Colombia - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/colombia/ Shaping the global future together Tue, 30 Jul 2024 17:57:10 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/favicon-150x150.png Colombia - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/colombia/ 32 32 Justice Fair Play Initiative: The key to improving justice delivery in Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/justice-fair-play-initiative-the-key-to-improving-justice-delivery-in-colombia/ Wed, 31 Jul 2024 12:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779288 An accessible judicial system is crucial in countering global threats to democracy by enabling swift and fair dispute resolutions. This study demonstrates that such system can reduce uncertainty and create an environment conducive to investment and sustainable economic development.

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Access to justice is a crucial component of the rule of law and the defense of democracy. A robust judicial system ensures that laws are applied fairly and equitably, strengthens confidence in institutions, protects rights, and promotes transparency and accountability, which are essential for democratic stability and economic development.1 In a global context where threats to democracy are increasing, strengthening access to justice and the rule of law becomes even more critical. An accessible judicial system acts as a safeguard against those threats.2 Access to justice for businesses and the general Colombian population is vital to ensure both fairness and economic efficiency. When businesses can resolve disputes quickly and fairly, uncertainty is reduced, fostering a favorable investment climate and sustainable economic development.

This research, based on a holistic and integrated approach, involves two key elements: a thorough understanding of access to justice and a comprehensive view of the justice system. The first element implies that effective access to justice extends beyond the initial approach to legal systems; it encompasses both the entry point and the ongoing journey within the system. The right to access justice is fully realized when it results in a prompt, comprehensive, and enforceable solution. This understanding of access to justice is essential for addressing the multifaceted challenges faced by individuals and corporations in Colombia.

Building on this thorough understanding of access to justice, this research sheds light on the problems faced by actors within the system, which affect companies of all sizes and citizens alike, regardless of their socioeconomic status. It explores the procedural journey, revealing systemic issues and managerial barriers embedded in the justice system. Forty-four percent of respondents expressed medium to high concerns about judicial corruption and threats to judicial independence and impartiality.

The second element is the comprehensive view of the Colombian justice system. Such a view requires data collection regarding the three routes of access to justice in Colombia, all different in nature: the judicial branch; administrative officials with jurisdictional functions; and individual entities that have the right to administer justice, such as conciliators and arbitrators.

The Colombian constitutional system allows the congress to delegate certain judicial powers to specific administrative authorities including superintendencies (regulatory agencies) of industry and commerce, finance, corporations, and health; police inspectors; and family commissariats, among others. However, it is worth noting that administrative authorities’ judicial power excludes criminal prosecutions and proceedings.3 When administrative authorities exercise jurisdictional functions through resolutions, they act as judges rather than as administrative entities. Individuals can choose, preventively, whether to approach judicial-branch judges or superintendencies judges with jurisdictional functions to resolve their disputes.

This report seeks to identify public policy recommendations that can enhance the efficiency and equity of the justice system through a holistic and integrated approach. Tackling access to justice during the process is crucial not only for the private sector, which relies on the justice system to protect its interests, but also for the broader Colombian society. This will ensure that justice is accessible and equitable for all.

By the numbers

Expert Insights

Key data

For all jurisdictions and types of disputes included in this study (both judicial and administrative proceedings), fewer than half of the companies surveyed fully or partially agreed that the duration of proceedings is reasonable. This finding is consistent with the study’s qualitative research component and existing cross-country data on unreasonable civil-justice delays from the World Justice Project (WJP). Colombian scores on timeliness of civil-justice delivery in the WJP Rule of Law Index are lower than those of both best-in-class nations (e.g., Germany or the Netherlands) and regional and income peers in Latin America (See Graph 1).

Delays permeate the system, affecting small, medium, and large companies. When companies were asked about the obstacles limiting effective access to justice when dealing with judicial authorities, the number of legal processes that never concluded scored as the highest obstacle, with 51 percent of companies ranking it as their top obstacle and 15 percent ranking it as a medium level obstacle (See Figure 1).

Similarly, when asked about the obstacles limiting effective access to justice when resorting to administrative authorities, interviewees ranked unjustified delays as the biggest obstacle. Forty-one percent of companies ranked it as the top obstacle and 20 percent ranked it as a medium-level obstacle (See Figure 2).

In terms of judicial independence from hierarchical superiors and other sources, superintendencies perform worse than all other paths to justice, and considerably below all judges (44 percent of companies either totally or mostly disagree that this path is free from this pressure). Critically, in terms of access to justice, it is the second-worst mechanism (34 percent of companies find it difficult to access this mechanism), (See Figure 4).

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Related content

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=p4CReF67hzQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=On+the+Rule+of+Law:+History,+Politics,+Theory&ots.
2    “2020 Corruption Perceptions Index—Explore the Results,” Transparency.org, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020.
3    Pursuant to Article 116 of the Colombian Constitution and Article 24 of the General Code of Procedure, some administrative authorities exercise jurisdictional functions, which are exceptional, must deal with precise matters, and must be duly attributed to them by law.

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What makes Colombian mercenaries so interesting? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/podcast/what-makes-colombian-mercenaries-so-interesting/ Wed, 29 May 2024 13:17:10 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=768214 Coming up this Thursday, in Season 2, Episode 2 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by Dr. Andrés Macías, a Bogota-based expert on Colombian mercenaries. They begin by looking at the explosive case of 26 Colombians arrested for their part in the 2021 assassination of the Haitian president, as well […]

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Coming up this Thursday, in Season 2, Episode 2 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by Dr. Andrés Macías, a Bogota-based expert on Colombian mercenaries. They begin by looking at the explosive case of 26 Colombians arrested for their part in the 2021 assassination of the Haitian president, as well as the public debate within Colombia. Andrés goes on to explain what makes former Colombian soldiers so interesting to the international private security market, the link back to the protracted armed conflict in Colombia and the recognized value of US training, as well as the need for the Colombian government to strengthen its veterans’ policy. They also discuss the thousands of Colombians who enlist under the banner of the United Arab Emirates and what’s driving hundreds of Colombians to sign up to fight Russia in Ukraine.

“What is the Colombian government doing with the huge number of veterans that we have had throughout the years? Because we actually don’t know much about what they are doing, what activities they are performing, and what their status is.”

Dr. Andrés Macías, Bogota-based expert on Colombian mercenaries

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice

About the podcast

Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalization of contract warfare tells us about the world we currently live in, the future of the international system, and what war could look like in the coming decades.

Further reading

Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

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Colombia’s president must focus on economic stewardship in the second half of his term https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/colombias-president-must-focus-on-economic-stewardship-in-the-second-half-of-his-term/ Tue, 07 May 2024 15:22:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=762417 President Gustavo Petro should adopt a steadier hand on domestic issues and a more cooperative stance toward international private sector investment.

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Colombian President Gustavo Petro is nearing the midpoint of his four-year term facing stalled progress on his reform agenda and increasing political volatility. Amid these challenges, Petro must adopt a steadier hand on domestic issues and a more cooperative stance toward international private sector investment. This would be a prudent reboot for a politician who is shedding support and sending signals that could sour relations with investors capable of lifting Colombia’s still-recovering economy.

Colombia, a key US security and trading partner in South America, needs to soothe markets and solidify its economic recovery through a mix of political pragmatism, compromise, and a commitment to deepening investment. Economic stewardship is key both to securing reform and long-term development.

Economic challenges

Many Latin American economies have been buffeted in recent years, as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine each took a toll. For Colombia, it was a nearly 9 percent hit to its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 and a 13.1 percent rise in consumer prices in 2022. Combined, these factors prompted the previous administration of Iván Duque as well as the Petro administration in its early days (the last quarter of 2022) to adopt a series of countercyclical recovery programs to get the economy back on track.

Colombia’s economy has seen mixed indicators in recent years. On the one hand, unemployment remained at around 11 percent and inflation decreased to 9 percent in 2023, while on the other hand the economy grew only by 1.2 percent, below the Finance Ministry’s forecast of 1.8 percent growth and lagging behind other countries in the region. During 2023, for example, Colombia’s GDP growth was lower than the growth reported by Venezuela (5 percent), Panama (4.6 percent), the Dominican Republic (4.6 percent), Guatemala (3.2 percent), Honduras (3 percent), Costa Rica (2.7 percent), and Nicaragua (2.3 percent). Yet other economic fundamentals, such as the exchange rate, seem to be stabilizing, and interest rates are expected to follow the same trend or move downward. Forecasts for Colombia’s 2024 GDP growth range from 1.3 percent to 1.8 percent, and its annual inflation rate dropped in the first trimester of 2024 but is still among the highest in the region, at 7.4 percent.

Signals to the private sector

This coming August, Petro will hit the halfway point in his four-year term, and he is ineligible to seek reelection. If current trends continue, he will meet that milestone while overseeing lackluster economic growth; failing to advance his stymied health reform while other reform proposals languish in Congress; and facing scrutiny for the implementation of his 2022 tax reform, with aspects of it being challenged in the Constitutional Court.

Petro—who has expressed frustration with the forces impeding his agenda—backtracked from a campaign promise this year. In 2018, Petro literally carved into a marble tablet a list of promises to reassure critics who swore he would take the country down the same path of political extremism and erosion of democracy as Nicolás Maduro in neighboring Venezuela. One “commandment” was to refrain from convening a National Constituent Assembly to revise the country’s constitution. In March, however, he proposed convening a National Constituent Assembly, the first since 1991, to address six different issues that are stalled in the legislature. The proposal is unlikely to proceed given his lack of support in Congress, and any attempt to advance it through decree would be blocked by the courts. On top of this, Petro has lost the support of most Colombians: more than 60 percent of Colombians disapprove of his administration, according to an April 9 survey by Invamer.

Nonetheless, the polarizing constitutional reform proposal has generated further uncertainty about the country’s policy direction and economic expectations, both unwelcome drags on Colombia’s private-sector investment climate. Other issues contributing to concerns in the private sector include a 10 percent decline in imports of goods and services and a 16 percent drop in new business investment. Likewise, the slow disbursement of public spending in many government agencies has raised eyebrows because state spending is the main driver of employment in remote regions, particularly with infrastructure and housing development.

Three steps to shift this dynamic

The conventional wisdom in Colombian politics is that a good economy will help even an unpopular government find a way to advance its agenda with minimal resistance. But in order for this maxim to apply to the Petro administration, the president would need to make some significant changes to shift the current dynamic.

First, he would need to spur more coordination with the private sector to stoke investment and shore up the country’s reputation as a destination for companies. For instance, the government’s reindustrialization program provides an important opportunity, if implemented as planned, to foster cooperation and coordination with domestic and foreign private-sector entities interested in investing in Colombia. This program opens the door for new business ventures in areas that are critical for the country’s development. A good place to start would be for the national government and the private sector to work jointly on incentives that can help quickly spur investment in critical sectors such as infrastructure, tourism, health, digital communications.

Second, Petro would need to build consensus around the reforms he is seeking to advance in Congress. This will be essential to find a way to address Colombia’s most pressing needs—without undoing decades of stable economic and political development.

Third, the president should recognize that the outlook for Colombia’s economy matters to the United States as well. Despite ongoing debate over coca eradication efforts, Colombia remains the closest US ally in the region in the fight against drug trafficking. It is also the leading destination for US agricultural exports in South America and the third-largest in the Western Hemisphere overall, a position that has been secured by a free trade agreement that prioritizes investment in the country.

The US private sector can be an important catalyst in the development of Petro’s reindustrialization agenda. Post-pandemic changes in supply chains open up opportunities to invest in just such a friendly, nearby market. Colombia also has a rising middle class and the expanding consumption that entails, as well as the prospect of new revenue from Colombian exports to neighboring Venezuela and other countries across the region.

The rest of this year will be a crucial test for Petro’s economic stewardship. If managed successfully, he can bolster the country’s growth trajectory. To do so, he will have to both spend public funds wisely and do so in a way that works hand in hand with international investors and with the support of partners such as the United States. The necessary actions will be his to initiate—but the impact of such outreach and development would extend well beyond his term.


Enrique Millan-Mejia is a consultant and project manager at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former senior trade and investment diplomat of the government of Colombia to the United States.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Irregular migration starts well before the US southern border. Focus on the driving causes of the problem. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/irregular-migration-starts-well-before-the-us-southern-border-focus-on-the-driving-causes-of-the-problem/ Thu, 29 Feb 2024 00:09:57 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=742393 The United States must work with other countries in the Western Hemisphere to address the economic and security factors that drive migration.

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With US President Joe Biden and former US president (and current candidate) Donald Trump both scheduled to visit the southern border on Thursday, the spotlight is once again on the United States’ immigration policies. But it is an issue that extends well beyond the US-Mexico border. In 2023, a record 520,000 people crossed the treacherous jungle between Colombia and Panama known as the Darién Gap, more than double the number reported the year before, according to figures from the government of Panama. This figure highlights the critical need for comprehensive policies in the United States and in the region that not only ensure citizen and border security but also address migration as part of a broader, interconnected security challenge in the Western Hemisphere, spotlighting the pivotal role of the countries that migrants traverse.

Most immigrant traffic to the United States goes through and comes from Latin America. A lack of economic opportunities, climate vulnerabilities, political instability, and the pervasive influence of organized crime are often cited as push factors for these migrants. However, recent migration patterns also reveal a diversification of nationalities at the US southern border, underscoring the global nature of the challenge. In addition to regional events such as the collapse of Venezuela, political instability in Haiti, violence in Ecuador, and the ongoing and unrelenting crackdown in Nicaragua, conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war in the Middle East are also fueling the migration crisis. Most migrants at the US southern border in recent years originated in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. However, despite the persistent conception of most migrants coming from Central America, in December, more than half of migrant encounters at the US-Mexico border involved citizens of other countries, such as Russia, India, Brazil, Afghanistan, Romania, Turkey, and others.

As such, Latin American countries and the United States should work together to develop and implement policies and strategies that address the driving causes of migration that are specific to the region and mitigate the region-wide risks of such a large migrant flow—much of which now comes from outside the region.

Specifically, the United States should work with the countries originating high numbers of migrants to improve conditions and thus prevent the need for people to leave their countries—whether from Latin America and the Caribbean or other parts of the world. That starts with a holistic security strategy to address the challenges of human, drug, and arms trafficking. Supporting local economic growth and human capital development, employing climate change mitigation and adaptation programs, and fostering coordinated, multifaceted responses to the drug supply chain would create a more secure hemisphere and decrease the number of people fleeing violence.

Additionally, the United States needs to recognize that its current policies aimed at deterring migration are ineffective and often harmful. The hardline policies that were put in place by the Trump administration and have largely been continued by the Biden administration have done little to nothing to curb migration flows. At the US-Mexico border, migration crossings have hit a record high, with more than three hundred thousand Border Patrol encounters with migrants in December. This context demands a reevaluation of current strategies aimed at deterring migration.

Instead of continuing its failed effort at deterrence, Congress should focus on developing humane, legal pathways to migration, recognizing pull factors in the United States, which will decrease the frequency of irregular migration. A straightforward recommendation is for clear, realistic timelines for US judges to expeditiously deliver decisions on asylum cases.

The United States should not take on all of the burden. There are opportunities to work in the region and support regional partners on integrating displaced migrants in third countries, from the region or from other parts of the world, to help alleviate the migration flow to the US border. A new report by the Atlantic Council also puts forward the idea of the United States supporting a regional task force “with the goal of jointly addressing the factors behind irregular migration and insecurity.” The idea builds on the existing work of countries such as Costa Rica and Panama, which are working hand in hand to establish more streamlined, efficient, and unified border crossings. Last week, these two countries, with the assistance of the Inter-American Development Bank, inaugurated a one-of-a-kind border facility. Building on the Atlantic Council’s recommendation for a regional task force to address these challenges, the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala are already moving in this direction. The three nations have just “committed to establish an operationally focused trilateral working group aimed at enhancing security, law enforcement processes, and infrastructure along their international borders”—a concrete manifestation of a collaborative approach to solving regional challenges.”

Migration and security are inherently interlinked issues, and the urgency for a collaborative, multifaceted approach to both cannot be overstated. The United States must work with and support other countries in the hemisphere to holistically mitigate the root causes of migration and create safer conditions for citizens across the region.


María Eugenia Brizuela de Avila is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and a former minister of foreign affairs of El Salvador.

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2024 predictions: How ten issues could shape the year in Latin America and the Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/spotlight/2024-predictions-how-ten-issues-could-shape-the-year-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/ Fri, 12 Jan 2024 22:22:24 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=716754 How will the region ride a new wave of changing economic and political dynamics? Will the region sizzle or fizzle? Join in and be a part of our ten-question poll on the future of LAC.

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2024 will be a highly consequential year for Latin America and the Caribbean, both politically and economically.

Following global trend lines, significant shifts in Latin America and the Caribbean—including presidential elections in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Argentina, unprecedented agreements with the Venezuelan government, a worsening security situation in many countries, and a pressing focus on climate change—set the stage for even more change to come in 2024.

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we explore top questions that may shape this upcoming year in the hemisphere.

What will the region’s newest presidents accomplish? How might Latin America’s ties with countries such as China and Russia evolve? What might be the role of the United States in an election year? Will the Caribbean see new, international attention to the specific threats faced by major climatic events?

Take our quiz to find out if you agree with what we’re predicting!

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Advancing US-Colombia cooperation on drug policy and law enforcement https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/advancing-us-colombia-cooperation-on-drug-policy-and-law-enforcement/ Thu, 30 Nov 2023 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=705700 Consumption and price of the drug has remained stable in the United States in recent years. However, the current trend of falling coca leaf and cocaine prices in Colombia present a natural incentive for coca growers to find alternative forms of income, which could mean a higher rate of success for alternative development programs.

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A report by the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Advisory Group; honorary co-chaired by Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN)

With Geoff Ramsey and Isabel Chiriboga

Executive summary

On September 7, 2023, the Petro administration presented a new strategy to combat the illicit drug trade in Colombia—at a time when illicit coca cultivation is at an all-time high. The strategy’s emphasis on rural development and on offering viable economic alternatives for illicit crop growers, as well as changing counternarcotics priorities in Washington, provide a set of new opportunities for US-Colombia collaboration.

The United States and Colombia have a thirty-year track record of collaboration on this issue. Yet there is still a long road ahead, especially considering the growing concerns over the proliferation of organized crime in Colombia and the region writ large. In this context, progress on US-Colombia counternarcotics cooperation will require a delicate balance between reducing large-scale coca cultivation and building the capacity of security services to disrupt organized criminal networks, as well as investing in the rural communities most affected by this phenomenon.

At the same time, there is a growing recognition in the United States that the illicit drug trade is a shared responsibility primarily fueled by demand. Consumption and price have remained stable in the United States in recent years. However, the current trend of falling coca leaf and cocaine prices in Colombia present a natural incentive for coca growers to find alternative forms of income, which could mean a higher rate of success for alternative development programs and crop-substitution efforts if combined with a comprehensive law enforcement strategy.

The United States and Colombia should continue to collaborate closely to address the problems arising from the supply and demand for illicit drugs in this global context. This is crucial considering the emergence of new drug markets in West Africa and Europe, as well as the connections of certain trafficking organizations to fentanyl production. These dynamics, as well as a lack of state presence and the absence of economic alternatives in many parts of rural Colombia, have created longstanding challenges for both countries. Moving forward, it is crucial that both nations align their strategies to make the most impactful use of US assistance. The recommendations presented here are meant to bolster the approach to a decades-old problem.

US-Colombia Advisory Group recommendations

1. Enhance international cooperation efforts to dismantle organized crime groups and bolster interdiction operations.

Under Colombian law, any individual arrested by a Colombian authority at sea must be presented to a judicial officer within forty-eight hours. In practice, this means that offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) must leave their station. During that time, there is a gap in maritime coverage. The United States can support Colombia by offering essential equipment and training to incorporate advanced technology into OPVs. This could involve leveraging video processing techniques to facilitate due process during apprehensions at sea, thus negating the need for the vessel to return to port, while ensuring the protection of the rights of the accused and full compliance with Colombian law.

2. Define precise and inclusive guidelines for the manual eradication of “industrial” plantations, while working to develop additional metrics to measure progress.

In replacing coca and other illicit crops with other industrial-scale agricultural yields, several factors should be considered. These include the type of industrial crops best suited for coca-growing areas, the presence of an external market for large-scale production, and the fulfilment of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards overseas so that these products can have a guaranteed market access. To comply with these requirements, the Colombian government should promote public and private alliances to produce industrial-scale crops with SPS standards approved.

3. Strengthen coordination efforts between national and local governance on rule of law and state presence in conflict-torn communities.

The Petro administration should enhance coordination efforts between the national government and local authorities. While the current drug and security strategies outline fundamental areas for progress, they can better incorporate perspectives from local government at the level of cities and municipalities. These include persistent budgetary concerns exacerbated by growing migration pressures and the need for greater coordination on the implementation of nationwide policies.

4. Expand and strengthen US-led capacity-building programs for the prevention and detection of money laundering and financial crimes, with a focused emphasis on cyber-based illicit transactions.

Certain sectors, including banking, gold mining, legal advisory, and real estate are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. To address this, Colombian law enforcement, military forces, and intelligence units should enhance existing partnerships with their US counterparts to significantly upscale training and capacity-building with an emphasis on cyber-based illicit transactions. Special attention should be given to small financial cooperatives and credit providers, which are at a higher risk of unwittingly facilitating illegal transactions.

5. Advance the implementation of a holistic bilateral counternarcotic agenda through a careful balance of effective drug policies.

The United States and Colombia should prioritize policies that will mitigate the escalating violence and security challenges Colombia faces. This includes enhanced cooperation efforts on real-time intelligence sharing on drug trafficking including routes, money laundering, and key individuals, and promoting advanced technologies for surveillance, interdiction, and data analytics to combat traffickers. Once the security situation is under control cooperation should focus on making those conditions sustainable through long-term social programs.

6. Work with affected communities to develop an environmentally sustainable approach to transition to legal crop cultivation while mitigating further environmental damage.

The United States could be a key partner in accompanying the Colombian government in shaping the preservation of the Amazon, as it will require restructuring a portion of Colombia’s debt to allocate the saved funds toward initiatives focused on forest preservation, sustainable land use, and community development. To achieve this, both countries can begin by collaborating on a detailed framework that outlines specific conservation targets and reforestation goals to then decide on the allocation of saved debt funds toward a combination of projects, particularly in areas with coca cultivation.

7. Advocate for the creation of a multilateral trust fund that can provide sustained funding for crop substitution and alternative development programs to curb the growing illicit drug-production trend.

Colombia’s new anti-drug strategy carries an estimated cost exceeding $21 billion over the next decade. To secure international support and incentivize donors to contribute to the long-term success of crop substitution and an alternative development program, we propose the establishment of a trust fund led by a recognized international financial institution. Given that the World Bank has a proven track record of efficiently mobilizing resources through trust funds,1 it may be best suited to leverage its extensive convening power on both the international stage and within individual countries.

About the US-Colombia Advisory Group

Since its founding in 2017, the Advisory Group has been co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). This year, upon Senator Blunt’s retirement, Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) assumes the honorary chairmanship alongside Senator Cardin.

Senators Cardin and Hagerty are both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where, in addition to other assignments, Senator Cardin serves as Chairman and Senator Hagerty as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on State Department & USAID Management, International Operations, & Bilateral International Development. The two senators bring additional regional and global expertise to their honorary co-chairmanship: Senator Cardin is a member of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, & Global Women’s Issues; and Senator Hagerty is a member of the Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, & International Cybersecurity Policy.

In 2023-2024, the Advisory Group will provide a concrete plan on how to navigate the potential changes in US-Colombia relations. A new administration in Colombia represents a unique opportunity to work with an increasingly diverse set of actors in the public, private, and civil society sectors to deepen US-Colombia economic and diplomatic ties. The Advisory Group will advance concrete recommendations where the United States and Colombia can advance long-lasting peace and socio-economic prosperity that mutually benefits each country.


About the writers

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade. Before joining the Atlantic Council, Ramsey directed the Venezuela program at the Washington Office on Latin America where he led the organization’s research on Venezuela and worked to promote lasting political agreements aimed at restoring human rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Prior to that, he carried out research and reporting on security and human-rights issues in Colombia, Uruguay, and Brazil with InSight Crime and as a consultant for the Open Society Foundations. His work has been published or cited in Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, the Economist, and other major media outlets. Ramsey earned a master’s degree in international affairs from the American University School of International Service, as well as a bachelor of arts in international studies with a minor in Spanish from American University.

Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. She also helps steward the Center’s Advisory Council. During her time at the Atlantic Council, she has supported the work of the US-Colombia Advisory Group, the US-Chile Integration Program and the center’s programming around the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings. Her work has been published in Foreign Policy, Miami Herald, The National InterestGlobal Americans and the New Atlanticist. Prior to her time at the Atlantic Council, Chiriboga worked as a research assistant at the London School of Economics’ Department of International Relations conducting research on the impact of land inequality in Argentina’s democratization. Prior to that, she worked at the embassy of Ecuador in Washington, where she supported the trade agreement negotiations process between Ecuador and the United States. Originally from Ecuador, Chiriboga has lived in the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom. She has a bachelor’s degree in international economics and international affairs from Trinity University. Chiriboga also completed a year-long study abroad program at the London School of Economics.  

About the Center Director

Jason Marczak is the Vice President and Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, joining the center in 2013 for its launch. He has more than twenty years of expertise in regional economics, politics, and development, working with policymakers and private-sector leaders to shape public policy. Marczak has also been an adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs since 2016. Among his previous positions, he served as director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas in New York City and co-founder of Americas Quarterly magazine. Marczak is a frequent English- and Spanish-language contributor to major media outlets, and a sought-after speaker, and has testified before the US Congress on key regional developments. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Tufts University and a master’s degree in international affairs and economics from the Johns Hopkins University Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.


US-Colombia Advisory Group

We are beyond grateful to our US-Colombia Advisory Group members for their passion, commitment, expertise, and leadership. Members who provided crucial input and have decided to have their names associated with this report are listed below.

Honorary Co-Chairs

The Hon. Ben Cardin
US Senator (D-MD)
United States

The Hon. Bill Hagerty
US Senator (R-TN)
United States

Members

Alejandro Mesa

Ambassador Anne Patterson

Ambassador Carolina Barco

Ambassador Kevin Whitaker

Ambassador P. Michael McKinley

Ambassador Paula Dobriansky

Ambassador Rand Beers

Ambassador Roger Noriega

Ambassador William Brownfield

Angela Tafur

Cynthia Arnson

Felipe Ardila

Josefina Klinger

Juan Esteban Orduz

Kristie Pellecchia

Minister Maria Claudia Lacouture

Minister Mabel Torres

Minister Mauricio Cardenas

Michael Shifter

Muni Jensen

Stephen Donehoo

Steve Hege

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Adrienne Arsht for her generous support, without which the work of this Advisory Group would not have been possible.

Foremost, thank you to Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) for their leadership as honorary co-chairs of this group. It is always a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. Thank you to Robert Zarate, Nick Checker, Lucas Da Pieve, Michael Manucy, Tom Melia, Brandon Yoder, Stephanie Oviedo, and Aidan Maese-Czeropski for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our honorary co-chairs.

Isabel Chiriboga, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC) program assistant, was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in coordinating the Advisory Group, drafting the report, and organizing multiple strategy sessions. We also thank Enrique Millán-Mejía, AALAC consultant, who provided crucial expertise, important feedback, and logistical support for this project, and Lucie Kneip for her research and editorial support throughout the publication process. The success of this project is also thanks to the leadership of Jason Marczak and Geoff Ramsey, who worked to convene the Advisory Group and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in this brief.

For decisive input, thorough research, and as an exceptional adviser on the topic we thank Ambassador Kevin Whitaker. For their precise editorial assistance and flexibility, we thank Cate Hansberry and Mary Kate Aylward and Beverly Larson. We would also like to extend our thanks to Nancy Messieh, Andrea Ratiu, and Romain Warnault for their design of another Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center publication.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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What Colombia’s ambitious new anti-drug plan means for US relations https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-colombias-ambitious-new-anti-drug-plan-means-for-us-relations/ Mon, 13 Nov 2023 20:07:43 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=702985 The Colombian government recently unveiled a new ten-year drug strategy, attempting to break from a half-century of policies that have failed to curb coca production.

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Colombia, the world’s largest cocaine producer, has once again broken its own record for illicit coca leaf cultivation, leading to a surge in cocaine production. Coca cultivation increased by 13 percent in 2022 according to the latest report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with a potential to produce a record 1,738 metric tons of refined cocaine—the highest figure ever recorded by the UNODC.

Colombia’s response to this booming illicit industry is forcing an important discussion on the future of US-Colombia cooperation. Washington and Bogotá must decide whether their shared security priorities will pave the way for a revitalized counternarcotics approach or risk the unraveling of decades of bilateral coordination.

On November 3, Colombian President Gustavo Petro visited Washington for the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity Leaders’ Summit, marking his second visit this year to the White House, after a meeting with US President Joe Biden in April. While the April meeting saw both presidents commit to bolstering anti-drug efforts through increased intelligence and interdiction cooperation, uncertainty has grown in the seven months since about the future of security and counternarcotics coordination between the two countries.

Amid questions over its counterdrug strategy, the Colombian government unveiled a new ten-year drug strategy in September, attempting to break from a half-century of policies that have failed to curb coca production. A hallmark of Petro’s new counternarcotics strategy is putting into action his 2022 campaign promise to better consult with the long-neglected rural communities that are most affected by the drug trade. In developing the new strategy, the Colombian Ministry of Justice carried out twenty-seven community dialogues from January to July of this year in sixteen Colombian provinces and Bogotá. Each of these dialogues was organized in partnership with the UNODC, which facilitated the participation of local residents as well as organizations of rural farmers, Afro-Colombians, and indigenous Colombians. Atlantic Council staff were invited to observe one of the meetings in June in Corinto, Cauca.

The forum in Corinto and the other community dialogues consisted of structured breakout conversations in small groups followed by an assembly in which Colombian authorities listened to input from participants. Attendees in Corinto, many of whom were growers of illicit crops such as coca, cannabis, and poppy, broadly expressed a willingness to transition to legal crop cultivation. They highlighted the lack of state presence, basic infrastructure, and few opportunities in their communities as barriers to connecting to the formal economy. After decades of various administrations failing to deliver on promises of rural development, communities such as Corinto are pushing the government to address their needs in order to transition. These needs include building basic infrastructure, such as bridges and roads, and increasing access to non-military state presence, such as social service resources. It remains to be seen whether the Petro administration will meet these requests to help rural communities break their dependence on cultivating illicit crops.

Ministry of Justice Drug Policy Director Gloria Miranda responds to a question from a cannabis grower at a government-organized forum with communities in Corinto, Cauca. Credit: Geoff Ramsey.
Ministry of Justice Drug Policy Director Gloria Miranda responds to a question from a cannabis grower at a government-organized forum with communities in Corinto, Cauca. Credit: Geoff Ramsey.

The government’s decision to carry out these community dialogues reflects the importance of connecting any counternarcotics strategy with a strategy to address the needs of those most affected by the drug trade. However, to truly be successful in diminishing the supply of drugs, Colombia and the United States must ramp up their coordination on this strategy.

On the surface, both governments have expressed an interest in continued cooperation. Following the launch of Petro’s new approach, the US and Colombian governments agreed to continue developing a comprehensive counternarcotics approach that promotes public health and human security. They committed to increasing interdiction efforts through joint training, capacity building, and intelligence sharing, as well as combatting money laundering, protecting the environment, increasing state presence in rural areas, and mitigating drug consumption. The biggest question, however, lies at the root of the plant. What strategy should be adopted to provide opportunities to those who are currently dependent on illicit coca crops as a livelihood?

While previous Colombian governments have favored forced eradication, the Petro administration is leaning into crop substitution. The ten-year drug strategy aims to enable roughly 50,000 out of 115,000 families economically dependent on coca cultivation to transition to legal means of income. This is part of an ambitious plan that seeks to cut both cocaine and coca production by 40 percent in the next decade. The plan is structured around two strategies, dubbed “oxygen” and “asphyxiation.” The “oxygen” pillar aims to provide relief to vulnerable communities affected by the drug trade, including subsistence growers and individual consumers. This includes investing in public health, environmental protection, and transitions to legal crops for small-scale coca growers. The “asphyxiation” pillar targets key actors in the organized crime and transnational drug trafficking networks to mitigate market proliferation and violence precipitated by criminal groups in coca-growing regions. The government plans to increase interdiction and strategic coca eradication of industrial-scale plantations. 

Both forced eradication and crop substitution are imperfect strategies. Aerial fumigation has been banned by Colombia’s supreme court for its effects on public health and environmental degradation, and coca cultivation has continued to skyrocket under national policies centered on forced eradication by ground troops, who sometimes face opposition from local communities. 

Meanwhile, thousands of families are still waiting for compensation and technical support after enrolling in the national crop substitution program (PNIS) that was created following the 2016 peace accords. The program has experienced years of delay due to a slow rollout and a lack of financial and infrastructural support. While 94 percent of families enrolled in the PNIS voluntarily eradicated their coca without replanting, the government has failed to fulfill its subsidy promises. 

Forced and voluntary eradication find commonality in the loss of human life: More than 1,500 social leaders in communities that agreed to crop substitution reportedly have been killed since the 2016 accords. Security forces have been targeted in forced eradication operations. Armed drug trafficking organizations dominate remote areas where coca is grown and have developed sophisticated processes for transportation and processing.

What the United States and Colombia can do together

It is natural that Colombia and the United States view this issue somewhat differently, given the different ways the drug industry has impacted each country. Colombia’s leaders are foremost concerned with investing in communities that are currently under the control of drug trafficking groups and need help shifting away from the illicit trade. They are also seeking alternatives to the harmful public health and environmental effects of chemical crop eradication. At the same time, there are questions over how the Petro administration will leverage the necessary infrastructure to conduct large-scale crop substitution, both in terms of funding and implementation capacity. Cocaine markets and criminal groups are rapidly evolving, increasing pressure for forceful and direct action.

Clearly, funding will be a challenge. Colombian Minister of Justice Néstor Osuna has indicated that crop substitution alone would require five billion dollars in investments. This does not account for the drug strategy’s other initiatives in security, public health, environmental conservation, and infrastructure. Yet if the funding materializes, it may provide an important opportunity to address issues such as environmental protection and increasing the visibility of marginalized groups.

For the United States, what is most important is that a prolonged influx of drugs from Colombia has devastated US communities and created a public health crisis. The cocaine industry also brings with it a number of transnational criminal organizations that have consistently found ways to evolve, break into new markets, and exploit ground, sea, and air routes to avoid security forces. Many US policymakers view security-centered policies, particularly eradication, as essential to curbing the increase in coca leaf and cocaine production.

With Congress currently debating how much to set aside for economic and security assistance to Colombia in 2024, and even whether to set aside funding, there is likely to be turbulence ahead for the US-Colombia relationship. But in spite of differences between and within the US and Colombian governments on how to address the coca issue, there are a number of areas where the two countries’ interests overlap. Both countries understand the changing nature of transnational trafficking networks and have committed to strengthening interdiction efforts. There is also consensus on the need to increase state presence in rural communities in Colombia to provide the necessary security conditions for families to transition to the legal economy. Further, both countries understand the link between demand and consumption and have underscored the necessity of addressing the narcotics issue from both ends. And in the April 2023 meeting between Biden and Petro, both leaders displayed a shared commitment to combatting climate change and preserving the Amazon, which could aid in counternarcotics discussions linked to environmental conservation.

Going forward, for example, the United States and Colombia could focus more on resource allocation to protect critical forest areas and restore those damaged by illicit crop cultivation. They could also support the efforts of Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in promoting leadership and community participation, which has been shown to be an effective deterrent to the expansion of illegal coca crops. These and other policies are opportunities to reinvigorate US-Colombia coordination to take on this scourge that has caused so much pain and suffering in both countries.


Lucie Kneip is a project assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Global China Hub nonresident senior fellow Parsifal D’Sola quoted in the Financial Times https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/global-china-hub-nonresident-senior-fellow-parsifal-dsola-quoted-in-the-financial-times/ Thu, 26 Oct 2023 19:43:42 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=696671 Global Senior Hub nonresident senior fellow Parsifal D’Sola quoted in the Financial Times discussing China’s ambitions in Latin America. He says, “[Gaining a foothold in Colombia] would help with the distribution of products and technology services, among other Chinese interests, and given Colombia’s historical ties to the US, it would be a diplomatic win for […]

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Global Senior Hub nonresident senior fellow Parsifal D’Sola quoted in the Financial Times discussing China’s ambitions in Latin America. He says, “[Gaining a foothold in Colombia] would help with the distribution of products and technology services, among other Chinese interests, and given Colombia’s historical ties to the US, it would be a diplomatic win for China.”

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Russian War Report: Kremlin denies that it targeted civilians in a missile attack on a pizza restaurant https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-missile-strikes-kramatorsk-restaurant/ Fri, 30 Jun 2023 19:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661201 A deadly Russian missile strike on a cafe in Kramatorsk leaves a dozen dead and more injured. Post-mutiny, Wagner's future in Africa is up in the air.

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As Russia continues its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than seven years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine—as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union—the DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian War Report

Security

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Tracking narratives

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

Media policy

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

International Response

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia’s loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

Military camps for Wagner reportedly under construction in Belarus

Russian independent outlet Verstka reported on the construction of camps for Wagner forces near Asipovichi, Mogilev Oblast, located in Belarus approximately two hundred kilometers from the Ukraine border. According to Verstka’s local forestry source, the area will cover 2.4 hectares (5.9 acres) and accommodate eight thousand Wagner fighters. The source also claimed that there will be additional camps constructed. Family members of Wagner fighters also confirmed to Verstka that they were deploying to Belarus. 

Radio Svaboda, the Belarusian-language edition of Radio Liberty, reviewed satellite imagery from Planet Labs that suggested signs of expansion at the Unit 61732 military camp adjacent to the village of Tsel, twenty kilometers northwest of Asipovichi. The outlet interviewed Ukrainian military analyst Oleg Zhdanov, who suggested it was “too early to tell” as to whether the military camp’s expansion is specifically for Wagner forces. “Very little time has passed to start building a camp specifically for the Wagnerites—it’s unreal,” Zhdanov told Radio Svaboda.

Location of possible construction at the Unit 61732 military camp in Tsel, Belarus. (Source: Planet Labs)

On June 27, in his first speech after the Wagner mutiny, Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the deal that ended the rebellion on June 24 in which Yevgeniy Prigozhin would relocate to Belarus. Putin praised those Wagner fighters who did not participate in the revolt and said they could sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense of other services. He added that other mercenaries who do not want to join could go either home or follow Prigozhin to Belarus.

Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Pro-Kremlin sources spreading disinformation to justify missile strike in Kramatorsk

Pro-Kremlin sources denied Russia targeted civilians when a missile struck a crowded pizza restaurant in Kramatorsk, killing at least twelve civilians and injuring more than fifty others. According to this narrative, RIA Pizza was actually a military base hosting US and Ukrainian soldiers. To support the claims, pictures taken after the strike were published on Telegram and Twitter.

To support the claim that soldiers of 101st Airborne Division were located at the pizza “military base,” pro-Kremlin sources circulated grisly footage of the attack aftermath recorded by freelance journalist Arnaud De Decker. The clip shows a man wearing a morale patch of a US flag with the words “Always Be Ready: 5.11 Tactical.” 5.11 Tactical is a military apparel company that sells branded merchandise, including morale patches, worn to offer support to various causes and slogans but not used official unit patches. Various types of 5.11 Tactical’s “Always Be Ready” patches are readily available for purchase online.

Top: A 5.11 Tactical morale patch for sale on its website. Bottom: Image taken during the aftermath of the Kramatorsk attack showing a man wearing the same morale patch on his helmet. (Source: 5.11 Tactical/archive, top; @arnaud.dedecker/archive, bottom)

Similarly, another post from Aleksandr Simonov’s Telegram channel that a man wearing an 101st Airborne t-shirt was a member of the US Army division. These t-shirts are also readily available from online retailers.

Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro/archive)
Montage of three screenshots from online retail websites selling 101st Airborne t-shirts. (Sources: top left, Etsy/archive; bottom left, Predathor/archive; right, Allegro)

Sayyara Mammadova, research assistant, Warsaw, Poland

Kremlin blames Colombian victims for the injuries they sustained in the Kramatorsk attack

In addition to pro-Kremlin accusations that the Kramatorsk attack targeted a base housing US Army soldiers, Kremlin influencers also targeted citizens of Colombia, three of whom were injured in the attack, for being at the site of the incident. Colombian President Gustavo Petro said the attack targeted “three defenseless Colombian civilians” in violation of the protocols of war and called for the Colombian Foreign Ministry to submit a note of diplomatic protest to Russia. While the Kremlin acknowledged launching the attack, it insisted the assault struck military personnel rather than civilians.

The three Colombian citizens injured in the attack include acclaimed Colombian writer Hector Abad Faciolince; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, who previously led Colombia’s peace negotiations with FARC rebels; and Ukrainian-based journalist Catalina Gomez. According to the New York Times, Abad and Jaramillo were in Kramatorsk “collecting material” in support of their initiative, ¡Aguanta Ucrania! (“Hang On Ukraine!”), which seeks to garner support for Ukraine in Latin America.

Following the attack, Colombian influencers and officials criticized the attack through media outlets and social media accounts in Spanish. Danilo Rueda, Colombia’s current high commissioner for peace, issued a statement expressing support for the victims without mentioning Russia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its “strongest condemnation of the unacceptable attack by Russian forces on a civilian target.” 

Gomez, who was injured in the attack, broadcast a video for France 24 from the site of the explosion. Meanwhile, Abad and Jaramillo conducted interviews with Colombian media outlets such as El Tiempo in which they described the incident.

Actualidad RT, a Russian media outlets with enormous reach in the Spanish-speaking world, insisted that the victims of the attack were mercenaries and instructors of NATO and Ukraine rather than civilians. Actualidad RT quoted statements from Igor Konashenkov, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Defense,  and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov, who said the attack struck “military targets” and that “Russia does not attack civilian infrastructure.” Actualidad RT promoted its claims via Twitter and Facebook multiple times on June 28.

Colombian radio station WRadio interviewed Kremlin foreign policy spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the morning of June 28. Zakharova stated that the restaurant was a Russian military target and called for an investigation into Victoria Amelina, a Ukrainian writer who was gravely injured while purportedly hosting the Colombians at the restaurant, claiming without evidence that Amelina had prior knowledge that the restaurant was a military target. Zakharova reiterated this statement after a WRadio journalist asked her to confirm the accusation. In contrast, Abad stated that it was Gomez who suggested they visit the restaurant, and that she apologized for doing so after the attack.

The Russian embassy in Colombia amplified Zakharova’s narrative later that same afternoon and evening. On Twitter, the embassy insisted that the city was “an operational and logistical-military hub, not a suitable place to enjoy Ukrainian cuisine dishes.” It also seemed to celebrate that the “reckless trip [of the Colombians] did not turn into an irreparable tragedy.”

Daniel Suárez Pérez, research associate, Bogota, Colombia

Prigozhin’s online assets reportedly blocked in Russia

Over the course of the thirty-six-hour Wagner mutiny, the Kremlin attempted to limit information about Yevgeniy Prigozin on Russian social media and search engines, eventually blocking websites affiliated with Prigozhin. On June 24, the Telegram channel of Russian state-owned propaganda outlet RT reported that several Prigozhin-controlled media outlets including RIA FAN, People’s News, and Patriot Media Group were no longer accessible in parts of Russia. RT added that the reason for their disappearance was unknown. Similar reports appeared in Mediazona and several Telegram channels

The DFRLab used the Internet censorship measurement platform OONI to verify the claim and check the accessibility of RIA FAN within Russia. OONI detected signs that riafan.ru was blocked in the country. 

Internet censorship measurement platform OONI detected the apparent blocking of Prigozhin-owned media outlet RIA FAN. (Source: OONI)

On June 29, independent Russian outlet The Bell claimed the Kremlin was searching for a new owner for Patriot Media Group, which includes media assets associated with Prigozhin. The following day, multiple Russian outlets reported that Prigozhin had dissolved Patriot Media Group.

Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Questions abound over the future of Wagner contracts and Prigozhin-linked businesses in Africa

For years, Wagner has acted as Russia’s primary form of influence in Africa—spreading disinformation and propaganda, securing military contracts, and exporting natural resources to support Putin’s war effort. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent has come into question. While it is highly unlikely the Kremlin would willingly abandon its influence in Africa, if Wagner is retired or its troops absorbed into the Ministry of Defense, it is uncertain who would maintain the group’s operations on the continent.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that Russia’s work in Africa will continue. In a TV interview with Russia Today, Lavrov said, “In addition to relations with this PMC the governments of CAR and Mali have official contacts with our leadership. At their request, several hundred soldiers are working in CAR as instructors.”

A top advisor to Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadéra appeared unconcerned about the weekend’s events. Speaking of Wagner’s military instructors, Fidèle Gouandjika said, “If Moscow decides to withdraw them and send us the Beethovens or the Mozarts rather than Wagners, we will have them.” In a statement released to its Telegram channel, the Officer’s Union for International Security—a US-sanctioned Wagner front company operating in CAR—claimed CAR’s defense minister had apologized for Gouandjika’s remarks. It quoted Defense Minister Claude Rameaux Bireau as saying, “The people of the CAR are grateful to the Russian instructors of Wagner, ask any Central African on the streets of Bangui or in the village of the CAR—he will confirm my words.”

In Mali, where Wagner forces have taken over responsibility for pushing back jihadists after the departure of French forces, the online outlet Mali Actu reported that the situation could dramatically impact Mali. “This situation raises major concerns about the security, stability and sovereignty of Mali, as well as the impact on the local population and counter-terrorism efforts,” it wrote.

Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

Analysis: With Wagner mutiny, Russia loses plausible deniability about its involvement in Africa

While Wagner’s future in Africa remains uncertain, it is important to consider that the Wagner Group not just a paramilitary force. It is also a conglomerate of companies active in different sectors, from mining and logistics to political warfare and moviemaking, able to travel the spectrum between private entrepreneurism to state proxy. This flexibility has previously allowed Moscow to deploy Wagner to act as a force multiplier in Africa while simultaneously denying Russia’s direct presence on the continent. In Africa, Russia has used Wagner multiple times as part of a strategy to help authoritarian leaders stay in power and gain a pro-Russian military presence on the ground, all while maintaining plausible deniability. Until now, the positive outcomes of this strategy have far exceeded the costs for the Kremlin, as Russia has built a strong network of African influence with relatively little effort, securing concessions in strategic extractive industries, and expanding military-to-military relations on the continent.

However, this principle of plausible deniability, which made Wagner so successful and so useful for Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence, is now damaged. As previously noted, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as Putin, publicly confirmed direct links between Wagner and the Russian state apparatus.

Africa is intimately linked to Wagner: In the wake of Wagner’s involvement in Syria, Africa became the scene of the group’s expansion. Engaging in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Mali, Wagner employed an opportunistic strategy of supplying security while taking concessions to mine natural resources. While its forces were in most cases invited to stabilize fragile states, its actions actively invited further instability, creating more opportunities and a greater demand signal for its services, ultimately granting renewing opportunities to Moscow to reinforce its footprint in the continent.

While denying direct links to Wagner’s actions in Africa might have become more difficult for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to waste the network of influence built by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to deploy hybrid tools such as Wagner, although organized in different shapes and forms, so Russia can continue displacing Western influence, exploiting natural resources, and evading sanctions through dozens of front companies.

Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Investigation sheds light on how Putin’s childhood friends allegedly evade sanctions

On June 20, the Organized Crime and Corruption reporting project (OCCRP) published a series of investigations titled “The Rotenberg Files” that shed light on the business dealings and alleged sanctions evasion attempts of Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, close friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The report is based on fifty thousand leaked emails and documents, examined by journalists from seventeen outlets. The OCCRP said the leak came from a source who worked for the brothers at a Russian management firm. The OCCRP investigation was conducted in partnership with the Times of London, Le Monde, and Forbes, among others.

Boris and Arkady Rotenberg are childhood friends of Putin. The billionaire brothers faced Western sanctions amid Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, but their lavish lifestyles do not appear to have been impacted. 

According to the OCCRP, the leaked documents demonstrate how the Rotenberg brothers allegedly used Western lawyers, bankers, corporate service providers, and proxies to evade sanctions. 

One of the report’s findings also alleges the brothers maintain business links to Prince Michael of Kent, a cousin of the late Queen Elizabeth II who was previously accused by the Sunday Times and Channel 4 of profiting off close access to the Kremlin. According to the latest investigation, “Prince Michael distanced himself from earlier ties to the Putin regime in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But leaked emails and corporate records show he co-owns a company with two Russian businessmen who helped billionaire oligarch and Putin ally Boris Rotenberg dodge Western sanctions.” 

Another investigation from the Rotenberg files reported that Putin’s eldest daughter regularly visited a holiday property financed by Arkady Rotenberg in an exclusive Austrian skiing destination. Documents reviewed by the OCCRP suggest that the house was purchased by a Cypriot company in 2013 with a loan from a bank then owned by Arkady, using funds invested by another company he owned. Other records suggested that the former romantic partner of Putin’s daughter is connected to the company that owns the Austrian property. Residents claim to have seen Putin himself at the Kitzbühel residence, though this has not been confirmed. 

The Rotenberg brothers and Prince Michael declined to comment to the OCCRP investigative consortium.

Ani Mejlumyan, research assistant, Yerevan, Armenia

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What’s going on in Colombia? A guide to Petro’s cabinet shake-up, Venezuela summit, and future US collaboration https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/whats-going-on-in-colombia-a-guide-to-petros-cabinet-shake-up-venezuela-summit-and-future-us-collaboration/ Fri, 28 Apr 2023 21:59:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=641006 Despite some friction, Colombia's conference on Venezuela highlighted the potential for Washington and Bogotá to work together.

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Colombian President Gustavo Petro took office promising change, but his rhetoric is bumping into reality. Petro’s recent cabinet shake-up raises questions about the sustainability of his agenda moving forward—especially as a major player in advancing a democratic solution in Venezuela.

Despite facing mounting opposition since taking office in August, Petro hopes to consolidate his government’s program with this new lineup announced on April 26. The reshuffle boots seven ministers from the administration, including market-friendly Finance Minister Jose Antonio Ocampo and the ministers of health, interior, transportation, agriculture, communications, and science. The question now is whether this surprise shake-up will prove to be a defining moment in Petro’s presidency or serve as a nail in the coffin for parts of his wide-ranging domestic agenda, which includes sweeping proposals for health, labor, and pension reforms. The stakes are high and come just as the United States and Colombia are trying to find ways of working together to coordinate on a range of issues—both inside Colombia and across Latin America.

At the top of the agenda is Venezuela. On April 25, Colombia hosted a high-level summit on Venezuela meant to widen the international consensus in support of political talks to resolve the country’s long-standing political and humanitarian crisis. Despite some friction, the conference highlighted the potential for US-Colombia collaboration on Venezuela—with implications for other regional diplomatic priorities in the future. While close coordination with Colombia could potentially advance US priorities across the hemisphere, this progress won’t come easily. It will largely depend on Colombia’s ability to navigate the current challenges with stability.

The conference came about after a White House meeting between US President Joe Biden and Petro on April 20. The two presidents discussed key issues in the bilateral relationship, such as counternarcotics, security, and US assistance. But in their joint statement, it’s also clear that the two leaders found a surprising amount of common ground on broader areas such as climate change, migration, and perhaps the leading human-rights issue in the Americas today: the crisis in Venezuela.

Colombia followed up the White House meeting by hosting high-level diplomatic delegations from twenty countries across the globe. The conference saw diverse participation, including EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, Brazilian presidential advisor Celso Amorim, and other leading decision makers from Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere. While Colombia’s decision to invite representatives from South Africa and Turkey raised eyebrows, this did not dissuade the Biden administration from sending a high-level delegation to the meeting, including Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer, Special Presidential Advisor for the Americas Chris Dodd, National Security Council Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Juan Gonzalez, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Wells.

While the conference was held in private, remarks afterwards by Colombian Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva (who survived the cabinet shakeup) identified three points of consensus.

  1. A solution to Venezuela’s crisis requires a timetable for free and fair elections. With presidential elections in Venezuela meant to occur in 2024 and legislative and regional elections slated for 2025, the focus of the international community is on ensuring competitive electoral conditions. This will not be easy given ongoing persecution of opposition candidates, widespread corruption, and Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro’s control of state institutions. In this sense, Borrell’s presence was significant. The European Union Electoral Observation Mission that oversaw regional and municipal elections in 2021 had significant access to Venezuela’s electoral authority on the ground. Its twenty-three recommendations make up a framework for the path to free and fair elections moving forward.
  2. Negotiations to resolve the crisis are an urgent priority—and implementing a humanitarian accord is the best chance to build momentum. In 2021, the Maduro government and the opposition signed an ambitious plan in Mexico City to begin negotiations to resolve the country’s political crisis, aimed at electoral and judicial reforms. While the parties continue to negotiate in Caracas, progress in this process has been intermittent. In a breakthrough agreement in November 2022, the parties agreed to create a joint committee to channel an estimated three billion dollars in funds frozen by US sanctions to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuela. This fund, to be overseen by the United Nations, is meant to prioritize health care, malnutrition, and restoring basic infrastructure. However, implementation is lagging behind. For example, the United Nations has not yet created the fiduciary fund five months after the agreement, claiming that it lacks clarity on navigating US sanctions. This international consensus in support of implementing the humanitarian fund is a sign of buy-in for the idea of building momentum based on existing accords.
  3. Agreements should be paired with clear US offers of sanctions relief in order to incentivize progress. In its readout on April 25, the White House made clear that it had spelled out a step-by-step approach for such progress, “where concrete actions toward restoring Venezuelan democracy, leading to free and fair elections, are met by corresponding sanctions relief by the United States.” Existing financial and oil sanctions give the US significant leverage, since Maduro is desperate for access to resources amid an ongoing economic crisis. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Venezuelan government can be incentivized to provide significant political agreements that may ultimately threaten its hold on power.

The fact that these three points emerged out of the conference is significant—but it was especially significant that Colombia signed on. Previously the Petro administration had issued mixed messages on Venezuela, voicing vague concerns on human rights while moving to normalize diplomatic and trade relations with Maduro. Indeed, Petro has been more comfortable talking about the impact of US sanctions than about authoritarianism, human-rights violations, and crimes against humanity in Venezuela. In Leyva’s remarks after the conference and in some of Petro’s comments after his meeting with Biden, the Colombian government’s position appears to have shifted to include a clearer emphasis on the need to pair sanctions relief with progress towards free and fair elections.

There are limits to US-Colombia coordination on Venezuela. The uncertainty and instability surrounding the Colombian government inspired by the recent cabinet shake-up and the government’s inconsistent messaging on other areas of prior consensus, such as the Trade Promotion Agreement with the United States, limits its credibility. Additionally, the Petro administration is focused on negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) to secure peace in Colombia, making it hard for Petro to take a bold stand against the Maduro regime, unless the United States offers significant support on this front. 

Colombia’s decision to expel former Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó, who was recognized by the United States as interim president until his mandate ended in January, did not gain the Andean country many points either. Guaidó arrived unexpectedly in Colombia on the eve of the conference. Rather than using the opportunity to recognize his contributions to the search for a democratic solution, the Colombian government wasted no time in ensuring that he made it on a plane to Miami. In doing so, the Petro administration generated unnecessary noise, raising concerns about their commitment to denouncing persecution and distracting from wider opposition support for jumpstarting negotiations.

Despite the friction, Colombia’s decision to host this conference—and ultimately to shift its position on Venezuela to be more in line with US priorities—represents an important step in exploring the future of diplomatic cooperation between Washington and Bogotá. This holds important lessons for other shared interests, including climate and migration policy, areas where the two countries have identified opportunities for future collaboration.


Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Ramsey is a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela and has traveled regularly to the country for the last decade.

Isabel Chiriboga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she contributes to the center’s work on Colombia, Mexico, and the Andes.

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Can Colombia and the United States get on the same page? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/can-colombia-and-the-united-states-get-on-the-same-page/ Fri, 21 Apr 2023 19:50:55 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=639066 The two countries find themselves at odds on counternarcotics policy, but in synch on climate. Our experts break down the presidents' Oval Office meeting

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“By the way, happy birthday,” US President Joe Biden wished Colombian President Gustavo Petro at the White House on Thursday. Their meeting fell a day after Petro’s sixty-third birthday and a year after both countries marked two centuries of US-Colombia relations. But it is what’s ahead, not what’s past, that was the real focus of the visit. The United States and Colombia now find themselves at odds on counternarcotics policy and a number of other issues. At the same time, addressing climate change may be an opportunity for collaboration. For a full breakdown of the visit, we put five burning questions to our Latin America experts.

1. Why does this meeting matter for the US-Colombia relationship, and what did each side come away with?

The Biden administration understands the historical importance of Petro’s presidency and recognizes the election of a progressive leader as an indication of the institutional advances made over the last twenty years. Petro should be pleased with the meeting, as he wanted to speak of his focus on decarbonizing the economy and addressing the narcotics question in a different manner. Both sides had a chance to express their views and to have them heard respectfully. That’s a success.

Kevin Whitaker is a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and former US ambassador to Colombia.

For the United States, this was about broadcasting the importance of the relationship with Colombia. Despite occasional disagreements with the Petro administration, the Biden administration wants to show it is willing to work with him on issues like climate change and trade while they continue to hash out thorny issues such as counternarcotics. Biden’s announcement of a five hundred million dollar commitment to the Amazon Fund is a significant gesture, which—while not limited to Colombia—suggests that the United States may engage with some of Petro’s proposals linking climate change with rainforest protection.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Thursday’s meeting advanced the longstanding ties between the United States and Colombia in a way that can only be done through a presidential visit to the White House. Biden and Petro clearly found deep common ground on combating climate change, in addition to economic development and migration. For a relationship historically centered around security and counternarcotics, the readout of Thursday’s discussion showed the importance of adding new issues such as climate change to the bilateral agenda. As with any relationship, there will be sticking points—and much concern has been raised by some US policymakers on Petro’s peace and counternarcotics plans—but the White House meeting was a win for both leaders to reinforce the extent of the common ground.

Jason Marczak is the senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

2. Did the two leaders make progress on Venezuela?

Biden and Petro spoke about Venezuela and about Colombia’s role in advancing negotiations between the Maduro government and opposition. While the Venezuelan parties have not publicly reached new agreements since announcing a major three billion dollar humanitarian accord in Mexico City in November, the process is still active. Mexico has now become a kind of clearing house for finalized agreements, not a host of technical talks—which are ongoing and quietly taking place in Caracas. When Colombia hosts an international conference on Venezuela next week, its ability to coordinate with the United States and other allies to refocus attention on negotiations will be put to the test.

—Geoff Ramsey

The public statements were certainly consonant with one another, and the photos seemed to show some chemistry between the two leaders.  On Venezuela, Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Álvaro Leyva’s earlier comment that sanctions relief could come only after there was material progress towards free elections is consistent with the US view. Colombian leadership on Venezuela can be a welcome element in the government-opposition talks, which appear stuck. Next week’s meeting in Bogotá will be important in making clear how the Colombian government’s influence can help give the Venezuelan people a real opportunity to state their views through free elections.

—Kevin Whitaker

3. What are the tension points in the relationship, and how did we see those play out on Thursday?

The readouts were as important for what they didn’t say as what they did say. While the salience of the cocaine trade is less in the US now than in the past, thanks to the emergence of the new scourges of fentanyl and synthetic opioids, there are many stakeholders here concerned with the explosive growth of coca/cocaine coming from Colombia and the absence of a clear and executable plan for controlling it.

Separately, while both presidents seem to agree on the need to move away from hydrocarbons, the reality is that both nations’ economies and budgets are dependent on those extractive products. The US “all of the above” approach, implemented step by step, is frustrating to leaders like Petro, who advocate more dramatic steps.

—Kevin Whitaker

While we saw some signs of cooperation on climate change and US-Colombia economic ties, there is still daylight between Biden and Petro on counternarcotics. Coca cultivation and cocaine production have skyrocketed in recent years in Colombia, but in the context of this visit the leaders seem to have agreed to disagree for now. Behind the scenes there are ongoing conversations about the future of US-Colombia cooperation on drugs and security. Moving forward we’ll likely see a middle ground that incorporates US concerns while also getting at the Petro administration’s interest in addressing the root economic causes of coca cultivation in impoverished rural areas.

—Geoff Ramsey

Security policy and the counternarcotics strategy of the Petro government represent a sharp contrast from his predecessor. The challenge will be to figure out a plan moving forward that is acceptable to both sides of the aisle in Washington and that speaks to the desire of Petro and those who elected him to have a different approach to achieving the same shared goal of reducing illicit coca cultivation. Petro is speaking to the concerns of those in rural areas of Colombia who ultimately just want to improve their livelihoods and to find a sustainable, long-term path to move out of poverty.

—Jason Marczak

4. How important is this partnership in the regional context? What impact can the US-Colombia partnership have on democracy promotion?

Petro, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva all are presidents of the political left who struggled to achieve power through institutional means in systems they believed tilted against them. The fact that all did so, within the system, is a testament to their democratic vocation and an important message to victims of the dictatorships in Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Relatedly, the United States hopes that these presidents, with their progressive credentials, will be able to develop persuasive arguments with the leaders of those nations to move toward greater democracy.

—Kevin Whitaker

A renewed US emphasis on democracy promotion worldwide is an opportunity for countries to showcase and deepen their democratic credentials at home. Petro came to office promising to address the needs of long-neglected Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in areas of the country that the US Agency for International Development has worked for decades. This work is ripe for expansion given the priorities of the new Colombian government.

—Geoff Ramsey

Colombia is one of the United States’ most important regional allies and an historically reliable global partner as well. Just last year, Colombia was designated as a major non-NATO ally, becoming the third country in Latin America with that privileged status and among fewer than twenty such countries globally. That distinction was a long time coming and reflects the traditionally deep cooperation of the United States and Colombia on a broader set of issues that go beyond the bilateral relationship. Petro has an opportunity to show that the political ideology of a country’s can change, but the institutions of democracy remain strong.

—Jason Marczak

5. Do we see any hints of a policy shift from the US with regard to counternarcotics strategy in Colombia?

The United States seems to have embraced the Colombian idea of a “holistic” approach, whatever that turns out to mean, and does not appear publicly to be pressuring for more eradication, even though that tool has proven effective in Colombia in the past. Greater clarity from the Colombian government about the practical components of its Paz Total approach with respect to counternarcotics would be welcome. 

National Security Council Senior Director Juan Gonzalez said that the United States is considering the request to send a special envoy to the Paz Total process. That would be a daring move given that the process is only just getting started, and given that this is an internal Colombian matter.

—Kevin Whitaker

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Aviso LatAm: February 18, 2023 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/aviso-latam-covid-19/aviso-latam-february-18-2023/ Sat, 18 Feb 2023 13:27:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=613646 For the first time in nearly three years, Brazil registered zero pandemic-related deaths in a day

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​​​​​What you should know

  • Nicaragua: On February 9, the Ortega-Murillo regime released and expelled 222 political leaders, priests, students, and other dissidents to the United States.
  • US-Brazil relations: Presidents Biden and Lula da Silva met on February 10, during which they underscored the importance of strengthening democracy, promoting respect for human rights, and addressing the climate crisis.
  • Ecuador: Ecuadorians rejected all eight items on a constitutional referendum backed by President Lasso, signaling anti-incumbent sentiments and the clout of pro-Correísmo opposition political forces.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

  • Argentina: Annual inflation reached 98.8 percent, while activities in the construction and manufacturing sectors continued to decline.  
  • Brazil: The government met with Mexico, Germany, Colombia, Chile, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to explore issuing green bonds this year. 
  • Belize: The government launched two new projects in cooperation with Taiwan, a business support program focused on women and micro, small, medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and a flood warning system for disaster prevention.  
  • Colombia: 2022 GDP growth is estimated to be 7.9 percent, down from 2021’s 10.8 percent growth. In 2023, growth is expected to further decline to 1.05 percent. 
  • Peru: Continuing protests and supply shortages have led several mines to suspend or reduce operations, threatening copper production.  
  • Suriname: President Santokhi expressed willingness to collaborate with neighboring Guyana on oil and gas exploration and development to position the Caribbean as an energy hub. 

In focus: Inflation and infighting

As regional inflation continues, political pressures are leading to criticism of central bank policy in Brazil and Colombia. Recently-elected presidents Lula and Petro have both questioned rate hikes as a method to tackle inflation, suggesting more flexible targets and alternative policies. The governor of Colombia’s Central Bank, Leonardo Villar, expects the region to require continuing tight monetary policy, which critics argue may complicate other policy goals such as growth. Roberto Campos Neto, president of the Central Bank of Brazil, has expressed his willingness to coordinate with the Lula administration to achieve growth and control inflation. 

Despite the public clashes, central bank policy in both countries remains independent. In Brazil, a 2021 law protects central bank autonomy and is unlikely to be repealed. In Colombia, the central bank has maintained a course independent of presidential advice for two decades. 

Health + Innovation

  • Colombia: President Petro presented a health reform to Congress that seeks to improve primary care, expand access to treatment, raise healthcare worker salaries, and fight corruption by eliminating private sector management of payments.
  • Brazil: Nearly three years since COVID-19 claimed the life of its first victim, the country has for the first time registered zero pandemic-related deaths in a day on February 12.
  • Jamaica: The Bureau of Standards launched the Jamaican Standard Specification for Telemedicine, which provides the framework through which telemedicine may be safely practiced while upholding the integrity of the medical profession.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

  • The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Aviso LatAm: February 6, 2023 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/aviso-latam-covid-19/aviso-latam-february-6-2023/ Mon, 06 Feb 2023 14:28:37 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=609106 Dr, Jarbas Barbosa takes office as PAHO's new director

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​​​​​What you should know

  • PAHO: Dr. Jarbas Barbosa took office on February 1 as the health organization’s new director, pledging to work in partnership with member states to end the pandemic and ensure that the region’s health systems recover stronger than before.
  • IMF: The organization raised its global growth forecast to 2.9 percent, up from its original 2.7 percent. The outlook is also better for the region’s two major economies: up 0.2 percent for Brazil, to 1.2 percent, and a half point for Mexico, to 1.7 percent.
  • Migration: The 250,000 migrants that irregularly crossed into Panama through the Darien Gap in 2022 represents a record high that is nearly double the 133,000 entries recorded in 2021.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

  • Mexico: The national statistics agency reported that the economy grew 0.4 percent in Q4 of 2022 compared to the previous quarter.
  • Argentina: The government will leverage new gas exports to Chile, and potentially Brazil, to improve its trade balance and pay down debt.  
  • Brazil: Alongside Argentina, the government is floating the development of a common currency linking the two countries to facilitate trade. 
  • Colombia: The Minister of Mines and Energy Irene Velez announced at Davos that the country will no longer approve new oil and gas exploration contracts.
  • Jamaica: Third-quarter GDP grew by 5.9 percent over 2022 due to a resurgent tourism sector, which has boosted hotels, restaurants, and services, among other sectors.  
  • Peru: Ongoing protests and road blockades have cost the country $550 million since the ousting of President Pedro Castillo last December. 
  • Transatlantic ties: German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, to discuss the EU-Mercosur trade agreement and support for Ukraine. 

In focus: Energy expansion in Trinidad and Tobago

On January 24, the United States licensed Trinidad and Tobago to develop a natural gas project off the coast of Venezuela in the Dragon field region. The project will support overall Caribbean energy security, with a requirement that some of the produced gas must be exported to Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. To comply with US sanctions, Trinidad will pay for the gas with humanitarian aid. 

Atlantic Council experts reacted immediately, emphasizing the importance of this move towards meeting Caribbean energy demand. You can read more here

 

Health + Innovation

  • Haiti: As of January 17, the Ministry of Public Health and Population has reported over 24,400 suspected cholera cases.
  • Education: A World Bank study shows that by 2045, nearly 5 million people across LAC would fall into poverty due to pandemic-induced learning losses.
  • Brazil: The Health Ministry announced that it will roll out bivalent COVID-19 booster shots as early as February 27.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

  • The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Aviso LatAm: January 21, 2023 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/aviso-latam-covid-19/aviso-latam-january-21-2023/ Sat, 21 Jan 2023 15:40:27 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=604657 Protests in Peru descend into capital city Lima

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​​​​​What you should know

  • Brazil: The Supreme Court will investigate whether former President Jair Bolsonaro incited the January 8 attack on Congress and other government buildings in Brasilia.
  • Peru: People—mainly from remote Andean regions—descended on the nation’s capital to protest against President Dina Boluarte in support of her predecessor and demand elections and structural change in the country.
  • Trade: The value of goods exported from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) increased at an estimated rate of 18.8 percent in 2022, a downward trend from 27.8 percent in 2021, due to higher prices and low volumes.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

  • Argentina: The government will buy back overseas bonds equivalent to over $1 billion to improve its debt profile, looking to send a positive signal to markets despite low reserves levels.
  • Brazil: Vice President Alckmin said that Lula’s administration wants to remove a key tax on manufacturing and importing, the IPI, as part of a broader tax reform package. 
  • Guyana: The government announced $43.4 billion in funding for a new natural gas power plant, alongside distribution infrastructure improvements, to promote business and development. 
  • Multilaterals: During his inauguration, new Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) president Ilan Goldfajn announced three key priorities for the bank: social issues, climate change, and sustainable infrastructure. 
  • Mexico: The 2023 North American Leaders Summit concluded with new agreements to promote sustainability, strengthen supply chains, and respond to migration. 
  • Peru: The national statistics institute (INEI) said the economy expanded 1.7 percent year-on-year in November, marking a slight slowdown from the rise of 2.0 percent in October.

In focus: LAC in Davos

Latin American and Caribbean public- and private-sector leaders gathered alongside their counterparts from across the world in Davos, Switzerland, for this year’s Global Economic Forum. Colombia’s finance minister Jose Antonio Ocampo used the opportunity to push for a stronger agreement on minimum taxes for multinational companies. Brazil’s finance minister, Fernando Haddad, and environmental minister, Marina Silva, discussed Brazil’s positive economic outlook, environmental stewardship, and desire for regional integration. 

Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez also delivered a speech, in which he emphasized Spain’s role in building ties between Europe and Latin America, as Spain prepares to take over the Presidency of the Council of the European Union later this year. 

Health + Innovation

  • Vaccines: The Canadian government will donate $33.4 million to the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) to increase access to COVID-19 immunizations for populations across the region. This donation is in addition to a prior contribution of $40 million in 2021.
  • Belize: The country will celebrate 34 years of relations with Taiwan through the construction of a new general hospital in San Pedro.
  • Nutrition: A new United Nations report found that 22.5 percent—or 131.3 million people—of the region’s population cannot afford a healthy diet, citing a country’s income level, the incidence of poverty, and level of inequality as contributing factors.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

  • The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Aviso LatAm: January 7, 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/aviso-latam-covid-19/aviso-latam-january-7-2022/ Sat, 07 Jan 2023 15:47:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=599785 Lula's return to power

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​​​​​What you should know

  • Brazil: On January 1, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as president for a third term after defeating incumbent Jair Bolsonaro.
  • Outlook: According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), economic growth will continue to slow in 2023 and reach 1.3 percent.
  • Venezuela: The opposition-led legislature dissolved the interim government led by Juan Guaidó. The vote signaled that members of the opposition had lost faith in Guaidó’s ability to oust Maduro. The United States will continue recognizing the 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining democratic institution in Venezuela.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

  •  Brazil: In 2022, trade surplus reached a record high of $62.3 billion. Total exports also reached a 335 billion high, helped by a boost in prices in the agriculture and livestock sector.
  • Argentina: The IMF disbursed a tranche of $6 billion from its $44 billion program with Argentina, citing positive indicators including falling inflation, a better trade balance, and foreign reserves. 
  • Colombia: Minimum wage will increase by 16 percent this year, to $242.7 per month. President Petro said the move would boost an economy slowed by inflation. 
  • Dominican Republic: The S&P upgraded the country’s credit rating from “BB-“ to “BB,” highlighting its strong recovery from the pandemic and long-term growth potential. 
  • El Salvador: The government will receive a $150 million loan from the CAF development bank, designed to strengthen its education system in the wake of the pandemic.  
  • Peru: The government launched a $1.6 billion plan to increase welfare and investment in regions gripped by protests following the ouster of former president Pedro Castillo. 

In focus: Nearshoring opportunities in the Americas

With the next North American Leaders Summit (NALS) set for this incoming week (January 9 and 10), nearshoring – the relocation of supply chains closer to the United States – is rising in importance.

Rising costs of and delays during shipping, coupled with the pandemic, have made businesses in the United States wary of relying on supply chains across the Pacific. As a result, some 400 companies explored reshoring to Mexico from Asia in 2022. Mexico’s manufacturing sector is now larger than it was before the pandemic, and Mexican exports to the United States have rapidly increased. Firms such as Walmart have already relocated some business to Mexico, while Tesla is planning a new factory in northern Mexico. NALS will pay particular attention to the electric vehicle production chain in North America.

Health + Innovation

  • Chile: In an effort to curb the spread of the BF.7 COVID-19 subvariant, travelers coming from China are now required to show a negative PCR test.
  • Haiti: Over 14,700 suspected cholera cases have been reported since December. Nine in every ten cases are from areas hit hard by food insecurity.
  • PAHO: Most countries in LAC invest less than the minimum 6 percent of GDP in health and allocate less than 30 percent of the health budget to the first level of care as recommended by the regional health organization.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

  • The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

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What might be ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2023? Take our ten-question poll and see how your answers stack up https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/spotlight/what-might-be-ahead-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-in-2023/ Tue, 20 Dec 2022 17:43:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=588929 How will the region ride a new wave of changing economic and political dynamics? Will the region sizzle or fizzle? Join in and be a part of our ten-question poll on the future of LAC.

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2023 might very well define the trajectory for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) over the next decade.

While many countries are still on the rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic, new crises—and their effects—are emerging, and are expected to continue into the next year. From global inflation to a costly energy crisis, and from food insecurity to new political shifts, how can the region meet changing dynamics head-on? And how might risks turn into opportunities as we enter a highly consequential 2023?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll to see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might new regional collaboration take shape across Latin America and the Caribbean with a wave of new leaders? What decision points might shape government policy? Will Bitcoin continue to see the light of day in El Salvador? Are the harmful economic effects of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the rearview mirror for the region, or is the worse yet to come? Will China’s new foreign policy ambition translate to closer relations with LAC?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

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Aviso LatAm: December 17, 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/aviso-latam-covid-19/aviso-latam-december-17-2022/ Sat, 17 Dec 2022 14:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=596242 Peru's president ousted after attempt to dissolve Congress

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​​​​​What you should know

  • Peru: President Castillo was ousted by lawmakers after he sought to dissolve Congress ahead of an impeachment vote.
  • Brazil: The Economy Ministry rejected assertions by President-elect Lula’s transition team that Bolsonaro’s outgoing administration was leaving government finances “bankrupt.”
  • Social outlook: A recent Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report projects that by the end of 2022, LAC will have 201 million people living in poverty – an increase of 15 million compared to the pre-pandemic situation.
  • ICYMI: On December 7, the Atlantic Council launched a paper on improving tax policy in LAC. Read it here.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

  • Argentina: signed a new information-sharing agreement with the US designed to root out tax evasion. It could increase tax revenue for Argentina by $1 billion US.
  • Barbados: concluded new funding arrangements with the IMF, $113 million US to continue its fiscal reform package and $189 million US towards its climate change response.
  • Brazil: President-elect Lula announced that Fernando Haddad, former minister of education and mayor of São Paulo, would be his finance minister.
  • Mexico: announced that additional consultations on the USMCA energy dispute would be held through early January, to ensure continued investment and confidence.
  • Peru: was placed under a state of emergency after protests gripped the country. Political upheaval led S&P to lower the country’s economic outlook to “negative.”
  • Transatlantic relations: Argentina called for reviewing the potential EU-Mercosur trade agreement, highlighting threats to local auto industry and barriers to agricultural exports.
  • Uruguay: criticized Mercosur’s inaction on trade agreements with large economies, drawing criticism for its own independent negotiations with China and to join the TPP.

In focus: Guyana’s carbon credits

Guyana is the first country to issue carbon credits designed to prevent forest loss and the first under the ART’s REDD+ Environmental Excellence Standard to ensure integrity and independent verification. The Hess Corporation, which is a partner in an oil consortium led by ExxonMobil that operates in Guyana, will purchase $750 million US of these credits. This move reflects how resilient growth, balancing between the opportunities in the energy sector and protecting its valuable environment, has become a priority in light of climate change and stresses like the COVID-19 pandemic.

These credits will support Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy, with 15 percent of the revenues set aside for indigenous communities. With some 18 million hectares of forest, Guyana is a major carbon sink, and has previously worked with Norway to protect this resource. The new credits reflect Guyana’s status as a “High Forest, Low Deforestation” country, another first.

Health + Innovation

  • Argentina: Transport Ministry officials recommended all passengers travelling on public transportation to return to wearing face-masks amid a spike in COVID-19 cases.
  • Universal Health Day: The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) director called on the region to redouble efforts towards achieving universal health as they begin to rebuild from the pandemic.
  • Mexico: The state of Nuevo Leon reintroduced the mandatory use of face masks in closed public spaces as the number of COVID-19 infections and other respiratory diseases rise.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

  • The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Aviso LatAm: December 3, 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/aviso-latam-covid-19/aviso-latam-december-3-2022/ Sat, 03 Dec 2022 08:19:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=591118 Latin America and the Caribbean's stagnation is 'worse than the 1980s'

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​​​​​What you should know

  • Economic outlook: The head of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) said that the region’s stagnation is ”worse than the 1980s” due to weak investment, low productivity, and inadequate education.
  • Mexico: Remittances sent from workers abroad surpassed $5.35 billion in October, beating economists’ forecast on US job strength.
  • #ProactiveLAC: On Wednesday, December 7, the Atlantic Council will host a virtual conversation on LAC’s economic outlook, fiscal policy, and small and medium-sized enterprises in uncertain times. Register here.

Monitoring economic headwinds and tailwinds in the region

  • Argentina: Upcoming legislation is set to encourage investment in its liquified natural gas sector, as demand, driven by the war in Ukraine, continues to grow. 
  • Bolivia: The country lowered its 2023 growth forecast from 5.1 to 4.8 percent, as an ongoing strike in Santa Cruz has led to over $780 million in losses.  
  • Chile: During the recent high-level dialogue with the United States covering migration and sustainable development, both parties agreed to relaunch their bilateral Science, Technology, and Innovation Council. 
  • Dominican Republic: The United States will block sugar imports from Central Romana, the Caribbean nation’s largest employer, accusing it of using forced labor
  • Ecuador: The government is considering a new financing deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 2023, as its current agreement is set to expire at the end of 2022.  
  • Guyana: According to new ECLAC data, the country recorded the highest FDI growth in the Caribbean in 2021, and now accounts for half of all Caribbean FDI, thanks to its booming hydrocarbon sector.  
  • Peru: Farmers and truckers set up roadblocks to protest rising gas and fertilizer prices, driven up by the war in Ukraine.  
  • FDI: In a 2022 ECLAC report, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) rose by 40.7 percent in 2021 but fell short to achieve pre-pandemic levels.

In focus: Venezuelan thaw

Last weekend, the United States granted Chevron a six-month license to expand operations in Venezuela after the Maduro government agreed to resume talks in Mexico City with the country’s opposition. The two sides signed an agreement to use frozen Venezuelan assets for humanitarian relief as well.  

The United States has framed this policy shift as a “targeted” response to promote “concrete steps” forward by the parties meeting in Mexico City. At the same time, the energy crisis driven by Russia’s war in Ukraine has elevated Maduro’s–-and Venezuela’s –-importance in a time of rising oil demand.  

Health + Innovation

  • ICYMI: On November 16, the Atlantic Council launched a report with actionable recommendations for improving immunization program outcomes and financing in the region. Read it here.
  • Uruguay: Health authorities issued a recommendation that immunocompromised patients and over 50 year-olds should take their fifth dose of the COVID-19 vaccine.
  • Food insecurity: An ECLAC report found that 56.5 million people in LAC are impacted by hunger.

Geopolitics of vaccine donations: US vs. China

  • The United States outpaces China in its donations of COVID-19 vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia and Mexico topping the list. The region has received roughly 52 percent of all US COVID-19 vaccine donations. To learn more, visit our COVID-19 vaccine tracker: Latin America and the Caribbean.

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Colombia’s first leftist president is taking office. What should the US expect from him? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/colombias-first-leftist-president-is-taking-office-what-should-the-us-expect-from-him/ Fri, 05 Aug 2022 14:41:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=553836 We reached out to our top Latin America minds to break down what a Gustavo Petro presidency will mean for this longstanding strategic relationship.

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The election in June of Gustavo Petro as Colombia’s next president sent shockwaves through Latin America—and also probably through Washington.

The former guerrilla fighter, who will be inaugurated Sunday, was part of the wave of leftist political forces that has washed over the region in recent years, sparking analysts to wonder whether the crucial US-Colombia relationship under decades of right-leaning governments in Bogotá could significantly change.

We reached out to Jason Marczak, senior director of the Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and Camila Hernandez, associate director of Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, to break down what a Petro presidency will mean for the longstanding relationship.

What will be the primary sources of tension between the US and Colombian administrations as Petro settles in?

Tension will center around two areas: drug policy and Venezuela. Petro campaigned with a pledge to reassess Colombia’s drug policy, favoring substitution over forced eradication with ideas to potentially legalize certain drugs. Any moves to diminish Colombia’s role as a strategic partner in reducing illicit drug cultivation will be met with ire from both sides of the aisle in the US Congress, especially with coca cultivation sky-high compared to twenty years ago. 

On Venezuela, Petro will move quickly to reopen diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors—a sharp contrast to the US policy of isolation toward Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. There’s a case to be made for greater coordination given the 1,400-mile shared border, and despite international efforts to isolate him, Maduro remains in power with few openings for democratic actors. But a clear line will have to be drawn between engagement on issues critical for Colombian security and a full embrace of the Venezuelan leader. Otherwise, bipartisan consensus among US lawmakers will quickly emerge to scale back longstanding US support for Colombia.

Jason

Petro also intends to renegotiate Bogotá’s trade agreements with Washington, including the 2012 United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA). Although he’d moderated his speech by the time he was elected, and although US officials have expressed openness to having conversations on the TPA, renegotiating the accord (or even opening it up for discussion) may prove to be a difficult task.

Moreover, Petro has pledged to stop issuing permits for oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon exploration. With oil and gas representing 40 percent of the country’s exports and 12 percent of government revenue, many have questioned the feasibility of implementing his plans for Colombia’s energy sector—which receives considerable US investment. This may lead to potential bilateral tensions as he moves forward with his policy proposals. 

Camila

In which areas will they be able to work together, and how will that shape the relationship?

Cooperation should hopefully win the day. The US-Colombia relationship is incredibly strong and enduring, with two hundred years of diplomatic relations yielding cooperation on issues ranging from commercial ties to the environment, migration, and beyond. That historical bond—and the deep ties between the US and Colombian people—is the bedrock of the relationship. 

Early indications are that strengthening bilateral ties will be a priority for the United States. US President Joe Biden called Petro shortly after his electoral victory, while US government officials have traveled to Bogotá in recent weeks. USAID chief Samantha Power will personally attend Petro’s inauguration. Common ground is clear on joint priorities, including the environment, climate change, and securing peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as laid out in the 2016 accord. The US-Colombia Bicentennial Alliance Act, a recent piece of US Senate legislation, should be prioritized for its holistic approach to carving out the future of the relationship.

Jason

Indeed, peace is a priority for Petro and Vice President-elect Francia Márquez. Together, they have vowed to lay the foundation for ending Colombia’s decades-long armed conflict, prioritizing the 2016 agreement and protecting rural communities. Colombian Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva and Ambassador to the United States Luis Gilberto Murillo have both also mentioned that peace and rural development are top priorities. While continued US support for this agenda is likely, both countries need to find creative ways to work at the intersection of security and rural development, overcoming potential differences in terms of drug policy. Security is essential for development and remains a central issue for US-Colombia relations.

Camila

Petro takes office amid a leftist wave that’s washing over Latin America. Is this a broader regional concern for Washington? 

Whether a government is from the left or right should not be a concern, as long as that government is democratically elected and governs through democratic means. What we may be seeing is a new type of leftist government—one that prioritizes social inclusion while also ensuring fiscal discipline and respect for the rule of law. To this end, Petro’s appointment of the well-respected economist José Antonio Ocampo as his finance minister sends a signal of fiscal evenhandedness. 

More broadly, citizens across Latin America and the Caribbean are categorically rejecting the established political class following slow and uneven responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and years of discontent over policies that failed to reduce inequality. Now, high inflation, alongside increasing food and energy prices, is sparking protests in countries long immune to such social discontent. What’s clear is that a new approach must be taken to show that democracies can deliver. The United States and its European partners should seize this moment to expand their own partnerships in areas that will address the direct concerns of the region’s frustrated people.

Jason

What advice would you give diplomats of both countries as this relationship begins to take shape?

Rather than giving advice, it’s important to raise a few issues to keep in mind. For one, the longstanding US-Colombia relationship has faced moments of great opportunity as well as tensions in the past. Relationships across the ideological spectrum will continue to be essential to advance each country’s priorities at such pivotal moments. So, too, will dialogue and pre-emptive explanation of any major policy decisions before they’re announced. And given the importance of bilateral ties, it’s essential to advance steady engagement at both the executive level as well as within each legislature.

Jason

Both countries should remain open-minded about the future of the relationship and search for creative ways to overcome the tensions that will inevitably arise. More importantly, US and Colombian diplomats should prioritize a long-term vision for the bilateral partnership—one that builds on decades of close cooperation and is also adaptive and resilient to short- and medium-term changes. There is no country better positioned to support Colombia’s efforts to advance peace, economic development, and environmental protections than the United States—just like there is no country in Latin America whose alliance is more valuable to the United States. 

Camila

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Agenda | Allies: Twenty-seven bold ideas to reimagine the US-Colombia relationship https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/allies-us-colombia-book/agenda-allies-twenty-seven-bold-ideas-to-reimagine-the-us-colombia-relationship/ Wed, 01 Jun 2022 19:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=530847 Agenda for June 1, 2022 event, Allies: Twenty-seven bold ideas to reimagine the US-Colombia relationship.

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Agenda

Please note that all times are Eastern Time (ET).

7:30 p.m.

Program begins

Welcome remarks: Importance of Colombia as a global ally

Fred Kempe, President and CEO, Atlantic Council

7:30 – 7:35 p.m.
7:35 – 7:40 p.m.

Special remarks: 200 years of US-Colombia relations

H.E. Juan Carlos Pinzón, Ambassador of Colombia to the United States, Republic of Colombia

Discussion with book authors

Min. Carolina Barco, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia; Former Ambassador of Colombia to the United States; Member, US-Colombia Task Force, Atlantic Council

Juan Gonzalez, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere, US National Security Council

Min. María Claudia Lacouture, Executive Director, Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce; President, Alianza de Asociaciones y Gremios; Former Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Republic of Colombia; Member, US-Colombia Task Force, Atlantic Council

Amb. Kevin Whitaker, Former US Ambassador to Colombia; Non-resident Senior Fellow, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council

MODERATORS:
Jason Marczak, Senior Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
Cynthia J. Arnson, Distinguished Fellow, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

7:40 – 8:10 p.m.
8:10 – 8:40 p.m.

Video – Book preview

INTRODUCED BY: Camila Hernández, Associate Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council

Essay excerpt reading – STEM and the arts

Leila Cobo, Vice President, Latin Industry Lead, Billboard

8:14 – 8:18 p.m.
8:18 – 8:25 p.m.

Keynote remarks

H.E. Marta Lucía Ramírez, Vice President; Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Colombia

INTRODUCED BY: Adrienne Arsht, Executive Vice Chair; Founder, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, Atlantic Council

Closing remarks

Amb. Mark A. Green, President and CEO, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Former Administrator, US Agency for International Development (USAID); Former US Ambassador to Tanzania

8:25 – 8:30 p.m.
8:30 p.m.

Program ends

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In new Atlantic Council book, US and Colombia influencers propose new vision for US-Colombia ties https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/new-atlantic-council-book-proposes-new-vision-for-us-colombia-ties/ Wed, 01 Jun 2022 18:28:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=531607 The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book, Allies: Twenty-Seven Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship, that outlines a new vision for US-Colombia relations amid the bicentennial of diplomatic relations and as new local and global challenges call for a reimagined partnership.

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Allies: Twenty-Seven Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship features contributions from President Bill Clinton, General David Petraeus, Minister Carolina Barco, and Members of Congress, among other US and Colombian thought leaders

Washington, DC—June 1, 2022 – Today, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book, Allies: Twenty-Seven Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship, that outlines a new vision for US-Colombia relations amid the bicentennial of diplomatic relations and as new local and global challenges call for a reimagined partnership.

The book, produced with insight and collaboration from the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, features nearly thirty essays from thought leaders on opportunities for future US-Colombia cooperation in addressing bilateral and global needs. Contributors are prominent politicians, business leaders, academics, and artists, including President Bill Clinton, businessman Howard Buffett, General David Petraeus, Colombia’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Carolina Barco, former Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism María Claudia Lacouture, and singer-songwriter Carlos Vives.

The book comes as Colombia prepares to elect its next president in a second round on June 19, 2022. It represents a collective, binational effort to reimagine the US-Colombia partnership based on a shared vision for a more prosperous, inclusive, and sustainable future.

The book provides a roadmap for future US engagement with Colombia in seven areas, which include and go beyond traditional areas of bilateral cooperation: global issues; shared security; democracy and the rule of law; inclusive economic growth; migration and internal displacement; environment and climate; and STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) and the arts.

“An even deeper US-Colombia partnership is fundamental to the national interests of both countries. This historic book provides innovative ideas to advance the relationship so we can jointly build on the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead,” said Jason Marczak, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and co-editor of Allies.

“Future US engagement with Colombia should recognize the country’s positive transformations, expanding and deepening bilateral cooperation to advance democracy, security, and prosperity for all,” said Camila Hernández, associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and co-editor of Allies. “A volume like this is more needed than ever,” added Cynthia Arnson, distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and co-editor of Allies. “Colombia’s change election underscores the need for the fresh thinking laid out in these essays.”

With articles by Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force co-chairs Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) and the Chairman and Ranking Member—Representatives Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and Michael McCaul (R-TX), respectively—of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the book recognizes the bipartisan support that has characterized US policy toward Colombia.

Through its US-Colombia Task Force—a nonpartisan group of experts in the United States and Colombia—the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center works to strengthen bipartisan support for this relationship, while deepening bilateral diplomatic and economic ties. The group’s next report, to be released in Fall 2022, will provide a critical blueprint for Colombia’s next leader on how to strengthen US-Colombia ties.
A copy of the book, including essays and videos from contributors, can be accessed here. The book will be formally launched tonight at 7:30 p.m. (ET) at an invite-only event at the US library of Congress with the participation of book authors, Vice President of Colombia Marta Lucía Ramírez, and Special Assistant to the President of the United States and Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere at the US National Security Council Juan Gonzalez.

If interested in attending the book launch in-person, please contact ELardizabal@atlanticcouncil.org. Please note that press availability is limited and first come, first served. The book launch will also be livestreamed via Zoom and YouTube. To receive a zoom link, register here.

For further information, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Advance democracy, security and rule of law https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/allies-us-colombia-book/advance-democracy-security-and-rule-of-law/ Wed, 01 Jun 2022 15:16:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=531264 Go behind the scenes of the launching of Plan Colombia and explore the balancing act between the “hard side” and “soft side” of the foreign policy community, and how the flexibility of both sides and commitment of US and Colombian government made it a success.

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I was deputy assistant secretary of state for South America and the Caribbean in 1999 when the administration of President William J. Clinton first contemplated a dramatic increase in support for the Colombian government. We were worried about Colombia, and the worry was bipartisan. In close-hold meetings and briefings, we debated whether the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) might actually win its then 35-year conflict with the government; whether drug traffickers might penetrate and dominate entire sectors of the government; whether one of the hemisphere’s steadiest, most reliable economies might collapse. In the offices and halls of official Washington, there was an uncharacteristic consensus that what happened in Colombia was important to the United States and that we needed a new strategy to address it.

We were relieved to find that the Colombian government of President Andrés Pastrana had reached the same basic conclusions. Government officials described three immediate crises—security, law enforcement, and economic—threatening the Colombian state. Our two governments began the serious work of hammering out a strategic approach and support package, making quick progress. Official teams moved back and forth from Washington and Bogotá for months outlining a new strategy known as “Plan Colombia.”

We agreed on all fundamental issues, but there were questions on timing and emphasis. The Pastrana government was then engaged in a bold effort at dialogue with the FARC, creating a demilitarized zone the size of Rhode Island to encourage negotiations, which lasted until 2002. The Colombian government was careful not to endorse a strategy that undercut the dialogue process, although even then, we sensed the government’s doubts (strongly shared by us) about the FARC’s commitment to peace.

We also wrestled over a name for the new strategy. I suggested “Plan Paz, Prosperidad y Progreso,” proudly pointing to the alliteration in both languages and linkage to the themes of peace, prosperity, and progress. The Colombian government concluded that since the strategic objective was to reestablish the constitutional government’s sovereignty over the entire nation, the simple phrase “Plan Colombia” should describe the effort.

With an agreed plan in hand, the Clinton Administration got down to the work of identifying, funding, and implementing the parts of Plan Colombia that we could support. Congress was enthusiastic, and we hoped for a supplemental appropriations bill to be passed and signed quickly. But for the first time, we faced divisions in our ranks on how to proceed. At the risk of over-simplification, the arguments were between the “hard side” and “soft side” of the US foreign assistance community. The “soft side” (the US Agency for International Development and the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and parts of Justice) argued that the point of the exercise, and our strategic objective, was not to make Colombia a major military and law enforcement power, but rather to build democratic, economic, and social institutions to undercut the popular appeal of the guerrilla and drug trafficking organizations. The “hard side” (the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and law enforcement) argued that democracy, economic, and social development programs could not succeed if the government did not provide basic security in the communities most in need. 

In the end, we decided to sequence the support. In the early years of Plan Colombia, our support would prioritize security, police, and prosecutor equipment, training, and construction. In later years, as the government re-established police and security presence throughout the country, the priority would shift to democratic institutions and social and economic development.

The rest, as they say, is history. 

In January 2000, Congress overwhelmingly passed a $1 billion emergency supplemental appropriation to support Plan Colombia. For the next six years, US support for Colombia averaged nearly $1 billion per year. Until 2007, US “hard side” support was twice the level of the economic and social (“soft side”) assistance and provided the Colombian military and police the aviation and mobility to fight the FARC and traffickers. Communications equipment allowed them to listen in on guerrilla and criminal communications. New units were created, trained, and equipped to provide presence in lawless territory and support law enforcement anti-drug operations. Police stations were built and staffed in communities that had not seen police in years. Prosecutors more than doubled in number and entered the profession through a new national training curriculum.

Colombia’s governmental institutions were stressed in the 1990s, but they did not collapse. Once provided resources and infrastructure in the 2000s, they functioned as well as those of any government in the Western Hemisphere, if not the entire world. Colombia and the United States were partners in the truest sense. The two governments worked seamlessly together in sensitive programs and operations in a way rarely seen outside NATO. Cooperation produced the Jaque hostage rescue operation of 2008, dozens of drug kingpins were captured and tried, major FARC commanders were removed from the chessboard, and thousands of tons of cocaine were eliminated from the market.

Yet, each side stayed in its lanes. The armed forces received training and equipment, insisting that only they would conduct operations in Colombia; after the first two years, they were no longer taking much direct training from US counterparts. The National Police welcomed training, equipment, and intelligence, but the operations were theirs alone. Colombian prosecutors cooperated with US Justice Department counterparts, and many Colombian cases resulted in extradition, but Colombian prosecutors tried Colombian cases in Colombia. 

By the time I arrived in Bogotá as ambassador, the improved security picture could be measured in statistics. President Álvaro Uribe liked to tell visitors that when he took office in 2002, more than two hundred municipalities did not have mayors in residence because of security threats; by his second term in 2006, all mayors were residential. Cocaine production began a steady decline in 2007. By 2008, the FARC had lost roughly 50 percent of its active numbers, most voluntarily surrendering. Curfews were lifted through most of the country. Construction cranes were ubiquitous in all the main cities, evidence of a building boom. By 2008, more Colombians were returning to their nation than fleeing it. And in an easily measurable statistic—the cruise line industry returned to the port of Cartagena, starting from zero in 2007, two in 2008, forty in 2009, and reaching 200 a year before the COVID-19 pandemic.

By 2005, the two governments were criticized for Plan Colombia’s continued tilt toward security and law enforcement. In truth, when the Clinton Administration first presented the case for Plan Colombia to the Congress, we had suggested (assured) that in five years, the hard/soft ratio would flip to a greater emphasis on economic and social development and democratic institutions. Whether due to the extraordinary success of hard-side programs or the bureaucratic tendency to keep doing what we did the year before, the ratios had not flipped. The critics had a valid argument.

The 2006 midterm US elections returned Congress to Democrat control, and by 2008, the majority of US assistance to Plan Colombia was focused on the “soft side.” It happened so quickly that the embassy’s USAID Mission suffered financial whiplash on seeing its budget triple overnight. 

The timing of the imposed shift in emphasis was fortuitous. After seven years of Plan Colombia, the armed forces and law enforcement were highly professionalized. They were, in fact, the best military and police institutions in all of Latin America. By establishing security and law enforcement presence throughout the country, it was possible for Colombia’s political, economic, and social institutions to do their jobs. Had we tried to implement the labor-intensive development programs in poor communities with the security conditions of 2000, we would have failed.

In Colombia, as in the United States, the security/military and civilian communities do not always see eye to eye. But after seven years of pounding against the guerrillas and traffickers, the armed forces and police understood that civilian success in their mission was their ticket to success. The civilians understood, for their part, that if they wanted to build roads, clinics, electrical grids, clean water, schools, and community centers, if they wanted to bring sustainable development to poor campesinos and city barrios, they needed the support of the police and military.   

To paraphrase Uribe, our support program shifted from “democratic security” to “secure democracy,” from a security program with strong democracy components to a democracy program with robust security elements. In my final two years in Colombia, the US embassy supported agricultural programs providing poor campesinos the opportunity to grow coffee, cacao, or African palm rather than coca. We built rural roads with parallel electric, water, and sewer lines to allow farmers to get their crops to market. We constructed and opened more than fifty “Justice Houses” in which poor Colombians could find justice, social, and medical help in a single day. We supported prominent development plans in areas previously controlled by the FARC, signaling that the government of Colombia was back to stay.   

In 2016, six years after my tenure as ambassador had ended, I returned to Cartagena, Colombia, when President Juan Manuel Santos signed the peace accord with the FARC. Colombians will argue for generations about the agreement and the process leading to it. But most will agree the democracy and security support for Plan Colombia got the accord over the goal line. 

No essay on US support for democracy and security in Colombia is complete without some lessons learned. Here are a few:

  • Security and democracy are tightly connected. You cannot have one without the other. 
  • A long-term security and development plan must be adaptable. Assumptions will prove wrong. Reality will change on the ground. The plan, the planners, and the implementers must be able to change over time.
  • No nation-building plan succeeds without buy-in and commitment from the host government. We cannot want success more than they do. During my ambassadorship, we calculated that the Colombian government put $30 into Plan Colombia for every US dollar.
  • Plan Colombia did not succeed because of the work of US government officials and contractors; it succeeded because of the work of Colombian officials and citizens implementing joint programs.
  • It takes time and patience to build bipartisan support for a major foreign assistance program and even more to maintain it. But it is worth the effort.

Some academics argue that Plan Colombia is the most successful nation-building exercise since the Marshall Plan in 1947. They might just be right.

* * *

Ambassador William (Bill) Brownfield is a career ambassador in the United States Foreign Service and the former assistant secretary of state for the bureau of international narcotics and law enforcement affairs as of January 10, 2011. He has previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Venezuela, and Colombia.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Special investment case study https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-special-investment-case-study/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:50:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=528294 When I was asked to become the inaugural chair of the US-Colombia Business Council in 2017, I agreed without hesitation. My work in supporting two different administrations to help broaden and deepen bilateral social and economic ties is rooted in the extensive his- tory of Occidental Petroleum (“Oxy”) in Colombia. Almost forty years have passed […]

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When I was asked to become the inaugural chair of the US-Colombia Business Council in 2017, I agreed without hesitation. My work in supporting two different administrations to help broaden and deepen bilateral social and economic ties is rooted in the extensive his- tory of Occidental Petroleum (“Oxy”) in Colombia.

Almost forty years have passed since a mid-April morning in 1983 when  Oxy began to drill a well in the Cano Limon field in a remote part of Colombia’s Arauca Department along the Venezuelan border. Oxy’s geologists believed that a major discovery was possible even though other companies had explored the area without promising results.

The first traces of hydrocarbons were found in a matter of weeks. Increasing evidence showed that a major oil field existed. Roughly two years later, commercial production had begun with an average yield of 8,000 light crude barrels per day (bpd). It would eventually reach a peak of 300,000 bpd. That these geologists were proven correct not only helped change the course of  Oxy’s history but also helped propel Colombia from a major importer of crude oil to a substantial exporter. It also spurred significant new investment in Colombia’s resource-rich hydrocarbons sector.

Oxy’s discovery occurred during a particularly challenging time for Colombia. While the first positive assessments of the Cano Limon field were being recorded, Time magazine devoted its cover to the spiraling debt in Latin America that would envelop the region for many years. The inability of several countries in the region to honor their obligations helped foster an international financial crisis that led many governments to adopt severe austerity measures. The social cost was immense: a decline in income per capita, a rise in unemployment, and general economic malaise. Yet, Colombia weathered the storm and consistently met its debt commitments, leading Euromoney magazine to label Colombia as “the golden exception.”

As in prior decades, responsible fiscal management undergirded the ability of Colombian authorities to manage a complex set of economic challenges. The discovery of massive new oil reserves played an important role in supporting fiscal stability. According to an analysis by the US consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, between 1985 and 1993, Colombia’s GDP growth increased by 1.5 percent annually due to the development of hydrocarbons stemming from the Cano Limon discovery. By 2022, the field had yielded 1.5 billion barrels of oil and generated more than $20 billion in total revenue.

The robust partnership between Colombia and Oxy launched over four decades ago continues to this day. We have taken great pride in being part of Colombia’s past and remain very optimistic about its future. I have seen first-hand the tremendous resilience of the Colombian people and the extraordinary talent and determination of its workforce, which is among the best. We have also expanded our partnership with Colombia’s state oil company, Eco- petrol, to include operations in the prolific Permian Basin in Texas.

Since the beginning of Oxy’s engagement with Colombia, we have not only sought to be a partner of choice but also to help address some of the more pressing economic challenges facing the country. One such challenge is confronting the realities of a changing climate and fostering an energy transition that can help protect and sustain future generations. Colombia has shown extraordinary leadership and commitment to a sustainable energy transition. It has established ambitious goals for reducing green- house gas emissions, including setting targets fully in line with the Paris Agreement: e.g., lowering emissions by 51 percent by 2030 and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. Colombia has made impressive investments in alternative energy sources in recent years, and according to a recent report issued by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, significantly more are on the horizon.

Like Colombia, Oxy is taking bold steps to innovate for a low carbon future. We are reducing greenhouse gas emissions across our oil and gas, midstream, and chemical operations while providing products and services to help others do the same, all to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Adopting innovative technologies can accelerate Colombia’s ability to achieve its ambitious climate goals. The installation of carbon capture equipment in power plants and manufacturing facilities can also help since captured CO2 can be stored safely and permanently deep underground. With more than 60 million hectares of natural forests, Colombia also has enormous potential to sell carbon credits while protecting its forest, mangroves, and other natural solutions for storing carbon.

I am genuinely excited about what the future holds for Colombia and the historic partnership between our countries, especially in areas that support an energy transition so critical to the safety and security of our respective peoples and the planet. In fifty years, when the moment arrives to celebrate the 250th anniversary of US-Colombia relations, this unique partnership will be even stronger. Generations of Colombians and Americans will be the better for it.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Partner for sustainable pathways https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-partner-for-sustainable-pathways/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:42:05 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527008 The United States and Colombia can play a key role in
supporting green recovery and nature-positive futures by applying the commitments and frameworks they have pledged to uphold to shift the balance of fossil fuels and renewables in their energy sourcing.

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THE CONVERGENCE OF CRISES ON A PLANETARY SCALE collides in ways that translate into exceptional opportunities and responsibilities for Latin America. The vast natural riches of the continent host more than 50 percent of the world’s biodiversity, one-third of its freshwater, and underpin its vital and increasing role as a global breadbasket. The immense landscapes of its forests, watersheds, and coasts also harbor a significant percentage of the nature-based climate solutions needed to shift emission trajectories.1 Latin America and the Caribbean hold the largest reforestation potential to mitigate climate change.2 But there is a narrow window to effect the transformation needed in a region with spiraling, unabated deforestation, where agriculture and ranching drive 70 percent of land-use change, and one of the world’s most important carbon sinks—the Amazon basin— veers toward an irreversible tipping point.3

The United States and Colombia have a unique opportunity to intervene at this decisive juncture through diplomacy, assistance programs, and commitments to trade agreements sanctioning products that cause deforestation. The two countries have long-standing bilateral relations; in the last few years, high-level dialogues have embraced shared agendas across social, economic, and environmental dimensions. Both have sought to increase the collective ambition in climate change negotiations as part of the High Ambition Coalition.4 A drive for bolder action has been prominent in their engagement around climate and biodiversity at the recent United Nations (UN) Conference of Parties, the Paris Agreement in Glasgow (COP26), and in the working groups in 2022 supporting the global Convention on Biological Diversity.

Beyond pledges, diplomacy, trade, and official development assistance, investments and efforts must focus on advancing nature-based solutions that shift the greenhouse gas emissions curve while increasing ecosystem resilience, ensuring that the poor, smallholders, and landless benefit. A significant proportion of these emissions (between 35 percent and 60 percent) in Latin America come from the agricultural, forestry, and land-use sectors; these stand at 62 percent in Colombia. Fulfilling commitments under the Paris Agreement will require that Colombia take action across these sectors. 

Moreover, as Colombia and other Latin American economies emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic and respond to the challenges it has left in its wake, prioritizing investments in nature-based solutions is crucial to stem the planetary emergency and protect the critical underpinnings of the region’s economies.5 According to Fastmarkets, “GDP levels at the start of 2021 fell back to levels not seen since 2011. Latin America lost an entire decade of economic progress.”6 In Colombia, gross domestic product fell to levels not seen since 2015.

Yet, as countries seek to stimulate growth and promote recovery, analysis from the UN Environmental Programme underscores that Latin American countries risk missing a unique opportunity to reorient their economies toward just and sustainable growth.7 Given the vast natural endowment of the continent and that, on average, 23 percent of the land is under the stewardship of Indigenous peoples and local communities—28 percent in Colombia—nature-positive, carbon-neutral, and more equitable development trajectories that uphold Indigenous rights must be supported and advanced.

Countries like Colombia that have made significant investments and commitments to meet their climate goals are vital partners for the United States, despite the challenges inherent in achieving economy-wide shifts to lower carbon trajectories. In approving a national carbon tax on fossil fuels in late 2016, Colombia was a frontrunner in climate finance. In 2017, Colombia approved a measure allowing carbon credits to be used against the new carbon tax, permitting entities to offset 100 percent of their tax liability. From 2017 to 2021, $507 million was levied through the carbon tax and disbursed to cover operating costs for the protection, preservation, restoration, and sustainable use of strategic areas and ecosystems through reforestation programs and payment for environmental services.8

The Leticia Pact

The Leticia Pact, spearheaded by President Iván Duque and signed by seven South American Amazon countries, also signaled Colombia’s pledge to tackle deforestation and the illegal activities that threaten the integrity of this unique biome. It spoke to the recognition that strong, aligned political will is needed to bring about the necessary structural shifts. Leaders signed a 52-point action plan. However, implementation has been weak, and traditional communities and Indigenous peoples are demanding a greater voice and agency in this pact.

There is a huge opportunity and need for continued leadership to effectively reshape extractive modes of production and align incentives toward regenerative practices, sustainable land management, and biodiversity protection that will deliver multiple benefits across this biome. For example, greening development pathways and eliminating deforestation and environmental degradation through trade regulations that enforce more transparency in supply chains offer historic opportunities to address existing inequalities, promote green growth, and tackle the root causes of entrenched poverty and economic insecurity. These same initiatives can also uphold Indigenous land rights, enable more secure titling, and resource oversight mechanisms that increase transparency and traceability in supply chains, reducing the threats against existing protected areas and Indigenous communities.

Deforestation and decarbonization

However, as the Climate Action Tracker analysis underscores, “Reducing emissions from deforestation is a vital part of Colombia’s climate action, but to fully decarbonize its economy, Colombia would need to focus on other sectors, especially energy and transport.”9 Colombia updated its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) target in December 2020, but the NDC demonstrates that it intends to rely primarily on land-based mitigation measures to meet 70 percent of the reductions needed for its updated target. Moreover, despite bold commitments to extend new protected areas through initiatives like Manacacías National Park, deforestation levels continue to rise, and current forest protection policies are not adequately resourced or enforced.

Methane

In addition to ensuring that sufficient resources are forthcoming for forest protection and enforcement, it is essential to strengthen collaboration on other fronts. There is ample room for targeted collaboration around methane. At COP26, the United States, with partners, led a pledge signed by more than one hundred countries to reduce methane emissions by 30 percent. According to the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, there was a record increase in methane emissions in 2021.10 Colombia is also actively supporting the Global Methane Pledge and has developed a standard for methane emissions introduced in early 2022 that focuses primarily on emissions from mining and extractives.

The Colombian Ministry of Energy and Mines aims to contribute to the pledges made at COP26 to reduce methane leaks by 2.7 million gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent. However, in both the United States and Colombia, the leading source of methane emissions is livestock. In Colombia, 32 percent of emissions are from enteric fermentation, so there is a valuable opportunity to collaborate further on this front.

30×30

Similarly, the Americas need to live up to ambitious commitments on restoration and achieve its obligations to protect 30 percent of land and sea by 2030, an initiative known as 30 by 30.11 Colombia is taking courageous steps to develop a new National Biodiversity Law, consulting broadly across different sectors and reviewing other countries’ laws and policies. This will enable it to meet its 30 by 30 promises eight years ahead of schedule, as announced at COP26.

Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama announced the creation of the Eastern Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor initiative at COP26,12 which would increase the size of their protected territorial waters, creating a fish- ing-free corridor covering more than 500,000 square kilometers (200,000 square miles) in one of the world’s most significant migratory routes for sea turtles, whales, sharks, and rays. The United States has played an important role in spearheading increased protection for the world’s oceans; this is another critical front for enhanced and continued hemispheric collaboration along the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

Prior to COP26, US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry announced US support for regional initiatives such as Renewable Energy for Latin America and the Caribbean (RELAC), through which countries will endeavor to achieve a regional goal of at least 70 percent renewable energy capacity by 2030. As an active member of RELAC, Colombia has committed to reaching at least 70 percent of renewable energy participation in the region’s electricity matrix by 2030. Both countries should continue to pursue these commitments actively, leading to more ambitious and rapid decarbonization.

Colombia is well-positioned to act as an effective mediator at the September 2022 Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biodiversity in Kunming, China and the next UN Climate Change Conference, COP27, in Egypt. Colombia has an established global presence as a country that helps bridge positions, and it should leverage its domestic efforts to call for increased action on climate, biodiversity, and finance across these critical agendas.

Looking ahead

The United States and Colombia can play a key role in engaging on the global and regional stage supporting green recovery and nature-positive futures. They can use the commitments and frameworks they have pledged to uphold to shift the balance of fossil fuels and renewables in their energy sourcing. The two countries can potentially follow the route of the European Union13 and the United Kingdom14 in legislating that trade involve only deforestation- and conversion-free commodities such as soy, beef, coffee, cacao, and palm oil. They can support Indigenous guardians of the forests and uphold their human and environmental rights. They can pledge to protect oceans and restore reefs. They can lead with funding that resources their commitments to sustainability at home and in Latin America.

As Colombia and the United States celebrate two hundred years of diplomatic history, the time is ripe to leverage this partnership to boldly address the environmental challenges of our time.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    “Nature-based Solutions” are defined by the InternationalUnionforConservationofNatureas “actions to protect, sustainably manage, and restore natural or modified ecosystems that address societal challenges effectively and adaptively, simultaneously providing human well-being and biodiversity benefits,” https://www.iucn.org/commissions/commission-ecosystem-management/ our-work/nature-based-solutions.
2    Bronson W. Griscom et al., “National mitigation potential from natural climate solutions in the tropics,” PhilosophicalTransactionsB(January 7, 2020): 375: 20190126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/ rstb.2019.0126.
3    Science Panel for the Amazon, Amazon Assessment Report 2021, United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, November 12, 2021, https://www.theamazonwewant.org/ amazon-assessment-report-2021/; and Thomas E. Lovejoy and Carlos A. Nobre, “Winds of will: Tipping change in the Amazon,” Science Advances 5, no. 12 eaba2949 (2019): doi:10.1126/sciadv. aba2949.
4    “The Republic of the Marshall Islands formed the High Ambition Coalition in run-up negotiations to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Paris Agreement in 2015, helping to secure key elements of the deal, including the 1.5C temperature goal, the net zero global emissions pathway by the second half of the century, and a five-year cycle for updating mitigation contributions.” High Ambition Coalition website, accessed February 26, 2022, https://www.highambitioncoalition.org/work.
5    A. Bárcena et al, The climate emergency in Latin America and the Caribbean: the path ahead–resignation or action?(Santiago: ECLAC Books, 2020).
6    “How Latin America lost a decade of economic progress,” Fastmarkets, August 12, 2021, https:// www.fastmarkets.com/insights/how-latin-america-lost-a-decade-of-economic-progress?msclkid=0b6bacb2a96511ecad81cde3d01fb213.
7    Is the COVID-19 economic recovery building a sustainable future? A snapshot from Latin America andtheCaribbean, United Nations Environment Programme, 2021, https://recuperacionverde.com/en/state-of-play-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-may-september-2021/.
8    B. Kelsey Jack, Carolyn Kousky, and Katharine R.E. Sims, “Designing payments for ecosystem services: Lessons from previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms,” ProceedingsoftheNational Academy of Sciences, July 15, 2008, https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.0705503104.
9    “Colombia,” Climate Action Tracker, accessed February 25, 2022, https://climateactiontracker.org/ countries/colombia/.
10    “Increase in atmospheric methane set another record during 2021,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, April 7, 2022, https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/increase-in- atmospheric-methane-set-another-record-during-2021.
11    This is a worldwide initiative for governments to designate 30 percent of Earth’s land and ocean area as protected areas by 2030. E. Dinerstein et al., “A Global Deal for Nature: Guiding principles, milestones, and targets,” ScienceAdvancesVolume 5 Issue 4 (April 19, 2019), https://www.science. org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aaw2869.
12    “COP26: Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Panama Announce New Protections for ‘Ocean Highway’,” National Geographic Society press release, November 2, 2021, https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2021/11/02/cop26-colombia-costa-rica-ecuador-and-panama-announce-new-protections-for-ocean-highway/.
13    European Commission, “Questions and Answers on new rules for deforestation-free products,” November 17, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_5919.
14    Government of the United Kingdom press release, “Major shifts in private finance, trade and land rights to protect world’s forests,” Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs et al., November 2, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/major-shifts-in-private-finance-trade-and-land-rights-to-protect-worlds-forests.

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Deepen conservation partnerships https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-deepen-conservation-partnerships/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:41:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527012 The United States has had a long, valuable collaboration with Colombia to conserve nature, biodiversity, and sustainable natural resources; prospects for further progress are promising.

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COLOMBIA IS THE MOST IMPORTANT US ALLY in South America. Our relations include close and strategic cooperation on security, countering narcotics, human rights, and rule-of-law matters. But it is not always perceived how long and valuable our collaboration has been in con- serving nature, biodiversity, and sustainable natural resources, due mainly to active support by the US Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including Audubon, Conservation International, the International Conservation Caucus Foundation (ICCF), Rainforest Alliance, Rainforest Trust, The Nature Conservancy, Wildlife Conservation Society, and World Wildlife Fund.

Colombia is the second most biodiverse country on Earth. More than 10 percent of all species on our planet are found in this one medium-sized nation. The diversity of birds is especially notable; there are at least 1,900 bird species (the most in the world), from a global total of 10,800. This abundance now attracts growing numbers of birders: The National Audubon Society has helped support the creation of hundreds of miles of bird-watching trails that have attracted considerable numbers of US tourists.

Fundamental to conservation in the country is the extensive natural parks and reserves network: fifty-nine sites totaling 65,000 square miles or 14 percent of the national territory. In the early days of the parks movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the US National Park Service provided vital train- ing and field help to Colombia, including preparing some of the first park management plans. The Peace Corps also assisted with long-term help. The parks included the gems of the system, Tayrona and Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. The International Conservation Corps, an affiliate of ICCF, regularly provides teams of volunteer park experts from the United States and Canada to assist with the preparation of park and protected area management, the visitor center, and interpretation plans.

The parks network is still growing. Colombia recently expanded the park at Tatama with help from the private Rainforest Trust, and further expansions are under study at Sierra Nevada and Malpelo, among other sites. The Colombian government of President Iván Duque endorsed the global goal of “30 by 30” (30 percent of all land and water territory under some degree of protection by the year 2030).

Tourism, much of it nature-based, is playing an increasing role in economic development. Foreign visitors grew 300 percent from 2006 to 2019, including large numbers of US nationals. Tourism grew especially fast (8.5 percent per year) after the peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was signed in 2016. This opened up many rural areas that had been closed due to insecurity. By the end of 2019, the tourism industry employed 1.4 million people and contributed $19 billion to the economy, equal to 3.8 percent of the gross domestic product.1 Then came COVID-19 and a sharp decline in tourism, but Colombians are already rebounding by focusing on services, security, new infrastructure, and unique landscapes. As Colombians say with pride, Colombia is the only place on Earth where a visitor can sit on a tropical beach (at Santa Marta) and look up to see snow-capped mountains.

US-Colombia park partnerships

The most significant factor in US-Colombian cooperation for conservation has been through USAID programs. As part of its global mis- sion, USAID initially concentrated on issues of industrial growth, infrastructure, and housing. But since the early 1990s, nature conservation, especially in the sense of biodiversity, has been a priority. Colombia benefited from Parks in Peril (PiP), which for seventeen years after 1990, was the most extensive conservation program in Latin America. In partnership with the Nature Conservancy, it aimed to raise “paper parks” to a minimum level of long-term protection and active visitation by the public.

As elsewhere in the region, many parks in Colombia had been proclaimed by the government but not actually protected from inappropriate or illegal development by agricultural land invaders, loggers, illegal miners, and the drug trade. Parks in Peril worked in Colombia over several years to raise park sites to what was called “consolidation,” typically meaning that park boundaries had been marked, a visitor center had been built and staffed, park guards were trained and on duty, and local communities benefited from jobs and tourism income. La Playa, Chingaza, and Cahulnazi were among the parks that PiP helped.

Although PiP has ended, the conservation mission remains critical to USAID and Colombia. The largest such program has been USAID’s Natural Wealth, a multi-million-dollar 2017-2022 program. Working principally in the dry forests of the Caribbean region and the seasonally-flooded freshwater regions of the eastern plains, Natural Wealth has improved the management of parks while strengthening their governance by local communities and Indigenous tribes managing and legally defending their lands.

Colombia has massive potential for nature tourism in public parks and private reserves. Such projects can deliver jobs and prosperity while pre- serving landscapes (especially forests) vital to mitigating climate change. Moving forward, US government agencies, particularly USAID, should continue to find new ways to partner with Colombia on nature tourism projects. US development assistance, NGO support, and public-private partnerships to leverage Colombian investment are crucial to the success of these efforts. The ICCF’s work to strengthen political will for conservation will help facilitate these partnerships and raise awareness among Colombia’s political elite about emerging opportunities in nature tourism and other preservation efforts.

Conservation caucuses

The ability of USAID to support conservation via Natural Wealth and other efforts worldwide is made possible by the biodiversity line item passed each year by the US Congress within the State and Foreign Operations appropriation. This item grew from about $100 million annu ally in the early 1990s to more than $400 million, due mainly to the House and Senate members’ consistent support of the US Congressional International Conservation Caucus (ICC), founded in 2003.

The advantage of a congressional caucus is it allows any member interested in a topic an opportunity to become more engaged and informed, regardless of committee assignments. Of the dozens of caucuses in the US Congress, the ICC is the second biggest, with almost one-third of the total membership of the House and Senate. Its mission is “helping the United States lead public and private international partnerships that provide stewardship of natural resources for habitat and biodiversity protection, poverty reduction, economic development, and regional security.”2

The larger caucuses typically have a 501(c)3 organization affiliated, which arranges events of interest to the members, such as expert briefings, panel discussions, and field visits. The ICCF plays that role for the ICC. Beginning in 2015 with Colombia, the ICCF Group has extended the caucus “model” to more than fifteen foreign countries throughout the global trop- ics. Members attend expert meetings in the capital city, visit parks, and are invited to international events. The ICCF itself does not have any set agenda for conservation: the issues engaged are those raised by the legislative members. In addition to Colombia, in Latin America, the ICCF Group has staff and active caucuses in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and several islands of the Eastern Caribbean, with further expansion anticipated to Paraguay and Ecuador. 

Of these international caucuses, Colombia’s remains the most active and successful. More than forty members belong to the core conservation caucus and a parallel caucus that concentrates on ocean issues. Membership has included the speaker of the lower house and vice president of the Senate. The Colombian conservation caucus has also encouraged regional activism by Colombian members of the Andean Parliament, Amazon Parliament, Leticia Pact, and observer status at gatherings such as the Biodiversity Convention Conference of the Parties. Chiefly through the interest and engagement of these caucus members, the Colombian Congress has adopted the following new conservation laws in recent years:

  • Approval of 2013 Minamata Convention on Mercury. Led to Colombia’s formal accession to the Minamata Convention on Mercury.
  • Law for the Protection of Andean Highlands (Páramos). Regulates activities in and around the Andean highlands for the restoration and sustainable use of these integral ecosystems.
  • Police Code to Fight Use of Mercury in Illegal Gold Mining. Prohibits the use of chemical substances in the irregular removal of minerals.
  • Plastic Bags Ban, Isle of San Andrés. Phases out single-use plastics in the Colombian archipelago.
  • Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol. Adds the fifth modification to the Montreal Protocol for the ozone layer.
  • Approval of the Global Green Growth Initiative Project. The Global Institute for Green Growth is established in Colombia  as an international organization.

By adding an element of “political will,” the caucus movement engages political elites with conservation issues, encouraging them to take owner- ship of them, potentially reducing dependence on outside assistance.

Colombia is increasingly taking responsibility for and making notable strides toward conserving its natural resources. Still, larger domestic appropriations for national parks and protected areas will be crucial to future progress. The creation of sizeable new protected areas, particularly in the forested zones, is a possibility and should be a priority—as recently demonstrated by Rainforest Trust’s commitment to subsidize the creation of a new national park. There is substantial potential for partnering with US-based NGOs and public-private partnerships for nature tourism infrastructure. In partnership with the US Government and with US-based nonprofits, foundations, and other private-sector actors, Colombia can preserve and lever- age its vast biodiversity and natural wealth for the benefit of the Colombian people and for our shared future.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Leonie Rauls, “How Tourism Can Jumpstart Colombia’s Economy,” AmericasQuarterly, June 2020, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/how-tourism-can-jumpstart-colombias-economy/.
2    ”About the ICCF Group,” ICCF website, accessed March 18, 2022, https://www. internationalconservation.org/about.

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Innovate to protect our ecosystems https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-innovate-to-protect-our-ecosystems/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:41:27 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527016 Mobilizing financial mechanisms and methods to reduce deforestation, preserve Colombia’s biodiversity, and promote social inclusion and governance are ongoing challenges. Here’s how Colombia and the United States could accomplish these goals.

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US-COLOMBIA COOPERATION is often viewed through the prisms of security or economic interests. Yet, bilateral conservation and bio- diversity protection efforts are ongoing and have the potential to become an increasingly important component of our shared agenda. In the 2021 National Intelligence Estimate, President Joseph R. Biden’s administration said Colombia is among eleven countries globally that would be “especially helpful in mitigating future risks to US interests” in terms of cli- mate change.1 Our two countries are well positioned to work side-by-side to address environmental concerns, protect biodiversity, and safeguard natural resources for the entire region.

Colombia’s protected and conserved areas

As the second most biodiverse country globally, Colombia plays a key role in preserving our planet’s natural resources. The country’s commitment to conservation efforts is reflected in the establishment of its Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (National Protected Areas System or SINAP), which covers 31 million hectares (ha), equivalent to 15 percent of the country’s territory. The SINAP includes all of Colombia’s protected areas, providing essential ecosystem services to local populations, including water provisioning and regulation.

Protected areas produce the necessary water to generate 50 percent of Colombia’s hydro-energy (estimated at $502 million) and provide drink- ing water for more than twenty-five million people (an annual value of $491 million). In an average year, water provision and regulation services from national parks are expected to add at least $2.3 billion to the gross domes- tic product.2

Troublingly, around 24 percent of Colombia’s freshwater ecosystems show transformations caused by urbanization, agriculture expansion, cattle ranching, and infrastructure development.3 Future water yield will be largely determined by land usage and the impacts of climate change. Data indicates that Colombia will be unable to sustain the hydrological functionality of its watersheds without safeguarding forest, water, and coastal ecosystems via the designation and effective management of key protected areas. This would not only protect biodiversity, but also support ecosystem services such as water provision and climate regulation, enhancing community well-being.

Recognizing this, the Colombian government approved the National Policy for the Consolidation of the SINAP (CONPES No. 4050) in November 2021, aimed at “reducing the drivers of degradation of the natural and cul tural values conserved in the National System of Protected Areas.” However, Colombia’s SINAP faces a significant structural financial gap to achieve its climate and biodiversity policy goals by 2030. Barriers to addressing this gap can be grouped into two interconnected categories—both of which would benefit from a stronger partnership with the United States. The first is the inadequate capacity of environmental authorities to access and sequence funding instruments that the government has or plans to put in place. The second is management inefficiencies due to a limited capacity to develop and implement sustainable land practices and climate change adaptation mea- sures in protected areas and adjacent private lands.

As a staunch supporter of the climate change agenda, the United States could support Colombia’s efforts to preserve natural resources, biodiversity, and cultural heritage through the SINAP. It should also build on, replicate, and expand existing initiatives to support water regulation and provision in Colombia—the two most important ecosystem services. For example, the Nature Conservancy’s Water Funds Partnership help ensure that upstream communities are compensated for protecting the lands and freshwater eco- systems that supply water to cities.4 To date, Water Funds has helped safe- guard water sources for sixteen million people in Bogotá, Valle del Cauca, Medellín, Cali, Cúcuta, Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Ciénaga.5 It has also contributed to improved water governance among the various Colombian agencies that oversee water security.

Implementing Heritage Colombia

The strategic vision of Colombia’s SINAP 2030 policy was informed by a baseline assessment of finance for protected area management,6 recognizing that the system was already facing a $15 million annual shortfall prior to COVID-19. The assessment identified the need for a new financial model to address existing financial challenges.

In 2015, Heritage Colombia (HECO)7 was established as a possible solution—an innovative strategy to expand coverage and support the effective management and governance of Colombia’s SINAP and its surrounding landscapes. Led by the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, in partnership with Parques Nacionales Naturales, Patrimonio Natural, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Conservation International, Wildlife Conservation Society, and the World Wildlife Fund, HECO contributes to the long-term conservation of more than 20 million hectares. Following the results-based payments approach of the Project Finance for Permanence (PFP), an initiative from the world of finance, HECO addresses funding gaps by leveraging diverse funding sources and significantly increasing baseline government investments in the initial implementation period. It also builds a portfolio of long-term sustainable financing mechanisms with public and private capital, allowing for the development and financing of conservation policies and programs far into the future.8

Given HECO PFP’s vast scope and estimated $1.2 billion cost, implementation will occur in phases. Phase one seeks to secure permanent protection for 8.7 million hectares of terrestrial protected areas and at least 10 million hectares of marine protected areas and their surrounding landscapes.9 In its first ten years, HECO PFP aims to attract $100 million in new investment from government, private sector, foundations, and individual donors for four selected landscapes that include more than 500 protected areas. In the next ten years, the PFP would secure new resources from the Colombian government (way above baseline investments), generating the projected $7.2 million needed annually to address the structural financial gap. 

The United States can play a critical role in supporting HECO. With over two decades of partnership, the United States has facilitated more than $60 million in investments to promote activities to preserve, protect, or effectively manage Colombia’s natural and biological resources.10 In addition to providing HECO-specific investments in Colombia, the United States can also leverage its National Park Service experience and partner with Colombia’s SINAP to develop policies and programs for protected area management. These policies and programs could entail planning for the management of conservation areas in relation to ecotourism, capacity building in the “Leave No Trace” methodology,11 workshops on the design and maintenance of paths for visitors and sustainable infrastructure, technical assistance to improve public-private interaction in ecotourism, and climate change assessments for vulnerability management and as a criterion to declare new protected areas.

HECO’s initial interventions to protect and maintain at least ten million terrestrial ecosystems—including its expansion of terrestrial and marine protected areas—indirectly benefit approximately 34 percent of Colombia’s population. The estimated avoided emissions are 8.9 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) by HECO’s first ten years and 45.9 million tCO2e cumulatively over its thirty-year lifespan. This means that HECO will contribute between 14 and 18 percent of Colombia’s targeted reduction in emissions from deforestation by 2030.12

Expanding HECO’s impact

The US and Colombian governments have a strong track record of collaboration to protect biodiversity. They have worked together to mobilize investments and develop financial mechanisms to support protection and conservation programs. For example, the 2004 debt-for-nature swap agreement (based on the US Tropical Forest Conservation Act [TFA] of 1998) helped secure increased resources to combat deforestation, pre- serve biodiversity, promote social inclusion, and enhance governance in protected areas.13 The agreement remains active and contributes to the conservation and sustainable management of Colombia’s tropical forests, recognizing that tropical deforestation and forest degradation are growing challenges worldwide.

US-Colombia cooperation also led to negotiating a financial endowment scheme of $10 million, managed by Colombian Trust Fund Fondo Acción(Action Fund), to directly invest $5 million in grants and $5 million in an endowment.14 Lessons from this experience and other TFA financial mechanisms could be applied to HECO financial management.

Moving forward, the US and Colombian governments could work together to identify and structure financial mechanisms to fund HECO, including green bonds and impact investment funds. Collaboration on this front would contribute to the sustainable financial management of Colombia’s protected areas, supporting environmental services and preserving our planet’s biodiversity. The United States could also aid Colombia’s efforts to establish public-private alliances at the national and international levels to advance sustainability and income diversification for protected areas. Implementing financial mechanisms such as short-term donor support, government budget allocation, taxes, and park revenues could also help achieve a broader, more comprehensive financial strategy.

Increasing investment in productive landscapes surrounding protected areas will require coordination, efficiency, and leveraging private finance and investments from different partners. HECO is well-positioned to be a fundamental strategy in Colombia’s fight against climate change and the conservation of protected areas. And it’s a strategy that aligns with our shared bilateral interests.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    NationalIntelligenceEstimate:ClimateChangeandInternationalResponsesIncreasingChallengestoUSNationalSecurityThrough2040, National Intelligence Council, December 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIE_Climate_Change_and_National_Security.pdf.
2    Ibid.
3    Luis Germán Naranjo, “Colombia Viva: un país megadiverso de cara al futuro. Informe 2017,” World Wildlife Fund-Colombia, December 2017, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/321625989_Colombia_Viva_un_pais_megadiverso_de_cara_al_futuro_Informe_2017.
4    “The Latin American Water Funds,” Latin American Water Funds Partnership, accessed March 20, 2022, https://www.fondosdeagua.org/en/.
5    Ibid.
6    Ibid.
7    “Maximizing the contributions of Sustainably Managed Landscapes in Colombia for achievement of Climate Goals” (proposal submitted to the Green Climate Fund [GCF] 2021 under final approval), Heritage Colombia (HECO).
8    The latest and most detailed description of the PFP approach and lessons learned can be found in SecuringSustainableFinancingforConservationAreas, World Wildlife Fund, December 7, 2021, https://www.worldwildlife.org/publications/securing-sustainable-financing-for-conservation-areas.
9    “Maximizing the contributions of Sustainably Managed Landscapes in Colombia for achievement of Climate Goals” (proposal submitted to GCF 2021 under final approval), Heritage Colombia (HECO).
10    US Embassy Bogotá, “A One-Hundred-Year Commitment to Conservation and Childhood in Colombia,” US Department of State, May 25, 2021, https://co.usembassy.gov/a-one-hundred-year-commitment-to-conservation-and-childhood-in-colombia/.
11    “The 7 Principles,” Leave No Trace, accessed March 25, 2022, https://lnt.org/why/7-principles/.
12    “Maximizing the contributions of Sustainably Managed Landscapes in Colombia for achievement of Climate Goals” (proposal submitted to GCF 2022 under final approval) Heritage Colombia (HECO).
13    “Colombia (04-0429) – Agreement Regarding a Debt-for-Nature Swap to Prepay and Cancel Certain Debt Owed by the Government of Colombia to the Government of the United States,” US Department of State, April 29, 2004, https://www.state.gov/04-0429.
14    Ibid.

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Prioritize internally displaced people https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-prioritize-internally-displaced-people/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:41:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=528279 The history of internal displacement in Colombia,
government responses, and the impact of the 2011 Victims Law and 2016 peace agreement provide the foundation for understanding recent challenges—and possible solutions— to continued and new displacements.

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At a time when more attention is focused on the desperate plight of Venezuelan refugees and migrants—and indeed, their needs are enormous—it is important not to lose momentum for resolving Colombia’s internal displacement. Despite significant progress in recent years, future improvement will partially depend on ongoing support to implement the historic 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This agreement ended a conflict that led to some 220,000 deaths and the internal displacement of more than eight million Colombians.1

More than five years after the peace agreement, Colombia is still grappling with a long-standing and difficult-to-resolve internally displaced person (IDP) population alongside continuing displacement. The government is also confronting the challenge of responding to a large-scale influx of almost two million Venezuelan refugees while the urgency around Colombian IDPs is dissipating.

Solutions that enable IDPs to go home or begin new lives elsewhere will require continued US support.

Origins of Colombia’s internal displacement

The story of internal displacement in Colombia is rooted in the history of long-standing conflicts with guerrilla groups, such as the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary and successor armed groups known as Bandas Criminales or BACRIM. Displacement has been a deliberate strategy pursued by armed groups and the consequence of governmental counterinsurgency efforts. The struggle to control land has been at the center of insurgency campaigns and economic interests linked to the narcotics trade and illegal mining operations.2

In the late 1990s, the Colombian government adopted Law 387, which upheld the rights of IDPs and provided assistance and support.3 This was the first comprehensive legislation on IDPs globally, and since then, Colombia has developed an impressive array of laws and policies intended to support IDPs. Yet, despite laudable innovation and achievements on the policy front, the number of IDPs has continued to increase over the past thirty years.

Displacement has taken various forms in Colombia. In some cases, whole communities have been displaced while some were dislocated individually, known as gota a gota (drop by drop) displacement. Many people have been displaced multiple times. Every province in Colombia has been affected, but it has been especially significant in areas of conflict where state presence is lacking. Afro-Colombian and Indigenous groups have been disproportionately displaced. Almost 90 percent of Colombia’s internal displacement has been from rural to urban areas. Intra-urban displacement has also increased in the past decade, mainly due to turf battles between rival criminal groups.4 

In 2011—five years before the peace agreement—the Victims and Land Restitution Law (Victims Law) recognized IDPs as conflict victims.5 Colombian IDPs, who thought the authorities and public had overlooked their plight, had long sought this. The Victims Law provided compensation and the restitution of land to displaced persons. With US Agency for International Development (USAID) support, the Colombian government set up a Victims Unit to register and compensate victims. The tally of victims in the Victims’ Registry includes deaths, disappearances, and other human rights abuses, but IDPs make up the largest number. According to the Victims Registry, as of April 21, 2022, 9,263,826 people were registered as victims, of whom 89 percent were IDPs. Of those, 81 percent (6,711,922) were eligible for assistance.6 Compensating so many people is complex, and restituting their land is even more so. While the law provides land restitution to IDPs displaced after 1991, the process has been slow due to ongoing conflicts in many areas; most of the displaced have not received any form of government compensation.7

Resolving as key to the 2016 peace agreement

The 2016 peace accord sought to address the underlying causes of the conflict, support victims’ rights, and assure transitional justice and reconciliation. IDPs participated in the consultative processes leading up to the agreement, an unprecedented process globally, largely due to IDPs organizing themselves and strong support from civil society organizations. The resulting peace agreement reflects their engagement because land reform—and returning land to IDPs or compensating them—is central to the accord.8 The peace agreement, complementing the 2011 Victims law, allowed for compensating victims and redistributing assets obtained by the FARC. Between August 2018 and September 2021, some $735 million in individual compensation was paid.9 However, implementing the land pro- visions of the agreement has lagged behind executing other components of the peace agreement.10

Unfortunately, the peace agreement did not mean the end of the conflict—or displacement. Since 2016, more than 800,000 people have been displaced—and the UN projects an increase in 2022.11 In Medellín, criminal and gang violence is estimated to force 5,000 to 15,000 people from their communities every year.12 The ELN, BACRIM, and other groups filled the vacuum left by the FARC when they demobilized and are now the main actors driving displacement. The continuing violence means that even when IDPs are authorized to reclaim their land, security issues often prevent them from doing so. Moreover, Colombia is deeply affected by landmines, which force people from their land and impede their return. And in addition to displacement, there are growing numbers of people experiencing “forced confinement,” in which armed groups prohibit individuals from leaving their communities in search of safety. The UN reports that in 2021, there were 66,000 people forcibly confined, an increase of 77 percent since 2020.13

In addition to continuing violence-driven displacement and forced confinement, there have been alarming attacks on social leaders and human rights defenders, including IDPs and their advocates, reflecting the always contentious issues around land. Hundreds of leaders have been killed since 2020.14

With solutions to displacement taking far longer than anticipated, Colombian IDPs continue to face insecurity, stigma, and poverty. They often live in informal settlements that lack adequate housing, services, and infra- structure and experience high levels of violence due to criminal and gang activity. In a positive move, the Colombian government has taken steps since the 2000s to legalize these informal settlements, enabling IDPs to access state support for housing and other social services.15

The United States has worked for many years with the Colombian government, UN agencies, and civil society groups to support IDPs and find solutions.16 The US Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration provided substantial funds for humanitarian assistance for IDPs, which has now been taken on by USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, focusing on resilience and livelihoods in conflict-affected areas.17 USAID’s CountryDevelopmentCooperationStrategy2020-2025focuses on vulnerable groups, including IDPs, and emphasizes the importance of restoring trust in government and reconciliation—factors essential for creating an environment where IDPs can return to their land.18 This balance between supporting humanitarian aid for the newly displaced and investing in longer-term structural changes has been essential and should continue.

Finding solutions

Finding lasting solutions for Colombia’s eight million IDPs is a challenging and complicated process, particularly as many have been dis- placed for years or even decades. But it is key to Colombia’s future security and development. When 16 percent of Colombia’s population remains displaced within their borders, and tens of thousands are uprooted every year, it is hard to talk of post-conflict stabilization or reconciliation. Ending internal displacement means making time-consuming decisions on restitution and compensation and enabling IDPs who cannot return to rebuild their lives elsewhere.

Recommendations for US-Colombian future collaborations:

  • The United States should continue to support Colombia’s efforts to implement the 2016 peace agreement, including provisions related to resolving displacement. In particular, US support for land reform in rural areas and formalizing urban settlements19 is crucial and offers opportunities for private sector engagement. US support for Colombian IDPs has been consistent and essential over the years and must be sustained—even as new displacement crises in other countries strain humanitarian funding. The United States can also do more to highlight the continuing needs of IDPs in its diplomatic and public outreach activities, such as in multilateral meetings and public statements on Colombia and humanitarian issues.
  • The United States should increase its efforts to protect leaders of IDP associations and human rights defenders and urge Colombia to do more to end impunity for these attacks.20 Civil society groups play a vital role in denouncing human rights violations and monitoring governmental progress in resolving displacement and implementing the peace agreement. The United States should make it clear to the Colombian government that this is a high priority and monitor the effectiveness of governmental efforts to protect social leaders through Colombia’s National Protection Unit, for example, which provides protective measures, such as bodyguards and protective gear.21
  • Colombia’s Truth Commission (Comisión para el Esclarece- miento de la Verdad, la Convivencia y a la No Repetición)22 is expected to present its final report by mid-2022,23 offering an opportunity to assess Colombia’s progress with transitional justice and redouble US government efforts to support lasting solutions. Following this publication’s release, USAID could organize a roundtable with representatives from government, civil society, IDPs, and academia to assess progress and identify steps to speed up the lengthy process of resolving displacement.

Colombia’s IDPs have been waiting for a long time to end their displacement. The Colombian government has taken impressive action to ensure that mechanisms are in place to allow them to recover their land and return to their communities. But finding solutions for almost seven million IDPs requires renewed commitment from the Colombian and US governments and the international community.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, Updated December 16, 2021: 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43813.
2    Although not addressed in this essay, Colombians have also been displaced by disasters. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimates that 64,000 Colombians were newly displaced by disasters in 2020, “Colombia,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed March 15, 2022, https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia. As in many countries, the response to disaster displacement is carried out by various ministries and agencies.
3    UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Refworld, “Law 387,” https://www.refworld.org/ docid/5a255b374.html, accessed March 1, 2022.
4    “From aid to empowerment: Addressing urban displacement in Colombia’s informal settlements,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020): 5, https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/from-aid-to-empowerment-addressing-urban-displacement-in-colombias-informal.
5    Government of Colombia, “2011 Victims’ and Land Restitution Law,” accessed February 22, 2022, https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentosbiblioteca/ley-1448-de-2011.pdf. In 2020, the law was extended until 2031.
6    Government of Colombia, Unidad de Victimas, accessed February 22, 2022, https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/37394. Note these figures are higher than those reported by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the United Nations.
7    Sydney Chloe, Stuck in the Middle: Seeking Durable Solutions to Post-Peace Agreement Colombia, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, March 2019: 6, https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/201903-colombia-cross-border-report.pdf.
8    “Colombia’s Peace Process: The Moment of Truth,” The Economist, August 30, 2014, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2014/08/30/the-moment-of-truth.
9    Data compiled from Colombian government sources and reported in Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service: 24.
10    Five Years of Peace Agreement Implementation in Colombia: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities to Increase Implementation Levels: December 2016-October 2021, University of Notre Dame (2021), https://curate.nd.edu/downloads/und:5d86nz8373p.
11    Plan de Respuesta Humanitaria: Colombia, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), February 2022, 11, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/colombia_ hrp_2022_es.pdf.
12    “Colombia,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed February 28, 2022, https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/colombia.
13    Plan de Respuesta Humanitaria: Colombia, OCHA, 17.
14    Adam Isacson, A Long Way to Go: Implementing Colombia’s Peace Accord after Five Years, Washington Office on Latin America, November 23, 2021, https://www.wola.org/analysis/a-long-way-to-go- implementing-colombias-peace-accord-after-five-years/.
15    US Agency for International Development, Country Profile: Colombia: Property Rights and Resource Governance, 2017, https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/USAID_Land_Tenure_Colombia_Profile_Revised_December-2017.pdf.
16    For an overview of US government humanitarian contributions to Colombia, see ColombiaAssistanceOverview, US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance, August 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USAID-BHA_Colombia_Assistance_Overview_-_August_2021.pdf.
17    Colombia Assistance Overview, USAID, Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance.
18    USAID, Colombia Country Development Cooperation Strategy, July 17, 2020-July 17, 2025, accessed February 25, 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Colombia_CDCS_Narrative_Public-Oc7-2020.pdf.
19    USAID, Country Profile: Colombia: Property Rights and Resource Governance, 2017, https://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/USAID_Land_Tenure_Colombia_Profile_Revised_ December-2017.pdf.
20    Some concrete suggestions for doing so were raised by the Washington Office for Latin America in How the Biden-Harris administration can protect and support social leaders in Colombia, 2021, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy%20recommendations%20-%20How%20 the%20the%20Biden-Harris%20administration%20can%20protect%20and%20support%20 social%20leaders%20in%20Colombia.pdf.
21    Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service.
22    For more on the work of the Truth Commission, see Comisión de la Verdad website, accessed March 15, 2022, https://comisiondelaverdad.co/.
23    Christina Préfontaine, “2022 – un año para la verdad y la reconciliación,” El Espectador, January 31, 2022, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/analistas/2022-un-ano-para-la-verdad-y-la-reconciliacion/.

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Support a holistic migration strategy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-support-a-holistic-migration-strategy/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:40:47 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=528288 Colombia has welcomed displaced Venezuelans with open arms, setting a global example. Continuing and deepening these policies will remain challenging and require even greater US and international support.

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Colombia hosts one of the largest displaced populations in the world, roughly 1.8 million Venezuelans, who have fled their country due to political conflict, economic turmoil, and the partial breakdown of the healthcare system.1 Most of these displaced migrants arrived after 2017, when the underlying push factors accelerated. Another half-mil- lion Colombians living in Venezuela have returned simultaneously. More than two million Venezuelans have crossed through Colombia in transit to other countries, with Haitian, African, and Asian migrants increasingly moving through Colombia toward the United States. Their arrival has turned Colombia, once a country with few immigrants but many nationals living abroad, into an immigrant society.

Two elements have been particularly innovative in Colombia’s response to Venezuelan displacement. First, the country offered temporary, long- term legal status to Venezuelans arriving in the country before January 31, 2021. This decision was a first-of-its-kind move in Latin America and pro- vides a long-term path to permanent residence for a population increasingly likely to stay. In contrast to many countries receiving large-scale dis- placed peoples, Colombia has chosen to integrate Venezuelan migrants into the local labor market, education system, and national life instead of relying on the international community to shelter, feed, and care for those arriving. 

Second, this approach has been an all-of-government effort directed by the presidency rather than a single agency or set of agencies. In many other cases, governments have implemented short-term legalization programs, but often with contradictory signals from different parts of government on whether the migrants are welcome.2 The Colombian government has made it clear that it is the official government policy to receive, recognize, and integrate all Venezuelans who arrive. Most local governments have also engaged in this effort, and all political parties have sought to avoid politicizing the question of Venezuelan immigration, even if some individual politicians haven’t always toed the line.

The Colombian response represents an act of solidarity with people from a neighboring country, and a strong element of pragmatism, given Colombia’s real limitations to restrict irregular entries from Venezuela and the need to know who is entering and staying in Colombia. There is a realization that the arrival of so many Venezuelans will eventually produce economic benefits. At the same time, actual adjustment costs need to be paid upfront, including emergency services, implementing regularization campaigns, and, most importantly, expanding education, healthcare, and other services to deal with a rapidly growing population. The international community has helped defray some of these costs, but others are being borne by Colombian taxpayers in the short term.

Colombia’s emergency response evolves

Initially, no one could have imagined the number of Venezuelans who would eventually cross Colombia’s border. At first, in 2017, the Colombian government issued a temporary two-year stay permit, the Permiso Especial de Permanencia (Special Stay Permit or PEP), to Venezuelans who entered the country legally through official ports of entry. Other regularization programs followed for those who had entered without registering, and by November 2020, Colombia had regularized the status of 707,000 of the 1.72 million Venezuelans in the country.3 However, the measures never fully kept up with the demand, and the requirement to renew the PEP every two years created bureaucratic backlogs.

Finally, the government decided in February 2021 to conduct an even more ambitious effort by offering a ten-year stay permit to all Venezuelans who were already in the country, regardless of their legal status. The new permit, the Permiso de Protección Temporal (Temporary Protection Permit or PPT), sought to cover all Venezuelans who had entered the country by January 31, 2021, and would be available during the next year for those who entered Colombia legally from Venezuela. The PPT permit allows access to services and employment and creates a pathway for recipients to transition to permanent residence with time already spent in the country counting toward the five-year residency requirement.4

The Colombian government also offered a TarjetadeMovilidadFronteriza (Border Mobility Card or TMF) to Venezuelans living in the border region, allowing them to cross the border freely. This mechanism was introduced to dissuade migrants from moving to the country’s center by providing a border permit to allow access to emergency health services, education, and work.5

Also, all children born in Colombia of Venezuelan parents are citizens, even though Colombia’s constitution usually does not allow this unless the parents are legally domiciled in the country. The Colombian government got around this limitation by enacting a presidential decree, Primero la Niñez(Children First), noting its obligations under the International Convention on Statelessness of 1961.6

Since 2019, it has been made clear that all Venezuelans are eligible to enroll in primary, secondary, and tertiary education.7 Emergency medical assistance is also open to all, regardless of immigration status. However, Colombia’s healthcare system is not universal, making the incorporation of recent migrants into the healthcare system more complex; many are not yet affiliated.8

Despite these efforts to incorporate Venezuelan migrants through legal documentation and access to education and basic healthcare, according to a 2021 study, 97 percent of Venezuelan nationals in Colombia worked in the informal economy, compared to only 48 percent of Colombian citizens.9 A key obstacle to accessing the formal labor market has been credential recognition. Many Venezuelans arrive in Colombia with strong qualifications and professional experience but find it difficult to get their educational and professional credentials recognized, limiting their job opportunities while depriving Colombia of essential skills. Streamlining the credential recognition process would help Venezuelan migrants and the Colombian economy, which needs doctors, dentists, engineers, and teachers.

Colombia’s migration decision on the global stage

The other essential ingredient needed to continue deepening the integration process for Venezuelan migrants is public buy-in. Colombian political and social leaders have consistently tried to include average citizens in their efforts to welcome Venezuelans, but this is challenging in a society already divided along ideological, regional, and ethnic lines. September 2020 polling shows that more than one-third of Colombians believe facilitating migrant integration benefits Colombia more broadly, but most Colombians are less certain.10

Changing this perception is critical for getting the necessary public sup- port to integrate migrants and ensure that current efforts survive changes in government at a national and local level. Doing so will be even more challenging during pandemic recovery since people often feel they are competing over scarce resources and jobs and have had fewer opportunities to forge social connections during intermittent lockdowns. To achieve ambitious policy reform, the public must believe its best interests are being served and that there is a sense of common purpose between migrants and host communities.

This necessitates investing in basic public services, ensuring that schools, hospitals, and housing stock expand in cities hosting large numbers of Venezuelan migrants so migrants and native-born Colombians benefit equally. Some pushback against new arrivals has nothing to do with the migration itself but with the precarious nature of public services that were already overtaxed before Venezuelans arrived en masse.11

But ensuring a mutual sense of purpose between Colombians and Venezuelans also requires building new narratives about Colombian society that emphasize why and how Colombia has responded by receiving and integrating Venezuelans and how they share a common future.12 The current administration—and many local political and social leaders—have been adamant about finding a future together, but there are also increasing voices of hostility toward the Venezuelans living in Colombia, especially on social media and in local politics.

The international community can play a vital role in supporting Colombia’s efforts to integrate Venezuelan migrants in tangible and intangible ways. Among the most crucial international endeavors have been concessional loans from the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, which have supported infrastructure development, healthcare access, and housing in parts of the country with significant immigration. However, moving from concessional loans to preferential interest rates and other mea- sures to support Colombia as a recipient of the hemisphere’s largest refugee and migration crisis would be a smart next step.

The Regional Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants, led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, which supports a regional response to the displacement crisis, has been a vital source of support for a range of initiatives from improving education access to combating xenophobia. And behind all these initiatives, the US government has been a particularly important partner, channeling funding and political support into these undertakings.

The US and Colombian governments have also worked closely on a broader regional strategy to promote safe, orderly, and regular migration across the hemisphere. The October 2021 ministerial summit hosted by Colombian Foreign Minister Marta Lucía Ramírez and US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in Bogotá was a critical step toward building a broader shared understanding of migration across the hemisphere, as was the April 2022 ministerial in Panama that followed. The main points of those two meetings—how to integrate migrant populations and create legal pathways that generate order in future migration movements—speak directly to Colombia’s current challenges.

The key question is how to ensure that Colombia’s commitment to integrating a large displaced population leads to positive gains for the country overall, not only in its international reputation and bilateral relationships but also in the everyday lives of Colombians. It is critical for the policy of the last two administrations to remain state policy as administrations change. This will require the ongoing commitment of the Colombian government and strong and consistent support from the international community. As a result, Colombia’s solidarity with displaced Venezuelans will also depend, at least in part, on the solidarity of other countries around the world. Here, no country could play a bigger role than the United States. Using its lever- age within financial institutions and its resources, it could help Colombia expand its education system, healthcare access, and infrastructure to incorporate the arrival of Venezuelan migrants and make sure that host communities benefit in the process.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Only Turkey (and perhaps soon Poland) hosts a larger displaced population. Regarding Venezuelan displacement, see Andrew Selee and Jessica Bolter, “Colombia’s Open Door Policy: An Innovative Approach to Displacement,” International Migration, No. 60 (2022): 113-131, https://onlinelibrary. wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/imig.12839. Updated figures on the number of Venezuelans in Colombia (and other countries), compiled by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration, can be found at www.r4v.info.
2    Andrew Selee and Jessica Bolter, An Uneven Welcome: Latin American and Caribbean Responses to Venezuelan and Nicaraguan Migration (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, February 2020). There have been similar whole-of-government approaches from Argentina and Uruguay and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, but the numbers of arrivals compared to the overall population are a fraction of Colombia’s. The signals have been mixed across different government agencies in other countries receiving large numbers of displaced Venezuelan migrants, including Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago.
3    Selee and Bolter, “Colombia’s Open Door Policy,” 119-120.
4    Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan and Diego Chaves-González, “What Comes Next Now that Colombia Has Taken a Historic Step on Migration,” Migration Policy Institute, February 2021, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/colombia-historic-legalization-what-next.
5    Although the government discontinued using this permit in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this measure issued 5.2 million TMFs to Venezuelan nationals. Still, it is hard to determine how many of these holders remain in Venezuela, how many regularized their status under the PEP or PPT schemes, or how many transited to other countries. Selee and Bolter, “Colombia’s Open Door Policy.”
6    This decree allowed the National Registry of Civil Status to grant Colombian nationality to all children who had a Venezuelan parent and were born in Colombia as of August 19, 2015. This measure later evolved into a law expanding its validity for two more years.
7    Government of Colombia, “Welcome, Integrate and Grow, Colombia,” 2020: 92. Before 2019, one of the main challenges of integrating students into the education system was the documentation barrier. Migrants without legal status could not access or move through the different levels of education. The government established detailed instructions for Colombian educational establishments to overcome this obstacle. For Venezuelan students without a valid passport or foreign identity card—a requirement needed for taking the state exams or validating their high school diploma—the government passed a resolution that allowed them to do so.
8    There are two different healthcare regimes: subsidized and contributory, which have consistently remained restricted for migrants. Data from Colombia on access to public health insurance is limited, but official numbers from 2021 found that 60 percent of Venezuelan migrants did not have health insurance, and three out of four with health insurance were taking part in the subsidized regime since many migrants are not part of the formal economy, which would allow them to access the more robust contributory healthcare regime.
9    Diego Chaves-González, Jordi Amaral, and María Jesús Mora, Socio economic Integration of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees: The Cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,and Peru (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, July 2021), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/socioeconomic-integration-venezuelan-migrants-refugees.
10    Proyecto Migración Venezuela, “Diferencias regionales en la percepción de los Colombianos hacia los migrantes,” Fall 2021: 5, https://s3.amazonaws.com/semanaruralvzla/documentos/1609184052_boletin_16_de_percepcion_regionalpdf.
11    Selee and Bolter, An Uneven Welcome.
12    Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, Haim Malka, and Shelly Culbertson, How We Talk about Migration: The Link between Migration Narratives, Policy, and Power (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, Rand Corporation, National Immigration Forum, and Metropolitan Group, 2021).

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Recognize the power of music https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-recognize-the-power-of-music/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:40:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=529166 Colombian musicians have become global leaders. They are the single-most recognized ambassadors of the country’s culture, folklore, and traditions. They are vocal agents of change, thanks to an ever-growing number of artistic collaborations and an increasingly solid business infrastructure.

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WHEN I WAS GROWING UP IN THE PRE-INTERNET 1980s in Cali, Colombia, my father subscribed to Time magazine, and every week, the shiny, ostensible purveyor of everything that was of import in the world arrived in the mail.

I’d scour Time in search of any news—good, bad, whatever—about Colombia. Save for an occasional natural disaster reviewed in a paragraph or two, there never was any. Until Pablo Escobar became the world’s anti- hero in the late 1980s, and except for Gabriel García Márquez’s Nobel prize for literature in 1982, Colombia was mostly absent from global and certainly from US consciousness. I read the dry entry on Colombia in Collier’s Encyclopedia and attempted to make sense of its insufficient information. Was this how people in other parts of the world viewed us? A far-away, underdeveloped tropical nation whose primary assets were a plethora of birds (thank God for that “Colombia is the country with the most variety of birds” stat) and coffee?

When I auditioned for the Manhattan School of Music, a female profes- sor, considered one of the leading pianists of her generation, said: “You’re from Colombia? I have a good friend from Argentina. Perhaps you know her?”

Alas, I did not. But I understood then that even though the distance from Miami to Cartagena is a mere 1,100 miles—while Buenos Aires is 4,410 miles—for many in the Northern Hemisphere, anything South of Mexico was one big blob of sameness—unremarkable save for the extremes of tragedy and crime.

Colombia-and Colombians-were largely invisible

It wasn’t that we had nothing to offer. Colombia had a decent soccer team, even if it never seemed to get past the first rounds of the World Cup. It had Juan Valdés and Gabriel García Márquez. And, to our eternal consternation, in the mid-1980s, it had Pablo Escobar, whose infamy eclipsed all those other blips of achievement.

But, of course, there is a world of difference between notoriety and respect, recognition and scorn.

And then, the music came.

It started almost surreptitiously with Carlos Vives and his new take on vallenato, an almost subversive artistic creation at home (after all, wasn’t vallenato the music of the proletarian masses?) that suddenly found exotic acceptance in the United States.

Then came Shakira with her crossover aspirations, her bilingual hits—a first-ever for a Colombian artist—and her use of Colombian rhythms and patriotic expression. When Shakira sang “En Barranquilla se baila así” in 2005 as she shimmied to the beat of “Hips Don’t Lie,” millions of people, for the first time, looked up her native city on a map.

It took roughly a decade, but now, two generations of musical artists have followed in Shakira’s steps and, almost impossibly, stepped into an international spotlight that was unimaginable in my teen years.

Music has long been the great equalizer. Historically, it has crossed barriers of race, class, politics, nationality, and language, with music in English— the world’s vast lingua franca—consumed by people from around the world. Thanks in no small measure to a growing contingent of Colombian super- stars that includes Shakira, Juanes, Maluma, Camilo, and J Balvin, music in Spanish has also sliced the language barrier and is listened to broadly by non-Spanish speakers worldwide.

How did this happen? Our circumstance as a country in near-perpetual conflict favored the development of music as an alternative, outlet, and solution. Yet, music was long insular in Colombia. We listened to local acts and imports from the United States, Spain, Argentina, and Mexico, as did most Latin Americans. Colombia was a depository of music from other places, but our own rhythms and beats were regarded as too, well, Colombian ever to be appreciated outside the confines of our borders.

Seen dispassionately, the evolution of Shakira is almost miraculous. As a young girl growing up in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s, there was no one she could artistically emulate or aspire to and no industry to viably sup- port her brand of youth-oriented, slightly rebellious rock. Shakira not only managed to set foot outside Colombia into other Spanish-language countries but improbably pierced the veil of mainstream acceptance, becoming a global superstar who sang in English, recognized on equal footing with artists like Madonna and Ricky Martin in their heyday. It had never happened before to one of us. Once Shakira was able to break that barrier, possibilities unfolded for new generations.

After all, the musical movement borne out of Medellín is a post-narco phenomenon, fueled by young artists who sought to depict their social malaise through music and strove to get ahead through musical art that came from their very own streets and culture, rather than through violence or conformism.

When J Balvin showed “molas,”1 palenqueras,”2 and “chivas”3 in his video of “Mi Gente” (my people), he served as a de facto ambassador for Colombian culture and folklore, placing it on a platform that allowed for its mass consumption. When Maluma tattooed the word Medellín on his famous chest and sang using the colloquial language of his city’s streets, he turned preconceived notions of Latin crooners on their heads, offering the image of the singer as a patriotic symbol instead. When Camilo sings “No es vida de rico, pero se pasa bien rico,” (“It’s not a rich man’s life, but we have a great time”) he speaks not just for millions of young Colombians, but for the millions of young Spanish speakers who tackle their struggles with humor.

Yet, until just a few years ago, the fact that musicians were leading the fray in terms of raising Colombia’s visibility abroad was widely discounted. Until relatively recently, music was seen as mostly a trivial pursuit, certainly not a “real” career, and unworthy of serious consideration by influential decision makers and politicians.

Except, musicians overall have become the decision makers, and Colombian musicians, in particular, have become global leaders. This is obvious, not just in terms of fame—easily measurable nowadays by the number of social media followers and music streams and downloads, but also in terms of tangible social and economic impact and influence. Colombian musicians today are the single most recognized ambassadors of the country’s culture, folklore, and traditions and are also vocal agents of change. Witness Shakira’s Fundación Pies Descalzos (Barefeet), Juanes’s Fundación Mi Sangre (My Blood), and Maluma’s ElArtedeLosSueños(the Art of Dreams) foundation. Not only do they transform lives inside Colombia, but they raise the country’s equity everywhere.

And now we have Encanto, an animated Disney film remarkable for its sheer visual beauty (which reflects the beauty of the Colombian countryside near the coffee-growing region where the mythical casita stands), uplifting family themes, and joyful music, much of it performed by—Oh My Good- ness—actual Colombians! At the time of this writing in March 2022, the film’s soundtrack had spent eight non-consecutive weeks at No. 1 on the fabled Billboard 200 chart, which measures consumption of all albums in every genre. No soundtrack has ever done that in the chart’s history.

That’s not the only record it’s set. Encantois the first soundtrack to go to No. 1 since 2019 and the sixth animated soundtrack to ever top the chart. 

Beyond that, Encanto is a film set in Colombia, with a predominantly Colombian cast that sings and speaks in Spanish and English. Animated or not, this degree of exposure and success for our country is unprecedented on the screen.

As Colombian actor John Leguizamo, who voices Bruno in Encanto, once told me: “It’s more common to see aliens than Latinos on mainstream film and television.” And Colombians? Aside from Leguizamo and Sofía Vergara, there are no other actors you can name off the top of your head.

For years, movies about Colombia were filmed elsewhere. Such block- busters as Collateral Damage and Clear and Present Danger, for example, were both shot in Mexico because Colombia was deemed too dangerous, and Colombian characters were played by Mexicans or Spaniards speaking with the wrong accent.

Encanto, on the other hand, really minded its Ps and Qs, from accents to outfits to minute details like the hand-painted tableware, the embroidered dresses, the food, the various colors of our skin, and the animals— from the ubiquitous toucan to the yellow butterflies that are synonymous with García Márquez.

Many years ago, I asked Carlos Vives–who performs two songs in the soundtrack—if he thought his music was too regional and Colombian root- based to attain international success.

“Being local is what allows me to be international,” he replied, way ahead of his time. It’s not surprising, with this mentality, that Maluma and Sebas tian Yatra, another new-generation Colombian singer, are also featured in Encanto.

The year 2021 was a watershed year for Latinos in film, with In the Heights, West Side Story,and Encanto featuring Latin lead actors, none of them hugely famous. After all, it’s been a year of breaking parameters, zeroing in on inclusivity and diversity, and looking beyond the well-mined bubbles. But in film, the only major success thus far has been Encanto, a musical and arguably the narrowest in scope. What made it work?

I want to think Colombia and its music made it work. Yes, the country is indeed that dangerous, with thousands displaced from their homes every year because of violence, as the film superficially shows. But it’s also that beautiful, that exuberant, that passionate, that family-oriented, that hospitable, that delicious, that musical, and yes, that magical.

Now, that musicality is systematically finding its way to the rest of the world. Music isn’t something you can taste or smell, like our coffee, or see and touch, like our birds. But thanks to an ever-growing number of artistic collaborations and an increasingly solid business infrastructure, it’s become perhaps the most effective and widely-lauded vehicle to transmit eminently Colombian emotions to the world, without constraints of borders or language.

At the 2022 Academy Awards, Encanto, an animated musical based in Colombia and proudly featuring Colombian voices and sounds, won Best Animated Feature. At the 2022 Grammy Awards, there were eight nominees from Colombia in the four Latin categories, more than any other country.

It’s not just about what happens with our music on an international stage. Inside our borders, for perhaps the first time ever, there’s a multi-tiered, highly-profitable music industry that allows inspiration to have a ripple effect that reverberates throughout the local economy: from the recording studio to the 50,000 tickets Karol G sold to her show at Estadio Atanasio Girardot in Medellín.

At a recent international award show, Maluma performed with four fellow artists from Medellín, all wearing t-shirts that said: “Medallo en el Mapa,+ Música–  Violencia,” (Medallo4 in the Map + Music – violence).

The message was proud, but also defiant.

Thanks to music, we are finally being seen and heard. And we are making change happen.

Portions of this essay originally appeared in the article by Leila Cobo published by Billboard on January, 2022 “With ‘Encanto,’ Colombia Is Finally Seen and Not Just Heard,” accessible here: https://www.billboard.com/music/latin/encanto-colombia-positive-image-1235017931/

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Molas are colorful pieces of stitched artwork created by the Indigenous Gunadules community (also known as Kuna) in Colombia. Kuna women design and sew Molas, which they wear as part of their traditional clothing.
2    Palenqueras are afro-Colombian women who wear vibrant, colorful dresses and balance bowls of tropical fruits in their heads, particularly in the streets of Cartagena. They are direct descendants of the world’s first free African slaves, established in San Basilio de Palenque in the southeast of Cartagena. Today, Palenqueras stand as one of Colombia’s most iconic national symbols.
3    Chivas are colorful, rustic buses typically used in rural Colombia as a form of public transport. 
4    Colloquial name given in Colombia to the city of Medellín.

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Share the Colombian American dream https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-share-the-colombian-american-dream/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:40:02 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=529174 Colombian Americans are integral to the arts and culture in the United States. From an immigrant working-class family in Queens to a renowned artist in theater, film, and television, I share my story and aspiration for other Colombians to seize their dreams and follow in my path.

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GROWING UP IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD of Jackson Heights, Queens, in New York City taught me an early lesson on being myself. From a tender age, I felt the pressure of “being different,” and experiencing the world through an unusual lens as I witnessed my mother work several exhausting jobs to keep our family afloat in a country that was foreign to us. Soon, I realized that “being different” made me a target to those who did not sympathize with the way I looked or how I spoke. Living in a predominantly Caucasian neighborhood forced me to learn about survival, who I was, and, ultimately, who I was meant to become.

I was born in Bogotá, Colombia, and although I moved to the United States at a young age, I never ceased exalting my identity as a Colombian and a Latino. I don the badge and the title of being an immigrant to the United States with the utmost honor and respect. Throughout my career in the arts––from performing in local New York City venues to opening a show on Broadway and eventually breaking glass ceilings in Hollywood––I have accomplished what might have seemed unimaginable through unspeakable hours of hard work and tribulation, a marvelous quality that all Latino immigrants share.

Making a decent living in the United States as a minority is no simple feat, yet there is no one better than an immigrant with a dream and a purpose to upend that expectation. As a young boy running around the streets of New York, using my humor as a means to stay safe in the urban jungle, I learned to channel the gargantuan resilience of a Colombian American, repurposing life’s difficulties into fuel to keep my dream alive.

Most of the people who once bullied me quickly found me hilarious–– or perhaps I worked at crafting that comedic image better than I could have imagined, and it was precisely that comedy that took me down trails not blazed before. I was aware of being a skimpy little brown kid with a funny speech pattern who could imitate every accent imaginable.

I was a nerd in love with the arts, reading, comic books, plays, movies, and great performers; I used this adoration to empower myself in a place that was not seeing me or my potential. I refer to this source of motivation as “Ghetto Nerd Power.”

It was by the library’s bookshelves and, later, inside the theater where I met my true self and decided to step into my future, no matter the hardships, setbacks, or prejudice. I was ready to do it all: study drama, learn diverse acting techniques, practice tongue twisters, follow elocution lessons, and audition for every single role possible. It was never easy, and sometimes it still feels that way, but failure was and is never an option. I stand by the statement “Latinos must do twice the work to get half the opportunities,” because I have experienced this scenario on several occasions. Nevertheless, Latino tenacity, spiritual fiber, and passion from my Colombian DNA propelled me to search within myself and forge my destiny.

I first won over audiences in 1991 as the star and writer of MamboMouth. I have portrayed seven different Latino characters in sold-out theaters off-Broadway. I have played various characters from different backgrounds, including a lowlife criminal in Carlito’sWay(1993), Luigi in SuperMarioBros(1993), and nineteenth-century French artist Toulouse-Lautrec in Moulin Rouge (2001). And even though I have been blessed with international success, I still source much of my material from my unlikely path to stardom–– from a working-class family in Queens to a renowned artist in theatre, film, and television.

This beautiful nation has offered me life-changing possibilities. I am humbled by the astonishing achievements I have amassed in the United States. My indigenous Chibcha,Muisca(TheMuisca[alsocalledChibcha]are an indigenous people and culture of the Altiplano Cundiboyacense, Colombia), and Afro-Latino identity is deeply-rooted and informs who I am as an artist and human being. I cherish the best of what these identities have granted me––from bilingualism to delicious food to incomparable music to amazing people. I never tire of representing Colombia in this country and in front of the world.

As a Colombian American, I am continuously astounded by the immense talent that treks from Colombia into the United States. I cherish it, and it overwhelms me with unwavering pride. This is why continuous US-Colombia relations signify a beacon of hope, especially when I consider the bond between two nations fighting for the betterment of their people. At the same time, that story and fight do not end here. I may very well be an example to millions of Latino immigrants who are still unsure whether to follow their dream or walk away from it because they have no other choice.

I want to be more than an example. After decades of working in the entertainment industry and sharpening my artistry, I ache to be more than just an image for people to look up to.

Multiplying a Colombian American dream

My experience in this country as a thriving creative and spokesman for positive societal change means that other Colombian Americans can also create a prosperous future where they can empower their careers, livelihoods, and families. This speaks to the need for more programs that foster and enrich the potential of young, brilliant minds who may not have the means to attend top-tier universities or institutions. Pro- grams through which children and young adults can approach educators, resources, and funding are catalysts to spur equity among our youth.

The arts are the most competitive field in the marketplace. Our young Colombian minds should be able to tap into their fullest potential within Colombia and abroad in the United States by participating in cultural and educational residencies to learn how to be great storytellers and collaborators and, ultimately, create their own work with the potential to be seen and commissioned.

Oftentimes, potential is squandered before it can blossom due to a lack of access to opportunities; this is the gap that cultural programs should close. The demand for foundations and artists’ funds at the local level is rising. It is up to established creatives and their teams to champion more tangible opportunities aimed at those who aspire to grow within a career in the arts. Ultimately, it is our responsibility to leverage programs and mentorship.

I wish to gift my message and life experiences to future generations of Colombian Americans, and Latin immigrants everywhere, as a means to inspire. I want to show them that what I have done is not only possible but also attainable; no matter the language they speak, the accent they have, or the color of their skin, they can conceive a beautiful future where they can be seen and celebrated.

This, right here, is what I consider the American dream. And it is now time for it to become a reality for any of mis paisanos (my fellow Colombians) who one day dare decide to claim the extraordinary life for which they have never stopped struggling. I wish for them to open their arms, beam their gorgeous brown smile, and embrace their own Colombian American dream.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Diversify the bilateral agenda https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-diversify-the-bilateral-agenda/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:36:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527006 Overcoming Colombia’s security challenges will require investment, job creation, and a strong social agenda. The United States should play a key role in this endeavor.

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TO COMMEMORATE THE BICENTENNIAL of US-Colombia diplomatic relations, we should prioritize areas of cooperation beyond hemispheric security, the fight against transnational organized crime, and drug trafficking—topics that have historically governed our agenda. It is in our countries’ best interest to diversify our bilateral strategy, dedicating more attention to sustainable development objectives. This will consolidate decades of economic and security gains in Colombia, positioning the country as a stronger and more strategic partner to the United States.

Strengthening the relationship and deepening trade, investment, and tourism is key to achieving shared economic objectives. It will capitalize on the unlimited opportunities to enhance US-Colombia cooperation in agriculture, agribusiness, clothing, metalworking, and knowledge-based services.

As we work to diversify our agenda, it will be imperative to expand spaces for bilateral dialogue, promote education and job creation, advance Colombia’s digital transformation, and support technology transfers and investment in large-scale projects. Such prioritization can help boost development, particularly in Colombia’s most vulnerable regions.

With critical US support, Colombia has strengthened the rule of law and increased state presence in remote, conflict-affected territories over the past two decades. Now is the time to build on Plan Colombia and its successor programs by investing in a social agenda that prioritizes education, employment, and well-being in territories historically disenfranchised, where crime continues to prevail.

The time is right

During the UN General Assembly in September 2010, the administrations of President Barack Obama and President Juan Manuel Santos laid the groundwork to expand US-Colombia cooperation beyond security issues to include social development, economic growth, the environment, education, energy, and human rights.

To further advance this agenda, the United States and Colombia should leverage existing mechanisms for bilateral dialogue and engagement, like the US-Colombia High-Level Dialogue (HLD). The HLD should periodically evaluate progress and ensure that counter-narcotics and law enforcement cooperation is complemented with efforts to positively transform territories, including programs to improve public goods provision, roads, land titling, and economic opportunities.

According to local media, the February 2022 bilateral meeting with US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland focused on US-Colombia collaboration in addressing violence and potential security threats, including cybercrime. Certainly, the scope of high-level bilateral meetings should be broader. Moving forward, we should focus on job creation, entrepreneurship opportunities, and export diversification. This will benefit Colombia’s most vulnerable regions, particularly if we create a market in the United States for licit agricultural goods produced as part of crop substitution programs, including avocados, cacao, and mangoes.

Future iterations of the HLD and other bilateral meetings should include participation from the private sector. Public-private collaboration is funda- mental for the US-Colombia alliance and the success of development pro- grams and efforts to strengthen institutions across the country. Private sector participation should be intentional and substantive, with participants joining as observers in thematic and preparatory roundtables and offering issue-specific recommendations.

Education and employment

There is no question that reducing corruption, illegality, and violence requires efforts to improve peoples’ livelihoods, enhance skills and knowledge, and advance local leadership. This happens by investing in schools, universities, and technical training programs while promoting innovation and economic opportunities through entrepreneurship and employment.

Advancing education, training, and entrepreneurship programs based on labor market needs, particularly in municipalities with fewer possibilities, would generate more economic opportunities and contribute to reducing historic inequalities. These efforts would be particularly impactful if complemented with long-term consulting from specialized US centers and investments in English training, bilingualism, and bilateral exchange programs.

We are a country of micro and small businesses. According to the Ministry of Labor, these represent more than 90 percent of Colombia’s productive sector and 80 percent of total employment.1 These businesses need to be strengthened via training, technology transfer, digital transformation programs, and increased financing and technical advice to meet the needs of new industries. While efforts to support small and medium enterprises in Colombia are considerable, they are limited in scope and budget and would benefit from a stronger partnership with the United States.

More investment and trade

The United States is Colombia’s leading trading partner, receiving 27 percent of Colombia’s exports in 2021.2 The United States is also Colombia’s principal foreign investor, accounting for 19 percent of total foreign direct investment between January and September 2021.3 Moreover, the United States is the foremost supplier of foreign travelers, accounting for 24 percent of international tourists in 2021.4

Colombia must continue to attract US investment for extensive infra- structure and development projects, including secondary roads and 5G projects, and the modernization of ports and airports. As Colombia’s principal investor, the United States should not lose ground, since China would pick up the slack, as evidenced by its participation in the Bogotá metro system, mining projects in the Department of Antioquia, and increased trade. Recognizing that no US firm placed bids on the Bogotá metro or on any of Colombia’s large road projects in the past six years,5 the United States should strive to position itself as Colombia’s partner of choice. This would help to counter China’s growing economic influence in the region.

To secure more US investment in infrastructure, it is essential to make progress on issues such as the double taxation agreement between the United States and Colombia. The approximately 450 US companies doing business in Colombia in 2022 generate more than 100,000 direct and indirect jobs.6 Colombia could maximize this positive impact by providing more legal certainty, which allows for long-term planning and investments aligned with social development objectives.

In addition, we must accelerate full implementation of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) so that competitive Colombian products reap the benefits of entry into the United States. Here, the United States could speed up and harmonize the approval process for Colombian agricultural and livestock products pre-approved under the TPA, including passion flowers, yellow dragon fruits, blueberries, poultry, and bovine meat.

Likewise, actions must be prioritized to allow greater trade accumulation between the two countries and with the Pacific Alliance to realize emerging opportunities in value chains. We should also encourage TPA administrators to update the agreement using available tools and mechanisms under the established free trade commission. Implementing technology transfer programs to improve product development and competitiveness and enhancing access to public procurement are also critical areas for future bilateral engagement.

Looking forward

Continued bipartisan support in the United States and renewed commitment from all sectors to the US-Colombia partnership are key for the future of our alliance. To move the relationship forward, alignment of interests and close coordination between the public and private sectors in both countries is essential, complimented by strong support from civil society.

The time is right to diversify and expand the bilateral agenda, for diplomacy and the public sector to work side-by-side with business to expand trade, investment, and tourism, prioritizing a vision of social development that strengthens Colombia and its democratic institutions. This would posi tion Colombia as an even stronger US partner in promoting stability and prosperity across the region.

Our US partners are aware this is not the time for loose ends. The priority must be our shared hemisphere, especially when other powers are eager to occupy economic, political, and geostrategic spaces.

Although there are two parties in this relationship, the push for diversification should come from us Colombians. To negotiate more effectively, we should understand how valuable we are as a partner to the United States. Modern diplomacy should be based on shared interests and continued respect for democratic principles and sovereignty, with a clear purpose and feasible objectives, while remaining assertive when faced with challenges.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Government of Colombia, “‘MiPymes represent more than 90% of the national productive sector and generate 80% of employment in Colombia’: Minister Alicia Arango,” Ministry of Labor, September 26, 2019, https://www.mintrabajo.gov.co/prensa/comunicados/2019/septiembre/ mipymes-representan-mas-de-90-del-sector-productivo-nacional-y-generan-el-80-del-empleo-en-colombia-ministra-alicia-arango.
2    “Boletín Técnico Exportaciones (EXPO),” National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), January 31, 2022, https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/exportaciones/boletin_ exportaciones_dic21.pdf.
3    Flujos de inversiones directas en la economía colombiana Enero – Diciembre de 2021, Banco de la República, March 2022, https://www.banrep.gov.co/sites/default/files/nota_de_prensa_inversion_ directa.pdf.
4    “Colombia Tourism Statistics 1995-2022,” Macrotrends, accessed March 25, 2022, https://www. macrotrends.net/countries/COL/colombia/tourism-statistics.
5    Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, A Planfor Colombia’s COVID-19Recovery and WhyitMatters, Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Institute, December 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AC_ColombiaTaskForce_v18.pdf.
6    Government of Colombia, “Colombia – U.S. Investment Roadmap,” accessed March 25, 2022, https://newsletter.procolombia.co/2019/inversion/col_us_invMap/COLOMBIA_US_ INVESTMENT_ROADMAP.pdf.

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Advance energy transformation https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-advance-energy-transformation/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:36:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527003 Colombia and the United States could offer solutions to the world as it seeks to mitigate the effects of climate change.

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1998: A turning point

ONE OF THE MOST MEMORABLE EXPERIENCES of my career was heading the US delegation to Colombian President Andrés Pastrana’s 1998 inauguration.

Like everyone there, I was deeply moved by the beauty of Bogotá in full bloom and the spirit of hope and purpose in the air as the new president declared, “Change begins today.”1 Pastrana’s election marked the beginning of a new era in Colombia’s history and our nations’ long relationship. By the end of Pastrana’s tenure, his hard-won progress toward peace and stability had laid a firm foundation upon which subsequent leaders and the people of Colombia could build.

Yet, 1998 was remarkable for something else as well. Although we didn’t know it at the time, that year would be the warmest year of the twentieth century,2 a milestone on our planet’s feverish climate change journey. Since then, we have experienced nineteen of the hottest years in human history.3 The Inter- governmental Panel on Climate Change has issued a series of increasingly terrifying assessments, what United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres calls a “code red for humanity.”4 And while massive investments are needed to build a clean, green future, success is only possible if the costs and rewards are broadly shared.

As the United States and Colombia celebrate 200 years of bilateral relations, together, we can—and must—tackle the greatest challenge of our time.

Specifically, the United States should continue to support Colombia’s pioneering efforts in energy transformation and environmental preservation, geared toward stemming, mitigating, and, where possible, reversing the damaging effects of climate change. Doing so would secure the ground- work for sustainable, inclusive economic growth.

Despite our relative difference in size, our countries are natural partners in this endeavor. From the Amazon to the Andes, the Pacific coast to the Caribbean Sea, Colombia has the second-highest level of biodiversity worldwide, featuring a rich endowment of energy sources. Both countries are already feeling the impact of climate change, from drought to forest fires. As US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken has said, our countries know “these consequences are hitting underserved and marginalized communities in our countries the hardest.”5

Colombian President Iván Duque, like US President Joseph R. Biden, is deeply committed to regional and global leadership in this area—as recognized by the International Conservation Caucus Foundation in September 2021, which awarded President Duque the Teddy Roosevelt International Conservation Award “for his leadership in establishing significant new and expanded national parks and his efforts to expand renewable energy, pro- mote sustainability, and protect biodiversity in Colombia.”6

Advancing energy transformation

US-Colombia cooperation in the energy sector is key to diversifying the country’s energy resources.

In 2016, Colombia launched its Plan Energético Nacional Colombia: Ideario Energético 2050, which aims to diversify and make more resilient the country’s energy resources through investments in wind, solar, and geo- thermal power.7 It was one of five Latin American countries featured at the US-organized April 2021 Leaders’ Summit on Climate. At the summit, President Biden announced that US greenhouse gas emissions would be reduced by 50 to 52 percent, relative to 2005 levels, by 2030. For their part, Colombian leaders reiterated their country’s determination to reduce emissions by 51 percent by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. 

In July 2021, Colombia enacted an energy transition law to promote investment in hydrogen, renewable energy, and sustainable transport.8 And at the UN Climate Change Conference, COP26, in November 2021, Colombia put forward an ambitious updated Nationally Determined Contributions goal reinforcing its commitment to urgent climate action.

Under the US Build Back Better World agenda, Colombia aspires to develop sustainability technology such as carbon capture and storage and wind and solar farms.9 The Ministry of Energy and Mines recently published the National Hydrogen Strategy and Road Map to continue the de-carbonization of the energy sector by promoting investment in renew- ables.10

Recognizing that private investment is often the most significant barrier to developing renewable energy infrastructure, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has been helping Colombia establish renew- able energy auctions.11 Colombia’s third renewable energy auction was completed in October 2021, with power purchase agreements going to eleven solar projects, representing 796 megawatts of combined capacity.12 This signifies an extraordinary opportunity for US companies to compete and develop transparent, sustainable projects in Colombia.

USAID has also been helping strengthen human capital for a clean energy future through efforts such as the USAID-National Renewable Energy Laboratory partnership, which provides comprehensive workforce training to Colombia’s energy sector.13 One specific aim of the collaboration is to help Colombia ensure its energy transformation is gender inclusive.

These initiatives with holistic approaches to community engagement indicate opportunities for further investments. Training Colombians to build and integrate clean energy technology into their grid advances gender parity, infrastructure, and sustainability, among other goals.

Speaking for the trees

Colombia has set an impressive example for combating climate change and deforestation—something other Latin American and Caribbean countries could learn from and replicate.

One signature endeavor is Operation Artemisa, a joint effort launched in 2019 between the Ministries of Environment and Defense to crack down on illegal deforestation and the trafficking of plants and animals inside Colombia’s national parks. As Bogotá’s City Paper journalist Richard Emblin said, “Since launching in 2019, Artemisa’s 22,000-strong jungle guardians have managed to recover more than 146,000 hectares of tropical forest belong- ing to Chiribiquete National Natural Park and the Llanos de Yarí watershed. Hundreds of military sorties have resulted in arrests of persons charged with environmental crimes, including setting fires in protected parkland, toxic chemical dumping, illegal mining, and animal trafficking.”14

In January 2022, the Colombian government expanded Operation Arte- misa to patrol the seas, with a goal of protecting coral reefs, atolls, marine wildlife, and the fundamental right to water.15

Back in 2013, the United States and Colombia advanced mutual progress on environmental protection with the US-Colombia Environmental Cooperation Agreement, which established the Environmental Cooperation Commission to spearhead joint activities to promote conservation and sustainability.16 Additionally, the Environment Chapter of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement requires both countries to maintain current levels of domestic environmental protection and strive for higher environmental standards. The United States has been a strong ally of Colombia’s efforts to protect its natural heritage, helping conserve more than four million hectares of land and sea through various projects in the last twenty years.17

During his October 2021 visit to Colombia—his first trip to South America as a Biden administration cabinet member—Blinken described USAID’s Páramos program, which, in his words, is “working with nineteen Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities to protect 500,000 hectares of Colombia’s forests.”18 According to Blinken, the collaboration has “already generated 6.2 million tons of carbon offsets.”19

Another USAID program, Amazon Alive, is helping the Colombian government prevent and prosecute environmental crime. According to a USAID fact sheet, expected results include reducing, sequestering, and avoiding the emission of 12 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, improving natural resource management on 1.3 million hectares of biologically significant lands, increasing the number of formal charges against environmental crime offenders by 30 percent, and training 10,000 people in sustainable natural resources management, biodiversity conservation, and natural cli- mate solutions.20

The signature outcome of Blinken’s visit, as part of the US-Colombia high-level dialogue, was a joint declaration committing to renew and advance the strategic alliance.21 As part of that announcement, the United States pledged $50 million to support Colombian efforts to combat deforestation in the Amazon, conserve biodiversity, and increase environmental security.

Addressing climate change and energy transformation also impacts other areas of bilateral importance, including combating illegal mining, coca cultivation, and other security challenges that have regional spillover effects.

In 2018, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with Colombia to expand bilateral cooperation to combat illegal mining and minimize its negative impacts on governance, the economy, and the environment.22 In addition to the clear-cutting23 of virgin Amazon basin jungle areas to grow coca,24 there is tremendous environmental deterioration in places where narcotraffickers set up field coca processing plants25 and poured leftover precursor chemicals into the ground and waterways. The holistic US-Colombia counternarcotics strategy, launched in October 2021, prioritizes countering environmental crimes that sustain and fuel narcotrafficking groups.26 Efforts include reforestation and building resilience through a robust monitoring and security patrol element.

The recently proposed United States-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act of 2022 by US Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) aims to expand engagement on inclusive economic growth and environmental protection, along with other objectives.27 This would boost the successful track record on bilateral climate action and biodiversity conservation.

Challenge = opportunity

As much as US-Colombian cooperation in these areas is about combat- ing threats, it also presents tremendous opportunities for the US private sector. Investments bolstering climate resilience and renewable energy sources can expand the economy, create jobs, and promote equity in Colombia, the United States, and worldwide.28

At a time when the global public expects more of the private sector than ever, environmental, social, and governance standards are not a sidebar but a mainstay of successful businesses. Colombia ranks among the top ten developing economies as a foreign direct investment destination. Green growth initiatives in the sustainable ranching and timber sectors are promising collaboration targets as companies seek to boost their environmental scorecards. The US private sector leads in raising standards for investments that protect and support employees, local communities, and the environment. There are several companies installing mining or agricultural projects fueled by wind and solar power generation; this model can and should be replicated.

Moreover, Colombia’s strategic location as a link between Central and South America serves as a regional transportation, distribution, and trade hub for which energy innovation can be spread across the hemisphere. And as an active member of regional and international organizations, including the Pacific Alliance, Organization of American States, and UN, Colombia can use its platform to promote mutual aspirations for environmental protection and energy transformation.

For these reasons, continuing and fortifying US-Colombia cooperation on energy transformation and climate change mitigation is in our mutual— and the world’s—interest.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Juanita Darling, “Colombia Inaugurates New Leader,” LosAngelesTimes, August 8, 1998, https:// www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1998-aug-08-mn-11265-story.html.
2    Rebecca Lindsey, “Did global warming stop in 1998?,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, September 4, 2018, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/did- global-warming-stop-1998#:~:text=The%201997%2D98%20El%20Ni%C3%B1o,of%20 finding%20a%20cooling%20trend.
3    “Global Temperature,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, accessed February 20, 2022, https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/.
4    “Secretary-General Calls Latest IPCC Climate Report ‘Code Red for Humanity’, Stressing ‘Irrefutable’ Evidence of Human Influence,” United Nations, August 9, 2021, https://www.un.org/press/ en/2021/sgsm20847.doc.htm.
5    US Department of State, Antony J. Blinken, “Opening Remarks at the Virtual Leaders’ Summit on Climate,” April 22, 2021, https://www.state.gov/opening-remarks-at-the-virtual-leaders- summit-on-climate/.
6    “ICCF held its annual awards dinner on Monday, September 20, 2021, at the Willard Intercontinental Hotel,” International Conservation Caucus Foundation, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www. internationalconservation.org/multimedia/gala/2021-iccf-u-s-congressional-international- conservation-leadership-awards-dinner.
7    Government of Colombia, “Plan Energetico Nacional Colombia: Ideario Energético 2050,” Mining Energy Planning Unit, 2015, https://www1.upme.gov.co/Documents/PEN_IdearioEnergetico2050. pdf.
8    Colombian Congress, “Through Which Provisions Are Enacted for the Energy Transition, the Dynamization of Market Energy, the Economic Reactivation of the Country and Other Provisions,” July 10, 2021, https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/LEY%202099%20DEL%20 10%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202021.pdf.
9    Government of the United States, Fact Sheet: “President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership,” White House, June 12, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders- launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/.
10    Government of Colombia, “Colombia’s Hydrogen Roadmap,” September 30, 2021, https://www. minenergia.gov.co/documents/10192/24309272/Colombia%27s+Hydrogen+Roadmap_2810.pdf.
11    “Auction Design Support to Colombia,” US Agency for International Development, October 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/energy/auction-design-support-colombia#:~:text=USAID%20is%20 helping%20Colombia%20develop,investment%20in%20its%20energy%20sector.
12    “Nuevo hito en la Transición Energética: Colombia multiplicará por más de 100 veces su capacidad en energías renovables,” Minenergía, October 26, 2021, https://www.minenergia.gov.co/en/ web/10180/historico-de-noticias?idNoticia=24314285.
13    US Agency for International Development and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, “USAID-NREL Partnership: Readying Colombia’s Energy Sector Workforce,” accessed February 28, 2020, https://www.nrel.gov/usaid-partnership/project-colombia.html.
14    Richard Emblin, “Colombia’s Operation Artemisa extends frontline to ocean protection,” City Paper, January 24, 2022, https://thecitypaperbogota.com/news/colombias-operation-artemisa-extends- frontline-to-ocean-conservation/29213.
15    Ibid.
16    US Department of State, “U.S.-Colombia Environmental Cooperation Agreement,” April 19, 2013, https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/eqt/trade/207758.htm.
17    US Embassy Bogotá, “A one-hundred-year commitment to conservation and childhood in Colombia,” May 25, 2021, https://co.usembassy.gov/a-one-hundred-year-commitment-to- conservation-and-childhood-in-colombia/.
18    US Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez at a Joint Press Availability,” October 20, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j- blinken-and-colombian-president-ivan-duque-marquez-at-a-joint-press-availability/.
19    Ibid.
20    US Agency for International Development, “Amazon Alive Overview,” last updated: October 6, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/colombia/fact-sheets/env-amazon-alive.
21    Governments of Colombia and the United States, “Declaration of principles for a long-term cooperation and friendship between the Republic of Colombia and the United States of America,” US Embassy in Colombia, October 21, 2021, https://co.usembassy.gov/declaration-of-principles-for-a-long-term-cooperation-and-friendship-between-the-republic-of-colombia-and-the-united-states-of-america/.
22    US Department of State, Congressional Testimony, “Illicit Mining: Threats to U.S. National Security and International Human Rights,” Richard H. Glenn, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, December 5, 2019, https://2017-2021.state. gov/illicit-mining-threats-to-u-s-national-security-and-international-human-rights/index. html.
23    Joshua Collins, “Fires in the Jungle: Coca Production and Deforestation Accelerate in Colombia,” Sierra Club Magazine, November 17, 2021, https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/fires-jungle-coca- production-and-deforestation-accelerate-colombia.
24    Elisa Botero, “Coca Production, Deforestation and Climate Change,” Columbia Climate School website, March 24, 2010, https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2010/03/24/coca-production- deforestation-and-climate-change/.
25    “Coca and Colombian Environment (COLCOCA Case),” Shaffer Library of Drug Policy, accessed February 28, 2022, https://druglibrary.net/schaffer/cocaine/cocaenv.htm.
26    Government of the United Sttes, “The White House Releases Details of the New Holistic US-Colombia Counternarcotics Strategy, White House, October 25, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/briefing-room/2021/10/25/the-white-house-releases-details-of-the-new-holistic-u-s-colombia-counternarcotics-strategy/.
27    US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations press release, “Senators Menendez, Kaine Unveil U.S.- Colombia Strategic Alliance Act,” March 9, 2022, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/ release/senators-menendez-kaine-unveil-us-colombia-strategic-alliance-act.
28    Government of the United States, Fact Sheet, “Supporting Economic Growth While Tackling Climate Change,” White House, November 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2021/11/15/supporting-economic-growth-while-tackling-climate-change/.

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Make bold bets https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-make-bold-bets/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:35:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=526998 Colombia and the United States are uniquely positioned to enjoy an exceptional commercial partnership. Achieving this will require a level of ambition, coordination, and commitment comparable to what enabled Plan Colombia.

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In 2018, when Amazon Web Services announced it was opening a facility in Bogotá, where 600 customer service associates would answer calls in Spanish, English, and Portuguese, I remember thinking, “They get it.”

For years, people in the US-Colombia business community have known that Colombia is an ideal base for US companies with hemispheric ambitions. Amazon’s decision to launch a data center in Colombia in 2019, lever aging the country’s location and human capital to facilitate growth across the Americas, was a case in point.1

There have been many other promising advances since the two countries signed a Trade Promotion Agreement in 2012. The United States is now the largest global investor in Colombia. More than 450 US companies are active in Colombia, while some 2,200 Colombian firms do business in the United States. The United States is Colombia’s main bilateral trade partner and the leading destination of Colombian exports, representing almost 30 percent of the total. Colombia is the third-largest trading partner of the United States in Latin America and the twenty-fifth worldwide, with around $28 billion worth of goods and services exchanged in 2020. And while much of South America remains a mystery to people in the United States, Colombia is dif ferent; US citizens account for nearly one in three foreign visitors to Colom bia, vastly more than any other country. And 60 percent of all foreign travel by Colombians is to the United States.

When you consider the history of deep cooperation on security issues and the legacy of Plan Colombia—arguably the most ambitious and successful US government initiative in Latin America—there is no question that both countries are uniquely positioned to enjoy an exceptional commercial partnership.

Yet this relationship is far from reaching its full potential. In recent years, US investment in Colombia has been flat, averaging a modest $2 billion per year. Trade growth has also been lackluster, and Colombian exports to the United States are still primarily dominated by raw materials and agricultural products. After the setback inflicted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical convulsion prompted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, how can Colombia and the United States recharge their economic relationship and chart a faster path toward mutually beneficial growth in the future?

This requires action on two broad fronts: constructing a world-class commercial and trade architecture and aggressively promoting investment in a group of emerging business sectors that offer rewards to both countries.

Trade opportunities remain

First, Colombia and the United States should finish the unglamorous but critical work of removing structural obstacles to trade and investment. Many experts have already highlighted the pending tasks of this agenda, which are well-summarized in the Atlantic Council’s 2019 report, “The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership.”2

In broad terms, Colombia can do much more to create an ecosystem that encourages competitiveness, productivity, and innovation domestically. It should continue to reform its tax structure and modernize tax procedures to increase revenue. Stronger incentives for formalization through improved access to credit and other business services are essential if Colom bia’s resourceful entrepreneurs are to join regional and global value chains. Using US labor regulations as a framework, Colombia could regulate work by hours, thus permitting a substantial number of young workers to work shorter hours while contributing to the country’s social security reserves. This can be done in combination with varying minimum hourly wages for urban and rural areas.

Similarly, Colombia could look to US business-regulation frameworks to facilitate business creation. Reducing unnecessary norms and barriers for firms and making labor regulations more flexible are also crucial. While Colombia’s labor action plan has increased avenues for labor association, specific regulations within it have placed strains on payroll costs for compa nies, creating a rigid labor environment that disincentivizes foreign investment.

Colombia and the United States should further streamline immigration, customs, and inspections procedures. By accelerating the digitalization of processes and sharing real-time information, the two countries could set a new regional benchmark for agility and speed, while simultaneously enhancing the traceability of goods to undermine illicit activities.

Both countries will gain from full implementation of the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA). For Colombia, this means prioritizing protections for intellectual property rights, labor rights, and the environment, while the United States could resolve cumulation provisions for textiles and increased access to biodiesel products. Under the current agreement, textile cumulation provisions only allow the usage of raw materials that originate from either the United States or Colombia, limiting the attractiveness of the TPA for certain products as a result of pan demic-induced supply chain disruptions. The United States could also grant Colombia tariff exemptions on steel and aluminum and further facilitate imports of Colombian crops such as passion fruit, blueberries, dragon fruit, and papayas, as well as bovine and poultry meat. The potential for agricul-tural trade remains vastly underexploited.

Removing these lingering structural constraints would clear the way for a coordinated push to fully develop sectors that show promise.

Investment potential

Several multinational pharmaceutical companies have made Colombia a hub for regional production and distribution in recent years. Between 2018 and 2020, Colombian pharmaceutical exports grew at an average annual rate of 11.5 percent by volume and now reach more than fifty countries.3 Colombia’s robust domestic consumer market and comprehensive healthcare system make it attractive for medical tourism, clinical research, and medical device testing companies. The number of med- ical tourists to Colombia quintupled between 2010 and 2019, to more than twenty-one thousand patients.4 The COVID-19 pandemic led to a temporary contraction of these flows, but long-term trends in US healthcare and cost structures will make Colombia extremely attractive to service providers. Colombia should lure major US hospital groups to create full-service surgery and rehabilitation facilities to draw patients from across the hemisphere.

Colombia is also well-positioned in the Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) sector, where it has world-class capabilities in contact centers, collection, in-house technology provision, marketing, auditing, and consulting. Colombia ranked third in Latin America in the availability of skilled labor in the 2020 International Institute for Management Development World Talent Ranking and accounted for 17 percent of BPO sales in the region.5

Colombia’s numerous universities and worker-training options could give it a competitive edge in the emerging Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) industry. With bots and artificial intelligence handling a grow- ing range of basic customer service tasks, companies are looking for work- ers with higher-value capabilities in paralegal support, health insurance processing, and cybersecurity. Colombia could become a preferred destination for companies needing these next-generation skills. Doing so would require developing the single most promising area for US-Colombia collaboration in the coming decade: building education, science, training, and research clusters based on public-private partnerships between universities and companies.

The COVID-19 pandemic has simultaneously exposed the weaknesses in traditional education and training models and the pent-up demand for new, flexible approaches to continuing education in the digital age. While millions of students in the region would love to attend US universities, the prohibitively high cost means fewer than fifty thousand can do so each year.6 For their part, US universities face dramatic drops in enrollment due to long-term domestic demographic trends, combined with declining demand for the traditional four-year degree. Now is the time to foster large-scale joint ventures between leading US and Colombian universities to offer state- of-the-art virtual and hybrid learning models at price points attractive to college students and people in their prime working years. This market segment (ages twenty to fifty-five) numbers more than 300 million in LAC.

Using Colombia as a base, these partnerships could develop programs in Spanish, English, and Portuguese that range from full academic degrees to continuing-education certificates tailored to meet the needs of specific industries. In addition to the skills demanded by the KPO sector, these pro- grams could focus on areas that Colombia has already identified as strategic, such as energy, infrastructure, construction, the creative industries, information and communications technology services, agribusiness, manufacturing, chemicals, and life sciences.

Both governments could also introduce incentives to develop applied research centers along the lines pursued by the US National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health. The United States could share its expertise in strengthening industry-university collaboration and promoting innovation of research centers that respond to the needs of firms. The United States could also support Colombian efforts to provide technical assistance to firms to increase their productivity and enable them to join value chains requiring more sophisticated processes.7

In addition to cultivating local human capital, these joint ventures could attract funding for research and development in renewable energy and bio-technology. According to the World Bank, in 2017, total public and private sector spending on research and development in Colombia was only 0.24 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), a level far below the regional average of 0.8 percent of GDP. The joint ventures proposed herein could make Colombia a much more attractive destination for research and innovation.

Moving forward

There is no time for complacency. The war in Ukraine marks the end of an era in global economic and geopolitical relations. For the past thirty years, Colombia and the United States have reaped the fruits of liberalization and economic opening that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Millions of Colombians emerged from poverty, and the United States enjoyed extraordinary prosperity. This period also marked China’s rise as an industrial, commercial, and military superpower. China’s push to enter LAC markets is now visible on numerous fronts, from consumer electronics and automobiles to large infrastructure investments. And like the rest of its neighbors, Colombia’s trade strategy must look to Asia and Europe as well as North America.

As Colombia and the United States navigate the unknowns of this new era, their shared values and security priorities will become ever more important—as will the advantages of the enhanced economic partnership proposed herein. In a world where regional ties are becoming more vital than global ones, Colombia and the United States could model a new kind of political and economic synergy in the Americas. I see no reason why US direct investment in Colombia could not quintuple in the coming decade, generating tens of thousands of jobs in both countries. Achieving this will require a level of ambition, coordination, and commitment comparable to what enabled Plan Colombia. This time, the leadership and execution will depend more on the private sector. Old assumptions should be abandoned as a new generation of entrepreneurs and civic leaders forge a vision for a future attuned to an altered set of realities. But as was the case with Plan Colombia, a bold bet today could yield multiple gains and new opportunities well into the twenty-first century.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Amazon Web Services Public Sector Blog Team, “President of Colombia joins AWS in Bogota, talks innovation across the region,” Amazon Web Services, April 12, 2019, https://aws.amazon.com/ blogs/publicsector/president-of-colombia-joins-aws-in-bogota-talks-innovation-across-the- region/.
2    The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, The Untapped Potential of the US-ColombiaPartnership, The Atlantic Council, September 26, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/untapped-potential-us-colombia-partnership/.
3    “Potencial de Colombia como exportador de productos farmacéuticos,” SICEX, July 2, 2021, https:// sicex.com/blog/exportacion-de-medicamentos-en-colombia/.
4    “Number of medical tourists in selected countries in Latin America in 2019,” accessed February 25, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/910471/latin-america-number-medical-tourists- country/.
5    IMDWorldTalentRanking2020, International Institute for Management Development, November 2020, https://www.imd.org/globalassets/wcc/docs/release-2020/talent/imd_world_talent_ ranking_2020.pdf; and Cristina Estrada Rudas, “Las exportaciones de servicios BPO durante 2021 ascendieron a US$1.475 millones,” La República, February 16, 2022, https://www.larepublica. co/empresas/las-exportaciones-de-servicios-bpo-durante-2021-ascendieron-a-us1475- millones-3303864.
6    In 2021, Colombian students attending US universities reached 52,064. “The Colombian Study Abroad Market,” educationfair.nl, accessed February 25, 2022, https://www.educationfair.nl/market-reports/south-america/colombia/.
7    US-Colombia Task Force, “Untapped Potential.”

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Invest in peace https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-invest-in-peace/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:35:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=526995 Colombia is poised to prove to the world that it will be known for the peace it has brokered at home rather than the conflict endured for fifty years. This requires an enormous investment in development and close coordination among all stakeholders to ensure these commitments meet the needs of the people most affected.

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When Colombia signed a peace agreement in 2016 after fifty years of conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), we knew the real work was just beginning. A peace agreement is just a piece of paper until the commitments written on it become a reality.

As chairman and CEO of the Howard G. Buffett Foundation, a private family foundation with an annual grant-making budget of more than $200 million, my job is to deploy the most risk-tolerant capital available—philanthropy—to invest in ideas that improve the lives of some of the most impoverished and marginalized people in the world. Our foundation focuses its funding on improving food security through agriculture, mitigating conflict through development, building capacity to combat human trafficking, and securing the safety of as many people as possible. Although we created our foundation in 1999 with an emphasis on conserving wildlife and habitat, we soon shifted our focus to include people because conservation and sustainability become viable when people have choices beyond simple survival. I can think of no better investment than in people—like the Colombians— who are resilient enough to have survived decades of conflict.

The real question we faced in Colombia was not whether to invest in development but where to start. Colombia’s 200-year relationship with the United States provided a framework for answering that question. Philan-thropy is, in essence, venture capital that measures the return on investment based on the positive impact on people’s lives. Our funding can test new ideas, but we need public sector support to bring those ideas to scale in every part of the country that needs investment. Working with government—locally and nationally—is essential. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States gave us a roadmap for working with Colombia’s government institutions. Within a few months of our initial outreach to the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos, we made the first commitment that eventually would total nearly $45 million to support humanitarian demining operations in rural areas. This foundational investment would redeploy the military to focus on development and secure land for further investments in smallholder agriculture, smaller-scale voluntary coca-crop substitution, and land titling projects.

Afterwards, the foundation worked with the administration of President Iván Duque to develop a holistic approach to security and development, focusing investments on Tibú, a municipality in the Catatumbo region that borders Venezuela. Catatumbo is marked by high levels of violence, poverty, and drugs. About a third of the militants in the National Liberation Army continue to operate in the region as they dispute power with other drug trafficking groups and smaller factions of dissidents. The presence of armed groups has fueled the cultivation of illicit crops in Tibú, which pro- duces more coca—the base ingredient of cocaine—than any other Colombian municipality. Why focus investment in the part of Colombia with the most difficult challenges? Because if we can demonstrate success here, we know success is possible everywhere.

Focusing our efforts in Catatumbo also allowed us to complement Colombia’s investments. A 2018 government strategy, “Sustainable Catatumbo,” has brought more than $175 million in development investments to the region, but health, education, and policing remain underfunded, and agri- cultural assistance requires a multi-pronged approach to remove barriers. As an outside funder, we consider every investment through the lens of how any successes we achieve could be sustained or replicated locally and nation- ally after our funding is completed. That informed an approach that mixes one-time capital investments and pilot projects, which could attract future funding if we demonstrate success.

Roads are vital to providing rural farmers access to markets for alter- native crops to replace coca. They also serve as a deterrent to armed groups and the drug trade because they improve the government’s ability to secure those areas. In September 2020, the foundation signed an agreement to build or improve nearly 50 miles of tertiary and 4.5 miles of regional roads in Catatumbo for $45 million. The National Roads Institute is scheduled to complete the first six regional and tertiary roads by the end of 2022, with follow-on funding for the remainder contingent on performance. These roads will enable market access and security, allowing farmers to get better prices for their production of legal crops, thus reducing the incentive to grow coca.

Land titling is another essential element in providing legal alternatives to coca cultivation for rural farmers. The foundation has provided a $4.5 million grant to Mercy Corps to assist nine hundred farming families in obtaining land titles in Tibú and one thousand families in reducing food insecurity. A separate, parallel grant to the National Coffee Federation is exploring ways these farming families can voluntarily replace their coca production with alternative crops that are legal and profitable, in partner- ship with a private-sector buyer committed to purchasing their products at fair prices. The rural farmers we’ve met want to grow legal crops, but they also need to feed their families. Obtaining land titles allows them to access financing to make this transition and invest in high-value, legal crops like cacao and coffee. Land titles also raise the stakes for growing coca because farmers risk losing their land if they do not make the switch.

Many organizations and donors invest in development only when conflicts end. Often, our foundation’s investment decisions are based on the theory that peace cannot be secured and sustained without investing in development first. Communities need to see what life could be like without conflict to fight for that peace. That is why we complement investment in activities like agriculture that will take years to produce tangible results with investments that could improve lives today. That includes limited human itarian support for internally displaced persons and investments in new health clinics, shelters, schools, and even police stations. These choices are informed by the needs articulated by local communities and governments in partnership with the national government to ensure that the personnel to support this new infrastructure is included in government budgets.

Finally, no investment in post-conflict development is sustainable without addressing the issue of ex-combatants. They need investment too, so they can have viable livelihoods that do not involve conflict, but this investment must be made in a way that is fair to the individuals who never took up arms against the government. The foundation supports the World Food Programme’s work with FARC ex-combatants living in fourteen of the twenty-four reintegration camps across Colombia, including the one in Tibú. The projects provide a way for ex-combatants to gain new skills, earn a living, and make amends with their communi ties, many of which are victims of the armed conflict.

Over the last six years, our work in Colombia has underscored that his- tory will not judge success based on the signing of the peace accords but rather by Colombia’s ability to fulfill its commitments. This requires an enormous investment in development and close coordination among all stakeholders to ensure these commitments meet the needs of the people most affected. The role of outside donors is to listen and support efforts to achieve that objective.

As Colombia and the United States celebrate two hundred years of cooperation, it’s important to recognize that Colombia’s success or failure affects us here at home. Succeeding in Catatumbo will reduce the coca production that ultimately becomes cocaine in US cities. The stability we create in Colombia helps stem the flow of migrants across our borders. The peace and development we demonstrate in Colombia is the beacon of hope we give people living in Venezuela that there is an alternative to poverty, lawless- ness, and autocracy. Colombia is poised to prove to the world that it will be known for the peace it has brokered at home rather than the conflict it has endured for fifty years. That is a future worth investing in.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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Improve productivity https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-improve-productivity/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:35:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=526984 Colombia must grow at high and sustained rates
to increase economic and social development. Improving productivity would lead to increased growth, sustainability, equality, and inclusion.

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Juan lives in Bogota and has been a construction worker for twenty-five years. His brother Pedro, also a construction worker, lives in Los Angeles, California. To Pedro’s surprise, when he compared the results of their respective jobs, he realized he produced much more than his brother in Colombia in the same amount of time. In other words, his productivity far outpaced Juan’s, and thus, his income was much higher.

This efficiency in using time, characteristic of the United States, is not a product of chance. High labor productivity—five times higher than Colombia’s—is the result of technology, training of the labor force, and adequate regulation for business development, among other factors.

This high productivity also explains, in large part, the enormous gap between the per capita income of the United States and Colombia. World Bank estimates1 show that close to 50 percent of the differences between the countries’ per capita incomes can be explained by disparities in productivity. In other words, the main barrier to convergence with developed countries’ income levels is lagging productivity.

Colombia urgently needs to grow at high and sustained rates to increase economic and social development and, above all, become a more inclusive society. The current levels of monetary poverty of 42.5 percent and extreme poverty of 15.2 percent, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, are unacceptable, as are the figures for business and labor informality. The latter is close to 63 percent and is mostly concentrated among women.2

Pivotal to achieving this transformation is improving productivity, the most critical determinant of per capita income growth in the long term and, therefore, poverty reduction. Without productivity, there is no growth, no sustainability, no equality, and no inclusion.

A bilateral agenda based on productivity

Undoubtedly, Colombia’s primary objective in increasing productivity is to improve the welfare of its population in a sustainable and sustained manner. Achieving this would have very positive external repercussions well worth considering. For example, for the United States, a more efficient and sophisticated Colombian productive apparatus would provide a reliable and long-term commercial partner with high-quality standards and reasonable prices, in addition to the valuable advantage of geographical proximity.

In recognition of the positive impact on both countries, the bilateral agenda should also focus on working together to improve Colombia’s productivity. What better occasion to do so than the bicentennial of bilateral relations?

There is no such initiative, but scaling up existing programs such as the Productive Factories Program of Colombia Productiva of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism or replicating them in different sectors or regions could provide a solution.

According to international evidence, policies to increase productivity should focus on three fronts: productivity gains within firms, efficient real- location of resources from low-productivity to high-productivity businesses, and free entry of high-productivity enterprises and the exit of low-productivity ones.3

In Colombia, despite the importance of these three factors, the first— productivity increases within companies—is the most relevant, according to an analysis of the evolution of productivity in several companies.4 Around 65 percent of productivity increases are due to improvements in production processes and better product positioning.

Therefore, the most advisable work within companies would be techno- logical extension and technical assistance programs, such as the previously mentioned Productive Factories Program, which has had positive results and became the star program of President Iván Duque’s effort to increase productivity at the firm’s level. It most definitely is a program that should be continued and strengthened by incoming governments.

Productive factories

The Productive Factories Program is a solid example of cooperation between Colombia and the United States. The Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism united to increase business productivity and competitiveness by applying new technologies. The program was created in 2019, inspired by the technology extension model (Manufacturing Extension Partnership [MEP] and Georgia Tech MEP). It emerged from an initiative involving the public and private sectors in 2017 to transfer methodologies to Colombia and train in technology extension methods. Georgia Tech’s EI2 Business Innovation Institute supported its design and implementation.5

The program’s first phase involved training and certifying 150 Colombian extensionists at Georgia Tech, who then returned to the country to work together with twenty-five Georgia Tech EI2 professionals in a pilot program in forty companies and four cities, transferring their knowledge.

Based on these lessons learned, the program was extended to all regions of the country, with very positive results, precisely because of its ability to reach the heart of companies with specialized services through coordinated work with chambers of commerce and public-private partners.

According to Colombia Productiva, the program has 850 productivity experts in quality management, digital transformation, logistics, energy efficiency, productivity, and commercial management. It has served more than 4,000 companies of all sizes, improving their productivity indicators by more than 31 percent, above the initial 8 percent goal.6

In evaluations conducted by Fedesarrollo and UT Econometría-SEI, the program was well-rated, with its high design standards and a positive perception of quality highlighted. However, both evaluations drew attention to the program’s limited scope in terms of economic and human resources to reach the bulk of the business sector.

Scaling up

To visualize the magnitude of the productivity challenge, it is mandatory to characterize the Colombian business world. Unfortunately, limited information is available since an economic and business census has not been conducted since 1991 due to a lack of resources. Contributing resources to carry out this census is fundamental and a possible front for bilateral collaboration.

According to the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE), Clombia has few large companies and many informal micro-busi- nesses (ten million).7 These are not very productive and employ almost half of the country’s workers, accounting for the high level of labor informality. Medium-sized companies, on the other hand, are practically nonexistent.

According to the Single Business Registry, there were about 1,643,000 registered companies in 2019, of which 20,000 had more than fifty workers. By August 2021, the number of registered companies fell by 18 percent due to the COVID-19 pandemic.8

Technology adoption in Colombia, an essential determinant of productivity, lags far behind. Although most companies have computers, internet access, and a webpage, the use given to these tools is basic: sending e-mails, searching for information, or accessing electronic banking.

Perhaps the most critical for business transformation and where the greatest challenge lies is in the quality of management. According to surveys conducted by the Colombian National Planning Department (DNP), the level of management practices in Colombian companies is lower than in developed countries. As seen in the following graph, a company in Colombia obtains half the management practices score as that obtained by a com- parable US company. In Colombia, the average is 0.38 percent; in the United States, it is 0.62 percent. This lack of management quality also explains why Colombian companies are less innovative.

Distribution of managerial skills in Colombia and the United States, 2018


DNP, based on DANE(2018) and MOPS9 (2018).

Poor training at the managerial level is a major impediment to business transformation since those in charge are unable to ask the right questions regarding human capital requirements, technological change, and innovation, for example. As the President of Georgia Tech, Ángel Cabrera, said at the recent meeting of the Productive Factories Program, “transforming an economy requires business leaders who turn talent into ideas in the twenty-first century.”10

Thus, to improve the productivity of the Colombian economy for the benefit of both countries, it is necessary to concentrate efforts on developing managerial capabilities through technological extension and technical assistance by scaling up the Productive Factories Program or developing similar programs.

Given that Productive Factories originated in the United States and its design and methodology have proven successful, the best way forward is to scale up this program by accessing financial resources or scholarships for training extension workers on various productivity fronts. This is undoubtedly the most efficient way to address the needs of companies and improve their capabilities. The training could be done in the United States, as was the case of the extensionists trained at Georgia Tech, or the methodology for training could be transferred to Colombia.

What is clear is that knowledge must be multiplied to transform the country.

The challenge, although ambitious, is well known, and there is a proven way to meet it. Joint work between Colombia and the United States would make it possible to achieve the desired impact—a more developed and inclusive country for the benefit of Colombians, which would also benefit the United States. And more importantly, it would reduce the gap between Pedro’s and Juan’s income, allowing both brothers to finally enjoy a similar quality of life.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Ana Paola Cusolito and William F. Maloney, Productivity Revisited: Shifting Paradigms in Analysis and Policy(Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2018), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/578861548876206044/Productivity-Revisited-Shifting-Paradigms-in-Analysis-and-Policy.
2    DANE – National Administrative Department of Statistics of Colombia website, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www.data4sdgs.org/partner/dane-national-administrative-department-statistics-colombia.
3    Cusolito and Maloney, Productivity Revisited: Shifting Paradigms in Analysis and Policy.
4    Productividad:laclavedelcrecimientoparaColombia, Consejo Privado de Competitividad and Universidad de los Andes, 2017, https://compite.com.co/proyecto/productividad/.
5    Mónica Novoa, “Success Story: Design and Implementation of Technology Extension Services (TES) in Colombia,” Georgia Tech Enterprise Innovation Institute, August 23, 2021, https:// innovate.gatech.edu/uncategorized/success-story-design-and-implementation-of-technology- extension-services-tes-in-colombia/.
6    El camino hacia la productividad: Evolución de Fábricas de Productividad 2018 – 2021, Colombia Productiva, accessed March 5, 2022, https://www.colombiaproductiva.com/ptp-capacita/ publicaciones/transversales/el-camino-de-la-productividad.
7    DANE – National Administrative Department of Statistics of Colombia website, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www.data4sdgs.org/partner/dane-national-administrative-department-statistics-colombia.
8    All formal firms are required to register at the local Chamber of Commerce and the Registro Único Empresarial (RUES); the Single Business Registry is the sum of these registries. See the Registro Único Empresarial website, accessed March 5, 2022, https://www.rues.org.co/.
9     Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS).
10    Colombia Productiva, “Facebook Live,” accessed March 5, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/ ColombiaProductiva/videos/694015008444716.

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Forge a strong democracy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-forge-a-strong-democracy/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:32:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=528032 The US-Colombia alliance has achieved seemingly
impossible feats over decades of close collaboration. Ensuring Colombia becomes a fully developed liberal democracy is the next step.

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COLOMBIA STANDS AS ONE OF the United States’ strongest and closest allies in the Western Hemisphere. With generous US support on multiple fronts and hefty Colombian investment and leadership, within 20 years, Colombia walked itself back from the brink of failed statehood and established itself as a vibrant middle-income liberal democracy.

The US-Colombia relationship is particularly strong from a military and public safety perspective, given the historical mutual focus on the war on drugs and relevant national security issues. The bilateral partnership is also strong in trade, investment, and diplomacy. Still, despite remaining internal security challenges, and even with notable successes over the years, such as destroying the Medellín Cartel and dismantling the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), the potential of a US-Colombia strategic relationship with global reach is unlimited if developed fully.

The bilateral agenda in the next decade should focus on consolidating Colombia as a developed, militarily adept, liberal democracy capable of pro- viding its citizens with a prosperous future and helping safeguard our shared values in Latin America and beyond. A further developed Colombia would promote economic opportunities and job creation, while strengthening democratic institutions to curtail transnational criminal activities like drug trafficking and illegal mining. Colombia would also be better prepared to absorb migrants and refugees from Venezuela, preventing migration to and instability in other countries. A more prosperous Colombia would become a stronger partner to the United States and the broader region by deepening its already strong security cooperation, investment, and commercial ties with Central America. It would also contribute to holding back and even reversing the rise of authoritarianism in Latin America and could help deter the geopolitical ambitions of Russia and China in our hemisphere.

While fully developing Colombia is an ambitious goal, much progress has already been made. Colombia is a centuries-old democracy that peace-fully alternates power at all levels of government with strong institutions and checks and balances that have proven resilient in the face of great challenges. Socially, seven million Colombians—about 14 percent of the population—moved out of poverty into the middle class between 2000 and 2019.1 Although this progress was significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, it is recoverable. Economically, Colombia boasts the fourth-largest economy in Latin America, and its private sector is among the most sophisticated. Internationally, Colombia is a respected power with the most operationally capable military in the region. It is one of three Latin American members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the only Latin American Global Partner of NATO, and in March 2022, US President Joseph R. Biden announced the United States would designate Colombia as a Major non-NATO Ally.2

Nevertheless, Colombia must overcome three major obstacles to consolidate itself as a developed liberal democracy. The first, and perhaps most challenging, is ensuring that Colombia’s democratic, free-market system responds to the needs and wants of all its citizens. Following significant reductions in violence starting about a decade ago, people’s expectations of government shifted from simply reestablishing security to improving livelihoods, increasing employment opportunities, providing better-quality healthcare and education, and promoting social equality.

Despite significant socioeconomic advances over the past twenty years, progress has not arrived fast enough. Even before the economic setbacks caused by COVID-19, more than 35 percent of the population lived in poverty, half the country’s economy was informal, the quality of education remained below par, and there were still too many forgotten regions in the hinterlands where criminal activities thrived.3 Furthermore, the significant reduction of terrorist violence made structural problems more visible, particularly public sector corruption at the local and provincial levels.

The government’s inability to address these issues has progressively diminished trust in the democratic system and institutions. According to the Universidad de los Andes’ Observatorio de la Democracia, satisfaction with the functioning of Colombian democracy has fallen yearly from 55 per- cent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2020.4 Other national polls during this period show a grave distrust of institutions in all branches of government. Growing apathy toward the system has translated into electoral abstentionism, allowing corrupt political organizations to consolidate, particularly at the local level, further fueling the prophecy of a failed system. This distrust has contributed to the rise of a breed of populism that is both antidemocratic and anti-free market, which, if allowed to prosper, would render Colombia’s full development into a liberal democracy unviable.

The second obstacle to Colombia’s development and democracy is transnational criminal activities, including the cocaine trade and illegal mining— and the violence, human rights violations, and ecological devastation that accompany them. Domestic cocaine production hovers close to 1,200 tons per year,5 up from 65 tons in 1993,6 the year Pablo Escobar was killed.

Some estimate the size of the Colombian cocaine industry to be some- where between 1 percent and 3 percent of gross domestic product.7 8 When adding the revenue of other criminal endeavors such as illegal mining, illegal logging, and contraband, illicit activities could represent double that number.9 Add the proceeds from public sector corruption, and the number could be much higher still. In and of itself, this is a stunning threat to democracy as these funds inevitably feed corruption, violence, and human rights violations.

The state’s inability to address this issue allows illegal businesses to thrive and corrupt public officials to remain in office, heightening apathy with the democratic system, which could lead to more corruption, further discrediting the state and pushing Colombia toward populism. These threats to democracy need to be addressed more aggressively in innovative ways.

The final obstacle faced by Colombia is geopolitical. State actors such as Cuba, Russia, Venezuela and, to a different extent, China—and even Iran— would benefit strategically from a destabilized or discredited Colombia. Weakening Colombia in any of these ways would be a significant blow to US interests in the Western Hemisphere and those of liberal democracies. Not only would a major ally be put under significant pressure, but it would also send a message to other Latin American nations that being close to the United States one day means nothing the next. Furthermore, a weak or unaligned Colombia could entice major powers such as Russia to act more assertively, perhaps by following through on their reiterated promises to base troops or strategic weapons in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.10 To countries invested in the region, Colombia’s success or failure as a liberal democratic and free-market society translates to the success or failure of the US model in Latin America.

When Plan Colombia was first developed twenty years ago, it seemed like an overly ambitious proposition for an almost failed Colombia to recover from narco-fueled violence. It was not. The key to its success was having a set of clear goals coupled with US technical support and financial aid while empowering Colombia to lead the charge and allocate the majority of funds and resources necessary to accomplish the mission. We need to apply this same formula to consolidate Colombia as a developed liberal democracy. A task this grand requires a detailed roadmap but should, in any case, include:

  • Security sector reform with the goal of increasing, training, and strengthening Colombia’s police force to tend to all public safety and internal security needs (terrorist, criminal, and public safety-related) following the highest international standards, particularly on the human rights front. Colombia’s military should be transformed from an army trained and equipped for counterinsurgency to a force focused on protecting Colombian sovereignty and collaborating with international partners, including the United States and NATO, on defending the rules- based international order.
  • Boost economic growth by designing and implementing an export-oriented growth strategy, including identifying and carrying out reforms, such as tax reform; strengthening the educational system, particularly in technology and bilingualism; increasing access to capital; training Colombian suppliers to serve the US market, and attracting nearshoring projects of US companies that want to be closer to home. Initiatives such as the G7’s Build Back Better World and US developmental assistance should prioritize Colombia to help bring its infrastructure up to par.
  • The fight against transnational crime and corruption must innovate and evolve. An anti-narcotics policy based on eradication and interdiction alone has proven insufficient. Colombia’s hinterlands need to be connected to the rest of Colombia and developed economically. We must more aggressively target the finances of drug cartels, illegal mining outfits, and illicit marketers of precursor chemicals. The US Department of Justice (DOJ) should forcefully prosecute public sector corruption in Colombia using innovative approaches such as those used during FIFA-gate,11 the 2015 corruption scandal of global soccer’s governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). The DOJ successfully applied the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, given that many ill-got- ten funds go through the international and US banking systems.

The US-Colombia alliance has achieved seemingly impossible feats over many years of close collaboration. Ensuring Colombia becomes a strong, developed liberal democracy will benefit both countries and further consolidate the realm of like-minded nations during uncertain times. We must seize the opportunity.

* * *

Alejandro Eder is a former presidential high counselor for reintegration of the Republic of Colombia (2010-2014) and was a Colombian government negotiator during the secret and public phases of the peace process with FARC (2010-2014). Afterwards, he served as executive director of the Cali- based ProPacifico Foundation. In 2019, Eder ran for mayor of Cali as an independent civic candidate.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Jorge Guerra, Andrés Zambrano, and Hernando Zuleta, “Entre regiones desiguales, ¿qué podemos hacer para reactivarlas?,” Universidad de los Andes, January 20, 2022, https://uniandes.edu.co/es/noticias/gobierno-y-politica/entre-regiones-desiguales-que-podemos-hacer-para-reactivarlas.
2    Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Columbia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez-of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.
3    “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) – Colombia,”World Bank data website, accessed March 15, 2022, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=CO.
4    Observatorio de la Democracia, Colombia, un país en medio de la pandemia 2020: Democracia e Instituciones, US Agency for International Development, April 2021: 75, https://obsdemocracia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/02_USAID_Democracia_2020.pdf.
5    Drug Market Trends: Cocaine Amphetamine-Type Stimulants, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, June 2021: 15, https://www.unodc.org/res/wdr2021/field/WDR21_Booklet_4.pdf.
6    The NNIC Report 1993 – The Supply of Illegal Drugs to the United States, National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee, US Drug Enforcement Agency, August 1994: 23, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/153725NCJRS.pdf.
7    Santiago Montenegro, Jorge Llano, and Diana Ibáñez, El PIB de la Cocaína 2005-2018: Una estimación empírica, Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Económico, November 2019, https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/41108/dcede2019-44.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
8    Reducción del efectivo y tamaño de la economía subterránea en Colombia, National Association of Financial Institutions Centro de Estudios Económicos, May 2017: 5, https://www.anif.com.co/mp-files/reduccion-del-efectivo-y-tamano-de-la-economia-subterranea-en-colombia.pdf/.
9    Andrés Molano-Rojas and Juan Moncada, Economías ilegales versus iniciativa empresarial: Implicaciones de una competencia desleal, Instituto de Ciencia Política Hernán Echavarría Olózaga, August 2017: 2, http://www.icpcolombia.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17.08-EN-CONTEXTO-KAS-15-ECONOMIAS-ILEGALES-1.pdf.
10    Carlos Salinas Maldonado, “Rusia ofrece redoblar su ayuda a Nicaragua, Cuba y Venezuela frente a las ‘amenazas externas’,” El País, June 23, 2021, https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-06-23/rusia-afirma-que-nicaragua-cuba-y-venezuela-requieren-ayuda-de-moscu-contra-amenazas-externas.html; and “Rusia negocia mayor presencia militar en Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua,” BBC WorldNews, February 26, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2014/02/140226_ultnot_rusia_bases_msd.
11    Government of the United States, “Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption,” Department of Justice, May 27, 2015, https://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering- conspiracy-and.

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Learn from a democratic culture https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-learn-from-a-democratic-culture/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:31:55 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527966 For decades, Colombia, through adversity and prosperity,
has counted on one undeniable truth: the strength of its democracy.

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IN 2008, DURING MY FIRST-EVER visit to Colombia, I watched aerial coca eradication operations in the conflict-ridden Meta Department, then flew to San Vicente del Caguán to catch a flight to Bogotá. On the ramp at San Vicente were two squads of Colombian army troops. Having just arrived at the base after a month of patrolling in search of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) units, they slumped, exhausted and muddy, their packs and weapons stacked neatly, awaiting airlift back to their base. The contrast between these warfighters and the comfortable, twenty-first-century Bogotá I had left that morning could not have been starker. That juxtaposition was the beginning of my understanding that two Colombias—one modern, connected, and progressing, the other disconnected, geographically remote, and stuck in an endless loop of exclusion and violence—existed side by side. Colombian democracy and its leaders have been tested for decades as they try to end these recycled conflicts by institution- ally, economically, and physically joining the Colombia of exclusion and criminality together with its modern half.

An adapting, imaginative, courageous Colombia

Colombia’s political system has strained to meet that challenge. For decades, the country has been plagued by insurgencies. Groups as diverse as Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel to drug-dealing paramilitary groups like the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) to terrorist organizations like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC (both deeply corrupted by narcotics) have serially sought to upend democratic processes. Colombian administrations for nearly forty years have sought to break the cycle of conflict. And as Colombia has sought to confront these challenges, it must be noted that some state actors at times engaged in terrible criminal abuses, from allying with paramilitary groups to the dis- graceful “false positive”1 killings of innocents to unlawful interceptions of individuals’ communications.

But let’s fully appreciate what Colombian democracy has achieved, and how. Over the past four decades, Colombia’s democratic leaders have responded with innovation and courage to address seemingly intractable problems. They wrote a new constitution with the participation of a demobilized, terrorist group; reformed security, intelligence, and judicial entities (with the longtime partnership of the United States); and undertook nearly a dozen serious negotiation efforts. These leaders negotiated the demobilization of whole rebel structures, notably the 19th of April Movement (M-19) leftist guerrillas and the right-wing paramilitary AUC. Colombian administrations built on the experiences of their predecessors as they conceived new approaches. The culmination was the landmark 2016 Peace Accord with the FARC, a comprehensive and internationally-praised effort achieved after an arduous six-year negotiation. The accord remains controversial, but it took the FARC off the battlefield and into the halls of congress. It was a triumph of Colombian democratic institutions and leaders, even if it remains a work in progress.

Examples of the innovation and courage of Colombian democracy abound. In the 1950s, Colombia established an enforced bipartisanship to lower the political costs of being the out-party. The presidency passed from Liberal to Conservative hands, knowing that the constitution required “adequate and equitable participation” for the party that did not control that office. When the threat of violence from that quarter receded, Colombia con- fronted new and even more devastating challenges. From the 1970s through the 1990s, extrajudicial actors convulsed the nation with violence to seek the government’s capitulation. Pablo Escobar ordered car bombs, destroyed an airliner in flight, directed the murders of hundreds of police officers, and was behind the assassinations of government ministers and two candidates for president in his battle against the state and justice. Four major and several minor terrorist insurgencies, including the FARC, M-19, and ELN, sought the violent overthrow of the state. The AUC engaged in narcotrafficking, displaced thousands to steal their property, and committed horrific human rights abuses.

While the Colombian state battled these groups with arms, every Colombian administration since the 1980s also sought to negotiate the demobilization and integration of the rebel groups into institutional democratic life. Even after a catastrophic wave of attacks and death in the mid-1980s, including the bloody takeover and destruction of the Supreme Court building in downtown Bogotá by the M-19, the aspiration to achieve a negotiated settlement was never extinguished.

By the end of that decade, then-President Virgilio Barco and his team had drafted an Initiative for Peace and were negotiating directly with a “guerrilla coordinating group” that included all major insurgent groups. The initiative did not achieve all of its ambitious goals, but it resulted in the demobilization of the M-19, members of which were central players in drafting the 1991 constitution. Moreover, the initiative established starting points for President Juan Manuel Santos’ ultimate successful negotiation of the Peace Accord with the FARC, the most important of these being a government commitment to integrate the rural, disconnected Colombia with the rest of the nation and provisions to address political participation and justice concerns.

By the late 1990s, Colombia was again in crisis. The FARC moved into the space occupied by the dismantled Medellín and Cali cartels to become the country’s most significant drug trafficking organization and used its wealth to finance fighters and materiel to topple the state. In another example of Colombian imagination and daring, then-President Andrés Pastrana turned over a 16,000 square mile tract in central Colombia to the FARC to create momentum for negotiation. This step is seen as either painfully naïve or dangerously counterproductive. Regardless, its real importance was that the FARC’s bloody criminal reign of terror in the so-called zona de distensión showed its true nature.

This exposure of the FARC’s brutal criminality was a key factor in the 2002 election of President Álvaro Uribe, whose promise to impose “democratic security” was appealing to Colombian voters. Uribe’s tough new approach included continual operations to pressure the FARC militarily, a high-value target strategy to eliminate FARC leadership, and new methods to knock down unprecedented coca cultivation and cocaine production, which funded the FARC’s war machine. Uribe enjoyed strong, sustained, bipartisan support from the United States through the new Plan Colombia. Uribe’s unprecedented aggressive approach would have lacked justification and support, nationally and internationally, had Pastrana’s “despeje” (demilitarized zone) not revealed the FARC for what it was.

Other branches of Colombian democracy showed their vitality. In 2010, a very popular Uribe sought to amend the constitution to permit a run for a third term in office. The Constitutional Court determined the proposal for a referendum to allow a congressional vote on the matter to be unconstitutional. Importantly, Uribe—who retained very high popular approval— quickly accepted the ruling, despite his disappointment and disagreement with the decision.

Santos’s peace talks with the FARC (2010-16) were the culmination of the decades-long effort by Colombian democratic institutions and lead- ers to address the root cause of violence and exclusion and incorporate that insurgency into the institutional democratic system. The imagination, rigor, and courage with which the Santos team negotiated the ultimate accord are well known. But it held its own risks. Holding peace talks with the FARC was hardly unprecedented, and the FARC, battered by eight years of military pressure, was ready to come to the table. However, FARC violence had made it profoundly unpopular, so any concessions to it, even in the context of peace talks, were likely to raise popular ire. In 2009, hundreds of thou- sands of Colombians took to the streets in massive “No Más FARC” demonstrations. Finally, the long gestation period of the talks—six years, start to finish—tried the patience and interest of the Colombian people. Santos’ iron-willed determination to see these talks to their conclusion in the face of FARC obstructionism and growing concerns about perceived excessive concessions to the FARC can be traced to Santos’s obsession with peace, as well as the long history of courageous Colombian leaders seeking to negotiate an end to the conflict.

Colombia’s way ahead

Colombia’s democratic institutions and its leaders over the years have proven imaginative and courageous, and the work continues. Three specific observations are salient.

First, Colombians are far too self-critical. The first to complain about the ineffectiveness of Colombian democracy are Colombians, which is understandable, but it’s a barrier to searching analysis. Colombia will realize its true democratic potential only when Colombians can assess their weak- nesses and also appreciate the achievements of their democratic institutions and leaders. The US constitution refers to forming “a more perfect union,” implying a continuing need for debate and reform. Discussions that devolve into mere contention with endless reference to past failings are not helpful. Nor is embracing the notions of Nietzsche and (more importantly) Gabriel García Márquez that time is a flat circle, and we are condemned to repeat the past. A Colombia that recognizes the remarkable achievements of its democracy and its innovative, courageous political culture—that progress is not just possible, but has occurred through its own efforts—will be best prepared to face its future trials.

Second, the next challenge is already here. In explaining the fundamental goal of the peace talks with the FARC, Santos spoke of Colombia becoming a “normal country with normal problems.” That is happening. Like nations worldwide, Colombia’s economy was set back dramatically by the COVID-19 pandemic. Thousands of middle-class families have plum- meted into poverty, while low-income families have dropped to extreme poverty. These Colombians are understandably and justifiably demanding that their political and economic systems respond effectively. Such problems are invulnerable to facile populist solutions. Colombian democracy needs to take action quickly, building on the political culture of innovation and courage it showed in confronting twentieth-century challenges.

Finally, a Colombia armed with the self-confidence derived from accepting the significance of its achievements can be an even more influential player regionally and internationally, especially in partnership with the United States. The world is increasingly dividing into two governance models. The United States and Colombia embrace a liberal democratic system based on individual rights, open markets, and clear, universally applied rules. Its counterpart is the authoritarian vision of China, in which an unelected government grants rights to citizens on condition of behavior, subjectively and impermanently, and the center applies laws and norms variably following its own criteria.

Colombia and the United States are already collaborating on law enforcement and judicial matters in the hemisphere; our work should be broadened and deepened to partner on these governance matters. Given its painful experiences and vibrant democratic culture, Colombian insights can be uniquely useful.

In the summer of 2016, I joined a group observing a demining effort in Caquetá, a rural department long torn by insurgency, coca/cocaine, and dis- connection from the rest of Colombia. As we flew that sunny morning in a Colombian army helicopter, I gazed out at a lush piedmont landscape dotted with small farms. The undulating terrain was marked by watercourses and dirt roads, rising into mountains just distinguishable through a blue haze. My reverie was interrupted by a colleague, who showed me a news flash on his phone that the government and FARC had reached a final agreement on the peace accord. There was a completeness to the moment. I looked again at the bucolic scene, and it struck me why it appealed to me so: it strongly resembled the piedmont of my beloved home state of Virginia. A peace and future in which the Caquetá piedmont could be a sister to the Virginia piedmont, with inclusion, education, and opportunities, seemed within reach.

* * *

Kevin Whitaker served as the US ambassador to Colombia from 2014 to 2019; during his tenure, Colombia signed and began implementing the land- mark 2016 Peace Accords. He was previously the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs’ deputy assistant secretary of state for South America. He is a member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force and a nonresident senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    False positives killings were murders of innocent people by criminal commanders in the armed forces and presented as combat kills of guerrillas. Commanders and units were encouraged to demonstrate effectiveness by increasing their “body count.” The practice first came to light in 2008, and reportedly resulted in the deaths of over 3,000 individuals. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace created by the 2016 peace accord with the FARC is investigating these killings.

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Commit to democracy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-commit-to-democracy/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:31:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527934 Through our security cooperation, counter-narcotics
efforts, promotion of civil society, and environmental initiatives, we are supporting a strong foundation for democracy and the rule of law to flourish in Colombia.

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AS ONE OF THE LONGEST-STANDING democracies and the first constitutional government in South America, Colombia has remained a steadfast ally of the United States, committed to democracy, the rule of law, and free enterprise. Our shared values and vision for the future have only strengthened the bonds of our two-hundred-year diplomatic relations and friendship. However, as in any relationship, challenges have arisen, such as Colombia’s armed conflict, narcotics trafficking, and the production of illicit substances like cocaine.

Serving in President George W. Bush’s administration as under secretary of state for global affairs, I worked closely with Colombian officials, including President Álvaro Uribe and Vice President Francisco Santos, on a wide range of issues dominant in the Washington-Bogotá relationship. As the State Department’s lead in assisting countries to build more democratic, secure, stable, and just societies, I found it imperative to engage Colombia. In his first presidential inaugural address, Bush said, “Our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear and pass along.1 As we celebrate the bicentennial of our extraordinary bond, let us continue working together on four key areas: security cooperation, counter-narcotics strategies, rule of law initiatives, and environmental stewardship. Advancement and progress in these critical domains can solidify Colombia’s democratic foundation and provide a valuable model for other countries.

Security cooperation

US-Colombia security cooperation is deep and significant. Colombia was the only Latin American country to participate in the Korean War as a military ally of the United States. It was also the only South American nation to support the US-led Iraq war of 2003. Colombia also sent soldiers to Afghanistan to assist the International Security Assistance Force in its fight against the Taliban.

During President Iván Duque’s March 2022 visit to Washington DC, President Joseph R. Biden announced his intention to designate Colombia a “Major non-NATO Ally.”2This would provide a long-term framework for our security and defense cooperation. It would also reinforce our solid bilateral defense relationship by helping support aligned defense planning, procurement, and training. Advantages of Major non-NATO Ally status include eligibility for collaboration on the development of defense technologies, access to the US defense industry, special access to military equipment financing, and joint military exchanges, exercises, and training.

The US-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act of 2022, a new legislative initiative advanced by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez, seeks to codify into law Colombia’s status as a “Major non-NATO Ally.3 It also lays out a forward-leaning agenda for US-Colombia relations focused on expanding engagement on economic growth, international security, refugees, human rights, the rule of law, and migration. The Chairman asserted that it will “set out a bold new chapter in US-Colombia relations.”4 Investments aimed at increased security and defense cooperation should remain strong and sustained. The US-Colombia Defense Bilateral Working Group, established in 1999, is a useful forum to discuss strategic-level defense issues and chart future cooperative actions protecting the community of democracies.

Counter-narcotics efforts

Initially conceived in 1999, with bipartisan support, Plan Colombia targeted drug cartels, sought to eradicate coca cultivation, bolster law enforcement, and end the armed conflict. The Bush administration expanded it to support “eradication, interdiction and alternative development of coca fields,” and assistance to rural areas.5 These strict measures were essential to counter the negative impact of drug trafficking on Colombia’s democracy and the rule of law.

Uribe was a tough counter-narcotics partner and enforced strong policies, including aerial eradication efforts on coca plantations. Bush cooperated with Uribe and advanced his tripartite strategy of “waging a global war on terror, supporting democracy, and reducing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.”

At the State Department, I had oversight of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). I frequently traveled to Colombia to see firsthand its eradication attempts and law enforcement efforts, which had a real impact. In fact, a few years later, we urged Colombian officials to share their successful counter-narcotics strategies and experiences with Afghan officials.

Under the leadership of Duque, Colombia has remained a regional leader in counter-narcotic efforts but must do more to eradicate coca cultivation. The State Department’s INL Bureau’s 2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report describes how at least 95 percent of the cocaine samples seized in the United States in 2020 subjected to laboratory analysis were of Colombian origin.6 Coca cultivation in Colombia remains at “record” levels in 2022, as cited by the White House Office of Drug Policy Control.7 It brings Colombian farmers less than $1 billion in revenue per year while the United States and Colombia spend billions of taxpayer money in drug control efforts.

In August 2020, the US-Colombia Growth Initiative (USGI), a bilateral strategy, was unveiled, focusing on drug eradication and sustainable investment in rural Colombia.8 The program is built on traditional drug interdiction, security, and assistance with a private sector-led sustainable economic growth model and alternative development programs. It addresses the urgent need to stem the cultivation and flow of illicit drugs into the United States. Creative and innovative partnerships like the USGI are needed to succeed against this longstanding challenge. We must work jointly to ensure that Colombia’s democratic institutions and the rule of law are not weakened by narcotics trafficking.

Democracy and the rule of law

Decades of corruption and lawlessness by drug cartels and illegal armed groups have severely harmed Colombia’s democracy. Until November 2021, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia was on the State Department’s list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The National Liberation Army remains on the list. These groups are responsible for decades of misery and violence that embroiled the country, took a massive human toll, and generated an economic downturn. Over the years, however, our governments have shared a strong interest in collaborating and fostering change by fighting corruption and lawlessness. We know that effective and sustainable democracy requires the rule of law.

At the State Department, I worked with Roy Godson, a Georgetown University professor emeritus. Along with a team at the National Strategy Information Center, he advanced the Culture of Lawfulness Project in Colombia, including in Medellín. This initiative used public and private funding and the participation of school systems and civil society leaders to improve public knowledge and attitudes about the rule of law. The goal of lawfulness education is to reach the next generation of students and, through them, their parents and communities. As I noted in a 2004 speech, “a culture of lawfulness changes the dynamics of law enforcement—and builds the rule of law—by marginalizing lawless behavior.” I added, “a culture of lawfulness makes two major contributions to society: it fundamentally changes the dynamics of law enforcement, and it empowers individuals.”9 Through this creative citizen-oriented initiative, there were improvements in civic consciousness and a decline in crime and violence. Colombian law enforcement efforts against the drug cartels also contributed to reducing crime.

During this period, I also worked closely with Vice President Francisco Santos on human rights, meeting regularly to discuss cases and abuses and provide solutions. Our collaborative efforts were direct, transparent, and constructive. In turn, concrete steps were taken to investigate, prosecute, and punish those officials and others who committed human rights violations.

To protect human rights and human dignity, Colombia must further strengthen those mechanisms to safeguard the rule of law and human rights and enforce security. Forward-looking initiatives, like the Culture of Lawfulness Project, focused on educating the next generation on the importance of the rule of law, are paramount in fostering a more peaceful, vibrant Colombia.

Environmental stewardship

One of the most innovative initiatives enacted by Congress in 1998 was the Tropical Forest Conservation Act, which has enabled eligible developing countries to reduce their debts to the United States and undertake action to protect their tropical forests.

In 2004, the United States, Colombia, and three environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy, and the World Wildlife Fund—signed agreements to reduce Colombia’s debt to the United States by more than $10 million. In return, Colombia promised to use those funds toward conservation efforts in several important tropical forest areas, including Tropical Andes, the Llanos region in the Orinoco Basin, and the Caribbean. The program became known as the Debt-for-Nature agreement. Colombia became the fifth country in Latin America to benefit from this program; the others were Belize, El Salvador, Panama, and Peru.10 It created a permanent endowment for preserving Colombia’s tropical forests while advancing its economy. Since signing these agreements, communities have safeguarded more than 700,000 hectares of forest, reduced deforestation by more than 15,000 hectares of mega-diverse forest, and protected more than 70 species, according to the US embassy in Bogotá.11

This creative program should continue and expand with sustained US funding. It has had multiple positive impacts in Colombia, including protecting and conserving tropical forest areas and enhancing local civic involvement and community action to support the environment and economic growth. New NGOs have been created and will further strengthen Colombia’s civil society.

Moving forward

We have learned a great deal from our challenges and experiences. As we look forward to our next bicentennial, we must continue to bolster US-Colombia ties. Through our security cooperation, counter-narcotics efforts, promotion of civil society, and environmental initiatives, we are collaborating to support a strong foundation for democracy and the rule of law to flourish in Colombia. As Simón Bolivar once said, “A people that loves freedom will in the end be free.”12 This is the very spirit that pervades Colombia.

* * *

Amb. Paula J. Dobriansky is a senior fellow at the Future of Diplomacy Project at the Harvard University Belfer Center and vice chair of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. During her thirty years in national security affairs, she served as under secretary of state for global affairs (2001-2009), director of European and Soviet Affairs at the National Security Council and deputy assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs. From 1997-2001, she was senior vice president and director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    ”Government of the United States, “President George W. Bush’s Inaugural Address,” White House, January 20, 2001, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/inaugural-address.html.
2    Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Columbia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez-of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.
3    US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations press release, “Senators Menendez, Kaine Unveil U.S.-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act,” March 9, 2022, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/ press/chair/release/senators-menendez-kaine-unveil-us-colombia-strategic-alliance- act#:~:text=J.)%2C%20Chairman%20of%20the,agenda%20for%20U.S.%2DColombia%20 relations.
4    Bob Menendez, “My bill will make the United States’ strong bond with Colombia even stronger,” Miami Herald, February 15, 2022, https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article258420598.html.
5    June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, updated December 16, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R43813.pdf.
6    US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume 1, Drug and Chemical Control, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2022, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-00767-INCSR-2022-Vol-1.pdf.
7    Government of the United States, 2022 National Drug Control Strategy, White House Executive Office of the President’s Office of National Drug Control Policy, April 21, 2022, https://www.whitehouse. gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/National-Drug-Control-2022Strategy.pdf.
8    US Embassy Bogotá, “U.S. Government Announces Bilateral Initiative to Advance Rural Development in Colombia,” US Department of State, August 18, 2020, https://co.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-announces-bilateral-initiative-to-advance-rural-development-in-colombia/.
9    Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Remarks at Georgetown University, “Promoting a Culture of Lawfulness,” US Department of State, September 13, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2004/37196.htm.
10    US Department of State press release, “Debt-for-Nature Agreement for the Republic of Colombia,” April 23, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/31741.htm.
11    US Embassy Bogotá, A one-hundred-year commitment to conservation and childhood in Colombia,” US Department of State, May 25, 2021, https://co.usembassy.gov/a-one-hundred-year-commitment-to-conservation-and-childhood-in-colombia/#:~:text=In%20%202004%2C%20the%20U.S.%20and,direct%20participation%20of%20local%20communities.
12    Simón Bolívar, “Letter from Jamaica,”1815, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Letter-from-Jamaica.

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Invest in diversity and inclusion https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-invest-in-diversity-and-inclusion/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:30:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527911 Without the participation of Afro-Colombians,
Indigenous communities, and women, it is unlikely we will achieve lasting peace and stability in Colombia and meet our global climate goals. Those in power— including Congress—must make the systemic change needed for these groups to be part of the solution.

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THE YEAR 2022 MARKs A REMARKABLE two hundred years of US-Colombia diplomatic relations. Through heartrending struggles and historic advances, Colombia remains one of our top strategic partners in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

I have worked for more than twenty years to shape US policy to deepen our relationship with Colombia and LAC, taking on tough issues like violence, drug trafficking, human rights, and the rule of law while championing trade and peaceful solutions to economic stagnation, persistent inequality, and a lack of access to opportunities. Colombia has overcome tremendous obstacles, emerging from several domestic crises to become a country that now provides refuge to nearly two million Venezuelans fleeing declining economic conditions and political instability. Colombia holds a special place in my policy agenda—so too have the Colombian people and the country’s Caribbean and Pacific communities. In my role on the bipartisan, bicameral Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, I will continue to put forward policy that supports the growth and prosperity of Colombians and LAC.

Despite notable progress in the past two decades, I am concerned about Colombia’s remaining challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare deep economic, educational, and health disparities in Colombia, as it has in the United States. It has exposed the persistent inequities faced by those who have experienced centuries of racial and ethnic discrimination and structural inequalities. That is why, as Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I continue to advocate tirelessly for increased COVID-19 vaccine accessibility and US support for global recovery efforts.

Ignoring opportunities to address root causes and propose constructive solutions to unrest in our countries hinders our ability to open pathways to prosperity and improved quality of life for more people. While I am proud of what we have accomplished together, I place a premium on peace for a sustainable future. We will not achieve lasting peace or any great endeavor with- out the participation of Black and Indigenous communities and women in Colombia and the Western Hemisphere.

Despite making up nearly 33 percent of the population in LAC, people of African descent too often remain “invisible” and underrepresented in places of decision making, influence, and mainstream leadership. Although people of African descent and Indigenous peoples in Colombia have been resilient throughout history, these communities have been some of those most impacted by internal conflict, structural inequality, and all forms of discrimination.

Colombia has the second largest population of people of African descent in Latin America, making up nearly 11 percent of the populace. Yet, according to the United Nations Development Programme, Afro-Colombians experience higher rates of poverty (54 percent) and illiteracy (11 percent), have less access to basic services (42 percent), and face greater food insecurity (59 percent) than the rest of the population.1 2 Of the 3.4 percent of Colombians who identify as Indigenous, 63 percent live in persistent forms of structural inequality.3 Despite the resilience and potential of these significant Colombian com- munities on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts, the Guajira, and the Amazon, these data sound an alarm. Regardless of the optimism by many in the inter- national community who were hopeful that the 2016 peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) would bring peace, decrease violence, and open opportunities, challenges persist. Despite leading to the demobilization and disarmament of the FARC, full implementation of the peace agreement—particularly the ethnic chapter—remains woe- fully incomplete.

This piece of the puzzle is significant because peaceful and inclusive policies and practices are necessary conditions for attracting investment, creating new jobs, and strengthening supply chains. Most investors “recognize that the viability of business itself depends on the resources of healthy ecosystems—fresh water, clean air, robust biodiversity, productive land—and on the stability of just societies.4 They value societies that prioritize the critical roles youth, women, and ethnic minorities play in shaping a country’s future. As one of those main investors, the United States and I, as Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, will continue to work with Colombia to ensure full implementation of the ethnic chapter in the agreement.

Sustainable peace in Colombia requires robust economic development that encompasses an intelligent trade policy and provides necessary assistance to affected communities, especially youth, Afro-Colombian, and Indigenous peoples. Economic empowerment, whether through access to viable employment or entrepreneurship, is key; it requires investment, access to resources, contacts, and capacity.

Many young people are working to change the existing narratives that place people of their communities at the bottom of the pyramid. Young entrepreneurs drive and shape innovation; they speed up structural changes in the economy and introduce new competition, thereby contributing to productivity. US–Colombia cooperation should invest in programs that can leap- frog them into new markets, leadership, and success in areas so often denied them. For this reason, I have been a strong advocate of programs that prepare Afro-Colombian and Indigenous youth for world-class education and global leadership opportunities with programs focused on fostering untapped talent. While women in Colombia have become increasingly active in paid work and elected offices, closing the gender gap at an impressive rate, Afro-Colombian women are neither experiencing similar growth nor present in positions of traditional decision making. Instead, women of African descent encounter higher levels of social and economic vulnerability, extreme poverty, and limited access to education and quality health services.5 Most enter the labor market at an early age in low-income, unskilled jobs, many experience early motherhood, and others are subjected to racial and gender-based violence. Our partnerships with Colombia can and should exchange good practices and identify ways to provide targeted support for women, especially women in rural areas and ethnic communities. African descendants and Indigenous women should have access to the resources they need to build businesses, expand cooperative economic empowerment initiatives, and innovate using new and ancestral technologies. I have supported programs—funded through the Inter-American Foundation—that strengthen existing grassroots and community efforts by investing in locally-led initiatives and exchange programs, targeting resources, and providing needed sup- port for these communities beyond workshops. These efforts can and should be enhanced using public-private partnerships.

I am also committed to supporting the 2010 US-Colombian Action Plan on Racial and Ethnic Equality, an important policy complement to development assistance programs and the work and mandate of the Race, Ethnicity, and Social Inclusion Unit at the US Department of State. I am dedicated to increasing funding for State Department and US Agency for International Development (USAID) diversity hiring, retention, and promotion initiatives, and expanding opportunities for minority-owned businesses, Historically Black Colleges and Universities, and other minority-serving institutions to compete for State Department contracts and grants. I support US government efforts to hire from and build relationships with local communities, including Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and women-led organizations and businesses.

In addition to these efforts, I have advocated for and supported USAID funding for the Afro-Colombian and Indigenous Peoples package, totaling nearly $92 million from 2011 to 2021, and the program’s successor, the Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Colombian Empowerment Activity 2021-2026, focused on the Caribbean, Pacific, and Amazon regions. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle in the US Congress to prioritize these efforts and provide the necessary support to ensure targeted objectives are achieved to strengthen further the foundations of inclusive and equitable development efforts in Colombia.

Despite the many concerns facing us worldwide, the Western Hemisphere remains a central priority for the Biden Administration and Congress. We are leading through diplomacy, promoting democracy, ensuring inclusive, sustainable development, and reaffirming our firm commitment to diversity as a valuable and undeniable asset of our foreign and civil service. Democracy is precious and fragile. If it is not inclusive and we do not consider the challenges facing those at the margins, growth and prosperity for the whole are fleeting.

Throughout my career in Congress, I have encouraged an open space for new voices where regional and global power meet. In 2021, I was inspired by the launch of the Afro-Interamerican Forum on Climate Change during COP26, with leaders and scientists of African descent from twelve countries in the Western Hemisphere. The forum introduced the concept of an Afro-Descendant Natural Belt of the Americas and developed a Strategy for Environmental Equity and Racial Justice in the Amazon, inclusive of the unique perspectives and culturally-sourced solutions from African descendant communities and advocates.

In Glasgow, it became clear that without the participatory contributions of the African descendant, Indigenous communities, and women in Colombia and throughout LAC, it is unlikely we will meet our global climate goals.6 While the people who have historically inhabited the Western Hemisphere and native communities worldwide are among the most vulnerable to the climate crisis, they are also the key to our planet’s survival. It is the responsibility of those in power—including those in Congress—to make the systemic change needed to empower those most affected by climate change to be at the core of its solution.7. I believe in the tremendous potential of Colombia and the powerful ties between our nations. Colombia, its institutions, and its people are stronger when we work together to prioritize inclusive and sustainable economic development, respect for human rights, and the democratic values we cherish and aspire to uphold. I am critically optimistic about the future of Colombia because Colombia, like the United States, can elevate and lever- age the talent of our diverse populations and build relationships that tap into the cultural bonds that exist in so many communities across our nations— bonds that extend beyond borders.

* * *

Representative Gregory Meeks (D-NY) has been the congressional representative for New York’s 5th District since 1998 and is the first Black member of Congress to serve as chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He is also a senior member of the House Financial Services Committee and chair- man of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Financial Institutions. He is member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    “Social Movements” in Comparative Perspectives on Afro-Latin America, eds. Kwame Dixon and John Burdick (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012), 135-155.
2    Colombia: Inclusive Economic Development, United Nations Development Programme, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Poverty%20Reduction/MDG%20Strategies/colombia.pdf.
3    “Colombia Population 2022 (Live),” World Population Review, accessed March 1, 2022, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/colombia-population.
4    ”Yvon Chouinard, Jib Ellison, and Rick Ridgeway, “The Sustainable Economy,” Harvard Business Review (October 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/10/the-sustainable-economy.
5    Julie Goldscheid, “Gender Violence Against Afro-Colombian Women: Making the Promise of International Human Rights Law Real,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review (May 27, 2020), http://hrlr.law.columbia.edu/hrlr-online/gender-violence-against-afro-colombian-women-making-the-promise-of-international-human-rights-law-real/.
6    Rep. Gregory Meeks, “Those on the front lines of climate change should be empowered to be central to its solution,” The Hill, December 1, 2021, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy- environment/583934-those-on-the-front-lines-of-climate-change-should-be/amp/.
7    Ibid

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Recognize the high stakes https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-recognize-the-high-stakes/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:30:06 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527889 The achievements of the US-Colombia relationship
have laid the foundation for what must be a new era of increased, deepened collaboration to confront new and emerging threats.

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AS WE MARK THE BICENTENNIAL of bilateral relations, we should be proud of the many successes. Our mutually beneficial alliance has been a force multiplier for hemispheric security, prosperity, and democratic governance. It is a testament to our shared democratic values and commitment to human rights. From my perspective as the lead Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the United States has no closer ally in Latin America than Colombia.

Over the last few decades, our countries confronted the scourge of narcotics trafficking and terrorism. As a result of Colombia’s political will and sustained US commitment, Colombia transformed itself into the primary pillar of Latin America’s security and stability. This success story is largely rooted in the sustained bipartisan consensus that has driven policy making from Washington and the leadership and commitment in Bogotá. It is also a testament to Colombia’s stability and prosperity as a force multiplier for US national security.

When I was first elected to Congress, conversations circled around the threats to Colombia’s existence. Violence and terrorism from the hemisphere’s longest-running conflict destabilized the region. Yet, thanks to the sacrifice of countless Colombians and staunch support from the United States, the Western Hemisphere has a strong, thriving, and prosperous democracy—and the United States has an unwavering ally. Colombia is now a hub for regional security, training, and equipping military and police personnel. Its transformation and robust democratic institutions should serve as a model for much of the region.

Progress in the security and rule of law context paved the way for the 2012 US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement that accelerated the economic relationship into the twenty-first century. These growing commercial ties have acted as a much-needed bulwark against China’s corrosive and growing influence in the region. Increased market access has created higher-quality investments and jobs in both the United States and Colombia. And thanks to Colombia’s growing technology sector and other entrepreneurs, it is home to Latin America’s highest fintech adoption rate. Yet, while the citizen security and financial situations have improved, the country still faces considerable challenges.

As I look at the next era of the bilateral relationship, I see our ally at a critical juncture. Colombia has not been immune from the regional wave of citizen dissatisfaction with government and democracy. The slow implementation of the 2016 peace agreement has meant that marginalized and violence-ridden areas of the country remain without a proper state presence. This is compounded by a growing regional influence of malign foreign actors promoting a departure from free markets and democratic principles. Against this backdrop, the United States must demonstrate to our allies that we are the partner of choice. This means Colombia’s priorities and needs should inform foreign policy and security objectives. For starters, we should streamline our foreign development and assistance to critical areas with the greatest potential impact. The US International Development Finance Corporation can best leverage private sector capabilities and innovative development tools to boost Colombia’s economic potential.

Often, our assistance is not competitive, arrives too late, or is poorly designed for the local context. We must rectify these shortcomings. Like many of its Pacific neighbors, Colombia is also confronting the challenge of Chinese fishing fleets conducting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. These fleets threaten environmentally sensitive zones and bully local patrol vessels and aircraft.1 Colombia’s affinity and commitment to the environment are incompatible with China’s poor environmental track record. While Colombia is not a signatory to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese commercial ties and investments through state-owned enterprises have grown significantly in recent years. Reversing this requires that we position ourselves as an even stronger economic partner to Colombia. Ongoing projects to nearshore parts of US supply chains closer to home provide an opportunity to do so.

Drug trafficking and organized crime remain enduring challenges for Colombia and the United States. Despite significant efforts and improvements, Colombia remains the world’s biggest producer of cocaine, with most of it ending up in the United States, where overdose rates are rising steadily. Our countries cannot afford to discontinue cocaine interdiction and coca eradication programs. As a key market for Colombian narcotics, the United States has a special responsibility to address its role in the drug trade— including the demand side of the challenge. Public health officials must take innovative steps to tackle our addiction crisis.

While we must use every proven tool to address the cocaine challenge, including exploring the possibility of aerial eradication, we cannot solely rely on eradication mechanisms. Crop substitution programs and land formalization efforts will offer legal alternatives to coca cultivation, preventing vulnerable Colombians from contributing to the narcotics trade. To ensure the sustainability of these programs, we must work to provide state presence and fill security vacuums in conflict-riddled zones.

There is no question that efforts to address the lingering narcotics issue are hampered by the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela. No country suffers the brunt of the Venezuela crisis more than Colombia. Trafficking routes have proliferated along the Venezuela-Colombia border, a safe haven for terrorist groups and drug traffickers. The presence and operations of these groups from Venezuela, along with the country’s willing relationship with pariahs like Russia, China, and Cuba, has long amplified Maduro’s ability to destabilize the region.

Close to two million Venezuelan refugees and migrants have permanently resettled in Colombia and millions more throughout the hemisphere. During my last trip to Colombia, I was awestruck by the Colombian government’s generous efforts to support these vulnerable populations. While I am proud the United States remains the largest donor for displaced Venezuelans, we should continue encouraging our international partners to fully fund their pledges and increase their contributions. With the growing migrant crisis in the region, Colombia’s efforts—and those of regional partners like Costa Rica, Mexico, and Panama—to absorb displaced Venezuelans are helping to prevent migration to the United States and the spread of instability across the region.

With Venezuela’s dire security and humanitarian crisis, restoring the country’s democracy should remain a key priority for our two countries. The Maduro regime’s destructive ideology has permeated the Americas, empowering and legitimizing authoritarians and populists. As long as criminal organizations and terrorist groups remain active in Venezuela, instability will continue plaguing the Western Hemisphere. Colombia, the United States, and like-minded partners must remain resolute on this matter.

Colombia’s half-century-long conflict has left eight million Colombians displaced within its borders, including women and children. Their reintegration is an essential part of responsibly implementing the peace agreement. Women’s empowerment must also extend to the national security space. Understanding the unique value and contribution of women and promoting women’s empowerment and participation in national security must influence our engagement moving forward.

As we mark this bicentennial, we are reminded of the high stakes in Colombia and the region. Our countries must evolve the bilateral relationship to address remaining challenges and seize future opportunities. Colombia is a model and critical player in the region; it is a democratic leader, regional security trainer, and economic power. The like-mindedness and a shared sense of purpose between our countries will continue advancing the bilateral relationship for many years to come.

* * *

Representative Michael T. McCaul (R-TX) has been the Congressional representative for Texas’s 10th congressional district since 2005. McCaul is the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and is a senior member and former chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security. McCaul previously served as Chief of Counter Terrorism and National Security in the US Attorney’s office, Western District of Texas, and led the Joint Terrorism Task Force. McCaul also served as a Texas Deputy Attorney General.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Fisheries and Aquaculture in Colombia, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, January 2021, https://www.oecd.org/agriculture/topics/fisheries-and-aquaculture/documents/report_cn_fish_col.pdf

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Adapt intelligence capabilities for new threats https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-adapt-intelligence-capabilities-for-new-threats/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:27:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527787 Colombia continues to grapple with internal security
challenges years after the peace agreement. The United States should continue to work with Colombia to address evolving security threats.

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COLOMBIA’S SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY are at a crossroads. Nearly six years after the Colombian government under then-President Juan Manuel Santos signed a peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s armed conflict remains a reality. Violence is escalating in critical rural and border areas, while urban centers report a deterioration in citizen security. The gains of two decades of sustained US security and intelligence cooperation are increasingly at risk.

A model for bilateral cooperation

Colombia offers a template for a lasting mutually-beneficial security and intelligence partnership with the United States. Through Plan Colombia, the United States provided Colombia, nearing the brink of failed state status in 2000, with security, intelligence, and economic development aid to battle the FARC and other criminal groups. The multi-billion-dollar US program supported Colombia’s efforts to counter narcotics trafficking, train and equip law enforcement and the military, and promote economic growth in areas lacking state presence.1 This supported an unprecedented whole-of-government approach by then-President Álvaro Uribe, including the “Democratic Security” policy and the multi-year counterterrorism “Patriot Plan.”

Two elements were unique to Plan Colombia. The first was well-coordinated and equipped joint operations between the different branches of Colombia’s armed forces (including shifts in military doctrine). The second was its focus on revamping intelligence capabilities. A combination of US equipment and training assistance gave Colombia’s military renewed confidence.

Colombian security forces—the National Police and military—developed human intelligence, signals intercept capabilities, imagery exploitation, and rapid battlefield damage assessment collection. Superior aerial capabilities allowed security forces to develop operationally actionable intelligence. Military intelligence personnel expanded and intelligence was integrated into military operations.

The United States also worked with civilian intelligence—the Colombian National Intelligence Directorate (DNI)—to incorporate sound intelligence practices with improved oversight of the Colombian National Police and military. This contributed to cutting homicides in Colombia by half and a 90 percent decline in kidnappings and terrorist attacks.2

However, while military intelligence improved, not enough attention was given to enhancing civilian and military intelligence coordination. Future cooperation to strengthen Colombia’s security forces should address this shortcoming, while also focusing on addressing corruption, increasing transparency, and preventing excessive use of force and human rights violations.

A crisis unraveling

Colombia continues to grapple with security and defense challenges, despite the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC. In 2021, the country reached the highest homicide rate since 2014. From January to March 2022, there were twenty-three recorded massacres with sixty-one victims, adding to ninety-six massacres with 338 victims in 2021.3There was also a four-year increase in victims of improvised explosive devices between 2017 and 2021.4

With the FARC’s disarmament, conflict centers mainly around the National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC dissidents have sprung up. These include Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP, and bandas criminales (BACRIM), including the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces (also known as the “Gulf Clan”) and the “Border Commands,” previously known as “the Mafia.” By 2021, there were reported to be at least 36 FARC dissident groups with more than 5,200 combatants.5

The situation along the porous 1,378-mile Colombia-Venezuela border is particularly tense and often overlooked. Colombia’s Arauca State and Ven- ezuela’s Apure State have become a war zone between FARC dissidents, the ELN, and the Venezuelan military. Violence escalated in 2022 with at least eighty-seven homicides in Arauca by March.6

Competition to control the lucrative illicit activities market—primarily narco-trafficking, but also illegal mining, counterfeiting, and contraband smuggling—remains the main driver of violence.7While the government took important steps to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine production in 2021, a 2015 ban on aerial fumigation with glyphosate maintained by Colombia’s Supreme Court has contributed to all-time highs in coca crops and total cocaine production.8

Colombia’s Unified Risk Monitoring Mechanism, a conflict-monitoring instrument of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP),9 identified the twelve areas most afflicted by violence.10 These regions correlate almost perfectly with areas that report the highest rates of illicit coca production or illicit mining, including the border areas with Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela, which provide trafficking routes.11There is also a close correlation between the assassination of social leaders and FARC ex-combatants and regions with high narco-trafficking.12 This demonstrates the state’s failure to recover FARC-era strongholds, with military and institutional presence seen only in sporadic raids.13 Citizen insecurity in major urban centers is also rising, including acts of terrorism.14

Opportunities ahead

The tactics used in today’s conflicts are sophisticated. Intelligence is the first line of defense. Unfortunately, early investments in military intelligence and much-needed civilian intelligence reforms did not focus adequately on creating a Colombian intelligence community. Intelligence cooperation must now focus on building this community, fostering sharing intelligence, and countering the threats posed by criminal actors operating with smaller cells, sophisticated courier networks, and a growing dark web footprint.15

The DNI, Colombia’s primary civilian intelligence organization, must be strengthened to coordinate more closely with military intelligence. While the DNI produces analysis and is responsible for counterintelligence activities, it operates in silos from the intelligence organizations of the National Police, Air Force, Army, and Navy. Fusing intelligence—taking disparate types of intelligence collection and combining them to provide more operationally relevant information—should be a priority moving forward. Ensuring national-level civilian combat support agencies supplement the military is also crucial.

How could the United States support these improvements?

First, the United States should support the creation of joint committees and civilian combat support units to improve US-Colombia intelligence collaboration. These efforts should build on successful experiences and incorporate technical support from the United States and other allies across the world like Israel and the United Kingdom.

Second, the United States should work with Colombia to update the strategy and equipment used to target border violence, conflict hotspots, and the financial operations of criminal actors. Colombia could better staff the DNI and commit to evaluating how bureaucratic and administrative hurdles limit efficacy and contribute to corruption. With US support, Colombia should also enhance efforts to improve human rights and professional standards.

Third, the whole-of-government approach that recovered territorial control in certain areas during Plan Colombia should be restored. The Colombian government should focus on setting measurable objectives to reduce the size of the BACRIM and remaining FARC disenfranchised personnel, while reevaluating the more traditional warfare approach it adopted following the peace agreement. An incoming government should prioritize a strategy that synchronizes security, intelligence, economic development, and human rights objectives in high-risk territories.

Finally, the United States and Colombia should prioritize bilateral strategic security dialogues that build on the framework provided by the US-Colombia High Level Dialogue. Future dialogues should incorporate interagency participation and focus on combating armed non-state actors, strengthening US support for Colombia’s whole-of-government approach to the conflict.

Both the United States and Colombia must recognize the gravity of large swathes of Colombian territory in the hands of new criminal actors. In March 2022, President Joseph R. Biden announced his intention to designate Colombia as a Major non-NATO ally, signaling the importance of the bilateral security partnership and granting Colombia preferential access to trade and security cooperation.16Colombia stands as the only country in Latin America designated as a NATO Global Partner.

Colombia: A vital partner in the hemisphere

The United States and the Western Hemisphere benefit from a strong partnership with Colombia. Its security gains in the last two decades have positioned it as Latin America’s third-largest economy and an indispensable security partner to the US, training police and prosecutors in Latin America and other regions. With a new yet focused strategy in place, Colombia is well-positioned to reverse the tide of transnational organized crime afflicting our hemisphere.

US intelligence and security cooperation with Colombia bore positive results for both countries over the past two decades. It would be unwise to overlook a partner with a demonstrated record of results and a willingness to learn from past mistakes. With current and looming internal and external threats to Colombia’s democratic future, too much is at stake to disregard the lessons learned of a fruitful partnership and apply those lessons to this vital relationship in the Americas.

* * *

Kiron K. Skinner is the Taube Professor for International Relations and Politics at Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Politics and Strategy. Skinner formerly served at the US Department of State as the director for policy planning and senior adviser to the secretary of state. Skinner is a life-time director on the board of the Atlantic Council and a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy.

David R. Shedd is a former deputy director of national intelligence for policy, plans, and requirements. Between 2005 and 2007, Shedd served as chief of staff and acting director of the intelligence staff to the director of national intelligence. He also held several posts at the National Security Council from 2001 to 2005, including special assistant to the president and senior director for intelligence programs and reform.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Nick Miroff, “‘Plan Colombia’: How Washington learned to love Latin American intervention again,” Washington Post, September 18, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/plan-colombia-how-washington-learned-to-love-latin-american-intervention- again/2016/09/18/ddaeae1c-3199-4ea3-8d0f-69ee1cbda589_story.html.
2    US Global Leadership Coalition, “Plan Colombia: A Development Success Story,” 2015, https://www.usglc.org/media/2017/04/USGLC-Plan-Colombia.pdf.
3    Observatory on Human Rights, Conflict, and Peace, “Massacres in Colombia During 2020, 2021, and 2022,” Indepaz, March 16, 2022, https://indepaz.org.co/informe-de-masacres-en-colombia- durante-el-2020-2021/.
4    Lorenzo Caraffi et al., “Colombia: Living in the Shadow of Armed Conflict,” International Committee for the Red Cross, March 23, 2022, https://www.icrc.org/es/document/balance-humanitario-colombia-2022-dih.
5    Andres Granadillo, “Mortiferous Territorial Dispute in Colombia between Dissidents of the FARC and the ELN,” France 24, April 1, 2022, https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20220104-mort%C3%ADfera-disputa-territorial-en-colombia-entre-disidencias-de-las- farc-y-el-eln.
6    Medellin Editors, “Humanitarian Caravan for Life in Arauca,” Colombia Informa, March 21, 2022, https://www.colombiainforma.info/caravana-humanitaria-por-la-vida-en-arauca/.
7    Andres Molano Rojas and Juan Moncada, “Illegal economies versus business initiative: Implications of disloyal competition,” Instituto de Ciencia Politica, August 2017, https://www.icpcolombia.org/dev/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17.08-EN-CONTEXTO-KAS-15-ECONOMIAS-ILEGALES-1.pdf.
8    Christine Armario, “US report: Colombia coca production still at record high,” AP News, March 5, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/0aa6474b944f4ff8eb9e7e9cffffce87.
9    The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) is the transitional justice mechanism instituted by the Colombian government following the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC.
10    Cristina Navarro, “12 Zones Identified in Armed Conflict with Colombia,” Caracol, February 16, 2022, https://caracol.com.co/radio/2022/02/17/judicial/1645060792_011828.html.
11    “US Department-Level Coca Production Estimates for Colombia,” uploaded by InSightCrime for Scribd, 2016, https://www.scribd.com/document/342745017/US-Department-Level-Coca- Production-Estimates-for-Colombia.
12    “More than 900 social leaders assassinated in Colombia since 2016,” DW, April 19, 2021, https://www.dw.com/es/m%C3%A1s-de-900-l%C3%ADderes-sociales-asesinados-en-colombia-desde-2016/a-57257906.
13    Latin America and the Caribbean, “A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC,” International Crisis Group, November 30, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/092-fight-other-means-keeping-peace-colombias-farc.
14    Vanessa Perez Diaz, “National Concern Over Deterioration of Urban Security in the Country Throughout 2021,” Asuntos Legales, March 12, 2021, https://www.asuntoslegales.com.co/actualidad/preocupacion-por-el-deterioro-de-la-seguridad-urbana-en-el-territorio-nacional-3138426.
15    Timothy Quintero, “The Connected Black Market: How the Dark Web Has Empowered LatAm Organized Crime,” InSightCrime, September 13, 2017, https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/connected-black-market-how-dark-web-empowered-latam-organized-crime/.
16    “Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden and President Iván Duque Marquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership,” The White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez-of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.

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Think broader to advance security https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-think-broader-to-advance-security/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:26:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527743 Advancing the US-Colombia security relationship through innovation is in the best interest of both countries. A stronger Colombia can spur democracy and freedom in the Western Hemisphere, while a weaker Colombia opens the door to regional violence and instability. Colombia cannot fall or fail.

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THE BICENTENNIAL OF US-COLOMBIA diplomatic relations is an opportunity to reflect on an historic and enduring relationship. Our shared history is rooted in common values, a commitment to defending democracy, protecting human rights, and promoting shared prosperity. While the relationship continues to flourish on many fronts—from trade and investment to the deployment of advanced technologies and a green economy—the security partnership is especially vital for our nations’ future.

The security partnership has personally impacted me. It brought me to the United States as a child in the 1980s, when my father participated in a military education program. Years later, while visiting NATO headquarters, I met a US colonel who I would later learn advised the Colombian military and was a friend to my father. His support and care for Colombia was a real push for Colombia´s military agenda for years to come. The positive influence the security partnership has had on my own life reflects how it has charted a brighter future for both our countries. Personal connections and friendships matter.

From a special relationship to strategic allies

Simón Bolívar was inspired by the ideals that led to the creation of the United States; a free republic as envisioned by the United States’ founding fathers was the same vision patriots had for Colombia. Both countries also share a strong commitment to multilateral and international institutions, participating in the creation of the United Nations, the Bret- ton Woods institutions, and the Organization of American States. In 1951, Colombia became the only Latin American country that responded to the UN call for troops in the Korean peninsula. Our sacrifice of close to eight hundred Colombian soldiers resulted in a stronger military-to-military relationship with the United States.

The relationship grew even closer during the Cold War, with the United States providing support to enhance Colombian military equipment, education, doctrine, and training programs on counterinsurgency. The formation of the lanceros school, modeled on the US Army Ranger School, was a highlight. Colombia participated in UN peacekeeping operations in the Suez Canal in 1956 and the Sinai Peninsula, starting in 1981. During the 1970s through the 1990s, the security relationship focused more on count- er-narcotics and law and order activities. By the 1990s, Marxist guerrillas and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia funded their activities through the drug business, which was rapidly growing and expanding. By the end of the twentieth century, violence was at its peak, and Colombia was close to failure.

In response to these threats, Plan Colombia, which was initially conceived by Colombia, became a US foreign policy initiative in the late 1990s to provide invaluable support to Colombia. It acknowledged that, as the largest consumer of cocaine globally, the United States shared responsibility in addressing the illicit drug trade. Conceived by Colombian President Andrés Pastrana and crafted by President William J. Clinton, binational and bipartisan support for Plan Colombia has endured for more than twenty years; it is arguably the most successful US bipartisan foreign policy in decades. As evidence, consider that Colombia reduced all violence indicators, cocaine production decreased until 2013, the Colombian economy grew faster than those of other Latin American countries, poverty was cut by more than half in less than twenty years, and the country has become the largest security exporter in the region.

With support from Colombian taxpayers, US-enhanced Colombian military and police capabilities—including mobility, intelligence, special operations, and professional standards—have strengthened the Colombian Armed Forces, which allowed it to wage a campaign of successful and sustained blows against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest guerilla group. President Álvaro Uribe’s leadership on security and policy also contributed decisively to the campaign’s success. The security policy of the first five years of the Santos administration further weakened the FARC. These efforts allowed the Colombian government to negotiate peace from a position of strength.

Where are we today?

Colombia faces a complex scenario and four main challenges that could imply a downturn after years of advancement. First, the 2016 Havana Agreements have not brought peace as envisioned. While they have resulted in significant FARC demobilization and disarmament and pro- vided a development program for marginal areas, the agreements also led to renewed unrest and political division. They have implied impunity for war crimes, higher benefits for perpetrators than victims, the weakening of a successful security strategy, and a national consensus for security.

The worst development has been the increase of cocaine and illicit mining enterprises, which illegal groups have diligently exploited. This has created renewed risks for stability and territorial control, contributing to human rights violations, crimes against social leaders, political corruption, and the destruction of the tropical forests and contamination of rivers. The strengthening of the National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC surrogates and dissidents, and other criminal actors have kept real peace out of reach for Colombians.

Second, as in all countries, the COVID-19 pandemic has had steep economic and social consequences in addition to the loss of lives. Despite the Colombian government’s well-regarded performance in enhancing the healthcare system’s response capabilities and an accelerated vaccination process, dramatic unemployment exacerbated historical inequality and poverty, contributing to societal instability, potentially threatening security.

Third, the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega’s regime in Nicaragua are sources of human rights violations, threats to freedom and democracy, and instability for Latin America and the Caribbean. In Venezuela, poor economic management has created the greatest ever refugee and migration crisis in the Western Hemisphere, with nearly two mil- lion Venezuelans already living in Colombia.

In addition, Venezuela is a safe haven for terrorist groups that plan and operate against Colombia and US interests, including a June 2021 attempt against President Iván Duque’s life. This safe heaven provides a favorable business environment for criminals, allowing them to smuggle drugs to the United States and other countries, and permitting the illegal mining of gold and other minerals in Colombia and Venezuela. Venezuela and Nicaragua have become footholds of aggressive extra-regional powers like Russia, allowing for foreign military presence and intelligence capabilities in their territories.

Fourth, global issues have worsened or emerged in recent years, including cyber threats, disinformation, climate change, pandemics, and war. These are poised to create a more unstable environment for democratic institutions and societies. We must not underestimate the risk of intervention and biased results in democratic elections. Undermining a country’s elections is, at its core, a grievous assault on the sovereignty of any nation and one with dire security consequences.

What comes next?

A stronger Colombia can spur democracy and freedom in the Western Hemisphere, while a weaker one opens the door to regional security threats and instability. To ensure Colombia does not fall or fail, and remains an indispensable security partner to the United States, the US-Colombia partnership should focus on the following areas of cooperation:

  • Reconciliation and justice. Consolidating peace and stability in Colombia requires national reconciliation and providing development and market opportunities for the country’s most isolated areas. This would entail a long-term plan that includes rebalancing the current peace agreement framework with a higher focus on victims. Modernization of our justice system is also necessary and will con- tribute to enhanced state credibility in a country with high levels of impunity.
  • Economic and social prosperity. The bilateral agenda should focus on reducing inequality, promoting employment and entrepreneur- ship opportunities, and defeating extreme poverty. Economic and social prosperity is the best tool to undermine populism, authoritarianism, and the illicit economies that threaten our shared security.
  • Education, development, and technology. Although not traditionally associated with enhancing the security paradigm, new and expanded efforts focused on education, export promotion, energy development, and digital infrastructure would contribute to countering today’s security challenges. A joint program to dramatically increase student exchanges and higher-quality education for Colombians, especially in the digital and programming fields and English-language instruction, would contribute to a more skilled and competitive labor force. Expanding and enabling faster access of Colombian agro-industrial products to US markets is crucial to unleash Colombia’s potential as a major food and input producer. Mining development as part of the supply chain for new clean energy technologies and semiconductors in the digital realm presents opportunities for both countries. Investment in infrastructure and 5G and 6G connectivity is essential for Colombia’s competitiveness and attracting industries seeking nearshoring options.
  • A “cancel culture” for illegal drugs. An unavoidable subject is the need to develop a strategy to end the international illegal drug trade permanently. Colombia must continue to fight criminal organizations that profit from cocaine. Given its shared responsibility, the United States should continue to support Colombia with proven efforts against narcotrafficking. We are hopeful our US partners will join us in exploring new techniques and data analytics to make progress on eradication, alternative crop cultivation, and countering money laundering. Beyond that, the demand for cocaine should be addressed with different approaches, including new technologies to undermine cultivation. Consumption is the real problem and treating it as a public health concern is insufficient. We need to create a “cancel culture” around the use of cocaine based on the destruction it causes to lives and the environment while funding crime and rogue regimes.
  • Even stronger security ties. The potential to expand the US-Colombia security partnership is exponential. The years of strong military-to-military operational coordination and the framework for designation as a Major non-NATO Ally, as President Joseph R. Biden recently stated his intent to do,1 present an opportunity to deepen ties in doctrine, interoperability, and training. Cooperation in intelligence, cyber technology, and equipment for conventional military operations can transform Colombia’s traditional counterinsurgency capabilities into a broader spectrum of military operations. Multiple missions could be developed for humanitarian assistance, natural disaster relief, and security and stabilization operations. Finally, the opportunity for advanced technology sharing, pre-positioned stockpiles, lend and lease programs, and preferred status for excess defense articles from the United States should boost Colombia’s contribution to regional and global peace and stability.

In sum, the US-Colombia relationship has a bright future. One of its greatest strengths is its people-to-people connections. Colombian Americans are making contributions everywhere: academia, politics, business, military, science, sports and communities across the United States. In a bilateral meeting on March 10, 2022, with President Duque, President Biden reinforced the strength of our special relationship, stating: “Colombia is the lynchpin, in my view, to the whole hemisphere—north and south.… The US-Colombia relationship is the foundation … of regional security and prosperity, and it’s only going to grow more important in the years ahead.” During that meeting, President Duque, remarking on President Biden’s stated intent to designate Colombia a strategic Major non-NATO Ally, said that “we are taking the bilateral relationship to the highest peak ever.”2

* * *

Amb. Juan Carlos Pinzón has served as Colombia’s ambassador to the United States since 2021. He was the president of Probogotá between 2018-2021 and Colombia’s ambassador to the United States between 2015-2017. During his first ambassadorship, Pinzón established the US-Colombia Business Council and contributed to Atlantic Council work on the US-Colombia relation- ship. Previously, Pinzón was Colombia’s minister of defense from 2011– 2015. He was a presidential candidate in 2018.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint- statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque- marquez-of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.
2    Ibid.

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Ensure a whole-of-government approach https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-ensure-a-whole-of-government-approach/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:26:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527724 Despite the great potential to achieve long-term peace throughout Colombia, without a well-funded whole-of- government approach focused on social recovery of territory, these efforts run the risk of not living up to their promise and that of the 2016 peace accord.

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I WAS FIRST EXPOSED TO the whole-of-government approach to securing long-term peace in Colombia, formerly called “consolidation” or “integrated action”—and more recently known as “stabilization”— during a 2008 trip to Cartagena with Admiral James Stavridis, former commander of US Southern Command. It has continued to shape my thinking, including during my time as deputy assistant secretary of defense for West-
ern Hemisphere Affairs (2013-2016).

The logic behind stabilization is simple and makes sense, but the approach requires tremendous resources and political will. Although the armed forces are critical to the physical recovery of territory, they cannot guarantee lasting peace. After the military secures an area, civilian agencies must follow through with basic services like building and staffing schools and hospitals, improving infrastructure, stimulating economic development, and enhancing the rule of law. As Colombia seeks to implement the 2016 peace accord, the complete execution of this strategy is more urgent than ever.

As a former US Department of Defense official, I can say with certainty that no matter how capable the armed forces are, Colombia will not be able to leave the cycle of violence behind without the robust presence of non-military agencies in remote areas. Although the Colombian government has tasked soldiers with leading development efforts in much of the country, militarization is not the solution. It will take the sustained action of civilian ministries to prove that renewed state presence in rural areas is beneficial and permanent.

Decades of state absence in rural regions has become one of Colombia’s most significant modern-day challenges. Civil rule quickly eroded in the 1960s after guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) took up arms against the Colombian government and established operations in remote areas. Rural Colombian residents were forced to abandon their land, while those who remained faced widespread violence and injustice. Over the next decades, state absence in many rural areas created growing space for the illegal drug trade, exacerbated widespread violence, and led to a greater consolidation of guerrilla powers.

In the post-COVID-19 era, addressing historical governance, security, and state presence deficiencies is critical. Despite an initial reduction in violence after signing the peace accord, new forms of conflict-related violence have increased at alarming rates, particularly against social leaders and human rights defenders.1 Now is the time for Colombia to double down on the whole-of-government approach and for the United States to commit to supporting its partner. While observers point to Plan Colombia as a success, we risk jeopardizing sustainable peace and stability in the region with- out first acknowledging its gaps and our plans to fill them. We’ve seen the results of successful security cooperation, and there is no reason for stabilization to fail if it is prioritized and properly funded.

A brief history of stabilization

Colombia and the United States have long recognized the critical role of non-military actors in long-term peace-building. In fact, the United States has supported Colombia’s whole-of-government approach since its inception, following the creation of the Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI) in 2007. The first CCAI conference I attended during my 2008 visit to Cartagena left me full of hope for Colombia’s future. Both the Colombian and US participants demonstrated a commitment to an interagency strategy. Given that President Juan Manuel Santos, then-Defense Minister, was one of CCAI’s leading advocates, I wasn’t too worried about the fact that the military outnumbered the civilian attendees. I was optimistic about increased civilian participation in the effort due to the active participation of President Álvaro Uribe and non-military agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which suggested that stabilization would truly be an interagency endeavor, living up to the “integrated action” label.

CCAI’s first foray into social recovery and integrated action was in the Macarena region, a coca production hotbed under FARC control that I visited during my first months as deputy assistant secretary of defense. I could see why Macarena had become a recipient of US assistance. The Colombian Army Commander, who coordinated and led the visit, had reason to be proud. I found it remarkable that the armed forces had secured the area after it had been a FARC stronghold for decades without any real state presence. Unfortunately, a robust civilian surge did not follow the armed forces into the Macarena region. Soldiers, not civilians, were leading development projects and interacting with the local population. Today, fifteen years after the creation of CCAI and despite the government’s best intentions, work remains in pursuit of this critical mission.

In the years since the creation of CCAI, the Colombian government introduced the Territorially Focused Development Program (PDETs in Spanish) to implement the Comprehensive Rural Reform chapter under the 2016 peace accord. PDETs cover 36 percent of Colombia’s territory and stand at the center of the government’s strategy for the comprehensive development of the 170 municipalities most affected by conflict, the absence or weakness of the state, and illicit activities.

The US government provides significant support to this approach, particularly though USAID. The agency’s Country Development Strategy for Colombia prioritizes PDET municipalities, estimating that approximately 75 percent of aid will be directed to these areas through 2025.2 The PDETs have also attracted investment from US philanthropists and donors such as Howard Buffett. Still, they remain largely under-resourced. Further US-Colombia cooperation to enhance transportation, healthcare, education, and economic development in PDETs will be critical for their success and fulfilling the peace accords’ promise of ending Colombia’s cycles of violence.

The way forward

Social recovery is possible. Although program names have changed, Colombia’s leadership continues to advocate for stabilization as the main strategy to mitigate violence, strengthen state presence, and consolidate peace.

This whole-of-government approach should continue to inform US assistance to Colombia, which has increased 152 percent since 2016.3 More specifically, aid geared toward governance has more than doubled to $410 million since the signing of the peace accord, with a greater focus on civil society, economic development, and peacebuilding than in-country narcotics control and traditional security cooperation.4. However, the multidimensional Venezuelan refugee crisis, coupled with the lingering socioeconomic effects caused by COVID-19, has left Colombia in a precarious fiscal situation. The country has been generous in accepting nearly two million Venezuelan migrants, granting them access to employment, education, health- care, and other social services, and offering a ten-year temporary protected status. Recommitting to support Colombia as it absorbs this population is more critical than ever.

Future US stabilization resources should build on more than two decades of strategic US-Colombia partnership for social recovery. The administration of President Barack Obama supported CCAI through its Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, and the Biden administration remains a key partner of the Colombian government and could do even more in implementing the PDETs. For instance, PDET zones in Catatumbo that specialize in producing cacao, papaya, and palm oil, directly benefiting more than 20,000 agricultural families, would benefit from greater attention from the international donor community.5

To inform future assistance, subsequent US administrations should look at the 2018 Framework for US Stabilization developed by the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, and USAID.6The United States could work with Colombia to scale up existing interagency initiatives such as the Misión para la Transformación del Campo (Mission to Transform the Countryside),7 designed to narrow gaps between urban and rural Colombia and accelerate rural development—a prerequisite to achieving lasting peace. Beyond agriculture, investments in health and education coverage, rural entrepreneurship programs, primary and tertiary roads, eco-tourism, and other development programs should be prioritized. These programs will require close interagency coordination, particularly among Colombia’s agriculture, education, transportation, commerce, health, and defense ministries.

In addition, the United States could offer a wealth of experience and technical knowledge to non-military government agencies in Colombia. For example, the US Department of Agriculture could provide expertise in crop control, yield prediction, and pest control to Colombia’s Ministry of Agriculture to better use Colombia’s fertile lands, particularly in PDET regions. Such agency-to-agency knowledge-sharing could be an extra incentive for other Colombian agencies and civil society groups to establish a presence in rural regions.

The US and Colombian private sectors can also play a critical role in sup- porting rural regions. Companies can provide technical expertise to farmers looking to sell their products in urban areas by teaching them best practices to transport their crops or how to better market their products to bigger stores. The existing US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement could also be leveraged to create a market in the United States for agricultural products produced in conflict-affected territories.

Despite the great potential that PDETs and similar stabilization programs have to achieve long-term peace in Colombia, without a greater commitment from a diverse group of government agencies coupled with US and international support, these efforts run the risk of not living up to their promise and that of the 2016 peace accord. Now is the time to ensure the sustainability of interagency coordination models by opening the discussion on their progress, benefits, and the needed adjustments to consolidate state presence and governance.

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Rebecca Bill Chavez is the Inter-American Dialogue’s president and CEO. From 2013 until 2016, Dr. Chavez was deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, where her focus areas included defense institution building, combating law enforcement militarization, and women, peace, and security initiatives. Before joining the administration of President Barack Obama, Dr. Chavez was a tenured professor of political science at the US Naval Academy.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    World Report 2022, Human Rights Watch, March 08, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia#.
2    Peace, Stability, & Prosperity: Country Development Cooperation Strategy July 17, 2020 – July 17, 2025, US Agency for International Development, July 2020, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/Colombia_CDCS_Narrative_Public-Oc7-2020.pdf.
3    As of 2020, the latest complete dataset available. US Agency for International Development, “US Foreign Assistance by Country: Colombia,” ForeignAssistance.gov, accessed March 15, 2022, https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/colombia/2020/obligations/0.
4    “Colombia Aid,” Google spreadsheet, accessed March 1, 2022, https://docs.google. com/spreadsheets/d/1P8IEn5b4XlUOD0xYatu3SH1L6jgNPuY0QDggAiDWqF0/ edit#gid=1299308071
5    Jorge Andrés Ríos Tangua, “Catatumbo, una gran despensa agrícola por aprovechar,” La Opinión, May 2, 2018, https://www.laopinion.com.co/economia/catatumbo-una-gran- despensa-agricola-por-aprovechar.
6    US Department of State, Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts To Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, 2018, https://www.state.gov/reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework- for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected- areas-2018/.
7    La Misión para la Transformación del Campo (Mission to Transform the Countryside or MTC) is a national government initiative with a technical secretariat from the National Planning Department and the support of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Department of Social Prosperity. Its objective is to elaborate a robust and broad portfolio of instruments and public policies to develop the Colombian countryside over the next twenty years. The MTC differs from other government initiatives insofar as it contemplates a comprehensive and long-term vision in which productivity and competitiveness go hand-in-hand with the well-being of rural residents.

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Invest in our military relationship https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-invest-in-our-military-relationship/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:25:12 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527694 Hemispheric and global security benefit from the Colombian military’s highly skilled forces and the US-Colombia security partnership. We should build on the fundamental strengths of the US-Colombia military relationship and prioritize areas for our militaries to further enhance the relationship in the ever-changing global security environment.

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During my final trip to Colombia as the Commander of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in September 2021, I visited the Colombian Military Inclusive Rehabilitation Center. The facility was built by the Colombian and South Korean governments to commemorate the Colombian troops who sacrificed their lives for freedom on the Korean peninsula. I spoke with soldiers who bravely fought and lost limbs in battles against terrorist organizations like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), FARC dissidents, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and drug trafficking groups such as Clan del Golfo. That visit solidified one profound truth: Colombia is relentlessly committed to playing a key role in regional and international security. It was true when our nations established diplomatic relations in 1822, it was true during the Korean War in 1950, and it’s as true as ever today.

In 2022, democracy is under assault from multiple threats around the world, including Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) growing global malign ambitions, Iran, North Korea, terrorism, and the increased sophistication of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).

Like-minded democratic nations must build ironclad security alliances based on trust to counter these threats and protect our populations. In Latin America and the Caribbean—our shared neighborhood—Colombia is one of the United States’ most trusted partners. The Colombian military works to enhance professionalism and war-fighting ability through a relentless focus on human rights and the ethical use of force in everything from education to training, exercises, and multinational operations. Hemispheric and global security benefit from the Colombian military’s highly skilled forces and the US-Colombia military security partnership. Now is the moment for our two militaries to further enhance the relationship in the ever-changing global security environment.

When I reflect on how far Colombia has come in recent decades, I’m impressed by our partner’s progress. As recently as the 1980s and 1990s, Colombia was mired in narcotics wars, Pablo Escobar was a household name, and the central government teetered on collapse. Today, while threats from narco-terrorists remain, Colombia is a key regional leader and security exporter. In its ongoing fight, the military has sustained an exceptionally high tempo while maintaining the trust and confidence of the population. For the past seven years, Colombia has led Operation Orion, a multinational, multi-domain (land, air, sea, and cyber) counter-narcotics operation. In 2021, Orion disrupted more than 200 metric tons of cocaine and captured more than 100 TCO aircraft and vessels, keeping drugs off Colombian and US streets and thus, saving lives. The Colombian Air Force annually participates in the US Air Force Red Flag exercise, and the US Air Force participates in the annual Colombian regional “Relampago-Lightening” and “Angel of the Andes” exercises.

Colombia supports its neighbors by responding to natural disasters caused by climate change. Following the 7.2-magnitude earthquake that struck Haiti in 2021, Colombia sent two Air Force planes transporting an urban search and rescue team and 12 tons of humanitarian aid, including food, cleaning supplies, and blankets. At the 2021 UN Climate Change COP26 summit in Glasgow, Colombia joined Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Panama to expand their maritime protected areas, partly to deter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing from PRC-flagged vessels.

Colombia’s transformation into a regional leader did not happen over- night. It has taken decades of sustained training, partnership, and collaboration. The US-Colombia Action Plan (USCAP), an outgrowth of the highly successful Plan Colombia launched in 2000, continues today. Through USCAP, Colombian soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen, with modest assistance from the United States, train partners across Central and South America for security missions. Colombia has fully operationalized Spanish-language entry-level and advanced helicopter training schools for forces around the world. The US army once ran this training at Fort Rucker, Alabama, but Colombia has expanded it and made it world class.

I have toured Colombian facilities where helicopter pilot and maintenance training are conducted to NATO standards, emphasizing professionalism and self-sustainment at a fraction of what it would cost elsewhere. Colombia also inaugurated a NATO-certified demining course and deploys United Nations peacekeeping forces worldwide, demonstrating its commitment to global stability and humanitarian causes. As a result, the administration of President Joseph R. Biden has nominated Colombia to become a full Major non-NATO Ally.1

The key to the Colombian military’s success boils down to one word: professionalism. Global military professionals recognize the Colombian Armed Forces (CAF) for their fighting ability and ethical use of force. The CAF understands the importance of professionalism in their ranks, from the commander-in-chief (the president) to the newest conscript. The Colombian military works hard every day to educate and train to the highest human rights standards, reinforcing professional behavior by awarding and promoting officers who uphold these standards and taking legal action against officers who violate them.

Colombian military officials understand that strong, professional, corruption-free institutions are the best bulwark against insecurity and instability. Among professional militaries, trust is the foundation to build the ethically-based military skills necessary to deter and defeat threats. Nations must invest sufficient resources in people, processes, and programs to build trusted security relationships.

I have met with all levels of Colombian officers and enlisted soldiers and found no nation more committed to education and professional development for its military personnel than the CAF. It often commits its funds to send commissioned and non-commissioned officers to attend US military academies, participates in SOUTHCOM’s Women, Peace, and Security Program, and engages in numerous regional military exercises. But today’s progress does not guarantee future success. Improvements in all militaries and alliances require a sustained commitment in resources and time, under- pinned by relentless self-assessment and investments in education, training, doctrine, exercises, and equipment to keep pace with evolving and growing threats. Military success also requires institutional professionalism with trusted processes that produce corruption-free procurement, budgets matched to strategic needs, and a balance between modernization and sustainment (keeping existing equipment ready to use).

To continue enhancing and accelerating the US-Colombia military relationship, we should:

  • Reinvigorate the existing regional security architecture, put real substance into what it means to be a Major non-NATO ally, and develop new multinational security mechanisms. Considering global trends, are existing bilateral and multilateral exercises, pro- grams, and security mechanisms enough? For example, NATO partner-militaries annually participate in bilateral exercises and military-to-military programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Why not combine efforts within a more robust policy framework? In 2021, SOUTHCOM sponsored a NATO conference to explore first steps in enhancing Western Hemisphere security. Policy makers should seize on these first steps and expand historical NATO global partnerships and other partnerships, such as the Inter-American Defense Board of the Organization of American States, to build professional armed forces and enhance mutual defense.
  • Overhaul the US system of foreign military sales, financing, and US Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation. Current systems and processes are inadequate for the tempo of conflict and competition the world now faces. They are under-resourced and often held hostage to annual budgeting exercises. When I was SOUTHCOM commander, I would often say, “why are we blocking our own field goals with respect to many of our security assistance programs?” To win in conflict and competition, we must be consistent, agile, and have an adequate level of investment. We must be on the field globally to compete and win; presence matters. We should not hold partner-nation militaries to higher standards than our own. The US Department of State (DOS) must lead for foreign assistance, but DoD security cooperation programs have a role alongside DOS. Programs should include sufficient flexibility to respond to the rap- idly changing security environment. Develop multi-year security cooperation programs with a designated floor that is not subject to annual reprogramming or the debilitating impacts of continuing resolutions. Congress plays a critical role and should develop oversight mechanisms that are not subject to yearly change and beholden to narrow political interests.
  • Increase investment in Colombian and Latin America and Caribbean security cooperation programs. Consistent, long-term efforts are necessary. A strong and professional Colombian military is not enough. Given geographic proximity to the United States, security in Latin American and the Caribbean is intertwined with US national security, yet we severely underinvest in security assistance in our hemisphere. The Colombian military is in urgent need of modernization to upgrade its equipment. The best way to ensure stability in a rough neighborhood and push back on the malign influence of Russia, the PRC, and Iran is to focus on building our friends’ capacity to deal with conflict and crises.
  • Significantly improve intelligence sharing; call it “Compartir Americas.” In the world of professional militaries, intelligence drives everything. Intel-sharing is built on trusted people, institutions, processes, and systems. While the US and Colombian militaries have made significant strides in sharing intel, we should ensure that our intelligence sharing equals that of our closest NATO partners. Anyone who claims what we do now is adequate has not operated in the byzantine, arcane, slow, technologically-backward world of bilateral and multilateral intel-sharing. The crisis in Ukraine illustrates the importance of vigorous intelligence sharing.
  • Keep pace with emerging threats. Develop a US approach for foreign cyber assistance that brings together US and partner nation interagency teams and is strong and flexible enough to respond to emergent needs. Only recently has cybersecurity assistance been recognized as a valid area for security cooperation. The Colombian military and SOUTHCOM are working together to combat malign cyber activity and disinformation campaigns from Russia and Venezuela. Such cybersecurity collaboration is a good start, but the additional authority and capacity to conduct bilateral training, subject matter expert exchanges, information sharing, and operations, all at the speed of relevance, is needed.
  • Double the US global international military education and training and exercise budget and authorize human rights training billets at all US combatant commands. Now is the time to increase investments in professionalism as the bedrock of our global partnerships.

These ideas would benefit Colombia, the United States, and the world. We must put tangible action behind our stated goal of strengthening partnerships. We must learn lessons from Putin’s war in Ukraine and apply those lessons globally, including in our Western Hemisphere neighborhood, put- ting programs and processes in place that contribute to regional stability and security.

During my final trip to Colombia, I visited the Colombian Army Military Academy. The academy’s front entrance had three words: “Patria, Honor, y Lealtad”—homeland, honor, and loyalty. For 200 years, Colombia and the United States have developed professional militaries and institutions that are now the bulwark of our stable democracies. Devoting adequate and consistent investment in time, people, and resources to deter and defeat today’s threats will ensure our democracies endure for another two centuries. Democracy must deliver to all people. Professional militaries are a fundamental part of this.

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Admiral Faller is a retired four-star US Navy admiral, former commander of the US Southern Command from 2018 to 2021, and former chief of legislative affairs for the US Department of the Navy, the top Navy liaison with Congress. He is currently a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez- of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.

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Prioritize comprehensive security assistance https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-prioritize-comprehensive-security-assistance/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:24:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527672 There is no country better positioned to stand by Colombia than the United States, just as there is no country in South America whose partnership is more valuable to the United States. It is time for the United States to translate that reality into coherent, comprehensive, and committed action.

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IN NOVEMBER 2016, Colombia ratified historic peace accords, formalizing an end to Colombia’s decades-long conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). I remember that day well; it was a momentous occasion for all of Colombia, particularly for then-President Juan Manuel Santos, who had tirelessly overseen negotiations with the FARC since 2012. I knew how much he had invested in the process. While visiting Colombia as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), I was the first US official he told that he would pursue a peace agreement. I was encouraged for him and the entire country as I realized what a critical turning point it could be for Colombia’s future and our bilateral relations.

Colombia has long been a highly valued partner of the United States. Our two countries’ bilateral relationship has been characterized by cooperation across various sectors over many decades. It is undoubtedly the United States’ most important security partnership in South America, with the two countries working together tirelessly to address threats to hemispheric security. Since 2000, the United States has provided $12 billion to Colombia, helping to strengthen its military and police forces and to provide assistance for numerous economic development initiatives.1 Our long-standing and successful military, police, and intelligence partnerships have been validated most recently by Colombia’s nomination as a Major non-NATO Ally.

In President Joseph R. Biden’s March 2022 meeting with President Iván Duque, President Biden commemorated the bicentennial of the US-Colombia partnership, highlighting the “uniquely close” relationship between our countries and committing to a “comprehensive approach to … consolidate and sustain peace implementation and reconciliation programs.2 While this is a welcome affirmation of the administration’s intent to sustain the bilateral relationship, it is imperative we find additional ways to galvanize it with funding and initiatives because the need for US solidarity with Colombia has never been greater.

A new reality

The 2016 Colombian peace agreement set out to undo many of the structural causes of Colombia’s decades-long conflict, an admirable, albeit lofty, task. While the agreement did result in the disarmament of some thirteen thousand FARC members, the road to peace and stability beyond that achievement has proven to be quite rocky.3 At the five-year mark of implementation—one-third of the total timespan designated in the accords—Colombia still had a long way to go. That was not unexpected. Finding peace and security after decades of conflict is a tall order, and, in retrospect, the signing of the peace agreement may prove to have been easier than achieving lasting peace.

The challenges of implementing the agreement have been amplified by the fact that around 6.9 million Colombians—the world’s third-largest population of internally displaced people—remain displaced.4 Many violent armed groups—guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers—bear responsibility for the displacement crisis: some groups explicitly targeted civilians in a quest for territorial control.5

Violent conflict among the various groups forced civilians to flee. The common denominator was the absence of the state in rural areas, which made displacement worse. The vacuum allowed the FARC, for example, to set up de facto governance structures, dislodging state control from certain areas for decades.6 When the FARC was at its peak in the late 1990s, it controlled as much as one-quarter of Colombian territory.7 While the Colombian government now has greater access to these areas, it still struggles to make inroads with historically under-resourced populations.8

The optimistic visions of the peace dividend have been undermined by the pernicious and persistent problem of coca crop cultivation. During my time as CIA director in 2012, coca cultivation was approximately 78,000 hectares (ha). In 2020, coca crops reached 245,000 ha, with 1,228 tons of cocaine produced.9 10 New initiatives for partnership in reducing coca cultivation are essential for both the United States and Colombia. Otherwise, remaining guerilla and criminal groups will capitalize on the smuggling of staggering quantities of cocaine out of Colombia, a substantial amount of which finds its way to US soil.

In addition to the challenges of illegal narcotics, Colombia is also grappling with political and economic crises in neighboring Venezuela, resulting in an enormous outflow of refugees. Colombia has been generous in its acceptance of nearly two million Venezuelan refugees. It deserves considerable admiration for what it has done,11 with its welcoming policies an example for the rest of the world, especially as Europe copes with the enormous migration of Ukrainians fleeing the war that has resulted from Russia’s unprovoked invasion. The influx of Venezuelan migrants has further challenged the government, both in its allocation of government resources and economic consequences, with no end in sight. A study by Colombia’s Central Bank predicts that between three and five million Venezuelans will settle in Colombia by the end of 2022, which will further strain Colombia’s limited federal resources.12

Securing further international financial assistance to support Venezuelan migrants is vital, particularly given the enormous gap in global funding for the Venezuela crisis compared to past migration situations. Host countries like Colombia have, for example, received only $256 per capita in international assistance for each Venezuelan refugee—less than one-tenth of the $3,150 received by host countries for each Syrian refugee.13

The way forward

The United States must build on its decades of partnership with Colombia and use the present moment to lay out a new comprehensive approach to its assistance, updated for present-day challenges and addressing the obstacles to peace. To do so, the US government should look back on the rich shared history of our two countries, evaluate successes and shortcomings, and build on the positive developments enabled by Plan
Colombia to establish solutions for a more prosperous future.

Historically, the United States has been the leading provider of aid to Colombia, with most funds—averaging 65 percent annually—going toward military assistance.14 President Barack Obama’s “Peace Colombia” initiative, however, increased the amount allocated to develop other sectors of Colombia, an approach that Congress has continued to support in ongoing appropriation negotiations.15While it is essential for the United States to diversify its investments, it should not be done at the expense of consistent and cost-effective security aid. After all, without security, other progress is not possible.

The United States should recommit itself to professionalizing the Colombian military and police in the post-peace accord era, specifically focusing efforts on achieving institutional control in remote, disenfranchised territories. Before signing the peace agreement, I participated in a Ministry of Defense conference in Bogotá, where I heard an overarching assumption that the peace dividend would reduce the requirement for security force operations. As I cautioned then, Colombia needed to understand that there likely would be no peace dividend; rather, Colombia would actually need more, not less, military and police forces, as they would have to take control of additional rural territories. That would require additional security capabilities and a comprehensive approach that included economic alternatives to coca cultivation, new infrastructure development, expanded educational services, and the provision of other basic services necessary for long-term stability. Events since the conclusion of the peace agreement have validated that assessment.

The United States should also continue making its funding contingent on increased training on human rights and the rule of law, underscoring our commitment to democratic development and economic growth.16And clearly, a realistic assessment of drug trafficking activities and guerrilla assets must be undertaken to develop a coherent plan for addressing them.

To facilitate all of this, we should continue to help Colombia rebuild its intelligence agency—previously dismantled due to corruption and involvement in political activities—to better monitor Colombia’s ever-evolving security situation and continue to share information with trusted allies, including the United States.17 More robust law enforcement and criminal investigation capabilities in Colombia, akin to those of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, alongside two-way intelligence sharing and enhanced training in surveillance and reconnaissance strategies, would likely open the door to other areas of cooperation. The reestablishment of the Colombian intelligence community—done correctly and transparently—could serve as an example of how Colombia acknowledges its past missteps, learns from them, and strengthens its commitment to democratic values, thereby building further confidence in its governing capacity.

This military support will only succeed if coupled with sustainable, long-term investment in other sectors, notably infrastructure and trade. Colombia has tried multiple initiatives to build up its rural areas and expand governmental reach. Clearly, the understanding for this need is there, but so too must be the long-term commitment and funding. The United States has a unique ability to assist Colombia and fund projects that can support Colombian farmers in their bid to find economic outlets beyond coca cultivation while also providing education in rural communities, helping ex-combatants find jobs, encouraging foreign investment—particularly in infrastructure projects—and seeking to build dialogue among a citizenry that has been divided for far too long.

For the United States to demonstrate commitment to its pledge of support for Colombia, it should accept that results cannot and will not come overnight. Rebuilding a conflict-affected country will require patience, resources, and unwavering commitment. There is no country better positioned to stand by Colombia than the United States, just as there is no country in South America whose partnership is more valuable to the United States. As President Biden recently observed, “Colombia’s security is in the national security interest of the United States.18 It is once again time for the United States to translate that reality into coherent, comprehensive, and committed action.

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Gen. David H. Petraeus (US Army, Ret.) is a partner with the global investment firm KKR and chairman of the KKR Global Institute, which he established in May 2013. He is also a member of the board of directors of Opti, FirstStream, and the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining KKR, Petraeus served more than thirty-seven years in the US military and was director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, updated December 16, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R43813.pdf.
2    ”Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez- of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.
3    Luis Jaime Acosta and Helen Murphy, “Exclusive: Thousands of Colombian FARC rebels return to arms despite peace accord – military intelligence report,” Reuters, June 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-rebels-exclusive/exclusive-thousands-of-colombian-farc-rebels-return-to-arms-despite-peace-accord-military-intelligence-report-idUSKCN1T62LO.
4    “Global Internal Displacement Database,” Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data.
5    Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez G., eds., Violence in Colombia 1990- 2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 2001).
6    Ana Arjona, Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
7    Nick Miroff, “The staggering toll of Colombia’s war with FARC rebels, explained in numbers,” Washington Post, August 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/08/24/the-staggering-toll-of-colombias-war-with-farc-rebels-explained-in- numbers/.
8    “En municipios Pdet ya se han invertido más de $10 billones: Gobierno,” El Colombiano, November 9, 2021, https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/paz-y-derechos-humanos/consejero-emilio- archila-visita-medellin-y-habla-de-municipios-pedet-PE15998878.
9    Government of the United States, “Office of National Drug Control Policy Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,” White House, July 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/briefing-room/2021/07/16/ondcp-releases-data-on-coca-cultivation-and-potential-cocaine-production-in-the-andean-region/.
10    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Summary Fact Sheet – Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey, 2020,” UNODC, accessed March 1, 2022, http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Colombia/Colombia_2020_Coca_Survey_FactSheet_ExSum.pdf.
11    “R4V Latin America and the Caribbean, Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in the Region – April 2022,” Regional Interagency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants of Venezuela, April 12, 2022, https://www.r4v.info/en/document/r4v-latin-america-and-caribbean-venezuelan-refugees-and-migrants-region-april-2022.
12    Vanessa Buschschlüter, “We gave Venezuelan migrants a licence to dream,” BBC News, May 17, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-57070813#:~:text=Colombia’s%20Central%20 Bank%20predicts%20that,could%20have%20settled%20in%20Colombia.
13    Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, “Venezuelan refugees and their receiving communities need funding, not sympathy,” Brookings, February 26, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/02/26/venezuelan-refugees-and-their-receiving-communities-need-funding- not-sympathy/.
14    “Colombia Aid,” Google spreadsheet, accessed March 1, 2022, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1P8IEn5b4XlUOD0xYatu3SH1L6jgNPuY0QDggAiDWqF0/edit#gid=1299308071.
15    June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service.
16    Congress of the United States, “S.1605—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” Congress.gov, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1605/text.
17    Juan Forero, “Amid Scandal, Colombia Dismantles Spy Agency,” National Public Radio, January 20, 2012, https://www.npr.org/2012/01/20/145529485/amid-scandal-colombia-dismantles-spy- agency.
18    ”Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022.

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Look to the new Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-look-to-the-new-colombia/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:17:18 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527653 Revitalizing the US partnership with Colombia based on a shared vision of a more prosperous, equal, and greener future seems like a more solid foundation for building out the next two hundred years of diplomatic ties than simply recycling the past.

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IN TWENTY YEARS, Colombia became the most strategic and important relationship for the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean. The question is whether the United States fully recognizes what this transformation implies for the future bonds between our countries as we celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of diplomatic ties.

Colombia is not standing still, nor, for that matter, is the wider Latin American region. It is not waiting for direction, engagement, or definition from Washington. As this book goes to publication, fifty million Colombians are set to forge a new paradigm for their country in the post-COVID-19 pandemic period when they vote in its presidential elections.

How the United States responds to the opportunities and challenges of a modernizing, sophisticated, and complex neighbor will determine whether the strategic convergence of interests in the Plan Colombia era was a moment in time or the foundation for a lasting transformational alliance of like-minded nations.

Time to look ahead

he concerns of yesteryear are not those of the future. In Colombia, that future includes, as in other parts of the world, a post-pandemic response that can lead to the necessary economic and social transformation in response to twenty-first century challenges.

In the United States and Colombia, the post-pandemic recovery also requires addressing the changing nature of globalization, the implications of China’s rise and Russia’s war in Ukraine, climate change, and the disenchantment of large sectors of the population with politicians and democracy itself. In Colombia, more specifically, there is a pressing need to modernize the economy, improve services, and reduce inequalities and social violence. Washington at times can seem more concerned with the past and transposing its broader geopolitical objectives to the region. It is striking that Colombia is still primarily seen in the United States through the prism of drugs, left-wing insurgencies, aid dependency, and the continental struggle
between authoritarian and democratic ideologies.

The US-Colombia Strategic Alliance Act launched by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2022 only underscores the enduring nature of this perspective.1 The updated language on inclusive growth fails to disguise the US priorities that drive most of the bilateral agenda—security, China, Venezuela, migration, drugs, and terrorism. There is not as much reflection as there should be of modern-day Colombia’s changing political and social realities or its national interests or aspirations for the twenty-first century. The text is restrictive about how Colombians should address internal questions.

The US Congress is not alone in its approach. The White House focused on many of the same concerns during the March 2022 visit of President Iván Duque to Washington. To realize President Joseph R. Biden’s vision of the US-Colombia relationship as “the foundation … of regional security and prosperity,” the agenda must be palpably broader and include how Colombians define their challenges, future, and region.2

The new Colombia

There is so much more to Colombia’s present-day reality than “cocaine and war,” as one of the Colombian creators of the animated film Encanto commented after its Oscar award win3

I thought so when I was the US ambassador in Bogotá between 2010 and 2013. We worked on security and counter-narcotics but we also prioritized finalizing a free trade agreement that transformed our economic ties and included landmark labor and environmental protections. We supported a peace process that ended fifty years of war and is a model of conflict resolution in the post-1989 world, and deepened US engagement with Colombia’s vibrant literary, musical, and artistic communities.
I think so now, even in the context of Colombia’s still daunting challenges. No one should seek to minimize these. The mass protests and violence of the summer of 2021 indicated the strains caused by social, economic, and racial inequality and unmet expectations. The undercurrents of public discontent remain. There has been an exponential increase in drug production, implementation of the 2016 peace agreement is incomplete, political polarization is increasing, and Venezuela provides safe haven to narco-terrorists who attack Colombian soil.

But contrary to the almost universal dire predictions of 2020 when the COVID-19 pandemic was raging and the country underwent its most severe economic downturn in history, Colombia in 2022 is defying the more pessimistic prognoses of where it seemed headed.

Colombia’s leaders and people are finding a way to respond to the devastation of the pandemic and economic collapse. Colombia’s completed vaccination rate of its population is now higher than in the United States, with far fewer resources and without culture wars. Colombia’s equally remarkable economic recovery since 2020 is among the fastest in the Western Hemisphere and has taken place as headlines predicted a lost decade for Colombia and the region.

The ongoing economic recovery, which reflects Colombia’s strong macroeconomic management, is only part of the story. In response to the hard- ships imposed by the pandemic, in which millions of families lost their incomes and education was severely disrupted, a reorientation is underway in the government’s priorities—priorities a new government is unlikely to shift. Spending has dramatically increased to address poverty alleviation improve health service delivery, and transform education for Colombia’s next generation.

Generally, there is greater urgency to the innovations transforming key sectors of the economy, focusing on sustainability and digitalization. Colombia’s commitment to training 100,000 programmers and its emergence as a center for fintech and a home for start-up unicorns suggest the scale of what is underway.4. The transformation meshes with public policies focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions at one of the fastest rates in the world. Colombia, one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, has scaled-up environmental protections during the pandemic response.

Colombia is also adapting to a changing world landscape in the trade arena and is positioning itself to benefit in the post-pandemic period. Colombia has expressed interest in becoming a member of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, which includes most of Asia’s important economies.5 It has trade agreements with the European Union and Canada and is a regional leader in pro-market growth and integration as a member of the Pacific Alliance, which includes Chile, Mexico, and Peru. Contrary to what many in Washington have feared, Colombia is managing economic ties with China without slipping into strategic vulnerability, and is preparing to benefit from the drive to nearshore supply chains in the region.

Colombia’s democratic institutions are functioning in a period of great strain. The Justice Ministry is investigating the human rights abuses and killings that accompanied the 2021 protests. The country held successful elections for a new legislature in the most polarized political environment in memory, with all sides accepting the results. In speaking about current political tensions, my Oxford University professor, Malcolm Deas—considered the doyen of living historians on Colombia—recalled an observation he had made about the peace process: “no habrá revolución en Colombia, pero toca hacer reformas”[“there will not be a revolution in Colombia but reforms are necessary”].6 If he is correct, and I hope he is, it will be the strength of Colombia’s democratic traditions and institutions that proved determinant.

Poland’s generosity to millions of Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion has justly received massive praise in the West. The same recognition should be extended to Colombia. In early 2019, I witnessed in Cúcuta how Colombians welcomed and assisted families streaming across the border as the Venezuelan situation deteriorated. With far less money and international attention, as the pandemic plunged millions of Colombians into poverty, Colombia set a standard for how to humanely respond in an orderly fashion to a major migration crisis.

A new relationship

I have suggested why present-day Colombia merits an updated approach from the United States. In looking forward, it should be possible for Washington to provide one in a new spirit of partnership and shared bilateral, regional, and global challenges.

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force December 2021 report provides the critical blueprint for doing so without ignoring the concerns that have previously driven our cooperation.7. It makes practical programmatic recommendations for achieving the objectives of inclusive economic growth, a broader social pact, expanded outreach to Colombia’s next generation, and further implementing the 2016 peace accords. It is time to use that report to forge our collaborative engagement in the coming years.

A new relationship also means a two-way street of strategic cooperation. Colombia may emerge as a voice bridging ideological differences in a fragmented Latin American political landscape. As a member of global trading organizations, Colombia is well-positioned to work with the United States to combat unfair and predatory competition and address the challenges of a digitalized world economy. As a major producer of hydrocarbons and a green technology innovator, Colombia can promote sustainable development and assist in a difficult moment for the world’s energy markets. The United States could use its strong security partnership with Colombia to work more strategically to strengthen the rule of law in Central America.

There is more. As a country which has responded to a major migration crisis of its own, Colombia can help lead the hemispheric search for solutions not conditioned by US concerns with its borders. As a growing center of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), digital, and artistic creativity, Colombia can become a regional driver of innovation. As a democratic nation that has (so far) resisted populism, Colombia can exemplify how governments can meet the needs of their populations without upending representative democracy and its system of checks and balances.

I cannot predict how Colombians will vote in future elections, and domestic politics anywhere can turn in ways that alter relations between countries. The promise of this moment, however, is evident. As the United States redefines its engagement with a changing world, a revitalized partnership with Colombia based on a shared vision of a more prosperous, equal, and greener future for our citizens seems like a more solid foundation for building out the next two hundred years of diplomatic ties than simply recycling rationales of the past.

* * *

Amb. P. Michael McKinley is a former US ambassador to Colombia, Afghanistan, Brazil, and Peru. As ambassador to Colombia, McKinley helped finalize the entry into force of the bilateral free trade agreement between the United States and Colombia and provided support for Colombia’s peace negotiations. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Financial Times, and Politico. McKinley is a member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force and a non-resident senior advisor for the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Americas Program.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations press release, “Senators Menendez, Kaine Unveil U.S.- Colombia Strategic Alliance Act,” March 9, 2022, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/senators-menendez-kaine-unveil-us-colombia-strategic-alliance-act.
2    Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez- of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.
3    .Joe Parkin Daniels, “Not just ‘cocaine and war’: Colombian pride at Oscar-winning Encanto’s positive portrayal,” The Guardian, March 29, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/29/colombia-encanto-oscars-animated-film.
4    “Prepárese: en diciembre se abre nueva convocatoria de Misión TIC,” Portafolio, July 7, 2021, https://www.portafolio.co/innovacion/mision-tic-abrira-convocatoria-para-formar-a- personas-en-programacion-553772
5    “The CPTPP Enters into Force: What Does it Mean for Global Trade?,” White & Case, January 21, 2019, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cptpp-enters-force-what-does-it-mean- global-trade.
6    “‘En Colombia no habrá revolución, pero toca hacer reformas’: Malcolm Deas,” Contexto, May 13, 2021, https://contextomedia.com/en-colombia-no-habra-revolucion-pero-toca-hacer- reformas-malcolm-deas/.
7    Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, A Plan for Colombia’s COVID-19 Recovery and Why it Matters, The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Institute, December 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AC_ColombiaTaskForce_v18.pdf

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Build on shared global priorities https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-build-on-shared-global-priorities/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:15:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=527626 As we celebrate the bicentennial of the US-Colombia
relationship, we should focus on what lies ahead. Now is the time to develop new approaches and responses that will lead to more just, prosperous, and inclusive societies that can rebuild trust and confidence in our governments, democracies, and the ideals of freedom and the rule of law.

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THE BICENTENNIAL COMMEMORATION of US-Colombia diplomatic relations is a time to celebrate and reflect on our countries’ deep, strong relationship, one built on shared values, mutual help, cooperation, and a firm commitment to the ideals of freedom and democracy. Colombia and the United States have historically addressed their differences with respect and pragmatism and worked together to advance bilateral, regional, and international priorities.

Simón Bolívar and the founders of Gran Colombia—Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Venezuela—looked to the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Men as guiding principles for the new nation. They studied how the United States defined and structured its new government with its division of powers. Bolívar sent Manuel Torres to Washington to learn firsthand about this inspiring project and seek support and diplomatic recognition. Two years after its independence from Spain, Gran Colombia became the United States’ first diplomatic partner in Latin America, and Torres, the first diplomatic attaché. Colombia remains the longest-standing democracy in Latin America, and its constitution was inspired by the democratic principles of the US Constitution.

Our two countries continue to work side-by-side to defend civil rights, freedom, and democratic governance. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is a reminder that we must not take our political freedom or responsibilities for granted. Both our countries understand the importance of defending our democratic system and values. Colombia fought with the United States in the Korean War against the spread of communism. Through Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia, the United States has provided strategic support and more than $12 billion in assistance to face the threats posed by illicit groups and their criminal activities. Colombia has been an indispensable US partner in training more than 17,000 police and prosecutors in Central America via the US-Colombia Action Plan since 2013.1

Multilateral institutions and the US-Colombia relationship

Central to our relationship has been our mutual commitment to multilateral and international institutions as an essential means to address regional and global challenges. Our two countries were founding members of the United Nations (UN) and remain actively involved in the UN system. When the UN sought to extend the Millennium Development Goals, Colombia suggested that the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have sustainability and environmental dimensions in addition to economic ones. Colombia then set an example by incorporating the SDGs into the National Development Plan, including commitments at the national, regional, and local levels.2. After signing the peace agreement in 2016, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) requested that the UN create a verification mission to monitor the reincorporation process and the safety of former FARC combatants. The mandate has been extended until October 2022.

As founders of the Organization of American States (OAS), Colombia and the United States have helped lay the foundation for programs addressing economic and social needs and defending democratic institutions. An early example was the Alliance for Progress, a far-reaching US program to strengthen hemispheric growth and address Cold War challenges. Developed by Colombian President and Secretary General of the OAS Alberto Lleras Camargo, US President John F. Kennedy, and Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, this ambitious program supported rural reform, expanded housing, and improved public education. In September 2011, with active US and Colombian participation, the OAS approved the Inter-American Democratic Charter, affirming that democracy is and should be a common form of government for all countries of the Americas; it also included objectives to defend human rights, fight poverty, and maintain a democratic culture.

Our global agenda

The United States and Colombia should prioritize cooperation in advancing fundamental areas of the UN’s Our Common Agenda and the objectives of the OAS’s Ninth Summit of the Americas, including strengthening democracy, the rule of law, and human rights protections, as well as promoting inclusive economic growth, sustainability and climate action, and solutions to migration-related challenges. These issues are linked and should be considered comprehensively.

Democracy, security, the rule of law, and human rights

Public opinion surveys Latinobarómetro and the Edelman Trust Barometer show a growing loss of confidence in democracy and political leader- ship throughout Latin America. This dissatisfaction was evident during the 2019 violent protests in Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru and the 2021 nationwide demonstrations in Colombia. Many see democracy as working for only a few and not addressing Latin America’s income inequality, among the highest in the world. Concern with growing corruption, ineffective judicial systems, and deepening insecurity feed this problem.

As we look at the next two hundred years of US-Colombia relations, our two countries should continue to prioritize initiatives to enhance democracy, the rule of law, security, and human rights protections. Specifically, the United States could support Colombian-led efforts to strengthen the judiciary, increase government transparency, and create more effective structures for dialogue between the government, civic groups and organizations, youth, minorities, the private sector, and other key stakeholders.

Inclusive economic growth

The United States remains one of Latin America’s most important commercial partners, a role strengthened by a series of trade agreements: the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and bilateral agreements with Chile, Colombia, Panama, and Peru. Still, ongoing opportunities and great potential exist to increase commerce by simplifying procedures and providing more technical support to facilitate compliance with US product standards. Another area of opportunity with significant security and commercial implications is nearshoring the production of essential parts of US industry supply chains in Latin America rather than in distant Asian markets. Colombia is uniquely positioned to receive these nearshoring projects, given its geographic proximity to the United States and the stable and predict- able commercial environment provided by the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.

According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Latin America has a significant infrastructure investment gap of approximately $150 billion per year.3 The region requires roads, ports, airports, and connectivity. With the US Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC’s) extended authorities to invest in equity, provide technical assistance, and undertake transactions in local currency, the United States is well-positioned to finance infra- structure projects. As recommended by the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force,4 a concerted effort by the DFC to collaborate with the IDB, the IDB Investment Corporation, and the Development Bank of Latin America could create significant resources for financing infrastructure projects in Colombia. In addition, the US Department of the Treasury and the US Trade and Development Agency could work with the US private sector to identify barriers to the investment and financing of infrastructure projects in Colombia. US agencies should then work with Colombia’s National Infrastructure Agency to address identified barriers.

Close cooperation in education, science, and technology would impact economic development, create new economic opportunities, improve productivity, and support innovation. Education and training programs could strengthen science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) skills and develop cyber capabilities and newer technologies such as artificial intelligence and robotics. Here, the US-Colombia partnership could create a joint development strategy to fund research centers in Colombia, modeled after those of the US National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health.

Also, research and exchange programs between our two countries would strengthen economic growth, well-being, and binational ties by promoting friendship, trust, and respect among US and Colombia participants. Exchanges among universities, professors, and students lay the foundation for long-term productive relationships, the backbone of economic development.

Sustainability and climate change

Latin America is home to the two most biodiverse countries in the world, Brazil and Colombia, and the Amazon Rainforest, the most biodiverse place on Earth. Protecting this unique reserve has lasting implications for global hydrological cycles, oxygen production, and carbon absorption.

For more than thirty years, Colombia has implemented a progressive approach to conserving biodiversity and the rainforest by recognizing the rights of Indigenous communities. These communities’ cultures, knowledge, and respect for the rainforest’s fragile ecosystem have effectively protected it. To address rising degradation concerns, Colombia proposed the Leticia Pact of 2021, with Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname as partners in monitoring, conserving, and implementing strategies to tackle deforestation.

As signatories of the Paris Accord, the United States and Colombia are working to achieve net-zero emissions, serving as an example to other countries. To do so, the United States has made a significant commitment to reduce 2005 carbon emissions by half by 2030, while Colombia has focused on decreasing deforestation and a 40 percent carbon emission reduction.

Migration

Immigration throughout Latin America is on the rise. Colombia had limited immigration until very recently, but it now faces an overwhelming challenge having received nearly two million migrants from Venezuela. The country has displayed remarkable solidarity toward incoming Venezuelans, implementing policies to assist and integrate them into the Colombian economy and society, including a ten-year temporary permit that grants them access to employment, education, and healthcare services, including COVID-19 vaccines.5 It also gave Colombian nationality to children of Venezuelan mothers born in Colombia.

As the largest donor in response to the Venezuelan regional crisis, the United States should encourage the international community to fully fund their pledges and increase financial support to Colombia as it absorbs 34 percent of the population forced to flee Venezuela. Moving forward, the US-Colombia partnership should also prioritize programs that address the principal drivers of the Venezuelan exodus, namely violence and the lack of economic opportunities. In addressing other migration crises, we should learn from the Colombian experience and respond with efficient, humane, and transparent procedures and programs.

Final thoughts

Our two nations were founded on the ideals of freedom and democracy. As we celebrate the bicentennial of our relationship, we should recognize our progress while acknowledging remaining challenges and working to seize future opportunities. Now is the time to develop new approaches and responses that will lead to more just, prosperous, and inclusive societies that can rebuild trust and confidence in our governments, democracies, and the ideals that we hold dear.

* * *

Amb. Carolina Barco formerly served as Colombia’s foreign minister from 2002 to 2006, Colombia’s ambassador to the United States from 2006 to 2010, and ambassador to Spain from 2019 to 2020. Barco was a consultant for eight years with the Inter-American Development Bank and is a member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    “Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Colombia Summary,” US Department of State, accessed March 1, 2022, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/colombia-summary/.
2    Localizing the 2030 Agenda in Colombia, Development Dialogue paper 25, Dag-Hammarskjöld Foundation, December 2018, https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/localising-the-2030-agenda-in-colombia/
4    Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, A plan for Colombia’s COVID recovery and why it matters for the United States, Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, December 8, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-plan-for-colombias-covid-recovery-and-why-it-matters-for-the-united-states/.
5    Rachel Treisman, “Colombia Offers Temporary Legal Status To Nearly 1 Million Venezuelan Migrants,” National Public Radio, February 9, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/02/09/965853031/colombia-offers-temporary-legal-status-to-nearly-1-million-venezuelan-migrants.

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Counter new strategic challenges https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-counter-new-strategic-challenges/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:13:38 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=525183 As the US faces significant global challenges and an era of great power competition, our alliance with Colombia has become increasingly important for safeguarding democratic values and regional stability.

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THE YEAR 2022 IS AN IMPORTANT ONE for the United States and Colombia: the 200th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations between our countries. Beyond simply marking the rich history of two centuries, this is an excellent time to examine our relationship in the context of current global affairs and look for ways to further strengthen it.

In my time in Congress and as co-chair of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, I have been proud to lead and support many of the initiatives that have strengthened US relations with Colombia. Our joint efforts have boosted our economies and helped lay the groundwork for institutional growth, security, and peace-building in Colombia.

This has made a real difference for Colombia. Since 2000, Congress has directed roughly $12 billion in bilateral aid to support the country’s economic development, conflict resolution, and counter-narcotics efforts.1 As a result, Colombia’s economy began to evolve into what it is today: an open and growing market-based economy ripe with opportunity.

Colombia’s progress will help unlock an even stronger relationship between our countries. We look to this increased stability and economic growth to serve as a bulwark against emerging threats to democratic values. As the oldest democracy in Latin America, Colombia will be an excellent partner in countering the influence of our competitors.

Chief among these competitors is China, which has used its economic strength for coercion and to strengthen its military power. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initially targeting the Indo-Pacific region, has now expanded to reach more than 130 countries, amounting to 40 percent of global GDP and more than 63 percent of the world’s population.2 In 2017, four years after the program was launched, China announced that Latin America was a “natural extension” of the BRI and would facilitate “a community of shared future for China and Latin America.”3 Panama became the first Latin American country to join, and more than twenty of the region’s thirty-three countries have followed.4

The expansion of the BRI into Latin America is typical of a larger trend of increasing connection between China and the Western Hemisphere. Total trade between China and Latin America increased from $18 billion in 2002 to $318 billion in 2020. China is now the largest trading partner of Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay and the second largest for many other countries, including Colombia, where trade with China fell short of US trade in goods by only $109 million in 2020.5 6

China has displayed the ability and the intent to use its economic power to expand its influence, broaden its military footprint, and attempt to coerce its “partners” to fall in line on issues like human rights abuses, isolating Taiwan, and China’s antagonistic activity on the world stage.

According to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, while economic interests remain the primary driver of China’s engagement in Latin America, its standing as a top trading partner, lender, and investor gives it a great deal of power over other governments. The commission reports that China “[encourages] Latin American and Caribbean governments to make domestic and foreign policy decisions that favor China while undermining democracies and free and open markets.”7 The United States must remain mindful of the consequences of China acquiring this much political and economic leverage in Latin America.

While Colombia has remained outside the BRI, Chinese investment in Colombia has increased. State-owned firms have inked deals to construct and operate Bogotá’s first metro system and hydroelectric power plants and purchased a large gold mine.8 Notably, no US firms placed bids on the metro system project or on any of Colombia’s large road projects in the past six years.9 Given China’s propensity to use these types of investments for its objectives, the United States should strengthen economic ties with Colombia, increase investment in the country’s future, and help it resist any attempts to undermine its democratic values.

The United States should continue to deepen bilateral trade with Colombia via the existing US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA). As a member of Republican leadership in the US House of Representatives during the George W. Bush administration, I helped start the trade agreement negotiations. As a senator, I helped give it the final push into law. When the agreement entered into force in May 2012, it immediately lifted tariffs on more than 80 percent of US exports of consumer and industrial products to Colombia, with the remainder lifted over ten years. On the tenth anniversary of this landmark agreement, the United States should reinvigorate its trade relationship with Colombia to ensure we remain the country’s top partner and that the agreement continues to create jobs and economic opportunities in both countries. In addition, the TPA could be better leveraged to advance nearshoring opportunities as it provides US companies with a stable and predictable trade and investment environment. US companies seeking to relocate their supply chains closer to their main markets should take advantage of the agreement’s friendly investment chapter and rules of origin provision as well as Colombia’s geographic proximity to the United States. Another way the United States could deepen our economic ties and reduce dependence on China is through nearshoring. The COVID- 19 pandemic and China’s destabilizing maritime activities in the Indo-Pacific have raised alarms about supply chain resiliency and the risks of heavily relying on China for key exports. A 2020 survey by financial services firm UBS found that 71 percent of manufacturers planned to move some of their production out of China.10 Moving US supply chains from China to regional partners like Colombia would diminish this reliance while boosting jobs and business opportunities.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has begun taking steps to finance and otherwise encourage nearshoring to Latin America. In 2021, the IDB worked with sixteen Latin American countries to identify criti- cal export and supply-chain advantages of nearshoring.11 ProColombia, the government agency tasked with promoting Colombian exports, tourism, and investments, maintains a website identifying key sectors with investment opportunities, including agricultural products, energy, manufacturing, health care services, and information technology.12

These are critical steps in jumpstarting investment, but there is room for additional US support for nearshoring and investment. The US government should facilitate public-private collaboration and work with both the private sector and the Colombian government to identify and overcome barriers to investing and nearshoring. We should reevaluate the tools at our disposal, such as the International Development Finance Corporation, and find more ways to support these opportunities in countries like Colombia that support our national security and foreign policy priorities.

The expansion of competition in the Western Hemisphere also presents opportunities for US-Colombia relations to preserve security and stabil-ity. In addition to its economic influence, China collaborates with repressive authoritarians, such as the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela, and enables anti-democratic behavior in other countries. Of particular concern is China’s exportation of digital and surveillance technologies, which allow more regimes to surveil and repress critics and minority populations.13

In 2021, we saw widespread democratic backsliding in Latin America. Authoritarians consolidated their power, and more Latin Americans became indifferent or disillusioned with democracy. Colombia saw its own mass protests in 2021, with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating longstanding societal tensions. Colombia needs US partnership now more than ever to support effective governance and institutional capacity and to prevent Colombia from falling victim to the political turmoil taking place throughout the region.

International enablers of the Maduro regime have exacerbated the crisis in Venezuela, generating a mass exodus. Colombia’s acceptance of nearly two million migrants and refugees has been a stabilizing force in this crisis, but the government needs more support given the challenges it already faces.14

Colombia needs more resources to support the initiative launched last year that will provide temporary protective status to Venezuelan migrants, allowing them to access healthcare and other essential services. The COVID-19 pandemic added another layer of complexity, necessitating a vaccination campaign for Colombian citizens and Venezuelans to reduce the virus’s spread.

The United States should also build upon existing cooperation with Colombia on security, safety, and countering illicit activity. It’s no coincidence that Colombia’s economic growth accompanied a reduction in violence. We should continue strong support for Colombia’s coca eradication and counter-narcotics efforts, including building state capacity in isolated regions and facilitating crop substitution. These programs help stem the production of drugs and associated violence, and they also help underserved communities gain access to state services to begin building economic prosperity. For the United States, these programs target supply sources of the drug crisis that brings despair to our communities.

A lot has changed in Colombia since I worked to pass the legislation for Plan Colombia and since Senator Ben Cardin and I became co-chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Colombia Task Force. What has not changed is the critical role that Colombia plays in the Western Hemisphere and worldwide as a symbol of democratic persistence and economic openness. I look forward to Colombia’s continued growth. I believe that more cooperation between our countries makes us both stronger, more prosperous, and more secure as we start the third century of the formal bond between our countries.

* * *

Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) has been a US senator for Missouri since being elected in 2010. Blunt chairs the Senate Republican Policy Committee, serves as the top Republican on the Senate Rules Committee, and is a member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Blunt co-chairs the non- partisan Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force alongside Senator Ben Cardin.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    June S. Beittel, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service, updated December 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43813.
2    David Sacks, “Countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Who’s In And Who’s Out,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 24, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/blog/countries-chinas-belt-and-road- initiative-whos-and-whos-out.
3    Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Johannesburg, “Wang Yi: The Belt and Road Initiative Becomes New Opportunity for China-Latin America Cooperation,” September 18, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgjb/eng/xwdt/zgyw/t1494844.htm.
5    China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, Congressional Research Service.
6    International Trade Administration, “Colombia Country Commercial Guide,” US Department of Commerce, November 8, 2021, https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/exporting-colombia- market-overview.
7    United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean,” November 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021- 11/Chapter_1_Section_2–Chinas_Influence_in_Latin_America_and_the_Caribbean.pdf.
8    Michael Stott, “Foreign investment in Colombia holds firm, says trade minister,” Financial Times, October 7, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/9fa69fba-a4a2-48bc-a928-ef5c1793fe9b.
9    Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, A Plan for Colombia’s COVID-19 Recovery and Why it Matters, Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Institute, December 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AC_ColombiaTaskForce_v18.pdf.
10    “China Economic Perspectives: CFOs’ take on COVID-19 impact,” October 28, 2020, UBS Investment Bank, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/investment-bank/in-focus/covid-19/2020/cfos-take.html.
12    “Investment Sectors,” Colombia Co., accessed March 1, 2022, https://investincolombia.com.co/en/sectors.
13    United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.”

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Construct the road ahead together https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-construct-the-road-ahead-together/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:12:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=525141 The US alliance with Colombia is rooted in our shared values of democracy, transparency, and accountability. We can celebrate this year’s bicentennial by reinvigorating bilateral, bipartisan, and bicameral support for the US-Colombia partnership to ensure our region’s stability and continued prosperity.

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FOR TWO CENTURIES, the United States and Colombia have maintained a robust and productive diplomatic relationship that has withstood economic fluctuations, internal and external conflicts, global crises, and political transitions in both countries. Today, the US-Colombia relationship is a key pillar of stability in the Western Hemisphere, requiring continued and unwavering multiparty support in our congresses and the sustained attention of policymakers, scholars, the private sector, and the people of both countries.

As a primary strategic partner in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia will undoubtedly remain an indispensable ally for the United States in addressing regional and global needs. Our historical record of success demonstrates how US-Colombia collaboration could help usher in a new era, bringing important and tangible benefits for our nations.

As we contemplate new directions for the US-Colombia partnership, our two countries have the opportunity to renew our joint efforts and strive for a healthier future post COVID-19—bringing inclusive economic growth, increased security, more robust solutions to climate and environmental challenges, and a greater commitment to democracy, rule of law, peace, and human rights.

A healthier future post-COVID

The last two years are a testament to the importance of close coordination with allies in addressing transnational health challenges. US support for Colombia’s efforts to recover from COVID-19 contributed to a healthier future in the Americas and provided a blueprint to prepare our hemisphere for other health crises.

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, which I co-chair alongside my friend and colleague Senator Roy Blunt of Missouri, laid out a four-pillar strategy in December 2021 for further policy actions the US-Colombia partnership could take to accelerate inclusive and sustainable COVID-19 recovery in Colombia.1 That strategy includes not only accelerating vaccine rollout but also promoting investment and job creation, strengthening Colombia’s social compact, and enhancing the rule of law, peace-agreement implementation, good governance, and human rights protections.
Our support for Colombia’s fight against COVID-19 has not only benefitted Colombians, but may also help the United States usher in solutions for bolstering supply chain resilience, addressing information gaps to enhance vaccine confidence, and learning lessons that will help us all prepare for future crises—all priorities discussed at the US Department of State’s February 2022 COVID-19 Global Action Meeting.2 We will continue the fight against this pandemic to secure a healthier future for our citizens and the hemisphere.

Inclusive, sustainable economic growth

The COVID-19 pandemic showed us the power of innovation and resilience in the face of economic downturns, leading to major changes in how we work and live, including the emergence of a more digitally-engaged workforce. The United States, working with Colombia, could be at the forefront of ushering in economic prosperity driven by values of transparency, accountability, and inclusion.

Our countries have a rich history of economic cooperation, and 2022 marks the tenth anniversary of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. This agreement has helped generate thousands of US jobs, expand US access to markets, and enhance US competitiveness on the world stage. The agreement eliminated tariffs and various barriers to US exports, promoting greater trade and economic growth in both countries. It also opened up a new world for US service providers looking to do business in Colombia. The agreement is expected to continue to provide positive advantages for US businesses and consumers.

Colombia has leveraged its excellent trade partnership with the United States to secure Free Trade Agreements with the European Union, Canada, and twenty-six nations in Latin America and the Caribbean.3 In addition, as nearshoring manufacturing becomes a possible alternative to trade with Asia in the wake of the pandemic, US-Colombian trade could expand further. As China increases its engagement with Latin America, US-Colombia collaboration could help bolster a rules-based economic environment in the Americas. Colombia remains one of the few countries in the region that trades more with the United States than China; 26 percent of its total trade is with the United States. Through its commitment to improving transparency, anti-corruption, financial sustainability, labor protections, and environmental preservation standards, Colombia could set the tone for the wider region.

Regional security and Peace Colombia

Few countries in the Western Hemisphere have faced the array of security challenges Colombia has encountered, including illegal armed groups financially sustained by illicit economies, internal insecurity, and an influx of two million migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Under Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia, our nations have forged a steadfast partnership that is a force-multiplier for promoting accountability, combating drug trafficking and organized crime, and supporting human rights across the hemisphere.

President Joseph R. Biden announced in March 2022 that the United States intends to designate Colombia as a Major non-NATO Ally: “In recognition of our uniquely close cooperation in the hemisphere, Colombia’s significant contributions as a NATO Global Partner, its commitment to NATO’s mission to promote democratic values and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, and its rejection of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression against Ukraine.”4 This is a move that I anticipate a broad bipartisan consensus in Congress will support. Colombia continues to aid in the global fight against terrorism, cybersecurity threats, corruption, and other global security challenges. Colombia’s strong, albeit complex, history in combating armed groups and insurgencies within its borders uniquely positions it as a critical ally in training police, military, and prosecutors via the US-Colombia Action Plan and other mechanisms for joint operations.

Robust solutions to climate and environmental challenges

Dealing with climate change is a national security priority for the United States, and Colombia has been an exemplary partner in this effort. Environmental degradation does not stop at a country’s border, and neither should the fight to preserve our world’s clean air and water and natural resources.

Colombia has made bold strides to address climate change. The country’s Paris Agreement commitments include a 51 percent reduction in green- house gas emissions and net-zero deforestation by 2030, and carbon neutrality by 2050. These go hand in hand with shorter-term goals, such as Colombia’s implementation of legislation regulating methane emissions from oil and gas. The country has also vowed to plant 180 million trees and secure a 30 percent reduction in total deforestation by the end of 2022.

Protecting environmental assets, tropical forests, carbon sinks, and bio- diversity is crucial not just for Colombians but for the United States, our hemisphere, and the world. Greater US support for this joint effort remains vital to ensure future generations do not experience climate devastation.

An ongoing commitment to democracy, the rule of law, peace, and human rights

There is no area more important to the US-Colombia relationship and our world today than preserving democracy worldwide. As Freedom House recently reported,5 2021 was the sixteenth year in which declines in democratic performance have outpaced democratic strengthening—meaning the world is deep into a global democratic recession. An ongoing commitment to democracy, peace, and human rights is not only a cornerstone of foreign policy but also an essential US national security interest.
Authoritarian actors such as Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela have contributed to the demise of democracy and one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world today. For the past decade, countries across the Americas have risen to help address mass migration from Venezuela. In this effort, Colombia has been a model for our global community.

With US support, Colombia has taken in and assisted nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees, approximately 33 percent of the estimated 6 million people who have fled Venezuela.6 By January 2022, almost 1.7 million Venezuelans had begun the registration process for Colombia’s Temporary Protected Status program, with nearly half a million fully enrolled, giving them access to health care, work permits, and other social services for the next decade.7

Corruption undermines faith in democracy and strengthens autocratic regimes by exacerbating existing repression and allowing violations of civil rights and liberties. Corruption is a fundamental obstacle to peace, prosperity, and human rights. We know this, and so does Colombia. The United States and Colombia should build on joint work to fight corruption in Colombia and globally and continue to partner to defend democracy and counter extremism. Initiatives to increase transparency and accountability that leverage new technologies and involve civilians could help pave the road to a more free, safe, and democratic world.

Conclusion

The US alliance with Colombia is rooted in our commitment to collaboration and the shared values of democracy, transparency, and accountability. The partnership is strong precisely because it is as wide as it is long, encompassing a range of priorities that affect every one of our citizens. Future US bipartisan and democratic engagement with Colombia in strategic areas will strengthen the entire Western Hemisphere. As our two nations cooperate on immediate parallel challenges posed by COVID-19 and other health issues, democratic backsliding and hyper-polarization, and the Venezuelan political, economic, and human rights crisis, we must prepare for future challenges. We can celebrate this year’s bicentennial by reinvigorating bilateral, bipartisan, and bicameral support for the US-Colombia partnership to ensure our region’s stability and continued prosperity.

* * *

Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) has represented Maryland in the US Senate since 2007 and before that in the US House of Representatives. He works to integrate good governance, transparency and respect for human rights in American foreign policy. Cardin is a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and co-chairs the nonpartisan Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force alongside Senator Roy Blunt.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, A Plan for Colombia’s COVID-19 Recovery and Why it Matters, Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Institute, December 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AC_ColombiaTaskForce_v18.pdf.
2    Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “The COVID-19 Global Action Meeting,” US Department of State press release, February 14, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-covid-19-global-action-meeting/.
3    Government of Colombia, “Acuerdos TLC Colombia,” accessed March 15, 2022, https://www.tlc.gov.co/acuerdos/vigente.
4    “Joint Statement by President Joseph R. Biden and President Iván Duque Marquez of the Republic of Colombia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership,” The White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement- by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez- of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.
5    Freedom in the World 2021: Democracy Under Siege, Freedom House, March 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege.
6    “Venezuela situation,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed March 20, 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/venezuela-emergency.html.
7    Rachel Treisman, “Colombia Offers Temporary Legal Status To Nearly 1 Million Venezuelan Migrants,” National Public Radio, February 9, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/02/09/965853031/colombia-offers-temporary-legal-status-to-nearly-1-million-venezuelan-migrants.

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Embrace our shared future https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/books/allies-embrace-our-shared-future/ Tue, 31 May 2022 22:07:35 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=525116 Colombians have come too far to give up on better
tomorrows and brighter futures for their children. The United States must stand with them.

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AS THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA celebrate two hundred years of bilateral relations, the foundations of our friendship are strong, and the prospects for greater cooperation that benefits our people, our region, and our world are bright. It has been an honor to support Colombia over the last 20-plus years, see our strong bonds grow even stronger—even in hard times, and witness Colombia’s emergence as a leader in our hemisphere.

I fell in love with Colombia when I read 100 Years of Solitude as a law student. I was so captivated that I read it right through my tax law class. My professor abruptly asked me after class what was so much more interesting than his lecture. I showed him the novel and said I thought it was the greatest written in any language since William Faulkner died. My later friendship with Gabo, which began in 1994 and endured until he passed away, was a great gift in my life, as have been the relationships I’ve formed with Colombian presidents and other elected leaders, great musicians, business and philanthropic leaders, and the citizens I’ve met all over the country who have contributed in their own way to give Colombia’s children a future of peace, prosperity, and security.

As president, I was proud to launch Plan Colombia with President Andrés Pastrana at a time when drug cartels and their armed supporters controlled about a third of the country. It was renewed several times by leaders of both countries, regardless of party—a commitment to give Colombia back to the people that has endured despite the massive migration from Venezuela, the COVID-19 pandemic, the resurgence of violence, and increased drug production.

In the face of these challenges and the worldwide assault on inclusive, cooperating democracies, it is important never to forget that Colombia is a country rich in history, culture, natural resources, environmental treasures, and wonderful, hardworking people. Colombians have come too far to give up on better tomorrows and brighter futures for their children. And the United States must stand with the Colombian people.

There are several areas where further progress can be made. Colombia is especially well-positioned to transition to clean, renewable, more afford- able energy systems. The World Economic Forum has rated Colombia third in South America in its Energy Transition Index,1 with significant potential for developing solar, wind, and biomass sources. Already, the renewable energy sector employs about two million people throughout Latin America,2 with significant room for growth. This is especially important as so much of Colombia’s clean energy potential—especially for wind—is located near the Venezuelan border, where Colombians and displaced Venezuelans alike are yearning for new job sources.

Another huge opportunity to put people to work while strengthening the natural environment is agroforestry. Colombia’s location makes it suitable for at least ten forest species, and the government offers strong incentives for reforestation projects. Colombia and its people also have the climate, farming knowledge, and skills to grow almost any crop, including high-level exports like its wonderful coffee, essential oils, and spices, which can support development in many rural and often underserved communities.

Colombia also boasts a growing and innovative tech sector. President Iván Duque and his government have demonstrated strong support for the tech sector, including establishing new governmental entities that offer grants, mentoring, networking, and other services to support innovation and entrepreneurship in this critical field.

I’ve been to Colombia many times over the last twenty-two years. Each visit holds vivid memories. In 2000, while I was still president, President Andrés Pastrana took my daughter Chelsea and me on an evening walk through the historic district of Cartagena, where we met and danced with Los Niños del Vallenato. Their wonderful voices and costumes, making their music a powerful message of peace and resilience, moved me so much that I invited them to perform at the White House and again four years later at the dedication of my Presidential Center. When I returned to Colombia in 2002, during the transition to President Álvaro Uribe, the children greeted me as I stepped off the plane, and a representative of Colombia’s Indigenous people presented me with a traditional woven bracelet. I followed tradition and never took it off. Finally, the worn, faded strands fell apart after nineteen years.

In 2017, at the invitation of President Juan Manuel Santos, I went to Medellín, which was hosting the first World Coffee Producers Forum, bringing together coffee growers’ associations from Africa, Asia, and Latin America to unite the entire coffee value chain worldwide to promote sustainability and economic fairness for those who harvest the beans. Medellín—with its famous escalators up the mountain of Comuna 13, once the hotbed of narcotrafficking, was the perfect place to gather attendees representing more than forty coffee-producing countries, including roasters, traders, and retailers; financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, and government representatives. It symbolized the country’s rebirth, the peace dividend of an emerging regional and global leader.

It is imperative that the United States and Colombia, the two oldest democracies in the Western Hemisphere, keep strengthening our relationship—as we did most recently when US President Joe Biden announced his intention to designate Colombia as a Major US non-NATO Ally.3 I am proud to have played a role in building that friendship, both in public office and as a private citizen.

People who visit my New York offices, the old farmhouse Hillary and I call home, or my Presidential Library all see evidence of how much Colombia means to me. In my Harlem office, there’s a medal that the widow of a police officer killed in the drug wars gave me, saying she wanted me to show it to others because it told Colombia’s story, and she didn’t need it to remember who he was. In my Midtown office, I keep a first English printing of 100 Years of Solitude. In my home office, there’s a photo of the late Culture Minister Consuelo Araújo, the patron of Los Niños del Vallenato, slain for championing the crusade of the children. There’s a photo of Chelsea and me dancing with them in Cartagena in my home and a beautiful craft work commemorating their visit to the White House in my library. There are Colombian spices that remind me of my foundation’s work for small farmers and fishers who support their families by providing restaurants with locally-sourced products.

Memories of yesterdays like these are most important when they drive us to make tomorrow better, so our children can make their own memories without the burden of our nightmares.

I believe our best days together are still to come, and I will continue to do whatever I can to make it so.

* * *

President Bill Clinton served as the 42nd president of the United States from 1993 to 2001. He previously served as governor of Arkansas from 1979 to 1981 and again from 1983 to 1992, and as attorney general of Arkansas from 1977 to 1979. Since leaving office, Clinton created the Clinton Foundation to address international concerns such as the prevention of HIV/AIDS and global warming.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Fostering Effective Energy Transition 2021 edition, World Economic Forum, April 20, 2021, www.weforum.org/reports/fostering-effective-energy-transition-2021.
2    Executive Summary: Renewable Energy Market Analysis–Latin America, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2016, https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2016/IRENA_Market_Analysis_Latin_America_summary_EN_2016.
3    Statement by Joseph R. Biden of the United States and President Iván Duque Márquez of the Republic of Columbia, US-Colombia Bicentennial Partnership, White House, March 10, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/10/joint-statement- by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-of-the-united-states-and-president-ivan-duque-marquez- of-the-republic-of-colombia-u-s-colombia-bicentennial-partnership/.

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Colombia can lead the energy transition in Latin America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/colombia-can-lead-the-energy-transition-in-latin-america/ Fri, 06 May 2022 17:48:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=520965 Colombia's geography gives it a chance to take a leadership role in Latin America's energy transition. But to do so, Colombian leaders will first need to address indigenous concerns, remove barriers to investment, and fix long-standing mismanagement issues.

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As the gateway to South America, Colombia has the potential to be a world-class producer of renewable energy. Access to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans—the only such place in South America—allows for the formation of mature, global maritime networks for renewable energy exports. Colombia’s northern coast, specifically, boasts high wind speeds and solar radiation prime for exploitation.

Recognizing this potential, the Colombian government has made concerted efforts to push the country towards becoming a regional renewable leader.

The Guajira region, located in northeastern Colombia, is at the epicenter of the domestic wind energy industry given its advantageous peninsular location and arid flat terrain, where winds move uninterrupted with speeds ranging from 8.5 to 8.75 meters per second, above global averages. President Duque’s administration is developing a series of sixteen new wind farms across the region. The first, the Guajira I wind farm, is estimated to become operational this year and provide 20 megawatts (MW) of power. If all projects are completed on schedule by 2031, the wind farm network could power 17 percent of the country’s electric grid. Municipalities are following in the national government’s footsteps. Barranquilla, the largest Colombian city on the Caribbean coast, signed an agreement with Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners for a feasibility study to explore a 350 MW offshore wind farm.

Wind energy represents only a part of the country’s long-term renewable prospects. Colombia is also expanding its hydrogen capabilities, drawing investors and pilot projects to its rapidly growing market. In March, Ecopetrol, the country’s state-owned hydrocarbon company, inaugurated Colombia’s first green hydrogen pilot project at its Cartagena-based refinery. The project will be paired with a $140 million annual investment until 2040 for green hydrogen production. Colombia’s Caribbean coast is well positioned for green hydrogen due to its advantage in clean energy generation—evidenced by Guajira—alongside well-established ports that have easy access to the Americas and Europe for potential export. The levelized cost of hydrogen in Colombia is expected to reach parity with other hydrogen market leaders, such as Chile and Australia, by 2030. Estimates indicate that green and blue hydrogen production together could reach between 3.2 and 5.8 megatons by 2050.

However, political and technical barriers have inhibited Colombia’s clean energy development and continue to strain scalability. To legally construct infrastructure in the Guajira territory, the government must retain approval from its residents, the indigenous Wayúus, a community that faces high rates of poverty, malnutrition, and unemployment compared to national averages. Critics allege that the region has been historically neglected from partnerships and development opportunities in the region, and that improper compensation has been given for land bought for project development. This trend continued in the creation of the country’s first wind farm, Jepírachi, in 2004, and similar complaints have been alleged in ongoing wind power projects. The Wayúus argue that wind projects take large swaths of land from the community and do not compensate them adequately for the land’s worth. Tense relationships in the region have thus sapped the region of its advantageous geography’s utility.

The Jepírachi wind farm also typifies the technical hurdles faced by wind farm investment in Colombia. Mismanagement and improper upkeep have caused long-running delays in operation and weakened the effectiveness of plant capabilities. Beyond the issues this disuse presents to steady generation, it deprives green hydrogen facilities of the energy inputs they need, dimming domestic hydrogen prospects.

To meet the country’s renewable potential, the Colombian government should follow a two-pronged approach: foster an environment to attract foreign and domestic investment across a diverse project portfolio, and include local communities and municipalities as leaders in renewable project development.

Existing government initiatives, such as the Energy Transition Law No. 2099, create a fiscal frame and tax benefits for unconventional renewable investment, which includes green and blue hydrogen. Bill 365, which promotes non-traditional fuel sources, is another good starting point. The passage of a domestic emissions trading system and more expansive tax benefits for companies investing in hydrogen would provide even more robust pathways for blue and green hydrogen development.

Adequate private and public investment is a necessity but must also be paired with accountability to ensure the proper inclusion of disadvantaged and local communities in the development of renewable projects. The inclusion of Colombian municipalities on the Caribbean coast would expand continuous clean power access to a region that is partially disconnected from the national grid and faces frequent outages. But inclusive rhetoric alone is insufficient. When appropriate, concessions should be made both to pursue environmental justice and to ensure the wind farm project’s longevity.

The path towards Colombia’s decarbonization is not simple. The country will continue to confront significant hurdles as it looks to leverage its advantages in renewable energy potential. However, should the government follow a holistic strategy, it would be poised to successfully deploy its expansive resources and emerge as a renewable leader in Latin America.

Juan Gomez is a Spring 2022 Young Global Professional at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

Learn more about the Global Energy Center

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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Allies: Videos by Ecopetrol and ISA https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/allies-us-colombia-book/allies-by-ecopetrol-and-isa/ Tue, 03 May 2022 15:10:38 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=519608 Visual Essays by Ecopetrol and ISA in Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship.

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Sustainability and energy transition: A bet on Colombia’s comprehensive development and growth

The way we relate to one another and do business in the world has changed. Beyond delivering results or profits for shareholders, companies are expected to be key players in countries’ development and sustainability, acting responsibly with the environment and society to ensure a better future for all.

Colombia and the United States have established and strengthened bilateral ties, jointly advancing in this global dynamic, always coordinating around the shared values of democracy, security, free trade, and prosperity.

While dialogue and cooperation have been fundamental pillars for a mutually beneficial relationship, in changing environments like the current one, we call for governments and companies to continue evolving, facing challenges, and innovating side-by-side to rebuild our social fabrics, prevent and mitigate the impacts of climate change, and boost economic gains for both countries.

Business leaders across all sectors of Colombian industry play a key role in guaranteeing these advancements, promoting sustainable development, and maintaining a robust bilateral relationship with the United States, ensuring that Colombia remains the United States’ closest strategic partner in the Western Hemisphere.

For the energy and oil and gas sector, in particular, our contribution and commitment are to maintain responsible, ethical, safe, and efficient operations, contribute to ecosystem conservation and biodiversity, be guarantors of the energy transition and infrastructure, and promote the development and well-being of communities to consolidate sustainable strategies that result in improvements in their quality of life. Likewise, we must take important steps in the integrated hydrocarbon chain, electrification, diversification, and the decarbonization of operations through investments in new non-conventional energy businesses.

By doing this, we all win.

On June 1st, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship. To view book contents and more visual essays, click here.

In partnership with

Ecopetrol
ISA

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Allies: Video by Ana Maria Porras https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/allies-us-colombia-book/allies-by-ana-maria-porras/ Tue, 03 May 2022 15:09:15 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=519588 Visual Essay by Dr. Ana Maria Porras in Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship.

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Dr. Ana Maria Porras, Biomedical Engineer and the University of Florida, discusses STEM* cooperation between Colombia and the United States.

On June 1st, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship. To view book contents and watch more visual essays, click here.

*STEM = Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics

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Video message from Michael R. Bloomberg https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/video/allies-by-michael-r-bloomberg/ Tue, 03 May 2022 15:07:47 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=519579 Visual Essay by Michael R. Bloomberg in Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship.

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Michael R. Blomberg, Founder of Bloomberg LP & Bloomberg Philanthropies and Chair of the Climate Finance Leadership Initiative (CFLI), discusses environment and climate mitigation cooperation between Colombia and the United States.

On June 1st, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book Allies: Twenty-Seven Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship. To view book contents and watch more visual essays, click here.

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Allies: Video by Maria Victoria Llorente https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/video/allies-by-maria-victoria-llorente/ Tue, 03 May 2022 15:05:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=519537 Visual Essay by Maria Victoria Llorente in Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship.

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Maria Victoria Llorente, Executive Director of Fundación Ideas para la Paz and Member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, discusses security cooperation between Colombia and the United States.

On June 1st, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship. To view book contents and watch more visual essays, click here.

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Allies: Video by Carlos Vives https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/video/allies-by-carlos-vives/ Tue, 03 May 2022 14:59:57 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=519594 Visual Essay by Carlos Vives in Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship.

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Carlos Vives, singer-songwriter, actor, businessman, and member of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Advisory Council, discusses cooperation in the arts between Colombia and the United States.

On June 1st, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center published its first book Allies: 28 Bold Ideas to Reimagine the US-Colombia Relationship. To view book contents and watch more visual essays, click here.

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Ambassador Riyad Insanally, Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, and Sally Yearwood join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as nonresident senior fellows https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/new-class-of-fellows-joins-adrienne-arsht-latin-america-center/ Tue, 26 Apr 2022 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=517573 New class of fellows to bring deep foreign policy experience and understanding of US-Caribbean and US-Colombia relations, as well as China’s role in the Western Hemisphere.

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New class of fellows to bring deep foreign policy experience and understanding of US-Caribbean and US-Colombia relations, as well as China’s role in the Western Hemisphere

Washington DC – April 26, 2022 – The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center today announced the appointment of three new nonresident senior fellows: Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, former US Ambassador to Colombia; Ambassador Riyad Insanally, Guyana’s former Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS); and Sally Yearwood, Counselor of the Government of Barbados at the Inter-American Development Bank.

The three experts join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at a crucial time in the Center’s history following the recent announcement of American philanthropist and businesswoman Adrienne Arsht’s $25-million gift to endow the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Whitaker, Insanally, and Yearwood’s expert advice and analysis will guide the Center’s work amid a rapidly changing international order while highlighting the role Latin America and Caribbean actors will play in shaping it.

“As we continue to seek avenues to accelerate greater prosperity and opportunities across the Western Hemisphere, we could not have asked for better partners and expert voices to join the Council in our mission to shape the global future. Ambassador Insanally and Sally Yearwood bring a profound understanding of the strategic role that the Caribbean plays for the stability and prosperity of the Americas. Ambassador Whitaker brings a nuanced approach to the US-Colombia partnership and is a true champion of US engagement and leadership with the region,” said Jason Marczak, Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

The three new nonresident senior fellows will add new perspectives and thought leadership to the Center at a time when there is an urgent opportunity for greater US-Caribbean partnership, and as the US and Colombia celebrate the 200-year anniversary of their diplomatic ties.

As Guyana’s ambassador to the United States and permanent representative to the OAS, Ambassador Insanally served as chair of the OAS Permanent Council. “I am honored and delighted to join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Caribbean Initiative at a time when global and hemispheric events make it all-important that the long-standing ties between the Caribbean and the United States be strengthened through meaningful engagement and action,” said Ambassador Insanally.

Ambassador Kevin Whitaker, a member of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, served forty-two years in the US Foreign Service, achieving the rank of career minister. He was the longest-serving US ambassador to Colombia in a century (2014-2019). “It’s an enormous honor to be associated with the Council and especially the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, which is known not only for the balance and rigor of its analysis, but also for its enduring focus on suggesting practical, well-considered, and implementable policy approaches,” said Ambassador Kevin Whitaker.

Sally Yearwood currently represents the Government of Barbados and the Caribbean Constituency as a counselor on the board of the Inter-American Development Bank. Yearwood has worked with governments and private sector groups in Central American and Caribbean countries for over twenty-five years. “Trade and economic development are central drivers of the US-Caribbean relationship. I believe that the Atlantic Council’s Caribbean initiative is providing an essential forum for public-private dialogue on these issues,” said Sally Yearwood.

Please email inquiries to achavez@atlanticcouncil.org.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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The North-South divide is growing. Can a new Bretton Woods help? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-north-south-divide-is-growing-can-a-new-bretton-woods-help/ Thu, 21 Apr 2022 15:34:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=515442 The growing divide is under the scanner as US Treasury Secretary Yellen and Colombian Finance Minister Restrepo both voiced a need to modernize the institutions.

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During her April 13th, 2022, speech at the Atlantic Council, Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen made more than a dozen references to Bretton Woods, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and multilateral development banks. When asked by Financial Times (FT) journalist, Rana Foroohar, about the nature of “new institutions” in the global economic and financial governance, Secretary Yellen responded by saying “while I feel they should play an important role going forward, they need to be modernized to address problems…that are really challenges that we face today and these institutions were not really designed to address.” A week later, Colombia’s Minister of Finance and Credit, José Manuel Restrepo, echoed the same concerns regarding the Bretton Woods System and called for “building a new Bretton Woods” that is stronger and more inclusive in response to global challenges, such as the provisioning of global public goods, with vaccines as case in point.

We must celebrate Secretary Yellen’s and Minister Restrepo’s remarks on modernizing the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), namely the World Bank and the IMF. This is especially critical in this juncture in time when the fault lines between the Global North and the Global South are growing. Just look at how countries voted on the United Nations (UN) resolution suspending Russia from the Human Rights Council. Placing that map (Figure 1) next to the map of countries that are part of China’s BRI (Figure 2) highlights that growing rift.

Besides Russia and North Korea, the remaining 22 of the 24 UN members who voted against the resolution are all part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Moreover, 49 of the 58 who abstained from voting are also part of the BRI. While little more than half the countries that voted in favor of the resolution are also countries that have signed a BRI MoU with China, most of them are in Eastern Europe —which are concerned about Russia’s westward expansion— and in Latin America, which have more to benefit from their relationship with the United States than with China.

Substantial and meaningful reforms in the BWIs can help reduce the pace of the growing division between the Global North and Global South. One area of reform is the governance and decision-making structure of BWIs. There is no reason why the average citizen of high-income economies should have 10 times more voting power and representation in the boards of BWIs than an average citizen from the rest of the world (Figure 3). If BWIs are to remain as the main vehicle for global economic and financial multilateralism, their member states need fairer, though not necessarily equal, representation in these institutions. The Global North, headed by the United States, must welcome —and in fact lead— the reforms to result in such an outcome. This would help rebuild trust in these institutions, reinvigorating global multilateralism, and helping them achieve their objectives of financial stability, inclusive growth, and shared prosperity.

Another area of reforms in BWIs, among many others, is climate change. For this to happen, the Global North must acknowledge that in per capita terms, many of the top CO2 emitters are from their camp (Figure 4). For example, an average Canadian and American emits twice as much CO2 as an average Chinese, even though about one-third of all energy intensive global manufacturing is taking place in China, as compared to 18% in the United States. Furthermore, fourteen countries in the Global North are among the top 30 CO2 emitter per capita, while India is not even among the top 100. In other words, 12% of the world’s population residing in the Global North countries is responsible for around one-third of all global CO2 emissions. Their CO2 emissions negatively impacts the lives of the world’s most vulnerable and the poor, the vast majority of whom reside in the Global South. This provides a golden opportunity for the BWIs and its largest shareholders from the Global North —such as the United States— to support and lead the climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. They could thereby improve the wellbeing of hundreds of millions in the Global South and regain their trust in BWIs.

In her remarks, Secretary Yellen also hoped that the world would not “end up with a bipolar system” and highlighted the “need to work very hard and to work with China to try to avert such an outcome.” One certain and effective venue for such cooperation is within the framework of BWIs. A more effective and inclusive Bretton Woods system and economic and financial multilateralism will reduce the probability of a bipolar system. However, this requires substantial reforms in BWIs to increase the voice of Global South in these institutions and to equip them with the mandates, tools, and resources needed to address today’s pressing global challenges and especially those challenges that are impacting the Global South disproportionately. The Atlantic Council’s newly launched Bretton Woods 2.0 Project is excited to lead the way in this effort because, as mentioned by Secretary Yellen “we ought not wait for a new normal. We should begin to shape a better future today.”


Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou is a consultant with the GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of Economics at the American University in Washington, DC.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Pavia and Pelayo in Al Arabiya: Colombia is tackling the threat of Hezbollah in South America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/pavia-and-pelayo-in-al-arabiya-colombia-is-tackling-the-threat-of-hezbollah-in-south-america/ Thu, 10 Feb 2022 05:47:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=485518 The post Pavia and Pelayo in Al Arabiya: Colombia is tackling the threat of Hezbollah in South America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Global Sanctions Dashboard: Groundhog edition https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-groundhog-edition/ Sun, 06 Feb 2022 17:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=483591 Who sanctions Russia and why, Colombia’s narcotics trafficking, Iran’s balancing act, and Chinese military sanctions.

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In our previous edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we discussed the growing anti-kleptocracy movement in the United States and dug into designations across Africa. For this month’s Groundhog Edition—as Russia keeps us all in suspense in and around Ukraine—we will review current sanctions against Russia and the potential consequences the Kremlin may face should it decide to invade (again). We will also look at Iran’s sanctions (yes, Iran sanctions too) ahead of negotiations in Vienna. In this little world, it does feel like history is repeating itself, so it’s fitting that the little guy saw his shadow last week. 

Last year, in one map

Looking at this visual summary from last year, something should stand out to you, notably delistings in parts of the world we haven’t discussed in a while. OFAC’s largest sanctions program, Specially Designated Narcotics Trafficking Kingpin (otherwise known as ‘SDNTK’), undergoes periodic batches of large designations and delistings. Last year, OFAC delisted 494 Colombian designees, primarily from its SDNTK list. The largest batch followed the State Department’s November 2021 announcement revoking the terrorism designation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Some FARC designees were relisted under OFAC’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list for continued engagement in terrorist activities. In case you missed it, the FARC ceased to be a military organization in 2017.

Throughout the course of last year, the United Nations began delistings for Resolution 1518, which in 2003 authorized sanctions targeting the assets of Saddam Hussein. These delistings were made in several tranches, totaling 60 targets. If you take away one lesson here from all of this, it’s that once you’re designated for terrorism, it’s very hard to prove a negative. 

Old is new in the New Year

In January, OFAC designated seven individuals and one entity responsible for advancing North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, notably the DPRK’s testing of six missiles since September 2021. More listings are likely to come as North Korea continues its program in violation of multiple UN resolutions. DPRK is a dead heat with Syria as the most sanctioned jurisdiction in the world, but with backing from China and Russia, respectively, neither shows any prospect of changing course. 

Onto the Balkans. In early January, OFAC re-sanctioned Milorad Dodik and his media company, Alternativna Televizija, for corruption and efforts to undermine the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina under an updated Balkans executive order. Milorad Dodik is the Serb member of the three-person presidential body governing Bosnia, and has been sanctioned by OFAC since 2017 for his efforts to destabilize the country. Dodik continues to bellow nationalist rhetoric to gain support for secession while handinvg out government contracts to close associates throughout the Republika Srpska. 

Moscow’s gambling dice

Russia has been sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States for its occupation of Ukrainian territory since 2014. The concept was new then–sanctioning a major global economy, and using novel instruments such as limiting the maturity of debt and equity. Things are different now. As the Putin-decoding continues, Western policymakers are debating actions that were off the table eight years ago. Instead of “altering the calculus” of the Russian inner circle, the US and its partners vow to punish the broader Russian economy, spurring capital flight and weakening the ruble.

Options include sanctions on oligarchs, oil and gas, mining sector, and major Russian banks (including Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, The Russian Direct Investment Fund). The administration may even invoke the Foreign Direct Product Rule to restrict exports of technical components that are key to Russia’s conventional weapons systems (such as the ​​Elbrus-8CB microprocessor chip), a measure that could have major consequences for governments and firms (remember Huawei?). A signature measure would be to halt the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Biden has even signaled his willingness to sanction Putin himself. UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss stated that her government would unveil legislation that would allow Britain to sanction “oligarchs close to the Kremlin,” expanding authorities tied to Russia’s actions on the ground.

Congress too is back in the game. The Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act of 2022 would enact a slew of mandatory and discretionary measures, including prohibiting transactions on primary and secondary Russian sovereign debt. The draft bill also calls for public disclosure of Putin’s assets and financial practices—an acknowledgement that illicit finance bears direct national security implications for the United States. 

Among all of these conversations, if the Russians downplay the threat of sanctions by saying they’ve seen a lot of this before, they’re stating a fact. Spend some time with this graphic where we have compiled sanctions on Russia from around the world. Yes, even Indonesia has Russia sanctions. From terrorism, to cyberattacks, chemical weapons, human rights violations, and supporting the Asad regime, Maduro and Belarus’ Lukashenko, countries have found a way to express their displeasure with the Kremlin. To us, the data gives some credence to Russia’s perception of sanctions inflation.

Back in Moscow, sanctions continue to mean something different than Western countries think they mean. Russia’s main sanctioning authority—Rosfinmonitoring—designated Alexei Navalny under its ‘Terrorists and Extremists’ list, along with five of his closest aides. One week earlier, Navalny aides Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhdanov were added to the same list as part of the Kremlin’s attack on those it fears. This is a far cry from the legal basis for Western sanctions. We say rule of law, they say “rule of law”. Our takeaway? Perceptions and misperceptions by Russia, shown here through data, will determine the Biden administration’s success in using sanctions as the cornerstone of its deterrence policy.

Iran’s balancing act

As nuclear talks in Vienna enter their final stage, negotiators are holding out hopes of reviving the 2015 agreement with both Iran and the United States as signatories. Any deal acceptable to Tehran would provide sanctions relief and open up international markets, and the US has begun to reinstate certain waiver provisions. But while much of the attention has been focused on multilateral sanctions against Iran, almost no attention goes to Iran’s own use of sanctions, now part of our database. On the two-year anniversary of the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, Tehran sanctioned 51 Americans it suspects were involved. After the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure campaign” failed to bring Iran back to negotiations, Tehran’s political leadership has offered a face-saving response to Soleimani’s assassination, decrying the US military and Trump’s team, while agreeing to negotiate once again with America’s new leadership.

On the radar 

Last week, the European Parliament’s Special Committee on Foreign Interference concluded its 18-month long inquiry into how the European Union can protect itself against foreign interference, with a main focus on Russia and China. One of the chief findings of the report was that the EU should consider sanctions. The United States has sanctioned various targets for spreading disinformation under Executive Order 13848, which was created to counter election interference efforts, but does not have a statutory application to general disinformation operations. Good luck to the European Parliament defining sanctionable disinformation.

Last but certainly not least: Chinese military sanctions. The US Treasury continues to add Chinese entities to its non-SDN list of companies linked to China’s military-industrial complex, which forbids named firms from listing in US stock markets. The use of this authority is likely to expand and become increasingly complicated as the debate heats up around the role US investment plays in the advancement of Chinese technology. Both Congress and the Executive Branch are tabling options to restrict US outbound investment in sensitive sectors, including through capital markets. Navigating this issue promises a complicated intersection of law, financial regulation, and national security prerogative.

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Spotlight: Latin America and the Caribbean – Ten questions for 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/ten-questions-for-2022/ Tue, 04 Jan 2022 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=470439 The year 2022 will be one of change across the Western Hemisphere. So, what might or might not be on the horizon?

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The year 2022 will be one of change across the Western Hemisphere. So, what might or might not be on the horizon?

The year 2022 will be one of change across the Western Hemisphere. From presidential elections in Brazil and Colombia to newly elected presidents taking office in Chile and Honduras, regional leaders will be looking at new ways to rebuild economies from the COVID-19 pandemic while balancing mounting social pressures. So, what might or might not be on the horizon in 2022?

Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the year ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean, then take our signature annual poll and see how your opinions shape up against our predictions.

How might key presidential elections shake out? Will regional economies recover to pre-pandemic growth rates? What might be the outcome of the US-hosted Summit of the Americas, and will Caribbean voices play a larger role than in previous gatherings? Will the region expand its ties with China?

Take our ten-question poll in less than five minutes!

Question #1: Caribbean – Will Vice President Kamala Harris make her first trip to the Caribbean in 2022?

Question #2: Central America – Will the United States have confirmed ambassadors in all three northern Central American countries (currently only Guatemala) by year-end 2022?

Question #3: Chile – Will the new Chilean constitution be approved when put to a referendum?

Question #4: China and Latin America – Considering Nicaragua’s newly established China ties, will the three other Central American countries that currently recognize Taiwan—Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras—also switch recognition to China?

Question #5: Colombia – Will Colombia’s presidential election go to a second round?

Question 6: Economy – Can the region recover pre-pandemic growth rates in 2022?

Question #7: Mexico – Will Mexico remain the United States’ top trading partner throughout the next year?

Question #8: Bitcoin – Following in El Salvador’s footsteps, will support for Bitcoin tender grow in the region?

Question #9: Venezuela – Will Nicolas Maduro return to the negotiating table in Mexico City?

Question #10: Brazil – Will President Jair Bolsonaro win another term this year?

Bonus Question: Will Latin America and the Caribbean be represented in the final of the World Cup?


Our answer to question #1: YES

In 2022, the Biden-Harris administration will look for big wins and opportunities to expand its leadership in the Americas. This is achievable in the Caribbean with a high-profile visit, which would optimally be accompanied by a major policy announcement from Vice President Harris. President Joe Biden was the last vice president to visit the region, where he focused his time discussing the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative.

The stage is set for a similar visit to occur with Vice President Harris. Economic recovery is slow, vaccine hesitancy is increasing, and other actors, such as China, are playing a more active role in the Caribbean. Regional leaders often note that US attention is inconsistent, and that few high-profile US officials travel to the Caribbean. A visit and subsequent policy announcement that aids the Caribbean in its time of need would build on recent conversations between the Vice President and Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Keith Rowley (virtual) and Prime Minister of Barbados Mia Mottley (in person).

Our answer to question #2: NO

Given President Nayib Bukele’s recent personal attacks against President Biden and other US government officials, including Ambassador Jean Manes and current Charge d’Affaires Brendan O’Brien, it is unlikely that the United States will confirm all ambassadors to the Northern Triangle countries. President Bukele’s attacks were a response to the Biden administration’s decision to add Osiris Luna Meza, the chief of the Salvadoran penal system and vice minister of justice and public security, and Carlos Marroquin, chairman of the Social Fabric Reconstruction Unit, to the Specially Designated Citizens and Blocked Persons List. Both Salvadoran officials are accused of having a direct relationship with gangs, including MS-13. In Honduras, however, a new administration under President-elect Xiomara Castro provides a renewed sense of cooperation between the United States and the Central American country.

Our answer to question #3: YES

Once the constitutional draft is finalized by summer 2022, the Constitutional Convention will vote to approve or reject the new legal charter. If the body rejects the new constitution, Chile will keep its current one. However, if it is approved, the group will present the document to the newly elected head of state, who, in turn, will issue a call for a national referendum in which Chileans will vote to approve or reject the new constitution. Voting will be mandatory, and the new constitution will move forward only if an absolute majority is achieved.

While 78.3 percent of voters cast their ballot in favor of a new constitution in 2020, rising polarization and inefficiencies within the Constitutional Convention have left thousands of Chileans disenchanted with the reform process. However, the desire for fundamental changes remains high. If the new legal charter is approved by Chilean voters, it will be put into effect shortly after the vote through a formal ceremony. However, if Chile votes to reject, the 1980 Constitution written under Augusto Pinochet will remain in place. With just one opportunity to get the new constitution approved, the convention will attempt to generate a moderate bill that will stimulate consensus among the political left and right.

Our answer to question #4: NO

It is unlikely that all three of Taiwan’s Central American allies will switch recognition to China in 2022. But, considerations of international benefits, domestic political agency, or both may prompt a change in at least one of the countries. Internationally, US COVID-19 vaccine donations far outstripped those of China, sending a reassuring message to Taiwanese allies in the region.

But, Chinese vaccine diplomacy—including early, well-publicized vaccine sales and shipments—and broader medical, humanitarian, and economic assistance could still prove alluring for countries in need. Despite running with a pro-China message, Honduran President-elect Xiomara Castro recently declined to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. Absent any external shocks, Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras will likely attempt to maintain the status quo for as long as possible, favoring Taiwan while leaving the door open for closer ties with China. This delicate balancing act has served to remind larger countries not to take their allegiances for granted and will continue to do so. But, it will be increasingly tested, as seen with Nicaragua, in the critical and uncertain year ahead.

Our answer to question #5: YES

There has yet to be an election in Colombia’s history in which a president is elected in the first round. Senator Gustavo Petro, who served as mayor of Bogotá (2012–2014), leads the left-wing political party Colombia Humana, and was the runner-up in the 2018 presidential election against incumbent President Ivan Duque. With nearly 42 percent of the vote, Petro has positioned himself as the candidate with the greatest support from Colombian voters.

However, Petro currently polls at 25.4 percent, which is not enough for an absolute majority that will grant him the presidency in the first round. Petro will most likely go to a second-round vote against a center-right or center-left candidate, potentially former Mayor of Bucaramanga Rodolfo Hernández or former Governor of Antioquia Sergio Fajardo. To date, Hernández polls at 11 percent and Fajardo at 7 percent. As recommended by the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, co-chaired by Senators Roy Blunt and Ben Cardin, strengthening the alliance between Colombia and the United States ahead of 2022 presidential elections is paramount to safeguard Colombia’s gains in terms of development, rule of law, and democracy. Regardless of election results, the United States should continue to position itself as Colombia’s strongest ally, advancing stability and prosperity at home and abroad.

Our answer to question #6: YES

Led by its five major economies, regional gross domestic product (GDP) is on track to return to pre-pandemic levels in 2022, though per-capita income will likely not recover until 2023. Key uncertainties may alter this outlook: the extent of success in vaccination and pandemic management, stimulus trade-off between continued support and fiscal discipline, labor markets (currently experiencing slower recovery than GDP), inflation, electoral outcomes, and external conditions including evolving investor appetite and commodity prices.

The region as a whole is not expected to return to pre-pandemic growth trajectories in the coming years, signaling permanent output losses due to COVID-19. In a divergent recovery, smaller and vulnerable states, such as those in the tourism-dependent Caribbean, are experiencing an even slower return to normal. Lastly, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) should set an ambitious agenda beyond “recovery”—given unimpressive pre-pandemic growth rates and patterns—and, rather, seek ways to accelerate development and build forward in a more inclusive, productive, and sustainable way.

Our answer to question #7: YES

It is likely that Mexico will remain the United States’ top trading partner throughout 2022. Mexico currently holds the top position—overtaking China in February 2021—with Canada in the second spot, lagging behind by $2.9 billion in total trade. COVID-19 significantly hindered US-Mexico trade—which largely relies on land trade via trucks and railcars—due to the pandemic-induced land-border closures to “non-essential” traffic. As of November 8, 2021, however, the United States reopened its borders to non-essential traffic and booming commerce is expected along the border. Moreover, US-Mexico trade topped $545 billion through October 2021 (the most recent data available), an increase of over 24 percent from one year earlier. Given the highly integrated nature of US-Mexico trade in the automotive and energy sectors, coupled with the efforts in border cities and ports to increase capacity and efficiency, trade is likely to continue to grow between the United States and Mexico.

Our answer to question #8: YES

Bitcoin presents an attractive option for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, yet those countries will not replicate El Salvador’s approach. The government of El Salvador claimed that adopting Bitcoin would reduce financial exclusion and high remittance fees. These issues also affect the entire region. The World Bank predicted that remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean rose 21.6 percent in 2021, costing roughly $6.9 billion in remittance fees. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), financial inclusion in the region falls below global averages, and is exacerbated in the Caribbean due to the de-risking of correspondent banks. The worsening effects of climate change will also likely generate support for a decentralized virtual currency, as remittances typically increase following natural disasters, alongside decreased access to financial institutions.

Despite Bitcoin’s allure, its implementation in El Salvador has been marred by technological unreliability, weak financial regulations, and high price volatility. Politicians in Paraguay, Mexico, and Panama have already introduced legislation to regulate Bitcoin’s use as legal tender, and more will follow in 2022. As support for Bitcoin rises, so will debates on its social and environmental risks. Countries across the region will chart their own paths instead of following El Salvador’s playbook.

Our answer to question #9: YES

Although, the latest round of negotiations in Mexico has been suspended since October 2021, a combination of long-term incentives will likely propel Maduro to negotiate with the Venezuelan Unitary Platform—the umbrella organization encompassing the main political opposition parties in the country. Maduro seeks access to capital, legitimacy, guarantees against prosecution, and division within factions of domestic opponents—all of which he can accomplish through negotiations.

However, these factors are not the only ones at play in determining Maduro’s negotiation participation. After the highly visible diverging strategies within the opposition during the recent regional elections—and Julio Borges’ recent resignation and call for the interim government’s dissolution—Maduro might decide to simply wait out further erosion of opposition unity, instead of engaging with it directly. The success of such a strategy, if taken, would enhance the regime’s monopoly on power.

Our answer to question #10: Too early to call.

The odds are not in his favor, but it’s too early to say. Recent polls suggest that President Bolsonaro and former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will face each other in a second round of elections, repeating the 2018 Bolsonaro versus Workers’ Party (PT) duel. However, this time around, former President Lula, as the PT candidate, is leading the way in early polling. Both candidates have a strong support base, but former President Lula’s history with corruption and President Bolsonaro’s mismanagement of the pandemic and current economic hurdles also give them significantly high rejection rates.

Third-way candidates, such as President Bolsonaro’s former minister of justice, Sergio Moro—famous for leading the Car Wash Operation that put President Lula in jail—is running on an anticorruption, center-right platform. Those Brazilians who in 2018 voted for President Bolsonaro as a “vote against corruption” might be more inclined to seek other alternatives. Current high inflation and unemployment rates might also play against President Bolsonaro’s reelection. Having said that, it will likely be a close race, and there is still a long way to go until elections in October 2022.

BONUS QUESTION ANSWER: YES

Brazil and Argentina are the only Latin American counties that have already qualified for the 2022 World Cup. In the Caribbean, Jamaica seems to be the only country with a chance of qualifying. While it is impossible to know who will be in the final (RIP Paul the Octopus), Brazil and Argentina are always strong contenders.

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Colombia’s president: The US helped Colombia through COVID-19. Now it’s time for the next phase of cooperation. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/colombias-president-the-us-helped-colombia-through-covid-19-now-it-must-help-with-peace-building/ Thu, 09 Dec 2021 18:13:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=466549 Duque listed opportunities for the United States to invest in Colombia and improve economic opportunity in the country—and Cardin and Blunt reiterated the United States’ willingness to continue its two-hundred-year partnership with Colombia.

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Read the report

Report

Dec 8, 2021

A plan for Colombia’s COVID recovery and why it matters for the United States

By Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force

The continuity of Colombia’s prosperity and role as a key US partner depends, in part, on the country’s ability to swiftly recover from COVID-19. In 2020, lockdowns and mobility restrictions led to a major recession in Colombia, exacerbating unemployment, poverty, and pre-existing inequalities.

Americas Civil Society

On Wednesday, US Senators Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Roy Blunt (R-MO), co-chairs of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, presented Colombian President Iván Duque with the task force’s latest report, which provides a blueprint for US-Colombia cooperation in a post-COVID world. Duque listed opportunities for the United States to invest in Colombia and improve economic opportunity in the country—and Cardin and Blunt reiterated the United States’ willingness to continue its two-hundred-year partnership with Colombia, focusing on economic, health, and good-governance goals. Below, edited for length and clarity, is Duque, Cardin, and Blunt’s conversation with Jason Marczak, director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

JASON MARCZAK: President Duque, I’ll turn to you for reactions to the report, but first I’ll ask Senator Cardin and Senator Blunt to share some of the topline findings that we are releasing today. These ideas and recommendations, which come just about six months before the United States and Colombia will celebrate two hundred years of bilateral relations, focus on four strategic pillars: accelerating vaccine rollouts; promoting investment and job creation, strengthening Colombia’s social pact; [and] enhancing rule of law, peace agreement implementation, good governance, and human-rights protections.

Senator Cardin, let me start with you. I’d like to ask what you see as the main takeaways of this publication. And why do you believe this report and the ideas being released today, [in] which both you and Senator Blunt played an integral role. Why do you see this as so critical for US interests, especially given the many challenges that we face across the region and across the world?

SENATOR BEN CARDIN: We’ve been on a very positive path on Colombia over a long period of time. We’re now implementing the Peace Colombia Plan, which is for prosperity and peace in the region. Colombia is a critical partner for the United States’ national-security [interests]. They are pivotal in our global fight against drug trafficking, against money laundering, [and] against organized crime. They’re our partner in the region in regard to our security interests and economic prosperity. So it’s in the US interest for us to strengthen that partnership.

It was a challenge to implement the peace plan, and then put on top of that the problems of Venezuela and two million refugees coming into Colombia. That’s a burden that is extremely difficult to manage.

Colombia is a critical partner for the United States’ national-security [interests]. They are pivotal in our global fight against drug trafficking, against money laundering, [and] against organized crime… So it’s in the US interest for us to strengthen that partnership.

Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD)

Then comes COVID-19. COVID-19 [has] been devastating to all countries, but [for] Colombia, it affected their economy by a significant reduction in their economic performance, and that’s understandable. We recognize they’ve had a challenge getting people vaccinated [and] getting the virus under control…

We need to help Colombia deal with the extra burdens created by COVID-19. And when you look at the four pillars that this report represents—getting the vaccine rollout, making sure that’s done; getting job creation, which is critically important to the long-term peace and prosperity of the country; more robust social pact—we recognize that the COVID-19 had a particular impact on underserved communities and those that are more vulnerable and made it even worse; and enhancing rule of law, which is a path that Colombia has been on, and we need to make sure that we strengthen that during COVID-19 where, again, it was challenged. So I think it [points] to the four pillars that are critically important to enhance our partnership in the mutual interests of our two countries…

But it’s amazing that next year we’re going to celebrate [the] two hundredth anniversary [of US-Colombia relations]. You cannot take that for granted, and I am really optimistic about our future. And we’re going to make sure that that optimism is well placed.

JASON MARCZAK: Senator Blunt, building off of Senator Cardin’s comments, how do you see these ideas being taken into account in your own deliberations and your own work in the US Senate?

SENATOR ROY BLUNT: A two-hundred-year [US-Colombia] relationship, as my good friend Senator Cardin just said, is no small relationship for us to have had. We’ve been around a while, but we haven’t been around much longer than this relationship has been. And it’s been a relationship of working together, a partnership of hope that our countries could get even closer together. But the long-term commitment to democracy by Colombia in South America is unique in how long they have been committed to these kinds of values. We want to do all we can to continue to make this partnership better and stronger.

You know, in the last twenty years, Senator Cardin and I, working together in the House as well, have been involved in Plan Colombia and then Peace Colombia and then the follow-up that we’re doing right now. And I think about twelve billion dollars have been invested by the United States during that twenty-year period of time in Colombia. It is a different kind of long-term partnership than we have with almost anybody else in the world. It’s one that we value.

I think one of the things coming out of this report is really the importance of looking at where that money has been used most effectively. And we need to talk to our Colombian partners with even more intensity… Let’s look at what we’ve done in twenty years and let’s analyze where we’ve made the most difference. Have we made the most difference in the rule of law? Have we made the most difference when we invested directly in the economy? Have we made investments in non-government organizations and social and community groups? This is a good time to evaluate where we can be the most helpful.

It’s also a good time to evaluate the challenges in our economic relationships. The fact that Colombia had a significant number of projects that were bid [upon] and no American company bid on those infrastructure road projects. I think we ought to be asking why.

What do we need to do to be sure that we’re the principal partner for the people and the government of Colombia as they move forward? What was missing, and what do we need to do to assist in opening that door wider and with more confidence for American companies? The things that happen in the hemisphere really matter… In South America, the partnership with Colombia is the one not only that we have the longest and greatest confidence in, but it also allows us to impact other countries through our partners in Colombia in ways that we can never have directly the same kind of influence or the same kind of advice given as our Colombian partners are able to give.

The partnership with Colombia is the one not only that we have the longest and greatest confidence in, but it also allows us to impact other countries through our partners in Colombia

Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO)

And so all of those things are things that I think this report focuses on. And I think it’s pretty clear, looking ahead, we need to see where we’ve been the most effective. I think our investment in Colombia this year, almost half a billion dollars, is the biggest investment in a decade. And so, American partners there, our Colombian partners: Who would have thought that President Duque would be dealt this hand, where you have so many challenges. Of Venezuela, of COVID-19, of the reaction to Peace Colombia and the impact that had on the internal workings of the government itself… I look forward to what we can do with this continued partnership.

JASON MARCZAK: President Duque… I’d like to ask you where you see the greatest opportunity to move forward [with the] implementation of some of the ideas, recommendations discussed by both senators, and also given the focus of the report on Colombia’s COVID-19 recovery, how worried are you as well about the new variant and how that could affect Colombia’s recovery trajectory?

PRESIDENT IVÁN DUQUE: … We’re proud and we’re glad that this report is a very significant validator of the policies that we are embracing in Colombia. But if I may react to it point by point, the first thing that has to be said is that the United States has supported Colombia [in facing] the COVID-19 crisis.

We got strong support… [from] President Trump when he supported us when we required ventilators. And we have received amazing support from President Biden and his team because we have received more than six million vaccines to be deployed around the country. And we value that because that has made the United States the biggest donor [in helping] Colombia to face the consequences of COVID-19. And one of the things that I want to highlight is that as of today, our one-shot vaccination rate… has reached levels that are even above the United States and Germany.

And we’ve done that because we have been deploying all the capacities throughout the country. And, yes, we have [surpassed] 73 percent of the Colombian population with one single [dose]. We already [surpassed] 50 percent of the population with full vaccination. And we want to accelerate in the next weeks so that we can have full vaccination for 70 percent of the population, so that that could support us in the path [to] having herd immunity. But I want to also reiterate that we have to keep on expanding our capacity to immunize the population. So that’s why we already started third shots for people above [age eighteen], and pretty soon we’ll get also to youngsters. But I think it’s a great message that Colombia’s doing good, at this moment, in the way that we have managed, integrally, the COVID-19 crisis.

Now, when we look at the economic consequences, I think that when we launched the equivalent of the Colombian New Deal last year, called Compromiso por Colombia, and when we launched all the social responses for the people in need, where we basically [increased] from 3.5 to more than nine million households that are receiving the nonconditional transfers and the conditional transfers, and that we have been able to subside 40 or 50 percent of the payroll for more than four million employers in Colombia, and that we have been able to put together the most ambitious social plan ever in this country, that is also a trigger of reactivation.

And we’re going to end this year with the highest economic growth in this century. And that means we’re going to be above 9 percent. And that is very good news because that demonstrates Colombia’s resilience. So I’m glad that the report highlights that looking at the present and the future, the economic recovery—hand in hand with massive vaccination—is something that is really making a difference.

Now, on the third front, and that’s also very important, is that in order to build a lasting peace in Colombia, we have to… not only [attend to] those municipalities that were historically badly hit by violence, but we have also to expand the services in the rest of the country. And we had the visit of the United Nations secretary-general some days ago. And he acknowledged something that is very important: Colombia has become a reference model on peacebuilding. And it has become a reference model because we have been able to mobilize resources like no other time before to 170 municipalities that were affected by violence, and that now are receiving the highest public investment ever.

But what is interesting is that hand-in-hand, this year we’re going to get to a record high in terms of land titling. And that will mean that by the end of this year my administration will already grant fifty thousand property titles around the country—fifty thousand—which is more than what was done in the eight years before my administration, and also in the eight years between 2002 and 2010.

So that demonstrates the capacity that we have to [have] in the field. We have been also advancing on the national Kadaster that is crucial to [protecting] our land and to have environmental concerns to be addressed. And we’re also very happy to say that in terms of tertiary roads and roads around the country, we are fulfilling the task. And just on four-generation highways, just looking at all the concessions, we’re going to end this administration with the same amount of new kilometers of concessions that Colombia had during the first twenty-five years of first- and second- and third-generation concessions. So that means that the country, it’s moving forward. We’re recovering pre-pandemic employment levels. So I value that the report makes this highlight because, yes, we’re building back better.

The country, it’s moving forward. We’re recovering pre-pandemic employment levels…. Yes, we’re building back better.

Colombian President Iván Duque

And… how are we adapting to the new mutations of this virus?… We have to do something there in order to have global herd immunity, because if most of us do what we have to do, but there are some, that for any reason, can’t do it, that also puts in jeopardy the possibility of having globally head immunity, and that allows mutations. So I think we have to do something stronger there.

And I will finish by saying: Peace with legality. Today Colombia, it’s reaching most of the municipalities that were affected by violence in the last fifty years with a historical investment. The UN, the Kroc Institute, most of the reference validators that we have are saying that Colombia is [becoming] a reference model for peacebuilding around the world. So in a nutshell, all the four items that are considered in the report, the way that the proposals are planned, for me continue the line that the Atlantic Council has had. And we look forward that for the two-hundred-year celebration, we can strengthen all these policies and build what we have already discussed with the Atlantic Council. That is to have a long-term policy between the United States and Colombia that is beyond the political cycles.

JASON MARCZAK: Senator Cardin, let me give you an opportunity to react to some of President Duque’s comments.

SENATOR BEN CARDIN: … Impressive record during this very challenging time. Congratulations on your handling of this crisis as far as COVID-19 is concerned.

You mentioned a lot of the areas where I think this report is really centered on. Yes, we want to complete the vaccine rollout to make sure that everyone gets the vaccine, that [a slow rollout is] not as a result of not having the availability. And secondly, when we look at job creation—which is a critically important part—we have tools in the United States… How we use our development corporation, how we participate in infrastructure projects, what we do with agriculture are all areas where I think we can complement the leadership that you have provided in regards to economic growth.

And in regard to the social compact and the rule of law, this is a continuing struggle. We recognize that. This is not easy. You have detractors that are trying to make it more difficult. So I think we can find partnerships there to help you in that regard.

So I think you’re going to find in the United States Congress a very supportive partner, that we’re going to be looking at how we can creatively use our institutions and resources to really reinforce the plans that you have brought out. And I think when you look at the specific recommendations in this report, it complements very much your strategy for peace and prosperity in your region and dealing with the challenges of COVID-19.

JASON MARCZAK: Senator Blunt.

SENATOR ROY BLUNT: Well, again, the challenges that the government has faced have been significant. They have been unprecedented in many ways…

When I was in the House during the [George W. Bush] administration, I helped start the negotiations for the trade agreement that we were able to finalize when I got to the Senate in 2011. I think immediately that allowed about 80 percent of our industrial products and half of our agricultural products to go in duty-free. We continue to move along that line. By the end of this decade, 2028 or so, there will be free trade across the board in our countries.

Nearsourcing is a real opportunity for us with Colombia as we look for ways to condense our worldwide sourcing issues. Why wouldn’t we want to be close and be close with our friends? I do think for that to work we need to be thinking of ways we can encourage and help the workforce of Colombia become more technically ready for that workforce of the next decade and the decade after that. There’s a real opportunity here. We should make the most of it.

And again, back to Senator Cardin’s comments, the rule of law, the certainty of relationship, the economy that is obvious and above board so that when we make those determinations we understand that everything that was on the table [was what had] to be considered, not the other kinds of things that make it so difficult to do business in some parts of the world. But I think we’ve come through a challenging period here, and I think in many ways we’ve come through that challenging period with our relationship stronger and our interest in looking for partners that are closer to us—so geographically and philosophically and by standards of law—than we might have had in other places. It’s a good time for this relationship, and we need to move forward.

I think we’ve come through a challenging period here, and I think in many ways we’ve come through that challenging period with our relationship stronger and our interest in looking for partners that are closer to us… It’s a good time for this relationship, and we need to move forward.

Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO)

JASON MARCZAK: President Duque, would you like to share any final comments before the senators have to leave?

PRESIDENT IVÁN DUQUE: I believe that what the senators said, it’s crucial. And how do we make this happen immediately?

So my take is that the two-hundred-year celebration shall be the opportunity for us to have [a] Colombia-US long-term comprehensive strategy. And it’s not just about putting resources, but it’s about using all the institutional tools in order to strengthen the relationship.

Let me give you one example. One week ago, we got the approval [to export] mangoes from Colombia to the United States. Last year, we got green peppers. Just on those two projects, and if we started looking at accessibility in a broader way, these can open the opportunities for many people around the country to earn a job and even to turn from illegal crops to legal ones.

The second thing that is very important: We need to strengthen investment. So we’re going to have biddings for fifteen megaprojects in the next eight months. We want to have US companies participating in those bids. We want to bring investments from the United States. We still have to do much work together on the climate agenda. But I think what we did in Glasgow was very important because we’re aligned. So when we talk climate change, trade, investment, security, [and peacebuilding], I think we are [on] the right track.

And on security: I think last year we saw that the consumption of drugs around the world skyrocketed, including the United States, obviously including Colombia. But I think in the co-responsibility procedures that we have to embrace, I think we have to do a lot more in the United States on prevention because we have reached record highs on interdictions. We have destructed cocaine laboratories around the country. We have captured kingpins. We have destroyed structures. But we have to do something very strong, as well, to reduce the demand from the United States, and I think that’s also very important for long-term peace-building.

Read the report

Report

Dec 8, 2021

A plan for Colombia’s COVID recovery and why it matters for the United States

By Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force

The continuity of Colombia’s prosperity and role as a key US partner depends, in part, on the country’s ability to swiftly recover from COVID-19. In 2020, lockdowns and mobility restrictions led to a major recession in Colombia, exacerbating unemployment, poverty, and pre-existing inequalities.

Americas Civil Society

Watch the full event

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A plan for Colombia’s COVID recovery and why it matters for the United States https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-plan-for-colombias-covid-recovery-and-why-it-matters-for-the-united-states/ Wed, 08 Dec 2021 20:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=449508 The continuity of Colombia’s prosperity and role as a key US partner depends, in part, on the country’s ability to swiftly recover from COVID-19. In 2020, lockdowns and mobility restrictions led to a major recession in Colombia, exacerbating unemployment, poverty, and pre-existing inequalities.

The post A plan for Colombia’s COVID recovery and why it matters for the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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A report by the Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, co-chaired by Senator Ben Cardin (D- Maryland) and Senator Roy Blunt (R-Missouri)

With Chairman Gregory Meeks (D-New York); Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-Texas); Representative Ruben Gallego (D-Arizona).

And Jason Marczak, Camila Hernandez, Michel Janna

Executive summary

On June 19, 2022, the United States and Colombia will celebrate two hundred years of bilateral relations. Historically, Colombia has been an indispensable ally, serving as an anchor for US relations in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and collaborating with the United States to address regional and global needs. It hosts the largest number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, leads security and defense efforts in Central and South America, and plays a pivotal role in the global fight against drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime.

The continuity of Colombia’s prosperity and role as a key US partner depends, in part, on the country’s ability to swiftly recover from COVID-19. In 2020, lockdowns and mobility restrictions led to a major recession in Colombia, exacerbating unemployment, poverty, and pre-existing inequalities. With US support for inclusive and sustainable COVID-19 recovery, Colombia will be better able to partner with the United States to advance common interests, particularly amid increasing regional and global challenges. 

This report outlines a series of policy actions that the US-Colombia partnership could take to accelerate inclusive and sustainable COVID-19 recovery in Colombia, strengthening the US-Colombia alliance. It is a product of the Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, a bilateral and multisectoral group of experts in the United States and Colombia, co-chaired by Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO). 

Task Force recommendations fall into four strategic pillars: accelerating vaccine rollout; promoting investment and job creation; strengthening Colombia’s social pact; and enhancing rule of law, peace-agreement implementation, good governance, and human-rights protections. Advancing US-Colombia relations along these pillars will safeguard key US security, economic, political, and humanitarian interests, and support Colombia’s path toward greater internal peace, a stronger democracy, and sustainable and inclusive economic growth. The group’s sixteen policy solutions are outlined below.

US-Colombia Task Force recommendations

Vaccine rollout: Jump-starting the economy

1. Build on previous US commitments to share COVID-19 vaccines globally by increasing bilateral donations to Colombia. Direct donations would circumvent delivery and supply problems currently faced by the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, ensuring timely and equitable vaccine access for Colombians, particularly in rural areas, as well as Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia. The United States could also consider allocating vaccines to Venezuela that will then be distributed in Colombian localities with high Venezuelan presence.

Job creation: The path to inclusive growth

2. Strengthen the US Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) ability to mobilize more US investment to Colombia by

  1. studying the need to increase the agency’s budget for equity investment and technical assistance, to support growth-stage companies and project identification and preparation in Colombia;
  2. permitting partnership with multilaterals and/or organizations in which the United States is a shareholder, to share due-diligence responsibilities; and
  3. encouraging engagement with Colombian stakeholders at the city and municipality levels in addition to DFC’s work with Colombia’s national government.

3. Provide additional US government credit guarantees to support lending for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Colombia and promote inclusive economic growth. Also, prioritize financing for large infrastructure projects and projects in sectors that benefit vulnerable and historically marginalized communities.

4. Advance opportunities and spaces (e.g., strategy sessions, roundtables) for the US Department of the Treasury, US Department of State, United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), US Department of Transportation (USDOT), US Department of Energy (DOE), and DFC to work with US and Colombian subject-matter experts to identify and structure highly bankable projects in Colombia.

5. Incentivize US private-sector participation in Colombia’s large infrastructure projects by instructing the US Department of the Treasury and USTDA to work with industry-leading US firms to

  1. identify barriers faced by US companies to commit capital or financing to infrastructure projects; and
  2. put forward proposals to Colombia’s National Infrastructure Agency (ANI) on how to address investment concerns.

6. Explore adoption of a modernized version of enterprise funds as a US foreign policy instrument toward Colombia. A potential enterprise fund in Colombia should

  1. adopt more flexible business plans; 
  2. establish partnerships with other institutions (e.g., DFC and the International Finance Corporation) to leverage additional investment and lessons learned from non-US funds; and 
  3. incorporate technical-assistance programs led by nongovernmental organizations.

7. Work with the US Department of Agriculture to expedite sanitary and phytosanitary approvals for Colombian agricultural products with preferential access to the US market under the 2012 US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA). Creating a market in the United States for agricultural products apt for production in conflict-afflicted territories would support US-Colombia crop-substitution and coca-eradication efforts.

A more robust social pact: Promoting greater stability

8. Prioritize, finance, and expand US Agency for International Development (USAID)-led programs to support women, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous people, and youths in Colombia.

9. Explore increasing funding needs to support Colombia’s efforts to assist and promote the socioeconomic inclusion of the nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees in its territory.

10. Encourage international donors to fully fund donation pledges and increase financial support in response to the Venezuela regional crisis.

11. The US embassy and USAID mission in Colombia, in partnership with multilateral agencies, should provide technical assistance to Colombia’s National Planning Directorate (DNP) to improve its beneficiary databases and payment-dispersion systems, thereby ensuring that COVID-driven and pre-COVID subsidies effectively reach those in need.

12. Support the modernization of Colombia’ tax and customs agency (DIAN) through an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) program of assistance and/or technology collaboration to improve trade traceability and increase the digitalization of customs processes. A stronger DIAN is key to fighting money laundering and smuggling schemes.

Enhancing rule of law, peace-agreement implementation, good governance, and human-rights protections

13. Convene a binational task force to inform the future allocation of US resources to stabilize conflict-affected territories, focusing specifically on

  1. producing a comprehensive evaluation of the status and results of key ongoing and US-backed stabilization programs;
  2. assessing the degree of interconnectedness between existing stabilization efforts at the local level, and proposing strategies for increased coordination and unity, where needed; and
  3. defining and advancing the adoption of holistic success metrics for territorial stabilization that go beyond total coca crops and cocaine production.

14. Continue to support the implementation of Colombia’s 2016 agreement by

  1. building on US-backed studies and initiatives (e.g. the Kroc Institute’s Peace Accord’s Matrix) to determine the need for additional US funding, particularly to Colombia’s most vulnerable territories—i.e., the one hundred and seventy Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (PDET) municipalities.
  2. working with other international donors to increase coordination and complementarity between different sources of funding.

15. Support changes in policies, practices, and training to reduce use-of-force incidents during police-citizen encounters and improve community trust in the Colombian police. Specifically, USAID, the Department of State, and the US Department of Defense could partner with in-country stakeholders to train police forces on human rights, de-escalation, and gender-based violence; and implement early-warning systems and new policing technologies to increase police accountability, transparency, and legitimacy.

16. Continue to financially support the Colombian Attorney General’s Office (AGO), ensuring accountability of US support through conditionality and clear monitoring mechanisms. The US Department of Justice and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) should also continue to provide technical workshops and trainings to the Colombian AGO to prevent and investigate human-rights violations.

Introduction

US foreign policy actions during the Joseph Biden-Kamala Harris administration could help to define US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean for years to come. With increasing challenges in the region—including democratic backsliding, growing social dissatisfaction, the Venezuelan migrant and refugee crisis, and the fallout from COVID-19—the United States should reinvigorate its relationships with partners and allies to promote hemispheric stability and prosperity. Strengthening US-Colombia relations should be a top priority, as the positive effects will reverberate far beyond Colombia. 

As President Biden mentioned, Colombia is the “keystone” of US foreign policy toward LAC.1 For decades, the US-Colombia partnership has safeguarded US economic, political, security, and humanitarian interests in the wider region, and supported Colombia’s path toward greater peace, security, and well-being. 

However, recent challenges caused or aggravated by COVID-19 threaten Colombia’s internal stability and democratic institutions, and may lead to unwanted spillovers across the region. Jointly addressing these challenges is critical for the continuity of Colombia’s democracy, security, and development gains. 

Like many other countries in LAC, Colombia was hit hard by COVID-19, in terms of both infections and deaths. The country imposed strict lockdowns and mobility restrictions to curb transmissions, which hindered economic activity and led to one of the worst recessions on record. In 2020, Colombia’s economy contracted by nearly seven percentage points, while unemployment surpassed 21 percent. Poverty increased from 35.7 percent in 2019 to 42.5 percent in 2020, reversing progress in poverty reduction by almost ten years. In a matter of months, 3.5 million new Colombians entered poverty, of whom 2.8 million fell into extreme poverty.2

These economic setbacks, coupled with preexisting social grievances—inefficient public services, perceived inadequacies in the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, unfulfilled government promises to vulnerable and historically marginalized communities, corruption, violence, and organized crime—–fueled a wave of mass protests in early 2021. Although largely peaceful, some demonstrations were intensified by police use of force, and permeated by criminal activities, vandalism, and blockades, causing more than eighty deaths and $1.5 billion in economic losses.3

Support for sustainable and inclusive COVID-19 recovery in Colombia is critical to sustain the country’s success, and to demonstrate the United States’ commitment to democracy, social justice and the US-Colombia alliance. Now is the time to build on more than two decades of successful US-Colombia partnership and devote new resources to ensure that previous investments can remain the foundation for the future.

The Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force calls for a new and ambitious multiyear, bipartisan, and binational plan; one designed to both tackle immediate issues facing Colombia and the region—COVID-19, the Venezuela crisis, rising human-rights concerns, and others—and to promote long-term prosperity, democracy, social inclusion, and equitable wealth creation in Colombia. This will help to address the conditions that spark social and political unrest, boosting Colombia’s contributions to regional stability and role as one of the United States’ strongest global partners. This report outlines some of the strategies that such a plan should include. 

A historically successful partnership

During his October 2021 trip to Colombia, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the US-Colombia relationship “transcends any administration or any political party” and continually evolves to become progressively stronger.4 According to Secretary Blinken, democracies deliver “by working closely with partners and allies on the biggest challenges we face. And that’s exactly what the United States and Colombia are doing.”5

Sustaining and expanding such an alliance will help to address many global needs, generating positive impacts on the lives of US, Colombian, and other regional citizens. With nearly two hundred years of bilateral relations and two decades of partnership under the Plan Colombia framework, the following examples demonstrate Colombia’s position as one of the most willing and capable US allies in the world and the Western Hemisphere.  

Under Plan Colombia and Peace Colombia, both countries forged an enduring security and counternarcotics partnership, which built toward the signing of Colombia’s 2016 peace accord. Between 2000 and 2015, Colombia spent more than $130 billion to reduce coca crops, fight drug trafficking, strengthen its institutions, and combat illegal armed groups.6 Since 2000, the United States has invested nearly $12 billion to support Colombia’s efforts to enhance security, create economic opportunities, and build effective and legitimate state institutions.7 Despite these efforts, in 2020 coca cultivation and cocaine production reached record expansion of 245,000 hectares and 1,010 metric tons, respectively.8 Without enhanced bilateral cooperation, these issues could hinder Colombia’s capacity to strengthen governance and transition to sustainable peace.  

Colombia’s efforts to take in and assist nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees points to its growing capacity for regional leadership. In February 2021, the government offered a decade of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to conflict-affected Venezuelans, granting them access to formal employment and essential services including healthcare and COVID-19 vaccinations. Colombia also offered to host more than four thousand Afghan refugees following the US exit from Afghanistan, sent sixteen tons of critical humanitarian aid and thirty rescue workers to Haiti after the August 2021 earthquake, and donated $1 million to the Caribbean community (CARICOM) via the Pan American Health Organization (PHO) to support vaccination efforts.9 

As an important US ally at the United Nations (UN), Organization of American States (OAS), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Colombia has become a vital contributor of security expertise and a promotor of democratic institutions, rule of law, and economic liberty across the world. In Central America specifically, Colombia has cooperated with the United States to train more than seventeen thousand police and prosecutors via the US-Colombia Action Plan since 2013.10 Colombia was the first Latin American country to become one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nine global partners.11 By providing critical demining expertise and training to NATO allies and partners, Colombia has aided the global fight against terrorism, cybersecurity threats, corruption, and other global security challenges. 

The strong economic relationship between the United States and Colombia should continue to prioritize foreign direct investment (FDI) and the full implementation of the 2012 US-Colombia TPA. The United States is currently Colombia’s largest trading partner, and Colombia remains one of the few South American countries that trades more with the United States than with China. As China’s economic engagement in the region continues to increase, a more robust US-Colombia economic partnership could help to balance out China’s growing involvement and investments in LAC.

Widespread dissatisfaction with democracy in LAC has placed democratic institutions under threat, particularly with extra-hemispheric powers like China increasingly promoting their form of government as more stable and productive than the liberal open-market democratic model. These circumstances make Colombia’s 2022 presidential and congressional elections high stakes for the future of US-LAC relations, and grant greater importance to US support of Colombia’s efforts to strengthen national democratic institutions.

Similarly, Colombia’s prompt and sustainable COVID-19 recovery is critical for political and social stability at home and in the region. The United States should position itself as Colombia’s partner of choice in its post-pandemic recovery to address challenges and reinforce the “wins” of a strong relationship for years to come.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with Colombian Vice President and Foreign Minister, Marta Lucia Ramirez, at the U.S. State Department in Washington, DC, U.S. May 28, 2021. Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/Pool via REUTERS

A flour-pillar plan for post-COVID-19 recovery win Colombia

The COVID-19 pandemic led to the most severe economic recession in Colombia in more than a century. As previously noted, the country’s economy contracted by 6.8 percent in 2020 and poverty and unemployment rates skyrocketed, reaching nearly 43 percent and 21 percent, respectively. Colombia’s structural social and economic challenges became even more evident as labor informality, the inefficient provision of public goods, infrastructure bottlenecks, and weak local governance hampered social and economic recovery.

As the administration of President Joe Biden supports COVID-19 recovery in LAC and works to reinvigorate and modernize US alliances in the region, the US-Colombia partnership should be top priority. 

The United States should: help to restore economic activity by building on previous commitments to provide COVID-19 vaccines to Colombia; promote investment and job creation in Colombia in partnership with international financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), DFC, and USAID to consolidate free markets and productivity as the engines for sustainable growth; provide increased and strategic technical and financial assistance to ensure Colombia’s social and political stability; and strengthen existing initiatives to boost security conditions, state capacity, and rule of law. The four strategic pillars are outlined below.

Pillar one

Vaccine rollout: Jump-starting the economy

In 2020 and 2021, Colombia implemented strict quarantine and mobility restrictions to contain the spread of COVID-19 and prevent the collapse of the healthcare system. However, given Colombia’s high informal- employment rates (nearly 63 percent of the working population), staying at home was not viable for many low-income or vulnerable households.12 Thus, lockdown measures proved unsustainable and contributed to increased poverty, inequality, and social discontent.  

Colombia’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign launched in February 2021, relatively late in comparison to its regional peers. As of October 20, the program has had strong results, with 43.8 percent of the population fully vaccinated according to the Health Ministry. Assuming every person needs two vaccine doses.13 Despite large strides to ensure equitable in-country vaccine distribution, vaccination rates still vary across regions. Data from July 2021 reveal that, on average, vaccine coverage is lower in rural municipalities (25 percent) and remote rural municipalities (23 percent) than in large cities (30 percent).14 Nevertheless, coverage varies considerably from department to department, with rural municipalities in certain regions (e.g., Valle del Cauca, Santander, and Atlántico) actually doing better than cities.  

The pace of Colombia’s vaccination program has been influenced almost entirely by inventory issues, rather than infrastructure, distribution, or administration capacity. With a population of more than fifty million, Colombia has contracted seventy-six million vaccines through multilateral and bilateral channels, but only 52.5 million have been delivered.15 The continuous flow of vaccines is critical for the application of booster shots, immunization of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, and the achievement of widespread vaccination among vulnerable and historically marginalized communities, particularly in remote rural areas.

The United States is the only producing nation that has made direct bilateral donations to Colombia, providing a total of six million doses as of October 16, 2021 (2.5 million from Johnson & Johnson and 3.5 million from Moderna), enough to fully vaccinate approximately 10 percent of Colombia’s eligible population.16  

Despite these advances, supply shortages and delays in delivery schedules keep vaccine rollout slow. Nearly 22 percent of remaining deliveries (approximately 16.5 million doses) will be received via the COVAX Facility, a consortium backed by the World Health Organization (WHO). While the initiative works to ensure the equitable distribution of vaccines, deliveries have been slow, and uncertainty about future deliveries remains high. 

Recommendations for an effective US-Colombia partnership

The US-Colombia Task Force welcomes the commitment of the United States to providing COVID-19 vaccines globally, including to Colombia and other LAC countries, bilaterally and through multilateral mechanisms.

The United States can send additional bilateral vaccine donations to Colombia. Direct donations would circumvent delivery and supply problems currently faced by COVAX, ensuring timely and equitable vaccine access for Colombians, particularly to rural communities, and the nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees on Colombian soil. The United States could allocate vaccines for Venezuela (which currently receives no US COVID-19 vaccines) and provide them to Colombia to distribute in localities with a large Venezuelan presence, reaching Colombians and a greater number of migrants and refugees.

Colombian women organize bouquets of flowers to be exported overseas ahead of Valentine’s Day. The United States is a leading importer of Colombian flowers. (Reuters/Jaime Saldarriaga)
Pillar two

Job creation: The path to inclusive growth

The massive and sudden job loss in Colombia remains one of the most dramatic effects of the pandemic-driven economic downturn. In May 2021, unemployment peaked at 20.9 percent and, despite declining to 12.1 percent in September 2021, remains above its pre-pandemic levels (10.5 percent in 2019).17 In the first three months of the COVID-19 crisis, five million jobs were lost—and six hundred and eighty thousand have yet to be restored as of September 2021. To date, employment recovery has mainly occurred in the informal sector. Millions of Colombians continue to lack access to social-security services or social-welfare programs amid a global health and economic crisis. Also, as shown in the figure below, Colombia’s job loss has disproportionately affected women, given their high participation rate in the sectors hit hardest by COVID-19 (tourism, restaurants, and services in general). 

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Source: “Información Septiembre 2021,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, September 2021, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral/empleo-y-desempleo.  

To address the impact of COVID-19 on people’s livelihoods, the Colombian government implemented cash-transfer programs for low-income families and credit guarantees for companies. These initiatives involved a $6.5-billion fiscal effort between March 2020 and June 2021.18 Cash transfers to individuals and corporate payroll subsidies will run until the end of 2022 and 2021, respectively. 

Recent estimates suggest that these programs have prevented a 2.2-percentage-point surge in poverty.19 However, their longevity relies on the DNP’s ability to improve beneficiary databases and payment systems, to ensure the swift delivery of government funds and the careful assessment of future fiscal burdens.  

In the medium and long terms, a sustainable improvement in people’s livelihoods and well-being will result from the promotion of inclusive economic growth through new employment opportunities, rather than government transfers. The creation of millions of new jobs will require efforts in the following three areas.

Large-scale infrastructure projects: Colombia must prioritize projects that have a material impact on gross capital formation and positive spillovers into other sectors. Given current fiscal constraints, Colombia has encouraged private-sector participation in said projects via public-private partnerships (PPP) like the fifth-generation (5G) plan to develop roads, airports, trains, and waterways infrastructure, which contemplates an investment of $4.8 billion over the next decade.20 Focusing efforts on infrastructure projects that benefit PDET (i.e., municipalities classified as specially affected by violence) can provide significant benefits in the short and long terms. Similarly, the Build Back Better World (B3W) Initiative, designed to meet the infrastructure needs of developing countries, serves as an opportunity to advance collaboration with the DFC to create additional infrastructure/construction related jobs.

Housing-construction programs: Colombia has a housing deficit of approximately 5.1 million units, making housing a promising sector to attract public and private investment.21 Historically, Colombia has used housing development as a countercyclical policy, due to its quick positive impact on employment and aggregate demand.

Tourism and services: The COVID-19 pandemic generated a sharp downturn in tourism activities, leading to the loss of more than 76 percent of jobs in Colombia’s retail, entertainment, restaurant and food service, and hotel industries.22 As international travel restrictions start to ease, promoting the tourism industry will allow Colombia to recover millions of jobs, generate additional employment opportunities, and return to pre-pandemic positive growth trends. Stimulating the service and tourism sectors can contribute to rapid job recovery and income gains among low- and middle-class workers, particularly women and young workers, given that said sectors do not require specialized skillsets or trainings. 

Nearshoring: Opportunities for nearshoring in LAC continue to grow as businesses increasingly consider relocating operations closer to their main markets. In addition to strengthening supply-chain resiliency, nearshoring could help to advance socially equitable production standards.23 The McKinsey Global Institute identified $4.6 trillion in global nearshoring opportunities over the next five years.24 Given its proximity to the United States and other LAC markets, Colombia is uniquely positioned to receive nearshoring investments from US companies looking to divest from Asia to reduce risks of future trade wars or other disruptive events like COVID-19. Colombia’s Commerce Ministry, with the support of the Colombian American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham), identified nearly six hundred companies across several sectors in which nearshoring to Colombia would provide competitive advantages, including processed foods, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, information technologies, and fashion, among others.25 Moving forward, ProColombia, the government agency responsible for promoting exports and FDI, should continue to work with US companies to identify and reduce existing legal, tax, and regulatory burdens to FDI in these sectors. Also, the Ministry of Education could scale up bilingual-education programs to make Colombia a more attractive relocation destination for US companies. 

Recommendations for an effective US-Colombia partnership

The US government can support Colombia’s long-term growth by creating a more robust private-sector engagement plan that allows US investors and companies to tap the full potential of investment opportunities in Colombia.

The DFC should play a critical role in such a plan. Despite being well positioned to mobilize US private-sector investment in Colombia, the DFC has not met initial expectations due to the slow start of its US-Colombia Growth Initiative, an ambitious plan launched in August 2020 to attract $5 billion in investments in Colombia.26 To fully implement the initiative, the DFC should work with the US Congress to determine the need and explore ways to increase the budget for equity investments, as well as technical assistance and feasibility studies. Additional budget for equity investments would allow the agency to support more growth-stage companies in Colombia, which would otherwise not be able to take on debt, promoting inclusive development and advancing US foreign policy goals. Similarly, increasing the budget for feasibility studies, technical assistance, or trainings would accelerate project identification and preparation, increasing their developmental impact or commercial sustainability, and attracting additional private investment.

Moreover, for projects in which its capabilities are limited, DFC should consider partnering with multilaterals—such as the IDB, IFC, and/or other organizations in which the United States is a shareholder—to share due-diligence responsibilities, while leveraging their extensive knowledge, track records, and networks in Colombia.

In parallel, the United States and/or Colombia could assess the feasibility of adopting additional credit-guarantee schemes (CGSs) to unlock lending for SMEs and promote inclusive economic growth. Under a CGS, the government fully or partially guarantees the value of a loan to an SME, which mitigates the risk to the lender, incentivizing financial institutions to increase access to credit to a broader client base. Specifically, the United States could replicate and/or expand USAID/Colombia’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) portfolio to support lending to SMEs in more municipalities across Colombia. As of July 2021, the DCA has leveraged $55 in private-sector financing for every dollar in USAID funds obligated, for a total of $337 million since 2008.27 Additional CSGs could prioritize access to financing for local infrastructure projects and projects in the tourism and service sectors, given their potential to rapidly generate jobs that directly benefit women, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous peoples, and youths.

In addition to working with Colombia’s national government, the DFC could engage key stakeholders (public sector, private sector, and civil society) in large cities (e.g., Barranquilla, Bogotá, Cali, and Medellin) and in localities with high unemployment rates (e.g., Cúcuta, Neiva, Quibdó, Riohacha, and Valledupar) to identify and structure commercially sustainable projects that attract additional private investments in development and promote job creation. The US Treasury, State Department, USTDA, USDOT, and DOE could support these efforts by working with the DFC to structure projects alongside relevant subject-matter experts. Engagement at the city and/or municipality levels will also show the United States’ commitment to work nationwide and allow agencies to navigate federal government changes following Colombia’s 2022 presidential election.

The US and Colombian governments should also incentivize US private-sector participation in Colombia´s large infrastructure projects, which is currently very low. For example, no US company has made a bid for any of Colombia’s thirty large road PPP projects awarded in the past six years; instead, the projects were awarded to companies from other countries, including China. To address this and incentivize future investment, the US Department of Treasury and USTDA should work with industry-leading firms in the United States to identify barriers that inhibit US players from committing their capital or financing to these projects, and make proposals to Colombia’s ANI on how to address them. Existing barriers might be related to structuring issues, the balance of risks faced by private players, broader contract clauses, or security and rule-of-law concerns. Once identified, Colombian authorities should tackle these constraints to make large infrastructure projects more attractive to a greater array of US and other strategic investors.

Additionally, the United States should consider adopting a modernized version of enterprise funds as a foreign policy instrument toward Colombia and the wider region. These funds deliver US government monies to private-equity investments in emerging markets, promoting entrepreneurship abroad and generating high financial returns. With these funds’ foundation in the early 1990s, the US government invested $1.2 billion in nineteen countries. According to USAID, original funds realized approximately $1.7 billion of net proceeds from successful investments and raised $6.9 billion of private capital from outside the US government, reaching a total of $9.8 billion from all sources.28

Overall, the relative financial and policy success of enterprise funds could be scaled and replicated in Colombia and other LAC countries, albeit with modifications to meet regional demands and realities. In Colombia specifically, the United States could revisit and adjust enterprise funds based on lessons learned from USAID’s experience with the $100-million Tunisian American Enterprise Fund (TAEF). Between 2013 and 2020, the TAEF invested approximately $36.7 million to SMEs in every Tunisian governate, and it will continue to actively invest through 2028.29 A potential enterprise fund in Colombia should: adopt more flexible business plans; establish partnerships with other institutions (e.g., DFC and IFC) to attract additional resources and leverage lessons learned from non-US enterprise funds; and incorporate nongovernmental organizations to provide supplementary technical-assistance programs.

Finally, the US government should work with Colombia to prioritize and expedite the approval of Colombian products with preferential access to the US market under the 2012 US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement. Specifically, The US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) could speed up and harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary requirements to facilitate and accelerate the entry of agricultural products into the United States—particularly those apt for production in areas afflicted by criminal economies, such as coca cultivation and illegal mining. Establishing a market in the United States for agricultural products that are part of coca-crop substitution programs would significantly advance licit economic opportunities in rural Colombia and US-Colombia coca-eradication efforts.30

Demonstrators take part in a protest against the tax reform of President Ivan Duque’s government in Bogota, Colombia April 28, 2021. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez
Pillar three

A more robust social pact: Promoting greater stability

In 2019, mass protests led by trade unions and student groups erupted across Colombia and many other LAC countries (e.g., Chile, Peru, and Ecuador), calling for improvements in health, education, pensions, and judicial systems. However, protests lost some of their saliency in 2020 due to COVID-19 and the implementation of mobility restrictions. Nevertheless, mass demonstrations broke out again in April 2021, triggered by a tax-reform plan that raised prices on basic consumer products. Lasting several months and turning violent at times, the protests led to eighty-four civilian and police deaths, $1.5 billion in economic losses, and a surge in COVID-19 cases, which exacerbated Colombia’s third COVID-19 peak and added new pressures to the healthcare system.31 

The protests are partially explained by the government’s inability to meet citizens’ expectations amid a difficult fiscal situation. As a result of these tensions, populist movements gained popularity in the political arena, threatening the potential implementation of sustainable policies that are critical for the country’s long-term growth.

Improving the existing social pact to effectively reduce poverty and inequality is essential for social and political stability. Moving forward, Colombia must ensure that subsidy spending effectively reaches those in need, particularly given that approximately 60 percent of pre-COVID-19 subsidies went to the non-poor. Additionally, the country needs to strengthen protections for the elderly, as retirement-pension coverage only benefits 25 percent of the adult population. Labor informality also remains a challenge, as nearly two thirds of the working population operates in the informal sector and lacks access to social-security services.32 The Colombian government should, among other things, continue to reduce non-wage payroll costs, such as payroll contributions to family welfare funds (cajas de compensación familiar), that hamper job creation in the formal sector. Moving from flat-rate social-security contributions to progressive rates would lower the cost of hiring minimum-wage workers for employers, and thereby incentivize formalization.33

A stronger social pact is particularly urgent given the ongoing health, economic, and social challenges brought on by COVID-19. Recent economic dislocations have disproportionately affected vulnerable populations, particularly women, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous peoples, low-skilled workers, and youths. Any state response to the pandemic and its aftermath should prioritize these groups of individuals. A more robust social pact is also paramount given the mass influx of vulnerable Venezuelans to Colombia, and the burden that ongoing migration places on Colombia’s public-goods provision and fiscal balance.

Improving the state’s social safety net amid a global health emergency inevitably implies additional costs. To finance them, Colombia approved a new tax reform in September 2021, which seeks to collect 1.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in new revenues. In addition to changes to Colombia’s tax code, DIAN needs better capabilities to counter tax evasion and smuggling. This will not only strengthen public finances, but also improve rule of law and state capacity. 

Recommendations for an effective US-Colombia partnership

The US government should continue to prioritize, finance, and expand USAID-led programs to support women, youth, Afro-Colombians, and Indigenous peoples in Colombia. New initiatives should be informed by lessons learned from ongoing USAID programs in Colombia, including the recently launched FEMPOW (Mujeres Poderosas), Youth Resilience Activity, Inter-Ethnic Alliance for Peace Activity, Territories of Life Activity, and Afro-Colombian Leadership and Scholarship Program. The first program seeks to improve the lives of Colombian women by increasing their economic participation, promoting gender equality, and advancing the implementation of gender-related policies and services. The second is USAID/Colombia’s first activity focused entirely on youth, and looks to provide employment and entrepreneurship opportunities in thirty urban and rural municipalities by partnering with the private and public sectors, training centers, and chambers of commerce. The Inter-Ethnic Alliance for Peace Activity works with Indigenous and Afro-descendant community organizations to strengthen self-government structures, with a focus on food security and women and youth leadership. The Territories of Life Activity supports Indigenous organizations in the Amazon Basin to legally establish and manage Indigenous Community Conservation Areas, and the Afro-Colombian Leadership and Scholarship Program aims to increase the number of emerging ethnic minority leaders pursuing graduate studies in the United States.

Meeting the social, political, and economic costs of Venezuela’s mass migration to Colombia represents a significant challenge for President Iván Duque’s government and future administrations. The United States has provided approximately $1.9 billion in financial assistance to the Venezuelan regional crisis since 2017, more than any other country.34 However, the crisis remains largely underfunded. The United States should explore ways to increase its humanitarian and development assistance to Colombia as it responds to the needs of the nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombian territory. Additional humanitarian aid is particularly needed to provide emergency food assistance, healthcare, education, protection services, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) support to Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and host communities. Additional development assistance is critical to support the implementation of the TPS program, sustain USAID’s integration centers (Centros de Integración para migrantes, refugiados, y retornados), and expand efforts to promote the long-term socioeconomic inclusion of migrants, refugees, and Colombian returnees from Venezuela.

Host countries like Colombia have received $256 per capita in international assistance for each Venezuelan migrant or refugee—less than one tenth of the $3,150 received by host countries for each Syrian refugee.35 The gap in funding is especially striking given that each crisis displaced about 5.5 million people in its first five years. If the Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP) for 2021 is fully met, the total amount of funding for the Venezuelan crisis would be roughly $259 per person.36 Yet, as of October 22, 2021, only 34.5 percent of the appeal has been funded ($89 per person).37

The United States should actively encourage other donors to follow through on donation pledges, increase their financial support, and maintain focus on the Venezuela regional crisis. In June 2021, Canada mobilized the international community to pledge nearly $2.4 billion in additional funding to assist crisis-affected people ($957 million in donations and $1.4 billion in credits). Direct budget support to Colombia (and other recipient countries) will help to reduce fiscal pressures, alleviate social discontent, and address the growing needs of Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and host communities.

The US embassy and USAID mission in Colombia can help to improve the effectiveness of structural and COVID-related social programs in Colombia by strengthening the core capabilities of Colombia’s DNP, which runs government information systems for the allocation of social transfers (e.g., Sisben 4.0). Such engagement could come under the umbrella of an international effort, in which multilateral agencies like the World Bank and/or the IDB provide technical assistance to improve beneficiary databases and payment-disbursement systems, and the United States provides technological capabilities to ensure that public resources in Colombia effectively reach those in need. Such an alliance should also seek to improve Colombia’s unequal pension system and its protections for the elderly.

Finally, the United States can support the modernization of the DIAN’s tax and customs information systems. A stronger DIAN will not only reduce tax evasion and improve tax collection, but will also help to fight money laundering and smuggling schemes associated with criminal groups. Specifically, the United States can provide assistance and expertise through an IRS program of secondments or job rotation, as well as technology collaboration to increase trade traceability and the digitalization of customs processes at ports and airports.

Mayerli Lopez, former FARC guerrilla, nurserywoman and signer of the peace agreement with the government of Juan Manuel Santos, stands during a visit to one of the nurseries run by former FARC guerrillas in Putumayo, Colombia August 26, 2021. Picture taken August 26, 2021. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez
Pillar four

Enhancing rule of law, peace agreement implementation, good governance, and human rights protections

To achieve a sustainable post-COVID recovery, Colombia must address historical deficiencies in terms of security, state presence, good governance, and human rights. These issues have governed US-Colombia relations for decades, and—despite considerable progress—much work remains to be done. Given that Colombia’s stability is key to regional security and prosperity, the United States should strengthen its support for Colombian government efforts to fully implement the 2016 peace agreement, and enhance rule of law, good governance, and human-rights protections. 

Rule of law and peace-agreement implementation: Historically, weak institutional presence and lack of economic opportunities have allowed illegal activities and armed groups to thrive in rural Colombia. The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) aimed to improve security, justice, land property rights, public goods, and economic opportunities in rural, conflict-torn areas of Colombia.38

Despite steady progress, the international community has expressed concerns about the pace of implementation of the agreement. According to the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, implementation in 2020 advanced slower than in previous years, due to a shift in focus from short-term commitments necessary to lay the foundations for implementation to medium- and long-term goals that require broader institutional adjustments and coordination. The Kroc Institute’s fifth status report, published in May 2021, reveals that 28 percent of the stipulations in the agreement have been fully implemented, 18 percent are on track to be implemented within the established timeline, and 54 percent have made little or no implementation progress (see Figure 2, page 16).39 

To date, point six in the six-point agreement, implementation, verification, and public endorsement, has the highest number of completed stipulations (55 percent), followed by point three, end of the conflict (49 percent).40 In contrast, point one, comprehensive rural reform, and point two, political participation, have the lowest number of fully implemented stipulations (4 and 12 percent, respectively).41 The figure below outlines the implementation status of each point in the agreement. 

Implementation status of each point in Colombia’s six-point peace agreement 

(December 2019–November 2020)

Point/implementation stage (Percentage of stipulations)Not initiatedMinimum Intermediate Completed 
Point 1 (Comprehensive rural reform)1864134
Point 2 (Political participation)34342012
Point 3 (End of the conflict)14191949
Point 4 (Solution to the problem of illicit drugs)18392617
Point 5 (Agreement regarding the victims of the conflict)20372023
Point 6 (Implementation, verification, and public endorsement)13181455

Source: “The Colombian Final Agreement in the Era of COVID-19: Institutional and Citizen Ownership is Key to Implementation,” Peace Accords Matrix Barometer Initiative and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, May 20, 2021, https://doi.org/10.7274/r0-cffp-qr07.

In 2020, three main challenges marked and protracted the implementation timeline of the agreement. The first was COVID-19 and government-imposed mobility restrictions to curb the spread of the virus. These not only exacerbated existing inequalities and vulnerabilities in the territories, but also hampered the advancement of community-level consultation processes. The second major challenge emerged from the insufficient allocation of financial resources toward implementation. The third challenge was the upsurge in confrontations among illegal armed groups, as well as clashes between these groups and security forces, resulting in instances of violence against human-rights defenders, social and environmental leaders, and former combatants. In some conflict-affected territories, these confrontations, coupled with the increasingly common fragmentation of illegal armed groups, also contributed to an upsurge in violence (e.g., homicides, massacres, and forced displacement) against civilians in early 2021.42

Progress on the implementation of the peace agreement, along with enhanced institutional presence and rule of law, will help to unlock the full potential of Colombia’s agricultural sector, and boost efforts to protect the environment and mitigate climate change —both key for post-COVID recovery. Despite favorable soil, climate, and geographical conditions, agricultural productivity stands at suboptimal levels, explained partially by land-tenure informality. Approximately 52 percent of Colombia’s rural properties lack formal titles, which hampers access to credit and investment in technology and long-term infrastructure. Additionally, illegal activities in Colombia’s Amazon (e.g., illicit mining, cattle raising, coca cultivation, and drug trafficking) not only exacerbate deforestation and hamper regional food production, water availability, and global efforts to reduce carbon emissions, but also fuel violence against environmental activists and fund non-state armed groups.43 USAID should continue to partner with Colombia on environmental protection and land-ownership formalization efforts, an important stipulation in the peace agreement. Colombia also needs to increase investments in irrigation and drainage systems through public and private financing and find new opportunities to integrate agricultural production into global value chains.    

Strengthening security, justice, and rule of law in large cities across Colombia is also critical to ensure a stable democracy and sustainable and inclusive post-COVID-19 recovery. Despite a decrease in overall levels of violence over the past two decades and a 70-percent drop in homicide rates between 1991 and 2019, recent upticks in violence and perceived insecurity are concerning.44 Between January and September 2021, homicide rates increased by 10 percent in comparison to 2019, with 40 percent of total homicides occurring in large cities.45 Cali experienced the highest number of cases, followed by Bogotá, Medellin, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. Security, justice, and rule of law are preconditions for private-sector investment in Colombia. 

Good governance and human rights: As previously mentioned, a wave of violence against human-rights defenders and social and environmental leaders has continued to spread across several regions. Estimates of the total number of homicides vary, but a compilation of government and civil-society sources provides a range of between 831 and 1,352 victims from 2016 to 2021.46 According to Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), killings of social leaders dropped 49 percent in the first quarter of 2021, reaching the lowest levels since the implementation of the peace agreement began in 2017.47 Death threats and threats of violence, however, are on the rise—suggesting that violence continues, but has evolved in form and intensity. The FIP also reports that homicides of former combatants in reincorporation processes have not declined. In the first four months of 2021, twenty-four people in reincorporation processes were killed; one more in comparison to the same period in 2020, and seven more than in 2019.48  

Between April and June 2021, largely peaceful protests across Colombia’s largest cities converged with vandalism, arson, and property destruction, leading to violent clashes between protesters and security forces, and dozens of instances of human-rights violations, according to reporting from the international community and human-rights organizations. Instances of human-rights violations are unacceptable, and a direct threat to democracy, civil society, and peace. Addressing such situations should be a top priority for Colombia and the US-Colombia bilateral agenda. 

Recommendations for an effective US-Colombia partnership

The United States should continue to partner with Colombia to improve security and build effective and legitimate state institutions in rural and urban areas, implement the 2016 peace agreement, combat illegal armed groups and illicit drugs, and protect vulnerable populations, including human-rights defenders and social leaders

In the short term, the United States and Colombia should convene an independent binational task force with three specific mandates to inform the allocation of future US stabilization resources. First, the group should produce a comprehensive evaluation of the status and results of key ongoing and US-backed programs to promote stability in conflict-affected areas, including the Zonas Futuro, Paz con Legalidad, the PDETs, and the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Crops Used for Illicit Purposes (PNIS), among others. Such an assessment will help ensure an efficient intersection between security and development in accordance with the Framework for US Stabilization developed by the US Department of State, US Department of Defense, and USAID in 2018.49 Existing and new interventions should not only promote civil security, but also deliver basic services (education, healthcare, WASH, etc.) and increase economic opportunities, supporting vulnerable and historically marginalized communities and enhancing state legitimacy.

Second, the task force should assess the degree of unity and coordination between existing stabilization programs, particularly at the subnational level, and propose improvements where needed. Ensuring effective coordination and unity between efforts and actors is critical to reduce levels of violence and consolidate stability in conflict-affected areas, which will ultimately produce more tangible and long-lasting outcomes for US taxpayers. Lastly, the group’s third mandate should be to establish and advance the adoption of more holistic metrics for bilateral success in terms of territorial stabilization. These metrics should go beyond narrow indicators of success, including total cocaine production and coca cultivated, which have historically defined US-Colombia relations.

International assistance and cooperation remain critical for the successful implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. Moving forward, the United States should continue to support Colombia’s peace-agreement implementation efforts, informing and optimizing the allocation of future US assistance based on the findings of US-backed studies and initiatives such as the Peace Accord’s Matrix at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

Once specific funding needs are established, the United States and Colombia could convene a conference of international donors to support peace-agreement implementation, with the participation of other donor countries (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom, and European Union countries), international financial institutions like the World Bank, IDB, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations. The conference is also an opportunity to adopt strategies to promote coordination and complementarity between different sources of funding. Additional resources and efforts resulting from this initiative should be directed to Colombia’s most vulnerable territories—i.e., the sixteen PDET regions outlined in the agreement, which comprise one hundred and seventy municipalities.

The United States should work with Colombia to implement changes in police policies, practices, and trainings to reduce use-of-force incidents and improve community trust in the police. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act permits US agencies to provide training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy. In Colombia, USAID, the Department of State, and Department of Defense are well positioned to partner with in-country stakeholders (the private sector, academia, and civil society) to train the Colombian National Police on human rights, de-escalation techniques, and gender-based violence.50 These programs should build on prior US police/military trainings in Colombia and leverage lessons learned from US police trainings on human rights in Central America (2018) and gender-based-violence prevention in the Dominican Republic (2021).51

USAID, the State Department, and the Defense Department could also support the efforts of the Office of Human Rights within the Colombian National Police, created in July 2021 and led by a former US State Department consultant, to inform police policies on the prevention, reduction, and respect for human rights. Additionally, US agencies could support the implementation of early-intervention systems to detect and address officer misconduct and strengthen accountability and human-rights protections—as well as the adoption of innovative technologies in policing to increase accountability and transparency and rebuild perceptions of police legitimacy and trust in Colombia.

The United States should continue to financially support the Colombian Attorney General’s Office (AGO) with conditionality and clear monitoring mechanisms to ensure that US resources are effectively used in resolving and preventing human-rights violations. Also, the US Department of Justice—via its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), and in coordination with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)—should continue to provide technical workshops and trainings to the Colombian AGO to investigate human-rights violations, as well as including it as a key stakeholder in transnational criminal investigations.

Conclusion

With more than two decades of successful cooperation, Colombia stands as one of the United States’ closest and most capable allies in the region. Strengthening this strategic relationship and supporting Colombia’s COVID-19 recovery will significantly advance regional stability amid increasing global challenges. 

To foster inclusive and sustainable COVID-19 recovery in Colombia, the US-Colombia partnership should accelerate vaccine rollout, promote investment and job creation, address social and political tensions, and enhance security, state capacity, rule of law, and human-rights protections. 

A steady stream of vaccines to Colombia supported by the United States will contribute to the immunization and COVID-19 recovery of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, as well as vulnerable and historically marginalized communities, particularly in remote rural areas. It will also allow Colombia to address other pressing issues including social discontent, public debt, and fiscal deficits. Promoting US investment and job-creation creation will accelerate Colombia’s economic recovery, decrease the strain on social-security services and programs, and stimulate entrepreneurship and small-to-medium business growth. By supporting the expansion of programs to support women, Afro-Colombians, Indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees, and youth, the US-Colombia partnership will address preexisting grievances and promote long-term stability. Finally, aiding in Colombia’s efforts to stabilize conflict-affected territories and fully implement the 2016 peace agreement, will reinforce state legitimacy, rule of law, good governance, and human-rights protections.

A medical worker prepares an injection with a dose of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine at the Colombia Clinic in Bogota, Colombia February 18, 2021. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez

Acknowledgements

About the US-Colombia Task Force

This is the third report of the Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force, a high-level group of policymakers, business leaders, and civil-society representatives in the United States and Colombia co-chaired by Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) and Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO). In addition to bipartisan leadership, the group includes a bipartisan membership from the US House of Representatives: Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Gregory Meeks (D-NY), Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-TX), and Representative Ruben Gallego (D-AZ). 

Since its foundation in 2017, the US-Colombia Task Force has worked to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties between the United States and Colombia. Its first report, published in 2017, developed a roadmap for US engagement with Colombia following the 2016 peace agreement. The second, launched in 2019, provided a comprehensive assessment of US-Colombia relations, creating a modernized plan for the bilateral relationship. 

Task Force members who have decided to have their names associated with this report are listed below.

About the writers

Camila Hernandez is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Mexico, Colombia, and the US-Colombia Task Force. She has co-authored and edited reports on the US-Colombia strategic partnership and Colombia’s energy future. Camila provides regular commentary on political and economic issues affecting US relations with Latin America and the Caribbean to major media outlets in Colombia and the United States. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she worked at the World Resources Institute and Human Rights Watch. She holds a bachelor’s degree in government and economics from Georgetown University. Originally from Colombia, Camila is a native Spanish and English speaker, and is fluent in French.

Michel Janna is the president of AMV Colombia, the self-regulating organization for securities and foreign-exchange markets in Colombia. He has more than twenty years of experience in both public- and private-sector positions related to Latin American economic and financial issues. Janna has served as general director of public credit at the National Treasury of Colombia; as vice president of risk management and advisory for sovereigns at Goldman Sachs, New York; as chief financial officer (CFO) of Cenit, a company of the Ecopetrol Group, the largest corporate in Colombia; and as a financial-stability specialist at the Central Bank of Colombia. He has been a member of the board of directors of several corporates and financial institutions. He holds a PhD in economics from Northwestern University, and a master’s and bachelor’s degree in economics from Universidad de los Andes.

About the Center director

Jason Marczak is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, joining the center in 2013 for its launch. He has more than twenty years of expertise in regional economics, politics, and development, working with policymakers and private-sector leaders to shape public policy. Marczak has also been an adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs since 2016. Among his previous positions, he served as director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas in New York City and co-founder of Americas Quarterly magazine. Marczak is a frequent English- and Spanish-language contributor to major media outlets, and a sought-after speaker, and has testified before the US Congress on key regional developments. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Tufts University and a master’s degree in international affairs and economics from the Johns Hopkins University Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

US-Colombia Task Force

Co-Chairs

The Hon. Ben Cardin
US Senator (D-MD)
US Congress

The Hon. Roy Blunt
US Senator (R-MO)
US Congress

Special Members

The Hon. Gregory Meeks
US Representative (D-NY)
US Congress

The Hon. Dan Crenshaw
US Representative (R-TX)
US Congress

The Hon. Ruben Gallego
US Representative (D-AZ)

US Congress

Director

Jason Marczak
Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin
America Center
Atlantic Council

Coordinator

Camila Hernández
Assistant Director, Adrienne Arsht
Latin America Center

Atlantic Council

Members

Amb. William Brownfield

Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2011-2018), US Department of State; Former US Ambassador to Colombia (2007-2010), Venezuela (2004-2007), and Chile (2002-2004); Non-resident Senior Adviser, Americas Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Min. Mauricio Cárdenas

Former Minister of Finance and Public Credit (2012 – 2018); former Minister of Mines and Energy (2011 – 2012); Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Advisory Council Member
Republic of Colombia

Ms. Catalina Escobar Restrepo

Founder and President
Fundación JuanFe

Ms. Muni Jensen

Senior Advisor
Albright Stonebridge Group

Min. María Claudia Lacouture

Former Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (2016- 2017), Republic of Colombia; Executive Director
AmCham Colombia

Ms. Maria Victoria Llorente

Executive Director
Fundación Ideas para la Paz

Mr. Bruce Mac Master

President
Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI)

Mr. Michael Shifter

President
The Inter-American Dialogue

Dr. Arturo Valenzuela

Former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere (2009-2011); US Department of State; Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere, National Security Council (1999-2000); Emeritus Professor of Government
Georgetown University

Amb. Kevin Whitaker

Former US Ambassador to Colombia (2014 -2019) former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America, Western Hemisphere Affairs
US Department of State

Mr. Felipe Ardila

Principal
Tinello Capital

Dr. Cindy Arnson

Director, Latin America Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Amb. P. Michael McKinley

Former US Ambassador to Brazil (2017-2018), Afghanistan (2014-2016), Colombia (2010-2013), and Peru (2007-2010); Senior Counselor
The Cohen Group

Mr. Luis Fernando Mejía

Former Minister of Planning (2017-2018), Republic of Colombia; Executive Director
Fedesarrollo

Mr. Alejandro Mesa

Partner
BakerMcKenzie

Amb. Roger Noriega

Former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere (2003-2005), US Department of State; former US Ambassador to the Organization of American States (2001-2003)

Amb. Anne Patterson

Former US Ambassador to Egypt (2011-2013), Pakistan (2007- 2010), the United Nations (2005), Colombia (2000-2003) and El Salvador (1997-2000)

Ms. Kristie Pellecchia

Former Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere, United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC); Principal
Pellecchia International

Mr. Alejandro Santo Domingo

President
Grupo Santo Domingo

Mr. Rand Beers

Former Acting Secretary of Homeland Security (2013)
US Department of Homeland Security

Amb. Marlene Fernandez

Former Ambassador of Bolivia to Italy (2003 – 2004) and to the United States (1999-2002); Vice President Government Relations
Arcos Dorados- McDonald’s Latin America

Mr. Juan Esteban Orduz

President
Colombian Coffee Federation – North America Subsidiary of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia

Mr. Stephen Donehoo

Managing Partner
McLarty Associates

Mr. Andrés Cadena

Senior Partner
McKinsey&Company

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Adrienne Arsht for her generous support, without which the work of the US-Colombia Task Force would not be possible. A special thanks to Senator Cardin (D-MD) and Senator Blunt (R-MO) for their bipartisan leadership as co-chairs of the group. Our thanks, as well, to Chairman Gregory Meeks (D-NY), Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-TX), and Representative Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) for their contributions to the report and commitment to strengthening US-Colombia relations.   

Thank you to task force members for their expertise, ideas, and dedication, evident throughout the report. 

We would also like to thank Ignacia Ulloa and Willow Fortunoff for their research and writing contributions; Andrea Trujillo for her valuable inputs; Susan Cavan and Jeff Fleischer for editorial assistance; Donald Partyka for design support; and Carolina Urdaneta for translation services. Finally, a special thank you to Alyssa Anderson, Carol Brey, Daniel Burgess, Jose Contreras, Kenneth Depew, Richard Eddings, Sophia Lafargue, Tom Melia, Amanda Peper, Habiba Shebita, Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, Hannah Schwartz, and Debbie Yamanda for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our task force co-chairs and House members.

1    Joe Biden, “‘Reconstrucción de Alianza con Colombia Será Una de Mis Prioridades,’” Tiempo, October 7, 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/elecciones-en-estados-unidos-que-dice-joe-biden-sobre-colombia-541912.
2    José Manuel Restrepo Abondano, “Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo,” Ministerio De Hacienda y Crédito Público, July 21, 2021, https://www.minhacienda.gov.co/webcenter/ShowProperty?nodeId=%2FConexionContent%2FWCC_CLUSTER-165808%2F%2FidcPrimaryFile&revision=latestreleased.
3    “Listado de las 80 Víctimas de Violencia Homicida en el Marco del Paro Nacional al 23 de Julio,” INDEPAZ, last updated July 23, 2021, http://www.indepaz.org.co/victimas-de-violencia-homicida-en-el-marco-del-paro-nacional/ ; Luis Fernando Mejía, “Tendencia Económica Editorial: Costos Económicos del Paro Nacional,” Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo, June 2021, http://dams.fedesarrollo.org.co/tendenciaeconomica/publicaciones/217-junio-2021/
4    “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks at the U.S.-Colombia High-Level Dialogue,” US Department of State, October 21, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-remarks-at-the-u-s-colombia-high-level-dialogue/
5    Ibid.
6    “Plan Colombia: Balance de los 15 Años, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015,  https://sinergia.dnp.gov.co/Documentos%20de%20Interes/PLAN_COLOMBIA_Boletin_180216.pdf.
8    “UPDATED: ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Potential Cocaine Production in the Andean Region,” White House, press release, July 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/briefing-room/2021/07/16/ondcp-releases-data-on-coca-cultivation-and-potential-cocaine-production-in-the-andean-region/.
9    “Colombia Sends to Haiti 16 Tons of Humanitarian Aid Following Devastating Earthquake,” Embassy of Colombia in the United States, August 16, 2021, https://www.colombiaemb.org/post/colombia-sends-to-haiti-16-tons-of-humanitarian-aid-and-30-rescue-workers-following-devastating-eart; “Colombia Dona un Millón de Dólares para Vacunación en Países del CARICOM,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, July 21, 2021, https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/colombia-dona-millon-dolares-vacunacion-paises-caricom.
10    “Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Colombia Summary—United States Department of State,” US Department of State, March 1, 2021, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/colombia-summary/.
11    “Relations with Colombia,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated June 17, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_143936.htm.
12    Luis Fernando Mejía, et. al., “Rigideces del Mercado Laboral en Colombia: Tendencias, Perspectivas y Recomendaciones,” in Descifrar El Futuro: La Economía Colombiana en los Próximos Diez Años, Fedesarrollo, (Penguin Random House, April, 2021), p.261-319 ; Jorge Alvarez and Carlo Pizzinelli, “COVID-19 and the Informality-Driven Recovery: The Case of Colombia’s Labor Market,” International Monetary Fund, September 2021, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/09/17/COVID-19-and-the-Informality-driven-Recovery-The-Case-of-Colombia-s-Labor-Market-465831.
13    “Vacunación contra COVID-19,” Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, last accessed October 19, 2021, https://www.minsalud.gov.co/salud/publica/Vacunacion/Paginas/Vacunacion-covid-19.aspx.
15    “¿Cuántas Vacunas Contra COVID-19 han Llegado a Colombia?” Vacunación en Colombia, last updated October 6, 2021, https://vacunacoronavirus.canalinstitucional.tv/cuantas-vacunas-han-llegado-colombia.
16    U.S. International COVID-19 Vaccine Donations Tracker—Updated as of October 16,” KFF Global Health Policy, last updated October 16, 2021, https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/issue-brief/u-s-international-covid-19-vaccine-donations-tracker/#recipient-country.
17    “Información Agosto 2021,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, August 2021, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral/empleo-y-desempleo; “Principales Indicadores del Mercado Laboral,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, December 2019, https://www.dane.gov.co/files/investigaciones/boletines/ech/ech/bol_empleo_dic_19.pdf.
18    Jesús Antonio Bejarano Rojas, “¿Qué hay que Hacer para Lograr una Reactivación Sostenible?” Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, June 2021, https://www.anif.com.co/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/jesus-bejarano-minhacienda.pdf. COP 24.6 trillion at 3750 COP per USD.
19    Abondano, “Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo.”
20    Rojas, “¿Qué hay que Hacer para Lograr una Reactivación Sostenible?”
21    “Déficit Habitacional,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, September 2, 2021, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/deficit-habitacional.
22    “Monitoreo de Territorios Afectados por Cultivos Ilícitos 2020,” Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito (UNODC)-Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (SIMCI), July 2021, https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2021/Julio/Informe_Monitoreo_de_Territorios_Afectados_por_Cultivos_Ilicitos_2020.pdf.
23    Richard Feinberg, “Widening the Aperture: Nearshoring in our ‘Near-Abroad,’” Wilson Center Latin America Program, April 2021, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/WideningTheApertureNearshoringInOurNearAbroadRichardEFeinbergApril2021.pdf.
24    Susan Lund, et. al, “Risk, Resilience, and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains,” McKinsey & Company, August 6, 2020, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/op%ADerations/our-insights/risk-resilience-and-re%ADbalancing-in-global-value-chains.
25    “Cincuenta Empresas del Exterior, con Interés en Colombia,” Portafolio, September 7, 2020, https://www.portafolio.co/economia/cincuenta-empresas-del-exterior-con-interes-en-colombia-544378.
26    “U.S. Government Announces Bilateral Initiative to Advance Rural Development in Colombia,” US Embassy in Colombia, August 18, 2020, https://co.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-announces-bilateral-initiative-to-advance-rural-development-in-colombia/.
27    “Rural Finance Loan Portfolio Guarantee,” USAID, last updated July 12, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/red-rural-finance-loan-portfolio-guarantee.
28    “The Enterprise Funds in Europe and Eurasia: Successes and Lessons Learned,” USAID, September 12, 2013, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/EE_Enterprise_Funds-LessonsLearned.pdf.
29    “Inaugural Impact Report 2020: Executive Summary” and “What is Our Mission,” Tunisian American Enterprise Fund, 2021, https://www.taefund.org/en/mission-2/.
30    “The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership, Atlantic Council,” September 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/untapped-potential-us-colombia-partnership/.
31    “Listado de las 80 Víctimas de Violencia Homicida en el Marco del Paro Nacional al 23 de Julio”; Mejía, “Tendencia Económica Editorial: Costos Económicos del Paro Nacional.”
32    Luis Fernando Mejía, et. al., “Rigideces del Mercado Laboral en Colombia: Tendencias, Perspectivas y Recomendaciones,” in Descifrar El Futuro: La Economía Colombiana en los Próximos Diez Años, Fedesarrollo, (Penguin Random House, April, 2021), p.261-319.
33    Miguel Benítez, et. al., “Reformas para una Colombia post-COVID 19: Hacia un Nuevo Contrato Social,” La Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo, April 12, 2021, https://www.repository.fedesarrollo.org.co/bitstream/handle/11445/4103/Repor_Abril_2021_Mej%EDa_et_al.pdf?sequence=9.
34    “United States Announces Additional Humanitarian and Development Assistance for People Affected by The Ongoing Crisis in Venezuela and the Region,” USAID, press release, September 22, 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/sep-22-2021-us-announces-additional-humanitarian-assistance-venezuela
35    Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, “Venezuelan Refugees and Their Receiving Communities Need Funding, Not Sympathy,” Brookings, updated February 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/02/26/venezuelan-refugees-and-their-receiving-communities-need-funding-not-sympathy/; The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership.
36    “Funding Update—RMRP,” Plataforma de Coordinación Internagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, last updated October 1, 2021, https://www.r4v.info/es/financiamiento. Calculated using $1.44 billion total RMRP requirement for an estimated 5.4 million Venezuelan refugees.
37    Ibid.
38    The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership
39    A total of five hundred and seventy-eight stipulations were included in the text of the peace agreement. “The Colombian Final Agreement in the Era of COVID-19: Institutional and Citizen Ownership is Key to Implementation,” Peace Accords Matrix Barometer Initiative and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, May 20, 2021, https://doi.org/10.7274/r0-cffp-qr07.
40    Ibid.
41    Ibid.
42    Juan Carlos Garzón Vergara, “En 2021 la Confrontación Armada Disminuye, pero la Violencia Contra Civiles Aumenta,” Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, May 28, 2021, https://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/2001.
43    Juan Carlos Garzón Vergara, “Un Clima Peligroso: Deforestación, Cambio Climático y Violencia Contra los Defensores Ambientes en la Amazonía Colombiana,” Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, September 30, 2021, https://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/2058.
44    “Homicidios Intencionales (por Cada 100.000 Habitantes)—Colombia,” Banco Mundial, 2018, https://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?locations=CO.
45    ¿Qué hay Detrás del Aumento de Homicidios en lo que Va del Año?” Tiempo, July 1, 2021, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/delitos/balance-de-homicidios-en-colombia-aumentaron-21-en-2021-600015.
46    “Defensoría del Pueblo Presenta Reporte de Conductas Vulneratorias contra Líderes Sociales Durante el Primer Semestre de 2021,” Defensoría del Pueblo Colombia, August 25, 2021, https://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/nube/comunicados/10368/Defensor%C3%ADa-del-Pueblo-presenta-reporte-de-conductas-vulneratorias-contra-l%C3%ADderes-sociales-durante-el-primer-semestre-de-2021-l%C3%ADderes-sociales-Defensor%C3%ADa-informe.htm; “Líderes Sociales, Defensores de DD.HH y Firmantes de Acuerdo Asesinados en 2021,” INDEPAZ, October 2, 2021, http://www.Indepaz.Org.Co/Lideres-sociales-y-defensores-de-derechos-humanos-asesinados-en-2021/.
47    Vergara, “En 2021 la Confrontación Armada Disminuye, pero la Violencia Contra Civiles Aumenta.”
48    Ibid. 
49    “Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas,” US Department of State, 2018, https://www.state.gov/reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework-for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected-areas-2018/.
50    “The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” US Department of Justice,  2004, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1282.
51    “Foreign Military Training Report: Fiscal Years 2018–2019,” US Department of State and US Department of Defense, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/FMT_Volume-I_FY2018_2019.pdf#page=404;“Central American Police Training: GAO-18-618,” Government Office of Accountability, September 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-618.pdf; “Standing Against Gender-Based Violence in the Dominican Republic,” US Agency for International Development, March 29, 2021, https://medium.com/usaid-2030/standing-against-gender-based-violence-in-the-dominican-republic-2a813de03711.

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Colombia’s national strike: Overview of the situation and strategies moving forward https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/spotlight/colombias-national-strike-overview-of-the-situation-and-strategies-moving-forward/ Fri, 18 Jun 2021 12:56:15 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=401683 Amid the third peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Colombia faces the longest and most destructive mass protests in recent history. The protests, which began on April 28, 2021, were triggered by a tax-reform bill proposed by the government to stabilize public debt and fiscal deficit. Despite the bill’s removal on May 2, 2021, protests continued […]

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Amid the third peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Colombia faces the longest and most destructive mass protests in recent history. The protests, which began on April 28, 2021, were triggered by a tax-reform bill proposed by the government to stabilize public debt and fiscal deficit. Despite the bill’s removal on May 2, 2021, protests continued and expanded, becoming a broad call for improvements in other areas. To date, dozens of people have died, and thousands have been injured.

How Did Colombia Get Here?

Colombia, like other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, its economy contracted by nearly seven percentage points, affecting the livelihoods of millions of people. Poverty rose from 35.7 percent in 2019 to 42.5 percent in 2020, which reversed the country’s progress in the fight against poverty by almost ten years.1

To address this situation, the Colombian government undertook a series of emergency actions in 2020. It increased public spending to strengthen the healthcare system, to assist vulnerable populations, and to help businesses remain afloat. As a result, the fiscal deficit rose from 3.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 to 7.8 percent in 2020; public debt increased from 44 percent of GDP in 2018 to 55 percent in 2020.2 In 2021, the fiscal deficit is expected to reach 8.6 percent of GDP, and public debt 65 percent.3

Protesters have voiced discontent over growing inequality, deficient public services, the slow implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, among other issues.

If unattended, Colombia’s fiscal situation will negatively affect societal well-being and quality of life in the medium-to-long term. Fiscal instability compromises a country’s ability to attract foreign capital, create new jobs, provide public services, and finance social programs. In fact, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Global Ratings reduced Colombia’s credit rating from BBB- to BB+ on March 19, moving the country’s debt to junk bond status and hurting future economic growth.

President Iván Duque’s proposed tax reform aimed to improve Colombia’s fiscal situation by raising nearly $6.4 billion.4 The reform would have reduced the threshold for starting to pay income tax, placed a value-added tax (VAT) on new products and services, and removed many VAT exemptions.5

However, most Colombians—fully 80 percent—opposed the bill.6 Many political parties and leaders, including those close to President Duque, were also against it. Notwithstanding the advisability—and even urgency—of addressing Colombia’s fiscal situation, a tax hike on top of COVID-19 lockdowns, led many to conclude that the approach was not well timed. As a result, thousands of Colombians took to the streets on April 28 to protest the proposed reform.

Despite the government modifying the bill on April 30 and removing it on May 2, protests continued and expanded to include preexisting grievances, many exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Protesters have voiced discontent over growing inequality, deficient public services, the slow implementation of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), unkept government promises to vulnerable communities, political and social violence, corruption, and increases in organized crime. Unless these and other underlying issues are addressed, social and political tensions are likely to continue.

Demonstrators take part in a protest demanding government action to tackle poverty, police violence and inequalities in healthcare and education systems, in Bogotá, Colombia, May 9, 2021. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez

How Has the National Strike Evolved?

Led by the National Strike Committee, labor unionists, Afro-Colombians, indigenous communities, LGBTQI people (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex), students, and activist groups, thousands of Colombians mobilized on April 28 against the now-cancelled tax overhaul. Fueled by other grievances, protests have continued for more than a month.

Although demonstrations have been largely peaceful, some have resulted in violent clashes between protesters and police forces. On June 9, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed that thirty-four deaths occurred in the context of the protests, attributing at least twenty to the police.7 HRW also received, and is investigating, credible reports of thirty-four other deaths.8 On June 13, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office reported fifty-one civilian deaths, of which twenty-one were directly connected to the protests, nineteen were not, and eleven still need to be verified. The Colombian government claims that more than 1,100 civilians have been injured as a result of the protests.9 Also, according to Colombia’s National Police, two police officers have been killed and more than 1,360 have been injured.10

The strike has also become an increasingly polarizing issue in Colombia. At first, 72% supported the protests, but weeks later support collapsed to 47%, while 79% say they disapprove of the blockades.

To investigate alleged abuses of force and police misconduct, Colombia’s National Police opened two hundred and four disciplinary investigations.11 Arguing that investigations related to homicides, personal injuries, and sexual violence should be conducted by the Attorney General’s Office, that agency requested on May 31 that Colombia’s Ministry of Defense share all information on these investigations.12 In addition, on June 6, President Duque announced upcoming reforms to the Ministry of Defense and National Police.13

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) visited Colombia from June 8 to 10 to assess the human rights situation.14 The delegation met with diverse sectors in Bogotá and Cali, including government officials, civil society and union leaders, and victims of human rights violations and their families to gather testimonials and complaints.   

Protests have also led to vandalism, arson, and property destruction, particularly in Cali, Bogotá, and Medellín. The police have reported more than 4,300 of such instances, most of them targeting public transportation, banks, and commercial establishments, as well as government and police buildings.15 Also, nearly three thousand road blockades have taken place across the country, disrupting the flow of people, interrupting COVID-19 vaccinations, and causing shortages in goods and services. The effects of blockades have been especially dire in the Valle del Cauca department and its capital city, Cali. Only a few days into the protests, the department became the epicenter of violent clashes and criminal activities. Illegal armed groups and other criminal actors have taken advantage of ongoing unrest across the country.

Public opinion regarding the national strike has evolved as protests continue. The strike has also become an increasingly polarizing issue in Colombia. After two weeks of protests, 72 percent of Colombians said they supported the strike, with 68 percent against blockades as a form of protest.16 A May 15 survey also found a strong correlation between political-party identification and opinions on blockades.17 A month into the protests, support for the national strike fell to 47 percent and disapproval of blockades reached 79 percent.18 Still, the almost 50-50 split in attitudes toward the strike underscores the polarizing and divisive nature of the situation.

After ten days of protests, President Duque announced his “Agenda on the Fundamentals,” a space for dialogue with different sectors. However, as with the failed National Dialogue of 2019, the agenda was set by the government; members of other participating sectors believed they should have been consulted in the drafting of the agenda. Between May 6–9, the government met with business associations, universities and colleges, student and youth groups, religious leaders, unions in the healthcare sector, local quasi-governmental Community Action Boards (Juntas de Accion Comunal), and Colombia’s higher courts, including the Special Jurisdiction of Peace (Justicia Especial para la Paz).19 President Duque also met with mayors and governors, who later agreed to hold regional dialogues. He also had a meeting with political opposition leaders.

Thirteen days into the protests, on May 10, the Colombian government met with the National Strike Committee, something that had not happened since 2019 talks were derailed by COVID-19. Formal negotiations were announced on May 14, and conversations began on May 20. Accusing the government of delaying negotiations, the National Strike Committee halted talks on June 6. 

Ongoing dialogues with different sectors have produced important, yet insufficient, outcomes, most of which benefit young Colombians. These include free public-college tuition for low-income students in the second quarter of 2021; the Young Homeowners Program that will reduce interest rates and increase financing options for young home buyers; and new credit lines with preferential rates for youth in agriculture. The government is also working with groups of young Colombians to develop a Great Pact for Youth (Gran Pacto por la Juventud), which will prioritize connectivity and opportunities for youth employment, education, and representation.

A man walks behind a barricade built with parts of a police station, in Cali, Colombia May 13, 2021. Picture taken May 13, 2021. REUTERS/Luisa Gonzalez

What are the Social and Economic Implications of the National Strike?

Blockades and vandalism across the country are having detrimental social and economic effects. The first thirty-one days of protests have cost the Colombian economy between $1.3 and 1.6 billion, comprising between 2.3 and 2.9 percent of the country’s GDP in the first quarter of 2021.20 After a year of economic contraction, Colombia had started to slowly recover productive activity and domestic consumption in early 2021. However, experts now project slower economic growth in the second quarter.21 

Ongoing blockades are also hurting societal well-being by compromising employment recovery and putting at risk existing jobs. A survey of nearly thirteen thousand business owners revealed that more than 90 percent will have to lay off between one and five employees due to the effects of the National Strike. In Bogotá, 21 percent of businesses will reduce staff if the situation continues. 

Medium- to long-term employment will depend on how many businesses need to reduce or permanently close operations. As of May 24, more than 53 percent of Colombian companies were operating at 50 percent or less of their productive capacity, and more than 22 percent had to suspend their operations.22 If blockades continue, more than 12 percent of businesses would have to permanently shut down in June.23 This would cause a massive spike in unemployment, which was already relatively high prior to the national strike, at 15 percent.24An increase in unemployment would reverse decades of progress in poverty reduction, curtailing domestic demand and compromising the prospects for a speedy COVID-19 recovery. 

Blockades are also disrupting the free flow of people and essential goods and services, particularly in the departments of Valle del Cauca and Cauca. In those departments, nearly 70 percent of companies have faced food-supply interruptions, and more than 47 percent of workers have struggled to get to work.25More than half of the productive capacity in these areas is paralyzed, and nearly 53 percent of companies expect to reduce or permanently close their operations in June.26 In fact, almost 42 percent of companies in the Valle del Cauca and Cauca departments had to lay off workers in May.27 In addition, the port of Buenaventura in Valle del Cauca, Colombia’s most important port in the Pacific, remained closed for forty-eight days causing billions in economic loses.  A return to normal will take at least four months.

Shortages have led to increased prices in basic foodstuffs such as potatoes, eggs, dairy products, and animal proteins, putting a strain on low-income and unemployed Colombians, who are already experiencing food insecurity as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.28 Moreover, protests and road blockades have interrupted COVID-19 response by preventing the transport of key medical supplies, including oxygen.29 Mass demonstrations are also expected to cause a surge of transmission of COVID-19. 

Vandalism and criminal activities have severely impacted Colombia’s public and private infrastructure and interrupted crucial infrastructure projects. In Bogotá, damages to the TransMilenio rapid-transit system, which transports 2.5 million passengers per day, will take up to six months to repair.30 Additionally, seventy-five active construction projects were forced to halt operations. 

The current climate of uncertainty is also impacting Colombia’s ability to attract and retain foreign capital. S&P Global Ratings already lowered Colombia’s long-term foreign currency rating to BB+, and Wall Street banks predict that credit rating agency Fitch will follow suit.31Many businesses have already postponed their investments in Colombia to 2022. If investor confidence continues to decrease, Colombia may experience capital flight, leading to increased levels of unemployment and poverty.

Finally, the current political and social polarization, fueled by the protests, might lead to a precipitous decline in trust in democratic institutions. This, along with the increased antagonism evidenced between sectors of the civilian population and government, will have lasting effects with important implications for Colombia’s upcoming presidential elections in 2022.

Finally, the current political and social polarization, fueled by the protests, might lead to a precipitous decline in trust in democratic institutions. This, along with the increased antagonism evidenced between sectors of the civilian population and government, will have lasting effects with important implications for Colombia’s upcoming presidential elections in 2022.

Why is This Relevant to the United States?

The United States faces unprecedented global and regional challenges today. The longstanding and strategic relationships with partners like Colombia are fundamental to addressing these challenges.  

Hemispheric stability and prosperity hinge upon a close and efficient alliance between the United States and Colombia. As President Joe Biden said, Colombia is the “keystone” of US foreign policy toward LAC.32 US foreign policy toward Colombia is also a point of bipartisan consensus. Representative Dan Crenshaw (R-TX) reinforced this on May 19 at an Atlantic Council event, saying, “Colombia has been an amazing foreign policy success story and an amazing ally.”33 US Representative Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), also present, said, “Colombia is our best Latin American partner in the Western Hemisphere…they have been a stabilizer in the region…a true model for South America about what liberal democracies can do and can continue to do.”34

In the past two decades, the United States and Colombia have built a mutually beneficial alliance that has safeguarded US interests in LAC, and consolidated Colombia’s role as a key regional player. Colombia has also become an indispensable US partner on many fronts. It hosts the largest Venezuelan diaspora, recently granting temporary legal protected status to nearly two million people. Colombia also cooperates with the United States on security and defense in Central and South America, and in the global fight against drug trafficking, money laundering, and organized crime. 

How Can the United States Support Colombia?

In May, the Atlantic Council convened its US-Colombia Task Force—a bipartisan and binational group of experts from Colombia and the United States—to discuss concrete ways in which the United States can support Colombia as it continues to address the situation. Here are three things the United States could do.

  1. US Vaccines to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), particularly Colombia. Given the urgent need for vaccine support across the Western Hemisphere, the United States should continue to prioritize LAC countries as it allocates the remaining fifty-five million US vaccine doses available for global distribution by the end of June. Although critical, the six million doses allocated to LAC countries on June 3 are only a first step. China, by comparison, has provided 165 million.

    Sharing more doses of US vaccines with Colombia will accelerate COVID-19 recovery and help to curtail the conditions that have furthered protesters’ grievances. It will also strengthen US-Colombia relations, support regional peace, and allow Colombia to continue welcoming migrants and refugees safely from Venezuela. As of May 20, Colombia has bilateral and multilateral agreements for nearly seventy-two million vaccine doses, but has only received fewer than twelve million. More US vaccines to Colombia will help to increase the percentage of the population that is fully vaccinated, which currently stands at nearly 8 percent. Those vaccines should then be allocated to Colombia’s vulnerable and marginalized communities, particularly Afro-Colombians and indigenous peoples.
  2. Increased Financial Assistance for the Venezuela Crisis. The Venezuela regional crisis remains the most underfunded crisis in modern history. By 2020, the international community had provided only $1.4 billion in funding to assist Venezuelan migrants and refuges across the region—an astonishingly small number when compared to the $20.8 billion provided for the Syrian refugee crisis. Given their similarity in magnitude and evolution (both have displaced 5.5 million people in their first five years), the gap in funding is even more striking. In per capita terms, host countries like Colombia have received $256 in international assistance for each Venezuelan migrant or refugee—less than one tenth of the $3,150 received by host countries for each Syrian refugee.35
    Colombia hosts the largest Venezuelan diaspora, with nearly two million people making up 32 percent of the total number of migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Despite the social and economic challenges brought on by COVID-19, the country has continued to welcome and provide critical assistance to Venezuelans in its territory. 

    The United States should increase its financial, diplomatic, and technical support to Colombia and other host countries as they respond to the crisis amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This will not only support hemispheric peace and stability, but also help prevent the continued upward spike in Venezuelans arriving at the US southwest border due to deteriorating conditions in Venezuela and in host countries.
  3. Information Assessment. Decision-makers in the United States should continue to inform themselves about the situation in Colombia. Through social and traditional media, people in the United States have received an important, yet incomplete, version of recent events. It is essential that the international community, including the US government, continue to engage with key stakeholders in Colombia (policymakers, business leaders, civil society), as well as independent groups of experts, to learn more about the situation on the ground. This will help to inform future official and unofficial policy actions, as well as decisions regarding US foreign policy toward Colombia.

Acknowledgments

Many of the ideas in this spotlight are the product of a May 10 strategy session of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force. The group, comprising policymakers, business leaders, and civil-society representatives in Colombia and the United States, has worked to strengthen US-Colombia economic and diplomatic ties since 2017. Members who have decided to have their name associated with the spotlight are listed below. The document is also a product of independent research and consultations carried out by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Thank you to Eva Lardizabal and Felipe Félix Méndez for their research and writing support.

About the Authors

Jason Marczak is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, joining the Center in 2013 for its launch. He has more than twenty years of expertise in regional economics, politics, and development, working with policymakers and private-sector leaders across the region to shape public policy. Marczak is also adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs since 2016. Among his previous positions, he served as director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas in New York City and co-founder of Americas Quarterly magazine. Marczak is a frequent English- and Spanish-language contributor to major media outlets, and a sought-after speaker, and has testified before the US Congress on key regional developments. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Tufts University and a master’s degree in international affairs and economics from the Johns Hopkins University Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Camila Hernandez is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the center’s work on Colombia and its US-Colombia Task Force. She has co-authored and edited reports on the US-Colombia strategic partnership and Colombia’s energy future. Camila provides regular commentary on political and economic issues affecting US-Colombia relations to major media outlets in Colombia and the United States. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she worked at the World Resources Institute and Human Rights Watch. She holds a bachelor’s degree in government and economics from Georgetown University. Originally from Colombia, Camila is a native Spanish and English speaker, and is fluent in French.

About the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center: The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC) broadens understanding of regional transformations through high-impact work that shapes the conversation among policymakers, the business community, civil society, and media. Founded in 2013, the center focuses on Latin America’s strategic role in a global context, with a priority on pressing political, economic, and social issues that will define the trajectory of the region, now and in the years ahead. Select lines of programming include: China in Latin America; Venezuela’s crisis; Mexico’s US and global ties; Colombia’s future; a changing Brazil; Central American prosperity; combatting disinformation; shifting trade patterns and modernization of supply chains; charting a post-COVID future; Caribbean development; and leveraging energy resources. Jason Marczak serves as center director.

US-Colombia Task Force members who contributed to the spotlight:

The Hon. Ruben Gallego

US Representative (D-AZ)

US Congress

Dr. Cindy Arnson

Director, Latin America Program

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Amb. William Brownfield

Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2011-2018), US Department of State; Former US Ambassador to Colombia (2007-2010), Venezuela (2004-2007), and Chile (2002-2004); Non-resident Senior Adviser, Americas Program

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Mr. Andrés Cadena

Senior Partner

McKinsey&Company

Min. Mauricio Cárdenas**

Former Minister of Finance and Public Credit (2012 – 2018); former Minister of Mines and Energy (2011 – 2012)

Republic of Colombia

Ms. Rosario Córdoba

President

Consejo Privado de Competitividad

Mr. Stephen Donehoo

Managing Partner

McLarty Associates

Amb. Marlen Fernandez

Vice President Government Relations

Arcos Dorados – McDonald’s Latin America

Ms. Muni Jensen

Senior Advisor

Albright Stonebridge Group

Min. María Claudia Lacouture

Former Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (2016-2017), Republic of Colombia; Executive Director

AmCham Colombia

Mr. Bruce Mac Master

President

Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI)

Amb. P. Michael McKinley

Former US Ambassador to Brazil (2017-2018), Afghanistan (2014-2016), Colombia (2010-2013), and Peru (2007-2010); Senior Counselor

The Cohen Group

Mr. Alejandro Santo Domingo

President

Grupo Santo Domingo

Mr. Alejandro Mesa

Partner

BakerMcKenzie

Roger Noriega

Former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere (2003-2005), US Department of State; former US Ambassador to the Organization of American States (2001-2003)

Mr. Juan Esteban Orduz

President

Colombian Coffee Federation – North America Subsidiary of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia

Amb. Anne Patterson

Former US Ambassador to Egypt (2011-2013), Pakistan (2007-2010), the United Nations (2005), Colombia (2000-2003) and El Salvador (1997-2000)

Ms. Kristie Pellecchia

Former Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere, United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC); Principal

Pellecchia International

Mr. Michael Shifter

President

The Inter-American Dialogue

Dr. Arturo Valenzuela

Former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere (2009-2011); US Department of State; Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere, National Security Council (1999-2000); Emeritus Professor of Government

Georgetown University

Amb. Kevin Whitaker

Former US Ambassador to Colombia (2014 -2019)

**Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Advisory Council Member

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center (AALAC) broadens understanding of regional transformations through high-impact work that shapes the conversation among policymakers, the business community, civil society, and media. Founded in 2013, the center focuses on Latin America’s strategic role in a global context, with a priority on pressing political, economic, and social issues that will define the trajectory of the region, now and in the years ahead. Select lines of programming include: China in Latin America; Venezuela’s crisis; Mexico’s US and global ties; Colombia’s future; a changing Brazil; Central American prosperity; combatting disinformation; shifting trade patterns and modernization of supply chains; charting a post-COVID future; Caribbean development; and leveraging energy resources. Jason Marczak serves as center director.

1    “Pobreza Monetaria y Pobreza Monetaria Extrema 2019,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE), October 13, 2020, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/pobreza-monetaria/pobreza-monetaria-2019; “Pobreza Monetaria y Pobreza Monetaria Extrema 2020,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE),April 2021, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/pobreza-monetaria.
2    Carolina Salazar Sierra, “‘Esta Reforma Tributaria, tal Como la Presentó el Gobierno, no Va a Pasar en el Congreso,’” República, April 2021, https://www.larepublica.co/economia/esta-reforma-tributaria-tal-como-fue-presentada-no-va-a-pasar-en-el-congreso-3158477.
3    Ibid.
4    Carolina Salazar Sierra, “Estos son Todos los Puntos que Incluye la Tercera Reforma Tributaria de Iván Duque,” República, April 2021, https://www.larepublica.co/economia/estos-son-todos-los-puntos-que-incluye-la-tercera-reforma-tributaria-de-ivan-duque-3154132.
5    Most VAT exempt products in Colombia are basic necessity goods included in the country’s Canasta Básica – a group of goods considered necessary to meet a household’s basic needs.
6    Aliza Chelminsky, et al., “Ficha Técnica: Evolución de la Situación en Colombia,” Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, May 2021, https://centrogilbertobosques.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/contexto/protestas-colombia/viewdocument.
7    “Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against Protesters,” Human Rights Watch, June 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/09/colombia-egregious-police-abuses-against-protesters#
8    Ibid.
9    Colombian Ministry of Defense (@mindefensa), “Balance general del paro nacional. Cifras del 28 de abril al 13 de junio. En esta imagen se puede ver el número de actividades relacionadas con las marchas, así como las lamentables afectaciones a la población civil y miembros de la @PoliciaColombia,” Twitter,June 14, 2021, 8:22 a.m., https://twitter.com/mindefensa/status/1404413894731386885/photo/1
10    Ibid
11    Colombian Ministry of Defense (@mindefensa), “Afectaciones a bienes de la @PoliciaColombia e investigaciones disciplinarias en lo corrido del paro nacional.” Twitter,June 14, 2021, 8:22 a.m., https://twitter.com/mindefensa/status/1404413911575711745/photo/1.
12    Francisco Roberto Barbosa Delgado, “Ref. Remisión de diligencias de competencia de la jurisdicción penal ordinaria,” Francisco Roberto Barbosa Delgado to Dr. Diego Andrés Molano Aponte, Bogotá, Colombia, May 31, 2021, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fCQnBcO2PeJcQi9sbeXJ0BkKhSKOtyV9/view.
13    Ivan Duque (@ivanDuque), Twitter, June 6, 2021, 10:50 a.m., https://twitter.com/IvanDuque/status/1401552002816122883
14    Daniela Blandón Ramírez, “CIDH Visitará Colombia entre el 8 y 10 de Junio para Analizar Situación de Derechos Humanos,” France24, June 2021, https://www.france24.com/es/américa-latina/20210601-cidh-colombia-visita-paro-nacional-violencia-derechos-humanos.
15    Colombian Ministry of Defense (@mindefensa), “Afectaciones…”
16    “El 72% de los Colombianos Apoya el Paro, pero Rechaza Contundentemente los Bloqueos: Encuesta SEMANA,” Semana, May 2021, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/el-72-de-los-colombianos-apoya-el-paro-pero-rechaza-contundentemente-los-bloqueos-encuesta-semana/202136/.
17    Ibid.
18    “Así Ven los Colombianos el Paro un Mes Después: Encuesta,” Tiempo, May 2021, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/gobierno/encuesta-asi-ven-los-colombianos-el-paro-un-mes-despues-592671.
19    The transitional justice body set up by the 2016 peace agreement.
20    “Paro ha costado entre $ 4,8 y $ 6,1 billones, según Fedesarrollo,” El Tiempo, June 2021, https://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/cuanto-ha-costado-el-paro-nacional-a-la-economia-593367.
21    Ibid.
22    “Encuesta de las Cámaras de Comercio sobre el Efecto en las Empresas de la Conyutura Social y de Orden Público,” Confecámaras Red de Cámaras de Comercio,May 2021, https://www.ccc.org.co/file/2021/05/Encuesta-Cámaras-de-Comercio-Mayo-2021.pdf.
23    Ibid.
24    “Mercado Laboral—Información Abril 2021,” Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE),April 2021, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/mercado-laboral/empleo-y-desempleo.
25    “Estas son las Reveladoras Cifras de la Crisis Empresarial en Valle y Cauca, Según Encuesta de Cámaras de Comercio,” Semana, May 2021, https://www.semana.com/economia/empresas/articulo/estas-son-las-reveladores-cifras-de-la-crisis-empresarial-en-valle-y-cauca-segun-encuesta-de-camaras-de-comercio/202104/.
26    Ibid.
27    Ibid.
28    “Alimentos que Aumentaron por los Bloqueos en Colombia,” Infobae, May 2021,https://www.infobae.com/america/colombia/2021/05/19/alimentos-que-aumentaron-de-precio-por-los-bloqueos-en-colombia/.
29    Dave Lawler, “Colombia’s Protests Rumble on into their Second Month,” Axios, May 2021, https://www.axios.com/colombia-protests-continue-police-brutality-379d1651-e410-4352-968c-6f3dab7e7a7c.html.
30    “TransMilenio: Estas son las Estaciones que no Tendrán Servicio hoy Jueves 27 de Mayo,” Semana, May 2021, https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/transmilenio-estas-son-las-estaciones-que-no-tendran-servicio-hoy-jueves-27-de-mayo/202116/.
31    “Wall Street Giants Bet on Colombia Sinking Deeper into Junk,” Reuters, May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/jpmorgan-morgan-stanley-bet-colombia-sinking-further-into-junk-after-sp-move-2021-05-20/.
32    Joe Biden, “’Reconstrucción de Alianza con Colombia Será Una de Mis Prioridades,’” Tiempo, October 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y-canada/elecciones-en-estados-unidos-que-dice-joe-biden-sobre-colombia-541912.
33    Rep. Dan Crenshaw (R-TX), What is the Road Ahead for Colombia?Atlantic Council, May 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/what-is-the-road-ahead-for-colombia/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAF9CznfjWzq6ghKBMewyitwdkVj8z4IwSoVZRyqCq6Z01G5s9BGDuxs9fmosQ3qnX5VxMnhHeNAXSq1hGWZqUcC9ve27pWEHr0xaAWzQxY.
34    Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), What is the Road Ahead for Colombia?Atlantic Council, May 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/what-is-the-road-ahead-for-colombia/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAF9CznfjWzq6ghKBMewyitwdkVj8z4IwSoVZRyqCq6Z01G5s9BGDuxs9fmosQ3qnX5VxMnhHeNAXSq1hGWZqUcC9ve27pWEHr0xaAWzQxY. 
35    Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, “Venezuelan Refugees and their Receiving Communities Need Funding, not Sympathy,” Brookings, February 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/02/26/venezuelan-refugees-and-their-receiving-communities-need-funding-not-sympathy/. 

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Raising ambitions: How Latin America and the Caribbean is tackling the climate crisis https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/raising-ambitions-how-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-is-tackling-the-climate-crisis/ Fri, 30 Apr 2021 19:38:57 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=384664 The Americas are a crucial player in coordinated efforts to tackle global climate change, so we asked experts from the Atlantic Council and elsewhere to lay out what’s next.

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The ripple effects of last week’s Leaders Summit on Climate, led by US President Joe Biden, will be felt for years, as the international community embraced renewed momentum toward mitigating the impacts of climate change ahead of November’s UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow, Scotland. With climate change impacts being felt across the Americas, urgency is rising in this pivotal part of the world.

The Leaders Summit brought together forty world leaders, including seven from Latin America and the Caribbean, representing Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico. The Americas are a crucial player in coordinated efforts to tackle global climate change, so we asked experts from the Atlantic Council and elsewhere to lay out what’s next.

What were some of the most ambitious commitments made by Latin America and the Caribbean in mitigating climate change? Are they aligned with the expectation put out by the Biden administration and COP26? How will the international community contribute to these regional efforts? 

Jorge Gastelumendi is the global policy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center. He is also a COP26 high level climate champions co-lead for the Race to Resilience.

Putting nature-based solutions at the core of the efforts to fight climate change was the most outstanding, though not surprising, feature of commitments advanced by Latin American and Caribbean representatives—from Brazil’s president, Jair Bolsonaro, indicating the country’s commitment to end illegal deforestation in the Amazon by 2030, to Mexico’s president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, committing to implement one of the largest reforestation programs in the world. Peru went even farther by committing that 50 out of the 150 actions in its climate plan will be nature-based solutions in sectors such as water management, land use, and forests. The main obstacles to materialize these commitments is the lack of implementation capacity in the region and the lack of financial resources from both public and private actors, particularly the financial sector. The international community, with the leadership of the United States, is critical in helping overcome these two obstacles. Colombia, for example, highlighted exploring innovative financial mechanisms, such as debt-for-adaptation swaps, which could avoid deforestation in the Amazon (a priority of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru) and protect the oceans (a priority for Chile).

President Bolsonaro, in his speech, raised the need for the right to development of current and future generations, also mentioning the Amazonian Paradox. What is the Amazonian Paradox and in what ways can a collaborative approach with the international community, the private sector, civil society, and indigenous communities help address it?  

Rodrigo Lima is a lawyer with expertise in international trade, non-tariff barriers and sustainable development. He is the director of Agroicone, a Brazilian sustainable agribusiness organization.

The Amazonian Paradox emerges from the immense contradiction between the assets and potentials from a mega-biodiverse forest that covers almost five million square kilometers over nine countries, and the social realities and inequalities among its more than twenty-three million inhabitants. The possibility to provide effective value to the forest, generate profits from its services, promote its sustainable use, and allow its population to thrive from the economic benefits and environmental services reflects the challenge of the Amazonian Paradox.

It is reasonable to compare the Amazon to a puzzle that needs time and effort to be assembled. The Amazon is home to 329 indigenous lands, covering almost one million square kilometers—local communities, family farmers, medium and large farmers. About 640,000 square kilometers are non-designated public lands, which should be designated as national parks, private areas, indigenous land, or for other uses.

To organize the territory and create policies to enable a low carbon economy, while considering different actors and interests, depends on federal and state governments. But it also relies on cooperation from multiple sources. In this regard, climate finance can play a critical role not just in promoting Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) projects, but more broadly in creating and sustaining a flourishing nature-based economy.

The completed puzzle relies on fostering a thriving economy based on natural resources, tourism, sustainable agriculture, forest management, and conservation activities. Bioeconomy opens a huge possibility to build upon this challenge, connecting extractivist producers to processing facilities and the market, generating social co-benefits from REDD+ projects, harnessing sustainable agriculture production based on innovation and good practices, and generating cosmetics and medicines, among other activities that could transform the Amazonian Paradox into the Thriving Amazonia.

International cooperation, as discussed at the Leaders Summit on Climate and other forums, has a fundamental role to play to support assembling this puzzle. The Amazon cannot be seen as a pure protection area; it must enable and promote social, economic, and environmental benefits for its population while it generates environmental goods to all society.

President López Obrador, in mentioning Mexico’s reforestation program, suggested its expansion to the South of Mexico and into Central America, generating jobs. He also suggested temporary work-permits and residency in the United States for those committed to this program, as a mechanism to address the migration crisis. How could the climate crisis be a greater challenge to the current border crisis? In what ways could addressing climate issues also be an opportunity to solve migration?

Maria Fernanda Bozmoski is the deputy director for programs at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Mexico and Central America.

Hurricane season in Central America is right around the corner, and back-to-back natural disasters may bring the region to the breaking point. The number of migrants will likely increase in anticipation of hurricane season, as well as in the aftermath. While migration from the dry corridor—which stretches from Guatemala to Costa Rica—is likely, hurricanes also greatly affect the Caribbean coast. The Central American Integration System (SICA) estimates that up to eight hurricanes may form in the region this year. Four of the eight may be intense, according to the organization.

Climate change is both a long-term push factor for migration and an accelerant. The United Nations estimates more than 7.3 million people were directly impacted by hurricanes in 2020, and there are more than 8 million starving people in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador—up from 2.2 million in 2018. While the nearly four-fold increase in starvation is not all a result of the climate crisis, the destruction of crops and villages is a factor in this increase. In fact, experts find that climate change is a major factor explaining in the current surge in hunger.

The consequences of climate change are being felt now by current generations and the Caribbean nations are particularly impacted. Like other heads of state, the leaders of Antigua and Barbuda, and Jamaica reinforced the need for support and collaboration on addressing climate change. How could the international community support Caribbean nations in adapting to the existing and upcoming consequences of the rise in global temperatures?

Vicki Assevero is a former senior fellow for the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Caribbean Initiative.

The international community can support Caribbean nations and other small island developing states (SIDS) by acknowledging the World Meteorological Association’s 2020 Report that sea level rise has doubled, and hurricanes have intensified, so the imperative to finance climate adaptation is urgent. Prime ministers Gaston Browne of Antigua and Barbuda, and Andrew Holness of Jamaica urged acceleration of the pace of implementation of existing accords. This would mean not only funding the financing mechanisms foreseen in the original Paris Climate Accord but also those outlined in the Warsaw Mechanism and the Samoa Pathway. More importantly, multilateral institutions must continue to mobilize capital for greater investments in renewable energy and green technologies. The Caribbean SIDS are also urging new metrics in the form of a multi-dimensional vulnerability index that would facilitate access to concessional financing. 

Commitments on energy transition and renewable energy were popular among leaders at the summit. In terms of transitioning to cleaner energy, how close is Latin America and the Caribbean to reaching that goal and significantly reducing its greenhouse gas emissions? What key steps could be taken to accelerate an energy transition in the Americas?

Randolph Bell is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, and Reed Blakemore is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.

Though the reaffirmation and raised ambitions for climate action last week from across Latin America and the Caribbean were encouraging, regional progress to meeting climate goals has thus far been inconsistent. That said, growing electricity demand and the cloudy forecast for hydropower (long the prevailing baseload electricity source in the region) presents an important opportunity for countries to take significant steps to transform their energy mix and kickstart their climate goals. Accelerating the introduction of a mix of variable renewables, low-carbon natural gas resources, and in some cases nuclear energy, will offer alternatives to bioenergy, diesel, and coal in order to fulfill new electricity demand while also replacing potential declines in hydropower output. Additional efforts to decarbonize the transportation sector will also further electrify the region and support reduced emissions. Taken together, this makes investment into accompanying grid infrastructure as well as digitalization and energy efficiency important next steps in maximizing the emissions-reducing potential of regional electrification and energy transition.

Valentina Sader, is assistant director and Brazil lead at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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How the US can help Colombia surmount dual crises https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-us-can-help-colombia-surmount-dual-crises/ Tue, 30 Mar 2021 20:18:02 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=370960 On the eve of the two-hundredth anniversary of diplomatic ties between the United States and Colombia, there is “good momentum to strengthen the bilateral relationship,” says Colombian President Iván Duque.

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On the eve of the two-hundredth anniversary of diplomatic ties between the United States and Colombia, there is “good momentum to strengthen the bilateral relationship,” says Colombian President Iván Duque.

Duque shared his optimism for the future of US-Colombia relations during an Atlantic Council Front Page event hosted by the Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. The event, moderated by author and journalist Marie Arana, also featured US Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), the co-chairs of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center US-Colombia Task Force.

US President Joe Biden will further strengthen ties between Washington and Bogotá, Duque said, especially in regard to one particular issue: the rising influx of refugees arriving in Colombia from neighboring Venezuela in what he called “the biggest migration crisis in the world today.”

Cardin agreed with Duque and added that the US-Colombia friendship “represents one of the most successful foreign-policy partnerships that any two countries can point to around the world.”

“When we look at what we’ve been able to accomplish together over the past twenty years, it’s with great pride,” said Cardin. “And we say that recognizing that we see backsliding on democratic institutions in far too many countries in our own hemisphere. But we see Colombia moving forward in strengthening its democratic institutions.”

But Blunt cautioned that “we still need to work on being sure we don’t have obstacles” in the relationship like tariffs. “I think we need to treat our great strategic partner, Colombia, [with] the highest level of equity as the great partner they are when those things [come] up.”

Duque said he hopes to execute a new joint action plan with the Biden administration. This, he suggested, could mark “a new chapter in bilateral relations” based on security, democratic values, trade, investment, and coordinated efforts to fight climate change.

Duque outlined how Colombia has transformed recently, including with advancements in the energy transition and in high tech, with the support of the United States. He also identified several goals for Colombia in 2021 including vaccinating 70 percent of the Colombian population, encouraging a safe economic recovery, and achieving a sustainable social transformation by making pandemic-related social programs permanent.

Watch the full event

Colombia’s COVID-19 strategy

With nearly 2.4 million infections and over 62,000 deaths so far, Colombia has acutely felt the impact of the pandemic. However, Duque said his country is today in “much better shape than other countries” in the region and even the world, including those with higher per-capita incomes than Colombia.

In addition to increasing its number of intensive-care units, Colombia has bought COVID-19 vaccines from Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, Sinovac, Johnson & Johnson, and Oxford-AstraZeneca. At the time of his appearance, Duque said that the government has already administered 1.3 million shots and hopes to reach 150,000 a day by April 17.

While Duque praised Biden for rejoining the World Health Organization and joining the COVAX Facility—the program through which Colombia has agreed to purchase twenty million vaccine doses—he also criticized the unequal distribution of vaccines around the world.

“We have countries that have bought vaccines, but they haven’t been able to receive [any], not even one. And obviously that has to change,” he said, pointing out that meanwhile, “some countries have bought four or five or six times the size of their population in vaccines,” disrupting the market.

“I am very optimistic that… what we’re going to have is an oversupply and not what we have today,” Duque said. But he added: “It might be too late for many countries, because definitely there are people who are taking advantage politically to create social unrest due to the circumstances of the lack of provision of vaccines.”

From the US perspective, Blunt said “we need to do our best to be sure that we’re assisting our friends in Colombia with vaccines that are available.” He explained, “We don’t want other countries, who don’t have the friendly intentions that we have, coming in and providing vaccines to Colombia. One, some of these countries never quite provide the vaccines that the initial discussion says they’re going to provide. And two, it needlessly puts a foot in the door of a country that’s dedicated to democracy, of a country that’s really working to have the rule of law, to help grow their economy.”

Confronting the Venezuelan migration crisis

In February, Duque granted temporary protection status (TPS) for ten years to all Venezuelans in Colombia. Duque said that at present, Colombia hosts 32 percent of the estimated 5.4 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees who have fled deteriorating conditions at home.

Duque said that granting TPS to these 1.8 million migrants means they’ll have access to formal employment opportunities and essential services like healthcare and the COVID-19 vaccination program.

The Venezuelan humanitarian crisis amounts to “the biggest migration crisis in the world today,” said Duque, who added, “We have decided to embrace this challenge with fraternity and with a humanitarian sentiment.”

Cardin called the decision to grant TPS “a real model for the global community,” adding that “the long-term benefits will be in regard to the relationship between your two countries. But I think the people of Venezuela see that peace and prosperity in Colombia needs to be duplicated in Venezuela.”

Duque highlighted the Biden administration’s decision to grant TPS to almost 400,000 Venezuelan citizens on US soil, but he also urged US companies, especially those working in information technology, to nearshore in Latin America where labor costs are lower than they are in the United States. He explained that migrants crossing both the US-Mexico border and the Colombia-Venezuela border do so in search of better economic opportunities and that nearshoring may increase opportunities for these migrants in their home countries. “If there is a strategic nearshoring of those investments in Latin America, it can be a way to contain massive migration to the United States,” he said.

Larry Luxner is a Tel Aviv-based freelance journalist and photographer who covers the Middle East, Eurasia, Africa, and Latin AmericaFollow him on Twitter @LLuxner.

Further reading

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Transcript: After two centuries, the US-Colombia relationship is entering a ‘new chapter’ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/transcript-after-two-centuries-the-us-colombia-relationship-is-entering-a-new-chapter/ Fri, 26 Mar 2021 15:02:43 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=369808 Colombian President Iván Duque, US Senator Roy Blunt, and US Senator Benjamin Cardin reflected on the two-hundred-year US-Colombia relationship and discussed the United States' role in helping COVID-19 and migration strategies across Latin America.

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Watch the full event

Event transcript

Speakers

President Iván Duque,
President of the Republic of Colombia

US Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO)

US Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD)

Introductions

Jason Marczak
Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council

Adrienne Arsht
Executive Vice-Chair, Atlantic Council; Founder, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Advisory Council

Moderator

Marie Arana
Author, Journalist, and Literary Director, Library of Congress

JASON MARCZAK: Welcome to this episode of Atlantic Council Front Page, featuring President of Colombia Iván Duque and the co-chairs of our US-Colombia Task Force, Senators Ben Cardin and Roy Blunt. It’s an honor to have you with us today. I’m Jason Marczak, director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. And I’d like to thank IHS Towers, the exclusive sponsor of today’s program. IHS Towers is one of the largest independent providers of telecommunications infrastructure globally. Founded in Nigeria, IHS Towers is committed to emerging markets, providing services across the full tower value chain in nine countries, including Colombia.

Now it’s my pleasure to introduce a true visionary, Adrienne Arsht, the founder of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and of the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center, and executive vice-chair of the Atlantic Council. Adrienne.

ADRIENNE ARSHT: Thank you, Jason. And good afternoon, everyone. Particularly good afternoon, President Duque. Nearly a year ago you joined us for our first Atlantic Council Front Page event. It’s really an honor and quite special we’re welcoming you back again. That must be some record already in our Front Page events. And seven years ago, Fred Kempe, president of the Atlantic Council, embraced my vision to launch a center that would challenge the world’s perception of Latin America by positioning the region as a core partner in the community. Colombia’s rise and success over the years and its role as one of the United States’ most important global allies certainly speak to that vision.

President Duque, since becoming president three years ago you and your administration have demonstrated remarkable leadership, welcomingly nearly two million Venezuelans, and made a commendable commitment to decrease carbon emissions, among other important priorities. You have impressed the world with your steadfast commitment to entrepreneurship, innovation, legality, and equality. We all look forward to continuing to work together with you to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties between Colombia and the United States.

On a personal note, you know how important Colombia is to me. Two years ago I was honored to receive the Order of San Carlos in recognition of my commitment to the prosperity of your country. That commitment is strong today as we look for new opportunities to deepen the bilateral relationship as Colombia confronts COVID-19 and the continuing destabilizing effects of Maduro’s reign in Venezuela.

And now I would also like to thank and welcome Senator Ben Cardin and Senator Roy Blunt and thank them for their longstanding commitment to strengthening the strategic partnership, and for their leadership as co-chairs of the US-Colombia Task Force. I look forward to seeing the continued work of the bipartisan US-Colombia Task Force in its goal to deepen and broaden [US-Colombia] ties. This is so pivotal as President Biden begins to advance the new strategic priorities of his administration in this hemisphere.

And now onto the program. Following President Duque’s remarks my dear friend, Marie Arana, a former journalist for The Washington Post, author literary director at the Library of Congress, will moderate from Washington a conversation with President Duque and Senators Cardin and Blunt.

Mr. President, the floor is yours.

PRESIDENT IVÁN DUQUE: Well, thank you so much, Adrienne, for your kind words. And it’s always a pleasure to be with you at the Atlantic Council. Thank you for all your support to Colombia. I also want to express my gratitude to Jason once again. And it is always a great honor to share the floor with Senator Blunt and Senator Cardin, who have been great friends of Colombia, who have supported our country in many, many ways.

And it’s also a great honor for me to be here with Marie Arana. I still remember some years ago when I was interviewing her after she published her biography on Simon Bolivar. So it’s a great honor for me to be this afternoon.

What I’ll try to do, Adrienne, in my introduction is to make the case for the transformation that we’re building in Colombia. Obviously, we’re facing all the adversities that are derived from COVID-19 while we continue to embrace the values and the vision of our national development plan.

But I should say that this year, 2021, has four very important purposes for Colombia. On the one hand, massive vaccination. We are supposed to reach almost four percent of our population being vaccinated maybe early next week, and we’re going to get to three million people vaccinated by April the 17th. And our goal is to vaccinate 35 million people by the end of the year so that we can reach 70 percent of the Colombian population and have some sort of a herd immunity in our country.

The second great objective that we have is to have a safe economic recovery. Last year our GDP was badly hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, and our GDP shrank by 6.8 percent. But we already have not only the plan, the vision, and the investment, and the cycles of investment that will lead us to grow close [to] or above 5 percent this year. And that involves many projects in the rural areas. It involves also the acceleration of the Peace with Legality policy that we have. It involves also water and sewage, four-generation highways, and also the opening for bids for the five-generation highways that are going to be bi-centenary roads of Colombia.

And we also consider that the most important thing that we have to advance, as we do with massive vaccination and with the safe recovery, is a sustainable social transformation. So we’re about to present before Congress a bill that would allow us not only to protect the poorest of the poor by managing all the social programs that we created in the midst of the pandemic so that they will become permanent programs and we will reach almost twenty million Colombians by providing benefits for something close to five million families so that we are not going to have setbacks on all the advancements that we made reducing poverty. But we also want to stabilize our national finances for the short and long term.

So those are elements that are in place, but it’s very important to say that as of today we are seeing great transformations; one, the energy transition in Colombia, where we’re going to pass from 0.2 percent of non-conventional renewables to 14 percent of our energy matrix by the end of next year. We’re making a big advancement in high tech, and especially we’re now training 100,000 programmers so that Colombia will become the number one destination for technology companies that want to sell in Latin America. And we’re also at this moment making a very important transformation in the health and education system.

Those elements are the ones that are leading us to have the recovered growth this year, to be very close to [recovering] pre-pandemic unemployment levels, and to keep on reducing unemployment. But more importantly, we want to move very fast in the policy of the Peace with Legality, where now we have already finished more than one thousand projects in the areas that historically have been badly affected by violence.

All this transformation that has taken place in Colombia has had the support of the United States. And Senator Blunt and Senator Cardin, I should recognize always that the support that we have gotten from the United States has been bipartisan and has been bicameral. And I think Colombia represents maybe one of the most successful foreign-policy programs that has been implemented with the United States because it has been focused not only on security but using trade to promote investment and generate jobs. And today we got the accessibility of green peppers from Colombia to the United States that is going to generate a good amount of work and jobs in the rural areas of our nation. And we believe that now, with President Biden, that bipartisan and bicameral support is going to be strengthened, and one of the issues where we want to strengthen the bilateral relationship is also connected to attending the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela that has generated the biggest migration crisis in the world today.

We decided to embrace this challenge with fraternity and with a humanitarian sentiment, and we have granted temporary protection status to 1.8 million migrants in Colombia that will have their migration card with all the biometric technology so that we have all the right information to grant them rights but at the same time to be able to connect with them and understand what their needs are so that they can also benefit from programs such as the massive vaccination program.

So we’re working with the United States [on] this very important matter, and we also congratulate the United States for granting TPS to almost 400,000 Venezuelan citizens [on] US soil. But more importantly, next year—and I will finish with this, and this is something I know Marie Arana will love—next year we’ll be celebrating two hundred years of diplomatic relations between the United States and Colombia.

It was President Monroe, who was better known as the last Founding Father by many historians, who recognized Colombia and it was the first former Spanish colony to be recognized by the United States two hundred years ago. And it was young Quincy Adams, who, at the time, was the secretary of state. And the man who made this happen was a diplomat that was living in the United States of America. His name was Dr. Manuel de Trujillo y Torres. He was known at the time as the Colombian Franklin, and he passed away a few days after the recognition took place.

Two hundred years where we have shared values and common objectives, and we consider that all the work that has been done with the Atlantic Council and especially with the support of Senators Blunt and Cardin, we want to turn all the exercise that has been made in the last three years into a bilateral foreign policy plan that would cover almost a decade, a new joint action plan that we want to execute with the Biden administration.

This could be a new chapter in the bilateral relations and will pass from the idea of Plan Colombia to have a permanent bilateral program that is based on security, democratic values, trade, but also investment, something that is very important. And it’s how we jointly are going to fight the crisis from climate change.

So I consider that at this moment in time there is a good momentum to strengthen the bilateral relationship between the United States and Colombia, keeping the great value of being a focus that comes from a bipartisan, bicameral, state-of-the-art policy.

With that, I will leave that as my introduction to have this dialogue and, once again, Jason, Adrian, and Senator Blunt and Cardin, it’s a great honor for me to be back at the Council and to work hand in hand with you so that this bilateral relationship keeps on strengthening. Thank you so much.

MARIE ARANA: Thank you, President Duque. It’s a pleasure to see you again, and thank you for those informative remarks and for joining us in this discussion. And I do, indeed, appreciate, having written about the history, that very strong relationship, diplomatic relationship, that has existed for two hundred years between Colombia and the United States.

Well, as President Duque mentioned, Colombia is one of the United States’ strongest and most important allies in the world. If a vibrant US foreign policy toward Colombia exists today, it’s because of bipartisan consensus and successes, and we owe those successes to strong leadership by the administrations of both countries as well as to an unwavering and mutual commitment between Washington and Bogotá.

So, Senators Blunt and Cardin, as co-chairs of the Atlantic Council’s US- Colombia Task Force and throughout your careers, you have advocated for a strong relationship between the United States and Colombia. As a US citizen of Latin American origin myself, I thank you for your commitment to that goal.

Why, in your opinions, Senators, is it more important than ever to continue strengthening this bilateral partnership with Colombia? And where would you say is our greatest potential to fortify that engagement? Senator Blunt.

SENATOR ROY BLUNT: Well, Maria, thank you for being the moderator today. And thanks to the Atlantic Council, Jason’s fine work there. And maybe most of all, thanks to Adrienne Arsht for coming up with a concept that the Atlantic connects not only the northern hemisphere or the western hemisphere but also the southern part. And we are neighbors. And treating this neighborhood in the way that the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s effort has allowed us to do, really important.

Two hundred years is a long time. Two hundred years of virtual democracy in both of our countries. And Americans appreciate as they get more familiar with Colombia that long commitment to democracy, the long relationship we’ve had in our countries. I know that on more than one occasion, President Biden, then as vice president, referred to Colombia as the keystone of Latin America. And it’s fairly evident from parts of the map, but it’s also evident from looking [at] the example that Colombia sets. President Duque’s example of the way that Venezuelan refugees have been welcomed, saying two million of them could legally be in the country really shows that you can have the leadership and democracy and understanding what goes on in your neighboring country, in this case, is really something important.

And President Duque’s done that, you know, from Plan Colombia, where as a member of the leadership in the House I was working to be sure that every year we extended Plan Colombia, to Senator Cardin, my really close friend. And I say that in the Senate, but I came to the Senate not too long after Senator Cardin is. I looked for a mentor on the other side, and I thought who would be better than the guy who I already have such great confidence in. And we have been able to find things—so many things to work together on. And looking at how we transition from Plan Colombia to Peace Colombia.

And I think, frankly, we saw some of the problems in the Peace Colombia transition in our report, but we’re still very hopeful that it would work out in the best way—though there were some questions that obviously came up…. And now looking again with President Duque’s leadership in Colombia of how we bring together some combination of what we were doing in Plan Colombia with what we hope to do in Peace Colombia. And glad to be with all of you today. But, Maria, thanks for moderating. And, again, I’m particularly pleased to be part of this effort with Senator Cardin.

MARIE ARANA: Thanks very much, Senator Blunt.

Senator Cardin, can you answer the same question?

SENATOR BENJAMIN CARDIN: First of all, thank you very much. President Duque it’s wonderful to be with you. Thank you for your [extraordinary] leadership in Colombia. To my friends at the Atlantic Council, thanks for making this possible. We thank you all for putting a real spotlight on this.

You asked a question: Why is this relationship important and where do we go from here, and can we make it stronger? And I think President Duque put his finger on it when he said that this is one of the most successful foreign policy partnership initiatives that any two countries can point to around the world. When we look at what we’ve been able to accomplish together over the past twenty years, it’s with great pride. And we say that recognizing that we see backsliding on democratic institutions in far too many countries in our own hemisphere. But we see Colombia moving forward in strengthening its democratic institutions. It’s in the exact direction we want to see in our own hemisphere.

So over the last twenty years, we’ve seen the homicide rate in Colombia drop by 60 percent, the lowest rate now since—in forty-five years. The GDP has been tripled. The foreign direct investment is tenfold as to what it was twenty years ago—the highest in Latin America. The poverty rate cut [by] less than half. And the list goes on and on. And we point to it with pride and success. This partnership has worked in the best interests of Colombia and the United States. We have a partner on so many different issues, as the president has already indicated, we may now go to the next level of our partnership.

And the reason why we have to strengthen that partnership is that we still have challenges. Venezuela is a critical challenge for our hemisphere. How do we deal with solving that conflict? What do we do with the migration issues? We have drug trafficking problems that we have to work together. We’ve got to strengthen our protections on human rights activists. We know we have those challenges. We still have challenges, and we have to build the partnership to deal with those challenges in the same way we have in our partnership that’s now been twenty years.

I’m proud of this. Important to the United States. Important to Colombia. But we need to make sure we strengthen these efforts.

MARIE ARANA: Thanks very much, Senator Cardin.

Now let’s turn to the situation with COVID-19, the vaccination and recovery period. Colombia was the first country in the Americas to receive vaccines from the UN-backed COVAX mechanism, a program meant to ensure the equitable distribution of immunization worldwide. It has also received vaccines from China. So far the country has administered over one million doses to its people, and President Duque referred to that in his introductory remarks.

President Duque, you hope to administer 200,000 doses a day in April. What can the United States do to help Colombia in this vaccine administration? And more generally, how can the US best partner with Colombia in its economic recovery, including advancing the technological capacities that are critical for Colombia’s long-term competitiveness?

PRESIDENT IVÁN DUQUE: Well, thank you so much, Marie, for your question. And let me begin by saying that where we stand right now with COVID-19.

So, [there have been] very important achievements during the last year. We got to double the amount of ICUs in Colombia. When the pandemic began, we had 5,300 ICUs in Colombia. Today, we have more than 11,400. And that has been a major achievement. Even though when the pandemic began we had one of the highest levels of ICUs per 100,000 inhabitants in the region, today we are the leaders. We have twenty-one. And we are above most of the countries in Latin America in terms of ICUs per 100,000 inhabitants.

When it comes to deaths per million people and cases per million people, we look today in a much better shape than other countries from the region and other countries from the world, even though with countries that have high incomes per capita. We have now a 95 percent recovery rate of the people that have been affected by the virus. We have 2.1 percent active cases and we have 2.5 percent lethality rate from the people that have been affected by the virus.

And it’s important that we have tried to manage not only the tension on the health-care system, by expanding social programs we have been able to grant non-conditional cash transfers to almost 3.4 million homes in Colombia. We have also provided what we call a giveback tax from VAT. The families that are on the poorest of the poor, we have given back what they have paid on VAT tax, and that has become a very important program. We have granted free university education for students that are in need and we’re covering almost 700,000 students. And we have also provided loan guarantees where we guarantee 90 percent of the loans for many companies, and we have been able to subsidize the payroll to almost 3.4 million workers to protect the employments in Colombia during this year.

And we began the negotiations with a dual strategy six months ago where we joined COVAX, and we bought twenty million doses for ten million people with COVAX because it had a limit of no more than ten percent of the population—but we also made the bilateral agreements with pharmaceutical companies. We did it with Pfizer. We did it with Johnson & Johnson. We did it with Moderna. We did it with AstraZeneca. And we also did it with Sinovac from China.

As of today, we have 1.3 million doses that have been applied in Colombia. And we expect to have a growth that will likely reach more than 150,000 per day maybe in the next month, when we hope by the 17th of April to be around three million. And we want to keep that level so that we keep on advancing rapidly.

So what can we do? And let me make some reflections on this. I think it has been very important that the US has gone back to the World Health Organization. I think that was a must. And I think it has been a wise move from President Biden’s administration to join COVAX, because the importance of COVAX is that we’re all paying for the vaccines. We’re a middle-income country and the US is a high-income country. What we buy from middle- and high-income countries represents that it’s going to ensure the supply of vaccine to the poorest countries around the world. So it’s a very important, equitable system.

Now, I have to say this in a blunt way. What we’re seeing internationally is that the distribution of vaccines has been pretty much unequal. We have countries that have bought vaccines, but they haven’t been able to receive not even one. And obviously, that has to change. And something that I consider has to [be rethought] is that we have seen countries that have bought four or five or six times the size of their population in vaccines. And that certainly disrupts the market.

So it’s very important that this is fixed to ensure that we can have a better supply. And definitely I consider that since the US has become a leader in the production of vaccines, I think it’s also a very important instrument of soft diplomacy that can be very well used with other countries around the world, not only to facilitate those who can buy, to be bought, but also in the cases of countries that have not only received vaccines, to be able to do it in a prompt way.

And I am very optimistic that maybe by the second semester, what we’re going to have is an oversupply and not what we have today. But my consideration and my thought is that it might be too late for many countries, because definitely there are people who are taking advantage politically to create social unrest due to the circumstances of the lack of provision of vaccines. And we don’t want that to happen. And we want to see countries that are effective in their institutional stability because of this.

So I definitely think that the US can certainly become a leader in the hemisphere to help the countries that have not received vaccines to do it in a prompt way.

MARIE ARANA: Thank you very much, President Duque.

A very important question for sure. Senators Cardin and Blunt, I’d love for you to comment on this too, and if you would do so in brief comments, please.

Senator Cardin, you’ve done so much and have [made] so many accomplishments in general. You have been a great advocate for human rights. And why is it important to continue deepening US-Colombia cooperation in the fight against COVID-19? How can the anti-epidemic efforts undertaken for COVID-19 actually now help advance US interests generally in the region?

SENATOR BENJAMIN CARDIN: I think President Duque made a very strong case of why we have to be engaged internationally, not just in Colombia but throughout the world. This is a global pandemic, and we’re not going to be safe in our own country unless all countries are safe.

I do want to acknowledge that Senator Roy Blunt has been one of our leaders in the United States Senate on health-care issues here in the United States and around the world. We recognize that access to health care is critically important as far as quality-of-life and humanitarian issues, but also security issues. [If people] can’t get access to health care, it’s going to be everything very vulnerable.

So the fair distribution of the vaccine is critical in the United States. It’s critical in Colombia and it’s critical globally. And that means we all need to be engaged. The United States needs to be [a leader] to make sure there’s fair supply to countries around the world, that affordability is not an issue, that communities that have a hard time getting access to health care get that access. And we need to take direction in each individual country to responsible leaders.

So in Colombia, we follow the recommendations of President Duque as to how we can help make sure his people are safe and getting the vaccine.

MARIE ARANA: Thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator Blunt, you were one of the main champions of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, fighting tirelessly for the approval of the trade agreement a decade ago, in 2011. This agreement, of course, is instrumental in US and Colombia business and has led to increased cross-border communications and activity.

How will the agreement contribute actually to the COVID-19 recovery? And why is it more important than ever to advocate its full implementation?

SENATOR ROY BLUNT: Well, I’m an advocate of continued greater cooperation, greater investment, between our countries. I was a major proponent of the trade agreement with Colombia when we did it.

I’d say, first of all, the trade agreement had the Colombian economy in a better shape going into this COVID-19 and border crisis than it would have been in otherwise. It’s hard to imagine a country that’s been more challenged by two bigger things happening at the same time than Colombia. And President Duque’s leadership [looking] at both how to be sure that people have access to the vaccine [and also] the unbelievable cost to Colombia of people coming into the country fleeing the repressive government and devastated economy in Venezuela. But we were in better shape with our Colombian economy that I’m proud to say I’m glad to be an advocate for and part of…

I think we still need to work on being sure we don’t have obstacles. Some of those trade obstacles came up as we put tariffs on steel and other things around the world. I think we need to treat our great strategic partner, Colombia, [with] the highest level of equity as the great partner they are when those things came up. And in terms of the vaccine, it is destabilizing when people feel like somehow they don’t have fair access to the vaccine. And we need to do our best to be sure that we’re assisting our friends in Colombia with vaccines that are available. Thirty-five million vaccines, I think, is what President Duque said was the goal by the end of the year. And that will give a significant level of immunity but not the full immunity that we need with even more vaccines available.

What we don’t want, frankly—or, in my view—is we don’t want other countries, who don’t have the friendly intentions that we have, coming in and providing vaccines to Colombia. One, some of these countries never quite provide the vaccines that the initial discussion says they’re going to provide. And two, it needlessly puts a foot in the door of a country that’s dedicated to democracy, of a country that’s really working to have the rule of law, to help grow their economy. And we know that the health care crisis created an open door for other countries that aren’t nearly as interested in that as Colombia and the United States are.

MARIE ARANA: Thanks very much, Senator.

We have actually very little time left, but I don’t want to close this program without talking a little bit about Venezuela. President Duque, earlier this month you signed a decree to grant temporary protective status for ten years to all Venezuelans in Colombia. This is a humanitarian gesture on a massive scale. Colombia hosts the largest Venezuelan diaspora of over 1.7 million people, or 32 percent of the 5.4 million migrants and refugees from Venezuela in the world. The temporary protective status, the TPS, is expected to benefit two million people, granting them access to formal employment and to essential services including health care and COVID-19 vaccinations.

Mr. President, renewed and expanded international support to your country will be essential for the successful implementation of this newly announced temporary protective status. How can the international community best support Colombia’s efforts to integrate Venezuelan migrants and refugees? What will be the medium- to long-term benefits of the TPS?

PRESIDENT IVÁN DUQUE: Well, thank you, Marie. I wanted to make a comment based on the question that you asked previously but I’m going to connect it with this. And you were asking what can the United States do for Latin America and for Colombia for the recovery. And something that I consider very strategic as of this moment is the concept of nearshoring. And let me put it in this way. It is crucial, and we understand for sure, that the United States is also facing its own challenges at home. And I know it’s very important, the policy of reshoring some of the investments that [were] deployed in other parts of the world.

That, obviously we know, and we also consider that that’s part of the US internal policy. However, if there is a percentage of that investment that cannot be reshored but nearshored in the Americas, that nearshoring is going to trigger investment, is going to trigger employment, and is going to take the advantage of being close to market to generate opportunities in Latin America.

And obviously, I don’t want to get into US internal and domestic policies, but I made this comment publicly. We all are going to struggle with the migration crisis. What we are suffering right now is not going to be the last. And what we’re seeing at the southern border of the United States is not going to be the last. But if there is a strategic nearshoring of those investments in Latin America, it can be a way to contain massive migration to the United States.

And I say this because many people want to cross the border and multiply their income by the exchange rate and send back money to their houses. Well, the same thing, we are living with that in Colombia, because the minimum salary in Venezuela is ten bucks while in Colombia it’s three hundred bucks. So if you just cross the border, you’re going to multiply by the exchange rate and be able to send money to buy food at home.

At this moment in time, we are facing the worst migration crisis in the world. More than six million people have left Venezuela with hunger… [and] lacking health services. And we decided in Colombia—and this is not something that came just to my mind recently. I proposed it when I was a candidate. And while I was also inspired by the figure of the TPS that the US has historically used. And I said to the Colombian people that we had to think [about] that, and we created our migration policy that we launched by the end of 2018. And we have been able to mature in such a way the idea of having a migration policy that today we are going to grant the TPS, and that TPS is going to allow people that already had short-term permits to have a long-term permit of ten years, and they’re going to have their TPS card with biometric information. But those who are informal have to register, and we’re going to have the registry having the name, who they are, where they live, what the conditions are they’re suffering. And also, we’re going to be able to focus resources for them.

But this also takes me to put the concept before your eyes that there was a report that came out a few weeks ago in the United States demonstrating that in the Syrian migration crisis, the whole international community—the donor community—had provided more than three thousand dollars per migrant in the Syrian crisis, and [$1,600] when it was related to the South Sudan crisis. But when it comes to the Venezuelan crisis, what the world has been able to mobilize doesn’t even get to three hundred dollars per migrant. And as of today, the United States has been the major donor for us to attend this circumstance. Obviously, Spain has supported us, Canada has supported us, but we definitely need to connect what has been pledged to the disbursements that are needed.

And we consider that if we get to nearshore investments, that if we get to trigger the right conditions, we’re going to be able to manage this crisis successfully. And actually, we have made very interesting economic analysis that at the end of the day, looking at this type of migration that is not short term, we have to find through the regularization the process where they can also contribute to the Colombian economy.

But also, looking at the long term—and I’ll finish with this—the bond that has been created between Colombian and Venezuelan citizens, once there is light at the end of the tunnel in Venezuela and there is a rebirth of democracy, those who will go back will never forget the bonds that they had created with Colombia. And this can become the engine of social and economic transformation in the years to come for both nations.

MARIE ARANA: Those are very great points. Thank you, President Duque.

And Senators Blunt and Cardin, following on this same question, would you please comment—and briefly, too, because we are wrapping up with this—that although international assistance is critical to the general well-being of the region, the current response to the Venezuela crisis remains insufficient, I think as President Duque has just said, with those 2020 figures that have host countries receiving $265 in funding for each Venezuelan migrant and refugee, but over ten times less than the $3,150 that President Duque mentioned that the Syrian migrant refugees received? What additional steps should be taken by the US and the international community to help Colombia resolve this terrible crisis of migration?

Senator Blunt?

SENATOR ROY BLUNT: I think we can do more, as—I think the exact number from the United States in 2020 was $197 million. That’s about a hundred of that $255 that you mentioned that all the countries in the world sent. We can do more. We should do more. The force multiplier, the strategic partnership, the long-term stabilizing impact of Colombia are incredibly valuable to us. And I really like President Duque’s idea of nearshoring. There’s going to be a lot of focus on the supply chain, a lot of jobs I think will come back to the United States.

But another viable option can be his near-shoring option, so that you’ve got a stronger economy there as well as us reaching out in ways that we uniquely should be willing to do with our friend in Colombia, who is constantly helping us with its neighbors, talking about things in the drug and trafficking and other areas, and how they lead on this is the way we would lead on this. But it’s more effective for them to do it because they’re neighbors in the exact neighborhood.

And so we’re grateful. We should understand why people are fleeing Venezuela. And a lack of stability in Colombia or any other country they’re fleeing to is not to our advantage. And I hope we can and will do more.

SENATOR BENJAMIN CARDIN: Certainly, I agree with Senator Blunt. Because I agree [with] what he said. And first of all, President Duque, thank you so much for responding to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela by allowing the borders to accept the refugees. And thank you for giving them status, which was so important. It’s a real model for the global community. And you point out, the long-term benefits will be in regard to the relationship between your two countries. But I think the people of Venezuela see that peace and prosperity in Colombia needs to be duplicated in Venezuela. So thank you very much for presenting that model.

And I agree with Senator Blunt that we need to do more, and we need the leadership in the international community to provide more international recognition for the responsibilities to deal with the crisis caused by Venezuela. That’s what happened in Syria. We could have been even a greater help internationally. But certainly, we’re not doing what we need to in the countries that are impacted by the migrants from Venezuela.

MARIE ARANA: Thanks very much, Senator Cardin.

And that wraps it up for our conversation. It’s been a pleasure to talk to you, gentlemen. I will go back now to Jason.

JASON MARCZAK: Well, thank you very much, President Duque, Senator Cardin, Senator Blunt, for your important message during today’s conversation. Marie, thank you for the moderation.

In the midst of an incredibly challenging global moment, your insight and actions as well have again reinforced all that we’ve achieved, and also the enormous future potential of what the US and Colombia can achieve together. President Duque, we heed your call on the importance of this moment to further advance a joint bipartisan action plan. And thank you, Senators Cardin and Blunt, for your continued leadership and partnership. We’re looking forward to another very productive year with our US-Colombia Task Force members focused on strengthening the bilateral relationship, especially in the midst of COVID-19 recovery, continued peace implementation, and Colombia’s important role as a regional leader.

Thank you all for joining us for this episode of AC Front Page.

Watch the full event

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Colombia is pioneering a new model for integrating migrants and refugees. Will it work? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/colombia-is-pioneering-a-new-model-for-integrating-migrants-and-refugees-will-it-work/ Fri, 19 Feb 2021 17:04:36 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=355440 Colombian President Iván Duque announced that he will grant temporary protection status to Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia. It is a herculean task, and the country will encounter two major challenges.

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Earlier this month, Colombian President Iván Duque announced that he will grant temporary protection status (Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos, or ETPV) to Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Colombia.

The ETPV will apply to Venezuelans in Colombia who crossed the border prior to January 31, 2021 as well as those who enter Colombia legally in the next two years. Once issued, ETPVs are valid for ten years. Colombian authorities estimate the measure will benefit more than two million people, granting them access to formal employment and essential services including healthcare and COVID-19 vaccinations.

This is a humanitarian gesture of massive scale: Colombia hosts 1.7 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees, making up 34 percent of the 5.4 million Venezuelans who have fled their country since 2015. While the ETPV reflects Colombia’s approach to the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis, it is also a good economic decision. Doing more to include migrants and refugees in the economy and formal labor market not only reduces their dependency on international humanitarian assistance, but also can contribute to the country’s post-COVID recovery and future economic growth.

Duque said that he hopes “other countries follow [Colombia’s] example,” while the International Organization of Migration’s Director General Antonio Vitorino similarly said the decision “serves as an example to the world” and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi praised it as an “example of humanity, commitment towards human rights, and pragmatism.” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also commended the announcement, affirming that “the United States stands with Colombia in support of refugees and migrants.”

Renewed and expanded international support is precisely what Colombia will need. Such a large-scale initiative will require tremendous investments of time, logistical planning, and resources. As Colombia begins to process ETPV requests, the international community should increase its technical, logistical, and financial aid to Colombia to help the country successfully roll out this initiative. Simply put: If Colombia succeeds in fully integrating Venezuelan migrants and refugees, so will the entire region.

Colombia will confront two daunting challenges in the immediate future. First, it needs to raise awareness about the initiative with the nearly two million migrants and refugees in the country, counter any misinformation around it, guide qualifying individuals through the registration process, review applications, and issue permits. This will be a herculean logistical task for Colombia’s migration agency and border-control police, especially given that more than half of the migrants and refugees entered the country without authorization and have not obtained a government-issued residence permit. The Colombian government will have to determine who crossed the border before January 31, 2021 (and therefore qualifies for the ETPV) with exceptionally little information about most people’s date of entry. 

The second challenge is the likely spike in humanitarian needs, especially in border municipalities. Encouraged by the ETPV announcement, more Venezuelans might try to make their way into Colombia in coming weeks and months. With an estimated five to seven thousand people crossing the border every week, the Colombian government’s capacity to provide humanitarian assistance and essential services to an even larger number of migrants and refugees is meager. Director of Migración Colombia Juan Francisco Espinosa reiterated that only those who enter the country legally starting February 1, 2021 are eligible for the ETPV. However, scammers or “coyotes” have already begun to deceptively promise Venezuelans a fast-track entry to the ETPV program, offering to smuggle them into the country via illegal trails or “trochas.” 

As Colombia navigates these logistical and humanitarian challenges, the international community should double down on its support to the country. Without increased financial, technical, logistical, and humanitarian aid, Colombia might fail to integrate the nearly two million Venezuelan migrants and refugees within its borders. This would not only compromise regional stability and security, but also the country’s future economic growth.

Camila Hernandez is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council. Follow her on Twitter @CHernandezGB.

Further reading

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Spotlight: 10 Questions for Latin America and the Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/spotlight-10-questions-for-2021/ Thu, 11 Feb 2021 14:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=351374 As February begins, we can now look ahead to the rest of the year with our annual predictions of what may or may not transpire in this unpredictable world.

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As we approach one year since the first COVID-19 case in Latin America and the Caribbean, we look ahead at what might or might not be on the horizon for the region over the next year.

Join us as we look at some of the key questions that may shape the region, then take our informal poll and see how your opinions shape up against our analysis.

Will the region see mass vaccinations? How will regional economies fare? What might be on the agenda for the US relationship with Brazil and Mexico? US President Joe Biden’s administration has entered office with a full inbox: how will developing trends in the region affect the new administration’s agenda?

Here are the eleven questions that the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center is answering to map the rest of the year.

Question #1: COVID – Will Latin America and the Caribbean achieve widespread vaccination in 2021?

Question #2: Economy – Will regional economies outpace growth forecasts in 2021?

Question #3: Central America – Given the extent of damage from the 2020 hurricanes in Central America, will the region see more climate migrants?

Question #4: Mexico – Will joint security challenges top the list of priorities in the US-Mexico relationship under Biden?

Question #5: Stability – Latin America has faced sporadic, but massive, waves of protests and national strikes prior to and during the pandemic. Will 2021 be a year of even greater social unrest?

Question #6: Venezuela-EU – Will the European Union (EU) resume conversations with Nicolás Maduro’s regime to monitor Venezuela’s regional elections in 2021?

Chapter #7: Brazil – Will the Biden administration and that of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro find ways to cooperate on a climate agenda?

Question #8: Colombia – Will the United States and Colombia reform the underlying premises of their anti-narcotics policies?

Question #9: China and the Caribbean – Will the five Caribbean nations and two Central American countries that still recognize Taiwan shift to recognizing the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?

Question #10: Caribbean – Will the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) achieve its goal of a Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) in 2021?

BONUS QUESTION: In the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (#13), Jamaica (#22), and Cuba (#23) were the only Latin American and Caribbean countries to finish in the top twenty-five in the medal count. Assuming the Olympics are held, will more countries from the region finish in the top twenty-five this summer?

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #1: NO

The first case of COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean was reported in Brazil on February 26, 2020. Since then, the region has reported nearly 17.5 million cases and more than 550,000 COVID-19-related deaths, accounting for one third of global deaths. Countries have actively worked to secure vaccines through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including agreements with Pfizer, Moderna, AstraZeneca, Russia’s Sputnik V, and China’s CoronaVac. Nevertheless, widespread vaccination requires not only adequate planning for vaccine acquisition, but efficient and equitable distribution. Recent incidents in Germany and the United States show that even more resourceful countries are experiencing hiccups in massive vaccine rollouts, such as logistical challenges (especially the required temperature-controlled supply chain), personnel shortages, and vaccine hesitancy. Latin American and Caribbean nations may face these hurdles at a greater scale, due to resource and capacity constraints.

As of January 19, 2021, eleven Latin American and Caribbean countries have authorized emergency use of COVID-19 vaccines: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela.  On December 24, 2020, Mexico, Chile, and Costa Rica became the first countries in Latin America to begin mass vaccination. Despite moving quicker than most others in the region, Mexico aims to inoculate only 75 percent of its population by March 2022. For most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, definitive delivery and mass vaccination timeframes remain unclear, and could be delayed over time.

Some low-income countries in the region may be able to vaccinate, at most, 20 percent of their populations in 2021, a figure considerably lower than the 65-percent theoretical threshold for herd immunity. Of added concern, the COVAX initiative—a key global initiative launched to secure vaccine doses for poor countries—currently faces a $4.9-billion funding gap. This could potentially complicate the initiative’s goal of helping inoculate 20 percent of each low-income country’s population against COVID-19 by the end of 2021. With stark disparities in vaccine access across and within countries, widespread vaccination is a distant prospect for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2021.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #2: YES

In July 2020, a month after Latin America and the Caribbean became the global epicenter of the coronavirus pandemic, Alicia Bárcena, head of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), cautioned that the region should brace for a “lost decade.” By the end of 2020, the economic contraction in Latin America reached 7.7 percent—its steepest contraction ever, albeit 1.4 percent less than ECLAC’s earlier forecast. Can the region rebound in 2021 and exceed current growth forecasts?

After experiencing its worst economic crisis ever in 2020, the regional economy is expected to grow 3.7 percent in 2021. But, it’s also possible that the region can outpace this forecast, if it can manage a strategic balancing of expanded fiscal support for social-protection programs and small businesses, investment in job-generating productive sectors, and structural reforms to tackle long-standing challenges in the rule of law, equality, productivity, and climate. To accelerate economic reactivation, the region must leverage international investment and cooperation from global institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as from regional organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank. The private sector, at the national and international levels, must also play a central role in revamping growth, but will require strong incentives from local governments and risk-mitigated business climates.

Eyes will be on Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina (the region’s three largest economies) as well as Peru, which has had one of the best developing-world growth rates in the past decade, to recover from their 2020 economic downturns. In comparison to these four countries, Chile and Colombia suffered less devastating declines and could be positioned for stable growth over the year, but the migration crisis in Venezuela will continue to pose a heavy burden on neighboring countries’ already-strained public resources.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #3: YES

This year will almost certainly see a surge in Central American migrants and refugees trekking north to the US southern border, due to a unique confluence of the devastation caused by Hurricanes Eta and Iota, as well as the myriad effects of the coronavirus pandemic and other long-standing migration pressures. Days before Biden’s inauguration, a caravan of more than nine thousand Hondurans created international headlines. The caravan was fueled, in part, by the promise of a revamped immigration policy in the United States.

The back-to-back hurricanes—which made landfall in Central America less than two weeks apart—wreaked havoc across Nicaragua and the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), affecting more than five million people and forcing at least 350,000 Hondurans and Guatemalans into emergency shelters. With hundreds of thousands of Central Americans internally displaced, shelters lacking basic services and sanitation quickly became new ground for rapid coronavirus infection. The destruction to essential infrastructure—such as bridges, roads, buildings—and entire communities was a heavy blow to a region that saw a 6.5-percent economic decline in 2020.

Food insecurity in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras is expected to rise significantly, due to the destruction of large swaths of agricultural lands, livestock, and infrastructure. In a region with long-standing pre-pandemic challenges around rule of law, insecurity, and economic opportunity, the most likely outcome from these push forces is a novel wave of “new” climate refugees seeking better livelihoods in the United States.

In 1998, Hurricane Mitch, the second-deadliest Atlantic hurricane, caused a massive surge in Central American migration to the United States. If history is any indication of the future, Hurricanes Eta and Iota—Category 4 and 5, respectively—can trigger a similar scenario in 2021.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #4: NO

Security cooperation will be an important, though complicated, part of the US-Mexico relationship. In the days leading up to Biden’s inauguration, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) administration decided to stop investigations into former Mexican Secretary of National Defense General Salvador Cienfuegos—who was arrested in Los Angeles at the end of last year, and then sent for prosecution to Mexico. AMLO then released more than seven hundred pages of confidential evidence and intelligence, prompting an unusual rebuke by the US Department of Justice. The General Cienfuegos saga is just the latest example of a strained US-Mexico security relationship.

The Mexican Congress passed a new law in December 2020 that limits and deters the work of foreign enforcement agents in Mexico. Under the law, all communications—at all levels—with foreign enforcement agents will need to be reported, meetings with foreign agents must be approved in advance, and senior federal officials will need to be present at said meetings. Failure to do any of the above may result in expulsion of foreign agents. The law has prompted serious concerns that international cooperation with Mexico on the security front will be henceforth paralyzed. Most of the intelligence on criminal groups and illicit activities comes the United States.

AMLO has sought to double down on addressing the root socioeconomic causes of crime, and has moved away from the drug-kingpin strategy of past administrations. These actions also reflect a desire to move away from a “war” with cartels and other powerful criminal organizations in Mexico. But, security cooperation goes beyond reduction of homicides and combating drug trafficking—a stable security climate is a requisite for business and commerce to thrive. The Biden administration will have to navigate this complex scenario in Mexico.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #5: YES

Protests in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Haiti that began in 2019 were expected to continue into 2020, but extended lockdowns to control the spread of the pandemic led to the suspension of protests in the first half of 2020. Despite the lockdowns and the inherent risk of public gatherings, citizens gathered in large numbers last fall in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Peru for reasons ranging from a rejection of government austerity plans to calls for racial equality, better social and economic protections, increased transparency, and free elections.

As vaccines become available and social activities resume, protests will most likely resume in 2021 as citizens will air new grievances. The pandemic has increased inequality in the region, pushing an additional forty-five million people below the poverty line. As governments struggle to fund social-protection programs, discontent with ruling governments will rise. Costa Rica will likely see protests as President Carlos Alvarado Quesada’s administration resumes negotiations with the IMF to secure a much-needed loan. In 2020, the Costa Rican government quickly retracted proposed tax measures after protestors blocked major roads. Colombia may also continue to see protests as long as marginalized groups, including Colombia’s indigenous and Afro-Caribbean groups, feel the government has failed to address their demands.

Finally, as Nicaragua heads toward an election in November in which the opposition will be unable to run, protestors against Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s regime should be expected to return to the streets. Protests may also gain momentum in Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru, as they also head toward elections.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #6: YES

The EU will continue to promote a democratic transition in Venezuela. In September 2020, a European mission was sent to Venezuela in a failed attempt to promote minimum democratic conditions ahead of legislative elections. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, who announced the EU’s rejection of Venezuelan election results, asked Maduro to “chart a path towards national reconciliation.” Borrell also reiterated the EU’s commitment to supporting Venezuela’s transition to democracy.

In 2021, municipal and regional elections are set to occur according to the Venezuelan Constitution. This will open a new opportunity for the EU and a multilateral coalition to continue engaging in close dialogue with the Maduro regime, the opposition, academia, non-governmental organizations, and other civil organizations to seek to promote conditions that allow for the participation of all political parties in a competitive electoral process. However, conversations aside, the Maduro regime is unlikely to see any upside in allowing elections that are transparent or fair.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #7: MAYBE

In past years, the synergy between the United States and Brazil has led to the signing of the Alcântara Technological Safeguards Agreement, advancing scientific and technological cooperation; support from the United States for Brazil to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); and, at the end of 2020, the signing of a protocol to facilitate trade and investment between the two largest economies in the Western Hemisphere. Despite some diverging views at the presidential level, stronger bilateral relations between Brazil and the United States are mutually beneficial, and opportunities could still exist for advancing on a common agenda.

Brazil has been criticized for recurrent fires in the Amazon rainforest and Pantanal wetlands, environmental disasters such as the Brumadinho dam collapse, and high levels of deforestation, heightening pressures on the Brazilian government to take action to protect its environment.

For Bolsonaro, the economy and structural reforms are top priorities. The government has pursued trade agreements with the EU, South Korea, and Canada, as well as the United States. However, with increasing pressure from the EU, and now the United States, failing to advocate for strong democratic principles and a concrete plan for sustainable development can isolate Brazil in the global arena, undermining possibilities for cooperation with the United States and other countries. To advance on the trade and investment fronts, which are priorities for the Bolsonaro administration, Brazil will need to double down on its efforts to reconstruct its image and role abroad, particularly regarding the climate agenda.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #8: YES

In December 2020, the Congressional Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission (WHDPC) unveiled a bipartisan report recommending that the United States rethink many of its historical anti-narcotics policies. The report found that while Colombia has made remarkable progress in strengthening state authority in marginalized areas, the United States’ $11.6-billion Plan Colombia was unsuccessful in meaningfully curbing coca cultivation. Despite having significantly increased manual eradication efforts in Colombia, coca cultivation and cocaine production remain high; it is unlikely the current strategy will allow the United States and Colombia to reach their joint objective of decreasing coca cultivation and cocaine production to half of 2017 levels. As discussed in the report “The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership,’’ the United States and Colombia must take measures to reduce coca cultivation and also target other stages of the drug market, including cocaine production, trafficking, and consumption.

Entering office with a profound understanding of the Americas and a track record of advancing policies fundamental to the region’s prosperity, Biden will prioritize strengthening the United States’ ties to the region—particularly the US-Colombia partnership, which he has referred to as the keystone of US foreign policy in the region. In light of the WHDPC report, the new administration has new thinking on how to reorient the US counter-narcotics policy in Colombia away from mass eradication and toward a more holistic approach, placing renewed emphasis on providing physical and economic security to rural Colombians and demobilized rebels. There is also new momentum for the United States to develop a whole-of-government strategy to counter transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and the international drug trade, per the report’s recommendations.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #9: NO

It is unlikely that all five Caribbean countries that currently recognize Taiwan—Belize, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—will instead recognize the PRC in 2021. However, the Dominican Republic’s switch to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC in 2018 puts significant pressure on Haiti, with whom it shares the island of Hispaniola. In its overtures to Haiti, the PRC recognizes the country’s extreme poverty and holds out a promise of building the kind of capacity that allowed China to lift 850 million of its citizens out of extreme poverty, but only if Haiti recognizes the “One-China” policy. The other Caribbean countries have long, and sometimes ethno-cultural, histories with Taiwan, which has been a loyal and generous partner. Nevertheless, the geopolitics playing out between Washington and Beijing will put pressure on these small island nations to choose—not necessarily in their own developmental interests, but in the interest of alignment with one great power.

For Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua—the three Central American countries that still recognize Taiwan—pressing domestic issues around the pandemic, natural disasters, citizen and food insecurity, and the economic downturn will prevail over the diplomatic issue of recognition. In addition, the new administration in the United States will move away from a bilateral and mostly stick approach to the isthmus, and toward a more regional and balanced carrot-and-stick approach, in which the question of China can be a powerful bargaining chip. A ramping up of conditionality on foreign aid and support to the region from the United States can be highly persuasive, and can discourage Central American leaders from switching sides.

Caribbean and Central American recognition of China versus Taiwan also hinges on the intensity of Chinese outreach efforts. This, in turn, is often dictated by the state of play in cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. Since 2016, Taiwan under Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership—in alignment with former US President Donald Trump’s administration—has shifted to a more explicitly competitive stance vis-à-vis Beijing. As cross-strait relations soured, both sides became more aggressive in maintaining or courting new diplomatic allies (e.g., the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Panama). In this context, China will likely continue its soft-power diplomacy in the region. The PRC’s staunch verbal support for multilateralism also has the potential to tilt more Caribbean countries toward its orbit. However, much of this could change in the next four years, contingent upon new dynamics in the US-China-Taiwan triangle, as well as Biden’s promised return to global, non-transactional cooperation and a renewed focus on the Americas.

OUR ANSWER TO QUESTION #10: NO

Although the CARICOM has operationalized the single market, the prospect of a single economy remains unlikely. A little history will help. CARIFTA was formed in 1965, shortly after anglophone Caribbean countries achieved independence. CARIFTA removed tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to regional trade. CARICOM was formed in 1973 to implement the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which replaced the free-trade area with a single market. The intended free movement of people, goods, and capital is still not a reality because there is not a “regional body with powers and accountability that can help transform community decisions to binding laws in individual jurisdictions is a key impediment,” according to a 2020 report from the IMF.

In 1989, the CARICOM heads decided that further economic integration was required in an era of globalization. The Treaty of Chaguaramas was revised in 2001 to accelerate the implementation of the CSME, which started in 2006. The 2008 global financial crisis further delayed what former Managing Director of the London-based Caribbean Council David Jessop called “a process plagued by rhetoric and inaction.”

COVID-19, however, may have done what neither of the two best-known analyses of the Caribbean’s challenges, the Golding Report and the Ramphal Commission, could: show the fragmented Caribbean nations the real benefits of integrated, unified coordination when faced with externalities. As she relinquished the CARICOM chair In June 2020, Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley praised the regional architecture for its sterling performance in organizing and supporting the region during the pandemic.

Current Chairman of CARICOM and Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Keith Rowley called for 2021 to be “the year of CARICOM,” and challenged the region to live up to its promise: “Let this be the year that we make CARICOM work for us and construct the resilient society that will provide a safe, prosperous and viable community for all of us.” He boldly called for the CSME to become the principal framework for recovery. Despite the real obstacle of establishing a single currency and its attendant institutions, CSME got a shot of energy from the COVID-19 crisis.

BONUS QUESTION ANSWER

Assume the Olympics occur this summer. Several factors contribute to a country’s medal-count prospects—population size, the promotion of women in sports, national investment in sports, etc. While no single factor explains a country’s success or failure, decisions and investments made by Latin American nations over the past four years could be an indication of a strong Olympic showing.

Brazil has made the strategic decision not to prioritize one sport, and has instead sought to be in the competition for as many Olympic slots as possible, securing one hundred and eighty so far. Cuba, in comparison, has focused on boxing and baseball to achieve its Olympic medal goals. Mexico’s Olympic team is also looking promising, with a fairly gender-balanced team (forty-nine men and thirty-seven women). AMLO also announced a financial stimulus for athletes who participated in the 2019 Pan American Games and are now preparing for Tokyo 2020+1 amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Jamaica is also investing in its Olympic athletes, despite the economic constraints of the pandemic, providing $40 million in funding for its athletes’ preparation and qualification.

With all eyes hopefully on the Summer Olympics, the authors predict that countries that provided the most comprehensive support to their athletes during the pandemic will come out on top in the upcoming games. 

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El potencial de los yacimientos no convencionales en Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/el-potencial-de-los-yacimientos-no-convencionales-en-colombia/ Mon, 07 Dec 2020 14:15:03 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=327032 El informe, escrito por John D. Padilla, analiza los diversos temas globales y locales que repercutirán y determinarán si se puede llevar a cabo el desarrollo sostenible de los recursos de lutita en Colombia.

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La producción de petróleo y gas ha sido durante mucho tiempo un motor importante del crecimiento económico de Colombia. Sin embargo, la producción de hidrocarburos convencionales se ha ralentizado en los últimos años, llevando al gobierno a considerar la posibilidad de desarrollar los abundantes recursos de lutita del país. El mes pasado, el gobierno adjudicó los primeros proyectos piloto de investigación (PPII) para determinar si la técnica de perforación hidráulica (o fracking), mediante la cual se extrae dichos recursos, es viable. Se espera una segunda ronda de convocatorias en los próximos meses.

En este momento crítico para el desarrollo de los recursos de lutita de Colombia, el Centro para América Latina Adrienne Arsht y el Centro Global de Energía del Atlantic Council publican el informe “El potencial de los yacimientos no convencionales en Colombia,” el cual hace parte de su serie “The Future of Shale.”

En el informe, John D. Padilla analiza los diversos temas globales y locales que repercutirán y determinarán si se puede llevar a cabo el desarrollo sostenible de los recursos de lutita en Colombia. El informe determina que los factores más importantes para el desarrollo sostenible de los recursos de lutita son voluntad política seguridad jurídica, y un marco regulatorio robusto pero flexible para los PPIIs.

Sobre el autor

John D. Padilla es Director Gerente de IPD América Latina. John es un experto en el sector energético con casi 30 años de experiencia en la consultoría y el financiamiento del negocio. Tiene una sólida trayectoria empresarial, habiendo liderado la expansión de IPD en México en 2001 y en Colombia en 2009. Afincado en Bogotá, Colombia, desde abril de 2011, John posee una experiencia internacional que se extiende por toda la región, y en Asia y Europa. Habitualmente, participa en consultorías y asesorías, así como en entrevistas con la prensa internacional y en conferencias de alto nivel.

El Centro para América Latina Adrienne Arsht amplía la comprensión de las transformaciones regionales y propone soluciones constructivas para informar como los sectores públicos y privados pueden promover la prosperidad en el hemisferio.

El Centro Global de Energía promueve la seguridad energética trabajando con el gobierno, la industria, la sociedad civil y otros actores para desarrollar soluciones prácticas a retos geopolíticos, de sostenibilidad y económicos relacionados a la energía global.

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What a Biden presidency means for US-Colombia relations https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-a-biden-presidency-means-for-us-colombia-relations/ Wed, 25 Nov 2020 16:04:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=324274 On repeated occasions, President-elect Biden has characterized Colombia as the “keystone” of US foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, maintaining that, if elected president, restoring the alliance between the United States and Colombia will be among his top foreign policy priorities.

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As President-elect Joe Biden prepares to enter the White House, many Colombians hope to see an era of renewed US global leadership and an embrace of multilateralism to address common challenges. Biden’s shift in rhetoric and approach could represent a big opportunity for US-Colombia relations going forward. 

On repeated occasions, President-elect Biden has characterized Colombia as the “keystone” of US foreign policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, maintaining that, if elected president, restoring the alliance between the United States and Colombia will be among his top foreign policy priorities.

With a proven track record of working with Colombian leaders toward peace and prosperity, he is well positioned to deliver on this promise. As a US senator, Biden was the point person on Plan Colombia, helping hash out the details of the initiative and securing critical bilateral support. While vice president, he helped craft President Barack Obama’s Peace Colombia, which widened the partnership to include sustainable development, trade and investment, hemispheric security, human rights, and other areas of cooperation.    

With a Biden presidency, Colombia and the United States have a unique opportunity to deepen bilateral relations along the three strategic pillars outlined below and identified by the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, co-chaired by US Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD).

Economic development

Colombia and the United States will benefit from a partnership that promotes inclusive and sustainable economic development in both countries. Deepening bilateral investment and trade is critical to achieving such development.

Opportunities for increased US investment in Colombia are numerous over the next four years, especially in the areas of innovation, technology, and tourism. “A Biden administration could promote investments in clean and renewable energy, as well as in technology-intensive manufacturing sectors and tourism,” Task Force member Maria Claudia Lacouture, who currently serves as executive director of the Colombo-American Chamber of Commerce and is a former minister of trade, industry, and tourism of Colombia, told us. She also noted that, “the United States is the main foreign investor in the country, benefiting more than fifteen economic sectors and 100,000 workers.”

The US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), also provides enormous opportunities for mutually beneficial trade. The United States has remained Colombia’s main commercial partner since the agreement entered into force in 2012, with total bilateral trade amounting to almost $25 billion. The new Biden administration should focus on working with Colombia to fully implement the TPA. This will not only result in increased trade, jobs, and overall economic growth, but also in improved protections for workers, intellectual property, and the environment.

Moreover, the Biden administration could continue to work with Colombia to incentivize formalization and strengthen the country’s tax system. Currently, 75 percent of companies and 45 percent of workers operate in the informal economy and tax evasion is close to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Although tax reform is strictly a national matter, “the United States could advise on how to modernize and strengthen the governability of Colombia’s tax agency, DIAN,” said Luis Fernando Mejia, Task Force member and executive director of Fedesarrollo. “The IRS could cooperate in issues related to best practices, technology, training of human capital, digitalization, among others.”

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Rule of law, institutional control, and counternarcotics

US and Colombian economic and security interests in the region are dependent on the promotion of peace and development in the high coca-producing areas of Colombia, where illegal armed groups thrive and populations face violence and poverty.

As the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force outlines in its 2019 report, lasting peace and prosperity requires a holistic, long-term strategy, that goes beyond security and counternarcotics, and includes justice, education, quality governance, and economic opportunities in rural Colombia.

While US President Donald Trump made coca reduction and aerial spraying a top priority, President-elect Biden might adopt a multidimensional approach to the global drug problem. Strategies under such approach could include, “localized-aerial coca spraying, regional coordination mechanisms for interdiction, construction of tertiary roads, purchases of crops that substitute coca cultivation, and long-term contracts for farmers,” according to Juan Carlos Pinzón, Task Force member, former minister of defense of Colombia, and former ambassador of Colombia to the United States. “International cooperation, especially from the United States, is fundamental to make meaningful advances in these areas,” he explained to us.

Maria Victoria Llorente, Task Force member and executive director of Fundación Ideas para la Paz, reinforced the need for a holistic approach. “The bilateral agenda needs to transcend the drug problem, and include environmental and economic issues,” especially in rural areas. A “multidimensional approach that includes a gradual path to formality and legality for coca growers,” she added, “and a more horizontal partnership between the United States and Colombia,” is critical to solving the world drug problem.

The Venezuelan regional crisis

Colombia also plays a key role in responding to the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Colombia has displayed immense leadership in the international arena, engaging with the Lima Group to work for a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela. It has also welcomed in almost 2 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees since 2014, becoming the primary destination for Venezuelans. President Iván Duque has adopted a policy of complete solidarity toward Venezuelans, making a commendable effort to regularize their legal status, grant them work permits, and provide them with medical care, housing, public education, and other services.

With the economic recession unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this level of attention on migrants and refugees may prove hard to sustain in the coming months and years. And, although critical, current international aid to Colombia has proved largely insufficient to address the migrant and refugee crisis—a problem that will only continue to grow.  

President-elect Biden will be able to count on deep bipartisan support in the United States for addressing the Venezuela crisis. Biden can fulfill his promise of deepening US-Colombia ties by increasing financial, technical, and diplomatic support to Colombia, and encouraging the international community to do the same.

The math is simple. A peaceful and prosperous Colombia will safeguard US national security, economic, and geopolitical interests in Latin America. President-elect Biden understands this and has pledged to strengthen the US-Colombia partnership. To succeed, the partnership must be further expanded to address economic development, peace and security, and the lingering crisis on Colombia’s borders.

Camila Hernandez is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council. Follow her on Twitter @CHernandezGB.

Daniel Payares-Montoya is an intern at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin American Center, and a research fellow at the University of California’s Center for Latin American Studies at Berkeley.

Further reading:

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Colombia’s shale resource potential https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/colombias-shale-resource-potential/ Thu, 29 Oct 2020 15:38:06 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=315023 An exploration of the necessary conditions for successful shale development in Colombia.

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Oil and gas production is a significant driver of Colombia’s economic growth. With decreased conventional hydrocarbon production in recent years, unconventional shale resources could provide additional revenues from the sector and stimulate growth as the country recovers from COVID-19. But care must be taken to ensure that shale production is environmentally sound and that royalties reach local communities. As the Iván Duque administration prepares to award investigative pilot projects (PPIIs) for shale development in November 2020, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Global Energy Center launched on October 29 the report “Colombia’s Shale Resource Potential,” the second in the Global Energy Center’s Future of Shale series.

In the report, John D. Padilla explores the necessary conditions for successful shale development in Colombia. He analyzes key global and local factors that will determine whether the country’s abundant shale resources can be developed safely and sustainably. The new report argues that the most important factors that will support sustainable shale development are political will, legal certainty, and a robust, yet flexible, regulatory framework for PPIIs. 

About the author

John D. Padilla is a Managing Director at IPD Latin America. John is an energy sector expert with nearly 30 years of expertise on the consulting and financing side of the business. He has a strong entrepreneurial track record, having led IPD’s expansion into Mexico in 2001 and Colombia in 2009. Based in Bogota, Colombia, since April 2011, John has substantial international experience that extends throughout the region, Asia, and Europe. He is routinely sought out on the consulting and advisory fronts, as well as in the international press, and on the conference circuit.

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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Mind the gap: Reducing gender gaps will foster long-term economic prosperity in Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mind-the-gap-reducing-gender-gaps-will-foster-long-term-economic-prosperity-in-colombia/ Thu, 16 Apr 2020 16:59:38 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=244532 Significant lags in women’s economic and political empowerment remain in countries like Colombia. Having closed educational attainment and health and survival gaps almost entirely, the country still faces important gender gaps in economic participation and opportunity (a gap of 26.5 percent) and in political empowerment (a gap of 68.2 percent). If Colombia doubles-down on its efforts to close these gaps, numerous economic and social benefits will follow.

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Closing gender gaps is not just a moral imperative; it’s good for business. Greater gender equality in education, health, economics, and politics leads to economic growth, reduced income inequality and poverty, and improved business outcomes.

Yet, significant lags in women’s economic and political empowerment remain in countries like Colombia. Having closed educational attainment and health and survival gaps almost entirely, the country still faces important gender gaps in economic participation and opportunity (a gap of 26.5 percent) and in political empowerment (a gap of 68.2 percent). If Colombia doubles-down on its efforts to close these gaps, numerous economic and social benefits will follow.

Why should Colombia prioritize closing its gender gap in economic participation?

Gender parity promotes economic growth. At a basic level, greater gender equality in economic participation and opportunity will boost growth by expanding the size of Colombia’s labor force, which will, in turn, increase output. Currently, women’s potential economic contribution in Colombia remains untapped, with 62.9 percent of women aged fifteen to sixty-four participating in the labor force, compared to 85.1 percent of men in the same age bracket. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, if all thirty-six member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—of which Colombia is set to become a member—increase their female labor force participation rate to match that of Sweden (80 percent), global gross domestic product (GDP) will rise by over $6 trillion. 

An increase in women’s labor force participation will also enhance aggregate productivity by fostering new ideas for production and management. Women bring different perspectives and aptitudes to the table, which makes their work complementary, rather than a perfect substitute to that of men. Hence, increasing the number of women in Colombia’s workforce should contribute greater economic benefits than an equivalent increase in the number of men. Additionally, young women (aged twenty-five to thirty-four) have greater educational attainment than young men in Colombia, which incentivizes increased female labor force participation to deepen Colombia’s talent pool, leading to a more efficient allocation of resources, gains in income and total factor productivity, and higher output growth.

Closing Colombia’s gender gap in economic participation will also help reduce income inequality and poverty. Gender inequality usually comes hand-in-hand with income inequality, which compromises the sustainability of growth. Disparities in wages and labor force participation between men and women increase income inequality and yield unequal access to pensions and social benefits. In Colombia, wage and unemployment gaps both stand at 5.8 percent, with women earning less than men in similar positions and facing higher unemployment rates regardless of their education level. Women are also more likely to work in the informal sector, earning less and receiving no social benefits.

In the early 2000s, poverty fell significantly in Latin America due, in part, to increased labor market earnings and participation rates for women (along with the implementation of noncontributory pensions for women), suggesting that promoting women’s economic inclusion can further this drop in poverty. This will also lead to other positive human development outcomes, given that women’s labor force participation is correlated with higher expenditure on schooling and health for children, which supports poverty reduction, increased productivity, and long-term economic growth.

Greater gender equality also improves business outcomes. A 2019 International Labor Organization (ILO) study shows that firms with a gender inclusive business culture and gender-friendly policies are more likely to have increased productivity and profits; enhanced talent retention; greater creativity, innovation, and openness; improved company reputation; and a better sense of consumer interest and demand. In a similar study, McKinsey & Company found that companies in the top quartile for gender diversity are fifteen percent more likely to have higher financial returns than their competitors. Also, according to ILO, firms with female chief executive officers (CEOs) are 3.5 percent more likely to have increased productivity and profits, resulting in higher potential output. Evidence from Europe suggests that including one more woman in senior management or corporate boards (without changing the size of senior teams) yields higher returns on assets of eight to thirteen basis points.

Colombia has made significant progress toward promoting women in senior roles, with OECD statistics reporting that women hold 57 percent of managerial positions in the country. Although this statistic reflects important improvement, it does not accurately depict the whole picture. Full gender parity in senior roles has yet to be achieved— women in Colombia usually oversee areas that are arguably less central to the work of the organization like human resources, public relations, communications, and administration. Women remain underrepresented in managerial positions in areas traditionally and stereotypically reserved for men like research, product development, operations, and sales.

Research shows that policies matter for women’s employment decisions even after controlling for personal preferences toward work. Most of these policies will pay for themselves in the medium and long term, as Colombia begins to reap the economic and social benefits of gender parity.

Here are five ways in which Colombia can promote gender equality and women’s economic empowerment:  

  • Increasing access to infrastructure and public services. Investing in infrastructure (e.g. better roads and networks) will allow for more women to access work and for more girls to attend school. Also, investing in public services like electricity, water, and sanitation will increase women’s participation in the workforce and boost school attendance among young women. The burden of unpaid domestic work, intensified by the absence of adequate services, falls disproportionately on women and girls. In Colombia, 89.5 percent of women and girls (aged ten or more) engage in unpaid domestic and care work in comparison to 62.0 percent of their male counterparts. On average, women and girls devote twice as much time as men and boys to unpaid work— women and girls spend 50 hours per week or 7.14 hours per day in unpaid work while men and boys dedicate 22.8 hours per week or 3.35 hours per day. Improving access to quality public services will free up time for girls and women to participate in the economy or attend school.
  • Promoting financial and digital inclusion. Increasing women’s access to digital technology, financial services, microfinance, and mobile banking, and improving financial literacy among young women, leads to higher female labor force participation, entrepreneurship, and productivity. It also promotes female presence in leadership roles and reduces gender gaps in income, borrowing rates, and time spent doing unpaid work. Digital inclusion is of heightened importance in a country where 23 million Colombians—almost 50 percent of the country—do not have internet access.
  • Cash transfers to low-income women. Providing cash transfers to low- and middle-income women working in the formal or informal market can increase female labor force participation, boosting potential output, while reducing poverty and wage and income gaps in the short and long run. Previous CCT programs in Colombia have been successful in reducing poverty and mitigating income inequality, such as the Familias en Accion CCT program, which provided conditional cash transfers to vulnerable families complying with healthcare and education commitments, effectively improving children’s health, nutrition, and educational attainment.
  • Closing gender gaps in political participation. Although Colombia has its first female vice president and a ministerial cabinet with gender parity, several barriers to women’s political participation in Colombia remain. Gender gaps are most evident at the departmental and municipal level, as only two out of thirty departments (6.25 percent) and 132 out of 1,101 municipalities (12.0 percent) are governed by a woman. Evidence suggests that women’s participation in politics contributes to increased supply of and demand for economic opportunities for women, which boosts female labor force participation and fosters economic growth. Additionally, promoting women’s political empowerment leads to more just, equitable, and peaceful societies.
  • Promoting gender-transformative education. Investing in education is the most effective way to boost women’s human capital and shape future labor force productivity. Colombia has improved remarkably in this front, but the country’s lingering economic, social, and political gender gaps demonstrate that exclusively focusing on girls’ educational attainment does not address deep structures of gender inequality reinforced in and through education. Colombia must therefore work to provide quality education for all and include gender-transformative initiatives in school curriculums. Growing evidence shows that quality education plays a critical role in transforming boys’ and men’s attitudes and behaviors in terms of gender equality. When boys and young men have higher educational attainment and are empowered to challenge and overcome discriminatory gender norms, they display more gender equitable attitudes and practices. Among other outcomes, they become less likely to violently abuse an intimate partner and have homophobic attitudes, are more likely to share unpaid domestic and care work, and have better sexual and reproductive health practices. Focusing on harmful gender norms that disadvantage both girls and boys will push Colombia forward in its path toward gender equality.

Camila Hernandez is an assistant director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council. Follow her on Twitter @CHernandezGB.

Further reading:

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President Duque outlines how Colombia is handling dual coronavirus challenges https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/president-duque-outlines-how-colombia-is-handling-dual-coronavirus-challenges/ Tue, 14 Apr 2020 21:34:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=243616 For most countries around the world, the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has strained resources and demanded singular attention from policymakers. For Colombia, this new crisis must also be juggled with the ongoing collapse of neighboring Venezuela, which has already seen 2 million Venezuelans seek refuge in Colombia. “We have had to manage two crises at the same time,” President Iván Duque explained on April 14, which forced Colombia to take drastic measures to contain coronavirus earlier than many of its neighbors.

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For most countries around the world, the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) has strained resources and demanded singular attention from policymakers. For Colombia, this new crisis must also be juggled with the ongoing collapse of neighboring Venezuela, which has already seen nearly 2 million Venezuelans seek refuge in Colombia. “We have had to manage two crises at the same time,” President Iván Duque explained on April 14, which forced Colombia to take drastic measures to contain coronavirus earlier than many of its neighbors.

Speaking on April 14 as part of the Atlantic Council’s Front Page event series and the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Leaders of the Americas series, Duque explained that limited healthcare capacity and the potential for an outbreak to explode in neighboring Venezuela compelled his administration to act quickly to limit the spread of the virus. Duque recalled that he had the first meeting with his health officials in December when the initial reports of the virus emerged from China and his government began putting travel restrictions and mandatory quarantine orders for travelers into place as soon as there were reports of spread in other countries.

Colombia eventually stopped all international flights, closed schools and universities, and shut down bars, clubs, stadiums, and concert halls. Duque said that these actions needed to be implemented quickly because of the country’s limited healthcare capacity. While Colombia has the most intensive care units (ICU) per capita in Latin America, it still pales in comparison to more developed countries, making the need to “flatten the curve” to avoid overwhelming the healthcare system more dire. He argued that “all of the time that we have been able to save by flattening the curve is allowing us to strengthen our capacities and allow us to have more testing capacity.” As of April 14, Colombia has 2,852 confirmed cases of coronavirus, with 112 deaths.

The added strain of the Venezuelan crisis—triggered by the economic and societal collapse of the country due to the misgovernance and exploitation of the Nicolas Maduro regime—also forced Duque to shut down the border between the two countries—a tough decision for a country that has made a considerable commitment to helping Venezuelans flee the instability. But “since there is no sound epidemiological system in Venezuela, since there is a lack of information, since the country doesn’t have more than 200 ICUs,” the risk of a rapid increase in cases in that country meant that the border had to be closed “to protect lives and to protect the healthcare system” in Colombia, Duque maintained. Duque implored the international community not to forget the plight of the Venezuelan people during this crisis, noting that support to Venezuelan refugees is roughly a tenth of what Syrian refugees have received.

In addition to limiting the potential spillover effects from Venezuela, Colombia has had to manage the devastating economic effects of social distancing. As Duque explained, the coronavirus emergency is not only a pandemic, but also an “oil price crisis…a world trade crisis, a world aggregated demand crisis…and a financial market crisis.” Policymakers are facing a terrible dilemma, he argued, as they are faced with a tradeoff between saving lives and damaging economies. “There is no economy that will work with bad health or massive loss of life,” he said, but also “if you do not have a vibrant economy you will not be able to improve the healthcare capabilities” needed to fight the virus spread.

Duque explained that his administration has attempted to find the balance between adequate distancing and economic activity by keeping “open sectors that were crucial for the Colombian economy and [our] supply chain,” including food and agriculture, essential services, banking, media, and government.” Colombia and other Latin America countries, however, must find a way to reach their massive informal economic sectors, which includes nearly half of Colombia’s workforce, Duque said. He reported that nearly 3 million Colombian families who “have never received a conditional cash transfer or were not in a social program from the state,” have been given cash payments to help them weather the crisis. The government has also begun delivering grocery packages to the poorest Colombians and has allowed workers to defer payments into the pension system for three months. Duque estimated that nearly 30 million of Colombia’s 50 million people have gotten some sort of assistance from the government, on top of extensive loan programs to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Duque said he hopes to “start reopening the economy by April 27,” although he cautioned that this will be a return to “productive life, but not social life,” as a return to normalcy will require a vaccine or significant treatment first. The restarting of economic activity will also be dependent on meeting the country’s growing demand for health equipment, a need that Duque acknowledged is shared by many countries around the world. The virus “is hurting us at the same time globally,” he explained, which means that “we are all fighting for the same products to face the challenges,” including ICUs, ventilators, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Developing countries are particularly disadvantaged in this respect, he added, as “we are fighting for the same elements to face the pandemic that the richest countries also need.”

The shortage of equipment cries out for a global response, Duque argued. “I think at a world level there is much to be done,” to better coordinate the flow of supplies and information, he said. Specifically, Duque continued, countries need to “run for a vaccine,” which is to only certain way to overcome the virus. While the international community scrambles to secure equipment, Duque said he was instructing manufacturers to start domestically producing ventilators and PPE to help meet demand. He suggested that the United States could be particularly helpful in this effort, especially once cases reach a peak there. “I believe the United States can help a lot of Latin America acquire technology,” for products such as fast tests, ventilators, and PPE, Duque said. He added that Latin American countries should try to emulate the United States’ Centers for Disease Control, which is “one of the world’s best epidemiological control units.”

Duque said he believed the current pandemic “is the most complicated crisis the world has seen since World War Two,” which will strain all societies around the world. For a country like Colombia, dealing with its unique challenges amid the coronavirus emergency will require the country “to be very smart with the limited toolkit that we have.” So far, Colombia has been spared the worst of the crisis, but Duque warned that meeting this challenge will require “continuous work that we have to monitor every single day.”

David A. Wemer is associate director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

Further reading:

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Fighting COVID-19 side by side with migrants https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/fighting-covid-19-side-by-side-with-migrants/ Thu, 09 Apr 2020 20:56:37 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=241480 In uncertain times humanity historically comes together to embrace our commonalities. In the case of COVID-19, we can achieve more together if we include migrants as active participants in our efforts to quell the spread and impact of this disease.

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Since the COVID-19 crisis began, there are now more than 1.4 million cases worldwide in about 185 countries and territories; more than 83,000 people have died – and all of these numbers are climbing. No region is immune.

Every day we see more data that this highly contagious virus does not discriminate, however its impact can be highly discriminatory. Certainly, the elderly or those with compromised immune systems are at high risk – but also, an already extremely vulnerable and overlooked population: migrants and displaced. The latest tally suggests our world is home to 258 million international migrants. While not all of these people are vulnerable, 70 million have been forcibly displaced by conflict and violence – both within their countries and cross-border – and an average of 24 million are displaced by disasters and effects of climate change every year. In a crisis where we are all explicitly told to “stay home” to help contain the spread of this virus, how do those who have been displaced from their homes comply? When you no longer have a home, “sheltering in place” is simply not an option, and this challenge further compounds your existing vulnerabilities as a migrant.

Simón Bolívar International Bridge on the Venezuela–Colombia border.

This past January, the Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (AARFRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) made a joint-visit to the border of Colombia and Venezuela, to see firsthand, the humanitarian crisis that has been ongoing in the region for nearly five years – and it’s the largest population movement crisis ever seen in the Americas.

Migrants crossing in both directions on the Simón Bolívar International Bridge.

We visited the Simón Bolivar bridge, where tens of thousands of migrants from Venezuela cross daily, to see where migrant journeys begin. At this same bridge is where we see the first of IFRC’s Humanitarian Service Points (HSP) – lifelines for migrants which provide essential services like healthcare, water and sanitation, psycho-social support, and critical (sometimes lifesaving) guidance and information for the journeys that lie ahead for these individuals or groups walking hundreds of miles away from what they used to call home. With support from hundreds of volunteers, Red Cross Societies including Colombia and Ecuador have been able to station – and at times be mobile to adjust to migrant paths – these HSPs from border-to-border to “walk with migrants” along their strenuous journeys.

Migration Mission to the Colombia-Venezuela Border

Margarita Arias & Edwin Armenta of Cruz Roja Colombia explain how a mobile HSP joined forces with a community-led effort to support migrant journeys near the Colombia-Venezuela border.

Fast forward three months: migrants are still crossing the Simón Bolivar bridge every day, people displaced by conflict and situations of violence are still in camps in the Mediterranean, migrant workers have lost their livelihoods, and the entire world is facing a pandemic.

How do we reduce vulnerability of the most vulnerable? How do we foster inclusion and reduce xenophobia in a time of social and physical distancing?

For starters, we can continue to meet migrants where they are. The HSPs are well positioned to raise awareness among migrants and host communities about COVID-19, and to provide migrants with practical information on how to access healthcare and appropriate treatment if infected. Information is power and at the community level, reaching and informing migrants is equally as important as it is for the wider public. This is imperative from the perspective of protection and basic human-rights, and there is a clear public health rationale to extend all COVID19 outbreak readiness and response measures to everyone to ensure full coverage, regardless of citizen status.

As a universal tool, social media reaches everyone with access to mobiles phones or computers. Ensuring migrants are aware of reliable sources, they can access accurate and real-time reporting and guidance. This has been true for migrants as they make their journeys – the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab monitors the information environment in order to produce public reporting focusing on disinformation narratives targeting migrant populations. IFRC and its network of 192 country-level national societies and 13 million volunteers are doing the same, pushing out trustworthy and accessible information to migrants and host communities included as a vital activity to reduce the risks of COVID-19. This information is delivered via digital and social media platforms, and often targets at-risk communities where people gather, like places of worship, community centers and Humanitarian Service Points.

It is important however to balance raising awareness of the risks that migrants may face with ensuring that xenophobic attitudes and social stigma of people from certain nationalities being associated with COVID-19 are not promoted. Working together, AARFRC and IFRC can help counter xenophobia by leveraging their combined efforts and affiliated networks to change the narrative and encourage social inclusion around migration. This vision will bring us closer to a resilient world where societies are safer, healthier, compassionate, more inclusive, and flourish through diversity.

In uncertain times humanity historically comes together to embrace our commonalities. In the case of COVID-19, we can achieve more together if we include migrants as active participants in our efforts to quell the spread and impact of this disease. 

Walter Cotte is Regional Director for the Americas, International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Rebecca Scheurer is Director, Humanitarian Initiatives, Adrienne Arsht-Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center

Further reading:

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What Latin American countries are doing to confront coronavirus https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-latin-american-countries-are-doing-to-confront-coronavirus/ Mon, 23 Mar 2020 19:43:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=234400 As governments in North America, Europe, Asia, and around the world continue to combat the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), Latin American leaders are stepping up their efforts as cases are beginning to be documented in their countries. Although the number of cases across the region remains mostly lower than the epicenters in Europe and the United States, “we are not letting our guard down,” El Salvador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandra Hill Tinoco said on March 23. “No one can guarantee us that it is not going to hit us,” she explained, so every Latin American government is taking the threat seriously.

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As governments in North America, Europe, Asia, and around the world continue to combat the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), Latin American leaders are stepping up their efforts as cases are beginning to be documented in their countries. Although the number of cases across the region remains mostly lower than the epicenters in Europe and the United States, “we are not letting our guard down,” El Salvador’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexandra Hill Tinoco said on March 23. “No one can guarantee us that it is not going to hit us,” she explained, so every Latin American government is taking the threat seriously.

According to Fernando Llorca Castro, Costa Rica’s ambassador to the United States, most governments throughout the region have been preparing for outbreaks since the first news of the virus in China emerged in January. Costa Rica immediately began bringing “institutions from different sectors to the table” to discuss preparations by early January, he explained. Chilean Ambassador to the United States Alfonso Silva Navarro reported that his government set up a committee for coordination in January, while Hill Tinoco added that El Salvador “activated an enlarged health cabinet” at the same time. El Salvador also went as far as to suspend all flights from China and entry to travelers coming from China shortly after the World Health Organization declared an emergency on January 30.

As the virus spread into the region by mid-March, governments began taking escalating steps to limit its spread, despite low initial numbers. Colombia has already enacted a three-week quarantine for the entire country, the country’s ambassador to the United States Francisco Santos Calderón, explained, although documenting less than four hundred cases and three deaths so far. Santos Calderón added that “anybody seventy or older is going to be quarantined until May 30.” In Chile, over 80 percent of the cases are in the capital of Santiago, Silva Navarro reported, and in response the government has restricted internal movement to other areas of the country in order to limit the spread of the virus.

To help prepare for a potential explosion of cases, Silva Navarro said the Chilean government has already increased hospital bed capacity in the country from 37,000 to 42,000 beds, including the opening of five new hospitals. The government is also working on deploying a hospital ship to “move around the country” with spare bed capacity and a purchase of “4,000 ventilators by the end of the week. Costa Rica has just over 130 cases as of March 23, but the government has already begun construction on a specific hospital “to face only patients from [the] coronavirus,” while also “trying to keep all the [necessary] equipment and healthcare providers available to face this,” Llorca Castro said.

Regional policymakers are also focused on minimizing the potential economic effects of the outbreak and the quarantine measures. Hill Tonoco said that El Salvador has suspended electric, internet, and phone bills for three months, frozen monthly rental payments, mortgages, and loan payments for three months, and expanded unemployment protections. Similar protection measures have been launched in Colombia, Santos Calderón said, paid for by shifting money from the national oil company and the pensions systems, due to a preexisting tight government budget.

Despite the needed controls to help slow the spread of the curve, Llorca Castro maintained that regional governments “have been trying to keep the borders open” in order to sustain critical trade between countries. “Our borders are not closed,” Hill Tonoco added, “it is business as usual.” This does not mean that incoming goods and vendors are flowing full freely as normal but “the truck driver has to wear a mask,” and unnecessary passengers will not be permitted, she said, noting that border checks will ensure that goods continue to travel while restricting the contact individuals have with the general population.

Santos Calderón specifically warned about the challenge neighboring Venezuela, which has been enduring an economic and societal collapse under the regime of Nicolas Maduro for the last few years, will bring to Colombia’s efforts to slow the virus. “If something really critical is going to happen with this crisis it is going to come from Venezuela,” he explained, as poor nourishment and lack of any organized healthcare system makes the population there extraordinarily susceptible to the disease. Colombia’s healthcare system is already under strain from the millions of Venezuelans who have fled the Maduro regime and Santos Calderón fears that the refugee population will balloon as “if you are facing death and a lack of a health system, you will want to move to Colombia [for treatment].”

Santos Calderón conceded that the outbreak has created “a new challenge and [has prompted] a new way of governing during this period,” as cities, the private sector, and different government agencies all try to coordinate an effective response. “Nobody was prepared for what is happening,” he explained, but governments are taking every precaution that they can. “The life of one human being is worth every sacrifice,” Hill Tonoco said, adding that governments around the region “have done everything that is in our hands” to meet this crisis head-on.

David A. Wemer is associate director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

Further reading:

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Colombia ¿Cómo vamos?: Women’s political and economic empowerment https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/colombia-como-vamos-womens-political-and-economic-empowerment/ Tue, 10 Mar 2020 12:49:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=229486 Closing gender gaps in economic and political empowerment will move Colombia forward in its path toward sustainable development. Greater female participation in the economy and in politics will not only boost the country’s economy (by increasing productivity, diversifying the economy, reducing income inequality, increasing organizational effectiveness, among others), but will also contribute to more inclusive, democratic, and sustainable policies.

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Colombia’s fifty-year-long internal armed conflict left over eight million victims, of which 49.7 percent are women. Displacement, homicide, femicide, violent threats, forceful disappearances, and sexual violence are just some examples of the victimizing acts that over 4 million Colombian women have suffered during the conflict.

The 2016 peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)—considered one of the most innovative and inclusive in the world—puts women and gender equality at the forefront of peace implementation. However, studies show that women are engaging less in participatory mechanisms for peace implementation (e.g. community meetings) in comparison to men.

Under the peace accord, the Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDETs) are designed to include civil society in decision-making processes related to rural development. By decree, the PDETs must have a strong gender component that recognizes the particular needs of women in rural Colombia. Yet, by January 2018, women represented only 38 percent of total attendees at the over four hundred community meetings.

Other significant gaps between men and women remain in Colombia. According to the World Economic Forum’s 2020 Global Gender Gap Report, which tracks gender-based gaps along specific dimensions (health, education, economy and politics), the country ranks twenty-second out of 153 countries and third in Latin America in gender equality, having closed 75.8 percent of its gender gap. The global average stands at 68.6 percent.

Colombia’s apparently high score reflects the country’s success in narrowing educational attainment and health and survival gender gaps—closed to 100 percent and 98 percent, respectively. Yet, differences between men and women in economic participation and opportunity (a remaining gap of 26.5 percent) and in political empowerment (a gap of 68.2 percent) are still significant.

In Colombia, 62.9 percent of women aged fifteen to sixty-four participate in the labor market. For men in the same age group, the percentage is higher: 85.1 percent. The amount of unpaid work, access to labor opportunities, and gender wage gaps (the ratio of a woman’s wage to that of a man in a similar position), among other factors, explain the relatively low workforce participation of Colombian women.

Women perform 3.86 times more unpaid domestic and care work than men in Colombia, allocating 17.54 percent of their day for such activities, while men allocate 4.54 percent. Women aged fifteen to sixty-four are 1.7 times more likely to face unemployment in comparison to men, with unemployment rates at 13.2 percent for women and 7.6 percent for men. Among youth population (ages fifteen to twenty-four), unemployment rates are higher for both genders, at 25.6 percent for women and 15.4 percent for men, and show a similar unemployment gap of 1.6. Interestingly, a woman’s level of education (basic, intermediate, or advanced) does not seem to significantly alter her employment prospects. All else equal, a woman is 1.4 to 1.7 times more likely to be unemployed than a man. In Colombia, the wage gap stands at 5.8 percent.

Remarkably, Colombia has achieved gender parity in senior roles, with 54.2 to 57.0 percent of managerial positions being held by women. However, female presence on boards of publicly listed companies remains limited: only 13.5 percent of board seats belong to women. Other members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have a slightly higher but still low percentage of women on corporate boards: 22.3 percent. The share of women investors in Colombia grew significantly between 2010 and 2017, from 11.1 percent to 25.5 percent. Yet, the share still needs to double to achieve parity.  

In terms of women’s presence and participation in politics, Colombia still has a long road ahead. The Law 581 of 2000 or “quotas law,” stipulating that women must hold 30 percent of top-level positions in all branches of public power (executive, legislative, and judicial), and the law 1475 of 2011 or “Law of Parties,” establishing a 30 percent quota for women on electoral lists, have contributed to an increase in women’s political participation in the past two decades. Although important, this increase remains insufficient, especially after female candidates’ performance in the October 2019 regional elections.

Colombia’s 2019 regional elections showed a regression in women’s political empowerment. Only two women were elected governors, Clara Luz Roldan (Valle del Cauca) and Elsa Noguera (Atlantico), three less than those elected in 2015. This means that, for the 2020-2023 period, only 6.25 percent of the thirty departments will be governed by a woman. The number of women elected mayors also decreased slightly, from 134 in 2015 to 132 in 2019, meaning that only 12 percent of the 1,101 municipalities in Colombia will be led by a woman. Most remarkably, capital cities Bogota and Santa Marta elected female mayors for the first time in history. Also noteworthy is Colombia’s first ministerial cabinet with gender parity under President Iván Duque.

Women’s low access to political positions in Colombia is partially explained by having fewer female candidates. For governorships, only 12.12 percent of candidates were women and for mayorships 15.2 percent. From those, 17.5 percent were elected. These numbers show that, despite Colombia’s quota laws, women continue to face significant barriers to political presence and participation.

Limited efforts to promote and recognize women’s leadership, stereotypes regarding women’s leadership abilities, lower access to economic resources, and women’s high domestic burden represent some of the major obstacles to women’s participation in politics. Yes, some women have managed to overcome these barriers with great acclaim, including Marta Lucia Ramirez, Colombia’s first woman vice president, Claudia Lopez, mayor of Bogota, and Virna Jonhson, mayor of Santa Marta. But the playing field must be leveled for all women.

Closing gender gaps in economic and political empowerment will move Colombia forward in its path toward sustainable development. Greater female participation in the economy and in politics will not only boost the country’s economy (by increasing productivity, diversifying the economy, reducing income inequality, increasing organizational effectiveness, among others), but will also contribute to more inclusive, democratic, and sustainable policies. The time is now to double-down on efforts to include more women in Colombia’s economic and political spheres.

Camila Hernandez is an assistant director in the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Further reading:

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Una nueva frontera para la relación bilateral: Un plan moderno para la relación entre Colombia y Estados Unidos https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/un-plan-moderno-para-la-relacion-entre-colombia-y-estados-unidos/ Thu, 06 Feb 2020 15:56:08 +0000 https://atlanticcouncil.org/?p=218701 Transmisión en vivo del lanzamiento del informe en Washington Video: Lanzamiento del grupo de expertos de Colombia y Estados Unidos del Atlantic Council Para compartir en redes sociales Ex presidente y CEO de OPIC David Bohigian hablando sobre la importancia de invertir en las personas Senator de Estados Unidos Ben Cardin hablando sobre la cooperación […]

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Descarga el informe

Transmisión en vivo del lanzamiento del informe en Washington

Video: Lanzamiento del grupo de expertos de Colombia y Estados Unidos del Atlantic Council

Para compartir en redes sociales

Ex presidente y CEO de OPIC David Bohigian hablando sobre la importancia de invertir en las personas

Senator de Estados Unidos Ben Cardin hablando sobre la cooperación estratégica internacional alrededor de la crisis en Venezuela

Senator de Estados Unidos Roy Blunt hablando sobre la importancia de fortalecer la relación bilateral entre Colombia y Estados Unidos

Ex presidente y CEO de OPIC David Bohigian hablando sobre como Colombia y Estados Unidos pueden trabajar juntos

Senator de Estados Unidos Roy Blunt hablando sobre la importancia de la relacion bilateral entre Colombia y Estados Unidos

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Duque’s dilemma: Social unrest and critical governance https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/duques-dilemma-social-unrest-and-critical-governance/ Fri, 13 Dec 2019 16:19:19 +0000 https://atlanticcouncil.org/?p=205895 Colombia's president struggles to form the political coalition needed to govern while protesters rally in the streets frustrated by the administration.

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Unprecedented numbers of Colombians have taken to the streets to express their dissatisfaction as part of a national strike called by workers’ unions and student leaders on November 21. A wide range of issues have motivated the protests, including labor reforms, the pension system, tax changes, the government’s market-oriented approach, privatization of public enterprises, corruption scandals, energy tariffs, the implementation of the peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and outstanding demands from previous demonstrations.

Though the protests’ scale, spontaneity, and diversity are unparalleled in Colombia’s recent history, social mobilizations are not unusual in Colombia. The previous administration under President Juan Manuel Santos saw significant opposition to proposed changes to education and public health laws. The backlash from students, teachers, doctors, nurses, farmers, and truckers pushed the government to retract the bills and eventually make meaningful concessions. However, early-on President Santos publicly disregarded the existence of the protests in a televised address to the nation. This blunder emboldened the protesters and was a significant public relations defeat for Santos. Thus far the current administration has avoided making the same mistake; in a televised address after the first day of demonstrations, President Duque told Colombians “I hear you,” but his initial message did not go beyond sympathy and people were left wanting answers. 

Most protestors have marched peacefully, but after more than two weeks of protests four civilians have died, more than five hundred people and police officers have been injured, and over two hundred people have been arrested. Notwithstanding the figures, violent rioters are a distinct minority in a much larger mass of peaceful protesters, and yet some law enforcement officials have responded with excessive force too quickly in an effort to control the demonstrations. President Duque, in coordination with city mayors, ought to change the antiriot police’s rules of engagement in order to prevent more lethal incidents.

An opportunity to change course

The Duque administration has had a harder time than its predecessors in getting Colombians to support his government’s agenda. Unlike President Duque’s “legality, entrepreneurship, and equality” motto, former President Álvaro Uribe’s security policy and President Santos’ push for the peace process with the FARC were simpler proposals. As a result, more people understood the agenda of the previous administrations. To garner support within congress and civil society, President Duque should communicate clearly to Colombians why his formula can address the root causes of their grievances. Widespread understanding will lessen the gridlock in Congress and improve perceptions of the government’s performance and reassert his leadership. The latest wave of social unrest has come at a particularly difficult time for the Duque administration. The president has pledged to refrain from using pork-barrel spending (government funds allocated to particular issues so as to please legislators and their constituents, often referred to in Colombia as ‘marmalade’) as a coalition-building tool, which has prevented him from garnering strong support or a coalition in Congress. The recent resignation of former minister of defense, Guillermo Botero, after he faced the prospect of an almost-certain no-confidence vote in early November, revealed the vast divisions between the legislative and executive branches. These divisions are all the more challenging given that Duque’s own party sometimes disagrees with him.

As protests continue—although with waning numbers—the Duque administration must make every effort to balance its electoral mandate with the need to govern with a broader coalition. They must also face an additional challenge that is inherent to the way governments and pressure groups negotiate following major protests. Anticipating the government’s inability to fully deliver on their demands, protesters often broaden their list of requests until the government compromises. Unfortunately, more demands make it harder for the government to deliver, which eventually leads to greater frustration amongst protesters. Moderation on both sides and an early compromise would be in the best interest of the country. 

It seems as though President Duque has taken those considerations to heart. On December 3, the president announced that he would be sitting down exclusively with the national strike’s leaders to discuss their demands in the face of another major call for mobilization the next day. The protesters did not back down from calling for the strike, hoping to demonstrate their strength to the government and prevent the momentum on the streets from fading away. On that day, demonstrations were largely peaceful and had a smaller turnout. Since then, the government and the national strike’s leaders have met twice. No compromise has been reached and meaningful disagreements over the agenda, scope, and nature of this national dialogue remain. While the Duque administration leans towards a more general dialogue, protesters insist on a formal negotiation. On December 8, several artists held a concert demonstration reaffirming their message of discontent to the government.

There is well-founded skepticism about the outcome of the dialogue, but, if President Duque succeeds, the experience could enhance public debate, bolster his government’s legitimacy, and strengthen Colombia’s democracy. The stakes are high.

Felipe Zarama Salazar is a project assistant in the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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US-Colombia task force launches findings of report in Bogota https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/event-recaps/us-colombia-task-force-launches-findings-of-report-in-bogota/ Mon, 09 Dec 2019 17:04:18 +0000 https://atlanticcouncil.org/?p=204039 Task Force recommendations focus on three mayor areas: Economic development and innovation; institutions, rule of law, and counter-narcotics; and the crisis in Venezuela.

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In Bogota on Wednesday December 4, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center launched the report produced by its US-Colombia Task Force. The Task Force is a group of experts led by Senators Roy Blunt and Ben Cardin. Other members include former public officials, business executives and civil society leaders in Colombia and the US, as well as four members of the US House of Representatives: Ruben Gallego, Francis Rooney, Bradley Byrne, and Gregory Meeks. The group developed a road map for the Trump administration, the Duque administration, and the US Congress on how to strengthen and deepen the bilateral relationship. Task Force recommendations focus economic development and innovation; institutions, rule of law, and counter-narcotics; and the crisis in Venezuela. 

The report’s launch came amid the fourth day of widespread protests in Colombia, which reinforced the need for advancing the US-Colombia task force’s recommendations that promote socio-economic prosperity throughout the country. Colombia’s Minister of Commerce José Manuel Restrepo Abondano and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Adriana Mejía as well as USAID Mission Director Lawrence Sacks participated as keynote speakers. A number of Task Force members also participated in the event, including Bruce Mac Master, Rosario Cordoba, Felipe Ardila, Andres Cadena, Maria Victoria Llorente, Stephen Donehoo, Arturo Valenzuela, Alejandro Mesa, and Roger Noriega.

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Colombian president aims for “second phase” of US-Colombian ties https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/colombian-president-aims-for-second-phase-of-us-colombian-ties/ Thu, 26 Sep 2019 21:16:32 +0000 https://atlanticcouncil.org/?p=184025 Twenty years after the United States enacted Plan Colombia, Ivan Duque said the United States and Colombia are ready for the next chapter of their partnership, focusing on solidifying the rule of law , promoting entrepreneurship and trade, and managing growing regional challenges.

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While “the relationship between the United States and Colombia has been strategic [throughout] history,” it is time for an important shift in the alliance between both countries, Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez said in Washington on September 26.

Twenty years after the United States enacted Plan Colombia—a major initiative helping Colombia combat the far-left insurgent group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and eliminate the lucrative illicit drug trade and coca cultivation within the country—Duque said the United States and Colombia are ready for the next chapter of their partnership. This next phase, the Colombian president explained, should focus on solidifying rule of law within Colombia, promoting entrepreneurship and trade, and managing growing regional challenges.

Duque spoke at a Capitol Hill launch of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s new report The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership, a product of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force providing a blueprint for how the US-Colombia partnership should be structured in the future. The Task Force is co-chaired by US Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). The report argues for a “strengthened and modernized US-Colombia partnership” that deepens trade ties, promotes rural development in Colombia, cooperates on mitigating the global drug crisis, and finds a solution to the crisis in Venezuela.

“As one of the United States’ closest allies in the world, this moment is pivotal to double down with concrete and actionable proposals on how to recognize Colombia’s achievement and strengthen the bilateral relationship,” Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe said.

When the United States initiated Plan Colombia in 1999, “Colombia was close to a failed state,” Cardin said. Although the US government sent more than $10 billion in assistance to Colombia as part of this effort, “we have gotten back much more than that in economic growth, let alone the other benefits we have had in terms of dealing with regional problems,” Cardin argued.

A key reason Plan Colombia was so successful, Duque explained, was “that it was conceived as a bipartisan [measure].” Having both Blunt and Cardin leading the Atlantic Council US-Colombia Task Force not only follows this tradition, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Director Jason Marczak said, but also demonstrates that “US foreign policy toward Colombia is one of the most significant examples of bipartisan consensus, and frankly, bipartisan success.”

 “Colombia is a dramatically different place than it was when I first went twenty years ago,” Senator Blunt said, but “it also has some dramatically new challenges.” While the Obama administration’s Peace Colombia plan in 2015 attempted to alter the relationship after Plan Colombia, Duque argued that the initiative “was conceived for a period that is no longer the driver for what is taking place in Colombia,” necessitating a new revamped strategic framework.

The challenge next door

One of the most significant changes to Colombia’s position in the last few years has been the unfolding crisis in Venezuela, where the regime of Nicolás Maduro has clung to power despite an economic and societal collapse that has caused millions of Venezuelans to flee. An estimated 1.5 million Venezuelans have fled to Colombia, which has embraced an open-door policy to those fleeing Maduro. Duque said that accepting Venezuelan migrants was “the morally right thing to do,” but stressed that Colombia needs more assistance to cope with “the most horrendous migration crisis in Latin America’s recent history.”

Cardin thanked Duque and the Colombian people for saving “thousands of lives by allowing those that are at risk to be able to get into your country.” Cardin acknowledged that “it has had a real toll” on Colombia and stressed that “the international community has not stepped up the way it should. There needs to be a greater response.”

In addition to the strain the influx of migrants has caused Colombia, Duque also highlighted the support Maduro is giving to illegal and terrorist elements operating within Colombia. “Maduro is a brutal dictator that has provided safe haven and that has sponsored…terrorist organizations in his territory,” Duque explained. The Colombian president told the United Nations General Assembly on September 25 that his “government has irrefutable and conclusive proof that corroborates the support of the dictatorship for criminal and narco-terrorist groups that operate in Venezuela to try and attack Colombia.” The president presented a dossier outlining the allegations against the Maduro regime, which Duque said he gave to the UNGA president and UN Secretary General António Guterres.

Progress on internal challenges, but more to do

Despite the progress made from Plan Colombia in eradicating drug production and trafficking in the country, Duque admitted that his country has taken a step back in recent years. From 2015 until August 2018, he explained “Colombia passed from having less than 60,00 hectares” of illegal drug crops “to more than 200,000 hectares” when he took office as president in the summer of 2018. Duque reported that his government has made considerable progress in stemming the tide of drug production, recording a drop in the drug crop “for the first time in seven years.” He argued that his government will need to adopt a range of tools to beat back the illicit drug trade, including crop substitution, manual eradication programs, alternative economic development initiatives, and even aerial precision sprays “to go to places that have landmines or snipers that are paid by cartels that are supporting illegal groups in the country.”

Duque also stressed the successful changes his government has made in the implementation of the 2016 peace deal with the FARC. He said that his government wants to offer “full support” to former FARC participants who “genuinely want to build the path to legality,” but added that “those who want to go back to criminal activities will be faced with all the weight of the law.” Duque added that his government has made substantial progress in creating new economic and social programs to help rehabilitate regions affected by FARC violence, although more work needs to be done.

A tremendous opportunity

While the challenges of Venezuela, drug production, and implementing the peace plan will remain to be top priorities in the next US-Colombian partnership, there is also tremendous opportunity for the United States to grow its economic ties to Colombia, Blunt said. “We should be further economically linked to this country that has maintained a democracy in an area where democracy was hard to maintain for generations now,” the senator said, adding that the United States “should be their number one investor and we should be the number one place where Colombians want to invest.”

Duque highlighted the dynamism of the Colombian economy, which continues to grow despite slower Latin American growth. Even the Venezuelan crisis has not hobbled Colombia, as Duque noted that “the most important demonstration of the resilience of Colombia is that having one of the major migration crises in the world, [yet] the economy is growing at 3 percent.”

As Colombia looks to confront these new challenges and continue its economic and social development, Duque stressed the necessity of strategic plans such as the new Atlantic Council report. “We have to build the relationship thinking on the short-, mid-, and long-term,” Duque argued. He lauded the new report as a great step towards what he “really want[s] to build with the United States: mov[ing] to a second phase of the bilateral relationship.”

David A. Wemer is associate director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

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The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/untapped-potential-us-colombia-partnership/ Thu, 26 Sep 2019 13:00:13 +0000 https://atlanticcouncil.org/?p=183297 Creating a Modernized Plan for the Bilateral Relationship

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DOWNLOAD REPORT

Foreword

The United States and Latin America are at a historic moment. As members of the United States Senate, we believe in working closely with our partners to overcome the most difficult political and economic hurdles of our time. In Latin America, the United States has many such strong allies, with Colombia top among them.

For decades, the United States and Colombia have built a solid partnership based on mutual respect, cooperation, and common goals. This alliance has safeguarded the economic, security, and geopolitical interests of our nation, while also advancing Colombia’s path to increased stability, prosperity, and regional leadership. With Colombia’s transformations, the United States stands to reap the benefits of this vital relationship and further work with Colombia to help solve hemispheric challenges.

We must build upon our bilateral successes to ensure sustainable prosperity in the years to come. Colombia faces strong headwinds that require renewed US attention: ensuring the effective implementation of the Colombian peace accords, securing resources to continue providing assistance for Venezuelan migrants and refugees, and mitigating ongoing security threats. By further investing in the US-Colombia relationship, the United States and the US Congress can provide new momentum for the hemisphere.

This report lays out a modernized plan for the bilateral relationship. It builds on the successes of Plan Colombia and provides a roadmap for continued, strengthened, and transformative USColombia engagement. The report follows the work of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, a group of current and former policymakers, including colleagues in the House of Representatives, business executives, and civil society leaders from both Colombia and the United States. As co-chairs of the Task Force, we are confident the recommendations outlined in the following pages will help advance US interests, contribute to peace and prosperity in Colombia, and promote regional stability.

This is a moment of great promise for the US-Colombia relationship. A more peaceful and prosperous Colombia not only translates to a more secure United States, but also to a more stable Western Hemisphere. We hope the work of this Task Force will help underscore the importance of a deepened and modernized US-Colombia alliance and set the stage for a new era of successful bilateral collaboration.

The multisectoral, bipartisan, bicameral, and bilateral nature of the task force allowed us to develop concrete, fresh, and actionable proposals that will help guide US and Colombian policymakers going forward. We identified three major areas of engagement: economic development and innovation; rule of law, institutional control, counternarcotics; and joint regional leadership. A strengthened US-Colombia partnership along these pillars will pay dividends on US investments far beyond our national borders.

Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO)
Task Force Co-Chair

Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD)
Task Force Co-Chair

Table of Contents

Executive summary

  1. Overview of Recommendations
  2. The Need for a New Plan for Colombia
  3. The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force
  4. Historically Successful Partnership
  5. A Blueprint for Modernized US-Colombia Partnership
  6. Building Sustainable Economic Development and Promoting Innovation
  7. Strengthening Institutions and Rule of Law while Combatting Illicit Drugs
  8. Recognizing Colombia’s Leadership in the Context of the Venezuelan Regional Crisis
  9. The Takeaways
  10. Task Force Co-Chairs and Members
  11. Acknowledgments

Executive Summary

Return to table of contents

Colombia is one of the United States’s closest allies in the Western Hemisphere. For decades, both nations consolidated a mutually beneficial partnership that successfully safeguarded US and Colombian national security interests. Today, with increased interconnectedness, both nations’ security, economic, and geopolitical interests are more intertwined than ever before.

Colombia’s transition into a more peaceful and prosperous democracy makes it imperative that the United States and Colombia seize this moment to expand and deepen the partnership. The findings presented in the following pages require urgent attention. Although Colombia is a different country than it was two decades ago, new challenges with peace accord implementation and Colombia’s role as the top receiving country of Venezuelan migrants and refugees make finding new ways to work together crucial — Colombia’s success is the United States’ success.

This report provides a blueprint for a modernized US-Colombia strategic partnership. It is the product of a nonpartisan, bicameral, multisector, and bicountry task force launched in March 2019 by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Composed of high-level business executives, current and former policymakers, and civil society leaders from Colombia and the United States, the task force offers concrete, actionable, and fresh proposals on how to strengthen the bilateral relationship. The ideas are intended to provide guidance to both the Colombian and US administrations, the US Congress, and the respective business communities on opportunities to maximize the full potential of the US-Colombia relationship. Task force recommendations are divided into three categories: sustainable economic development; rule of law, rural development, and counternarcotics efforts; and joint leadership around the Venezuela regional crisis.

Tapping the full potential of the US-Colombia partnership must include the promotion of economic development. A healthy Colombian economy directly serves US national security interests as it contributes to rural development, which is critical to undermine the drug trade and other illicit economic activities as well as illegal armed actors. Fully implementing all aspects of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) and endorsing the double taxation agreement will lead to deepened bilateral trade and investment.

U.S. President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump stand with Colombian President Ivan Duque and his wife Maria Juliana Ruiz after their arrival at the White House in Washington, U.S.

This report serves as a blueprint for addressing the challenges and responses that would strengthen US national security and regional stability.

U.S. President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump stand with Colombian President Ivan Duque and his wife Maria Juliana Ruiz after their arrival at the White House in Washington, U.S., February 13, 2019. REUTERS/Carlos Barria

The task force identified Colombia’s taxation system and high levels of informality as two major barriers to economic development. The partnership can include collaboration to modernize Colombia’s taxation agency and reduce informality. Further digitalizing Colombia’s economy, simplifying processes for firm creation and closure, improving access to credit and other business services, setting corporate taxes at levels similar to those of other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and making labor regulations more flexible, will all help to incentivize the formal (or licit) economy and undermine informality. Advances in innovation, science, technology, and education are also crucial to achieve the economic development needed to combat illegal armed groups and reduce coca production and cocaine trafficking.

Advancing shared US and Colombian security interests requires the stabilization of territories where coca crops are cultivated, illicit armed actors operate, and local populations face high levels of violence and poverty. Critical to regaining control of rural areas is implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC. The task force recognizes the need for a long-term, adequately resourced intervention strategy that includes security, justice, formalization of land property rights, education, public goods provision, and economic opportunities in priority areas to dismantle organized armed groups, eradicate rising coca crops, and fight drug trafficking. If a successful, multidimensional intervention plan is implemented in ten municipalities, the US-Colombia partnership will disrupt the conditions that favor illegality in territories responsible for almost half the entire national coca production. Colombia and the United States should promote partnerships between both countries’ private sector and civil society to develop market-driven, large-scale and holistic rural development projects in coordination with the Colombian government.

Safeguarding US and Colombian security interests also requires enhancing rural connectivity in Colombia, addressing the world drug problem, and protecting Colombian social leaders and human rights defenders. Rural infrastructure stands as a prerequisite to rural economic growth and the success of crop substitution programs. Unless farmers can get their legal products to market, no eradication effort will prove sustainable in the long run. Colombia and the United States can work together to replicate successful projects involving local populations in the building and maintenance of secondary and tertiary roads, with the long-term goal of creating capacity for future infrastructure projects in the locality. To address the world drug problem in an integral way, the US-Colombia partnership should not only aim to reduce coca crops in the short run but also continue to target other stages of the drug market, including cocaine production, trafficking, and consumption.

The United States and Colombia share a firm commitment to human rights and should therefore continue to collaborate to end the rising levels of violence against social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia. The United States can support Colombia’s current efforts by providing financial assistance for President Duque’s Timely Action Plan on Prevention and Protection for Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders, and Journalists (PAO). Colombia, in turn, should develop a progress report for the PAO with clear follow-up mechanisms that involves civil society organizations in the process.

The political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is a threat to regional stability. Colombia has demonstrated commendable solidarity in receiving over 1.4 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees – a number that will continue to grow in the coming months and years. The United States should increase its financial, diplomatic, and technical support to Colombia as it plays a leadership role in addressing the crisis. If current international support does not increase, Colombia runs the risk of spiraling into economic stagnation, violence, criminality, illicit economies, and decayed governance. This will not only harm US national security and geopolitical interests but will lead to major economic losses to previous and current US investment in Colombia. The United States can further support its ally by enhancing the Colombian government’s capacity to gather and process data on Venezuelan migrants and refugees entering the country and by contributing to border control through monitoring technologies. The US-Colombia partnership can also create a task force to calculate the fiscal impact of the crisis to Colombia to understand the exact level of funding that will be required to absorb the growing number of Venezuelans. In addition, the partnership can support the efforts of the Venezuelan interim government by convening a group of experts on stabilization of territories and transitions to democracy that can provide it with intelligence cooperation and guidance on the promotion of rule of law and strengthening of national institutions.

The US-Colombia partnership is one of the greatest US foreign policy successes over the last two decades. Dedicated, sustained, bipartisan commitment to achieving common goals, once thought to be out of reach, was possible due to US congressional leadership and a commitment to work across US administrations. At the same time, successive Colombian governments showed themselves to be critical partners for the United States—both in-country and beyond its borders. But we cannot rest on our laurels. New domestic and regional paradigms make this moment imperative to define how our relationship can and should be taken to the next level.

Overview of Recommendations

Sustainable Economic Development and Innovation

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Institutions, Rule of Law, and Illicit Drugs

Colombia’s Leadership In the Context of the Venezuela Crisis

The Need for a New Plan for Colombia

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Colombia is one of the United States’ strongest, most reliable allies in the Western Hemisphere. It collaborates with the United States in fighting international drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, as well as in promoting democracy, rule of law, and economic prosperity in the region. At the United Nations (UN), among other things, Colombia supports US diplomatic efforts on priorities such as North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine. It also contributes security expertise in Central America, Afghanistan, and a number of countries in Africa. Colombia is NATO’s only global partner in Latin America, one of the two Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries in South America, and a regional leader in facing the crisis in Venezuela. Here, its generous response to the massive influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees should be viewed as a model for countries around the world.

With the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), the opportunities for mutually beneficial trade are enormous. The United States is Colombia’s largest trading partner and Colombia is the United States’ third-largest export market in Latin America behind Mexico and Brazil.1 Today, with increasing hemispheric challenges, the US-Colombia strategic partnership is more important than ever. By continuing to invest in the already strong bilateral relationship, both countries stand to benefit in the short, medium, and long term.

Colombia is pivotal in addressing Venezuela’s unprecedented political and economic crisis, which has led to the largest mass migration in Latin American history. With 1.4 million Venezuelan migrants in its territory as of June 2019, Colombia is the primary destination for Venezuelans.2 President Iván Duque has adopted a policy of complete solidarity toward Venezuelan migrants,3 providing medical care, housing and public education, among other services. According to the World Bank, the estimated economic cost for Colombia in 2018, not including infrastructure and facilities, reached 0.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), or the equivalent of $1.5 billion.4

Today, with increasing hemispheric challenges, the US-Colombia strategic partnership is more important than ever.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (right) and Colombian Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo speak with reporters before their meeting at the US State Department in Washington in 2019. Deepened US-Colombia collaboration in areas of economic development, security, and regional stability will further advance mutual interests. (Reuters/Yuri Gripas)

Colombia has also sought to confront increased illegal activity in Venezuela, including illegal mining, the arms and drug trade, and human trafficking, as well as the smuggling of goods and money laundering. Here, a contradiction exists around the role of China. At the same time that China is increasing its economic ties with Latin America—and while Colombia’s exports to China increased 83 percent in 2018 compared with 2017—it continues to support the Maduro regime, helping to maintain a criminal enterprise in Venezuela that directly threatens Colombia’s interests. As the presence of guerrilla groups, drug cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations in Venezuela5 creates new security challenges for the region, Colombia’s role in maintaining regional stability becomes more vital than ever. Eventual reconstruction efforts in Venezuela will also require enormous Colombian support.

In addition to its partnership with the United States in the region, Colombia plays a unique role in tackling the world drug problem, as also stated in the Global Call to Action by President Donald Trump at the 2018 United Nations General Assembly. Colombia has the most to lose if the fight against drugs is unsuccessful, and it has thus advanced a full-on strategy to disrupt the cocaine trade. The United States has been a crucial ally in this quest. Since Plan Colombia was announced in 1999, the United States has provided more than $11 billion6 to aid the Colombian government in strengthening state capacity and institutions, decreasing coca crops, and fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other illegal groups that profited from drug trafficking. Colombia has contributed more than 95 percent of the total investment in Plan Colombia.7

Between 2001 and 2016, the country destroyed 37,504 illegal laboratories, seized an average of 181,201 kilograms of cocaine each year, and reduced the area containing coca crops by half in the first six years.8 Colombia has also made enormous sacrifices in terms of lives lost: between 2009 and 2018, 126 members of the state security forces as well as civilians died in eradication missions and 664 were wounded.9 Overall, during the first fifteen years of Plan Colombia, about six million people—including members of the state forces, combatants of illegal groups, and, mostly, civilians—were victims of a violent event such as forced displacement, homicide, or kidnapping.10 By 2017, and after decades of enormous efforts, successive governments in Colombia had advanced in dismantling the most significant drug cartels, reached agreements to demobilize several paramilitary forces, and started the implementation of the Peace Accords with the FARC. In 2017, the country achieved the lowest homicide rate in its past forty-two years.11

In 2019, the UN Security Council, following its mission visit to Colombia in July, called Colombia’s ability to negotiate a peace agreement in 2016 “an example for others around the world.”12 The Council also “welcomed Government efforts to advance the reintegration of former FARC-EP members and strengthen rural development” and stressed the importance of “implementing the peace agreement as an interlocking set of commitments.”13

However, several challenges to Colombia’s national security and democracy as well as the rights of its citizens still remain. These challenges are partially explained by the capacity of existing illegal armed groups and criminal organizations to adapt and take advantage of conditions that favor their growth—i.e., insufficient institutional presence, limited economic opportunities, and the availability of illegal funding sources. After the demobilization of the FARC, several armed groups competed for territorial control in areas where the guerrilla group used to operate. A vacuum had been left for them to exploit and profit from illicit economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion.14

The rights of vulnerable populations in areas where the state is fragile therefore remain unprotected. According to Colombia’s Victims Unit, more than 360,000 people were internally displaced between January 2016 and July 2019.15 The situation of social leaders is particularly critical—more than 300 have been killed since 2016.16 Corruption, which President Duque has identified as a top priority (and recently submitted legislation to counter it), has facilitated criminal activities and undermines the legitimacy of the Colombian state. At the same time, while there has been progress in the implementation of the Peace Accords, there is still a long way to go to achieve the accords’ stated goals and commitments. Additionally, instability in Venezuela and the meddling of Russia, in particular, contributes to new security challenges.

Deepening Colombia’s alliances with the United States in security and economic issues is of paramount importance for both countries to achieve their common goals.

These problems do not only affect Colombia: They also directly compromise US goals. A new US-Colombia partnership can better address the structural conditions that favor illicit activities, thus reducing the flow of cocaine to the United States. The two countries can also deepen cooperation to help governments in Central America, Mexico, and South America confront transnational criminal organizations, drawing on Colombia’s experience as a leader in addressing regional security issues.

Deepening Colombia’s alliances with the United States in security and economic issues is of paramount importance for both countries to achieve their common goals. The terms of this partnership must originate with a long-term plan to effectively transform the conditions that currently favor illegality and enable the production and trafficking of cocaine but then move to a long-term vision that fully maximizes the relationship and Colombia’s regional role. This commitment to an even more robust, long-term strategic alliance will set Colombia on a path for sustainable growth and ensure that both countries’ interests are mutually reinforcing.

This report outlines the main areas for US-Colombia cooperation that the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force identified to advance US and Colombia interests while fostering a more secure and prosperous Western Hemisphere.

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force

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Colombia is in a period of momentous transition. It is rapidly consolidating its role as a key player in Latin America and an indispensable partner for the United States on many fronts. Simultaneously, the United States has become an important source of political and economic support for Colombia, making it imperative to deepen ties between the two countries at this critical time in Colombia’s history. Colombia must not only ensure that peace is in fact achieved, but also grapple with the external and internal challenges that arise from the worsening of the crisis in Venezuela. US economic, humanitarian, and security assistance to Colombia, as well as continued bipartisan support, is thus vital for the long-term interests of Colombia and the United States.

The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center launched its US-Colombia Task Force to create the foundation for a new plan of action vis-à-vis the US-Colombia economic and diplomatic relationship. This distinguished group built on the recommendations of the Atlantic Council’s 2017 Colombia Task Force, which provided the Trump administration with a blueprint for US engagement with Colombia. This refocused and expanded US-Colombia Task Force provides a roadmap for the Duque administration, the Trump administration, and the US Congress on how to deepen and expand the relationship along three pillars: economic development; strengthening institutions and rule of law, promoting rural development, and tackling the world drug problem; and Colombia’s leadership in the context of the Venezuela regional crisis.

The United States Congress meets for a vote. Sustained bipartisan attention and commitment on Capitol Hill is key to strengthening US-Colombia relations. (Reuters/Carlos Barrira)
The United States Congress meets for a vote. Sustained bipartisan attention and commitment on Capitol Hill is key to strengthening US-Colombia relations. (Reuters/Carlos Barrira)

The task force is co-chaired by Senator Roy Blunt (R-Missouri) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-Maryland). Senator Blunt serves on the Senate Appropriations Committee and Senator Cardin is a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In addition to bipartisan leadership, members include a bipartisan grouping from the US House of Representatives: Congressman Bradley Byrne (R-Alabama); Congressman Ruben Gallego (D-Arizona); Congressman Gregory Meeks (D-New York); and Congressman Francis Rooney (R-Florida). The task force also includes former policymakers from and leaders in business and civil society in both the United States and Colombia, who provide expert insight to help guide the leaders of both countries in advancing the next chapter of the US-Colombia relationship. The task force is a truly nonpartisan, bicameral, binational working group with a wide reach and the foundation to create impact for years to come.

Historically Successful Partnership

COLOMBIA AS ONE OF THE UNITED STATES’ CLOSEST ALLIES

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The United States and Colombia have consolidated a close and mutually beneficial partnership over the past decades. Plan Colombia, announced in 1999 and sustained by US leaders of both political parties, laid the foundation for a strategic alliance that has widened to include sustainable development, trade and investment, hemispheric security, human rights, and other areas of cooperation. Plan Colombia has been one of the United States’ most successful foreign policy initiatives in the past 20 years. Its success is visible today in Colombia’s positive transformations and the safeguarding of vital US interests. As former National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley, who served under President George W. Bush and is now executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council, said, “Plan Colombia is an example of a visionary, bipartisan strategic framework that has supported the Colombian people and government as they have transformed Colombia into a peaceful democracy.”17

Colombian President Iván Duque shakes hands with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after a meeting at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels, Belgium in 2018. Colombia is the first NATO global partner in Latin America. (REUTERS/Yves Herman)
Colombian President Iván Duque shakes hands with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after a meeting at the Alliance headquarters in Brussels, Belgium in 2018. Colombia is the first NATO global partner in Latin America. (REUTERS/Yves Herman)

Although Colombian taxpayer funds financed almost 95 percent of the total investment in Plan Colombia, US political leadership, military and police training, and technology assistance were crucial to the success of this bipartisan foreign policy initiative. US investment in Plan Colombia totals $11 billion, with $10 billion provided between 2000 and 2016—a number that represents less than 2 percent of the cost of the Iraq war over the same period.18 A strong return on US investment is evident. In those same years, Colombia significantly strengthened its institutional capacity and made notable progress combating drug trafficking, fighting illegal armed groups, and securing government control of territories. Additionally, Colombia’s liberalized economy quadrupled in size, poverty and homicides fell by more than 50 percent, and kidnappings were reduced by 90 percent.19 With its improved security situation and strengthened democratic institutions, Colombia transitioned from being an aid recipient to a strategic ally of the United States and an exporter of security and political leadership in the region.

The successor strategy to Plan Colombia, Peace Colombia, was announced by President Barack Obama in February 2016. This multiyear initiative sought to scale up vital US support to help Colombia “win the peace,” in the event of a peace agreement with the FARC.20 Less than five months later, a peace agreement was signed. Peace Colombia was designed to consolidate Plan Colombia’s security gains; advance counternarcotics efforts; reintegrate former combatants into society; expand state presence and institutions, especially in territories most affected by violence; provide titles and access to land for poor farmers; and promote justice and economic opportunities for Colombians.21 As with Plan Colombia, Colombian taxpayers were expected to fund close to 90 percent of the total budget for the initiative. In fiscal year (FY) 2018, the US Congress approved an omnibus appropriations measure funding Peace Colombia programs at $391 million.22 Although President Trump’s FY 2019 budget request for Colombia was $265 million (a 32 percent reduction from the $391 million appropriated by congress in FY 2018), the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided Colombia “no less than” $418 million in funding.23 This additional assistance has a focus on drug eradication and interdiction efforts as well as rural security. For FY 2020, the administration requested $344 million in funding for Colombia.24 Continued and deepened US assistance to Colombia is more important than ever as Colombia receives a growing number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees and continues to work toward the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. A stable and prosperous Colombia will safeguard US national security, economic, and geopolitical interests in the region, generating a strong return on US investment.

COLOMBIA AS A NATO PARTNER AND PARTICIPANT IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Colombia’s cooperation with NATO started in 2013. Four years later, the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) made Colombia NATO’s first and only global partner in Latin America and the ninth in the world, alongside Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Pakistan. As a NATO partner, Colombia has access to and engages in various organization activities ranging from trainings and education to military exercises.

Given the challenges it has faced over the past five decades as well as its leading role in security and defense cooperation in Central and South America, Colombia has significant contributions to make to NATO and the global community. For example, the country recently started participating in the Science for Peace and Security Program, and was invited to a research workshop in Denmark this year, focusing on counterterrorism lessons from maritime piracy and narcotic interdiction. In addition, Colombia’s International Demining Centre (CIDES) joined the network of NATO Partnership Training and Education Centers in March 2019. CIDES will contribute to the education and training of personnel from NATO nations and partners in the crucial areas of humanitarian procedures and military demining. Colombia and NATO plan to develop common approaches in supporting peace and security efforts. Under this same program, Colombia and NATO are working on the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, as well as protecting children and civilians in armed conflict.

Colombian national policemen attend the inauguration of an international training school in Pijao, Tolima, Colombia in 2009. For decades Colombia, alongside the United States, has helped train policemen and military officials both within its own borders and in the region.   (REUTERS/John Vizcaino)
Colombian national policemen attend the inauguration of an international training school in Pijao, Tolima, Colombia in 2009. For decades Colombia, alongside the United States, has helped train policemen and military officials both within its own borders and in the region. (REUTERS/John Vizcaino)

At the same time, the IPCP will benefit Colombia, allowing it to access cooperation and training programs. The agreement is expected to improve the country’s humanitarian operations, rescue missions, crisis management, and security collaboration for civil emergencies, as well as inform its fight against terrorism, cybersecurity, and organized crime. It also is expected to help export Colombia’s experience, an added value for the Alliance. The program will reinforce both political dialogue and interoperability with the armed forces of partner countries. The US Congress can further support Colombia’s role by advocating for Colombia to become a non-NATO ally.

Colombia also is advancing its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. The Colombian Armed Forces are training service members who will join UN forces to help countries in conflict achieve peace. Trainees will take courses on human rights, international humanitarian law, and UN Peacekeeping Operations commands and doctrine, while at the same time learning about the culture of the countries of placement.25

COLOMBIA AS A HUB FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

Colombia is a strategic partner for the United States and its success in combating organized crime has been a significant mutual achievement. Colombia’s experience in that fight and the lessons learned from Plan Colombia have given the country considerable security expertise. Today, Colombia is training public servants from numerous countries on security-related issues. Between 2010 and 2018, over 46,000 individuals from eighty-one countries received training by Colombian public officials on the fight against drugs, the prevention and control of crime, the strengthening of the military and police, and citizen security and organizational development. About 60 percent of those trained were in Central America under the Triangular Cooperation Plan between Colombia and Canada (2013), and the Cooperation Plan between Colombia and the United States to strengthen Central America and the Caribbean (USCAP).

In 2012, the United States and Colombia signed the Regional Security Joint Action Plan. Since then, personnel from the military forces, police, and similar institutions of beneficiary countries have been trained. For 2020, Argentina, Ecuador, and Paraguay are projected to become beneficiary countries of the program. The United States and Colombia should expand their shared security portfolio in international hot spots where Colombia can play a pivotal role. This would advance US interests globally, while also reducing costs to the United States and minimizing cultural and language barriers.

In the last twenty years, Colombia’s National Police has also increased its cooperation with various countries in the region as well as with Interpol, the international criminal police agency that the country joined in 1954. Colombia has taken a leading role in the creation and management of the American Police Community, or Ameripol, since 2007, an organization that integrates thirty-three police forces of Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 2010 and 2012, Colombia supported more than sixty “outsourcing” activities in security, benefiting more than 220 institutions and fifty national and local partners. With support from the United States, Colombia trained more than 10,000 officers in forensic investigation and special operations between 2009 and 2013.

In that same period, Colombia trained almost 22,000 military and police personnel from various countries.26 To help advance police capabilities in the region, Colombia, in one year alone, trained police personnel from Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil. In total, through international cooperation agreements that focus on crimes of kidnapping and extortion, criminal investigation, criminal intelligence, and human rights, Colombia has made a substantial contribution to advancing security, providing assistance to sixteen countries in the region.

Colombia has the potential to become a security hub for the region. Colombia can play a fundamental role in helping to transform the regional security order, moving from reactivity and unilateralism to strategic planning, multilevel coordination, and the institutionalization of cooperation against transitional organized crime. For this to happen, the United States should continue supporting Colombia’s military and police. Although Colombia plays a leading role on regional security issues, greater efforts must be made to ensure the continuity of its leadership as the country grapples with economic challenges and security concerns both internal and external in nature. In addition to the Venezuela crisis, the August 2019 announcement of a “new phase of the armed struggle” by Iván Márquez, a former FARC commander, is a clear indication of the many security challenges facing Colombia. By working with the United States to improve security in Colombia and in the region, the US-Colombia partnership—through efforts such as a joint evaluation of security capacities and security investment plans—can set the foundation for long-lasting prosperity and stability.

A Blueprint for a Modernized US-Colombia Partnership

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Over the past decades, Colombia and the United States have consolidated a mutually beneficial partnership that has successfully safeguarded both nations’ security interests. Under Plan Colombia, the country became an increasingly peaceful and prosperous democracy and, together, the United States and Colombia effectively reduced transnational organized crime, violence, coca cultivation, and drug trafficking. Now, with Colombia’s improved security situation, strengthened economy, and increased leadership in the region, the bilateral relationship calls for a renewed partnership.

Instability in neighboring states and interference of extra-hemispheric powers in the region further reinforce the need for a deepened and modernized US-Colombia partnership. After rigorous consultations and discussions, the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force identified three major areas that will serve as the foundation for the bilateral relationship going forward: economic development; rule of law, rural development, and the fight against drugs; and joint leadership in the region.

The interests of Colombia and the United States are more intertwined than ever before. The new US-Colombia partnership should recognize this reality, and capitalize on the opportunities that this represents. The partnership will be further solidified as the United States supports Colombia’s efforts to stabilize territories, foster rural development, and bring about a sustainable democratic transition in Venezuela. Economic and diplomatic ties will also be strengthened as both countries work together for the eventual reconstruction of Venezuela and the promotion of stability in other parts of the region, particularly in Central America.

1. Building Sustainable Economic Development and Promoting Innovation

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The United States and Colombia stand to benefit from a partnership that promotes economic development in both countries. Bilateral trade and investment offer multiple opportunities for economic growth that will directly benefit both economies. A stronger Colombian economy not only translates to improved living conditions for Colombians but also protects key US national security interests by undermining the drug trade and other illicit economies as well as illegal armed actors. A stronger economic partnership between the two countries will help the United States achieve greater engagement with Latin America to manage current challenges and seize growing opportunities.

The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force identified the following three areas as paramount to the bilateral economic relationship: trade and investment; formalization and taxation; and innovation, science, technology, and education. The first area explores opportunities for increased economic growth in both countries. The second area focuses on how to strengthen Colombia’s taxation system and further develop the country’s formal economy. Finally, the third area examines innovative opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange that further both nation’s economic and security interests.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

With an improved security situation, abundant natural resources, and an educated, growing middle class, Colombia has the potential to become an even stronger economic partner for the United States.27 In 2012, the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) took effect. Upon entry into force, 80 percent of US exports of consumer and industrial goods and 50 percent of US exports of agricultural products to Colombia became duty free. The remaining tariffs are scheduled to phase out by 2027. Colombia should consider accelerating the elimination of certain non-agricultural tariffs, with a focus on industries that wouldn’t be disrupted by the removal of such protections, to advance US-Colombia bilateral trade and export flows in line with Colombia’s other bilateral agreements. While US exports to Colombia decreased 16 percent, from $16.4 billion in 2012 to $13.7 billion in 2018, due in part to the sharp depreciation of the Colombian peso, agricultural and manufacturing exports continue to enjoy significant growth.28 According to the US International Trade Commission (ITC), the TPA will expand US exports by more than $1.1 billion and increase US GDP by $2.5 billion.

Fully implementing the TPA represents a significant opportunity for both countries. The results would not only increase trade, jobs, and economic growth, but also improve protections for intellectual property rights, labor rights, and the environment. Moreover, since Colombia’s capacity to continue dealing with the Venezuelan crisis depends on the strength of its economy, the economic bilateral relationship will also benefit both countries’ national security interests. However, for the US-Colombia TPA’s potential to be fully realized, both countries must make changes. Colombia has yet to implement some aspects of the TPA to the fullest, including bills on internet service providers’ responsibilities, commercial agency, and a screen TV quota, the ratification of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (1991) treaty, and allowing for importation of duty free remanufactured goods.

Fully implementing the TPA represents a significant opportunity for both countries.

Employees organize bouquets of flowers to be exported overseas, ahead of Valentine’s Day, at a farm in Facatativa, Cundinamarca, Colombia. The United States is a leading importer of Colombian flowers. (Reuters/Jaime Saldarriaga)

Additionally, strengthened trade and investment between Colombia and the United States will help to provide some counterweight to China’s growing influence in Latin America. Over the last twenty years, trade between China and Latin America has multiplied eighteen times, from $12 billion in 2000 to $224 billion in 2016.29 Today, China is the largest trading partner for Chile, Peru, and Brazil,30 and, in the case of Colombia, China has moved to become its second-largest export partner.31 Whereas Chinese investment used to focus on oil and mining and agriculture, it is now expanding to other sectors of the economy including transport, finance, electricity generation and transmission, information and communications technology, and alternative energy.32 Deepening commercial relations between Colombia and the United States will strengthen the commercial partnership in light of new Chinese economic interest, with the potential effect of having the bilateral relationship serve as a model for other countries seeing new Chinese economic interest.

Implementing reforms geared to decreasing uncertainty for companies seeking to do business in Colombia is also needed, as frequent changes in the tax system and in regulations for different sectors create instability and unpredictability. Colombia and the United States could also work together to identify opportunities for US companies in Colombia. In particular, given the rising tensions between the US and China, several US companies are seeking to relocate from China. The Colombian government and US companies could look for opportunities for mutually beneficial agreements that facilitate their relocation to Colombia. Colombia also needs to give predictability and stability to intellectual property rights by not imposing discriminatory compulsory licenses.

The United States, for its part, should strive to accelerate the process of implementing pending TPA related matters. These include the regional accumulation provision with Peru and other Pacific Alliance countries for textiles and lifting environmental barriers to Colombian palm biodiesel. The US government should also work with the Colombian government to speed up and harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary requirements to facilitate and accelerate the entry of certain Colombian products—mainly agricultural ones—into the US market. Although 105 Colombian agricultural products have preferential access to the US market within the TPA, and seven are currently undergoing the market access process, fewer than ten match the phytosanitary protocols required to enter the United States. This year Colombia is expecting tangible progress for top market-access priorities: fresh peppers, mangoes, pitayas (also known as dragon fruit), papayas, watermelons, cantaloupes, blueberries, and passifloras (yellow passion fruit, sweet granadilla, purple passion fruit, and banana passion fruit).

Thus, the US government could make it a priority for the US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to expedite the approval of these products. Colombia, in turn, could prepare to effectively promote and market these products in the United States. Given the importance of reducing coca crops for both the United States and Colombia, devising mechanisms for expedient entry into the US market of agricultural products that are part of crop substitution schemes is also a priority. The United States could also facilitate the entry of Colombian products into the US market by allowing companies to fulfill required processes at competitive prices. For example, Colombian companies could be allowed to carry out product radiation processes in the United States as opposed to Colombia, to reduce costs and logistical barriers. The United States could also work with Colombia to establish a fast-track process for companies that already have the certificate of economic operator authorized by both Colombia’s tax agency, the National Directorate of Customs and Taxation (DIAN), and the Business Alliance for Secure Commerce.

During the last years, Colombia has made enormous progress on labor legislation, due, in part, to the sustained implementation of the Labor Action Plan. The government has increased the number of labor inspectors and issued new regulations to strengthen control over abusive subcontracting methods. Regarding the judiciary, Colombia has made significant progress in pursuing and solving cases related to instances of violence and threats against union members. The United States has recognized this progress. The United States and Colombia can further improve labor conditions by revising their agreement to include success metrics that focus on preventing labor violations rather than only sanctioning them. A modern approach would promote legal flexible labor tools to effectively increase productivity and reduce job informality and unemployment. Examples include temporary work, part-time work, telework, flexible salaries, and subcontracting, among others.33

There is ample opportunity for increased US investment in Colombia, especially in areas of innovation, science, technology, and agroindustry.

For Colombia’s economy to grow and offer new market possibilities for the United States, Colombian firms need to grow stronger and create jobs. As explored below, a better economic situation is also the most effective and sustainable way to reduce cocaine trafficking from Colombia to the United States. Granting Colombia’s steel and aluminum products entering the US market an exemption from the 25 percent and 10 percent tariffs, respectively, which were imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, would contribute to Colombia’s economic growth. While Colombian exports of these products represent only 0.5 percent of the US market, these tariffs affect the installed capacity and job creation of Colombian companies. Moreover, the Colombian government has implemented several additional antidumping measures against steel and aluminum products coming from countries that contribute to world overcapacity, especially China.

The United States should also continue to support the Pacific Alliance. This alliance, which Colombia helped create, is now considering merging with another regional bloc in Latin America, Mercosur, and wants to bring in more partners and establish new trade deals with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore. If this happens, the global economy could experience a tremendous boom. Colombia should continue with its commitment and dedication to solving the different issues that could arise during this process, and the United States should support and even encourage this alliance.

Opportunities for bilateral investment, which benefit both countries, are also growing. Colombia is committed to developing efficient capital markets, creating jobs, and building legal and regulatory systems that meet world-class standards for security and transparency. Its accession to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in May 2018 reflects the country’s attainment of these standards and encourages further investment and economic cooperation. US foreign direct investment (FDI) in Colombia totaled $7.2 billion in 2017 and Colombian FDI in the United States totaled $2.6 billion, supporting 5,500 US jobs.34 There is ample potential for increased US investment in Colombia, especially in areas of innovation, science, technology, and agroindustry. As well, Colombia’s acceptance of US federal motor vehicle standards opens additional areas for US investment.

For these opportunities to materialize, Colombia should strive to be more attractive to foreign investors, and can do so by offering more transparent conditions for FDI and reducing regulations, nontariff barriers, as well as cumbersome operations and foreign trade procedures. Strengthening the institutions tasked with ensuring compliance with labor, social security, and tax laws, and increasing coordination among these agencies, will improve enforcement.

Reforming an inefficient tax system should be, as explored below, a priority for future administrations. In addition, Colombia should spotlight itself as an investment destination, showing its potential to become a regional investment hub for the United States. Strengthening the rule of law and gaining institutional control of territories affected by violence, which are discussed later in this report, will also serve to minimize companies’ concerns about political risk and uncertainty.

The United States can help foster conditions for long-term US investment in Colombia. Promoting the double taxation agreement between the two countries would provide investors with legal security and additional incentives for investment. In addition, US foreign policy toward Colombia should avoid producing any uncertainty around the bilateral relationship. The August 2019 certification of Colombia as cooperative in counternarcotics efforts was important to avoid such uncertainty. Any ambiguity in the strength of the relationship negatively impacts investment and commercial flows. Sending the message that the two countries support each other as strategic allies is good for business.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD

TRADE AND INVESTMENT

COLOMBIA
• Implement fully pending aspects of the TPA to increase trade, jobs, and economic growth, but also improve protections for intellectual property rights, labor rights, and the environment.
• Launch structured promotional campaigns for Colombian products entering the US market.

UNITED STATES
• Implement pending aspects of the TPA, including the regional cumulation provision for textiles and increased access to biodiesel products.
• Grant Colombia’s steel and aluminum products entering the US market an exemption from tariffs of 25 percent and 10 percent, respectively.

US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary requirements to accelerate the entry of preapproved Colombian products into the US market. Top market access priorities include: fresh peppers, mangoes, and passifloras.
• Promote the double taxation agreement between the two countries to increase legal security and incentives for bilateral investment.

FORMALIZATION AND TAXATION

A healthy Colombian economy provides the United States with greater market opportunities for goods and services. It can also help to stabilize the territories where illicit groups operate and illicit economies thrive, especially the cocaine market. Two of the most critical barriers to economic development in Colombia are the country’s tax system and high levels of informality. The United States can partner with Colombia to support much-needed reforms to counter these two challenges.

Tax revenues in Colombia have increased consistently from the 1990s to around 15 percent of the country’s GDP today, but remain very low by international standards:35 the OECD average is 26 percent of GDP—a measure similar to that of Argentina (29 percent) and Brazil (26 percent). Part of the problem is Colombia’s tax structure. In Colombia, around 45 percent of these revenues come from taxes on goods and services, which tend to be regressive. Corporate taxes are considered relatively high, with rates of up to 34 percent36 and revenues accounting for 3.8 percent of GDP, which discourages formalization and entrepreneurship. The Duque administration did pass tax reform in 2018, which is currently under revision by the Constitutional Court and aims to progressively lower corporate tax rates down to 30 percent by 2022. Still, in comparison, the average corporate tax in Latin American countries in 2018 was 28 percent.37 Dividends to individuals are taxed at a small percentage, and while this avoids the double taxation of distributed profits, it reduces progressivity. Meanwhile, revenues from personal income taxes represent 1.1 percent of GDP and social security contributions are 2.1 percent of GDP.

The progressivity of the tax system is undermined by generous tax relief and exemptions—there are more than 200 exemptions, representing approximately 30 percent of tax collection—which mostly benefit the wealthier sectors of Colombian society.38 Colombia’s tax system still needs reforms to enhance progressivity and raise more revenue that can then be channeled to expand social policies. However, an eventual tax reform should maintain corporate taxes at levels comparable to those of other OECD countries. Colombia should also improve transparency and stability in the development and implementation of this updated taxation system.

Tax evasion should also be addressed to strengthen state capacity and foster economic development—this will enhance Colombia’s ability to be a strong economic and security ally to the United States. The DIAN has local branches in only forty-three of the country’s 1,121 municipalities, and the tax officer-to-inhabitant ratio is half the regional average (one to 10,000). Evasion of income tax and value-added tax is estimated to be 4 percent of the GDP, and informality, discussed below, also facilitates tax evasion while reducing the tax base.39 Overall, the tax system significantly distorts economic activity and has a very small redistributive impact.

Two of the most critical barriers to economic development in Colombia are the country’s tax system and high levels of informality.

Colombia has a large informal economy, equivalent to one-third of its GDP.40 As of 2015, about 60 percent of firms and 48 percent of workers remained in the informal sector. In the countryside, almost two-thirds of farmers lack formal property titles to their land,41 and although informality decreased by seven percentage points since 2001,42 it is still a critical barrier to development. Informality negatively affects economic growth as it promotes low-paying jobs, unemployment, and lower productivity by allocating resources ineffectively. Because of this, informal firms have lower access to credit, use more unskilled labor, adopt less technology, perform less training, and have low access to public goods.

Informal firms limit the growth of formal firms as the former do not comply with standards and regulations, which artificially lowers their costs, generating unfair competition. More than half of formal firms in Colombia report that informal firms are one of their top challenges.43 In addition, informality reduces the tax base and access to credit and social insurance for lower income families. Informality also discourages investment and productivity and widens economic disparities across the country, while limiting poverty reduction and the consolidation of the middle class. As an important obstacle for Colombian development, informality compromises efforts to reduce coca cultivation and combat illegal armed groups, therefore undermining US law enforcement and national security interests. Additionally, informality makes it harder for US firms to seize the opportunities that Colombia’s expanding market has to offer.

The United States and Colombia can engage in mutually beneficial cooperation that helps Colombia reduce informality. The two countries should continue training labor inspectors, as they did in a program from 2012 to 2016, with more focus on prevention of labor violations rather than sanctions. Colombia should continue its fight against abusive and illegal subcontracting as well as using legal subcontracting as a necessary tool to increase formality, employment, competitiveness, and productivity. The United States can work with Colombia to devise best practices for achieving several goals. These include streamlining the process for firm creation and closure; reducing unnecessary norms and barriers for firms across geographical divisions; making labor regulations more flexible; and increasing access to credit and other business services. To incentivize formalization, the Colombian government can also engage in public information campaigns to educate workers about the benefits of working in the formal economy (sick days, maternal leave, paid vacation days, etc.). The country also can improve access to credit and other business services to incentivize firms to register their activity and pay taxes.

Improving the modernization process and strengthening the governability of Colombia’s tax agency, DIAN, is of critical importance. Colombia needs to update the software that its taxation system relies on, as it is ineffective and facilitates corruption and money laundering. Strengthening the DIAN and customs agencies—with US assistance—is also a priority because both have been permeated by trafficking groups and other types of criminal organizations. Digitalizing the customs, tax, ports, and airports systems, as well as incorporating blockchain technology would allow for higher traceability of goods and improved intelligence, which favor legal activities and tax collection while creating obstacles for illicit economies. Digitalizing the economy would also benefit US companies doing business in Colombia. The United States could support this process by facilitating the training of engineers. US companies could also contribute by verifying the quality of new information systems.

It is also important to accelerate the process to conduct US immigration procedures on Colombian soil. United States immigration authorities have begun high-level talks with Colombia’s Foreign Ministry to study this possibility. This means that travelers departing the special US designated immigration area in El Dorado Airport in Bogotá would be subject to the laws of the US, and US officers would conduct the same immigration, customs, and agriculture inspections of international air travelers typically performed upon arrival in the United States. A close working relationship on the ground means that authorities from both nations will be able to share information on immigration, customs, and agriculture.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
FORMALIZATION AND TAXATION

COLOMBIA
• Reform the current tax structure to increase tax revenues while also encouraging formalization and entrepreneurship. An eventual tax reform should maintain corporate taxes at levels comparable to those of other OECD countries.
• Incentivize formalization by educating workers about the benefits of participating in the formal economy, while also offering improved access to credit and other business services.

US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Cooperate to reduce informality and protect formal firms doing business in Colombia. The partnership should work to devise best practices for simplifying the process of firm creation and closure; reduce unnecessary norms and barriers for firms; make labor regulations more flexible to increase formalization, productivity, and competitiveness; and improve the modernization process of Colombia’s tax agency, DIAN.
• Accelerate the process to conduct US immigration customs and inspections at El Dorado airport in Bogotá, Colombia. A close working relationship on the ground will allow authorities from both nations to share real-time information on immigration, customs, and agriculture.
• Collaborate to increasingly digitalize Colombia’s economy, as well as its customs, tax, ports and airport systems, to enhance the traceability of goods, improve tax collection, and undermine illicit economies.

INNOVATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND EDUCATION

For Colombia to achieve the long-term development needed to stop cocaine production and further advance legality, advancements in innovation, science, technology, and education are needed. In particular, for Colombia to keep the high growth rates that maintain advances in poverty reduction and development, it must diversify production and increase productivity and sustainability. Creating legal opportunities in areas affected by violence and illicit economies also requires transforming rural economies. Innovation, science, technology, and education are essential to these quests. The United States has ample experience in these areas and can share best practices with Colombia. At the same time, both countries can engage in new, productive collaborative initiatives, as explained below.

According to the World Bank, in 2017, the total amount of government and private sector funds spent on research and development (R & D) in Colombia was only 0.24 percent of the country’s GDP—an extremely low value compared to the average investment in the sector for Latin America and the Caribbean (0.8 percent). Investment in science, technology, and innovation in Colombia is slightly higher (0.65 percent of GDP). In the 2018 Global Innovation Index (GII), which measures the performance of innovation ecosystems in 126 countries, Colombia ranked sixty-third, below Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay. In 2017, about 30 percent of science, technology, and innovation funding came from the public sector and 70 percent from the private sector. For R & D, the percentages were 25 percent and 75 percent, respectively.44

The United States should work with Colombia to create a development strategy to fund research centers in Colombia. It should be a results-oriented and impact-driven strategy, as are the funding strategies of the United States’ National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health. The United States could also share its expertise in strengthening industry-university collaboration, given its ample experience in connecting university training with private-sector needs and in promoting innovation by research centers that responds to the needs of firms. Promoting innovation, science, and technology in Colombia will help disrupt the conditions that facilitate illicit activities while also maximizing human capital in this important US free-trade partner.

The United States could also support Colombian efforts to provide technical assistance to firms in order to increase their productivity and prepare them for more sophisticated innovation processes. The United States has significant experience in the design, implementation, and evaluation of such schemes. The US Manufacturing Extension Partnership, for example, has been successful in improving production processes, upgrading technology capabilities, increasing competitiveness of firms, and facilitating innovation throughout the United States.45

Education is another area rich with potential for US-Colombia collaboration. Colombia faces multiple challenges to achieving a high-quality and equitable education system. Given that the transition from illicit to licit economies requires new human-capital development, education in Colombia should be an area of importance to the United States. The United States can make several contributions. For example, Colombia lags behind most Latin American countries in English proficiency. In 2018, it was ranked 60 among 88 countries in the world in this category.46 The Colombian government has tried to increase the number of English teachers, but at least 3,200 more are needed. The United States could help to train Colombian English teachers and provide additional scholarships for US teachers who seek to teach English in Colombia.47 At the same time, Colombia could offer education opportunities for US teachers, especially Spanish-language programs, while they teach English in public schools in Colombia. This and other types of exchange programs for language training would benefit both countries.

Advancing the interests of both Colombia and the United States in vulnerable territories requires prioritizing rural education. The Colombian government is creating partnerships with land grant universities to develop programs focused on agriculture. Purdue University, for example, has partnered with Colombia to promote collaborative research, education, and economic development activities. One of the projects consists of a master plan for sustainable development of the Orinoquía region based on analysis-and research-based tools to enable a deeper understanding of the economic and development opportunities related to agriculture and tourism.48 Fostering such partnerships will catalyze initiatives for mutually beneficial collaboration, while contributing to development, stabilization, and legality, all of which undermine the coca industry and the rise of criminal actors.

Colombia and the United States can also broaden opportunities for educational exchange via scholarships, grants, exchange programs, and joint research, aiming to create long-lasting connections between people and institutions in both countries, which, in turn, can promote innovation. About 8,000 Colombians study in the United States every year, with an economic impact of $302 million.49 Approximately 236 of these students receive full scholarships through the Fulbright Program, while others get partial funding through collaborative programs between Fulbright and Colombian agencies. Expanding opportunities for postgraduate training of Colombian students in the United States would make a direct contribution to the development of human capital and economic development in Colombia, which would benefit shared US-Colombia interests.

Similarly, Colombia can become a preferred destination for US students looking to study in Latin America. Today, only around 900 Americans study in Colombia every year—about one-fourth of the number of study-abroad students going to Peru and Ecuador.50 Central American countries like Guatemala and Nicaragua receive more than 2,000 American students every year, despite not having any university ranked among the top fifty in Latin America. Colombia, to the contrary, has three universities ranked among the top thirty and one among the top ten.51 Colombia can become an important education destination for US students, especially for learning Spanish and studying biodiversity. One government agency, such as the new Ministry of Science, Innovation and Technology, should coordinate different efforts and initiatives to facilitate alliances between US and Colombian universities to promote Colombia as one of the top study-abroad destinations for US students seeking to study in Latin America.

Finally, creating programs specifically for ethnic minorities is also a priority for both countries. The Colombian Ministry of Education is currently advancing an agreement with historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) to provide funding for Afro-Colombian students to study in the United States while offering scholarships for foreign students to study in Colombia. The United States can share its experience in developing programs to support the enrollment of women, ethnic minorities, and low-income students in STEM areas (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). Exchanging such best practices with Colombia can have a positive impact on education and innovation in Colombia while furthering cultural exchanges.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
INNOVATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND EDUCATION

COLOMBIA
• Designate one agency responsible for coordinating alliances between universities in Colombia and the United States. Both large and small universities should benefit from this program to ensure that students form all ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds have access to new opportunities. Specifically, the agency should promote collaborative research and education between Colombian and US universities.

• Broaden and increase awareness about opportunities for educational exchanges via scholarships, grants, and study abroad programs, especially for ethnic minorities.

• Promote Colombia as a prime education destination for US students in areas such as Spanish and biodiversity.

UNITED STATES
• The United States can offer trainings to Colombian English teachers and provide additional scholarships to US English teachers seeking to teach in Latin America. While in Colombia, US English teachers will have access to additional education opportunities, especially Spanish language programs.

US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Collaborate to strengthen industry-university collaboration in Colombia to foster innovation. The United States can also help Colombian research institutions replicate the funding models and development strategies of US research centers. By promoting innovation, science, and technology in Colombia, the partnership will help transform the conditions that incentivize illegality, safeguarding both countries’ national security interests.

2. Strengthening Institutions and Rule of Law while Combating Illicit Drugs

Colombian soldiers patrol aboard a highspeed, armored boat over the Caquetá river during an army training near Tres Esquinas army base. (REUTERS/Daniel Munoz)
Colombian soldiers patrol aboard a highspeed, armored boat over the Caquetá river during an army training near Tres Esquinas army base. (REUTERS/Daniel Munoz)

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Crucial to the advancement of shared US and Colombia interests is the stabilization and development of territories where coca is cultivated, illegal armed groups thrive, and populations face violence, low-quality governance, and poverty. The state needs to gain institutional control of these territories and foster development to accelerate transformation. Employing an integral drug policy that not only decreases coca crops in the short run but also focuses on the other stages of the drug market—including cocaine production, trafficking, and consumption—is essential for tackling the world drug problem in a way that achieves long-term goals.

These strategies also require protecting human-rights defenders and social leaders. Defending the lives of its citizens is Colombia’s principal duty, and protecting civic leaders is needed for democracy to flourish. Transforming the institutional capacity of the state in vulnerable territories, tackling the world drug problem in an integral way, and protecting social leaders will change the structural conditions that breed illegality, undermine the well-being of the Colombian population, and threaten US national security interests.

TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Two critical barriers to Colombia’s security and development—weak institutions and lack of economic opportunities in rural areas—affect both Colombia and the United States. These conditions serve as the breeding ground for coca cultivation and cocaine production, illegal mining, and environmental degradation as well as the strengthening of criminal organizations, all of which affect the well-being of Colombian citizens as well as US national security interests.

Critical to regaining control of rural areas is implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC. Following the UN Security Council’s July 2019 visit to Colombia, the task force welcomes the decision of the Colombian government to request that the UN’s verification and monitoring mandate and term be extended for an additional year beyond September 25, 2019, and the Security Council’s agreement to give such request prompt consideration.

For the Colombian government, devoting the necessary effort and resources to implement the agreement is critical. Also critical is bringing to justice those who are in stated violation of the agreement and intend to return to conflict. All actors in Colombia are encouraged to work together to ensure peace agreement implementation. To accomplish this, Colombia will need resources beyond its own. We call on the US Congress and the US administration to provide significant resources for implementation over the coming years.

At the same time, Colombia will need long-term support beyond that of the United States, especially considering the fiscal strains of the Venezuela crisis (discussed in the following section). Continued financial assistance from the international community for implementation of the Colombian peace process is crucial for its success. Thus, we propose that the World Bank and/or Inter-American Development Bank convene an international consortium of donors to build on or strengthen existing efforts, develop a long-term funding plan, and then dedicate the necessary financial support.

In addition to the need for peace agreement implementation, weak or absent institutions must be addressed as each represent major threats to security and stability in Colombia. In places where the state is absent or weak, illegal armed groups and illicit economies thrive. As the FARC laid down their arms, preexisting and new armed groups moved in to fill the vacuum the rebels had left. These groups profit off the cocaine business and other illicit economies such as illegal mining and the smuggling of goods.

Many of the communities that believed the end of the FARC meant the arrival of the state are experiencing fierce battles between different criminal groups competing over illicit rents.52 According to official data, more than twenty-five illegal armed groups, with a total of about 7,000 members, operate in the country today.53 The August 2019 call to arms by former FARC commander Iván Márquez reinforces the critical importance of meaningful reintegration of ex-combatants and attention to unmet needs in rural areas, the parts of the accord most behind in terms of implementation.

Although Colombia has experienced in the last few years some of the lowest homicide rates in its recent history, violence is on the rise in some areas of the country, especially those affected by illicit economies and where the state has traditionally been weak. Today, Colombia continues to have the world’s highest number of internally displaced persons,54 and recently the number of victims of land mines and other explosives has soared.55 Attacks against social leaders and human rights defenders have been on the rise since 2016, as explained below, and more than 100 former FARC members have been assassinated since the signing of the peace accords.56

Colombia will need long-term support beyond that of the United States.

Illicit economies thrive not only because institutions are weak but also because of the lack of economic opportunities. Coca grows in municipalities with very high levels of poverty and job informality57 and low tax revenue, connectivity, and institutional development.58 Public goods provision is also significantly lower than the national average: about one-third of the population is illiterate and 18 percent of minors are not enrolled in school.59 Coca growers do not have higher earnings than most Colombian peasants; however, coca allows peasants to make money in areas with high transportation costs, a lack of facilities and chains to collect, store, and bring products to market, and poor access to credit, among other factors. Peasants receive, per hectare of coca grown, about $130—which is 56 percent of the monthly minimum wage. In areas with coca crops, each coca-growing family cultivates between 0.5 and 1.8 hectares (ha) of coca and uses any additional hectares to cultivate legal crops.60 Almost 27 percent of households in rural Colombia face monetary poverty. The percentage rises to 57 percent in areas where coca crops are present. In addition, approximately 90 percent of children ages six to nine living in areas with coca crops work in the fields.61

To help Colombia to dismantle illegal armed groups, fight coca cultivation and drug trafficking, and protect vulnerable populations, especially ethnic minorities, the United States should support its efforts to consolidate effective and legitimate state institutions in previously disenfranchised territories and promote rural development. This strategy requires a holistic long-term approach that goes beyond Colombian military and police deployment in areas affected by crime and violence.

Rather than investing in small-scale projects in many areas of the country, the United States should support an ambitious, multidimensional plan that includes security, justice, formalization of land property rights, education, health and other public goods provision, and economic opportunities to help vulnerable territories embark on a sustainable path to development. Although coca crops are located in twenty-two of the thirty-two Colombian departments, 60 percent of all coca crops are concentrated in three of these departments: Nariño, Putumayo, and Norte de Santander. Furthermore, 44 percent of these crops grow in ten municipalities (Tibú, Sardinata, and El Tarra in Norte de Santander; Tumaco, El Charco, and Barba.coas in Nariño; Puerto Asís and Orito in Putumayo; El Tambo in Cauca; and Tarazá in Antioquia).62 This means that a successful, holistic intervention in ten municipalities could change the conditions of territories responsible for almost half the entire national coca production. This strategy will require careful planning and substantial resources for implementation. However, only a long-term, targeted approach will yield lasting results.

With support from different multilateral agencies, Colombia has created several funds, three of which were established with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the United Nations to transform vulnerable territories, help them transition into licit economies, and consolidate peace.63 Additional resources should be provided to these funds to support interventions seeking to transform prioritized territories. Going forward, this funding model could be replicated to aid other countries in the region that are spiraling into violence, criminality, illicit economies, and poor governance.

As a first step, both countries should take stock of previous interventions in rural areas. Different initiatives have been implemented by Colombian agencies and international organizations in attempts to bring the state to vulnerable communities, promote rural development, and advance democracy. Some of these interventions have focused explicitly on reducing coca cultivation and undermining criminal organizations. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has led multiple projects pursuing these goals and has evaluated their impact individually. However, individual assessments have not provided conclusive evidence as to what initiatives (or combination of initiatives) can be most successful in strengthening institutions and rule of law, promoting rural development, and eradicating coca crops. The US-Colombia partnership should conduct a rigorous assessment of all previous interventions to determine how to best allocate development resources in the future.

Workers eradicate coca leaf plantations as part of a government counter-narcotics program in El Peñol, Nariño, Colombia. The United States should continue its support of Colombia as it works to fight coca cultivation and drug trafficking. (REUTERS/Jose Miguel Gomez)
Workers eradicate coca leaf plantations as part of a government counter-narcotics program in El Peñol, Nariño, Colombia. The United States should continue its support of Colombia as it works to fight coca cultivation and drug trafficking. (REUTERS/Jose Miguel Gomez)

How can the Colombian state consolidate its institutions in vulnerable territories? President Duque’s plan to consolidate institutions and development in areas most affected by violence, crime, and poverty, called Zonas Futuro64 (Future Zones), entails the coordinated action of different state agencies to offer basic services, transition from illicit to licit economies, and protect the environment. This strategy will be implemented in 2.4 percent of the national territory—this is where about one-third of coca crops are located and where a large portion of the killing of social leaders has occurred. At the same time, the government has launched a stabilization program (announced in the Paz con Legalidad65 or Peace with Legality plan), a defense and security plan,66 and a drug policy plan (Ruta Futuro67 or Future Path). These plans deem it critical to create an integral policy that brings together authorities at national, departmental, and municipal levels under a shared vision. These policy plans focus on long-term goals, and they all recognize the importance of considering local contexts and promoting active community participation.

Colombia should continue to pursue this type of integral, holistic approach that builds on the participation of local communities and requires the coordination of different state agencies and levels of government. Success requires that these initiatives are coordinated by the Office of the President and have the presidency’s full support. Ensuring constant accountability is also essential for implanting these interventions.

The United States should work with the Colombian government in its quest to address the structural conditions that reproduce violence and breed illegality in critical territories. Specifically, USAID could provide funding and technical assistance to large-scale, holistic interventions including the formalization of land property rights, public goods, viable projects for rural development, and institutional development—especially around local justice, citizen security, and participatory democracy. In addition, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), once operational in October 2019, should identify Colombia as a priority for development financing and encourage private sector-led development. Coordinating with other donors is crucial for interventions to be efficient. These efforts will pay off in the long run by undermining illicit economies and boosting Colombia’s role as a strong security ally in Latin America.

Sustainable rural development must be market-driven. It requires the participation of both the state and the private sector. Cases like Colanta, a Colombian cooperative of cattle farmers that grew to become a leading company in the dairy sector, show the viability and sustainability of this type of initiative. With more than 10,000 members throughout the country, Colanta has generated more than 50,000 rural jobs. Another example of success is Corporación Colombia Internacional (CCI), a state and private owned company that helps farmers structure their productive projects by presenting them with viable and environmentally sustainable licit crops they can cultivate in their respective region, helping them develop cost structures, facilitating their association with other farmers, and identifying potential international and national buyers for their products. CCI also provides technical assistance to farmers for three years and serves as a guarantor to buyers participating in the project. Between 2005 and 2018, more than 573,000 rural families have benefited from this model, of which 7,520 are indigenous peoples and 6,500 are Afro-Colombians.68

Coffee grower Ramon Eliodoro Mejia poses after selling 613 kg (1,351 pounds) of organic coffee during the weighing and sale process at a warehouse of the National Coffee Growers Federation in Pueblo Bello, Cesar, Colombia. Generating economic opportunities for farmers is crucial for rural development. (REUTERS/Jose Miguel Gomez)

The US-Colombia partnership could support these projects at the outset by promoting investment delegations from the United States to support joint ventures for projects on alternative products. The partnership could also help with the commercialization of products. Legal products that have substituted coca crops could be promoted and marketed as a special type of fair trade good, and the United States could assist Colombia in adopting the best practices in agriculture, organic produce, and manufacturing, and prioritizing its access to the US market. Improving living conditions in rural Colombia advances US law enforcement and national security interests.

Examples of successful private partnerships to foster rural development also suggest that US and Colombian companies can work together and support vulnerable communities. Nestlé Nespresso SA, the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation (FNC), the foundation of the National Association of Entrepreneurs of Colombia (ANDI Foundation), and the Howard G. Buffett Foundation, for example, are working under an agreement whereby Nespresso acquires coffee from 100 producers in the Nariño department who have substituted their coca crops for coffee plantations, while the Buffett Foundation helps to improve public goods provision in their communities.69

Other public-private partnerships entail securing funds for projects to advance core business interests as well as development objectives. In the last two years, USAID has promoted such projects in Colombia through its Global Development Alliance, with most of the funding coming from the private sector. In these projects, companies are involved—and have a stake—in development projects. Both the United States and Colombia should support these initiatives and facilitate the involvement of the private sector.

The Colombian government could create a database or program to match farmers interested in substituting coca crops with parties interested in buying products. This initiative could have a large impact as the lack of a systematic way to connect new suppliers of licit products with buyers presents a major challenge for crop-substitution programs. The US and Colombian governments could also support these initiatives by increasing the access of licit substitute products to US and international markets. The United States also could cooperate with the Colombian private sector to facilitate processes of technology transfer, especially in the agricultural sector. In particular, Colombia could explore possible technology transfer and training agreements with state governments in the United States in agricultural areas including Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, Colorado, Nebraska, and Indiana. One possibility would be to create a “fellows” program to train Colombians on agricultural techniques for between six and twelve months in the United States under the condition that they return to Colombia to advise regional and local governments as well as farmers’ organizations.

Yet both countries should recognize that not all rural development can be based on agriculture. About 20 percent of coca crops are located in national natural parks and forest preserves, where coca crops either cannot be substituted for licit crops or can only be substituted in minimal quantities.70 Identifying opportunities around biodiversity and environmental protection is crucial to designing policies that are appropriate for these areas. It is also important to consider allowing people to live in natural parks, rather than forbidding it, and creating opportunities for residents to work with the state in comanaging the parks and engaging in sustainability projects.

Considering the needs, preferences, and strengths of organized indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities in lands they own collectively also is of paramount importance since more than 25 percent of coca crops are located in their territories. Promoting development in these communities entails not only thinking about the specific product that can work but also about how the community can cooperate to maintain the required infrastructure, sell their products, and make substitution projects sustainable. It is important to support the organizational capacity of these communities and take into account the particular strengths—and challenges—of cohesive communities with collective property rights. For example, these communities have been found to be more effective at preventing deforestation,71 resisting against illegal armed actors,72 and opposing coca crops in their territories.73 Considering these communities as partners for environmental protection and development will open new possibilities insofar as the government ensures their safety.

Improving living conditions in rural Colombia advances US law enforcement and national security interests.

In both natural parks and collectively owned lands, payments for ecosystem services (PES) can be a viable opportunity—although perhaps not a sustainable one in the long run. PES can work as a transitional mechanism that allows residents of these areas to invest in green projects.74 For example, a community could use PES to develop highly differentiated products of high quality with the expectation that in the future the market pays for their added value. Colombia already has success stories: The Afro-Colombian community of El Roble in Tumaco is, for example, producing premium cacao that has received awards in Paris and Tokyo. Other possibilities include ecotourism and artisanal handicrafts. Colombia and the United States should partner to open new markets and create incentives for scaling green projects.

Colombia and the United States also can jointly address specific critical barriers to rural development with ambitious projects that can impact several communities. The formalization of property rights, for example, is a priority. Colombia, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United States, and three European countries are coming together to offer a large-scale solution: The Multipurpose Cadaster Project. This program will develop a land administration system to strengthen the security of property rights, facilitate access to land and property information, and support land tenure formalization for about 67,000 people, of which about 40 percent are women. The project has a differential approach for Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.75 Partnerships like this support Colombia’s efforts to develop state institutions and promote rural development in vulnerable areas, undermining illicit armed actors and creating barriers to coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking.

In reducing coca cultivation, a critical short-term goal is adjusting the National Integral Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS). Under this program, the government committed to provide monthly payments and technical assistance to families who agreed to eradicate their illicit crops and embark on licit economic activities. Of the 99,000 families that signed the agreement, 94 percent have eradicated their coca crops, honoring their commitments. Furthermore, according to UN data, coca replanting has only occurred in 0.6 percent of cases where growers joined the voluntary crop substitution program. This is quite a successful outcome compared to the 36 percent replanting rate of crops uprooted through forced eradication.76

However, only 67 percent of the families have received subsidies and only 40 percent have received technical assistance. In most cases, subsidies and assistance started quite late in the process, compromising their ability to pursue a licit, productive project. It is now clear that the program is underfunded, has several design and implementation problems, and will not be viable if it is not adjusted.77 The minimal essential elements of the crop-substitution program are delivery of subsidies in the initial phase and timely technical assistance, ensuring that peasants can sell their licit products in the first few years—either by matching them with sellers or having the government buy the produce.

Colombia and the United States should partner to open new markets and create incentives for scaling green projects.

Colombians uproot coca crops in rural areas. Rural development in Colombia is key to the reduction of coca crops and eradication of the illict drug trade. (REUTERS/John Vizcaino)

However, making the PNIS a component of a broader approach that includes institutional and rural development, as discussed above, is critical. It is also crucial to take into account that broken government promises do not only undermine current efforts to reduce coca cultivation but also create a negative precedent and sow distrust between the communities and the state, compromising the possibility of future programs. The United States should support Colombia in its efforts to help families who uprooted their coca plants and are undertaking the transition to legality within a broader, integral policy of rural development.

Another critical barrier to rural development and rule of law consolidation in areas beyond the government’s reach is the capacity of local bureaucrats. Local authorities in these territories usually lack the tools to transform the conditions that breed informality and illegality and part of the problem is the training of local bureaucrats. There is a wide gap in the skills of local public servants in municipalities affected by violence as compared to the rest of the country, given that trained public officials have little to no incentive to serve in rural areas. Expected salaries and security guarantees for public officials in these territories are significantly lower than those received in larger cities. Deprived of skilled leaders, vulnerable municipalities can hardly improve the quality of their governments—and weak local governments often lead to corruption and increases in illicit drug trade and organized criminal groups, which undermines US national security interests.

Another critical barrier to rural development and rule of law consolidation in areas beyond the government’s reach is the capacity of local bureaucrats. Local authorities in these territories usually lack the tools to transform the conditions that breed informality and illegality and part of the problem is the training of local bureaucrats. There is a wide gap in the skills of local public servants in municipalities affected by violence as compared to the rest of the country, given that trained public officials have little to no incentive to serve in rural areas. Expected salaries and security guarantees for public officials in these territories are significantly lower than those received in larger cities. Deprived of skilled leaders, vulnerable municipalities can hardly improve the quality of their governments—and weak local governments often lead to corruption and increases in illicit drug trade and organized criminal groups, which undermines US national security interests.

The United States could promote programs to train highly talented local and nonlocal officials to serve in these municipal governments and offer them support while they are in office so that the characteristics of each locality are taken into account. These public servants could in turn train others and support them in their first years serving in vulnerable localities. Creating incentives for trained public servants to stay for long periods of time in vulnerable municipalities is crucial to sustainability.78

By investing in human capital, this program can have long-lasting effects not only on the quality of local governance but also in bringing about broader societal change through leadership. The Postsecondary School of Public Administration (Escuela Superior de Administración Pública) is currently considering developing a program that would involve supporting public servants in critical territories in 2020. The United States can advance the transformation of local governments by supporting targeted programs like this one and investing in initiatives to educate and support a new generation of local leaders. Similar programs could be designed to train not only public officials but also doctors, educators, and professionals, and encouraging them to serve in rural areas and train local populations.

Where should these efforts be directed? Since transforming all needy areas in the country at the same time is not viable, it is imperative to focus on the most vulnerable territories. The 170 municipalities included in the Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDETs), or Development Programs with a Territorial Approach, have been most affected by violence in the past decades. With the demobilization of FARC, many areas previously under the group’s control were left with a vacuum of power and this in turn has been progressively filled by criminal organizations.

In some of these territories, social leaders have been assassinated and coca cultivation and illegal mining have increased. In fact, the ten municipalities with 50 percent of the coca crops in Colombia are on this list of 170 municipalities. Of these, the PDETs of the Catatumbo region, Nariño’s Pacific wetlands, Arauca, and Bajo Cauca Antioqueño—areas also included in the strategic Future Zones of President Duque’s plan—are critical as they concentrate a large portion of coca crops and exhibit some of the highest levels of violence in the country. Transforming the most vulnerable territories is the best way to overcome criminality, violence, and illicit economies while consolidating the rule of law, democracy, and development.

Improving the efficacy and legitimacy of state institutions in vulnerable territories and promoting rural development will benefit Colombia, the United States, and the binational partnership. Colombia has the potential to improve the lives of citizens who have long lived in precarious conditions, while also undermining illicit armed organizations and illicit economies that harm the entire country. By reducing drug trafficking and weakening criminal groups, institutional growth and rural development will also favor US national security interests while also enabling Colombia to continue its leading role in security cooperation in the region.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

COLOMBIA
• Adjust the PNIS to viably support all families that have signed and complied with the crop- substitution agreement. Possible adjustments include the delivery of subsidies in the initial phases of the program to ensure that farmers can pursue their licit productive project. In the initital years of production, the government should help peasants sell their licit products by connecting them with sellers or buying some of the production. Provision of technical assistance is also necessary.
• Create a database or program that connects farmers interested in substituting coca crops with potential buyers. The current disconnect between potential suppliers of licit products with markets represents a major challenge to the crop-substitution program.

UNITED STATES
• Support the commercialization and facilitate market access to legal products that have substituted coca crops. They can be promoted and marketed as a special type of fair trade good.

US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Invest in a long-term, multidimensional plan that includes security, justice, formalization of land property rights, education, public goods provision, and economic opportunities in ten priority areas to dismantle organized armed groups, eradicate rising coca crops, and fight drug trafficking. The ten priority municipalities identified by the Colombian government are included in the PDETs and are responsible for one-half of the entire national coca production.
• Promote programs to train local and nonlocal public officials to serve in rural areas, offering support while in office to guarantee that characteristics of each locality are taken into account. These public servants could in turn train others and provide support in their first years serving in vulnerable localities.
• Work to establish technology transfer and training programs, especially in the agricultural sector. For example, creating a “fellows” program to train Colombians on agricultural techniques for between six and twelve months in the United States under the condition that they return to Colombia to advise regional and local governments as well as farmers’ organizations.
• Foster partnerships between the Colombian and US private sectors and nongovernmental organizations to implement market-driven rural development projects, in coordination with the Colombian government.
• Identify viable projects to combat illicit drug production in natural parks and lands owned by indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. Projects in collectively owned lands must take into account the needs, preferences, and strengths of the communities that own them.
• Channel additional resources to funds created by multilateral agencies and Colombia to transform vulnerable territories, help them transition to licit economies, and consolidate peace.
• Conduct a rigorous assessment of all previous interventions in rural areas to determine how to best allocate development resources in the future.

INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY

Rural infrastructure is paramount to unleashing economic growth in rural areas, which is essential to decreasing coca cultivation, undermining other illicit economies, and weakening illegal armed groups while fostering legal economic activities. The United States needs rural Colombia to prosper in order to curb cocaine trafficking and undermine organized crime. However, Colombia has a severe lag in rural infrastructure. Public service delivery in the countryside is inadequate. Government statistics put electricity coverage at 80 percent of the nation, but aqueduct and sewage coverage trail at 20 percent and 6 percent, respectively. Moreover, 73 percent of rural areas in Colombia are more than three hours away from department capital cities by road.79 Of the 142,000 kilometers (km) of existing rural roads, close to 65 percent are in bad shape and only 6 percent are paved.80

This situation makes transport extremely costly both for individuals and for farmers seeking to get their agricultural products to markets. In addition, internet service barely reaches 10 percent in rural areas. Unsurprisingly, rural areas exhibit a poverty rate of 45 percent, almost twice the national average.81 As part of the Rural Colombia program, President Duque allocated about $150 million to the improvement and maintenance of tertiary roads in 2019. This is a step in the right direction. Colombia must do more to connect rural areas and to improve rural infra.structure in order to expand economic opportunities for farmers, particularly in places with high coca cultivation or illicit mining.

Recent public-private initiatives have worked to bring quality connectivity to rural areas in Colombia and encourage youth to stay in the countryside. Various projects, totaling $25 million and led by the Colombian Coffee Growers Federation, have focused on improving tertiary roads in 10 of the departments most affected by conflict (Cauca, Caldas, Antioquia, Nariño, Valle del Cauca, Quindío, Cundinamarca, Huila, Risaralda and Santander).82 In another project, the Ministry of Information Technologies and other agencies, in association with Microsoft Corp., has allocated $1 million to increase the internet connectivity of farmers in certain coffee regions.

The United States needs rural Colombia to prosper in order to curb cocaine trafficking and undermine organized crime.

Locals carry coffee in Gaitania, Tolima, Colombia. Increasing rural connectivity is paramount to unleashing economic growth in rural areas of Colombia. (REUTERS/Jaime Saldarriaga)

The private sector may have proved more efficient in providing certain services than the government, but going forward, successful public-private partnerships need to clearly align social and individual interests, carefully assign the risk involved, and remain transparent throughout the project. These schemes provide valuable examples of future projects the United States can help to replicate to increase rural connectivity, and, by so doing, create obstacles to the expansion of illegal armed groups and the illicit economies from which they profit.

To foster economic opportunities, create jobs, and guarantee the success of crop-substitution programs, rural areas must be accessible and connected to the rest of the country. Roads, especially secondary and tertiary ones, need to be built. In the last few years, the country has launched ambitious programs to build and improve both primary and tertiary roads. The “fourth generation” of road concessions (4G), as it is known in Colombia, is a megaroad public-private partnership program with aggregate capital expenditures of $15 billion83 that seeks to build and rehabilitate approximately 8,000 km of the nation’s most important primary roads. Despite multiple challenges, the program is moving forward and the Duque administration plans to finalize eight highways and significantly advance twenty-one more in the next four years.84

The United States could play a role in supporting the Duque administration’s Rural Colombia program to advance secondary and tertiary roads,85 which make up about 70 percent of all roads in the country. The United States can facilitate the involvement, presence, and financing of the DFC, which consolidates the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of USAID and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in this process. USAID funds also could focus on a few, large-scale projects with long-term impacts on stabilization areas rather than on several small projects in multiple areas of the country. Moreover, USAID can replicate successful projects involving local populations in the maintenance of tertiary roads, with the long-term goal of creating capacity for future infrastructure projects in the locality.86 The United States can also push for Colombia to be prioritized for a compact agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent US foreign assistance agency, to support the government’s heavy financing burden. Connecting vulnerable communities to the rest of the country can only be accomplished, however, if Colombia finishes building its primary roads.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY

US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Replicate successful projects involving local populations in the building and maintenance of secondary and tertiary roads, with the long-term goal of creating capacity for future infrastructure projects in the locality. The partnership should further facilitate the involvement of DFC and USAID as a potential source of financing for these projects.
• Support public-private partnerships to increase connectivity in rural areas and create incentives for youth to remain in the countryside.

STEPS TO ADDRESS THE WORLD DRUG PROBLEM

A soldier from the Seventh Division of the Colombian National Army looks on as a make-shift cocaine laboratory burns during an operation to eradicate coca plants in Yali, Antioquia, Colombia. Addressing the world drug problem requires tackling the issue at all stages of the production process. (REUTERS/Fredy Builes)
A soldier from the Seventh Division of the Colombian National Army looks on as a make-shift cocaine laboratory burns during an operation to eradicate coca plants in Yalí, Antioquia, Colombia. Addressing the world drug problem requires tackling the issue at all stages of the production process. (REUTERS/Fredy Builes)

Between 2013 and 2017, coca crops in Colombia saw an exponential increase, rising from 80,500 hectares to 209,000 ha, according to the US Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also reports a stark increase in coca crop cultivation, from 48,189 ha to 171,000 ha in that same time period. Between 2017 and 2018, after four years of continued increase, coca crop cultivation finally stabilized and slightly decreased, from 209,000 ha to 208,000 ha, according to ONDCP, and from 171,000 ha to 169,000 ha, according to UNODC. However, there is still much to be done.

The Colombian government’s new drug policy, Ruta Futuro, which was mentioned earlier, is a holistic, multidimensional plan to combat drug challenges. Ruta Futuro focuses on five main pillars: reducing drug consumption; decreasing drug production; dismantling illegal organizations; attacking illicit economies and rents from organized crime; and transforming territories affected by illicit economies. The Colombian government is exploring multiple eradication tools, including returning to aerial spraying with glyphosate, a herbicide.

In 2015, Colombia’s constitutional court prohibited aerial spraying with glyphosate due to potential health risks. The National Council on Narcotics (Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes, CNE) endorsed the decision shortly afterwards. In 2017, the court issued a new sentence allowing the government to resume aerial spraying if several conditions were met, including providing “a scientific investigation that, in an objective and conclusive manner, demonstrates the absence of damage to health and the environment.” The lack of such conclusive, indisputable evidence has prevented aerial spraying since 2015. For the past four years, the government has therefore utilized terrestrial eradication, both forceful and voluntary, as its main eradication strategy.

In July of this year, the Constitutional Court clarified its 2017 ruling stating that the government must corroborate that aerial spraying does not cause harm to public health or the environment but clarified that it does not have to demonstrate this with absolute and unquestionable certainty. It is now up to the CNE to evaluate existing evidence and make a decision. This means that President Duque might be able to resume aerial spraying with glyphosate. The Colombian government has stated that aerial fumigation will only be carried out when manual eradication is impossible and in cases where there is noncompliance with crop-substitution agreements.

Colombia should continue to lead the fight against coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking in the region by using a combination of the most cost-effective tools at its disposal, considering both material and social costs. Eradication works in the short run, but it fails as a long-term strategy unless it is articulated with other interventions that successfully transform local territories.87 Places where coca is eradicated can have coca crops growing again if structural conditions do not change. At the same time, eradication can simply push crops to more remote and inaccessible areas—the so-called balloon effect—unless the conditions in those territories also change.

Colombia should continue to lead the fight against coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking in the region by using a combination of the most cost-effective tools at its disposal, considering both material and social costs.

Colombia and the United States should therefore invest in long-term rural development as previously discussed. In addition, Colombia should continue to disrupt the necessary ingredients for the production of cocaine (gasoline, cement, arsenic and other chemicals), destroy laboratories, dismantle organized criminal groups, engage in interdiction activities, and combat money laundering. The United States should support Colombia not only in these activities but also in its efforts to modernize its ports and customs agencies to boost the country’s capacity to control drug trafficking and money laundering.

The United States and Colombia have enjoyed a strong, constructive relationship between their law enforcement agencies in the ongoing battle against transnational crime and drug trafficking. An important element in that relationship has been cooperation on extradition where warranted. We urge the law enforcement agencies of both nations to continue using the effective protocols they have relied on for several years with resounding success.

Recognizing the importance of assessing what has worked and what has not, the US Congress in 2019 passed bipartisan legislation to create the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission.88 This independent government commission will study the successes and mistakes of US drug policy in the Western hemisphere. Its conclusions will be highly important to the US-Colombia partnership, as it should guide US drug policies and influence roles in the fight against drugs in the region.

With coca cultivation, cocaine consumption, and transnational drug trafficking groups on the rise, the Americas must take stock of existing policies at each stage in the chain, from production and trafficking to money laundering. What has worked in the past to reduce coca cultivation? Which interventions have proved more effective in weakening drug trafficking criminal organizations? Some studies suggest that targeting coca crops is less effective than focusing on the processing and trafficking stages. Since the participation of the coca leaf in the value chain is rather small (about 9 percent), devoting more efforts to trafficking (which concentrates about 70 percent of the cocaine profit chain) can be more efficient.89 What is the estimated effect of a dollar spent on coca eradication vis-à-vis a dollar spent on interdiction? Is destroying labs an effective measure or are these easily and quickly rebuilt, as they are in Afghanistan?90 Is controlling precursor chemicals for cocaine production an effective strategy? What are the best barriers to money laundering? What are the most successful strategies to prevent drug use? Carefully considering the human and social cost of different interventions in all countries is also vital to devising effective solutions from a shared-responsibility perspective.

The United States and Colombia should also work together on the development of new technologies for decreasing coca crops as well as cocaine trafficking. Creating an innovation lab or hosting a formal call for proposals on innovative ways to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking could facilitate this process. Initiatives to devise new policies to curb trafficking of opioids91 could serve as a model for fostering innovation in drug policy in countries where cocaine is produced or trafficked. The countries involved in the production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs in the region should also come together to look at the available evidence and apply lessons learned about counternarcotics policy design and implementation.

As more countries in Latin America become part of trafficking routes—the list now includes, for example, Costa Rica92—the region also needs to strengthen its coordination mechanisms. There are now more routes from South America to the United States through the Pacific Ocean than through the Caribbean,93 and Venezuela is playing an increasingly important role in the drug trade.94 At the same time, trafficking from South America to Europe and Asia through Western Africa has been on the rise for years.95 Today, for every ton of cocaine the United States seized at its border with Mexico, Colombia seizes eighteen at its different borders.96

The United States can enhance its surveillance capacity in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean through the existing maritime interdiction treaty including by increasing the presence of its vessels and patrol. Strengthening regional coordination mechanisms for interdiction such as the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South and the Colombia International Maritime Center Against Narcotrafficking (CIMCON) could facilitate cooperation and increase efficacy. The United States should work with Colombia to strengthen its riverine and radar capabilities, surveillance, mobility, and interdiction assets such as helicopters and fast boats. The Colombian government could also create an agency that coordinates all efforts to fight drug trafficking with the support of ONDCP.

Involved countries should also discuss the indicators they rely on to measure success.

While short-term goals are important, the region must consider policies that produce sustainable results. Since policies should change the structural conditions that facilitate the cultivation of illicit crops and trafficking of illicit substances, indicators of success should also include these outcomes. The efforts made by every country involved should also be measured and considered. The United States contributes to the fight against drugs with human capital, technological transfer, intelligence, military cooperation, and financial resources. Colombia contributes 80 percent of the monetary resources for the fight against drugs within and at its borders, with 20 percent coming through international cooperation. Colombia also contributes its institutional capacity and, crucially, risks the lives of military and police personnel as well as civilians. In the past nine years, more than 600 Colombians were wounded and 126 were killed in eradication operations,97 and hundreds of thousands have been killed in the different cycles of violence linked to drug trafficking that the country has endured in the past four decades.98 Having clear estimates of these efforts is important as the region discusses options and shared responsibilities.

Finally, as levels of cocaine consumption remain high in the United States and are increasing both in Central and South America, the United States and Colombia should implement domestic programs to prevent and reduce consumption among youth. The US-Colombia partnership should also encourage other consuming countries to devise national plans to prevent and reduce consumption.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
STEPS TO ADDRESS THE WORLD DRUG PROBLEM COLOMBIA

COLOMBIA
• Cut coca cultivation and production in half by 2023 using a combination of the most cost-effective tools at its disposal.
• The Colombian government, with the support of ONDCP, should also create an agency that coordinates all efforts to fight drug trafficking in the country.
UNITED STATES
• Increase financial and technical support, military cooperation, and intelligence assistance to combat the world drug problem. For example, the United States can increase the presence of its vessels and patrol in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean.

US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Create an innovation lab or host a formal call for proposals on innovative ways to reduce coca crops and cocaine trafficking.
• Strengthen regional coordination mechanisms for interdiction such as the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South and the Colombia International Maritime Center Against Narcotrafficking (CIMCON) to double down on the fight against drugs.
• Collaborate to strengthen Colombia’s riverine and radar capabilities, surveillance, mobility, and interdiction assets such as helicopters and fast boats.
• Countries involved in the production, trafficking, and consumption of illicit drugs in the region should come together to look at the available evidence and apply lessons learned about counternarcotics policy design and implementation, and devise stronger and more holistic measures of success.
• Work to modernize Colombia’s ports and customs agencies to boost the country’s capacity to fight drug trafficking and money laundering.
• Implement programs to prevent and reduce consumption among youth in Colombia and the United States and encourage other consuming countries to devise national plans for this same purpose.

SOCIAL LEADERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

Although overall levels of violence have decreased in Colombia in recent years,99 a new wave of violence against human rights defenders, community leaders, and social activists is spreading across several regions in the country. The targeting of social leaders started to escalate in 2016 and surged in 2018 and the first semester of 2019. Although estimates of the total number of murders vary across sources, Colombia’s Ombudsman’s Office reports 317 victims from January 2016 to April 2019,100 most of whom were peasants, Afro-Colombians, or indigenous persons. The United States has a firm commitment to the defense of human rights. As a major partner of Colombia, it is deeply concerned about these crimes and willing to support Colombia in its efforts to find a solution.

In early 2019, Colombia’s Office of the Attorney General characterized the killing of social leaders as systematic acts, which are usually perpetrated by organized criminal groups. About 14 percent of these assassinations were reported in areas with coca crops. The attacks seem to be related to vendettas and competition between different criminal groups101 as well as conflicts over land, and illicit economies such as drug trafficking, coca cultivation, and illegal mining.102 Some of the victims were leaders who opposed coca cultivation or who had joined crop-substitution programs. Emilio Archila, Colombia’s High Commissioner of Peace, cited in July 2019 that 58 leaders of the PNIS program have been assassinated since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016.103

President Duque developed and is currently implementing a new plan to protect human rights defenders, titled Timely Action Plan on Prevention and Protection for Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders, and Journalists (Plan de Acción Oportuna de Prevención y Protección para los Defensores de Derechos Humanos, Líderes Sociales y Comunales, or PAO). This plan is built on three strategic pillars. The first pillar, articulation and institutional re-engineering, aims to articulate the work of multiple agencies and norms. The second pillar, strategic action in the territory, focuses on municipalities that have widespread criminal activities and inadequate institutional responses to their needs. Finally, the third pillar, communication strategy and training, entails implementing a campaign to counteract the stigmatization of the status of “social leader” as well as to publicize existing protection and self-protection programs. The Colombian government should work with national and international civil society organizations that have been monitoring the situation of social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia to develop a progress report for the PAO. This report should include an evaluation of progress as well as clear follow-up mechanisms.

This new wave of violence has not only appalled Colombians, it has also sparked concern among US legislators104 and the international community more broadly.105 The assassination of social leaders is not only a human rights violation, it is also a stab to democratic representation, civil society, rural development, and peace. A threat to democracy and security in Colombia is a threat to US interests in the region as it undermines stability, decreases Colombia’s capacity to continue its role in addressing the crisis in Venezuela, and undermines its potential security cooperation with the region. The United States should support Colombia’s efforts to protect social leaders and end impunity by continuing to support the Attorney General’s Office in cases of human rights abuses. Moreover, it could assist with intelligence to help prevent these killings and offer financial assistance to President Duque’s Timely Action Plan on Prevention and Protection.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
PROTECTING SOCIAL LEADERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

UNITED STATES
• Continue supporting the Attorney General’s Office in cases of human rights abuses and provide intelligence assistance to help prevent crimes against social leaders and human rights defenders. The United States can also provide financial support to President Duque´s Timely Action Plan on Prevention and Protection.

COLOMBIA
• Implement fully the Timely Action Plan on Prevention and Protection for Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders, and Journalists (PAO).
• Develop a progress report for the PAO with clear follow-up mechanisms. Civil society organizations should play a role in this process.

3. Recognizing Colombia’s Leadership in the Context of the Venezuelan Regional Crisis

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The Venezuelan crisis has generated the largest migration mobilization or mass migration in the history of Latin America. Over four million people have fled Venezuela between 2015 and June 2019.106 This number is growing exponentially as conditions continue to deteriorate in Venezuela. From February 2019 to June 2019, the number of migrants increased by 17.6 percent to four million from 3.4 million. Estimates show that by the end of 2019, 5.3 million Venezuelans will have fled the country—a 32.5 percentage increase in only six months.107 By 2020, the total number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees could reach between 7.5 million and 8.2 million.108 This means that the Venezuelan exodus will surpass the Syrian refugee crisis, which displaced 6.3 million people between 2011 and 2017. If unmanaged, the mass migration of Venezuelans can destabilize the entire Western Hemisphere.

Colombia is the largest recipient of Venezuelan migrants, having received more than 1.4 million migrants as of June 2019.109 Almost 64 percent of Venezuelans in Colombia are concentrated in five departments: Bogotá, Capital District (315,528 migrants, 22.3 percent of the total); Norte de Santander (185,433, 13.2 percent); La Guajira (163,966, 11.6 percent); Atlántico (125,075, 8.9 percent); and Antioquia (112,745, 8 percent).110 These numbers will continue to rise as migration flows intensify in the coming months and years. By 2021, Colombian authorities expect the number of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia to reach four million, which would represent about 7.7 percent of the population.111

Unless the conditions pushing people to flee Venezuela (namely, the current political and economic crisis) change, the massive influx of Venezuelans will reach unprecedented proportions and host countries will be increasingly strained to address the needs of migrants and refugees. The foreign minister of Colombia, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, has already said that Colombia can no longer deal with the Venezuelan influx if the amount of international funding does not increase.

Colombia should be showcased as a global model of solidarity and commitment to helping a neighbor in crisis.

Venezuelans stand at the Rumichaca border bridge while trying to cross into Ecuador from Colombia, after new visa restrictions from the Ecuadorian government took effect in August 2019. (REUTERS/Daniel Tapia)

Colombia has demonstrated tremendous generosity and has taken extraordinary measures to address the basic needs of incoming Venezuelans. With its “open door” policy, Colombia’s government is recognizing that both countries’ histories and destinies are irrevocably intertwined. When Colombia’s conflict reached a newfound intensity in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Colombians migrated to neighboring Venezuela looking to improve their economic and security situation. According to Marco Romero Silva, director at the Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), millions of Colombians are believed to have fled to Venezuela, but specific statistics are unknown due to irregular migrant flows.112 This reveals the regional spillover effect of instability, democratic breakdown, increased violence, or economic stagnation in one country.

The Colombian government has adopted a policy of complete solidarity toward Venezuelan migrants,113 implementing a series of measures to assist them. A special focus has been given to migrants in border municipalities (Cúcuta, Maicao, Arauca and Puerto Carreño) and major cities (Bogotá, Medellín, Bucaramanga, among others) where the situation is most critical. Between 2017 and 2019, 273,000 Venezuelans were treated in the Colombian health system, 156,000 Venezuelan children and youth were enrolled in publicly funded schools, and 62,000 Venezuelans had access to public protection programs and child and family welfare services.114 The Duque administration has also made a commendable effort to regularize the legal status of Venezuelan migrants and integrate them into the labor force, offering a temporary protected status (the PEP, or Permiso Especial de Permanencia) to almost 600,000 migrants, which gives them access to legal employment, healthcare, and education.115 Recently, the government granted nationality to 24,000 children born to Venezuelan parents in Colombian territory. Previously, these children were in a condition of statelessness—neither Colombia nor Venezuela recognized them as nationals.

The Colombian government is launching other policies and initiatives to facilitate the integration of Venezuelans into Colombia’s society and economy. Colombia should be showcased as a global model of solidarity and commitment to helping a neighbor in crisis. The leadership that the country has demonstrated is admirable and should be further backed by the international community—in diplomatic, technical, and financial support—to achieve a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela and put an end to this regional migratory and humanitarian crisis. Continued engagement with the Lima Group regional bloc, of which Colombia is a member, will be critical in this quest.

Naturally, the Venezuelan migration crisis is placing significant strains on Colombia’s economy as well as its healthcare and education systems. A 2018 country report by the World Bank estimates that Colombia’s fiscal costs associated with the influx of Venezuelans are approximately 0.4 percent of GDP in 2019.116 Fiscal costs will peak in 2020 as a result of Colombia’s efforts to provide migrants and refugees with access to quality healthcare, education, housing, and other basic needs. These costs represent a major economic strain for a country working to implement a peace agreement and seeking to secure institutional control of all its territory. The United States and Colombia should create a task force of experts to calculate the exact fiscal impact and funding that Colombia will require to successfully absorb the growing number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees. This is a necessary step to developing a sound response strategy to the situation in the short, medium, and long term.

At the same time, Colombia has almost eight million internally displaced people, and, despite the peace accord with the FARC, violence and criminality continue to strike a large portion of its territory. That peace deal is further threatened by the Maduro regime, which has welcomed with open arms Jesús Santrich and Iván Marquez, former senior FARC leaders. Venezuelan territory is now used as a launching point and safe haven for criminal organizations to mount attacks inside Colombia. These security concerns reinforce the need for appropriate funding for Colombia in the midst of a wave of migrants and refugees.

In late 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration announced the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RRM Response Plan) and asked for $738 million in funding to assist 2.7 million Venezuelan migrants in Latin America between January and December 2019.117 However, by July 2019, only 23.7 percent of this request had been fulfilled.118 Considering that USAID estimates migrants and refugees to reach 5.3 million by the end of 2019, this level of funding, even if fully met, is largely insufficient. The United States and Colombia should call on the international donor community to fully fund the UN’s funding request.

For Colombia specifically, the RRM Response Plan allocates $315.5 million in funding, of which only about 30 percent has been fulfilled. This response plan estimates that around 1.1 million refugees and migrants will need assistance in Colombia in 2019. These estimates are much lower than USAID’s calculations, which show a total of 1.9 million people in Colombia in need of assistance as a result of the Venezuela regional crisis.119 Total US government funding to Colombia for the Venezuela regional response in FY 2018 and FY 2019 amounts to $89.9 million.120

Although critical, current international aid to Colombia is insufficient given the prolonged nature of the crisis and the growing number of migrants and refugees crossing the border. According to Colombian Foreign Minister Trujillo, Colombia has received international funds that equate to approximately $68 per migrant, significantly lower than the $500 to $900 donated per person for migrants and refugees from Syria, South Sudan, and Myanmar.121 The international community should increase its financial, diplomatic, and technical support to Colombia as it plays a leadership role in responding to the Venezuela situation.

Specifically, the United States can support Colombia’s efforts by enhancing the country’s technology to gather and process data on Venezuelans crossing the border. This assistance will not only enhance security but also facilitate the integration process of migrants and refugees into the Colombian economy and society. Technology assistance should be accompanied by training to local authorities on how to design and implement effective systems for migration and integration.

The US-Colombia partnership should also combat disinformation around the Venezuela regional crisis, manage public misconceptions about migrants, and prevent the rise of xenophobia and discrimination. Xenophobic sentiments and attitudes toward migrants are driven by the misconception that migrants pose security threats, drain national resources, and take away jobs from local workers. However, studies specific to Colombia show that crime does not increase in areas with a higher number of Venezuelan migrants,122 and migration can have positive effects on the national economy of host countries.

Although critical, current international aid to Colombia is insufficient given the prolonged nature of the crisis and the growing number of migrants and refugees crossing the border.

If properly integrated into the formal labor market, Venezuelan migrants can make many contributions to the economy of recipient countries: filling formal sector labor shortages and expanding the labor supply; creating formal jobs through their own entrepreneurship; raising GDP with increased consumption of goods and services; and expanding government tax revenues.123 The Colombian government, in partnership with civil society and private-sector companies, should conduct campaigns to inform the population about the Venezuela regional crisis, combat the narrative that migrants pose threats to national security, and explain the positive economic impacts of regularizing Venezuelan’s migrant status and incorporating them into the labor force.

As a result of Venezuela’s democratic breakdown and deteriorating security and economic conditions, the Colombia-Venezuela border has become a hub for criminal activities of all kinds, which provide a source of funding to the Maduro regime and threaten regional stability. Undermining these illegal activities will put new financial pressures on the Maduro regime and weaken its support. The US-Colombia partnership should devote further resources to combatting illegal activities and illicit armed groups in the border areas.

Venezuela also now serves as a key transit point for drug shipments coming from Colombia to the United States and Europe. As a result, several armed groups are competing for control of drug trafficking routes and other contraband flows, which inevitably generates increased levels of violence and leads to human rights violations. The National Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym, ELN), FARC dissidents, and the Popular Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym, EPL) have been the major actors controlling the smuggling and trafficking market in the Colombia-Venezuela border.124 With the unfolding of the political, economic, and social crisis in Venezuela, other armed groups have emerged in the border region: criminal gangs such as “La Linea,” Venezuelan paramilitaries known as “Colectivos,” and Colombian drug-trafficking groups such as the “Rastrojos,” the “Urabeños,” and the “bandas criminales” or BACRIM.125 In the past decade, the United States has also reported the involvement of Hezbollah, the armed wing of the Lebanese Shiite Muslim political party, with drug-trafficking activities in Venezuela.126 In addition to the illicit trade of drugs along the border, armed groups are engaging in illegal mining, arms trafficking, contraband fuel and gold trade, human smuggling and trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and money laundering. Oil and crude smuggled from Venezuela into Colombia alone have a value of between $1.5 billion and $3 billion per year.127 The United States can contribute to border control by providing Colombia with better technology to monitor and secure the border including sensors and drones.

As the political and economic crisis in Venezuela worsens and migration flows intensify, Venezuelan migrants are increasingly at risk of being recruited by illicit armed groups. Vulnerable populations are the most susceptible to forceful or voluntary recruitment by criminal organizations. Venezuelan migrants and refugees, including children and teenagers, have already been recruited by the BACRIM,128 the ELN, FARC dissidents, and the EPL129 as combatants, smugglers, informants, or hitmen. Additionally, a vast number of Venezuelan migrants, especially women and children, are falling prey to gross transitional crimes and human rights violations, including extortion, rape, human smuggling, and human trafficking. The United States and Colombia have a vested interest in working together to prevent such recruitments. This collaboration should include intelligence sharing and working together to provide for development of Colombia’s rural areas—the core of the peace accord—to counteract the conditions that breed the rise and expansion of criminal organizations.

The Venezuelan crisis has profound implications for the prospect of peace in Colombia, US national security interests, and regional stability. The United States and the international community should therefore increase their financial assistance to Colombia to support its efforts to absorb more than 1.4 million Venezuelans. Although responding to the immediate humanitarian needs of Venezuelans is vital, future assistance should focus on their medium- and long-term integration into host countries.

Events inside Venezuela bear implications for the rest of Latin America, the United States, Europe, and beyond. Most timely for Colombia is receiving both the resources to manage the inflow of migrants and refugees and the assistance to combat criminal organizations that operate out of Venezuela and launch attacks in Colombian territory. A strong security component, in particular, is needed as the nonstate armed actors operating in Venezuela and along its borders pose significant challenges to Venezuela’s stabilization and return to democracy. These groups already threaten peace and security in Colombia.

At the same time, Colombia, given its experience with nonstate armed groups, should work closely with the Venezuelan interim government to implement and enhance the security components of the National Assembly’s Plan País stabilization and reconstruction plan. The US-Colombia partnership can further support the interim government’s democratic restoration plans by creating a task force with international experts on stabilization of territories and the transition to democracy. Task force members with security expertise could provide intelligence cooperation to the Venezuelan interim government, as well as advice on how to promote rule of law and strengthen national institutions.

Given the fragility of political transitions, Colombia and the United States should assist Venezuela to peacefully restore democracy. To do so, the United States should work with Colombia to strengthen Colombia’s internal institutions and devise a ten-year national plan to better support the interim government in the reconstruction of Venezuela.

US-COLOMBIA PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
THE VENEZUELAN REGIONAL CRISIS

COLOMBIA
• Continue to play a leadership role in the international arena to achieve a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela. Do so specifically through continued engagement with the Lima Group regional bloc.
• Continue working to assist and integrate Venezuelan migrants and refugees crossing the border by regularizing the legal status and granting work permits
• Conduct campaigns to inform the population about the Venezuela regional crisis, combat xenophobic narratives and discrimination, and explain the positive economic impacts of integrating Venezuelan migrants into the Colombian economy and society.


UNITED STATES
• Increase its financial, diplomatic, and technical support to Colombia as it plays a leadership role in responding to the Venezuela situation. Examples of technology assistance include:

a) Enhancing Colombia’s existing capacity to gather and process data on Venezuelan migrants crossing the border. This will not only help manage security threats but also facilitate the social and economic integration of Venezuelan migrants.

b) Contribute to border control by working with Colombia to deploy sensors, drones, and other monitoring technologies in the Colombia-Venezuela border area.


US-COLOMBIA PARTNERSHIP
• Ask the international donor community to fully fund the $738 million requested by the UN to help Colombia respond to the Venezuelan migration crisis.
• Create a Task Force on stabilization of territories and transitions to democracy and include international experts who can provide intelligence cooperation to the Venezuelan interim government and advice on how to promote rule of law and strengthen national institutions.
• Create a Task Force of experts to calculate the exact fiscal impact on and funding needed by Colombia to absorb the growing number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

The Takeaways

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For decades, the strategic alliance between Colombia and the United States has focused on, and succeeded in, safeguarding both nations’ most pressing security interests. Today, with Colombia’s improved security situation, strengthened economy, and increased regional leadership, the bilateral relationship is expanding to also include mutually beneficial and deepened economic and diplomatic interactions.

A strengthened and modernized US-Colombia partnership involves deepening bilateral trade and investment, promoting rural development in Colombia, cooperating to find a solution to the world drug problem, and finding a peaceful solution to the Venezuela regional crisis. Solidifying the strategic partnership along these pillars will allow Colombia and the United States to advance their national security and economic and geopolitical interests, while also promoting regional stability and strengthening democratic institutions throughout the Western Hemisphere. In this report, the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force developed a roadmap for action that provides targeted, fresh ideas on how to strengthen bilateral cooperation in these areas.

The multisectoral, nonpartisan, bicameral, and binational nature of the task force has enabled it to devise concrete and actionable recommendations that provide the Duque administration, the Trump administration, and the US Congress with a comprehensive and multifaced strategy. If embraced, Colombia will move forward in its path toward peace and prosperity, the United States will reap the security and economic benefits of its $11 billion Plan Colombia investment, and the region will experience the stabilizing effect of a deepened and strategic US-Colombia alliance.

To succeed, a renewed US-Colombia partnership must be sustained, nonpartisan, and adequately resourced. Colombia still faces a number of challenges, intensified by the mass influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, and the United States stands in a unique position to help Colombia manage these challenges. In today’s interconnected world, stability and prosperity in Colombia will directly benefit the United States. This is especially true given Colombia’s leadership around the Venezuela regional crisis, its strategic cooperation with the United States on global security, and its privileged geopolitical position to manage extrahemispheric interventions in the region. Today more than ever, the United States should work with one of its strongest global allies to advance both nations’ security, economic, and political interests.

Task Force Co-Chairs and Members

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CO-CHAIRS


The Hon. Roy Blunt
US Senator (R-MO)

The Hon. Ben Cardin
US Senator (D-MD)


CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS


The Hon. Bradley Byrne
US Representative (R-AL)

The Hon. Ruben Gallego
US Representative (D-AZ)

The Hon. Gregory Meeks
US Representative (D-NY)

The Hon. Francis Rooney
US Representative (R-FL)


MEMBERS


Felipe Ardila
Principal
Tinello Capital

Cynthia J. Arnson
Director, Latin American Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Ambassador Bernard Aronson
Former US Special Envoy for the Colombian Peace Process (2015) and former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (1989-1993), US Department of State; Founder and Managing Partner, ACON Investments

The Honorable Rand Beers
Former Acting Secretary of Homeland Security (2013)
US Department of Homeland Security

Ambassador William Brownfield
Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Depart.ment of State; Former US Ambassador to Colombia (2007-2010); Former US Ambassador to Venezuela (2004 -2007)

Andrés Cadena
Senior Partner
McKinsey & Company

Rosario Córdoba
President
Consejo Privado de Competitividad

Stephen Donehoo
Managing Partner
McLarty Associates

Catalina Escobar Restrepo
Founder and President
Fundación Juanfe

Daniel W. Fisk
Former US Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, National Security Council (2005-2009); Chief Operations Officer, International Republican Institute

Ambassador Robert Gelbard
Former US Assistant Secretary of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (1993-1997); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Inter-American Affairs (1991-1993); Deputy Assistant Secretary, South American Affairs (1985-1988)

The Honorable Maria Claudia Lacouture
Former Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (2016-2017)
Republic of Colombia

María Victoria Llorente
Executive Director
Fundación Ideas para la Paz

Thomas F. “Mack” McLarty, III
Former White House Chief of Staff (1993-1994); Co-Founder and Chairman, McLarty Associates

Bruce Mac Master
President
Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI)

Luis Fernando Mejía
Executive Director
Fedesarrollo

Alejandro Mesa
Partner
Baker McKenzie

Ambassador Roger F. Noriega
Former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere (2003-2005); Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Juan Estebán Orduz
President
Colombian Coffee Federation, North America Subsidiary of the National Federation of Coffee Grow.ers of Colombia (FNC)

Missy Owens
Director, Government Relations, Federal and Diplomatic
Coca-Cola Company

Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzón
Former Ambassador to the United States (2015-2017), Republic of Colombia; Former Minister of Defense of Colombia (2011-2015); President, Fundación para el Progreso de la Región Capital (ProBogotá)

Alejandro Santo Domingo
President
Grupo Santo Domingo

Michael Shifter
President
The Inter-American Dialogue

Ambassador Arturo Valenzuela
Former US Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere (2009-2011); Senior Latin America Advisor, Covington & Burling

Jorge Mario Velásquez
Chief Executive Officer
Grupo Argos SA

Simmonetta Verdi
Director, Government and Community Relations
Ford Motor Company

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Adrienne Arsht for her generous support, without which the work of this task force would not have been possible.

A special thanks to everyone who helped create this task force and who provided support and insight over the last year. First and foremost, thank you to Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) for their leadership as co-chairs of this task force. It was a true pleasure and honor to work with them and to see how successful bipartisan efforts come to fruition. In addition, we are deeply grateful to Congressmen Bradley Byrne (R-AL), Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), Gregory Meeks, (D-NY), and Francis Rooney (R-FL) for their commitment to strengthening US-Colombia relations. Thank you to Daniel Burgess, Katherine Close, Daniel Friedman, Joe Bartlett, Miriam Fry, Robert Ikoku, and Sophia Lafargue for facilitating the unwavering cooperation of our co-chairs and House members.

Our gratitude goes out to the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center team, under the leadership of Jason Marczak and Paula García Tufró, who worked tirelessly to convene the task force and whose passion for a prosperous US-Colombia strategic partnership is reflected in the pages of this report. Camila Hernandez, program assistant, was an instrumental force behind this project from start to finish. She played a key role in steering the vision of the task force, drafting the report, and coordinating the multiple task force meetings and communications. Katherine Pereira, assistant director until April 2017, provided invaluable research and logistical support. We thank Roberta Braga for her guidance and support throughout the production process. We also thank Andrea Trujillo, who joined the Center as a consultant in May, and provided crucial expertise, important feedback, and logistical support.

For decisive input, thorough research, and the original drafting of this report we thank Ana Arjona. For his valuable input and ideas, we thank Steve Hege. For her precise editorial assistance and good-spirited flexibility, we thank Susan J. Cavan, Atlantic Council editor. We would also like to extend our thanks to Donald Partyka and Nikita Kataev for their exceptional design of yet another Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center report.

Most importantly, we thank our task force members for their passion, commitment, expertise, and leadership. Their unwavering commitment to strengthening the US-Colombia partnership and their many ideas helped to guide the work of the task force.


1    Embassy of Colombia, “Colombia and the United States: A Successful Trade Alliance,” https://www.colombiaemb.org/TradeAlliance.
2    “Venezolanos en Colombia,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores – Gobierno de Colombia, August 1, 2019, http://migracioncolombia.gov.co/index.php/es/prensa/infografias/infografias-2019/12565-infografia-venezolanos-en-colombia.
3    El Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (CONPES), “Estrategia Para La Atención de la Migración desde Venezuela,” November 23, 2018, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/3950.pdf.
4    The World Bank, “US$31.5 Million to Help Improve Services for Migrants from Venezuela and Host Communities in Colombia,” April 12, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/12/us315-million-to-help-improve-services-for-migrants-from-venezuela-and-host-communities-in-colombia.
5    “ELN in Venezuela,” InSight Crime, March 11, 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/eln-in-venezuela/.
6    Congressional Research Service, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” February 8, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf.
7    Dirección de Justicia, Seguridad y Gobierno (DJSG) and Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Públicas (DSEPP), “Plan Colombia: Balance de los 15 años,” Departamento Nacional de Planeación – Government of Colombia, 2016, https://sinergia.dnp.gov.co/Documentospercent20depercent20Interes/PLAN_COLOMBIA_Boletin_180216.pdf.
8    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Colombia – Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2016,” July 2017, https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2017/julio/CENSO_2017_WEB_baja.pdf.
9    Juan Carlos Garzón Vergara, Juan David Gelvez F., and Ángela María Silva Aparicio, “Los costos humanos de la erradicación forzada ¿es el glifosato la solución?,” Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, March 7, 2019, http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1734.
10    Red Nacional de Información, “Inicio,” Unidad Victimas – Government of Colombia, August 1, 2019, https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/.
11    “Homicidios en Colombia: La tasa más baja en los últimos 42 años se dio en 2017,” El Espectador, January 21, 2018, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/homicidios-en-colombia-la-tasa-mas-baja-en-los-ultimos-42-anos-se-dio-en-2017-articulo-734526.
12    United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Colombia,” July 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13896.doc.htm.
13    United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Colombia.”
14    El Tiempo, “Estos son los grupos armados que azotan a varios departamentos,” July 23, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/regiones-del-pais-afectadas-por-grupos-armados-en-colombia-391642.
15    Red Nacional de Información, “Desplazamiento – Personas: Registro Unico de Victimas,” Unidad Victimas – Government of Colombia, August 1, 2019, https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Home/Desplazamiento.
16    José David Rodríguez Gómez, “Más de 317 líderes sociales han sido asesinados en el último año: Medicina Legal,” RCN Radio, May 15, 2019, https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/mas-de-317-lideres-sociales-han-sido-asesinados-en-el-ultimo-ano-medicina-legal.
17    Atlantic Council, “A Roadmap for US Engagement with Colombia,” May 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/A_Roadmap_for_US_Engagement_with_Colombia_web_0517.pdf.
18    Congressional Research Service, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.
19    Miguel Silva, “Path to Peace and Prosperity: The Colombian Miracle,” Atlantic Council, 2015, http:// publications.atlanticcouncil.org/colombia-miracle/; United States Senate, “S.Res.368 – A resolution supporting efforts by the Government of Colombia to pursue peace and the end of the country’s enduring internal armed conflict and recognizing United States support for Colombia at the 15th anniversary of Plan Colombia,” 2016, https://www. congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senateresolution/368/text.
20    The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Santos of Colombia at Plan Colombia Reception,” February 4, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/remarks-president-obama-and-president-santos-colombia-plan-colombia; The White House, “Fact Sheet: Peace Colombia — A New Era of Partnership between the United States and Colombia,” February 4, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership-between-united-states-and.
21    The White House, “Fact Sheet: Peace Colombia — A New Era of Partnership between the United States and Colombia.”
22    Congressional Research Service, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations.”
23    Peter J. Meyer, and Edward Y. Gracia, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2019 Appropriations,” Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45547.pdf.
24    Congressional Budget Justification, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, And Related Programs: Fiscal Year 2020,” May 22, 2019, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Supplementary-Tables-%E2%80%93-Foreign-Operations.pdf.
25    Myriam Ortega, “Colombia Boosts Peace Missions Participation,” Diálogo, February 12, 2018, https://dialogo-americas.com/en/articles/colombia-boosts-peace-missions-participation.
26    Diego Felipe Vera, “Cooperación Internacional y Seguridad: el Caso Colombiano,” in Memorias del Seminario Académico “Prospectivas en seguridad y defensa en Colombia,” ed. Vera (Libros Escuela Superior de Guerra, 2018), 41-47, https://esdeguelibros.edu.co/index.php/editorial/catalog/download/28/24/404-1?inline=1.
27    “Outcomes of Current U.S. Trade Agreements,” US State Department, https://www.state.gov/trade-agreements/outcomes-of-current-u-s-trade-agreements/.
28    Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, “Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda,” Government of Colombia, 2018, https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/demografia-y-poblacion/censo-nacional-de-poblacion-y-vivenda-2018; United States International Trade Commission, “Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (2018), Basic Edition,” 2018, https://hts.usitc.gov/view/list.
29    Anabel González, “Latin America – China Trade and Investment Amid Global Tensions,” The Atlantic Council, December 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Latin-America-China-Trade-and-Investment-Amid-Global-Tensions.pdf.
30    González, “Latin America – China Trade and Investment Amid Global Tensions.”
31    World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS), “Colombia Trade at a Glance : Most Recent Values,” The World Bank, 2019, https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/COL.
32    “China moves into Latin America,” The Economist, February 3rd, 2019, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/02/03/china-moves-into-latin-america.
33    Christian Camilo Vargas Isaza et al., “Tercerización e intermediación laboral: balance y retos,” Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI), June 2019, http://www.andi.com.co/Uploads/Tercerizacio%CC%81n%20e%20intermediacio%CC%81n%20laboral%20balance%20y%20retos%20Colombia%20CESLA.pdf.
34    SelectUSA, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Colombia,” July 2019, https://www.selectusa.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t0000000LKM6.
35    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Details of Tax Revenue – Colombia,” 2018, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LAC_REVCOL.
36    The Colombian Government has established a progressive path to reduce corporate taxes from 33 % to 30 % over the next four years.
37    Daniel Bunn, “Corporate Tax Rates Around the World, 2018,” Tax Foundation, November 2017, 2018, https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-tax-rates-around-world-2018/.
38    Rafael De la Cruz, Leandro Gastón Andrián, and Mario Loterszpil, “Colombia: Toward a High-income Country with Social Mobility,” Inter-American Development Bank, January 2016, https://publications.iadb.org/en/colombia-toward-high-income-country-social-mobility.
39    De la Cruz, Andrián, and Loterszpil, “Colombia: Toward a High-income Country with Social Mobility.”
40    Asociación Nacional de Instituciones Financieras (ANIF), “Reducción del efectivo y tamaño de la economía subterránea en Colombia,” May 2017, http://www.anif.co/sites/default/files/investigaciones/anif-asobancaria-efectivo0517.pdf.
41    DANE, “Tercer Censo Nacional Agropecuario: Tomo 2 – Resultados,” November 2016, https://www.dane.gov.co/files/images/foros/foro-de-entrega-de-resultados-y-cierre-3-censo-nacional-agropecuario/CNATomo2-Resultados.pdf.
42    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Estudios Económicos de la OCDE: Colombia,” May 2017, http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Colombia-2017-OECD-economic-survey-overview-spanish.pdf.
43    The World Bank, “Enterprise surveys : Colombia country profile 2010,” in Enterprise surveys country profile, (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2010), http://espanol.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2010/colombia#informality.
44    Alexander Cotte Poveda et al., “Indicadores de Ciencia y Tecnología Colombia 2018,” Observatorio Colombiano de Ciencia y Tecnología, April 2018, https://www.ocyt.org.co/proyectos-y-productos/informe-anual-de-indicadores-de-ciencia-y-tecnologia-2018/.
45    Ronald S. Jarmin in his 1999 study finds that firms that participated in manufacturing extension partnership (MEP) programs in the United States experienced between 3.4 and 16 percent higher labor productivity growth between 1987 and 1992 than nonparticipating firms. Ronald S. Jarmin, “Evaluating the Impact of Manufacturing Extension on Productivity Growth,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 18, no.1 (1999), 99–119.
46    “El ranking mundial más grande según su dominio del inglés,” EF, 2018, https://www.ef.com/wwes/epi/.
47    Semana, “Colombia y su preocupante nivel de inglés,” April 10, 2017, https://www.semana.com/educacion/articulo/bilinguismo-nivel-de-ingles-en-colombia/542736.
48    “Colombia Purdue Partnership,” Purdue University, https://www.purdue.edu/colombia/.
49    US Department of State, “2018 Fact Sheet: Colombia,” in Open Doors. Report on International Educational Exchange, 2018, https://p.widencdn.net/19i6p4/Open-Doors-2018-Colombia.
50    US Department of State, “2018 Fact Sheet: Latin America & Caribbean,” in Open Doors. Report on International Educational Exchange, 2018, https://p.widencdn.net/46tto7/Open-Doors-2018-Latin-America-and-Caribbean.
51    “Best Universities in Latin America 2019,” Times Higher Education, June 18, 2019, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/student/best-universities/best-universities-latin-america.
52    Helen Murphy, and Luis Jaime Acosta, “Special Report: A fractured peace – violent rivals rush into FARC void in Colombia,” Reuters, April 26, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-peace-special-report/special-report-a-fractured-peace-violent-rivals-rush-into-farc-void-in-colombia-idUSKBN1HX2BD.
53    Javier Jules, “Tras la caída de ‘Guacho’, autoridades analizan estrategias para enfrentar grupos armados,” La FM – RCN Radio, December 24, 2018, https://www.lafm.com.co/colombia/tras-la-caida-de-guacho-autoridades-analizan-las-estrategias-para-enfrentar-grupos-armados.
54    Caracol Radio, “Colombia sigue siendo el país con más número de desplazados internos con 7,4 millones: Acnur,” June 19, 2016, https://caracol.com.co/radio/2017/06/19/nacional/1497887381_656795.html.
55    Santiago Torrado, “La violencia aumenta en varias regiones de Colombia, alerta Cruz Roja,” El País, March 29, 2019, https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/03/28/colombia/1553795131_179462.html.
56    El Tiempo, “Van 114 desmovilizados de las Farc asesinados,” May 15, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/desmovilizados-de-las-farc-asesinados-tras-el-proceso-de-paz-361882.
57    UNODC, “¿Quiénes son las familias que viven en las zonas con cultivos de coca?: Caracterización de las familias beneficiarias del Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos (PNIS),” August 2018, https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2018/Agosto/Quienes_son_las_familias_que_viven_en_las_zonas_con_cultivos_de_coca_N.1.pdf.
58    Hernando Zuleta, “Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico,” Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, Documentos CEDE no.42, June 2017, https://economia.uniandes.edu.co/components/com_booklibrary/ebooks/dcede2017-42.pdf.
59    UNODC, “¿Quiénes son las familias que viven en las zonas con cultivos de coca?”
60    UNODC, “¿Quiénes son las familias que viven en las zonas con cultivos de coca?”
61    UNODC, “¿Quiénes son las familias que viven en las zonas con cultivos de coca?”
62    UNODC, “Colombia – Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2018,” August 2019, https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2019/Agosto/Informe_de_Monitoreo_de_Territorios_Afectador_por_Cultivos_Ilicitos_en_Colombia_2018_.pdf.
63    “Fondos de Cooperación,” Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional de Colombia, https://www.apccolombia.gov.co/seccion/fondos-de-cooperacion.
64    Consejería Presidencial para las Comunicaciones, “Zonas futuro: Zonas Estratégicas de intervención Integral,” accessed on September 5, 2019, https://id.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/190808-Infografia-Zonas-Futuro.pdf.
65    Presidencia de la República de Colombia, “Paz con legalidad,” accessed on September 5, 2019, http://www.posconflicto.gov.co/Documents/politica-estabilizacion-Paz-con-legalidad.pdf.
66    Gobierno de Colombia, “Política de defensa y seguridad PDS,” January 2019, https://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/politica_defensa_deguridad2019.pdf.
67    Minjusticia, “Ruta futuro: Política Integral para Enfrentar el problema de las drogas,” December 2018, http://www.minjusticia.gov.co/Portals/0/Documentos/RUTA_FUTURO_POLITICA_INTEGRAL.pdf.
68    “Historias de Vida,” Corporación Colombia Internacional, http://www.cci.org.co/historias-de-vida/
69    Consejería Presidencial para la Estabilización y la Consolidación, “Fundación Buffet, Nespresso y Fedecafé en alianza para apoyar la sustitución de cultivos del Gobierno,” Gobierno de Colombia, May 29, 2019, http://www.posconflicto.gov.co/sala-prensa/noticias/2019/Paginas/cafe.aspx.
70    UNODC, “Colombia – Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2018.”
71    Maria Alejandra Velez et al., “Is Collective Titling Enough to Protect Forests? Evidence from Afro-Descendant Communities in the Colombian Pacific Region,” Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, Documentos CEDE no.2019-03, February 14, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334497.
72    Ana Arijona, “Institutions, Civilian Resistance, and Wartime Social Order: A Process‐driven Natural Experiment in the Colombian Civil War,” Latin America Politics and Society 58-3 (2016), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2016.00320.x.
73    María Alejandra Vélez, and Iván Lobo, “Challenges of Organised Community Resistance in the Context of Illicit Economies and Drug War Policies: Insights from Colombia,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development 1-1 (2019), 72-79, https://jied.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/jied.15/.
74    Maria Alejandra Velez et al., “Recomendaciones para el diseño e implementación de incentivos para la conservación en paisajes agricolas,” Foro Nacional Ambiental, August 2017, http://www.foronacionalambiental.org.co/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/CONSERVACION-EN-PAISAJES-AGRICOLAS-web.pdf.
75    The World Bank, “Colombia’s Multipurpose Registry Will Become a Reality with World Bank Support,” March 14, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/03/14/colombias-multipurpose-registry-will-become-a-reality-with-world-bank-support.
76    Alicia Liliana Méndez, “Cuando comunidades erradican cultivos de coca, es menor la resiembra,” El Tiempo, February 27, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/resiembra-es-de-0-6-en-7-puntos-donde-se-erradico-voluntariamente-331762.
77    Juan Carlos Garzón, Juan David Gélvez, and José Luis Bernal, “¿En qué va la sustitución de cultivos ilícitos? Desafíos, dilemas actuales y la urgencia de un consenso,” Fundación Ideas para la Paz, April 2019, http://ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_sustitucion_VOL06.pdf.
78    Building on successful examples in Colombia and abroad, Fundación Ideas para la Paz has proposed a program that entails selecting candidates with exceptional skills and training them to address the specific needs of identified municipalities where they will work for two to three years as coaches of public servants as well as participants in regular work processes and new initiatives. The program covers the expenses and honoraria of these professionals and offers them support throughout their tenure.
79    Semana, “Mejores vías para el campo,” October 4, 2018, https://www.semana.com/contenidos-editoriales/infraestructura-la-transformacion-de-un-pais/articulo/mejores-vias-para-el-campo/563113.
80    Simón Gaviria Muñoz, “Política para la Gestión de la Red Terciaria: Prepuesto Informado por Resultados,” PowerPoint Presentation, Deparamento Nacional de Planeación, accessed on September 5, 2019, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Prensa/Presentaciones/RED%20TERCIARIA%20CCI%20-%20DNP.pdf.
81    Gaviria Muñoz, “Política para la Gestión de la Red Terciaria.”
82    “Federación Nacional de Cafeteros ejecutará obras en 10 departamentos,” Federación de Cafeteros, February 2018, https://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/pergamino-fnc/index.php/comments/federacion_nacional_de_cafeteros_ejecutara_obras_en_10_departamentos/.
83    Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “OECD Economic Surveys: Colombia 2017,” May 25, 2017, https://www.oecd.org/countries/colombia/oecd-economic-surveys-colombia-2017-eco-surveys-col-2017-en.htm.
84    Juan Camilo Montoya E., “Concluir ocho autopistas 4G, meta del gobierno Duque,” El Colombiano, May 27, 2019, https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/gobierno-duque-proyecta-concluir-ocho-autopistas-4g-DM10851750.
85    “Conectamos a la Colombia Rural,” Gobierno de Colombia, https://colombiarural.invias.gov.co/.
86    Carlos Campos Cruz, and Management Systems International, “Modelo participativo de base comunitaria para la gestión de la red vial terciaria en Colombia,” USAID/Colombia EVAL, October 28, 2016, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N1BD.pdf.
87    UNODC, “Colombia – Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2018.”
88    Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Engel Launds Launch of Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission,” US House of Representatives, May 22, 2019, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2019/5/engel-lauds-launch-of-western-hemisphere-drug-policy-commission.
89    Zuleta, “Coca, cocaína y narcotráfico.”
90    W. J. Hennigan, “The U.S. Sent Its Most Advanced Fighter Jets to Blow Up Cheap Opium Labs. Now It’s Canceling the Program,” Time, February 21, 2019, https://time.com/5534783/iron-tempest-afghanistan-opium/.
91    Department of Homeland Security, “8 Finalists Announced in $1.55m Challenge for New Solutions to Detect Opioids in International Mail,” June 11, 2019, https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/06/11/8-finalists-announced-155m-challenge-new-solutions-detect-opioids-international-mail.
92    Douglas Marin, “Costa Rica Becomes Hub of Drug Cartels,” Latin American Herald Tribune, accessed on September 5, 2019, http://laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=349013&CategoryId=23558
93    Juan Diego Posada, “Traffickers are turning the Pacific Ocean into a drug-smuggling superhighway,” Business Insider, March 7, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/traffickers-are-turning-the-pacific-into-a-drug-smuggling-superhighway-2019-3.
94    Nick Paton Walsh, Natalie Gallón and Diana Castrillon, “Corruption in Venezuela has created a cocaine superhighway to the US,” CNN, April 17, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/17/americas/venezuela-drug-cocaine-trafficking-intl/index.html.
95    Sean Duncan, “Narcotics trafficking through West African waters,” Stable Seas, November 2, 2019, https://stableseas.org/illicit-trades/narcotics-trafficking-west-africa.
96    María Camila Roa, “Por cada tonelada de cocaína que decomisa EE.UU., Colombia incauta 18: Whitaker,” BLU Radio, July 8, 2019, https://www.bluradio.com/nacion/por-cada-tonelada-de-cocaina-que-decomisa-eeuu-colombia-incauta-18-whitaker-219728-ie174
97    Garzón Vergara, Gelvez F., and Silva Aparicio, “Los costos humanos de la erradicación forzada ¿es el glifosato la solución?”
98    “Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia,” Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, accessed on September 5, 2019, http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.html.
99    El Colombiano, “Tasa de homicidios en Colombia en 2017 es la más baja en 30 años,” December 26, 2017, https://www.elcolombiano.com/colombia/tasa-de-homicidios-en-colombia-bajo-en-2017-GX7918080.
100    Rodríguez Gómez, “Más de 317 líderes sociales han sido asesinados en el último año: Medicina Legal.”
101    Mininterior, “Plan de acción oportuna de prevención y protección para los defensores de derechos humanos, líderes sociales, comunales y periodistas,” accessed on September 5, 2019, https://www.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/plan_de_accion_oportuna_de_prevencion_y_proteccion_0.pdf
102    Mininterior, “Plan de acción oportuna de prevención y protección para los defensores de derechos humanos, líderes sociales, comunales y periodistas.”
103    Redacción Colombia 2020, “Las medidas del Gobierno para proteger a líderes de sustitución de cultivos,” El Espectador, July 16, 2019, https://www.elespectador.com/colombia2020/pais/las-medidas-del-gobierno-para-proteger-lideres-de-sustitucion-de-cultivos-articulo-871222.
104    US Congress, Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Hearing on Peace and Victims’ Rights in Colombia, 116th Cong. (2019), https://humanrightscommission.house.gov/events/hearings/peace-and-victims-rights-colombia.
105    Albiol Marina et al., “Letter to European Parliament’s Hon. President Santos, Ministers, and Public Prosecutor’s Office,” March 16, 2018, http://www.omct.org/files/2018/03/24777/180316_letter_european_parliament.pdf.
106    “Situación en Venezuela,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed on September 5, 2019, https://www.acnur.org/situacion-en-venezuela.html.
107    USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis,” April 10, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/04.10.19_-_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Fact_Sheet_2.pdf.
108    OAS Working Group, “Preliminary Report on the Venezuelan Migrant and Refugee Crisis in the Region,” Organization of American States, March 8, 2019, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Preliminary-Report-2019-on-Venezuelan-Migrant-and-Refugee-Crisis-in-the-Region.pdf.
109    “Venezolanos en Colombia.”
110    “Venezolanos en Colombia.”
111    Julia Symmes Cobb, “Four million Venezuelans may live in Colombia by 2021: minister,” Reuters, October 2, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-migration-colombia/four-million-venezuelans-may-live-in-colombia-by-2021-minister-idUSKCN1MC2NZ.
112    Megan Janetsky, “Here’s Why Colombia Opened Its Arms to Venezuelan Migrants—Until Now,” Foreign Policy, January 14, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/14/heres-why-colombia-opened-its-arms-to-venezuelan-migrants-until-now/.
113    CONPES, ““Estrategia Para La Atención de la Migración desde Venezuela.”
114    Data provided by the office of Colombia’s Venezuela Border Czar.
115    “Venezolanos en Colombia.”
116    The World Bank, “US$31.5 Million to Help Improve Services for Migrants from Venezuela and Host Communities in Colombia.”
117    “2019 Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed on September 5, 2019, http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/21600?_ga=2.263278924.1937849855.1566829714-1981709478.1566829714.
118    United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Venezuela Situation,” June 2019, http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Update%20on%20Venezuela%20Situation%20-%20June%202019.pdf
119    USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis.”
120    USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis.”
121    Al Jazeera, “Colombia: International aid for Venezuelan migrants is too low,” August 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/ajimpact/colombia-international-aid-venezuelan-migrants-190820210642930.html.
122    Fundación Ideas para la Paz, “Seguridad ciudadana y migración venezolana,” January 27, 2019, http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1722.
123    Michael Clemens, Cindy Huang, and Jimmy Graham, “The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access,” Center for Global Development, 2018, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/economic-and-fiscal-effects-granting-refugees-formal-labor-market-access-brief.
124    Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Shifting Criminal Dynamics Signal Violent Future for Colombia-Venezuela Border,” InSight Crime, January 29, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/shifting-criminal-dynamics-violence-colombia-venezuela-border/.
125    Venezuela Investigative Unit, “Colombia-Venezuela Border Reopens, But Hidden Trails Still Hotspots,” InSight Crime, June 26, 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/colombia-venezuela-border-reopens-but-hidden-trails-still-hotspots/.
126    Colin P. Clarke, “Hezbollah Is in Venezuela to Stay,” Foreign Policy, February 9, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/09/hezbollah-is-in-venezuela-to-stay/.
127    Mark Hay, “Inside the Illicit Venezuela-Colombia Gas Smuggling Trade,” Vice News, August 24, 2016, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vdqvb4/inside-the-illicit-venezuela-colombia-gas-smuggling-trade.
128    Caracol Radio, “Venezolanos están siendo reclutados por bandas criminales colombianas en la frontera,” December 21, 2015, https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2015/12/21/cucuta/1450730614_548873.html.
129    Juan Carlos Garzón Vergara et al., “Inseguridad, Violencia y Economías Ilegales en las Fronteras,” Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2018, http://ideaspaz.org/media/website/fip_seguridad_fronteras.pdf.

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The US-Colombia partnership: From Venezuela’s crisis to counter-narcotics efforts https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/the-us-colombia-partnership-from-venezuela-s-crisis-to-counter-narcotics-efforts/ Tue, 16 Jul 2019 21:10:25 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/news/event-recaps/the-us-colombia-partnership-from-venezuela-s-crisis-to-counter-narcotics-efforts/ The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, in partnership with the United States Institute for Peace, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Latin America Program, and the Inter-American Dialogue, hosted H.E. Carlos Holmes Trujillo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, for a discussion on the future of US-Colombia relations. The conversation was moderated […]

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The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, in partnership with the United States Institute for Peace, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Latin America Program, and the Inter-American Dialogue, hosted H.E. Carlos Holmes Trujillo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, for a discussion on the future of US-Colombia relations. The conversation was moderated by Judy Woodruff, anchor and managing editor of PBS NewsHour. The discussion focused on major issues that impact US-Colombia relations, from the Venezuelan crisis to coca eradication in Colombia. The event highlighted the need for a strong US-Colombia ties to ensure further progress for the entire Western Hemisphere.

In his opening remarks, Jason Marczak, director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, stressed the importance of the bilateral relation, emphasizing the Atlantic Council’s commitment to this partnership. The Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force is a group of experts led by Senators Roy Blunt and Ben Cardin focused on advancing and modernizing this strategic relationship. Marczak also stressed that a democratic transition in Venezuela is a priority for the Atlantic Council and for the region.

Kicking off the discussion, Woodruff was curious to know what issues keep the foreign minister awake at night, to which Minister Holmes Trujillo replied, “all of them together.” But, if he had to pic one, Minister Holmes Trujillo mentioned the one and a half million Venezuelan refugees now living in Colombia. He identified the potential for this number to rise if economic and humanitarian conditions in Venezuela continue to worsen. He further referenced President Duque’s desire to reframe issues involving Venezuelan migrants as a regional problem and not solely a Colombian concern to effectively mobilize international assistance. He expressed immense gratitude to the international community, particularly the United States, for its support, but called for additional assistance to strengthen Colombia’s capacity to assist refugees.

Venezuela, as Woodruff notes, is no longer a topic present in the daily news cycle of many Americans. For Minister Holmes Trujillo, achievements that were unthinkable earlier this year, such as the recognition of an interim president in Venezuela by more than sixty countries and the formation of a unified opposition, highlight his hope that “conditions will [soon] exist so that democracy can again be back in Venezuela.” While he stressed that the US must keep playing a fundamental role in this process through sanctions and continued discussions, he emphasized that a solution to the Venezuelan crisis must come from within the region.

Coca eradication was another topic discussed with the foreign minister. He stated that, out of the one hundred and sixty thousand hectares of illicit crops inherited by President Duque, approximately forty thousand hectares were eradicated this year alone. He reaffirmed Colombia’s commitment to uphold health standards set by the country’s Constitutional Court regarding the aerial spraying of glyphosate, as a tool to address the coca issue. Considering illegal drugs holistically, Minister Holmes Trujillo defends the multilateral approach to addressing the issue, bringing up the concept of shared responsibility. From this viewpoint, the foreign minister believes that all parties involved in the illegal drug trade, from cultivation to consumption, need to unite to fight back against this industry.

To conclude, the discussion centered on the implementation of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). As Woodruff noted, the agreement has not been fully implemented since its conclusion in 2016. Minister Holmes Trujillo shared that President Duque’s wants the agreement to be altered to encompass long term challenges. He lists five potential changes to the agreement: narcotrafficking and kidnapping cannot be considered a political crime; sex crimes against minors must fall under the jurisdiction of Colombia’s ordinary justice system and not the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP); crimes committed after the signing of the agreement must be considered under Colombia’s ordinary jurisdiction; FARC members with goods or resources that were not properly declared must face severe penalties; and a congressperson from the FARC political party found guilty of grave crimes by the JEP must resign, and the FARC political party will have the capacity to fill the vacant position. These alterations would be considered and possibly implemented through political consensus and institutional means.

After underscoring Colombia’s desire to further judicial cooperation with the United States via extradition treaties, Minister Holmes Trujillo concluded the discussion by reinforcing the administration’s commitment to successfully implementing the peace agreement with the proposed changes that helped Duque win the presidency in 2018. 

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As crisis continues in Venezuela, Colombia’s “borders are open,” foreign minister says https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/as-crisis-continues-in-venezuela-colombia-s-borders-are-open-foreign-minister-says/ Tue, 16 Jul 2019 21:08:39 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/blogs/new-atlanticist/as-crisis-continues-in-venezuela-colombia-s-borders-are-open-foreign-minister-says/ "We are receiving Venezuelans with a sense of solidarity."

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Colombia is not going to change its open-door policy for its neighbor Venezuela, despite the influx of 1.5 million Venezuelans fleeing the economic and political collapse of Nicolás Maduro’s regime, according to Colombian Foreign Minister Carlos Holmes Trujillo.

“The impact is being felt daily in our country,” Trujillo told an Atlantic Council audience on July 16, admitting that the number of arrivals already “goes beyond our capacity.” Despite the strain on his country, he underscored Colombia’s commitment to accept Venezuelan refugees, promising that this policy “is not going to change. We are receiving Venezuelans with a sense of solidarity, with a humanitarian attitude, and with a sense of historical gratitude.” He explained that it would be impossible to “decide how many Venezuelans can come inside Colombia,” due to the close connection many in Colombia feel for their Venezuelan neighbors.

An estimated four million Venezuelans have fled the catastrophic economic conditions and political repression under leader Nicolás Maduro, who has clung to power following fraudulent elections in May 2018. Maduro’s economic mismanagement has led to widespread shortages of food and medicine, debilitating inflation, and nearly half of Venezuela’s population is now in poverty. On January 23, National Assembly President Juan Guaidó took the oath of office as interim president, given that Maduro’s inauguration for a second term in January was illegitimate because of the fraudulent elections. Guaidó is now recognized as the legitimate leader of Venezuela by nearly sixty countries, including the United States, Colombia, and many Latin American states.

Despite widespread international support, Guaidó has been unable to take control of the country from Maduro. Guaidó attempted to woo members of the army and security services to  the cause of democracy in “Operation Freedom” on April 30 but was unable to achieve widespread defections. Maduro has also been supported by Russia, which sent nuclear-capable bombers and Russian military advisers to the country.

When Judy Woodruff, anchor and managing editor of the PBS Newshour and the event’s moderator, suggested that removing Maduro has been more difficult than the United States or Colombia may have thought earlier this year, Trujillo maintained that the momentum is still going against Maduro. “We see this as a process,” he explained. “Dictatorships never fall from one day to the other. Dictatorships fall because a series of conditions are created that lead to the end of tyranny,” he argued. “I think we have made a lot of advances politically and diplomatically,” he added, including the recognition of Guaidó and his representatives by nearly sixty countries and many international organizations, and the unity of the political opposition around Guaidó.

“We always believed it was going to be very difficult,” to achieve Maduro’s exit from Venezuela, Trujillo admitted. But the positive developments of the last seven months lead him “to believe that sooner or later the conditions will exist so that democracy can [exist again] Venezuela.”

That transition cannot come soon enough for Colombia, Trujillo said, as his country is already feeling the strain of the mass exodus from their eastern neighbor. While Venezuelans have thus far been received warmly by Colombians, Trujillo warned that support for welcoming the migrants could be waning. “There is no doubt that problems are starting to be present in several regions of the country,” in which regional elections will also soon be held, he explained.

If nothing changes in Venezuela, Trujillo said his government projects that the number of migrants in Colombia could rise to 1.8 million, with a potential to spike to 3 or 3.5 million “if there is a catastrophe.”

Trujillo noted that Colombia is very grateful for the help the United States has provided but added that more could certainly be done, including more money to help provide food to refugees and help Colombia’s strained health and education systems. He pushed other members of the international community to step up their assistance, in order to prevent the migration crisis that is overwhelming Venezuela’s neighbors from becoming a truly global problem.

Progress Against Drugs

In addition to attending US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, Trujillo said his visit to Washington was an opportunity to brief the Trump administration on Colombian President Ivan Duque’s efforts to clamp down on the production of illegal drugs—especially cocaine. On March 29, US President Donald J. Trump criticized Duque as “having done nothing for us,” on curbing the drug trade.

Trujillo pushed back on these comments, explaining that Duque’s predecessor, Juan Manuel Santos, reversed policies that had previously seen the number of hectares used for drug production reach a low of 40,000. When Duque entered office, Trujillo explained that number “went up to a figure that we have never lived through before”—an estimated 200,000 hectares.

Duque is now aiming “first to stabilize the number of hectares and then to try to bring them down,” Trujillo explained, through the use of police raids to stop production, as well as crop substitution and development programs to lower the incentive to grow lucrative drug products. Progress has already been made, he added, as “since the first day of the administration, close to 40,000 hectares have been eradicated…The goal this year is to eradicate 80,000 hectares of illicit drugs.”

Trujillo stressed that his government wants to return to multilateral solutions for combatting the global drug problem, as clamping down on production can only do so much. Other countries need to step up to help fight transportation, money laundering, and consumption, Trujillo argued. “Every country that has to do with any link of the chain has to work very strongly in order to combat it,” he said.

Despite Trump’s criticism earlier this year, Trujillo reported “lately President Trump says that he knows President Duque is doing well.”

Small Changes to the Peace Accord

Duque’s successful presidential campaign in 2018 focused heavily on the 2016 peace accord signed between the Santos administration and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in an attempt to end more than five decades of conflict. A narrow majority of Colombians opposed the peace accord in a public referendum in October 2016 over concerns that it was too conciliatory to the FARC and that it was not fair to the victims of FARC violence.

Trujillo argued that the “no” vote on the referendum and the election of Duque—who criticized the deal—means that the Colombian president has a mandate from the Colombian people to achieve “some changes for the future” in a modified deal, which would be accomplished “through political consensus and institutional means.” Trujillo maintained that his government only wants to see a few specific changes to the accord, namely the assurance that drug trafficking, kidnapping, and child sex crimes would be prosecuted normally without the special judicial privileges of the peace process, and that there would be limits on judicial privileges for crimes committed after the agreement was signed, penalties for FARC members who have not declared goods or resources in their possession, and a ban on prosecuted FARC members from representing the party in Congress.

“Those changes are not going to touch the [main] body” of the peace accord, Trujillo argued, but rather would provide the “sustainability and durability in popular support for the agreement,” that it has previously lacked. Achieving real peace in Colombia, he explained, requires genuine buy-in from the Colombian people, which can be achieved by making these important, if minor, changes.

David A. Wemer is assistant director, editorial at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

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INFOGRAPHICS – Disinformation in democracies: Strengthening digital resilience in Latin America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/infographics-disinformation-in-democracies-strengthening-digital-resilience-in-latin-america/ Thu, 27 Jun 2019 21:08:44 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/publications/reports/infographics-disinformation-in-democracies-strengthening-digital-resilience-in-latin-america/ 2018 saw political tides turn in three of Latin America’s largest democracies. These elections also saw deep polarization and distrust in institutions among Brazilians, Mexicans, and Colombians in an information environment ripe with disinformation. And while disinformation and misinformation are nothing new, the spread o#f false information at alarming rates is more effective and worrisome […]

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2018 saw political tides turn in three of Latin America’s largest democracies. These elections also saw deep polarization and distrust in institutions among Brazilians, Mexicans, and Colombians in an information environment ripe with disinformation. And while disinformation and misinformation are nothing new, the spread o#f false information at alarming rates is more effective and worrisome than ever. A year-long effort to identify, expose, and explain disinformation around elections in Latin America using open source methodologies yielded the following key findings and recommendations.

Recommendations: Disinformation in democracies (English PDF)

Key findings: Disinformation in democracies (English PDF)


Recomendações: Desinformação em democracias (Português PDF)

Principais conclusões: Desinformação em democracias (Português PDF)


Recomendaciones: Desinformación en las democracias (Español PDF)

Resultados clave: Desinformación en las democracias (Español PDF)

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MLP Executive Education – Bancolombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/program-impact-stories/mlp-executive-education-bancolombia/ Wed, 12 Jun 2019 14:22:20 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/?p=141286 From June 12 to June 15, MLP hosted an executive education program and study tour for Bancolombia executives. The bank brought a mix of C-suite executives from flagship and subsidiary organizations including their Chief Executive, Juan Mora Uribe. Participants were hosted at the Council for a series of high-level meetings. MLP collaborated with many others […]

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From June 12 to June 15, MLP hosted an executive education program and study tour for Bancolombia executives. The bank brought a mix of C-suite executives from flagship and subsidiary organizations including their Chief Executive, Juan Mora Uribe. Participants were hosted at the Council for a series of high-level meetings. MLP collaborated with many others in this effort: special recognition to Mr. Bart Oosterveld, Ms. Marie Kasperek and Mr. Alvaro Weis of the Global Business & Economics Program, Mr. Jason Marczak and Ms. Camila Hernandez of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and to Millennium Fellowship alumni Usman Ahmed (2017) and Florence Akinyemi (2016).

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Millennium Leadership Program 2019 Core Program https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/blog-post/millennium-leadership-program-2019-core-program/ Sat, 01 Jun 2019 16:05:17 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/?p=139614 From May 3 to May 17, the 2018 and 2019 cohorts of Millennium Fellows traveled to Colombia for MLP’s annual Core Program. The 2019 cohort began with the Study Tour component that included meetings with seven ministers and cabinet members, two additional elected officials, six additional senior government and multilateral officials, and a nonprofit leader […]

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From May 3 to May 17, the 2018 and 2019 cohorts of Millennium Fellows traveled to Colombia for MLP’s annual Core Program. The 2019 cohort began with the Study Tour component that included meetings with seven ministers and cabinet members, two additional elected officials, six additional senior government and multilateral officials, and a nonprofit leader who received a special audience with the Pope for her work surrounding the conflict. The 2018 cohort of Millennium Fellows joined us in Bogotá for the Concordia Americas Summit, where we convened two heads-of-state (President Duque and former president Uribe), business leaders, and members of civil society. We had a number of 2019 fellows contribute during the Summit: Netra Gowda, Ulrik Smed, Steven Kryger, and Rodrigo Garcia spoke during a roundtable on Digital Transformation. Catherine Kolimas and Rodrigo Garcia contributed to a strategic dialogue entitled, “Sustainable Financing: Implications for Investors and Corporations.” Following the Concordia Americas Summit, the 2018 and 2019 cohorts journeyed to Subachoque, Colombia, for a Leadership Retreat focused on identifying and strategizing around an individual’s leadership style. We concluded the program by matching every fellow up with a peer-mentor who they will work with over the course of the coming year to improve specific leadership skills. Fellows will have the opportunity to reconvene in-person or virtually in pursuit of self-improvement.

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US-Colombia Task Force – Phase 2 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/video/us-colombia-task-force-phase-2/ Tue, 09 Apr 2019 21:44:35 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/centers/adrienne-arsht-latin-america-center-centers/us-colombia-task-force-phase-2/ Today, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center launches phase two of its US-Colombia Task Force chaired by US Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). The bi-national group will help guide President Duque, President Trump, the US Congress, and both countries’ private sectors, as Colombia transitions into a more peaceful and prosperous democracy.

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Today, the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center launches phase two of its US-Colombia Task Force chaired by US Senators Roy Blunt (R-MO) and Ben Cardin (D-MD). The bi-national group will help guide President Duque, President Trump, the US Congress, and both countries’ private sectors, as Colombia transitions into a more peaceful and prosperous democracy.

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Digital resilience in Latin America: Automation, disinformation, and polarization in elections https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/digital-resilience-in-latin-america-automation-disinformation-and-polarization-in-elections/ Thu, 28 Mar 2019 21:28:02 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/news/event-recaps/digital-resilience-in-latin-america-automation-disinformation-and-polarization-in-elections/ 2018 saw political tides turn in three of Latin America’s largest democracies. These elections also saw deep polarization and distrust in institutions among Brazilians, Mexicans, and Colombians in an information environment ripe with disinformation. Following a year-long effort in which the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and its Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) […]

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2018 saw political tides turn in three of Latin America’s largest democracies. These elections also saw deep polarization and distrust in institutions among Brazilians, Mexicans, and Colombians in an information environment ripe with disinformation. Following a year-long effort in which the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and its Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) exposed and explained disinformation around key elections in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, on Thursday, March 28, 2019, the teams launched a comprehensive report that outlines trends and lessons learned from the 2018 presidential elections in Latin America.

Graham Brookie, director and managing editor of the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab kicked off the event by painting a picture of the global nature of disinformation and its repercussions. “The challenges of disinformation will continue to evolve in ways we can’t fully predict. And as they do, the more people working on this issue, the better the chances for addressing the risks to democracies and fact-based discourse,” Brookie stated.

In laying the groundwork for the day’s discussions, Andrew Sollinger, publisher at Foreign Policy, pointed to the dangers of disinformation not only around elections in Latin America, but globally, emphasizing the important role media can and should play in combatting the spread of disinformation. As elections in countries such as India and Argentina approach, takeaways from the 2018 elections in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia can assist with fact-checking and debunking of disinformation, Sollinger noted.

To dive deeper into the role of polarization, disinformation, and automation in Latin America around the 2018 elections, Roberta Braga, associate director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, moderated a conversation with leading experts from the region.

Gerardo de Icaza, director of the department of electoral cooperation and observation at the Organization of American States (OAS) explained the characteristic widespread distrust in institutions and electoral process of these elections. He noted that “from a political party perspective, it works to question the establishment, it works to have conspiracy theories, it works to say the system is rigged unless I win. And even if I win, it was rigged but I won anyway,” which hits trust at its core. He explained the phenomenon of widespread mistrust in terms of the essence, incompetence, and failure to adapt by electoral management bodies. In terms of electoral regulatory bodies, de Icaza explains essence as the ability to point out the wrongdoing without being called biased. Incompetence is the failure of electoral bodies to realize their out dated communications approach, especially in the context of social media, where political candidates have millions of followers and an exclusive communications team. Electoral bodies, thus, fail to adapt, because, in many instances, they believe to be above social media and this kind of discourse.

For Tania Montalvo, executive editor at Animal Politico and coordinator of Verificado 2018, the main challenge when combatting disinformation in Mexico is disinformation from within the government. Montalvo defended “innovative forms of investigative journalism with citizens at its core, and collaboration” as mechanisms to effectively combat disinformation.

Carlos Cortés, co-founder of Linterna Verde layed out the challenges ahead for Colombia in this realm. He emphasized that first, civil society must leverage their effort to better understand the scope of the issue and develop best tools to combat it. Secondly, the media must better assess their fact-checking efforts. Lastly, incentivizing the ongoing process of building digital literacy among users of social media platforms.

Amaro Grassi, lead coordinator of the Digital Democracy Room at the Department of Public Policy Analysis at Fundação Getulio Vargas (DAPP/FGV) agrees with other panelists that a “coalition-like approach to solve the issue of disinformation in all its complexity” is the only viable approach. He argues that the government, represented by the electoral body, and media must equip themselves to identify and combat disinformation. He adds the role of tech companies to assist with data management as support to the work of fact-checkers.

The director at InternetLab, Francisco Brito Cruz, defended the need to avoid a technocratic approach of blaming technological advancements and broader access to technology as causes of widespread disinformation. In the case of Brazil, “for the first time in 30 years, we [had] real grassroots, robust right-wing or conservative activism,” which was a major shift in the country, affecting how media functions.

Montalvo attributed the success of Verificado 2018 in setting the political agenda during the elections in Mexico to multidisciplinary collaboration, diversification of sources, prioritizing citizens’ needs, and the unification of partnerships under one single brand: Verificado 2018, in this case.

Moltalvo focused on the importance of explaining rather than accusing the source of disinformation, to which Cortés added the importance of emphasizing the need to bring awareness to the effects of amplification. As Grassi explains, not every piece of information can go through the fact-checking process. For him, during elections, civil society and electoral bodies must be in alignment to understand what types of information should be checked, based on the detriment it may bring to the democratic process itself.

The question of the day was regulation. There is no doubt that there must be an institutionalized mechanism to hold actors accountable in the digital space without threatening freedom of speech. De Icaza brought to the discussion the issue of a “black market” in campaign funding with regards to disinformation. The hiring and use of bots, for example, is not accounted for in campaign finances. Brito Cruz pushed for analysis and changes to compliance and liability regulations on social media, including third party posts.

Moderated by Graham Brookie, director and managing editor at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), the second panel discussed the possibilities of fostering digital resilience in a hyperconnected world.

Katie Harbath, public policy director for global elections at Facebook, outlined the five approaches the company has taken to protecting the integrity of elections in the platform, while still protecting good civic engagement. Their efforts have included: cracking down on fake accounts; reducing false news by controlling their reach and partnering with fact-checkers; advocating for more transparency around political advertisement through improved regulations; disrupting bad actors both foreign and domestically, by differentiating between perceived truths and facts; and civic engagement through information about participating in the democratic process.

Both Harbath and Carl Woog, director and head of communications at WhatsApp, noted the importance of accounting for differences in design of each platform. Woog explained the challenges of the platform, having privacy at its core. Still, in Brazil, one of its largest markets, WhatsApp was able to ban thousands of accounts that presented abnormal activities in the election period. WhatsApp generally bans around 2 million accounts per month related to automation.

Describing the Lie Detector project by La Silla Vacia in Colombia, Woog says “the presence of a fact-checking initiative on WhatsApp, even if it doesn’t reach every single person, is contributing to a conversation about misinformation in society, raising our awareness to disinformation on WhatsApp.”

Looking ahead, the upcoming elections in various parts of the world are the next challenge for building digital resilience.

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Has progress been made in containing disinformation? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/has-progress-been-made-in-containing-disinformation/ Thu, 28 Mar 2019 19:21:58 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/blogs/new-atlanticist/has-progress-been-made-in-containing-disinformation/ Facebook and Whatsapp representatives hail progress on limiting disinformation's impact on social media.

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The spread of online disinformation during the 2018 election campaigns in Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil demonstrated to social media companies that they need to “make sure that we are not solving just the problems that we saw in the US in 2016, but that we are really thinking steps ahead,” according to Katie Harbath, public policy director of global elections at Facebook.

The three high-profile elections in Latin America made up “one of our very first big test cases” for new measures meant to limit the spread of false information on Facebook, Harbath said at the Atlantic Council in Washington on March 28. But while Facebook has had some success in limiting harmful activity on its platform, Harbath explained “we have to have different solutions for all of our different platforms.”

Harbath was joined at the Atlantic Council by WhatsApp Director and Head of Communications Carl Woog for an event looking back at 2018’s elections in Latin America. While Facebook is used throughout the region, WhatsApp use is far more ubiquitous and presented unique problems for counter-disinformation efforts.

“Encryption is a headline feature of what we do,” Woog explained, “which means that we can’t see the messages that people send.” The widespread use of WhatsApp during all three electoral contests last year presents an issue for “a digital version of a private space that is much more like a living room than it is a town square,” Woog said.

The event was held to mark the launch of a new report by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Digital Forensic Research Lab outlining the polarization, automation, and disinformation online during the 2018 elections and presenting a vision for fostering digital resilience in future elections.

Harbath and Woog both reported on how their companies are making tangible changes to their platforms to prevent their misuse in the future. “Even though we can’t see the content that people are sharing,” Woog said, WhatsApp “can look at an account to see if it is acting in an abnormal fashion,” such as sending thousands of messages per minute. Once abnormal accounts are identified they can then be banned. Woog said that during the Brazilian election WhatsApp banned almost 2 million accounts per month. Woog also said that WhatsApp has limited the ability to mass forward messages in order to stop the viral spread of messages on a platform that is primarily designed for one-to-one messages and small groups. With new features, Woog said, “as soon as you get a message from someone who is not in your contacts, you get a warning that pops up.”

Harbath said that Facebook is also targeting clearly automated accounts and is focusing on giving “people additional context about who they are seeing this information from.” The company also made a conscious decision last year to change its feed algorithm to prioritize content from family and friends in user feeds. The decision has hurt the ability for business and other pages to grab attention, Harbath conceded, but she argued it was based on the actual preferences of users and the desire to limit the spread of disinformation by bad actors.

Harbath warned that Facebook’s initial attempts to mark potentially fake information had largely backfired on the platform as “it made people believe it even more” by drawing attention to it.

Graham Brookie, director and managing editor of the Digital Forensic Research Lab, explained that “disinformation is an emotional problem” and that marking disinformation as overtly fake often makes people have “a visceral reaction.” He warned that if platforms or fact-checkers get bogged down in “an extended conversation about who is right and who is wrong, then you have already lost. Those who are trying to spread disinformation have already won.”

Harbath said Facebook now is including relevant links below potentially fake content and focusing on putting the source of the information in the proper context.

Both Harbath and Woog stressed the importance of factcheckers from civil society and the media in helping social media companies identify and then counter disinformation online, an idea shared by a collection of Latin American disinformation experts who also spoke at the Atlantic Council on March 28. Francisco Brito Cruz, director of the InternetLab in Brazil, pushed back on the instinct to blame social media platforms themselves for the promotion of disinformation. “We need to stop thinking that the problem is technology,” he said, but focus instead on how this technology is interacting with “the social and political environment.”

Tania Montalvo, executive editor of Animal Politico in Mexico and coordinator of the Verificado 2018 election reporting and fact-checking initiative, argued that journalists and media companies can play a huge role in pushing back disinformation, especially if media outlets “put into the center of our work as journalists, the citizen” rather than making money or trying to affect political outcomes.

Andrew Sollinger, publisher of Foreign Policy magazine, on the other hand argued that media companies can only play a limited role in pushing back, especially on platforms such as WhatsApp where “it is very difficult for media organizations—trusted media organizations—to publish premium content on that vehicle.” As media companies double down on subscription services in an effort to stay financially solvent, Sollinger said, “information is becoming a luxury commodity… [and] folks living in favelas don’t have not just the presence of mind but also the wallet” to consume quality news.

Carlos Cortés, co-founder of Linterna Verde in Colombia agreed, saying that fact-checking initiatives by news outlets and social media companies “need to be assessed critically [to see] if they are really working, if they are really having an impact.”

What both Harbath and Woog want to avoid is becoming “arbiters of truth” on their platforms, deciding what type of content to allow or not to allow. Harbath argued that she sees content moderation as following the rule that a user “has the right to say that the sun rises in the West, but he doesn’t have the right for us to amplify it.”

Woog worried that overreaction from policy makers could threaten the very benefits that an open and free Internet provides, especially if it threatens the privacy of the user. “Once you lose privacy, it is very hard to get it back,” he said.

David A. Wemer is assistant director, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @DavidAWemer.

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Maduro’s days are over, says Colombian President Duque https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/maduro-s-days-are-over-says-colombian-president-duque/ Thu, 14 Feb 2019 23:00:30 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/blogs/new-atlanticist/maduro-s-days-are-over-says-colombian-president-duque/ Colombia’s leader calls on Venezuelan military to support interim President Juan Guaidó

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Colombian President Ivan Duque said on February 14 Nicolás Maduro should relinquish his hold on power in Venezuela and face trial for crimes against humanity. He also called on the Venezuelan military to support Juan Guaidó, who is recognized by a number of countries, including the United States, as the interim president of Venezuela.

“His days are over,” Duque said, referring to Maduro. “Now, the military, who are the ones that have to make the change… they have now to support President Guaidó. What is the other option? Continue with a dictatorship that has impoverished the whole population; a hyperinflation of millions; the deterioration of all the liberties?”

“Juan Guaidó is not only the option to enter into a democracy, he is the option to re-establish liberties and hope for the Venezuelan people,” said Duque, adding, “The military has to receive that message and it has been prudent that the National Assembly has offered differentiated treatment for the people that support this transition in Venezuela.”

“I believe that this is the right moment for the dictatorship to end,” Duque said in a conversation moderated by CNBC contributor, Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, at an event jointly hosted by the Atlantic Council in Washington.

The Venezuelan military’s support has been critical for Maduro to retain his grip on power. In an effort to erode this support, Venezuela’s National Assembly has offered an amnesty to civilian and military officials who “collaborate with restoring constitutional order in Venezuela.”

On the question of whether he would support amnesty for Maduro, Duque recalled that as a senator he had denounced Maduro before the International Criminal Court.

The Colombian president proceeded to offer a vivid scenario to explain his position. “Imagine,” he said, “that you’re living in a condo and your neighbor next door, every night, is beating his wife and his children. So what’s the moral attitude? Just wake up in the morning and meet the guy in the elevator and pretend everything is OK? No, it is the moral duty to denounce.”

“Amnesty for Maduro for me is not an option,” said Duque, adding that the Venezuelan should be tried in the International Criminal Court.

On January 23, Guaidó, the president of the National Assembly, declared himself interim president of Venezuela after Maduro’s re-election to a second term was deemed fraudulent—a view shared by much of the international community. Article 233 of the Venezuelan Constitution states that the president of the National Assembly has the ability to serve as interim president and to call elections when the office of the president becomes vacant.

The United States and about two dozen other countries recognize Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela. Russia, China, and Turkey are among the countries that continue to support Maduro.

Venezuela has been gripped by a crisis marked by hyperinflation, dire shortages of food and medicine, and political repression. As millions of people flee the country, Colombia has taken in a significant portion of the migrants leaving its eastern neighbor.

The United States has also offered $20 million in humanitarian aid to Venezuela, but Maduro has refused to let this aid into the country all the while denying the existence of a crisis. Duque said Colombia will receive humanitarian aid from any country that wants to help the Venezuelan people.

While aid has arrived at Cucuta, on the Colombia-Venezuela border, freight containers have been used on the Venezuelan side to block the bridge connecting the two countries.

In his meeting with US President Donald J. Trump at the White House on February 13, Duque described obstructing access to humanitarian aid as a “crime against humanity.”

Trump and Duque issued a joint statement in which they affirmed their commitment to “taking steps to resolve the ongoing democratic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela” and called on countries around the world to support Guaidó.

“Both countries will work with the Guaido government to restore freedom, democracy, and prosperity to Venezuela,” the statement said, adding, “The United States and Colombia stand side by side with many other nations in the face of any provocation by the illegitimate, former dictator of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, and those who work on his behalf to undermine the security and safety of the region.”

In an effort to choke off a critical lifeline for the Maduro regime—oil revenue—the Trump administration on January 28 imposed sanctions on PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company. The regime has turned to selling gold.

Trump has not ruled out military intervention to deal with the crisis in Venezuela.

Asked by a reporter whether he was considering sending 5,000 US troops to Colombia—a reference to a note seen scrawled on National Security Advisor John Bolton’s notepad during a January 28 news conference—Trump responded: “You’ll see.”

At the event on February 14, Duque talked about his government’s counternarcotics efforts and determination not to restart peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), an armed group considered a terrorist organization by the United States, unless it releases nineteen hostages and ends its attacks. ELN is blamed for a January 17 car bombing near a police academy in the Colombian capital, Bogotá, which left more than twenty people dead.

Ashish Kumar Sen is deputy director of communications, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @AshishSen.

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President Iván Duque Márquez: Colombia’s domestic and regional opportunities and challenges https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/president-ivan-duque-marquez-colombia-s-domestic-and-regional-opportunities-and-challenges/ Thu, 14 Feb 2019 22:53:23 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/news/event-recaps/president-ivan-duque-marquez-colombia-s-domestic-and-regional-opportunities-and-challenges/ On Thursday, February 14, His Excellency Iván Duque Márquez, president of the Republic of Colombia, discussed Colombia’s ambitious agenda for transitional justice, economic reform, and regional leadership. Duque, who was sworn in as president of Colombia in August 2018, was interviewed by CNBC Contributor Michelle Caruso-Cabrera. The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic […]

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On Thursday, February 14, His Excellency Iván Duque Márquez, president of the Republic of Colombia, discussed Colombia’s ambitious agenda for transitional justice, economic reform, and regional leadership. Duque, who was sworn in as president of Colombia in August 2018, was interviewed by CNBC Contributor Michelle Caruso-Cabrera. The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council hosted the event in conjunction with CSIS, AS/COA, the Inter-American Dialogue, and the Wilson Center. President Duque covered a wide array of topics, including:

Venezuela: The dialogue opened with the region’s most pressing issue: the Venezuela crisis. Duque made no reservations about criticizing Nicolas Maduro, stating that “this is the most brutal dictatorship in recent Latin American history.” He was firm that “amnesty is not an option” for Maduro, as he is a dictator who must be tried by the international criminal court. “Blocking humanitarian aid for me is a crime against humanity,” said Duque, adding that Colombia will continue to receive foreign aid intended for Venezuelans. Furthermore, he made a bold, clear request to members of the Venezuelan military to shift allegiance to the Venezuelan people and let aid in.

Most significantly, he expressed unwavering support for the Interim Government of President Juan Guaidó, commending the opposition’s efforts in the last six months to reclaim democracy for the Venezuelan people. Duque conveyed hope for progress in Venezuela, saying that “this is the first time in many years that the Venezuelan people are seeing light at the end of the tunnel.” He celebrated the international community for supporting Guaidó and asked China to reconsider its posturing on the issue. “I would respectfully invite [the Chinese] to support Juan Guaidó because it is important for Latin America…”.

US-Colombian Relations: Duque, fresh off his meetings with President Trump, expressed his commitment to work with Trump on issues of mutual interest, including counter-narcotics and support for Venezuela. He expressed reservations about military intervention, which the Trump administration has touted as a viable option for Venezuela. Otherwise, he articulated a shared vision between the two countries moving forward. He said he enjoyed the discussion with the US President and members of Congress and looked forward to deepening ties between the countries.

Counter-narcotics policy: Duque also discussed his administration’s plans for countering the narcotics trade in Colombia. He said that combatting the drug trade and organized crime requires a proactive, uncompromising stance against violence.

“In the last five years, we have jumped from 60,000 hectares to 200,000 hectares” of coca, said Duque, acknowledging a problematic increase in coca production in Colombia. “By 2023, we should reduce the number of crops by more than 60%, and we are working together [with the US] on achieving that”. He mentioned that his administration has already eliminated 60,000 hectares of Coca in just six months.

Duque’s plans to use a “360 type of approach” to eradicate drugs, drawing from a diverse array of tools and policies. When probed about whether the toolbox would include aerial fumigation, Duque referred to the Constitutional ruling in Colombia, which requires definitive proof that spraying does not negatively impact the health of individuals on the ground. He told the audience that he planned to engage in dialogue on the topic on March 6 at a hearing in Bogotá.

Duque also stressed the need to frame the conversation around issues of sustainable business outlets beyond coca production. “When Plan Colombia began in 1999, we had more or less 160,000 hectares of coca. We were able to reduce that size to less than 60,000 by 2012. That means that yes, we can be effective, but it also means that to be effective is not just a matter of eradication. We have to shift from illegal economies to legal economies,” said Duque. Ultimately, he said he “preferred to take the moral stand” on issues of drug production in Colombia, arguing for a “comprehensive way” of addressing the root causes of the issue.

ELN and political violence: When asked about the recent ELN bombing that killed 21 cadets in Bogotá and a general return to urban violence in Colombia, Duque was clear: “For me, it is the consequence of trying to be morally relaxed with violence.” His response was met with uproarious applause from the audience.

The President said that he fundamentally rejects violence as an approach to relations with the state, and that he will ensure that those responsible for acts of violence face justice. “Nothing justifies what they did,” said Duque. “No ideology justifies a kidnapping, a killing. No longer can terrorism be used as a way of expressing political ideas.”

Peace implementation: During his campaign for the presidency, Duque rejected the 2016 Peace Accords with the FARC signed by ex-president Juan Manuel Santos. Now, as President, Duque is committed to ensuring success in the reintegration of former FARC members, as well as to rebuilding conflict torn areas of Colombia. He said his administration has completed 19 projects to allow former combatants to sustainably reintegrate and has continued to push for stabilization and economic opportunities in the 117 municipalities most impacted by the conflict.

Duque said also pointed to a promising statistic: homicides have been reducing under his administration. “…I have given the Ministry of Defense and the military one big goal,” said Duque. “By the end of my administration, we will end up with the lowest homicide rate in the history of Colombia. Day by day, week by week, we are following those trends. We are working together, with all of the units—the judicial system primarily—to achieve those results.” He ended by stating that he aims to increase the number of victims with full reparation benefits by at least 35% by the end of his term in office.

Business, trade, and foreign investment: Duque, considered a friend of the private sector, made the following statement on economics and trade: “When you have too much market excess and the market does not have the right regulations, it ends up in a voracious capitalism.” He continued by saying that “the most important social program to sustain income is a formal job,” and indicated that he will open the market to more private investment in an effort to create more official jobs in Colombia. He explained that his tax reductions aim to incentivize private sector growth and thus job stimulation. “I truly believe that we need the private sector to generate employment,” said Duque.

He also commented on investment from foreign actors, most notably from China. “We need to have sound investment from the rest of the world,” said Duque. “If Chinese corporations want to invest in Colombia, they must follow the rules and if they do, they are welcome.”

Duque also addressed the status of exports in Colombia, which sit at 17% of total GDP. “The first thing I want is for exports as share of GDP to grow. I also want to diversify the trade basket,” he said. “76% of our exports are highly concentrated on 12-13 products, and we definitely need to diversify that.” He also said there is a need for creating accessibility to markets, and that Latin America needs to focus more on intraregional integration so that it is not profoundly dependent on external shocks. Along this vein, he proposed a continuance of the relationship between the Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR.

Duque ended his time on stage with a commitment to more inclusive policies, especially toward those who have been disenfranchised and unheard in the peace process. “We want Afro-Colombians to actively participate in governance issues. For me,” said Duque, “it is important that we get a better representation in the government and in regional entities” by those groups who have otherwise been left behind.

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Five takeaways from Latin America’s presidential elections in 2018 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/five-takeaways-from-latin-america-s-presidential-elections-in-2018/ Thu, 13 Dec 2018 16:09:08 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/five-takeaways-from-latin-america-s-presidential-elections-in-2018/ The next four years are an opportunity for each government to implement reforms necessary for the growth and development of the region’s three largest democracies.  

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In 2018, the three largest countries in Latin America—Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil—elected new heads of state. Colombia voted in its youngest president, Iván Duque; Mexico elected left-wing populist Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO); and Brazil chose former army captain and right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro. As the three leaders kick off their respective mandates, and as other elections shape up in the region, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center highlights five overarching trends that warrant a closer look and that are likely to affect the region over the next five years.
1.     Social media as the new harbinger of democratic discourse

An ongoing byproduct of a hyper-connected world, social media shook elections at their core in 2018—throwing into question traditional components of campaign execution and information consumption as voters increasingly turned to Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp for election-related news and discussions. Particularly in Brazil, television and radio air time and campaign financing—well known for contributing to victories in past elections—gave way to conversations conducted online and on messaging applications. The most popular of all candidates on social media, with more than eight million followers on Facebook, Bolsonaro built a direct bridge between his campaign and his electorate with social media. This strategy helped him win the election in October.

In Mexico and Colombia, social media also served as a platform for debate and information-sharing among voters. Though not the only catalyst for electoral success, the increasing significance of social media platforms in elections and the public policy sphere represent a pattern seen around the world: with US President Donald J. Trump and his tweets, with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Twitter presence, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s strong presence on Twitter, and now, Bolsonaro on Facebook and WhatsApp in Brazil. Candidates vying for leadership positions in Latin America are sure to continue to capitalize on this recent and evolving trend as they aspire to connect with voters.

2.     Disinformation’s potential to skew election discussions

The exponential role of social media as a tool for candidates to speak directly with their constituents has also generated new challenges. While social media has been a source of information for its users, it has also opened doors for the sharing of untruthful, exaggerated, or out-of-context information. With distrust in traditional and established media at an all-time high in Latin America, disinformation jeopardizes the ability of users—and voters—to make informed, conscientious decisions. With the objective of forging digital resilience in the lead up to and during critical presidential elections in three of Latin America’s most connected and geopolitically important democracies, the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Digital Forensic Research Lab focused on identifying and explaining cases of disinformation in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil during this year’s election cycles. Into 2019, we will continue to advance efforts to combat disinformation and create digital resilience in Latin America and other regions.

3.     Voter rejection of the traditional political establishment

All three new leaders—AMLO, Duque, and Bolsonaro—represented an anti-establishment movement in their countries. Each voiced the dissatisfaction and distrust of the population by espousing discourses against the status quo, effectively portraying themselves as outsiders. AMLO referred to the “power mafia” in reference to the traditional PAN and PRI parties’ politicians and promised to “end the corruption, the impunity, and the privileges enjoyed by a small elite,” so “leaders of [Mexico] can recover their moral and political authority.” Duque won with the promise of “a new generation” of leadership for a country dominated by a long-established elite and still emerging from half a century of civil conflict, according to the Financial Times. Bolsonaro advanced a narrative against “Brazil’s corrupt politicians” and criticized traditional media, appealing to his electorate against traditional news outlets, including Folha de S. Paulo, one of Brazil’s largest newspapers.

4.     A nationwide discourse against corruption

AMLO, Duque, and Bolsonaro advanced a platform against corruption as one of the major pillars of their campaigns. Bolsonaro praised himself as one of the few politicians in Brazil not embroiled in a corruption case. AMLO tied corruption as a contributing factor to the security issues in Mexico, saying “this evil is the main cause of social and economic inequality, and also that corruption is to blame for the violence in our country.” Duque’s stance focused on impunity, as he stated his administration would “take back the last peso stolen by the corrupt. Impunity will not reign anymore” in Colombia.

Such renewed focus on anti-corruption representation and efforts is a trend expected to become even stronger throughout Latin America, as the Lava Jato investigation uncovered cases of corruption beyond Brazil’s borders, raising awareness to this structural issue across the region.

5.     Security as the number one concern

Security was the hot topic of these presidential elections, and all three candidates offered specific innovative agendas to address the issue of insecurity and violence. In Colombia, Duque proposed changes to the peace accord with the FARC to enforce the rule of law and to tackle criminal drug gangs, the ELN guerrilla, and the rise in illicit crops. In Mexico, AMLO said he would “reformulate the security policy that is almost exclusively based on the use of force,” arguing against fighting violence with violence. In Brazil, Bolsonaro, who was widely considered to be the “law-and-order” candidate, offered a range of proposals, including changes to gun control policies, less resistance to police use of deadly force, and lowering the legal age of criminal responsibility. The success of these new approaches to security policies will surely affect the popularity and governability of the new administrations.

Conclusion

The newly elected presidents and their innovative points of view are an opportunity for further dialogue between the government and opposition; greater political involvement of the population, civil society, and media, beyond the election period; and a stronger set of institutions to hold the executive and the legislative branches, as well as other organizations accountable and aligned with democratic principles. The next four years are an opportunity for each government to implement reforms necessary for the growth and development of the region’s three largest democracies.

AALAC5Years

Valentina Sader is a project assistant with the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America CenterFollow her on Twitter @ValentinaSader.

The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center focuses on the region’s strategic role in a global context. The Think Five Blog Series, launched to mark the Center’s fifth anniversary, reflects on major transformations set to redefine the trajectory of the region now and in the years ahead.

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#ElectionWatch: As Colombia votes again, misinformation flows https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/electionwatch-as-colombia-votes-again-misinformation-flows/ Tue, 28 Aug 2018 20:18:50 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/electionwatch-as-colombia-votes-again-misinformation-flows/ On Sunday, August 26, Colombians went to the polls again. A significant share of the campaigning involved spreading misinformation  —  or countering it.

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August 28, 2018

On Sunday, August 26, Colombians went to the polls again, this time to vote in a “popular consultation” on a series of seven initiatives intended to counter corruption. A significant share of the campaigning involved spreading misinformation  —  or countering it.

The consultation asked Colombians to vote on seven initiatives intended to crack down on Colombia’s endemic corruption. If approved, they would have strengthened punishment for convicted corrupt officials, improved the transparency of public offices and public contracts, imposed a maximum of three four-year periods for holding seats in public corporations  —  Congress, department assemblies (something like state legislatures in the United States), and city councils  —  and lowered the salary of Congress members and other high-ranking public officials.

The consultation was backed by both the president and the opposition, requiring a high turnout and a high vote to be approved, but failed to achieve the former. Disinformation aimed at suppressing the vote likely had a serious impact on the outcome.

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#ElectionWatch: Partisan Media Deepens Divides in Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/electionwatch-partisan-media-deepens-divides-in-colombia/ Sun, 12 Aug 2018 12:20:11 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/electionwatch-partisan-media-deepens-divides-in-colombia/ During recent elections in Colombia, entities on all ends of the political spectrum spread misinformation and editorialized to suit varied agendas.

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August 12, 2018

During recent elections in Colombia, entities on all ends of the political spectrum spread misinformation and editorialized to suit varied agendas. The trend was on full display in the sharing patterns of four very partisan media outlets: Elnodo.co, elexpediente.co, oiganoticias.co and voces.com.co. The first three were right-wing biased, while the last was left-wing, specifically anti-Uribista: it had an agenda against the ideas and actions of former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez. 

The success of these partisan media outlets in the recent elections is a testament to the increasing polarization among Colombian audiences. Moreover, it also shows how these new online-only media startups are emerging and took a good chunk of the traditional media’s audience and advertising cake.

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#ElectionWatch: Everyday Misinformation in Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/electionwatch-everyday-misinformation-in-colombia/ Fri, 20 Jul 2018 04:00:00 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/electionwatch-everyday-misinformation-in-colombia/ Colombia's presidential election was rife with concerns over the impact disinformation and misinformation on voter behavior and the overall election.

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July 20, 2018

The Colombian elections are over. On June 17, conservative Ivan Duque was elected president with 10,373,080 votes, which was 54 percent of the ballots. Duque was victorious over left-wing Gustavo Petro, who garnered 8,034,189 votes. The process was rife with concerns over the impact disinformation and misinformation on voter behavior and the overall election.

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Colombia “Turns The Page” With Presidential Election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/colombia-turns-the-page-with-presidential-election/ Tue, 19 Jun 2018 20:29:12 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/colombia-turns-the-page-with-presidential-election/ Alina Dieste, Tomás González, and Juan Carlos López all hailed the election of Iván Duque as the next President of Colombia as a historic success for Colombian democracy. Duque, of the right-leaning Democratic Center party, beat left-leaning candidate Gustavo Petro, fifty-four percent to forty-two percent. The June 17th election was the second round of the […]

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Alina Dieste, Tomás González, and Juan Carlos López all hailed the election of Iván Duque as the next President of Colombia as a historic success for Colombian democracy. Duque, of the right-leaning Democratic Center party, beat left-leaning candidate Gustavo Petro, fifty-four percent to forty-two percent. The June 17th election was the second round of the contest, after no candidate reached the fifty percent threshold during the first round on May 25th.

At a June 19th event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Dieste, González, and López explained the importance of Duque’s election and detailed the challenges his new administration will face.

For López, the US Political Director and Anchor for CNN en Español, the biggest success of the vote was the lack of violence. “It was so ingrained in Colombia that elections mean violence. . . that seeing this election on Sunday happen in total calm without any type of interruption was a big headline,” he said. López also pointed out that the speed of the vote tally – it was counted in less than an hour – was another important “sign of maturity” on what was a “very positive day for the Colombian democracy.”

Jason Marczak, Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and moderator of the panel, also noted the lack of coordinated disinformation campaigns that have marred other global elections in recent years. Marczak highlighted the joint project between the Latin America Center and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) in determining that only small pockets of disinformation appeared in the run-up to the second-round election.

Alina Dieste, the Washington correspondent for Agence France-Presse (AFP) and the former managing editor of the AFP Colombia bureau, argued that the results on Sunday, which showed not only a victory for Duque, but also a record high vote total (8 million) for his left-leaning opponent Gustavo Petro, demonstrated that the Colombian people “were voting for change.” Duque won, in part, because he was a “young face. . . [that] no one knows in terms of corruption,” according to Dieste.

Despite winning by twelve percentage points, the panelists believed that Duque received a less than clear mandate from the Colombian electorate. Tomás González, the Executive Director for Colombia at the International Monetary Fund and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Colombia Task Force, pointed out that the results featured heavy geographic polarization, with the coasts and Bogotá voting for Petro and the rest of the country for Duque. López asserted that “Duque has a mandate, but not one that allows him to go any way he wants,” but also pointed out Duque’s acceptance speech as a sign that the new president may be more willing to govern from the center and broaden his appeal to Petro’s left-leaning voters.

González identified two potential indicators of Duque’s ability to govern from the center: his choice of cabinet members and the first budget. Should Duque be able to provide tangible concessions to the left through these actions, then his calls for unity could be considered more serious. González believes it will be difficult for Duque to balance his fiscal priorities – passing a tax cut and cutting government spending – with the quality of life programs included under the “inclusive growth” program demanded by Petro’s base.

Duque must also balance his campaign promise to alter the 2016 deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with the clear desire among many Colombians for the peace process to be protected. “[Duque] does not want to tear the accord apart, but he wants to be fair towards the victims” of FARC attacks, according to Dieste. She stressed that while Duque has committed to making changes, this could “be risky. . . [because] those people who voted for Petro wanted the peace to be maintained,” and was an important factor in the leftist’s record high vote total.

Venezuela will also prove to be an enormous challenge for Duque, as Colombia has become “an escape valve,” for its neighbor’s political crisis, according to López. While Colombia will continue to receive assistance in dealing with a spiraling migrant crisis, López believes that Duque will have “a limited toolbox” to address the crisis.

Economically, Duque “will inherit a lot of positive instruments” to continue to grow the Colombian economy, according to González. Colombia’s acceptance in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a successful adjustment after the latest oil shock, and historically low levels of unemployment and inflation, will give him considerable room to maneuver, González argued. When asked what Duque’s priorities should be as he starts his administration, González listed infrastructure, the formalization of Colombian businesses and the labor market, and reforming the energy sector as the most important issues.

Despite the challenges ahead, there was agreement that the June 17th election was a major milestone for Colombian democracy. In the past, many voters would have been scared to vote for leftist candidates, out of fear for being labelled as a FARC sympathizer, but in this election “people voted for whoever they wanted,” cheered López. After decades of civil war and political division, López argued, “Colombia turned the page.”

David Wemer is an assistant director of editorial content at the Atlantic Council.

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#ElectionWatch: Eyes on Colombia from Venezuela https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/electionwatch-eyes-on-colombia-from-venezuela/ Sun, 17 Jun 2018 20:18:20 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/electionwatch-close-eyes-on-colombia-from-venezuela/ The Colombian elections have spurred significant interest in Venezuela, as evidenced by the social media activity of accounts based in the country or managed by Venezuelans.

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June 17, 2018

The Colombian elections have spurred significant interest in Venezuela, as evidenced by the social media activity of accounts based in the country or managed by Venezuelans.

#ElectionWatch researchers looked into this activity. There is more evidence of coordinated social media efforts between Venezuelan opposition supporters and Colombian right-wing groups, than between the Colombian left wing and Chavista supporters.

The most successful tweet from Venezuela to Colombia, however, was a false story, which once again highlights our concerns about the misinformation flows in these elections and their political use.

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Celia Quoted in CNBC on Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/celia-quoted-in-cnbc-on-colombia/ Thu, 14 Jun 2018 18:50:35 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/celia-quoted-in-cnbc-on-colombia/ Read the full article here

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Read the full article here

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#ElectionWatch: Bees Cause Buzz in Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/electionwatch-bees-cause-buzz-in-colombia/ Wed, 13 Jun 2018 23:02:53 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/electionwatch-bees-cause-buzz-in-colombia/ A week before the election, people attending a campaign rally for Colombian presidential candidate Iván Duque were attacked by a swarm bees.

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June 13, 2018

A week before the election, people attending a campaign rally for presidential candidate Iván Duque were attacked by a swarm bees. A number of high-profile Uribe sympathizers blamed supporters of Colombia Humana’s Gustavo Petro for the attack. The Cesar department police chief quickly debunked the accusations. 

The Atlantic Council’s #ElectionWatch team analyzed the case and the flows of information online. Like the case with the #FraudeElectoral hashtag, partisan users were willing to push deceptive narratives, without regard for the availability of verified versions of them. What is even more worrying, is that the work of fact-checkers and journalists is not being shared widely enough for debunking lies on social media.

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