) LNG import terminal, built with EU funding. This facility is especially significant in that it has allowed Hungary to diversify its gas imports and receive 1 million bcm per year despite Hungary’s conclusion at the end of 2021 of a long-term contract with Gazprom for up to 4 million bcm of gas supplies per year. Slovenia is also interested in reducing its Russian gas dependence by drawing from the Krk terminal.

Gas substitution and the energy transition

Gas consumption in the Western Balkans currently stands at about 4 bcm per year, mainly in heating and combined heat and power (CHP) systems in major towns and a few industries in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The power sectors of these countries currently have different mixes of hydropower and thermal power, including significant coal and lignite use.

Although the six Western Balkan countries are working to expand renewable energy and have set targets under the Energy Community framework, they are pursuing the expansion or introduction of gas supply in parallel.  Such development can be useful in improving system flexibility, substituting for coal and lignite, and complementing varying seasonal and annual hydro generation and intermittent solar and wind production.

For the three countries without domestic gas connections, Albania is moving to build a gas exit point off the TAP pipeline near the Fier compressor and considering supplying gas to the dormant Vlore thermal plant. Montenegro may be able to obtain gas if the Ionian-Adriatic gas pipeline (a spur off TAP that would extend to Montenegro and on to Croatia) proceeds, and a feasibility study of a possible FSRU LNG import project at the Port of Bar is being conducted. Gas would be especially helpful to reduce Kosovo’s heavy dependence on power from the Kosovo A and B lignite units.  A line from Albania to Kosovo is under consideration and feasibility work for this project, called ALKOGAP, is being financed by the Balkan Investment Framework.

Of three current Russian gas importers, North Macedonia has been the most focused on phasing out coal with an initial target of 2027. With gas consumption and demand growing rapidly, the government seeks to expand the natural gas network beyond Skopje, and a direct 160km Greece-North Macedonia interconnector is planned. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a 187 km Croatia-Bosnia gas interconnector, planned under an agreement between BH-Gas and Plinacro of Croatia for operation in 2024, will help expand and diversify gas supplies. Serbia is the largest gas consumer in the Western Balkans, with over 2.7 bcm annual consumption. It is mainly dependent on coal for power, and gas use is limited to CHPs and district heating systems. In an effort to reduce coal use through renewables and gas, Serbia signed a new 3-year agreement with Gazprom in May; thus, despite EU and German pressure, it is unlikely they will impose sanctions or pursue meaningful gas diversification.

The future of gas in the Western Balkans

The Western Balkans, as part of NATO’s southern flank, is becoming increasingly important to the diversification of Europe’s gas supply and increasing South-North flows and options. The future of gas will depend significantly on the pivotal position of Greece and Turkey with respect to both their transit role and the potential to import more LNG. However, both countries face a major challenge in reducing their high domestic dependence on Russia gas (30 and 43 percent of gas supply in 2021, respectively). Despite Turkey’s past reliability as a transit state for Azerbaijani gas, its controversial purchase of a surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia, its reliance on Russia for the large $20 billion Akkuyu nuclear power complex (which is being negatively affected by the war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia), and strained diplomatic relations between Turkey and Greece are of concern, especially with calls increasing to expand Trans-Adriatic and TANAP volumes and to import gas from Israel and Egypt. Turkey’s agreement at the recent NATO Summit to remove its opposition to the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO, though, is a positive sign.

Though there are innumerable threats emanating from the war in Ukraine that jeopardize European and global security, it is vital that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union give concrete, specific attention to the Western Balkans and support investment in projects to increase gas diversification, develop renewable energy generation, and enhance the integration of regional gas and electricity infrastructure. It is especially important to work with Serbia and help them understand that their future does not lie with Russia. The path forward is thorny and will require crafty and careful diplomacy, but it could prove a pivotal part of the success of Europe’s move to get out from under its dependence on Russian energy.

Dr. Robert F. Ichord, Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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The impact of the European Council’s decision on the Western Balkans

What will happen in the Western Balkans following the European Council’s decision?

As Balkan leaders expressed their frustration with the enlargement impasse, they emphasized the importance of strengthening regional cooperation. Ilva Tare, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, speaks with Maja Piscevic and Damir Marusic, Senior Fellows at the Europe Center with firsthand knowledge of the situation in the region.

Will the path forward for the six Balkan countries towards EU integration be via the Berlin Process 2.0 or the Open Balkan initiative? Can the concept of a European Geopolitical Community help to advance enlargement? If so, how?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

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Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – The impact of the European Council’s decision on the Western Balkans | A Debrief from Damir Marusic and Maja Piscevic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This sounds exactly like Ukraine’s current experience, but it is actually the story of Croatia in the early 1990s.

In 1991, Europe’s biggest conflict since WWII erupted in the Balkans when the Yugoslavian military invaded Croatia after it declared independence. Serbia opposed the secession and sought to claim Croatian lands populated by ethnic Serbs. After an initial attempt to occupy Croatia failed, a self-proclaimed Serbia-backed entity was established within Croatia occupying 26% of the country.

In 1995, Croatia launched two major offensives and regained control over the occupied regions of the country. Despite this success, the cost of the conflict was huge. From a pre-war population of four million, around 15,000 civilians and soldiers were killed or missing. More than half a million people were displaced. Economic losses were equally severe, with GDP falling by half during the first year of the conflict alone. Meanwhile, infrastructure damaged was estimated at approximately EUR 250 billion, or five times Croatia’s annual GDP.

In every single category, these figures are strikingly similar to the costs inflicted on Ukraine during the first four months of today’s ongoing Russian invasion. 

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

Since the end of the Balkan Wars, Croatia has made huge progress. It has undergone a transformation from war-torn country to a high-income EU member state and, after Slovenia, is now the most developed country in the region.

The celebration of Croatia’s Statehood Day this year coincided with a historic milestone for Croatia; the European Commission (EC) and the ECB published a Convergence Report which concluded that Croatia is the only non-euro EU country ready to implement the EURO from 2023. The EC also concluded that Croatia no longer suffers from macroeconomic imbalances and can be excluded from the Macro Imbalances Procedure (MIP). Croatia is now expected to join the Schengen zone and become an OECD member in the near future.   

Reaching this point was not easy. For a quarter of a century, Croatian governments have had to tackle challenges including rebuilding the country, establishing a sensible monetary regime, and handling successive economic crises. Through it all, Croatia’s strong commitment to EU integration has served as a guiding light that has helped steer the country toward more prosperous times.

The parallels between Croatia’s earlier predicament and Ukraine’s current plight are immediately apparent. Both countries were forced to fight for their freedom, identity and independence against a more powerful neighbor. Thankfully, today’s Ukraine also shares the same sense of national unity and solidarity that proved so crucial in Croatia’s earlier success.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Croatians have enormous empathy for Ukraine’s suffering because it is so painfully familiar. Indeed, this emotional bond has been evident ever since Russian aggression against Ukraine first began with the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. Following the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Croatia has provided humanitarian and military aid, with individual Croatians volunteering to help defend Ukraine.

While Ukrainians are very grateful for all this material and moral support, we believe Croatia offers something even more precious: hope. Croatia’s national journey is a source of inspiration for all Ukrainians. It tells us that victory over a far stronger adversary is possible. It gives us reason to believe that occupied lands can be liberated and reintegrated. And it allows us to look with growing confidence toward a future within the European family of nations.

Ukrainians expect to receive EU candidate nation status in the coming days, but nobody in Ukraine is under any illusions over the difficulties that lie ahead. The war with Russia is far from over. Ukraine is fighting not only for its independence but for its very existence. Once this existential threat is overcome, Ukraine must then meet the demanding criteria for EU membership. This historic process may take time, but the journey made by Croatia gives us hope and inspiration.

Vladyslav Rashkovan is Alternate Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund.

Further reading

UkraineAlert May 24, 2022

Putin’s Mariupol Massacre is one of the 21st century’s worst war crimes

By Paul Niland

The Russian destruction of Mariupol ranks among the gravest crimes against humanity of the twenty-first century and sends a clear message to the international community that can be no compromise peace with Putin.

Conflict Democratic Transitions

UkraineAlert May 27, 2022

South Ukraine holds the key to Putin’s dreams of a new Russian Empire

By Taras Kuzio

The biggest European battles since WWII are currently raging in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region but the ultimate outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War is likely to be decided hundreds of miles to the south.

Civil Society Conflict

UkraineAlert Jun 10, 2022

Putin admits Ukraine invasion is an imperial war to “return” Russian land

By Peter Dickinson

By abandoning all pretense and comparing himself to Peter the Great, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has confirmed that he is waging an old-fashioned imperial war of conquest with the goal of annexing Ukrainian land.

Conflict Disinformation

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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The post Croatia’s remarkable national journey is a source of hope for Ukraine appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Part II: What is the path forward for the stalled Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue?

As the dialogue between the two countries is stalled and the region expects anxiously the EU Council decision on accession talks, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and a seasoned observer of the Western Balkans to continue the conversation on the future of the dialogue and EU enlargement. 

This episode broadens the aperture on these issues: What is the sentiment of Serbian citizens on the recognition of the independent state of Kosovo? Does Serbia have the political will and leadership to make a final deal between Belgrade and Pristina? Will the EU make a bold decision on EU enlargement for the region?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post #BalkansDebrief – Part II: What is the path forward for the stalled Belgrade-Pristina dialogue? | A Debrief from Ivan Vejvoda appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What is the path forward for the stalled Belgrade–Pristina dialogue?

The dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo has stalled and the two countries seem to be in a state of unfinished conflict. The Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare speaks to Veton Surroi, a well-known publicist and former politician from Kosovo, about the path forward for both countries.

What can be done to change the status quo and start a productive dialogue? Should Kurti’s government participate in regional and European initiatives? What should Kosovo do to make the most of the Berlin Process 2.0?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – Part I: What is the path forward for the stalled Belgrade–Pristina dialogue? | A Debrief with Veton Surroi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

What are the regional ramifications of Serbia’s gas agreement with Russia?

The three-year agreement announced by Serbian President Vučić with Russia’s Gazprom is a sharp contrast to other EU and candidate countries that have joined the sanctions against Putin for his war in Ukraine. The Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews the Global Energy Center’s Olga Khakova on the ramifications of this agreement to Serbia, the region, and beyond.

What are the implications of this decision for Europe and the Balkans? What does Vučić’s gas deal with Putin signify for Serbia’s relationship with Russia? Is the EU’s oil-import ban enough to affect Putin’s revenues which he uses to fund his war in Ukraine?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.

Fellow

Ilva Tare

Resident Senior Fellow

Europe Center

Albanian English

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

Learn more

The post #BalkansDebrief – What are the regional ramifications of Serbia’s gas agreement with Russia? | A debrief with Olga Khakova appeared first on Atlantic Council.

EU enlargement: a process that is lacking political fuel?

As the June European Council meeting is approaching, Bulgaria continues to block North Macedonia’s opening of accession negotiations with the EU. The Atlantic Council Europe Center’s Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare interviews former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of North Macedonia Nikola Dimitrov on his expectations for this meeting.

Will the EU begin accession negotiations with North Macedonia after a 17 year wait for the country? Will Bulgaria’s decision on North Macedonia have an impact on the Balkans’ European dream? What are the different scenarios for moving forward European enlargement and is a two-staged accession a realistic idea?

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

Watch #BalkansDebrief on YouTube and listen to it as a Podcast.