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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Recent steps to limit access to YouTube are seen as somewhat risky due to the video sharing platform’s status as the most popular social media site in Russia. Indeed, it came as no surprise when the apparent shutdown of YouTube sparked significant alarm and anger on Russian social media. Notably, no genuine alternative currently exists in Russia. The Kremlin has promoted similar domestic platforms such as VK Video and RuTube, but these options have not been able to rival the popularity or audience reach of YouTube itself.

There are additional indications that the Kremlin may now be seeking to strengthen its control over the information space and further cut Russia off from the outside world. On August 9, Roskomnadzor blocked access to Signal, a messaging app that allows for end-to-end encrypted communications. Reports also continue to circulate that the Kremlin is preparing to take similar steps against messenger platform WhatsApp.

Recent measures to prevent Russians from accessing YouTube represent the latest escalation in the Kremlin’s campaign to dominate the domestic information space and eliminate all independent media in today’s Russia. Over the past twenty-four years, Vladimir Putin has created a powerful propaganda machine that has proved instrumental in legitimizing his own increasingly dictatorial rule and mobilizing public support for the invasion of Ukraine. Popular social media platforms like YouTube remain outside of Moscow’s control and therefore pose a significant threat to the Kremlin censors. With Ukrainian troops now advancing inside Russia itself, it would seem that this threat can no longer be tolerated.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Ukraine’s dramatic change in tactics comes after almost a year of slow but steady Russian gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. Since 2023, Russian commanders have been deploying their country’s overwhelming manpower and firepower advantages to gradually pummel Ukrainian forces into submission. The Kremlin’s reliance on brute force has proved costly but effective, leaving the Ukrainian military with little choice but to think outside the box.

It has long been obvious that fighting a war of attrition is a losing strategy for Ukraine. The country’s military leaders cannot hope to compete with Russia’s far larger resources and have no desire to match the Kremlin’s disregard for casualties. The Kursk offensive is an attempt to break out of this suffocating situation by returning to a war of mobility and maneuver that favors the more agile and innovative Ukrainian military. So far, it seems to be working.

While bringing Vladimir Putin’s invasion home to Russia has undeniable strategic and emotional appeal, many commentators have questioned why Ukraine would want to occupy Russian territory. The most obvious explanation is that Kyiv seeks bargaining chips to exchange for Russian-occupied Ukrainian lands during future negotiations.

The significant quantity of Russian POWs captured during the offensive also opens up possibilities to bring more imprisoned Ukrainian soldiers home. Meanwhile, control over swathes of Kursk Oblast could make it possible to disrupt the logistical chains supplying the Russian army in Ukraine.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Beyond the military practicalities of the battlefield, the Kursk offensive is challenging some of the most fundamental assumptions about the war. Crucially, Ukraine’s invasion of Russia has demonstrated that Putin’s nuclear threats and his talk of red lines are in reality a big bluff designed to intimidate the West.

Ukrainians have long accused Western policymakers of being overly concerned about the dangers of provoking Putin. They argue that since 2022, the international response to Russian aggression has been hampered by a widespread fear of escalation that has led to regular delays in military aid and absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons. Ukraine’s offensive has now made a mockery of this excessive caution. If the Kremlin does not view the actual invasion of Russia by a foreign army as worthy of a major escalation, it is hard to imagine what would qualify.

As the Kursk offensive unfolds, Ukraine is hoping the country’s allies will draw the logical conclusions. Initial indications are encouraging, with US and EU officials voicing their support for Ukraine’s cross-border incursion despite longstanding concerns over any military operations inside Russia. At the same time, restrictions on the use of certain categories of weapons remain in place. This is hindering the advance of Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. It is also preventing Kyiv from striking back against the airbases used to bomb Ukrainian cities and the country’s civilian infrastructure.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive represents a powerful signal to the country’s partners. It demonstrates that the Ukrainian military is a highly professional force capable of conducting complex offensive operations and worthy of greater international backing. It also confirms that Putin’s Russia is dangerously overstretched and is militarily far weaker than it pretends to be.

The muddled and unconvincing Russian response to Ukraine’s invasion speaks volumes about the relative powerlessness of the Putin regime. This should persuade Kyiv’s allies of the need for greater boldness and convince them that the time has come to commit to Ukrainian victory.

Oleksiy Goncharenko is a Ukrainian member of parliament with the European Solidarity party.

Red lines and reconciliation: Turkey and Syria’s diplomatic gamble

Sinan Hatahet, Ömer Özkizilcik — Thu, 15 Aug 2024 14:40:24 +0000

Turkey’s motivations for re-engaging with Syria after ending ties in 2011 are driven by regional security concerns, domestic political pressures, and the broader geopolitical landscape. With that in mind, Ankara’s primary objectives include addressing the People’s Defense Units (YPG) threat, facilitating the return of refugees, and seeking political stability in Syria—actions that are heavily influenced by Russia and the United States. From Damascus’s perspective, reconciliation with Turkey is crucial for consolidating Syrian control over its future political landscape and achieving economic recovery through re-established trade links, but it remains wary of legitimizing Ankara’s military presence in its territory.

This article analyzes the evolving dynamics of Syria-Turkey relations, focusing on the key diplomatic milestones and the underlying factors influencing their interactions, and providing a comprehensive understanding of the path toward potential reconciliation. The objective is to identify the critical factors that could facilitate or hinder the normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara.

Turkey’s intentions

The ongoing situation in Syria presents risks for Turkish security, prompting a search for viable solutions to its multifaceted challenges. Starting in 2019, developments in Syria have been shaped by shared Russian-US interests in preventing Turkish intervention in the country and, in particular, safeguarding the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The presence of the Russian military and the prospect of economic sanctions from the United States have repeatedly prevented Turkish efforts to launch military operations in Syria. At least three planned Turkish military operations appear to have been prevented because of these factors.

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Turkey urgently needs to address the situation in northeastern Syria, mainly because it has lost hope in the United States resolving its security concerns related to the YPG-dominated SDF. Ankara views the US partnership with the YPG, the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—a designated foreign terrorist organization—as a national security threat.

As mentioned earlier, Turkey has three main objectives in Syria: to eliminate the YPG threat, facilitate the return of refugees, and seek a political solution for long-term stability. There is growing anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey and the Turkish opposition is gaining strength, putting pressure on the government to address the refugee crisis. Domestic politics significantly influence Turkey’s involvement with Damascus as the government aims to ease public discontent and bolster its political position.

Furthermore, Russia has conducted a successful propaganda campaign targeting the Turkish public and decision-makers, shaping perceptions, and influencing policy decisions. This campaign has further emphasized the supposed benefits of talking with Damascus.

Turkey didn’t perceive a realistic policy option to cooperate with the United States in Syria and pursue talks with Damascus. Speculation about a possible US withdrawal from Syria due to the upcoming US elections in November and a new momentum in Turkish-US relations resulted in Ankara hoping for a joint approach with Washington. However, the United States’ refusal to abandon the YPG continues to be the main barrier to reaching any agreement.

As Turkey cannot achieve its objectives given opposition from Russia and the United States, and Washington has yet to provide Ankara with a viable alternative, Turkey is willing to consider the option proposed by Russia. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has acknowledged the need for an exit strategy from Syria, a reality recognized across the Turkish political spectrum. The main issues concern Syria’s conditions and the nature of governance there. Erdogan has emphasized the need for a new social contract in Syria that would ensure the safe return of refugees and address Turkey’s security concerns.

The Russian strategy

Russia’s efforts to pressure Turkey into a military retreat from Syria suffered a significant setback in 2020, when the Turkish Armed Forces effectively defeated regime forces after the unfortunate loss of thirty-four Turkish soldiers. This event exposed the limits of Russia’s power and necessitated a reassessment of its strategy toward Turkey and the broader Syrian crisis.

While Russia has been focused on the invasion of Ukraine, its strategy in Syria has been aimed at preventing a situation in which a fait accompli by another actor diminishes its influence. Russia is actively pursuing a plan to secure its ongoing presence and control in Syria, while also preventing Western powers or their regional allies from establishing a solid position in Damascus. This strategic maneuvering is essential for Moscow to maintain its geopolitical leverage in the Middle East.

Turkey remains the primary obstacle to a decisive Russian victory in Syria. Moscow recognizes that, to surmount this impediment, it must actively involve Ankara in a manner congruent with Turkey’s interests, which only sometimes coincide with those of Western countries. Russia believes that Turkey is pursuing an autonomous agenda in Syria, which might deviate from the objectives of Western countries. This autonomy presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Russian diplomacy.

Russia is greatly concerned about the possibility of a Turkish-US agreement regarding Syria, particularly considering the potential future withdrawal of US forces from the area. This agreement could weaken Russian interests, leading Moscow to influence Turkey’s position actively. In the worst-case scenario for Russia, negotiations between Ankara and Damascus could serve as a stalling tactic, buying time until the situation in Ukraine stabilizes or the United States withdraws from Syria.

Russia has skillfully capitalized on Turkey’s concerns about migration to benefit itself. At first, it used the tactic of threatening to attack internally displaced persons (IDPs) along the border between Turkey and Syria to put pressure on Ankara. Presently, Russia is implementing an all-encompassing propaganda strategy intended to persuade the Turkish population that engaging in negotiations with Damascus is the definitive resolution to Turkey’s refugee crisis. This psychological and media campaign aims to alter public opinion and enable diplomatic talks.

Moscow is invoking the 1998 Adana Protocol, which would officially legitimize the Turkish military’s existence in Syria, to promote a consensus between Ankara and Damascus. Nevertheless, this proposal would require a thorough examination and possible protocol enhancement to make it more attractive to Ankara. Russia’s proposal for a formal and globally acknowledged military presence is intended to give Turkey a feeling of safety and credibility in its actions, thus creating a favorable atmosphere for diplomatic talks.

Damascus’s position

Reconciliation with Turkey, the last-standing primary regional adversary, is crucial to completing Syria’s narrative of victory. The prevailing sentiment in Damascus is that mending ties with Ankara would deliver a significant blow to the opposition, further impeding the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (UNSCR 2254). By reconciling with Turkey, Syria could strategically undermine the opposition’s position in the negotiations and strengthen its stance. This would help Syria consolidate its control over its future political landscape.

Syria would have preferred to negotiate with a Turkish government other than the one led by President Erdogan. Opposition parties in Turkey have demonstrated more eagerness to engage with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and are less bound to impose burdensome conditions for reconciliation on Damascus. Syria must confront the current reality of Erdogan’s government, which holds power despite its contentious position. The general sentiment in Damascus is that a potential reconciliation with Ankara should lead to only a limited amount of diplomatic interaction, allowing Syria to maintain some influence for possible future negotiations with a more favorable Turkish government. By adopting this pragmatic approach, Damascus can effectively navigate the intricate dynamics of Turkish politics while maintaining flexibility in its long-term strategic choices.

Moreover, re-establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey would significantly influence opposition armed factions in northern Syria. If Ankara changes its position, these groups—many of which depend on Turkish support—would experience a substantial decline in their influence. By ensuring that Turkey is held responsible for their actions, the opposition from these factions is anticipated to decrease significantly. Additionally, this normalization could resolve the stalemate in negotiations with the YPG-dominated SDF. The process of reconciliation with Turkey has the potential to either result in Kurdish communities making further concessions or lead to the formation of a united anti-YPG front by antagonistic Arab communities, with the support of Ankara. This transition has the potential to result in a more united and secure northern Syria, which aligns with Damascus’s broader strategic objectives.

Reconciliation with Ankara also carries substantial economic and financial incentives. Regaining partial or complete control over Turkey’s borders would provide Syria access to international trade routes, which would be crucial for economic recovery. The Syrian economy, severely damaged by prolonged conflict and financial restrictions, urgently needs opportunities for expansion and progress. Despite Turkey’s interest in other regional connectivity projects, Syria’s connectivity remains more feasible and cost-effective. The strategic advantage of re-establishing trade links with Turkey highlights the economic imperative for Syria to pursue normalization.

Nevertheless, Damascus has substantial apprehension about the validation of the Turkish military’s presence in Syria. Damascus might lose vital leverage in future discussions with Ankara by acknowledging or temporarily legitimizing this presence. As a result, Syria, with Tehran’s backing, is expected to consistently insist on the complete withdrawal of the Turkish Armed Forces from northern Syria as a prerequisite for reconciliation.

As Syria and Turkey navigate this new phase of diplomacy, the path to reconciliation remains fraught with uncertainty and complex technical negotiations. While recent developments hint at a thaw in relations, the demands and concessions required from both sides are more complicated. A photo-op between leaders might offer a symbolic victory, but it is the most accessible milestone in a future filled with arduous discussions and complex agreements. The real test lies ahead as both countries strive to address deep-seated issues, balance regional interests, and forge a sustainable path forward amid enduring skepticism.

Sinan Hatahet is a nonresident senior fellow for the Syria Project at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and vice president for investment and social impact at the Syrian Forum.

Ömer Özkizilcik is a nonresident fellow for the Syria Project in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Russian-Iranian military cooperation: How much can they depend on each other?

Mark N. Katz — Thu, 15 Aug 2024 13:41:25 +0000

Last February, Reuters reported that Iran had exported about four hundred Fateh-110 ballistic missiles to Russia—a more lethal weapons system than the slow-moving armed drones that Tehran has been shipping to Moscow for use in its war against Ukraine. On August 9, though, Reuters reported that unnamed “European intelligence sources” said that “no transfer had happened at all.” Further, Ukraine had not publicly reported finding any Iranian missile remnants or debris.

The Reuters article also quoted European intelligence sources as stating that “dozens” of Russian military personnel were being trained in Iran on Fath-360 short-range ballistic missiles, which are said to have a maximum range of 120 kilometers (75 miles). These intelligence sources also stated that delivery of these Iranian Fath-360s is expected “soon.” According to one source, the Fath-360 is based on the Fateh-100 design but is considerably smaller, and its launcher can be camouflaged as a civilian truck.

In addition, former Russian Defense Minister and current Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu was in Tehran on August 5, where he met with several officials, including Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian. During their meeting, Pezeshkian reportedly told Shoigu that Iran was “determined to expand relations” with its “strategic partner Russia.” Various media sources indicate that Tehran has renewed its requests for Russian deliveries of advanced air-defense systems and that Moscow might have delivered radars, Iskander missiles, and other items, but these have not been verified.

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The reports come at a time when Moscow and Tehran have experienced embarrassing setbacks. Israeli forces killed Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah commander in Lebanon—something Israel has admitted. Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh was then killed in Tehran, for which Israel has not claimed responsibility but which it is widely believed to have been behind. Additionally, Moscow was unable to prevent an armed incursion by Ukrainian forces into a sizeable segment of Russian territory in the vicinity of Kursk near the Russian-Ukrainian border.

While the expansion of Russian-Iranian military cooperation might have already been in the works, these setbacks that Moscow and Tehran have experienced at the hands of US-backed Ukraine and Israel may only serve to increase it. Still, the policies pursued by Russia and Iran are not completely in harmony.

While Tehran has vowed to retaliate against Israel for the killing of Haniyeh in particular, Moscow has called for “all parties”—which presumably includes Iran—to refrain from taking steps that could lead to a wider war in the region.

Further, Tehran cannot be pleased by recent news reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin dropped plans to provide missiles to the Iran-backed Houthis at the request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. It is unclear how accurate these reports are, as different intelligence sources on which they are based were not in complete agreement with one another. It was a reminder that even while Moscow’s relations with Iran’s adversary, Israel, may have soured after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on the Jewish state, Russia’s ties to Iran’s Sunni Arab adversaries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have not.

According to other reports, the Su-35 fighter aircraft Russia reportedly agreed to send to Iran have still not been delivered. An agreement on a new twenty-year Russian-Iranian cooperation agreement has yet to be finalized—with Russian sources pointing to Tehran as the reason.

Despite their differences, Russian-Iranian military cooperation will likely continue—and increase. But with both now on the back foot, the question is just how useful their cooperation is. Moscow is urging Iranian restraint in responding to Israel over the death of Haniyeh in Tehran not because of any inherent peace-loving nature, but because the Kremlin understands that, with its forces tied down in Ukraine, it is not in a position to do much to protect Iran in a wider conflict with Israel—especially if the Jewish state receives US military support. And it might have occurred to the Islamic Republic’s leaders that Iranian drones and ballistic missiles sent to Russia are no longer available for use against Israel or US forces in the Middle East.

However, while military assistance that Moscow and Tehran receive from one another has not allowed either Russia to prevail against Ukraine or Iran to prevail against Israel and the United States in the Middle East, it allows each to continue prosecuting these conflicts—something which leaders in Russia and Iran are clearly determined to do. Absent being able to somehow bring about an end to either conflict, the United States and its partners in Europe and the Middle East do not appear to have a viable means of forcing or persuading either Moscow or Tehran to reduce their military cooperation.

Mark N. Katz is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and professor emeritus of government and politics at the George Mason University Schar School of Policy and Government.

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The Olympic truce in French politics is ending. What happens next?

Joely Virzi — Wed, 14 Aug 2024 17:13:54 +0000

During the Ancient Olympics in Greece, messengers called spondophoroi were sent out far and wide to declare the Ekecheiria, or Olympic truce. According to the agreement, no war was permitted during the Games. A similar spirit has run through French politics, which had been in a state of tumult in the run-up to the Paris Games but paused the sparring during them. With the Olympics over, however, this temporary political calm is beginning to dissipate, and questions are reemerging about what’s next for the French Parliament and President Emmanuel Macron’s foreign policy agenda, as well as how changes in Paris could have broader implications for the European Union (EU).

What’s next for the parliament?

The second round of legislative elections on July 7 left France with three different blocs of competing agendas. With the Olympic “political truce” over, appointing a new prime minister has become the priority. Macron is under no legal pressure to name Prime Minister Gabriel Attal’s successor, which gives the president time to strategize how to form a stable government. Negotiations are already underway, but some speculate that Macron might seek to extend the political truce through the Paralympic Games, which run through September 8.

Typically, the president chooses a prime minister from the party with the most seats in the National Assembly—currently, the New Popular Front (NFP) coalition. However, the NFP, composed of five different political parties, faces internal challenges, particularly with the far-left France Unbowed party at the helm. The coalition has proposed Lucie Castets as their preferred candidate, yet Macron’s allies have labeled France Unbowed as too “extreme” to govern. This situation has increased the likelihood that Macron might attempt to lure some moderate Socialists and Greens from the NFP to his more centrist bloc.

Whoever is named prime minister is in for a rocky road ahead, starting on October 1, when the National Assembly reconvenes. France’s budget is under tight scrutiny after the European Council launched formal action against its high deficit-to-gross domestic product ratio. The Council has requested that France submit medium-term plans by September to get its deficit levels back on track. Managing these budget concerns while operating in an unprecedented hung parliament will be a daunting task for Macron’s choice.

What’s next for Macron?

Despite embracing gold medal–winning French swimmer Léon Marchand and capitalizing on the feel-good spirit evoked by the Olympics, Macron will soon find that sporting euphoria doesn’t last. Shortly after the French men’s soccer team won the World Cup in 2018, the “yellow vest” movement gripped the nation for fifty-two consecutive weeks. It’s too soon to tell whether 2024 will resemble 2018, but Macron will undoubtedly attempt to keep the spirit of the Olympics and Paralympics alive for as long as he can.

The division of labor in French politics grants Macron a near monopoly over foreign policy, but his agenda could be complicated by the French Parliament. Many of Macron’s plans—reducing the budget deficit through spending cuts or tax increases, transitioning to renewable energy, and maintaining a hard stance on Russia—could be upended by bureaucratic hurdles raised by the NFP or the National Rally (RN) party. Marine Le Pen of the RN, for example, already made it clear that Macron’s defense and foreign policy agenda will not go his way.

What does this mean for the EU?

As the next few weeks unfold in France, no one will be watching the French political scene more anxiously than policymakers in Brussels who rely on French support. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has outlined a strategic agenda for the EU with ambitious goals surrounding competitiveness, defense, and clean energy. Realizing these initiatives will require strong support from France.

Perhaps the most significant implication of the French political saga for the EU is its impact on support for Ukraine. Macron has been a staunch advocate for aiding Ukraine, saying in May that “if Russia wins in Ukraine, there will be no security in Europe.” Going forward, however, maintaining a high level of support hinges on his ability to navigate a hung parliament.

Another factor in the equation is Jordan Bardella, president of the RN party, who now leads the far-right Patriots for Europe (PfE) group in the European Parliament. The PfE has emerged as the third-largest bloc in the European Parliament and has the backing of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The far right may have faltered in the second round of the French snap elections, but with the PfE’s increasing momentum in the European Parliament and Orbán as a powerful ally in the European Council, the RN still has the potential to complicate the pro-EU agenda.

Macron is basking in the success of a spectacular Olympics, but it’s unlikely that that success will translate into political gains for the president or lead to compromises in the French Parliament. The two biggest tests will be naming a prime minister and addressing the budget proposal for the European Council. French politics will certainly stay in the headlines for the foreseeable future, leading to profound implications for both Paris and Brussels.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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New US-Ukraine partnership proposal from influential senators is a recipe for bipartisan success

Andrew D’Anieri — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 20:56:31 +0000

Since February 2022, dozens of US senators and representatives, both Democrats and Republicans, have made the long journey to Kyiv to show support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia. It’s a challenging trip from Washington involving multiple flights, a sometimes-jammed border crossing, and a long train ride. But the chance to show US support and learn more about Ukraine’s struggle up close evidently makes the journey worthwhile.

Perhaps none have been as active, nor shown a greater commitment to bipartisanship, than Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), who made their sixth trip to Kyiv on August 12. This was no recess joyride down Kyiv’s Khreshchatyk Street. Most notably, the two senators met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and then quickly announced what could be a blueprint for US policy toward Ukraine in the waning months of the current Congress.

In a joint press release, Blumenthal and Graham outlined four pillars for a strong US policy on Ukraine through 2024 and 2025. First, they called on NATO to “issue an invitation this year to Ukraine for membership,” an obvious but crucial next step to more formally bind the country into the Alliance.

Second, the two announced that Blumenthal would introduce the Stand with Ukraine Act when Congress returns to Capitol Hill in September to “codify the bilateral security agreement” that the Biden and Zelenskyy administrations reached in June. This, too, is a sensible and necessary move. While Ukraine has signed security pacts with a host of Western partners, nearly all of them have been non-binding, including the US-Ukraine agreement. An act of Congress would seal its implementation over the length of its ten-year lifespan.

The senators joined a growing chorus of US lawmakers and experts calling on the Biden administration to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US weapons against military targets in Russia. After months of pressure, the administration assented in May to allow limited strikes inside Russia, but only under specific conditions. Blumenthal and Graham see the folly in limiting when and how Ukraine can use US weapons and vowed to “urge the Biden administration to lift restrictions on weapons provided by the United States so they can strike the Russian invaders more effectively.”

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the senators offered the prospect of a strategic economic partnership between the United States and Ukraine centered on metals and rare earth elements development. Their press release hinted that their suggestion was a welcome surprise for Zelenskyy, whose government has expressed hopes of leveraging Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth to become a major exporter of lithium and rare earths, raw materials key to new technologies and the energy transition. In a veiled reference to China’s dominant position in the rare earths market, the senators noted that “an agreement with Ukraine in this area would make the US less dependent on foreign adversaries for rare earth minerals.”

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After the House of Representatives belatedly passed the national security supplemental package that unlocked further US aid to Ukraine in April, experts and lawmakers alike began to wonder how Washington might continue to support Ukraine throughout the rest of 2024. The Blumenthal-Graham priorities outline what could be an ambitious, re-energized US policy on Ukraine through the end of the current year.

US President Joe Biden has been skittish at the last two NATO summits about pushing for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance, largely for fear of escalating tensions with Russia. But with Biden now out of the 2024 presidential race, he may be thinking more about his foreign policy legacy. Having already helped usher Finland and Sweden into the Alliance, opening Ukraine’s accession bid in earnest would be the third in a hat-trick of transatlantic security wins for Biden. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s underwhelming response to Ukraine’s offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast should certainly tamp down any misplaced fears of escalation.

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Blumenthal’s Stand With Ukraine Act will likely run up against latent partisanship and electoral jitters when he introduces it in September. Much of Congress will be campaigning this fall, avoiding difficult votes while trying to score political points against the other party. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer could very well bring the bill to a floor vote, both to support Ukraine and to force a vote from anti-Ukraine Republicans, but Speaker of the House Mike Johnson may be loath to spend political capital to do the same. Even so, the bill may get the ball rolling on further Ukraine legislation, especially as some pro-Ukraine Republicans indicate they want funding to continue uninterrupted, even under the prospect of a Donald Trump presidency.

As for dropping restrictions on the use of US weapons, only the Biden administration can reverse this policy, something it has repeatedly declined to do. It may take further public and private calls from Democrats such as Blumenthal before the White House agrees to a change. In the meantime, Russian rockets will continue to kill Ukrainian civilians using launch systems that could have been taken out by US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and other Western-supplied weapons.

The senators’ proposal for a US-Ukraine economic partnership has all the ingredients for bipartisan consensus in Washington: Support for Ukraine without US taxpayer dollars, reduced dependence on China, and the potential for economic gain by importing one of the few materials the United States can’t make itself. A formal agreement would likely be highly technical and take many months to negotiate, but all the incentives are there for a new element in US-Ukraine relations.

Congressional delegations can sometimes be high on style and discussion but low on action and deliverables. This time, Blumenthal and Graham delivered on all counts and laid out a road map outlining US support for Ukraine through the end of 2024. Their list is as ambitious as it is sounds, both in its support for US interests and in helping Ukraine move toward victory on the battlefield. That combination of vision and vigor is exactly why their initiatives deserve bipartisan support.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Belarus’s political prisoners must not be forgotten

Hanna Liubakova — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 17:32:28 +0000

As Belarus marked the fourth anniversary of the fraudulent August 2020 presidential election that sparked nationwide protects and a brutal crackdown, the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom all unveiled new sanctions targeting the regime of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In a joint statement that was also signed by Canada, the three called on the Belarusian authorities to “immediately and unconditionally” release the country’s almost 1,400 political prisoners.

These steps are encouraging and indicate welcome Western awareness of the repression that continues to define the political climate in today’s Belarus. Nevertheless, there is still a sense that not nearly enough is being done by the international community to challenge the impunity enjoyed by Lukashenka and members of his regime.

These concerns were amplified recently when the largest prisoner swap between the Kremlin and the West since the Cold War went ahead without featuring any Belarusian political prisoners. Lukashenka himself was closely involved in the complex negotiations behind the exchange. The Belarusian dictator agreed to free German national Rico Krieger, who was being held in Minsk on terrorism charges, as part of efforts to convince the German government to release Russian secret service assassin Vadim Krasikov.

Many have questioned why prominent Belarusian pro-democracy leader Maria Kalesnikava, who had previously lived for many years in Germany, was not also freed as part of the trade. Kalesnikava was jailed amid nationwide protests following Lukashenka’s rigged 2020 election. One of the figureheads of the anti-Lukashenka protest movement, she has reportedly been suffering from deteriorating health for the past year and a half. Similar questions were also asked regarding fellow political prisoners Ales Bialiatski, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022, and Ihar Losik, a prominent blogger and journalist for RFE/RL’s Belarus Service.

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Four years since the sham ballot that sparked the biggest protests of Lukashenka’s three-decade reign, he appears more comfortable than ever with the idea of holding large numbers of political prisoners as hostages. This must change. With no regime-linked Belarusians in Western custody who are anything like as valuable as Krasikov was to Putin, other approaches are clearly needed to increase the pressure on Lukashenka and convince him to release political prisoners.

Economic measures can be used to target the largely state-controlled Belarusian economy, but this is more likely to have an impact as part of a long-term strategy. One alternative approach would be to engage third parties such as China, which has considerable influence in Minsk. Earlier diplomatic efforts succeeded in securing the release of US citizen Vital Shkliarau, indicating that negotiations of this nature can yield results.

Finding the right formula to keep up the pressure on individual members of the Lukashenka regime is crucial. At present, comparatively few of those involved in repressive measures are subject to international sanctions. For example, I was recently sentenced in absentia by a Belarusian court to ten years in prison alongside nineteen other independent Belarusian analysts and journalists. The judge in our case has a history of handing down lengthy sentences to prominent opposition figures, but has yet to be sanctioned.

During the past four years, only 261 Belarusians have been placed on the EU sanctions list. While the work of sanctions teams is commendable, their capacity is limited. Past experience has also demonstrated how sanctions can be sabotaged, as was the case in 2020 when Cyprus was accused of blocking the introduction of new restrictions against Belarus. There is also room to improve cooperation between Western partners, with a view to developing a more unified approach to sanctions.

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Strikingly, the quantity of Belarusians currently facing Western sanctions is far less the almost 1,400 political prisoners in the country’s prisons. According to human rights groups, tens of thousands of Belarusians in total have been detained in recent years for political reasons. Behind these arrests and prosecutions stands an army of enablers including government officials, security personnel, and judges. The vast majority of these people have yet to be held accountable by the international community for their role in the repressive policies of the Belarusian authorities.

There are some indications that Western policymakers are looking to broaden the scope of sanctions and increase individual accountability. However, while the recent round of sanctions included new measures targeting officials responsible for regime propaganda, other representatives of the Belarusian state media received international accreditation to cover the Olympics in Paris.

The West already has powerful tools at its disposal that can realistically make Belarusian officials consider the consequences of their actions. Standard personal sanctions such as travel bans and asset freezes go far beyond mere symbolism and are capable of creating problems that can have far-reaching practical implications in everyday life. However, more leverage is required in order to maintain the pressure on the regime and on the individuals responsible for specific abuses.

Looking ahead, the West needs to make the issue of political prisoners far more uncomfortable for the entire Lukashenka regime. There is no single solution to this problem; instead, a range of options should be explored including broad economic restrictions, personal sanctions, and diplomatic pressure. Crucially, sanctions should be applied to thousands of officials rather than just a few hundred. The end goal must be to significantly raise the costs of the repressive policies pursued by Lukashenka and all those who enable his regime.

Hanna Liubakova is a journalist from Belarus and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive proves surprise is still possible in modern war

Mykola Bielieskov — Tue, 13 Aug 2024 15:19:36 +0000

Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is now in its second week and the sense of shock is still tangible. The Ukrainian military was able to achieve almost total surprise when it crossed the border into Russia’s Kursk Oblast on August 6. While the ultimate goals of the operation remain subject to much debate, Ukraine’s success in catching the Russians completely off-guard is a considerable accomplishment in its own right.

The Ukrainian military’s ability to maintain a veil of secrecy around preparations for the current operation is all the more remarkable given the evidence from the first two-and-a-half years of Russia’s invasion. The war in Ukraine has been marked by the growing importance of drone and electromagnetic surveillance, creating what most analysts agree is a remarkably transparent battlefield. This is making it more and more difficult for either army to benefit from the element of surprise.

Given the increased visibility on both sides of the front lines, how did Ukraine manage to spring such a surprise? At this stage there is very little detailed information available about Ukraine’s preparations, but initial reports indicate that unprecedented levels of operational silence and the innovative deployment of Ukraine’s electronic warfare capabilities played important roles.

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Ukraine’s political leaders have been unusually tight-lipped about the entire offensive, providing no hint in advance and saying very little during the first week of the campaign. This is in stark contrast to the approach adopted last year, when the country’s coming summer offensive was widely referenced by officials and previewed in the media. Ukraine’s efforts to enforce operational silence appear to have also extended to the military. According to The New York Times, even senior Ukrainian commanders only learned of the plan to invade Russia at the last moment.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive appears to have been a major surprise for Ukraine’s Western partners. The Financial Times has reported that neither the US nor Germany were informed in advance of the planned Ukrainian operation. Given the West’s record of seeking to avoid any actions that might provoke Putin, it is certainly not difficult to understand why Kyiv might have chosen not to signal its intentions.

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It is also likely that Ukraine benefited from Russia’s own complacency and overconfidence. Despite suffering a series of defeats in Ukraine since 2022, the Kremlin remains almost pathologically dismissive of Ukrainian capabilities and does not appear to have seriously entertained the possibility of a large-scale Ukrainian invasion of the Russian Federation. The modest defenses established throughout the border zone confirm that Moscow anticipated minor border raids but had no plans to repel a major Ukrainian incursion.

Russia’s sense of confidence doubtless owed much to Western restrictions imposed on Ukraine since the start of the war that have prohibited the use of Western weapons inside Russia. These restrictions were partially relaxed in May 2024 following Russia’s own cross-border offensive into Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast, but the Kremlin clearly did not believe Kyiv would be bold enough to use this as the basis for offensive operations inside Russia. Vladimir Putin is now paying a steep price for underestimating his opponent.

It remains far too early to assess the impact of Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive. One of the most interesting questions will be whether Ukraine can force the Kremlin to divert military units from the fighting in eastern Ukraine in order to defend Russia itself. Much will depend on the amount of Russian land Ukraine is able to seize and hold. Putin must also decide whether his military should focus on merely stopping Ukraine’s advance or liberating occupied Russian territory.

Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has succeeded in demonstrating that surprise is still possible on the modern battlefield. This is a significant achievement that underlines the skill and competence of the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainian invasion has also confirmed once again that Putin’s talk of Russian red lines and his frequent threats of nuclear escalation are a bluff designed to intimidate the West. Taken together, these factors should be enough to convince Kyiv’s partners that now is the time to increase military support and provide Ukraine with the tools for victory.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

Linderman in American Foreign Policy Council: A political inflection point in Georgia

Atlantic Council — Mon, 12 Aug 2024 16:19:01 +0000

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Tech regulation requires balancing security, privacy, and usability

Karen Sowon, Giulia Fanti, JP Schnapper-Casteras — Mon, 12 Aug 2024 14:44:33 +0000

In the United States and across the globe, governments continue to grapple with how to regulate new and increasingly complex technologies, including in the realm of financial services. While they might be tempted to clamp down or impose strict centralized security requirements, recent history suggests that policymakers should jointly consider and balance usability and privacy—and approach their goals as if they were a product designer.

Kenya is a prime example: In 2007, a local telecommunications provider launched a form of mobile money called M-PESA, which enabled peer-to-peer money transfers between mobile phones and became wildly successful. Within five years, it grew to fifteen million users, with a deposit value approaching almost one billion dollars. To address rising security concerns, in 2013, the Kenyan government implemented a law requiring every citizen to officially register the SIM card (for their cell phone) using a government identification (ID). The measure was enforced swiftly, leading to the freezing of millions of SIM cards. Over ten years later, SIM card ID registration laws have become common across Africa, with over fifty countries adopting such regulations.

But that is not the end of the story. In parallel, a practice called third-party SIM registration has become rampant, in which cell phone users register their SIM cards using someone else’s ID, such as a friend’s or a family member’s.

Our recent research at Carnegie Mellon University, based on in-depth user studies in Kenya and Tanzania, found that this phenomenon of third-party SIM registration has both unexpected origins and unintended consequences. Many individuals in those countries face systemic challenges in obtaining a government ID. Moreover, some participants in our study reported having privacy concerns. They felt uncomfortable sharing their ID information with mobile money agents, who could repurpose that information for scams, harassment, or other unintended uses. Other participants felt “frustrated” by a process that was “cumbersome.” As a result, many users prefer to register a SIM card with another person’s ID rather than use or obtain their own ID.

Third-party SIM registration plainly undermines the effectiveness of the public policy and has additional, downstream effects. Telecommunications companies end up collecting “know your customer” information that is not reliable, which can impede law enforcement investigations in the case of misconduct. For example, one of our study subjects shared the story of a friend lending their ID for third-party registration, and later being arrested for the alleged crimes of the actual user of the SIM card.

A core implication of our research is that the Kenyan government’s goals did not fully take into account the realities of the target population—or the feasibility of the measures that Kenya and Tanzania proposed. In response, people invented their own workarounds, thus potentially introducing new vulnerabilities and avenues for fraud.

Good policy, bad consequences

Several other case studies demonstrate how even well-intentioned regulations can have unintended consequences and practical problems if they do not appropriately consider security, privacy and usability together.

Uganda: Much like our findings in Kenya and Tanzania, a biometric digital identity program in Uganda has considerable unintended consequences. Specifically, it risks excluding fifteen million Ugandans “from accessing essential public services and entitlements” because they do not have access to a national digital identity card there. While the digitization of IDs promises to offer certain security features, it also has potential downsides for data privacy and risks further marginalizing vulnerable groups who are most in need of government services.
Europe: Across the European Union (EU), a landmark privacy law called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been critical for advancing data protection and has become a benchmark for regulatory standards worldwide. But GDPR’s implementation has had unforeseen effects such as some websites blocking EU users. Recent studies have also highlighted various usability issues that may thwart the desired goals. For example, opting out of data collection through app permissions and setting cookie preferences is an option for users. But this option is often exclusionary and inconvenient, resulting in people categorically waiving their privacy for the sake of convenience.
United States (health law): Within the United States, the marquee federal health privacy law passed in 1996 (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known as HIPAA) was designed to protect the privacy and security of individuals’ medical information. But it also serves as an example of laws that can present usability challenges for patients and healthcare providers alike. For example, to comply with HIPAA, many providers still require the use of ink signatures and fax machines. Not only are technologies somewhat antiquated and cumbersome (thereby slowing information sharing)—they also pose risks arising from unsecured fax machines and misdialed phone numbers, among other factors.
Jamaica: Both Jamaica and Kenya have had to halt national plans to launch a digital ID in light of privacy and security issues. Kenya already lost over $72 million from a prior project that was launched in 2019, which failed because of serious concerns related to privacy and security. In the meantime, fraud continues to be a considerable problem for everyday citizens: Jamaica has incurred losses of more than $620 million from fraud since 2018.
United States [tax system]: The situation in Kenya and Jamaica mirrors the difficulties encountered by other digital ID programs. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had to hold off plans for facial recognition based on concerns about the inadequate privacy measures, as well as usability concerns—like long verification wait times, low accuracy for certain groups, and the lack of offline options. The stalled program has resulted in missed opportunities for other technologies that could have allowed citizens greater convenience in accessing tax-related services and public benefits. Even after investing close to $187 million towards biometric identification, the IRS has not made much progress.

Collectively, a key takeaway from these international experiences is that when policymakers fail to simultaneously balance (or even consider) usability, privacy, and security, the progress of major government initiatives and the use of digitization to achieve important policy goals is hampered. In addition to regulatory and legislative challenges, delaying or canceling initiatives due to privacy and usability concerns can lead to erosion in public trust, increased costs and delays, and missed opportunities for other innovations.

Policy as product design

Going forward, one pivotal way for government decision makers to avoid pitfalls like the ones laid out above is to start thinking like product designers. Focusing on the most immediate policy goals is rarely enough to understand the practical and technological dimensions of how that policy will interact with the real world.

That does not mean, of course, that policymakers must all become experts in creating software products or designing user interfaces. But it does mean that some of the ways that product designers tend to think about big projects could inform effective public policy.

First, policymakers should embrace user studies to better understand the preferences and needs of citizens as they interact digitally with governmental programs and services. While there are multiple ways user studies can be executed, the first often includes upfront qualitative and quantitative research to understand the core behavioral drivers and systemic barriers to access. These could be complemented with focus groups, particularly with marginalized communities and populations who are likely to be disproportionately affected by any unintended outcomes of tech policy.

Second, like early-stage technology products that are initially rolled out to an early group of users (known as “beta-testing”), policymakers could benefit from pilot testing to encourage early-stage feedback.

Third, regulators—just like effective product designers—should consider an iterative process whereby they solicit feedback, implement changes to a policy or platform, and then repeat the process. This allows for validation of the regulation and makes room for adjustments and continuous improvements as part of an agency’s rulemaking process.

Lastly, legislators and regulators alike should conduct more regular tabletop exercises to see how new policies might play out in times of crisis. The executive branch regularly does such “tabletops” in the context of national security emergencies. But the same principles could apply to understanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities or user responses before implementing public policies or programs at scale.

In the end, a product design mindset will not completely eliminate the sorts of problems we have highlighted in Kenya, the United States, and beyond. However, it can help to identify the most pressing usability, security, and privacy problems before governments spend time and treasure to implement regulations or programs that may not fit the real world.

Karen Sowon is a user experience researcher and post doctoral research associate at Carnegie Mellon University.

JP Schnapper-Casteras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the founder and managing partner at Schnapper-Casteras, PLLC.

Giulia Fanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Ukraine’s invasion of Russia is erasing Vladimir Putin’s last red lines

Peter Dickinson — Mon, 12 Aug 2024 02:15:22 +0000

In the early hours of August 6, units of the Ukrainian army crossed the border into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in a surprise move that ended a two-and-a-half year taboo over military operations on Russian soil. The goals of this ambitious Kursk incursion are still shrouded in mystery and subject to much debate, but it is already clear that Ukraine’s decision to invade Russia has succeeded in making a complete mockery of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and the West’s fears of escalation.

Ukraine’s summer offensive is a watershed moment in the current war and an historic milestone in its own right. For the first time since World War II, Russia has been invaded by a foreign army. Initial reports indicate that this ambitious operation was prepared amid great secrecy over a period of months. Ukraine managed to catch the Russians completely off-guard, with Ukrainian forces advancing tens of kilometers into Kursk Oblast during the first days of the campaign.

Ukraine’s political and military leaders have so far remained remarkably tight-lipped about the invasion, saying very little publicly and providing few details. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a number of likely objectives.

Ukraine’s most obvious intention is probably to ease the military pressure in the south and east of the country, where Russia has been slowly but steadily advancing in recent months. By attacking across the lightly defended border and seizing Russian territory, Ukrainian commanders believe they can force the Kremlin to withdraw troops from the front lines of the war in Ukraine in order to redeploy them for the defense of Russia itself.

The offensive also creates opportunities for Ukraine to regain the military initiative after a year of costly and demoralizing defensive operations. It has long been obvious that Ukraine cannot realistically hope to win a war of attrition against the far larger and wealthier Russian Federation. Kyiv’s best chance of military success lies in returning to a war of mobility and maneuver that allows Ukrainian commanders to take advantage of their relative agility while exploiting the Russian army’s far more cumbersome decision-making processes. This is exactly what the invasion of Kursk Oblast has achieved.

In psychological terms, bringing the war home to Russia has allowed Ukraine to strike a powerful blow against enemy morale. The Ukrainian army’s advances in Kursk Oblast are spreading panic throughout the surrounding region and undermining Putin’s efforts to prevent the invasion of Ukraine from disrupting the daily lives of ordinary Russians. On the home front, Ukraine’s surprise summer offensive has provided Ukrainian society with a desperately needed morale boost, reviving hopes that the war-weary nation can still achieve meaningful military success.

The Kursk offensive may ultimately be part of Ukraine’s preparations for a future peace process, with Kyiv looking to occupy as much Russian territory as possible to use as a bargaining chip in any negotiations with the Kremlin. Indeed, during the initial days of the invasion, there was widespread speculation that Ukraine’s primary target may be the Kursk nuclear power plant, with a view to trading it for the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine. An eventual land swap on a far larger scale may be part of Kyiv’s calculations.

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The Ukrainian army’s advance into Russia has profound implications for perceptions of the war. It directly challenges the widespread belief that Russia’s invasion has reached a stalemate and can no longer be decided on the battlefield. Crucially, it also exposes the emptiness of Vladimir Putin’s red lines and the folly of the West’s emphasis on escalation management.

Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, the international response has been hindered by fear of escalation. Western leaders have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin, who has used thinly veiled nuclear threats and frequent talk of Russian red lines to restrict the flow of military aid and convince Ukraine’s partners to impose absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons inside Russia. As a result, Ukraine has effectively been forced to wage war with one hand tied behind its back.

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What we are currently witnessing is entirely in line with a well-established pattern of Russian threats being exposed as bluffs by Ukrainian boldness. During the first year of the war as Putin prepared to announce the annexation of occupied Ukrainian city Kherson, he warned that any attempt to reclaim this “Russian land” would result in a nuclear reply. “I’m not bluffing,” he famously declared. But when Ukraine liberated Kherson just weeks later, Putin did not reach for the nuclear button. Instead, he ordered his beaten troops to quietly retreat.

Russia’s reaction to wartime setbacks in Crimea has been similarly underwhelming. The 2014 seizure of the Ukrainian peninsula remains Putin’s crowning glory and serves as the basis for his claim to a place in Russian history alongside the country’s greatest rulers. Nevertheless, when Ukraine deployed missiles and marine drones to sink or disable around one-third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, there was no apocalyptic response from the Kremlin. On the contrary, Putin instructed his remaining warships to withdraw from Crimea and seek safety in Russian ports.

This record of inglorious Russian retreats makes the West’s frequently voiced fear of escalation all the more difficult to justify. Ukrainians will now be hoping Putin’s characteristically weak response to the Kursk offensive can persuade Western leaders to belatedly abandon their failed policies of escalation management and acknowledge that the quickest way to end the war is by arming Ukraine for victory.

There are some indications that attitudes among Ukraine’s Western allies may finally be changing. The EU has led the way, with European Commission spokesperson Peter Thano responding to the Ukrainian cross-border push into Kursk Oblast by saying Ukraine has the “legitimate right” to defend itself, including inside Russia. Berlin has reacted in the same manner, with the German Foreign Ministry issuing a statement confirming that Ukraine’s right to self defense “is not limited to its own territory.” Meanwhile, US officials have also signaled their approval. “Ukraine is doing what it needs to do to be successful on the battlefield,” commented a Pentagon official.

This broadly supportive international reaction is welcome news for Ukraine, but officials in Kyiv are also well aware that further steps are required in order to set the stage for Putin’s eventual defeat. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy underlined this point in his August 11 evening address, when he once again called for the lifting of all Western restrictions on long-range strikes against military targets in Russia. Until that happens, Moscow will retain the ability to pummel Ukrainian cities at will and Putin will have little reason to end his invasion.

The West has spent more than two years slow-walking military aid to Ukraine for fear of provoking Putin. And yet time after time, Ukraine has proved that whenever the Russian dictator is confronted with the prospect of defeat, he is far more likely to retreat than escalate. Now that the Ukrainian military has crossed the last of Putin’s red lines and invaded Russia without sparking World War III, there are no more excuses for restricting Kyiv’s ability to defend itself or denying Ukraine the weapons it needs to win the war.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Since the late 2010s, however, there has been a radical increase in state-linked attacks and harassment of merchant vessels. Around that time, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Israel began attacking vessels linked to the other side, primarily in the Strait of Hormuz, a situation that persists. China, for its part, has taken to harassing merchant vessels in the South China Sea in a strategy to enforce its unilateral territorial claims. The harm imposed on merchant vessels further increased in November 2023, when the Iran-linked Houthi rebels launched geopolitically linked attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. Eight months later—despite interventions by the US Navy, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Royal Navy, European Union (EU) navies, and other Western navies—the attacks continue and have caused large-scale rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope.

The increasing attacks on merchant vessels pose an acute threat not just to seafarers and shipping companies, but also to the global maritime order on which modern economies are based. This report discusses the history of attacks on shipping, the rules implemented to keep shipping safe, and the new and serious threats posed by the Houthis and other actors. It also discusses steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to reduce the harm posed by such attacks. These steps include:

collective threats of rerouting away from risky waters;
directed-energy weapons on naval vessels protecting merchant shipping; and
increased focus on disrupting militias’ supply chains.

History of attacks on shipping

“Japan’s dependence on international economic ties for its survival is well recognized…In recent years, however, another source of vulnerability has assumed importance-the threat of international shipping disruptions in the Middle East.” Thus begins an article in the academic journal Pacific Affairs—not from 2023, but from 1986. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq had taken to attacking merchant ships linked to Iran as part of its war against the Islamic Republic.

The attacks began in 1981, the war’s second year, when Iraq attacked five merchant vessels, “largely to reduce Iran’s oil exports, which go entirely by sea and which help finance Iran’s war effort.”¹ The following year, Iraq attacked sixteen vessels carrying Iranian oil; the next year, it was twenty-two. In 1984, Iran began responding in kind. That year, Iraq attacked fifty-three tankers linked to Iran, while Iran attacked sixteen tankers linked to Iraq. By 1987, the numbers had risen to eighty-eight attacks by Iraq and ninety-one by Iran. The systematic attacks on the other side’s merchant vessels became known as the Tanker War, and it alarmed the outside world, which by that point was dependent on the supply of oil through the Persian Gulf. “Mizuo Kuroda, Japanese ambassador to the United Nations, in the Security Council debate on the gulf conflict in May 1984, made an appeal that Iran and Iraq and all other states exercise the utmost restraint, and asked that both countries respect the right of safe navigation. (However, attacks on neutral shipping have continued.),” the Pacific Affairs article noted. In the summer of 1987, after neutral Kuwait had concluded that Kuwaiti-flagged tankers could no longer travel through the Gulf and asked for permission to have them reflagged as American, the tankers were reflagged and the United States launched Operation Earnest Will, which saw US Navy vessels escort the US-flagged Kuwaiti vessels between the Gulf of Oman and their home ports.²

When the Iran-Iraq war ended the following year, more than 320 merchant mariners had been killed, injured, or were missing. Three hundred and forty merchant vessels had been damaged, some more than once. Some 30 million tons of cargo had been damaged, while eleven ships had been sunk and three dozen declared total losses.³

The Tanker War became infamous because it was a blatant case of aggression against merchant shipping as a tool of war, and it took place during a period in which countries’ economies were beginning to globalize. The Warsaw Pact countries largely operated in parallel with Western market economies and China was still a mostly closed economy, but Japan and South Korea were trading heavily with Western economies,Latin American economies had also begun opening up, and Middle Eastern oil fueled many countries’ growing economies. It was against this background that the Tanker War was such a shock. It demonstrated to increasingly commercially linked countries that global shipping—the most important tool of global trade—could easily be targeted by interested nations and that there was little other countries could do to stop the attacks.

However, geopolitically motivated attacks on shipping are nearly as old as shipping itself.⁴ Indeed, merchant vessels have been regularly attacked during wars. As H. B. Robertson, Jr. notes

During the Napoleonic era, both France and England utilized their differing strengths in an attempt to curtail the other’s logistic and commercial capabilities. In the American Civil War, the blockade of the Confederacy was a principal component of the Union’s war strategy. The indispensable condition for victory by Japan in its 1905 war with Russia was control of the seas. Without this advantage, Russia could have resupplied its superior land armies from the sea. During the progress of both WorId Wars, success of the maritime resupply effort of the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, was the sine qua non of victory.⁵

Until the nineteenth century, “privateers” also attacked merchant vessels on behalf of a country’s armed forces in exchange for bounties from the vessels.⁶

The reason merchant vessels have so systematically been attacked during wars is, of course, that they carry vital supplies to the adversary. “If it is true that merchant shipping can be critical to a nation’s ability to prosecute a war effort, it is equally true that the opposing power will seek to interdict that supply effort,” Robertson notes. “Tactics, weapons systems and geography are variables that will affect any interdiction effort but the interdiction effort fits nearly with the general principles of war.”⁷

Yet, by the time World War I erupted, nations realized that unrestricted warfare against merchant shipping was unsustainable and sought to restrict it. Traditional (or customary) international law had established a distinction between enemy naval ships and enemy merchant vessels, with the latter granted protection from attacks. The Hague Conventions, to which forty-four countries agreed in 1907, included an article on the status of merchant ships following the outbreak of hostilities. It stipulated that “the belligerent may only detain it, without payment of compensation, but subject to the obligation of restoring it after the war, or requisition it on payment of compensation” and that “enemy merchant ships which left their last port of departure before the commencement of the war, and are encountered on the high seas while still ignorant of the outbreak of hostilities cannot be confiscated.”⁸

The Hague Convention became international customary law, the de facto legal baseline governing merchant shipping during armed conflict. This meant that “merchant ships, even those sailing under the flag of the enemy, are considered as civilian objects and manned by civilian crews, and so long as they maintain their proper role, are subject only to seizure as prize and subsequent condemnation in prize courts of the capturing belligerent. Only in special circumstances is the capturing power allowed to destroy the prize, and then only after removing the passengers, crew and ship’s papers to a place of safety.”⁹ Germany had, however, developed a submarine fleet. During World War I, these submarines set about attacking merchant vessels supplying the Allies. In the first months of 1917, following German submarine attacks on several US merchant ships, the United States declared war on Germany.¹⁰

In the years after World War I, states sought to further codify merchant vessels’ rights, which resulted in the London Protocol of 1936. By 1939, all of World War I’s combatant countries except Romania had joined the protocol, which stipulated

A warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.¹¹

Even so, World War II saw regular attacks on merchant vessels. International customary law was simply ignored. As a result, some vessels sought to reduce the risk of attack by sailing under neutral countries’ flags (including the increasingly popular flag of Panama). As Robertson notes, both the Allies and the Axis powers attacked enemy merchant vessels—and sometimes even neutral merchant ships—and did so without ensuring the safety of the passengers, the crews, or the ships themselves, even though the protocol obliges warring parties to take such action.

Both sides justified these practices either on the basis of reprisal (which in itself is an admission that absent the first violation by the other side, the practice is illegal under international law) or on assertions that the other side had incorporated its merchant fleet into the combatant force by mounting offensive weapons on the ships, convoying them, requiring them to report enemy submarine sightings, and ordering them to take offensive action against surfaced submarines.¹²

Toward and after the end of World War II, the world’s nations attempted to create a global system of rules and institutions, with the United Nations (UN) at its center. In addition to the United Nations itself, nations created the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization (WHO), and a string of other bodies. In 1948, they adopted the Convention on the International Maritime Organization and agreed to form the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). The name was later changed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and came into force ten years after its adoption. The organization’s statutes placed little emphasis on maritime security, focusing instead on promoting economic action in support of freedom and reducing discrimination in some countries.¹³ Article C, for example, states an IMCO aim “to provide for the consideration by the Organization of matters concerning unfair restrictive practices by shipping concerns.”¹⁴

Indeed, such was the desire for safe shipping among the world’s nations that a focus on security in the IMCO’s founding statute seemed unnecessary. Harm caused by pirates and criminals posed a problem, but even the most ideologically opposed governments agreed that shipping needed to be kept safe. Countries deliberately harming merchant vessels was no longer acceptable.

Even with the IMCO’s rules in place, ships continued to face considerable threats, but such threats came from criminals, terrorists, and malcontents. In 1961, a group led by Captain Henrique Galvao hijacked the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria in protest against the regime of Antonio de Salazar. In subsequent years, Cuban exile groups attacked Russian and Cuban merchant vessels, though they sometimes got the wrong ship, and the Palestinian terrorist group PLFP attacked vessels bound for Israeli ports. Groups with other causes similarly found shipping a convenient target. RAND researchers summarized the problem.

Besides guerrillas and terrorists, attacks have been carried out by modern day pirates, ordinary criminals, fanatic environmentalists, mutinous crews, hostile workers, and foreign agents. The spectrum of actions is equally broad: ships hijacked, destroyed by mines and bombs, attacks with bazookas, sunk under mysterious circumstances; cargos removed; crews taken hostage; extortion plots against ocean liners and offshore platforms; raids on port facilities; attempts to board oil rigs; sabotage at shipyards and terminal facilities; even a plot to steal a nuclear submarine.¹⁵

The Tanker War received such global attention because it was an extremely rare example of nation-states targeting merchant vessels. The attacks created considerable risks for vessels beyond those linked to the two respective countries. “Like the Houthis today, the Iraqi and Iranian armed forces at that time weren’t always that accurate in their targeting,” noted Svein Ringbakken, a maritime executive with several decades in the business who now serves as managing director of the Norway-based maritime war insurer DNK.¹⁶ Of the vessels attacked, sixty-one sailed under the Liberian flag, forty-one under the flag of Panama, thirty-nine under the flag of Cyprus, and twenty-six under the flag of Greece. A number of other Western countries similarly saw vessels sailing under their flag attacked. Forty-six were Iranian flagged. Ringbakken added that “the ships that were going back and forth to [in the Gulf] were often attacked several times each, so the number of attacks were much higher than the 340 ships that were listed as having been attacked.” Had the merchant vessels carrying oil and other supplies through the Gulf been less sturdy, the human and material losses caused by the Tanker War would have been even more dramatic.

But not even during the height of the Cold War, in the 1960s and 1970s, did NATO or Warsaw Pact member states systematically seek to harm merchant vessels linked to the other side. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries indisputably acted unethically in other ways, but in the maritime domain they respected rules, conventions, and the neutrality of merchant shipping. They did so not least because they also depended on ships carrying goods to and from their countries being able to travel safely.

Indeed, when the attacks by terrorists and other non-state entities continued, the world’s nations convened to negotiate and adopt the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the fifth version of global shipping’s cornerstone safety treaty, which governs the safety of the vessels themselves. (Previous versions had been adopted in 1914—in response to the Titanic disaster—and then in 1929, 1948, and 1960.)¹⁷ Five years later, in 1979, nations adopted the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), which entered into force in 1985. SAR governs the responsibilities of coastal states in maritime search and rescue; the 1979 version divided the world’s oceans into thirteen search-and-rescue regions and introduced the obligation for countries to operate rescue co-ordination centers on a twenty-four-hour basis with trained, English-speaking, staff.¹⁸

The crowning achievement of Cold War maritime agreements took place in 1982, when negotiators representing 160 nations adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the “constitution of the oceans.”¹⁹ UNCLOS covers crucial areas including exploitation of ocean and seabed resources, as well as maritime transit rights. Crucially, coastal states are given territorial rights over waters extending twelve nautical miles from their coastlines; foreign vessels have the right to sail through these waters under UNCLOS’s “innocent passage” provision. Coastal states are also given limited rights in the Exclusive Economic Zones extending another two hundred nautical miles beyond their territorial waters.²⁰

A rare case of apparently state-linked attacks on merchant shipping took place in 1984, when nearly twenty vessels transiting the Red Sea were struck by mines. Egyptian and Western authorities subsequently identified the Ghat, a Libyan-flagged merchant vessel, as the culprit. Libya’s motivation for the attacks appears to have been ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi’s desire to demonstrate what he punish other Arab regimes’ misguided policy of maintaining close relations with the West.²¹

From the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of more harmonious relations between crucial groupings of countries decreased geopolitically linked risk everywhere, including in shipping. Crucially, the end of the Cold War delivered an extraordinary rise in commercial relations between previously hostile countries. In addition, China had begun opening up its closed economy in the 1980s and was quickly becoming a manufacturing hub for Western companies. The rapidly growing trade and resulting globalization were facilitated by global shipping. Between 1990 and 2019, global shipping grew nearly threefold, from 4,008 million tons loaded to 11,076 million tons loaded.²²

During the 1990s and 2000s, and until the late 2010s, shipping had to contend with spikes in piracy attacks, but geopolitically linked attacks remained minimal. The few attacks that took place, most prominently an explosion on the French-flagged oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen, were carried out by terrorists.²³ In Nigeria in the early 2000s, the Movement for the Development of the Niger Delta—a local militant group—kidnapped oil workers and attacked oil facilities and pipelines, though this was done in protest against inequalities in Nigeria.

The mostly peaceful period ended around 2019, when a proxy war targeting merchant vessels unfolded in the Strait of Hormuz, an indispensable body of water through which more than 20 percent of global petroleum travels.²⁴ In 2018, Donald Trump’s administration took the United States out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the “Iran nuclear deal.” Soon after that, Iran began to regularly harass merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. In a particularly high-profile incident, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized the Swedish-owned, UK-flagged oil tanker Stena Impero passing through the Strait of Hormuz on July 19, 2019, and took the crew hostage.²⁵ Though the IRGC alleged that the tanker had struck a fishing boat and failed to obey IRGC instructions, there was no evidence of this. Since then, attacks on merchant vessels have continued. Merchant vessels sailing under flags ranging from those of Norway to the United Arab Emirates have been struck by mines, magnetic mines, and torpedoes.²⁶ In August 2023, the United States dispatched a naval and Marine force to the strait to “support deterrence efforts.”²⁷ By that point, there had been twenty attacks on merchant shipping in the strait since the beginning of 2021, including two on July 5, 2023, when Iranian naval vessels attempted to seize two oil tankers.²⁸ The US Navy and Marine presence appears to have succeeded in deterring the aggression, which subsided after the force’s arrival. As with all deterrence measures, though, it’s impossible to know whether the attackers had already been planning to reduce their aggression or whether the deterrence measures changed their cost-benefit calculus.

Threats to commercial vessels in the Black Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea

In early 2022, another threat to global shipping emerged when Russia deployed close to two hundred thousand troops to its border with Ukraine. It was clear that any invasion by Russia would also involve attacks on Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and on shipping in the Black Sea. In the weeks immediately following the invasion, several merchant vessels in Ukrainian waters and ports were struck in suspected Russian attacks. On February 25, for example, a tanker was struck by missiles. Two crew members were injured, and the crew was forced to abandon ship.²⁹ On March 2, a Bangladeshi seafarer was killed when a shell hit his vessel in the Ukrainian port of Olvia.³⁰ In addition, when Russia invaded, ships crewed by some 800–1,000 seafarers were docked in seven Ukrainian ports and, in practice, unable to leave. Being stuck in Ukrainian ports, of course, made them an easy target for Russian attacks and also raised the risk of their becoming collateral damage of attacks against other targets.³¹ “There were more than 90 vessels [stuck in Ukrainian ports] to start with, and during the [UN-negotiated grain] Corridor [between Russia and Ukraine that allowed ships carrying grain to leave Ukrainian ports, traveling through a Black Sea corridor on to international destinations], about 30 got out. We ended up with around 65 claims for total loss,” said Neil Roberts, the secretary of the maritime insurance industry’s Joint War Committee, which lists international waters according to risk level.³²

Shipping in the Taiwan Strait has been similarly threatened, but has not yet been attacked. When, in April 2023, President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan met with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in California, Beijing registered its displeasure by launching an offensive military exercise targeting Taiwan and sending a coast guard “inspection flotilla” to the Taiwan Strait. The strait is the main passage for cargo moving between Southeast Asia and Japan, South Korea, and northern China, which makes it one of the world’s busiest maritime thoroughfares; some 240–500 ships per day, including nearly nine in ten of the world’s largest container vessels, pass through the strait on an average day.³³ Beijing, which considers Taiwan a region of China, argues it has “sovereignty and jurisdiction” over the strait, while Taiwan and countries including the United States consider it international waters divided along the strait’s unofficial median line.

By threatening to inspect ships passing through the strait, on the basis of legal powers not recognized by Taiwan and large parts of the international community, China would be able to severely disrupt shipping in the strait and, thus, cause considerable problems for shipping globally. Yet, the deployment of an inspection flotilla—whether or not it carries out any inspections—hardly reaches the threshold where the US Navy or another navy would consider it necessary to intervene. In its law-enforcement scope of inspections of merchant vessels (albeit on Taiwan’s side of the median line), China’s inspection flotilla differs from the overtly aggressive actions China’s coast guard, maritime militia, long-distance fishing fleet, and other maritime entities take. All, though, constitute a risk to civilian vessels. Roberts noted

China has long been “leaning in” via its fishing fleet, and it’s been building all these little islands in the South China Sea. The Chinese government issues white papers to float their ideas, for example saying they’ll allow their Coast Guard to fire on all vessels in their territorial waters. And if nobody reacts, then they make it policy. Whilst the littoral states do not agree, they’re up against a huge nation and there’s no one in the area who’s in a position to react. That comparative disparity is what China has leveraged in deploying the inspection flotilla to the Taiwan Strait.³⁴

In addition, China’s maritime militia, coast guard, and long-distance fishing fleet habitually harass vessels, including civilian ones. These activities are of particular concern in the South China Sea, through which approximately one-third of global trade travels, as China claims some 90 percent of these waters under its “nine-dash line” policy.³⁵ These practices, which will be analyzed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project, are not specifically targeted against shipping but instead target a wide range of vessels, including civilian ones. Survey vessels sailing under the flags of Norway and Vietnam, for example, have been harassed by a combination of Chinese vessels.³⁶ Since the beginning of the 2020s, the harassment has increased significantly, creating an environment of heightened uncertainty and risk for merchant vessels. This uncertainty is heightened because it’s entirely unclear how coastal states and de facto protectors of the global maritime order, most notably the US Navy, can deter such activities. As Ringbakken noted

China has its Navy, it has its Coast Guard and it has the militia and the fishing boats and this kind of crossover between the fishing boats and the militia, which is a strange construct. And China has a long-term perspective. These small skirmishes and the small transgressions are not viewed as an attempt to undercut the global maritime regime, but that’s what they are. It’s what you might call the Chinese water torture method. Any kind of countermeasure from the Americans or others would seem disproportionate. The activity is just merely little bit out of normal and not like what the Houthis are doing in the Red Sea, and that makes responding even harder. You don’t send a naval group to try to stop this kind of behavior because it seems too minor. So it goes on.³⁷

The US military has come to much the same conclusion. “It’s getting more aggressive, they’re getting more bold and it’s getting more dangerous,” Admiral John Aquilino told media in late April 2024, shortly before handing over command of the US Indo-Pacific Command. He added that China was increasing its aggression through a “boiling the frog” strategy. “There needs to be a continual description of China’s bad behavior that is outside legal international norms,” he noted. “And that story has to be told by all the nations in the region.”³⁸

Indeed, China’s maritime harassment can easily be expanded to target many more cargo ships, in addition to the fishing vessels and supply vessels that have until now been the most frequently targeted categories. In the area of unilateral inspection flotillas , if the flotilla that was dispatched during Tsai’s visit to California were to be followed by similar measures, shipping companies and their insurers would need to assess whether it’s worth sending vessels through the Taiwan Strait. “Even if the US Navy wanted to intervene, it would be seen a gross intrusion, and it could spark something far worse. The merchant ships are on their own,” Roberts noted.³⁹ Ships don’t need to go through the strait to reach destinations other than Taiwan; they can simply travel along Taiwan’s eastern coast. That route, however, would render them unable to call at Taiwan’s main port—the massive Port of Kaohsiung—or the Port of Taipei. This is what makes a blockade of Taiwan, whether executed by the China Coast Guard, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, China’s maritime militia, or a combination of the three, possibly with other entities also involved, such a troubling scenario.⁴⁰ “What would happen to Taiwan if ships don’t call at its ports? Well, ultimately the people of Taiwan will starve ,” Roberts said. “But shipowners have to focus on crew welfare and they’d just go around [east of Taiwan] and take a bit more fuel. It’s really difficult.”⁴¹

Houthi attacks on merchant vessels: A new form of aggression

On November 19, 2023, armed commandos belonging to the Yemeni Houthi militia stormed the Galaxy Leader, a Bahamas-flagged roll-on, roll-off (RORO) carrier traveling through the Red Sea near the Yemeni port of Hodeida. The commandos, who filmed themselves arriving in a helicopter, took the twenty-five-strong crew hostage and directed the Galaxy Leader to Hodeida and then the port of Al Saleef, which is also controlled by the Houthis.⁴² The Galaxy Leader had apparently been targeted because it is part-owned by Israeli national Abraham “Rami” Ungar, though his firm is registered in the United Kingdom.

“The Yemeni Naval Forces managed to capture an Israeli ship in the depths of the Red Sea taking it to the Yemeni coast. The Yemeni armed forces deal with the ship’s crew in accordance with the principle and values of our Islamic religion,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Sare’e declared on X on the same day.

The Yemeni armed forces reiterate their warning to all ships belonging to or dealing with the Israeli enemy that they will become a legitimate target for armed forces. […] Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will continue to carry out military operations against the Israeli enemy until the aggression against Gaza stops and the heinous acts against our Palestinian brothers in Gaza and the West Bank stop…If the international community is concerned about regional security and stability, rather than expanding the conflict, it should put an end to Israel’s aggression against Gaza.⁴³

“All ships belonging to the Israeli enemy or that deal with it will become legitimate targets,” the Houthis added in a statement after the hijack.⁴⁴ The opportunistic labeling of the attacks as being an act of support for the people of Gaza was a clever move by the Houthis, gaining the attacks attention far beyond the global maritime community and gaining the Houthis sympathy for their actions among the public in countries troubled by Gazans’ plight. It also made any response by the United States and other Western countries geopolitically fraught. A few days later, assailants identified as Houthis attacked the Israel-linked tanker Central Park in the Gulf of Aden, the body of water that leads into the Red Sea.⁴⁵ On December 3, the Houthis attacked three additional vessels.⁴⁶

The attacks continued, though the targeted vessels’ alleged Israeli links were not always clear or even existent. On December 9, the militia expanded its scope, saying it would also target ships headed for Israeli ports. Two days later, it hit the Strinda, a tanker owned, managed, and flagged in Norway and crewed by Indians, which the Houthis said was headed for Israel, though the owner said the tanker was bound for Italy.⁴⁷

On December 15, a Houthi drone struck the Liberian-flagged Al Jasrah and two Houthi missiles struck the MSC Palatium III, which was also sailing under Liberian flag; both were thought to be headed for Israeli ports. On the same day, the Houthis threatened another Liberian-flagged vessel, the MSC Alanya, and told it to turn around.⁴⁸ “The Houthis’ targeting mechanism wasn’t that good, or their intelligence wasn’t entirely up to speed,” Ringbakken said. “And we don’t know for sure whether that was by chance or whether they didn’t mind a little bit of collateral damage because that got them more attention.”⁴⁹

Indeed, the Houthis appear to have decided to make necessity into an extraordinary virtue. Instead of having to conduct painstaking research into vessels’ complex ownership and management structure, and their cargo’s provenance and destination, the Houthis—while declaring that they were targeting Israeli-linked vessels—attacked a range of merchant vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Aden. That, of course, has made the waters unsafe for vessels form all countries, though the Houthis appear to consistently have exempted vessels linked to Russia and China. Retired Rear Admiral Nils Wang, a former chief of the Danish Navy, noted the following.

It’s instructive to compare the Houthis’ attacks to the piracy of the Horn of Africa [that was particularly frequent in the early 2010s]. With the pirates off the Horn of Africa, the intimidation of international shipping was the same. That made launching a counter-piracy operation straightforward. Everybody, including China, Pakistan, Iran, everybody was of the opinion that this piracy had to be stopped. Indeed, the military operations against piracy at that time were probably the biggest multinational military operation that has ever taken place, if you count on how many countries, regions, and continents were involved. Everyone agreed that the piracy had to be stopped. If you then compare that to the situation now in the Red Sea, the Houthis only seem to be targeting ships linked to the West, not to Russia and China. And it’s only the Western world that is intervening to protect the ships there.⁵⁰

By pure coincidence, the IMO Assembly—the IMO’s governing body—was scheduled to hold its biannual meeting in late November and December 2023. Various items had been submitted for consideration by the assembly, including measures to prevent the growing dark fleet.⁵¹Unsurprisingly, the Houthis’ attacks received urgent attention. The Bahamas, the world’s eighth-largest flag state, criticized the Houthis’ attacks on merchant vessel as a “violation of all of the norms relating to innocent passage of ships.”⁵² And, referring to the Houthis, the country added, “Here we have non-state actors so who do you hold responsible?”

That is the dilemma posed by the Houthis’ novel campaign against shipping. The militia attacks ships ostensibly for geopolitical reasons, and it’s backed by a nation-state, but it’s not an official government. The militia is also linked to Iran but doesn’t officially represent this country either. “That makes it difficult to make this a matter between a hostile country and other countries, but at the same time, the Houthis are a completely different category from pirates and other opportunistic attackers without government links,” Wang said.⁵³

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that Western governments have struggled to formulate strategies to deter the attacks.

International response to the Houthis’ attacks

On December 18, the United States announced the establishment of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval task force comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the Seychelles, Spain, and several other nations, amounting to a total of twenty countries.⁵⁴ Some opted not to divulge their participation out of concern that doing so could increase the risks for their countries. “The recent escalation in reckless Houthi attacks originating from Yemen threatens the free flow of commerce, endangers innocent mariners, and violates international law,” US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in the press release announcing the task force. “The Red Sea is a critical waterway that has been essential to freedom of navigation and a major commercial corridor that facilitates international trade. Countries that seek to uphold the foundational principle of freedom of navigation must come together to tackle the challenge posed by this non-state actor launching ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) at merchant vessels from many nations lawfully transiting international waters.”⁵⁵

Operation Prosperity Guardian is set up as “highway patrol in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden” with the task of averting attacks on merchant vessels, not punishing the Houthis.⁵⁶ It will “respond to and assist as necessary commercial vessels that are transiting this vital international waterway,” Pentagon spokesman Major General Pat Ryder said in a briefing on December 21.⁵⁷ “It’s a defensive coalition meant to reassure global shipping and mariners that the international community is there to help with safe passage.”⁵⁸

Prosperity Guardian is a fitting name for a naval coalition tasked with thwarting the attacks on merchant vessels in the Red Sea and the adjacent Bab el-Mandeb Strait and Gulf of Aden. The water forms a crucial thoroughfare in the globalized economy; under normal circumstances, some 15 percent of global maritime trade passes through it.⁵⁹ Indeed, in deciding to attack shipping, the Houthis have opted for the form of aggression that would yield by far the most global disruption and attention.

Since December 19, Prosperity Guardian’s members have escorted merchant vessels with links to a wide range of countries (not just the countries involved in the operation). They have also regularly thwarted attacks. This is deterrence by denial: by denying the attackers the gain they seek, the defenders are changing the attackers’ cost-benefit calculus. “You always have the right to self-defense,” Wang noted. “So if you are shot at, you or your defenders can shoot back. That’s mandate for all the ships participating in Prosperity Guardian: they can shoot as soon as they see any threat emerging.”⁶⁰

Retired Vice Admiral Andrew Lewis, who until 2021 commanded the US Navy’s Second Fleet and in an earlier posting commanded the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 12, described the situation as follows.

The Houthis’ attacks are essentially a culmination of the threats we’ve seen over the past 15 years. At the beginning of that period, we broadly saw terrorist and piracy threats. As things progressed, we saw the Houthis become more active. As recently as nine years ago, when I was a carrier strike group commander, we were intercepting Iranian convoys of dhows that were transiting to either Oman or Yemen to go to Yemen with the weaponry the Houthis are now using to target vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. For a period of time, we intercepted these convoys and forced them to turn around, so the equipment wasn’t flowing through, but they continued to build up that capability, and that is the result we’re seeing now.⁶¹

The fact that there was no global body policing Iran’s shipments of weapons through the Red Sea thus became the source of the dramatic threats to shipping in the Red Sea once the Houthis acquired enough weaponry to launch their attacks.

Indeed, despite the launch of Prosperity Guardian, the Houthis’ attacks accelerated. On December 26, for example, US naval vessels and aircraft in the Red Sea shot down twelve one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles, and two land-attack cruise missiles within a period of ten hours.⁶² Such lack of success would convince a conventional adversary to give up. But the novel aspect of the Houthis’ campaign against shipping is not just their comparatively modern weaponry (including the fact that they’re the first non-state group to have fired anti-ship ballistic missiles) but also that the ability to harm merchant vessels is secondary in their cost-benefit calculus. “The difference between piracy and the Houthis is that piracy is criminality. It’s to make money,” said retired Vice Admiral Duncan Potts, who until 2018 was the UK armed forces’ director general of joint force development and previously commanded the EU’s ATALANTA counter-piracy mission. “And like any other business model, if the cost and the risk gets too high, you just move elsewhere. But for the Houthis the attacks are not about money.”⁶³ The Houthis’ priority is not even to sink vessels, which is what a traditional adversary attacking vessels would intend. Instead, their top priority has turned out to be to gain global attention and to cause fear among shipping companies, their insurers, and their customers, and thus to gain a global platform.

The Houthis’ cost-benefit calculus also differs from that of the West’s traditional adversaries, as they primarily use cheap drones and missiles. An often-quoted cost per Houthi missile is $2,000. Simon Lockwood, head of shipowners at Willis Towers Watson, noted that it is these weapons’ relative lack of sophistication that—together with the Houthis’ sloppy research—causes the most fear in the shipping industry. “How do you cause a massive amount of disruption? You just create that level of uncertainty that causes companies in the maritime industry to say, ‘we can’t go into the Red Sea,’” he said. “If I were that way inclined, I would laud the Houthis’ ability to create absolute mayhem with relatively unsophisticated weapons, just to scare off merchant vessels.”⁶⁴

However, the Houthis’ current weapons are a significant improvement from the weaponry used by militias in the early 2000s. The Limburg was attacked by a suicide bomber driving an explosive-laden small boat into the vessel’s hull. Today, by contrast, the Houthis have sophisticated missiles as well as relatively simple drones. “Improvements in technology are a key reason these attacks are happening,” Ringbakken noted. “When I started in this job and even ten years into the job, my experts were telling me that for groups of terrorists and others to hit a moving target like a vessel is extremely difficult. Now the Houthis have proved that it’s quite easy. There’s technological development in targeting technology that has made it possible for groups like the Houthis to drag their equipment around on a lorry and then target and hit a ship far away out in the sea. That was not possible a decade ago.”⁶⁵ Even the best of these missiles and drones don’t reach the technological sophistication of those used by first-rate armed forces, and the Houthis’ drones only hit ships randomly. But the combination is powerful. “The Houthis’ weapons are a mix of very, very advanced missiles and very, very cheap drones. It’s dangerous cocktail,” Wang said.⁶⁶ The fact that a non-state group that has signed no maritime conventions and feels bound by no maritime rules has access to this dangerous cocktail is a serious threat to global shipping.

Indeed, the drones and missiles cause fear among shipping companies, and thwarting them requires far more sophisticated—and far more expensive—technology. Offensive missiles don’t need to be very precise, at least if the attacker’s objective is not to harm specific targets. By contrast, defensive missiles—whose task is to shoot down the offensive missiles—must be extremely precise. US Navy defensive missiles cost, on average, between $1.5 million and $2.5 million each.⁶⁷ For the Houthis, $2,000-a-piece missiles supplied by Iran are a bargain, especially because the missiles spread fear in the shipping industry, regardless of whether they hit their intended target.

Despite Operation Prosperity Guardian’s efforts, the Red Sea has become too risky for many shipping lines and their insurers. By late December 2023, shipping traffic through the Red Sea had decreased by nearly 20 percent.⁶⁸ On January 3, the United States, UK, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and several other Western countries (and, again, Bahrain) issued a stern statement, warning the Houthis of consequences should the attacks continue:

Ongoing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea are illegal, unacceptable, and profoundly destabilizing. There is no lawful justification for intentionally targeting civilian shipping and naval vessels. Attacks on vessels, including commercial vessels, using unmanned aerial vehicles, small boats, and missiles, including the first use of anti-ship ballistic missiles against such vessels, are a direct threat to the freedom of navigation that serves as the bedrock of global trade in one of the world’s most critical waterways. These attacks threaten innocent lives from all over the world and constitute a significant international problem that demands collective action.⁶⁹

The Houthis—logically, according to their cost-benefit calculus—responded with a highly complex attack comprising Iranian-designed one-way attack drones, anti-ship cruise missiles, and an anti-ship ballistic missile.⁷⁰ Shooting them down required the efforts of F/A-18s from USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, USS Gravely (DDG 107), USS Laboon (DDG 58), USS Mason (DDG 87), and the Royal Navy’s HMS Diamond (D34).⁷¹ The fact that Iran supplies the drones and missiles and, in some cases, intelligence to the Houthis, is well-known both to maritime executives and to Western militaries. It would, however, be legally dubious and highly risky for Western armed forces to militarily punish Iran for the Houthis’ attacks. “The maritime domain is unfortunately a welcome arena for escalation without making it state to state,” Ringbakken said.⁷²

Indeed, the Houthis have demonstrated that they can keep escalating because the United States and other Western allies are loath to retaliate against Iran. On January 11, the United States and UK, supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands—operating as part of a new coalition operating in parallel with Prosperity Guardian—launched strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen. “These strikes are in direct response to unprecedented Houthi attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea—including the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles for the first time in history,” President Joe Biden said in a statement. “These attacks have endangered US personnel, civilian mariners, and our partners, jeopardized trade, and threatened freedom of navigation.”⁷³ Further strikes have followed; by the end of February, the United States and the UK had carried out strikes on an almost daily basis.⁷⁴

Not even this punishment has convinced the Houthis to end their attacks. In early 2024, they instead expanded the scope of their attacks, targeting vessels linked to the United States and the UK in addition to those linked to Israel. On January 18, for example, they launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles against a Marshall Islands-flagged, US-owned, Greek-operated tanker.⁷⁵ Since then, the United States and the Prosperity Guardian allies have thwarted Houthi drones, missiles, and anti-ship missile attacks on an almost daily basis, while the US- and UK-led strike coalition has continued its strikes against strategic installations in Houthi-held Yemeni territory.⁷⁶

As before, the Houthis decide what constitutes links to the countries concerned, which puts every vessel at risk of attack. “We can disagree with them and argue that a ship they’ve attacked is not linked to one of these three countries, but once the rocket has hit your ship, it’s too late,” Ringbakken noted.⁷⁷ Lockwood added, “US links, UK links, Israeli links: that’s rubbish. The attacks are about targeting shipping for effect, and it’s crippling shipping.”⁷⁸ By April 2024, sixty-five countries’ interests had been affected by the campaign, according to the US Defense Intelligence Agency.⁷⁹ Only ships linked to Russia and China have appeared safe. Indeed, in an effort to keep their vessels safe, by the beginning of 2024 some captains had adopted a strategy of incorrectly communicating to the Houthis that they had an all-Chinese crew. On February 19, the EU announced the formation of another naval mission in the Red Sea. Operation Aspides, comprising France, Germany, Italy, and Belgium, would protect merchant vessels alongside Prosperity Guardian and the strike coalition.⁸⁰ The Houthis, meanwhile, appeared to continue sparing any vessels linked to Russia and China.⁸¹

By March 2024, forty merchant vessels had been successfully attacked, thirty-four of which had sustained damage.⁸² A few weeks later, the rate of Houthi attacks appeared to have slowed. “Their pace of operations is not what it was,” US Air Force Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich, the top US Air Force commander for the Middle East, told a press conference.⁸³ Grynkewich attributed the slowdown to the effect of the US strikes, which had curtailed the Houthis’ arsenal of drones and missiles.⁸⁴ Crucially, despite a reduced arsenal, the Houthis appeared undeterred and kept up their missile and drone strikes. The US Central Command, communicating through its Twitter (X), reported Houthi attacks on a near-daily basis.⁸⁵ Yet the United States seemed to have little confidence the strikes would fundamentally improve security for Red Sea shipping. Grynkewich told reporters that Iran’s continued supply of weapons was a “complicating factor.”

Indeed, in the second half of April, the attacks increased again. On April 26, for example, the Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Red Sea, where they nearly hit one vessel and struck another, an apparently erroneously targeted suspected shadow vessel.⁸⁶ By the end of the month, the US Navy and allies had shot down Houthi drones and missiles or struck Houthi installations around 130 times, according to publicly known numbers.⁸⁷ An exact figure of how many vessels have been targeted by the Houthis is impossible to establish, precisely because the Houthi attacks are vague and may not always hit a vessel, though the attacks are always successful in spreading fear.⁸⁸ Without Prosperity Guardian’s defense of merchant vessels, the harm to vessels would, of course, be far more extensive. The number of vessels available to attack had also dropped significantly as Western-linked vessels’ owners were diverting them to the Cape of Good Hope route. By the end of February, traffic in the Suez Canal (and thus the Red Sea) had dropped by 50 percent.⁸⁹ By contrast, Red Sea traffic by Chinese merchant vessels rose by 73 percent between October 2023 and March 2024, compared to the same period one year earlier.⁹⁰ “The fact that you’ve got so many ships now avoiding the area tells you everything,” said Guy Platten, secretary general of the International Chamber of Shipping. “We absolutely welcome Operation Prosperity Guardian and the EU naval forces, because their presence does provide some sort of protection, but you can’t get every ship. But what does this mean for seafarers? These ships have crews, they’re not just inanimate objects. Nobody wants to risk their lives, and owners also have a responsibility and a duty of care for the seafarers on their ships.”⁹¹

The attacks have an effect on seafarers far beyond the ones working on vessels that have been struck by the Houthis—and, thus, on the globalized economy. “Shipping depends absolutely on its crew,” Roberts noted. “People have compared being a member of crew to being in prison, but with worse internet. It’s just not a great life. They don’t get many breaks, they get criminalized at the drop of a hat. It’s really not very attractive. And then on top of that, now you’ve got attacks on vessels. If you haven’t got crew and you haven’t got security, then the supply chain isn’t going to work for you. There’s got to be some serious thought given to this. If the crews don’t want to go, then nothing happens.”⁹²

Indeed, the global shortage of seafarers is becoming so severe that, if not enough of them are willing to crew ships having to pass through perilous waters, ships risk being unable to leave port. “There’s a limited number of people in our navies who could be drafted in to help on commercial ships,” Roberts said. “And would they be willing or able or allowed to do that? Governments would have to set priorities and start with the oil tankers and absolutely vital food. Luxury goods traveling on container ships, not so much. What is the appetite for consumer goods when you’ve got a threatened environment?”⁹³

The Houthis have continued their attacks despite paying a significantly higher price, measured in damaged or destroyed infrastructure in Houthi-held Yemeni territory. By April 2024, the militia appeared to have expanded its campaign into the Indian Ocean, to which the Gulf of Aden’s eastern end is connected but which is located several hundred nautical miles from the Red Sea. On April 26, the militia struck the MSC Orion, a container ship sailing under the flag of Madeira, off the coast of Somalia.⁹⁴

Then, on May 2, the militia announced it was expanding its attacks to the eastern Mediterranean. “We will target any ships heading to Israeli ports in the Mediterranean Sea in any area we are able to reach,” Houthi military spokesman General Yahya Saree said. He added that the decision would be implemented “immediately, and from the moment this statement is announced.”⁹⁵ By the end of June, no such attacks had occurred, but the Houthis kept up their attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waters and expanded their arsenal. On May 13, EUNAVFOR Aspides reported that it had escorted 100 vessels since its inception less than three months earlier.⁹⁶ On May 28, the Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier Laax was hit—twice.⁹⁷ In June, the Antigua and Barbuda-flagged cargo ship Norderney was hit.⁹⁸ Five days later, a Liberia-flagged, Greek-owned coal carrier was hit so badly that its crew had to be evacuated, with one member unaccounted for.⁹⁹ Two days after that, another vessel reported two explosions nearby—apparent failed attempts to hit it.¹⁰⁰ As the attacks continued, the Houthis expanded their arsenal. On June 23, the militia reported having attacked a Liberia-flagged bulk carrier, this time using not flying drones or missiles but an uncrewed boat (which can also be referred to as a waterborne drone).¹⁰¹ Four days later, another Houthi uncrewed boat attacked a vessel, this time a Malta-flagged bunker.¹⁰² The Houthis’ use of uncrewed boats continued in July. On July 20, for example, an uncrewed boat appearing to be loaded with explosives approached a Liberian-flagged vessel the Houthis subsequently described as American. Armed guards onboard the merchant vessel managed to repel the attack.¹⁰³ In the subsequent 24 hours, US forces destroyed four such boats.¹⁰⁴ DNK and other maritime companies had been predicting this expansion, especially because the Houthis were already using airborne drones. The expansion also continued along the path of ever more sophistication. On June 26, the Houthis claimed to have struck another vessel with a hypersonic missile, a highly sophisticated weapon heretofore not used by militias.¹⁰⁵

Because modern merchant vessels are sturdy, even the successful attacks caused mostly minor material damage. They did, however, have a human toll. At the time of writing, the attacks have cost four seafarers their lives, and many seafarers whose ships were attacked have been left traumatized.¹⁰⁶ On June 25, the Philippines—the world’s leading provider of seafarers—announced it was considering banning its nationals from serving on vessels transiting the Red Sea.¹⁰⁷ While such plans are hardly surprising, they will further harm Western ships, as Philippine seafarers overwhelmingly crew Western-linked vessels, while Russian and Chinese vessels are primarily crewed by Russian and Chinese nationals.

The attacks have also continued to illustrate the Houthis’ inaccuracy in targeting (and their faulty due diligence). On April 26, for example, they struck the Andromeda Star, a vessel owned in the UK, flagged in Panama, and operated in the Seychelles.¹⁰⁸ On May 18, they struck the M/T Wind, a Greek-owned, Panamanian-flagged oil tanker. The two were, however, hardly Western vessels; they’re part of the dark fleet carrying Russian oil. In another illustrative turn of events, Western coalition ships in the Red Sea came to their aid.¹⁰⁹

Measured in the cost-benefit term of vessels hit by strikes compared to losses and damage to the attacker side, the Houthis’ campaign has, as we have seen, largely been a failure. Indeed, traditional armed forces would likely have ceased their attacks after such an increase on the cost side of the cost-benefit calculus. Yet the Houthis have not only kept up their campaign but expanded it. This again illustrates how the Yemeni militia reacts differently than traditional armed forces because it uses a different cost-benefit calculus. From the Houthis’ perspective, the benefit is not the number of vessels destroyed or severely damaged, but the inordinate global attention and power the attacks generate. The militia appears to measure cost purely in monetary expenses for its weaponry, and that cost is modest. In the Houthis’ calculus, the cost in number of targets missed, environmental damage in Yemeni waters, and infrastructure destroyed by US-UK airstrikes appears to be marginal. Attacks on shipping “are a great weapon that can be used, for want of a better expression, to prevent or effect change in a particular area or cause damage to other nations and to shift the order of the world,” Lockwood said. “That’s the real danger that we face with the Houthis.¹¹⁰” Captain (Navy) Niels Markussen, the director of NATO’s Shipping Center, added

The Houthis’ capability appears to have been reduced to around 50 percent as we speak [in March 2024], but they still have the will to continue as long as we’re not taking over their territory with land forces, which we’d have to do to prevent them from using their coastline to launch attacks. Western and allied navies can do what they’re doing right now, they can lie outside the coast and they can protect ships, they can shoot down the drones and the missiles that are coming out, but some of these drones and missiles will get through, meaning that the Red Sea is not safe for shipping. We cannot guarantee safe passage through the Red Sea. And it’s that uncertainty that they will keep using against us.¹¹¹

The Houthis are so illustrative because they’re not a one-off campaign but represent a triply new threat to shipping. The militia is not an officially recognized state and doesn’t operate according to the same calculus as traditional armed forces. At the same time, it’s linked to a government that supplies it with a range of weaponry, including highly sophisticated kinds. Because the Houthis’ objective is to wreak havoc on Western-linked merchant shipping, it matters little how successful their strikes are. What’s more, because global trade is so intense, they can wreak havoc on not just shipping, but on the globalized economy. Wang summarized the predicament facing Western nations, the default protectors of global shipping.

Is the Western defense against incoming missiles sustainable? When you’re using two-million-dollar missiles to shoot down a drone worth a few hundred dollars, there’s a long-term problem. Of course, if you are attacked by a ballistic missile, you need to engage it with a very advanced missile. That’s the only way you can counter it. But the combination of advanced missiles and very, very cheap weapons is basically drawing resources from the Western coalition at a pace that’s not sustainable in the long run. When it comes to drones, it takes a lot of courage to wait and to engage a drone when it comes into gun range, which would be the cheap way of doing it. But if you have a warship worth a billion dollars, you need to engage the drone or missile as soon as you can in order to cope with the threat as far out as possible. So you will have to waste expensive missiles on drones in order to be safe on board. And that raises, you could say, a technological challenge that you have on warships today because all warships are filled with advanced missiles. That has been the rule of the game because to engage a peer adversary you need advanced missiles and you also need to have precision deep strike capability to engage the enemy ashore from the sea. So that part is still valid. But you need another way of dealing with cheap drones that is coming towards you.¹¹²

Indeed, as Wang had predicted, the Biden administration appeared to conclude that the Houthis—with their fundamentally different cost-benefit calculus—could not be defeated militarily. In April, the US government appeared to be trying to find a diplomatic solution with the Houthis. One such solution involved removing the designation as a terrorist group, which the United States had imposed in January 2024, in a quid pro quo that would see the Houthis cease their attacks. “We would certainly study that but not assume it’s an automatic thing,” Tim Lenderking, President Biden’s special envoy for Yemen, told news media.¹¹³

The shipping industry’s response

The shipping industry (including shipping lines and insurers) possesses centuries-long experience assessing new and growing threats. Lloyd’s Market Association, a large marketplace for underwriters, traces its origins to Edward Lloyd’s coffeehouse in central London, where from 1688 seafarers, bankers, and underwriters met to discuss business. Today the insurance industry maintains bodies like the Joint War Committee (JWC), which operates a list of so-called listed areas. In regular meetings and emergency sessions, the JWC’s members assess risky waters. The most dangerous ones are “listed,” which means that shipping operators must clear passage with their insurers before sending their vessels through them. About a week before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the JWC listed Russia’s and Ukraine’s parts of the Black Sea, as well as the Sea of Azov. In mid-December, the JWC expanded its listed parts of the Red Sea.¹¹⁴

Red-flagging bodies of water is a logical measure for the shipping industry: it creates a common basis on which a critical mass of the industry can act. The JWC’s listing of Black Sea waters and the Sea of Azov was followed by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine , which left no doubt that sailing through these waters was inadvisable.¹¹⁵ In cases short of war, where the case for not sailing may be less obvious, the listed designation prompts shipping companies and insurers to approach perilous waters with caution, which creates a somewhat unified industry response.

This is what has taken place since the Houthis’ hijacking of the Galaxy Leader. Some shipping companies have diverted all their ships away from the Red Sea to the route around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds some 10–12 days to a vessel’s journey and added logistical complexity involving the reception and delivery of cargo and arrival and departure of crews. Other shipping lines have diverted some of their vessels. In late March 2023, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait had a seven-day moving average of thirty-one vessels; one year earlier, the seven-day moving average was seventy-six vessels.¹¹⁶ In early April 2023, the Cape of Good Hope had a seven-day moving average of forty-three vessels; by early March 2024, the seven-day moving average was seventy-eight vessels.¹¹⁷

Avoiding risky waters is a feasible strategy in the short term, but it doesn’t solve the problem of the Houthis and other state-linked outfits targeting shipping. “If you just look at these rebels, whether their actions are backed by Iran or not, the impact they’re having on not just shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, but on global trade generally, is substantial,” Lockwood said. “It will lead to shortages, and it will have an inflationary impact on trade. It will also lead to opportunism among people who see an opportunity to push prices.”¹¹⁸

Indeed, the attacks will create a contentious debate across the shipping sector (and its clients) about what added costs are acceptable—the alternative being to stop shipping goods altogether—and who should pay for them. “You have commercial pressures,” Ringbakken noted. “You have cars on the way from China to be launched in the European market and [the client] saying, ‘you have to get the cars to the market.’ But as insurers, we have to assess the risk, and if the risk increases we increase the premiums, which increases the costs.”¹¹⁹ The costs haven’t become prohibitive, meaning they are not so high that customers opt not to ship their goods.

It’s quite expensive to go around the Cape, and the Egyptians are pretty good at calculating what the cost is to go through the Suez Canal. As an example, if you have a 65-million-dollar tanker [a tanker insured for a value of $65 million], that’s our average ship going through [the Red Sea and the Suez Canal]. She will pay one million dollars to go through the canal and it would pay $650,000 in war risk premium to go through. That makes it slightly cheaper to go around the Cape, but it’s also 16 days more.¹²⁰

By contrast, Chinese-owned and Chinese-flagged vessels, which are under no threat of attack, don’t face additional premiums in the Red Sea.

Indeed, it may only be when the number of total losses—vessels sunk or rendered unusable—begins accumulating that the Western shipping industry and maritime insurers will collectively opt out of the Red Sea route. By May 2024, there had been two total losses resulting from the Houthis’ attacks. Had modern vessels not been so sturdy, the total losses would have been significantly higher. And, added Ringbakken, “there’s of course a duty of care for the crew, and at some point most operators will have realized that there is a chance if not of being targeted at least of being subject to collateral damage.”¹²¹ Rerouting to the Cape of Good Hope, however, also brings additional expense. By April 2024, ports along the cape route had also reached, and in many cases surpassed, capacity as a result of the sudden influx of ships. As a result, vessels calling at these ports frequently need to wait for a berth, and storage yards struggle to handle the cargo.¹²²

The Houthis’ campaign against shipping is, in fact, brilliantly executed gray zone aggression (sometimes referred to as hybrid aggression). It causes real harm to the entities, people, and countries targeted, but—because it’s not a military aggression by a government—the targeted countries struggle to respond. The peril posed by the Houthis is not just that shipping in the Red Sea will continue to be dangerous. Their campaign also sends the message that the global maritime order is crumbling and those violating its rules can do so with impunity.

The lesson other militias and hostile states are likely to draw from the Houthi campaign is that a militia or hostile state can cause immense and immediate harm to countries through similar campaigns by groups that are not officially or technically armed forces. Wang notes that

in global maritime strategy, there has always been a strong focus on choke points—a narrow strategic important strait, like the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Hormuz, the Great Belt in Denmark, the channel area between Europe the UK, the Strait of Gibraltar and so on. And you also have choke points in the Northern Sea route [the route that leads from the Barents Sea near Russia’s border with Norway, along Russia’s Arctic coast and on to the Bering Strait]. And those chokepoints will always potentially be subjects for aggression against global shipping because it’s so easy to inflict the sea waves from the shore thanks to the short distance from the shore.¹²³

In the early 2000s, the Strait of Malacca—a crucial shipping lane located between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand—experienced a spike in piracy, which subsided dramatically when Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand began jointly patrolling the strait.¹²⁴ It and similar narrow, strategic bodies of water may see the emergence of militias backed by a state in the region, perhaps even ad hoc militias created to attack shipping for geopolitical purposes. The Strait of Gibraltar, the English Channel, and the Great Belt, all located between nations that maintain friendly relations, are less at risk of geopolitically motivated attacks on shipping. The Great Belt, however, is a crucial thoroughfare for “shadow vessels” going to and from Russia.¹²⁵ Such vessels could be used to harm regular shipping in the Great Belt and the neighboring Baltic Sea.

In each case, the attackers’ objective would not be to sink merchant ships but to frighten the shipping industry for geopolitical reasons—for example, to gain global attention or, in the case of separatist groups, to gain some kind of legal recognition. The Baltic Sea could, for example, see the emergence of a maritime-style Wagner Group that might officially simply operate merchant vessels but unofficially frighten other merchant vessels by its mere presence.

As with the Houthis, such groups’ cost-benefit calculus is likely to fundamentally differ from that of traditional armed forces. Indeed, states with hostile intentions could create proxy groups to harm merchant vessels associated with other countries. Similarly, China could expand its use of maritime harassment by making it more frequent, using it in more areas, or both, and other countries could decide to similarly send geopolitical signals by dispatching inspection flotillas or initiate maritime harassment. Indeed, from China’s perspective, the Philippines engages in maritime harassment in parts of the South China Sea that Beijing considers Chinese waters, though the Philippines and other governments consider the waters Philippine.¹²⁶

As we have seen, the Houthis’ attacks are just the most dramatic example of geopolitically linked forms of aggression currently facing global shipping. If these forms of aggression are not deterred, they will continue to grow in quantity and will be joined by new forms. In the immediate term, such aggression will pose a threat to shipping operations in affected waters. In the longer term, it will also threaten functioning of the global maritime order, which depends on a critical mass of countries and other entities—whether they be militias or shipping companies—respecting maritime rules. If such compliance with maritime rules can’t be taken for granted, shipping lines and other companies involved in global shipping will be wary of sailing through certain bodies of water. This would harm not only countries located adjacent to such bodies of water but the entire conduct of global shipping.

Improving strategies to counter attacks on shipping

When the Houthis attacked the Central Park, it was clear that the countries trying to protect the global maritime order were facing a new type of adversary. This recognition among Western governments and maritime companies, though, was only marginally helpful, because it was entirely unclear what strategies Western governments could use against such an adversary. As we have seen, Western governments have struggled to establish an effective response to the Houthis’ attacks precisely because the Houthis are a new kind of adversary, whose logic differs from that of nation-states and traditional armed forces. Lewis notes:

If the Houthis were not an enemy, I would have an admiration for their strategy, but as it is I just have a distaste for their whole approach. They’re putting military forces, nation states, and industry at risk because they’re playing by different rules. How do you defend against this thing, how do you prepare to nullify it? It’s very costly for industry, and it’s very costly for militaries trying to enforce maritime rules. When it comes to the Houthis, we know who their backer is, Iran, so an extreme solution would be to hit it and all the military targets associated with it. But that would be too risky.¹²⁷

Indeed, hitting the state sponsor of every kind of aggression against merchant shipping would not only be highly risky, but would also quickly overextend the capacity of Western navies. The Russian and Chinese navies have not intervened against the Houthis’ attacks. This is regrettable from a maritime-order protection perspective but hardly surprising, given that both countries violate maritime rules in other ways.¹²⁸ They also seem to tolerate the Houthis’ attacks, which have—with the exception of a few cases of apparently misdirected attacks—spared vessels linked to Russia and China.

However, there are several steps Western governments and the shipping industry can take to at least partly blunt the impact of state-linked aggression against merchant vessels. They include the following.

Preemptive diversion of shipping

A yet-untried way to defang the Houthis and prospective similar attackers would be for a core group of governments and Western-based shipping companies and maritime insurers to declare that all merchant shipping linked (by flag, ship ownership, or cargo) to a core group of countries will be diverted. “As soon as you are away from the coasts, on the oceans, it’s much more difficult for paramilitary organizations to attack,” Wang noted. “The solution to the Red Sea attacks may be to collectively put everything on the southern route around the Cape of Good Hope.”¹²⁹

This kind of collective action would involve an extraordinary diplomatic effort to bring together enough countries—including flag-of-convenience states—as well as shipping companies and underwriters. But success in assembling such a coalition would produce significant power. The threat of shipping diverting to the Cape of Good Hope—not out of fear, but as part of a collective decision by a wide-ranging group of governments and companies in the shipping industry—would, in the case of the Houthis, turn the Yemeni militia from a self-proclaimed anti-Western fighting force into a force driving business away from the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez Canal. Such an undertaking would have to be led by the US State Department, the Egyptian government, or, given the number of EU-linked vessels affected, the European Commission. If the lead entity were to succeed in getting enough governments and companies to commit to the plan, it could present the plan as an ultimatum. In the case of the Houthis, given that the plan would leave the militia and its sponsor Iran isolated, Iran may well conclude that the Houthis’ campaign has achieved its objectives and force the Houthis to end it.

Intra-industry risk updates

Vessels would be helped by risk updates not just when sailing in waters such as the Red Sea that are known to be home to attacks, but also in waters where new attacks are being orchestrated. The International Chamber of Commerce operates a Kuala Lumpur-based organization called the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB), which is meant to function as a hub for maritime threat updates. But Peter Broadhurst, head of Inmarsat Maritime Safety, noted that updates logged with the IMB are often forwarded slowly and may not reach vessels at all.

The information is there. If you’ve got a ship that’s just been hit by a rocket, it’s got a crew on board, and they’ll want to abandon it. The nearest rescue is another vessel, either a military vessel that’s shadowing it or another commercial ship. Somebody needs to go and help these guys, and if you don’t tell them they’re not going to know.¹³⁰

Shipping companies and related firms could, he suggested, form an industry-funded outfit that would function as the hub for such updates.

Such a hub could be further aided by artificial intelligence (AI)-aided risk updates. Mature AI companies and AI startups could train artificial intelligence to detect anomalies in maritime thoroughfares and other strategic bodies of water and forward any anomalies—such as the accumulation of hardware or personnel in locations from which attacks could be launched—to the hub. After assessing whether the anomalies posed a risk to merchant vessels, the hub would alert shipping companies.

Use of directed-energy weapons

Directed-energy weapons use concentrated electromagnetic energy to “incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and/or personnel.”¹³¹ The Congressional Research Service (CRS) notes that these weapons include high-energy lasers, which are used by “ground forces in short-range air defense, counter-unmanned aircraft systems, or counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar missions [and] could theoretically provide options for boost-phase missile intercept.”¹³² That makes these weapons—if they can easily be produced and used—an extremely cost-effective alternative to defensive missiles and, indeed, more cost-effective than missiles of the kind the Houthis use.¹³³ “If you can engage the enemy with laser weapons, you don’t have the logistics problem anymore because you can reload while you are at sea. It’s just a matter of having enough energy,” Wang said. “And that development of energy weapons is likely to be accelerated now as a result of the war in Ukraine, but definitely also as a result of the situation in the Red Sea.”¹³⁴ These defensive capabilities could also be developed as exportable, commercially procurable, standalone systems that commercial shipowners can procure and install on their fleets, which would enhance vessels’ defensive capability and, thus, lower risk and insurance premiums. For military customers, manufacturers could modify and enhance the weapons to meet military requirements such as increased power output and integration with other weapons.

For fiscal year 2024, the US Department of Defense has requested around $1 billion for unclassified directed-energy weapons. In a speech in January 2024, Vice Admiral Brendan McLane, the commander of the US Pacific Fleet’s Naval Surface Force, “called for a directed energy weapon to be deployed on every Navy ship.”¹³⁵ Such large-scale development, though, is likely to take some time. At the time of writing, only nineteen directed-energy weapons are installed on US naval vessels.¹³⁶

Selective protection dependent on flag registration

Countries sending naval forces to the Red Sea (and prospective future flashpoints) to defend merchant vessels could also announce that they will only protect vessels sailing under their flags. “To a certain extent, you can send naval vessels to the Red Sea in order to protect shipping,” Wang noted.” But it’s the same ships that are needed in the Indo-Pacific and in the North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea and off the coast of Norway. When it comes to Western naval resources, it’s a zero-sum game.”¹³⁷ During the Tanker War, when the government of Kuwait asked the US government to allow Kuwaiti-flagged tankers—which were coming under attack—to be reflagged under US flag, Washington complied and provided the tankers with naval protection.¹³⁸

Western governments could declare that they will only seek to protect ships flagged in their countries, on the basis that shipowners that don’t commit to the rules of Western countries also can’t expect their protection. China and Russia, for example, have a history of only protecting merchant vessels sailing under their flags. Restricting protection would, however, do little for the general protection of the global maritime order, especially because the past several decades have seen the trend toward flags of convenience accelerate. In 2022, more than 70 percent of global ship capacity, as measured in deadweight tons, was registered under a foreign flag with beneficial owners and registries being in different countries, UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports.¹³⁹ Only 0.9 percent of merchant vessels (measured in deadweight tons) sail under US flag, 0.5 percent sail under UK flag, and 0.3 percent sail under German flag. The three largest flag states are Panama and Liberia, with more than 16 percent each, and the Marshall Islands with 13.2 percent.¹⁴⁰

Indeed, trying to reverse the shipping industry’s pervasive use of flags of convenience while, at the same time, trying to protect shipping against state-linked attacks would likely be impossible. “If you look at all our economies in the West, irrespective of where the vessels are flagged, the goods they are transporting are fundamental to our economy,” said Potts, who has commanded the US-led Coalition Task Group in the northern Gulf and has also commanded NATO’s High Readiness Force (Maritime).¹⁴¹ He added:

In the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Strait of Hormuz region, historically we used to say we’re absolutely flag blind about who we’re protecting. Because the West, all our economies, rely on freedom of navigation for global trade and the well-being of our economy. Whether you’re Marshall Island-flagged or US-flagged or UK-flagged or Greek-flagged or anything else, we would treat them exactly the same because it’s only when the whole system works that the shipping works.¹⁴²

And, Potts noted, “Often the cargo is more valuable than the ship. Who owns the cargo? Where’s it going? Who’s insuring it? Who owns the ship? With many ships, you can identify several different countries who have a stake in the ship and should take responsibility.”¹⁴³

Freedom-of-navigation operations

In freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs, also known as FON operations or FON assertions), a country’s naval vessels underline the importance of innocent passage by sailing through waters over which another country wrongfully claims jurisdiction or otherwise tries to interfere with civilian traffic. FONOPs are regularly conducted by the Royal Navy, and especially the US Navy, as a constabulary measure to protect the global maritime order.

In the South China Sea, the US Navy now regularly undertakes FONOPs through waters that are internationally recognized as belonging to the Philippines or other countries but are claimed by China under its “nine-dash line” policy. Noted retired Rear Admiral David Manero, a former US defense attaché to Russia and the UK, respectively, said, “In order to be successful doing freedom and navigation operations, you have to be consistent, and your messaging has to be on, and it has to always be refined. Imagine taking that whole message among several nations and coordinate it. This is why we’re doing it, citing the law of the sea. But it involves a great deal of coordination.”¹⁴⁴

To date, FONOPs have rarely been conducted in response to state-linked attacks on merchant vessels, simply because such attacks have been so rare. The US Navy has, however, conducted FON-related operations in the Strait of Hormuz and in the Bab el-Mandeb. The latter challenge Yemen’s requirement for foreign warships and nuclear-powered vessels to obtain Yemen’s permission prior to transiting its territorial waters. The United States also regularly conducts FONOPs in the South China Sea.¹⁴⁵ There would be little point conducting FONOPs against attackers like the Houthis because they don’t represent nation-states and have such a different cost-benefit calculus. FONOPs would, however, be useful against inspection flotillas, should China or other countries begin to regularly deploy such flotillas in internationally disputed waters. In practice, such FONOPs would need to involve the US Navy or the Royal Navy, as other Western governments would be hesitant to lead such operations.

Yet it would be illusory to think that the US and UK navies could conduct simultaneous FONOPs around the world and, in essence, provide a global maritime constabulary. This would stretch the two navies’ resources beyond the breaking point. In the Taiwan Strait, FONOPs would also involve the risk of confrontation with the world’s largest navy, that of China, “with a battle force of over 370 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.”¹⁴⁶

Indeed, the attacks against, and harassment of, merchant vessels have reached a quantity that key Western navies would struggle to tackle. The Royal Navy, for example, has some eighty vessels, but only twelve of them are frigates, while eight are offshore patrol vessels and six are destroyers.¹⁴⁷

Disrupting the delivery of weapons

As previously noted, the US Navy has long tried to interdict weapons supplies being shipped to the Houthis. Indeed, it began doing so long before it was evident that the militia would use the weapons to attack shipping. Now that it’s clear the weapons are being used not just in Yemen’s civil war but also to harm global shipping, the United States and its allies could ramp up these efforts. They could also announce they’re expanding such efforts to other weapons-smuggling operations. Until now, the smuggling has primarily harmed civilians in countries affected by civil war. But with the Houthis likely to inspire copycat attacks on shipping, disrupting the supplies of weapons and weapons components has gained additional urgency. “We need to really understand the Houthis’ supply chains and how the components for weapons that they then assemble get into the country,” Potts said. “It will be complex to map this, but it’s a practical step we can take.”¹⁴⁸ To map these supply chains, governments could also confer with the private sector, as some companies are likely to have information that could help governments establish a clearer picture.

They could also confer with AI companies that can track and trace movements of suspected arms components to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Indeed, governments could establish cooperation with AI companies, especially with startups seeking to prove their technologies, to receive early indications of patterns suggesting potentially worrying developments involving other groups and states. Such collaboration would add to observations already provided by intelligence services.

Armed guards on board

When piracy increased heavily off the coast of Somalia in the early 2000s, many shipping companies responded by hiring armed guards. The Houthis’ seizure of the Galaxy Leader quickly prompted suggestions of armed guards onboard merchant vessels in the Red Sea. Guards on merchant vessels are, however, relatively lightly armed and would not be able to protect a vessel against trained militias like the Houthis. Indeed, because ship guards are not soldiers, they’re legally prevented from operating military equipment and would thus not be able to protect ships from missile and (most) drone attacks. They would likely also struggle to thwart a professionally executed hijacking of the kind the Houthis mounted against the Galaxy Leader. This is illustrated by the fact that, even though ships in the Red Sea have increased “armed guards on board” signals since the Houthis began their attacks, the attacks have continued.¹⁴⁹ In addition, armed resistance against a seizure attempt by a militia would risk escalating into a situation in which navies would feel compelled to intervene.

Western countries could, however, offer vessels protection by law-enforcement officers. Such officers’ task could be defined as defending the cargo rather than the ship. That would mean the exporting or importing country could offer embarked law enforcement that would be able to employ military or quasi-military defensive capabilities. The United States has tried this concept: the Navy and Marine task force that was deployed to the Strait of Hormuz in August 2023 included the offer of servicemembers embarking on merchant vessels if the vessels’ owners and managers requested such protection.

Conclusion

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the world’s nations have gradually built a set of rules and agreements that allows merchant shipping to operate without constant fear of attacks by hostile states. They have done so because nations’ economies—at least since the Industrial Revolution—rely on global shipping.

The Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea, however, have introduced a new threat to merchant shipping: geopolitically connected attacks that are linked to a hostile state but not carried out by it. The Yemeni militia has, in fact, demonstrated that building up a capacity to act in the maritime domain is possible for a non-state actor with no maritime tradition. The fact that the Houthis are not the armed forces of an internationally recognized country and operate with a completely different cost-benefit calculus than traditional armed forces make them such a fierce threat to global shipping. So does the fact that they use more sophisticated weapons than previous generations’ militias have had at their disposal, and that the weapons are inexpensive and attractive to use. Other militias (including ones yet to be formed) will likely want to copy the Houthis’ successful concept in other maritime chokepoints and heavily trafficked waters.

For the global shipping industry (except vessels linked to Russia and China, which the Houthis exempt from their attacks), this means that a neutral sector can be severely harmed and disrupted, at great expense to the shipping industry. The Houthis’ different cost-benefit calculus means retaliating against their strikes has little effect on their motivation. The harm to seafarers as a result of the Houthi attacks now presents an additional problem for Western shipping companies and, thus, global supply chains. So far, the shipping industry has managed to recruit seafarers—these days, predominantly from India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.¹⁵⁰ If attacks continue, shipping’s already precarious recruitment situation will worsen significantly. “Who wants to work in a war zone?” Broadhurst asked. “Unless we can protect seafarers, how can global trade continue?”¹⁵¹ At the end of June 2024, the Philippine government banned Philippine seafarers from working on ships that had been attacked in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.¹⁵²

Instead, Western governments and the shipping industry will need to use means other than traditional military force to reduce the pain caused by the Houthis (and prospective future attackers of a similar kind). These efforts—including the preemptive threat of collective rerouting away from perilous waters and the use of direct-energy weapons—will require public-private collaboration. Western governments and shipping companies could start by announcing that they are increasing their collaboration beyond the immediate needs in the Red Sea. This would signal to prospective attackers that Western governments and companies are prepared for new maritime gray zone aggression and will have a better strategy to thwart it than has been the case in the Red Sea.

About the program

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

1 Ronald O’Rourke, “The Tanker War,” Proceedings, US Naval Institute, May 1988, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/tanker-war.

2 Bradley Peniston, “Operation Earnest Will,” Navybook, last visited June 14, 2024, https://www.navybook.com/no-higher-honor/timeline/operation-earnest-will/.

3 O’Rourke, “The Tanker War.”

4 Piracy is not covered in this report, which exclusively analyzes state-linked aggression against shipping

5 H. B. Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping: Bridging the Gap Between Conventional Law and State Practice,” in Richard J. Grunawalt, ed., International Law Studies 65 (1993), 338, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=ils#:~:text=The%20conundrum%20of%20this%20situation,legitimate%20targets%20of%20direct%20attack.

6 “Privateer,” Britannica, last visited June 14, 2024, https://www.britannica.com/technology/privateer.

7 Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping,” 338.

8 “Hague Convention VI—Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities: 18 October 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 305, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 533, entered into force Jan. 26, 1910,” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, last visited June 14, 2024, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/1907e.htm.

9 Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping,” 339

10 “American Entry into World War I, 1917,” US Department of State, last visited June 14, 2024, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/82205.htm.

11 Ibid., 342.

12 Robertson, Jr., “U.S. Policy on Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping,” 342.

13 “Convention on the International Maritime Organization,” International Maritime Organization, 1948, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Convention-on-the-International-Maritime-Organization.aspx.

14 Ibid.

15 Brian Michael Jenkins, et al., “A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions against Maritime Targets,” RAND, September 1983, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P6906.pdf.

16 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

17 “International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974,” International Maritime Organization, 1974, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx.

18 Ibid. International maritime rules, treaties, and conventions will be discussed at greater length in a later report.

19 Tullio Treves, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Audiovisual Library of International Law, December 10, 1982, https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/uncls/uncls.html. UNCLOS entered into force in 1994.

20 “United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982: Overview and Full Text,” United Nations, 1982, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

21 Richard A. Mobley, “Revisiting the 1984 Naval Mining of the Red Sea: Intelligence Challenges and Lessons,” Studies in Intelligence 66, 2 (June 2022), 22f, https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/RedSeaMiningMystery1984.pdf.

22 Felix Richter, “The Steep Rise in Global Seaborne Trade,” Statista, March 26, 2021, https://www.statista.com/chart/24527/total-volume-of-global-sea-trade/.

23 “U.S. Charges Saudi for 2002 Oil Tanker Bombing,” Maritime Executive, February 6, 2014, https://maritime-executive.com/article/US-Charges-Saudi-for-2002-Oil-Tanker-Bombing-2014-02-06.

24 “The Strait of Hormuz is the World’s Most Important Oil Transit Chokepoint,” US Energy Information Administration, November 21, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61002.

25 “Stena Impero: Seized British Tanker Leaves Iran’s Waters,” BBC, September 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-49849718.

26 Patrick Wintour, “A Visual Guide to the Gulf Tanker Attacks,” Guardian, June 14, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/13/a-visual-guide-to-the-gulf-tanker-attacks.

27 C. Todd Lopez, “U.S. Forces Arrive to Support Deterrence Efforts at Strait of Hormuz,” US Department of Defense, August 7, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3485733/us-forces-arrive-to-support-deterrence-efforts-at-strait-of-hormuz.

28 Heather Mongilio, “Video: Iranian Navy Warship Fires on Oil Tanker in the Strait of Hormuz,” USNI News, July 5, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/07/05/video-iranian-warship-fires-on-oil-tanker-in-the-strait-of-hormuz.

29 “Merchant Ships Attacked and on Fire off Ukraine,” Maritime Executive, March 25, 2022, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/merchant-ships-attacked-and-on-fire-off-ukraine.

30 Matt Coyne and Gary Dixon, “Engineer Killed in Attack on Bangladeshi Bulker in Black Sea,” TradeWinds, March 2, 2022, https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/engineer-killed-in-attack-on-bangladeshi-bulker-in-black-sea/2-1-1177847.

31 Elisabeth Braw, “Foreign Seafarers Are Stranded in Ukraine for Christmas,” Foreign Policy, December 27, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/27/seafarers-stranded-ukraine-christmas-russia-war/.

32 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

33 Alexander Lott, Hybrid Threats and the Law of the Sea (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2021),172, https://brill.com/display/book/9789004509368/BP000013.xml?language=en&body=pdf-60830; Katie Zeng Xiaojun, “East Asia: Impact of China and Taiwan Conflict on Shipping,” Maritime Intelligence, September 6, 2022, https://www.riskintelligence.eu/analyst-briefings/east-asia-impact-of-china-and-taiwan-conflict; “Taiwan Strait: Pray We’ll Always Be as Lucky,” Lloyd’s List, August 5, 2022, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1141850/Taiwan-Strait-pray-well-always-be-as-lucky.

34 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024. China’s construction of artificial islands and its long-distance fishing fleet, whose estimated nearly seventeen thousand vessels fish other countries’ waters dry, will be examined in a subsequent report within the Atlantic Council’s Threats to the Global Maritime Order project.

35 Bec Strating, “China’s Nine-Dash Line Proves Stranger than Fiction,” Interpreter, April 12, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-nine-dash-line-proves-stranger-fiction; Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke, and Max Molot, “The Critical Role of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea,” in China and the U.S.: Cooperation, Competition and/or Conflict an Experimental Assessment, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 1, 2019, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22586.30.

36 Gregory B. Poling, Tabitha Grace Mallory, and Harrison Prétat, “Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies and Center for Advanced Defense Studies, November 2021, 5, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?VersionId=Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuLIq7wR.

37 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

38 Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Pacific Commander Says China Is Pursuing ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy,” Financial Times, April 28, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/f926f540-d5c2-43f2-bd8f-c83c0d52bcda.

39 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

40 Marek Jestrab, “A Maritime Blockade of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China: A Strategy to Defeat Fear and Coercion,” Atlantic Council, December 12, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/a-maritime-blockade-of-taiwan-by-the-peoples-republic-of-china-a-strategy-to-defeat-fear-and-coercion/.

41 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

42 “Hijacked Car Carrier’s Crew Treated ‘As Well As Can Be Expected,’” Maritime Executive, December 5, 2024, https://maritime-executive.com/article/hijacked-car-carrier-s-crew-treated-as-well-as-can-be-expected.

43 Yahya Sare’e (@Yahya_Saree), “The Yemeni Naval Forces managed to capture an Israeli ship in the depths of the Red Sea taking it to the Yemeni coast. The Yemeni armed forces deal with the ship’s crew in accordance with the principle and values of our Islamic religion,” Twitter, November 19, 2023, 11:23 a.m., https://twitter.com/Yahya_Saree/status/1726290072994296194.

44 Isabel Debre and Jon Gambrell, “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Hijack an Israeli-Linked Ship in the Red Sea and Take 25 Crew Members Hostage,” Associated Press, November 20, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/israel-houthi-rebels-hijacked-ship-red-sea-dc9b6448690bcf5c70a0baf7c7c34b09.

45 Ibid.

46 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “Today, there were four attacks against three separate commercial vessels operating in international waters in the southern Red Sea. These three vessels are…” X post, December 3, 2023, https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1731424734829773090.

47 Nadine Awadalla, Terje Solsvik and Phil Stewart, “Yemen’s Houthis Claim Missile Attack on Norwegian Tanker in Tense Middle East,” Reuters, December 12, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/cruise-missile-yemen-strikes-tanker-ship-us-officials-2023-12-12/.

48 John Gambrell, “2 Attacks Launched by Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Strike Container Ships in Vital Red Sea Corridor,” Associated Press, December 15, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/yemen-houthi-ship-attack-israel-hamas-69289146266b9042b5896aa4679605ef.

49 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

50 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

51 The dark fleet will be the subject of a subsequent report.

52 “Crew of Seized Galaxy Leader Allowed ‘Modest’ Contact with Families—Shipowner,” Reuters, December 5, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/crew-seized-galaxy-leader-allowed-modest-contact-with-families-shipowner-2023-12-05/.

53 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

54 Phil Stewart, “More than 20 Countries Now Part of US-led Red Sea Coalition, Pentagon Says,” Reuters, December 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/more-than-20-countries-now-part-us-led-red-sea-coalition-pentagon-2023-12-21/.

55 “Statement from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on Ensuring Freedom of Navigation in the Red Sea,” US Department of Defense, press release, December 18, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3621110/statement-from-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-ensuring-freedom-of-n/.

56 Jim Garamone, “Ryder Gives More Detail on How Operation Prosperity Guardian Will Work,” US Department of Defense, December 21, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3624836/ryder-gives-more-detail-on-how-operation-prosperity-guardian-will-work/.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Parisa Kamali, et al., “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade,” International Monetary Fund, March 7, 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/03/07/Red-Sea-Attacks-Disrupt-Global-Trade.

60 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

61 Interview with the author, March 13, 2024.

62 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “U.S. assets, to include the USS LABOON (DDG 58) and F/A-18 Super Hornets from the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group, shot down twelve one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles, and two land attack cruise missiles in the Southern Red Sea that were fired by the Houthis over a 10 hour period which began at approximately 6:30 a.m. (Sanaa time) on December 26. There was no damage to ships in the area or reported injuries,” Twitter, December 26, 2023, 2:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1739746985652158755.

63 Interview with the author, April 10, 2024.

64 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

65 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

66 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

67 Wes Rumbaugh, “Cost and Value in Air and Missile Defense Intercepts,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 13, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/cost-and-value-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts.

68 Bridget Diakun, “Red Sea Activity Down Nearly 20% after Containership Exodus,” Lloyd’s List, January 4, 2024, https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1147824/Red-Sea-activity-down-nearly-20-after-containership-exodus.

69 “A Joint Statement from the Governments of the United States, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom,” White House, January 3, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/03/a-joint-statement-from-the-governments-of-the-united-states-australia-bahrain-belgium-canada-denmark-germany-italy-japan-netherlands-new-zealand-and-the-united-kingdom/.

70 “US CENTCOM Statement on 26th Houthi Attack on Commercial Shipping Lanes in the Red Sea,” US Central Command, January 9, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/STATEMENTS/Statements-View/Article/3639970/us-centcom-statement-on-26th-houthi-attack-on-commercial-shipping-lanes-in-the/.

71 Ibid.

72 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

73 “Statement from President Joe Biden on Coalition Strikes in Houthi-Controlled Areas in Yemen,” White House, press release, January 11, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/11/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-coalition-strikes-in-houthi-controlled-areas-in-yemen/.

74 Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, “US, British Forces Carry out More Strikes against Houthis in Yemen,” Reuters, February 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-british-forces-carry-out-additional-strikes-against-houthis-yemen-2024-02-24/.

75 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “Third Houthi Terrorists Attack on Commercial Shipping Vessel in Three Days: On Jan. 18 at approximately 9 p.m. (Sanaa time), Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles at M/V Chem Ranger, a Marshall Island-flagged, U.S.-Owned, Greek-operated tanker ship. The crew observed the missiles impact the water near the ship. There were no reported injuries or damage to the ship. The ship has continued underway,” Twitter, January 18, 2024, 6:42 p.m., https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1748143745567010833.

76 Ibid.

77 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

78 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

79 “Yemen: Houthi Attacks Placing Pressure on International Trade,” US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2024, 3, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/YEM_Houthi-Attacks-Pressuring-International-Trade.pdf.

80 Mared Gwyn Jones, “EU Launches Mission Aspides to Protect Red Sea Vessels from Houthi Attacks,” Euronews, February 19, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/02/19/eu-launches-mission-aspides-to-protect-red-sea-vessels-from-houthi-attacks.

81 Sam Dagher and Mohammed Hatem, “Yemen’s Houthis Tell China, Russia Their Ships Won’t Be Targeted,” Bloomberg, March 21, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-21/china-russia-reach-agreement-with-yemen-s-houthis-on-red-sea-ships?sref=NeFsviTJ.

82 “Who Are the Houthis and Why Are They Attacking Red Sea Ships?” BBC, March 15, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911.

83 Sam Chambers, “Washington Seeks New Ways to Deescalate Red Sea Shipping Crisis,” Splash 247, April 4, 2024, https://splash247.com/washington-seeks-new-ways-to-deescalate-red-sea-shipping-crisis.

84 Ibid.

85 https://twitter.com/CENTCOM.

86 U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM), “April 26 CENTCOM Red Sea Update: At 5:49 p.m. (Sanna time) on April 26, Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Red Sea in the vicinity of MV MAISHA, an Antigua/Barbados flagged, Liberia operated vessel and MV Andromeda Star, a UK owned and Panamanian flagged, Seychelles operated vessel. MV Andromeda Star reports minor damage, but is continuing its voyage,” Twitter, April 26, 2024, 7:46 p.m., https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1784021287553135050.

87 Jonathan Lehrfeld, Diana Stancy and Geoff Ziezulewicz, “All the Houthi-US Navy Incidents in the Middle East (that We Know of),” Military Times, last updated April 30, 2024, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/02/12/all-the-houthi-us-navy-incidents-in-the-middle-east-that-we-know-of/.

88 Chambers, “Washington Seeks New Ways to Deescalate Red Sea Shipping Crisis.”

89 Kamali, et al., “Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade.”

90 Takeshi Kumon, “Chinese Cargo Ships Poised to Gain from Red Sea Tensions,” Nikkei Asia, April 27, 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Middle-East-crisis/Chinese-cargo-ships-poised-to-gain-from-Red-Sea-tensions2.

91 Interview with the author, April 11, 2024.

92 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

93 Interview with the author, April 5, 2024.

94 Robert Wright, “Houthis Extend Attacks on Shipping to Wider Indian Ocean,” Financial Times, May 1, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/778a80a0-1f55-4ffc-ade0-857bd5bd9b92; “MSC Orion,” Vessel Finder, last visited June 14, 2024, https://www.vesselfinder.com/vessels/details/9857157.

95 “Houthis Say They Will Target Israel-Bound Ships Anywhere within Their Range,” Al Jazeera, May 3, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/3/yemens-houthis-say-they-will-target-ships-heading-for-israel-within-range.

96 EUNAVFOR Aspides (@EUNAVFORASPIDES), “EUNAVFOR ASPIDES: 100 close protections. In less than 3 months since its official launch, Operation ASPIDES completed 100 CP, providing safe transit of merchant vessels,” X, May 9 2024, 10:49 a.m., https://x.com/EUNAVFORASPIDES/status/1788597163435360334.

97 Jana Choukeir, Tala Ramadan and Adam Makary, “Bulker Damaged Near Yemen by Two Missile Attacks, Security Sources Say,” Reuters, May 28, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vessel-tilts-off-yemens-coast-after-attack-by-missiles-ambrey-says-2024-05-28/.

98 “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Claim Latest Attack on Cargo Ship in Gulf of Aden,” VOA, June 9, 2024, https://www.voanews.com/a/yemen-s-houthi-rebels-claim-latest-attack-on-cargo-ship-in-gulf-of-aden/7649384.html.

99 Neil Jerome Morales and Jonathan Saul, “Bulk Carrier ‘Tutor’ Abandoned After Houthi Attack,” Reuters, June 14, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/rescue-underway-for-bulk-carrier-missing-crew-member-after-houthi-attack/.

100 UKMTO Warning, June 16, 2024, https://www.ukmto.org/-/media/ukmto/warnings/indian-ocean/2024/jun/20240616-ukmto-warning-incident-087-update-001.pdf?rev=46316c731be5415c8e6cc5587046f9c6.

101 “Houthis Claim Attacks on Two Ships in Red Sea and Indian Ocean,” Reuters, June 24, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-claim-attacks-two-ships-red-sea-indian-ocean-2024-06-23/.

102 “Houthis Hit Another Merchant Ship with a Bomb Boat,” Maritime Executive, June 27, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-hit-another-merchant-ship-with-a-bomb-boat.

103 Mike Schuler, “Watch: Houthi Drone Boat Destroyed by Armed Guards,” gCaptain, July 23, 2024, https://gcaptain.com/watch-houthi-drone-boat-destroyed-by-armed-guards/.

104 https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1815178599151882616.

105 “Video: Houthis Claim First Launch of Hypersonic Missile Targeting MSC Ship,” Maritime Executive, June 26, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/houthis-claim-first-launch-of-hypersonic-missile-targeting-distant-msc-ship.

106 “Surviving Crewmembers of Bulker Tutor Recount Ordeal of Houthi Attack,” Maritime Executive, June 17, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/surviving-crewmembers-of-bulker-tutor-recount-ordeal-of-houthi-attack.

107 “Seafarer Supply, Quinquennial, 2015 and 2021,” United Nations Trade and Development, last visited July 22, 2024, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.Seafarers; “Philippines Says 78 Crew Refused to Sail Red Sea as it Increases Ban,” Maritime Executive, June 26, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/philippines-says-78-crew-refused-to-sail-red-sea-as-it-increases-ban.

108 “April 26 Red Sea Update,” US Central Command, press release, April 26, 2024, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/3758387/april-26-red-sea-update/.

109 TankerTrackers.com, Inc. (@TankerTrackers), “Ironically, WIND (9252967) is a Dark Fleet tanker that not only we know very well from Venezuela, but was carrying Russian oil last night in the Red Sea,” Twitter, May 18, 2024, 10:23 a.m., https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/1791852091876528209; U.S. Central Command, (@CENTCOM), “Houthis strike M/T Wind in Red Sea: At approximately 1 a.m. (Sanaa time) May 18, Iranian-backed Houthis launched one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) into the Red Sea and struck M/T Wind, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek owned and operated oil tanker…” Twitter, May 18, 2024, 10:20 a.m., https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/1791851421152743816; “Houthi Attack Damages Shadow Fleet Tanker Carrying Russian Oil,” Maritime Executive, May 18, 2024, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/houthi-attack-damages-shadow-fleet-tanker-carrying-russian-oil.

110 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

111 Interview with the author, March 18, 2024.

112 Ibid.

113 Sam Dagher, “US May Revoke Houthi Terrorist Label If They Stop Red Sea Ship Attacks,” Bloomberg, April 3, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-03/us-may-revoke-houthi-terrorist-label-if-they-stop-red-sea-ship-attacks?srnd=economics-v2&sref=NeFsviTJ.

114 Elisabeth Braw, “The Last Thing Ukraine Needs Is a Shipping Crisis. But It’s About to Have One,” Prospect Magazine, February 17, 2022, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-last-thing-ukraine-needs-is-a-shipping-crisis-but-its-about-to-have-one; Jonathan Saul, “London Marine Insurers Widen High Risk Zone in Red Sea as Attacks Surge,” Reuters, December 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/london-marine-insurers-widen-high-risk-zone-red-sea-attacks-surge-2023-12-18.

115 A UN-sponsored “grain corridor” was later created to allow the shipment of Ukrainian grain to world markets.

116 “Trade Disruptions in the Red Sea,” IMF Portwatch, last visited June 14, 2024, https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/573013af3b6545deaeb50ed1cbaf9444.

117 Ibid.

118 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

119 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

120 Interview with the author, May 9, 2024.

121 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

122 Robert Wright, “Mediterranean Ports Warn of Overflowing Storage Yards in Latest Threat to Supply Chain,” Financial Times, April 23, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/1f0a7add-1412-4b27-926f-cb99338fa520.

123 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

124 “Drastic Drop in Piracy in Malacca Straits,” Maritime Security Asia, April 21, 2011, https://web.archive.org/web/20171107012031/http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/piracy-2/drastic-drop-in-piracy-in-malacca-straits/.

125 For more about the shadow fleet, see: Elisabeth Braw, “Russia’s Growing Dark Fleet: Risks for the Global Maritime Order,” Atlantic Council, January 11, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/russias-growing-dark-fleet-risks-for-the-global-maritime-order. The dark fleet will also be analyzed in an extensive report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Threats to the Global Maritime Order initiative.

126 Again, these activities will be analyzed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project.

127 Interview with the author, March 14, 2024.

128 Russia’s use of the shadow fleet will be discussed in a subsequent report as part of the Atlantic Council’s Maritime Threats project, as will other maritime violations including China’s maritime harassment.

129 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

130 Interview with the author, March 21, 2024.

131 “Defense Primer: Directed-Energy Weapons,” Congressional Research Service, last updated February 1, 2024, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11882.pdf.

132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.

134 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

135 Stew Magnuson, “Directed Energy Weapons: Here Now? Or 5 Years Off?” National Defense, February 29, 2024, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/2/29/editors-notes-directed-energy-weapons-here-now-or-5-years-off.

136 Ibid.

137 Interview with the author, March 28, 2024.

138 MG Wachenfeld, “Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers,” Duke University, last visited June 14, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3026&context=dlj.

139 “Review of Maritime Transport 2023,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2023, 32, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/rmt2023_en.pdf.

140 Ibid., 33.

141 Interview with the author, April 10, 2024.

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.

144 Interview with the author, March 21, 2024.

145 “IKE Strike Group Transits the Strait of Hormuz,” US Navy, November 27, 2023, https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3598368/ike-strike-group-transits-the-strait-of-hormuz/.

146 “Report to Congress on Chinese Naval Modernization,” USNI News, February 1, 2024, https://news.usni.org/2024/02/01/report-to-congress-on-chinese-naval-modernization-20.

147 “Number of Vessels in the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom in 2023, by Type,” Statista, December 8, 2023, https://www.statista.com/statistics/603297/type-of-vessels-in-royal-navy/.

148 Interview with the author, April 10, 2024.

149 “Windward Trade Patterns & Risk Insights Report Q4/2023,” Windward, January 2, 2024, https://windward.ai/blog/windward-q4-risk-report/.

150 “Seafarer Supply, Quinquennial, 2015 and 2021,” UN Trade and Development, last updated July 18, 2023, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.Seafarers.

151 Interview with the author, April 2, 2024.

152 Marita Moaje, “Pinoy seafarers no longer allowed on ships attacked in Red Sea,” Philippine News Agency, June 25, 2024, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1227677.

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Is Ukraine’s raid into Russia a ‘crossing the Delaware’ moment?

Daniel Fried — Fri, 09 Aug 2024 10:48:35 +0000

Ukrainian forces, on the defensive in eastern Ukraine, have mounted an audacious raid into Russia’s Kursk Province, capturing enemy soldiers and destroying equipment, surprising and discomforting the Kremlin. What strategic significance might it have?

Some raids have no impact on the course of a war. In the summer of 1864, with Union forces besieging Richmond and Petersburg, Confederate General Jubal Early mounted a large and spectacular raid north into Maryland and then southeast into the District of Columbia. Early’s troops stopped just five miles from the US Capitol. It was spectacular but inconsequential, however: The raid distracted the Union command for a few days but made no difference to the outcome of the war.

Other raids do have strategic impact. In 1776, George Washington’s forces had been routed from New York and chased out of New Jersey. Morale was low and political support for the American fight for independence was flagging. In a risky maneuver that December, Washington led a large raid across the Delaware River, surprised enemy forces, and returned to Pennsylvania with captured prisoners and supplies. The raid revived morale and support for the war, demonstrated the Continental Army’s tactical cunning, audacity, and tenacity against a superior foe, and presaged eventual victory.

The raid and the public alarm in Russia it has generated may compel the Kremlin to shift forces from its current offensive in the Donbas region to defend its own territory.

While it is too early to say with certainty, there is at least a case that the Kursk raid more resembles Washington crossing the Delaware than Early’s raid on Washington; namely, that it has strategic significance. In a war in which battlefield transparency is supposedly universal, the Ukrainians achieved surprise, demonstrating Russia’s failure of intelligence and weakness along its border. The attack thus upends the Kremlin narrative of inevitable Russian victory, a narrative that Kremlin propaganda deploys in Europe and the United States to advance its argument that Ukrainian resistance is useless and support for Ukraine is futile. The raid and the public alarm in Russia it has generated may compel the Kremlin to shift forces from its current offensive in the Donbas region to defend its own territory. Certainly, the raid is a morale booster for Ukrainians.

Politically, the raid undercuts the current Russian demand that, as a precondition for negotiations, Ukraine withdraw from all of the territory of the four Ukrainian provinces that Russia partially occupies and claims but does not totally control. The Russians were in effect demanding Ukrainian capitulation as a condition for opening peace negotiations. Even before the raid, the demand that Ukraine withdraw from its territory that Russia has tried but failed to conquer seemed an arrogant overstretch. This demand is now revealed as feckless in the face of Ukraine’s ability not only to limit Russian attacks to marginal advances, but also to launch successful surprise attacks of its own, defending its own land while seizing Russia’s.

It is premature to make final judgments about a raid still in progress. While some military analysts have suggested that the raid seeks to seize and hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip in eventual negotiations, that seems a stretch: Raids are one thing, a full-scale offensive is another. After all, Washington crossed the Delaware to attack exposed Hessian mercenaries. He then retreated back across the Delaware to avoid a full-scale British assault. But, in the end, Washington, with a lot of help from France, won the war. Ukraine’s current raid does not mean that Ukraine will win its war of national survival. It does suggest that Ukraine could win, given the right and timely help from its friends.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

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Ukraine continues to expand drone bombing campaign inside Russia

Marcel Plichta — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 21:03:30 +0000

Ukraine’s long-range drone bombing campaign targeting military and industrial sites inside Russia has had a dramatic series of successes over the last few weeks. The most eye-catching achievement was the attack on Russia’s Morozovsk airbase, which Ukrainian officials claim damaged Russian jets and destroyed stockpiles of munitions including glide bombs used to pummel Ukraine’s military and cities.

This progress has come as no surprise: Ukrainian military planners have been working to capitalize on Russia’s air defense vulnerabilities from the first year of the full-scale invasion. Ukraine’s attacks have escalated significantly since the beginning of 2024, with oil refineries and airfields emerging as the priority targets.

In a July interview with Britain’s Guardian newspaper, Ukrainian commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi confirmed that Ukrainian drones had hit around two hundred sites connected to Russia’s war machine. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has vowed to continue increasing the quality and quantity of Ukraine’s long-range drone fleet. Underlining the importance of drones to the Ukrainian war effort, Ukraine recently became the first country in the world to launch a new branch of the military dedicated to drone warfare.

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Long-range attack drones are a good fit for Ukraine’s limited offensive capabilities. Kyiv needs to be able to strike military targets inside Russia, but is prevented from doing do with Western-supplied missiles due to restrictions imposed by the country’s partners. While Ukraine has some capacity to produce its own missiles domestically, this is insufficient for a sustained bombing campaign.

Drones are enabling Ukraine to overcome these obstacles. Ukrainian drone production has expanded dramatically over the past two-and-a-half years. The low cost of manufacturing a long-range drone relative to the damage it can cause to Russian military and industrial facilities makes it in many ways the ideal weapon for a cash-strapped but innovative nation like Ukraine.

Ukraine’s drone industry is a diverse ecosystem featuring hundreds of participating companies producing different models. The Ukrainian military has used a variety of drones with different characteristics for attacks inside Russia, making the campaign even more challenging for Russia’s air defenses.

The decentralized nature of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing sector also makes it difficult for Russia to target. Even if the Kremlin is able to identify and hit individual production sites located across Ukraine, this is unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s overall output.

Since 2022, Ukraine has taken a number of steps to reduce bureaucracy and streamline cooperation between drone makers and the military. The result is a sector capable of adapting to changing battlefield conditions and able to implement innovations quickly and effectively. This includes efforts to create AI-enabled drones capable of functioning without an operator, making it far more difficult for Russia to jam.

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As it expands, Ukraine’s drone bombing campaign is exposing the weaknesses of Russia’s air defenses. Defending a territory as vast as Russia against air strikes would be problematic even in peacetime. With much of Russia’s existing air defense systems currently deployed along the front lines in Ukraine, there are now far fewer systems available to protect industrial and military targets inside Russia.

During the initial stages of the war, this shortage of air defense coverage was not a major issue. However, Ukraine’s broadening bombing offensive is now forcing Russia to make tough decisions regarding the distribution of its limited air defenses.

In addition to strategically important sites such as airbases, the Kremlin must also defend prestige targets from possible attack. In July, CNN reported that air defenses had been significantly strengthened around Russian President Vladimir Putin’s summer residence. Protecting Putin’s palace from attack is necessary to avoid embarrassment, but it means leaving other potential targets exposed.

Ukraine’s drone program is the biggest success story to emerge from the country’s vibrant defense tech sector, and is helping Ukraine to even out the odds against its far larger and wealthier adversary. The country’s partners clearly recognize the importance of drones for the Ukrainian military, and have formed a drone coalition to increase the supply of drones from abroad. This combination of international support and Ukrainian ingenuity spells trouble for Russia. It will likely lead to increasingly powerful and plentiful long-range strikes in the months ahead.

Marcel Plichta is a PhD candidate at the University of St Andrews and former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on the use of drones in the Russian invasion of Ukraine for the Atlantic Council, the Telegraph, and the Spectator.

How Ukraine’s incursion into Russia could change the war

Atlantic Council — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 19:08:02 +0000

GET UP TO SPEED

The August surprise came from Ukraine. Beginning on Tuesday, as many as a thousand Ukrainian troops reportedly crossed the border into the Kursk region in Russia, capturing an estimated seventeen square miles of territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the move a “major provocation,” while the Ukrainian government has largely declined to comment. The size and depth of the incursion adds a significant new dimension to the ongoing conflict. Below, our experts share their insights on the thinking in Kyiv and what could come next.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION BROUGHT TO YOU BY

Daniel Fried (@AmbDanFried): Weiser family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe
John E. Herbst (@JohnEdHerbst): Senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former US ambassador to Ukraine
Konstantin Eggert (@kvoneggert): Deutsche Welle Russian affairs analyst and program host
Shelby Magid (@shelbyjmag): Deputy director of the Eurasia Center

The element of surprise

“In a war where battlefield transparency is supposedly universal, the Ukrainians achieved surprise, demonstrating a Russian failure of intelligence and weakness along its border,” says Dan. “The attack thus upends the Kremlin narrative of inevitable Russian victory,” which “Kremlin propaganda deploys in Europe and the United States to advance its argument that Ukrainian resistance is useless and support for Ukraine futile.”

“Even if Ukrainian forces are soon forced out of Kursk, this is a clear shot in the arm for Ukraine,” John tells us. In recent weeks, Russia has made advances in eastern Ukraine, but this incursion may now “force the Kremlin to relieve its current pressure on Ukrainian positions in the Donbas or north of Kharkiv.” If Ukrainian forces do establish defensible positions on Russian territory, then “Moscow will have to consider even more adjustments of its forces in Ukraine” and “a ceasefire in place” would be “less attractive to the Putin clique.”

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A rattled Russia and uplifted Ukraine

As with the short-lived mutiny by Wagner Group mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in June 2023, Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk revealed “the vacuousness and inefficiency of modern Russia’s governance system, based on corruption and fear,” argues Konstantin. “Even reports in Russian state media (which are generally upbeat) had to mention the evacuation of the population and hint at the intensity of the fighting,” while “pro-Kremlin Telegram channels paint a picture of a major strike that took Russia’s military and civilian authorities by surprise.”

Dan notes that another risky and successful raid, George Washington’s crossing of the Delaware River in December 1776, boosted troop morale and political support at a critical moment in the American Revolutionary War. Like Washington’s raid, Ukraine’s Kursk incursion reveals its “cunning, audacity, and tenacity against a superior foe” and could have “strategic significance.”

Ukrainians are closely following reports of the raid. “As a further sign of success and a morale boost for the exhausted Ukrainian troops and society, video is circulating of dozens of Russian troops surrendering to Ukrainian forces,” Shelby points out.

For Ukrainians, it’s an opportunity to “show to Russia’s ruling class how vulnerable the country is,” Konstantin explains, noting that the situation has been made all the more urgent by the fact that the Kursk nuclear power plant is within reach of Ukraine’s forces. The incursion also “shows Kyiv’s determination to incorporate the politico-psychological warfare factor into purely military operations.”

What’s next?

While some Ukrainians have characterized the raid as an effort to “seize and hold Russian territory as a bargaining chip in eventual negotiations, that seems a stretch,” according to Dan. “Raids are one thing, a full-scale offensive is another.” Shelby agrees, noting that “entering and seizing land is different than holding it.”

It’s “highly likely” that part of Ukraine’s goal is to demonstrate its capability to its partners, observes John. Kyiv faced a months-long delay in receiving additional US aid, and continues to be restricted by US and German reluctance to provide more advanced weapons in large quantities and allow their use against strategic targets deeper inside Russia, he explains. The Kursk incursion, John maintains, “should be a reminder to the more timid Western leaders that Ukraine can win this war if we enable and allow them to win.”

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F-16 jets will help defend Ukrainian cities from Russian bombardment

Olena Tregub — Thu, 08 Aug 2024 12:44:30 +0000

The recent appearance of F-16 fighter jets in the skies above Ukraine is a victory for all Ukrainians, and particularly for the relatively small group of people who worked tirelessly to promote the idea of delivering the planes. The push to secure F-16s began as a grassroots effort initiated by Ukrainian civil society and the military, before being taken on by the country’s political leadership. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was then able to convince Ukraine’s allies to create an F-16 coalition. In many ways, the process was a great example of teamwork involving different segments of Ukrainian society.

Ukraine’s efforts to persuade partner countries focused on the US, which had to grant permission as the manufacturer of F-16s. Ukrainian pilot Andriy Pilschikov deserves a special mention for the key role he played in the campaign to win American backing. A fluent English speaker and experienced air force pilot known to many by his callsign “Juice,” Pilschikov became the unofficial public face of Ukraine’s appeal for F-16s. Crucially, he was able to articulate why the F-16 was the best choice for Ukraine, arguing that it was the most widely available modern jet and relatively easy to use.

In the initial months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there was no consensus over which aircraft Ukraine should request from the country’s allies. Various Ukrainian government officials mentioned a range of different models, leading to some confusion. Pilschikov provided much-needed clarity and managed to convince everyone to focus their efforts specifically on the F-16. With support from Ukrainian civil society, he personally travelled to the US and established productive relationships with a number of US officials and members of Congress.

US President Joe Biden finally gave the green light to supply Ukraine with F-16s in summer 2023. However, it would take another year before the the Ukrainian Air Force received the first batch of jets. Sadly, Pilschikov did not live to see this historic day. The pilot who did so much to secure F-16s for his country was killed in a mid-air collision during a training exercise in August 2023.

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Despite achieving a breakthrough in summer 2023, the process of preparing for the delivery of F-16s to Ukraine proved frustratingly slow. Ukrainian pilots spent many months training, with only a limited number of slots made available. As a result, Ukraine still has very few pilots able to fly F-16s. Identifying and upgrading Ukrainian airfields capable of accommodating F-16s also created challenges.

The planes that Ukraine has received from the country’s European partners are from the older generation, which is being phased out elsewhere as air forces transition to more modern models. This imposes some limitations on the functions Ukraine’s F-16 fleet can perform. Limited radar reach means that deployment of F-16s on the front lines of the war is seen as too risky, as they could be shot down by both Russian aircraft and Russian air defenses.

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With a combat role unlikely at this stage, Ukrainian F-16s will primarily be used to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The planes Kyiv has received are ideally suited to the task of shooting down the Russian missiles and drones that are regularly fired at Ukrainian cities and vital infrastructure.

Their effectiveness in this role will depend on the kinds of missiles they are armed with. F-16s can carry a range of armaments that are more advanced that the types of weapons used by the majority of planes in service with the Russian Air Force. Initial indications are encouraging, with the first F-16s arriving in Ukraine complete with weapons ideally suited to air defense. It is now vital for Ukrainian officials and members of civil society to focus their advocacy efforts on securing sufficient numbers of missiles from partner countries.

Ukraine should also prioritize the supply of long-range radar detection aircraft, such as the planes recently promised by Sweden. In May 2024, the Swedes announced plans to deliver two surveillance aircraft as part of the Scandinavian nation’s largest support package to date. These “eyes in the sky” can monitor airspace for hundreds of kilometers. Together with Ukraine’s growing F-16 fleet, they will significantly enhance the country’s air defenses.

As Ukraine acquires more F-16s in the coming months, and as the country’s limited pool of pilots grows in size and experience, we will likely see these jets used in more adventurous ways. This may include targeting Russian planes and helicopters operating close to the front lines with long-range strikes. For now, though, the main task of Ukraine’s F-16s will be to improve the country’s air defenses and protect the civilian population from Russian bombardment.

Olena Tregub is Executive Director of the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO), a member of the Anti-Corruption Council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

#AtlanticDebrief – What do the 2024 Paris Olympic Games mean for France? | A debrief from Amb. Samuel Ducroquet

nlawler — Wed, 07 Aug 2024 20:48:49 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What do the 2024 Paris Olympic Games mean for France? What is the overall impression of the Paris Olympics so far? What sort of values and principles does France want to showcase to the world by hosting? And how will France pass the torch to the United States for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympics?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Visiting Fellow Léonie Allard sits down with the French Ambassador for Sport Samuel Ducroquet to discuss his impressions of the Paris Olympics and the role of the Olympics in international diplomacy.

You can watch #AtlanticDebrief on YouTube and as a podcast.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What do the 2024 Paris Olympic Games mean for France? | A debrief from Amb. Samuel Ducroquet appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can work together in an era of strategic competition

Gorana Grgić — Wed, 07 Aug 2024 15:48:59 +0000

In its landmark 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO identified three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. The first two are rather self-explanatory, but the third was an important advancement. The notion of collective security as a core task starts with a recognition that NATO “is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders.” Because of this fact, the Alliance seeks out partnerships with other countries and organizations to enhance international security. The Alliance’s relationships with Indo-Pacific countries are prime examples, and for years after 2010, this task was seen primarily as supporting non-Article 5 crisis management operations.

These days, however, NATO is adapting its partnerships to respond to changed structural realities and the focus on strategic competition given the growing assertiveness and militarism of revisionist states such as Russia and China.

In that sense, there have been significant qualitative changes in the way NATO partnerships with the individual Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—and the minilateral grouping operate today and challenges they face compared to when they were first created. Namely, both sides now see their respective partners as significant for their own defense and deterrence, rather than as interlocutors in the provision of security for third parties, as was the case in out-of-area missions, where crisis management and cooperative security were the central organizing principles of these partnerships.

NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific

Last month’s NATO Summit in Washington demonstrated that the IP4 countries occupy a pivotal place in the ecosystem of NATO’s partner states. This role began to emerge in its present form at the 2022 Madrid summit, which unveiled NATO’s current Strategic Concept. Substantive engagement between NATO and the IP4 countries has continued to develop since then. This year’s summit, for example, marked the third consecutive year that IP4 leaders attended, making it clear that this informal grouping is becoming a mainstay of NATO’s outreach to and strategic thinking about the Indo-Pacific.

The 2022 Strategic Concept referred to the Indo-Pacific as “important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” Such a diagnosis of the international security environment converges with the general assessment of trends as seen from Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul, and Wellington, which have also witnessed firsthand how Russia’s war against Ukraine is reverberating in their region. Furthermore, the Strategic Concept characterized China’s ambitions and policies as major challenges to the Alliance’s security, interests, and values. It also raised concern over increased China-Russia cooperation, which threatens to undermine the rules-based international order. The Washington Summit Declaration, issued on July 10, also underscored how these trends have continued to grow in pace and magnitude as North Korea and Iran provide direct military support to Russia.

In response, coordination and engagement channels between NATO and the IP4 have become even more relevant to the security of both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, creating a strong common basis for cooperation. However, the intra-Alliance consensus for engagement has not been easy to reach due to some notable differences among the thirty-two allies.

At the Washington summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the “strong and deepening cooperation” between the Alliance and the IP4. Emblematic of the greater ambition behind NATO-IP4 cooperation has been a move to the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme agreements, which replaced the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, and which all of the IP4 countries signed over the past year.

Moreover, NATO has pursued engagement with these partners as a minilateral group rather than as a collection of four individual partnerships. This commitment has resulted in four joint projects, announced by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in July, which will focus on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, combating disinformation, and cybersecurity.

At the same time, IP4 countries have continuously demonstrated their commitment to Euro-Atlantic security by providing military and economic aid to Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, and initiating a range of direct and indirect capacity-building initiatives. Some of the IP4 members’ leaders, such as Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, have even urged US lawmakers to continue aiding Ukraine.

The future of NATO-IP4 cooperation

If managed well, NATO’s IP4 partnerships can be a vital tool to enhance the Alliance’s core tasks of cooperative security and crisis management. More importantly, these partnerships have the potential to contribute to NATO’s defense and deterrence, strengthen the Alliance’s competitive advantages, and shape the global security environment in ways that serve its interests and values.

To be successful, NATO must recognize and cater to the spectrum of ambition for cooperation among IP4 partners. The Alliance should tailor its approach and maximize the benefits of cooperation at various levels. For countries with lower levels of ambition, the benefits to cooperation with NATO come primarily from political consultations, and these talks should continue. These consultations foster a shared strategic domain awareness and enhance the understanding of how events in one region impact the security of others.

For those with greater ambitions for strengthening ties with NATO, there should be an emphasis on expanding cooperation in science and technology. This includes capacity building, which can have significant positive effects on the security of both NATO and its partners. With sufficient political will and consensus from both sides, individual IP4 partners can further develop their relationships with NATO. This cooperation could then lead to achieving, strengthening, and maintaining interoperability—that is, operating together according to agreed-upon rules and procedures, as well as using similar equipment. It also could mean working together on international standards-setting and the co-production and joint maintenance of military assets, expanding on existing cooperation between NATO and its partners in other initiatives.

The NATO-IP4 format has already proven useful for information sharing and presenting a unified front to promote common values vis-à-vis revisionist states. The Alliance should build on the significant groundwork that has already been laid for integrating the IP4 into various NATO structures and processes to continue the multiparty coordination and “regularize” these partnerships in a way that would shield them from domestic politics. However, considering that Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns have propagated the narrative that NATO is attempting to expand into the Indo-Pacific, it is crucial for the Alliance to consistently emphasize that the partnerships with IP4 nations, or any future potential partners from the region, are not a prelude to full membership.

Finally, while it may seem self-evident, managing and reconciling expectations is crucial, as NATO operates on a consensus basis. Therefore, given the past episodes of disagreements among allies around NATO’s outreach to the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative to handle these relations carefully to avoid creating unnecessary intra-Alliance tensions and to demonstrate how nurturing ties with the IP4 serves the interests of both sides.

Gorana Grgić is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post How NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can work together in an era of strategic competition appeared first on Atlantic Council.

A Russia without Russians? Putin’s disastrous demographics

Harley Balzer — Wed, 07 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 challenged much of the common Western understanding of Russia. How can the world better understand Russia? What are the steps forward for Western policy? The Eurasia Center’s new “Russia Tomorrow” series seeks to reevaluate conceptions of Russia today and better prepare for its future tomorrow.

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Introduction

I. Addressing the Soviet legacy

II. Pre-war policies

III. The ethnic variable

V. Conclusion

About the author

Russia’s future will be characterized by a smaller population. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war has virtually guaranteed that for generations to come, Russia’s population will be not only smaller, but also older, more fragile, and less well-educated. It will almost certainly be ethnically less Russian and more religiously diverse. While some might view diversity as a strength, many Russians do not see it this way. In a world with hordes of people on the move to escape war, persecution, poverty, and the increasing impact of climate change, xenophobic political rhetoric sells well.

Putin has spoken frequently about Russia’s demographic problems, beginning in his first months as president. Despite spending trillions of rubles on high-profile “national projects” to remedy the situation, population decline continued. Putin’s choice of timing for military aggression in Ukraine might have reflected an understanding that Russia’s demographic (and economic) situation would not improve in the next two decades. However, the war is turning a growing crisis into a catastrophe.

The demographic consequences from the Russian war against Ukraine, like those from World War II and the health, birth rate and life expectancy impact from Russia’s protracted transition in the 1990s, will echo for generations. Russia’s population will decline for the rest of the twenty-first century, and ethnic Russians will be a smaller proportion of that population. The ethnic and religious groups that embrace the “traditional family values” Putin favors are predominantly non-Russian.

United Nations scenarios project Russia’s population in 2100 to be between 74 million and 112 million compared with the current 146 million. The most recent UN projections are for the world’s population to decline by about 20 percent by 2100. The estimate for Russia is a decline of 25 to 50 percent.

While Russia is hardly unique in facing declining birth rates and an aging population, high adult mortality, and infertility among both men and women, increasingly limited immigration and continuing brain drain make Russia’s situation particularly challenging. Population size is determined by a combination of natural factors—birth rates and life expectancy, along with the emigration-immigration balance. Putin’s war on Ukraine has undermined all the potential sources of population growth.

There have been four important inflection points in demography policy since Putin became president. The first came in 2006, when Putin’s rhetoric about demography finally resulted in specific policies: demography was one of the first four national projects he launched at that time. The second significant change came following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The reaction to that aggression in Ukraine, Moldova, and other former Soviet republics narrowed the number of countries providing labor to Russia.

A third key moment was the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack near Moscow in March 2024. Tajiks made up half of the immigrants to Russia in 2023, but that has become politically problematic in the aftermath of the Crocus attack. The most recent policy shifts accompanied the formation of a new government in May 2024. Initial reports promise a long-term approach that perhaps begins to recognize Russia’s new demographic reality. It comes too late, and the measures proposed fail to offer new solutions.

The paper begins with a summary of the demographic problems the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet Union and its ineffective initial response. The second section reviews the deteriorating situation after 2013. The third section focuses on ways Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine is exacerbating all of these challenges. The conclusion suggests what impact population decline will have on Russia’s future.

Addressing the Soviet legacy

The Soviet Union experienced multiple demographic shocks in the twentieth century. Following Joseph Stalin’s death, recovery appeared possible. Yet by the 1960s, Russia’s high infant mortality and low adult life expectancy were outliers compared with most highly industrialized countries.

The population shock from World War II echoed for decades. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign in 1986–1987 generated a brief improvement in life expectancy, but this was hardly enough to change the dynamic.

Economic disruptions, beginning with Gorbachev’s perestroika and continuing into the 1990s, resulted in fewer births, higher mortality, and significant emigration. The dissolution of the Soviet Union spurred massive population relocation, as millions of Russians and non-Russians returned to their titular homelands. Every former Soviet republic became more ethnically homogeneous. This trend has continued within the Russian Federation, as some non-Russian republics continue to become less Russian. Russians relocating within the Russian Federation have reduced the population in the Far East.

Russia’s immigration-emigration balance involves several population flows. Russians have moved back to Russia from newly independent former Soviet republics. As Russia’s economy improved, labor migrants, primarily from former Soviet republics, have found formal and informal work in Russia. Prior to the war, the immigrants compensated for the multiple waves of (mostly Russian) people emigrating from Russia.

The breakdown of the Warsaw Pact —and then the Soviet Union itself—disrupted economic linkages and supply chains that had existed for decades. Economic insecurity reduced already-declining birth rates across much of the post-Soviet space. Russia’s total fertility rate (TFR)—the number of births per woman—dropped from just below replacement level in 1988 to 1.3 in 2004. Maintaining a population level requires a TFR of at least 2.1 without positive net immigration; Russia’s high adult mortality rate requires one even higher.

In his initial inaugural address in August 2000, Putin warned that Russia could become “an enfeebled nation” due to population decline. Despite the warnings, little was done. Russia’s TFR increased from 1.25 in 2000 to 1.39 in 2007. This slight improvement reflected better economic conditions due to rising oil prices, and a (temporarily) larger number of women in the 18–35 age cohort.

One reason for persistent difficulty in achieving higher birth rates or TFR numbers has been the legacy of Soviet polices. Lack of access to effective birth control and male resistance to condom use resulted in abortion being the widely used solution for unwanted pregnancies. Murray Feshbach calculated that the Soviet-era abortion rate averaged seven per woman. Far less attention has been devoted to male infertility. Alcohol and substance abuse have resulted in unusually high infertility rates among Russian men.

Low birth rates are only one part of the population problem. Unhealthy diet and lifestyle, binge alcohol consumption, and accidents contribute to the high adult mortality numbers. When Putin was first elected president in 2000, Russian men aged 18–64 were dying at four times the rate of European men. Russian women were perishing at about the same rate as European men.
Until early 2005, Putin’s public position was that Russia could offset its population decline by attracting more Russians living in former Soviet republics to return to Russia, bringing with them needed skills while augmenting the ethnic Russian population. This immigration offset much of the population loss in the 1990s but has increasingly declined since Putin became president. Significantly, non-Russians became the dominant labor migrants.

Data from the Russian state statistics service Goskomstat indicate legal immigration peaked at 1.147 million in 1994 and declined each year thereafter, shrinking to 350,900 in 2000 and 70,000 in 2004.

Despite the declining numbers, the Russian government adopted a highly restrictive law in 2002 limiting legal immigration. When the Security Council discussed immigration again in 2005, Putin called for a more “humane approach,” dropping the racial and religious criteria. Yet he followed this with a “clarification” prioritizing Russian speakers. It is possible that Putin understood the situation but adjusted his rhetoric in accord with public opinion.

Russian media reports of a massive influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1990s were wildly exaggerated. By 2000, as oil prices rose, workers from Central Asia, Ukraine, and Moldova found formal or informal work in Russia. Russia incorporated the populations of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, and additional territories since 2022, which accounts for official claims of a larger “Russian” population.

Immigrants to Russia have come overwhelmingly from former Soviet republics, which account for 95–96 percent of the total. Just five countries that were part of the Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) had population growth between 1989 and 2004. Migrants from two former Soviet republics with declining populations, Ukraine and Moldova, continued to provide labor until 2014. Putin reiterated the importance of demography in his inaugural addresses in 2012, 2018, and 2024, and in many of his annual call-in programs. Several times he has acknowledged the failure to achieve promised increases in births. Yet there appears to be no learning curve regarding policies. Putin’s 2024 address promised more of the same: paying Russians to have larger families, accompanied by invoking the need for more soldiers to defend the motherland.

Pre-war policies

As the price of oil increased in the 2000s, Putin’s government debated how to use the windfall to address persistent demographic challenges. As in many countries, immigration remains politically fraught. Russian nationalist groups adopted “Russia for the Russians” as a campaign slogan. Improving life expectancy is an ideal solution, but it is slow and expensive, depending on adults taking care of their health. Putin’s government opted for pro-natal policies. In his presidential address in 2006, Putin cited demography as “the most serious problem in Russia today.” Rather than listening to advisers familiar with the basket of diverse policies that improved birth rates in France and Sweden—prenatal and postnatal care, parental leave, daycare, preschool programs, housing support, and other incentives—Russia’s government emphasized “maternity capital.”

The initial maternity capital program offered incentives to women for the birth or adoption of a second or additional child. The funds, paid when a child turned three, could be used for housing, the child’s education at an accredited institution, the mother’s pension, or assistance for children with disabilities. Over time, changes have included payment for a first child and improved housing. The annually indexed funding was enough to encourage additional births in rural areas and smaller towns but had little impact in higher-priced urban areas that are home to 70 percent of the population. Moreover, many women who experienced giving birth in a Russian maternity hospital decided once was sufficient.

The pro-natal policy coincided with slightly higher Russian birth rates, raising the TFR from 1.3 when the maternity-capital program was launched in 2007 to nearly 1.8 in 2015. Most demographers, however, attribute the higher numbers to a (temporarily) larger cohort of women in prime child-bearing years, economic growth due to higher oil prices during Putin’s first two terms, and hopes that nationwide protests over the 2011–2012 elections augured real change. After 2012, the reduced number of returning compatriots offset the gains in births.

Despite the augmented maternity-capital program, Russia’s TFR dropped back to 1.5 by 2019, prior to COVID-19 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian official sources continued to report the rate as 1.8. Without immigration, even a TFR of 1.8 would result in Russia’s population decreasing by about 20–25 percent in each generation.

The other endogenous factor in natural population change is life expectancy. Russia is hardly an outlier in experiencing lower birth rates. Most countries outside of Africa are projected to have smaller populations in the coming decades. Yet Russia continues to be exceptional among developed countries in the rate of mortality among adults aged 18–64. Russia’s economic recovery during Putin’s first two terms as President did lead to some improvement. While Russian men died at four times the rate of European men in 1990, by 2022 the rate was merely double the European rate.

The modest improvements during Putin’s first two terms were due to the economic recovery, greater stability, and efforts to improve healthcare. Yet the major focus of the healthcare program was not the badly needed primary and preventive care. Instead, most of the funds were used to purchase expensive new equipment, creating opportunities for graft.

The improvements in life expectancy began to reverse by 2019. Russia’s COVID-19 response was deeply flawed, resulting in the highest per-capita death rate among industrialized countries, though official statistics have consistently concealed the impact.

Economic benefits from people living longer are double edged. The impact depends on individuals’ capacity to work and the related dependency ratio for the population. Societies need enough able-bodied workers to support the young, the old, and the disabled.

Russia’s demographic issues involve quality as well as quantity. Even before Putin opted to invade Ukraine, Russia was experiencing another significant brain drain. Just before the war, Valerii Fal’kov, Russia’s Minister of Science and Higher Education, told Putin that the number of scientists in Russia was declining. Outside of atomic energy and the defense industry, Russia’s best specialists preferred to work in the US, Europe, and “even China.” Nikolai Dolgushkin, Academy of Sciences Chief Scientific Secretary, reported that emigration by scientists had increased from 14,000 in 2012 to 70,000 in 2021. Russia was the only developed nation where the number of scientific personnel was shrinking.

The challenges have become more serious, as the war on Ukraine has resulted in as many as half a million young men killed or wounded, women choosing to forego having children, women being sent to fight in Ukraine, and more than one million mostly young and highly educated people choosing to leave Russia.

Replacing them has been increasingly undermined by shortsighted government policies. In a country with a history of claiming to be multinational while viewing Russians as the system-forming ethnicity, recent government policies are creating additional difficulties. One of the great ironies of the situation Putin has created is that, in addition to poor rural villagers, the demographic groups best matching his August 2022 decree advocating “preservation and strengthening traditional Russian spiritual-moral values” are Russia’s non-Russian and non-Russian Orthodox populations.

The ethnic variable

Russia’s birth rates vary across regions and ethnic and religious populations. The rates in major urban centers resemble those of Central Europe, with later marriages, widespread use of birth control, and a large number of single-child families. Rural regions and small towns tend to retain more traditional values around child-rearing. People in these venues marry and begin having children earlier and are far more likely to have two or more children. Yet 70 percent of Russians live in the urban centers. The citizens most likely to have large families live in villages, small towns, and Russia’s non-Russian regions and Republics. In 2023, the non-Russian share of the population was about 30%.

Putin-era policies have persistently undermined the principles of federalism enshrined in Russia’s 1993 constitution. Some non-Russians believe the assault on their special status stems, in part, from Russians fearing their higher birth rates.

Significant differences in birth rates among ethnic and religious groups within Russia pose serious policy challenges. Some groups have been more resistant to the “demographic transition” than others. The predominantly non-Russian and Muslim republics of the North Caucasus are experiencing the “demographic transition” more slowly than most Russian regions. The Chechens in particular have responded to their deportation to Central Asia during World War II with a strong pro-natal ethos.

Comparative studies find relationships between high birth rates and traditional religious beliefs in multiple places. Some accounts emphasize higher birth rates among Muslims, despite wide variation across communities. Religious conservatives in many faiths record higher birth rates: evangelical Christians, Mormons, Hindus, Orthodox Jews, and others. Some groups have historically been known for large families. In Russia, some non-Russian ethnic groups have higher birth rates than Russians. The birth rates in the largely Muslim North Caucasus have been a particular concern for Moscow. Despite birth rates among many ethnic populations declining, births in many non-Russian communities continue to remain higher than those of ethnic Russians.

Several analysts call attention to a phenomenon of ethnic groups that feel threatened responding with high fertility rates. Russia’s “punished peoples”—those accused of sympathizing with the Germans during World War II and deported from their homelands—have received particular attention. Marat Ilyasov, a scholar from Chechnya who now teaches in the US, makes a strong case for the Chechens, one of the groups that managed to return to their ancestral territory, striving for high birth rates to guarantee the nation’s survival. They have the highest birth rates in the country.

Chechens are hardly the only ethnic group in the North Caucasus with birth rates higher than the Russian average. Some official sources intentionally downplay the numbers of Chechens and other non-Russian groups in an attempt to emphasize “Russianness” and downplay the significance of non-Russian populations.

Some Russian demographers suggest that non-Russians are increasingly experiencing the “demographic revolution,” but at a slower pace. While this is plausible, complaints about changing definitions and undercounting in recent Russian censuses provide ample grounds for skepticism regarding the official numbers.

Even the official data show that birth rates continue to be higher among many of the non-Russian groups in Russia. Many leaders of non-Russian peoples claim that these populations are being sent to fight in Ukraine in far larger numbers than ethnic Russians. Russian officials try to emphasize that it is the rural population that provides most of the soldiers, due to the high wages the military offers.

Data show that individuals from ethnic republics in Russia’s far east and south have a far higher chance of being mobilized for combat. While proving intent is complicated, the numbers are shocking. Men living in Buryatia have a 50- to 100-percent greater chance of being sent to fight in Ukraine than a resident of Moscow or St. Petersburg.

It is too early to gauge whether the high numbers of deaths and injuries will stimulate a response by some groups to try increasing birth rates. It does appear that the war is resulting in a more serious decline in births among ethnic Russians in urban centers than in both Russian and non-Russian rural communities. Russia’s non-ethnic-Russian citizens increasingly perceive their populations as being singled out as cannon fodder in Ukraine.

Immigrants have also been pressed into military service, causing a precipitous drop in immigration.

Wartime policies undermine population growth

Russia’s natural population growth has been curtailed by mobilization, casualties, emigration, and widespread reluctance to have children. Illegally annexing Crimea added 2.4 million people to Russia’s population, but significantly reduced immigration from Ukraine and Moldova. After 2014, labor migration to Russia was limited to five countries in Central Asia. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine stalled, the Kremlin has consistently needed more troops, forcing increasing numbers of these workers into military service.

Offering high salaries has attracted mercenaries from Cuba, Syria and elsewhere, but devious tactics have discouraged many labor migrants. In 2023, half of Russia’s labor migrants came from Tajikistan. The Crocus City Hall terror attack in March 2024, which Russian law enforcement alleges was carried out by Tajiks, is curtailing this pipeline. Tajiks have been rounded up for deportation and subjected to physical violence. Efforts to develop new sources of labor migration from Southeast Asia have been undermined by Russia continuing to send labor migrants to Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine also provoked another large exodus of Russians from Russia. Some families had their bags packed and were ready to leave when Russian troops crossed the border in February 2022. Mobilization in September 2022 caused an additional exodus, primarily by young men. Many information technology (IT) specialists left, believing they could continue to work while abroad.

A man walks past banners in support of the Russian Army in Saint Petersburg, Russia. (Anton Vaganov via REUTERS)

Emigration by hundreds of thousands of young men, and an unknown number of young women, is reducing the already small cohort of Russians in prime reproductive years. Hundreds of thousands of men being sent to serve in Ukraine further limits reproductive potential. Russian women have increasingly opted to avoid pregnancy in the face of economic difficulties and growing uncertainty. In the first half of 2023, a record number of Russians applied for passports for travel abroad “just in case” (na vsyaki sluchi).

The regime has responded with efforts to prevent abortion and limit birth control. This comes at a time when abortions are less frequent. Some Russian women are choosing sterilization instead. This represents an ironic shift from the Soviet-era legacy of many women being unable to have children due to multiple abortions. Births in 2023 reflected the lowest fertility rate in the past two or three centuries.

The declining value of the ruble and raids on immigrant communities to conscript workers to fight in Ukraine have reduced the number of Central Asians seeking work in Russia. The number willing to become paid mercenaries is limited.

Russia’s leadership apparently did not anticipate the need to recruit additional soldiers for a protracted war in 2022. Doing so now represents a serious challenge. Data in 2015 indicated that Russians were pleased that Crimea was under Russian control. However, fewer than 20 percent of Russians surveyed thought their government should spend large sums to rebuild occupied areas of Ukraine, especially the Donbas region. Fewer than 10 percent said it was worth risking Russian lives to keep these territories.

The Russian government’s polling consistently reports approval for the war as high as 70–80 percent. Some Western analysts accept these numbers, and some have commissioned their own polling that confirms strong support for the war. Others are dubious, reporting data similar to those of 2015, when respondents were asked about financing reconstruction or the need to suffer casualties.

One indication that Russia’s leadership understands the problem of sending Russians to fight in Ukraine is an increasingly desperate and shortsighted attempt to find alternatives to mobilizing more Russians. After the February 2022 invasion provoked a large exodus of Russians of all ages, the “partial” mobilization conducted in September 2022 resulted in tens of thousands more, primarily young men, leaving the country. No one has precise data, and many of these Russian citizens have moved on from their initial refuge. If seven hundred thousand Russians now registered as living in Dubai is any indication, the émigrés may number far more than one million.

The people mobilized are overwhelmingly from low-income rural and non-Russian regions. Stories have emerged about recruits needing to provide their own equipment, including bandages in case of injury. Some received less than a week of training before being sent into combat. These conditions confirm the belief that the authorities view them as expendable cannon fodder. The result is widespread efforts to evade serving.

In an attempt to reduce the need for mobilization, other tactics were developed. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the paramilitary Wagner Group, toured Russian prisons to offer convicts the opportunity to serve six months in Ukraine in return for presidential pardons. Tens of thousands took him up on the offer and died at the front. Survivors have returned to Russia, with some resuming their criminal activity, including rape and murder.

Prigozhin perished when his plane was shot down a few months after he staged an aborted march to Moscow to convince Putin to fire military commanders the Wagner leader deemed incompetent. But his program lives on, and recent reports indicate it is being expanded to include female prisoners.

Ironically, while the convicts who survive their six-month contracts have been allowed to return home, Russians who have been fighting for two years or more are still on active duty. Their families are furious. One of the few significant protest groups left in Russia, “the Council of Wives and Mothers,” that has protested the length of time their husbands and sons have been forced to serve, was declared a foreign agent in July 2023 in an effort by Putin to stifle public awareness of the treatment of soldiers and overall casualties in the war.

Despite major recruitment efforts, Russia is not experiencing a major influx of new immigrants or returning compatriots. The full-scale war has further limited the already diminishing prospects of inducing a large share of the 30 million Russians living outside of Russia to return home. In 2006, Putin signed a decree establishing a program to encourage Russians to return, and some eight hundred thousand did so between 2006 and 2018. The number of both applications and returns declined in 2020 due to COVID-19. The numbers recovered slightly in 2021 but declined after the start of the full-scale war in 2022. In 2023 the number applying to return was the lowest in a decade. The number who did return dropped below the 2020 COVID-19 level:

Legislation designed to prohibit Russians—especially mobile IT workers—from working while abroad has provoked sharp battles between security services and Russian companies that depend on these employees in a tight labor market.

Treatment of Central Asian and other foreign labor migrants has increasingly shifted to forced labor and sometimes outright slavery. Central Asians working in Russia have been rounded up and sent to join the war on Ukraine. A study of the Uzbek community reports that many Uzbeks have been arrested for minor or contrived offenses and sentenced to terms of fifteen, twenty, or even twenty-five years. Once in prison, they are offered the Wagner option of “volunteering” to fight in Ukraine.

Predatory practices have extended beyond Russia’s usual sources of migrant workers. Individuals from Nepal, Syria, and India have been recruited to work in factories or as guards at various venues in Russia. After they arrive, their passports are confiscated and they are sent to fight in Ukraine. As during World War II, punishment squads are deployed to prevent soldiers from retreating. These predatory tactics differ from the treatment of Cuban and African mercenaries who are attracted by the money.

In addition to money, another inducement to attract foreign fighters is the offer of Russian citizenship. If these commitments are honored, the result will be to add more non-Russians to the country’s population. The disastrous long-term impact of the predatory recruitment policies is clear. As information (and bodies) reach families, word spreads. Russian programs to increase labor recruitment in Southeast Asia are being undermined as word of these tactics spreads.

Conclusion

Why would a leader who has proclaimed demography to be one of the most serious threats to a nation’s future launch an unprovoked war against a neighboring country that was a significant source of labor before 2014? We may never be able to answer this. We can conclude that Putin has turned a daunting crisis into a cataclysm.

Putin’s policies cannot solve these demographic problems. He has been reiterating the importance of Russia’s dire demographic situation for a quarter-century. Manipulating demographic data, adding people in occupied Ukrainian regions to Russia’s population, and omitting war casualties from the census do not generate sustainable population growth. These tactics cannot meet the needs of employers who report serious labor shortages in nearly every sector of the economy. Russia’s defense industry is operating “three shifts” by requiring workers to work sixty to seventy hours per week. The sustainability of these measures and the impact on quality raise significant questions. Financial incentives are undermined when workers are compelled to make “voluntary” contributions to fund the war effort.

In 2022–2023, the most serious labor shortages were reported in agriculture and construction, sectors that rely heavily on Central Asian migrants. Now Russia’s government is endeavoring to attract labor from India, Pakistan, and North Korea to replace the war casualties and émigrés. Firms involved in production, retail, logistics, and e-commerce face labor shortages. While manufacturers continue to prefer Russian workers, one company told journalists that bringing workers from India required paying salaries at the same level as those for Russian staff, plus the cost of transporting and registering the workers. Yet the company was looking for a contractor to arrange providing five hundred workers from India. The reasoning was that workers who lack Russian language are less likely to be recruited by competitors, while foreign workers who know Russian are more mobile.

A Russian entrepreneur noted that labor brokers in Kazakhstan smuggle thousands of workers from Bangladesh into that country in containers each year. They are now offering their services to Russian employers, suggesting that the same tactics can be used to bring workers from India. Others point out that labor from India remains crucial in several Middle Eastern countries where wages are higher, making Russia the option for the least skilled and least desirable migrants.

Sources of labor globally are increasing due to population growth in developing countries that face serious impacts from climate change. Demographers project that the major growth in global population during the rest of the twenty-first century will be in Africa. Yet the six African countries with the largest populations also appear on most lists of the places likely to face the greatest threats from climate change. As in Latin America, this will result in “green migration.” These are not traditional sources of labor for Russia, and the regime may choose to rely on these countries for mercenaries.

Putin’s government has not evinced visible concern that Russia’s population might be cut in half by century’s end. Unless Russia’s leaders can develop and finance a more effective set of policies, the only solutions to population decline will be a combination of incorporating non-Russian territory and/or immigration from Asia and Africa.

If Putin truly believed that demography is an existential problem for Russia, he might have calculated how many Ukrainians lived or worked in Russia before annexing Crimea and launching an invasion.

Putin’s regime is both seeking and discouraging repatriation by compatriots. On February 1, 2024, Russian media reported new legislation allowing the government to seize property belonging to Russians outside the country who criticize the war on Ukraine. Multiple instances have been reported of Russian diplomats and security personnel demanding that other countries detain and repatriate Russians who speak freely. Threats to seize their property in Russia are a logical extension of policies threatening family members still living in Russia.

At the same time, Russia’s policy does encourage compatriots to return, even as other citizens continue to depart.

One possible solution to the problems compounding Russia’s labor shortage would be to decentralize policy, allowing Russian regions to make their own decisions about attracting foreign labor. The resulting competition could go a long way toward improving conditions for foreign workers. Regional development was the prime mover in China’s massive urbanization and industrialization after 1978. While this involved horizontal mobility within the country, the model would resemble the significant influx of immigrants that, at least thus far, has kept the US population at well above replacement level. As Russia’s population continues to decline, immigrants will be increasingly vital to economic recovery.

Invading Ukraine while facing a catastrophic demographic challenge appears to have been a massive folly for the Kremlin. Hubris based on an astonishing intelligence failure might account for the miscalculation. Another possible explanation is that Putin understood that Russia’s economic and demographic challenges mean the country would not be in a more favorable condition any time in the coming decades.

Every corner of Russia’s economy is experiencing personnel shortages, while war casualties continue to shrink the able-bodied population. Russians and their leaders must learn to value diversity, or Russia will have an increasingly smaller and older population. Either way, there will be fewer ethnic Russians.

About the author

Harley Balzer retired in July 2016 after 33 years in the Department of Government, School of Foreign Service, and associated faculty member of the History Department at Georgetown University. He was founding director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies from 1987-2001. Prior to Georgetown he taught at Grinnell College and Boston University, and held post-doctoral fellowships at Harvard’s Russian Research Center and the MIT Program in Science, Technology and Society. In 1982-83 he was a congressional fellow in the office of Congressman Lee Hamilton, where he helped secure passage of the Soviet-East-European Research and Training Act (Title VIII).

In 1992-93 Balzer served as executive director and chairman of the board of the International Science Foundation, George Soros’s largest program to aid the former Soviet Union. From 1998 to 2009, he was a member of the Governing Council of the Basic Research and Higher Education (BRHE) Program, funded by the MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and Russian Ministry of Education. BRHE established 20 Research and Education Centers at Russian Universities, and was significantly expanded by the Russian government using their own resources.

His publications have focused on Russian and Soviet history, Russian politics, Russian education, science and technology, and comparative work on Russia and China.

The Eurasia Center’s mission is to promote policies that strengthen stability, democratic values, and prosperity in Eurasia, from Eastern Europe in the West to the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia in the East.

How Armenia’s ‘Crossroads for Peace’ plan could transform the South Caucasus

Sheila Paylan — Wed, 07 Aug 2024 13:36:17 +0000

Armenia’s “Crossroads for Peace” initiative, unveiled by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in October 2023, is an ambitious regional transport proposal aimed at connecting Armenia with its neighboring countries—Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Georgia. The initiative seeks to revitalize and develop crucial infrastructure—roads, railways, pipelines, cables, and electricity lines—to facilitate the flow of goods, energy, and people across these nations, connecting the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea through easier and more efficient transportation links.

The initiative also represents a significant part of Armenia’s peace agenda in the South Caucasus amid negotiations with Azerbaijan. Armenian leaders envision these renovated and newly built routes as conduits for cultivating economic, political, and cultural ties between the countries involved, thus advancing long-term peace and stability in the region. With the potential to economically benefit the region, promote peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus, and reduce Armenia’s dependence on Russia, the West should support the Crossroads for Peace plan with more robust diplomatic backing and infrastructure investment.

Decades of instability

The South Caucasus, straddling the juncture between Europe and Asia, has long been a region of strategic importance plagued by persistent instability and conflict. Most notable has been the Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which emerged in the early 1990s and led to the closure of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders, severely restricting Armenia’s trade and hardening political divides.

The conflict experienced a significant turning point on September 27, 2020, when Azerbaijan launched a major offensive, triggering the worst escalation since 1994. After six weeks of intense fighting, a Russia-brokered ceasefire was signed on November 9, 2020, which stipulated concessions of Armenian-controlled territory within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan blockaded Karabakh for nearly ten months starting on December 12, 2022, leading to a humanitarian crisis. On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military assault that seized full control of Karabakh and forced more than one hundred thousand ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia. The United Nations estimates that only about fifty Armenians remain in the region.

The Karabakh conflict ended on January 1, 2024, with the Karabakh authorities announcing that their unrecognized government ceased to exist. Consequently, the initial rationale behind the closure of the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders no longer holds. Despite this, both Azerbaijan and Turkey, with the latter often aligning with the former’s policies, continue to refuse to reopen their borders with Armenia. This refusal persists even in the face of Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative—a proposal that would be beneficial for regional development.

Corridors and crossroads

The Trans-Caspian Corridor, also known as the “Middle Corridor,” is an increasingly important channel for transportation and cross-border trade connecting the Central Asian states with Europe. It primarily involves the transport of goods and resources across the Caspian Sea, bridging Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan via maritime routes. From Azerbaijan, the goods are then transported through Georgia and Turkey, reaching European markets. Though trade volumes and capacity are still relatively low, the corridor holds immense strategic opportunities, as it offers a viable alternative to the traditional, longer routes through Russia or the southern maritime paths via the Suez Canal, significantly reducing transit time and avoiding geostrategic hotspots.

The Eurasian Northern Corridor, offering both road and rail options, is currently the primary route for transcontinental transport but largely traverses Russian territory. Western sanctions, investment deterrents, and financial restrictions tied to Russia’s war on Ukraine complicate this corridor’s use, and potential instability in Russia might eventually further weaken this route’s reliability. More direct routes through Central Asian and South Caucasus nations could diminish the value of the Eurasian Northern Corridor, aligning with US and European Union efforts to reduce dependencies on Russia. The development of the Trans-Caspian Corridor offers such a strategic alternative, diversifying energy supplies to Europe and enhancing trade connectivity between Asia and Europe, while bypassing Russian influence.

Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative, therefore, would create a vital complementary set of routes, enhancing the strategic depth and utility of the Trans-Caspian Corridor. By developing infrastructure such as the Yeraskh-Julfa-Meghri-Horadiz railway, Armenia would offer new logistic pathways linking the Caspian region directly to the Mediterranean and Black seas through Armenian territory. This would not only shorten transit times and distances between Asia and Europe but would also introduce reliable alternative routes.

Additionally, the integration of Armenia into the Trans-Caspian Corridor could stimulate economic growth in the region by attracting foreign investment focused on logistics and infrastructure development. Armenia could become a central node in Eurasian trade, enhancing the corridor’s capacity and security. This strategic expansion would diversify the transport routes available to major trading powers and fortify the economic independence of Armenia and its neighboring countries by reducing their reliance on Russia.

Moreover, the Crossroads for Peace initiative is premised on the principles of sovereignty and jurisdiction, ensuring that infrastructure within each country’s borders remains under its control. The idea is to promote mutual respect and cooperation among its neighboring nations, facilitating equal and reciprocal management of border and customs controls. This ensures that each country would be able to safeguard its interests while promoting shared economic growth.

Obstacles in the path

However, Crossroads for Peace faces significant geopolitical hurdles. Azerbaijan has so far refused to support Armenia’s initiative, with analysts stating that neither Baku nor Ankara had been consulted. While the Armenian government should intensify its outreach on Crossroads for Peace, Armenia’s neighbors should judge the initiative in good faith on commercial viability, rather than on geopolitical grounds.

If realized, Crossroads for Peace could significantly benefit both Azerbaijan and Turkey by boosting regional trade and opening new markets. For Azerbaijan, it could provide a more direct route to European markets, while Turkey could see enhanced trade corridors that bypass less stable regions. Additionally, the project could serve as a diplomatic bridge, easing longstanding tensions and transforming a historical conflict into a hub of international commerce. For Turkey in particular, supporting this initiative could strategically position it as a peace broker in the region, which could strengthen its diplomatic relationships not only with its immediate neighbors but also across Europe and into Asia.

Baku has instead called for the development of the “Zangezur Corridor,” which would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia’s southernmost Syunik province. Azerbaijan’s conception of Zangezur includes not only a railway link, but also a highway between the two parts of Azerbaijan, and demands that it would have extraterritorial status, which would require Armenia to cede control over a strip of its own territory. Crucially, Zangezur envisions opening a single transit route with Azerbaijan, whereas Crossroads for Peace aims to open several border crossings with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenia has firmly stated that any discussions involving the loss of sovereignty and territorial integrity or third-party control over its territory are nonnegotiable red lines. Indeed, Baku has insisted that a detachment from Russia’s Federal Security Service guard Zangezur; having just kicked Russian border guards out of the country, it’s understandable why Armenia would balk at the installation of more Russian agents on its territory.

Azerbaijan’s Zangezur plan is also detrimental to Western interests in several ways. First, it would hinder the broader Western strategic objective of stabilizing and economically developing the South Caucasus—critical for energy routes and geopolitical balance among Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. By stalling broader regional integration initiatives, Azerbaijan’s position perpetuates dependence on existing routes that run through Georgia, which face logistical and capacity hurdles, and which could be susceptible to disruptions by external geopolitical influences.

This ongoing tension and the resultant lack of comprehensive peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus allows Russia and Iran to exert their influence there. Armenia’s isolation forces it to maintain its reliance on Russia, countering Western efforts to promote democratic governance and market liberalization in the area. This situation becomes increasingly dangerous as autocratic Azerbaijan deepens its ties with Russia. Simultaneously, Iran benefits by positioning itself as a crucial partner for Armenia in energy and trade, while also providing diplomatic support by rejecting the Zangezur plan to maintain clout in the South Caucasus.

By keeping the Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Turkey borders closed, Azerbaijan impedes Armenia’s economic and connectivity opportunities, limiting the scope for Western engagement and investment in the region. This keeps Armenia overly dependent on trade with Russia. Baku has long complained about Armenia’s close ties with Russia and should welcome Yerevan’s desire to open trade with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as its commitment to leave the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The Crossroads for Peace initiative, therefore, offers a more promising path. By opening up the region and paving the way for a new era of mutual economic growth and cooperation in the South Caucasus, Crossroads for Peace could serve as a catalyst for regional stability and prosperity. This initiative not only counters the restrictive nature of the Zangezur plan but also aligns economic incentives with geopolitical opportunities.

How the West can help

Armenia’s Crossroads for Peace initiative deserves more robust support and engagement from Western nations. By backing Armenia’s efforts to integrate into the Trans-Caspian Corridor and promote cooperation across the South Caucasus, Western countries can help ensure that the region develops into a vibrant economic hub that is less dependent on Russia. Increased investment in infrastructure, clear diplomatic backing, and strategic partnerships, such as the recent upgrade in US-Armenia relations, can solidify the West’s commitment to promoting a more balanced geopolitical landscape in this region.

This should start with applying diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Azerbaijan to engage constructively with the initiative and entering security pacts with Armenia that help deter aggression and maintain open and secure trade routes. Subsequently, Western countries should implement targeted funding and financial incentives along with technical assistance for the construction and modernization of infrastructure in the region. Potential new trade agreements and the promotion of private sector involvement encouraging Western businesses to invest in and partner with local firms within the framework of Crossroads for Peace would also help make the initiative more viable.

Enhanced Western support for Armenia could also serve as a catalyst for broader regional cooperation and prosperity, setting a precedent for peaceful conflict resolution and cooperative development efforts. Western policymakers should therefore help integrate Crossroads for Peace into regional connectivity plans that promote open, stable, and cooperative international systems and can make Armenia a key player in the diversification of transit routes across Eurasia.

Sheila Paylan is a human rights lawyer and senior legal consultant with the United Nations. The views expressed herein are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations.

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Russia is destroying monuments as part of war on Ukrainian identity

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi, John Vsetecka — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 20:14:30 +0000

Throughout Russian-occupied Ukraine, efforts continue to systematically erase all traces of Ukrainian national memory. This campaign against monuments and memorials is chilling proof that Russia’s invasion goes far beyond mere border revisions and ultimately aims to wipe Ukraine off the map entirely.

The modern history of a single park in east Ukrainian city Luhansk offers insights into the memory war currently being waged by the Kremlin. In 1972, the Communist authorities in Soviet Luhansk decided to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR by transforming a local cemetery into a Friendship of Peoples Park. Once construction got underway, workers soon began uncovering mass graves of people murdered during the Stalin era. This news was suppressed until 1989, when it was belatedly reported in the local newspaper. One year later, a memorial to the victims of Stalinist mass killings was erected at the site.

This initial monument was part of a broader movement for historical justice that emerged in the twilight years of the USSR as local historians, journalists, and officials sought to document the crimes of the Communist authorities in the Luhansk region. Following Ukrainian independence, the opening of national archives made it possible to identify and honor victims of the Communist regime and end decades of censorship that had suppressed knowledge of Soviet crimes against humanity including the Holodomor, an artificially engineered famine in 1930s Ukraine that killed millions of Ukrainians.

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During the early years of Ukrainian independence, Luhansk’s Friendship of Peoples Park remained a space of contested memory. While retaining its old Soviet era name, it gradually acquired a range of new memorials including a monument to Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, a cross marking the grave of the city’s former mayor, and a memorial to the victims of the Holodomor.

In 2009, following decades of public pressure, the park was renamed as the Garden of Remembrance. At this point, it seemed as though the long task of restoring historical memory in Luhansk was finally complete. However, the onset of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 transformed the memory politics of the region once again and revived many of the darkest chapters of the Soviet years.

When Kremlin forces occupied Luhansk in the spring of 2014, they soon began attempting to transform remembrance of the Soviet era. While monuments to Lenin were being dismantled elsewhere in Ukraine, the Russian authorities in Luhansk were erecting new monuments glorifying the Soviet past and celebrating the “liberation” of the city from Ukrainian rule. This mirrored similar processes that were underway in other Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, including nearby Donetsk and the Crimean peninsula.

Curiously, many memorials in Luhansk honoring the victims of the Soviet era initially remained untouched. This changed with the full-scale invasion of February 2022, which led to a more aggressive approach to the eradication of Ukrainian historical memory. In the second half of 2022, the Holodomor memorial in Mariupol was demolished. By summer 2024, the Russian occupation authorities had also dismantled monuments in Luhansk honoring the victims of the Holodomor and the Stalinist Terror.

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The occupation authorities in Luhansk have attempted to justify these measures by framing the Holodomor as a Ukrainian propaganda myth and positioning memorials to the victims of Soviet crimes as “pilgrimage sites for Ukrainian nationalists.” They have also argued that the dismantling of monuments is in response to grassroots demands from the local population.

Russia’s selective monument removals are part of a deliberate strategy to rehabilitate favorable aspects of the Soviet past while whitewashing the crimes of the Communist era. A similarly partisan approach has been adopted toward the historical role of Tsarist Russia. Throughout occupied regions of Ukraine, the Kremlin seeks to craft a narrative glorifying Russian imperialism that legitimizes Moscow’s land grab while suppressing any traces of a separate Ukrainian national identity. In this manner, Putin is weaponizing the past to serve his own present-day geopolitical ambitions.

The demolition of memorials is only one aspect of Russia’s war on Ukrainian national identity. In areas of Ukraine under Kremlin control, anyone deemed pro-Ukrainian is at risk of being detained or simply disappearing. Speaking Ukrainian is considered a serious offense. Ukrainians are pressured into accepting Russian citizenship, while thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted and sent to Russia, where they are subjected to indoctrination in camps designed to rob them of their Ukrainian heritage.

Unlike earlier attempts to erase entire nations, today’s Kremlin campaign to extinguish Ukrainian identity is taking place in full view of international audiences in the heart of twenty-first century Europe. This poses fundamental challenges to the entire notion of a rules-based international order and represents a major obstacle to any future peace process. As long as Russia remains committed to the destruction of Ukraine, a truly sustainable settlement to today’s war will remain elusive.

Yevhenii Monastyrskyi is a PhD student of history at Harvard University and a lecturer at Kyiv School of Economics. John Vsetecka is an assistant professor of history at Nova Southeastern University.

Can northeast Syria delink from the PKK?

JP Reppeto — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 19:43:50 +0000

A decade since the start of armed US intervention in the Syrian crisis, Turkey and the United States remain locked in a disagreement that impedes cooperation on the entire Syria file. Ankara demands that Washington halt its support for its chosen partners in northeast Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed People’s Defense Units (YPG), both offshoots of the transnational terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that has waged an armed campaign against Turkey for more than forty years. However, the two groups represent the leading elements of the US-backed Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES) and its Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) military units, crucial partners in the campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria. The stakes are high on both sides: the United States needs effective allies in the northeast to stabilize the area and block an ISIS resurgence, while Turkey must prevent the entrenchment of a PKK-led statelet on its border.

PKK penetration of the DAANES has also created a range of negative consequences for Syrians in the northeast, including relentless Turkish targeting of the area, anti-democratic governance by the PYD, systemic corruption, and armed clashes between the SDF and insurgents in Deir ez-Zor. To create conditions for a wider solution to the Syria crisis and satisfy their own interests, Washington and Ankara must find a mutually agreeable course of action; the two countries are due for a strategic dialogue on Syria later this year, where options can be scrutinized. A perennial idea for solving the impasse calls for the United States to facilitate delinking of the DAANES/SDF and the PKK. However, such a decoupling is easier said than done, and its feasibility hinges on US and Turkish willingness to make tough concessions.

Reign of the PKK

Despite unofficial US government claims to the contrary, the PKK has been intimately tied to the governance and security structures of northeast Syria from its inception. The foundational expertise and personnel that enabled the PYD and YPG to defend, administer, and expand their territorial holdings came from veteran PKK members. Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian Kurds affiliated with the PKK and its franchises flocked to northeast Syria after the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, forming the core of the area’s administrative and military personnel. PKK veterans assumed greater responsibility as Syria’s security situation deteriorated and new adversaries like ISIS confronted the nascent self-administration. Senior YPG leaders were often Syrian Kurds who had spent time fighting abroad, such as future SDF commander Mazloum Abdi.

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The network of experienced PKK operatives, or kadros in local parlance, subsequently became the chief conduit for PKK influence in the northeast’s civil and military architecture. While the DAANES has established myriad local political, security, and administrative councils and committees across its territory, power ultimately rests with the kadros assigned to “advise” them; no local authority can overrule the decisions handed down by the often foreign PKK veterans. Key economic functions, such as extracting, transporting, and selling oil from occupied fields in Deir ez-Zor, also fall under the kadros’ purview. Leaders in the DAANES-sponsored local councils have no oversight of the process, creating rampant opportunities for corruption. Smugglers allegedly seek the protection of kadros to protect their operations, and some experts contend that the YPG generates large swaths of its funding from kadros-linked oil diversion.

In the multi-ethnic SDF, kadros are a linchpin of the entire force; they comprise the most experienced fighters and often lead the forces’ non-Kurdish formations. An analysis of YPG casualty figures from 2013 to 2016 showed that nearly half of the militia’s battle deaths were Turkish citizens, demonstrating the importance of foreign fighters on the frontline. During the main phase of operations against ISIS in Syria, units of kadros frequently fought alongside embedded US troops in high-stakes operations, such as in amphibious crossings near Manbij and the liberation of Raqqa. The SDF’s—or, rather, the YPG leadership’s—lack of confidence in Arab partner forces tasked with holding Arab-majority areas like Deir ez-Zor, translated to the appointment of “shadow commander” kadros in these formations as well. PKK leadership reportedly even assigned kadros as minders for SDF commander Abdi.

Kadros are not the only PKK presence in the northeast. The party also works through a proxy known as the Revolutionary Youth (RY), a political organization that conducts civic and military programming but also engages in child recruitment for the PKK. The RY has also been instrumental in the recent PYD-instigated repression of opposing Kurdish political parties operating in the DAANES—a pattern dating back to the earliest days of the civil war in Syria. Offices of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a Kurdish political alliance closely linked with the Iraq-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and opposed to the PKK, are frequent targets of RY-linked arson attacks. In spite of these actions, the SDF and other security elements make no public effort to stymie the RY. In March, the US Department of State delivered a rebuke to SDF leadership over its failures to halt attacks on KNC offices and officials.

Discord in the DAANES

The entrenchment of the PKK has further complicated the already complex dynamics in northeast Syria. Turkey has adopted a more aggressive strategy for countering the PKK in Syria and Iraq, leading to several major military operations, as well as recent assassination and airstrike campaigns targeting DAANES officials, SDF fighters, and civilian infrastructure in the northeast. Non-Kurdish Syrians have their frustrations with the kadros’ rule, as demonstrated by Arab grievances aired during last year’s uprising and ensuing SDF crackdown in DAANES-controlled Deir ez-Zor. The United States is well aware of Turkish concerns and the degree of PKK influence in the northeast, though it has little to show for its efforts to dilute the latter. In spite of years of US-facilitated negotiations between the two Kurdish parties, the PYD continues to obstruct any power-sharing agreement with the KNC.

The situation within the SDF and its civil Syrian Democratic Council counterpart is no less knotted. Insiders and analysts have noted signs of a schism between hardliners and pragmatists within the Kurdish power structures. The former dismisses the idea of delinking from the PKK and eschews any power-sharing settlement with other Kurdish parties; hardliners also allegedly maintain a firm hold on critical political and security functions in the northeast. Meanwhile, pragmatists are open to dialogue and compromise with groups like the KNC; they favor greater international engagement and, perhaps, even breaking with the PKK.

Mazloum Abdi, ostensibly the leader of the pragmatists, claimed in 2020 that the SDF was working to remove foreign kadros from positions of authority and eventually from Syria, stating that “regional Kurdish support” was no longer needed in the DAANES’s extensive network of civic and military bodies. Whether Abdi was unwilling or unable to follow through is an open question, but PKK influence remains just as strong, if not stronger, four years later. Observers on the ground in the northeast have also reported the training of fresh, local Syrian kadros who now operate in areas such as Manbij and Deir ez-Zor, according to speakers in an expert working group attended by the author.

The narrow path to a win-win-win

Beyond its firm grip on power in the area, a complete decoupling of the PKK from northeast Syria also faces obstacles from stakeholders. The PKK has little current incentive to abandon or reduce its presence in Syria while it is losing ground in its traditional refuge in northern Iraq. If claims of oil revenue diversion are correct, hypothesized to constitute 40 percent or more of DAANES oil production, the group also stands to lose a significant fundraising stream connected to the kadros-run extraction operations. The existence of the aforementioned pragmatists might demonstrate some willingness by certain DAANES authorities to delink, but their seeming lack of leverage compared to the more militant hardliners and the lack of incentives from Washington and Ankara dim the prospect of a peaceful transition.

Were the United States and Turkey to agree on the end of direct PKK influence over northeast Syria, a mutually acceptable result would require considerable policy gymnastics from each side. First, Washington must recognize, at least tacitly, that it has empowered the PKK, as refusal to recognize empirical links between the group and the US counter-ISIS campaign in Syria strains credulity and damages mutual trust. Meanwhile, Turkey cannot wish away all the PKK-sympathetic Kurds and others in northeast Syria, even if the party leadership’s grip on the area is broken. A more practical goal for both sides is elevating pragmatist local Syrian elements in the DAANES and SDF and brokering a sustainable peace with Ankara. Reporting on previous US-Turkish compromise attempts indicated that Turkey would accept an opening with the Syrian Kurds in tandem with the expulsion of foreign PKK-linked Kurds, though the path to this might be dubious.

To whatever degree the purging of PKK personnel is operationalized, the effort would presumably create gaps in local administrative, governance, and security capabilities, which would need to be filled. Can the United States contribute to filling such gaps? US policymakers are leaning toward ending the US presence in northeast Syria, and discussions have already occurred on potential exit strategies. However, if an agreement can be reached with Turkey that ejects the PKK from the DAANES, this may incline Washington to invest in its involvement in the northeast to ease the transition from kadros administration to the local bodies already incorporated under the DAANES. Especially critical would be ensuring the competence of security forces tasked with maintaining the fight against ISIS, necessitating closer collaboration between the United States and Turkey.

The odds are slim that the two countries will reach the preconditions and compromises necessary for a delinking deal, let alone smoothly execute it in the face of expected PKK opposition. Still, the strategic logic presents wins for the United States, Turkey, and northeast Syria: Washington eases conflict with Turkey and maintains its Syrian partner, hedged on a commitment of diplomatic energy and finesse rather than new troops or money; Ankara drives a bitter foe from its physical and financial haven on the Syrian border and advances its thaw with Washington; and Syrians in the northeast can take the reins back from foreign militants ruling from the shadows. An agreement on the northeast could also jumpstart wider collaboration on Syria at a critical moment, benefiting millions of Syrians throughout the country still suffering from the fallout of their civil war. With soaring violence and humanitarian needs throughout the country, a burst of joint US-Turkish leadership has the potential to bring the international community back to the table and address the most grievous symptoms of the Syrian crisis.

JP Reppeto is an assistant with the Syria Strategy Project and a former Young Global Professional with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs. Follow him on X: @jp_reppeto

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Russia’s Black Sea defeats get flushed down Vladimir Putin’s memory hole

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 06 Aug 2024 13:51:05 +0000

There was much pomp and pageantry on display recently in former Russian imperial capital Saint Petersburg as Vladimir Putin presided over the country’s annual Navy Day festivities. In truth, however, Putin and his assembled admirals had very little to celebrate. Over the past year, Russia’s once-vaunted Black Sea Fleet has been decimated by Ukrainian drones and missiles in what must rank as the most remarkable series of naval defeats in modern military history.

Despite barely having a navy of its own, Ukraine has managed to sink or severely damage approximately one-third of Putin’s fleet, forcing the bulk of his remaining warships to retreat from occupied Crimea. The war at sea has gone so badly for Russia that by spring 2024, Britain’s Ministry of Defense was already declaring the Black Sea Fleet “functionally inactive.”

The details of this year’s Russian Navy Day program provided some hints of the inglorious reality behind Moscow’s efforts to project naval strength. Tellingly, the traditional parade of Russian warships along the Neva River to the Kronstadt naval base, which usually serves as the centerpiece of the entire holiday, was canceled due to security concerns. In its place, a reduced flotilla took part in a significantly scaled down event that featured around half as many vessels as in previous years.

Despite being by far the smallest Russian Navy Day since the holiday was reinstated in 2017, this year’s event nevertheless represented an excellent opportunity for Putin to honor Russia’s fallen sailors and vow retribution for the country’s unprecedented losses in the Black Sea. In fact, he did nothing of the sort. Throughout his official address, Putin barely mentioned the casualties suffered or the sacrifices made by the Russian Navy during the invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the Kremlin dictator preferred to flush Russia’s Black Sea defeats down the memory hole. He was aided by the loyal Russian media, which carefully avoided any awkward references to the disaster that has befallen the country’s Black Sea Fleet.

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All this brings to mind an old Soviet joke that begins with Napoleon, Julius Caesar, and Alexander the Great looking down from heaven at a Red Army parade on Red Square. Caesar indicates the endless rows of Soviet troops and says, “with so many men, I could have held Germania.” Alexander points to the tanks and missiles and declares, “with such weapons of war, I could have conquered all India.” Napoleon, meanwhile, completely ignores the parade and is instead engrossed in a copy of Pravda. “If I had such a newspaper,” he proclaims, “nobody would have heard of Waterloo.”

Many Soviet jokes have not aged well, but this particular punchline remains as relevant as ever in modern Russia, where Putin has succeeded in creating a propaganda machine every bit as potent as its Soviet predecessor. Today’s Kremlin-controlled multimedia ecosystem is far more sophisticated than its Communist forerunner, but it serves the same basic function of bending reality to suit the whims of Russia’s ruling elite.

For the past decade, Putin has used this unrivaled information weapon to fuel the biggest European invasion since World War II. Kremlin propagandists have managed to convince millions of ordinary Russians that democratic Ukraine is actually a “Nazi state” whose very existence poses an intolerable threat to Russia. Ukrainians have been demonized and dehumanized to such an extent that genocidal anti-Ukrainian rhetoric is now a routine feature on prime time Russian TV.

The success of these efforts is all too apparent, with a wide range of opinion polls, research, and anecdotal evidence pointing to consistently high levels of Russian public support for the invasion. Meanwhile, there is no meaningful anti-war movement in the country, despite widespread knowledge of the horrors taking place in neighboring Ukraine. This is not surprising. After all, as Voltaire once warned, those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.

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Putin’s ability to distort Russian reality is genuinely terrifying, but the sheer scale of his propaganda operation could also inadvertently offer hope for the future. Many commentators have argued that failure in Ukraine would lead to the fall of the Putin regime and quite possibly the breakup of Russia itself, but these concerns may be exaggerated. While a third Russian collapse in a little over a century cannot be ruled out, the experience of the past two-and-a-half years gives good cause to believe that Moscow’s disinformation industry is more than capable of rebranding any future retreat from Ukraine in a favorable light, or of burying it completely. In other words, if the Russian media can manufacture a major war, it can also fabricate a suitably plausible peace.

Anyone who still doubts the Kremlin’s capacity to whitewash military defeat in Ukraine hasn’t been paying attention. We have recently witnessed Putin hosting the biggest naval event of the year while studiously ignoring the historic humbling of his southern fleet. It was the same story in 2022, when he ceremoniously announced that Kherson had joined Russia “forever,” only to order his beaten troops to abandon the city just weeks later. Likewise, when Russia lost the Battle of Kyiv during the initial phase of the invasion, the Kremlin refused to acknowledge defeat and absurdly insisted that the retreat from northern Ukraine was a mere “goodwill gesture.” If Putin is eventually forced to end his invasion, it seems safe to assume he will downplay this humiliation in similar fashion.

Since February 2022, Western leaders have found numerous reasons to limit their support for Ukraine. Some are restricted by modest defense budgets and competing domestic priorities. Most are afraid of possible escalation and have allowed themselves to be intimidated by Putin’s talk of Russian red lines. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy says many of his country’s Western partners are also reluctant to arm Ukraine because they fear the unpredictable geopolitical consequences of a Russian defeat. This Western alarm over a possible Russian collapse is exaggerated and fails to account for the power of Putin’s propaganda.

If Russia suffers a decisive defeat in Ukraine, past experience indicates that the Kremlin will almost certainly seek to move the goalposts, change the narrative, or devise some other way of rewriting history and claiming victory. Any embarrassing evidence of failure would simply be flushed down the memory hole, along with all the sunken Russian warships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Karatnycky in Foreign Policy | The stubborn legend of a Western ‘coup’ in Ukraine

Atlantic Council — Sun, 04 Aug 2024 16:42:24 +0000

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Turkey’s linchpin role in the Russia prisoner swap offers a lesson

Rich Outzen — Fri, 02 Aug 2024 20:56:13 +0000

Each year, millions of passengers fly into and out of Ankara Esenboğa Airport, just north of the Turkish capital, without event. On Thursday, however, the transit of twenty-six passengers made international headlines. American journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, along with former US Marine Paul Whelan and several Russian political dissidents, among others who had been held in Russia, were exchanged with Moscow for eight prisoners who had been convicted in the West.

Prisoner swaps between Russia and the West have an asymmetric quality: Arms dealers and assassins get traded for journalists and dissidents. Such is the moral calculus between autocratic regimes and those striving to uphold the ideals of democracy and republican governance. It is regrettable that such deals must be struck, but the cost might be quite a bit higher if truth-speakers in the dark spots of the world thought no one would bargain for their freedom in a pinch. So, the multinational deal on Thursday that returned journalists, political dissidents, and friends of the West in exchange for the release of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s cadres can be welcomed and regretted at the same time.

Given the sharp divide between Western democracies and their authoritarian antagonists in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere, it is remarkable that deals remain possible at all. The reality of global polarization and great-power competition means that a very small number of countries maintain diplomatic contact and influence across dividing lines, and Turkey is one of the few. Thus, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, as well as its geographic position, made it a linchpin of the recent prisoner swap. Ankara receives a fairly steady stream of Western criticism for hedging and balancing behaviors keeping the door open to Russia, but Thursday’s deal demonstrates the wisdom of having allies with an open line to rival camps—which is why the West has generally acquiesced to the Turkish balancing act.

The politics of prisoner exchanges have been unfortunately prominent in 2024, in light of the ongoing wars in Ukraine and in Gaza, where Hamas has sought to use Israeli hostages as tools to shape the outcome of the war that followed its October 7 attacks into Israel. There have been previous exchanges of prisoners between Russia and Ukraine, including several facilitated by the United Arab Emirates, some via joint Saudi-Turkish mediation, and roughly fifty other prisoner exchanges done bilaterally or through third parties. But this week’s deal represented a different level of difficulty—politically prominent prisoners and accused spies, a half dozen countries, complex negotiations, and US electoral politics in the mix. Before this week, Ankara had been the site and the facilitator for less high-profile swaps of Russians and Americans, but after the complex deal this week, the trade space may narrow.

The international system has left an era of aspirational globalization and entered an era of hard power-driven geopolitical competition. In this era, diplomatic agility will matter a great deal, especially when coupled with economic and military leverage over prospective negotiating parties. Mediating or facilitating countries must not only have a reputation for even-handedness in the dispute in question, but they also need a degree of trust with the parties and enough geopolitical sway to incentivize cooperation. Turkey meets two key criteria in this regard: It has an imperfect alignment with the West, with sufficient friction to foster understanding of and hedging positions with non-Western powers. It also has relative self-sufficiency in defense matters, which provides it a risk tolerance in diverging from strict adherence to Western policy lines.

Prisoner exchanges, peace talks, and creative diplomacy become more difficult as alignments, bloc behavior, and other aspects of great-power competition reemerge as norms in the international system. While deterrence requires intra-alliance solidarity and discipline, deal-making requires occasional line-crossing, albeit not nonalignment altogether. Ankara clearly favors this aspect of modern statecraft. It remains a robust NATO member, passing the 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense spending commitment this year and solidly supporting collective defense requirements, including significant military support to Ukraine in the current conflict. Yet it engages in line-crossing diplomatic gambits in pursuit of de-escalation with some frequency, including in the Caucasus, Libya, Israel-Palestine (less successfully), and the war in Ukraine.

The swap just completed is in part a fruit of such line-crossing. That Ankara can pull off the balancing act of providing lethal aid to Russia’s enemies, fully supporting Western military deterrence, yet trading and making deals with Moscow in a manner that helps US policy interests is both rare and valuable. So the next time an article in a Western publication claims that Turkey is an ally in name only or not an ally at all due to imperfect alignment, it might be worth remembering that bad allies are a good deal more useful than enemies or neutrals, especially when they have demonstrated military, economic, and diplomatic heft.

Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Turkey with thirty-two years of government service both in uniform and as a civilian. Follow him on Twitter @RichOutzen.

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As sixteen of Putin’s prisoners come home, don’t forget the millions of hostages who remain

Mikhail Zygar — Fri, 02 Aug 2024 17:35:40 +0000

I never doubted that the United States would not abandon Evan Gershkovich and Paul Whelan in their time of need, but I did not expect their release to happen so quickly. My sources in Moscow did not believe that an agreement could be reached before the elections in November or even before the inauguration of the new US president next January.

I am very happy that some of the hostages, including Russian citizens who were captured solely because of their honesty and courage, have been freed. They stood against the war in Ukraine and fought for freedom. Until the moment they were released, I feared that some of them would end their lives in prison.

Who gained freedom thanks to these efforts?

One is seventy-one-year-old Oleg Orlov, a legendary Soviet human rights defender and one of the leaders of Memorial, an organization that received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2022. Orlov publicly called the Putin regime totalitarian and fascist, and for this, he was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison this year.

There is also Sasha Skochilenko, a thirty-three-year-old artist from St. Petersburg. At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, she made a small art performance in which she replaced price tags in a grocery store with anti-war slogans. For this, she was sentenced to seven years in prison. Her imprisonment posed a direct threat to her life: Sasha has a heart defect and bipolar disorder, and in the conditions of a Russian prison, she could have died.

Another example is the schoolboy Kevin Lik, who is now nineteen years old but was arrested while still a minor. He was accused of photographing military equipment and sending the photos to someone abroad. He was accused of state treason. Obviously, the Russian authorities themselves did not believe that a schoolboy could be a spy, and in the end, he was sentenced to only four years in prison, whereas in Russia, espionage usually results in much longer sentences. However, this is practically a child, and he was sentenced to four years in prison.

Vladimir Kara-Murza, a prominent activist and journalist whom Russian special services tried to poison, sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Ilya Yashin, probably the most famous opposition figure in Russia after Navalny’s death, sentenced to eight-and-a-half years.

Now Evan, Paul, Oleg, Sasha, Kevin, Vladimir, Ilya, and other hostages of Putin’s regime have gained freedom.

But even on such a day, I cannot stop thinking about the thousands of people who remain in Putin’s prisons. About the poet Zhenya Berkovich. About the politician Alexei Gorinov, who protested against the war from the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and is now dying in prison. About Daniil Kholodny, an information technology specialist who was imprisoned for eight years for creating a website for now-deceased opposition leader Alexei Navalny. About thousands of other people.

I do not call them all “hostages” by chance.

I am sure that most people living in Russia feel like hostages. About twenty-five years ago, power in Russia was seized by a gang of terrorists led by Vladimir Putin. All these years, they have been terrorizing the country’s population, imprisoning people for any disobedience, teaching citizens to think that resistance is impossible and useless, doing everything to make Russians develop Stockholm syndrome. It is impossible to help all of them; it is impossible to exchange millions of people. But it is important to remember that thousands of hostages are sitting in Putin’s prisons. And over the years, Putin has successfully turned the whole country into a gulag. And many people feel like hostages, even if they are not behind bars.

Mikhail Zygar is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of Russia’s only independent news television channel, Dozhd (TVRain). He was recently sentenced in absentia by a Moscow court to eight and a half years in prison for criticizing the Russian army.

A version of this article originally appeared on Zygar’s Substack, the Last Pioneer.

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Welcome home, Evan

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 22:08:16 +0000

I released the following statement today regarding the news of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich’s release from imprisonment in Russia:

We at the Atlantic Council are overjoyed and relieved that Evan has been released after 491 days of wrongful imprisonment in Russia. This is a great day for Evan, his family, and his colleagues at the Wall Street Journal, who worked tirelessly to secure his release. However, it doesn’t diminish our need to speak out against Russia’s crimes not only against Evan but against free speech more broadly.

As Almar Latour, Wall Street Journal publisher and Dow Jones CEO, said at the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards in May 2023, “Evan’s arrest is a symbolic reminder of the fight that we find ourselves in today. It’s autocrats versus the power of the pen—disinformation versus reliable information as the bedrock of free society.”

Latour’s point was underscored by those released with Evan: two other Americans wrongfully detained—journalist Alsu Kurmasheva and former US Marine Paul Whelan—as well as Russian political dissident and Pulitzer Prize winner Vladimir Kara-Murza, among others. In exchange, a contemptible lot, including a convicted murderer and several hackers and spies, was welcomed back to Russia by President Vladimir Putin.

Watch Latour’s full speech below:

Evan’s resilience and steadfastness are testament to the courage of journalists worldwide who take risks every day in service to freer societies. In partnership with Adrienne Arsht, the Atlantic Council has been proud to champion Evan’s cause through our “Reporters at Risk” series, which highlights those dangers and underscores the importance of supporting their critical work.

The Atlantic Council remains committed to press freedom and defending the safety of reporters at risk like Evan. As a twenty-five-year veteran of the Wall Street Journal, I welcome him home as a colleague. On behalf of the Atlantic Council, we commit ourselves to defending the freedoms he and reporters like him around the world represent.

Evan Gershkovich’s parents, Mikhail and Ella, meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Wall Street Journal Publisher Almar Latour, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht, and Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards, September 28, 2023.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Europe can do more to help Ukraine counter Russia’s energy attacks

Aura Sabadus — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 20:54:59 +0000

Russian bombing of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure has forced millions of Ukrainians to spend the summer months adjusting to rolling power blackouts, with record high temperatures adding to the practical challenges of living without electricity. The Ukrainian response to this latest episode of wartime adversity has been marked by typical grit, resourcefulness, and good humor. Nevertheless, there is now widespread awareness that the country is facing what may be the toughest winter in modern Ukrainian history.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Russia has destroyed, damaged, or occupied approximately eighty percent of Ukraine’s electricity infrastructure. The situation has deteriorated sharply since March 2024 following a wave of Russian attacks on Ukrainian power plants that have devastated the country’s thermal capacity.

Ukrainian energy sector officials believe that during the coming winter season, peak demand could be above eighteen gigawatts, with average consumption likely to hover around fifteen gigawatts. However, remaining capacity is just over ten gigawatts. Unless significant new sources can be secured, Ukrainians will have to deal with extended blackouts amid subzero temperatures. This could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and create new waves of refugees fleeing to the EU.

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Looking ahead, there is no substitute for much needed air defenses to protect Ukraine’s remaining energy production capacity. However, additional steps from the Ukrainian authorities and Kyiv’s partners could help prepare the country for the coming winter season.

A July 2024 report funded by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Education and Research has identified a number of short-term measures that could be adopted swiftly to at least partially plug current shortfalls. Fast repairs of thermal and hydro plants together with the deployment of small-scale gas-fired turbines and solar panels could bring approximately 3.4GW of additional capacity online before temperatures start to drop. Donations of spare equipment are also absolutely vital, while Ukraine should intensify work with partners to establish stockpiles of components to rebuild generation capacity.

One of the most promising initiatives would involve increasing cross-border capacity with neighboring EU countries operating under the umbrella of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Ukraine synchronized with the ENTSO-E grid in March 2022. Since then, Kyiv has increased cross-border capacity significantly, but there is still scope for a further expansion of interconnection capacity by approximately 0.3GW ahead of the coming winter season. This may be easier said than done, however.

Hungary and Slovakia are key exporters of electricity to Ukraine but are currently threatening to cut flows after Kyiv introduced a partial ban on the transit of Russian oil to refineries in the two EU countries. Budapest and Bratislava have long benefitted from cheap Russian energy imports and have faced accusations of acting in the Kremlin’s interests by blocking EU financial and military support to Ukraine. Both countries could now undermine efforts to boost energy exports to Ukraine.

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While there has not yet been any disruption to electricity flows from the EU into Ukraine, it is clearly in Kyiv’s interests to avoid disagreements where possible and to seek enhanced energy partnership with the country’s European neighbors. Closer cooperation with Slovakia and Romania in particular could pay major dividends. Indeed, recent research has found that transmission capacity could be more than doubled to five gigawatts. This could provide greater energy security, create jobs, and attract significant investments.

If completed, one existing power line project linking Slovakia and Ukraine could bring additional capacity of one gigawatt, enough to supply a million consumers. Work on this line began in 2013 and is seventy percent complete on the Ukrainian side, but nothing has yet been done on the Slovak side. Similarly, a proposed electricity power line linking Ukraine’s Pivdennoukrainska nuclear power plant to Romania would not only bring an additional one gigawatt of transfer capacity, but could also potentially end nearby Moldova’s dependence on electricity generated in the Kremlin-controlled Transnistria enclave.

Despite the numerous benefits offered by these projects, the Romanian and Slovakian governments remain unwilling to commit. This lack of political cooperation may contribute to a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine during the coming winter months that could spill over into neighboring countries. With the countdown to the cold season now already underway, there is no time to lose. Helping Ukraine to keep the lights on should be a priority for the whole of Europe.

Dr. Aura Sabadus is a senior energy journalist who writes about Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine for Independent Commodity Intelligence Services (ICIS), a London-based global energy and petrochemicals news and market data provider. Her views are her own.

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France has sided with Morocco on the Western Sahara. How might Algeria respond?

Sarah Zaaimi — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:49:39 +0000

On Tuesday, France moved toward recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territories of Western Sahara in a historic diplomatic shift for Paris and a major diplomatic victory for Rabat. Morocco’s neighbor Algeria was quick to signal its displeasure, saying that France’s decision was “the result of a dubious political calculation” and a “morally questionable judgment.” Will this realignment turn the page of the long-running Sahara conflict once and for all? Or will it further destabilize an already volatile region?

The news broke after the Moroccan royal palace released a communiqué that referenced a letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to the king of Morocco on the commemoration of the silver jubilee of his coronation. The letter states that the “present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” In his correspondence with the Moroccan king, Macron added that “France intends to act consistently with this position at both national and international levels.” Although the French position explicitly references Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, it will need more clarification and translation into concrete policies in the coming months.

Nonetheless, the French decision is particularly significant given its colonial past in North Africa and its shared responsibility with Spain in largely determining the postcolonial borders of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. These borders are the origin of many of the current territorial disputes in the region. France’s endorsement of the Moroccan autonomy plan this week follows similar support from Spain in 2022 and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara expressed by the United States in 2020 and Israel in 2023, along with a growing list of Arab and African nations.

Understanding the French calculus

France’s shift of stance comes as its relations with Morrocco have been strained. Since 2020, Rabat has pressured Paris to break the status quo—a neutrality on the issue apparently intended not to upset either Morocco or Algeria—and take a clearer stance on the Western Sahara. Striking a deal with then-US President Donald Trump in 2020 over the disputed territories and normalizing ties with Israel boosted Morocco’s diplomatic confidence and helped redefine the kingdom’s foreign policy. As a result, the Sahara issue, in the words of the Moroccan king, became “the lens through which Morocco looks at the world.”

As an example of the deteriorating bilateral relations, Mohammed VI reportedly “definitely shelved” relations with Macron and declined state visit requests by the French president last year. In addition, the kingdom started to increase its divestment from business partnerships with France—previously considered its international economic partner of choice. Torn between Morocco and Algeria, France failed to balance its act in the Maghreb after a chain of unfortunate events, including the Pegasus spyware case, a visa crisis, and the recall of Rabat’s ambassador to France in February 2023. Most recently, Morocco refused French aid after the Marrakesh earthquake in September 2023.

France, however, never stopped courting Morocco, because Paris did not want to lose strategically important economic and political ground in Africa. For its part, Rabat did not break its relations with Paris entirely, continuing its intelligence and security cooperation with France. Moroccan forces, for example, are currently helping to secure the Paris Olympics. Morocco also appointed Samira Sitail, a dual national and Makhzan insider, as its ambassador to attempt to stir the stagnant waters.

Rather than trying to deter Morocco’s ambitious Atlantic Initiative—aimed at offering landlocked Sahel countries trade access to the ocean through a $1.2 billion harbor in Dakhla, Western Sahara—France is eying a share of the economic benefits promised by the project. The only catch is how to address the 2021 European Union (EU) court ruling against the Morocco-EU trade deal over Western Sahara, which the Elysée may now advocate to reverse together with other pro-Moroccan EU countries ahead of the final judgment, due in a few months.

Western Sahara and global realignment

Another defining factor in understanding the recent French decision lies in the global realignment behind old Cold War frontiers, and NATO allies engaging in historic contests against increasingly destabilizing forces. Morocco has always been a reliable partner to the global liberal West in its fight against Russian aggression and different terrorist groups. The country is also more-or-less aligned with the United States and France on a common vision of the future. As Iran and its proxies reinforce ties with the Algerian regime, which has been cultivating close relations with Russia since the 1970s, North Atlantic allies fear a new stronghold of antagonists in North Africa.

For the past five decades, Western Sahara has been a major security loophole at the doors of the Mediterranean and the Sahel. With growing rumors about Iranian and Wagner Group presence among Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps in western Algeria, where an estimated 173,600 refugees live, it’s becoming imperative for the United States and European countries to try to resolve the Western Sahara file once and for all.

Disrupting the status quo in the Maghreb

While on paper the French decision to side with Morocco may seem in line with its economic and global priorities, it does come at a price. EU neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and exclusive reliance on the United Nations peacekeeping mission to maintain the status quo between Rabat and Algiers has been central to stabilizing the region. After the United States and Spain sided with Morocco, Algeria responded by severing diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 and recalling its ambassador in Madrid in 2022. Algeria also disrupted gas exports to Spain through Morocco by closing the EU-Maghreb pipeline just as tensions were building around Russia’s gas exports ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reaction by Algiers to Macron’s swing toward Mohammed VI described France and Morocco as “colonial powers, new and old.” This was followed on Tuesday by Algeria recalling its ambassador in Paris to express its discontent.

Macron’s decision has alienated an already nervous Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is running for reelection on September 7. This week’s events may push him deeper into Iranian and Russian arms. Even though not expressly sought by any of the parties, the risk of recent events sparking up a wider regional conflict in the Maghreb is higher than ever. Even if in a way designed to avoid escalation, Algeria will likely feel it necessary to respond in some form.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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Ukraine’s new F-16 jets won’t defeat Russia but will enhance air defenses

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:46:07 +0000

The first batch of F-16 jets finally arrived in Ukraine at the end of July, officials in Kyiv and partner countries have confirmed. The news comes after months of anticipation over the delivery of the fighter jets, which have long been high on Ukraine’s wish list as the country seeks the tools to defeat Russia’s ongoing invasion.

US President Joe Biden confirmed his support for the supply of F-16s in August 2023, but subsequent progress was slow. Training for Ukrainian pilots and ground crews has taken up to nine months, with an already technically complex and demanding process reportedly further complicated by language barriers. There have also been significant obstacles to identifying and preparing Ukrainian airbases with suitable facilities and adequate defenses.

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The F-16 models that Ukraine has now begun to receive are a clear step up from the Soviet-era jets inherited from the USSR, boasting superior radar capabilities and longer range. At the same time, Ukraine’s F-16s should not be viewed as a game-changing weapon in the war with Russia.

One obvious issue is quantity. Ukraine has so far only received a handful of F-16s, with a total of 24 jets expected to arrive by the end of 2024. To put this number into context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated in recent weeks that in order to effectively counter Russian air power, his country would require a fleet of 128 F-16 jets. So far, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands have committed to supply Ukraine with eighty F-16s, but there is no clear time frame for deliveries or for the training of additional pilots.

Ukraine’s fledgling F-16 fleet will likely have access to a limited selection of weapons, with partner countries currently pledging to provide a number of short-range munitions. It remains unclear whether Kyiv can count on longer range strike capabilities, despite recent reports that the US has agreed to arm Ukrainian F-16s with American-made missiles and other advanced weapons. The effectiveness of Ukraine’s new jets will also be constrained by restrictions on the use of Western weapons against targets inside Russia.

The limited number of F-16s in Ukraine means that these new arrivals will initially be deployed primarily to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The jets will considerably enhance Ukraine’s ability to prevent Russian pilots entering Ukrainian air space, and can also target Russian cruise missiles in flight. This is particularly important as Russia has recently demonstrated its growing ability to bypass existing surface-to-air defense systems and strike civilian infrastructure targets across Ukraine.

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Mercedes Sapuppo: The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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Ukraine’s F-16s enter service in what is an extremely challenging operating environment, with Russia’s sophisticated battlefield air defenses likely to make any combat support roles extremely risky. Acknowledging these difficulties, Ukraine’s commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskiy recently stated that the country’s F-16s would operate at a distance of at least forty kilometers from the front.

Another key challenge will be protecting Ukrainian F-16s on the ground against Russian attempts to destroy them with ballistic missiles. The Kremlin has made no secret of the fact that the jets are priority targets that will be hunted with particular enthusiasm. The Ukrainian Air Force will have to adapt quickly in order to counter this threat, and must rely on a combination of Patriot air defenses, decoy F-16s, and frequent airfield changes.

While the long-awaited arrival of F-16s in Ukraine has sparked considerable excitement and provided Ukrainians with a welcome morale boost, these new jets are not a wonder weapon that can change the course of the war. Instead, Ukraine’s small fleet of F-16s will bolster the country’s air defenses, helping to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure from Russian bombardment.

Over the coming year, Ukraine will face the task of gradually integrating and expanding its F-16 fleet. Based on past experience of Western weapons deliveries, Kyiv can expect to receive additional munitions, and may also eventually be given the green light to strike some categories of military targets inside Russia. This would open up a range of offensive options that could change the battlefield dynamics of the war in Ukraine’s favor. For now, though, the biggest change is likely to be in terms of enhanced security for Ukraine’s civilian population.

Hanna Liubakova: German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

Brian Whitmore: This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Today’s news is a truly extraordinary event: a large prisoner exchange involving twenty-four captives in seven countries. Russia and Belarus released sixteen prisoners; and the United States, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia sent eight back to Russia. Those released by Moscow include three Americans held essentially as hostages on trumped-up charges—businessman Whelan and journalists Gershkovich and Kurmasheva—and political prisoners Kara-Murza and Yashin. Belarus released Rico Krieger, a German convicted of “terrorism” in Belarus, who was sentenced to death but then pardoned by Lukashenka’s regime. The most notable prisoner released to Russia is Krasikov, a Kremlin operative who murdered a Chechen activist in Germany.

Two constants drove this deal. The first is Putin’s great interest in securing the release of Russian spies and provocateurs captured and jailed in the West. When he succeeded in trading American basketball player Brittney Griner for Viktor Bout with the United States in December 2022, Putin’s highest priority became the release of Krasikov from Germany. When Putin gave up Griner, he still had Whelan as a hostage for future trades with the United States. Then he added Gershkovich in March 2023 for additional trade bait and Kurmasheva this past spring. The second constant is the Biden administration’s interest in securing the release of all Americans unfairly detained by Moscow. After the Griner-Bout exchange, US efforts to secure the freedom of Whelan and then Gershkovich foundered on the refusal of Germany to include Krasikov—Putin’s prime objective—in any trade.

These constants alone do not explain this deal. The new factor was the arrest of Krieger in Belarus last fall. This gave Berlin a reason to consider releasing Krasikov. Germany’s willingness to do so likely set in motion a long negotiation that led to today’s news. The final deal also gave Putin back Russian operatives in Norway, Poland, and Slovenia; and provided an opportunity to free prominent Russian opposition figures Kara-Murza and Yashin.

It is notable that sixteen prisoners moved West and only eight east. But, as we know from the lopsided trade that sent 215 Ukrainian prisoners of war home in exchange for Putin-favorite Viktor Medvedchuk and others in the fall of 2022, there are times when Putin’s interest in a particular captive persuades him to make an uneven trade.

Still, Putin has the tactical advantage of being able to grab additional hostages from Americans and other Western visitors in Russia. One way for the West to reduce this nasty advantage would be to lower the evidentiary requirements for holding spies from Russia and other US adversaries.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

The news that Gershkovich, Kurmasheva, Whelan, Kara-Murza, and Yashin—along with other human rights activists and innocent civilians—have been released from Russia in a prisoner swap is historic. For those now free who were wrongfully detained on contrived and false charges and bravely endured the conditions of Russian detention, today is hugely celebratory. It is also a good day for their families and for all who have been advocating for their freedom, including the Biden-Harris administration. The swap released many who suffered unjustly and marks a positive day for independent media and press freedom.

The timing of this swap—and its scope—indicates that Putin thought it was time to cash out the bargaining chips that he had illegally collected to leverage against the West in the form of innocent Americans and Russian activists. However, it does not suggest that the Kremlin will pull back on its malign tactics of aggression against Ukraine as well as the United States and its allies, and Putin is by no means walking away empty-handed: Russia will welcome home convicted murderers, spies, hackers, fraudsters, and smugglers.

What this swap demonstrates on the Kremlin’s strategic front is a twisted and self-serving pragmatism that is unlikely to translate into a deescalation of Russia’s violence in Ukraine, nor into a new appreciation for international norms. Putin is still a war criminal, and he is still bolstering his autocratic alliances abroad. The drive demonstrated by global leaders and advocates pushing for the release of these unjustly detained journalists and activists should not be the end. Rather, it should be only the beginning of continued work to defeat Putin in Ukraine and deter his aggression, which includes the imprisonment of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers being kept in harrowing conditions in temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine.

—Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

The prisoner swap story between Russia and Western countries took an unexpected turn with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s involvement. Krieger, a German national sentenced to death in Belarus, was among the Western prisoners released in Thursday’s exchange. His case gained attention following his pardon on July 30. The unusual circumstances surrounding Krieger’s sentencing had sparked speculation that the Minsk regime was positioning itself for a high-profile prisoner exchange.

Shortly after the pardon, Lukashenka’s spokesperson indicated that Minsk was open to negotiations regarding Krieger, stating that various “proposals” had been made. This suggested that the pardon was a strategic maneuver to facilitate discussions with Germany. Krieger’s exchange demonstrated the Belarusian regime’s manipulative tactics, with speculation arising that he was swapped for Krasikov, a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assassin imprisoned in Germany.

Krieger was arrested in Belarus in October for allegedly acting as a mercenary and planting explosives. He appeared in a propaganda video, claiming he wanted to fight in Ukraine but was directed to a mission in Belarus. However, the inconsistencies in the video raise doubts about his claims.

The regime’s actions—capturing a foreigner, sentencing him to death, and then negotiating his release—resemble hostage-taking tactics. While Russia may have reclaimed some of its agents in part through Krieger’s exchange, Lukashenka seems to be sacrificing his relationship with Germany to support Putin’s interests. This mirrors Lukashenka’s previous concessions to Russia, including offering Belarusian territory for the invasion of Ukraine, despite his people’s opposition, or stationing Wagner Group troops in Belarus.

Amid these high-stakes negotiations, the plight of Belarusian political prisoners is often overlooked. Although eighteen political prisoners were released last month, an estimated 1,400 remain imprisoned, many urgently needing medical assistance.

—Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

The sweeping prisoner exchange that freed Kurmasheva, Gershkovich, Whelan, and others from Russian captivity was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, and the Biden administration deserves enormous credit for working with the United States’ allies to make it happen. And full disclosure, this one is personal. Two of the released hostages—Kurmasheva, a journalist with whom I worked for more than a decade at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Kara-Murza, a Russian dissident whom I have known for years—are close personal friends. The fact that sixteen hostages of Putin’s regime—including Americans, Germans, British nationals, and Russian political prisoners—are now free is cause for celebration.

That said, we should all use this occasion to reflect on what this prisoner exchange illustrates about the nature of Putin’s Russia. In order to get these hostages released, the United States and its allies needed to free actual criminals who were convicted after receiving the benefit of due process and fair trials in Western courts of law. Among these were a hitman, Krasikov, convicted of an assassination in Germany, and a cybercriminal, Roman Seleznev, who was convicted of bank fraud and identity theft in the United States. This is reminiscent of the United States securing the release of WNBA star and Olympic gold medalist Brittney Griner in exchange for convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout and swapping US Marine Corps veteran Trevor Reed for Russian drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko back in 2022.

One has to wonder, why does Putin want all these hitmen, cybercriminals, arms traffickers, and drug dealers released? And why is he willing to take Western hostages to do so? The answer is simple: The line between the government and the criminal underworld in Putin’s Russia is so thin that it is nonexistent. As I have argued in the past, the Putin regime is effectively a crime syndicate masquerading as a state. The correct metaphor for this prisoner exchange is not the storied Cold War-era swapping of Western and Soviet spies. Instead, it is the result of an unfortunately necessary hostage negotiation with a criminal and terrorist regime.

—Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of the Power Vertical podcast.

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Can citizens’ assemblies help counter a rising populist tide in the West?

Moritz Ludwig and Joely Virzi — Thu, 01 Aug 2024 13:28:02 +0000

Don’t be fooled by recent leftist and centrist electoral wins in France and the United Kingdom—the strength of right-wing populism is still a central through line for liberal democracies around the world. While each populist party carries its own national characteristics, a common driver of their recent increase in support has been the rejection of established political parties and criticism of much of the political, economic, and social order that has underpinned the West since the end of the Cold War. There has been much head-scratching and pontificating about what causes populism to take hold and how center-left and center-right politicians should respond.

Established political parties are now taking steps to win back support. Policymakers around the world should take note of these efforts, such as the use of citizens’ assemblies in Germany, as one way to counter this polarizing environment and rebuild trust in democratic systems.

Growing disillusionment and persistent divides

Germany is a compelling case study for the rise of populist ideology. Nearly thirty-five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the East-West divide in the country persists. To this day, people in eastern Germany often face fewer economic opportunities, underrepresentation in elite professions, power imbalances, and an aging population. As recently as 2019, 60 percent of Germans in the east perceived themselves as second-class citizens. While on the rise throughout Germany, it is in large part for these reasons that the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party resonates in the eastern part of the country, in states such as Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. Elections in all three in September see the AfD polling in first place.

The AfD was formed in 2013 in reaction to eurozone bailouts for other countries, but the 2015 refugee crisis transformed its platform into the extreme one it has today. When nearly one million migrants entered Germany, a majority of citizens called for an immigration cap. The AfD, weaponizing both economic and social grievances, built itself on and instigated this cultural discontent. The party trademarked “Islam does not belong to Germany” in its 2016 manifesto, and has taken aim at costly climate action to spur discontent with the center and fuel its own base. This approach propelled the AfD to ninety-two opposition seats in the Bundestag in 2017, and in the years since it has established itself as a formidable populist alternative to Germany’s traditional parties closer to the political center.

The AfD’s 2024 manifesto paints a worrying picture of its vision for Germany. The AfD proposes to reduce the net number of annual immigrants to zero and oppose all major climate actions, arguing such government encroachments threaten to unravel the cultural fabric and stability of German society. These extreme stances threaten to endanger the unity of Germany and could hamper international cooperation. The party is largely Euroskeptic, anti-American, and pro-Russian, which drives its urge to scale back on Ukraine aid. Notably, the far-right Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament kicked out the AfD in May of this year, following scandals surrounding its extreme statements and potential connections to China and Russia.

Nevertheless, the party remains relatively popular in Germany. It scored second among German parties in the European Parliament elections in June and could well secure more than a quarter of seats in state elections this fall. The AfD’s success has inspired other upstart parties on the left. The newly founded left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), for example, is expected to secure around 20 percent of seats across the three states, appealing to voters that are dissatisfied with the state of Germany’s economy and support for Ukraine.

The populist phenomenon is not exclusive to Germany. It is symptomatic of a general trend in the West. From gains in the European Parliament to momentum heading into the US presidential election, populism does not bode well for the liberal international order, especially at a time when intensifying global challenges demand collective solutions.

The long road to rebuilding trust

One strategy to counter illiberal tendencies and reengage citizens is the establishment of citizens’ assemblies: representative groups of randomly selected constituents that develop policy recommendations on a given issue based on expert briefings and discussions. The assemblies can be implemented at all political levels.

Citizens’ assemblies have been tried before. In various forms, they have been tested by several countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. They all share the goals of bringing participatory democracy to the public and reconnecting with voters who have lost trust in democracy.

These citizens’ assemblies have led to big changes before. In Ireland, the successful 2018 referendum to remove the Eighth Amendment banning most abortions stemmed from a recommendation from a ninety-nine-person-strong citizens’ assembly and helped end years of deadlock over the issue. A similar Convention on the Constitution in the country helped lead the way to the 2015 referendum on marriage equality.

In Germany, ten nationwide citizens’ assemblies have been convened since 2019, covering topics such as “Germany’s role in the world,” “climate action,” and “countering disinformation.” While the practical policy proposals are not binding, they do provide policymakers with valuable insights on current positions, possible compromises, and existing sticking points. Within just five years, the German citizens’ assemblies have grown from being independently organized by a nonprofit to being implemented by the Bundestag—an indication of the growing hope and trust politicians are placing on these fora.

The German approach isn’t perfect. Commentators have identified several challenges facing Germany’s citizens’ assemblies, including the representative selection of participants, the neutrality of moderators and experts, the optimal format and institutionalization of the assemblies, and the effect on participants and nonparticipating citizens.

And in truth, so far, it is too soon to see the impact of these assemblies in Germany. Mostly experimental in design, few concrete recommendations were implemented by policymakers. Some people believe the concept’s success hinges on the assembly on nutrition, food labeling, and food waste, the first citizens’ assembly instituted directly by the German Bundestag, which met in January 2024. The outcomes of this assembly included recommendations on school lunches and new regulations on energy drinks.

The participatory idea behind citizens’ assemblies cannot replace the parliamentary process. To avoid conflicts of legitimacy between participatory and representative democracy, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation recommends that parliaments initiate and mandate the process. It is crucial that the fora are not influenced externally and provide some flexibility regarding approach and outcome. They cannot be expected to arrive at predetermined conclusions and, depending on topic, composition, and mandate, every citizens’ assembly will be unique. To sustainably strengthen democracy and rebuild trust in political processes, it is important to complement the assembly with a broader public campaign. Linking the citizens’ assemblies with parliamentary institutions through the involvement of parliamentarians in the expert briefings could further improve the current system. Alternatively, an assembly could be followed by a referendum, giving citizens beyond those randomly chosen participatory power.

No easy fixes

Citizens’ assemblies alone are not sufficient to head off the rise of populists in Germany anytime soon: The AfD and BSW parties, for example, will very likely make gains in the eastern German elections this fall. Instead, the assemblies should be seen as part of a long-term strategy to address the root causes of voter dissatisfaction.

It is imperative to see citizens’ assemblies for what they are. Policymakers should not expect a panacea for polarization. Instead, the fora are a piece of a bigger puzzle. Implementing citizens’ assemblies in tandem with regional structural policies can start the process of rebuilding trust in government. Until more citizens feel like they have a real voice in politics, the seeds of populism will likely continue to find fertile ground—in Germany, in the United States, and beyond.

Moritz Ludwig is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Joely Virzi is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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The role Turkey can play in NATO’s post-Washington summit aims

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan — Wed, 31 Jul 2024 15:21:00 +0000

The NATO Summit held earlier this month in Washington was a testament to the Alliance’s enduring relevance in upholding shared ideals, values, and common interests as enshrined in the 1949 Washington Treaty. But it also showed that there is still work for NATO and its members to do, particularly in enhancing the Alliance’s collective deterrence and defense in the face of challenges by state and nonstate actors.

NATO has established its place among the most successful political and military alliances in history—despite facing very challenging circumstances since its founding—by dint of solidarity, unity of purpose, and resolve.

Today, allies are presented with challenges such as increasing global systemic rivalry and a complex, interconnected, and unstable security landscape, which threaten Euro-Atlantic security. Russia, as the most significant and direct threat for NATO, has been undermining Euro-Atlantic security since its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its aggression has since expanded in the form of its invasion of Ukraine. In addition, terrorism—in all forms and manifestations—persists. The topic has been on NATO’s agenda since the adoption of the Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept and it (specifically, the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States) was the reason the Alliance decided to invoke Article 5 for the first and only time in history. Since 2001, nonstate actors have continued to lodge a series of terror attacks on a number of allies such as the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Belgium as well as Turkey, which still grapples with terror attacks from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as the latter’s Syrian leg.

NATO allies must maintain their resolve and remain vigilant and ready to face challenges from any direction. Defense is not cheap, and it requires constant attention, care, and investment.

Since joining the Alliance seventy-two years ago, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s security in various theaters of instability and conflicts. Turkey was a bulwark against the Soviet threat in the Cold War period, and it continued to spend significantly on defense, sacrificing the opportunity to spend more elsewhere. For example, Turkey dedicated a level of forces and capabilities NATO in that period that was significant for the Alliance’s security and reduced pressure on allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Turkey, because it continued to spend on defense, did not benefit from the post-Cold War “peace dividend” to the extent that European NATO allies enjoyed during the early 1990s when the unifying vision to establish a belt of security, stability, and prosperity that included Russia (extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok) was first launched by the United States. During this period, Turkey spent around or above 4 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, while most other allies saw their commitments wane over time.

In the immediate post-Cold War era, Turkey faced challenges from nearby regional conflicts in the Gulf, the Balkans, and the South Caucasus. Yet this conflictual period did not stop Turkey from contributing to NATO efforts designed to protect peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. Turkey actively took part in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and it also made significant contributions to the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, which was followed by the Resolute Support Mission.

Today, Turkey has similarly consistently supported NATO efforts to enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area, even despite divergent perceptions in allied capitals about Turkey’s approach to recent global challenges such as Russia’s war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza.

For example, Turkey did join its NATO allies in approving the most recent NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at Madrid in 2022, that identified Russia and terrorism (along with other regional and global challenges) as threats for the Alliance. Turkey is also set to play a pivotal role in the implementation of regional plans launched at the Vilnius summit last year which are dedicated to the defense of Southern Europe against the pervasive challenges in its immediate vicinity.

Turkey’s role in Washington summit outcomes

With the Russian threat looming over European security, it is high time to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Allies at the NATO summit acknowledged the need to close the gaps between Europe’s defense needs and its capabilities. This includes, as highlighted at the Washington summit, expanding European allies’ defense manufacturing capacity in a coherent, complementary, and interoperable manner. To achieve interoperability will also require Turkey and NATO to find a lasting solution to the spat over the current Turkish administration’s decision in 2017 to procure the S-400 Russian missile system. While expanding capacity, the allies must take into account both the Alliance’s defense priorities and Ukraine’s needs as it continues to face up against Russian aggression.

Turkey can play a crucial role in helping expand the Alliance’s defense capacity through its contributions to collective deterrence and defense. Capabilities being produced by the growing Turkish defense industry cannot be sidelined in the Alliance’s endeavor to enhance deterrence and defense and maintain a technological edge against both state and nonstate adversaries. This will require result-oriented consultations within NATO and especially between European allies and Turkey, conducted with renewed vigor and mutual resolve. To this end, it is high time for the European Union (EU) to revisit its policies that engage only EU members in enhancing Europe’s defense capacity. Today’s challenges require collaboration with non-EU countries, such as Turkey, to the fullest extent.

With terrorism plaguing Turkey’s neighborhood, and with the issue remaining high on Turkey’s agenda, Ankara likely welcomed allies’ commitment (as outlined in the Washington Summit Declaration) to “counter, deter, defend, and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorists and terrorist organizations based on a combination of prevention, protection, and denial measures with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.” If allies align their perceptions of the threat to Turkey posed by the PKK and its affiliates by including, for instance, deterrence and defensive measures against the threat in the regional defense plan for Southern Europe, this would help ease the friction on this major issue and help erase the Turkish society’s negative perceptions of NATO allies.

The Washington Summit Declaration also included a reference to the 1936 Montreux Convention. While some Turkish observers have oddly argued the reference is ill-intentioned, it is actually a major outcome for Turkey, as the allies reaffirmed their commitments to “regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region.” The communiqué also welcomed the joint endeavor of three littoral allies (Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania) to launch the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Group.

Finally, with the global order at stake—due to Russia’s aggression, China’s growing global influence, and threats to security including terrorism—it has become vitally important to maintain and increase cooperation with southern neighborhood countries. The Alliance recognized this importance at the Washington summit, when it committed to taking a new approach toward its “southern neighborhood.” As part of that approach, the NATO secretary general appointed a new special representative for the southern neighborhood to coordinate NATO’s efforts in that neighborhood. Turkey could play a positive role in improving ties between the Alliance and the southern neighborhood by leveraging the linguistic, kinship, religious, and cultural ties it has with other countries. Turkey could also mobilize opportunities that it has in being part of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Organization of Turkic States, and in working with the Gulf Cooperation Council and African Union.

The Alliance has once again proven its relevance and value in protecting and defending the Euro-Atlantic area. As it continues to work to keep the Euro-Atlantic area safe, secure, and stable, Turkey has an important role to play.

Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a retired career ambassador with forty years of experience in international security and defense affairs. Formerly, he served in the Turkish Foreign Ministry and served as Turkey’s ambassador to NATO from 2013 to 2018.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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To deter Russia, NATO must adapt its nuclear sharing program

Michael John Williams — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 18:22:17 +0000

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s frequent nuclear saber-rattling to deter allied assistance to Kyiv have revived discussions about NATO’s nuclear deterrence to a degree not seen in four decades. “Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security,” NATO allies reaffirmed earlier this month in their Washington summit communiqué. But the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture, especially in Eastern Europe, remains inadequate.

To enhance the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence and counter Russia’s nuclear threats, the United States should expand nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO to allies such as Poland, Finland, and Romania. The United States should also expand the presence of medium-range US ground-based dual-capable missile systems in Europe. Connected to these changes, NATO should stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which is limiting the Alliance’s freedom and which Moscow has repeatedly violated. Only by expanding its approach to nuclear sharing can the Alliance adequately improve its deterrence posture and counter Russia’s nuclear blackmail.

The spread of nuclear weapons was a major concern at the dawn of the Cold War. In 1963, US President John F. Kennedy worried about “a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons” within a decade. NATO’s current nuclear sharing program emerged in the 1960s as Washington sought to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and two other pressing challenges: bilateral relationships across Europe and the defense of Western European NATO allies. Of particular concern to the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union, was West Germany’s desire for some sort of access to the nuclear deterrent at the heart of NATO’s defense strategy.

US efforts originally focused on a “hardware” solution to this dilemma known as the Multilateral Force, which would have created a fleet carrying Polaris A-3 missiles under NATO command. But once Washington realized Soviet opposition to this arrangement would also kill the much-desired Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Johnson administration switched to a “software” approach based on training and consultation with allies—what is now referred to as “nuclear sharing” within NATO. Under this arrangement US B-61 nuclear weapons are stored in secure locations in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The weapons are under US custody and control to maintain compliance with the NPT.

In the event of a nuclear war, a nuclear mission by NATO allies can only occur with explicit approval from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, along with authorization by the US president and UK prime minister. France remains outside the nuclear consultation mechanism with its own sovereign nuclear force.

NATO’s current nuclear sharing policy, which has been detailed in various publications, is based on layers encapsulated in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, the post-2012 NATO summit declarations, and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. The doctrine deliberately avoids specificity when it comes to qualifying circumstances for nuclear weapon use.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas has prompted NATO to reconsider the Alliance’s previous inattention to its nuclear deterrent. The 2016 Warsaw Summit signaled this change, but despite the Alliance speaking more publicly about the nuclear issue and signaling more clearly about its nuclear exercise (Steadfast Noon), the bulk of the balancing efforts have focused on conventional forces. The problem with this, as Simond de Galbert and Jeffrey Rathke note, is that conventional parity is “unrealistic and costly” and perhaps even “escalatory.”

Making matters worse for NATO were Russia’s violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. Although disputed by the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reportedly deployed missiles (9M729) with a range of 2,500 kilometers in Mozdok, North Ossetia, and near Moscow, which was a gross violation of the treaty, placing NATO’s eastern and northern allies under direct threat. In response, the United States withdrew from the INF treaty in 2019, a move that NATO allies supported.

Three years later, in 2022, the Alliance once again increased its signaling on the nuclear deterrent in its Strategic Concept, saying that it would “take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission.” The following year, the Alliance announced further modernization of NATO’s nuclear capability at its Vilnius summit. This modernization of NATO nuclear capability is facilitated through the renewal of national forces in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as upgrades to European dual-capable aircraft. For current nuclear sharing allies, the old B-61 gravity bombs, which number around one hundred, will be replaced by the advanced B61-12. These are new weapons utilizing existing warheads and the replacement does not represent an increase in the overall number of US warheads.

To date, despite modernization and stronger signaling, NATO’s nuclear posture remains stagnant. To improve the Alliance’s deterrence posture, the United States and its allies should take two steps: expand current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward and deploy land-based US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Expanding current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward will require fully breaking with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which Moscow has torn to shreds. Several allies refuse to abandon under the mistaken notion that it somehow provides a road back to peace. In practice, this has meant that the Alliance has focused on rotating conventional forces in Eastern Europe to stay within the spirit of the Founding Act.

But it is Russia, not NATO, that has destabilized Europe. Time and again, the Kremlin has blatantly ignored the Founding Act. There should be no illusions that there is a road back, and heeding the spirit of the act while Russia wages a brutal, illegal war against Ukraine and engages in political warfare against NATO allies including the United States is foolish.

Balancing Russia with conventional forces in places such as the Baltics is simply an attempt at reassurance rather than an actual effective deterrence and defense strategy. Equally ineffectual would be relying just on F-35 combat aircraft in bases already storing US nuclear weapons in Europe.

The only adequate solution is to respond to Russian moves in a tit-for-tat manner that George Bunn and Rodger Payne call an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Only in responding to the Kremlin in a manner that inflicts a real price can Washington bring about eventual cooperation from the Kremlin. The United States can do this by continually raising the stakes to a point where Russia views cooperation, rather than competition, as the best solution. Given the economic strength of the United States, and nuclear allies France and Britain, it would be logical for them to impose increasing costs on Russia through expanded nuclear sharing.

Moreover, the Pentagon recently announced that it would send Tomahawk, SM-6, and developmental hypersonic missiles to Germany in 2026. This is a good start, but again it does not impose a high enough price on Russian actions and a broader deployment should be considered for two reasons. First, Russia has deployed reciprocal technologies, and the current US deterrent is inadequate. Second, as noted above, the deployment of US ground-based dual-capable missile systems to NATO allies could be used as a bargaining chip to influence Russian behavior—in effect, escalating to deescalate. While this last point may not be appreciated by all advocates of expanding NATO’s deterrent, if it results in a decrease in Russian tactical nuclear deployments, it may be worth the trade if it elicits cooperation.

The United States should take a page out of the new Russian deterrent playbook, which sees little distinction between peacetime and wartime, instead favoring persistent engagement with the enemy across a range of capabilities as part of overall deterrence. Putin has time and again played Washington and its European allies, believing that they are too scared of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons to push back against his threats. Only by responding in kind may Washington find the Kremlin perhaps willing to listen.

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

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Paris Olympics: Ukrainian dedicates medal to athletes killed by Russia

Mark Temnycky — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 17:22:56 +0000

Ukrainian fencing star Olga Kharlan won her country’s first medal at the 2024 Paris Olympics on July 29, taking bronze in the women’s saber event. In an emotionally charged statement, Kharlan dedicated her medal to all the Ukrainian athletes “who couldn’t come here because they were killed by Russia.” According to the Ukrainian authorities, a total of 487 Ukrainian athletes have been killed as a result of Russia’s invasion, including numerous former Olympians and future Olympic hopefuls.

Kharlan’s Olympic victory has additional significance for Ukraine as she almost missed out on participating in Paris altogether due to her principled stand over the Russian invasion of her homeland. During the 2023 World Fencing Championship, Kharlan refused to shake hands with a Russian opponent in protest over the war, offering instead to tap blades. The Russian declined this offer and staged a protest of her own, leading to Kharlan’s disqualification and making it virtually impossible for her to take part in the 2024 Olympic Games.

The incident sparked a heated debate over the role of politics in sport and the continued participation of Russian athletes in international events at a time when Russia is conducting Europe’s largest military invasion since World War II. Following a considerable outcry, Kharlan was reinstated and received the personal backing of International Olympic Committee President Thomas Bach, himself a former fencer. Meanwhile, Kharlan’s gesture made her a hero to millions of Ukrainians.

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The controversy over Kharlan’s refusal to shake hands with her Russian opponent has been mirrored elsewhere in the sporting arena, highlighting the complex moral issues facing Ukrainian athletes as they compete internationally while their country is fighting for national survival. Ukrainian tennis star Elina Svitolina in particular has attracted headlines for her decision to avoid handshakes with Russian and Belarusian players.

Some critics have accused Ukrainians of politicizing sport, and have argued against holding individual Russians accountable for crimes committed by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, supporters of Ukrainian protest efforts have noted the Kremlin’s frequent use of sport as a propaganda tool, and have also pointed to the often close links between some Russian athletes and the Putin regime.

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For Ukraine’s Olympic team, participation in this year’s Summer Games is an opportunity to provide their war weary compatriots back home with something to cheer, while also reminding the world of Russia’s ongoing invasion. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, many of Ukraine’s Olympic athletes have had to train in exceptionally difficult conditions. Some have been forced to relocate from areas that have fallen under Russian occupation, while all have grown used to the daily trauma of the war and the regular disruption caused by Russian air raids.

Ahead of the Paris Olympics, Olga Kharlan was widely seen as one of Ukraine’s best medal hopes. Born in Mykolaiv, she has been fencing since the age of ten. Prior to the 2024 Olympics, she had already amassed four Olympic medals in a glittering career that has also seen her win six world titles. The thirty-three-year-old Ukrainian star demonstrated her mental strength during the third place playoff in Paris, overcoming South Korea’s Choi Sebin in a dramatic comeback win.

Thanks to her new bronze medal, Kharlan now shares top spot among Ukraine’s leading Olympians with a total of five medals. She claimed her first medal at the Beijing Olympics in 2008 before securing further honors in 2012 and 2016. However, the Ukrainian star says her success in the French capital stands out. “This medal is totally different,” commented Kharlan in Paris this week. “It’s special because it’s for my country. This is a message to all the world that Ukraine will never give up.”

Mark Temnycky is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

#BalkansDebrief – Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? A Debrief with Ivan Vejvoda

sjones — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 16:30:00 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Does the new EU-Serbia lithium deal undermine democracy? The European Union’s recent memorandum of understanding with Serbia on raw materials has sparked debate across the Balkans. Signed during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit, the MoU revives a controversial lithium mining project, drawing opposition from many Serbians.

In this episode, Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare is joined by Ivan Vejvoda, Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences and Head of Europe’s Futures Project in Vienna, to dissect this complex issue.

Does Mr. Vejvoda share the criticism that the EU and Germany are prioritizing lithium access in Serbia over essential democratic principles like environmental protection, rule of law, and independent media?

With concerns about weak independent institutions and a critical public sphere in Serbia, can the country uphold high environmental and social standards?

How can the EU ensure that such agreements maintain rigorous environmental and social principles?

Could this agreement reduce Serbia’s reliance on China, and what might be the broader geopolitical implications?

Join #BalkansDebrief for an in-depth discussion on the potential impacts of this deal and the geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of the EU in the Western Balkans.

ABOUT #BALKANSDEBRIEF

#BalkansDebrief is an online interview series presented by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and hosted by journalist Ilva Tare. The program offers a fresh look at the Western Balkans and examines the region’s people, culture, challenges, and opportunities.

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Libya is the crucial hub for Moscow’s activities in Africa

Chiara Lovotti, Alissa Pavia — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:32:31 +0000

Over the past decade, Russia’s involvement in Libya is evidence of its realization that it could transition from a marginal power to a significant competitor in the country, and thus in the broader Middle East and North Africa. As Russia became disillusioned by its perception of the West’s actions in Libya as aimed at regime change, it shifted its stance from cooperative to antagonistic. This disillusionment strengthened Russia’s determination to establish a strong presence in the country, exemplified by its deployment of mercenaries to Libya to secure greater power and influence.

Russia’s withdrawal from the Middle East

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end to the Cold War, Russia maintained a strong foothold in the Middle East, recognizing the region’s potential importance to global power dynamics. During the Cold War in particular, Russia maintained its presence by creating allies among those Arab nations that would help it achieve its goal of creating an anti-Western camp, most notably Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, along with Algeria, Yemen, and Sudan. Its relations expanded from diplomatic ties to arms shipments to support for liberation movements such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Soviet influence in the region was most obvious in its support for the Arab states during the Suez Canal Crisis (1956), the Six-Day War (1967), and the Yom Kippur War (1973), conflicts that saw a strong involvement by the United States on the side of Israel.

The 1990s, however, saw a major shift in Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The subsequent economic crisis forced Russia to dramatically scale back its involvement in the region, reducing both military engagement and economic support in order to focus on domestic issues. Additionally, Boris Yeltsin, the then president, saw a window to improve relations with the West. Scaling back Russia’s presence in what had been confrontational states represented one way to resolve tensions at a time when the country was reeling from internal economic turmoil. As a result, Russia played a marginal role in major confrontations such as the First Gulf War (1990–91), the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003–11).

The 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi represented the beginning of the end of Russia’s disengagement from the region. Due to the ongoing rapprochement with the West, Russia’s then president, Dmitry Medvedev, abstained from adopting the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973. This allowed Western intervention in Libya to overthrow the longtime dictator, who had by then turned on his own people. To many experts, Medvedev’s decision not to veto the resolution signaled an important change in Russia’s support of its Arab allies and allowed for a regime change to happen. Among the most notable critics of this action was Vladimir Putin, the then prime minister, who described the West’s subsequent intervention as akin to “medieval calls for crusades.”

The intervention in Libya left an indelible mark on Russian elites, many of whom saw it as emblematic of Western attempts to meddle in foreign countries and impose Western-like values. This threat left Russia feeling disillusioned with the West, which it accused of hypocrisy because of its violations of international law by interfering in Libya. It also left Russia feeling isolated at a time when the United States had promised that a regime change in Libya would not occur, and when Russia-US relations were strong and based on the pursuit of mutual trust. It cemented Russia’s persistent belief in the principle of nonintervention as a means to maintain stability and the status quo in the rules-based order, a belief that it accused the West of not sharing, with the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq and subsequent deposition of Saddam Hussein as an example.

Russian reengagement

Russia’s distrust of the West and recognition of the importance of the Middle East and North Africa region help explain its intervention in Syria in 2015 and in Libya in 2017. Following two decades of relative disengagement from the region, Russia saw a window of opportunity to reassert itself with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the request by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for help. Additionally, the United States’ lack of intervention, underscored by the failure of Barack Obama, the then president, to adhere to his “red line” commitment, cemented Russia’s belief that the United States would not interfere in its quest for increased influence in the area.

The end of two decades of Russian disengagement came with the recapturing of Aleppo from rebel forces in December 2016, thanks to Russian involvement, and Libyan General Khalifa Haftar’s request for help a month earlier. Libya, engulfed in a civil war, saw the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and France aiding Haftar, with Russia emerging as a prominent ally at a time when its presence in the region was becoming more entrenched.

Emboldened by its victories in Syria and the potential to exert influence in the region by supporting another Arab country, Russia began deploying mercenaries to Libya as early as 2018, marking a definitive turning point from the previous two decades of disengagement. From its marginalized position, Russia saw Libya not only as another window of opportunity to reemerge as a great power competing for influence in North Africa but also as a gateway to other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa. With the deployment of troops under the Kremlin’s authority, the days of being second to Western regime change in neighboring regions were over, and the potential for the resurgence of Russian primacy once again became a real prospect.

Russia reemerged as a regional power in the Middle East when Haftar attempted a takeover of Tripoli in 2019, with Russian forces fighting alongside Haftar’s. Egypt and the UAE were also involved, while Qatar and Turkey supported the Government of National Accord forces of Libya’s then prime minister, Fayez al-Sarraj. Libya became a military quagmire for foreign power interferences, with Russia refusing to be the marginal player it had been during the First Gulf War and the US invasion of Iraq. While Haftar’s objective of gaining control of Libya was thwarted by Turkish troops, Russian involvement in the country remained consistent, with around 2,000 mercenary troops permanently stationed in eastern Libya, evidence of Russia’s unabated goal to establish a continued presence.

Ongoing influence

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is keeping the Kremlin largely occupied with redefining its borders to the west. Yet, “Southern missions” have not been downgraded to lesser-scale priorities. On the contrary, some 800 – 1200 mercenaries from Wagner (now called Africa Corps) remain present in Libya, many controlling key oil production facilities and thus positioning the Kremlin to control output from Libya and affect world oil prices. Their continued presence illustrates the Kremlin’s conviction that North Africa and the Middle East is a region of vital importance, with enormous untapped resources that could help Russia’s economy in the long term. It also underscores that Russia is making a strategic bet during a time when the American presence is diminishing and the Chinese presence is growing, asserting itself alongside China as a main power by buying local support through influence and mercenary deployment.

This strategy of Russian reassertion is further exemplified by the ongoing activities of the Africa Corps in the wider Sahel region, where the mercenary group’s control has been well documented and is set to increase. In recent years, the area has been destabilized by numerous coups, creating power vacuums in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Russia and China have moved to fill these voids, seeking to expand their influence as French and American troops have withdrawn. While Western countries focus on short-term diplomatic solutions, Russia appears to be ahead in its strategy, providing military and financial support to nations it considers strategically important.

Indeed, it would be a mistake to frame Russia’s presence in Libya exclusively under its competition with the West. Its presence is driven primarily by national interests, many of which are linked to the continent of Africa. Libya serves as the crucial hub for Moscow’s mission in Africa due to its geographical location and political instability, which favors Russia’s actions. Strategically positioned at the crossroads of Africa and Europe, it provides Russia with a gateway to its operations in Sudan, Chad, Niger, and other Sahel and Central Africa countries, eventually projecting power and influence across these regions. Libya’s ongoing political chaos creates opportunities for Russia to establish footholds through alliances with both local factions and official authorities. This is exemplified by Russia’s support of General Haftar over the past few years and its more recent relations with the government of Tripoli. Not least, the country’s fragmented governance has guaranteed Russia much-needed access to air and naval military bases, especially across Cyrenaica, allowing it to coordinate its military expeditions. By maintaining a strong presence in Libya, Russia is able to pursue its broader geopolitical goals, including defying the West, expanding its military reach, and securing critical resources that are essential to sustain its economy and long-term strategic aspirations.

Chiara Lovotti is an Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) research fellow and scientific coordinator of the Rome MED-Mediterranean Dialogues, the annual flagship event of ISPI and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She is a specialist in Middle Eastern and North African international relations, with a focus on Russia’s foreign policy in the area and associated political and security issues.

Alissa Pavia is associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program. She is responsible for providing research and analysis on North Africa while also expanding the program’s reach with like-minded centers, foundations, and government agencies.

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After anti-migration efforts shrank its influence, Rome needs a new Libya policy

Karim Mezran, Aldo Liga — Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:31:35 +0000

It has been more than thirteen years since the outbreak of the 2011 Libyan revolution and the moment when Italy reluctantly supported the NATO-led intervention that imposed a no-fly zone over Libya purportedly to protect the population from Muammar Gaddafi’s retaliation.

The overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime led to more of a decade of intermittent civil war and conflict, dismantling of state institutions, and rampant kleptocracy, turning Libya into a battleground for competition between external powers. Meanwhile, Italy has seen nine governments since the Libyan revolution. These governments have come to power against a backdrop of political instability and economic uncertainty, the rise in populism and “sovranismo” (sovereignism), and geopolitical tensions in Italy’s eastern and southern neighborhoods. Irrespective of Rome’s different ruling coalitions, the crisis in Libya resulted in a rethink of Italy’s geopolitical posture and strategic orientation toward the North African country, questioning Rome’s approach to international intervention and national priorities, the resources and tools of its foreign policy, and its projection of power over the wider Mediterranean region. The conclusion of the debate has been that a stable Libya is strategically crucial for Italy, for political, security, and economic reasons.

However, the last decade has seen the gradual fading of Rome’s influence over Libya and the downsizing of its ambitions. The political leverage Italy historically possessed in Libya dwindled over the years. How did Italy squander its political capital and credibility in Libya? How could a country with prominent interests and a strong economic interest fail in Libya? The focus on short-term gains over long-term strategy played a pivotal role. Understanding the root causes of this marginalization is crucial for reshaping Italy’s approach to Libya and revitalizing its role in the region.

Migration policies have undermined Rome’s credibility in Libya

Between 2014 and 2017, over six hundred thousand migrants arrived in Italy, most departing from Libyan shores after enduring extensive journeys across Africa. Many suffered violence, forced labor, and sexual exploitation in both formal and informal Libyan detention centers. The migration issue became a focal point in Italian politics for several reasons: from challenges in managing the reception and integration of migrants once they arrived, to political exploitation of unfounded fears about terrorist infiltration and cultural clashes, to concerns about the country’s democratic stability during a period of economic uncertainty.

In 2017, amidst peak concerns about a surge in migrant arrivals and with Italy gearing up for elections, Interior Minister Marco Minniti introduced a new strategy for addressing the Libyan crisis. Stabilizing Libya became not just a priority in itself, but a means to control migration flows and counter transnational threats. Rome engaged extensively: it worked closely with the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj, signing agreements, providing financial aid and technical support, and becoming the first Western nation to reopen its embassy in Tripoli. Italy also established connections with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the east; engaged with southern tribes, cities, and municipalities; and even interacted with less-transparent groups like militias and armed factions, despite their involvement in smuggling and trafficking, which Italian authorities publicly denied but independent investigations corroborated. This approach proved effective as migrant arrivals dropped dramatically from July 2017, as evidenced by arrival data.

Despite changes in leadership and shifting political coalitions in Rome, the core strategy remained consistent even after the Government of National Unity, led by Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, took office in Tripoli in 2021. Italy saw different governments come and go: Giuseppe Conte’s “yellow-green” government (2018–19), Conte’s “yellow-red” government (2019–21), followed by Mario Draghi’s national unity government (2021–22), and now Giorgia Meloni’s leadership since October 2022.

However, new dynamics emerged as migrant departures shifted from the west to the east of Libya in recent years. Rome responded by increasing engagement with eastern Libyan authorities both politically and economically. This shift was highlighted by Haftar’s visit to Rome in May 2023 and a subsequent meeting held by Meloni in Benghazi on May 7.

So far, Italy, along with EU funds, has allocated almost €479 million to the “externalization” of its border to Libya, i.e. the act of empowering foreign actors to stop migrants from reaching Italy. However, this strategy of externalizing migration management—funding patrols and technology, and investing significant political attention and resources—has had significant unintended consequences. By treating militias as interlocutors, even indirectly through recognized institutions or actors with national ambitions, Italy inadvertently empowered and legitimized ambiguous players. This has altered local power balances and undermined prospects for peace in Libya. Since the implementation of this policy, evidence has emerged of its destabilizing effects and distortions of local equilibria, influenced by Italy’s perception of threats and insecurity stemming from migration policies.

Italy’s leverage of foreign actors was not aimed at stabilizing Libya but rather at addressing Italian perceptions of insecurity

Despite its interactions with local actors, Italy has not been among the most influential players shaping Libya’s dynamics. Other countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Russia, France, and Qatar have exploited Libya’s internal divisions to advance their own domestic and international agendas. This interference has spoiled prospects for the establishment of stable Libyan institutions, state reconstruction, and durable peace.

In this complex scenario, Rome has struggled to effectively stabilize Libya or facilitate consensus among Libyan factions based on international law and the desires of the Libyan people. Instead, Italy has mainly offered symbolic support for UN efforts without substantial mediation efforts or concrete peace proposals following the underwhelming results of the Palermo conference, a two-day conference in November 2018 intended to advance the UN-sponsored stabilization process for Libya.

In the complex web of Libyan, regional, and international agendas, Rome has primarily used foreign relationships to advance its migratory policies and address minor issues. For instance, with the UAE, one of the most involved foreign players shaping Libyan internal dynamics through its strong support to Haftar, Italy leveraged its influence to secure the release of fishermen arbitrarily detained by Haftar’s forces. Last year, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani visited the UAE twice, with migration from Libya featuring prominently in his discussions. The UAE’s president, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, then took part in the International Conference on Development and Migration in Rome, marking the start of the “Rome Process.”

Even with Ankara, Rome sought to align on its priorities in Libya. In 2020, Turkey emerged as a decisive actor in countering Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, supporting western Libyan authorities, under both the Sarraj and Dabaiba governments. Despite initial concerns about Ankara’s growing influence exerted over Tripolitania, and despite political competition and overlapping economic interests, Rome sought Turkey’s “solidarity” on the migration issue, which emerged as a central point of recent Italy-Turkey bilateral meetings.

Interestingly, Turkey’s recent imposition of visas for Bangladesh citizens entering the country was cited as an example of cooperation between Rome and Ankara. In 2022, more than 15,200 Bangladeshis arrived in Italy, with many transiting through Libya, about a third of whom travelled through Turkey. To avoid tensions with Ankara, Rome refrained from taking a more assertive stance on other contentious strategic issues, such as energy resource exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and maritime borders.

Another significant aspect of the Rome-Ankara entente involves Egypt, another key player in Libya. Rome leveraged recent regional diplomatic efforts to establish a triangular dialogue with Egypt and Turkey on Libyan issues, aiming to bridge differences and engage major supporters of the two rival power centers in Libya’s west and east.

Ambiguity between western and eastern authorities marginalized Rome’s ambitions in Libya

To control migration flows, Rome has blurred the lines between Libya’s western and eastern authorities. Initially a staunch supporter of the Skhirat Agreement, which led to the establishment of the GNA at the beginning of 2016, Italy found itself dealing with a divided country as Libya remained split between competing centres of power. This situation prompted then Italian minister of interior Marco Minniti to establish connections with Haftar during his tenure, integrating him into Italy’s new approach to the Libyan crisis.

This trend was further strengthened under the following two governments led by Conte (2018–21). Haftar’s presence at the Palermo conference in 2018, originally aimed at reconciling Libya’s factions, was seen more as a personal gesture to Conte than a genuine effort to forge an agreement with Tripoli.

Italy’s ambiguity peaked in April 2019 when Haftar attacked Tripoli. Conte declared that “Italy is neither in favor of Sarraj nor of Haftar, but of the Libyan people.” When Sarraj requested Italy to send troops and support, Rome did not officially respond, prompting Tripoli to seek and ultimately received crucial support from Ankara. Turkey’s military backing of the GNA gave Ankara significant political and economic influence over Tripolitania, sidelining Italy and diminishing its presence, role, and ambitions in Libya.

As another sign of Italy’s waning influence, the Bilateral Assistance and Support Mission in Libya (MIASIT), which includes the “Hippocrates” Task Force and the military field hospital in Misrata, has been downsized.

Rethinking a new Libya policy for Italy

Over the past decade, Italy’s influence over the Libyan crisis has steadily declined. This decline can be attributed to two main factors: first, Italy prioritized managing migration over consistent efforts to stabilize Libya. Second, Rome played an ambiguous role by engaging with both western and eastern Libyan authorities, which complicated its diplomatic and strategic approach.

Today, Italy seems willing to revitalize its role in North Africa (as well as in the Sahel and the rest of the continent) with the “Piano Mattei” (Mattei Plan), named after the founder of Italy’s ENI energy group. The late Enrico Mattei was known for advocating fairer relations across the Mediterranean. A steering committee has been formed, and initial pilot projects in nine African countries are set to begin soon. Notably, Libya is not among these countries, although during Meloni’s visit to Tripoli in May 2024, memoranda of understanding on health, education, and sport were signed under the Mattei Plan’s framework. However, merely enhancing development cooperation is insufficient to reestablish Italy’s influence in Libya.

To achieve this, the Italian government needs to fundamentally rethink its approach to migration. This involves moving away from polarizing political debates and shifting focus from securitizing migration to recognizing its political, demographic, and economic potential for Italy’s future. Instead of solely emphasizing police and border controls, Italy should centralize discussions on these broader impacts.

In Libya, this shift would diminish the economic power and political legitimacy that Italy unintentionally bolstered among various local and regional “spoilers of peace.” Moreover, Italy’s reduced dependence on Libyan energy resources—marked by the lowest natural gas exports in thirteen years in 2023—should embolden Italian leadership. This could open up opportunities to propose innovative pathways to peace and national reconciliation with its southern neighbor.

Italy and Libya share deep historic ties. Rome played a crucial role in Libya’s international rehabilitation in the 1990s and has a longstanding tradition of political, economic, social, and cultural connections with Libyan counterparts. This relationship reached a symbolic peak when Italy decided to reopen its embassy in Tripoli in 2017, despite the exodus of many other international actors. Today, it’s time for Italy to make up for lost opportunities and strengthen its ties with Libya.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. Mezran holds a PhD in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, a JD in comparative law from the University of Rome (La Sapienza), an LLM in comparative law from the George Washington University, an MA in Arab studies from Georgetown University, and a BA in management from Hiram College.

Aldo Liga is a research fellow for the Middle East and North Africa Centre at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. He is also a PhD candidate at the Institut Français de Géopolitique (University of Paris 8). He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the “Cesare Alfieri” (University of Florence) and a master’s degree in international security from Sciences Po Paris.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What is Germany’s approach to climate policy? | A Debrief from Lukas Köhler MdB

nlawler — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 17:06:03 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

Climate change cost estimates by 2049 will be close to $40 trillion per year for countries such as Germany and the United States. How is Germany managing both the scale of the climate problem and related economic costs? What is the German government doing to get citizens onboard to support climate change policies? What is the role of technological innovation in Germany when it comes to combatting climate change? And what is Germany doing to decarbonize its industrial sector? What role can a post-war Ukraine play in the green energy sector in Europe, and what are the possibilities for bilateral energy trade between Ukraine and Germany?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Carol Schaeffer sits down with Dr. Lukas Köhler, member of the German Bundestag, to discuss Germany’s approach to climate policy and green energy opportunities.

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The EU needs to adapt its fiscal framework to the threat of war

Piotr Arak — Mon, 29 Jul 2024 14:15:35 +0000

This year, the fiscal rules entrenched in the European Union (EU) treaties are coming back with force. Debt and deficit rules, which were frozen in 2020 to allow public spending to soften the economic blow of the COVID-19 pandemic, were reintroduced this year. Although the rules have been revised, they are still lacking in one crucial respect—they do not prioritize military expenditure over other types of spending. Without further revisions, the fiscal rules will constrain member states from increasing their defense budgets even as Russian aggression threatens European security.

With EU countries now facing greater fiscal constraints, the bloc needs to either further amend them or find a way to have more common European debt. Only then will EU member states be able to make the increases in defense spending that are necessary to bolster security on the continent and deter further aggression from Moscow.

The EU’s fiscal rules

The EU is a partial monetary union (not every state uses the euro) and is not a fiscal union. Twenty of its twenty-seven member states use the euro, but they maintain their own public accounts. The EU’s budget amounts to just 1 percent of the bloc’s entire gross domestic product (GDP). Brussels levies few taxes and spends little for the bloc, and that relatively small budget is the sum of the EU’s fiscal union. The real power of the EU resides in the supervision of the member states’ fiscal policies.

This is why some countries with high levels of debt or deficit—France, Italy, Poland (which spends 4.1 percent of its GDP on the military), and several others—might be under special supervision by the European Commission under the Excessive Debt Procedure (EDP). The EDP requires the country in question to provide a plan of fiscal consolidation that it will follow, as well as deadlines for its achievement. Countries that do not follow up on the recommendations may be fined. Of course, many EU countries are in debt, and most of them run a deficit even in good times; in bad times, they just run even bigger deficits. The European Commission will take into account additional military expenditures in the assessment, but only on military equipment, not on increasing the number of soldiers.

In 2023, the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the EU reached 82 percent, and it was even higher in the eurozone, at 89 percent (with France exceeding 110 percent and Italy going beyond 137 percent). The highest deficits were recorded in Italy (7.4 percent of GDP), Hungary (6.7 percent), and Romania (6.6 percent). Eleven EU member states had deficits higher than 3 percent of GDP. In comparison, the United States has a debt of around 123 percent of GDP and ran a deficit of 6.3 percent in 2023.

The original EU fiscal rules implemented thresholds for each country’s deficit and debt at 3 percent and 60 percent of GDP, respectively, and they required cutting national excess debt-to-GDP ratios by one-twentieth each year. These restrictive rules contributed to the eurozone’s prolonged recession from 2011 to 2013, and some rules have since been relaxed. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the bloc activated its general escape clause, which allows for deviations from the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact in times of crisis. Moving forward, however, the rules will likely turn restrictive again, though less so than the old ones. In April 2024, EU institutions agreed on a consensual change to the fiscal framework, making the path back to a debt of 60 percent GDP and a deficit below 3 percent of GDP a matter of negotiations between each member state’s government and the European Commission.

Treat military spending differently

Some EU countries, such as France and Poland, argue for military expenditures to be treated differently, as some member states have different needs in the current geopolitical climate. Not all EU member states are in NATO; for example, Austria is neutral. But under the current EU rules, the fiscal space for military expenditures is one-size-fits-all. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, defense expenditures incurred that year were within the escape clause, but this does not address the underfunding of the military within the EU.

In 2024, the average military expenditures of NATO and EU members is expected to reach 2.2 percent of GDP, with a group of countries far below the threshold of 2 percent. More importantly, these are big economies with relatively large armies, such as Italy (1.49 percent of GDP), Belgium (1.3 percent), and Spain (1.28 percent). All of these countries have high levels of debt and issues with deficits. Germany is set to reach 2.12 percent of GDP on defense spending this year, but it is held back by its constitutional debt brake, which does not allow for an annual deficit higher than 0.35 percent of GDP. This has created tensions within Germany’s coalition government, since spending more on weapons might mean having to spend less on climate change mitigation and social services.

Meanwhile, the United States spends 3.38 percent of its GDP on defense. To put that into perspective, the total expenditure of all European NATO members is $380 billion, almost three times lower than that of the United States (nearly $968 billion). At the same time, Russian military spending this year is estimated to reach $140 billion, or 7.1 percent of its GDP.

Common debt

European capitals need to treat the need for a stronger military in Europe as urgent and serious, but their accountants in the finance departments are not going to make it easy. Unless Brussels changes its fiscal rules to allow for greater defense spending, common EU debt might be the only solution.

The bloc can issue EU debt outside of national fiscal rules, which it did for the first time in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Some analysts argue for common debt for a European air defense system, which is a good starting point. EU debt funding could include spending on the further development of European defense industrial capacities. EU leaders such as former Estonian Prime Minister and future EU High Representative Kaja Kallas, French President Emmanuel Macron, and European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton have supported some version of common debt for defense purposes.

Utilizing common debt should not aim solely to expand the power of the European Commission, as some critics in various capitals fear. Instead, it should transform this measure from a temporary crisis-management tool into a standard policy instrument, enabling Europe to develop a meaningful defense industrial strategy, which has been lacking since the EU’s inception. After the failed attempt to establish a European Defence Community in the 1950s, the European project has primarily focused on economic issues. Unfortunately, it’s time to revisit that discussion.

Europeans must now prepare for a challenging geopolitical environment by investing in European defense, whether through changes in fiscal rules or by taking on more European debt.

Whichever path forward the EU chooses, it must do so quickly. There’s no time to waste.

Piotr Arak is the chief economist at VeloBank Poland.

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What French economic policy may look like after the Olympics

Charles Lichfield and Gustavo Romero — Fri, 26 Jul 2024 17:12:25 +0000

The snap parliamentary election called in June by French President Emmanuel Macron produced no absolute majority for any of the country’s three dominant political blocs. There is now widespread uncertainty about who could serve as prime minister. Many looked to the broad-left New Popular Front (NFP), which has the most seats, to put forward a candidate. After almost three weeks of infighting they finally agreed on Wednesday to put forward Lucie Castets, a little-known tax fraud official and public servant.

Mere moments after the announcement, Macron declared that he would not name a prime minister until after the conclusion of the Olympic Games in August. Until then, a caretaker government under Prime Minister Gabriel Attal will remain in place. Still, the potential of an NFP prime minister spooked the markets, as the party’s economic policies would trigger even more deficit spending. The spread of France’s ten-year bond yield against Germany’s increased by five basis points, reflecting a loss in confidence in the French government’s finances.

But even after the Olympics, Castets is unlikely to be tapped to form a government. Instead, the parties of the center, center right, and center left will have to endure a tedious drill from which France’s constitution has spared them for decades: negotiations.

The moderate “Republican Right” (DR) appears ready to play ball and recently put forward a set of policy proposals complete with two red lines that will inform the negotiations. But a deal including the Republicans would not be enough: The centrists would need the more moderate forces from the NFP (read: excluding the far left) to support—or at least not oppose—a government for the time being.

The negotiations behind an arrangement that would bring Communists, Gaullist Republicans, Greens, and centrists under the same banner is likely to be every bit as complicated as one would imagine. But in the likely case that the NFP fails to clear the bar for government formation, this would become the only option. The question then becomes: What could this political hodgepodge compromise on?

Synchronized steering

Despite having lost the legislative election, the Macron-supporting center block will not concede much on any of its policy laurels. Reversing the controversial and hard-won increase of the retirement age from sixty-two to sixty-four, for example, will be off the table.

The center right has also set explicit red lines: that there be no tax increases and that fiscal reform not hurt pensioners.

Taking into account these constraints and the need to manage France’s strained fiscal situation, there is not much negotiating flexibility left. Nevertheless, the centrist coalition must consider some concessions and secure certain inducements if they hope to bring the Republicans, Socialists, and Greens onside.

Green reindustrialization

The adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the United States prompted pushback from many European states. French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire and his German counterpart Robert Habeck claimed the legislation was not compatible with World Trade Organization principles and called for the “defense” and green reindustrialization of the European Union (EU).

In July 2023 the French National Assembly unanimously agreed on the creation of a “national strategy” for green industry, which lays out a plan for the 2023-2030 period. One week later, a Green Industry Law was approved at first reading and later adopted in October 2023. Like the IRA, France’s Green Industry Law seeks to meet environmental objectives (reducing forty-one million tons of CO2 by 2030, or 1 percent of France’s total footprint) and economic ones (positioning France as a leader in green and strategic technologies, while reindustrializing the country). As part of the law, the Green Industry Investment Tax Credit (C31V) was established to encourage companies to carry out industrial projects involving batteries, wind power, solar panels, and heat pumps. The C31V is expected to generate €23 billion in investment and directly create forty thousand jobs by 2030.

While in opposition, the Socialists and Greens voted against the law and other left parties abstained. All cited the lack of specificity and actual green commitments in the industrialization-centered bill. However, if the centrist bloc offered to revisit the bill or introduce new, more targeted standards and legislation, it could serve as a powerful inducement to win the Greens and Socialists’ support. Given that this French counter to the IRA involves private-sector mobilization and promises reindustrialization, it has the added benefit of being (just about) fiscally feasible and acceptable to the right.

Rewarding effort

The thirty-five-hour work week was first introduced into French law by Lionel Jospin’s Socialist-led government in 2000, and it has since become a cornerstone of the left’s platform. However, the fact that most employees still work above the legal thirty-five-hour limit has led to a system where they can take half days or full days off to compensate for extra hours.

In August of 2022, Macron’s government successfully passed an amendment that allowed firms to buy these hours back from their employees, essentially transforming them into paid overtime.

As part of the center right’s current proposal, the group is seeking additional flexibility in the thirty-five-hour work week by reducing taxation on overtime, on top of cutting overall social charges paid by employees. The center right has been fairly nonspecific about how much these would be cut, most likely to avoid alienating the left. However, the main way the Republicans propose to fund this—a cap on unemployment benefits at 70 percent of the minimum wage—would be a red flag for the parties which could otherwise be lured out of the NFP.

Balancing budgets

France’s large budget deficit, which in 2023 soared to 5.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), raises the stakes. In May, S&P Global Ratings downgraded the country’s long-term credit rating from “AA” to “AA-” and the European Commission reprimanded France for exceeding the EU’s deficit cap of 3 percent of GDP. Today, the Commission formally opened proceedings against France and six other violating countries, directing them to immediately take corrective measures to rectify their fiscal deficits or else face financial sanctions from Brussels.

Both S&P and the Commission forecast positive economic growth, but emphasize the urgent need for France to address its public finances. Growth alone will not be enough to overcome the fiscal hurdles ahead.

Reconciling the center right’s rejection of any tax hikes and the need to provide parties of the left with guarantees on social spending for them to abandon the NFP will be very challenging indeed. But there is some room for compromise.

Shortly after Macron’s arrival at the Élysée Palace for his first mandate in 2017, he moved to slash France’s contentious wealth tax, replacing it with a real estate tax. A flat tax of 30 percent on capital gains was also introduced. The decision came as part of Macron’s pro-business platform in a bid to curb the flight of French millionaires from the country, and it drew sharp criticism from political opponents who labeled him “president of the rich.”

The centrist bloc could offer to reintroduce a progressive taxation scheme on capital gains. In the spirit of France’s goal of green reindustrialization, the centrists could move to keep the favorable 30 percent flat tax for green technologies to encourage investment, while introducing a progressive scheme in other sectors. If they do decide to favor green industrial investment, the tax benefit would have to apply to capital gains accrued throughout the EU—not only France—so as to not violate single market rules.

Sticking the landing

Negotiations will be more of a marathon than a sprint. Macron is unable to call for new elections for at least the next twelve months, so until then, this parliament will have to find a way to work together.

After the formation of a government—which Macron has indicated will not begin until after the Olympics—the next major challenge facing French policymakers is to pass the yearly budget by December. This grueling event will be made all the more difficult by today’s unprecedentedly divided National Assembly.

Whichever government emerges from current negotiations will risk having its spending plan voted down immediately. Fortunately for France, the constitution contains a proviso that would allow the state to carry on. Essentially, if the Assembly cannot agree on a new budget, the plan approved for the previous fiscal year will roll over.

However, recycling this year’s budget would still create a projected deficit of 4.4 percent. This would again violate the EU’s 3 percent cap and fall well short of the deficit reduction the markets—the ultimate referees of how France is faring—are hoping to see.

Charles Lichfield is the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray senior fellow of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center

Gustavo Romero is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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#AtlanticDebrief – What did the RNC mean for Europe? | A Debrief from Nico Lange

nlawler — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 20:39:57 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

On July 18, former US President Donald Trump accepted his party’s nomination as the Republican presidential nominee for the November election together with his running mate, J.D. Vance. Both politicians share an isolationist vision for US foreign policy that could have serious implications for European security.

What might a potential Republican presidency mean for Europe, especially regarding support for Ukraine? Which lessons might China take from a weakened transatlantic security partnership? Should Europeans be more prepared for a potential second term of former president Trump?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Rachel Rizzo sits down with Nico Lange, Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference and the Center for European Policy Analysis, to discuss his impressions from the Republican National Convention and implications of a potential Trump presidency on European security.

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The West should articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus now

Richard Cashman — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 20:12:28 +0000

Belarus is often overlooked by the Euro-Atlantic policy-making community, with many taking for granted the relative stability represented by Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka during his three decades in power. In reality, however, today’s Belarus may soon reach a fork in the road that will force its people to choose between European democracy and Eurasian autocracy. The choice they make will have significant implications for Euro-Atlantic security. Articulating the possibility of a European future for Belarusians now can help shape their thoughts and actions when the time comes.

During the 1990s, some Russians claimed the dictatorial Lukashenka model was exactly what the troubled and oligarchic Russian Federation needed. Although always opposed to the Belarusian language and broadly aligned with Moscow, Lukashenka tenaciously maintained his independence when Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia, skillfully extracting benefits from both the Kremlin and the West.

This independence was severely undermined by the massive grassroots protests that erupted in Belarus in the wake of the country’s 2020 presidential vote. Large numbers of Belarusians believed reformist opposition candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had won the election and took to the streets to protest. Lukashenka only survived thanks to Russian support. This left him far more reliant on the Kremlin and significantly reduced his room for maneuver.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarusian territory to launch his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it soon became clear that things were not going according to Putin’s plan. Russia’s heavy losses during the initial weeks of the invasion restored some of Lukashenka’s independence, while disquiet in his own armed forces and some quarters of the security services convinced him that further direct involvement in Russia’s war would be folly. Since then, Lukashenka has provided training and equipment to Russian forces, but has resisted pressure to join the invasion.

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Putin remains eager to exploit Belarus’s resources and strategic position to threaten Kyiv once more and to target Western supplies entering Ukraine from Poland. Belarus could also play an important role in the future, if Russia seeks to intensify hybrid hostilities against the Baltic states or to launch a direct attack. This looks unlikely as long as Lukashenka remains in power. The Belarusian dictator may therefore represent a status quo which fundamentally favors Ukraine and its allies more than Russia.

If Putin continues to fail in his immediate objective of occupying all of Ukraine’s Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, there is a real possibility that he will ultimately lose patience with Lukashenka and move to either replace him or otherwise compel Belarus to join the invasion. Moreover, it is almost certain that Putin will attempt to secure Belarusian human and material resources if Lukashenka dies before him.

Many Belarusians already know what would await them if Putin fully incorporated and militarized their country. They would experience an oligarchic raiding of businesses, covert or overt mobilization, and the extinguishing of the traditionally Western-looking aspect that is an important part of Belarusian national identity.

In contrast, if Belarusians manage to maintain their independence and empower a reformist leadership, they can begin moving towards European integration, with European Union membership an eventual possibility. In this context, it is vital that all Belarusians, including political elites along with members of the military and security forces, receive assurances that they have a viable alternative to the Kremlin vision for their country’s future.

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Articulating a European future for Belarus does not need to entail talk of NATO membership. Instead, it should involve acknowledging the possibility of removing sanctions, enhancing access to EU travel, education, and capital, and eventually embracing Belarus’s modest population of 9.2 million people under democratic leadership and after deep structural reforms.

From a purely practical standpoint, European integration would not be an insurmountable task. Lukashenka’s repressive regime has actually resulted in relatively good infrastructure conditions for Belarusians, especially in rural areas, compared to most other former Soviet republics. Belarus boasts a highly educated and comparatively young demographic. Prior to the 2020 protests, the country had burgeoning IT and entrepreneurial sectors.

A Belarus free of Russian military entanglements and increasingly aligned with the Euro-Atlantic community instead of the developing Russia-China-Iran-North Korea axis of autocracies would contribute significantly to the security of Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic states. A Belarusian geopolitical pivot toward the West could also encourage transformation inside Russia itself and compel more Russians to embrace a post-imperial identity.

Failure to articulate the possibility of a European future for Belarus leaves the Euro-Atlantic community at risk of being caught off guard without a plan when Belarus does, indeed, reach its fork in the road. This may come sooner than many are prepared for. By taking steps now to engage with Belarusian society, the EU can strengthen its own foreign policy credentials as a major geopolitical player, mitigate against the risk of a rapid Russian militarization of Belarus, and set the stage for a cooperative relationship with Belarusians in the years to come.

Richard Cashman is a nonresident fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Putin is convinced he can outlast the West and win in Ukraine

Mykola Bielieskov — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 18:16:56 +0000

The annual NATO summit in early July resulted in a range of encouraging statements and practical measures in support of Ukraine. However, this widely anticipated gathering in Washington DC failed to produce the kind of decisive steps that could convince Vladimir Putin to end his invasion.

It was already clear some time before the NATO summit that there would be no serious discussion of a membership invitation for Ukraine. Instead, the emphasis would be on improving the existing partnership, with alliance leaders preserving as much room to maneuver as possible when dealing with the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Post-summit coverage focused on the official communique declaring Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to future NATO membership, but not everyone saw the wording of the joint statement as a breakthrough. Indeed, some skeptics interpreted this latest rephrasing of NATO’s open door for Ukraine as an indication that the alliance is still no closer to agreeing on a specific time frame regarding Ukrainian membership.

The summit was not a complete anticlimax, of course. A number of countries pledged additional air defense systems to Ukraine, meeting one of Kyiv’s most urgent requests to help protect the country from Russian bombardment. There were announcements regarding the imminent arrival of the first F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine, while additional mechanisms to coordinate weapons deliveries and enhance cooperation were unveiled.

NATO members also agreed in Washington to allocate forty billion euros for Ukrainian military aid next year. While this figure is certainly significant, it falls far below the level of funding needed to ensure Ukrainian victory. This is not a new issue. While the collective GDP of the West dwarfs Russia’s, Western leaders have yet to mobilize their financial resources to provide Ukraine with an overwhelming military advantage. As a consequence, it is the much smaller Russian economy that is currently producing more artillery shells than the entire Western world.

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The modest progress made at the NATO summit reflects a lack of urgency that has hampered the Western response ever since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion. There is little chance this hesitancy will provoke a change of heart in Moscow. On the contrary, Russian policymakers are far more likely to regard the West’s current posture as proof that the war is going according to plan.

Unlike the West, the Kremlin has a clear and coherent vision for a future Russian victory in Ukraine. This involves gradually wearing down Ukrainian battlefield resistance with relentless high intensity combat along the front lines of the war, while extensively bombing civilian infrastructure and population centers across the country.

In parallel to these military measures, Russia will also continue to conduct diverse influence operations targeting Ukrainian and Western audiences, with the goal of undermining morale and sowing division. This will leave Ukraine increasingly isolated and exhausted, leading eventually to collapse and capitulation.

The Russian authorities believe Ukraine will struggle to maintain the attention of its Western allies, and are encouraged by growing signs that many in the West now view the invasion as a stalemate. Putin himself appears to be more confident that ever that the West will lose interest in the war, and expects Western leaders to reluctantly pressure Kyiv into a negotiated settlement on Russian terms.

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Since the invasion began nearly two and a half years ago, Western leaders have failed to demonstrate the kind of resolve that would force Putin to revise his expectations. Instead of flooding Kyiv with the very latest tanks, jets, drones, and missiles, Ukraine’s partners have consistently slow-walked military aid while imposing absurd restrictions on the use of Western weapons.

The West’s messaging has been equally inadequate. Rather than publicly committing themselves to Ukrainian victory, Western leaders have spoken of preventing Ukrainian defeat and of standing with Ukraine “for as long as it takes.” This is not the language of strength that Putin understands.

Confronted by continued signs of Western indecisiveness, the Russian dictator is now escalating his demands. His most recent peace proposal envisaged Ukraine ceding all lands already occupied by Russia along with significant additional territory not currently under Kremlin control. There can be little doubt that he remains as committed as ever to the complete surrender and subjugation of Ukraine.

Putin knows he could not hope to match the collective might of the democratic world, but this does not discourage him. Instead, he fully expects continued Western weakness to hand Russia an historic victory in Ukraine. Unless the West is finally prepared to translate its vast financial, military, and technical potential into war-winning support for Ukraine, he may be proved right.

Dispatch from Paris: The Olympics of hope begin on the River Seine

Frederick Kempe — Thu, 25 Jul 2024 16:05:00 +0000

PARIS—The City of Light this week has the feel of a grand, open-air, anticipatory stage for a Summer Olympics designed as bold, unique, and all-embracing. It will be a celebration of style, of the athletes, of the city itself, and—less intentionally—of democracy’s messy and inspiring resilience.

The Opening Ceremony tomorrow evening will abandon the usual constraints of a stadium for a parade of athletes down the River Seine, with boats carrying national delegations. With eighty giant screens set up around the city, and with cameras capturing the action on every vessel, the largest in-person audience ever will cheer 10,500 athletes as they make their winding, six-kilometer way to the Place du Trocadéro, with the Eiffel Tower directly facing it, for the Olympic protocol and torch lighting.

The Paris Olympics thus will serve as a refreshing, democratic (small d) antidote to several recent authoritarian-hosted Games. It will be a celebration of the individual and the freedom-drenched collective, in the country of the 1789 French Revolution and the Age of Enlightenment’s notions of “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité.”

The Olympics never take place in a political vacuum, and this year’s context is chilling.

By comparison, the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics unfolded just before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and just after Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin entered their bloody, “no limits” partnership. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics were tarnished by revelations of Russia’s state-sponsored doping program and set the stage for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics before them signaled Xi’s rise as China’s most powerful and autocratic leader since Mao Zedong, and Putin’s Russia invaded neighboring Georgia during the Games.

The Olympics never take place in a political vacuum, and this year’s context is chilling: wars in Europe and the Middle East and growing tensions in Asia, all of which contribute to the biggest threats to global order since the 1930s.

“The world is really longing for something unifying among all these tensions and confrontations,” International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach noted in a recent must-read Washington Post feature. Bach added that the Paris Olympics could be that something. Speaking last November at the United Nations, the IOC president worried that the world was in a “dangerous downward spiral . . . Political, social, and economic divisions are gaining more ground.”

The Washington Post’s Les Carpenter writes, “Many in the Olympic world are hoping these Games will do what Los Angeles did 40 years ago” at the 1984 Summer Games.

Those Olympics followed the US-led boycott, joined by more than sixty countries, of the 1980 Moscow Summer Games to protest the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The Los Angeles Games also set the stage for one of the most dramatic expansions of democracy in history.

They transpired toward the end of US President Ronald Reagan’s first term and five short years before the Berlin Wall’s fall, which was followed by the Soviet Union’s collapse. They were a demonstration of a vibrant US democracy, full of confidence and determined to shape its times.

The games also marked a new, successful business model for the Olympic movement. They were run by a young travel executive named Peter Ueberroth, who introduced rich television deals and corporate sponsorships that produced more than two hundred million dollars in profit. The Soviets and many of their allies boycotted, and US athletes won four times more gold medals than anyone else.

It’s hard to say what legacy the Paris Games might have, though their context feels less promising than Reagan’s “morning in America.” From tomorrow through August 11, the Paris Olympics will coexist with the continued reverberations from French President Emmanuel Macron’s call for snap parliamentary elections, which resulted on July 7 in victory for the New Popular Front, a broad alliance of left-wing parties, and an unexpected defeat for the far right, with a prime minister yet to be chosen.

In the United States, a particularly divisive and decisive election will follow in November, amid an assassination attempt on former President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden’s withdrawal as a candidate.

There have been worse contexts for Olympics.

In 1936, Adolf Hitler used the Berlin Games to rally fascism ahead of World War II; five Games have been cancelled due to wars; Munich’s 1972 Olympics were blighted by a terrorist attack that killed Israeli athletes. Putin has launched invasions of northern Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine during the period of “Olympic truce,” when for the week ahead of the Games and the week after world leaders agree not to attack other countries.

Here’s the 2024 backdrop: The years that followed the Los Angeles Games saw more countries than ever become democratic—a formidable wave of democracy that lasted more than two decades. This stopped around 2006, and democracy has been in relative decline since then, according to Freedom House, the V-Dem Institute, and the Atlantic Council’s own Freedom and Prosperity Indexes.

When the final medal is awarded and the last athlete departs, the Paris Olympics will likely have reflected more than shaped our geopolitical scrum. They won’t signal autocratic rise, as did those in Beijing and Moscow before them, but it’s probably too much to expect that, like Los Angeles, they will be followed by a positive wave of democratic change.

The good news is that the next five Olympic Games, including both winter and summer, are in Milan-Cortina, Los Angeles, the French Alps, Brisbane, and Salt Lake City. Each will be held in a country that democratically elects its government, and each can be a milestone to measure if democracies are on a winning trajectory.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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European energy security requires stronger power grids

Andrei Covatariu — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 20:47:50 +0000

In 2022, 63 percent of all energy consumed in the European Union (EU) was imported. Europe’s energy generation gap has come into focus amid the energy security challenges stemming from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But while Europe has weathered the storm, in part by deploying renewables and accelerating electrification, there is a pressing need to strengthen the backbone of a decarbonized energy system—Europe’s power grid.

A mismatch between supply security, climate ambition, and grid capacity

Upgrading electricity grids to enable decarbonization is a worldwide issue. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that global grid investments must double to reach $600 billion per year by 2030 to meet nationally set climate objectives. In Europe, a recent study by Eurelectric suggests that the EU and Norway must invest €67 billion in grids per year to realize carbon neutrality by 2050.

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As the EU aims to reach a 42.5 percent—ideally 45 percent—share for renewables in its total energy mix by 2030, grid capacity must keep pace with rapidly growing clean energy generation.

Europe overall, including the UK, is making progress on renewable deployment, but a mismatch in grid capacity is already causing significant challenges. In Britain, for example, the connection queue for generation, storage, or energy-consuming projects waiting to be connected to the grid is projected to reach 800 gigawatts by the end of 2024. Grid congestion is also a major problem in the Netherlands, with industry and households asked to reduce demand at peak times to avoid blackouts. In Romania, a boom in state-backed prosumers without adequate storage facilities is placing significant stress on the grid.

Building the grid of the future

Currently, cross-border interconnections within the EU limit the amount of electricity that can be imported or exported, creating significant price discrepancies between neighboring states. Expected increases in electricity demand due to electrification will only exacerbate these distortions.

Enabling greater cross-border electricity trade is a must for solidifying energy security and solidarity across Europe. New high-voltage transmission lines could convert intermittent renewable generation into more baseload-like output by quickly moving excess clean electricity to regions in deficit.

To this end, debate continues in Brussels over creating an EU-wide supergrid that would enable high volumes of electricity to be transported across the continent. This would help level energy prices across borders, reduce equity concerns, and improve supply security over the short and long term.

Furthermore, the difficulties in predicting renewable energy generation and adapting consumption accordingly requires the digital transformation of energy grids. Digitalization can further integrate renewable generation through smart meters and smart appliances that can accurately forecast output and match it with flexible electricity consumption. This can help minimize grid congestion and enhance resilience in the face of intermittency.

Additionally, new sensor and software platforms can enable predictive maintenance that reduces the time infrastructure is out of service. Digital twins—virtual representations of physical power grids—use data analytics to model various scenarios, leading to higher operational efficiency, increased asset lifespan, and optimized energy flow. While a highly digitalized energy grid may also increase cyber threats, other sectors have demonstrated over decades that these threats can be mitigated through strategies that include rapid incident reporting to limit malware spreading and investment in threats monitoring systems.

The unavoidable but necessary cost

Upgrading and extending the grid would translate into higher tariffs paid by European end-users, who have already struggled with energy affordability. A spike in network tariffs could lead to negative social, economic, and—eventually—political consequences, as was seen during EU-wide protests in 2022, triggered by increasing energy bills.

Although these investments will impose direct and indirect costs on consumers in the short term, they will unlock over the medium and long term increased electrification and pass decreasing renewable generation costs onto rate payers. Today, onshore wind and solar photovoltaic energy are cheaper than new fossil fuel plants almost everywhere. The average cost of variable renewable energy generation is expected to drop further, from a levelized cost of electricity of $155 per megawatt hour in 2010 to $60 in 2028.

To finance these upgrades while minimizing the negative impacts on rate payers, new earmarked EU funds could complement tariff-based network revenues. While this has not been done before in advanced economies with complex electricity systems, policy innovation is required to keep the EU’s ambitious 2030 targets alive.

Not investing in transmission and distribution would jeopardize both European energy security and climate ambitions. By stalling deployment of renewable generation and thereby the electrification of heating and transport, failing to invest in the European grid would prolong high levels of fossil fuel imports. This would keep energy bills high, leave Europe exposed to fossil fuel supply insecurity, and place at risk Europe’s social and political fabric.

Bottlenecks to be addressed

Beyond financing challenges, building power infrastructure is notably slow. In Europe in particular, permitting procedures cause significant delays. The IEA highlights that the United States and EU have the longest deployment times for distribution—around three years—and transmission lines—between four and twelve years. The COVID-19 pandemic has made the problem worse, creating high demand while constricting supply for power grid components.

Regulatory frameworks are also constraining grid development. While the regulation of these natural monopolies has evolved in Europe to liberalize and unbundle the sector, national regulatory authorities need to deal with greater uncertainty; for instance, the rate of electrification and improvements on energy efficiency are difficult to predict. They will need to manage increased investment while encouraging innovation and keeping tariffs in check. Energy regulators must learn from previous experience, respond to current challenges, and anticipate future trends—all at the same time.

The overlooked factor in European energy security

Energy security in Europe hinges on the state of its power grids. As reliance on renewable energy and electrification grows, existing grid infrastructure is struggling to keep pace, causing congestion and delays. Substantial investments in grid upgrades and modernization are essential for integrating renewables, accelerating the electrification of heating and transportation, building technical redundancies to enhance resilience, combatting cyber threats, and protecting against extreme weather events.

While difficult to sell politically, investments in grid infrastructure will ultimately pay off in lower energy bills for consumers and industry, compared to a business-as-usual scenario. Failing to achieve these objectives will imperil Europe’s security of supply and its capacity to build a resilient energy future.

Andrei Covatariu is a Brussels-based energy expert. He is a senior research associate at Energy Policy Group (EPG) and a research fellow at the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE). This article reflects his personal opinion.

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EnergySource is the Global Energy Center’s (GEC) online publication providing commentary and analysis on developments in the energy and climate sector from a wide-array of thought leaders, politicians, and experts.

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The future of Gazprom’s piped deliveries to Europe looks bleak. However, Europe has no binding timeline for phasing out Russia’s growing LNG exports. Reducing these import will be critical to bringing Ukraine closer to victory and for securing Europe’s energy system.

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#BalkansDebrief – What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? A Debrief with Enrico Letta

sjones — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 19:15:50 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

What EU reforms will make enlargement successful? Why should Europe focus on the Balkans? What are the potential opportunities and challenges for EU enlargement and the Growth Plan for this region?

Join Nonresident Senior Fellow Ilva Tare in this episode of #BalkansDebrief as she interviews Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy and current President of the Institut Jacques Delors. With his extensive experience in European Union affairs and his recent influential report on the future of the Single Market, Mr. Letta provides deep insights into the necessary reforms for successful EU enlargement.

In this episode, Mr. Letta discusses his advocacy for the “Regatta Method” over the “Big Bang” approach for EU enlargement, emphasizing the importance of allowing each country to join when ready rather than waiting for the slowest in the region. He also elaborates on his proposed blueprint for EU enlargement success, which includes critical reforms such as on veto rules and the creation of a “solidarity enlargement facility.”

Discover the future of the EU and the vital steps needed to integrate the six Western Balkan countries into the new Single Market, as envisioned by Enrico Letta, a staunch advocate of enlargement in the Western Balkans.

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Lukashenka’s rhetoric toward Ukraine and the West has softened. His repression of Belarusians has not.

Hanna Liubakova — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 14:58:04 +0000

Last Friday, Belarus introduced a new visa-free regime allowing citizens from thirty-five European countries to stay for up to ninety days per year. This move is notable given the current tensions between the Belarusian regime of Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the West.

The visa-free policy seems to be a strategic propaganda effort from Minsk to ease these tensions. Following new European Union (EU) sanctions in late June, Poland has significantly restricted the import of goods into Belarus by Belarusian individuals, while Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have banned cars with Belarusian license plates from entering their countries. These measures impact the people of Belarus, and against this backdrop, the visa decision is an attempt by Lukashenka and his regime to “demonstrate the openness and peacefulness of our country.”

In reality, Lukashenka is continuing his campaign of domestic repression, targeting Belarusians in exile (including the author of this article), and weaponizing allegations that neighboring countries are setting up camps to train militants intent on overthrowing his regime. On July 19, for example, the Minsk regional court sentenced German national Rico Krieger to death in Belarus on charges including an “act of terrorism” and the “creation of an extremist formation.” The regime is using Krieger as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Germany, showcasing its manipulative tactics. According to the human rights organization Viasna, at least thirty foreigners remain imprisoned in Belarus, and a Lithuanian citizen died in a Belarusian prison in March after being arrested at the border.

As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia . . . The author of this article is among those convicted.

Even so, expect more rhetorical shifts as the 2025 Belarusian presidential election approaches and as Belarus tries to alleviate the economic pressures it faces from Poland and the Baltic states for Minsk’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. For example, newly appointed Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhankou has expressed a willingness to engage in dialogue with Poland, stating earlier this month that “the ball is on the Polish side.” This came after a slowdown in truck traffic at the Kazlovichy checkpoint on the Polish-Belarusian border on July 10.

Minsk accused Warsaw of halting the acceptance of Belarusian cargo. Poland has hinted at potentially closing its remaining border crossings with Belarus to counter Lukashenka’s hybrid tactics, the migration crisis that the regime helped engineer on the Polish border, and the imprisonment of journalist and Polish minority activist Andrzej Poczobut. The stabbing death of a Polish soldier by a migrant on the border in June prompted Polish President Andrzej Duda to discuss migration and economic cooperation with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in late June, hoping that Beijing would exert its increasing influence on Minsk.

Recent developments may have influenced Lukashenka’s shift in rhetoric. These developments include threats from Poland and the Baltic states to close border crossings with Belarus, efforts to involve China in political pressure on Minsk, and new EU sanctions. Lukashenka now calls for “reciprocity” in diplomatic relations with Poland and Lithuania, a stark contrast to his comments in March. At that time, accompanied by his white Pomeranian, Lukashenka had inquired about the width of the Suwałki Corridor and told a commander, “You will have to confront the Baltic republics . . . And you will grab part of Poland.”

Lukashenka has also softened his rhetoric on Ukraine in recent days. June was a month of major rhetorical escalation between Belarus and Ukraine, as the Belarusian national intelligence agency accused Ukraine of amassing troops near the Belarusian border. This led to a sudden military readiness check in Brest and Homiel, including troop deployments to Belarus’s southern border and the establishment of new checkpoints. For weeks, Belarus’s Ministry of Defense warned of a Ukrainian threat, citing a drone interception and an explosives cache.

However, this escalation ended abruptly on July 13 when Lukashenka visited an air defense unit in Luninets, announced the resolution of border tensions, and ordered troop withdrawals. He appeared to resolve a crisis he had fabricated, saying that “we are not enemies for Ukrainians,” calling for urgent negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv.

Some hoped for a real shift when, in early July, the regime freed eighteen political prisoners in a rare amnesty, nearly four years after Lukashenka’s crackdown on the opposition, following his announcements to release “seriously ill” prisoners. One of those released, Ryhor Kastusiou, who ran for president against Lukashenka in 2010, had been diagnosed with cancer. The names of the other released prisoners have not been disclosed. Both the United States and the EU welcomed these releases but urged the regime to free all remaining political prisoners.

While the release of some political prisoners is positive, many more are still incarcerated. An estimated 1,400 political prisoners are still being held in Belarus, hundreds of them in urgent need of medical assistance.

Belarus may continue to make gestures of goodwill to Ukraine and the West, but it’s crucial to differentiate between rhetoric and reality. Repression in Belarus continues. As recently as July 1, twenty Belarusian analysts were convicted and sentenced in absentia to between ten and eleven-and-a-half years by a Minsk court. The author of this article is among those convicted.

The regime accused me of four criminal charges, including an attempt to seize power, joining an extremist formation, harming national security, and inciting social discord. The regime-appointed lawyer never responded to my messages and emails. I was denied the right to a fair trial and refused legal assistance.

The regime is engaged in repression against Belarusians in exile, targeting their families abroad. In Belarusian jails, many prominent political prisoners are held incommunicado, and even their families don’t know whether they are alive. If the Belarusian regime wants to show Ukraine and the West that it is interested in real change, then it must take real actions to stop its brutal campaign of terror and repression at home.

Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

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The Women, Peace, and Security agenda made important strides at NATO’s Washington summit

Sarah Dawn Petrin — Wed, 24 Jul 2024 12:12:53 +0000

Much of the NATO summit earlier this month was overshadowed by US domestic politics, but one issue did make significant and bipartisan, if underacknowledged, headway when allies met in Washington: the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. During the three-day summit, leaders from the United States and other NATO member states recognized recent gains, including allied militaries implementing inclusive strategies to adapt to women in the armed forces as a means of preparedness. They also welcomed the role of women in political leadership—and underscored its importance.

“Bringing women on board is not only a women’s rights issue. It brings benefits to the whole of society and to our collective security,” Icelandic Foreign Minister Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir said on the first day of the summit. “It’s not about waiting for the time when you can afford focusing on women, peace, and security, or gender equality for that matter, or empowering women,” she added. “You become stronger because you focus on those points, not when you afford them.”

Icelandic Foreign Minister Thordis Kolbrun Reykfjord Gylfadottir addresses the Women, Peace, and Security reception organized by the US Department of State, on July 9, 2024. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

WPS commitments at the Washington summit

The show of support for advancing the WPS agenda during the summit was not just rhetorical. It included concrete commitments, such as adopting a new NATO policy on WPS that is “fit for purpose” for the twenty-first century security environment. Several allies also committed to fund more than ten thousand uniforms and body armor sets for Ukrainian female servicemembers defending their country against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

If the Alliance is looking for something that increasingly earns bipartisan support in the United States, then it should look to the importance of women’s inclusion in national security strategies. In 2017, then President Donald Trump signed the first national law that took steps to institutionalize a United Nations mandate to make the security sector more inclusive of female leadership and more responsive to the needs of women and girls, including freedom from conflict-related sexual violence. In 1994, then Senator Joe Biden was an original cosponsor of the Violence Against Women Act that year, and the Biden-Harris administration continues to make important reforms to the military code of justice on sexual assault in the military.

One of the highlights of the Washington summit was the announcement that as of 2024, twenty-three allied nations have met the commitment to spend 2 percent of annual gross domestic product on defense spending, a change that is applauded by both sides of the aisle in the United States. What is less known is how those fiscal commitments relate to national aspirations for a more inclusive force. According to the most recently published NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, released in 2020, twenty-seven members of the Alliance, including the United States, have national action plans on WPS. NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland, also have national action plans on WPS. Furthermore, twenty-five NATO nations reported an increase in female participation in the armed forces in the years before 2020. On average, 13 percent of allied forces were comprised of women that year.

In the Washington Summit Declaration, allies committed to integrate an ambitious WPS and human security agenda across all of NATO’s core tasks. NATO had previously committed to women’s meaningful participation in the security sector. But the new policy recognizes the conditions that make women’s leadership possible, including their full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation in decision making in national institutions.

The declaration also referred to the human security trends shaping today’s conflicts, including disregard for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, cultural property protection, and forced displacement that fuels human trafficking and irregular migration. These human security trends disproportionately affect women and girls, who make up more than half of the 117 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the United Nations. In Washington, the Alliance also renewed its commitment to international law and the fundamental norms of armed conflict, which distinguishes between military targets and civilians.

Lessons from Ukraine

Although NATO did not welcome Ukraine into the Alliance at the summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in his closing press statement that it is a matter of when, not if, Ukraine will become a member. This followed NATO commitments at the summit to establishing a new NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and NATO Security Assistance Training for Ukraine to increase Kyiv’s interoperability with the Alliance.

For the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has shown that the conduct of war involves more than military strategy. Providing security has become a whole-of-society effort, involving women in uniform and civilians providing support to the front lines. The evolving nature of conflict can blur the distinction between civilian and military action and change societal norms on what roles are appropriate for men and women. These dynamics are important for understanding the human domain, which is adaptive to evolving threats. Supporting female soldiers and addressing civilian harm caused by the war should be an integral part of NATO plans to train for the future operational environment and to secure peace in Ukraine.

The NATO Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for WPS, which has responsibility for a broader umbrella of cross-cutting human security policies, can continue working toward integrating lessons from the human domain in military training. While NATO continues to identify military lessons from the war in Ukraine, these lessons should also include concrete steps to protect civilians from air missile attacks, mitigate the use of sexual violence in conflict, and protect children against forced deportations to Russia. NATO can emphasize the lessons allies have learned about how to protect civilians in other conflicts, such as in Iraq and Libya, as it establishes new security cooperation training centers.

The war in Ukraine is a test case for whether the Alliance can help partner nations achieve stability and whether its actions are inclusive of the whole-of-society approach that has characterized the mobilization of the Ukrainian population. While volunteerism, patriotism, and the inclusion of women have sustained Ukraine’s war effort, the need to protect the civilian population from attack remains paramount.

Sarah Dawn Petrin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously advised the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute on integrating women, peace, and security and human security in US military operations.

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Putin accused of jailing US journalists as ‘bargaining chips’ for prisoner swap

Mercedes Sapuppo — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 19:14:45 +0000

On July 19, Wall Street Journal reporter and US citizen Evan Gershkovich was sentenced to sixteen years in Russian prison on espionage charges. The same day, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Alsu Kurmasheva, a journalist who holds dual American-Russian citizenship, was sentenced to six and a half years by a Russian court for supposedly spreading false information about the Russian military. Both trials took place largely behind closed doors under a veil of secrecy.

Gershkovich is the first US journalist to be convicted in Russia on charges of espionage since the Cold War. So far, the Russian authorities have not provided any credible evidence to support their accusations. Kurmasheva was convicted on a charge frequently used by the Kremlin to suppress unfavorable reporting on the realities of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The imprisonment of two US journalists marks a new escalation in the Kremlin’s confrontation with the West. Wall Street Journal publisher Almar Latour and editor Emma Tucker released a statement calling Gershkovich’s sentence “a disgraceful, sham conviction.” RFE/RL President and CEO Steve Capus deemed Kurmasheva’s conviction “a mockery of justice.”

US citizens Gershkovich and Kurmasheva are now facing the prospect of long prison sentences in extremely harsh conditions. An AP series published earlier this year described the “physical and psychological pressure, sleep deprivation, insufficient food, heath care that is poor or simply denied” and “dizzying set of arbitrary rules” that the pair are likely to encounter in Russian jails. Both journalists have already spent an extended period in pretrial detention.

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The Russian authorities have a long record of targeting journalists. These efforts have gained further momentum since February 2022 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin using draconian new legislation to silence anti-war voices and shut down any remaining independent Russian media outlets. In May 2024, the United Nations human rights office reported that the number of journalists imprisoned in Russia had reached an all-time high.

While the Putin regime is notorious for seeking to censor the media, that may not actually be the main motive in this case. Instead, there has been widespread speculation that the Kremlin ultimately aims to use Gershkovich and Kurmasheva as bargaining chips in negotiations with the US to secure the release of Russian citizens currently serving prison sentences in the West.

Putin is no doubt well aware that the United States will go to considerable lengths to free the two American journalists. Following Gershkovich’s conviction, the White House issued a statement that the US government has “no higher priority” than seeking the release and safe return of Gershkovich “and all Americans wrongly detained and held hostage abroad.”

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Speculation about a potential prisoner swap has swirled ever since Gershkovich was first detained in 2023. Typically, Russia only engages in prisoner exchanges once suspects have been convicted and sentenced. This has led some analysts to suggest that the relative speed of the two recent trials could indicate the Kremlin’s desire to proceed with an exchange in the near future.

Moscow will likely demand a high price for the release of Gershkovich and Kurmasheva. This may include handing over Vadim Krasikov, a Russian secret service colonel who is currently serving a life sentence in Germany for gunning down a Chechen dissident in a Berlin park in 2019. Sentencing Krasikov in 2021, a Berlin court called the killing “a state-ordered murder.”

US Senate Foreign Relations Chair Ben Cardin said Gershkovich’s trial and conviction were “stark reminders of the lengths to which tyrants like Putin will leverage innocent people as bargaining chips, stifle free speech, and suppress the truth.” While many now expect a prisoner swap to take place sooner rather than later, the targeting of US journalists in this manner highlights the Kremlin’s retreat from international norms and underlines the potential dangers facing any Western nationals who choose to visit Putin’s Russia.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

Michta on Sage International podcast on US and allied strategic decisions in the changing geopolitical landscape

gmatchett — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 17:38:04 +0000

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

On July 22, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, recorded a podcast episode for “The Focus: Geopolitics and What It Means to You” for Australian-based Sage International. In the episode, entitled, “End of Illusions: Preparing for a World of Risk and Rivalry,” Michta discusses critical strategic decisions that the United States and its allies must make for the end of the “rules-based international order” and rising threats from the “axis of dictatorships.”

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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Linderman in Georgian Institute of Politics | Beyond the NATO Summit in Washington: Implications for Georgia

Atlantic Council — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 16:25:00 +0000

Listen to the podcast here

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Biden’s legacy depends most of all on Ukraine

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 23 Jul 2024 11:04:00 +0000

During his press conference at the NATO Summit in Washington earlier this month, Joe Biden said of his presidential campaign, “I’m not in this for my legacy.” Two weeks and one difficult decision to bow out of the race later, his legacy is suddenly front and center.

That legacy, however, depends importantly on something he can no longer control: Ukraine’s ability over time to prevail against Russia’s criminal war.

That includes the inextricably linked question of whether the US president has contributed decisively to the United States’ ability, alongside its allies, to counter an emerging “axis of resistance” consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Those countries are determined to prevent Ukraine’s success. More to the point, they seem to view Russia’s subjugation of Ukraine as a crucial step in remaking the global system of rules and institutions that the United States and its partners forged after World War II.

Biden, who on Sunday announced his decision to abandon his presidential campaign, will likely be remembered by historians for defining the enormous stakes of the era we’re entering. He called it an “inflection point,” which I’ve been doing in this space since 2018, having previously been introduced to the term through the US intelligence community.

“We’re facing an inflection point in history—one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come,” Biden declared this past October, in only his second speech to the nation from behind the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office.

Significantly, in that speech he connected the dots between Russia’s war in Ukraine and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, which was only possible with the support of Iran. “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common,” he said. “They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy—completely annihilate it.”

Historians may praise Biden for defining the historic stakes in such unmistakable terms. However, the coming months and years will determine whether he fell short in delivering the remedies by too cautiously supporting Ukraine due to his fears of Russian nuclear escalation.

The result was self-deterrence, where the United States provided Kyiv the weaponry it most urgently requested too slowly and in insufficient numbers. The Biden administration also worsened the situation by restricting Kyiv’s freedom to use US weapons, particularly longer-range fires, against military targets in Russia, from which deadly attacks on Ukrainians were being launched. When the US Congress held up aid for Ukraine last year and into this one, it made Ukraine’s challenges far more dangerous.

Many Republican leaders agree that Biden was mistaken in holding back crucial support and permissions for Ukraine, but they weren’t the ones nominated for president or vice president at the Republican National Convention last week. For the moment, the gathering in Milwaukee indicated the party’s desire to do less for Ukraine.

Many Republicans have wanted to meld former President Donald Trump’s populism with former President Ronald Reagan’s larger global purpose, which contributed to the United States’ Cold War victory against the Soviet Union without a shot being fired. That seems to be the furthest thing from the intentions of the Trump-Vance ticket, though Trump has been known to change direction on a dime, as he did to free up congressional funding for Ukraine.

John Bolton, who was Trump’s national security advisor from 2018 to 2019, wrote in the Telegraph that both Trump and his running mate JD Vance “are disinterested, or openly disdainful, of assisting Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. For Vance, the US lacks both the military assets and the defense-industrial base to be a global power, meaning it must concentrate its resources to defend against China.”

My own view is that the best way to “defend against China” would be to counter Beijing’s unflinching and even increasing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. At their seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, NATO leaders called China a “decisive enabler” of that war by providing the wherewithal without which Moscow could not continue to wage it.

If the Republican Party truly believes Democratic leaders have provided inadequate defense budgets to address emerging challenges, “Trump should work to correct these deficiencies, not treat them as excuses for further reductions, thereby abandoning even more international positions of strength,” writes Bolton.

Instead, in a recent interview with Bloomberg Businessweek, Trump signaled that he may not be willing to defend Taiwan, likely the first place to fall next if Ukraine falters. “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” Trump said, noting that the island is 9,500 miles away from the United States and less than a hundred miles from China. “Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”

Where the Trump administration better understood the dynamics of this emerging autocratic axis was in its “maximum pressure” approach to Iran. The Biden administration, by contrast, at first hoped to resume nuclear talks with Iran and work over time to manage its threats to the region. Tehran then demonstrated its determination to disrupt the Middle East and threaten Israel, not with nuclear weaponry but through its proxies, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.

Where the Trump administration fell short, and where the Trump campaign seems to be doing so again, is in its underestimation of the advantages provided to the United States through alliances and common cause at a moment of such significant and historic challenge.

At the NATO Summit in Washington, I had the chance to speak with officials from across the Alliance, as well as those from Indo-Pacific partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. I found that there is consensus about one matter: They miss the certainty of the Cold War years, from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall, when US foreign policy remained relatively consistent through Republican and Democratic administrations. During that period, US leaders were resolute in the belief that they faced a long-term struggle against Soviet communism and its confederates.

Without US agreement in diagnosing the emerging autocratic challenge, which Biden has done well, and without US prescriptions for an allied and global response to address it, which he has done less well, the officials I spoke with expect a period of testing by US adversaries and hedging by US allies.

Biden defined the emerging geopolitical contest confronting the United States. He still has six months to give Ukraine the best chance of victory, including by removing restrictions on Ukrainian forces striking military targets in Russia. The outcome of the war and the larger contest, however, will increasingly be determined by forces that he can’t control, both within his own party and among Republicans, and among allies and adversaries around the world.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Tannebaum interviewed in Institute for International Finance’s podcast Current Account on the rise of secondary sanctions

cfalkenek — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 13:50:14 +0000

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Andriy Yermak: Ukraine and NATO are restoring Europe’s security architecture

Andriy Yermak — Mon, 22 Jul 2024 12:04:47 +0000

As I listened to world leaders announce the signing of the Ukraine Compact on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center, my mind drifted back to September 13, 2022. On that cold, rainy day, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I first unveiled the Kyiv Security Compact concept.

President Zelenskyy’s idea, which Anders and I began to implement together, was that allies should provide Ukraine with everything necessary to defeat Russia on the battlefield and to deter further aggression. The proposal outlined a set of measures designed to ensure that Ukraine could defend itself independently until it joins NATO.

Specifically, it included commitments from a group of guarantor states to provide weapons, conduct joint exercises under the EU and NATO flags, share intelligence, and assist in developing Ukraine’s defense industry. We claimed that security commitments were not an end in themselves, but a transitional phase towards Ukraine’s full-fledged membership in both the European Union and the NATO Alliance.

At the time, one journalist asked if I truly believed we could find even half a dozen countries willing to support this initiative. I responded with a line from John Lennon’s song: “You may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one.” This has proved to be an accurate forecast.

At the NATO Vilnius summit in July 2023, G7 leaders issued a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, based on our initiative. Other countries began joining soon after. Before long, their number exceeded thirty. By that time, we already had several bilateral security agreements in place. This work is ongoing, with 23 bilateral agreements currently signed. Together with our allies, we set out on the path to restore the European security architecture. We are determined not to stray from it again.

The Ukraine Compact, open for others to join, became the final piece in creating an ecosystem of security guarantees for our country. It is designed to enhance Ukraine’s resilience and ability to defend itself in the future, and to serve as a bridge during the period when Article 5 does not yet apply. I’m pleased that this aligns perfectly with Anders’ and my original draft. The bridge metaphor is also enshrined in the NATO summit’s final declaration. This is a crucial detail. Since 2008, Ukraine has been hitting a glass wall trying to enter the Alliance’s supposedly “open doors,” and now it has been removed.

The summit declaration’s statement on Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO is another strong step. Throughout the past year, Anders and I have emphasized again and again: NATO leaders need to make it clear to Vladimir Putin that his war is futile, that support for Ukraine will not waver, and that Ukraine will sooner rather than later become a NATO member. Finally, this signal has now been sent: Russia’s war of choice has been stripped of its stated pretext.

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Currently, the Ukraine Compact bears 25 signatures. It has been supported by the United States and Canada, nineteen European countries, and the European Union. Japan is also among the signatories. This is very telling, as Ukraine is a cornerstone not only of European but also of global security.

The Washington summit demonstrated that the Alliance can no longer limit itself to the Euro-Atlantic space as it seeks to effectively counter global challenges and threats. Aggressive autocracies are increasingly collaborating and taking on the shape of a military-political alliance. For all democratic countries this means one thing: Russia is not alone in its aggression against Ukraine, and the possibility of new conflicts elsewhere depends on Moscow’s ability to succeed. It is therefore in our common interest to do everything to ensure that Ukraine emerges victorious from this war, and that this victory is convincing.

I note that the recent NATO summit’s decisions are aimed precisely at this. Three key points are worth mentioning here. First, the institutionalization of aid formats that have emerged ad hoc during the war. Second, building Ukraine’s defense capabilities and strengthening the potential of its defense-industrial base. And third, the course toward deepening Ukraine’s political and military interaction with NATO structures.

We are sincerely grateful for these steps and extend thanks to our allies, whose unwavering leadership has allowed us to successfully defend ourselves despite Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of resources. Your dedication and your value-based choices strengthen the chances of our common victory over a lawless and cynical enemy.

Eurasia Center events

Forward Defense Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

Looking ahead, I need to outline several critical points. The further strengthening of Ukraine’s air defense system is crucial. Russia intends to continue terrorizing our civilian population by destroying residential buildings, power grids, and other critical infrastructure. The recent strikes on the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv, as well as two additional health clinics, have once again clearly demonstrated that for the Russian military, there are no red lines in terms of international law and ethics. There is therefore no alternative to strengthening the air shield over Ukraine.

One of the key components of this air shield will be F-16 jets. Ukraine’s allies have committed to delivering the first batch this summer. However, I have to emphasize that this is not enough. The Russians boast about using three-ton guided bombs against Ukraine. Their bombers are based at airfields in Russia’s border regions. In order to neutralize this threat, we still need long-range capabilities. Simply put, if there is a hornet’s nest in your neighborhood, you can hunt them one by one with varying success, or you can destroy the nest itself. Currently, only the first option is available to us, and even that is quite limited.

Addressing this problem will not only reduce the number of casualties; it will also further enhance the operational compatibility of Ukrainian defense forces with NATO. We sincerely welcome steps in this direction, in particular the creation of the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) program.

We are also extremely grateful to member states for their specific commitments to aid Ukraine, and for implementing a system of proportional contributions that will provide base funding of forty billion euros over the next year. We expect these funds to be spent specifically on purchasing weapons, rather than alternative forms of support, which are undoubtedly important as well.

At the same time, it is worth noting that this burden could be reduced by fine-tuning mechanisms for transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. A related issue is the further intensification of sanctions pressure on both Russia and the partners who enable Moscow to continue making weapons using microelectronics produced in the West. This has made it possible for Russia to manufacture the type of missile that hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital with Western components.

Our relationship with NATO has always been a two-way street, and we remain committed to this principle. We fully understand that one of the leading factors in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration is our capacity for transformation. President Zelenskyy and his team remain dedicated to reforms aimed at strengthening institutional resilience and democratic processes in the country.

Changes continue despite the war, and they are irreversible. We unhesitatingly and without reservations agree that the reforms mentioned in the summit’s final declaration are of utmost importance for Ukraine’s prospects. At the same time, common sense suggests that all these changes will only matter if Ukraine withstands this war. Withstands and wins. Only a strong, free, and successful Ukraine can be a reliable outpost of democracy in Eastern Europe. Comprehensive and long-term assistance to Ukraine is not charity. It’s an investment in a secure future for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Andriy Yermak is the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President.

Hays and Massa in Forbes on the risk of a Russian nuclear detonation in space

Atlantic Council — Sun, 21 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

Original SOurce

On July 21, Forward Defense Deputy Director Mark Massa and Peter L. Hays, professor of space policy at George Washington University, were quoted in a Forbes article on nuclear threats to space assets. Hays was quoted on the threat of a Russian detonation in space, stating “I believe the Russian nuclear ASAT is primarily intended to hold proliferated LEO [low Earth orbit] satellites like Starlink at risk.” Hays’s recently published issue brief, “Modernizing space-based nuclear command, control, and communications,” was extensively cited in this article.

Massa was quoted on the destructive risk of a nuclear detonation in space and the potential international response, stating that “such an action would demand a forceful response from the United States and the international community leveraging all tools of national power.”

Staff

Mark J. Massa

Deputy Director

Defense Policy National Security

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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Global China Newsletter—Russia’s ‘enabler’ punts again on economic reform

Dexter Tiff Roberts — Fri, 19 Jul 2024 19:35:20 +0000

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Amidst the assertions of commitment to Ukraine’s defense and eventual membership in NATO, conversations at last week’s NATO summit here in sweltering Washington, DC featured another hot topic: China.

The final communiqué, approved by all thirty-two NATO members, took the unprecedented step of calling China “a decisive enabler” of Russia’s war against Ukraine, noting how this is undermining China’s interests and reputation in Europe. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underscored that China cannot have it both ways, sponsoring the largest war in Europe in recent memory while attempting to maintain productive relationships across the continent.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10, 2024.

These developments on the security front come as European countries with deep ties to the Chinese economy wrestle with how to protect industries from an onslaught of Chinese exports. This dynamic has been most notable in the EU’s recent provisional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. While far short of the 100 percent tariffs announced by the Biden administration, Brussels’ move indicates there is growing transatlantic symmetry on derisking relationships with China.

There is far more to be done—not to mention the potential impact of a change in US leadership next year—but a more united transatlantic approach on economic security regarding China does appear to be progressing alongside that on hard security issues.

Meanwhile, as your Global China Editor-in-Chief Tiff Roberts writes below, there is no indication from the Party’s just concluded Third Plenum of hoped-for economic reforms or reduced reliance on emerging and green technology industries—and their export—to spur lagging growth. That’s a recipe for growing confrontation with developed economies, highlighting again the need for continued transatlantic convergence. We cover all this and more below—take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, senior director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

China Spotlight

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Third Plenum focused on ‘shiny new industries,’, neglected real reform

As Dave notes, many had been hoping China’s just-closed Third Plenum, a once-every-five-year party meeting that usually focuses on the economy, would deliver the reforms needed to jumpstart the country’s lackluster growth. That does not seem to have happened. “Instead of focusing on China’s current problems, the Third Plenum … will prepare China for a confrontation with the United States by building industries powered by massive investments in cutting-edge technologies,” GeoEconomics Center’s Jeremy Mark rightly predicted earlier this month. “China has clearly decided to direct all available resources to next-generation technologies while neglecting to support the vast majority of the population who scrape by outside the tech sector. That suggests Chinese leader Xi Jinping will end up with shiny new industries built on a weak economic foundation.”

As expected, the communiqué, released on July 18, highlighted high tech as well as reiterated Xi’s strident emphasis on the importance of security—something that has spooked both foreign and private investors before. China must achieve a “healthy interaction between high-quality development and a high level of security,” the document stated. And while it name-checked important areas like strengthening consumption and the need to improve “basic and bottom-up livelihood,” there were few specifics about the path ahead. A more detailed document will come later.

(Xi Jinping’s much-anticipated first Third Plenum in 2013 promised ground-breaking reforms to China’s economic system that many expected to see realized. I was far less optimistic, writing at the time of the “central paradox”: China needed major reforms to spark growth but “by pursuing these reforms the party is diluting its control.” That same dilemma remains today.)

The US and EU tariff war with China ramps up as the Global South welcomes Beijing’s embrace

Another big concern is China’s mercantilist trade practices, including subsidized exports undercutting global industries. But while the US and European Union (EU) have taken strong steps to retaliate, putting tariffs on Chinese electric vehicle imports as Dave noted above, Global South countries often welcome Beijing’s economic embrace.

Europe’s tariffs on Chinese EVs max out at 38.1 percent. But, as the Europe Center’s Jacopo Pastorelli and James Batchik write, while this “signal[s] greater alignment between Washington and Brussels on China,” there are differences. Washington’s tariffs will be implemented quickly and applied broadly, yet Europe’s tariffs targeted specific Chinese companies and were “provisional”—a final ruling on tariff levels won’t happen for another four months.

And while a tough approach to China has bipartisan support in the US, “another factor is European unity—or lack thereof,” particularly from export-oriented members, write the report authors. On July 15, Germany, Finland, and Sweden abstained in a non-binding vote on the tariffs, while Italy and Spain voted in favor, with a German economy ministry spokesperson saying “it is now crucial to seek a rapid and consensual solution with China.”

In marked contrast, many Global South countries are throwing their economic lot in with China. Take Peru, whose president Dina Boluarte visited Beijing on June 28. The state visit “follows a decade of increased Chinese economic influence in the Andean country. Between 2018 and 2023, Peru became the second highest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean,” writes the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Martin Cassinelli. “In 2024, Peru’s relevance to China will be transformed, as Lima becomes a crucial partner in China’s economic engagement with Latin America. In November, Xi plans to inaugurate the Chancay port, a $3.6 billion deep-water mega-port forty-four miles north of Lima.” Other Global South leaders who have recently visited Beijing include top officials from Guinea-Bissau, Vanuatu, Bangladesh, and the Solomon Islands.

NATO says China presents “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security”

As Dave notes above, the just-closed NATO meeting singled out China for criticism like never before. The thirty-two-nation organization declared that China presents “systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security,” citing the buildup of its nuclear arsenal, disinformation and cyberattacks. More than anything else, concern centered on China’s role as a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. “We call on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) … to cease all material and political support to Russia’s war effort,” read the communiqué.

As the below chart shows, China’s trade with Russia is expanding. That trade is helping China to prop up Russia’s “war machine”, writes the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Joe Webster. “While there is  no publicly available evidence that Beijing is providing lethal arms to Russian forces, its goods exports are nonetheless likely facilitating Moscow’s invasion,” the senior fellow notes, citing shipments of Chinese machinery, vehicles and parts, and dual-use technologies (In the communiqué, NATO singled out “weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defense sector”). And it’s not just direct exports. There likely is significant indirect trade via Central Asia and Belarus, with dual-use goods exports more than doubling over the last year. “It is very prudent to examine if China’s shipments…are simply being re-exported on to Russia,” Webster writes.

Meanwhile Hungary, unlike other NATO members, showed strong support for China in recent weeks, continuing a trend that began a decade ago. “Under [far-right leader] Orbán’s leadership, Hungary has oriented its foreign policy around Russian and Chinese interests since 2014, doing the two powers’ bidding inside the European Union and NATO and becoming increasingly hostile to the leaders of the United States and the EU,” writes the Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér. Many EU leaders have not taken kindly to Orbán’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing (and earlier with Vladimir Putin in Moscow) just before attending the NATO summit.

ICYMI

Next Wednesday, the Global China Hub will be co-hosting a public conversation on exposing and countering Chinese information operations in collaboration with the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Radio Free Asia, and Freedom House.
Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Director Markus Garlauskas reflected on their participation in the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan in June. The delegation was hosted by the Taiwanese government, and they met with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai Ching-te, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
The Scowcroft Center also published a report, “Strengthening Taiwan’s resiliency,” recommending actions for Taiwan’s new leadership to enhance its societal resilience against Chinese aggression in the context of both “gray zone” conflict and wartime attacks.
Two years after Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter and rebranding as X, the platform is far from winning the battle against spambots. DFRLab led an investigation into how spambots continue to suppress authentic posts in Chinese-language searches on X.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

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How to institutionalize NATO’s cooperation with its closest Pacific partners

Ira Straus, Francis Shin — Fri, 19 Jul 2024 17:24:17 +0000

For the third year in a row, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea attended NATO’s annual summit. Speaking on the sidelines of the Washington summit last week, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell declared that he “fully, 100 percent” supports NATO extending a standing invitation for future summits, going beyond its present ad hoc ones, to this grouping, known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4). This, he held, would place Atlantic-Pacific cooperation on a more solid footing and enable scaled-up joint planning. The United States, he has said before, should “weave” its Atlantic and Pacific alliances together.

There are two concrete steps NATO should take that will help achieve this goal.

First, NATO should upgrade its recent summit invitations to the IP4 by offering them a standing invitation. It is unwise to continue leaving this practice up in the air each year.

Second and more substantively, NATO and the IP4 should establish an Atlantic-Pacific Partnership Forum (APPF). This would be in the tradition of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and its Mediterranean Dialogue. Adding an APPF is the next step, arguably an overdue one.

The need for closer cooperation

The enduring threats from the revisionist autocracies show the need for closer Atlantic-Pacific cooperation among democracies, just as recent new channels for NATO-IP4 cooperation provide momentum for it. The increasingly aggressive alliance of autocracies is seen in China’s military exercises in Belarus near NATO’s border and in its de facto aid to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. It is also present in North Korea’s military pact with Russia.

Despite the geographic distance, NATO strategists increasingly see Indo-Pacific security as a necessary and complementary part of Euro-Atlantic security. This reality was recognized in the 2022 Strategic Concept and reaffirmed at the Washington summit. Any deterioration in Indo-Pacific security, such as a mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan or escalation of other territorial disputes in the region, would not just damage the world economy; it would challenge the larger international order as well. And China has consistently challenged NATO members directly with threats of economic coercion over Taiwan.

Making it official

So far, Atlantic-Pacific cooperation has occurred mostly in silos between NATO and the individual IP4 states, and much of it is unsecured from being disrupted by ordinary changes. For example, Japan’s ambassador in Brussels has met semi-regularly with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other senior figures in the NATO secretariat to discuss progress on Japan’s Individually Tailored Partnership Programme. Its higher-level meetings regarding security cooperation have occurred mostly at the past three NATO summits, plus recent Group of Seven (G7) summits and one visit by Stoltenberg to the region in 2023.

The relatively slow pace of these summits’ convenings—as well as the conspicuous absence of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea from the most recent G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, after their previous attendance at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan—indicates that these channels, without institutionalization and supplementation, cannot be relied upon consistently.

The domestic political situations in the IP4 states also risk the continuity of this cooperation. This is normal; in fact, a prime motive for institutionalizing cooperation is to ensure that it won’t die out when domestic politics take their next turn. It has been overlooked how easily the intense transatlantic cooperation of 1946-1948 could have dissipated after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 if it had not been institutionalized in 1949 in NATO and already gathered momentum in the years after.

Today, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have low approval ratings in polls in their respective countries. A change in government in either country might well shift it away from its pro-NATO stances, and from their efforts to improve Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. This would be a major reversal of recent progress.

An APPF would address these structural shortcomings in Atlantic-Pacific Cooperation. Developing new institutionalized platforms would help ensure continuity across shifts in domestic politics. For example, the APPF could overcome existing deficits in NATO-IP4 meetings by committing to convene respective foreign and defense ministers at least twice a year—a wider version of the 2+2 ministerial consultative committees. NATO could likewise invite its APPF partners to be observers in NATO committees. There is a precedent for this move: The security and partnerships and the cooperative security committees are already open for participation from partner countries on an ad hoc basis.

Meanwhile, an APPF could open partnership offices in its two main regions, like the one NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is opening in Jordan. This would fill in for NATO’s inability to reach agreement on the more daring step of opening a formal office of its own in the Indo-Pacific region.

The larger picture

The APPF could accelerate NATO members’ progress on developing Indo-Pacific policies and act as a consultative platform between NATO and the IP4 in times of crisis, such as in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

An APPF goal would—to borrow a 1990s NATO phrase—be to develop “interlocking but not interblocking” institutions. One model for such an effort is the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States grouping, known as AUKUS, discussing the inclusion of Japan and South Korea under pillar two of the partnership. Another would be the forthcoming secretariat for the US-Japanese-South Korean entente. These could be briefed with the NATO members in the APPF, ensuring they remain informed on the policy trajectories of these minilateral groupings. The APPF could then facilitate further development of the minilateral structures; for example, its discussions could encourage the trilateral entente secretariat to invite NATO, UK, Australian, and New Zealander delegates as observers, keeping avenues of cooperation open between the entente, AUKUS, IP4, and NATO.

Thus, more than seventy-five years after NATO’s founding, establishing an APPF would demonstrate that the Alliance remains ready to adapt to the challenges throughout the world. It would provide NATO with much-needed channels to deepen the cooperation across the two theaters between its annual summits. Perhaps most important, it would further underline the Alliance’s role as a values-based organization, reconnecting it to its moral and intellectual roots.

The IP4 are NATO’s best democratic partners by far in the wider world. Already in 1939, American journalist Clarence Streit called for uniting the leading democracies of the world—mostly Atlantic but also Pacific—for their shared economic and security interests, and as a nucleus to rally other democracies around. The founders of NATO were greatly motivated by his call. As democracies face the threat of growing autocratic aggressiveness, they can benefit by harkening back to the NATO founders’ vision: building a wider and deeper unity on the basis of shared democratic values.

Ira Straus is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Francis Shin is a research analyst specializing in transatlantic institutions, anti-corruption, and clean energy policy. He has previously worked at the Atlantic Council, Royal United Services Institute, and Center for a New American Security.

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Hungarian PM Orban poses as unlikely peacemaker for Russia’s Ukraine war

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi — Thu, 18 Jul 2024 21:03:06 +0000

As perhaps the most pro-Kremlin and anti-Western leader of any EU or NATO member state, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban makes for an unlikely mediator in efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. This did not prevent the Hungarian leader from embarking on an ambitious series of international visits in early July that he dubbed as a “peace mission.” In the first ten days of July, Orban visited four different countries on three continents, during which he claimed to have held twelve hours of talks with world leaders.

Orban’s intensive bout of shuttle diplomacy began with a visit to Kyiv on July 2, where he met with President Zelenskyy. This was the Hungarian leader’s first trip to neighboring Ukraine since 2015, and came just one day after his country took up the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The presidency, a position which rotates through all EU member states, is designed to coordinate the agenda and chair meetings of EU member state officials. It is limited in power, and the presidency carries no responsibility for representing the EU abroad.

A few days later, Orban was in Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who he then lavished with praise in an interview with Germany’s WELT Documentary. On July 8, the Hungarian PM was in Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping. He subsequently flew to the US for the annual NATO Summit, before rounding off his diplomatic mission by meeting with US presidential candidate Donald Trump in Florida.

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While Orban’s globetrotting itinerary was certainly impressive, there is little indication that this diplomatic initiative achieved much beyond generating media buzz and upsetting Hungary’s EU partners. Orban pushed the idea that a ceasefire in Ukraine could “speed up peace talks” and has tried to pitch his peace plan in a letter to European Union leaders, but so far he has faced little enthusiasm and a significant backlash. Crucially, both Zelenskyy and Putin have ruled out an immediate ceasefire.

This lack of progress toward peace might not be a major issue for Orban. Indeed, some believe his recent diplomatic efforts may actually have been designed primarily to strengthen his own position, both domestically and on the international stage. Crucially, it has allowed the Hungarian leader to balance his country between the key global centers of Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and Brussels. It has also served as a welcome backdrop for the creation of the new Patriots for Europe grouping within the European Parliament, as part of Orban’s self-styled effort to “change European politics.”

This international outreach allows Orban to maintain the stability of his own domestic position via continued NATO security, EU funding and market access, cheap Russian energy imports, and Chinese investments. He has been pursuing a similar model since 2010, and has consistently attempted to make himself useful to all key players. In the current geopolitical context, this means playing the role of potential peacemaker in the broader geopolitical confrontation that has emerged as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

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Orban’s current peacemaker posturing could prove particularly timely if Donald Trump wins this year’s US presidential election and returns to the White House in January 2025. This would set the stage for a likely increase in tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the Hungarian PM potentially positioned to serve as an intermediary on key issues such as Ukraine peace initiatives.

Critics have accused the Hungarian leader of handing Putin a significant PR victory. At a time when the Russian dictator is eager to demonstrate that he is not internationally isolated, their Moscow meeting was particularly welcome. This explains why Orban was careful to begin his world tour in Kyiv, allowing him to deflect accusations from the West that he is doing the Kremlin’s bidding. Instead, Orban sought to portray his outreach efforts as an example of the “third way” that the current crop of populist European politicians often seek to champion.

There can be little doubt that Orban’s tour was also an attempt to troll the entire EU leadership. By seizing the initiative and unilaterally embarking on high-profile visits to Moscow and Beijing while holding the EU presidency, Orban was hoping to contrast his own dynamic leadership with the perceived indecisiveness of the European Union’s more cautious diplomacy. In doing so, he succeeded in boosting his international profile while causing significant embarrassment in Brussels.

Despite generating much media interest and favorable headlines, it would be wrong to portray Viktor Orban’s peace mission as an unqualified success. At this stage, his peace proposals appear to have little genuine substance, and have so far gained virtually no traction. Nevertheless, the Hungarian leader will likely continue to view the invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to advance his own balancing act between Russia, China, and the West.

Dmytro Tuzhanskyi is director of the Institute for Central European Strategy. This article is published in his capacity as an analyst of the Institute for Central European Strategy and does not reflect any other institution’s position.

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Speaking in summer 2023, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov outlined the country’s drone strategy of bringing together drone manufacturers and military officials to address problems, approve designs, secure funding, and streamline collaboration. Thanks to this approach, he predicted a one hundred fold increase in output by the end of the year.

The Ukrainian drone production industry began as a volunteer project in the early days of the Russian invasion, and quickly became a nationwide movement. The initial goal was to provide the Ukrainian military with 10,000 FPV (first person view) drones along with ammunition. This was soon replaced by far more ambitious objectives. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more the one billion US dollars has been collected by Ukrainians via fundraising efforts for the purchase of drones. According to online polls, Ukrainians are more inclined to donate money for drones than any other cause.

Today, Ukrainian drone production has evolved from volunteer effort to national strategic priority. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the country will produce more than one million drones in 2024. This includes various types of drone models, not just small FPV drones for targeting personnel and armored vehicles on the battlefield. By early 2024, Ukraine had reportedly caught up with Russia in the production of kamikaze drones similar in characteristics to the large Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This progress owes much to cooperation between state bodies and private manufacturers.

Marine drones are a separate Ukrainian success story. Since February 2022, Ukraine has used domestically developed marine drones to damage or sink around one third of the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet, forcing Putin to withdraw most of his remaining warships from occupied Crimea to the port of Novorossiysk in Russia. New Russian defensive measures are consistently met with upgraded Ukrainian marine drones.

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In May 2024, Ukraine became the first country in the world to create an entire branch of the armed forces dedicated to drone warfare. The commander of this new drone branch, Vadym Sukharevsky, has since identified the diversity of country’s drone production as a major asset. As end users, the Ukrainian military is interested in as wide a selection of manufacturers and products as possible. To date, contracts have been signed with more than 125 manufacturers.

The lessons learned from the successful development of Ukraine’s drone manufacturing ecosystem should now be applied to the country’s cybersecurity strategy. “Ukraine has the talent to develop cutting-edge cyber products, but lacks investment. Government support is crucial, as can be seen in the drone industry. Allocating budgets to buy local cybersecurity products will create a thriving market and attract investors. Importing technologies strengthens capabilities but this approach doesn’t build a robust national industry,” commented Oleh Derevianko, co-founder and chairman of Information Systems Security Partners.

The development of Ukraine’s domestic drone capabilities has been so striking because local manufacturers are able to test and refine their products in authentic combat conditions. This allows them to respond on a daily basis to new defensive measures employed by the Russians. The same principle is necessary in cybersecurity. Ukraine regularly faces fresh challenges from Russian cyber forces and hacker groups; the most effective approach would involve developing solutions on-site. Among other things, this would make it possible to conduct immediate tests in genuine wartime conditions, as is done with drones.

At present, Ukraine’s primary cybersecurity funding comes from the Ukrainian defense budget and international donors. These investments would be more effective if one of the conditions was the procurement of some solutions from local Ukrainian companies. Today, only a handful of Ukrainian IT companies supply the Ukrainian authorities with cybersecurity solutions. Increasing this number to at least dozens of companies would create a local industry capable of producing world-class products. As we have seen with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian drone industry, this strategy would likely strengthen Ukraine’s own cyber defenses while also boosting the cybersecurity of the wider Western world.

Anatoly Motkin is president of StrategEast, a non-profit organization with offices in the United States, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan dedicated to developing knowledge-driven economies in the Eurasian region.

What to expect from Ursula von der Leyen’s second term

James Batchik — Thu, 18 Jul 2024 14:47:26 +0000

On Thursday, the European Parliament voted by a sizeable margin to confirm Ursula von der Leyen for another five-year term as president of the European Commission. Her confirmation is good news for Europe and the transatlantic relationship. This time around, however, she will have to confront a different set of challenges to her agenda than in her first term, and they will come both from within the European Union (EU) and without.

What can be expected from a von der Leyen 2.0? Ahead of her confirmation, she laid out a raft of proposals in her political guidelines for the next Commission term—a combined effort to outline her vision and win over votes. The guidelines prioritize:

Building a more competitive Europe that balances regulation and innovation that facilitates Europe’s green transition,
Boosting the EU’s defense ambitions,
Pushing social and economic policies such as affordable housing,
Sustaining agriculture and environmental policies,
Protecting Europe’s democracy, and
Standing up for Europe’s global and geopolitical interests.

In practice, this means her next term will mean more of a central and active role for the Commission—and for von der Leyen. But there will also likely be more roadblocks from the European Council and Parliament.

Start with her leadership style. In her first term, von der Leyen turned the Commission into the most important arm inside the EU at a time when crises came new and often. She served as the EU’s chief decision maker and negotiator during the COVID-19 crisis, helped coordinate Europe’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and shaped the EU’s economic de-risking strategy and general hawkishness toward China, serving as Europe’s “bad cop” standing up to Beijing’s coercive and unfair trade practices. The grumblings of an overstepping and power-hungry Commission president from other arms of the EU and national capitals aside, European leaders still looked to the Commission and von der Leyen to take action.

The Commission’s role was boosted by its policy successes too. Her first term oversaw the adoption of major rules on the digital and green transitions. The EU pushed through world-leading digital regulations on artificial intelligence, online content moderation, and platform competition, and it incentivized semiconductor manufacturing. She also prioritized green policies to reduce emissions, including the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and setting new emission reduction targets for cars, shipping, and factories.

The growing number and influence of far-right and hard-right groups will likely add extra complexity to the legislative process.

For her second term, von der Leyen will seek to pick up where she left off. The Commission will also look to build itself a stronger role in the traditional defense and the economic security agendas, with an eye to boosting Europe’s defense capabilities against Russia and de-risking from China. Von der Leyen’s focus on a competitiveness agenda will push for greater innovation and industrial support while furthering the green transition. On Thursday, von der Leyen promised a “European competitiveness fund” and a “clean industrial deal” within the first hundred days of the Commission’s next mandate, along with greater investment in energy infrastructure and technologies. This will all come with a price tag, and more responsibility for the Commission.

As a consequence of a busy 2019-2024 legislative cycle, von der Leyen and her Commission must now see through a raft of new rules. On digital policy alone, the to-do list is a tall order. The EU is standing up new offices and hiring a new army of competition lawyers, boosting the already massive size and scope of the Commission.

But there will be limits to von der Leyen’s ambition as member states and the parliament will look to exercise their own power.

Europe’s political center is not what it was in 2019, and EU members will want their influence felt. Von der Leyen will have to contend with a growing number of populist leaders around the table at Council meetings. More far-right governments may pop up over the next five years, including in major countries such as France as Marine Le Pen’s National Rally gets ever closer to power. And as the Commission tries to take on a bigger role in traditional member-state driven policies, such as security and defense, von der Leyen will need to deal with more engaged member states looking to exact concessions or carveouts, or to wield their own influence at the EU level.

Far- and hard-right groups in the European Parliament are also on the rise, and they are looking to make a mark. In a shift from her first term, emboldened hard-right politicians are more eager to influence EU policy rather than just play spoiler to it. The growing number and influence of far-right and hard-right groups will likely add extra complexity to the legislative process, and legislation may need to pass with ad hoc coalitions rather than the tradition of grand coalitions of parliaments past.

Greater influence on the right may hamper the Commission’s regulatory ambition. Von der Leyen promised she would continue the green transition, but the EU’s green rules have already become a political target. The platforms of the center-right European People’s Party (EPP), von der Leyen’s own group, and the further right European Conservatives and Reformists, both have peppered in objections to onerous new regulations, especially those associated with the green transition. And the competitiveness debate is in large part spurred on by this backlash to the Commission’s regulatory appetite. This may be difficult for the Commission. Institutionally, the Commission is designed to present new regulations and proposals. It is the only arm inside the EU that can. But that desire will be a point of friction with the aversion among member states and Parliament to new, seemingly onerous, rules.

Von der Leyen will face challenges from beyond Europe, too. “We have entered an age of geostrategic rivalries,” notes the policy guidelines. To the east, Beijing will continue to try to split Europe and poison the EU’s de-risking agenda just as it is starting to take off. And supporting Ukraine against Russia’s full-scale invasion will require sustained attention and funds.

To the west, von der Leyen cannot ignore the upcoming US elections. A transatlanticist at heart, she pushed the EU closer together with the United States in her first term—in large part benefiting from a new EU-friendly US administration. She will likely face an uphill battle in strengthening transatlantic ties in the event of a second Trump administration. “They treat us very badly,” former President Donald Trump said to Bloomberg News when asked about the European Union on June 25.

Von der Leyen’s confirmation this week goes a long way already to set up the EU for success and avoids an own goal for team Europe. Rejecting her would have forced the European Council back to the drawing board to pick a new—and likely weaker—appointee, wasting more time on internal bickering and politicking when predictability, not chaos, is critical. It’s not hard to picture the jubilee from Beijing, taunts from Moscow, and even snide comments from Washington about EU dysfunction in the face of a no vote. In the words of Greek Commissioner Margaritis Schinas (and von der Leyen ally) on her appointment, “There is no plan B.” It is a good thing plan A worked.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

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Russia’s retreat from Crimea makes a mockery of the West’s escalation fears

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 16 Jul 2024 20:52:12 +0000

This week marked another milestone in the Battle of the Black Sea as the Russian Navy reportedly withdrew its last remaining patrol ship from occupied Crimea. The news was announced by Ukrainian Navy spokesperson Dmytro Pletenchuk, who signaled the historic nature of the Russian retreat with the words: “Remember this day.”

The withdrawal of Russian warships from Crimea is the latest indication that against all odds, Ukraine is actually winning the war at sea. When Russia first began the blockade of Ukraine’s ports on the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, few believed the ramshackle Ukrainian Navy could seriously challenge the dominance of the mighty Russian Black Sea Fleet. Once hostilities were underway, however, it soon became apparent that Ukraine had no intention of conceding control of the Black Sea to Putin without a fight.

Beginning with the April 2022 sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Moskva, Ukraine has used a combination of domestically produced drones and missiles together with Western-supplied long-range weapons to strike a series of devastating blows against Putin’s fleet. Cruise missiles delivered by Kyiv’s British and French partners have played an important role in this campaign, but the most potent weapons of all have been Ukraine’s own rapidly evolving fleet of innovative marine drones.

The results speak for themselves. When the full-scale invasion began, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had seventy four warships, most of which were based at ports in Russian-occupied Crimea. In a little over two years, Ukraine managed to sink or damage around one third of these ships. In the second half of 2023, reports were already emerging of Russian warships being hurriedly moved across the Black Sea from Crimea to the relative safety of Novorossiysk in Russia. By March 2024, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had become “functionally inactive,” according to the British Ministry of Defense.

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Ukraine’s remarkable success in the Battle of the Black Sea has had significant practical implications for the wider war. It has disrupted Russian logistics and hindered the resupply of Russian troops in southern Ukraine, while limiting Russia’s ability to bomb Ukrainian targets from warships armed with cruise missiles. Crucially, it has also enabled Ukraine to break the blockade the country’s Black Sea ports and resume commercial shipping via a new maritime corridor. As a result, Ukrainian agricultural exports are now close to prewar levels, providing Kyiv with a vital economic lifeline.

The Russian reaction to mounting setbacks in the Battle of the Black Sea has also been extremely revealing, and offers valuable lessons for the future conduct of the war. It has often been suggested that a cornered and beaten Vladimir Putin could potentially resort to the most extreme measures, including the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, he has responded to the humiliating defeat of the Black Sea Fleet by quietly ordering his remaining warships to retreat.

This underwhelming response is all the more telling given the symbolic significance of Crimea to the Putin regime. The Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in spring 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, which occupies an almost mystical position in Russian national folklore as the home of the country’s Black Sea Fleet. Throughout the past decade, the occupied Ukrainian peninsula has featured heavily in Kremlin propaganda trumpeting Russia’s return to Great Power status, and has come to symbolize Putin’s personal claim to a place in Russian history.

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Crimea’s elevated status was initially enough to make some of Ukraine’s international partners wary of sanctioning strikes on the occupied peninsula. However, the Ukrainians themselves had no such concerns. Instead, they simply disregarded the Kremlin’s talk of dire consequences and began attacking Russian military targets across Crimea and throughout the Black Sea. More than two years later, these attacks have now become a routine feature of the war and are taken for granted by all sides. Indeed, the Kremlin media plays down attacks on Crimea and largely ignores the frequent sinking of Russian warships, no doubt to save Putin’s blushes.

The Russian Navy’s readiness to retreat from its supposedly sacred home ports in Crimea has made a mockery of Moscow’s so-called red lines and exposed the emptiness of Putin’s nuclear threats. Nevertheless, Kyiv’s international allies remain reluctant to draw the obvious conclusions. Instead, Western support for Ukraine continues to be defined by self-defeating fears of escalation.

For almost two and a half years, Ukraine’s partners have allowed themselves to be intimidated into denying Ukraine certain categories of weapons and restricting attacks inside Russia. This is usually done while piously citing the need to prevent the current conflict from spreading any further. Western policymakers apparently prefer to ignore the overwhelming evidence from the Battle of the Black Sea, which confirms that when confronted by resolute opposition, Putin is far more likely to back down than escalate.

The West’s fear of escalation is Putin’s most effective weapon. It allows him to limit the military aid reaching Kyiv, while also preventing Ukraine from striking back against Russia. This is slowly but surely setting the stage for inevitable Russian victory in a long war of attrition. Western leaders claim to be motivated by a desire to avoid provoking a wider war, but that is exactly what will happen if they continue to pursue misguided policies of escalation management and fail to stop Putin in Ukraine.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Back in the summer of 2020, there were unmistakable signs of growing political engagement throughout Belarusian society. More and more ordinary people were volunteering to join the campaigns of opposition candidates in the country’s upcoming presidential election, or simply expressing their political opinions. Although I was studying outside the country at the time, I also made a conscious decision to continue writing about the political situation in my homeland.

When Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka was then proclaimed the winner of a deeply flawed presidential ballot in August 2020, I was among the thousands of journalists, activists, and academics to speak up against election fraud and condemn the violent Kremlin-backed crackdown that followed. Like me, some had already left Belarus to advance their careers abroad. Others were forced to flee as the regime sought to silence domestic dissent. This large community of exiled Belarusians has continued its open criticism of the Lukashenka regime.

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Lukashenka was able to suppress the 2020 protest movement in Belarus thanks to Russian support. Ever since, he has remained heavily dependent on Moscow for his political survival. In exchange for this backing, he has allowed the Kremlin to expand its influence over Belarus in a process that some have likened to a creeping annexation. Lukashenka has also agreed to play the role of junior partner in Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s hybrid war against the West.

In February 2022, Lukashenka allowed Putin to use Belarus as a base for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. During the first month of the invasion, the country served as a gateway for the Russian march on Kyiv, which the Kremlin hoped would be the decisive offensive of the war. Russia has since used Belarus as a training ground for troops and as a launch pad to bomb targets across Ukraine.

In 2023, Putin announced the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, further involving the country in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow is also accused of funneling migrants through Belarus to the border with the EU as part of its efforts to weaponize illegal immigration.

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While tensions with the West have escalated, the domestic situation in Belarus has continued to deteriorate. Approximately one thousand four hundred people remain in prison on politically motivated charges, while up to six hundred thousand Belarusians are believed to have fled the country, representing more than five percent of the overall population.

In recent years, the Lukashenka regime has signaled its intention to target critics who have left the country. In January 2023, five administrators of a Telegram channel run by exiled Belarusians were each sentenced in absentia to twelve years. Since then, several more opposition politicians and activists have been convicted in the same fashion on charges of attempting to seize power, threatening national security, and organizing extremist groups.

On January 24, 2024, I woke up to news that I also faced similar charges along with nineteen colleagues. While we were arbitrarily grouped together as analysts of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, many of us had never actually met each other. Our trial started in May. None of us were able to get in touch with assigned lawyers, receive court materials, or join the hearings online. Instead, the case proceeded amid an almost complete information blackout until we learned of our guilty verdicts and prison sentences on July 1.

When I received confirmation of my sentence, I was struck by an overwhelming sense of anger at the injustice and absurdity of the entire process. At the same time, I have also been filled with gratitude for the solidarity expressed by international organizations and colleagues.

Our trial is the latest indication of the increasingly authoritarian political climate in today’s Belarus. In my opinion, this attempt to punish critical voices located outside the country and beyond the reach of the Belarusian authorities reflects the insecurities of a man who knows he has long since lost any remaining legitimacy as ruler of the country. Lukashenka’s growing desperation makes him an even greater threat to Belarusians, and means that he is also significantly more dangerous internationally as an ally of the Kremlin.

Those inside Belarus are well aware of the Orwellian reality they must deal with on a daily basis. They know that any public opposition to the regime will likely have grave consequences. In contrast, Belarusians living abroad still have the opportunity to voice our political opinions and share information about the horrors unfolding in our homeland. It is vital we continue to do so. The fact that Lukashenka is now attempting to intimidate us confirms that our efforts are not in vain.

Alesia Rudnik is a PhD Fellow at Karlstad University in Sweden and director of Belarusian think tank The Center for New Ideas.

Lipsky featured in Mercatus Center podcast on tools of financial statecraft

cfalkenek — Mon, 15 Jul 2024 15:57:34 +0000

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Modernizing space-based nuclear command, control, and communications

Peter L. Hays and Sarah Mineiro — Mon, 15 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000

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Abstract
Introduction
What is the NC3 system?
The nature of NC3
Current NC3 missions and space systems
How the attributes of space and space systems shape space security
Geopolitical challenges to the current NC3 system
Counterspace threats to space-based NC3
Modernization plans for space-based NC3
Conclusion and recommendations
About the authors
Acknowledgements

If I take nuclear command and control and spread it across 400 satellites … how many satellites do I have to shoot down now to take out the US nuclear command and control?”

Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations (CSO) United States Space Force (USSF)

Abstract

US nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is a bedrock for nuclear deterrence and the US-led, rules-based international order that it supports. Like the rest of the US nuclear arsenal, NC3 is in the midst of a modernization overhaul. The space-based elements of NC3, however, face different geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges during this modernization. Geopolitically, the two-nuclear-peer challenge, China’s perception of NC3 and strategic stability, and the prospect of limited nuclear use call into question the sufficiency of existing and next-generation NC3. Technically, Russia and China are developing more sophisticated counterspace weapons, which hold at risk space-based US NC3. Bureaucratically, the US Department of Defense (DOD)’s shift to a proliferated space architecture may not be appropriately prioritizing requirements for systems that are essential for NC3 missions. To address these challenges, space-focused agencies in the DOD need to ensure that nuclear surety is not given short shrift in the future of space systems planning.

Introduction

The NC3 system is one of the most opaque, complex, hardened, least understood, and perhaps least appreciated foundations for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. While each military service is busy developing and attempting to resource its instantiation of combined joint all domain command and control (CJADC2), NC3 has not yet enjoyed this same focus and attention. As security dynamics and technology developments continue to evolve, the United States must commit appropriate resources and focus to ensure the continuing effectiveness of NC3. In simple terms, NC3 is the protected and assured missile, air, and space warning and communication system enabling the command and control of US nuclear forces that must operate effectively under the most extreme and existentially challenging conditions—employment of nuclear weapons. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review explains the five essential functions of NC3: “detection, warning, and attack characterization; adaptive nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving and executing Presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces.”¹

The NC3 system must never permit the use of nuclear weapons unless specifically authorized by the president, the only use-approval authority (negative control), while always enabling their use in the specific ways the president authorizes (positive control). Risk tolerance for NC3 systems is understandably nonexistent; there can be no uncertainty in the ability of the United States to positively command and control its nuclear forces at any given moment. The DOD and Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration use the term “nuclear surety” to describe their comprehensive programs for the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons that leave no margin for error. The requirement for nuclear surety is constant, but it is becoming more difficult to deliver because threats to US NC3 systems are increasing, due to geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic trends and developments.

The geopolitical environment has shifted in significant ways since current US NC3 systems were deployed. The space-based elements of NC3 are now threatened in unprecedented ways, due to Chinese and Russian testing and deployment of a range of counterspace capabilities that can hold space-based NC3 systems at risk. As demonstrated by the current war in Ukraine, even regional conflicts can manifest long-standing questions and concerns about NC3 in a multipolar and increasingly complex global security environment. Layer in China’s quantitative and qualitative rise in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the unwillingness of China’s leadership to have basic discussions about strategic stability, and the 1960s architecture that is the foundation of US NC3 systems seems to be growing increasingly inadequate to deal with the geopolitical challenges of today and tomorrow. The reality is that the current NC3 system and architectures were predicated upon a bipolar nuclear geopolitical situation that no longer exists. Today, a multipolar, globally proliferated, and largely unconstrained nuclear weapons environment requires integrated deterrence across domains, sectors, and alliances.

The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, which provides travel support for the Secretary of Defense and their staff to ensure command and control connectivity outside of the continental United States. Credit: US Air Force.

While the geopolitical environment has evolved, so too has the technology available to deliver NC3 capabilities. Many of the current NC3 systems were developed decades ago using analog technology but are now being updated to digital interfaces, switches, and underlying network topologies. This transition will enable enhanced capabilities, but it will also open more threat vectors that can be exploited via various cyber means through all segments of the system. As the space-based systems that are part of the NC3 system are being comprehensively upgraded, whether for missile warning (detecting and characterizing a missile), missile tracking, or delivering persistent assured communications, the DOD must work to eliminate exploitable cyber vulnerabilities and maintain distributed end-to-end network and supply chain security.

Additionally, almost all the DOD’s bureaucratic structures that acquired the current NC3 systems have changed, sometimes in radical ways. Primary responsibility for acquisition of important elements of the NC3 system are now divided between several organizations that are not focused on nuclear surety, making it a significant challenge to achieve effective integration and unity of command and effort across this structure. Moreover, the overall architecture for US space systems is transitioning toward a hybrid approach that uses commercial, international, and government systems and capabilities to enhance space mission assurance. The benefits of this hybrid approach seem clear for most mission areas, but it is not necessarily optimal for NC3. The DOD must ensure that nuclear surety remains a foundational and non-negotiable requirement for next-generation NC3 systems and cannot allow this requirement to be out-prioritized by other important considerations or become adrift in new bureaucratic structures.

Given the importance of the capabilities, evolving geopolitical and technical threats, and the diverse units planning modernization of the system, the United States must think carefully about the best ways to acquire the next-generation, and generation-after-next, of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety in a new landscape that is characterized by a breathtaking degree and pace of change, troubling factors which seem likely to persist or even accelerate. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the US commitment to modernizing NC3 and lays out key challenges:

We will employ an optimized mix of resilience approaches to protect the next-generation NC3 architecture from threats posed by competitor capabilities. This includes, but is not limited to, enhanced protection from cyber, space-based, and electro-magnetic pulse threats; enhanced integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; improved command post and communication links; advanced decision support technology; and integrated planning and operations.”

2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

This paper characterizes the existing NC3 system and focuses on its space-based missions and elements. It describes how orbital dynamics shape space security and examines the emerging geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges to the extant NC3 system. Finally, it analyzes how ongoing modernization programs are addressing these challenges and offers some recommendations.

What is the NC3 system?

The nature of NC3

Department of the Air Force (DAF) doctrine defines the NC3 system as “the means through which Presidential authority is exercised and operational command control of nuclear operations is conducted. The NC3 system is part of the larger national leadership command capability (NLCC), which encompasses the three broad mission areas of: (1) Presidential and senior leader communications; (2) NC3; (3) and continuity of operations and government communications.”²

The current NC3 architecture is comprised of two separate but interrelated layers. The DOD’s 2020 Nuclear Matters Handbook describes it as follows:

The first layer is the day-to-day architecture which includes a variety of facilities and communications to provide robust command and control over nuclear and supporting government operations. The second layer provides the survivable, secure, and enduring architecture known as the “thin-line.”

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised], https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter2.html.

The thin-line uses several communication technologies and pathways to provide “assured, unbroken, redundant, survivable, secure, and enduring connectivity to and among the President, the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and designated commanders through all threat environments to perform all necessary command and control functions.”³ Assessments of space-based NC3 tend to focus most on the ways these systems support the thin-line; this assured connectivity is an essential foundation, but any comprehensive analysis must also consider the contributions of space systems to broader NC3 functions. Moreover, the highly integrated nature of modern command, control, communications, and battle management (C3BM) systems necessitates the integration of NC3 capabilities into a broader system-of-systems across the C3BM enterprise. For the DAF, this integrated system-of-systems is the DAF Battle Network and includes more than fifty-five programs and $21.5 billion in procurement as part of the broader DOD CJADC2 initiative.⁴

An Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), a dual-sided ballistic missile early warning radar, at US Space Force’s northernmost base in Greenland. Credit: US Space Force.

To instantiate a survivable communications network, the NC3 system is comprised of terrestrial, airborne, and space-based systems. Satellite terminals like the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) ensure that the satellite communications, cryptographic keys, and actual control functions of the network are available to the necessary decision-makers during nuclear conflict.⁵ Boeing was the original contractor for the FAB-T program, but a February 2023 report delivered to Congress from Frank Calvelli, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, indicated that FAB-T had fallen more than a decade behind schedule under Boeing and that a new sole-source contract for FAB-T was awarded to Raytheon in 2014.⁶ Allowing FAB-T to fall more than a decade behind schedule is an indication of the DOD’s reduced emphasis on NC3 in the post-Cold War era.

Satellite command post terminals in airborne command centers like the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center and the E-6B Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post (ABNCP) on the Navy’s Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft ensure that national decision-makers can command and control nuclear forces even if key ground sites and decision-makers come under attack.⁷ TACAMO aircraft can link national decision-makers with “naval ballistic missile forces during times of crisis. The aircraft carries a Very Low Frequency communication system with dual trailing wire antennas” and can also perform the Looking Glass ABNCP mission, which facilitates the launch of US land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles using a robust and survivable airborne launch-control system.⁸

Current NC3 missions and space systems

Space systems provide three capabilities that are essential for the NC3 enterprise: missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT), assured communications, and nuclear detonation detection. Space-based MW/MT uses infrared sensors to detect missile launches worldwide. This can be the first warning of an attack and, when combined with other attack indications from systems using different phenomenologies, provides high confidence that an actual attack is underway. This warning is essential for initiating other steps that may include moving the president, conferencing with senior leaders, and determining response options. Today, the space-based infrared system (SBIRS) provides MW/MT. SBIRS consists of the space segment of geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites, highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors, legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, and the associated worldwide deployed ground systems. SBIRS satellites were first launched in 2011, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in August 2022.⁹ In 2017, then-Commander US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Gen. John Hyten famously described SBIRS satellites as “big, fat, juicy targets,” pledging that USSTRATCOM would no longer support acquisition of such NC3 systems and that “we are going to go down a different path. And we have to go down that path quickly.”¹⁰ The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) (and its predecessor organizations) has, since the 1980s, conducted several experiments and developed prototype capabilities supportive of MW/MT/missile defense and adaptive nuclear planning. MDA’s prior efforts include Delta 180, Midcourse Space Experiment/Space-Based Visible, and Space Tracking and Surveillance System.¹¹

Assured, survivable communications capabilities are essential for the president to conduct conferences with senior leaders and exercise command and control over nuclear forces. Space-basing enhances survivability and enables global communications. The Advanced Extremely High-Frequency (AEHF) system currently provides many communication links for nuclear command and control. AEHF provides “survivable, global, secure, protected, and jam-resistant communications for high-priority military ground, sea and air assets.”¹² AEHF replaced the Cold War-era Milstar system; the first AEHF satellite was launched in 2010, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in March 2020.

A rendition of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System, a space-based communication system. Credit: US Space Force.

A final space capability providing important support to NC3 is data about the location of nuclear detonations worldwide. This information is essential for effective and adaptive planning in a nuclear conflict. The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) currently provides this capability.¹³ As described by the DOD, “the USNDS is a worldwide system of space-based sensors and ground processing equipment designed to detect, locate, and report nuclear detonations in the earth’s atmosphere and in space. The USNDS space-based segment is hosted on a combination of global positioning system (GPS) satellites, DSP satellites, and other classified satellites.”¹⁴ The enhanced detection capabilities of the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS-2) payload were first deployed in 2016.

How the attributes of space and space systems shape space security

Comprehensive analysis about modernizing space-based NC3 cannot be complete without a baseline understanding of the attributes of space and space systems that shape the most appropriate modernization paths and trade-offs. NC3 systems were first moved to space in the 1960s because this domain provides unique speed and positional advantages, persistent emplacement, and a global perspective. These developments were highly effective and efficient, despite the considerable expense of developing reliable space hardware and the great energy required to move a satellite above the atmosphere at the bottom of Earth’s gravity well and to accelerate it so it can sustain the specific orbit for which it was designed. Orbital dynamics, along with the lack of traditional cover and concealment measures available on Earth, means satellites can be more easily detected, tracked, and targeted than terrestrial forces, which are routinely able to maneuver and hide.

Attributes of space launch and orbital dynamics also drive space technology and operations in significant ways. Traditional satellite architectures have been shaped by several factors, including the costs and dangers of space launch (still the most hazardous part of satellite operations), significant limitations on capability to service satellites, perceived economies from custom-building very small numbers of increasingly capable and large satellites, and the ability of just a few of these highly capable satellites to perform a variety of key missions very competently. Due to these factors, several countries, and the United States in particular, in the past chose to develop and operate a very small number of highly expensive, sophisticated, and exquisitely capable satellites. Each of these attributes adds to the vulnerability of legacy satellite architectures and exacerbates temptations for enemies to negate them because these orbital assets are so fragile, so few, increasingly important, operate in highly predictable ways, and cannot today be repaired, refueled, or upgraded on orbit.

Another important defining characteristic of most space systems is that they are dual use, meaning that they can be used for both civilian and military applications. This dual-use characteristic has been inherent since the earliest days of space technology development and is highlighted by a description of Wernher von Braun (the leading space technology pioneer) as a “dreamer of space, engineer of war.”¹⁵ The hybrid space architecture under development by the United States is an integrated system of both government (civil, national security, intelligence) and commercial (industry) elements that is also inherently dual use, particularly when the government procures commercial goods and services. This architecture can also be extended to international and institutional (interagency, academia) allies, coalition members, and partners. Dual-use considerations sometimes create difficult balancing and trade-off issues, as the United States and other countries attempt to promote space technologies and activities considered to be benign, while limiting similar capabilities or actions that may be threatening or destabilizing.

An implication of the dual-use nature of space systems is that any satellite that can transmit or maneuver could be sent toward a potential collision (known as a conjunction) with a nearby satellite or used to jam satellite transmissions, making it a simple anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Such use is not likely to be as effective as a purpose-built ASAT weapon, but increasing development of in-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) and active debris removal (ADR) capabilities may blur and complicate distinctions between commercial, civil, and military applications and operations. Similarities between ASAT systems and some of the technologies and operations of ISAM and ADR systems are so great that analysts worry that widespread development of these beneficial commercial and civil capabilities would also create significant but latent ASAT potential.¹⁶ The dual-use characteristic of satellites or spacecraft is perhaps the single largest factor that complicates space security considerations, making it more difficult for analysts to determine ways to incentivize desired applications, constrain malign potential, and consider how these factors shape space superiority.

Dedicated or dual-use capabilities can strengthen capability, capacity, resilience, and security, but security is an ambiguous and relative concept. Analysts use the term “security dilemma” to describe the relative and interactive aspects of security and study them as a cause of war and one of the central problems of international relations.¹⁷ The characteristics of space and satellites exacerbate some of these issues and make their relative contributions to security more ambiguous and elusive. Accordingly, modernizing space-based NC3 in the context of these technical and political issues is a complex endeavor that may promote or inhibit cooperation under the security dilemma.¹⁸

On this subject, strategist Brad Townsend builds from earlier analysis and applies it directly to space, finding that the current space security situation is less dire than some originally predicted.¹⁹ CSO Saltzman acknowledges that the security dilemma is a concern but notes that weapons are not inherently offensive or defensive: “Weapons are just weapons. And the operations that you choose to undertake with those weapons makes them more offensive or defensive.”²⁰ As described in a 2023 New York Times Magazine profile of the US Space Force:

The important question, as [General Saltzman] saw it, was this: At what point does a buildup of defensive weapons in space constitute an ability to conduct offensive operations so that someone else feels threatened? “There is a balance here,” he said. “And this is about stability management. What actions can we take to protect ourselves before we start to cross the line and maybe create a security dilemma?” The line, he suggested—harder to find in space, no doubt, and at this point not clearly defined—had not yet been crossed.

Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?” Interior quotes are from General Saltzman.

A final attribute of space capabilities is rapidly evolving due to the burgeoning commercial space sector: the value of commercial space systems in supporting a wide range of military operations. These contributions have grown exponentially, as illustrated by the stunning successes of the Ukrainians in defending their country following the Russian invasion.²¹ Commercial space capabilities provide critical information that strengthens worldwide support for Ukraine, supply communications connectivity that is essential for coordinating many Ukrainian military operations, and demonstrate that states do not necessarily need to own and operate space systems to use them effectively.

US Vice President Kamala Harris announces a new US pledge to not destructively test direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons during a visit to Vandenberg Space Force Base in April 2022. US Space Force photo by Michael Peterson.

These characteristics of space and space systems are driving the United States toward a wholesale reorientation of its national security space enterprise that is focused on improving resilience and advancing better transparency- and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for space governance. The current enterprise-wide modernization and recapitalization of government space systems provides resilient, robust, and responsive solutions, seeking to take advantage of new capabilities and technologies through approaches including highly proliferated constellations in multiple orbits; in-plane and multi-orbit, multi-node cross-links; and shorter development and deployment cycles. Helpful TCBM steps include the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’s promulgation of twenty-one guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s declaration that space is a fifth operational domain where attacks could invoke Article 5 defense obligations,the DOD’s tenets of responsible space behavior in space, and the pledge by the United States that it will no longer conduct destructive direct-ascent (DA)-ASAT tests that has now been joined by several other countries and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.²² These steps and others seem to be generating momentum toward greater consensus and more specifics on what constitutes responsible behavior in space, which will facilitate the “naming and shaming” of parties that do not act in responsible ways. Nonetheless, these efforts also highlight just how far the space governance regime is from governance regimes in other domains that include much more specific obligations and robust verification mechanisms, rather than voluntary guidelines and pledges.

Geopolitical challenges to the current NC3 system

Two elements of the changing international security environment pose a challenge to the current NC3 system beyond what it was designed to face—principally, the nature and number of nuclear-armed countries which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal and the increasing risk of limited nuclear use. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the “pacing challenge” for the DOD, is currently engaged in a significant nuclear breakout. This has two key consequences for NC3. First, the increased focus on, and risk of nuclear conflict with, China raises the salience of Beijing’s possible lack of understanding of or appreciation for the principle of noninterference with space-based NC3 that Washington and Moscow arrived at during the Cold War. The second challenge posed by China’s nuclear breakout is the so-called two-nuclear-peer problem.²³ The United States may need to deter or, if deterrence fails, restore deterrence against two nuclear peers which may aggress against the United States or its allies in coordination, in sequence, or in overlapping timeframes. This development may raise the requirements for survivable NC3. Finally, US government documents evince a growing concern that Russia and China may be lowering the threshold for limited nuclear use to achieve their aims in a conflict with the United States or its allies, potentially requiring a graduated US nuclear response. These developments create a challenging environment for effective NC3 operations.

The NC3 system is arguably the most important communication system that the US maintains and is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. As such, deliberate degradation or destruction of these capabilities is a “red line” (meaning an unacceptable action that could trigger a nuclear war) for senior US decision-makers. Disruption, degradation, or denial of NC3 capabilities could have strategically destabilizing effects for the United States, as well as the allies that depend on US extended deterrence commitments to ensure their security. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and NATO allies all tangibly benefit from US extended strategic deterrence commitments that are predicated on assured NC3; confidence in US extended deterrence commitments is undermined if states question whether NC3 will always work as needed.

The first key development in the international security environment posing challenges to NC3 is the changing nature and number of nuclear-armed states which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal. China’s growing importance as a nuclear competitor presents a challenge to space-based NC3 because Washington and Beijing do not have a mutual understanding of red lines surrounding NC3 assets that is comparable to the understanding Washington developed with Moscow during the Cold War. The current NC3 system evolved based on important assumptions about strategic nuclear bipolarity between two superpowers with a shared understanding about red lines and at least a nominal commitment to reducing the risk of strategic miscalculation in decisions about using nuclear weapons.

China presents strategic challenges that cannot be met with the approaches used for Russia. The United States and China do not maintain regular strategic security dialogues designed to reach shared understanding about critical issues, such as red lines on disrupting NC3. Whereas Russia and the United States generally agree that degrading, denying, disrupting, or destroying systems associated with NC3 is destabilizing and potentially a precursor to nuclear exchange, there is no such understanding with China, and Chinese leaders may even see value in such uncertainty.²⁴ Additionally, China has chosen to remain outside of strategic arms control treaties and dialogues, ostensibly because it fails to see a strategic benefit to being bound to the terms of such agreements and is unwilling to submit to a stringent verification regime. Instead, China has been pursuing rapid quantitative and qualitative growth in its entire nuclear force structure and C3BM systems, while also concurrently developing and fielding counterspace and cyber weapons that could be employed against US space-based NC3 systems. Specifically, China’s first deployment of its own ballistic missile early warning satellites and putative move toward a nuclear launch-on-warning posture could be quite destabilizing.

The DF-41 land-mobile missile on parade. The DF-41 is one of China’s most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and a significant component of its nuclear breakout. Credit: Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

With China’s rapid nuclear modernization, the United States faces a possible two-nuclear-peer problem of deterring simultaneous, sequential, or overlapping aggression from both China and Russia. China has achieved a strategic breakout with its rapid expansion in scope, scale, and capabilities for strategic nuclear weapons, including their own nuclear triad in development and operations. China is expected to field a nuclear arsenal of at least one thousand deliverable warheads by 2030, a number which may continue to grow, and presents considerable challenges for effective NC3 in various two-nuclear-peer conflict scenarios.²⁵

An additional geopolitical challenge to NC3 is the increased likelihood of limited nuclear use by Russia or China. Limited nuclear use—that is, nuclear employment less than a full exchange against strategic targets in either party’s homeland—poses challenges to NC3 because NC3 elements may need to survive several limited exchanges while maintaining the ability to characterize attacks in detail to enable the National Command Authority to order responses that convey clear messages of resolve and restraint in a graduated manner. Recent world events and US government analysis demonstrates concern that both Russia and China are considering limited nuclear use strategies. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has backslid toward destabilizing activity in which the employment of “tactical nuclear weapons” has been contemplated to an unprecedented extent. As reported by the BBC, “In February 2022, shortly before invading Ukraine, President Putin placed Russia’s nuclear forces at ‘special combat readiness’ and held high-profile nuclear drills.”²⁶ As the conflict in Ukraine continued, Putin made this statement: “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will, without a doubt, use all available means to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.”²⁷ Even before the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, scholars and analysts had grown concerned that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons in a limited way in Europe.²⁸

As will be described in more detail in the following section, the problem of limited nuclear use is particularly nettlesome when considering that the nuclear taboo since Nagasaki may be weakening. Uncertainty caused by the latest round of threatening rhetoric and dynamic saber-rattling over Ukraine clearly reemphasizes the need for a robust, assured NC3 system that can operate through all contemplated nuclear scenarios, including nuclear detonations in space and regional nuclear exchanges. These kinds of unprecedented scenarios highlight tangible architectural threats to the system as it currently exists, even with the strategic competitor with whom the United States has the most historical basis for reducing miscalculation.

Nuclear dynamics have moved far beyond the nuclear bipolarity of the Cold War; today’s world is robustly multipolar with the peer competitors or peer adversaries of the United States having an “unlimited partnership” that is further complicated by their alliances and relationships with other emerging nuclear powers. The NC3 architecture as designed in the 1960s surely did not contemplate India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others potentially using nuclear weapons which the United States would need to be able to detect, characterize, respond to, and operate through. The physical architecture, data throughput capacity links, and even geographic and temporal constraints of the NC3 system all require upgrading and expansion to address today’s far more complex and challenging geopolitical environment.

Counterspace threats to space-based NC3

Accelerating development, testing, and deployment of a range of Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities significantly challenges the ability of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety. Other states, including Iran and North Korea, also possess some limited counterspace capabilities, but these capabilities are considerably less worrisome than those of China and Russia and are not the focus of this paper.

The DOD recognizes significant threats to its space systems from Russia and China, including to space-based NC3. As one of the authors has argued:

By describing space as a warfighting domain, the 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a fundamental shift away from legacy perspectives on uncontested military space operations and aspirations for free access and peaceful purposes espoused in the Outer Space Treaty. America’s potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia, now view space—from launch, to on-orbit, the up- and downlinks, and the ground stations—as a weak link in US warfighting capabilities. Conversely, the United States for generations believed space to be a permissive environment and did not make major investments in defensive capabilities, even as almost all modern military operations became increasingly reliant on space capabilities. These facts, coupled with the reemergence of great power competition, have led adversaries to believe that by denying US space-enabled capabilities, they can gain strategic advantage over US response options—making those options less assured, less opportune, and less decisive.”

Peter L. Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For? Opportunities and Challenges for the US Space Force,” in Benjamin Bahney, ed., Space Strategy at a Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges for 21st Century Competition, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2020, 20. The following five paragraphs draw substantially from Hays’ chapter cited here.

Most disturbingly, US adversaries, particularly China with its lack of interest in strategic arms control and seeming disregard for traditional norms surrounding stability and deterrence, may now perceive that undermining the efficacy of space-based NC3 may be one of its most attractive options for gaining strategic advantage. These are destabilizing conditions in that:

Adversaries may believe they can deter US entry into a conflict by threatening or attacking US space capabilities. This may even embolden adversaries to employ a space attack as a “first salvo” in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. This is a potentially dangerous situation that has moved past an inflection point and is starting to create strategic disadvantages rather than the strategic advantages space traditionally provided the United States. From a Clausewitzian perspective, the Space Force must also consider whether current US space strategy may be approaching a culminating point where it becomes counterproductive to continue either offensive or defensive space operations in wartime [unless it has deployed a far more resilient architecture].

Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 20. Internal citations omitted.

China has reformed its military and developed significant capabilities to hold at risk US space assets. As part of its 2015 military reforms, China established the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF).²⁹ The SSF combines space and counterspace capabilities, electronic warfare, and cyber operations in one organization and enables the PLA to be more effective in its approach to space as a warfighting domain. “The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern ‘informatized warfare.’”³⁰ In the words of a recent DOD report to Congress on protection of satellites:

The PRC views counterspace systems as a means to deter and counter outside intervention during a regional conflict. The PLA is developing, testing, and fielding capabilities intended to target US and allied satellites, including electronic warfare to suppress or deceive enemy equipment, ground-based laser systems that can disrupt, degrade, and damage satellite sensors, offensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missiles that can target satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). The PRC has launched multiple experimental satellites to research space maintenance and debris cleanup with advanced capabilities, such as robotic arm technologies that could be used for grappling other satellites. In 2022, the PRC’s Shijian-21 satellite moved a derelict satellite to a graveyard orbit above geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO).”

US Department of Defense, “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” September 2023, 2-3, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/14/2003301146/-1/-1/0/COMPREHENSIVE-REPORT-FOR-RELEASE.pdf.

The Shijian-21 demonstration was particularly threatening to US space-based NC3, as it indicated a potential capability to grapple and move or disable noncooperative satellites; many of the most important US NC3 systems are in GEO.

The PRC continues to seek new methods to hold US satellites at risk, probably intending to pursue DA-ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO. As the PRC has developed and fielded these counterspace weapons, it has simultaneously promoted false claims that it will not place weapons in space and, along with Russia, has proposed at the United Nations a draft of a flawed, legally-binding treaty on the nonweaponization of space that is inherently unverifiable and unenforceable.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3.

For decades, Russia has developed doctrine and pursued capabilities to target US satellites, including NC3 systems.

Russia reorganized its military in 2015 to create a separate space force because Russia sees achieving supremacy in space as a decisive factor in winning conflicts. Although Russia has a smaller fleet of satellites than China, Russia operates some of the world’s most capable individual ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] satellites for optical imagery, radar imagery, signals intelligence, and missile warning. Russia increasingly integrates space services into its military, though it wants to avoid becoming overly dependent on space for its national defense missions because it views that as a potential vulnerability. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding a suite of reversible and irreversible counterspace systems to degrade or deny US space-based services as a means of offsetting a perceived US military advantage and deterring the United States from entering a regional conflict. These systems include jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based DA-ASAT missile capabilities. In November 2021, Russia tested a DA-ASAT missile against a defunct Russian satellite, which created more than 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and tens of thousands of pieces of potentially lethal but non-trackable debris. The resulting debris continues to threaten spacecraft of all nations in LEO, astronauts and cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and taikonauts on China’s Tiangong space station.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3. Internal citations omitted.

Launch preparations for the Russian Nudol system, which serves as both an anti-ballistic missile interceptor as well as an anti-satellite weapon, 2021. Russian Ministry of Defense

In a most disturbing scenario, the efficacy of commercial LEO satellites in supporting Ukraine could lead the Russians (or the Chinese in a Taiwan invasion, for instance) to assess that the greatest military effectiveness from the limited use of nuclear weapons would be to detonate just one in LEO. A high-altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) would raise the peak radiation flux in parts of the Van Allen radiation belts by three to four orders of magnitude, cause the failure in weeks to months of most if not all LEO satellites not specifically hardened against this threat, result in direct financial damages probably approaching $500 billion and over $3 trillion in overall economic impact, and present daunting response challenges, since the attack would be outside of any state’s sovereign territory and not directly kill anyone.³¹

Modernization plans for space-based NC3

While the NC3 system currently appears to be sufficiently redundant, capable, and secure, it must be modernized to keep pace with the evolving geopolitical environment, technical developments, and planned modernization of the nuclear triad (submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles). As described by the DOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook:

In July 2018, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally appointed the USSTRATCOM Commander to be “the NC3 enterprise lead, with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration.” USSTRATCOM has created an NC3 Enterprise Center inside the command’s headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. On November 5, 2018, Commander, USSTRATCOM stated, “It is imperative that the US government modernize its three-decade-old NC3 in a manner that accounts for current and future threats to its functionality and vulnerabilities.” The NC3 Enterprise Center is developing and evaluating NC3 architectures and approaches for modernization.”

Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 28.

In earlier congressional testimony, General Hyten had simply stated that “nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is my biggest concern when I look out towards the future.”³²

US Navy VADM David Kriete, then-deputy commander of US Strategic Command, announced the initial operational capability of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Enterprise Center in April 2019. USSTRATCOM photo.

No nuclear weapon delivery platform can execute its mission without NC3, but the NC3 system is so complex that a former commander of USSTRATCOM stated it includes over 204 individual systems.³³ While many space systems contribute ISR data that supports NC3, this analysis focuses just on the space systems that were designed for and dedicated to supporting NC3. Focusing on space systems in this way is, however, becoming increasingly difficult, as the DOD works to modernize both its overall space architecture and space-based NC3. Modernizing the ground- and air-based NC3 systems supporting the triad remains on a relatively straightforward path, but the path toward modernizing space-based NC3 is being reconsidered within the context of broader changes to deploy a more resilient hybrid space architecture overall. This requires consideration of different factors and trade-offs than those that shaped legacy US space-based NC3. Defense planners must now consider the value of disaggregated, diversified, and distributed systems supporting just NC3 versus entangled systems supporting many mission areas; the role of proliferation and protection; the proper timing and phasing of deployments; appropriate ways commercial systems and deception might support space-based NC3; and the many challenges associated with balancing and integrating across an increasingly complex NC3 enterprise. A recent detailed analysis of these complex factors and trade-offs from Wilson and Rumbaugh presented the troubling finding that “the US decision to disaggregate its nuclear-conventional satellite communications capabilities poses strategic consequences, but it may not have been a strategic decision.”³⁴ An even more detailed report analyzing just the sensor requirements and trade-offs for missile defense against hypersonic threats is over one hundred pages long.³⁵ As the DOD’s work to field a resilient, hybrid space architecture proceeds apace, it is not always clear that the requirement for nuclear surety in space-based NC3 has been analyzed and weighted appropriately.

The DOD has major programs and plans in place to modernize systems supporting the NC3 missions of assured communications and MW/MT. For assured communications, the plan is to augment and eventually replace AEHF with the Evolved Strategic Satcom (ESS) program by the 2030s.³⁶ ESS will operate in GEO and will provide a worldwide and Arctic protected, secure, and survivable satellite communications system supporting critical networks for strategic operations. The ESS system is being acquired by Space Systems Command (SSC); it “is the first DOD hybrid space program that is leveraging alternate acquisition pathways for each of its segments” under the adaptive acquisition framework that the DOD implemented in 2020.³⁷ ESS satellites are currently being acquired using a middle-tier acquisition (MTA) down-select rapid prototyping competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. SSC is expected to issue a request for proposals on ESS satellites in 2024, and the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.³⁸ In May 2024, SSC announced it is seeking proposals for the development and production of four ESS satellites through a competitive contract award; the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.³⁹ The ESS Program Office plans to transition from the MTA-rapid prototyping pathway to a tailored major capability acquisition (MCA) pathway beginning with the award of the ESS space segment production contract. The space segment is being designed to deliver an integrated system capability that is resilient, flexible, cyber secure, and utilizes a modular open system architecture to support NC3. The ground “segment is leveraging a series of Software Acquisition Pathway contracts for subsets of mission capability in agile software sprints”; in May 2023, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon each won $30 million contracts to develop prototypes of the ground system for ESS.⁴⁰ Use of alternate acquisition pathways and competing teams of contractors is designed to spur innovation and speed, “allowing development to stay ahead of changing strategic need.”⁴¹ The first prototype payloads are due to launch in 2024. Much depends on validating the performance of the prototypes and successful integration of the separate acquisition pathways for the space and ground segments.

Specific details regarding how MW/MT capabilities will be improved are complex and evolving. Efforts are now divided between three separate organizations: SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA), and the MDA. MW/MT is “the first capability area to be redeveloped through a resilient-by-design approach.”⁴² As advocated by General Hyten and explained in a report to Congress: “This effort assessed architectures designed to meet future warfighting performance needs, establish resilience against modern military threats, and ensure cost parameters, resulting in recommendations on numbers of satellites and diversifying capabilities across orbital regimes.”⁴³ Using a Combined Program Office construct, SSC, SDA, and MDA are teaming to develop and implement a system-of-systems integration strategy for MW/MT and missile defense (MD) constellations of satellites in LEO, GEO, medium Earth orbit (MEO), and polar orbital regimes.

These efforts to develop next-generation overhead persistent infrared (NG-OPIR) capabilities are designed to provide MW/MT capabilities that can support MD for evolving intercontinental and theater ballistic missile threats using satellites in various orbits that are more survivable against emerging threats. “SSC’s Resilient MW/MT-MEO space and ground efforts pivot the Department of the Air Force’s legacy missile warning force design to a more resilient multi-orbit approach to counter advanced missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and fractional orbital bombardment threats.”⁴⁴ SCC’s NG-OPIR will be deployed in GEO (Next Generation OPIR GEO or NGG) and Polar (Next Generation OPIR Polar or NGP) orbits.⁴⁵ The original plan called for three NGG satellites and two NGP satellites; in its fiscal year 2024 request, the USSF cut the number of NGG satellites to two, and Congress has subsequently requested more information about the analysis underlying this change to the NGG program structure.⁴⁶ Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract to build NGG satellites and ground systems projected to cost $7.8 billion, and Northrop Grumman won a $1.9 billion definitized contract to build two NGP satellites; the first NGP is to be launched in 2028.⁴⁷ Both the NGG and NGP programs are expected to transition from the rapid prototype MTA pathway to the MCA pathway in early 2024. Additionally, SSC announced that, in November 2023, it “completed the critical design review for six [MW/MT/MD] satellites built by Millennium Space Systems that will go in MEO, clearing the way to start production ahead of a first scheduled launch by late 2026.”

The SDA, an independent space acquisition organization that was established in March 2019 and became part of the Space Force in October 2022, is leading parts of the effort to field resilient-by-design MW/MT capabilities via new proliferated space architectures. SDA’s business model values speed, simplicity, and resilience, while lowering costs by “harnessing commercial development to achieve a proliferated architecture and enhance resilience”; SDA plans to deliver a new layer (or tranche) of LEO satellites to support various missions every two years.⁴⁸ The first satellites in the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer are to begin launching in late 2024 and will include “28 satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) optimized for use by Indo-Pacific Command to monitor Chinese and North Korean missile launches.”⁴⁹ In September 2023, SDA issued a solicitation for the Tranche 2 Tracking Layer that will provide MW/MT capabilities by using infrared sensors for near-global continuous stereoscopic coverage and incorporating missile defense fire-control-quality infrared sensors on a selected number of satellites.⁵⁰ The Tranche 2 Tracking Layer is being designed to have some capabilities against advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems, and is scheduled for first launch in April 2027.

MDA’s current MW/MT/missile defense (MW/MT/MD) program is the HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor), an experimental early warning mission to “demonstrate the sensitivity and fire-control quality of service necessary to support both the emerging hypersonic threat kill chain and dim upper stage ballistic missiles.”⁵¹ Two HBTSS satellites were launched on February 14, 2024; the system is intended to work with SDA’s Tracking Layer, track dim targets not visible with current sensors, and provide near-global coverage. A DOD press release about the HBTSS launch indicated:

MDA, the US Space Force and SDA are collaborating to develop HBTSS as a space sensor prototype demonstration providing fire-control quality data required to defeat advanced missile threats. Ultimately, this data is critical to enabling engagement by missile defense weapons, including engagement of hypersonic glide-phase weapons. This “birth-to-death” tracking by HBTSS will make it possible to maintain custody of missile threats from launch through intercept regardless of location.”

“MDA, SDA Announce Upcoming Launch of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Tranche 0 Satellites,” DOD Press Release, February 14, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3676902/mda-sda-announce-upcoming-launch-of-the-hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space/.

It is laudable that the DOD is moving in innovative ways so quickly and comprehensively to field MW/MT/MD capabilities designed to be more resilient and address evolving missile threats. However, it is not clear from unclassified sources how the various significantly different approaches will meet stringent nuclear surety requirements for MW/MT. Operationally, the new approach will require the USSF to transition from its decades of experience in interpreting high-fidelity infrared data from a few exquisite sensors toward developing improved understanding of new missile threats based on lower fidelity inputs from many more sensors. Effectively integrating across these proliferated sensors acquired by separate agencies to produce an MD “kill chain”⁵² is likely to be an even more significant challenge that will require focused attention and resources. In the words of one missile defense scholar:

It remains unclear, however, how many HBTSS or HBTSS-derived payloads will eventually be fitted to SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation. While MDA requested $68 million for the program in FY 2023, funding is expected to decline after demonstration activities conclude and responsibility for fire control transfers to SSC and SDA. Following this transition, SDA aims to launch four HBTSS-derived sensor payloads as part of its Tranche 1 activities and an additional six fire control sensors in Tranche 2. Further developmental spirals, the priority accorded to the hypersonic defense mission, and SDA’s responsibilities for supporting missile defense, however, have not yet been publicly defined.”

Dahlgren, Getting on Track, 73. Internal citations omitted.

It is difficult to manage acquisition programs to meet requirements for cost, schedule, and performance. Unfortunately, however, it can be far more difficult to integrate effectively across separate systems to achieve required performance for an enterprise such as NC3. Tensions can arise between acquisition and integration objectives, which are made more acute when separate systems are acquired by separate organizations (as is the case for space-based NC3), and present daunting challenges for achieving nuclear surety.

Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). Image courtesy US Missile Defense Agency.

Much of the work to integrate various MW/MT/MD efforts will be performed by the ground segment. The largest ground system effort is the USSF’s Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), a complex program to develop a new ground system for NG-OPIR that is projected to cost $2.4 billion.⁵³ SSC has divided the FORGE program into various thrusts that include FORGE command and control, Next-Gen Interim Operations, FORGE Mission Data Processing Application Framework, Relay Ground Stations, and E-FORGE. Integration across these various thrusts within FORGE to advance unity of effort and meet nuclear surety requirements will be a significant challenge. An additional challenge relates to Assistant Secretary Calvelli’s space acquisition tenet that calls for delivery of the ground segment before launch of the space segment, a goal that may be difficult for FORGE to meet.⁵⁴

There are modest programs to modernize elements of the USNDS.⁵⁵ It should be noted that, as a hosted payload, USNDS does not always enjoy a high priority, and the schedule for its fielding can slip, depending on the priority of its host satellite. Additionally, a former commander of USSTRATCOM has raised concerns about the ability of USNDS data to support NC3 in timely and effective ways.⁵⁶ Overall, even while modernization efforts are underway, the geopolitical and technical challenges to the system are increasing and will require generation-after-next space-based NC3.

Conclusion and recommendations

The modernization of space-based NC3 is of vital importance to US national security objectives. While maintaining constant responsibility for enabling the employment of the world’s most capable nuclear arsenal, NC3 must be modernized to meet the significant changes and challenges presented by the evolving geopolitical and technical environment. Adding to the complexity of this modernization effort is an evolution in national security space architectures and their relationship with commercial providers of dual-use space services. The DOD must maintain a focused and sustained commitment as well as adequate resources to meet the range of daunting challenges that are entailed in modernizing space-based NC3.

As the DOD instantiates CJADC2 programs that are working to integrate sensors and shooters on complex kill webs, the modernization of NC3 systems must continue to meet unique requirements for positive and negative control unlike any other command-and-control system. The recognition of these unique requirements drives special emphasis on understanding deterrence scenarios and objectives, technical capabilities, and potential commercial contributions.

Based on the preceding analysis, this paper presents the following recommendations:

The United States should continue to support the modernization of space-based NC3, with specific tailoring that enables adapting to changes in the geopolitical threat environment, harnessing hybrid architectures and the evolution of national security space architectures, and meeting deterrence objectives across a range of increasingly challenging potential scenarios.
1. Modernization efforts for space-based NC3 systems must adhere to the strict need for nuclear surety at all times, while also exploring areas where technological innovation should be embraced.
2. LEO satellites supporting NC3 should be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND to strengthen deterrence against this type of attack.
3. More study on the specific deterrence scenarios and objectives for space-based NC3 systems is needed. The variance in scenarios, objectives, and threats (nonkinetic and kinetic) should drive modernization priorities.
4. More study is needed on the nuclear surety implications for the current exploration of disaggregation as a means to ensure resiliency.
As one of the authors has argued previously, “A whole-of government approach is then needed to assess the commercial viability [and military utility] of those [space-based] services upon which the US government intends to rely, either wholly or in part, and the government must act to improve the commercial viability of these services.”⁵⁷
1. The government should act to improve the commercial viability of the services deemed necessary through flexible contracting mechanisms and/or procurement.
2. The DOD should maintain unity of effort for space-based NC3 acquisitions regardless of whether the specific effector or system is ground-, air-, or sea-based.
3. The United States should continue supporting and advancing international approaches to strengthen deterrence of attacks on commercial space capabilities and improve protection measures for these systems.
The DOD should recognize the significant challenges and potential incompatibilities it faces in rapidly and simultaneously developing modernized space-based NC3 and fielding an overall hybrid space architecture that is far more resilient.
1. Integrating systems developed by separate organizations with sometimes divergent priorities into a unified NC3 system-of-systems that meets nuclear surety requirements is a novel challenge for space-based NC3 and will require focused attention to overcome. Additionally, NC3 and CJADC2 systems-of-systems must be distinct, but also integrated for national unity of command and effort.
2. Acquisition approaches that emphasize speed, use of commercial-off-the-shelf components, and fielding of ground systems before satellite launch are highly appropriate for deploying a resilient hybrid space architecture but may present dangerous incompatibilities with nuclear surety requirements. The DOD must not rush to deploy space-based NC3 that is not well integrated, suffers from avoidable supply chain and cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and contains other weaknesses that hackers and adversaries can exploit during the decades the next generation of space-based NC3 is likely to be in operation.

About the authors

Peter L. Hays is an adjunct professor of space policy and international affairs at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, space chair at Marine Corps University, and a senior policy adviser with Falcon Research. He supports the space staff in the Pentagon and has been directly involved in helping to develop and implement major national security space policy and strategy initiatives since 2004. Dr. Hays serves on the Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project advisory board, was a term member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Space Security from 2010 to 2014, and is a member of the editorial board for Space and Defense and Astropolitics. He earned a PhD from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and was an honor graduate of the USAF Academy. Dr. Hays served as an Air Force officer from 1979 to 2004; transported nuclear weapons worldwide as a C-141 pilot; and previously taught international relations, defense policy, and space policy courses at the USAF Academy, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and National Defense University.

Sarah Mineiro is the founder and CEO of Tanagra Enterprises, a defense, intelligence, space, science, and technology consulting firm. Over her career, Sarah has worked in venture capital-backed private industry and in the executive and legislative branches of government. Previously, she was the senior director of space strategy for Anduril Industries. Sarah was the staff lead for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee for the House Armed Service Committee, where she led the subcommittee’s activities of all Department of Defense and Military Intelligence Program space programs, US nuclear weapons, missile defense, directed energy, and hypersonic systems. Sarah was the senior legislative adviser to Chairman Mac Thornberry. In this role, she was the primary drafter and negotiator of the Space Force and Space Command legislation for the House Republicans.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not represent the official position of any US government organization.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge Robert Soofer and Mark J. Massa for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic forces has been made possible by support from our partners, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. The partners are not responsible for the content of this report, and the Scowcroft Center maintains a strict intellectual independence policy.

1 Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf, 22.

2 Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, “Nuclear Operations,” LeMay Center, December 18, 2020, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-72/3-72-AFDP-NUCLEAR-OPS.pdf, 17.

3 Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020.

4 Information provided by Maj. Gen. John Olsen, PhD, Space Force operations lead for CJADC2 and C3BM. For the past three years, General Olsen has served as the lead airborne emergency action officer and an instructor/evaluator on the Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post.

5 In “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract for Nuclear-Hardened Satcom Terminals,” Sandra Erwin indicates the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center awarded this contract to deliver an unspecified number of nuclear-hardened satellite communications force element terminals to connect B-52 and RC-135 aircraft with Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) military communications satellites. Space News, June 28, 2023, https://spacenews.com/air-force-awards-raytheon-625-million-contract-for-nuclear-hardened-satcom-terminals/.

6 “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract.” In 2020, Raytheon became part of the RTX Corporation.

7 Air Force Fact Sheet, “E-4B,” https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104503/e-4b/; NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury,” https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/E-6B-Mercury.

8 NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury.”

9 The original plan for SBIRS called for eight satellites; the seventh and eighth satellites were cancelled in 2019 after work began on the next-generation system.

10 Sandra Erwin, “STRATCOM Chief Hyten: ‘I Will Not Support Buying Big Satellites That Make Juicy Targets,’” Space News, November 19, 2017, https://spacenews.com/stratcom-chief-hyten-i-will-not-support-buying-big-satellites-that-make-juicy-targets/.

11 Dwayne A. Day, “Smashing Satellites as Part of the Delta 180 Strategic Defense Initiative Mission,” Space Review, July 17, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4622/1; Jayant Sharma, Andrew Wiseman, and George Zollinger, “Improving Space Surveillance with Space-Based Visible Sensor,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory, March 1, 2001, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA400541.pdf; Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System,” August 23, 2022, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/stss.pdf.

12 United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Advanced Extremely High-Frequency System,” July 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/2197713/advanced-extremely-high-frequency-system/.

13 United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Space Based Infrared System,” March 2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/2197746/space-based-infrared-system/; National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA delivers enduring space-based nuclear detonation detection capability,” March 22, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-delivers-enduring-space-based-nuclear-detonation-detection-capability.

14 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Evaluation of the Space-Based Segment of the US Nuclear Detonation Detection System,” September 28, 2018, https://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Reading-Room/Article/2014314/evaluation-of-the-space-based-segment-of-the-us-nuclear-detonation-detection-sy/.

15 Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage, 2008), is the authoritative assessment of von Braun’s contributions and legacy.

16 See, for example, Brian G. Chow, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 107-32; and James Alver, Andrew Garza, and Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies” (capstone paper, George Washington University, 2019), https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf.

17 Some of the earliest and most influential analyses of the relative and ambiguous characteristics of security include John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-80; and Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-502.

18 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. In this seminal article, Jervis applied game theory approaches to scenarios commonly used to analyze causes of war such as Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma, positing that two variables are primary determinants of how likely or unlikely it is that states can achieve cooperation: 1) whether offensive or defensive capabilities have the advantage; and 2) whether analysts can distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities. Applying this framework creates a 2 x 2 matrix in which Jervis labels situations where offense has the advantage, and analysts cannot distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities as “doubly dangerous” and situations with the opposite conditions as “doubly stable.” Some disagree, but unfortunately, today most analysts perceive that the doubly dangerous situation corresponds most closely to the current characteristics of space. Jervis finds that this situation “is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain.”

19 See Brad Townsend, “Strategic Choice and the Orbital Security Dilemma,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 64-90; and Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: The Orbital Security Dilemma (Milton Park, UK: Routledge, 2020).

20 Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?”

21 See, for example, Benjamin Schmitt, “The Sky’s Not the Limit: Space Aid to Ukraine,” Center for European Policy Analysis, May 19, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/the-skys-not-the-limit-space-aid-to-ukraine/; David T. Burbach, “Early Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War as a Space Conflict,” Atlantic Council, August 30, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/early-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war-as-a-space-conflict/; and Jonathan Beale, “Space, the Unseen Frontier in the War in Ukraine,” BBC News, October 5, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-63109532.

22 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty-Second Session, June 2019, 54-69, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf; NATO’s decision to consider space an operational domain like land, sea, air, and cyber is helpful, but it added caveats weakening Article 5 obligations for attacks in space: “A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” See NATO, “NATO’s Overarching Space Policy,” January 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=nato&utm_campaign=20220117_space; and Secretary of Defense, “Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,” July 7, 2021, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/Publications/Pub-Display/Article/3318236/tenets-of-responsible-behavior-in-space/. On April 18, 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States will no longer conduct destructive tests of DA-ASAT missiles (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/). Through October 2023, thirty-seven other countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have made similar pledges. On December 7, 2022, 155 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for a halt for this type of ASAT testing, while nine voted against the resolution (including China and Russia) and nine (including India) abstained. Ching Wei Soo, Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests: State Positions on the Moratorium, UNGA Resolution, and Lessons for the Future, Secure World Foundation, October 2023, https://swfound.org/media/207711/direct-ascent-antisatellite-missile-tests_state-positions-on-the-moratorium-unga-resolution-and-lessons-for-the-future.pdf.

23 For more, see Madelyn Creedon, chair, and Jon Kyl, vice chair, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf.

24 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, October 2023, 103-13, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

25 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023.

26 BBC, “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” September 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169.

27 Nina Tannenwald, “The Bomb in the Background: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/bomb-background-nuclear-weapons.

28 See, for instance, Matthew Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes, Atlantic Council, April 24, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-strategy-for-deterring-russian-de-escalation-strikes/.

29 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, 70. In April 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and split into three independent units: the PLA Aerospace Force, the PLA Cyberspace Force, and the PLA Information Support Force. Namrata Goswami, “The Reorganization of China’s Space Force: Strategic and Organizational Implications — The rationale behind the new ‘Aerospace Force,’” The Diplomat, May 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/the-reorganization-of-chinas-space-force-strategic-and-organizational-implications/.

30 Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, vii.

31 Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, “High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) against Low Earth Orbit Satellites (‘HALEOS’),” April 2001, https://spp.fas.org/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf. No satellites are known to be hardened against these nuclear effects. Estimates on financial damages from General Olsen. For further details about the threat from HAND and a discussion on a potential licensing requirement for commercial LEO satellites to be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND, see Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2002), 101-03. National security communications adviser John Kirby told reporters at a White House news conference that Russia “is developing an anti-satellite weapon capability, describing it as a serious threat.” Sandra Erwin, “White House Confirms It Has Intelligence on Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon, But Says No Immediate Threat,” Space News, February 15, 2024, https://spacenews.com/white-house-confirms-it-has-intelligence-on-russians-anti-satellite-weapon-but-says-no-immediate-threat. On April 24, 2024, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have reaffirmed its obligation not to station nuclear weapons in space in any manner, as stipulated in Article IV of the OST. Jeff Foust, “Russia vetoes U.N. resolution on nuclear weapons in space,” Space News, April 25, 2024, https://spacenews.com/russia-vetoes-u-n-resolution-on-nuclear-weapons-in-space/.

32 “Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements,” House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, HASC Hearing No. 115-11, March 8, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24683/html/CHRG-115hhrg24683.htm.

33 Yasmin Tadjdeh, “JUST IN: Stratcom Revitalizing Nuclear Command, Control Systems,” National Defense, January 5, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/1/5/work-underway-for-next-generation-nuclear-command-control-and-communications.

34 Robert Samuel Wilson and Russell Rumbaugh, “Reversal of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in Outer Space,” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 1 (September 15, 2023): 3.

35 Masao Dahlgren, Getting on Track: Space and Airborne Sensors for Hypersonic Missile Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/getting-track-space-and-airborne-sensors-hypersonic-missile-defense.

36 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book Volume 1, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Space Force, March 2023, PE1206855SF, 263-76, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY24/Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation/FY24%20Space%20Force%20Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation.pdf?ver=BQWN2ms9pfLNN_gvIz4mQQ%3D%3D.

37 Space Systems Command Media Release, “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program Uses Innovative Competition to Drive Acquisition of Threat-Focused Software,” May 2, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Evolved%20Strategic%20SATCOM%20Program%20Uses%20Innovative%20Competition%20to%20Drive%20Acquisition%20of%20Threat-Focused%20Software.pdf?ver=9hYpAExEQifvYTYBilFG2g%3D%3D; Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, “Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,” June 8, 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500002p.PDF.

38 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.

39 “Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS) Space Vehicle (SV) Development and Production,” GOVTRIBE, May 4, 2024, https://govtribe.com/opportunity/federal-contract-opportunity/evolved-strategic-satellite-communications-ess-space-vehicle-sv-development-and-production-fa880724rb004; Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.

40 “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program”; Sandra Erwin, “Lockheed, Raytheon to Develop Ground Systems for Nuclear-Hardened Satellite Communications,” Space News, May 3, 2023, https://spacenews.com/lockheed-raytheon-to-develop-ground-systems-for-nuclear-hardened-satellite-communications/.

41 “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program.”

42 “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 9.

43 “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 19.

44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates.

45 Space Systems Command Media Release, “Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Program Selects Mission Payload Suppliers,” March 1, 2022, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Next-Generation%20Overhead%20Persistent%20Infrared%20Program%20Selects%20Mission%20Payload%20Suppliers%20v4.pdf; Northrop Grumman, “Next Gen OPIR Polar (NGP),” https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/next-gen-polar.

46 Courtney Albon, “Congress Queries Space Force Plan for Fewer Missile Warning Satellites,” Air Force Times, July 12, 2023, https://www.airforcetimes.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/07/12/congress-queries-space-force-plan-for-fewer-missile-warning-satellites/.

47 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Polar-Orbiting Missile Warning Satellites Move Toward Production,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/space-force-polar-orbiting-missile-warning-sats-move-toward-production/; Courtney Albon, “Northrop Missile-Warning Satellites Pass Early Design Review,” C4ISRNET, May 24, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/05/24/northrop-missile-warning-satellites-pass-early-design-review/.

48 Space Development Agency, “Who We Are,” https://www.sda.mil/home/who-we-are/.

49 Theresa Hitchens, “Budget roadblock delaying Pentagon satellite program to track hypersonic missiles,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/budget-roadblock-delaying-pentagon-satellite-program-to-track-hypersonic-missiles/.

50 Space Development Agency, “Tracking,” https://www.sda.mil/tracking/.

51 “Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Phase IIb Awards,” MDA Press Release, January 22, 2021, https://www.mda.mil/news/21news0001.html.

52 “Kill chain” is a term commonly used by the DOD to describe the ISR and C3 capabilities and processes needed to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess the effectiveness of strike operations.

53 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Taps 4 Firms to Vie for Missile Warning C2 Prototype,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/space-force-taps-4-firms-to-vie-for-missile-warning-c2-prototype/.

54 Summer Myatt, “How Frank Calvelli’s 9 Space Acquisition Tenets Aim to Transform Space Procurement,” GovConWire, January 10, 2023, https://www.govconwire.com/2023/01/frank-calvellis-9-space-acquisition-tenets-aim-to-transform-space-procurement/.

55 Modernizations include the Integrated Correlation and Display System and the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System-2 and -3. Space Systems Command Media Release, “Space Systems Command’s Next-Generation Nuclear Detonation Detection System Completes System Requirements Review,” June 8, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Space%20Systems%20Command%E2%80%99s%20Next-Generation%20Nuclear%20Detonation%20Detection%20System%20Completes%20System%20Requirements%20Review.pdf?ver=IOge6OkS_Rtl1saZF-nJLA%3D%3D.

56 Written communication to author.

57 Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 21.

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This might be NATO’s greatest struggle yet—and it’s global

Frederick Kempe — Mon, 15 Jul 2024 11:05:00 +0000

During NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington last week, my private conversations with allied officials almost always landed on concerns about this year’s US elections, given former President Donald Trump’s doubts about NATO’s value and growing questions about US President Joe Biden’s durability. That was before this weekend’s assassination attempt against Trump at a Pennsylvania rally, which likely has only heightened allied concerns about US domestic volatility and unpredictability around the election—when gathering global challenges demand a steadiness that will be difficult to provide.

Over a decade of remarkable leadership, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has navigated an unruly Alliance of flawed democracies through some of their greatest historical challenges, including Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. In my on-stage interview with him at the NATO Public Forum, which the Atlantic Council co-hosted, Stoltenberg addressed doubts over whether NATO will continue to forge common cause, as he prepares to step down on October 1.

“The reality is that despite all these differences, which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong,” he said. “Because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together . . . That’s the reason why this Alliance prevails again and again.”

These new concerns over the direction of the United States were made all the more urgent by the Alliance’s recognition that NATO now faces a new axis of authoritarians—with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in the lead—that are working more closely together on defense-industrial issues than any such grouping before them, including Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s and the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s.

The NATO Summit was expected to focus on Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine, and so it did, in ways that were both encouraging and disappointing. What was encouraging was that the Alliance did well in providing Ukraine additional military and financial support and even a devoted Alliance command, based in Wiesbaden, Germany. It fell far short by dodging two issues crucial to Ukraine’s immediate and long-term security.

First, and for reasons increasingly difficult to defend—especially in a week when Putin greeted the NATO Summit by striking a Kyiv children’s hospital in a deadly missile barrage—the Biden administration stubbornly refuses to let Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy use US missiles to hit military targets in Russian territory that are killing his people. Second, Biden also continues to stand in the way of any language promising a more certain and time-defined path to NATO membership for Ukraine, even though membership is what will provide Ukraine lasting security.

The less anticipated development of this past week—and the one with the most historic importance—was the summit’s remarkable consensus that the world has fundamentally changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. NATO now acknowledges the need to better address an axis of autocrats bent on revising the global order: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

As Stoltenberg wrote in Foreign Affairs ahead of the summit, foreshadowing its decisions, “Putin shows no intention of ending this war any time soon, and he is increasingly aligned with other authoritarian powers, including China, that wish to see the United States fail, Europe fracture, and NATO falter. This shows that in today’s world, security is not a regional matter but a global one. Europe’s security affects Asia, and Asia’s security affects Europe.”

That’s powerful stuff—and a significant rethink of the threats facing this transatlantic Alliance.

The bottom line, though not quite stated that way, was: Our autocratic adversaries have joined in common cause globally against us, and thus we must do more ourselves to address this gathering threat. The alternative is to live in denial until the threats advance past the point of being able to address them.

No more having it both ways

One of the more concise NATO Summit declarations I’ve read, which is worth reading to gain an overall feeling of the landscape, lambasted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a “decisive enabler” of Putin’s war. Beyond that, it focused on significantly deepening relations with the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4): Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, all of which were represented for the third consecutive NATO Summit.

Thirty-two allies met with their Indo-Pacific partners in encouraging harmony about the challenges China poses. The declaration’s tough, unprecedented language on the PRC is worth reading in full, but note the unusual clarity in its call to action, coming from a multilateral Alliance in which language negotiations can be stultifying: “We call on the PRC . . . to cease all political and military support to Russia’s war effort. This includes the transfer of dual-use materials, such as weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector.”

In my interview with Stoltenberg, he said that although Iran and North Korea were growing more important to Russia’s war effort, “China is the main enabler.” The PRC, he said, is “delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.”

The declaration said: “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.” In his swan song summit as NATO leader, Stoltenberg told me that China “cannot have it both ways,” meaning it cannot maintain “a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies” while fueling the North Atlantic’s “biggest security challenge” since World War II.

It’s fair criticism that for all the growing recognition of China’s crucial enabling role in Russia’s war, around which there is now a welcome NATO consensus, there isn’t any agreement on what to do about it.

The sad truth, one worth saying out loud several times to recognize the gravity of the situation, is that for the moment the PRC is having it both ways. It is threatening Europe and profiting from Europe at the same time.

The world has changed much more dramatically in terms of autocratic common cause since February 2022 than Western leaders and voters have digested.

Still, this past week is a good beginning.

“I think it’s important that we recognize the reality [of China’s role], and that’s the first step toward any action,” Stoltenberg told me. “Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10, 2024.

Ukraine is the new West Berlin

Stoltenberg stressed that despite the presence in Washington this week of the IP4, “there will not be a global NATO. NATO will be for North America and Europe.” But, he added, the North Atlantic region faces global threats, from terrorism to cyber to space. “And, of course, the threats and challenges that China poses to our security [are] a global challenge.”

Perhaps Stoltenberg is right that there won’t be a global NATO, but this week marked the significant beginning of a NATO that understands that its global responsibilities and threats are inescapable. That realization might have started with international terrorism after 9/11, but the increasingly close China-Russia strategic relationship is now at the core of it.

Speaking to the NATO Public Forum, Senator James E. Risch, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, guided the Alliance to a newly published report from the committee’s Republican staff, “Next Steps to Defend the Transatlantic Alliance from Chinese Aggression.”

It lays out a powerful list of recommendations for the transatlantic community, including increased national and local collaboration on countering malign influence and interference from China, as well as improving institutional knowledge about everything from the workings of the Chinese Communist Party to the operational capacity of the People’s Liberation Army.

In the spirit of NATO’s growing Indo-Pacific focus, the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino recently published a “Memo to NATO heads of state and government” on the importance of engaging with the region.

“Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe,” they write. This is the “wrong answer,” Kroenig and Cimmino explain. “Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific.”

With all that as context, this week’s NATO Summit perhaps should have done even more to ensure that Ukraine prevails and Russia fails. But allies did at least more clearly recognize that Putin’s criminal war on Ukraine isn’t just a national or even primarily a European security matter. Ukraine is the front line of a global struggle, a role that West Berlin played during the Cold War and a fact that China and Russia long ago acknowledged in their “no limits” partnership on the eve of the 2022 invasion.

Now comes the hard part

This past week, the contours unfolded for what might be NATO’s greatest struggle yet, after seventy-five years of existence.

Republican Congressman Mike Turner, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee, told me on the sidelines of the summit this week that the burden allies share isn’t only a question of defense spending but also whether they still have the political will to defend democracy and freedom.

Having this week recognized the challenge as global and focused on Russia and China, having more closely embraced Indo-Pacific partners, now comes the hard part for the world’s most enduring and successful Alliance.

What does NATO do next?

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Pınar Dost joins Al-Monitor to discuss Turkey and NATO

aozen — Sun, 14 Jul 2024 10:54:33 +0000

Online Event Fri, July 12, 2024 • 12:15 pm ET

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Czech president: Don’t expect a ‘significant breakthrough’ in the war in Ukraine for the ‘foreseeable future’

Katherine Walla — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 22:20:13 +0000

Watch the event

The Czech president on next steps for transatlantic cooperation post-NATO Summit

AN #ACFRONTPAGE EVENT—President Petr Pavel discusses the future of US-EU collaboration on support for Ukraine and European security.

The support required to allow Ukrainians to fully reclaim their territory is “not realistic at this time,” Czech President Petr Pavel argued on Friday.

Pavel portrayed this sobering reality at an Atlantic Council Front Page event in Houston, Texas, following NATO’s Washington summit, where allies agreed to a “bridge” to membership in the Alliance for Ukraine.

“In the foreseeable future, we cannot expect any significant breakthrough on the front line,” he argued, later clarifying that if Ukraine holds the line and Russia doesn’t achieve any major successes, breakthroughs could happen late this year or early next. “We have to have in mind who is the opponent, and Russia definitely has much greater resources . . . than Ukraine.”

Following the NATO Summit, the Czech president said he was “positively surprised” by the Alliance’s response to Ukraine’s needs, with allies reaching bilateral security agreements with Ukraine and committing to send more financial and military support. “I believe that even [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy] was assured, even though he didn’t receive an invitation to the Alliance.”

As for when that invitation might be extended, Pavel said Ukraine’s military already works “seamlessly” with NATO in a number of areas—but the war is an “obstacle.” “Once we have a ceasefire, once we start negotiating peace, then we should also, in parallel, proceed with the integration,” he said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe, which touched upon the Czech Republic’s support for Ukraine, approach toward China, and hopes for European autonomy.

Czech President Petr Pavel speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe on July 12, 2024 in Houston, Texas.

Holding the line

Pavel argued that Ukraine’s partners should strive at this moment to “convince” Russia that it “cannot achieve any significant successes on the battlefield.” That, he said, would “bring them to the negotiating table.”

“And then once the negotiation starts . . . our position shouldn’t be to legalize occupied territories as Russian,” he clarified, “but rather declare them as temporarily occupied territories.”

“To achieve that, we have to equip Ukraine with all they need to really hold the line,” he said.

The Czech Republic took a “special forces approach” to support Ukraine, the president explained: “Act first, ask questions later,” he said. Low on stocks of artillery to send to Ukraine, Prague instead has located artillery in other countries and pooled funds from NATO allies to purchase rounds for Ukraine.
“We have financial cover for about half of a million rounds,” he said, adding that “it will fully cover Ukrainian need” and even fill reserves. He said that he is looking to expand the model to other forms of equipment.

Unity on China

Allies should concurrently work to convey to China that “it’s not in their interest to be so closely aligned with Russia,” Pavel said.

With four Indo-Pacific partner countries having attended the NATO Summit, Pavel explained that allies need to be “concerned” about security in that region because Euro-Atlantic security “cannot be separated” from security in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.

A Russian victory “would [embolden] China and make it more assertive,” he said, adding that the Indo-Pacific countries and NATO “are together in this global security environment,” because they share the same values.

Pavel said that while China is in many ways a “superpower,” it is also somewhat “dependent” on the “democratic world,” for example for trade. But the West doesn’t have “a common policy towards China,” the president said, warning that China is using that to divide the West “for its own benefit.”

Friendly autonomy

Pavel said that while European countries including the Czech Republic have reduced their dependency on Russian oil and gas, there is “still room for more coordination.” This summer, the Czech Republic and Germany began to push the European Union (EU) to hold talks on how to officially end imports of energy from Russia.

With US elections approaching, and the possibility of another Donald Trump presidency raising concern about the US role in transatlantic defense, some European members of NATO have argued that they need to reduce their military reliance on the United States. The EU “loves the word autonomous” in defense, the economy, energy, and more, Pavel said. “But whenever Europe gets into trouble, we look over the ocean.”

Ideas such as creating an EU army, Pavel argued, “don’t make sense” because such efforts would “duplicate what already exists.” Rather, European countries should “work with what we have,” he said, by reinforcing the European pillar of NATO.

This effort to reduce military reliance shouldn’t be “aimed against” the United States but rather should be seen as building “along with” the United States, he said. “The United States will need an equal partner in Europe, not a dependent child.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

Watch the full event

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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in Channel News Asia on NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships

ylee — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 20:40:54 +0000

On July 11, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was referenced in Channel News Asia discussing NATO’s interest in expanding its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Experts react: What the NATO Summit did (and did not) deliver for Ukraine

Atlantic Council experts — Fri, 12 Jul 2024 15:16:05 +0000

There’s no going back. At the NATO Summit in Washington this week, heads of state and government from the Alliance’s thirty-two allies pledged to support Ukraine on an “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” However, the allies left open when exactly that membership would come, instead noting simply that they “will be in a position to extend an invitation . . . when Allies agree and conditions are met.” Below, Atlantic Council experts are in a position now to take stock of what this pledge means, what Ukraine did get at the summit (including announcements about F-16 fighter jets and air defense systems), and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

John Herbst: There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

Alyona Getmanchuk: Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

Peter Dickinson: Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Shelby Magid: Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

It is the eleventh summit since Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 and the third annual summit since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022. Like its ten predecessors, this summit has taken incremental steps to deal with the challenge posed by the first large-scale war in Europe since Adolf Hitler was defeated. There was progress, sure, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive.

On the plus side, the communiqué states plainly that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” But the question is what steps NATO took this week to address that threat.

The answer came in two ways. The first was in its treatment of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. The hard fact is that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine joins NATO. Yes, the communiqué says the decision on Ukraine’s membership is “irreversible.” And it introduced steps to foster cooperation—putting a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, establishing a training program for Ukraine, and implementing a new venue for cooperation in the NATO-Ukraine Council.

But these steps are modest and contrast with the stronger interim advantages enjoyed by Sweden and Finland before they became members. For instance, why can’t the Ukrainian ambassador to NATO participate in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s decision-making body)? And why can’t Ukrainian officials participate within the NATO apparatus? This might explain why Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, exhibited unease at the NATO Public Forum regarding the question of how he would assess the summit, before acknowledging that Ukraine was “satisfied.”

In contrast to those modest steps, there were better results from the summit in the form of security agreements Ukraine signed with NATO members and partners. While these agreements are no substitute for the protections offered by NATO’s Article 5, in some cases—such as the agreement signed with Poland—they provide additional air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These agreements also pledge long-term security aid.

The picture is also positive when it comes to the actual weapons supplies—the most immediate need—that NATO allies committed to at and around the summit. The new packages include five Patriot batteries and other sophisticated defense systems, Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and F-16 fighter jets. Collectively, this will be a major addition to Ukraine’s defense capability—even if long overdue—and a strong signal to Russia of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

This positive story, unfortunately, has been marred by a well-timed provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin: the egregious attack on Kyiv on Monday that struck a children’s hospital. This was designed to tweak NATO and underscore to Ukrainians how vulnerable they remain. The United States could have turned this incident back on Putin if it used the occasion to remove all restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. (Such strikes are now limited to border areas against targets that are planning imminent attacks.) Instead, the White House announced publicly that its restrictions remain in place, a decision that is bad for the people of Ukraine and for US leadership.

—John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.

Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

The NATO Summit in Washington was a Biden summit, not a Ukraine summit. Even a statement on Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO—clearly a step forward compared with the Vilnius summit last year—turned out to be not an easy gain, but rather a result of rounds of exhausting negotiations.

Ukraine was offered a bridge to membership when it needs a highway—with an invitation or decision to start accession talks without formal invitation. Not to mention that the symbol of a bridge has quite a negative connotation in Ukraine since the days years ago when opponents of Ukraine entering into NATO and the European Union—both inside and outside of Ukraine—stubbornly positioned Ukraine merely as a “bridge” between East and the West.

It’s a false claim that starting Ukraine’s accession process to NATO can and should happen only after the war ends. This process is needed not only after the victory, but in order to accelerate the victory. If you can’t change Putin’s calculus on the battlefield, it is important to do so by adopting political decisions that could encourage him to think about ending the war.

It’s good that some important decisions on enhancing Ukraine’s air defense capabilities were announced in Washington, even though there was no need to wait with those announcements until the summit. Also, for those who really care that Ukraine would be able to protect its people and kids’ hospitals, those decisions should be underpinned with a green light for a deep strike on Russian launchers on its territory and the creation of an air defense shield over the western and southern parts of Ukraine.

—Alyona Getmanchuk is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and is the founder and director of the New Europe Center, a foreign policy-focused think tank based in Kyiv.

Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Few here in Ukraine expected this week’s NATO Summit to produce any major breakthroughs on the key issue of the country’s membership aspirations. Instead, attention was firmly focused on securing meaningful practical support for the fight against Russia. In that sense, the summit was a success, with NATO members promising to deliver much-needed air defense systems and pledging forty billion dollars in military aid over the coming year. Ukraine also used the Washington, DC, event to hold a series of useful bilateral meetings, which produced additional commitments.

At the same time, the Washington Summit Declaration’s rhetoric of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward NATO membership failed to elicit much excitement in Kyiv, where there is widespread cynicism over past failures to match grand proclamations with meaningful progress. A majority of Ukrainians have been calling for a clear roadmap toward NATO membership since Russia’s invasion first began ten years ago. A decade later, they are still waiting.

This mood of quiet frustration was evident during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s Thursday interview with CNN. “We have heard reassuring messages that Ukraine will be in NATO,” he commented. “But we cannot wait another seventy-five years to celebrate Ukrainian accession. It has to happen sooner rather than later.”

—Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

NATO’s Washington summit was a mixed bag when it comes to deliverables for Ukraine. While the seventy-fifth anniversary summit had a celebratory tone for many in the Alliance, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians.

The summit served as another occasion for disjointed feelings for those focused on Ukraine’s security and future. The week started with Russian forces firing a cruise missile into a Ukrainian children’s hospital and ended with champagne toasts and celebrations in Washington.

As volunteers in Kyiv helped dig children’s bodies out of the hospital’s rubble, NATO allies applauded their efforts to support Ukraine. There is reason for praise—the summit’s communiqué had strong language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward membership, and allies made commitments for political, military, and financial support along with efforts to enable further integration into NATO. Those allied commitments included much-needed decisions to enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and the launch of the Ukraine Compact with commitments to Ukraine’s long-term defense and security largely made through bilateral agreements. The NATO-Ukraine relationship grew stronger, while the Alliance also rightfully acknowledged the threat Russia continues to pose and the significant assistance it gets from China in its war effort.

While these decisions are positive, Ukraine still needs more. There are a number of NATO allies who would like to have seen the summit go further on Ukraine’s membership in NATO and immediate military support. Strong words and nonbinding agreements are important, but they don’t provide timelines, nor do they prevent missiles from destroying more hospitals. Ukraine’s leaders hoped to use the summit to get all restrictions removed on the use of US and other Western weapons against military targets in Russia. Yet even after the heinous attack against the children’s hospital, the White House shamefully announced that it is not changing its policy. When asked about those limitations on Thursday, US President Joe Biden replied that it wouldn’t make sense to strike the Kremlin, despite this being far from Ukrainian intentions. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, it is “crazy” that Ukrainian forces can’t attack the military bases firing missiles at them, including the military base that launched the attack on the hospital earlier this week.

NATO leaders can still be proud of the steps they took in the right direction for Ukraine, but they can’t stop here. The focus on tangible steps for support to Ukraine and work toward Kyiv’s membership must continue with an urgency and quick pace. Following the summit, NATO can’t go away for summer vacation. Ukraine doesn’t have the convenience of waiting for the fall, while Russia continues to unleash criminal attacks.

—Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

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Hospital bombing was latest act in Russia’s war on Ukrainian healthcare

Olha Fokaf — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:58:08 +0000

The bombing of Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital in Kyiv on July 8 has sparked a wave of global condemnation, with US President Joe Biden calling the attack a “horrific reminder of Russia’s brutality.” Meanwhile, others have noted that this latest airstrike was not an isolated incident. “Once again, Russia has deliberately targeted residential areas and healthcare infrastructure,” commented France’s representative at the UN.

Ever since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion almost two and a half years ago, the Kremlin has faced repeated accusations of deliberately targeting Ukrainian medical facilities. On the first anniversary of the invasion, CNN reported that “nearly one in ten” Ukrainian hospitals had been damaged as a result of Russian military actions. Underlining the frequency of such incidents, Kyiv’s Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8.

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As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

The Russian military has killed a large number of Ukrainian healthcare professionals over the past two and a half years. Monday’s bombings resulted in the deaths of an least six Ukrainian medics. They joined hundreds of colleagues from the healthcare industry who have been killed since the invasion began. Russian military actions have also resulted in billions of dollars worth of damage to Ukrainian healthcare facilities. In many cases, this has made it impossible to continue providing essential medical support, leading to significant further human costs.

The campaign against Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is in no way exceptional and appears to align with Russian military doctrine. Similar patterns of attacks on clinics and hospitals have been identified during Russian military campaigns in Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, and beyond. Unless Russia can be held accountable for the targeting of healthcare infrastructure, it potentially opens the door for other countries to adopt similar military tactics in future conflicts.

Eurasia Center events

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

Conflict Russia Security & Defense Ukraine

According to international humanitarian law, healthcare institutions and medical personnel are afforded specific and enhanced protection in conflict zones. Despite this status, Russia is accused of systematically targeting medical facilities across Ukraine. These attacks have been documented by the “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine” project, which is run by a coalition of Ukrainian and international civil society organizations.

In addition to direct military attacks on healthcare infrastructure, research carried out by this civil society initiative has also identified a clear pattern of Russian behavior in occupied areas involving restricted access to essential healthcare services. Throughout regions of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, the occupation authorities reportedly withhold medical care unless Ukrainians accept Russian citizenship and are otherwise cooperative.

It is also crucial to acknowledge the indirect impact of the Russian invasion on Ukrainian healthcare. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 has created a range of long-term challenges including unprecedented demographic changes and a dramatic increase in mental health disorders. The healthcare ramifications of Russian aggression extend beyond Ukraine’s borders, including the burden placed on foreign healthcare systems by millions of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war.

Prosecuting Russia for war crimes related to the targeting of Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure is likely to be an extremely challenging and time-consuming process. Potential obstacles include slow judicial systems, difficulties in identifying individuals responsible for deliberate attacks, and problems establishing clear links between the perpetrators and the crime. Collecting evidence that meets international prosecution standards is also a complex task during ongoing combat operations.

In order to break the cycle of impunity, the international community must prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who deliberately target healthcare infrastructure and medical personnel. This process should involve international and domestic legal systems along with the relevant UN investigative bodies.

Russia is clearly targeting the Ukrainian healthcare system and weaponizing the provision of medical services as part of a campaign aimed at breaking Ukrainian resistance and strengthening Moscow’s grip on occupied regions of the country. Unless there is accountability for these crimes, Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedent that will lead to similar offenses in other conflict zones.

Olha Fokaf is a healthcare specialist currently serving as a consultant to the World Bank in Kyiv.

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

Paul Grod — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:33:21 +0000

NATO leaders have this week declared that Ukraine’s path to membership is “irreversible,” but once again stopped short of officially inviting the country to join the alliance. This represents another missed opportunity to end the ambiguity over Kyiv’s NATO aspirations and set the stage for a return to greater international stability.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was high on the agenda as alliance leaders gathered in Washington DC for NATO’s three-day annual summit. This focus on Ukraine was hardly surprising. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is the largest European conflict since World War II, and poses substantial security challenges for all NATO members.

Since the invasion began almost two and a half years ago, Russia has strengthened cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, who all share Moscow’s commitment to undermining the existing rules-based world order. The emergence of this Authoritarian Axis has helped underline the need for a decisive NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Alliance members are acutely aware that China in particular is closely monitoring the NATO reaction to Moscow’s invasion, with any Russian success in Ukraine likely to fuel Beijing’s own expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere.

While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, this week’s summit confirmed that there is still no consensus within NATO over Ukrainian membership. On the contrary, the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue.

Objections center around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

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There are five compelling reasons to invite Ukraine to join NATO. Firstly, it would end Russian imperial ambitions in Ukraine. By formally inviting Ukraine to join NATO and announcing the commencement of accession talks, the alliance would send a clear message to Moscow that its dreams of subjugating Ukraine and restoring the Russian Empire are futile. This would represent a watershed moment for modern Russia that would likely force the country to rethink its role in the wider world.

Secondly, Ukrainian membership would significantly strengthen NATO. Ukraine boasts one of Europe’s largest, most capable, and innovative armies. For almost two and a half years, Ukrainian troops have defied expectations and successfully resisted the Russian military, which is widely regarded as the world’s second most powerful army. As a member of the NATO alliance, Ukraine would bolster Europe’s security, contributing its unique combat experience and knowledge of the most advanced battlefield technologies.

Third, inviting Ukraine to join NATO would help deter Russia from engaging in aggression or malign actions in other parts of Europe. It would confirm the counter-productive nature of Russia’s revisionist agenda and the likelihood of further negative consequences if the Kremlin continues to pursue policies hostile to the West. The security of Ukraine, eventually guaranteed by Article Five of the Washington Treaty, would ensure stability and peace throughout the Euro-Atlantic space.

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Fourth, Ukraine would be a particularly committed member of the NATO alliance. Polls consistently indicate that around three-quarters of Ukrainians back NATO membership, representing a higher level of public support than in many existing alliance members.

Ukrainian officials and Ukrainian society as a whole have a very good understanding of the responsibilities that would come with joining NATO. Throughout the past decade, Ukraine has demonstrated a high level of financial discipline, complying with NATO’s defense spending guidelines stipulating two percent of GDP. The Ukrainian military has also made major progress toward interoperability and the adoption of NATO standards.

The fifth compelling argument for Ukrainian NATO membership is the signal this would send to the international community. Inviting Ukraine to join the alliance would demonstrate the unity and resolve of the collective West at a time when Russia and other autocracies are looking for signs of weakness.

Few expected this year’s NATO summit to produce any meaningful breakthroughs toward Ukrainian membership. Nevertheless, the lack of progress will be welcomed by Russia, and will inevitably fuel frustration in Ukraine. Once again, NATO leaders have offered strong words but been unable to back this up with decisive actions.

Despite this setback, it is important to continue the debate over Ukraine’s future accession in the months ahead. Crucially, Ukrainians are not asking to join NATO immediately, and do not expect to receive the benefits of the alliance’s collective security in the context of Russia’s current invasion. Instead, they seek an invitation that will create a realistic and practical road map toward future membership.

Most Ukrainians see NATO membership as the only way to guarantee the long-term security of their nation against Russia and create the conditions for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Unless a firm invitation to join the alliance is forthcoming, they fear that any ceasefire agreement with Moscow will only provide a temporary pause before Russia’s next attack.

Paul Grod is President of the Ukrainian World Congress.

Moller featured in Eurasia Review on NATO’s challenges in Russia-Ukraine war

ylee — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:26:00 +0000

On July 10, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Sara Bjerg Moller’s recent analysis was republished in the Eurasia Review discussing the challenges NATO faces with its ongoing support for Ukraine amid heightened tensions with Russia. She expressed concerns about the “NATOization” of the conflict and emphasized the need for NATO to maintain a balanced approach to avoid unintended escalation and to ensure the alliance’s involvement does not worsen the situation in an already volatile region.

Fellow

Sara Bjerg Moller

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Danish Europe & Eurasia

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Ukraine’s prayer breakfast challenges Kremlin claims of religious persecution

Steven Moore — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 19:50:38 +0000

On June 29, more than eight hundred participants from fifteen countries representing a dozen different religious denominations gathered in the historic heart of Kyiv for Ukraine’s annual National Prayer Breakfast. The day before the breakfast, two Ukrainian Greek Catholic priests, Father Ivan Levytsky and Father Bohdan Geleta, had been released from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange brokered by the Vatican Diplomatic Corps. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the priests back to Ukraine in a speech that drew tears.

I was honored to be seated close to the two freed holy men. Their features were tight and drawn from months of captivity and starvation, but this only served to accentuate the smiles on their faces from being able to once again worship without threat of Russian violence. Their strength and courage permeated the room like incense.

The Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast, organized by Ukrainian evangelical Christian leader Pavlo Unguryan, first emerged from the regional prayer breakfast movement in Ukraine almost twenty years ago. The late June event was Ukraine’s tenth national prayer breakfast and notably, the first held under the auspices of the Office of the President. This presidential backing reflects the importance attached to religious freedom in Ukraine’s fight for national survival.

A former member of the Ukrainian Parliament from Black Sea port city Odesa, Ukrainian Prayer Breakfast organizer Unguryan has been building bridges between the American and Ukrainian evangelical communities for more than a decade. His relationships with key members of the US Congress reportedly helped provide the spiritual and emotional connection that convinced many Republicans to vote for a major new Ukraine aid package in April 2024. US officials were among the participants at this year’s breakfast in Kyiv, with a series of video addresses from members of Congress including Speaker Mike Johnson along with senators Richard Blumenthal and James Lankford.

The event was held in Kyiv’s Mystetskyi Arsenal, a cavernous former munitions plant located across the street from the one thousand year old Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, one of the holiest sites in Orthodox Christianity. The list of attendees reflected the diversity of religious belief in today’s Ukraine. At one table close to mine, a Japanese Buddhist monk broke bread with Crimean Tatar Muslims during a service led by an evangelical Protestant, with prayers offered in Hebrew by Ukraine’s chief rabbi.

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Ukraine’s National Prayer Breakfast represents an important reality check to Russian propaganda, which seeks to accuse the Ukrainian authorities of engaging in religious persecution. In fact, it is the Russian Orthodox Church itself that has declared a “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, has offered spiritual justification for the current invasion, and has said that Russians who die while fighting in Ukraine will have all their sins washed away.

Kirill has allies in today’s Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) is historically the local Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church and remains the second largest Orthodox denomination in the country in terms of parishioners. Despite some effort to distance itself from the Kremlin following the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the UOC remains closely associated with the Russian Orthodox Church and is staffed with clergy who have spent their entire careers reporting to Moscow. Around one hundred members of the UOC clergy are currently in prison or awaiting trial for a range of national security-related offenses including actively aiding the Russian military.

Recent research and polling data indicates that large numbers of former adherents are now leaving the UOC, while as many as eight-five percent of Ukrainians want their government to take action against the Russian-linked Church. However, while the Ukrainian authorities attempt to address this complex national security challenge, Kremlin-friendly public figures in the US such as Tucker Carlson, Candace Owen, and Marjorie Taylor Greene have accused Ukraine of persecuting Christians. A team of lobbyists, allegedly funded by a prominent pro-Kremlin Ukrainian oligarch, is currently canvassing Capitol Hill giving this message to members of Congress.

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Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

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Claims of religious persecution by the Ukrainian authorities are not only deliberately misleading; they also serve to obscure the very real crimes being committed against Ukraine’s Christian communities by Russian occupation forces. In areas of Ukraine that are currently under Kremlin control, virtually all churches other than the Russian Orthodox Church have been forced out. Even more alarmingly, a significant number of Christian community leaders have been abducted, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.

The details of Russia’s alleged crimes are often shocking. Baptist children’s pastor Azat Azatyan says Russians attached electrical wires to his genitals. In many cases, Russian Orthodox Church clergy are directly implicated. Evangelical pastor Viktor Cherniiavskyi claims to have been tortured with a taser while a Russian Orthodox priest tried to cast demons out of him. His alleged crime? Being an evangelical Christian.

International awareness of Russia’s hard line campaign against religious freedom in occupied regions of Ukraine is now finally growing. This is shaping attitudes among Christians toward the Russian invasion. While waves of Russian propaganda succeeded in sowing doubt among some Republicans during 2023, recent research has found that seventy percent of Republicans who identity as evangelical Christians are more likely to support aid to Ukraine when they learn of Russia’s oppressive policies against Christians in occupied Ukrainian regions.

The Kremlin is openly using religion to further the Russian war effort. The Russian Orthodox Church routinely portrays the invasion of Ukraine in religious terms, while members of the ROC clergy promote the war as a sacred mission. Throughout occupied Ukraine, all other Christian denominations are prevented from operating, with individual community leaders at risk of being detained or worse.

In stark contrast, the recent Ukrainian National Prayer Breakfast in Kyiv highlighted the Ukrainian government’s commitment to values of religious tolerance and diversity. This is the pluralistic Ukraine that millions of Ukrainians are now struggling to defend. They deserve the support of everyone who values freedom of religion.

Steven Moore is the Founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project.

Michta in Politico, RealClearWorld, and RealClearDefense on why US policymakers should reconceptualize their understanding of the international order

gmatchett — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:49:25 +0000

Original SOurce

On July 9, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in Politico, RealClearWorld, and RealClearDefense on why the United States must change its thinking about the international system, which would allow policymakers to think more deeply about the “vision of victory” for the global “system-transforming war that’s been all but declared by the newly formed ‘axis of dictatorships.’” He emphasized that, if the United States and its democratic allies would like to preserve peace, a cultural change is critical to reorganize economic activity and mobilize resources for the future.

We need to bring national security front and center into how we prepare for the future.

Andrew Michta

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor

Atlantic Council — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:19:05 +0000

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NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jake Sullivan
National Security Advisor, United States

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, everybody in the room. Good afternoon in Europe and all around the world joining us virtually.

Throughout its history, NATO has stood as a major force for good, advancing peace, prosperity and freedom across the Euro-Atlantic and beyond. US leadership has always been a central pillar in strengthening NATO’s collective defense, maintaining stability and security, and promoting peace since the alliance’s inception in 1949. What we’ve learned the last two days and what we all know is that the alliance faces new challenges, and we face a host of new challenges to the global order—maybe the biggest threat to the global system since the 1930s.

President Biden has called this an inflection point. The Atlantic Council has been using that language for some years, seeing it as the fourth inflection point—the period after World War I, period after World War II, period after the Cold War—and the fourth now will be the period after Ukraine prevails in its war—in Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

What all those inflection points have in common is they have been shaped by US leadership alongside partners and allies in a less favorable way at the end of World War I, a more favorable way at the end of World War II, and this is history in motion. The post-Cold-War world is over, and we’re entering a new era that our next speaker, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, has defined as an era of strategic competition in an age of interdependence. Navigating this new era will again require US leadership—principled US leadership alongside partners and allies.

It’s in that spirit that it’s my distinct honor to introduce a US strategic thinker and actor whose insights and vision are crucial as we navigate the complex challenges of this century. His dedication to safeguarding international cooperation and advancing collective security has been unwavering.

Jake Sullivan’s career is marked by high integrity, intellectual rigor, a deep commitment to diplomacy, strategic thinking, and the pursuit of peace and stability. His leadership has been instrumental in strengthening our alliances, addressing global threats, and promoting a world order based on mutual respect and cooperation. He, like all of us, is navigating wars in Europe, the Middle East, tensions with China. Seldom has a national security advisor dealt with so many challenges simultaneously, as has the Biden administration.

Earlier this year at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Jake rightly contextualized this inflection point in which we find ourselves today. He said, and I quote, “Nothing in world politics is inevitable. We are in command of our own choices to shape the future for the benefit of our fellow citizens and future generations to come.” And that’s why we’re here today. That’s why we’re here all week, to make the right choices that shape that future.

So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the twenty-eighth assistant to the president for national security affairs, Jake Sullivan.

JAKE SULLIVAN: Well, good morning, everyone. It’s great to be here with all of you. And I really want to thank Fred for that unduly generous introduction. But I especially want to thank the entire team who made this forum possible, because this forum is a critical pillar of the summit. Every think tank, every sponsor, every NATO leader, every partner, every participant, and, frankly, every citizen who has participated in this forum, either live or virtually, over the course of this summit. I’m honored to have the chance to be here to just say a few words to such an impressive group.

I know that one thing that has been on all of our minds throughout this summit, and in the lead up to it, is Russia’s brutal war of conquest against Ukraine. Where are we and where are we headed? Just a few months ago, the situation looked extremely grim. Security funding for Ukraine was held up in our Congress here in Washington, and we all saw the consequences. Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines running out of artillery shells, literally rationing ammo. Ukrainian families worried that Russian forces would take town after town. And we did indeed see the Russians try to press their advantage, seizing that window of opportunity to take additional territory.

And back in April, just a few months ago, there were voices predicting that by the time of this summit here in Washington today, Ukraine’s lines would crack, Russia would be making a major breakthrough, and the backdrop of this summit would be Russia surging forward across the front. And to be frank, I imagine that many of the people actually in this room today thought that might be the case as well. But Ukrainian forces stood strong. And President Biden, with bipartisan support in Congress, moved heaven and earth to get the national security funding for Ukraine passed. And since then, the picture has changed considerably.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive stalled out. Russia is continuing to throw wave after wave of men into the fight, taking little increments of territory but at astonishing cost. By and large, the front lines have stabilized. Ukrainian mobilization efforts have improved. Ukrainian units are building stronger fortifications and defensive lines. And, day by day, they’re pushing back. This is due to the people of Ukraine, to their sheer courage and commitment to their country and its freedom. But it’s also due to the support of the United States and nations around the world, including NATO allies here gathered at this summit. So this morning I want to speak a little bit about the picture as we see it in Ukraine, and the steps that we are taking to ensure that this war is a failure for Russia and a success for Ukraine.

I’ll start on the military side of things. The fundamentals of this conflict are artillery and air defense. And over the last few months, we’ve surged both to Ukraine, with the new resources authorized by the Congress, hundreds of thousands of rounds of 155 ammunition to the front lines to help Ukraine repel Russian attacks. And we’ve now provided Ukraine with long-range capabilities, ATACMS missiles, which the Ukrainians are employing with good effect in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, including in Crimea. And at this summit we’ve continued to make major moves.

First, allies have committed to collectively provide Ukraine with at least forty billion euros’ worth of security assistance over the next year. And that’s not just a dollar sign; that is equipment, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, missiles, the whole range of capabilities that Ukraine needs to be able to effectively fight and win.

Next, in partnership with our allies, we will provide Ukraine with five strategic air defense systems and dozens of tactical systems that are especially relevant to help protect Ukrainian forces on the frontlines. The strategic air systems will help Ukraine as it endures a continued pounding by Russia of its energy grid with Russian missiles and drones, and a continued assault on its frontlines by Russian planes. And we saw the horrific reality of Russia’s brutality with the attack on the children’s hospital in Kyiv just a few days ago, and we are working with the Ukrainians to deal with that attack and to respond with force and vigor.

From our own production, we’ll deliver hundreds of critical air defense missiles to Ukraine over the next year as well. There was a point earlier this year when it looked like Ukraine might run out of interceptors. But thanks to decisions President Biden has taken working with allies and partners, we will ensure that Ukraine remains supplied with the air defense missiles it needs for all of the batteries that we and our allies are now providing.

And together, the United States, Denmark, and the Netherlands have begun the transfer of F-16s to Ukrainian forces. And Ukrainian pilots will be operating in theater with those F-16s this summer. Like I said, major moves.

And we’re also steeled for the struggle ahead. President Putin thinks he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters, and he’s taken steps to put Russia’s industry—its defense industry, in fact its entire economy—on a wartime footing. And with help from Iran, from North Korea, and from the People’s Republic of China, he’s attempting to undertake Russia’s most significant defense expansion since the height of the Cold War. But make no mistake: This unsustainable war spending masks underlying weakness and fragility, and the economic costs for Russia are mounting and will compound over time.

Meanwhile, NATO allies have been making historic investments in our own defense industrial bases without distorting our national economies the way Russia has. Yesterday, for the first time ever, every ally pledged to develop plans to strengthen their defense industrial capacities at home. And like our defense spending commitment, these individual pledges are critical to our collective security. They’re going to help enable the alliance to prioritize production of the most vital defense equipment we need in the event of conflict and to produce the capabilities Ukraine needs as we speak to fight Russia on the battlefield. These pledges will also help forge new industry partnerships across the alliance, create jobs, and strengthen our economic competitiveness. And they will spur greater investment in NATO’s most significant advantage, our technology and innovation.

As the folks in this room know very well, Russia’s brutal war of conquest in Ukraine is evolving rapidly. The very shape of warfare is transforming before our eyes because of innovations—often deadly innovations—in technology and techniques and tactics. Ukraine’s continued success in this fight and our success in any future fight will depend on innovation, on creativity, on entrepreneurship, on adaptability. Ukraine and the Ukrainian people have that in spades, and they’ve demonstrated that since before the war began. But Ukraine will also have help from the collective innovation and entrepreneurship of its Western partners, and no one should bet against our collective advantage in this area. Already, we’re working with Ukraine to solve some of the key technological challenges of an evolving battlefield—electronic warfare, drones, demining—and more where that came from as the weeks and months unfold.

Now, taken all together the steps that I’ve laid out have put Ukraine in a stronger position on the battlefield, but the military side of this equation is only one part of the progress that we have seen over the course of 2024. Ukraine, with the support of the United States and other allies and partners, has made really remarkable diplomatic progress as well. Just look at the last month alone.

At the G7 summit in Italy, the United States and our partners reached a historic decision to make Russia pay for the damage they’ve caused by unlocking fifty billion from the Russian sovereign assets that we froze together. In Switzerland just a couple of days after that G7 summit, Vice President Harris and I had the honor to attend Ukraine’s peace conference to support President Zelenskyy’s vision for a just and lasting peace, in line with the UN Charter. That peace summit, attended by more than one hundred countries and international organizations, was a remarkable sign of Ukraine’s diplomatic strength and staying power—both because of the broad range of countries represented, and because those countries spoke with a single voice to say that any peace must be based on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the basic maxim that we cannot allow one nation to take another nation’s territory by force.

In this same timeframe, around the G7 summit, President Biden and President Zelenskyy signed a bilateral security agreement reflecting a long-term commitment from the United States of America to provide Ukraine the means to ensure its future security. It was genuinely historic. And in a few hours, we’re going to make history again. President Biden will convene more than twenty world leaders, who have also signed their own bilateral security agreements with Ukraine, to launch the Ukraine Compact. This compact knits all of these countries together. And it makes clear that we will continue to support Ukraine in this fight, and we will also help build its force so it can credibly deter and defend against future aggression as well. And after this war is over, all of the countries in the compact will continue to have Ukraine’s back. just like we have it now.

Over the last couple of days, NATO has come together to announce new measures of long-term support for Ukraine. And the session this afternoon of the NATO Ukraine Council will put these on full display. This includes a new NATO military command in Germany led by a three-star general who will launch a training, equipping, and force development program for Ukrainian troops. Secretary General Stoltenberg will appoint a new NATO senior representative in Kyiv to deepen Ukraine’s institutional relationship with the alliance and engage with senior Ukrainian officials.

The alliance reaffirmed in its communique yesterday that Ukraine’s future is in NATO. This summit, the Washington Summit, is about building a bridge to NATO for Ukraine as they continue to implement important reforms. And the steps I’ve just laid out are the building blocks of that bridge. Together they make clear, Putin cannot divide us. He cannot outlast us. He cannot weaken us. And Ukraine, not Russia, will prevail in this war.

The landscape of this conflict today is far different than it was in April, when Ukraine was running out of supplies and equipment and Russia was on the move. Today on the battlefield, Russia is grinding away, but not breaking through. And Ukraine is exacting massive costs and attritting Russian strategic capabilities. Diplomatically, Ukraine has concluded a successful peace summit and signed new bilateral security agreements with more than twenty countries, as I mentioned before. And at this summit, Ukraine has secured a historic set of deliverables—air defense, F-16s, additional security assistance, a compact of nations committed to supporting Ukraine for the long term, and the concrete elements of a bridge to NATO.

It doesn’t mean the days ahead, the weeks ahead, the months ahead are not going to be difficult. They will be difficult. And no one knows that better than the people fighting on the front lines. None of the progress that we’ve seen so far was inevitable. None of it happened by accident. It took the Ukrainians stepping up, first and foremost. It also took NATO allies coming together to choose again and again to stand with them to defend the values that have always united us as democracies: freedom, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity. This is what our predecessors did for seventy-five years, and this is what we all must do in the years ahead, even when it’s tough—in fact, especially when it’s tough.

So, yes, the road ahead will be challenging. President Putin is determined to keep trying to take over Ukraine. And countries like Iran, North Korea, and China are cheerleading him. We’re clear-eyed about all of that. But we are also clear-eyed about Ukraine’s strengths and resilience and courage and commitment and effectiveness and capabilities. And we’re clear-eyed about our own, too. And we have confidence in Ukraine and confidence in ourselves. And with that, and with the actual work—the spadework that has gone into the results produced at this summit these last two days—we are demonstrating our commitment to stand with Ukraine in their current fight and into the future.

And what I would ask in closing is that as we look at the picture before us, and as we think about what we need to do to succeed and to help Ukraine succeed, that we recognize this war has been unpredictable from the start. People thought Kyiv would fall in less than a week; Kyiv still stands today. People thought earlier this year we’d be looking at a much different picture than we’re looking at today. The future, the history of Europe, of Ukraine, of the world order is not yet written. As Fred said in his opening comments, nothing is inevitable; it comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.

I believe we’ve taken some bold steps in the last few days and weeks. We will take more bold steps in the days and weeks to come. President Biden will have the chance to sit down with President Zelenskyy in a couple of hours to review all of this, and not to rest on our laurels by any stretch but to say now that we’ve come this far what more do we have to do to get the job done. And we will, together, get the job done.

So thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here today. And thank you for everything you do every day in service of our common vision for the transatlantic community and a better world for all. Thank you very much.

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UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

David Lammy — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 15:06:07 +0000

Walking into King Charles Street for the first time as foreign secretary last Friday, I passed the bust of Ernest Bevin.

Bevin was an inspirational Labour foreign secretary—and is a personal hero of mine. He was proud of his working-class origins, firmly internationalist in outlook, and committed to realism, a politics based on respect for the facts.

Nowhere was this clearer than in his role helping to create the NATO alliance seventy-five years ago, which included signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 on behalf of the United Kingdom. As foreign secretary, he was equally committed to supporting the nascent United Nations. But he recognized that “naked and unashamed” power politics would limit its ambitions. Establishing NATO therefore became central to his strategy for how to protect Britain and its allies against future aggression.

Moscow protested that this new grouping targeted them. But while Bevin made every effort to engage the Soviet Union in dialogue, he dismissed such criticism. If that was how the Kremlin felt about a defensive alliance, that said much about its intentions.

Seventy-five years on, the wisdom of Bevin’s approach is as clear as ever.

Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations remain indispensable. But they are struggling under the strain of multiple challenges. With a return of war to our continent and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with our closest allies is firmly in the national interest.

NATO is the cornerstone of the United Kingdom’s collective security. This week, I am joining the British prime minister and defense secretary at the NATO Summit in Washington, DC. Our commitment to NATO and Britain’s nuclear deterrent is unshakeable.

The United Kingdom and our allies must step up defense spending. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has confirmed that the British government will launch a Strategic Defence Review, putting a “NATO-first” policy at the heart of Britain’s defense plans and setting out a road map to spending 2.5 percent of gross domestic product on defense. At the summit, the United Kingdom has been arguing that all NATO allies should adopt this as a new defense target.

The war in Ukraine has only reinforced the enduring centrality of NATO. But as in Bevin’s time, Kremlin disinformation about NATO’s role is rife. I am as dismissive of this as Bevin was. If Russian President Vladimir Putin feels threatened by a purely defensive alliance, that says much about his own intentions. It is Russia that has ridden roughshod over its neighbors’ sovereignty and conducted assassinations on Europe’s streets. It is Russia that has walked away from its international commitments, leaving a trail of lies and broken promises.

The prime minister has recommitted to providing Ukraine with three billion pounds a year of military support for as long as needed. And Britain is contributing forty million pounds to NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, making us the third-largest donor to the package. As the prime minister will tell NATO allies on Thursday, the frontline defense of the Euro-Atlantic region is the Ukrainian trenches.

As foreign secretary, I will do all that I can to build on the great legacy Bevin left us. At a time of rising insecurity, we join our allies in marking NATO’s immense contribution to our collective security and renew our determination to invest in the most successful defensive alliance the world has ever known.

David Lammy is the UK foreign secretary.

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Rich Outzen joined WION News to discuss NATO Summit

aozen — Thu, 11 Jul 2024 12:35:17 +0000

Daniel Fried: In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

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Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

Atlantic Council experts — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 22:44:21 +0000

What can thirty-two allies accomplish in forty-four paragraphs? NATO leaders on Wednesday afternoon released the Washington Summit Declaration, a consensus document setting forth what the Alliance stands for. In the case of Ukraine, it lays out a “bridge” to membership and a long-term financial commitment, but stops short of declaring when the country will be formally invited into the Alliance, as it continues to battle Russia’s full-scale invasion. The document is also notably tough on China, which it describes as the “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Our experts dig into the fine print below to break down what’s in the communiqué—and what isn’t.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Rachel Rizzo: There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

Ann Marie Dailey: The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

Luka Ignac: NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

Wayne Schroeder: NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

Andrew D’Anieri: Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Christopher Harper: The language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path to NATO is an important achievement

Robert Soofer: On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

Beniamino Irdi: NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

Joslyn Brodfuehrer: What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

Michael John Williams: Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

Through its Washington Summit Declaration, NATO has strengthened its support for Ukraine’s security and its “irreversible path” to NATO membership. This language, contained in the declaration’s paragraph 16, is a step forward. More importantly, it was not a grudging compromise (as at the Vilnius NATO Summit in 2023), or a fraught showdown (as at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008). This time, the allies, especially the United States, seemed serious in asserting that, difficult as it may be to bring Ukraine into the Alliance, in the end, this may be the only way to provide long-term security to Europe in the face of Russia’s imperial ends and violent means.

NATO also set up long-term mechanisms to provide military support for Ukraine and issued a supplemental statement that lays out details of this support. This, combined with the announcements of air defense equipment and F-16s for Ukraine, demonstrate that NATO is continuing to face down Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The remaining US caveats on Ukraine’s authorization to use US-provided weapons to attack even legitimate military targets inside Russia remain a problem. The laws of war ought to be sufficient in restricting Ukraine’s military actions; going beyond them seems excessive.

Many will argue that NATO should have just extended an invitation to Ukraine or at least started accession negotiations. I have sympathy for these views. Nevertheless, NATO moved forward. It is easier to write an article than negotiate a communiqué with thirty-two governments.

The decisions the allies took at the Washington summit and the language on Ukraine in the declaration passed the test of seriousness in time of war.

—Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.

There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

The final communiqué calls Ukraine’s pathway toward NATO “irreversible.” For a consensus-based organization, that’s a big deal. On top of that, we can finally see Ukraine’s “bridge” to NATO membership taking form, with the Alliance vowing to station a senior civilian in Kyiv and to set up a command in Wiesbaden, Germany for coordinating security assistance and training—with allies agreeing to send the Ukrainians a package of new air defense systems, including four Patriot batteries.

But with allied leaders saying the bridge will be short and well-lit, major questions remain about the duration and lighting. And what happens between now and Ukraine’s eventual membership, which could still be decades away?

From my conversations around town, I’m gathering that there’s also a sense of frustration amid the celebrations. Thus far there have been no announcements that the United States is willing to loosen the restrictions on how the Ukrainians can use US-supplied weapons. People seem frustrated that Ukraine can’t strike deep inside Russia, and there’s a feeling that the United States is making Ukrainians fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

There is also a somewhat somber mood regarding the US election. US President Joe Biden’s speech last night at the summit kickoff was strong and presidential, but there’s still some doubt about whether he has what it takes to pull off a win in November. And a loss for Biden means a win for former US President Donald Trump, which further rattles already-nervous Europeans. What I’ve been saying to them here at the summit is this: Tell NATO’s story, because it’s a good one. Keep increasing defense spending; twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are now spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an increase from nine allies when Biden took office. And keep shouldering more of the defense burden for the European continent. This is likely what Europeans will wind up needing to do anyway, so best to start now.

—Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

This communiqué contains few surprises, with the biggest announcement—the creation of a mechanism for the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine—previewed weeks in advance. The other key Ukraine-related deliverable is the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, which pledges forty billion euros in the coming year, with language loosely indicating that the support should continue in future years. While significant, this is a step down from some allies’ hope for a multiyear commitment of a percentage of each NATO nations’ GDP. With the Indo-Pacific partners on hand, the declaration missed an opportunity to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to global security, not just Euro-Atlantic security. The bureaucratic, stilted language on a “bridge” to NATO for Ukraine belies ongoing disagreement within the Alliance on Ukrainian membership, but the language on Russia underscores a united NATO assessment that Russia is a long-term, strategic threat.

The declaration is also an acknowledgment that more needs to be done to operationalize the commitments made at Madrid and Vilnius, namely that in order for NATO’s new regional defense plans to be executable, NATO nations will have to spend more than 2 percent of their GDP on national defense. Allies also acknowledged that gaps remain in key areas, including munitions stockpiles, integrated air and missile defense, command and control, and sustainment. The NATO Defense Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge aims to address some of these gaps. The declaration also acknowledges the need to partner with the European Union to counter emerging and hybrid threats, as well as the importance of working with like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific, including on support for Ukraine, cyber, disinformation, and technology.

One major missed opportunity was the absence of Latin America in the section outlining a new action plan for NATO’s southern neighborhood. China and Russia are conducting active disinformation and malign investment campaigns in South America. But unlike Africa and the Middle East, Latin America remains relatively stable, and it has significant economic and political cooperation potential with NATO allies. Whoever assumes the newly created role of special representative for the southern neighborhood should ensure that they include Latin America in their dialogue, outreach, and visibility.

—Ann Marie Dailey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently serving as a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.

NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

It is significant that NATO has highlighted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This acknowledgment underscores the Alliance’s unity and awareness of the evolving geopolitical landscape. By recognizing the mutually reinforcing attempts by Russia and the PRC to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order, NATO lays a crucial foundation for formulating strategies to address and counteract this burgeoning nexus.

This statement signals a collective commitment among member states to not only monitor but also actively engage in identifying and implementing measures to mitigate the influence of this partnership.

—Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

The Washington Summit Declaration correctly addresses the need to more urgently sustain national commitments to defense. It also correctly understands that expenditures beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed to remedy existing shortfalls and improve the capabilities, capacity, and readiness of the thirty-two NATO allies in all five defense domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space.

To achieve the 2 percent goal or even go higher, NATO allies will have to achieve real growth in their defense spending—growth beyond the rate of inflation—and stick to that goal for multiple years. Real growth in defense spending is how most NATO countries got to 2 percent, and it is how the remaining allies can get there.

—Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Buried at the bottom of the NATO communiqué are key details on the Alliance’s pledge to contribute a minimum of forty billion euros over the next twelve months to Ukraine for military purposes. While forty billion euros is no small change, the communiqué notes that this pledge is in fact not an increase in military aid to Ukraine, but an approximation of annual provisions by allies since Russia began its full-scale war of aggression in 2022.

In an effort to systematize and track military contributions to Ukraine by NATO member states, the “Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine” pegs minimum funding to countries’ GDP as a share of the Alliance total. For example, 2024 US GDP is estimated to be around $28 trillion, more than half of the roughly $46 trillion GDP total of the Alliance, so Washington would contribute approximately $26 billion in military aid to Ukraine over the next twelve months. Notably, allies must report on their contributions every six months to make sure each country is pulling their weight—a welcome dose of transparency. The first reporting period back dates to the start of 2024, so the United States is already much of the way toward fulfilling its minimum obligation.

The level of detail outlined in the pledge is no doubt aimed to mollify Ukraine skeptics (in the Trump orbit or otherwise) that allies in Europe are taking support for Ukraine seriously. Those efforts could be strengthened by continuing to source and send air defense, artillery ammunition, and long-range missiles to Ukraine on time and in appropriate quantities.

—Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

The language on Ukraine’s ‘irreversible’ path to NATO is an important achievement

The word “irreversible” in the paragraph regarding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is powerful and important. One should not underestimate how tricky it will have been to achieve consensus on this. The implication is that this path cannot be reversed during any negotiations that might occur with Russia.

—Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. As a Royal Air Force (RAF) pilot, he was involved in active operations over Iraq and in the Balkans and has commanded at all levels of the RAF. He also served in several positions at NATO, including director general of the HQ NATO International Military Staff.

On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

As expected, the communiqué reaffirms NATO’s commitment to modernize its nuclear capabilities, strengthen its nuclear planning capability, and adapt as necessary to changes in the security environment punctuated by Russia’s nuclear intimidation and ongoing modernization of its large stockpile of theater-range nuclear weapons.

As a former US representative to NATO’s High-Level Group (HLG) for nuclear planning, I recall how difficult it was just five years ago for the HLG to issue even a bland communiqué after each meeting—that’s how ambivalent some allies were about the nuclear mission. Today, NATO appears to be grappling with topics once considered off limits and is taking seriously the nuclear planning, exercises, and training necessary to demonstrate resolve.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg once said that “deterrence starts with resolve. It’s not enough to feel it. You also have to show it.” This communiqué, taken in conjunction with the 2022 Strategic Concept and 2023 Vilnius communiqué, sends a strong message to Russia that nuclear deterrence remains “the cornerstone of Alliance Security.”

—Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.

NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

As most NATO leaders have acknowledged in recent statements, Russia fights a nonmilitary war against the West alongside its effort on the battlefield in Ukraine.

The communiqué released today does reflect an awareness of this in the paragraphs dedicated to hybrid threats. For example, it notes that Russia has “intensified its aggressive hybrid actions against allies, including through proxies.” It also lists several hybrid actions, including sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference, and provocations at allies’ borders, such as by provoking irregular migration. In addition, the communiqué names China as engaging in “sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation.”

However, the space and dignity reserved by the document to this challenge do not do justice to its profound strategic nature. The effort to undermine democratic societies by leveraging its freedoms is the common denominator among all of NATO’s systemic adversaries, first and foremost China, and it will remain such after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been repelled.

Perhaps distracted by the kinetic pace of war on the European continent, NATO language on hybrid threats is still somewhat unrefined, especially at the leadership level. A more explicit focus should be put on the multi-domain, or “DIMEFIL,” dimension of the challenge, especially by avoiding any confusion between the parts—such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion—and the whole-of-society offensive coordinated campaigns they form.

Clearer and deeper language in top-level NATO communication on hybrid threats would achieve two key objectives.

First, it would emphasize the systemic aspect of these threats, which would be an implicit reminder that NATO is an alliance based on values, at a time when some allies need to be reminded of this message. A whole-of-government offensive will only be effective if it is directed from an authoritarian regime and addressed toward a democratic society, whose openness is not only its target but also the weapon used against it.

Second, it would inform a better counter-strategy to hybrid threats, one based on the whole picture and the adversaries’ strategic objectives rather than independent efforts in single domains.

—Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

As heads of state gather to take part in this milestone NATO Summit, we are reminded that today’s security environment differs significantly from the one that twelve nations faced when signing the Washington Treaty seventy-five years ago. War is raging in Europe. Russia has threatened to send troops to new ally Finland’s border and is rebuilding its land forces in preparation for a long-term conflict with NATO. But these conventional threats are situated within a broader spectrum of challenges ranging from nuclear saber rattling to the very real hybrid activities levied against frontline allies. The Washington Summit Declaration recognizes the complexity of the increasingly connected battlespace, with commitments to “enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense against all threats and challenges, in all domains, and in multiple strategic directions across the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Maintaining NATO’s edge will hinge upon the Alliance’s ability to operate across domains at speed and scale. Allies pledged to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to resource the new defense plans in preparation for “high-intensity and multi-domain collective defense” and integrate space—NATO’s newest operational domain—into the Defense Planning Process. While developments in this year’s declaration yet again reflect a push to accelerate the Alliance’s transformation into a multi-domain-operation-enabled warfighting machine, it remains unclear as to whether NATO Allied Command Operations and its military personnel are equipped with the tools and expertise they need to facilitate coordinated activities across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains—none of which are equal. Now is the time to move beyond NATO Allied Command Transformation’s 2023 concept by integrating capabilities across domains, increasing training on new domains, and ramping up NATO exercising. Without innovative, mutually reinforcing initiatives from allies in the short and medium term, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Christopher Cavoli will be constrained in his ability to leverage new domains to secure the advantage in a future fight.

—Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.

Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

The Washington Summit Declaration covers all the familiar ground, from setting expectations for Ukraine to defense spending to Indo-Pacific strategy. But for me, the most interesting parts are sections 12-14, which are focused on collective resilience, hybrid threats, and disinformation. The inclusion of these three sections is critical, because it is highly probable that any Russian actions against a NATO ally will be specifically geared to avoid a direct violation of Article 5. It is far less probable that the Kremlin would launch a full-scale invasion against Poland or the Baltics.

The Kremlin has waged a broad campaign of “political warfare” against NATO allies for a solid decade—and this “war” shows no sign of abating. Evidence of this is found in Kremlin funding for far-right parties across Europe, cyber attacks against Estonia, assassinations in the United Kingdom, and election meddling in the United States, to name but a few of the most egregious examples.

These sections of the communiqué convey the high level of concern within NATO around these critical issues, but they also lack specificity. For example, NATO should lead efforts across the Alliance to change national legal frameworks to recognize state-supported cyber attacks. One hopes that sections 12-14 of the communiqué will be further developed in the coming year, not least because indirect political warfare is just as popular in Beijing as it is in Moscow.

—Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

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Hinata-Yamaguchi quoted in NK News on Russia-North Korea relationship

ylee — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 20:27:20 +0000

Original source

On July 9, IPSI nonresident senior fellow Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi was quoted in an NK News article regarding a Russian military jet’s visit to North Korea, the first since the two countries signed a mutual defense treaty. Hinata-Yamaguchi noted that Russia appears open about its military cooperation with North Korea, predicting more overt military engagements and the potential for North Korea to gain advanced military technologies.

Fellow

Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi

Indo-Pacific Security Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Defense Policy Indo-Pacific

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Michta in German Council on Foriegn Relations and RealClearWorld on Germany’s defense policy and the US presidential election

gmatchett — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:54:16 +0000

Director and Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

On June 25, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in the German Council on Foreign Relations and RealClearWorld about Germany’s defense policy and how it may be impacted by the US presidential election. He underscored that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well-positioned to collaborate with whichever candidate wins in November.

The relationship between the United States and Europe—and Washington and Berlin in particular—will rise or fall depending on what America’s allies in Europe do to shore up their militaries.

Andrew Michta

Staff

Andrew A. Michta

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Scowcroft Strategy Initiative

Central Europe Eastern Europe

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Ullman in United Press International on the invasion of Normandy and the US presidential election

gmatchett — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:47:41 +0000

On June 5, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for United Press International that reflects on the 80th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy, the blockbuster movie Saving Private Ryan, and the upcoming US presidential election.

The virtues of Private Ryan are what the nation desperately needs.

Harlan Ullman

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

The post Ullman in United Press International on the invasion of Normandy and the US presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

Atlantic Council — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 16:23:56 +0000

Watch the full event

NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jens Stoltenberg
Secretary General, NATO

Moderated by

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, if it still is the morning. It’s great to see you all here in person. It’s wonderful to have so many people here online from all over the world and, of course, across all of our allies in Europe as well.

So, it’s my honor to introduce someone I’ve known a long time now, the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg. And I’m going to moderate conversation with you at a moment—something you’ve called a pivotal moment for our Alliance. I was going to start by saluting you on something I didn’t know about, which is your great arm because you threw out the first pitch of the Nationals game. And it was an amazing. I was there in the heat, sweating while I was watching you. But it was—it was an amazing salute to NATO.

But having been at Mellon Auditorium yesterday evening, one of the most moving events I’ve been at, I’ll instead quote President Biden, what he said to you as he gave you the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a standing ovation—a really remarkable moment. He called you a man of integrity and intellectual rigor, a calm temperament in a moment—in moments of crisis, a consummate diplomat. And I think the consummate diplomat, a person who can engage with leaders across all spectrums and across all nationalities, and I just want to salute you on behalf of everyone in the audience for more than a decade of the most extraordinary leadership. So let’s start with that.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we at the Atlantic Council gave you our highest honor, the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award, in 2017. And I consider that visionary. We knew you’d already accomplished a lot in your life, and I won’t go through it all—you know, prime minister of Norway, all the things you’ve done for NATO and at NATO in terms of strengthening its defense, strengthening the defense spending. And I think it would take too time—too long to go on that. And you’re a humble man, and I don’t think you would even want that. So I’m going to go right into the questions.

You laid out three goals for this summit—increasing support for Ukraine for the long haul, reinforcing collective defense, and deepening global partnerships. I’m sure they’re all important, but for this week what do you consider most crucial?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I will answer that in a moment, but let me first say that it’s great to be here, to be at the Public Forum. And many thanks to you, Fred. And also many thanks to all those who have organized and are making this event possible, because this is an important part of the summit, the public outreach which this Public Forum is a very important part of. Then thank you for your kind words. It has actually been a great privilege serving as secretary general of NATO for ten years. And I see around in the in the audience that there are many people who have helped me, supported me. And so many thanks to all of you for your advice, your help, and support throughout these years.

Then on throwing the first pitch, that is the most difficult task I ever committed as secretary general of NATO. Not least because I’ve never been at the baseball match ever before. The first time I touched a baseball, actually when I started to exercise for this, I thought it was a tennis ball. But it’s not the case. So it was a very steep learning curve. And I think my future is not in baseball. I think my future is in something else.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I was going to say in the introduction that it showed that NATO always sets lofty targets.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, yeah. And we have to adapt to the challenges. Then, of course, this summit. It’s, of course, a summit where we’re going to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the strongest, most successful alliance in history. But the only way to truly celebrate that achievement, the seventy-fifth anniversary, is, of course, to demonstrate that NATO is adapting, that we are changing when the world is changing. Because we are the most successful alliance in history because we have changed when the world is changing. And now we live in a more dangerous, more challenging security environment. And therefore, NATO is changing again.

And therefore, we will make important decisions at this summit for the future, not only celebrate the past. And there are three main issues. It’s deterrence and defense. It’s our partnership with our Asia-Pacific partners. But of course, the most urgent, the most critical task at this summit, will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine. Because this is really the time where we are tested. If we want to stand up for democracy and freedom, it’s now. And the place is Ukraine.

And I expect that NATO leaders will agree a substantial package for Ukraine. There are, affirmatively, five elements in that package.

One is that we will establish a NATO command for Ukraine to facilitate and ensure training and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. It will be seven-hundred personnel. It will take over much of what the US have done so far in leading the coordination of security assistance and training. It will be a command in Wiesbaden in Germany, but also with logistical nodes or hubs in the eastern part of the Alliance, to ensure that we have a more institutionalized framework for our support to Ukraine.

Then it will be a long-term pledge to support Ukraine, not least to send the message to President Putin that he cannot wait those out, because the paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed for a long-term to support Ukraine, the sooner this war can end. So that’s the thing we have to do.

Then we will have—and we have already seen some of the announcements of military immediate support with the air defense systems, with F-16s, other things that allies have and will announce. We have the bilateral—that’s a third—the announcement on more military aid, and then we have the bilateral security agreements—twenty agreed between NATO allies and Ukraine.

And then the fifth element of the package for Ukraine will be more interoperability. We will have a new joint training and relations center in Bydgoszcz in Poland. We will have the comprehensive assistance package to help Ukraine implement reforms on their defense and security institutions to ensure that the armed forces are more and more interoperable with NATO.

And together, the NATO command, the pledge, the bilateral security agreements, the announcement of new military support, and interoperability—these five elements combined constitute the bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine. And later on today, you will see the language which we will agree, and the NATO declaration on how to ensure that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership. So these are the five important deliverables on Ukraine that I expect allies will agree later on today.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Not to press you on what’s actually going to be in the document because, of course, you can’t reveal that, but we saw at the Vilnius Summit—hearing it again in Washington—that allies closer to Russia were more eager to provide NATO membership sooner for Ukraine, and no doubt the bridge and all the elements of the bridge are pretty impressive, including the new command.

But are Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects sufficient? We did our own wargaming with our Estonian partners and the Estonian government, and we found almost under any scenario, Ukraine was safer in NATO, that Russia would respond in a way that would be less provocative within and outside. What’s your thinking on that, and have we gone far enough with Ukraine?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, the language you will see later on today in the NATO declaration or the declaration from the heads of state and government, of course that language is important because language matters. It sets an agenda. It points a direction. But, of course, action speaks louder than words. So, in addition to that language in the declaration on membership, which again is important, I think that what we actually do together with Ukraine is as important. And therefore the fact that we now have a NATO framework—will have a NATO framework around the support, the fact that we have a long-term NATO commitment when we agreed the pledge, and also the fact that we actually are delivering more weapon systems to Ukraine—all of that has helped Ukraine to become closer to NATO—come closer to NATO membership because we will now deliver F-16s. We don’t want to deliver F-16s; we deliver the training, the doctrines, the operational concepts that will actually move Ukraine closer to being fully interoperable with NATO on more and more areas.

So, again, language is important. But the elements in the package I mentioned, they are actually changing the reality, enabling Ukraine to be—to come closer to membership so we can then—when the time is right, when you have consensus and the political conditions are in place—so when an invitation then is issued, they can become members straightaway. I can’t give you a date because, as you know, there has to be consensus in this Alliance on membership.

But what I can say is that when the fighting stops in Ukraine, we need to ensure that that’s really the end. Because what you have seen is a pattern of aggression. First, Russia annexed Crimea. We said that was unacceptable. After some few months, they went to the eastern Donbas. We said that that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk I agreement, with the delimitation of the ceasefire line. That was violated. And Russia pushed the front lines further east—no, sorry—further west in Donbas in 2014. We had Minsk II, and the Russians waited then for seven years. And they had the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, because Minsk II was in 2015.

So, we have seen a pattern where they’ve taken slices of Ukraine. If there is now a new ceasefire, a new agreement, then we need to be 100 percent certain it stops there, regardless of where that line is. And therefore, I strongly believe that when the fighting stops we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia and they need security guarantees. And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article Five. So therefore, I believe that a way to ensure that it stops is actually a NATO membership.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that very clear answer. One more brief question on Ukraine, then we’ll move on to Indo-Pacific. In a press conference you had with President Macron a couple of weeks ago you noted recent gaps in delays in how they’ve led—in funding and weapons—and led to battlefield consequences. You said, quote, “We must give Ukraine the predictability and accountability it needs to defend itself.” So, two questions: Is everything you’ve talked about today that’s going to be agreed enough? And, secondarily, not just with uncertainties in US politics, which exist, but also uncertainties in European politics, do you worry at all about the sustainability of that support over time?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, you are right that I have referred to—I also did that in Kyiv in a meeting with President Zelensky earlier this spring—to the fact that during this winter and the early spring allies didn’t deliver on their promises to Ukraine. We saw the delays in the US, months agreeing on a supplemental. But we also saw European allies not being able to deliver the ammunition and the support they have announced. So, of course, these gaps and these delays in military support to Ukraine, they created a very difficult situation for Ukrainians on the battlefield.

The good news in that difficult situation is that, despite all the delays in our support to Ukraine, Ukrainians have actually been able to hold the line, more or less. So the Russians have not been able to utilize these delays in really making any big advantage on the battlefield. Now we are providing more support, and I’m confident that allies will now actually deliver. And we see that, for instance, ammunition moving into Ukraine, been significant increase over the last weeks.

The purpose of a stronger NATO role in providing training and security assistance, the purpose of the command, and the purpose of the pledge is, of course, to minimize the risks for future delays and gaps. But of course, you don’t have guarantees, because at the end of the day it has to be support in all the individual allied capitals and parliaments to providing this support. At the end of the day, you have to go to the Congress, to the parliaments across Europe and Canada, to get support. But I believe that when we turn this into something which is more a NATO obligation, a NATO framework, it is—the threshold for not delivering will be higher than when it’s based on a more voluntary, ad hoc, national announcements.

So the purpose of creating a stronger NATO framework is to make the support more robust and more predictable. It’s also another part of this NATO framework for the support on the pledge and the command. And that is that it will visualize and ensure burden sharing, because my impression is that, especially in the United States, there is this perception that the United States is almost alone in delivering support to Ukraine. That’s not the case. When you look at military support, roughly 50 percent of the military support is provided by European allies and Canada. Ninety-nine percent of the support—the military support to Ukraine—comes from NATO allies, but 50 percent of that comes from European allies and Canada. If you add economic, macroeconomic support, humanitarian support, the European allies are providing much more than the United States.

So the point with the pledge to ensure that we have some kind of agreed formulas for burden sharing, that we have more transparency, and also that we have more accountability, because then we can use NATO to count, to measure, and to ensure that allies deliver. It’s not the same, but it’s a bit like the 2 percent pledge because the importance with the pledge made in Wales in 2014 was actually to give NATO a role to enforce and to ensure that allies delivered, and also that we agreed how to count and what to count. And that’s also what we now will do with the pledge, to agree how to count and what to count, and to give NATO a role to having also accountability.

So, again, there are no guarantees. But by giving NATO that role, I think the likelihood for allies delivering what they have promised will increase and the likelihood of new gaps will decrease. And that’s the purpose of giving NATO a stronger role.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Let’s go to China. The 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO Strategic Concept, recognized China as a challenge for the first time in the broader rules-based system. You’ve noted that Russia imports 90 percent of its microelectronics from China, which goes into military. Secretary Blinken today talked about 70 percent of machine tools that helped the military coming from China. You’ve also said that this—if this doesn’t change, as they’re fueling the greatest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, allies need to impose a cost. Is it time for that? And what cost can NATO and NATO countries actually impose?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, I think it’s important that we recognize the reality, and that’s the first step towards any action. And that is that not only are Iran and North Korea important when it comes to enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but China is the main enabler because, as you referred to, they are delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.

Well, I have said that it remains to be seen how far allies are willing to go, but I strongly believe that it—if China continues, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies in North America and Europe, and then continue to fuel the war in Europe that constitutes the biggest security challenge to—for our security since the Second World War. So this is a challenge for the Alliance. Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we’re getting close to the end of time, so just two other brief questions. First, the Indo-Pacific four—Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand—are here. Third time taking part in a NATO summit, but it’s going to be the first NATO joint document with this group. Can you give us some insight into what might be in it? Any concrete outcomes?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah. So, first I would just say that the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—that reflects a change in NATO, because that was not the case a few years ago. And as many of you may know, the first time we mentioned China in an agreed negotiated document in NATO is at the NATO summit in London in 2019. And in the previous NATO Strategic Concept, China was not mentioned with a single word; now China has a prominent place in the Strategic Concept we agreed in Madrid. And the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners reflects, of course, the fact that we have to take China seriously when it comes to the challenges it poses for our security, and the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most obvious example. Or, as the Japanese prime minister said several times: What happens in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow.

We are now working with our Asia-Pacific partners how we can do more together with them. We will agree some flagship projects. That’s about technology. It’s about support to Ukraine. But we are also working, for instance, as part of our defense industrial pledge, how we can ramp up defense industrial production and cooperation with these countries. They are big, some of them, on defense industry. We can work closely with them to ramp up our combined defense industrial capacity. We can exchange more information.

And I also welcome the fact that more and more allies are now also conducting joint exercises. Recently, there was a big air exercise. Allies are also more and more actively also looking into how they can also have more naval exercises with our Asia-Pacific partners. Because NATO will remain an alliance of North America and Europe. There will not be a global NATO. NATO will be North America and Europe. But this region, the North Atlantic region, we face global threats. And the reality is, that’s nothing new. Global terrorism—international terrorism brought us to Afghanistan. Cyber is global. Space, which is becoming more and more important for our armed forces, is truly global. And, of course, the threats that—and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge.

So this region, the North Atlantic region, faces global challenges. We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners, the Asia-Pacific partners, to address these global challenges. That, I guess, will be a very important issue at the next NATO summit. I will not be there, but I’m certain it will be –

FREDERICK KEMPE: Well, and that brings—and that brings me to my final question. This is your swan song summit. And as you prepare to step down, I think everybody in the audience, everybody virtually, would love to hear what gives you the most hope stepping down from this, but also what gives you the most concern.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, I’m an optimist. Because the reality is that we are very different in this Alliance. We are different countries with different histories, different cultures, from both sides of the Atlantic, and we have different parties. And we are always very concerned that when a new party comes into government they will make bad things for the Alliance. And if you read the history of NATO, we have been concerned about since—about that for from the beginning.

There were big concerns in NATO when you had a new—when actually you got the democratically elected government in Portugal in 1975. There were concerns whether or not they were going to be committed to NATO. There were concerns when you had some left-wing parties coming into government in some European countries in the ’70s. When I formed my government in—my second government—in 2005 there were big concerns that we had the Left Socialist Party there. It went quite well, to be honest. And now there are big concerns again.

But the reality is that despite all these differences, which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong. Because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together. And that’s a very strong message. And that’s the reason why this Alliance prevails again and again.

As I said in my speech yesterday, we cannot take it for granted. It’s not a given. It was not a given in ’49. It’s not a given now. And it’s not a given in the future. But the reality is that we have a strong common interest in standing together. So therefore, I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance. That was the first question. The second I’ve forgotten. I think I answered both of them.

But I will only say one thing about this. That I remember very well when I became prime minister in 2000. First of all, I attended my first NATO Summit in 2001. That was a very different guest list. It was—President Bush, newly elected. It was Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair. And, yeah, very different people than now. As I think it’s time for me to leave. But second, also, I remember then my predecessor when I became prime minister in 2000, she told me—Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian prime minister—she told me, Jens, you have to remember that most of your life you’ll be former prime minister.

And now I have to acknowledge that most of my life, I’ll be former secretary general NATO. But that’s not so bad. And I will hang around and see you, and I look forward to then perhaps being a part of this audience next time. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Fred.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. secretary general, nothing more need be said.

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Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin

Atlantic Council — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 15:08:09 +0000

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NATO Public Forum

Allied leaders, senior officials, international security experts, and opinion-shapers discuss the Alliance’s agenda and what’s happening behind closed doors at the summit.

Read the full article here.

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Lloyd Austin
US Secretary of Defense

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a great lineup to start the day—the secretary of state, the supreme allied commander Europe, secretary of defense. It’s really an honor to be here. And thanks to everyone in the room. Good morning to you all, and good afternoon to everyone joining from Europe, and hello to everyone joining from all over the world virtually.

Since its founding in 1949, since NATO’s founding, the United States has played a pivotal role in safeguarding transatlantic security. And the secretary of defense has always been at the center of that. As one of NATO’s founding members, the US has proven to be a critical part of the Alliance’s collective defense and its adaptability to deter evolving threats. And they have been evolving. America has always stood ready to defend and protect the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, continuing its commitments to the principles of the Washington Treaty. US leadership was pivotal, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mobilizing tremendous support—and you’ve heard more about that today, new Air Force batteries, F-16s—to bolster collective defenses on NATO’s eastern flank, fortifying the commitment to NATO allies, and extending that kind of critical assistance to Ukraine.

So it’s my privilege to introduce a leader who embodies this commitment to transatlantic and, indeed, global security—US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. A graduate of West Point in 1975, Secretary Austin’s career in the US Army spanned more than forty years. Throughout his years of service, he has led the command at the corps, division, battalion, and brigade levels in the US armed forces. Secretary Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the US Army’s Third Infantry Division during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Before he concluded his uniformed service, Secretary Austin was the commander of the US Central Command from 2013 to 2016, one of our most challenging positions where he was responsible for all the military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Under his leadership, the US Department of Defense has adapted national defense strategies to address the greatest global challenges of our time. And it’s reaffirmed the US commitment to allies and its role as a champion of the rules-based order.

In particular, and this is really important, Secretary Austin’s leadership in the Ukraine defense contact group has proven invaluable in uniting over fifty nations to provide critical military support and security assistance to Ukraine. We saw Vladimir Putin’s message to the NATO summit on Monday this week, with a barrage of more than forty missiles on Ukraine including hitting a children’s hospital. We’ve seen an answer in more—in more air defenses. We’ve seen an answer in the F-16s. We’ve seen an answer in everything else that Secretary Austin and all the allies are doing.

As President Biden has said, the world is at an inflection point with wars in the Middle East, Europe, rising challenge posed to China, biggest defense buildup—peacetime defense buildup in history from China. The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor. And we’re lucky to have a man of his pedigree and capability at this historic moment. So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming to the stage the twenty-eighth US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin.

LLOYD AUSTIN: Well, good morning. It’s really good to be here with all of you and, Fred, thanks for that kind introduction and for all that you’ve done for the Atlantic Council and for bringing us together on a pretty big week.

It’s a huge honor for the United States and President Biden to host this historic summit in Washington, just down the road from the site where the original twelve NATO allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty seventy-five years ago, and together we’re marking one of the great success stories that the world has ever known.

On April 4, 1949, those twelve democracies came together in the wake of two world wars and at the dawn of a new Cold War and they all remembered, as President Truman put it, “the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression.”

And so they vowed to stand together for their collective defense and to safeguard freedom and democracy across Europe and North America. They made a solemn commitment, declaring that an armed attack against one ally would be considered an attack against them all.

Now, that commitment was enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the foundation of NATO and it still is.

And on that bedrock we have built the strongest and most successful defensive alliance in human history. Throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe and prevented a third world war.

In the 1990s, NATO used air power to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the day after September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda terrorists attacked our country, including slamming a plane into the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history.

So NATO has always stood by us and we’re going to stand by NATO. Without NATO the past seventy-five years would have been far different and far more dangerous. You know, I’m proud of the ways that NATO continues to strengthen our shared security.

I’m proud of the way that NATO and other—NATO and America’s other alliances and partnerships have grown and strengthened under the leadership of President Biden and I’m especially proud of the way that our allies and partners, including our NATO allies, have met the challenge of Putin’s increasingly aggressive Russia.

In 2014, Putin made an illegal land grab against Ukraine’s Crimea region in eastern Ukraine and since then NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation with more forces, more capabilities, and more investment.

Since 2014, our fellow allies have increased their defense spending by an average of 72 percent, accounting for inflation. In February 2022, the world again saw what President Truman called the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression as the Kremlin’s forces invaded the free and sovereign state of Ukraine.

As this administration has made very clear, we will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice but we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security. We will defend every inch of NATO and we will continue to strengthen NATO’s collective defense and deterrence.

In the wake of Putin’s imperial invasion of Ukraine, we bolstered NATO’s forward defense posture with more troops at high readiness, larger exercises, sharper vigilance, and multinational battle group—battle groups in eight countries. NATO is now larger than ever. And our new allies in Finland and Sweden have brought the alliance’s membership to thirty-two. And make no mistake, NATO’s—Putin’s war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin’s war is the cause of NATO enlargement.

Over the past three and a half years, we’ve also seen an historic increase in annual defense spending across the alliance by almost eighty billion dollars. All NATO allies have agreed to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. In 2014, only three allies hit that target. In 2021, only six allies did so. But this year, a record twenty-three NATO allies are meeting the 2 percent defense spending target. Now, our NATO allies are not just spending more on their own defense, they’re also spending more on America’s defense industrial base. That means platforms and munitions built in America. And that’s helping to revitalize production lines across our country and to create good jobs for American workers.

Now, all of that progress is a testament to US leadership and allied solidarity. But it’s also a testament to the leadership of our outgoing secretary general, my good friend Jens Stoltenberg. Throughout a decade of challenge, Jens has guided the Alliance with skill and steel, and we are all deeply, deeply grateful. Now we’re going to keep building on our progress, and we’ve got an ambitious agenda this week. First, we’ll continue to implement NATO’s new family of plans, the most robust since the Cold War. And that will significantly improve our ability to deter and defend against any new threat. Second, we’ll work to endorse a pledge to expand industrial capacity across the alliance. And this will help us scale up military production and send an important long-term signal to industry.

Third, we’ll deepen cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense. We’ll launch a new military effort to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine and we’re poised to agree on a new financial pledge to Ukraine. As another sign of our deep commitment to Ukraine’s self-defense, a coalition of countries has been working tirelessly to provide F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. And today, President Biden, alongside the Dutch and Danish prime ministers, is proud to announce the transfer of F-16s is officially underway, and Ukraine will be flying F-16s this summer.

And finally, we’ll continue to deepen ties with our global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific. I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine, but that just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security. And it sends a message to the world that we are united in our values. So we have a lot to tackle together. But we’re also here to mark this moment. We’re here to strengthen an Alliance that has kept millions of people safe for seventy-five years. And we’re here to reaffirm the ironclad commitment that those twelve leaders made on April 4, 1949: An armed attack against one ally is an attack against us all.

You know, as you heard Fred say, I had a brief forty-one-year career in uniform. I started working with NATO back in 1975, when I was Lieutenant Austin. And I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today. And we are determined to keep it that way. You know, I learned a lesson early on in my Army career. And that lesson is that, as a soldier, the last thing that you want to do is to fight alone. So here’s the blunt military reality: America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies. And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.

So we are here this week to strengthen NATO and to strengthen American and allied security for the next seventy-five years. As President Biden has said, our foes and rivals have tried to shatter our unity, but our democracies have stood unwavering. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the legacy that we celebrate. That is the vow that we uphold. And that is the work that we will continue. Thank you very much.

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State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain

gmatchett — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 14:37:58 +0000

In June, much of the world saw not only rising temperatures, but also multiplying stresses on the world order. Israel and Hamas still did not agree on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his military leadership over war aims magnified, as the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies ramped up support for Ukraine, with new measures that allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia and a new Group of Seven (G7) plan to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets for a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. European Union (EU) elections saw the far right make gains, especially in France, but the center largely held.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Tensions mount within the Israeli government as conflict grinds on. As June ended, Israel and Hamas still had not agreed on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Although the United States assured that Israel accepted, it is unclear whether Israel declined the latest three phase. Yet Hamas requested some unworkable changes after all the parties alleged acceptance. Even as the two sides haggled over cease-fire terms, Israeli military operations in Gaza slowed due to operational tempo, but there remained an increase in intensity in the continued tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, driving global concern over a potential war between them that could evolve into a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu dissolved his war cabinet, the unit established to bring a unified approach to Israel’s fight against Hamas. The decision came following the resignation of former military chief Benny Gantz from the cabinet. Gantz resigned amidst protests over the continued lack of a strategic plan to defeat Hamas. Illustrating further divisions within the Israeli government over war aims, the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas, noting, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people—whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” Tens of thousands of Israeli people protested in Tel Aviv to demand a cease-fire and the return of hostages.

Shaping the order. Tensions within the Israeli government, between Netanyahu and his military leadership, came to a head as the two sides seemed at odds over end goals for Israel’s military operations. There remains limited consensus on the way forward. In February, Netanyahu presented a post-war plan aiming for local officials to govern Gaza, with Israel preparing to test the experimental model with “humanitarian bubbles.” Allies have collectively strategized various pathways and there remains widespread skepticism of the plan. Yet the Israeli government continues to struggle to advance a post-conflict plan and receive sufficient buy-in from the United States, Arab states, and others, which remains a key priority for regional stability and US interests.
What to do. The Biden administration should continue to work with allies in Doha and Cairo to pursue a path to a temporary cease-fire and hostage-for-Palestinian-prisoners deal—that would also enable a flood of humanitarian relief in Gaza—despite the low probability of success.

The United States and its allies step up support for Ukraine. The United States expanded its policy to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory,” according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This builds on its May decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike a limited set of targets, largely across the border from Kharkiv.

The Biden administration, following the G7 meeting in Italy, announced it would rush the delivery of air-defense interceptors to Ukraine by delaying the delivery of them to most other nations. The G7 also agreed to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to collateralize a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. The United States added new and strong US sanctions against Russia and finalized a US-Ukraine ten-year memorandum of understanding on security cooperation.

As US munitions began to reach the front lines in Ukraine, the Russian offensive against Kharkiv lost momentum. Although Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy generation did considerable damage (taking down almost half of Ukrainian electric generation), the US decision to rush delivery of air-defense interceptors may help further mitigate such attacks, as will Romania’s decision to send to Ukraine one of its Patriot batteries. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea were taking an increasing toll, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to shore up his relationship with dictator Kim Jong Un and ensure Pyongyang continues providing munitions and arms to Moscow for the war in Ukraine.

On the diplomatic front, Russia escalated its demands for a cease-fire in an unrealistic fashion, insisting that Ukraine must first abandon territory it currently holds in the four provinces partly occupied by Russia, land that Russia has been unable to take by force. Days after that, from June 15 to 16, ninety-three countries attended a peace conference in Switzerland to discuss Ukrainian terms (its ten-point plan) for a settlement and seventy-eight countries signed a document that called for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a key Ukrainian point (more countries have signed on since). China did not attend, however, and some key countries in the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico did not sign the conference document.

Shaping the order. The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia, beyond initial restrictions on targets near Kharkiv, is a significant, positive step in Western support for Ukraine. Using frozen Russian assets to collateralize a loan for Ukraine is another positive step, but the United States and its allies may find they need to go further, using said assets themselves rather than continuing to use their own funds exclusively.
Hitting home. Some US experts argue that Ukraine is a strategic liability and that US focus there diverts resources better used in the Indo-Pacific. Russian victory in the war, which is likely to result from a US withdrawal, would cause cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources.
What to do. The United States and its allies must marshal continued military assistance for Ukraine, including air defense and weapons that support Kyiv’s attacks on Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, especially Crimea. The United States has the means to intensify pressure on the Russian economy and should use such tools. Washington should consider enforcing sanctions to hit smugglers of technology subcomponents utilized for Russian weapons and evaders of the oil price cap (the latter missing from the otherwise strong June 12 US sanctions package). A successful Ukrainian land offensive may not be possible in the near term.

The center holds, but the right makes gains, in European Parliament elections. Across the EU’s twenty-seven member states, voters cast ballots to select their representatives to the European parliament. The election saw gains for the center-right and right, but it was a disappointing showing for French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renew party. The European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and Identity and Democracy—the hard right—were the main beneficiaries of the elections. These results were overshadowed by Macron calling for a snap parliamentary election after his party’s incredibly poor performance in the European Parliament election (garnering less than half the votes of their far-right rivals, the National Rally): The snap election resulted in the left-wing New Popular Front on top, Macron’s centrist alliance placed second, and Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. Yet, the right did not do well in Scandinavia, Spain, and Romania, and had only a modest uptick in Poland, where the ruling Civic Platform came in first place. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition—the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Greens—all lost ground in Germany, but the center-right alliance between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union did well.

Shaping the order. Snap elections in France overshadowed the fact that the center mostly held its ground in the EU elections. The far right’s marginal gains will matter, however, if said forces can unite and if center-right parties are willing to engage with the far-right. Even so, the incoming parliament is likely to be more fragmented and polarized than its predecessor. And the French elections, the first round having wrapped, are pointing to a major defeat for Macron and a surge of the right, which is both nationalist and wary about the extent of French support to Ukraine.
Hitting home. Even though the center largely held in the European Parliament elections, the increased fragmentation will likely mean less clarity on policy issues that impact US companies.
What to do. The United States should constructively engage the European Parliament, encouraging it to hold firm to its moderate stances and not bend to the far right’s proposals.

Quote of the Month

“The votes cast put the far-right forces at almost 40 percent and the extremes [on the right and left] at almost 50 percent. This is a political fact that cannot be ignored.“
—French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking after the European Parliament elections.

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy ()

On June 30, the far-right National Rally won in the first round of the parliamentary elections, although it’s unclear whether they will get a majority with the second-round vote upcoming on July 7. Many French citizens have been protesting against the National Rally out of concern for women’s rights and minority rights, where thousands of women marched in dozens of French cities, including Paris, to protest against Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
Mexico elected Claudia Sheinbaum, its first female president, in the country’s largest election in history with 98 million registered voters. As Mexico City’s former mayor and the favored successor of outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum was favored to win. Promising to continue López Obrador’s policies, she believes the government has a strong responsibility to address economic inequality and establish robust social security.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security ()

Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats that were attempting to resupply a Philippine military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. Multiple Philippine vessels were damaged, and sailors were injured in the incident. One US official called China’s actions “deeply destabilizing.”
Houthi rebels launched an aerial drone, striking and damaging the Transworld Navigator in the Red Sea, one of more than sixty attacks targeting specific vessels. The attack comes after United States recalled its USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after an eight-month deployment. Shipping in the corridor—crucial for connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—has slowed significantly. The Houthis said they would continue the attacks as long as the Israel-Hamas war continues.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Trade ()

Amid the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigations into electric vehicles (EVs) coming from China , the European Union announced additional tariffs on imported Chinese EVs. The tariffs range from 17.4 to 38.1 percent—and that’s on top of the 10 percent duty already in place. As a result, Chinese car companies may consider raising prices or establishing factories in Europe, as the continent recently became China’s largest EV export market.
On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

The United Nations conducted a worldwide poll that revealed 80 percent of people want governments to take more action on addressing climate change. The survey noted majority support for stronger climate action in twenty of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters and majority support globally a quicker transition away from fossil fuels. Despite the increasing state of global conflict and rise of nationalism, the desire to set aside geopolitical differences and work together on climate change is expanding.
Record-breaking heat, fueled by climate change, affected millions around the globe, scorching four continents and surpassing last summer as the warmest in two thousand years. There were more than forty thousand suspected heat stroke cases in India between March 1 and June 18, and in Saudi Arabia, over one thousand people died participating in the Hajj pilgrimage amid soaring temperatures. Devastating forest fires spread in Europe and northern Africa, and a heat dome trapped large regions of the United States, preventing cool air from getting in.
On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

For the first time in twenty-four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and dictator Kim Jong Un met in North Korea, reinforcing their commitment to cooperate and protect each other’s interests. As part of the meeting, they signed a mutual military-assistance treaty, with Putin announcing that Russia could provide weapons to North Korea—with potentially destabilizing effects for the democratic world order.
The leaders of the G7 convened in Apulia, Italy, for the 2024 G7 Summit to discuss supporting Ukraine, pushing back on unfair economic practices, combating climate change, addressing food and health insecurity, leveraging critical technologies, and partnering with like-minded countries around the globe.
On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

Michael Doyle, in Foreign Affairs, argues that democratic peace is back in vogue and great powers can prevent the tensions between democracies and autocracies from escalating into full-blown global cold war.
Robert C. O’Brien, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a Trump administration foreign policy centered on the return of peace through strength.
Célia Belin and Mathieu Droin explore in Foreign Policy what a far-right victory would mean for French foreign policy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

Niva Yau, in an Atlantic Council report, shows how China is training future authoritarians overseas in order to secure its interests in Global South countries and beyond.
Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, explain that the United States’ competition with China should be focused on weakening and defeating the Chinese Communist Party regime.
Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, offers seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia, stating that United States and its allies must commit to dedicating resources to identifying targets for taking economic steps against Russia.
Andrew Michta, in a piece for the German Council on Foreign Relations, contends that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well positioned to establish strong cooperation with whichever candidate wins the next US presidential election.

__________________________________________________

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Donovan and Nikoladze cited by Washington Post on sanctions evasion

cfalkenek — Wed, 10 Jul 2024 13:54:51 +0000

The post Donovan and Nikoladze cited by Washington Post on sanctions evasion appeared first on Atlantic Council.

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

Giedrimas Jeglinskas — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 21:32:53 +0000

In a dangerous world, NATO’s role has never been more important. Yet, to remain relevant, the Alliance needs to adapt to today’s security challenges at greater scale and speed. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it took three years for NATO to deploy the enhanced Forward Presence battalions in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, two-and-a-half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the allies have neither defined Ukraine’s path to NATO membership nor delivered what Ukraine needs to win. This “too little, too late” approach from NATO neglects the security interests of member states and empowers the Alliance’s adversaries.

At the latest NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Prague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised Ukraine a “bridge” to NATO. For a start, US President Joe Biden at the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Italy delivered a three-pronged blow to Moscow—a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, a fifty billion dollar loan to Ukraine from several nations backed by payments from Russia’s immobilized assets, and a new bilateral US-Ukraine security pact to ensure long-term aid.

Additionally, NATO’s new report on defense spending shows that twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are on pace to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) benchmark for defense spending this year. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, twenty-three allies is “more than twice as many as four years ago and demonstrates that European allies and Canada are really stepping up and taking their share of the common responsibility to protect all of us in the NATO alliance.”

These are positive steps, but they do not solve the lack of speed and scale that plagues NATO’s decision making. NATO should tackle three big sets of deliverables at the Washington summit that began today. At the summit, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to start accession talks, augment military support to Kyiv, and substantially elevate member states’ defense budgets to reach a collective 3 percent of GDP, with an allocation of 0.25 percent of GDP to Ukraine’s military assistance. Only then will NATO be operating at the appropriate speed and scale to address the Alliance’s security challenges and deter further threats from its adversaries.

First, NATO must provide Ukraine with a credible path to membership. Ukraine’s long-term security is impossible without membership in the world’s most powerful military alliance, while Europe’s security cannot be guaranteed without Ukraine in NATO. Statements from leaders of NATO member states that they will do “whatever it takes” to support Kyiv are no longer sufficient—real steps to absorb Ukraine into the NATO family are needed.

I had a chance to serve as a member of the International Task Force (ITF) on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration, co-chaired by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak. The ITF report released in May has proposed a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which should start with NATO inviting Ukraine to start accession talks at the Washington summit this week. To empower the process, the NATO-Ukraine Council should define specific conditions for membership. The ITF also recommends setting a timeline for Ukrainian membership of no later than July 2028, provided specific conditions are met.

Second, NATO must commit to augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities to tip the balance on the battlefield. At ITF, we recommended five concrete initiatives on which NATO member states can agree at the Washington summit:

Lift all the caveats on the weapons delivered by allies to Ukraine;
Create an extended air defense shield in western Ukraine;
Deploy a freedom of navigation and demining mission in the Black Sea;
Ramp up the training of Ukrainian forces, including inside Ukraine;
Provide the so-called “fix forward” logistics support on the ground in Ukraine rather than transporting it back abroad, which wastes time and money.

The members of the ITF believe that “[t]aken together, these measures would help Ukraine deny Russia the possibility to escalate its conventional war. They would also constitute an enhanced commitment to Ukraine’s security in the interim period between an invitation and full membership.”

Third, NATO allies must increase military spending. To address the perennial resource question, the Alliance should set an ambitious multiyear trajectory for members’ defense budgets, committing every ally to spend 0.25 percent of their GDP on military assistance to Ukraine. When NATO defense ministers first proposed the 2 percent of GDP defense spending guideline in 2006, the target was not enforceable, and many allies did not take it seriously. Many NATO members failed to meet this target even after the Wales summit in 2014, where NATO leaders signed the Defense Investment Pledge. At the Vilnius summit in 2023, 2 percent of GDP became a “floor” rather than a goalpost. That year, total NATO defense spending, which stood at $1.3 trillion, accounted for around 2.5 percent of NATO’s collective GDP, thanks in large part to the United States’ massive defense expenditure. To reach a 3 percent of GDP spending target for NATO, the allies in 2023 would have been short $234 billion. In other words, an additional 18 percent increase in defense spending would have been required on top of the already steep 18 percent growth last year.

Adequate increases in spending will take time. At the Washington summit, NATO allies should commit to a multiyear plan of uninterrupted defense budget growth with an aim for all allies, but especially European countries and Canada, to contribute enough to breach the 3 percent spending threshold for the Alliance’s collective defense.

At the same time, allies should agree to allocate 0.25 percent of their GDP to military support for Ukraine, which would amount to around $125 billion per year. Such an agreement could directly institutionalize NATO’s security assistance and training to Ukraine. The planned NATO command in Wiesbaden, Germany, which will coordinate training and aid to Ukraine and is set to include more than seven hundred personnel, is an important preparatory step for Ukraine’s eventual membership in the Alliance. In addition, the Atlantic Council’s Ian Brzezinski is right to recommend that such arrangements that allow Ukrainian personnel to embed in NATO structures should be accompanied by a formal acknowledgment that Ukraine is ready to join the Alliance.

This week in Washington is an important test for the Alliance. Can NATO operate at the speed and scale of relevance? Progress on paving the way to Ukraine’s NATO membership, augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities, and unambiguously elevating defense budgets would serve as proof of the Alliance’s continued relevance in a time of uncertainty.

Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the International Task Force on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Previously, he served as NATO’s assistant secretary general for executive management and as Lithuania’s deputy defense minister.

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Britain’s new government pledges ‘unwavering commitment’ to Ukraine

Peter Dickinson — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 20:34:03 +0000

Ukrainians responded calmly to news of the Labour Party’s landslide victory in the UK’s July 4 general election, reflecting widespread confidence that British support for Ukraine will continue despite the change in government in Westminster. At a time when the rise of the far right in France and the prospect of a second Trump presidency are fueling concerns in Kyiv over the future of international backing for the Ukrainian war effort, Britain is widely viewed as one of the country’s most dependable partners.

“Ukraine and the United Kingdom have been and will continue to be reliable allies through thick and thin,” commented Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a post congratulating Labour Party leader Keir Starmer on his historic win. “We will continue to defend and advance our common values of life, freedom, and a rules-based international order.”

Zelenskyy was one of the first international leaders to speak to Starmer during the new British Prime Minister’s first day in office, underlining what Starmer referred to as the incoming Labour government’s “unwavering commitment” to maintaining the UK’s strong support for Ukraine. The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was also reportedly high on the agenda during Starmer’s discussions with other world leaders including US President Joe Biden.

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Starmer has long been an outspoken advocate of British backing for Ukraine. As the country prepared to mark the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion in February 2023, he visited Kyiv to offer assurances that the UK would remain a steadfast partner under his leadership. “I’ve said throughout this conflict there will be no difference between the political parties on this,” he commented while in the Ukrainian capital.

The Labour Party has vowed to continue providing Ukraine with current levels of military, financial, and diplomatic support, while also pushing to hold Russia accountable for the invasion, including support for efforts to establish an international tribunal for the crime of aggression. The Labour Party is also committed to helping provide Ukraine with a clear path toward future NATO membership.

Starmer’s stance is a continuation of the leading role played by the British government in support of Ukraine since the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion. With the Russian military concentrated on the Ukrainian border in January 2022 and posed to invade, Britain was among the first countries to provide Ukraine with anti-tank weapons. This set the tone for British military aid to Ukraine, with the UK repeatedly setting the standard for other partners to follow by delivering new categories of weapons such as modern tanks and cruise missiles.

Britain has also provided Ukraine with vocal diplomatic backing in the international arena. During his tenure as Prime Minister, Boris Johnson was a particularly prominent supporter of the country, visiting Kyiv on numerous occasions and speaking powerfully of the threat to international security posed by Russian aggression. This advocacy helped earn Johnson something approaching cult status in Ukraine, with streets named and a pastry dish created in his honor.

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Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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The firm stance adopted by successive UK governments reflects British public opinion, which strongly favors continued support for Ukraine. This is very much in line with British tradition. Indeed, for many Brits, Ukraine’s current struggle against Russia’s invasion echoes their own fight against Nazi Germany almost a century earlier.

Starmer will have an opportunity to emphasize his commitment to Ukraine at the 2024 NATO Summit, which takes place this week in Washington. While there is no realistic prospect of any breakthrough toward Ukrainian membership of the alliance, this high-profile event will allow the new British leader to lay out his vision for continued international support for the Ukrainian war effort.

The bipartisan consistency of British support for Ukraine comes as a welcome relief to Ukrainians. The Ukrainian military is heavily dependent on continued international deliveries of weapons and equipment, but this aid has proven vulnerable to disruption due to political shifts in various Western capitals. Amid uncertainly over the implications of elections in key partners including France and the United States, Britain’s clear position gives Ukrainians much-needed confidence as they continue to fight for national survival.

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.

The Kremlin’s crimes will continue to escalate until Russia is defeated

Serhiy Prytula — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 20:04:56 +0000

Almost two and a half years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Kremlin still retains the ability to shock with the scale of its crimes. On July 8, the targets were Ukrainian children. Not just any children, but kids being treated for cancer, whose daily lives were already full of fear and pain.

The exact number of dead and wounded as a result of Russia’s targeted missile strike on the Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital in central Kyiv has not yet been confirmed. Nor is it possible to calculate the death and suffering that will result from lack of treatment due to the partial destruction of what is Ukraine’s biggest pediatric clinic.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, large numbers of distressed and in some cases injured children lined the pavement around the ruins of the wrecked hospital, many still attached to drips. Providing them with the specialized medical support they so urgently require will now be extremely difficult.

Doctors were also among the victims. Those killed in Monday’s missile strikes included thirty year old Svitlana Lukyanchuk, a nephrologist from Lviv. Svitlana was an orphan who overcame challenging personal circumstances to qualify as a doctor. She dedicated herself to saving children’s lives, but will never now experience the joy of motherhood herself.

Okhmatdyt Children’s Hospital was one of three separate Ukrainian medical facilities to be struck by Russian missiles on July 8. One such attack could potentially be attributed to human error or explained as a tragic mistake. Three targeted attacks on the same day suggests a deliberate Russian strategy to destroy Ukraine’s healthcare infrastructure, just as the Kremlin has already targeted and destroyed much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure. Moscow appears intent on making large parts of the country unlivable.

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It is no doubt hard for many outside observers to fully appreciate that such horrors are taking place in the heart of twenty-first century Europe. After all, just three years ago, it would also have been difficult for most Ukrainians to believe such things were possible. Sadly, that is no longer the case.

As a result of Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Ukrainians have been confronted by an astonishing array of war crimes that recall the worst excesses of bygone eras. Entire cities have been reduced to rubble. Hundreds of thousands have been killed, abducted, or subjected to forced deportation. Large numbers of vulnerable children have been sent to Russian indoctrination camps and robbed of their Ukrainian heritage. In regions of Ukraine under Kremlin control, all traces of Ukrainian identity have been ruthlessly erased.

The evidence of Russian war crimes is now so overwhelming that the International Criminal Court in The Hague has issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin himself and many of his most senior officials. Nevertheless, the nightmare continues. A genocide is being live-streamed to the watching world, but Western leaders choose not to call it by its name for fear of being obliged to act.

Today’s Russia did not become a rogue regime overnight. On the contrary, the crimes we are now witnessing reflect unresolved historic issues that have been allowed to fester since the early days of Putin’s reign. Unlike all other European empires, post-Soviet Russia never rejected imperialism and was not forced to confront the crimes of the imperial era. This has allowed for a revival of Russia’s imperial identity and has helped fuel a sense of impunity that directly paved the way for the invasion of Ukraine.

Rather than address the growing threat posed by Putin’s Russia, the Western world has consistently sought to avoid confrontation. When a newly anointed Putin crushed Chechnya, Western leaders chose to look the other way. After he invaded Georgia, they scrambled to reset relations and return to business as usual.

Inevitably, this approach only emboldened the Kremlin. The West’s weak response to the 2014 seizure of Crimea led directly to Russian military intervention in eastern Ukraine. When this, too, failed to produce a decisive reaction, the stage was set for today’s full-scale invasion.

Even now, Western policy remains defined by a reluctance to provoke Putin, with Western leaders hopelessly preoccupied by fears of escalation. This has left Ukraine unable to adequately defend itself, while encouraging Russia to escalate further. As a result, we are now closer to a major global war than at any time for a generation.

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Read the full article here.

Ukraine’s advance in Kursk: What’s next and implications

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It is delusional to think Russia can be stopped by appeasement, concessions, or compromise. Any ceasefire would merely provide the Kremlin with a pause to rearm before resuming the campaign to wipe Ukraine off the map entirely.

Nor are Putin’s imperial ambitions limited to Ukraine alone. He has repeatedly portrayed the invasion of Ukraine as part of a sacred mission to correct the historical injustice of the Soviet collapse and “return” historically Russian lands. If Putin achieves his goals in Ukraine, he will inevitably look to press home his advantage and “reclaim” other countries that were once part of the Russian Empire. The list of potential targets is long and includes Finland, Poland, the Baltic States, and Moldova. The only way to guarantee their security is by defeating Russia in Ukraine.

Western leaders now have a simple choice: They can provide Ukraine with the support necessary to defeat Russia, or they can prepare to face the Russians themselves in the near future. With every day of delay, the cost of stopping Putin grows. At the moment, it is the Ukrainians alone who are paying this terrible price. However, until Russia is beaten, nobody in the West can take their security for granted. Instead, the threat will only increase.

Ten years ago when the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began, a cautious Putin deployed Russian soldiers without identifying insignia in an attempt to mask his aggressive actions. A decade later, he is now bombing children’s hospitals in the center of a European capital city while his priests and propagandists preach holy war against the West. Clearly, he will not stop until he is stopped.

Vladimir Putin represents the greatest threat to European peace since Adolf Hitler. Today’s generation of Western leaders should recall the lessons of that earlier era before it is too late. They must reject the appeasement of the 1930s and embrace the mantra of “never again” that rose from the ashes of World War II. Until that happens, the Kremlin’s crimes will continue to escalate.

Serhiy Prytula is a Ukrainian volunteer fundraiser and founder of the Prytula Charity Foundation.

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

David Babikian and Julia Nesheiwat — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 17:07:40 +0000

This week, NATO will hold its landmark seventy-fifth anniversary summit. The Washington, DC, event is expected to focus on trade security, the war in Ukraine, and the organization’s greatest adversary, Russia. This comes on the heels of news that a record twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries will reach the Alliance’s defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product this year, according to NATO statistics published on June 17. This increase in spending is in large part a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region.

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together.

Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing.

NATO members should note that Russia has outpaced the Alliance in its establishment and usage of trade corridors in the Arctic region, funded heavily by Chinese investment. Transporting energy and mineral commodities via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) presents strong advantages to Russia: staying within its territory and circumventing the Suez Canal shortens Russian tankers’ trips to China by about ten days per journey. As climate change warms the Arctic at a pace far exceeding other parts of the world, the viability of the NSR will increase and the region’s strategic importance will continue to grow. Historically, Russian energy in the High North has been dispatched using ships specially built to navigate sea ice, but in September 2023, the first shipment was sent using a conventional, non-ice class oil tanker due to high levels of summer ice melt, an increasingly common phenomenon.

“The energy crisis that has emerged from the Ukraine war has been building for decades,” Paul Sullivan, an energy and international relations professor at Johns Hopkins University, told us. “Russia’s development of Arctic LNG [liquefied natural gas] and usage of the NSR should be of top concern to NATO countries with concerns about the precarity of energy sources and trade routes, respectively.”

Russia’s economic dependence on exporting its extensive energy and mineral resources has led to strengthened cooperation with China, an imperfect relationship based on mutual need. Chinese state-owned energy enterprises have in the past five years invested billions of dollars in Russian oil and gas ventures and mineral projects in the Arctic. Since facing Western sanctions, Russian reallocation of its crude oil supply to a discounted Chinese market cemented the partnership between the two nations. Since then, this infrastructure investment for ports, pipelines, mines, and railways has surged. Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing, which has affirmed its own involvement in the region as a “near-Arctic state.” For example, Russian and Chinese vessels were spotted in August 2023 conducting joint military exercises near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. That said, NATO members rethinking Arctic strategies should take a clear-eyed approach as to the extent of the “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing. At the beginning of June, the Russian gas market announced a pause of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to China. The deal has reportedly stalled over monopsonistic Chinese demands to pay drastically lower prices for lower quantities of gas.

NATO’s Arctic member states—the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—remain intent on maintaining free and navigable Arctic shipping lanes and are exploring their own energy and mineral resource projects in the region. Jennifer Spence, the project director of the Arctic Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, explained to us that “in these remote areas, military and economic infrastructure development go hand in hand—securitization of the Arctic can help facilitate investments in a more diversified economy for Arctic states.”

Recent European Parliament legislation to facilitate the construction of new mines to secure critical minerals has been a boon to Swedish mining companies, which have discovered mineral resources in the country’s north. In the United States, the ConocoPhillips Willow project is set to commence in northern Alaska’s National Petroleum Reserve, and in Canada, the federal government recently announced new investments in Arctic defense. Separately, the province of Alberta has worked with the state of Alaska to promote energy development ties. Per Spence, “commercial progress in the North American Arctic is comparatively more rhetoric than action, though signals of permanent infrastructure investment seem to be not too far behind.”

NATO’s Arctic member states have increasingly focused on the region as an important operational theater—and this trend should continue. Nordic countries have announced major NATO exercises in the High North as well as training events with the United States. Canada is procuring and deploying new Arctic-proof military aircraft and ships, and recently conducted joint exercises with the United States, demonstrating an independent investment in regional security. The United States has also increased its Arctic presence. This has included an initiative by the US Coast Guard and the US Navy, which built three Polar Security Cutters, upgraded versions of heavy-duty icebreakers replete with advanced sensors and equipment.

As of now, Russia’s pause in its Arctic developments reflects the status of commercial investment progress in the region. International sanctions, most of which were initiated by countries that are also NATO members, have taken a major toll on Russian Arctic commercial expansion (for example, Russian energy behemoth Novatek suspended production at its Arctic LNG 2 project in the spring due to sanctions and a shortage of ice-class gas tankers). As for NATO progress, according to Sullivan, the Johns Hopkins expert, the accession of Sweden and Finland “increases NATO’s Arctic footprint massively and thereby significantly improves its position.” With a vastly larger Arctic footprint and record levels of military spending, the time is ripe for NATO to further address the looming security consequences of Russia’s Arctic expansion. The NATO Summit in Washington provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North.

David Babikian is a graduate from Princeton University in economics. His research practice spans from work with policymakers, investment firms, and nongovernmental organizations, pertaining to climate resilience, commodities, and critical minerals. He is a fellow at Climate Cabinet.

Julia Nesheiwat is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a member of the Atlantic Council board of directors, vice president for policy at TC Energy, and the former US homeland security advisor.

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Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit

Frederick Kempe — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:49:08 +0000

The split screen was the devastating work of Vladimir Putin. On one side, a barrage of Russian missile strikes hit Ukraine, and rescue workers search for survivors at Kyiv’s finest children’s hospital. On the other side, heads of state and government arrive in Washington for NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit, the world’s most powerful alliance being shown by Putin as unable to save Ukrainian children.

Another screen shows a NATO leader, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, paying homage to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, following his visit with Putin in Moscow. The next screen shows the leader of the world’s most populous democracy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, making his first visit to Moscow since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Yet another screen shows US President Joe Biden looking lost in his presidential debate, raising new concerns about what his health means for NATO’s future.

No one can convince me it was a coincidence that Putin chose Monday, the eve of the NATO Summit, to launch one of his largest recent barrages of missiles on Ukraine. The leaders of Hungary and India both knew the significance of the timing of their visits—one by the Alliance’s most rogue member and the other by a major power keen to underscore its autonomy of action.

It’s appropriate that today’s opening day for the NATO Summit will be marked by a Ukrainian day of mourning for the at least forty-one individuals who died and the more than 170 who were injured in Monday’s attack, not to mention the wrecked hospital infrastructure that would have saved countless other lives. It seems that Putin hasn’t read Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, ratified by the United Nations after World War II, which prohibits attacks on civilian hospitals.

Ukrainians’ shock and anger at the strike on the children’s hospital in Kyiv could give way to dismay as they watch NATO stand by in Washington. The United States has not yet fully freed up the Ukrainians to use the longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) that could hit the Russian sites from which deadly missiles are fired. NATO allies once again will likely put off a decision about when exactly Ukraine will join the Alliance, which is the only outcome that will provide the country the long-term security its neighbors in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Hungary enjoy.

Orbán’s rogue relations with Russia and China come as he takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, something Xi acknowledged as an opportunity, just days after the European Union kicked off new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Orbán stopped in Moscow before he flew on to Beijing.

During his visit to Moscow, Modi called Russia an “all-weather friend” and a “trusted ally.” Putin reciprocated the sentiment by welcoming his “dear friend” to his official residence.

Underpinning the Russia-India partnership is energy. India is the third-biggest crude oil importer in the world, and Russia is its single largest source of seaborne oil, accounting for around 40 percent of imports in recent months, up from just 2 percent in 2021.

Modi would have known that choosing to make the trip during the NATO anniversary summit would rub some US officials the wrong way. However, he, like Orbán, knew there will be little price to pay from Western partners after the trip.

NATO began its mission seventy-five years ago amid an inflection point in history, a story former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson chronicled in his memoir Present at the Creation. Putin and Xi would very much like to be present at the conclusion of NATO and the US-led international order. But they will only be successful if allies don’t respond and if partners go out of their way to back these revisionist autocrats.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

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The UK sets a path for clean, affordable energy—and renewed climate leadership

Charles Hendry — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:24:21 +0000

The new United Kingdom administration is one that is passionate about clean energy and the energy transition. But first, to understand its approach to energy policy, it is important to understand how this new government will operate.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s pitch is that the government will be focused on “mission delivery” with mission delivery boards chaired by Starmer personally. He has said that his approach to all issues will be “country first—party second.”

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Almost all members of the Shadow Cabinet have been appointed to those same portfolios in government and, in addition, Starmer has also brought back some former ministers from the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown years. They are all therefore familiar with their portfolios, widely respected, and able to hit the ground running. It is also clear that the prime minister wants to work closely with the private sector in order to make early progress on the government’s priorities.

Ed Miliband has been appointed as secretary of state for energy security and net zero. This is broadly the role he held when Labour was last in government before 2010, so he knows the issues well and is a genuinely passionate advocate for tackling climate change and delivering net zero.

With the UK government now one the most secure among the large western nations (with a five-year mandate and a very large majority), the United Kingdom is expected to reassume a leading role in the international discussions on climate change. As the only country to have reduced its carbon emissions by over 50 percent since 1990, many will welcome that leadership once again.

In most areas, there will not be a huge difference in UK government energy policy under the new administration, but there will be a few distinct changes.

Labour has set a very challenging target to decarbonize the electricity grid by 2030. Until there is much more detail about how this can be done, industry will understandably be skeptical about the feasibility of such a goal, the costs involved, and how local communities will be brought on board. This will involve a significant further commitment to renewables, including a welcome early announcement to end the ban on onshore wind. The United Kingdom’s success in developing offshore wind will be continued.

There is evident government support for new nuclear, including next generation small modular reactors, and in the longer-term for fusion. The government wants to see a significant role for hydrogen and for tidal power, but these cannot deliver at scale in time for the 2030 target, so expect to see an acceleration of carbon capture utilization and storage programs. Starmer has spoken recently about the continuing role for gas in the mix, to deliver energy security, and this can only happen if its use can be decarbonized.

Labour is committed to ending the granting of new oil and gas licenses for the North Sea, while respecting the licenses that have already been issued. In reality, these would be for field developments that are many years off, so they would not make any significant difference to the United Kingdom’s energy security in the short-term. Of more immediate impact, there will be a new levy on companies operating in the North Sea oil and gas sector, and here the detail will be crucial—if not done carefully, companies may simply choose to leave the United Kingdom, as many have already done.

At the heart of its energy policy, there will be a new government organization, Great British Energy, and although its full details are still to be clarified, its purpose is to drive forward the clean energy sector and accelerate the transition. If done properly, it will help ensure the roll-out of the grid infrastructure needed to harness the wealth of renewable energy that the United Kingdom has in abundance.

Also of value will be greater attention on issues that have not had the attention they deserve, such as energy efficiency, decarbonizing heat, and an acceleration of demand-side response measures that are already starting to transform the electricity market. The government already knows that the success of its energy policy will be judged in large part by whether people can afford their bills.

Sadly, energy rarely seemed to be center-stage under the Conservative government (unless in response to a crisis), and that seems to be changing fast. There is already a sense that energy deeply matters to this administration—not just to deliver energy security but as an economic driver, helping to decarbonize homes and businesses, and creating a mass of new green jobs.

As a former Conservative energy minister, I wish this new administration well. If they can get these policies right, they stand a very good chance of delivering the holy grail in energy terms—clean, and secure energy, at a price people can afford.

Charles Hendry is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, a former member of the UK Parliament, and former UK minister of state for energy.

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Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

Andrew Bernard — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:03:53 +0000

NATO’s recent defense expenditure report was a cringeworthy moment in Madrid. Despite self-applauding recent years of defense spending growth, Spain had the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last among Alliance members for defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), clocking in at an estimated 1.28 percent for 2024. Although consistently investing in equipment expenditures at or above the NATO guideline of 20 percent of its defense budget, Spain’s inability to spend on defense at a rate agreed upon by allies will lend credence to naysayers who question its commitment to the Alliance.

However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

Spanish public opinion takes a turn

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shook Spanish public opinion. Blessed by favorable geography, Spain did not consider Russia to be a threat to its sovereignty, and most Spaniards did not feel Russia threated European security writ large. The invasion changed all of that. Spanish citizens judged Russia’s actions to be a clear violation of international law.

According to a Pew Research Center poll, only 5 percent of Spaniards held a favorable opinion of Russia in 2023, down sharply from 31 percent in 2020 and 46 percent in 2011. Many Spaniards disapprove of Russia’s malign activity, such as its propensity for election interference, including during the 2017 Catalonia independence referendum. More recently, the alleged Russian assassination in February in Alicante, Spain, of a Russian helicopter pilot who defected has further hardened Spanish public opinion against Russia’s role in the world.

With broad public backing, Spain has given Ukraine unwavering support since the beginning of the conflict. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez optimized Spain’s July-December 2023 Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) to showcase the nation’s commitment to Ukraine. Sánchez traveled to Kyiv on the first day of Spain’s presidency while hosting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the October 2023 European Political Community gathering, with both King Felipe VI and Sánchez individually meeting Zelenskyy. Spain also guided Ukraine’s EU accession negotiation process during its presidency.

Direct Spanish support to Ukraine continues to intensify as the war progresses. Madrid and Kyiv signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement in May 2024, accompanied by a Spanish pledge of one billion euros in military aid. Spain has provided Ukraine vast amounts of lethal and nonlethal military assistance, both bilaterally and through EU mechanisms. Spanish military equipment contributions have included air defense systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery systems with associated ammunition, including Patriot missiles, which had been desperately requested by Ukraine.

Given Spain’s underinvestment in defense prior to 2022, the Ukrainian donations have cut into Spanish reserves. This has not dampened Spain’s willingness to support Ukraine, with Sánchez meeting Spanish defense industry executives in March to ask them to prioritize Ukrainian needs over Spanish requirements. Spain hosts an EU training facility in Toledo as part of the EU Military Assistance Mission and has exceeded its mandate to train two thousand soldiers, with the Spanish Army more than doubling its output with nearly five thousand Ukrainian graduates. Spanish leaders also highlight their nonmilitary support for Ukraine, including hosting more than two hundred thousand Ukrainian refugees, earmarking reconstruction funds, and actively supporting Ukraine’s efforts for judicial accountability for Russian war crimes in the country.

Spain’s commitment to NATO deterrence and defense

In addition to supporting Ukraine, Spain bolstered its commitment to NATO deterrence efforts in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Spain deploys a high proportion of its armed forces to participate in NATO operations while actively volunteering to lead NATO missions in all domains. The Spanish Air and Space Force deploys fighter aircraft to either the Baltics or the Black Sea region eight months out of the year on average, and currently leads the April-July 2024 Baltic Air Policing detachment in Lithuania. For the maritime domain, the Spanish Navy commanded NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 for the first half of 2024, helming a multination, multi-ship maritime deterrence force in the Baltic Sea.

The Spanish Army notably increased its operational tempo in the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Spanish Army immediately augmented its troops in Latvia following the invasion, where it had been participating in NATO’s legacy Enhanced Forward Presence. The Spanish footprint in Latvia is a reinforced company-sized unit equipped with armor, artillery, and air defense enablers. This reinforcement included bilateral support to Latvia in the form of an advanced air defense unit. More importantly, Spain enthusiastically volunteered to be the framework nation for a new battlegroup in Slovakia. The Spanish Army officially took command of the battlegroup on July 1, bringing the same quality of forces to Slovakia as it did to Latvia, while it keeps another reserve battlegroup ready in Spain to augment its forward deployed forces if needed. Finally, the Spanish Marines (naval infantry) will send a company of soldiers to Romania to embed with the French-led battlegroup later this year. Thus, Spain is one of the few NATO members to have land forces defending the Alliance’s territory in the three separate regions along the eastern flank.

Keeping a vigilant eye on Europe’s south

Although Spain’s commitments to the eastern flank speak for themselves, it is Europe’s southern flank that gives Madrid the most cause for concern. Spain is a long-standing contributor to security and defense missions in Africa and the Middle East, often under a United Nations (UN) or EU mandate. Through these experiences, especially in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, Madrid consistently raises concerns about Russia’s behavior in Africa, closely observing Russian malign activity, including through Moscow’s Wagner Group or post-Wagner operatives. Spanish diplomats are especially concerned about Russia’s support for illegitimate governments and military juntas, viewing this as a deliberate effort by Moscow to hinder these nations’ development toward freedom and prosperity.

Spain urged NATO to launch its “southern neighborhood” working group and was an active participant in the final report, advocating for a larger yet humbler role for NATO in these regions. Spain led the NATO Mission in Iraq for one year, participates in every EU military and civilian mission in Africa, and is currently the commander for the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a force commitment of more than seven hundred troops.

Another Spanish commitment in support of Europe’s southern flank is often overlooked: Spain hosts US forces at its Rota naval base and Morón air base. These installations provide two of the four large runways in Europe for US air power projection (with the other two in Germany), enables the forward deployment of US maritime power in and beyond the Mediterranean Sea, and provides a gateway for three US geographic combatant commands, which itself contributes to European security.

Increasing defense spending for Spain’s benefit

Spain’s support for Ukraine and its reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank do not absolve it from its defense spending credibility problem. While it is likely to try to spin the defense spending discussion toward recent increases, Spain still has a long and steep climb to reach its self-proclaimed 2029 goal of passing the 2 percent of GDP threshold. To accomplish this, Spanish defense spending will need to grow at a minimum of 10 percent each year through 2029, while staying ahead of inflation. This is a real challenge, especially given the fractured nature of Spanish politics, budget processes, and high debt levels. While there is a consensus between the center-left and center-right in support of increased defense spending, both parties would be wise to formalize this and pass budgets so the armed forces can invest over time with confidence no matter which party is in power.

Increased spending is critical for acquiring much-needed capabilities. The Spanish Navy’s sole aircraft carrier, the multi-purpose Juan Carlos I, will face irrelevancy as a fixed-wing launch platform if the navy does not procure a replacement for its fleet of EAV-8B Harrier II jump jets. Although Spain joined the French-German Future Combat Air System project, the earliest any production aircraft may join the Spanish Air and Space Force is 2040, beyond the lifespan of its EF-18 fleet. The Spanish Army’s Fuerza 2035 program needs to be funded through completion. Soldier salaries continue to fall behind the cost of living and inflation, and the military may need to grow to employ future capabilities.

In other words, the to-do list is long. Spain’s political leaders need to commit to funding these capabilities if there is any hope for the Spanish military to keep pace with the rapidly changing security environment.

Andrew Bernard is a retired US Air Force colonel and a visiting fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

The post Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Nikoladze and Lejava cited by Defense One on Georgia foreign agent law

cfalkenek — Tue, 09 Jul 2024 14:07:40 +0000

The post Nikoladze and Lejava cited by Defense One on Georgia foreign agent law appeared first on Atlantic Council.

#AtlanticDebrief – What are the biggest takeaways from the French election? | A Debrief from Amb. Gérard Araud

nlawler — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 22:23:55 +0000

IN THIS EPISODE

On July 7, French voters headed to the polls in the second round of the French elections. The results showed the left and green party alliance winning the most votes, Macron’s Ensemble Party coming in second, and Le Pen’s far-right National Rally coming in a surprise third. No election contender was able to win a clear-cut majority, however. What does the result of the election mean for the political landscape in France and the ability of President Macron to govern?

On this episode of #AtlanticDebrief, Jörn Fleck sits down with Amb. Gérard Araud, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, to unpack the implications of the French election results and the emerging power struggles in French politics.

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The post #AtlanticDebrief – What are the biggest takeaways from the French election? | A Debrief from Amb. Gérard Araud appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations

Can Kasapoğlu and Sine Özkaraşahin — Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000

Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas : artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload , and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.