Americas - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/americas/ Shaping the global future together Fri, 16 Aug 2024 19:34:25 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/favicon-150x150.png Americas - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/americas/ 32 32 The IRA two years on: A signpost of the new economic policy consensus https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-ira-two-years-on-a-signpost-of-the-new-economic-policy-consensus/ Thu, 15 Aug 2024 18:34:52 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785745 Signed in August 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act has prompted global competition among governments to make public investments in emerging industries and technologies.

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Signed into law on August 16, 2022, the Inflation Reduction Act was a legislative Rorschach test: It looked like different things to different people. To some, it was a climate bill. To others, it was a health care bill. And to others still—in fact, to the member of Congress who was perhaps most instrumental in achieving its passage, Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia—it was an energy and national security bill. The legacy of the IRA will surely be closely tied to these annotations, and indeed, its contribution to achieving domestic and global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions targets is monumental.

However, two years on it is becoming increasingly clear that the legacy of the IRA is tethered to a renewed pact between government and the US economy, with key implications for trade, technological competition with China, and foreign policy writ large.

Since the early 1980s, the prevailing dogma on both sides of the aisle regarding US economic policy has largely been one of skepticism about direct government intervention in the economy. Trade and domestic market liberalization have been features of Republican and Democratic rhetoric since at least the Reagan administration. Of course, US government spending did increase over this period, and Washington did often step in with, for example, countercyclical spending during economic downturns. Nonetheless, most US politicians took as axiomatic that the government should not be “picking winners and losers” in the economy. The IRA has ushered in a new era in which this reflexive aversion to economic intervention may be vanishing.

Industrial policy has risen from the gutter

The IRA’s subsidies and grants for low-carbon electricity generation and technology manufacturing, along with its capitalization of the US Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office, represent a divergence from the once-dominant economic policy consensus. The IRA is among the most significant government investments in the US economy since President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. In fact, it is rivaled only by primarily demand-side stimulus packages, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and the CARES Act of 2020.

According to Goldman Sachs estimates, by 2032 the IRA will provide $1.2 trillion in incentives with the intention of fueling the deployment of energy technologies. This includes technologies that are currently profitable, such as solar and onshore wind, as well as new market entrants, such as electric vehicles, grid storage, new forms of bioenergy, offshore wind, clean hydrogen for hard-to-abate sectors, point-source carbon capture, and carbon removal. If the broad-scale deployment of these technologies is achieved at the scale envisioned by prevailing models—which is dependent on additional regulatory reform—these effects of the legislation will be uniformly positive for climate mitigation and economic growth alike.

These positive effects are being borne out in data. Of an estimated seventy-eight billion dollars in public investment since the IRA’s enactment, the bill has shepherded between five to six times that figure in private investment. In fact, investment in low-carbon technologies and manufacturing has comprised about half of private investment growth since the IRA’s passage. That is a success.

The implications of the IRA as a shift in economic policy are not uniformly positive, however. The global consequences of this shift have manifested in at least two ways.

First, the floodgates of government market interventions have been opened. In 2023 alone, governments around the world implemented more than 1,600 industrial policies. The IRA is both an example of this general trend and, given the size of the US economy and the IRA’s intervention, something other countries have reacted to with their own interventions. For example, the United States’ use of subsidies for its economy has prompted adverse reactions from the European Union, whose single market makes the use of subsidies difficult, and prompted concerns regarding the comparative advantage of its domestic industry. This year, the European Parliament and European Council passed the Net-Zero Industry Act, which provides financial support through grants, loans, and other funding mechanisms to promote research, development, and deployment of clean technologies and manufacturing capacity—a direct response to the IRA.

In a sense, the IRA has prompted global competition among governments to make public investments in emerging industries and technologies.

Second, trade measures have arisen as a method by which to protect, or “ring fence,” domestic industrial policy strategies from foreign competition. Notably, the May 2024 suite of tariffs announced by the White House represent a substantial signal of intent to isolate encroachment of Chinese imports on domestic industries that have not yet been established and that the IRA supports. In the IRA, certain softly punitive measures impact trade, stoking additional tension. For instance, eligibility for subsidies under the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit is limited, based on the country of origin of critical minerals and battery components and excluding several US allies and partners.

Economic competition among the United States, the European Union, and China is increasing, and the decades-long criticism of China’s subsidy-centric growth model by Washington and European capitals is being usurped by a new industrial policy with US and European characteristics. In some sense, although all three blocs are competing, two distinct visions have emerged: the bottom-up, private sector-led and government-enabled vision of the United States and European Union, and the top-down, state-directed vision of China.

Trade-offs, tariffs, and technological innovation

Will this trend continue? Industrial policymaking in democracies is necessarily impacted by political feasibility, what is favored by those with power, and what works within the parameters of a state’s administrative capacity, as an International Monetary Fund publication recently reflected. As such, the IRA is also a product of the political moment, dubbed by the Breakthrough Institute as a period of “post-COVID congressional profligacy.” It is difficult to predict what the next major industrial policy package in the United States will consist of, but it will likely be shaped as much by the political forces at play as by rigid economic analysis.

Careful reflection is needed going forward, as industrial policy, by definition, leads to concentrated benefits and carries diffuse costs. As such, it can also lead to unintended or counterproductive outcomes. The recent tariffs may prove this true, depending on one’s definition of the intended outcome.

Take the 25 percent tariff increase that was imposed on imports of Chinese solar cells. While this may protect domestic solar manufacturers, it may also slow the rate of solar deployment overall, given the higher resulting price for panels. Absent this tariff, solar panels would likely be cheaper, so it would be fair to say that the Biden administration’s implicit target of countering China’s industrial prowess is countering its explicit goal of achieving a carbon-free power grid by 2035.

The effects of trade policies such as this are unclear. What is clear is that acknowledgement of the trade-offs is necessary.

Public investments in infrastructure do have an important role. They are critical conduits of productivity growth and are necessary in areas where clear incentives for the private sector are not present. For instance, while nuclear energy is critical for bolstering the reliability of the electric grid, its business model has suffered significantly from the natural gas production boom that the United States has experienced from 2005 to the present. The affordability of gas, and increasingly of other resources, such as solar power, has made nuclear power’s high operating and capital costs less attractive to utilities, among other factors. Programs such as the Department of Energy’s Civil Nuclear Credit Program, which provides financial assistance to the United States’ nuclear reactor fleet, play an essential role.

Looking forward, however, it is also worthwhile to recall what is historically the engine of growth for the modern US economy, and the principal root of US competitive advantage in the global economy—technological innovation. It was not the tariffs of the McKinley administration or the safety net of the Roosevelt administration that led the way in supercharging US growth, although safety nets and infrastructure definitively do breed innovation.  

Attempting to reinvigorate domestic industry through grants, loans, or subsidies may be necessary to achieve goals such as “reshoring” manufacturing. At the same time, investments in research and development (R&D) are proven over decades to provide consistent macroeconomic returns and drive technological progress. An independent report commissioned by the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy found that investments of twelve billion dollars made by the office since the mid-1970s have yielded more than $388 billion in total undiscounted net economic benefits to the United States.

However, public R&D spending in the United States has been stagnant for decades as a percentage of gross domestic product. If government investment is looking for the best rate of return, as sound investors do, R&D may be an underappreciated “asset class” that should increasingly be targeted by the United States and its partners.


William Tobin is an assistant director at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, where he focuses on international energy and climate policy.

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Will Maduro negotiate a transfer of power? And four other questions about Venezuela’s political crisis. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/will-maduro-negotiate-a-transfer-of-power-and-four-other-questions-about-venezuelas-political-crisis/ Thu, 15 Aug 2024 15:51:43 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785677 Venezuela remains riven by its July 28 election, with Nicolás Maduro falsely claiming victory and the opposition presenting vote tally sheets that show Edmundo González received more than twice as many votes as Maduro.

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After Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election, incumbent Nicolás Maduro quickly and falsely claimed victory, even though the government-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE) still has not released precinct-level results. According to vote tally sheets collected by the opposition and verified by an independent analysis, presidential candidate Edmundo González received more than twice as many votes as Maduro. In response to Maduro’s power grab, the opposition has called for protests around the country, insisting that the government recognize its victory and move toward a peaceful transfer of power. The Maduro regime has replied by launching a sweeping crackdown and putting thousands of Venezuelans in jail. 

Below, experts from the Atlantic Council and its Venezuela Solutions Group answer five pressing questions about the country’s ongoing political crisis.

Venezuela is experiencing a deepening of its crisis. The lack of transparency in the electoral process and the failure of the CNE to present the electoral bulletins have led the country into a chaotic situation. Repression is increasing by the day, reaching levels that exceed anything previously seen in Venezuela. Respect for the right to demonstrate and for the popular will of the people are fundamental pillars of any government that calls itself democratic. The world cannot remain silent in the face of the systematic and violent repression of opponents and dissidents in Venezuela.

—María Ángela Holguín is a former foreign minister of Colombia and a senior advisor to the Atlantic Council’s Venezuela Solutions Group. 

The situation in Venezuela is deeply alarming, especially given the fact that the government has not presented detailed results for each polling station to back up its figures. Transparency in the process of counting votes is essential. A thorough verification of the election results must be carried out to ensure that they faithfully reflect the will of the Venezuelan people. This verification must include a complete count of all tally sheets, which the CNE must provide without further delay.

—Miguel Vargas is a former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic and a senior advisor to the Venezuela Solutions Group.

The voting, counting, and tallying system used in Venezuela includes a mechanism for verifying its operation and auditing its results through what is known as the “paper trail.” This paper trail consists of physical records and voting receipts that verify whether the results announced by the CNE reflect the valid will of the voters. The paper trail includes several components, such as the receipt given to each voter after casting their ballot. This receipt allows voters to confirm that it contains the candidate’s name and the organization they supported. This is the first step in the verification process. Voters then place this receipt into a secure box.

At the end of the voting process, the machine immediately prints out the voting record. For the presidential election on July 28, 30,026 voting machines were deployed for the CNE, each corresponding to a separate voting table. Consequently, 30,026 original voting records were printed and kept in the custody of the Plan República military personnel. Once the machine transmits the results, copies of the voting records are printed for all witnesses. These witnesses must verify that these copies are accurate reproductions of the original records printed by the system.

Additionally, each voting record features a QR code summarizing the data printed on the record. Following the transmission, up to 54 percent of the machines are audited by manually opening the boxes containing the printed voting receipts to ensure that the data on the records is accurate.

Starting on Monday, July 29, the opposition began publishing digitized images of the voting records collected by its witnesses. It is important to note that in many cases, Plan República agents prevented opposition witnesses from accessing this material. As of the time of this report, the opposition has managed to collect, validate, and digitize 83 percent of the election records.

However, the CNE has reported hacking of the 30,026 private transmission lines for the machines (one encrypted line per machine) and has refused to disclose the results broken down by center and table. This has made it impossible to compare the opposition’s copies with the results released by the CNE. Additionally, the telecommunications audit and phase II verification, scheduled for July 29 and August 2, respectively, were suspended. These reviews are crucial for assessing the consistency of the announced results.

Trust in an automated voting system is not a matter of faith. Trust is built through auditability, and to date, the Venezuelan government has obstructed the auditability of the results. After more than two weeks, there are also reasonable concerns about the custody of physical electoral materials and databases. The initial international request to present the voting records is proving to be inadequate.

—Eugenio Martínez is the director of Votoscopio, a Venezuela elections specialist, and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group. 

Latin American countries have a crucial responsibility at this moment. It is necessary to support efforts to promote credible negotiations that will lead to a peaceful and democratic solution in Venezuela. However, it is imperative that any negotiations incorporate the desire of both the Venezuelan people and all of Latin America to respect the rule of law and democratic order in Venezuela. Only through a firm commitment to these principles can we move toward a solution that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people.

—Miguel Vargas

Faced with this reality, it is imperative that Latin American countries continue to demand electoral transparency and condemn repression and the violation of human rights. It is essential to increase diplomatic coordination and demand transparency, independent auditing, and respect for the popular vote. Only with a firm and coordinated position in the region will we be able to engender a way out of the deep crisis in Venezuela, which must occur through a credible and realistic negotiation process with the accompaniment of guarantor countries. 

—María Ángela Holguín

We must start from the premise that Maduro’s government made a political decision in ignoring the results of the presidential election. This implies a radical break with popular sovereignty, which Chavismo proclaimed as the foundation of its legitimacy. The cost of this rupture is as high as the associated costs of international isolation and of reversing steps taken toward economic stabilization, because it enshrines the divorce between the ruling coalition and its popular bases. However, the dominant coalition perceives that it can stay in power if it manages to deflate the strong feeling of change and, above all, unity, through the weakening of the leadership of María Corina Machado and González, in a kind of repetition of the resistance-attrition strategy it used to address the 2019 crisis with the interim government of Juan Guaidó.  

The ruling coalition tries to do so through repression and self-isolation. It is attempting to prevent an internationally supported negotiation from forcing it to recognize the opposition’s victory. And it is doing so with a degree of open, articulate, and express support from the military that had not been necessary to exhibit in the past. The efforts of Colombian President Gustavo Petro and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are geared toward opening a crack to move Maduro from his position, which at this time is completely insensitive to the usual list of incentives. Thus, it is not foreseeable that in the short term an effective negotiating body can be built to ensure the verification of results. Perhaps it is necessary to start, as in serious armed conflicts, with more basic areas of agreement, such as advancing mutual guarantees and respect for human rights.

—Colette Capriles is an associate professor and researcher in philosophy, politics, and social sciences at Simón Bolívar University and a member of the Venezuela Solutions Group.

On August 11, the Wall Street Journal reported that Washington is engaged in secret talks with Maduro, and may be offering him and those around him an amnesty from US narcoterrorism charges in exchange for a democratic transition. This news may be a sign that the Biden administration is trying to preserve space for negotiations behind the scenes. However, Maduro is a serial abuser of dialogue and, should these efforts fail, it is likely that the White House’s patience will run out. The good news is that the United States still holds considerable leverage, which can be used to shape elite interests and maximize opportunities for a democratic solution. 

For the Biden administration, the challenge lies in finding a balance between applying targeted, effective pressure on elites and preventing Venezuela from drifting further into Russia’s and China’s spheres of influence. Some in Washington fear that a return to “maximum pressure” could drive Maduro closer to the United States’ geopolitical rivals. Individual sanctions may be a more appealing strategy, but it will be crucial to focus this pressure on fostering a democratic opening while avoiding actions that strengthen regime unity. More than 160 regime members have already been sanctioned—many of whom have been celebrated in public ceremonies and awarded replica swords of Venezuela’s liberator, Simón Bolívar. Bringing pressure to bear while avoiding anything that helps unify Maduro’s coalition at his weakest moment in years will be absolutely crucial.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Get ready for a volatile fall in the financial markets—but not necessarily a downturn https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/get-ready-for-a-volatile-fall-in-the-financial-markets-but-not-necessarily-a-downturn/ Wed, 14 Aug 2024 15:06:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785513 Between an election, the threat of conflict, and a slowing economy, there is likely to be more volatility in the months ahead. But volatility doesn’t mean a downturn—it just means there’s more uncertainty than usual. 

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The first global financial crisis of the twentieth century happened in 1907. The so-called Knickerbocker Crisis was triggered by the fallout from the San Francisco earthquake, a failed copper investment, and a surprise interest rate hike from the Bank of England. This crisis ultimately led to the creation of the Federal Reserve and underscored how the decisions of one central bank can impact the rest of the world. Last week, the world was reminded of this lesson, when the Bank of Japan hiked interest rates and sent markets into a temporary tailspin.

That tailspin has ended almost as quickly as it started, and new inflation data today is making the Fed’s upcoming interest rate decision much more straightforward. But it’s worth revisiting what exactly happened in the markets over the past ten days and the lessons we should take heading into a consequential fall.

On August 5, markets in the United States fell 13 percent, in part thanks to Japan’s decision but also based on signals of a cooling US labor market. Global markets have experienced jolts in recent years; In 2023 Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) collapsed, marking one of the largest bank failures since 2008.

Below is a market reaction comparison for SVB and the recent “Summer Selloff.”
Click the arrow to see more.

While the recent shock differed in many ways from the one in March of last year, two key factors set the Summer Selloff apart: the state of the US economy and the situation with Iran.

One of the main reasons the VIX (the stock market’s expectation of volatility, sometimes called the fear gauge) spiked to historic highs last week was the risk of Iran’s retaliation and a wider war in the Middle East. As more serious talks of a ceasefire deal emerged during the week, markets started to recover quickly. But the situation is shifting day-to-day.

In the United States, markets were worried that the Fed was reacting too slowly to what was happening in the jobs market. In February 2023, right before SVB, the United States was adding 300,000 jobs a month, beating all expectations. But last month’s report was under 115,000 jobs. 

The Fed typically convenes eight times a year, but the summer schedule means there will be a notably long seven-week break before interest rates are revisited (absent a highly unlikely, and based on current conditions unnecessary, emergency meeting). This time gap could heighten market anxiety that the Fed is falling behind the curve and further erode confidence among businesses and consumers. While the Fed has signaled that it is preparing to cut rates in September, it is also aware that the meeting takes place six weeks before the presidential election, putting even more scrutiny than usual on its decision making. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has been clear that the election will in no way impact the Fed’s decision making. 

This morning, the Fed’s decision was made easier. The consumer price index increase data came in lower than expected, at 2.9 percent, which strengthens the argument for a rate cut when the Fed meets next month. In fact, some market participants think the Fed will cut by 50 basis points (bps), or half a percentage point, not its more standard 25 bps move. 

Compare the situation in the US economy now to the one during SVB’s collapse.

When SVB was unfolding, countries around the world knew they could rely on US growth to  stabilize the global economy. Forecasts for the economy were high and labor data was strong. Today, US growth is slowing (forecasted to be under 2 percent in 2025), China’s economy is stalling, and Europe remains stagnant. 

That explains why the market reacted the way it did last week—but what about the rapid recovery? All of last week’s losses have since been recoupled. In short, markets came to their senses. 

True, the Fed does not meet for another month, but Powell will be giving one of his biggest speeches of the year at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium in a little over a week. The annual central banker retreat brings together financial leaders from across the world’s largest economies to discuss the ongoing economic issues and policy challenges. Powell’s speech is the perfect opportunity to signal the Fed’s intentions to cut rates and cool markets.

Meanwhile markets realized that while the United States is indeed slowing, it is still growing and far from a recession. Today’s inflation data confirms that the Fed—and the broader US economy—still have a very real chance of sticking the “‘soft landing” by hiking rates enough to tame inflation without causing a recession, an outcome that would be far outside the historical norm.

The bottom line is that between an election, the threat of conflict, and a slowing economy, there is likely to be more volatility in the months ahead. But volatility doesn’t necessarily equate to a downturn—it just means there’s more uncertainty than usual. 


Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.

Alisha Chhangani is an assistant director with the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center.

This post is adapted from the GeoEconomics Center’s weekly Guide to the Global Economy newsletter. If you are interested in getting the newsletter, email SBusch@atlanticcouncil.org

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The case for the United States and China working together in space https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-case-for-the-united-states-and-china-working-together-in-space/ Wed, 14 Aug 2024 14:55:11 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785284 Washington and Beijing should work to revive the idea that the exploration of space should be undertaken for peaceful purposes.

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In the fall of 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent then Senator Lyndon B Johnson to the United Nations (UN) with the proposal that “the exploration of outer space be undertaken for peaceful purposes, as an enterprise of international cooperation among all member nations.” The resolution reflected a growing aspiration that nations would join together in exploring the cosmos and in doing so find a common purpose.

The vision was amplified by Johnson when he became president. In a letter to the Senate in 1967, he emphasized that cooperation in space would provide a basis by which to avoid confrontational national tendencies, thereby leading to substantial contributions toward peace. The historic US Apollo and Soviet Union Soyuz (Apollo-Soyuz) docking in July 1975 was heralded as a first step toward meaningful space cooperation between otherwise adversarial nations. The image of astronauts and cosmonauts welcoming each other across their open spacecraft hatchways sparked an optimism and a sense of unity that inspired the world community. NASA astronaut Tom Stafford said that opening the hatch in space opened a “new era” back on Earth.

The current state of space diplomacy

Today, the International Space Station is a testament to multinational cooperation, persisting despite seismic geopolitical shifts. The partnership between the United States, Europe, Canada, Japan, and Russia has required a myriad of joint engineering projects and mutual reliance on resources despite monumental earthly tensions—a striking step forward in space diplomacy.

In recent years, however, hostility between the United States on one hand and Russia and China on the other has overshadowed the core tenets of space cooperation. The realization that space is not only an arena for scientific exploration and economic competition, but of future military conflict, has come to the fore. Although the United States and forty-two other nations have recently agreed to a set of principles for the peaceful exploration of space, known as the Artemis Accords, there exists no such agreement with other key space-faring nations, most notably China and Russia.

Parallel lunar ambitions

The United States and its allies are developing a major space program to return to the moon and establish a permanent presence with a lunar base and an orbiting lunar space station. The project has ignited public excitement and forged new agreements between the United States and partner nations. At the same time, China is leading a very similar project called the International Lunar Research Station to establish a permanent lunar presence, working with Russia and several other countries, including Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, and South Africa.

Two groups of nations separately working on the same goal, establishing separate lunar bases with no cooperation between them is a disappointing setback from earlier achievements. One might ask: What happened to the spirit that drove the handshake on Apollo-Soyuz?

There are of course challenges and barriers to sparking and sustaining cooperation. The growing conflicts on Earth and the threats posed by anti-satellite weapons provide arguments against initiating a dialogue. However, similar dynamics were present in the past, when leaders decided to work together to embrace the common objectives of exploring the cosmos and harvesting space for the betterment of life on Earth. Despite major tensions and conflicts, the two sides gained a measure of mutual understanding and respect for each other’s humanity through the efforts of scientists, engineers, and astronauts, as they joined in a common purpose.

Starting points for US-China space cooperation

The logical question is: Given substantial concerns regarding military hostility in space, where should the United States and China start? How can they find common ground in an environment of such intense mistrust?

Washington and Beijing can begin with a principle that has already been agreed upon and that touches a core human value. The UN Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement came into effect in 1968. It commits nations to come to the assistance of astronauts in distress, no matter what country they launched from. It was a noble step forward, and a theme largely taken from the finest of maritime traditions. The agreement, however, is hollow without plans, procedures, and systems in place to enable meaningful action. Spaceships and space suits are complex and unique, and without forethought and the right equipment it is highly unlikely that astronauts from separate nations could possibly provide any meaningful aid. For instance, how would a Chinese astronaut connect and supply the right pressure to provide oxygen to an American astronaut in distress without first having the right connecting gear and knowing the pressure settings? How can countries make their ships compatible to dock if medical support is needed? What would be the communication protocols to use when determining whether assistance is necessary?

A bilateral working group between NASA and China’s National Space Administration (CNSA) should be established to prepare for joint rescue operations. This interaction would lead to improved communication between the respective space communities. The collaboration would also establish readiness for potential rescue missions, which would have profound benefits in the event that an astronaut rescue was needed.

Once the rescue working group is formed, further bilateral agreements should be pursued. These could include mutual use of lunar communication and navigation services, as well as agreements on providing consumables, power, habitats, and transport.

What steps does the United States need to take? The United States should repeal the Wolf Amendment, which was put in place in 2011 due to concerns about space technology transfer to China. The establishment of this barrier has not slowed China’s space technology development. Instead, it has only hindered useful interchange between NASA and the CNSA.

And China? Beijing should foster more open communication with the United States regarding norms of behavior in space exploration and the preservation of the space environment. It should take a leading role in space sustainability, including being transparent about its plans to remedy issues with the Long March 6A rocket that broke apart earlier this month and left significant space debris. China should also initiate discussions to join moratoria on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing, which it has so far opposed.

Eisenhower and Johnson advocated for cooperation to prevent misunderstandings and mistrust from growing into armed conflict in space. They saw the need to take firm steps to avoid such a tragic result. To that end, the United States and China must now take swift steps to initiate space cooperation and lead a more unified world into the final frontier.


Dan Hart is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

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New US-Ukraine partnership proposal from influential senators is a recipe for bipartisan success https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/new-us-ukraine-partnership-proposal-from-influential-senators-is-a-recipe-for-bipartisan-success/ Tue, 13 Aug 2024 20:56:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785378 Senators Richard Blumenthal and Lindsey Graham came to Kyiv this week with an ambitious bipartisan vision for the future of US-Ukrainian relations, writes Andrew D’Anieri.

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Since February 2022, dozens of US senators and representatives, both Democrats and Republicans, have made the long journey to Kyiv to show support for Ukraine’s fight against Russia. It’s a challenging trip from Washington involving multiple flights, a sometimes-jammed border crossing, and a long train ride. But the chance to show US support and learn more about Ukraine’s struggle up close evidently makes the journey worthwhile.

Perhaps none have been as active, nor shown a greater commitment to bipartisanship, than Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), who made their sixth trip to Kyiv on August 12. This was no recess joyride down Kyiv’s Khreshchatyk Street. Most notably, the two senators met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and then quickly announced what could be a blueprint for US policy toward Ukraine in the waning months of the current Congress.

In a joint press release, Blumenthal and Graham outlined four pillars for a strong US policy on Ukraine through 2024 and 2025. First, they called on NATO to “issue an invitation this year to Ukraine for membership,” an obvious but crucial next step to more formally bind the country into the Alliance.

Second, the two announced that Blumenthal would introduce the Stand with Ukraine Act when Congress returns to Capitol Hill in September to “codify the bilateral security agreement” that the Biden and Zelenskyy administrations reached in June. This, too, is a sensible and necessary move. While Ukraine has signed security pacts with a host of Western partners, nearly all of them have been non-binding, including the US-Ukraine agreement. An act of Congress would seal its implementation over the length of its ten-year lifespan.

The senators joined a growing chorus of US lawmakers and experts calling on the Biden administration to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US weapons against military targets in Russia. After months of pressure, the administration assented in May to allow limited strikes inside Russia, but only under specific conditions. Blumenthal and Graham see the folly in limiting when and how Ukraine can use US weapons and vowed to “urge the Biden administration to lift restrictions on weapons provided by the United States so they can strike the Russian invaders more effectively.”

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, the senators offered the prospect of a strategic economic partnership between the United States and Ukraine centered on metals and rare earth elements development. Their press release hinted that their suggestion was a welcome surprise for Zelenskyy, whose government has expressed hopes of leveraging Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth to become a major exporter of lithium and rare earths, raw materials key to new technologies and the energy transition. In a veiled reference to China’s dominant position in the rare earths market, the senators noted that “an agreement with Ukraine in this area would make the US less dependent on foreign adversaries for rare earth minerals.”

Stay updated

As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox.

After the House of Representatives belatedly passed the national security supplemental package that unlocked further US aid to Ukraine in April, experts and lawmakers alike began to wonder how Washington might continue to support Ukraine throughout the rest of 2024. The Blumenthal-Graham priorities outline what could be an ambitious, re-energized US policy on Ukraine through the end of the current year.

US President Joe Biden has been skittish at the last two NATO summits about pushing for Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance, largely for fear of escalating tensions with Russia. But with Biden now out of the 2024 presidential race, he may be thinking more about his foreign policy legacy. Having already helped usher Finland and Sweden into the Alliance, opening Ukraine’s accession bid in earnest would be the third in a hat-trick of transatlantic security wins for Biden. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s underwhelming response to Ukraine’s offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast should certainly tamp down any misplaced fears of escalation.

Blumenthal’s Stand With Ukraine Act will likely run up against latent partisanship and electoral jitters when he introduces it in September. Much of Congress will be campaigning this fall, avoiding difficult votes while trying to score political points against the other party. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer could very well bring the bill to a floor vote, both to support Ukraine and to force a vote from anti-Ukraine Republicans, but Speaker of the House Mike Johnson may be loath to spend political capital to do the same. Even so, the bill may get the ball rolling on further Ukraine legislation, especially as some pro-Ukraine Republicans indicate they want funding to continue uninterrupted, even under the prospect of a Donald Trump presidency.

As for dropping restrictions on the use of US weapons, only the Biden administration can reverse this policy, something it has repeatedly declined to do. It may take further public and private calls from Democrats such as Blumenthal before the White House agrees to a change. In the meantime, Russian rockets will continue to kill Ukrainian civilians using launch systems that could have been taken out by US-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and other Western-supplied weapons.

The senators’ proposal for a US-Ukraine economic partnership has all the ingredients for bipartisan consensus in Washington: Support for Ukraine without US taxpayer dollars, reduced dependence on China, and the potential for economic gain by importing one of the few materials the United States can’t make itself. A formal agreement would likely be highly technical and take many months to negotiate, but all the incentives are there for a new element in US-Ukraine relations.

Congressional delegations can sometimes be high on style and discussion but low on action and deliverables. This time, Blumenthal and Graham delivered on all counts and laid out a road map outlining US support for Ukraine through the end of 2024. Their list is as ambitious as it is sounds, both in its support for US interests and in helping Ukraine move toward victory on the battlefield. That combination of vision and vigor is exactly why their initiatives deserve bipartisan support.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Tech regulation requires balancing security, privacy, and usability  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/tech-regulation-requires-balancing-security-privacy-and-usability/ Mon, 12 Aug 2024 14:44:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=785037 Good policy intentions can lead to unintended consequences when usability, privacy, and security are not balanced—policymakers must think like product designers to avoid these challenges.

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In the United States and across the globe, governments continue to grapple with how to regulate new and increasingly complex technologies, including in the realm of financial services. While they might be tempted to clamp down or impose strict centralized security requirements, recent history suggests that policymakers should jointly consider and balance usability and privacy—and approach their goals as if they were a product designer.

Kenya is a prime example: In 2007, a local telecommunications provider launched a form of mobile money called M-PESA, which enabled peer-to-peer money transfers between mobile phones and became wildly successful. Within five years, it grew to fifteen million users, with a deposit value approaching almost one billion dollars. To address rising security concerns, in 2013, the Kenyan government implemented a law requiring every citizen to officially register the SIM card (for their cell phone) using a government identification (ID). The measure was enforced swiftly, leading to the freezing of millions of SIM cards. Over ten years later, SIM card ID registration laws have become common across Africa, with over fifty countries adopting such regulations. 

But that is not the end of the story. In parallel, a practice called third-party SIM registration has become rampant, in which cell phone users register their SIM cards using someone else’s ID, such as a friend’s or a family member’s. 

Our recent research at Carnegie Mellon University, based on in-depth user studies in Kenya and Tanzania, found that this phenomenon of third-party SIM registration has both unexpected origins and unintended consequences. Many individuals in those countries face systemic challenges in obtaining a government ID. Moreover, some participants in our study reported having privacy concerns. They felt uncomfortable sharing their ID information with mobile money agents, who could repurpose that information for scams, harassment, or other unintended uses. Other participants felt “frustrated” by a process that was “cumbersome.” As a result, many users prefer to register a SIM card with another person’s ID rather than use or obtain their own ID.

Third-party SIM registration plainly undermines the effectiveness of the public policy and has additional, downstream effects. Telecommunications companies end up collecting “know your customer” information that is not reliable, which can impede law enforcement investigations in the case of misconduct. For example, one of our study subjects shared the story of a friend lending their ID for third-party registration, and later being arrested for the alleged crimes of the actual user of the SIM card. 

A core implication of our research is that the Kenyan government’s goals did not fully take into account the realities of the target population—or the feasibility of the measures that Kenya and Tanzania proposed. In response, people invented their own workarounds, thus potentially introducing new vulnerabilities and avenues for fraud.

Good policy, bad consequences 

Several other case studies demonstrate how even well-intentioned regulations can have unintended consequences and practical problems if they do not appropriately consider security, privacy and usability together. 

  • Uganda: Much like our findings in Kenya and Tanzania, a biometric digital identity program in Uganda has considerable unintended consequences. Specifically, it risks excluding fifteen million Ugandans “from accessing essential public services and entitlements” because they do not have access to a national digital identity card there. While the digitization of IDs promises to offer certain security features, it also has potential downsides for data privacy and risks further marginalizing vulnerable groups who are most in need of government services.
  • Europe: Across the European Union (EU), a landmark privacy law called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been critical for advancing data protection and has become a benchmark for regulatory standards worldwide. But GDPR’s implementation has had unforeseen effects such as some websites blocking EU users. Recent studies have also highlighted various usability issues that may thwart the desired goals. For example, opting out of data collection through app permissions and setting cookie preferences is an option for users. But this option is often exclusionary and inconvenient, resulting in people categorically waiving their privacy for the sake of convenience.
  • United States (health law): Within the United States, the marquee federal health privacy law passed in 1996 (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known as HIPAA) was designed to protect the privacy and security of individuals’ medical information. But it also serves as an example of laws that can present usability challenges for patients and healthcare providers alike. For example, to comply with HIPAA, many providers still require the use of ink signatures and fax machines. Not only are technologies somewhat antiquated and cumbersome (thereby slowing information sharing)—they also pose risks arising from unsecured fax machines and misdialed phone numbers, among other factors.
  • Jamaica: Both Jamaica and Kenya have had to halt national plans to launch a digital ID in light of privacy and security issues. Kenya already lost over $72 million from a prior project that was launched in 2019, which failed because of serious concerns related to privacy and security. In the meantime, fraud continues to be a considerable problem for everyday citizens: Jamaica has incurred losses of more than $620 million from fraud since 2018.
  • United States [tax system]: The situation in Kenya and Jamaica mirrors the difficulties encountered by other digital ID programs. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had to hold off plans for facial recognition based on concerns about the inadequate privacy measures, as well as usability concerns—like long verification wait times, low accuracy for certain groups, and the lack of offline options. The stalled program has resulted in missed opportunities for other technologies that could have allowed citizens greater convenience in accessing tax-related services and public benefits. Even after investing close to $187 million towards biometric identification, the IRS has not made much progress.

Collectively, a key takeaway from these international experiences is that when policymakers fail to simultaneously balance (or even consider) usability, privacy, and security, the progress of major government initiatives and the use of digitization to achieve important policy goals is hampered. In addition to regulatory and legislative challenges, delaying or canceling initiatives due to privacy and usability concerns can lead to erosion in public trust, increased costs and delays, and missed opportunities for other innovations.

Policy as product design

Going forward, one pivotal way for government decision makers to avoid pitfalls like the ones laid out above is to start thinking like product designers. Focusing on the most immediate policy goals is rarely enough to understand the practical and technological dimensions of how that policy will interact with the real world.

That does not mean, of course, that policymakers must all become experts in creating software products or designing user interfaces. But it does mean that some of the ways that product designers tend to think about big projects could inform effective public policy.

First, policymakers should embrace user studies to better understand the preferences and needs of citizens as they interact digitally with governmental programs and services. While there are multiple ways user studies can be executed, the first often includes upfront qualitative and quantitative research to understand the core behavioral drivers and systemic barriers to access. These could be complemented with focus groups, particularly with marginalized communities and populations who are likely to be disproportionately affected by any unintended outcomes of tech policy. 

Second, like early-stage technology products that are initially rolled out to an early group of users (known as “beta-testing”), policymakers could benefit from pilot testing to encourage early-stage feedback. 

Third, regulators—just like effective product designers—should consider an iterative process whereby they solicit feedback, implement changes to a policy or platform, and then repeat the process. This allows for validation of the regulation and makes room for adjustments and continuous improvements as part of an agency’s rulemaking process.

Lastly, legislators and regulators alike should conduct more regular tabletop exercises to see how new policies might play out in times of crisis. The executive branch regularly does such “tabletops” in the context of national security emergencies. But the same principles could apply to understanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities or user responses before implementing public policies or programs at scale.

In the end, a product design mindset will not completely eliminate the sorts of problems we have highlighted in Kenya, the United States, and beyond. However, it can help to identify the most pressing usability, security, and privacy problems before governments spend time and treasure to implement regulations or programs that may not fit the real world.


Karen Sowon is a user experience researcher and post doctoral research associate at Carnegie Mellon University.

JP Schnapper-Casteras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the founder and managing partner at Schnapper-Casteras, PLLC.


Giulia Fanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The future of digital transformation and workforce development in Latin America and the Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-future-of-digital-transformation-and-workforce-development-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/ Thu, 08 Aug 2024 14:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=775109 During an off-the-record private roundtable, thought leaders and practitioners from across the Americas evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation.

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The sixth of a six-part series following up on the Ninth Summit of the Americas commitments.

An initiative led by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center in partnership with the US Department of State continues to focus on facilitating greater constructive exchange among multisectoral thought leaders and government leaders as they work to implement commitments made at the ninth Summit of the Americas. This readout was informed by a private, information-gathering roundtable and several one-on-one conversations with leading experts in the digital space.

Executive summary

At the ninth Summit of the Americas, regional leaders agreed on the adoption of a Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation that reaffirmed the need for a dynamic and resilient digital ecosystem that promotes digital inclusion for all peoples. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the digital divide globally, but these gaps were shown to be deeper in developing countries, disproportionately affecting women, children, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable and/or marginalized individuals. Through this agenda, inclusive workforce development remains a key theme as an avenue to help bridge the digital divide and skills gap across the Americas.

As part of the Atlantic Council’s consultative process, thought leaders and practitioners evaluated progress made in the implementation of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation agreed on at the Summit of Americas, resulting in three concrete recommendations: (1) leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda; (2) strengthen public-private partnerships and multisectoral coordination to ensure adequate financing for tailored capacity-building programs, the expansion of digital infrastructure, and internet access; and (3) prioritize the involvement of local youth groups and civil society organizations, given their on-the-ground knowledge and role as critical indicators of implementation.

Recommendations for advancing digitalization and workforce development in the Americas:

  1. Leverage regional alliances and intraregional cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation of the agenda.
  • Establish formal partnerships between governments and local and international universities to broaden affordable student access to exchange programs, internships, and capacity-building sessions in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Programs should be tailored to country-specific economic interests and sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, and tourism. Tailoring these programs can also help enhance students’ access to the labor market upon graduation.
  • Ensure existing and new digital capacity-building programs leverage diaspora professionals. Implement virtual workshops, webinars, and collaborative projects that transfer knowledge and skills from technologically advanced regions to local communities. Leveraging these connections will help ensure programs are contextually relevant and effective.
  • Build on existing intraregional cooperation mechanisms and alliances to incorporate commitments of the Regional Agenda for Digital Transformation. Incorporating summit commitments to mechanisms such as the Alliance for Development in Democracy, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, the Caribbean Community and Common Market, and other subregional partnerships can result in greater sustainability of commitments as these alliances tend to transcend finite political agendas.
  • Propose regional policies to standardize the recognition of digital nomads and remote workers, including visa programs, tax incentives, and employment regulations. This harmonization will facilitate job creation for young professionals and enhance regional connectivity.
  1. Prioritize workforce development for traditionally marginalized groups by strengthening public-private partnerships and multisectoral collaboration.
  • Establish periodic and open dialogues between the public and private sectors to facilitate the implementation of targeted digital transformation for key sectors of a country’s economy that can enhance and modernize productivity. For instance, provide farmers with digital tools for precision agriculture, train health care workers in telemedicine technologies, and support tourism operators in developing online marketing strategies.
  • Foster direct lines of communication with multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank. Engaging in periodic dialogues with these actors will minimize duplication of efforts and maximize the impact of existing strategies and lines of work devoted to creating digital societies that are more resilient and inclusive. Existing and new programs should be paired with employment opportunities and competitive salaries for marginalized groups based on the acquired skills, thereby creating strong incentives to pursue education in digital skills.
  • Collaborate with telecommunications companies to offer subsidized internet packages for low-income households and small businesses and simplify regulatory frameworks to attract investment in rural and underserved areas, expanding internet coverage and accessibility.
  • Enhance coordination with private sector and multilateral partners to create a joint road map for sustained financing of digital infrastructure and workforce development to improve investment conditions in marginalized and traditionally excluded regions and cities.
  1. Increase engagement with local youth groups and civil society organizations to help ensure digital transformation agendas are viable and in line with local contexts.
  • Facilitate periodic dialogues with civil society organizations, the private sector , and government officials and ensure that consultative meetings are taking place at remote locations to ensure participation from disadvantaged populations in the digital space. Include women, children, and persons with disabilities to ensure capacity programs are generating desired impact and being realigned to address challenges faced by key, targeted communities.
  • Work with local actors such as youth groups and civil society organizations to conduct widespread awareness campaigns to help communities visualize the benefits of digital skills and technology use. Utilize success stories and case studies to show how individuals and businesses can thrive in a digital economy, fostering a culture of innovation and adaptation.
  • Invest in local innovation ecosystems by providing grants and incentives for start-ups and small businesses working on digital solutions. Create business incubators and accelerators to support the growth of digital enterprises, particularly those addressing local challenges.
  • Offer partnership opportunities with governments to provide seed capital, contests, digital boot camps, and mentorship sessions specifically designed for girls and women in school or college to help bridge the gender digital divide.

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The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

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How NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners can work together in an era of strategic competition https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-nato-and-its-indo-pacific-partners-can-work-together-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition/ Wed, 07 Aug 2024 15:48:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784314 Amid rising threats from Russia and China, it is in the interest of both NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners to deepen their cooperation.

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In its landmark 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO identified three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. The first two are rather self-explanatory, but the third was an important advancement. The notion of collective security as a core task starts with a recognition that NATO “is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders.” Because of this fact, the Alliance seeks out partnerships with other countries and organizations to enhance international security. The Alliance’s relationships with Indo-Pacific countries are prime examples, and for years after 2010, this task was seen primarily as supporting non-Article 5 crisis management operations.

These days, however, NATO is adapting its partnerships to respond to changed structural realities and the focus on strategic competition given the growing assertiveness and militarism of revisionist states such as Russia and China.

In that sense, there have been significant qualitative changes in the way NATO partnerships with the individual Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) countries—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—and the minilateral grouping operate today and challenges they face compared to when they were first created. Namely, both sides now see their respective partners as significant for their own defense and deterrence, rather than as interlocutors in the provision of security for third parties, as was the case in out-of-area missions, where crisis management and cooperative security were the central organizing principles of these partnerships.

NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific

Last month’s NATO Summit in Washington demonstrated that the IP4 countries occupy a pivotal place in the ecosystem of NATO’s partner states. This role began to emerge in its present form at the 2022 Madrid summit, which unveiled NATO’s current Strategic Concept. Substantive engagement between NATO and the IP4 countries has continued to develop since then. This year’s summit, for example, marked the third consecutive year that IP4 leaders attended, making it clear that this informal grouping is becoming a mainstay of NATO’s outreach to and strategic thinking about the Indo-Pacific.

The 2022 Strategic Concept referred to the Indo-Pacific as “important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” Such a diagnosis of the international security environment converges with the general assessment of trends as seen from Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul, and Wellington, which have also witnessed firsthand how Russia’s war against Ukraine is reverberating in their region. Furthermore, the Strategic Concept characterized China’s ambitions and policies as major challenges to the Alliance’s security, interests, and values. It also raised concern over increased China-Russia cooperation, which threatens to undermine the rules-based international order. The Washington Summit Declaration, issued on July 10, also underscored how these trends have continued to grow in pace and magnitude as North Korea and Iran provide direct military support to Russia.

In response, coordination and engagement channels between NATO and the IP4 have become even more relevant to the security of both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, creating a strong common basis for cooperation. However, the intra-Alliance consensus for engagement has not been easy to reach due to some notable differences among the thirty-two allies.

At the Washington summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the “strong and deepening cooperation” between the Alliance and the IP4. Emblematic of the greater ambition behind NATO-IP4 cooperation has been a move to the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme agreements, which replaced the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, and which all of the IP4 countries signed over the past year.

Moreover, NATO has pursued engagement with these partners as a minilateral group rather than as a collection of four individual partnerships. This commitment has resulted in four joint projects, announced by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in July, which will focus on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, combating disinformation, and cybersecurity.

At the same time, IP4 countries have continuously demonstrated their commitment to Euro-Atlantic security by providing military and economic aid to Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, and initiating a range of direct and indirect capacity-building initiatives. Some of the IP4 members’ leaders, such as Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, have even urged US lawmakers to continue aiding Ukraine.

The future of NATO-IP4 cooperation

If managed well, NATO’s IP4 partnerships can be a vital tool to enhance the Alliance’s core tasks of cooperative security and crisis management. More importantly, these partnerships have the potential to contribute to NATO’s defense and deterrence, strengthen the Alliance’s competitive advantages, and shape the global security environment in ways that serve its interests and values.

To be successful, NATO must recognize and cater to the spectrum of ambition for cooperation among IP4 partners. The Alliance should tailor its approach and maximize the benefits of cooperation at various levels. For countries with lower levels of ambition, the benefits to cooperation with NATO come primarily from political consultations, and these talks should continue. These consultations foster a shared strategic domain awareness and enhance the understanding of how events in one region impact the security of others.

For those with greater ambitions for strengthening ties with NATO, there should be an emphasis on expanding cooperation in science and technology. This includes capacity building, which can have significant positive effects on the security of both NATO and its partners. With sufficient political will and consensus from both sides, individual IP4 partners can further develop their relationships with NATO. This cooperation could then lead to achieving, strengthening, and maintaining interoperability—that is, operating together according to agreed-upon rules and procedures, as well as using similar equipment. It also could mean working together on international standards-setting and the co-production and joint maintenance of military assets, expanding on existing cooperation between NATO and its partners in other initiatives.

The NATO-IP4 format has already proven useful for information sharing and presenting a unified front to promote common values vis-à-vis revisionist states. The Alliance should build on the significant groundwork that has already been laid for integrating the IP4 into various NATO structures and processes to continue the multiparty coordination and “regularize” these partnerships in a way that would shield them from domestic politics. However, considering that Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns have propagated the narrative that NATO is attempting to expand into the Indo-Pacific, it is crucial for the Alliance to consistently emphasize that the partnerships with IP4 nations, or any future potential partners from the region, are not a prelude to full membership.

Finally, while it may seem self-evident, managing and reconciling expectations is crucial, as NATO operates on a consensus basis. Therefore, given the past episodes of disagreements among allies around NATO’s outreach to the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative to handle these relations carefully to avoid creating unnecessary intra-Alliance tensions and to demonstrate how nurturing ties with the IP4 serves the interests of both sides.


Gorana Grgić is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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The Great IT Outage of 2024 is a wake-up call about digital public infrastructure https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-great-it-outage-of-2024-is-a-wake-up-call-about-digital-public-infrastructure/ Tue, 06 Aug 2024 17:24:12 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784093 The July 19 outage serves as a symbolic outcry for solution-oriented policies and accountability to stave off future disruptions.

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On July 19, the world experienced its largest global IT outage to date, affecting 8.5 million Microsoft Windows devices. Thousands of flights were grounded. Surgeries were canceled. Users of certain online banks could not access their accounts. Even operators of 911 lines could not respond to emergencies.

The cause? One mere faulty section of code in a software update.

The update came from CrowdStrike, a cybersecurity firm whose Falcon Sensor software many Windows users employ against cyber breaches. Instead of providing improvements, the update caused devices to shut down and enter an endless reboot cycle, driving a global outage. Reports suggest that insufficient testing at CrowdStrike was likely the cause.

However, this outage is not just a technology error. It also reveals a hidden world of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that deserves more attention from policymakers.

What is digital public infrastructure?

DPI, while an evolving concept, is broadly defined by the United Nations (UN) as a combination of “networked open technology standards built for public interest, [which] enables governance and [serves] a community of innovative and competitive market players working to drive innovation, especially across public programmes.” This definition refers to DPI as essential digital systems that support critical societal functions, like how physical infrastructure—including roads, bridges, and power grids—are essential for everyday activities.

Microsoft Windows, which runs CrowdStrike’s Falcon Sensor software, is a form of DPI. And other examples of DPI within the UN definition include digital health systems, payment systems, and e-governance portals.

As the world scrambles to fix their Windows systems, policymakers need to pay particular attention to the core DPI issues that underpin the outage.

The problem of invisibility

DPI, such as Microsoft Windows, is ubiquitous but also largely invisible, which is a significant challenge when it comes to managing risks associated with it. Unlike physical infrastructure, which is tangible and visible, DPI powers essential digital services without drawing public awareness. Consequently, the potential risks posed by DPI failures—whether stemming from software bugs or cybersecurity breaches—tend to be underappreciated and underestimated by the public.

The lack of a clear definition of DPI exacerbates the issue of its invisibility. Not all digital technologies are public infrastructure: Companies build technology to generate revenue, but many of them do not directly offer critical services for the public. For instance, Fitbit, a tech company that creates fitness and health tracking devices, is not a provider of DPI. Though it utilizes technology and data services to enhance user experience, it does not provide essential infrastructure such as internet services, cloud computing platforms, or large-scale data centers that support public and business digital needs. That said, Fitbit’s new owner, Google, known for its widely used browser, popular cloud computing services, and efforts to expand digital connectivity, can be considered a provider of DPI.

Other companies that do not start out as DPI may become integral to public infrastructure by dint of becoming indispensable. Facebook, for example, started out as a social network, but it and other social media platforms have become a crucial aspect of civil discourse surrounding many elections. Regulating social media platforms as a simple technology product could potentially ignore their role as public infrastructure, which often deserve extra scrutiny to mitigate potential detrimental effects on the public.

The recent Microsoft outage, from which airlines, hospitals, and other companies are still recovering, should now sharpen the focus on the company as a provider of DPI. However, the invisibility of DPI and the absence of appropriate policy guidelines for measuring and managing its risks result in two complications. First, most users who interact with DPI often do not recognize it as a form of DPI. Second, this invisibility leads to a misplaced trust in major technology companies, as users fail to recognize how high the collective stakes of a failure in this DPI might be. Market dominance and effective advertising have helped major technology companies publicize their systems as benchmarks of reliability and resiliency. As a result, the public often perceives these systems as infallible, assuming they are more secure than they are—until a failure occurs. At the same time, an overabundance of public trust and comfort with familiar systems can foster complacency within organizations, which can lead to inadequate internal scrutiny and security audits.

How to prevent future disruptions

The Great IT Outage of 2024 revealed just how essential DPI is to societies across the globe. In many ways, the outage serves as a symbolic outcry for solution-oriented policies and accountability to stave off future disruptions.

To address DPI invisibility and misplaced trust in technology companies, US policymakers should first define DPI clearly and holistically while accounting for its status as an evolving concept. It is equally crucial to distinguish which companies are currently providers of DPI, and to educate leaders, policymakers, and the public about what that means. Such an initiative should provide a clear definition of DPI, its technical characteristics, and its various forms, while highlighting how commonly used software such as Microsoft Windows is a form of DPI. A silver lining of the recent Microsoft/CrowdStrike outage is that it offers a practical, recent case study to present to the public as real-world context for understanding the risks when DPI fails.

Finally, Microsoft has outlined technical next steps to prevent another outage, including extensive testing frameworks and backup systems to prevent the same kind of outage from happening again. However, while industry-driven self-regulation is crucial, regulation that enforces and standardizes backup systems, not just with Microsoft, but also for other technology companies that may also become providers of DPI, is also necessary. Doing so will help prevent future outages, ensuring the reliability of infrastructure which, just like roads and bridges, props up the world.


Saba Weatherspoon is a young global professional with the Atlantic Council’s Geotech Center.

Zhenwei Gao is a young global professional with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative, part of the Atlantic Council Technology Programs.

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Monday’s market rout is a painful but fundamentally healthy correction https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mondays-market-rout-is-a-painful-but-fundamentally-healthy-correction/ Mon, 05 Aug 2024 20:38:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783975 The global market selloff has been driven by the normalization of outsized expectations for the high-tech sector and one-way betting for low Japanese interest rates and yen exchange rates.

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The global stock market rout intensified on Monday. Japan led the correction, with the Nikkei 225 index dropping by 12.4 percent—the sharpest one-day decline since the 1987 Black Monday selloff. US equity markets have fallen substantially, too—in particular, the Nasdaq composite has fallen by 13 percent since last month’s peak. European markets, which had lagged behind in the market run-up, have declined less.

What accounts for this market correction? The most important factor has been the perception that the US Federal Reserve is behind the curve, having missed the opportunity to cut the federal funds rate in last week’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. This perception was reinforced by weaker than expected employment numbers on August 2. Nonfarm payrolls increased by only 114,000 in July, and the unemployment rate rose to 4.3 percent from 4.1 percent in June. The fact that the unemployment rate (on a three-month moving-average basis) has risen by more than 0.5 percentage points from its low of 3.5 percent in July 2023 has heightened fears of an imminent recession, according to the so-called Sahm rule. As a consequence, market interest rates declined substantially with two-year US Treasury yields falling to 3.8 percent, causing the gap against the effective federal funds rate of 5.3 percent to widen the most since the global financial crisis in 2008. Furthermore, the federal funds rate is also far above the policy rate of 3.95 percent, according to the Taylor Rule (developed by economist John Taylor in 1993 to calculate what the federal funds rate should be given current economic conditions). These gaps appear to validate the view that the Federal Reserve is behind the curve.

Having painted itself into this corner, there are no good options for the Federal Reserve going forward. Waiting until the September FOMC meeting to start cutting rates—as implied by the July meeting—could risk having additional weak economic data prolong the market selloff, undermining business and consumer confidence and hurting economic activity. Implementing a rate cut before September could send the message that things are not well, triggering worse fears among investors. Cutting by fifty basis points—instead of the traditional pace of cutting twenty-five basis points per meeting—would also confirm that the Federal Reserve has been wrong in delaying easing for too long. On balance, using the September meeting with more data to make an appropriate cut—of fifty basis points, if necessary—would be the least bad option, minimizing the risk of the Federal Reserve inadvertently feeding into the present market panic.

This “September fifty” option seems to be supported by a close look at the overall economic conditions. The July employment data could be distorted to some extent by Hurricane Beryl and problematic seasonal adjustment factors. The increase in the unemployment rate was caused by a rise in the number of workers entering or reentering the labor force—the prime-age (twenty-five to fifty-four years) labor force participation rate surged to 84 percent—and not by a decline in employment. Furthermore, the Purchasing Managers Index for the important services sector recovered to 51.4 in July from 48.8 in June. In fact, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis gross domestic product “nowcast model” estimates 2.54 percent growth in the third quarter, accelerating from the 1.14 percent pace in the second quarter. Weakening employment numbers warrant close attention to growth prospects, but a recession is yet to become the base case scenario.

Moreover, the global market selloff has also been driven by the normalization of outsized expectations for the high-tech sector and one-way betting for low Japanese interest rates and yen exchange rates. It could, therefore, be regarded as fundamentally healthy. For example, the US “magnificent seven” high-tech stocks, including Nvidia and Apple, have accounted for most of the market price gains over the past year or so, significantly stretching their market valuations. Their recent disappointing earnings reports have triggered the correction, shedding nine hundred billion dollars in market value.

In the case of Japan, investors have expected interest rates to remain low compared to the United States and for the yen to be weak against the dollar. Consequently, investors have borrowed substantially in yen to put on carry trades—investing in higher-yielding bonds, including in the United States and emerging markets. As the Bank of Japan hiked policy rates to 0.25 percent last week—for the second time since 2007—and outlined a plan to unwind its massive bond purchase program, the yen has strengthened by 10.5 percent against the dollar from its thirty-eight-year low of 166.99 yen/dollar in June. The appreciation of the yen has been magnified by short covering on the part of carry-trade investors—and this is expected to go on for some time given the estimated huge carry-trade positions, underpinning the yen in foreign exchange markets. A stronger yen would reduce the profits reported by many Japanese corporations, many of which rely on overseas markets for their profits, negatively impacting Japanese stock markets. To a lesser extent, the renminbi has also recovered to a seven-month high of 7.13 yuan/dollar due to short-covering of yuan-based carry trades.

On balance, the sharp equity market selloff may be painful to investors, but it could turn out to be a timely and healthy correction. Meanwhile, it is important that the Federal Reserve uses its long-planned review of its monetary policy operating framework to learn from its recent mistakes. (It has been behind the curve twice: keeping the federal funds rate too low for too long in 2022, and too high for too long now.) Going forward, the Federal Reserve must adopt a forward-looking policy framework instead of being fixated on current economic data.


Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and a former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

Data visualization created by Alisha Chhangani.

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Behind the market turmoil: Why a bad jobs report and the risk of war are shaking the financial world https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/behind-the-market-turmoil-why-a-bad-jobs-report-and-the-risk-of-war-are-shaking-the-financial-world/ Mon, 05 Aug 2024 20:12:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783901 A geopolitical crisis and disappointing economic news at the same time create a haze that can make each situation appear more threatening than it actually is.

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“Double, double toil and trouble; Fire burn and caldron bubble.” So sing the three witches of Macbeth as they add ingredients into their toxic brew. But while the famous chant is what is remembered from the scene, William Shakespeare spends far more time detailing each ingredient that goes into the pot. So Monday, as markets experience the highest fear factor since the COVID-19 pandemic, it’s worth taking a moment to understand what is—and what isn’t—contributing to actual danger.

An instigating ingredient added this past weekend was the disappointing jobs report released on Friday. Analysts expected 180,000 jobs—which would signal a slowdown but still relatively healthy job growth. This was, it seems, what the Federal Reserve expected last Wednesday when it decided not to cut interest rates and its chair, Jerome Powell, said, “the labor market has come into better balance.”

Instead, 114,000 jobs were created in July. This was disappointing, and some believed it signaled that the United States is headed for slower growth than forecast and even—dare one say the dreaded word—a recession. But within a day or two, most market participants had taken a deep breath, recognizing that bad weather probably had an impact, remembering that unemployment was still near historic lows, and aware that US gross domestic product growth was far outpacing that of the rest of the Group of Seven (G7).

Then Japan happened. As several financial commentators have noted, a unique mix of problems is plaguing Japanese markets. The Bank of Japan had stuck to zero interest rates during the global cycle of rate hikes but was forced to intervene last week to avoid further yen depreciation. This now means that Japanese borrowing conditions are becoming tighter as recession risks grow, making it an outlier during the coming easing cycle—just as it was during the global cycle of rate hikes. The record Nikkei index rout on Monday can also be attributed to the export-oriented nature of Japanese firms, which had benefited from the weak yen, until now.

So why then did US markets react so violently Monday? It’s not just the jobs report and it’s not just Japan. Instead, it’s the x-factor ingredient—geopolitics. Specifically, Iran’s likely imminent attack on Israel, as retribution for the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iranian territory.

Pricing in geopolitics is almost always an impossible task for Wall Street. Speculation about equity markets is one thing. Speculation about Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s intentions is usually far outside traders’ field of expertise. With more uncertainty comes more fear—see the VIX index, which is essentially Wall Street’s fear gauge, below—surprisingly showing that the market is more concerned now than it was during Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse in March 2023. In fact, it’s the highest volatility reading since the COVID-19 pandemic, rivaling volatility during the global financial crisis.

What’s especially hard for markets is to navigate a geopolitical crisis intertwined with bad economic news. Individually, either one can be mitigated and hedged against. But together, the two developing at the same time create a haze that can make each situation appear more threatening than it actually is. How then do we find solid ground? Focus on the data.

The US economic data remains strong. The economy is slowing, but it is nowhere near a recession. And in fact, as the chart below shows, it could slow significantly before falling to the level of its G7 peers.

Moreover, data released Monday show that economic activity in the service sector grew more than expected. And remember that the United States is still creating new jobs, even if at a slower pace than before. Gas prices are significantly lower than two years ago at the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. So even if a crisis widens in the Middle East, a slower global economy should keep price increases in check.

Meanwhile, inflation is finally coming back down to the Federal Reserve’s target range of 2 percent. All this signals an economy that is, as long forecast, coming off its breakneck pace. The Federal Reserve should probably have acted sooner by cutting rates last week, but to jump into an emergency session as some have called for is not supported by the data right now and risks creating more panic. The economic fundamentals remain stable.

Geopolitical tensions actually present the greater risk to markets. No one knows how and when Iran will retaliate and what the fallout will be. And as I wrote in February, the relative weakness of the region’s economies means any worsening of the situation could send multiple countries into debt distress and trigger more market failures.

Still, the overwhelming likelihood is that whatever develops in the Middle East this week will be contained to the Middle East. While that may impact energy prices, it is unlikely to trigger wider global economic fallout. To be sure, nothing is guaranteed. The situation could deteriorate and the worst fears could be realized. But it is not the most likely outcome.

So in the days ahead, it’s geopolitical tensions that will likely move the markets more than the macroeconomics. Watch carefully in the coming days (or as Macbeth would say, “tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow”) as markets recognize this reality and, hopefully, cooler heads prevail.


Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

Data visualizations created by Alisha Chhangani, Mrugank Bhusari, and Sophia Busch.

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Welcome home, Evan https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/welcome-home-evan/ Thu, 01 Aug 2024 22:08:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783549 We at the Atlantic Council are overjoyed and relieved that Evan has been released after 491 days of wrongful imprisonment in Russia, writes Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

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I released the following statement today regarding the news of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich’s release from imprisonment in Russia:

We at the Atlantic Council are overjoyed and relieved that Evan has been released after 491 days of wrongful imprisonment in Russia. This is a great day for Evan, his family, and his colleagues at the Wall Street Journal, who worked tirelessly to secure his release. However, it doesn’t diminish our need to speak out against Russia’s crimes not only against Evan but against free speech more broadly.

As Almar Latour, Wall Street Journal publisher and Dow Jones CEO, said at the Atlantic Council’s Distinguished Leadership Awards in May 2023, “Evan’s arrest is a symbolic reminder of the fight that we find ourselves in today. It’s autocrats versus the power of the pen—disinformation versus reliable information as the bedrock of free society.”

Latour’s point was underscored by those released with Evan: two other Americans wrongfully detained—journalist Alsu Kurmasheva and former US Marine Paul Whelan—as well as Russian political dissident and Pulitzer Prize winner Vladimir Kara-Murza, among others. In exchange, a contemptible lot, including a convicted murderer and several hackers and spies, was welcomed back to Russia by President Vladimir Putin.

Watch Latour’s full speech below:

Evan’s resilience and steadfastness are testament to the courage of journalists worldwide who take risks every day in service to freer societies. In partnership with Adrienne Arsht, the Atlantic Council has been proud to champion Evan’s cause through our “Reporters at Risk” series, which highlights those dangers and underscores the importance of supporting their critical work.

The Atlantic Council remains committed to press freedom and defending the safety of reporters at risk like Evan. As a twenty-five-year veteran of the Wall Street Journal, I welcome him home as a colleague. On behalf of the Atlantic Council, we commit ourselves to defending the freedoms he and reporters like him around the world represent.

Evan Gershkovich’s parents, Mikhail and Ella, meet with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Wall Street Journal Publisher Almar Latour, Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht, and Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the Atlantic Council Global Citizen Awards, September 28, 2023.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Ukraine’s new F-16 jets won’t defeat Russia but will enhance air defenses https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-new-f-16-jets-wont-defeat-russia-but-will-enhance-air-defenses/ Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:46:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783414 Ukraine's fledgling fleet of F-16 jets will not win the war but should strengthen the country's air defenses and help protect the civilian population from Russian bombardment, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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The first batch of F-16 jets finally arrived in Ukraine at the end of July, officials in Kyiv and partner countries have confirmed. The news comes after months of anticipation over the delivery of the fighter jets, which have long been high on Ukraine’s wish list as the country seeks the tools to defeat Russia’s ongoing invasion.

US President Joe Biden confirmed his support for the supply of F-16s in August 2023, but subsequent progress was slow. Training for Ukrainian pilots and ground crews has taken up to nine months, with an already technically complex and demanding process reportedly further complicated by language barriers. There have also been significant obstacles to identifying and preparing Ukrainian airbases with suitable facilities and adequate defenses.

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The F-16 models that Ukraine has now begun to receive are a clear step up from the Soviet-era jets inherited from the USSR, boasting superior radar capabilities and longer range. At the same time, Ukraine’s F-16s should not be viewed as a game-changing weapon in the war with Russia.

One obvious issue is quantity. Ukraine has so far only received a handful of F-16s, with a total of 24 jets expected to arrive by the end of 2024. To put this number into context, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has stated in recent weeks that in order to effectively counter Russian air power, his country would require a fleet of 128 F-16 jets. So far, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands have committed to supply Ukraine with eighty F-16s, but there is no clear time frame for deliveries or for the training of additional pilots.

Ukraine’s fledgling F-16 fleet will likely have access to a limited selection of weapons, with partner countries currently pledging to provide a number of short-range munitions. It remains unclear whether Kyiv can count on longer range strike capabilities, despite recent reports that the US has agreed to arm Ukrainian F-16s with American-made missiles and other advanced weapons. The effectiveness of Ukraine’s new jets will also be constrained by restrictions on the use of Western weapons against targets inside Russia.

The limited number of F-16s in Ukraine means that these new arrivals will initially be deployed primarily to strengthen the country’s air defenses. The jets will considerably enhance Ukraine’s ability to prevent Russian pilots entering Ukrainian air space, and can also target Russian cruise missiles in flight. This is particularly important as Russia has recently demonstrated its growing ability to bypass existing surface-to-air defense systems and strike civilian infrastructure targets across Ukraine.

Ukraine’s F-16s enter service in what is an extremely challenging operating environment, with Russia’s sophisticated battlefield air defenses likely to make any combat support roles extremely risky. Acknowledging these difficulties, Ukraine’s commander in chief Oleksandr Syrskiy recently stated that the country’s F-16s would operate at a distance of at least forty kilometers from the front.

Another key challenge will be protecting Ukrainian F-16s on the ground against Russian attempts to destroy them with ballistic missiles. The Kremlin has made no secret of the fact that the jets are priority targets that will be hunted with particular enthusiasm. The Ukrainian Air Force will have to adapt quickly in order to counter this threat, and must rely on a combination of Patriot air defenses, decoy F-16s, and frequent airfield changes.

While the long-awaited arrival of F-16s in Ukraine has sparked considerable excitement and provided Ukrainians with a welcome morale boost, these new jets are not a wonder weapon that can change the course of the war. Instead, Ukraine’s small fleet of F-16s will bolster the country’s air defenses, helping to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure from Russian bombardment.

Over the coming year, Ukraine will face the task of gradually integrating and expanding its F-16 fleet. Based on past experience of Western weapons deliveries, Kyiv can expect to receive additional munitions, and may also eventually be given the green light to strike some categories of military targets inside Russia. This would open up a range of offensive options that could change the battlefield dynamics of the war in Ukraine’s favor. For now, though, the biggest change is likely to be in terms of enhanced security for Ukraine’s civilian population.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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Experts react: What to know about the release of Evan Gershkovich and others held by Russia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-to-know-about-the-release-of-evan-gershkovich-and-others-held-by-russia/ Thu, 01 Aug 2024 19:35:18 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783342 A prisoner swap has freed American journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, former US Marine Paul Whelan, and Russian political dissidents Vladimir Kara-Murza and llya Yashin, among others.

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They’re coming home. On Thursday, Russia and the West carried out a massive prisoner swap in Ankara, Turkey, that saw Moscow free American journalists Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva, former US Marine Paul Whelan, and Russian political dissidents Vladimir Kara-Murza and llya Yashin, among others. In exchange, Western countries released eight Russian prisoners, including convicted Russian assassin Vadim Krasikov, who had been imprisoned in Germany. US President Joe Biden called the deal, which involved Germany, Poland, Turkey, Norway, and Slovenia, “a feat of diplomacy and friendship.” Below, our experts explain who was freed, the implications of their release, and what the prisoner exchange says about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s use of domestic oppression to gain leverage against the West.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

John E. Herbst: Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Mercedes Sapuppo: The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

Hanna Liubakova: German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

Brian Whitmore: This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate


Putin’s motivation for hostage trades is personal

Today’s news is a truly extraordinary event: a large prisoner exchange involving twenty-four captives in seven countries. Russia and Belarus released sixteen prisoners; and the United States, Germany, Poland, Norway, and Slovenia sent eight back to Russia. Those released by Moscow include three Americans held essentially as hostages on trumped-up charges—businessman Whelan and journalists Gershkovich and Kurmasheva—and political prisoners Kara-Murza and Yashin. Belarus released Rico Krieger, a German convicted of “terrorism” in Belarus, who was sentenced to death but then pardoned by Lukashenka’s regime. The most notable prisoner released to Russia is Krasikov, a Kremlin operative who murdered a Chechen activist in Germany.

Two constants drove this deal. The first is Putin’s great interest in securing the release of Russian spies and provocateurs captured and jailed in the West. When he succeeded in trading American basketball player Brittney Griner for Viktor Bout with the United States in December 2022, Putin’s highest priority became the release of Krasikov from Germany. When Putin gave up Griner, he still had Whelan as a hostage for future trades with the United States. Then he added Gershkovich in March 2023 for additional trade bait and Kurmasheva this past spring. The second constant is the Biden administration’s interest in securing the release of all Americans unfairly detained by Moscow. After the Griner-Bout exchange, US efforts to secure the freedom of Whelan and then Gershkovich foundered on the refusal of Germany to include Krasikov—Putin’s prime objective—in any trade.

These constants alone do not explain this deal. The new factor was the arrest of Krieger in Belarus last fall. This gave Berlin a reason to consider releasing Krasikov. Germany’s willingness to do so likely set in motion a long negotiation that led to today’s news. The final deal also gave Putin back Russian operatives in Norway, Poland, and Slovenia; and provided an opportunity to free prominent Russian opposition figures Kara-Murza and Yashin.

It is notable that sixteen prisoners moved West and only eight east. But, as we know from the lopsided trade that sent 215 Ukrainian prisoners of war home in exchange for Putin-favorite Viktor Medvedchuk and others in the fall of 2022, there are times when Putin’s interest in a particular captive persuades him to make an uneven trade.

Still, Putin has the tactical advantage of being able to grab additional hostages from Americans and other Western visitors in Russia. One way for the West to reduce this nasty advantage would be to lower the evidentiary requirements for holding spies from Russia and other US adversaries.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.


The prisoner releases are historic—but the Kremlin’s strategy hasn’t changed

The news that Gershkovich, Kurmasheva, Whelan, Kara-Murza, and Yashin—along with other human rights activists and innocent civilians—have been released from Russia in a prisoner swap is historic. For those now free who were wrongfully detained on contrived and false charges and bravely endured the conditions of Russian detention, today is hugely celebratory. It is also a good day for their families and for all who have been advocating for their freedom, including the Biden-Harris administration. The swap released many who suffered unjustly and marks a positive day for independent media and press freedom.

The timing of this swap—and its scope—indicates that Putin thought it was time to cash out the bargaining chips that he had illegally collected to leverage against the West in the form of innocent Americans and Russian activists. However, it does not suggest that the Kremlin will pull back on its malign tactics of aggression against Ukraine as well as the United States and its allies, and Putin is by no means walking away empty-handed: Russia will welcome home convicted murderers, spies, hackers, fraudsters, and smugglers.

What this swap demonstrates on the Kremlin’s strategic front is a twisted and self-serving pragmatism that is unlikely to translate into a deescalation of Russia’s violence in Ukraine, nor into a new appreciation for international norms. Putin is still a war criminal, and he is still bolstering his autocratic alliances abroad. The drive demonstrated by global leaders and advocates pushing for the release of these unjustly detained journalists and activists should not be the end. Rather, it should be only the beginning of continued work to defeat Putin in Ukraine and deter his aggression, which includes the imprisonment of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers being kept in harrowing conditions in temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.


German national’s case reveals Belarus’s hostage-taking tactics

The prisoner swap story between Russia and Western countries took an unexpected turn with Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s involvement. Krieger, a German national sentenced to death in Belarus, was among the Western prisoners released in Thursday’s exchange. His case gained attention following his pardon on July 30. The unusual circumstances surrounding Krieger’s sentencing had sparked speculation that the Minsk regime was positioning itself for a high-profile prisoner exchange.

Shortly after the pardon, Lukashenka’s spokesperson indicated that Minsk was open to negotiations regarding Krieger, stating that various “proposals” had been made. This suggested that the pardon was a strategic maneuver to facilitate discussions with Germany. Krieger’s exchange demonstrated the Belarusian regime’s manipulative tactics, with speculation arising that he was swapped for Krasikov, a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) assassin imprisoned in Germany.

Krieger was arrested in Belarus in October for allegedly acting as a mercenary and planting explosives. He appeared in a propaganda video, claiming he wanted to fight in Ukraine but was directed to a mission in Belarus. However, the inconsistencies in the video raise doubts about his claims.

The regime’s actions—capturing a foreigner, sentencing him to death, and then negotiating his release—resemble hostage-taking tactics. While Russia may have reclaimed some of its agents in part through Krieger’s exchange, Lukashenka seems to be sacrificing his relationship with Germany to support Putin’s interests. This mirrors Lukashenka’s previous concessions to Russia, including offering Belarusian territory for the invasion of Ukraine, despite his people’s opposition, or stationing Wagner Group troops in Belarus.

Amid these high-stakes negotiations, the plight of Belarusian political prisoners is often overlooked. Although eighteen political prisoners were released last month, an estimated 1,400 remain imprisoned, many urgently needing medical assistance.

Hanna Liubakova is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.

This wasn’t a Cold War prisoner swap, but rather a negotiation with a crime syndicate

The sweeping prisoner exchange that freed Kurmasheva, Gershkovich, Whelan, and others from Russian captivity was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, and the Biden administration deserves enormous credit for working with the United States’ allies to make it happen. And full disclosure, this one is personal. Two of the released hostages—Kurmasheva, a journalist with whom I worked for more than a decade at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Kara-Murza, a Russian dissident whom I have known for years—are close personal friends. The fact that sixteen hostages of Putin’s regime—including Americans, Germans, British nationals, and Russian political prisoners—are now free is cause for celebration.

That said, we should all use this occasion to reflect on what this prisoner exchange illustrates about the nature of Putin’s Russia. In order to get these hostages released, the United States and its allies needed to free actual criminals who were convicted after receiving the benefit of due process and fair trials in Western courts of law. Among these were a hitman, Krasikov, convicted of an assassination in Germany, and a cybercriminal, Roman Seleznev, who was convicted of bank fraud and identity theft in the United States. This is reminiscent of the United States securing the release of WNBA star and Olympic gold medalist Brittney Griner in exchange for convicted Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout and swapping US Marine Corps veteran Trevor Reed for Russian drug trafficker Konstantin Yaroshenko back in 2022.

One has to wonder, why does Putin want all these hitmen, cybercriminals, arms traffickers, and drug dealers released? And why is he willing to take Western hostages to do so? The answer is simple: The line between the government and the criminal underworld in Putin’s Russia is so thin that it is nonexistent. As I have argued in the past, the Putin regime is effectively a crime syndicate masquerading as a state. The correct metaphor for this prisoner exchange is not the storied Cold War-era swapping of Western and Soviet spies. Instead, it is the result of an unfortunately necessary hostage negotiation with a criminal and terrorist regime.

Brian Whitmore is a nonresident senior fellow at the Eurasia Center, an assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and host of the Power Vertical podcast.

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Pragmatism can improve Mexico’s energy outlook https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/pragmatism-can-improve-mexicos-energy-outlook/ Wed, 31 Jul 2024 21:17:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783233 Claudia Sheinbaum's victory in Mexico's presidential election marks a crucial juncture for the country’s energy future. Sheinbaum's initial moves are a promising beginning to maximizing Mexico's economic potential, which requires significant clean energy investment.

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Claudia Sheinbaum’s seismic victory in Mexico’s presidential election is certain to have material impacts on energy and investment in Mexico. Much will depend on her predecessor, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), and his government’s final actions before Sheinbaum takes office, as well as the composition of her cabinet.

It is a crucial time in Mexican energy politics. While there are important challenges to address, Sheinbaum’s initial moves are a promising beginning to maximizing Mexico’s economic potential, which requires significant investment in clean energy.

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Uncertainties complicate investment in clean energy

Under Mexican law, the new Congress takes office on September 1, but the new president takes office on October 1. The current government intends to present constitutional reforms to the new Morena-dominated legislature—the ruling party that will now likely have a supermajority—in a manner that could challenge certain policy adjustments by the new government. To that end, AMLO has stated that electoral and judicial constitutional reforms are his legislative priorities—repealing the 2013 energy reforms, which enabled an influx of foreign and private investment in Mexico’s energy sector during the mid-2010s, is not.

The outgoing government introduced complexities to private investment, especially in clean energy. These include suspending auctions in oil, gas, and clean energy, giving priority to the state electricity system operator CFE’s established fossil-based generation over cleaner and cheaper alternatives, and suspending implementation of the clean energy certificate program, which incentivized conversion to less carbon intensive electricity. Several of these actions are now the subject of disputes under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), and have disincentivized foreign investment in manufacturing, due to companies’ strict carbon-emission reduction targets—for them to set up shop or expand in Mexico, they require access to clean energy.

The government has also taken steps to prioritize Mexico’s long-established fossil-based power sector, but production by national oil champion Pemex is at historic lows despite a consistent influx of federal spending to revive the flagging company, which faces a looming debt crisis. Meanwhile, CFE is struggling to power Mexico’s growing economy amid the burdens of extreme heat and other climate-exacerbated energy challenges.

The federal government is in a challenging fiscal position, as its budget deficit is forecast to grow this year.  In addition, there appear to be adverse market reactions to controversial, proposed judicial reforms, which include appointing judges by popular vote. Some foreign investors remain cautious, particularly in the energy sector.

Mexico’s golden economic opportunity requires clean energy to sustain it

Despite these investment challenges, Mexico holds vast potential as a nearshoring destination. For Mexico to capitalize on the USMCA and its proximity to the lucrative US export market, it will need to expand its energy supply not only for manufacturing, but also to power artificial intelligence use by data centers, which will increase demand for clean energy exponentially.

It will be in the interest of both US government and energy industry stakeholders to help Sheinbaum find a way to navigate among Morena’s different groups to develop a pragmatic policy approach that moves forward Mexico’s energy security and transition while maintaining a leading role for Pemex and CFE, which remains a central element of Morena’s policy platform. Public-private partnerships of many forms can be part of the solution.

It will be challenging but possible for Sheinbaum to retain the primacy of Pemex and CFE while also giving foreign and domestic investors full confidence that they will receive permits to build and obtain reasonable returns without fear that a popularly elected judiciary and weaker national regulators will undermine their projects.

Serious policymakers will be in charge

Sheinbaum wants to make her own mark on history as the first female president of Mexico, but faces a tough road ahead. The most important benchmarks will be her cabinet appointments, her commitment to a predictable and transparent policymaking process, and her engagement on the USMCA, which comes up for review in 2026.

The composition of Sheinbaum’s cabinet will be an indication of her intent to meaningfully address Mexico’s energy and fiscal challenges. So far, the news is positive, with serious policy professionals being tapped for high-level appointments. Current Finance Minister Rogelio Ramírez de la O, who is familiar with the overall fiscal challenge, including that posed by Pemex and CFE, is slated to remain in his post. Former Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, a highly experienced and capable politician, was named economy minister and will play a steadying hand. Luz Elena González, an economist who until recently was finance secretary of Mexico City, will be the secretary of energy, demonstrating that the government understands the relevance of public finances for energy policy. Finally, current Foreign Minister Alicia Bárcena, who is experienced in environmental issues, will become environment minister and could be a relevant actor on energy transition.

The path forward

Sheinbaum’s commitment to clear, predictable policies will be an important marker of her style of governance. This can send positive signals to investors in areas such as energy import permits and infrastructure investment. Her approach to the 2026 USMCA review—which will be deeply impacted by whoever wins the US presidential election in November—will be another test of the Sheinbaum administration’s ability to navigate a delicate bilateral relationship. That review will be a top-line issue for both the US and Mexican governments, and early consultations are already underway. Energy will loom large in this review; both the US government and private stakeholders have a powerful motivation to ensure that energy disputes do not undermine the USMCA—they need it to remain strong enough to provide certainty for the wider cross-border relationship.

Sheinbaum has much to gain from reassuring investors, capitalizing on Mexico’s advantages in nearshoring, and addressing the country’s slow energy transition. She can creatively design a framework that respects Morena’s political stance on energy while increasing investor confidence. Sheinbaum will be looking for able and willing partners to craft solutions that maximize the potential of foreign investment and job creation in Mexico. Undoubtedly, the energy industry and civil society on both sides of the border all have a major interest in helping her succeed.

David L. Goldwyn served as special envoy for international energy under President Barack Obama and assistant secretary of energy for international relations under President Bill Clinton. He is chair of the Atlantic Council’s Energy Advisory Group.

Antonio Ortiz-Mena is a professor at the Center for Latin American Studies, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and a partner at DGA Group.

The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors and not necessarily those of any institution with which they are affiliated.

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The case for chief gender officers in Caribbean states https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-case-for-chief-gender-officers-in-caribbean-states/ Wed, 31 Jul 2024 13:51:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782841 Caribbean countries should consider appointing chief gender officers to help address issues such as gender-based violence.

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In the Caribbean, small but significant progress has been made toward greater female representation in politics. But women and girls in the region still face significant gender inequities, ranging from unequal pay to gender-based violence. As the Caribbean prepares for elections in the next year in Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, Guyana, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago, gender mainstreaming—bringing a gender perspective into every aspect of the decision making and policy implementation processes—should be at the forefront of policymaking and proposals from both men and women leaders. Gender mainstreaming will take time and an array of measures. As an initial step, however, Caribbean countries should consider establishing the role of chief gender officer within their institutions. This leadership role can, for example, play a decisive role in coordinating approaches to gender-based violence.

Female political representation is important. According to 2023 data, only fifty-nine of the 193 member states of the United Nations had a woman head of state or government in their history. Against this backdrop, four countries in the Caribbean have had or currently have women leaders: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados. But representation still lags behind, with an average of 22 percent of ministerial portfolios and cabinet positions in the English-speaking Caribbean held by women. And according to World Bank data, only four Caribbean countries—Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Grenada—have 30 percent or more seats in national parliaments held by women.

At the same time, greater and more effective female political representation must go hand in hand with bringing gender equity perspectives into all aspects policymaking in ways that improve the lives of citizens. In the Caribbean, women and girls face significant vulnerabilities, and gender mainstreaming is needed to address them, in particular gender-based violence.

Chief gender officers can help ensure appropriate support, accountability, and sustainability of policies for victims of gender-based violence.

The Caribbean has one of the highest rates of gender-based violence in the world. According to UN Women data, 46 percent of women in the Caribbean have experienced at least one form of violence in their lifetime. Jamaica, for example, has the second-highest femicide rate in the world, while 55 percent of Guyanese women have experienced at least one form of violence, including intimate partner violence or nonpartner sexual abuse. And data on gender-based violence is often underreported.

To tackle gender-based violence through gender mainstreaming in policymaking, governments in the Caribbean should work closely with civil society organizations that focus on gender and gender-based violence. They should also work with victims of gender-based violence to understand the bottlenecks of the system and its inadequate responses. With this deeper understanding, governments can map out specific areas to improve support for women victims of gender-based violence.

Governments should also include chief gender officers in key government institutions, particularly within the judicial system and the police. Chief gender officers can help ensure appropriate support, accountability, and sustainability of policies for victims of gender-based violence. These officers should be appropriately trained to bring a gender-sensitive perspective to decision-making processes, and their authority and dedicated office to these issues can help to overcome institutional inertia.

In the legal sphere, these officers should revise and help update legislation through a gender lens, as a mechanism to avoid the perpetuation of laws and norms that might have pervasive negative consequences for women and girls. Within the police, chief gender officers can be trained to welcome and support victims of gender-based violence, helping them as victims instead of discriminating against them. Focus groups commissioned by the Atlantic Council in Jamaica and Guyana, for example, found a lack of trust that institutions, such as the police, can support women victims of gender-based violence. One Jamaican woman explained, “But sometimes you go to the police and the police take your statement and look at you and be like if you wear that then you don’t think the man is going to see you.”

Ensuring that women victims of gender-based violence feel heard and supported could lead to more accurate data on this issue, as underreporting is a significant challenge. This, in turn, could help governments gain a better understanding of gender-based violence and the policies and programs that can help solve it.  


Valentina Sader is a deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, where she leads the Center’s work on Brazil, gender equality and diversity, and manages the Center’s Advisory Council.

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Justice Fair Play Initiative: The key to improving justice delivery in Colombia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/justice-fair-play-initiative-the-key-to-improving-justice-delivery-in-colombia/ Wed, 31 Jul 2024 12:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779288 An accessible judicial system is crucial in countering global threats to democracy by enabling swift and fair dispute resolutions. This study demonstrates that such system can reduce uncertainty and create an environment conducive to investment and sustainable economic development.

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Access to justice is a crucial component of the rule of law and the defense of democracy. A robust judicial system ensures that laws are applied fairly and equitably, strengthens confidence in institutions, protects rights, and promotes transparency and accountability, which are essential for democratic stability and economic development.1 In a global context where threats to democracy are increasing, strengthening access to justice and the rule of law becomes even more critical. An accessible judicial system acts as a safeguard against those threats.2 Access to justice for businesses and the general Colombian population is vital to ensure both fairness and economic efficiency. When businesses can resolve disputes quickly and fairly, uncertainty is reduced, fostering a favorable investment climate and sustainable economic development.

This research, based on a holistic and integrated approach, involves two key elements: a thorough understanding of access to justice and a comprehensive view of the justice system. The first element implies that effective access to justice extends beyond the initial approach to legal systems; it encompasses both the entry point and the ongoing journey within the system. The right to access justice is fully realized when it results in a prompt, comprehensive, and enforceable solution. This understanding of access to justice is essential for addressing the multifaceted challenges faced by individuals and corporations in Colombia.

Building on this thorough understanding of access to justice, this research sheds light on the problems faced by actors within the system, which affect companies of all sizes and citizens alike, regardless of their socioeconomic status. It explores the procedural journey, revealing systemic issues and managerial barriers embedded in the justice system. Forty-four percent of respondents expressed medium to high concerns about judicial corruption and threats to judicial independence and impartiality.

The second element is the comprehensive view of the Colombian justice system. Such a view requires data collection regarding the three routes of access to justice in Colombia, all different in nature: the judicial branch; administrative officials with jurisdictional functions; and individual entities that have the right to administer justice, such as conciliators and arbitrators.

The Colombian constitutional system allows the congress to delegate certain judicial powers to specific administrative authorities including superintendencies (regulatory agencies) of industry and commerce, finance, corporations, and health; police inspectors; and family commissariats, among others. However, it is worth noting that administrative authorities’ judicial power excludes criminal prosecutions and proceedings.3 When administrative authorities exercise jurisdictional functions through resolutions, they act as judges rather than as administrative entities. Individuals can choose, preventively, whether to approach judicial-branch judges or superintendencies judges with jurisdictional functions to resolve their disputes.

This report seeks to identify public policy recommendations that can enhance the efficiency and equity of the justice system through a holistic and integrated approach. Tackling access to justice during the process is crucial not only for the private sector, which relies on the justice system to protect its interests, but also for the broader Colombian society. This will ensure that justice is accessible and equitable for all.

By the numbers

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Key data

For all jurisdictions and types of disputes included in this study (both judicial and administrative proceedings), fewer than half of the companies surveyed fully or partially agreed that the duration of proceedings is reasonable. This finding is consistent with the study’s qualitative research component and existing cross-country data on unreasonable civil-justice delays from the World Justice Project (WJP). Colombian scores on timeliness of civil-justice delivery in the WJP Rule of Law Index are lower than those of both best-in-class nations (e.g., Germany or the Netherlands) and regional and income peers in Latin America (See Graph 1).

Delays permeate the system, affecting small, medium, and large companies. When companies were asked about the obstacles limiting effective access to justice when dealing with judicial authorities, the number of legal processes that never concluded scored as the highest obstacle, with 51 percent of companies ranking it as their top obstacle and 15 percent ranking it as a medium level obstacle (See Figure 1).

Similarly, when asked about the obstacles limiting effective access to justice when resorting to administrative authorities, interviewees ranked unjustified delays as the biggest obstacle. Forty-one percent of companies ranked it as the top obstacle and 20 percent ranked it as a medium-level obstacle (See Figure 2).

In terms of judicial independence from hierarchical superiors and other sources, superintendencies perform worse than all other paths to justice, and considerably below all judges (44 percent of companies either totally or mostly disagree that this path is free from this pressure). Critically, in terms of access to justice, it is the second-worst mechanism (34 percent of companies find it difficult to access this mechanism), (See Figure 4).

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1    Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=p4CReF67hzQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA1&dq=On+the+Rule+of+Law:+History,+Politics,+Theory&ots.
2    “2020 Corruption Perceptions Index—Explore the Results,” Transparency.org, 2020, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020.
3    Pursuant to Article 116 of the Colombian Constitution and Article 24 of the General Code of Procedure, some administrative authorities exercise jurisdictional functions, which are exceptional, must deal with precise matters, and must be duly attributed to them by law.

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Dispatch from Rio: Can Brazil set the G20 leaders’ summit up for success? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispatch-from-rio-can-brazil-set-the-g20-leaders-summit-up-for-success/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 20:14:51 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782996 Brasília has sought to acknowledge fundamental disagreements on geopolitics between some members, and then to sidestep them entirely at the ministerial level. How long can this approach last?

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RIO DE JANEIRO—As the Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers and central bank governors gathered here last week, they were met with a dense haze rolling off the mountains that morphed into bright winter sunshine by day’s end. It was a fitting metaphor for the struggle, and for some of the success, of the Brazilian G20 presidency in trying to work through the complex geopolitical morass—especially the one caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—that has hung over these ministers’ meetings for the past three years.

While previous G20 meetings have been noteworthy for their disagreements, Brazil has emphasized substance and consensus over geopolitics during its G20 presidency. Felipe Hees, the Brazilian diplomat and sous-sherpa of this year’s G20 presidency, explained this strategy on July 25 at an Atlantic Council conference on the sidelines of the meeting. Brasília, he said, has sought to acknowledge fundamental disagreements on geopolitics between some members, and then to sidestep them entirely at the ministerial level. The big question now is: How long can this approach last?

So far, Brazilian officials have chosen to focus on economic development issues that already enjoy widespread support. Last week, this approach resulted in one of the few joint G20 ministerial-level communiqués in the past two years. Released on July 26, this communiqué displays G20 members’ alignment on launching the Global Alliance against Hunger and Poverty under the Brazilian presidency. It’s an important topic for the host country, since Brazil is the world’s leading producer of soybeans, corn, and meat, and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has emphasized his country’s role in alleviating global food insecurity. At the same time, the issue has a wider resonance. At the Atlantic Council conference, Cindy McCain, executive director of the World Food Program, emphasized that “food security is a national security issue, and it should be labeled as one.”

Climate finance and the energy transition were at the forefront in Rio last week as well. Discussions focused on how to mobilize the public and private sector in achieving climate goals. At the Atlantic Council’s conference, Renata Amaral, the Brazilian secretary for international affairs and development in the Ministry of Planning and Budget, formally called for technical assistance from multilateral development banks for catastrophic weather events, such as the floods in southern Brazil this May. Immediately following the summit, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen headed to Belém, the capital city of the northern Brazilian province Pará. Located near the mouth of the Amazon River, Belém was a symbolic choice for the unveiling of the US Treasury’s Amazon Region Initiative Against Illicit Finance, which is intended to help combat nature crimes.

Another issue that garnered attention last week was wealth inequality, which the Brazilian president spotlighted in his speech on June 24. “The poor have been ignored by governments and by wealthy sectors of society,” he said. Despite disagreements on whether the G20 is the right forum for the issue, it issued the first ever ministerial declaration on taxation. While Brazil’s ambition was to move the needle on a 2 percent global wealth tax, the declaration simply said that ultra-high-net-worth individuals must pay their fair share in taxes. While this fell short of Brazil’s hopes on this issue, the meetings in Rio have done more on building consensus than the past two presidencies, which have been rife with outbursts over geopolitical issues between member states.

In 2022, the then G20 president, Indonesia, saw its plan to build international cooperation for the post-pandemic recovery paralyzed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February. When finance ministers and foreign ministers met in April and July of the year, officials from Russia and from the United States and Europe walked out of the room when their counterparts spoke. Ministers failed to agree on a communiqué, and negotiations on climate and education also broke down over criticisms of the war. Ahead of the leaders’ summit in November 2022, Western leaders balked at the thought of sharing a table with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who ultimately did not attend the summit. In the end, the leaders could only agree to a declaration that was a broad, noncommittal summary of approaches to addressing global challenges.

Last year, India focused its G20 presidency on depoliticizing the issue of the global supply of food, fertilizers, and fuels, as well as on addressing climate change and restoring the foundations of negotiations at the forum. Its strategy was to move geopolitics off center stage by highlighting perspectives from the “Global South,” including formally adding the African Union as a full member, and thus shaping the platform as an action and communication channel between advanced economies and emerging markets.

This was difficult. Shortly into India’s presidency, Russia and China withdrew their support for the text in the Bali statement on Ukraine. At the technical level, none of the ministerial meetings produced a joint communiqué, and New Delhi was forced to issue chairs’ statements instead. Since the leaders’ summit in New Delhi, the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas in October 2023 has made the job of navigating geopolitical tensions all the more difficult for Brazil.

While the Russian and Chinese leaders did not attend last year’s leaders’ summit, the New Delhi Declaration was nevertheless bolder and more specific than its Bali predecessor. It set the agenda for the G20 for the years ahead but offered few specifics on how to achieve these goals.

Will Brazil’s strategy of sidestepping geopolitics work at the leaders’ summit scheduled for November 18-19 in Rio? Finance ministers and central bank governors can ignore geopolitics; presidents and prime ministers often cannot. If Brasília concludes technical negotiations on the various proposals ahead of the leaders’ summit, then consensus-building at the gathering will be easier, as geopolitics will remain just an elephant in the room.

If Brazil is successful, it can end the stalemate that the G20 has found itself in and remake it into a relevant economic coordination body—one that can adequately address the goals of its emerging market and advanced economy members. If Brazilian officials are not successful, however, the forum’s relevance may begin to wane.

It has been in the interest of the last few G20 presidencies to keep up the balancing act between the United States, China, and Russia. Moreover, it is likely that South Africa will follow this approach as it takes on its presidency in 2025. As many of the discussions in Rio noted, however, what happens in the US presidential elections this November could determine both the relevance and the tone of the G20 meetings going forward.


Ananya Kumar is the deputy director, future of money at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

Mrugank Bhusari is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center.

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Marczak interviewed by BBC Newshour on Venezuela’s election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/marczak-interviewed-by-bbc-newshour-on-venezuelas-election/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 19:54:44 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784014 On July 30, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on BBC Newshour about the results of Venezuela’s presidential election. More about our expert

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On July 30, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center Jason Marczak was interviewed on BBC Newshour about the results of Venezuela’s presidential election.

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To deter Russia, NATO must adapt its nuclear sharing program https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/to-deter-russia-nato-must-adapt-its-nuclear-sharing-program/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 18:22:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782822 Russian President Vladimir Putin has time and again played the United States and its European allies, believing that they are too scared of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons to push back against his threats.

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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin’s frequent nuclear saber-rattling to deter allied assistance to Kyiv have revived discussions about NATO’s nuclear deterrence to a degree not seen in four decades. “Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of Alliance security,” NATO allies reaffirmed earlier this month in their Washington summit communiqué. But the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture, especially in Eastern Europe, remains inadequate.

To enhance the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence and counter Russia’s nuclear threats, the United States should expand nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO to allies such as Poland, Finland, and Romania. The United States should also expand the presence of medium-range US ground-based dual-capable missile systems in Europe. Connected to these changes, NATO should stop adhering to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which is limiting the Alliance’s freedom and which Moscow has repeatedly violated. Only by expanding its approach to nuclear sharing can the Alliance adequately improve its deterrence posture and counter Russia’s nuclear blackmail.

A brief history of NATO nuclear sharing

The spread of nuclear weapons was a major concern at the dawn of the Cold War. In 1963, US President John F. Kennedy worried about “a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons” within a decade. NATO’s current nuclear sharing program emerged in the 1960s as Washington sought to manage the proliferation of nuclear weapons and two other pressing challenges: bilateral relationships across Europe and the defense of Western European NATO allies. Of particular concern to the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union, was West Germany’s desire for some sort of access to the nuclear deterrent at the heart of NATO’s defense strategy.

US efforts originally focused on a “hardware” solution to this dilemma known as the Multilateral Force, which would have created a fleet carrying Polaris A-3 missiles under NATO command. But once Washington realized Soviet opposition to this arrangement would also kill the much-desired Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Johnson administration switched to a “software” approach based on training and consultation with allies—what is now referred to as “nuclear sharing” within NATO. Under this arrangement US B-61 nuclear weapons are stored in secure locations in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The weapons are under US custody and control to maintain compliance with the NPT.

In the event of a nuclear war, a nuclear mission by NATO allies can only occur with explicit approval from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, along with authorization by the US president and UK prime minister. France remains outside the nuclear consultation mechanism with its own sovereign nuclear force.

Nuclear sharing today

NATO’s current nuclear sharing policy, which has been detailed in various publications, is based on layers encapsulated in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, the post-2012 NATO summit declarations, and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. The doctrine deliberately avoids specificity when it comes to qualifying circumstances for nuclear weapon use.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas has prompted NATO to reconsider the Alliance’s previous inattention to its nuclear deterrent. The 2016 Warsaw Summit signaled this change, but despite the Alliance speaking more publicly about the nuclear issue and signaling more clearly about its nuclear exercise (Steadfast Noon), the bulk of the balancing efforts have focused on conventional forces. The problem with this, as Simond de Galbert and Jeffrey Rathke note, is that conventional parity is “unrealistic and costly” and perhaps even “escalatory.”

Making matters worse for NATO were Russia’s violations of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 2019. Although disputed by the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reportedly deployed missiles (9M729) with a range of 2,500 kilometers in Mozdok, North Ossetia, and near Moscow, which was a gross violation of the treaty, placing NATO’s eastern and northern allies under direct threat. In response, the United States withdrew from the INF treaty in 2019, a move that NATO allies supported.

Three years later, in 2022, the Alliance once again increased its signaling on the nuclear deterrent in its Strategic Concept, saying that it would “take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission.” The following year, the Alliance announced further modernization of NATO’s nuclear capability at its Vilnius summit. This modernization of NATO nuclear capability is facilitated through the renewal of national forces in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as upgrades to European dual-capable aircraft. For current nuclear sharing allies, the old B-61 gravity bombs, which number around one hundred, will be replaced by the advanced B61-12. These are new weapons utilizing existing warheads and the replacement does not represent an increase in the overall number of US warheads.

Nuclear sharing tomorrow

To date, despite modernization and stronger signaling, NATO’s nuclear posture remains stagnant. To improve the Alliance’s deterrence posture, the United States and its allies should take two steps: expand current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward and deploy land-based US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Expanding current nuclear sharing arrangements eastward will require fully breaking with the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, which Moscow has torn to shreds. Several allies refuse to abandon under the mistaken notion that it somehow provides a road back to peace. In practice, this has meant that the Alliance has focused on rotating conventional forces in Eastern Europe to stay within the spirit of the Founding Act.

But it is Russia, not NATO, that has destabilized Europe. Time and again, the Kremlin has blatantly ignored the Founding Act. There should be no illusions that there is a road back, and heeding the spirit of the act while Russia wages a brutal, illegal war against Ukraine and engages in political warfare against NATO allies including the United States is foolish.

Balancing Russia with conventional forces in places such as the Baltics is simply an attempt at reassurance rather than an actual effective deterrence and defense strategy. Equally ineffectual would be relying just on F-35 combat aircraft in bases already storing US nuclear weapons in Europe.

The only adequate solution is to respond to Russian moves in a tit-for-tat manner that George Bunn and Rodger Payne call an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Only in responding to the Kremlin in a manner that inflicts a real price can Washington bring about eventual cooperation from the Kremlin. The United States can do this by continually raising the stakes to a point where Russia views cooperation, rather than competition, as the best solution. Given the economic strength of the United States, and nuclear allies France and Britain, it would be logical for them to impose increasing costs on Russia through expanded nuclear sharing.

Moreover, the Pentagon recently announced that it would send Tomahawk, SM-6, and developmental hypersonic missiles to Germany in 2026. This is a good start, but again it does not impose a high enough price on Russian actions and a broader deployment should be considered for two reasons. First, Russia has deployed reciprocal technologies, and the current US deterrent is inadequate. Second, as noted above, the deployment of US ground-based dual-capable missile systems to NATO allies could be used as a bargaining chip to influence Russian behavior—in effect, escalating to deescalate. While this last point may not be appreciated by all advocates of expanding NATO’s deterrent, if it results in a decrease in Russian tactical nuclear deployments, it may be worth the trade if it elicits cooperation.

The United States should take a page out of the new Russian deterrent playbook, which sees little distinction between peacetime and wartime, instead favoring persistent engagement with the enemy across a range of capabilities as part of overall deterrence. Putin has time and again played Washington and its European allies, believing that they are too scared of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons to push back against his threats. Only by responding in kind may Washington find the Kremlin perhaps willing to listen.


Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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Ramsey quoted in The New York Times about Venezuela’s presidential election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-quoted-in-the-new-york-times-about-venezuelas-presidential-election/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 15:04:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784422 On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted in The New York Times about the Venezuelan election. More about our expert

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On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted in The New York Times about the Venezuelan election.

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Ramsey interviewed by BBC World Business Report https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-interviewed-by-bbc-world-business-report/ Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:43:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784415 On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on BBC’s World Business Report about the Atlantic Council’s Memo to the President outlining scenarios and paths forward for Venezuela. More about our expert

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On July 30, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on BBC’s World Business Report about the Atlantic Council’s Memo to the President outlining scenarios and paths forward for Venezuela.

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Ramsey quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-quoted-on-nprs-all-things-considered/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 23:41:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784970 On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered about Venezuela’s contested election. More about our expert

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s All Things Considered about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Marczak quoted by The Hill on Venezuela https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/marczak-quoted-by-the-hill-on-venezuela/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 22:46:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784976 On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by The Hill about Venezuela’s contested election. More about our expert

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On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by The Hill about Venezuela’s contested election.

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Ramsey interviewed on DW’s The Day https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-interviewed-on-dws-the-day/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 22:08:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784427 On July 29, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on DW’s The Day (broadcast on PBS in the United States) about the evolving situation following Venezuela’s presidential election. More about our expert

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On July 29, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed on DW’s The Day (broadcast on PBS in the United States) about the evolving situation following Venezuela’s presidential election.

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Marczak quoted by AP on Venezuela’s election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/marczak-quoted-by-ap-on-venezuelas-election/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 20:21:43 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784959 On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by AP about Venezuela’s contested election. More about our expert

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On July 29, 2024, Vice President and Senior Director Jason Marczak of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by AP about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

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Can Maduro hold onto power? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-maduro-hold-onto-power/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 20:17:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782639 Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has claimed victory despite evidence of fraud and intimidation. What will the opposition and the international community do next?

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JUST IN

He’s not giving up without a fight. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s election commission declared him the winner in Sunday’s vote, despite ample evidence of fraud and intimidation. Opposition candidate Edmundo González declared victory as the United States and other countries expressed concerns about the results. What will be the opposition’s next move? How will Maduro respond? And what role will regional and global powers play? We polled our experts for the answers.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

  • Jason Marczak (@jmarczak): Vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center
  • Iria Puyosa (@NSC): Senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab
  • Geoff Ramsey (@GRamsey_LatAm): Senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center

How to steal an election

  • The stage was set for this moment in the months leading up to the vote, when the regime banned opposition leader María Corina Machado, with González ending up on the ballot. Then, as Jason points out, only small delegations from the United Nations and the Carter Center were allowed to monitor the vote, meaning “the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results.” 
  • The González camp said he won about 70 percent of the votes that his team was able to verify—while Venezuela’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won 44 percent of the vote, with Maduro earning 51 percent. Jason notes that “it would be a mathematical miracle for Maduro to prevail” based on how the opposition has described the votes that it has seen.
  • The public isn’t fooled, Iria tells us, noting the “outpouring of messages and videos on social media” from witnesses on the ground indicating their certainty that González won. “This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy,” she adds.
  • As of this afternoon, those voters are mobilizing in the streets, creating a new test for the regime. “Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames,” Geoff says. “He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years.”

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Pressure from abroad

  • In addition to the “serious concerns” expressed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, several countries throughout the region called for more transparency around the vote count—including neighboring Colombia, where, as Jason notes, “President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro.”
  • Without full results and an independent audit, “the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure,” Geoff says, with the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe playing a crucial role.
  • That international pressure will be important to uphold the will of Venezuelans, but there are self-interested reasons for regional and international powers to push for change. Jason says another six years of Maduro will lead to “new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.”

Crackdown at home?

  • The major point of contention will be sanctions, which the United States reimposed in April after the Maduro government didn’t uphold its end of last year’s deal to hold free and fair elections. “I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe,” Geoff says.
  • The opposition, therefore, should “exploit divisions within the ruling coalition,” Iria says. At the same time, opposition leaders should “find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017.”
  • And if Maduro were to return to the bargaining table, it would look very different from the negotiations between the government and the opposition, Iria tells us. Now, she says, negotiations would no longer be about electoral conditions “but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela.”

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Experts react: Maduro is clinging to power after a disputed election. What’s next for Venezuela? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-maduro-is-clinging-to-power-after-a-disputed-election-whats-next-for-venezuela/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 15:37:57 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782590 Venezuela’s National Electoral Council has declared incumbent Nicolás Maduro as the winner of Sunday’s presidential election, in the face of widespread accounts of voter intimidation and other irregularities.

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Voting doesn’t make a democracy—legitimate and transparent counting of the votes does. On Sunday, Venezuelans went to the polls to select their next president. Early on Monday, the Nicolás Maduro-controlled election committee declared Maduro, who took over the presidency from Hugo Chávez in 2013, the winner of another six-year term. The announcement came in the face of widespread accounts of voter intimidation and other irregularities meant to deny victory to opposition candidate Edmundo González, who led in pre-election polling. “The Venezuelans and the entire world know what happened,” González said of the electoral committee’s dodgy results. Below, Atlantic Council experts sum up what to expect next in Venezuela and how the United States might respond.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Jason Marczak: The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

Geoff Ramsey: Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

Iria Puyosa: A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

Diego Area: The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections


The international community must apply pressure for a full, transparent vote count

The day after Venezuelans voted in massive numbers, it’s crystal clear that Maduro, a deeply unpopular authoritarian leader, was always going to claim electoral victory whether by hook or by crook. With most international observers banned from coming to the country to monitor the vote (except small United Nations and Carter Center delegations), the González campaign could only count on its own observers to verify results. The voting tabulations that opposition observers could verify (about 40 percent of the tabulations) showed González receiving 70 percent of the vote—a far cry from the 44 percent of votes that the country’s National Electoral Council claimed that González won.

It is important that the votes of the Venezuelan people are not an exercise in futility. Votes must be credibly counted. Here, it is imperative that the international community of democracies continue to resoundingly denounce fraud and take appropriate action. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted “serious concerns that the result announced does not reflect the will or the votes of the Venezuelan people.” Similar concerns have been raised in nearby Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic. European partners have also raised concerns. Even in Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has maintained a close relationship with Maduro, Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo made a “call for the total vote count, its verification, and independent audit to be carried out as soon as possible.”

The international community must continue to exact pressure so that the will of the Venezuelan people can ultimately prevail. Not doing so would mean being complicit in the disenfranchisement of the Venezuelan people. But another six years of Maduro will also have reverberations, including new outward migration flows and new transnational criminal activity that will extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.

Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.


Maduro is inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years

More than twelve hours after polls closed, the fact that authorities still haven’t released the full vote count tells you everything you need to know about yesterday’s election. It seems that Maduro has decided to condemn Venezuela to six more years of conflict and isolation. Unless the government backs up its claim of victory with the full results and opens the count up to audits from observers, the international community has no choice but to respond with swift condemnation and diplomatic pressure.

This isn’t over yet. Maduro has to convince the ruling elite that he can keep things under control, but both he and the military know that he can’t govern a country in flames. He’s effectively inviting the biggest loyalty test he’s faced in years. I doubt Venezuelan elites are eager for six more years of repression, sanctions, and economic catastrophe. The opposition, under María Corina Machado’s leadership, has maintained unity and message discipline, and has the evidence in hand to document fraud and mobilize the public against Maduro’s blatant power grab. The role of the United States and its allies in Latin America and Europe will be crucial. It’s time for greater multilateral coordination in order to push the government to respect the will of the people and restore Venezuelans’ fundamental right to elect their leaders.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.


A new cycle of heightened political turmoil looms over Venezuela

The presidential elections in Venezuela turned out as forecasted: a high voter turnout, what appeared to be a decisive electoral win for the democratic opposition, and a blatant fraud that disregarded the will of the voters. 

Due to the relatively small voting centers and the presence of witnesses from local communities, the population is convinced—as we’ve seen in an outpouring of messages and videos on social media—that González won in all electoral districts. This is strengthening the opposition’s unity and determination to continue its fight for the restoration of democracy. 

Maduro’s loss of political legitimacy has left the ruling coalition vulnerable to increased instability. It will likely resort to further repression against the political opposition and organized civil society. The increase in information censorship in the week leading up to the elections is a clear sign of the severe restriction of civic space. 

The democratic opposition, led by Machado, must aim to exploit divisions within the ruling coalition to weaken its power base. The Unitary Platform must also find ways to address public discontent without exposing the population to the violent repression experienced in 2017. 

On the international front, Maduro is facing isolation from Latin American democracies, the United States, and Europe. Former allies, such as Brazil under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia under Petro, were among the first to demand transparency in the election results. It now falls upon the United States to reevaluate the Qatar agreements. The negotiations would no longer be centered on electoral coexistence but rather on Chavismo’s exit from power after its defeat in the voting booths. The next six months will be a crucial period of intense conflict in Venezuela. 

Iria Puyosa is a senior research fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab.


The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for free elections

No one thought it would be easy to remove an autocrat from power, but yesterday marked a new height in the Venezuelan government’s abuses to impede the will of the people. The people of Venezuela and their leadership have endured an epic journey to overcome obstacles and unite around the ideal of change. The disqualification of candidates like Machado and Corina Yoris, who represented genuine alternatives, and the subsequent voter suppression efforts and significant irregularities in the process, illustrate the regime’s determination to retain power at any cost.

Maduro’s actions to undermine the democratic process and steal this election pose grave consequences for the future of the country and have a direct impact on Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States. By stifling free choice, the regime is not only eroding democratic institutions but also exacerbating the country’s humanitarian crisis. As a result, Venezuelans will continue to flee in search of opportunities and freedoms denied at home, contributing to an already critical migration crisis.

The world must stand with Venezuelans in their fight for a future where elections are not merely symbolic but are actual pathways to change. The integrity of the democratic process is crucial not only for Venezuela’s stability but also for the prosperity of the entire region.

Diego Area is a deputy director at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Bauerle Danzman cited in Nikkei Asia on Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bauerle-danzman-cited-in-nikkei-asia-on-nippon-steels-acquisition-of-u-s-steel/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 13:39:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=783095 Read the full article here

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Read the full article here

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Ramsey quoted in the Washington Post on Venezuelan election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-quoted-in-the-washington-post-on-venezuelan-election/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 08:57:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784610 On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Washington Post about Venezuela’s contested election. More about our expert

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Washington Post about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

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Geoff Ramsey interviewed by BBC News on Venezuela’s election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/geoff-ramsey-interviewed-by-bbc-news-on-venezuelas-election/ Mon, 29 Jul 2024 02:11:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784407 On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed by BBC News about the Venezuelan presidential election taking place that day. Venezuela is STILL waiting for results in its presidential election. An exit poll predicts an opposition victory but both sides sound confident. "If the ruling socialist […]

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was interviewed by BBC News about the Venezuelan presidential election taking place that day.

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Ramsey quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-quoted-by-bloomberg-about-venezuela/ Sun, 28 Jul 2024 20:26:32 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784962 On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela’s contested election. More about our expert

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by Bloomberg about Venezuela’s contested election.

More about our expert

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Ramsey quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-quoted-on-nprs-weekend-edition-sunday/ Sun, 28 Jul 2024 13:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784967 On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday about Venezuela’s election. More about our expert

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On July 28, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted on NPR’s Weekend Edition Sunday about Venezuela’s election.

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Ramsey quoted in Los Angeles Times on Venezuela’s election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ramsey-quoted-in-los-angeles-times-on-venezuelas-election/ Fri, 26 Jul 2024 20:17:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=784957 On July 26, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Los Angeles Times about Venezuela’s election. More about our expert

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On July 26, 2024, Senior Fellow Geoff Ramsey of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center was quoted by the Los Angeles Times about Venezuela’s election.

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‘We’re back to square one’ in fighting the hunger crisis, warns Cindy McCain https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/were-back-to-square-one-in-fighting-the-hunger-crisis-warns-cindy-mccain/ Fri, 26 Jul 2024 16:52:03 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782377 At an Atlantic Council event on Thursday, the World Food Programme executive director warned that the world has lost the progress it has made over the past fifteen years on lowering global hunger levels.

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Watch the full event

“We’ve lost all the progress that we’ve made in the past fifteen years” on lowering global hunger levels, World Food Programme (WFP) Executive Director Cindy McCain warned on Thursday.

McCain spoke at an Atlantic Council event hosted on the sidelines of the Group of Twenty (G20) meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in Rio de Janeiro. She pointed out that one in eleven people globally faced hunger last year.

On Wednesday, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced that Brazil—which holds the G20 presidency—will later this year launch the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty to bring countries together in sharing knowledge and resources.

“We have the capability as a planet to feed everybody on the planet—we grow enough food,” McCain said, “but we don’t” due to funding and other coordination issues.

With those challenges, the Global Alliance is “a great opportunity for all of us . . . to get together, exchange ideas, brainstorm” and to “develop science and technology” tools to help, McCain said.

Below are more highlights from the conversation, moderated by Valentina Sader, deputy director at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Food security

  • Food security is a “national security issue,” and “it should be labeled as one,” McCain argued, pointing out how access to food has shaped broader security crises in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
  • Yet, food security “gets kicked down” the list of priorities every time “something else happens in the world,” McCain warned.
  • She said that the WFP and United Nations agencies, because they provide critical aid, are “on the front lines” of crises and the “first in and last out.”
  • The WFP previously got most of its grain from Ukraine. But it has had to diversify its sources in the wake of the agricultural disruptions caused by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. WFP is also working with other countries to help them mitigate the effects of the conflict on global food supplies.
  • In the global hunger crisis, “women and children are taking the brunt,” McCain said. “You’ve never seen more of an example of it than in Gaza.”
  • She added that equity and gender inclusion are important to factor into food security efforts because “a woman will feed her family,” and while doing so, “she will make sure everybody else eats” before she does.
  • Moreover, with women making up around half of smallholder farmers, McCain argued that it is important to make sure that these women have the tools, expertise, seeds, and access to water that they need to farm effectively. “If a woman farms and can feed her family, she will wind up feeding the community,” McCain said.

Farm to negotiating table

  • McCain noted that G20 countries include not only the world’s leading economies but also some of the planet’s largest agricultural producers. That, she said, empowers these countries to work together to address the full spectrum of food-security challenges, from poverty to improvements in agriculture.
  • She added that the G20 is an optimal forum for raising the urgency around hunger because of how it brings together both governments and civil society organizations from countries that represent 85 percent of the world’s gross domestic product and over 60 percent of its population. “So the voice is huge,” she said, adding that “governments simply cannot do it all. We need everybody in on this.”
  • She urged global stakeholders to “continue to elevate the conversation” about the urgency of food security—and advised countries “most affected” by food insecurity to keep conveying the plight they face. “The problem is [that] around the world, people don’t understand what’s going on” or believe that hunger and malnutrition are only problems in Africa rather than globally, she said. “It’s all about. . . making sure that people understand.”

Katherine Walla is the associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council. 

Watch the full event

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Leland Lazarus on the Chinese-built port in Chancay, Peru in China US Focus https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/lazarus-in-china-us-focus/ Thu, 25 Jul 2024 19:09:35 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781987 On July 17th, Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Leland Lazarus published an article on the potential national security concerns of the Chinese-build port in Chancay, Peru in China US Focus.

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On July 17th, Global China Hub Nonresident Fellow Leland Lazarus published an article on the potential national security concerns of the Chinese-build port in Chancay, Peru in China US Focus.

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Experts react: What Netanyahu’s address to Congress reveals about the state of US-Israel relations https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-netanyahus-address-to-congress-reveals-about-the-state-of-us-israel-relations/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 23:04:50 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781979 Our experts break down Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech and what it says about his approach to relations with the United States and to Israel’s war in Gaza.

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“Our enemies are your enemies. Our fight is your fight. And our victory will be your victory.” That was the message Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered on Wednesday to a joint session of the US Congress that dozens of lawmakers refused to attend. In his speech, Netanyahu called for further US support for Israel in its war against Hamas, which he framed as part of a larger regional struggle between Iran and the West. He also condemned his government’s critics, including anti-war protesters in the United States. Outside the Capitol, thousands of people protested Netanyahu’s visit and his government’s conduct of the war in Gaza. 

Below, our experts break down Netanyahu’s message to Congress and what his visit to Washington reveals about the future of US-Israel relations.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

William F. Wechsler: The “Abraham Alliance” idea is new, but not fully developed

Jonathan Panikoff: Netanyahu’s rhetoric today is less meaningful than his meetings tomorrow

Emilia Pierce: Netanyahu’s math that civilian casualties in Rafah have been “practically none” doesn’t add up

Thomas Warrick: Netanyahu lays out a vision for postwar Gaza, but the serious talks are just starting

Carmiel Arbit: The controversies plaguing Netanyahu at home followed him to Washington


The “Abraham Alliance” idea is new, but not fully developed

Netanyahu has proved once again that he is an excellent orator, but this address was almost entirely a collection of statements he’s made previously, packaged for a new audience and carefully balanced for the US election cycle to give talking points to both political campaigns.

The most important new policy idea offered was the creation of an “Abraham Alliance” that would build on the ad-hoc coalition that shot down Iranian missiles headed to Israel in April. Netanyahu knows that work on this is already underway, led by the United States. But these discussions are best held in private, through military-to-military channels. The Gulf states are reluctant to be seen as building mechanisms that will protect Israel but leave them on the front lines in any confrontation with Iran. Indeed, the Gulf’s public and diplomatic strategies toward Iran have gone in the opposite direction, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and now Bahrain working to reestablish formal ties and improve commercial relations with Tehran.

William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.


Netanyahu’s rhetoric today is less meaningful than his meetings tomorrow

Before Netanyahu’s address to Congress began today, CNN posted a video report with the headline, “What to expect from Netanyahu’s high stakes speech to Congress.” It was curious framing—the speech was never high stakes and nothing in its delivered content altered that reality. 

For many on the left, represented by the large swath of Democratic lawmakers who didn’t attend, there was nothing that the prime minister could have said today that would have changed their opinion of him or Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza. For many center-left Democrats, centrists of both parties, and some Republicans, there was little he could have said to diminish their broader support for Israel, even while they maintain contempt for Netanyahu as its leader. And for many on the right, who view any criticism of Israel as inappropriate, there was unlikely to be anything the prime minister could have said to temper their support of him or Israel.

That does not mean that the speech wasn’t powerful and well-delivered. It was. Among the prime minister’s long-standing political gifts has been his eloquence in both Hebrew and English. His recognition of President Joe Biden’s support, especially in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on October 7, 2023, his criticism of those US protesters who have aligned themselves with Iran, and Hamas’s use of Palestinian civilians as human shields were all points strongly delivered that deserve to be highlighted.

But how much more powerful would the speech have been if it had contained the same robust defense of Israel and its military operations in Gaza, while also acknowledging the humanitarian tragedy that exists there today? How much more impactful would the speech have been if it had recognized that even if the Hamas-led health ministry numbers are inaccurate by having inflated numbers and not distinguishing between civilian and terrorist deaths, that still leaves at least twenty thousand innocent Palestinians who have perished during this conflict? War always results in civilian casualties. It’s a horrid reality. But recognizing that reality would have shown light on Netanyahu’s own humanity, which many view to be lacking.

Juxtaposed against today’s speech, what will be rather high-stakes are tomorrow’s meetings between Netanyahu and Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. Negotiators have been trying for months to reach an elusive temporary ceasefire in which hostages held in Gaza would be returned to Israel and Israel would pause military operations in the Gaza Strip.

For months, Netanyahu and Hamas’s leader in Gaza (and the mastermind of October 7) Yahya Sinwar have actually been aligned in their goals to avoid a ceasefire. Sinwar is convinced that more fighting, and more Palestinian deaths, are a long-term net positive for Hamas. Netanyahu, who has been changing the terms of Israel’s requirements, is desperate to try to stay in office. As a result, the press accounts of tomorrow’s meetings and the potential for a ceasefire, whether temporary or permanent, are likely to be far more important than anything the prime minister said today in the Well of the House.

Jonathan Panikoff is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He is a former deputy national intelligence officer for the Near East at the US National Intelligence Council.


Netanyahu’s math that civilian casualties in Rafah have been “practically none” doesn’t add up

Whatever viewers started the day believing about Israel’s war in Gaza is almost certainly what they will end the day believing. If viewers can agree on any one thing, it is likely that the speech contained little if any new information and certainly no surprises. However, two points from Netanyahu’s speech do merit additional scrutiny.

The first is the civilian harm caused by the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF’s) air and ground operations in Gaza. As social media has been flooded with graphic images of the humanitarian devastation, Netanyahu would have been better served by acknowledging the ongoing human toll and making good-faith arguments about civilian harm. In his speech today, he claimed that civilian casualties in Rafah were “practically none,” when former members of his military forces paint a very different picture. It is not a good-faith argument to claim that civilian deaths are “practically none,” when sources both external and internal to the IDF have reported serious concerns about lax rules of engagement and a breakdown of discipline. Additionally, investigations have shown that after executing short-notice evacuations from densely populated areas, the IDF has established “no go” areas where individuals are considered a threat and shot on sight regardless of demographics or whether that person was armed. If Netanyahu wants to defend the IDF’s treatment of civilians, those arguments must at the very least be made in good faith and with a clear-eyed assessment of the facts.

The second is Netanyahu’s framing of the northern threat from Hezbollah. Though his remarks on Hezbollah were relatively brief, they made an impression. Right or wrong, he clearly framed Hezbollah as an existential threat to Israel that cannot be disentangled from their wider struggle against Hamas, the Houthis, and ultimately Iran. One possibility is that this speech was meant to set the stage for a ground incursion into southern Lebanon and soften global public opinion on such a decision. However, opening a new active front against Hezbollah would be catastrophic for many reasons, both humanitarian and strategic. For civilians living in both southern Lebanon and northern Israel, an active conflict would spell further displacement and suffering. For the beleaguered IDF, it would mean a full-scale war against a well-armed adversary and make further regional spillover ever more likely.

While Netanyahu’s fourth speech to Congress may go down in history as the highest number of congressional addresses by a foreign leader, it will likely be remembered for little else—except perhaps his commitment to a misleading representation of humanitarian realities.

—Emilia Pierce is the deputy director of operations and finance at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.


Netanyahu lays out a vision for postwar Gaza, but the serious talks are just starting

Netanyahu’s speech to Congress laid out his vision for postwar Gaza: a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek to destroy Israel and are willing to live side by side in peace. While Netanyahu and his top advisers have said similar things before, the reported meeting convened on July 18 by UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed with top US and Israeli advisers shows that serious talks on postwar Gaza are just starting.

The key words to understand in Netanyahu’s speech are “de-militarization” and “de-radicalization.” Demilitarization means that Hamas should not be allowed to rule postwar Gaza, but it also means that Hamas cannot be allowed to follow the path of Lebanese Hezbollah—of letting someone else govern Gaza while Hamas rearms so that it can attack Israel again. Biden said something similar on May 31, as did US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on May 15 and July 1. Top US and Israeli officials are thus aligned on the goals, but with no agreement on a realistic, common plan to achieve them.

The key to how demilitarization can be achieved is a serious approach to what Netanyahu called de-radicalization. This will require taking control of Gaza’s institutions of governance away from Hamas or those who would tolerate Hamas’s re-armament. It will take a serious plan for keeping Hamas from killing the Palestinians who Netanyahu envisions would eventually govern Gaza. This is one of the practical steps that may come out of the discussions started in Abu Dhabi. There are a number of serious plans for how to do this, but as Netanyahu told Congress, it will take Israel, the United States, Arab nations, and Palestinians—all of them—to make this a reality.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and director of the Future of DHS Project at the Atlantic Council. He served in the Department of State from 1997-2007 and as deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security from 2008 to 2019.


The controversies plaguing Netanyahu at home followed him to Washington

Before heading to Washington for his fourth address to Congress, Netanyahu had promised to deliver a unifying speech—to stay above the political disarray that has overtaken Washington, promote bipartisan support for the US-Israel relationship, and commit to a path to ending the war in Gaza. Insofar as he praised both Biden and former President Donald Trump, he was certainly less partisan than he was in his 2018 address decrying the Iran nuclear deal. Yet Netanyahu, aided by the extremism of his far-right coalition, has continued to preside over the politicization—and potential weakening—of the US-Israel relationship. Very little he said in today’s speech—which also failed to address a path forward—will change that.

By some accounts, roughly half of the Democrats from the House and Senate were absent from the event; compare this with the fifty-eight who sat out his address in 2018 and the five who boycotted Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s speech earlier this year. Democratic legislators are fed up with Netanyahu, who has all but endorsed Trump publicly and whose right-wing rhetoric and kowtowing to extremists is anathema to the party’s values. Their patience for the war in Gaza has waned significantly in the months since October 7, as the death toll among Gazans and hostages alike only grows in the absence of a ceasefire agreement with Hamas.

Yet despite this snub from so many members, Netanyahu will still have meetings with Biden, Harris, and both House and Senate minority and majority leadership. No matter how disliked Netanyahu may be, or how politically charged the war in Gaza may be for many Americans, the meetings underscore the enduring strength of the relationship between the two nations—or, as Netanyahu put it, that the victories of the countries are shared.

Still, Netanyahu’s addresses to the United States are never really intended for American audiences alone, and he is deft in leveraging both negative and positive receptions in Washington to bolster his standing at home. The divisions and controversies plaguing Netanyahu in Israel followed him to Washington. His tribute to the hostages rang hollow for many Israelis—including those present in the Capitol today. Several family members of hostages being detained during Netanyahu’s speech was a startling image for Americans—and a reminder of the complexities of what’s at stake almost a year into the war.

Carmiel Arbit is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

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What Kamala Harris’s record in Central America and the Caribbean reveals about her foreign policy approach https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-kamala-harriss-record-in-central-america-and-the-caribbean-reveals-about-her-foreign-policy-approach/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 20:02:09 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781938 There are ample clues to what US foreign policy would look like with Harris as president in her work in the Americas over the past three-and-a-half years.

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In April 2021, three weeks after US Vice President Kamala Harris took on the assignment of leading the Biden administration’s efforts to address the root causes of migration from northern Central America, I joined her as one of seven experts offering external perspectives on the issues confronting the region. At the meeting, Harris sought out new ideas to inform the administration’s strategy on topics ranging from transparency and economic development to security and good governance. One takeaway immediately emerged: With migration from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador stemming from decades of insecurity, economic challenges, and weak governance, among other factors, there would be no fast fix for these root causes.

Since US President Joe Biden dropped out of the presidential race and endorsed Harris on Sunday, she has emerged as the likely Democratic nominee. So what might US foreign policy look like if she wins the presidency? For Harris, the daughter of Jamaican and Indian immigrants, there are ample clues in her work in the Americas over the past three-and-a-half years. Her approach: Listen to a broad array of stakeholders, act, follow up, and then adjust tactics as needed. This approach can take time to implement, but it also proves adaptive to unexpected challenges.

Although the United States’ southern border was not specifically part of the portfolio handed to her, Harris’s indirect involvement—through her role in seeking to reduce migratory push factors in northern Central America—has received considerable scrutiny, especially among those who criticize the Biden administration’s approach to migration. The data at this point indicate that the Biden administration has made progress in reducing the number of migrants arriving at the US border from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to levels last seen toward the end of the Trump administration, even as increased migration from other countries has contributed to a high level of overall encounters at the border.

At the same time, more work is clearly needed to ensure that migration levels from northern Central America do not jump back up. It is imperative that the efforts undertaken as part of the ongoing “root causes” strategy carry forward no matter who wins the US election in November. This means ensuring that local organizations have the technical and financial resources to improve opportunities for job creation and human-capital development and also to combat often-endemic corruption. These and other conditions are needed not just to dampen the drive to migrate but also to create longer-term economic security that ultimately benefits the national security of the United States and partner countries.

In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean . . . she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions.

In one example of her “listen, act, then follow up” approach, Harris traveled to Guatemala and Mexico in June 2021. A month later, she rolled out a five-pillar strategy that revolved around working with in-country partners to address the root causes of Central American migration, noting that “migration to our border is also a symptom of much larger issues” and admitting from the start that “progress will not be instantaneous.” She subsequently visited Honduras in January 2022. In March 2024, she welcomed Guatemala’s new president, Bernardo Arévalo, to the White House for more discussions. This approach suggests that Harris could govern in a manner where decisions are carefully thought out and where a multitude of factors are taken into account before acting.

In its three years, the five-pillar strategy has produced more than $5.2 billion in commitments from companies and organizations to invest in the region while supporting local development in areas of high emigration. And there are signs that migration from the region is now slowing. The number of Guatemalans encountered at the southwestern border last month (11,485) was the second-lowest since November 2020. The number of Hondurans (8,896) was the lowest over the same period. Overall, the proportion of migrants encountered at the US border who are citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has dropped from 49 percent (March 2021) to 18 percent (June 2024).

Still, reflecting the shift in migrant patterns, including new or growing countries of origin, the overall number of migrant encounters by border authorities remains high (130,419 in June) as compared to the last full month of the previous administration (73,994 encounters in December 2020).

Though it has been less high-profile than her Central America work, Harris has also given substantial attention to addressing the many significant challenges facing the United States’ Caribbean neighbors. As she has explained it, doing so is a US national security priority that cannot be overlooked.

In June 2023, just over a year after virtually hosting leaders of fifteen Caribbean nations, Harris became the highest-ranking US official to visit The Bahamas, where she co-hosted the US-Caribbean Leaders Meeting. That meeting—and her overall engagement—has been focused on establishing a greater US presence in the Caribbean at a time in which it’s becoming increasingly apparent that Caribbean prosperity yields benefits for the United States too. The region’s geographic proximity also means that there is a national security imperative for the United States to be more fully engaged in a partnership with the Caribbean.

In keeping with her typical approach, Harris met with Caribbean leaders first to hear their priorities before crafting a strategy. Her priorities started with climate change and the energy transition, expanded to food security, and then extended to security and arms trafficking. At that June 2023 meeting, she announced $100 million of US assistance to address these issues, including Haiti’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. (In parallel with these efforts, the Atlantic Council organized the PACC 2030 Climate Resilient Clean Energy Summit on the sidelines of her Bahamas trip.) Still, as with her Central America portfolio, substantial progress will not happen overnight.  

Over the coming days and weeks, Harris will set about defining what her foreign policy might look like. In the course of her work as vice president with Central America and the Caribbean, at least, she has taken on tough issues that don’t lend themselves to easy, quick solutions. And she has followed through on implementation, adjusting tactics along the way as the situation on the ground evolves. As she seeks to become commander-in-chief at a time of deep global instability, she will have no shortage of complicated challenges to confront.


Jason Marczak is the vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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The Biden administration has changed how the US engages with developing countries https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-biden-administration-has-changed-how-the-us-engages-with-developing-countries/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 15:30:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781765 Under Biden, the White House has restored US backing for international organizations and helped launch new initiatives, such as the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.

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This is part of a series of articles in which our experts offer “first rough drafts of history” examining US President Joe Biden’s policy record and potential legacy as his administration enters its final months, following Biden’s July 21 announcement that he will not seek reelection.

It’s often easy to spot where repression and hardship are severe. Parts of Europe and the Middle East are now entrenched in brutal war, and Russia and China are promoting autocratic models of governance around the world. Yet it would be a mistake to overlook some of the less visible efforts to advance democracy, freedom, and prosperity in response to these challenges. In particular, the Biden administration has made several important strides to adjust and adapt how the United States engages in international development.

US President Joe Biden, who announced on Sunday that he would not seek reelection, and his administration have sought greater inclusion of developing nations in addressing economic, social, and climate-related issues. Not only rooted in a battle for soft power against China and Russia, these efforts are also advancing global prosperity. They define how the United States interacts with the developing world, and they help shape how the United States is perceived abroad.

Shortly after Biden came into office in January 2021, his administration reengaged with international organizations. The administration has, for example, viewed the United Nations (UN) as an important venue for realizing US foreign policy goals and demonstrating global leadership. While US contributions to the UN have remained steady, the Trump administration sought to reduce or eliminate voluntary contributions to some UN programs, targeting peacekeeping operations and several specialized agencies. Biden restored funding to agencies that faced cuts under Trump, and he halted the planned US exit from the World Health Organization, allowing US contributions to continue uninterrupted. Biden also restarted funding for the UN Population Fund to support its work on ending preventable maternal death, reducing the unmet need for family planning, and ending gender-based violence. Under Biden, the United States contributed nearly $100 million to this fund in 2021, and more than $160 million in both 2022 and 2023, making it the largest single country contributor.

But international organizations are only part of the equation when dealing with the developing world. A more consequential legacy for Biden will be the Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the rebrand of his “Build Back Better World” initiative.

Over the past two decades, China has shifted its international development strategy, building influence through traditional global organizations and launching initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative. China’s expanding influence through these initiatives has raised concerns about its impact on the developing world. While allegations of debt-trap diplomacy might be wrong, Beijing’s approach of decoupling human rights from governance risks fueling the rise of autocratic societies.

The BRI, now a one-trillion-dollar endeavor, has prompted the United States and its G7 partners to create their own alternative, the PGI. The PGI aims to counter the BRI’s influence by boosting investments in sustainable infrastructure around the world and driving transparent investment in quality infrastructure.

At the 2024 G7 summit in Italy, Biden and other G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the PGI, emphasizing sustainable infrastructure investment. Biden highlighted historic progress, including mobilizing more than sixty billion dollars toward the PGI through federal financing, grants, and leveraged private-sector investments over the past three years—in effect doubling the contributions announced at the previous year’s G7 summit. The Biden administration’s stated goal is to mobilize $200 billion by 2027 to support the G7 target of $600 billion.

Successful implementation of the PGI will be essential to regaining the trust of developing countries by providing much-needed investment in social infrastructure. There is hope that the effort will continue beyond 2025 no matter who the next president is. A sister initiative, the Blue Dot Network, which aims to advance robust standards for global infrastructure, was launched in 2019 by the Trump administration and is rooted in the same principles as the PGI. The Biden administration continued this initiative and officially launched it in April of this year, at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris.

By securing support from the G7 and the OECD, Biden’s PGI might not only endure but significantly improve how other nations view the United States. The initiative has the potential to foster a win-win relationship in development finance, something that the United States and the West have been failing at over the past ten years.


Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank.

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China’s ability to buy US land near military bases just got more restricted https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/chinas-ability-to-buy-us-land-near-military-bases-just-got-more-restricted/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 13:47:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781661 Dig into the details of the US Treasury’s recently proposed rules that would expand its jurisdiction over foreign real estate purchases.

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In early June, the US Treasury Department announced a proposed update to Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) rules that would expand the committee’s jurisdiction over foreign real estate purchases. These new rules were announced after several recent high-profile and controversial planned property purchases by initially undisclosed or Chinese buyers, a growing number of state-level restrictions on foreign real estate investments, and increased congressional scrutiny on greenfield investment. These new proposed rules come on the heels of increasing concerns over Chinese investment in US real estate near sensitive locations, such as near military bases. Moreover, the proposed update could presage an expanded interpretation of CFIUS jurisdiction to include certain greenfield investments.

Passing over green fields

For the most part, CFIUS only has jurisdiction to review foreign investment in existing US businesses, often referred to as cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or brownfield investment. Its inability to review most greenfield investments, or foreign investments that establish a new business, is purposeful.

Since CFIUS’s creation in 1975 there have been calls to give it authority over greenfield investments But every time CFIUS rules have undergone legislative updates, Congress has decided to retain the Committee’s focus on M&A. This has generally reflected lawmakers’ desire to prevent CFIUS from being used as a protectionist tool or from discouraging beneficial forms of foreign direct investment (FDI). Most economists and policymakers view greenfield investment as more beneficial to economic growth than cross-border M&A.

For years, the United States has been careful to emphasize in its outreach to other countries that investment screening should apply to investment in existing businesses only. Most governments with screening mechanisms agree; among the twenty-five Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries with such mechanisms in 2023, eighteen countries, or 72 percent of them, do not review greenfield investments.

A real estate exception

When Congress updated the CFIUS process in 2018 (through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, or FIRRMA), it retained the committee’s historical focus on M&A activity—with a few important exceptions.

The committee now has review authority over real estate transactions that grant foreign investors access to or control over land located in close proximity to sensitive sites. These sites are defined in the regulation through an appendix to the implementing rules and are comprised of key critical infrastructure installations, such as ports and some military bases.

The rationale behind this change was straightforward: The US government needed additional authorities to address any attempts by foreign adversaries to buy or otherwise gain access to prime real estate from which they could spy or launch attacks on critical infrastructure.

In September 2012, for instance, then President Barack Obama used CFIUS authorities to issue a divestment order against a Chinese company that had invested in a wind farm near a US naval base in Oregon used for weapons testing and training. CFIUS was able to intervene because the Chinese company had invested in a US business. This case helped to make these kinds of collocational risks clear to US lawmakers, but before FIRRMA, there were no federal government authorities to block the sale or lease of land to foreign nationals near sensitive government sites. FIRRMA closed that regulatory gap.

Update or sea change?

So, what does CFIUS’s June 8 proposal add? On the surface, the new proposals are less new rules and more of a technical update. The proposed rules simply add a list of about fifty sensitive sites to the real estate rules’ appendix, expanding CFIUS’s jurisdiction to any land acquisition by foreign buyers that occurs close to a listed government site. For most instillations, “close” is defined as within a mile radius; for the most sensitive sites, “close” covers a one-hundred-mile radius.

This is the second time that the list of sensitive sites has been updated. The first update was made in August 2023 after a controversial proposed greenfield investment by a Chinese firm of North Dakota farmland located about twelve miles from a military site was found to be outside the scope of CFIUS’s original jurisdiction. The newly proposed rules come shortly after the Biden administration issued an executive order in May requiring a Chinese firm to divest its holdings in a crypto mining operation in Wyoming located within a mile of Warren Air Force Base. This was the first use of CFIUS’s real estate authorities to formally block a transaction that was structured as a real estate purchase and subsequent greenfield investment.

When the new rules were announced, some immediately called for CFIUS to use these new authorities to block controversial greenfield investments, such as the Chinese-owned Gotion’s development of an electric battery plant in Michigan. However, there are two reasons to be skeptical that these new authorities could be used in such a manner.

First, the Gotion land purchase occurred prior to the proposed rule change. Typically, CFIUS regulatory changes are not applied retrospectively, though the final rule should make this explicit. If CFIUS chose to attempt to apply the rules retrospectively, it would invite a lengthy legal battle.

Second, CFIUS real estate authorities provide the committee with jurisdiction over the real estate transaction, not the nature of the business activities that are planned to occur on the site in question. That is, the national security risk review of the transaction is supposed to address risks arising from colocation only, and not create a jurisdictional hook that would allow for a more comprehensive review of broader security risks associated with the specifics of the proposed greenfield investment.

In other words, a faithful interpretation of CFIUS’s real estate rules requires that transactions only be mitigated or blocked if a risk arises from the foreign entity owning or gaining access to the land under review. Whether the land is used to make cutting-edge technology or to grow cucumbers is beside the point.

For CFIUS to stop a transaction like Gotion’s from moving forward, it would need to find that access to the investment site generated a clear national security risk. The Gotion plant is located within one hundred miles of a US National Guard base that hosts joint trainings with the Taiwanese military, but there are no clear indications that the terrain in that area facilitates useful intelligence collection of activities on that base from the Gotion facility.

Likely effects

Given the narrow, technical nature of these updates to CFIUS’s authorities, it may be tempting to conclude that these expanded real estate rules will have little effect on foreign real estate acquisitions. Indeed, as the figure below illustrates, real estate FDI in the United States is low in volume and has recently experienced substantial declines.

But these figures only track FDI in land sales. They don’t track investment associated with greenfield investment that depends on acquiring or leasing land.

Considering how restrictions on land transactions could negatively affect greenfield investment, it becomes clear how these new rules could bite. They substantially expand the US land mass that is subject to CFIUS review, especially with the expansion of the number of sites for which an “extended range” of up to one hundred miles is reviewable. (See here for an especially useful map).

In today’s geopolitical environment, it is very hard to imagine CFIUS clearing any Chinese real estate transactions that fall under its jurisdiction. Espionage risks may be low-probability, but they are also of high consequence. This, plus the fact that discovering intelligence-gathering operations is challenging by design, suggests that the US government will likely be highly risk-averse when it comes to Chinese real estate purchases in designated areas.

In other words, CFIUS real estate authorities may operate functionally as a ban on Chinese greenfield investment in any area located close to a sensitive site. If that is true, then the real question will be how the US Treasury ensures that the process for identifying covered sites remains focused on narrow national security concerns and does not become overly expansive.


Sarah Bauerle Danzman is a resident senior fellow in the GeoEconomics Center’s Economic Statecraft Initiative.

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Memo to the president: Seizing the opportunity for a democratic solution in Venezuela https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to/memo-to-the-president-seizing-the-opportunity-for-a-democratic-solution-in-venezuela/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781436 Venezuelans head to the polls for a presidential election July 28. Whether incumbent Nicolás Maduro or opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia is declared the victor, the United States and its partners have a major opportunity to bring all parties together to negotiate a power-sharing agreement and restore the economically devastated country's democratic institutions.

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TO: POTUS
FROM: Geoff Ramsey, Jason Marczak, Brian Fonseca, and Eduardo Gamarra
SUBJECT: Seizing the opportunity for a democratic solution in Venezuela

What does the US president need to know? Our “memo to the president” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: Although Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election will take place amid high volatility, a significant likelihood of protests, and possible repression, it represents the best opportunity for a peaceful, democratic solution to the country’s long-running political crisis. The election will most likely be followed by a political negotiation process. Venezuelan economic, political, and military elites want the last three years of economic growth and greater international integration to continue, and incumbent Nicolás Maduro has a strong incentive to connect to the global economy and avoid the resumption of international pressure. The United States and its partners should take advantage of this, offering incentives and support for a Venezuelan-led negotiation process to encourage the restoration of Venezuela’s democratic institutions.

Background: Regardless of the election results, both the ruling party and the opposition will face incentives to negotiate.

A July 12 scenario-planning exercise, held by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute, identified several possible outcomes for the election and the weeks that follow.1

Scenario 1: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, with no documented evidence of irregularities or vote tampering.

If Venezuelan electoral authorities in the National Electoral Council declare Maduro the winner, he will face the enormous challenge of “landing the plane” and continuing down the current path of sanctions relief, global reintegration, and the restoration of diplomatic relations. He cannot credibly do so without entering into a sustainable negotiation process with the opposition, in which both parties are willing to make the significant concessions required.

  • The specific aftermath of a Maduro victory will depend on whether there is clear evidence of irregularities or tampering with the vote count on election day. Maduro’s best hope of winning by the numbers is if participation is low and the opposition base is unmotivated to turn out at the polls.
  • Some in Maduro’s ruling United Socialist Party (PSUV) believe they can successfully mobilize the party base to outperform polls and demotivate opposition voters, as has occurred on several instances over the last twenty-five years—most recently in the 2021 state and municipal elections. They believe they can count on the minimum of five or six million votes that Maduro received in the 2018 election, which the opposition boycotted.

Scenario 2: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare Maduro the winner, despite evidence of irregularities and vote tampering.

  • Even if the ruling party were to commit documented acts of electoral fraud, Maduro’s first challenge would be to reassure elements in the ruling PSUV and armed forces leadership that he would be able to continue the last three years of economic growth. He will be unable to do that in the face of opposition protests and the risk of an escalation in the international pressure campaign—which would be almost inevitable in the case of blatant vote rigging.
  • The irregularities could begin before July 28. Credible polling suggests that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia has a fifteen- to twenty-percentage point lead over Maduro, although that number is lower among the most likely Venezuelan voters. If it becomes clear that Maduro’s party has no chance of winning the vote count, even through abstention, there is a chance that the Supreme Tribunal of Justice will ban González’s Democratic Unity Table Roundtable coalition—this would likely guarantee an advantage to Maduro and dissuade opposition participation. A TSJ ruling could ensure that votes for the Democratic Unity Table Roundtable would be invalidated, and would force the base to either call for abstention, cast votes for González under less popular tickets from the Un Nuevo Tiempo or Movimiento Por Venezuela parties, or align behind an alternate candidate such as Enrique Marquez.
  • The ruling party could also engage in vote tampering on election day. However, this would be very difficult to conceal given the opposition’s election monitoring efforts and the presence of independent international observers affiliated with the Carter Center and the United Nations. Previous instances of fraud, such as when observers documented tampering with voter tally sheets in Bolivar state in the 2017 regional elections, have been clearly documented by comparing results with poll witness records.
  • A clearly fraudulent result would likely trigger street protests organized by opposition leader María Corina Machado and others. As in previous protest waves in 2014, 2017, and 2019, this may lead to clashes with security forces, but the prospect of these mobilizations forcing a change in government is highly unlikely. All eyes will be on Machado to gauge how she would react to low turnout or electoral fraud, and what each would mean for the prospect of unrest.
  • The security forces will likely be reluctant to engage in massive repression on the scale seen in the 2014 and 2017 protests, given how this fueled international condemnation and the investigation of International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan. Elites in the military and ruling party would likely apply quiet pressure on Maduro, even as he declares victory, to demonstrate an openness to reforms and a willingness to signal an element of power-sharing with the opposition in his next term.
  • Such overtures could split an opposition that has become more unified today than in the past. For ruling elites, there is no interest in reversing the last three years of economic growth and returning the country to the worst period of the country’s crisis, including greater international isolation.
  • The private sector in Venezuela would likely seek to ensure the continuation of government policies that have helped jumpstart growth and slow inflation to its lowest level in twelve years. Business leaders know that a fraudulent win by Maduro would jeopardize this, with all eyes on whether the US government would return to a pressure campaign that would place investment at risk.
  • An escalation of the border challenges with neighboring Guyana to deflect pressure at home cannot be ruled out, though it is unlikely. This would be a double-edged sword for the government, as the military is uninterested in assuming the risk of outright conflict with Guyana and would prefer to maintain tensions at current levels.

Scenario 3: Venezuelan electoral authorities declare González the winner.

A recognized opposition victory would face a myriad of immediate challenges. To have any hope of assuming office in January 2025, González would need to reach a comprehensive agreement with Maduro and the PSUV. Any negotiations must address complicated issues such as institutional reforms, transitional justice, the release of political prisoners, and electoral conditions for the upcoming legislative and regional elections. It is difficult to imagine Maduro ceding power without ironclad guarantees from the opposition and the international community regarding his safety, immunity, and influence, and that of his inner circle.

  • The opposition’s best hope of translating polling support for González into votes on July 28 is massive voter participation. Given the opposition’s own election monitoring efforts and the presence of international electoral observers, an overwhelming margin of victory would be difficult to paper over by vote tampering.
  • Voter participation at around the same level as the 2013 presidential election (roughly 80 percent) could cement an opposition win and could even force actors in the ruling party to recognize the result.
  • The PSUV coalition is likely to face internal fragmentation in the event of a clear, recognized González win. While moderates in the ruling coalition may be willing to bet on their political future in a post-transition landscape, more hardline elements in the PSUV and security forces could derail a transition in pursuit of self-preservation. Here, the armed forces will almost certainly have outsized influence over a transition and would likely seek to dictate the terms of a transfer of power.
  • The unity of the opposition would come under strain after a González win. While Machado has been the face of the electoral campaign over the last nine months, González is on the ballot as she is currently banned from holding office as part of a longstanding campaign against her. The opposition coalition would have to define where Machado stands in the decision-making apparatus, with the added complication that the Maduro government has explicitly refused to negotiate directly with her—and will likely continue to do so if the opposition wins. This would pose an early test of González’s leadership.
  • The role of the international community will be crucial. To be credible, any opposition guarantees would have to be backed up by the United States, which could offer full sanctions relief and diplomatic recognition to Caracas, and lift bounties placed on the heads of PSUV leaders. European and Latin American heads of state also have a role to play. Still, due to its sanctions policy, the US role—and Maduro’s trust that guarantees will hold under any US administration—is vital.
  • The international community should pay close attention to the prospect of fragmentation in the ruling coalition, particularly among the mid-level officer ranks in the armed forces, who will also seek guarantees and to preserve their influence.
  • Having been out of power for twenty-five years, the opposition’s return to government could come with a high degree of administrative turbulence. The opposition would face significant incentives to seek technical assistance and advisory support in governance, economic reform, and public administration from the private sector, international organizations, foreign governments, and nongovernmental organizations—all while negotiating its policy approach with the outgoing PSUV, which would likely seek to retain political influence.

How the United States and international allies should respond:

  1. Keep the focus on election data from credible international observers and independent monitoring efforts.
    • Prioritize data and reports from local and international independent observers, including the Carter Center and the United Nations, to assess the legitimacy of the election results. Communication with the public and international partners should be clear, consistent, and fact-based.
    • Rather than making a snap decision regarding developments on July 28, wait until the detailed vote count at the polling station level has been released, as has occurred in almost all previous elections. Delay any policy shift until there is a clear picture of the results.
    • Any actions should be grounded in verified data and credible sources to avoid hasty or misinformed decisions.
  2. Explore opportunities for coordinated US and EU sanctions relief to accelerate incentives and advance negotiations.
    • Regardless of the election result, both González and Maduro understand they cannot govern a country in flames, and any effort to keep sanctions relief and normalization on the table will require them to negotiate the terms of governability.
    • There will be a deep need for greater multilateral coordination by sanctioning countries. The United States, as the only country to impose oil and financial sanctions against Venezuela, has outsized leverage, but the European Union and others that have sanctioned government officials can also place sanctions on the table to support negotiations.
    • Any solution will also require complex discussions regarding the restoration of the country’s democratic institutions while ensuring a place for Chavismo in the country’s political landscape.
  3. No need to start from scratch.
    • The basis of any dialogue should be the 2021 Mexico City memorandum of understanding, which has served as the framework for international negotiations facilitated by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry with US, EU, and other international support.
    • This agreement outlined a seven-part agenda for dialogue efforts that have not been fully addressed, including guarantees of political rights for all, the restoration of constitutional order, coexistence and reparation for victims, economic reforms, and the verification and implementation of future agreements.
    • From there, talks can expand to focus on power sharing, the release of political prisoners, a judiciary overhaul, reforms of the security forces, the separation of powers, and improvements to electoral conditions ahead of 2025 legislative and regional elections.
    • The United States and international allies should focus on achievable, incremental progress rather than aiming for comprehensive solutions immediately. Small victories can build momentum and trust.
  4. Promote a regional response led by Colombia and Brazil.
    • The United States and allies should emphasize solidarity among these neighboring countries, encouraging them to take lead roles in support of negotiation efforts while ensuring that Norwegian facilitators retain their influence on ongoing talks. Brazil, which has ceded space to Colombia so far, in particular could play a more active role.
    • Joint statements and actions can amplify impact, and the international community should formalize the ‘’Group of Friends’’ mechanism outlined in the 2021 memorandum of understanding. The creation of such a group, while still giving primacy to existing negotiations, would provide clarity for regional leaders seeking to coordinate Venezuela policy and allow more formal negotiating channels with Venezuela to incentivize more robust compliance with existing accords.
  5. Regardless of outcome, consider the long-term benefits of an expanded Western footprint in Venezuela.
    • Specific licenses issued by the Treasury Department have allowed Western energy companies to maintain operations in Venezuela. The current foreign investment framework permits new modes of governance and payment and new rules of reporting, and provides opportunities for greater transparency.
    • Though sanctions are an important part of the United States’ leverage in Venezuela, there is space and good reason for this investment framework to be expanded. It is not in the US interest to sit back and watch as its rivals deepen their footprints in the country with the largest proven oil reserves on the planet—nor is it in the US interest to see Venezuela grow closer to these authoritarian powers and drift further into authoritarian rule.
    • Allied governments should continue to consider the broader geopolitical context, including relationships with China, Russia, and other influential countries with interests in Venezuela. The goal should be balanced policies that address these dynamics, acknowledge Venezuela’s role in global energy markets, and prioritize the humanitarian needs and human rights of the Venezuelan people.

Geoff Ramsey is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and a leading expert on US policy towards Venezuela.

Jason Marczak is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, and launched the center’s work on Venezuela in 2017. He is an adjunct professor at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

Brian Fonseca is director of the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and an adjunct professor in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University’s Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs.

Eduardo A. Gamarra is a tenured full professor of political science in the department of politics and international relations at Florida International University.


1 Aspects of the discussion during our scenario-planning exercise informed this memo, but the memo is not meant to reflect the views of any participants other than the authors. There was, however, broad agreement that, independent of the results of the election, the winner will face incentives to negotiate the terms of governability, avoid a deepening of the crisis, and prevent another cycle of unrest and repression.

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The Women, Peace, and Security agenda made important strides at NATO’s Washington summit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-made-important-strides-at-natos-washington-summit/ Wed, 24 Jul 2024 12:12:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781475 The Washington summit saw important women, peace, and security commitments, but NATO can do more to support female soldiers and civilians.

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Much of the NATO summit earlier this month was overshadowed by US domestic politics, but one issue did make significant and bipartisan, if underacknowledged, headway when allies met in Washington: the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. During the three-day summit, leaders from the United States and other NATO member states recognized recent gains, including allied militaries implementing inclusive strategies to adapt to women in the armed forces as a means of preparedness. They also welcomed the role of women in political leadership—and underscored its importance.

“Bringing women on board is not only a women’s rights issue. It brings benefits to the whole of society and to our collective security,” Icelandic Foreign Minister Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir said on the first day of the summit. “It’s not about waiting for the time when you can afford focusing on women, peace, and security, or gender equality for that matter, or empowering women,” she added. “You become stronger because you focus on those points, not when you afford them.”

Icelandic Foreign Minister Thordis Kolbrun Reykfjord Gylfadottir addresses the Women, Peace, and Security reception organized by the US Department of State, on July 9, 2024. REUTERS/Tom Brenner

WPS commitments at the Washington summit

The show of support for advancing the WPS agenda during the summit was not just rhetorical. It included concrete commitments, such as adopting a new NATO policy on WPS that is “fit for purpose” for the twenty-first century security environment. Several allies also committed to fund more than ten thousand uniforms and body armor sets for Ukrainian female servicemembers defending their country against Russia’s full-scale invasion.

If the Alliance is looking for something that increasingly earns bipartisan support in the United States, then it should look to the importance of women’s inclusion in national security strategies. In 2017, then President Donald Trump signed the first national law that took steps to institutionalize a United Nations mandate to make the security sector more inclusive of female leadership and more responsive to the needs of women and girls, including freedom from conflict-related sexual violence. In 1994, then Senator Joe Biden was an original cosponsor of the Violence Against Women Act that year, and the Biden-Harris administration continues to make important reforms to the military code of justice on sexual assault in the military.

One of the highlights of the Washington summit was the announcement that as of 2024, twenty-three allied nations have met the commitment to spend 2 percent of annual gross domestic product on defense spending, a change that is applauded by both sides of the aisle in the United States. What is less known is how those fiscal commitments relate to national aspirations for a more inclusive force. According to the most recently published NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives report, released in 2020, twenty-seven members of the Alliance, including the United States, have national action plans on WPS. NATO’s newest members, Sweden and Finland, also have national action plans on WPS. Furthermore, twenty-five NATO nations reported an increase in female participation in the armed forces in the years before 2020. On average, 13 percent of allied forces were comprised of women that year.

In the Washington Summit Declaration, allies committed to integrate an ambitious WPS and human security agenda across all of NATO’s core tasks. NATO had previously committed to women’s meaningful participation in the security sector. But the new policy recognizes the conditions that make women’s leadership possible, including their full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation in decision making in national institutions.

The declaration also referred to the human security trends shaping today’s conflicts, including disregard for international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians, cultural property protection, and forced displacement that fuels human trafficking and irregular migration. These human security trends disproportionately affect women and girls, who make up more than half of the 117 million people forcibly displaced worldwide, according to the United Nations. In Washington, the Alliance also renewed its commitment to international law and the fundamental norms of armed conflict, which distinguishes between military targets and civilians.

Lessons from Ukraine

Although NATO did not welcome Ukraine into the Alliance at the summit, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in his closing press statement that it is a matter of when, not if, Ukraine will become a member. This followed NATO commitments at the summit to establishing a new NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center and NATO Security Assistance Training for Ukraine to increase Kyiv’s interoperability with the Alliance.

For the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine has shown that the conduct of war involves more than military strategy. Providing security has become a whole-of-society effort, involving women in uniform and civilians providing support to the front lines. The evolving nature of conflict can blur the distinction between civilian and military action and change societal norms on what roles are appropriate for men and women. These dynamics are important for understanding the human domain, which is adaptive to evolving threats. Supporting female soldiers and addressing civilian harm caused by the war should be an integral part of NATO plans to train for the future operational environment and to secure peace in Ukraine.

The NATO Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for WPS, which has responsibility for a broader umbrella of cross-cutting human security policies, can continue working toward integrating lessons from the human domain in military training. While NATO continues to identify military lessons from the war in Ukraine, these lessons should also include concrete steps to protect civilians from air missile attacks, mitigate the use of sexual violence in conflict, and protect children against forced deportations to Russia. NATO can emphasize the lessons allies have learned about how to protect civilians in other conflicts, such as in Iraq and Libya, as it establishes new security cooperation training centers.

The war in Ukraine is a test case for whether the Alliance can help partner nations achieve stability and whether its actions are inclusive of the whole-of-society approach that has characterized the mobilization of the Ukrainian population. While volunteerism, patriotism, and the inclusion of women have sustained Ukraine’s war effort, the need to protect the civilian population from attack remains paramount.


Sarah Dawn Petrin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously advised the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute on integrating women, peace, and security and human security in US military operations.

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Lipsky cited in Bloomberg on US efforts to persuade emerging market countries to publicly criticize China’s export practices during the G20 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/lipsky-cited-in-bloomberg-on-us-efforts-to-persuade-emerging-market-countries-to-publicly-criticize-chinas-export-practices-during-the-g20/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 19:37:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781675 Read the full article here

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Lipsky cited in Reuters on U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s engagement at the G20 summit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/lipsky-cited-in-reuters-on-u-s-treasury-secretary-janet-yellens-engagement-at-the-g20-summit/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 19:36:43 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781427 Read the full article here

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Putin accused of jailing US journalists as ‘bargaining chips’ for prisoner swap https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-accused-of-jailing-us-journalists-as-bargaining-chips-for-prisoner-swap/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 19:14:45 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781682 Russian dictator Vladimir Putin has been accused of using American journalists as bargaining chips after jailing US reporters Evan Gershkovich and Alsu Kurmasheva on dubious charges ahead of a possible prisoner swap, writes Mercedes Sapuppo.

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On July 19, Wall Street Journal reporter and US citizen Evan Gershkovich was sentenced to sixteen years in Russian prison on espionage charges. The same day, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Alsu Kurmasheva, a journalist who holds dual American-Russian citizenship, was sentenced to six and a half years by a Russian court for supposedly spreading false information about the Russian military. Both trials took place largely behind closed doors under a veil of secrecy.

Gershkovich is the first US journalist to be convicted in Russia on charges of espionage since the Cold War. So far, the Russian authorities have not provided any credible evidence to support their accusations. Kurmasheva was convicted on a charge frequently used by the Kremlin to suppress unfavorable reporting on the realities of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The imprisonment of two US journalists marks a new escalation in the Kremlin’s confrontation with the West. Wall Street Journal publisher Almar Latour and editor Emma Tucker released a statement calling Gershkovich’s sentence “a disgraceful, sham conviction.” RFE/RL President and CEO Steve Capus deemed Kurmasheva’s conviction “a mockery of justice.”

US citizens Gershkovich and Kurmasheva are now facing the prospect of long prison sentences in extremely harsh conditions. An AP series published earlier this year described the “physical and psychological pressure, sleep deprivation, insufficient food, heath care that is poor or simply denied” and “dizzying set of arbitrary rules” that the pair are likely to encounter in Russian jails. Both journalists have already spent an extended period in pretrial detention.

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The Russian authorities have a long record of targeting journalists. These efforts have gained further momentum since February 2022 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with the Kremlin using draconian new legislation to silence anti-war voices and shut down any remaining independent Russian media outlets. In May 2024, the United Nations human rights office reported that the number of journalists imprisoned in Russia had reached an all-time high.

While the Putin regime is notorious for seeking to censor the media, that may not actually be the main motive in this case. Instead, there has been widespread speculation that the Kremlin ultimately aims to use Gershkovich and Kurmasheva as bargaining chips in negotiations with the US to secure the release of Russian citizens currently serving prison sentences in the West.

Putin is no doubt well aware that the United States will go to considerable lengths to free the two American journalists. Following Gershkovich’s conviction, the White House issued a statement that the US government has “no higher priority” than seeking the release and safe return of Gershkovich “and all Americans wrongly detained and held hostage abroad.”

Speculation about a potential prisoner swap has swirled ever since Gershkovich was first detained in 2023. Typically, Russia only engages in prisoner exchanges once suspects have been convicted and sentenced. This has led some analysts to suggest that the relative speed of the two recent trials could indicate the Kremlin’s desire to proceed with an exchange in the near future.

Moscow will likely demand a high price for the release of Gershkovich and Kurmasheva. This may include handing over Vadim Krasikov, a Russian secret service colonel who is currently serving a life sentence in Germany for gunning down a Chechen dissident in a Berlin park in 2019. Sentencing Krasikov in 2021, a Berlin court called the killing “a state-ordered murder.”

US Senate Foreign Relations Chair Ben Cardin said Gershkovich’s trial and conviction were “stark reminders of the lengths to which tyrants like Putin will leverage innocent people as bargaining chips, stifle free speech, and suppress the truth.” While many now expect a prisoner swap to take place sooner rather than later, the targeting of US journalists in this manner highlights the Kremlin’s retreat from international norms and underlines the potential dangers facing any Western nationals who choose to visit Putin’s Russia.

Mercedes Sapuppo is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.

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Michta on Sage International podcast on US and allied strategic decisions in the changing geopolitical landscape https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/andrew-michta-sage-international-the-focus/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 17:38:04 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782638 On July 22, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, recorded a podcast episode for “The Focus: Geopolitics and What It Means to You” for Australian-based Sage International. In the episode, entitled, “End of Illusions: Preparing for a World of Risk and Rivalry,” Michta discusses critical strategic decisions that the United […]

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On July 22, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, recorded a podcast episode for “The Focus: Geopolitics and What It Means to You” for Australian-based Sage International. In the episode, entitled, “End of Illusions: Preparing for a World of Risk and Rivalry,” Michta discusses critical strategic decisions that the United States and its allies must make for the end of the “rules-based international order” and rising threats from the “axis of dictatorships.”

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Biden will leave an enduring legacy of linking economic and national security https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/biden-will-leave-an-enduring-legacy-of-linking-economic-and-national-security/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 14:19:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781504 The Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law revived the idea that economic security and national security are deeply interconnected.

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This is part of a series of articles in which our experts offer “first rough drafts of history” examining US President Joe Biden’s policy record and potential legacy as his administration enters its final months, following Biden’s July 21 announcement that he will not seek reelection.

Three years ago, Brian Deese, then the director of the National Economic Council at the White House, came to the Atlantic Council to announce the Biden administration’s new “industrial policy.” Considering that the term had largely been taboo in economic orthodoxy in recent decades, the announcement took many of us at the Council—and throughout Washington—by surprise. But what Deese outlined that day will turn out to be one of the enduring legacies of the Biden administration: coordinated policy to steer public and private capital toward revitalizing domestic manufacturing and prioritizing the technologies needed to compete with China.

The legislation that made up the backbone of this industrial policy will have ripple effects for the rest of the decade: the Inflation Reduction Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. In total, the legislation authorized more than two trillion dollars in spending and tax incentives over ten years. But it wasn’t just the money; it was also the fact that major subsidies were directed to US companies producing semiconductors, clean energy, and electric-vehicle batteries. The Biden administration will point to the eight hundred thousand manufacturing jobs and fifteen million total jobs created in the past four years as proof of the success of these policies. Critics will say that the spending was misallocated, fueled the deficit, and contributed to inflation.

The final verdict will come in the years ahead, when all the investments finally pay off—or don’t. But already, the legacy of the decision is clear: There is a bipartisan consensus now on investing in domestic manufacturing. Whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris becomes the next president—and even if the sectors he or she chooses to focus on are different—that kind of economic policymaking is not going away.

What motivated the Biden administration’s economic framework wasn’t only creating jobs at home . . . The equally important ambition was competing with China.

Of course, the rest of the world took notice of the world’s largest economy making a major macroeconomic shift. The Inflation Reduction Act in particular alarmed European allies who saw their own companies racing to set up US subsidiaries and take advantage of the new law’s incentives to manufacture in the United States. 

The administration tried to explain that this new economic approach wasn’t about the United States going it alone. Two years ago, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen announced the administration’s “friendshoring” strategy at the Atlantic Council. She spoke in detail about how one of the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic was the need to rethink supply chains and work more closely with partners and allies to achieve economic security and resilience, not just maximize speed and reduce cost. Her choice of the term “friends” was intentional. It was meant to be an outstretched hand to countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia, not just traditional US allies.

Being a friend didn’t mean being a full partner—at least in the ways other countries had come to expect during the previous decades. The Biden administration has remained unwilling to open the US market to allies and other countries any further and has instead pursued trade-facilitation dialogues through plurilateral arrangements, in particular the Trade and Technology Council with the European Union and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity with the Asia-Pacific. While these were welcome steps, officials from several countries who met with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center team over the years said privately that it wasn’t enough. 

What motivated the Biden administration’s economic framework wasn’t only creating jobs at home, although that certainly was a goal. The equally important ambition was competing with China. Biden maintained Trump’s unprecedented tariffs on Chinese goods and added to them earlier this year. The lines between economic policymaking and national security continued to intertwine—and will be impossible to disconnect in the years to come.

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo best encapsulated this dynamic when she discussed Chinese electric vehicles at the Atlantic Council in January. Raimondo pointed to the unfair trade distortions created by Chinese subsidies, which could hurt US automakers. (That’s the domestic part of the Biden administration’s economic policy.) Then she pointed out that sensors in those cars could be used for surveillance; Chinese authorities, in fact, are worried enough about US surveillance that they do not allow Tesla cars near secure facilities. (That’s the national security argument.) 

It would be a mistake to say that Biden created a new paradigm in economic policymaking. Instead, he helped rediscover an old idea—one that was part of the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, but that the United States largely had the luxury of forgetting in recent decades: Economic security and national security are deeply interconnected. Whatever policies come next, that lesson won’t be forgotten again anytime soon.


Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

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Biden’s legacy depends most of all on Ukraine https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/bidens-legacy-depends-most-of-all-on-ukraine/ Tue, 23 Jul 2024 11:04:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781331 The US president has recognized that the world is at an inflection point. Now comes the part he cannot control.

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During his press conference at the NATO Summit in Washington earlier this month, Joe Biden said of his presidential campaign, “I’m not in this for my legacy.” Two weeks and one difficult decision to bow out of the race later, his legacy is suddenly front and center.

That legacy, however, depends importantly on something he can no longer control: Ukraine’s ability over time to prevail against Russia’s criminal war.

That includes the inextricably linked question of whether the US president has contributed decisively to the United States’ ability, alongside its allies, to counter an emerging “axis of resistance” consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Those countries are determined to prevent Ukraine’s success. More to the point, they seem to view Russia’s subjugation of Ukraine as a crucial step in remaking the global system of rules and institutions that the United States and its partners forged after World War II.

Biden, who on Sunday announced his decision to abandon his presidential campaign, will likely be remembered by historians for defining the enormous stakes of the era we’re entering. He called it an “inflection point,” which I’ve been doing in this space since 2018, having previously been introduced to the term through the US intelligence community.

“We’re facing an inflection point in history—one of those moments where the decisions we make today are going to determine the future for decades to come,” Biden declared this past October, in only his second speech to the nation from behind the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office.

Significantly, in that speech he connected the dots between Russia’s war in Ukraine and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel, which was only possible with the support of Iran. “Hamas and Putin represent different threats, but they share this in common,” he said. “They both want to completely annihilate a neighboring democracy—completely annihilate it.”

Historians may praise Biden for defining the historic stakes in such unmistakable terms. However, the coming months and years will determine whether he fell short in delivering the remedies by too cautiously supporting Ukraine due to his fears of Russian nuclear escalation.

The result was self-deterrence, where the United States provided Kyiv the weaponry it most urgently requested too slowly and in insufficient numbers. The Biden administration also worsened the situation by restricting Kyiv’s freedom to use US weapons, particularly longer-range fires, against military targets in Russia, from which deadly attacks on Ukrainians were being launched. When the US Congress held up aid for Ukraine last year and into this one, it made Ukraine’s challenges far more dangerous.

Many Republican leaders agree that Biden was mistaken in holding back crucial support and permissions for Ukraine, but they weren’t the ones nominated for president or vice president at the Republican National Convention last week. For the moment, the gathering in Milwaukee indicated the party’s desire to do less for Ukraine.

Many Republicans have wanted to meld former President Donald Trump’s populism with former President Ronald Reagan’s larger global purpose, which contributed to the United States’ Cold War victory against the Soviet Union without a shot being fired. That seems to be the furthest thing from the intentions of the Trump-Vance ticket, though Trump has been known to change direction on a dime, as he did to free up congressional funding for Ukraine.

John Bolton, who was Trump’s national security advisor from 2018 to 2019, wrote in the Telegraph that both Trump and his running mate JD Vance “are disinterested, or openly disdainful, of assisting Kyiv’s defense against Russia’s unprovoked aggression. For Vance, the US lacks both the military assets and the defense-industrial base to be a global power, meaning it must concentrate its resources to defend against China.”

My own view is that the best way to “defend against China” would be to counter Beijing’s unflinching and even increasing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. At their seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington, NATO leaders called China a “decisive enabler” of that war by providing the wherewithal without which Moscow could not continue to wage it.

If the Republican Party truly believes Democratic leaders have provided inadequate defense budgets to address emerging challenges, “Trump should work to correct these deficiencies, not treat them as excuses for further reductions, thereby abandoning even more international positions of strength,” writes Bolton.

Instead, in a recent interview with Bloomberg Businessweek, Trump signaled that he may not be willing to defend Taiwan, likely the first place to fall next if Ukraine falters. “Taiwan doesn’t give us anything,” Trump said, noting that the island is 9,500 miles away from the United States and less than a hundred miles from China. “Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.”

Where the Trump administration better understood the dynamics of this emerging autocratic axis was in its “maximum pressure” approach to Iran. The Biden administration, by contrast, at first hoped to resume nuclear talks with Iran and work over time to manage its threats to the region. Tehran then demonstrated its determination to disrupt the Middle East and threaten Israel, not with nuclear weaponry but through its proxies, including Hamas, the Houthis, and Hezbollah.

Where the Trump administration fell short, and where the Trump campaign seems to be doing so again, is in its underestimation of the advantages provided to the United States through alliances and common cause at a moment of such significant and historic challenge.

At the NATO Summit in Washington, I had the chance to speak with officials from across the Alliance, as well as those from Indo-Pacific partner states Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. I found that there is consensus about one matter: They miss the certainty of the Cold War years, from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall, when US foreign policy remained relatively consistent through Republican and Democratic administrations. During that period, US leaders were resolute in the belief that they faced a long-term struggle against Soviet communism and its confederates.  

Without US agreement in diagnosing the emerging autocratic challenge, which Biden has done well, and without US prescriptions for an allied and global response to address it, which he has done less well, the officials I spoke with expect a period of testing by US adversaries and hedging by US allies.

Biden defined the emerging geopolitical contest confronting the United States. He still has six months to give Ukraine the best chance of victory, including by removing restrictions on Ukrainian forces striking military targets in Russia. The outcome of the war and the larger contest, however, will increasingly be determined by forces that he can’t control, both within his own party and among Republicans, and among allies and adversaries around the world.


Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Trump, the Survivor https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/charai-in-the-jerusalem-strategic-tribune-trump-the-survivor/ Mon, 22 Jul 2024 13:29:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781285 The post Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: Trump, the Survivor appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Andriy Yermak: Ukraine and NATO are restoring Europe’s security architecture https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/andriy-yermak-ukraine-and-nato-are-restoring-europes-security-architecture/ Mon, 22 Jul 2024 12:04:47 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781259 Together with the country's allies, Ukraine has set out on the path to restore the European security architecture, writes the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President Andriy Yermak.

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As I listened to world leaders announce the signing of the Ukraine Compact on the sidelines of NATO’s 75th anniversary summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center, my mind drifted back to September 13, 2022. On that cold, rainy day, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and I first unveiled the Kyiv Security Compact concept.

President Zelenskyy’s idea, which Anders and I began to implement together, was that allies should provide Ukraine with everything necessary to defeat Russia on the battlefield and to deter further aggression. The proposal outlined a set of measures designed to ensure that Ukraine could defend itself independently until it joins NATO.

Specifically, it included commitments from a group of guarantor states to provide weapons, conduct joint exercises under the EU and NATO flags, share intelligence, and assist in developing Ukraine’s defense industry. We claimed that security commitments were not an end in themselves, but a transitional phase towards Ukraine’s full-fledged membership in both the European Union and the NATO Alliance.

At the time, one journalist asked if I truly believed we could find even half a dozen countries willing to support this initiative. I responded with a line from John Lennon’s song: “You may say I’m a dreamer, but I’m not the only one.” This has proved to be an accurate forecast.

At the NATO Vilnius summit in July 2023, G7 leaders issued a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, based on our initiative. Other countries began joining soon after. Before long, their number exceeded thirty. By that time, we already had several bilateral security agreements in place. This work is ongoing, with 23 bilateral agreements currently signed. Together with our allies, we set out on the path to restore the European security architecture. We are determined not to stray from it again.

The Ukraine Compact, open for others to join, became the final piece in creating an ecosystem of security guarantees for our country. It is designed to enhance Ukraine’s resilience and ability to defend itself in the future, and to serve as a bridge during the period when Article 5 does not yet apply. I’m pleased that this aligns perfectly with Anders’ and my original draft. The bridge metaphor is also enshrined in the NATO summit’s final declaration. This is a crucial detail. Since 2008, Ukraine has been hitting a glass wall trying to enter the Alliance’s supposedly “open doors,” and now it has been removed.

The summit declaration’s statement on Ukraine’s irreversible path to NATO is another strong step. Throughout the past year, Anders and I have emphasized again and again: NATO leaders need to make it clear to Vladimir Putin that his war is futile, that support for Ukraine will not waver, and that Ukraine will sooner rather than later become a NATO member. Finally, this signal has now been sent: Russia’s war of choice has been stripped of its stated pretext.

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Currently, the Ukraine Compact bears 25 signatures. It has been supported by the United States and Canada, nineteen European countries, and the European Union. Japan is also among the signatories. This is very telling, as Ukraine is a cornerstone not only of European but also of global security.

The Washington summit demonstrated that the Alliance can no longer limit itself to the Euro-Atlantic space as it seeks to effectively counter global challenges and threats. Aggressive autocracies are increasingly collaborating and taking on the shape of a military-political alliance. For all democratic countries this means one thing: Russia is not alone in its aggression against Ukraine, and the possibility of new conflicts elsewhere depends on Moscow’s ability to succeed. It is therefore in our common interest to do everything to ensure that Ukraine emerges victorious from this war, and that this victory is convincing.

I note that the recent NATO summit’s decisions are aimed precisely at this. Three key points are worth mentioning here. First, the institutionalization of aid formats that have emerged ad hoc during the war. Second, building Ukraine’s defense capabilities and strengthening the potential of its defense-industrial base. And third, the course toward deepening Ukraine’s political and military interaction with NATO structures.

We are sincerely grateful for these steps and extend thanks to our allies, whose unwavering leadership has allowed us to successfully defend ourselves despite Russia’s often overwhelming advantages in terms of resources. Your dedication and your value-based choices strengthen the chances of our common victory over a lawless and cynical enemy.

Looking ahead, I need to outline several critical points. The further strengthening of Ukraine’s air defense system is crucial. Russia intends to continue terrorizing our civilian population by destroying residential buildings, power grids, and other critical infrastructure. The recent strikes on the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv, as well as two additional health clinics, have once again clearly demonstrated that for the Russian military, there are no red lines in terms of international law and ethics. There is therefore no alternative to strengthening the air shield over Ukraine.

One of the key components of this air shield will be F-16 jets. Ukraine’s allies have committed to delivering the first batch this summer. However, I have to emphasize that this is not enough. The Russians boast about using three-ton guided bombs against Ukraine. Their bombers are based at airfields in Russia’s border regions. In order to neutralize this threat, we still need long-range capabilities. Simply put, if there is a hornet’s nest in your neighborhood, you can hunt them one by one with varying success, or you can destroy the nest itself. Currently, only the first option is available to us, and even that is quite limited.

Addressing this problem will not only reduce the number of casualties; it will also further enhance the operational compatibility of Ukrainian defense forces with NATO. We sincerely welcome steps in this direction, in particular the creation of the NSATU (NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) program.

We are also extremely grateful to member states for their specific commitments to aid Ukraine, and for implementing a system of proportional contributions that will provide base funding of forty billion euros over the next year. We expect these funds to be spent specifically on purchasing weapons, rather than alternative forms of support, which are undoubtedly important as well.

At the same time, it is worth noting that this burden could be reduced by fine-tuning mechanisms for transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. A related issue is the further intensification of sanctions pressure on both Russia and the partners who enable Moscow to continue making weapons using microelectronics produced in the West. This has made it possible for Russia to manufacture the type of missile that hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital with Western components.

Our relationship with NATO has always been a two-way street, and we remain committed to this principle. We fully understand that one of the leading factors in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration is our capacity for transformation. President Zelenskyy and his team remain dedicated to reforms aimed at strengthening institutional resilience and democratic processes in the country.

Changes continue despite the war, and they are irreversible. We unhesitatingly and without reservations agree that the reforms mentioned in the summit’s final declaration are of utmost importance for Ukraine’s prospects. At the same time, common sense suggests that all these changes will only matter if Ukraine withstands this war. Withstands and wins. Only a strong, free, and successful Ukraine can be a reliable outpost of democracy in Eastern Europe. Comprehensive and long-term assistance to Ukraine is not charity. It’s an investment in a secure future for the entire Euro-Atlantic community.

Andriy Yermak is the head of Ukraine’s Office of the President.

Further reading

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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How Venezuela became a model for digital authoritarianism https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/how-venezuela-became-a-model-for-digital-authoritarianism/ Mon, 22 Jul 2024 11:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781182 As Venezuelans head to the polls on July 28, the massive online surveillance apparatus developed under incumbent Nicolás Maduro watches street video, monitors social media and phone communications, and gathers data from online movements. What's behind this digital repression—and will it spread?

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Once the most vigorous democracy in Latin America, Venezuela started down a slow path toward autocracy twenty-five years ago. It also became a model for digital authoritarianism and an exporter of democratic backsliding to the rest of the Americas. Control of the information space, widespread surveillance, and digital repression are significant pillars of the current regime’s survival. Incumbent Nicolás Maduro is counting on this, along with electoral manipulation and judicial control, to remain in power as Venezuela holds a presidential election on July 28. Nonetheless, a cohesive democratic coalition mobilizing the population across the country has a serious chance of making this election the starting point for a transition toward re-democratization.

The media landscape in Venezuela is fragmented and marked by censorship. The rise of government-run media and state control through ownership changes or censorship mechanisms led independent journalists to migrate to small internet outlets. Venezuela’s media ecosystem shrank further when the country’s economy collapsed after 2015. The aftermath of the 2017 cycle of protests saw another significant shift in the media landscape, with surviving newscasts characterized by censorship and heavily biased coverage in favor of the ruling party. In addition, censorship has caused the closure of many radio stations, leaving many areas without access to local or regional news. The National Telecommunications Commission in Venezuela routinely censors the use of certain topics and words during programming, and also bans interviews with democratic opposition leaders. It prohibits public coverage of corruption allegations or human rights violations attributed to state officials or their family members, coverage of citizen protests or demonstrations against the regime, and discussion of international courts and other human rights entities.

In their new report, “Venezuela: A playbook for digital repression,” Iria Puyosa, Andrés Azpúrua, and Daniel Suárez Pérez dive deep into the state of media in Venezuela, the role it played in the country’s slide toward authoritarianism, and whether other Latin American countries will adopt Venezuela’s model of digital repression.

Additional contributions by Marco Ruíz and Valentina Aguana

Edited by Iain Robertson and Andy Carvin

Related content

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.


This report was made possible with support from the government of Canada.

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Hays and Massa in Forbes on the risk of a Russian nuclear detonation in space https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hays-and-massa-in-forbes-on-the-risk-of-a-russian-nuclear-detonation-in-space/ Sun, 21 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782246 On July 21, Mark Massa and Peter Hays were quoted in Forbes on nuclear threats to space, drawing from a recent Forward Defense report

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On July 21, Forward Defense Deputy Director Mark Massa and Peter L. Hays, professor of space policy at George Washington University, were quoted in a Forbes article on nuclear threats to space assets. Hays was quoted on the threat of a Russian detonation in space, stating “I believe the Russian nuclear ASAT is primarily intended to hold proliferated LEO [low Earth orbit] satellites like Starlink at risk.” Hays’s recently published issue brief, “Modernizing space-based nuclear command, control, and communications,” was extensively cited in this article.

Massa was quoted on the destructive risk of a nuclear detonation in space and the potential international response, stating that “such an action would demand a forceful response from the United States and the international community leveraging all tools of national power.”

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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How to institutionalize NATO’s cooperation with its closest Pacific partners https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-to-institutionalize-natos-cooperation-with-its-closest-pacific-partners/ Fri, 19 Jul 2024 17:24:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780988 NATO and its IP4 partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—should establish an Atlantic-Pacific Partnership Forum (APPF) to advance their cooperation.

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For the third year in a row, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea attended NATO’s annual summit. Speaking on the sidelines of the Washington summit last week, US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell declared that he “fully, 100 percent” supports NATO extending a standing invitation for future summits, going beyond its present ad hoc ones, to this grouping, known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4). This, he held, would place Atlantic-Pacific cooperation on a more solid footing and enable scaled-up joint planning. The United States, he has said before, should “weave” its Atlantic and Pacific alliances together.

There are two concrete steps NATO should take that will help achieve this goal.

First, NATO should upgrade its recent summit invitations to the IP4 by offering them a standing invitation. It is unwise to continue leaving this practice up in the air each year.

Second and more substantively, NATO and the IP4 should establish an Atlantic-Pacific Partnership Forum (APPF). This would be in the tradition of NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and its Mediterranean Dialogue. Adding an APPF is the next step, arguably an overdue one.

The need for closer cooperation

The enduring threats from the revisionist autocracies show the need for closer Atlantic-Pacific cooperation among democracies, just as recent new channels for NATO-IP4 cooperation provide momentum for it. The increasingly aggressive alliance of autocracies is seen in China’s military exercises in Belarus near NATO’s border and in its de facto aid to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. It is also present in North Korea’s military pact with Russia.

Despite the geographic distance, NATO strategists increasingly see Indo-Pacific security as a necessary and complementary part of Euro-Atlantic security. This reality was recognized in the 2022 Strategic Concept and reaffirmed at the Washington summit. Any deterioration in Indo-Pacific security, such as a mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan or escalation of other territorial disputes in the region, would not just damage the world economy; it would challenge the larger international order as well. And China has consistently challenged NATO members directly with threats of economic coercion over Taiwan.

Making it official

So far, Atlantic-Pacific cooperation has occurred mostly in silos between NATO and the individual IP4 states, and much of it is unsecured from being disrupted by ordinary changes. For example, Japan’s ambassador in Brussels has met semi-regularly with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and other senior figures in the NATO secretariat to discuss progress on Japan’s Individually Tailored Partnership Programme. Its higher-level meetings regarding security cooperation have occurred mostly at the past three NATO summits, plus recent Group of Seven (G7) summits and one visit by Stoltenberg to the region in 2023.

The relatively slow pace of these summits’ convenings—as well as the conspicuous absence of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea from the most recent G7 summit in Fasano, Italy, after their previous attendance at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan—indicates that these channels, without institutionalization and supplementation, cannot be relied upon consistently.

The domestic political situations in the IP4 states also risk the continuity of this cooperation. This is normal; in fact, a prime motive for institutionalizing cooperation is to ensure that it won’t die out when domestic politics take their next turn. It has been overlooked how easily the intense transatlantic cooperation of 1946-1948 could have dissipated after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953 if it had not been institutionalized in 1949 in NATO and already gathered momentum in the years after.

Today, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida have low approval ratings in polls in their respective countries. A change in government in either country might well shift it away from its pro-NATO stances, and from their efforts to improve Japan-South Korea bilateral relations. This would be a major reversal of recent progress.

An APPF would address these structural shortcomings in Atlantic-Pacific Cooperation. Developing new institutionalized platforms would help ensure continuity across shifts in domestic politics. For example, the APPF could overcome existing deficits in NATO-IP4 meetings by committing to convene respective foreign and defense ministers at least twice a year—a wider version of the 2+2 ministerial consultative committees. NATO could likewise invite its APPF partners to be observers in NATO committees. There is a precedent for this move: The security and partnerships and the cooperative security committees are already open for participation from partner countries on an ad hoc basis.

Meanwhile, an APPF could open partnership offices in its two main regions, like the one NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue is opening in Jordan. This would fill in for NATO’s inability to reach agreement on the more daring step of opening a formal office of its own in the Indo-Pacific region.

The larger picture

The APPF could accelerate NATO members’ progress on developing Indo-Pacific policies and act as a consultative platform between NATO and the IP4 in times of crisis, such as in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

An APPF goal would—to borrow a 1990s NATO phrase—be to develop “interlocking but not interblocking” institutions. One model for such an effort is the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States grouping, known as AUKUS, discussing the inclusion of Japan and South Korea under pillar two of the partnership. Another would be the forthcoming secretariat for the US-Japanese-South Korean entente. These could be briefed with the NATO members in the APPF, ensuring they remain informed on the policy trajectories of these minilateral groupings. The APPF could then facilitate further development of the minilateral structures; for example, its discussions could encourage the trilateral entente secretariat to invite NATO, UK, Australian, and New Zealander delegates as observers, keeping avenues of cooperation open between the entente, AUKUS, IP4, and NATO.

Thus, more than seventy-five years after NATO’s founding, establishing an APPF would demonstrate that the Alliance remains ready to adapt to the challenges throughout the world. It would provide NATO with much-needed channels to deepen the cooperation across the two theaters between its annual summits. Perhaps most important, it would further underline the Alliance’s role as a values-based organization, reconnecting it to its moral and intellectual roots.

The IP4 are NATO’s best democratic partners by far in the wider world. Already in 1939, American journalist Clarence Streit called for uniting the leading democracies of the world—mostly Atlantic but also Pacific—for their shared economic and security interests, and as a nucleus to rally other democracies around. The founders of NATO were greatly motivated by his call. As democracies face the threat of growing autocratic aggressiveness, they can benefit by harkening back to the NATO founders’ vision: building a wider and deeper unity on the basis of shared democratic values.


Ira Straus is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Francis Shin is a research analyst specializing in transatlantic institutions, anti-corruption, and clean energy policy. He has previously worked at the Atlantic Council, Royal United Services Institute, and Center for a New American Security.

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Michta quoted in Le Figaro on the lack of compromise in US politics https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/michta-quoted-in-le-figaro-on-the-lack-of-compromise-in-us-politics/ Mon, 15 Jul 2024 16:17:11 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780209 On July 15, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was quoted in the print edition of Le Figaro on the lack of compromise within current US politics.

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On July 15, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was quoted in the print edition of Le Figaro on the lack of compromise within current US politics.

Compromise was the mother’s milk of American democracy. One lost, the other won, it was OK. But today when one loses, the other must disappear and will be totally delegitimized.

Andrew Michta

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Lipsky featured in Mercatus Center podcast on tools of financial statecraft https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/lipsky-featured-in-mercatus-center-podcast-on-tools-of-financial-statecraft/ Mon, 15 Jul 2024 15:57:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=781052 Listen to the full podcast here.

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Listen to the full podcast here.

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Warrick on TRT World on assassination attempt on former US President Trump https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/warrick-on-trt-world-on-assassination-attempt-on-former-us-president-trump/ Mon, 15 Jul 2024 15:13:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780188 On July 13, Thomas S. Warrick, director of the Future of DHS project in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, appeared on TRT World on the assassination attempt on former US President Donald Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania. He discussed the role of the United States Secret Service, as well as the […]

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On July 13, Thomas S. Warrick, director of the Future of DHS project in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, appeared on TRT World on the assassination attempt on former US President Donald Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania. He discussed the role of the United States Secret Service, as well as the position of the shooter during the attack.

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Cryptocurrency Regulation Tracker cited by Politico on crypto relevance in US election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cryptocurrency-regulation-tracker-cited-by-politico-on-crypto-relevance-in-us-election-cycle/ Mon, 15 Jul 2024 13:38:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780996 Read the full newsletter here.

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Modernizing space-based nuclear command, control, and communications https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/modernizing-space-based-nuclear-command-control-and-communications/ Mon, 15 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=769668 While nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is in the midst of a modernization overhaul, the space-based elements of NC3 face unique geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges. This paper focuses on space-based missions and elements of the existing NC3 system, analyzing how ongoing modernization programs are addressing these challenges as well as offering recommendations.

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Table of contents

If I take nuclear command and control and spread it across 400 satellites … how many satellites do I have to shoot down now to take out the US nuclear command and control?”

Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, Chief of Space Operations (CSO) United States Space Force (USSF)

Abstract

US nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) is a bedrock for nuclear deterrence and the US-led, rules-based international order that it supports. Like the rest of the US nuclear arsenal, NC3 is in the midst of a modernization overhaul. The space-based elements of NC3, however, face different geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges during this modernization. Geopolitically, the two-nuclear-peer challenge, China’s perception of NC3 and strategic stability, and the prospect of limited nuclear use call into question the sufficiency of existing and next-generation NC3. Technically, Russia and China are developing more sophisticated counterspace weapons, which hold at risk space-based US NC3. Bureaucratically, the US Department of Defense (DOD)’s shift to a proliferated space architecture may not be appropriately prioritizing requirements for systems that are essential for NC3 missions. To address these challenges, space-focused agencies in the DOD need to ensure that nuclear surety is not given short shrift in the future of space systems planning. 

Introduction

The NC3 system is one of the most opaque, complex, hardened, least understood, and perhaps least appreciated foundations for nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. While each military service is busy developing and attempting to resource its instantiation of combined joint all domain command and control (CJADC2), NC3 has not yet enjoyed this same focus and attention. As security dynamics and technology developments continue to evolve, the United States must commit appropriate resources and focus to ensure the continuing effectiveness of NC3. In simple terms, NC3 is the protected and assured missile, air, and space warning and communication system enabling the command and control of US nuclear forces that must operate effectively under the most extreme and existentially challenging conditions—employment of nuclear weapons. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review explains the five essential functions of NC3: “detection, warning, and attack characterization; adaptive nuclear planning; decision-making conferencing; receiving and executing Presidential orders; and enabling the management and direction of forces.”1

The NC3 system must never permit the use of nuclear weapons unless specifically authorized by the president, the only use-approval authority (negative control), while always enabling their use in the specific ways the president authorizes (positive control). Risk tolerance for NC3 systems is understandably nonexistent; there can be no uncertainty in the ability of the United States to positively command and control its nuclear forces at any given moment. The DOD and Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration use the term “nuclear surety” to describe their comprehensive programs for the safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons that leave no margin for error. The requirement for nuclear surety is constant, but it is becoming more difficult to deliver because threats to US NC3 systems are increasing, due to geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic trends and developments. 

The geopolitical environment has shifted in significant ways since current US NC3 systems were deployed. The space-based elements of NC3 are now threatened in unprecedented ways, due to Chinese and Russian testing and deployment of a range of counterspace capabilities that can hold space-based NC3 systems at risk. As demonstrated by the current war in Ukraine, even regional conflicts can manifest long-standing questions and concerns about NC3 in a multipolar and increasingly complex global security environment. Layer in China’s quantitative and qualitative rise in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the unwillingness of China’s leadership to have basic discussions about strategic stability, and the 1960s architecture that is the foundation of US NC3 systems seems to be growing increasingly inadequate to deal with the geopolitical challenges of today and tomorrow. The reality is that the current NC3 system and architectures were predicated upon a bipolar nuclear geopolitical situation that no longer exists. Today, a multipolar, globally proliferated, and largely unconstrained nuclear weapons environment requires integrated deterrence across domains, sectors, and alliances. 

The E-4B National Airborne Operations Center, which provides travel support for the Secretary of Defense and their staff to ensure command and control connectivity outside of the continental United States. Credit: US Air Force.

The geopolitical environment has shifted in significant ways since current US NC3 systems were deployed. The space-based elements of NC3 are now threatened in unprecedented ways, due to Chinese and Russian testing and deployment of a range of counterspace capabilities that can hold space-based NC3 systems at risk. As demonstrated by the current war in Ukraine, even regional conflicts can manifest long-standing questions and concerns about NC3 in a multipolar and increasingly complex global security environment. Layer in China’s quantitative and qualitative rise in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the unwillingness of China’s leadership to have basic discussions about strategic stability, and the 1960s architecture that is the foundation of US NC3 systems seems to be growing increasingly inadequate to deal with the geopolitical challenges of today and tomorrow. The reality is that the current NC3 system and architectures were predicated upon a bipolar nuclear geopolitical situation that no longer exists. Today, a multipolar, globally proliferated, and largely unconstrained nuclear weapons environment requires integrated deterrence across domains, sectors, and alliances. 

While the geopolitical environment has evolved, so too has the technology available to deliver NC3 capabilities. Many of the current NC3 systems were developed decades ago using analog technology but are now being updated to digital interfaces, switches, and underlying network topologies. This transition will enable enhanced capabilities, but it will also open more threat vectors that can be exploited via various cyber means through all segments of the system. As the space-based systems that are part of the NC3 system are being comprehensively upgraded, whether for missile warning (detecting and characterizing a missile), missile tracking, or delivering persistent assured communications, the DOD must work to eliminate exploitable cyber vulnerabilities and maintain distributed end-to-end network and supply chain security. 

Additionally, almost all the DOD’s bureaucratic structures that acquired the current NC3 systems have changed, sometimes in radical ways. Primary responsibility for acquisition of important elements of the NC3 system are now divided between several organizations that are not focused on nuclear surety, making it a significant challenge to achieve effective integration and unity of command and effort across this structure. Moreover, the overall architecture for US space systems is transitioning toward a hybrid approach that uses commercial, international, and government systems and capabilities to enhance space mission assurance. The benefits of this hybrid approach seem clear for most mission areas, but it is not necessarily optimal for NC3. The DOD must ensure that nuclear surety remains a foundational and non-negotiable requirement for next-generation NC3 systems and cannot allow this requirement to be out-prioritized by other important considerations or become adrift in new bureaucratic structures.

Given the importance of the capabilities, evolving geopolitical and technical threats, and the diverse units planning modernization of the system, the United States must think carefully about the best ways to acquire the next-generation, and generation-after-next, of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety in a new landscape that is characterized by a breathtaking degree and pace of change, troubling factors which seem likely to persist or even accelerate. The 2022 US Nuclear Posture Review reaffirms the US commitment to modernizing NC3 and lays out key challenges: 

We will employ an optimized mix of resilience approaches to protect the next-generation NC3 architecture from threats posed by competitor capabilities. This includes, but is not limited to, enhanced protection from cyber, space-based, and electro-magnetic pulse threats; enhanced integrated tactical warning and attack assessment; improved command post and communication links; advanced decision support technology; and integrated planning and operations.”

2022 Nuclear Posture Review.

This paper characterizes the existing NC3 system and focuses on its space-based missions and elements. It describes how orbital dynamics shape space security and examines the emerging geopolitical, technical, and bureaucratic challenges to the extant NC3 system. Finally, it analyzes how ongoing modernization programs are addressing these challenges and offers some recommendations. 

What is the NC3 system?

The nature of NC3

Department of the Air Force (DAF) doctrine defines the NC3 system as “the means through which Presidential authority is exercised and operational command control of nuclear operations is conducted. The NC3 system is part of the larger national leadership command capability (NLCC), which encompasses the three broad mission areas of: (1) Presidential and senior leader communications; (2) NC3; (3) and continuity of operations and government communications.”2

The current NC3 architecture is comprised of two separate but interrelated layers. The DOD’s 2020 Nuclear Matters Handbook describes it as follows: 

The first layer is the day-to-day architecture which includes a variety of facilities and communications to provide robust command and control over nuclear and supporting government operations. The second layer provides the survivable, secure, and enduring architecture known as the “thin-line.”

Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020 [Revised], https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter2.html.

The thin-line uses several communication technologies and pathways to provide “assured, unbroken, redundant, survivable, secure, and enduring connectivity to and among the President, the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], and designated commanders through all threat environments to perform all necessary command and control functions.”3 Assessments of space-based NC3 tend to focus most on the ways these systems support the thin-line; this assured connectivity is an essential foundation, but any comprehensive analysis must also consider the contributions of space systems to broader NC3 functions. Moreover, the highly integrated nature of modern command, control, communications, and battle management (C3BM) systems necessitates the integration of NC3 capabilities into a broader system-of-systems across the C3BM enterprise. For the DAF, this integrated system-of-systems is the DAF Battle Network and includes more than fifty-five programs and $21.5 billion in procurement as part of the broader DOD CJADC2 initiative.4

An Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR), a dual-sided ballistic missile early warning radar, at US Space Force’s northernmost base in Greenland. Credit: US Space Force.

To instantiate a survivable communications network, the NC3 system is comprised of terrestrial, airborne, and space-based systems. Satellite terminals like the Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals (FAB-T) ensure that the satellite communications, cryptographic keys, and actual control functions of the network are available to the necessary decision-makers during nuclear conflict.5 Boeing was the original contractor for the FAB-T program, but a February 2023 report delivered to Congress from Frank Calvelli, the assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, indicated that FAB-T had fallen more than a decade behind schedule under Boeing and that a new sole-source contract for FAB-T was awarded to Raytheon in 2014.6 Allowing FAB-T to fall more than a decade behind schedule is an indication of the DOD’s reduced emphasis on NC3 in the post-Cold War era. 

Satellite command post terminals in airborne command centers like the E-4B National Airborne Operations Center and the E-6B Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post (ABNCP) on the Navy’s Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft ensure that national decision-makers can command and control nuclear forces even if key ground sites and decision-makers come under attack.7 TACAMO aircraft can link national decision-makers with “naval ballistic missile forces during times of crisis. The aircraft carries a Very Low Frequency communication system with dual trailing wire antennas” and can also perform the Looking Glass ABNCP mission, which facilitates the launch of US land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles using a robust and survivable airborne launch-control system.8

Current NC3 missions and space systems

Space systems provide three capabilities that are essential for the NC3 enterprise: missile warning/missile tracking (MW/MT), assured communications, and nuclear detonation detection. Space-based MW/MT uses infrared sensors to detect missile launches worldwide. This can be the first warning of an attack and, when combined with other attack indications from systems using different phenomenologies, provides high confidence that an actual attack is underway. This warning is essential for initiating other steps that may include moving the president, conferencing with senior leaders, and determining response options. Today, the space-based infrared system (SBIRS) provides MW/MT. SBIRS consists of the space segment of geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellites, highly elliptical orbit (HEO) sensors, legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, and the associated worldwide deployed ground systems. SBIRS satellites were first launched in 2011, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in August 2022.9 In 2017, then-Commander US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Gen. John Hyten famously described SBIRS satellites as “big, fat, juicy targets,” pledging that USSTRATCOM would no longer support acquisition of such NC3 systems and that “we are going to go down a different path. And we have to go down that path quickly.”10 The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) (and its predecessor organizations) has, since the 1980s, conducted several experiments and developed prototype capabilities supportive of MW/MT/missile defense and adaptive nuclear planning. MDA’s prior efforts include Delta 180, Midcourse Space Experiment/Space-Based Visible, and Space Tracking and Surveillance System.11

Assured, survivable communications capabilities are essential for the president to conduct conferences with senior leaders and exercise command and control over nuclear forces. Space-basing enhances survivability and enables global communications. The Advanced Extremely High-Frequency (AEHF) system currently provides many communication links for nuclear command and control. AEHF provides “survivable, global, secure, protected, and jam-resistant communications for high-priority military ground, sea and air assets.”12 AEHF replaced the Cold War-era Milstar system; the first AEHF satellite was launched in 2010, and the sixth and final satellite was launched in March 2020.

A rendition of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System, a space-based communication system. Credit: US Space Force.

A final space capability providing important support to NC3 is data about the location of nuclear detonations worldwide. This information is essential for effective and adaptive planning in a nuclear conflict. The United States Nuclear Detonation Detection System (USNDS) currently provides this capability.13 As described by the DOD, “the USNDS is a worldwide system of space-based sensors and ground processing equipment designed to detect, locate, and report nuclear detonations in the earth’s atmosphere and in space. The USNDS space-based segment is hosted on a combination of global positioning system (GPS) satellites, DSP satellites, and other classified satellites.”14 The enhanced detection capabilities of the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System (SABRS-2) payload were first deployed in 2016. 

How the attributes of space and space systems shape space security

Comprehensive analysis about modernizing space-based NC3 cannot be complete without a baseline understanding of the attributes of space and space systems that shape the most appropriate modernization paths and trade-offs. NC3 systems were first moved to space in the 1960s because this domain provides unique speed and positional advantages, persistent emplacement, and a global perspective. These developments were highly effective and efficient, despite the considerable expense of developing reliable space hardware and the great energy required to move a satellite above the atmosphere at the bottom of Earth’s gravity well and to accelerate it so it can sustain the specific orbit for which it was designed. Orbital dynamics, along with the lack of traditional cover and concealment measures available on Earth, means satellites can be more easily detected, tracked, and targeted than terrestrial forces, which are routinely able to maneuver and hide. 

Attributes of space launch and orbital dynamics also drive space technology and operations in significant ways. Traditional satellite architectures have been shaped by several factors, including the costs and dangers of space launch (still the most hazardous part of satellite operations), significant limitations on capability to service satellites, perceived economies from custom-building very small numbers of increasingly capable and large satellites, and the ability of just a few of these highly capable satellites to perform a variety of key missions very competently. Due to these factors, several countries, and the United States in particular, in the past chose to develop and operate a very small number of highly expensive, sophisticated, and exquisitely capable satellites. Each of these attributes adds to the vulnerability of legacy satellite architectures and exacerbates temptations for enemies to negate them because these orbital assets are so fragile, so few, increasingly important, operate in highly predictable ways, and cannot today be repaired, refueled, or upgraded on orbit.

Another important defining characteristic of most space systems is that they are dual use, meaning that they can be used for both civilian and military applications. This dual-use characteristic has been inherent since the earliest days of space technology development and is highlighted by a description of Wernher von Braun (the leading space technology pioneer) as a “dreamer of space, engineer of war.”15 The hybrid space architecture under development by the United States is an integrated system of both government (civil, national security, intelligence) and commercial (industry) elements that is also inherently dual use, particularly when the government procures commercial goods and services. This architecture can also be extended to international and institutional (interagency, academia) allies, coalition members, and partners. Dual-use considerations sometimes create difficult balancing and trade-off issues, as the United States and other countries attempt to promote space technologies and activities considered to be benign, while limiting similar capabilities or actions that may be threatening or destabilizing.

An implication of the dual-use nature of space systems is that any satellite that can transmit or maneuver could be sent toward a potential collision (known as a conjunction) with a nearby satellite or used to jam satellite transmissions, making it a simple anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Such use is not likely to be as effective as a purpose-built ASAT weapon, but increasing development of in-orbit servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM) and active debris removal (ADR) capabilities may blur and complicate distinctions between commercial, civil, and military applications and operations. Similarities between ASAT systems and some of the technologies and operations of ISAM and ADR systems are so great that analysts worry that widespread development of these beneficial commercial and civil capabilities would also create significant but latent ASAT potential.16 The dual-use characteristic of satellites or spacecraft is perhaps the single largest factor that complicates space security considerations, making it more difficult for analysts to determine ways to incentivize desired applications, constrain malign potential, and consider how these factors shape space superiority.

Dedicated or dual-use capabilities can strengthen capability, capacity, resilience, and security, but security is an ambiguous and relative concept. Analysts use the term “security dilemma” to describe the relative and interactive aspects of security and study them as a cause of war and one of the central problems of international relations.17 The characteristics of space and satellites exacerbate some of these issues and make their relative contributions to security more ambiguous and elusive. Accordingly, modernizing space-based NC3 in the context of these technical and political issues is a complex endeavor that may promote or inhibit cooperation under the security dilemma.18

On this subject, strategist Brad Townsend builds from earlier analysis and applies it directly to space, finding that the current space security situation is less dire than some originally predicted.19 CSO Saltzman acknowledges that the security dilemma is a concern but notes that weapons are not inherently offensive or defensive: “Weapons are just weapons. And the operations that you choose to undertake with those weapons makes them more offensive or defensive.”20 As described in a 2023 New York Times Magazine profile of the US Space Force: 

The important question, as [General Saltzman] saw it, was this: At what point does a buildup of defensive weapons in space constitute an ability to conduct offensive operations so that someone else feels threatened? “There is a balance here,” he said. “And this is about stability management. What actions can we take to protect ourselves before we start to cross the line and maybe create a security dilemma?” The line, he suggested—harder to find in space, no doubt, and at this point not clearly defined—had not yet been crossed.

Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?” Interior quotes are from General Saltzman.

A final attribute of space capabilities is rapidly evolving due to the burgeoning commercial space sector: the value of commercial space systems in supporting a wide range of military operations. These contributions have grown exponentially, as illustrated by the stunning successes of the Ukrainians in defending their country following the Russian invasion.21 Commercial space capabilities provide critical information that strengthens worldwide support for Ukraine, supply communications connectivity that is essential for coordinating many Ukrainian military operations, and demonstrate that states do not necessarily need to own and operate space systems to use them effectively.

US Vice President Kamala Harris announces a new US pledge to not destructively test direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons during a visit to Vandenberg Space Force Base in April 2022. US Space Force photo by Michael Peterson.

These characteristics of space and space systems are driving the United States toward a wholesale reorientation of its national security space enterprise that is focused on improving resilience and advancing better transparency- and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for space governance. The current enterprise-wide modernization and recapitalization of government space systems provides resilient, robust, and responsive solutions, seeking to take advantage of new capabilities and technologies through approaches including highly proliferated constellations in multiple orbits; in-plane and multi-orbit, multi-node cross-links; and shorter development and deployment cycles. Helpful TCBM steps include the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space’s promulgation of twenty-one guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s declaration that space is a fifth operational domain where attacks could invoke Article 5 defense obligations, the DOD’s tenets of responsible space behavior in space, and the pledge by the United States that it will no longer conduct destructive direct-ascent (DA)-ASAT tests that has now been joined by several other countries and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.22 These steps and others seem to be generating momentum toward greater consensus and more specifics on what constitutes responsible behavior in space, which will facilitate the “naming and shaming” of parties that do not act in responsible ways. Nonetheless, these efforts also highlight just how far the space governance regime is from governance regimes in other domains that include much more specific obligations and robust verification mechanisms, rather than voluntary guidelines and pledges.

Geopolitical challenges to the current NC3 system

Two elements of the changing international security environment pose a challenge to the current NC3 system beyond what it was designed to face—principally, the nature and number of nuclear-armed countries which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal and the increasing risk of limited nuclear use. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), the “pacing challenge” for the DOD, is currently engaged in a significant nuclear breakout. This has two key consequences for NC3. First, the increased focus on, and risk of nuclear conflict with, China raises the salience of Beijing’s possible lack of understanding of or appreciation for the principle of noninterference with space-based NC3 that Washington and Moscow arrived at during the Cold War. The second challenge posed by China’s nuclear breakout is the so-called two-nuclear-peer problem.23 The United States may need to deter or, if deterrence fails, restore deterrence against two nuclear peers which may aggress against the United States or its allies in coordination, in sequence, or in overlapping timeframes. This development may raise the requirements for survivable NC3. Finally, US government documents evince a growing concern that Russia and China may be lowering the threshold for limited nuclear use to achieve their aims in a conflict with the United States or its allies, potentially requiring a graduated US nuclear response. These developments create a challenging environment for effective NC3 operations. 

The NC3 system is arguably the most important communication system that the US maintains and is the bedrock of nuclear deterrence. As such, deliberate degradation or destruction of these capabilities is a “red line” (meaning an unacceptable action that could trigger a nuclear war) for senior US decision-makers. Disruption, degradation, or denial of NC3 capabilities could have strategically destabilizing effects for the United States, as well as the allies that depend on US extended deterrence commitments to ensure their security. Japan, the Republic of Korea, and NATO allies all tangibly benefit from US extended strategic deterrence commitments that are predicated on assured NC3; confidence in US extended deterrence commitments is undermined if states question whether NC3 will always work as needed. 

The first key development in the international security environment posing challenges to NC3 is the changing nature and number of nuclear-armed states which the United States seeks to deter using its nuclear arsenal. China’s growing importance as a nuclear competitor presents a challenge to space-based NC3 because Washington and Beijing do not have a mutual understanding of red lines surrounding NC3 assets that is comparable to the understanding Washington developed with Moscow during the Cold War. The current NC3 system evolved based on important assumptions about strategic nuclear bipolarity between two superpowers with a shared understanding about red lines and at least a nominal commitment to reducing the risk of strategic miscalculation in decisions about using nuclear weapons. 

China presents strategic challenges that cannot be met with the approaches used for Russia. The United States and China do not maintain regular strategic security dialogues designed to reach shared understanding about critical issues, such as red lines on disrupting NC3. Whereas Russia and the United States generally agree that degrading, denying, disrupting, or destroying systems associated with NC3 is destabilizing and potentially a precursor to nuclear exchange, there is no such understanding with China, and Chinese leaders may even see value in such uncertainty.24 Additionally, China has chosen to remain outside of strategic arms control treaties and dialogues, ostensibly because it fails to see a strategic benefit to being bound to the terms of such agreements and is unwilling to submit to a stringent verification regime. Instead, China has been pursuing rapid quantitative and qualitative growth in its entire nuclear force structure and C3BM systems, while also concurrently developing and fielding counterspace and cyber weapons that could be employed against US space-based NC3 systems. Specifically, China’s first deployment of its own ballistic missile early warning satellites and putative move toward a nuclear launch-on-warning posture could be quite destabilizing. 

The DF-41 land-mobile missile on parade. The DF-41 is one of China’s most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles and a significant component of its nuclear breakout. Credit: Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

With China’s rapid nuclear modernization, the United States faces a possible two-nuclear-peer problem of deterring simultaneous, sequential, or overlapping aggression from both China and Russia. China has achieved a strategic breakout with its rapid expansion in scope, scale, and capabilities for strategic nuclear weapons, including their own nuclear triad in development and operations. China is expected to field a nuclear arsenal of at least one thousand deliverable warheads by 2030, a number which may continue to grow, and presents considerable challenges for effective NC3 in various two-nuclear-peer conflict scenarios.25

An additional geopolitical challenge to NC3 is the increased likelihood of limited nuclear use by Russia or China. Limited nuclear use—that is, nuclear employment less than a full exchange against strategic targets in either party’s homeland—poses challenges to NC3 because NC3 elements may need to survive several limited exchanges while maintaining the ability to characterize attacks in detail to enable the National Command Authority to order responses that convey clear messages of resolve and restraint in a graduated manner. Recent world events and US government analysis demonstrates concern that both Russia and China are considering limited nuclear use strategies. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has backslid toward destabilizing activity in which the employment of “tactical nuclear weapons” has been contemplated to an unprecedented extent. As reported by the BBC, “In February 2022, shortly before invading Ukraine, President Putin placed Russia’s nuclear forces at ‘special combat readiness’ and held high-profile nuclear drills.”26 As the conflict in Ukraine continued, Putin made this statement: “If the territorial integrity of our country is threatened, we will, without a doubt, use all available means to protect Russia and our people. This is not a bluff.”27 Even before the Russian re-invasion of Ukraine, scholars and analysts had grown concerned that Russia would consider using nuclear weapons in a limited way in Europe.28

As will be described in more detail in the following section, the problem of limited nuclear use is particularly nettlesome when considering that the nuclear taboo since Nagasaki may be weakening. Uncertainty caused by the latest round of threatening rhetoric and dynamic saber-rattling over Ukraine clearly reemphasizes the need for a robust, assured NC3 system that can operate through all contemplated nuclear scenarios, including nuclear detonations in space and regional nuclear exchanges. These kinds of unprecedented scenarios highlight tangible architectural threats to the system as it currently exists, even with the strategic competitor with whom the United States has the most historical basis for reducing miscalculation. 

Nuclear dynamics have moved far beyond the nuclear bipolarity of the Cold War; today’s world is robustly multipolar with the peer competitors or peer adversaries of the United States having an “unlimited partnership” that is further complicated by their alliances and relationships with other emerging nuclear powers. The NC3 architecture as designed in the 1960s surely did not contemplate India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others potentially using nuclear weapons which the United States would need to be able to detect, characterize, respond to, and operate through. The physical architecture, data throughput capacity links, and even geographic and temporal constraints of the NC3 system all require upgrading and expansion to address today’s far more complex and challenging geopolitical environment. 

Counterspace threats to space-based NC3

Accelerating development, testing, and deployment of a range of Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities significantly challenges the ability of space-based NC3 to continue delivering nuclear surety. Other states, including Iran and North Korea, also possess some limited counterspace capabilities, but these capabilities are considerably less worrisome than those of China and Russia and are not the focus of this paper. 

The DOD recognizes significant threats to its space systems from Russia and China, including to space-based NC3. As one of the authors has argued:

By describing space as a warfighting domain, the 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a fundamental shift away from legacy perspectives on uncontested military space operations and aspirations for free access and peaceful purposes espoused in the Outer Space Treaty. America’s potential adversaries, particularly China and Russia, now view space—from launch, to on-orbit, the up- and downlinks, and the ground stations—as a weak link in US warfighting capabilities. Conversely, the United States for generations believed space to be a permissive environment and did not make major investments in defensive capabilities, even as almost all modern military operations became increasingly reliant on space capabilities. These facts, coupled with the reemergence of great power competition, have led adversaries to believe that by denying US space-enabled capabilities, they can gain strategic advantage over US response options—making those options less assured, less opportune, and less decisive.”

Peter L. Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For? Opportunities and Challenges for the US Space Force,” in Benjamin Bahney, ed., Space Strategy at a Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges for 21st Century Competition, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2020, 20. The following five paragraphs draw substantially from Hays’ chapter cited here.

Most disturbingly, US adversaries, particularly China with its lack of interest in strategic arms control and seeming disregard for traditional norms surrounding stability and deterrence, may now perceive that undermining the efficacy of space-based NC3 may be one of its most attractive options for gaining strategic advantage. These are destabilizing conditions in that:

Adversaries may believe they can deter US entry into a conflict by threatening or attacking US space capabilities. This may even embolden adversaries to employ a space attack as a “first salvo” in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies. This is a potentially dangerous situation that has moved past an inflection point and is starting to create strategic disadvantages rather than the strategic advantages space traditionally provided the United States. From a Clausewitzian perspective, the Space Force must also consider whether current US space strategy may be approaching a culminating point where it becomes counterproductive to continue either offensive or defensive space operations in wartime [unless it has deployed a far more resilient architecture].

Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 20. Internal citations omitted.

China has reformed its military and developed significant capabilities to hold at risk US space assets. As part of its 2015 military reforms, China established the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF).29 The SSF combines space and counterspace capabilities, electronic warfare, and cyber operations in one organization and enables the PLA to be more effective in its approach to space as a warfighting domain. “The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern ‘informatized warfare.’”30 In the words of a recent DOD report to Congress on protection of satellites: 

The PRC views counterspace systems as a means to deter and counter outside intervention during a regional conflict. The PLA is developing, testing, and fielding capabilities intended to target US and allied satellites, including electronic warfare to suppress or deceive enemy equipment, ground-based laser systems that can disrupt, degrade, and damage satellite sensors, offensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) missiles that can target satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO). The PRC has launched multiple experimental satellites to research space maintenance and debris cleanup with advanced capabilities, such as robotic arm technologies that could be used for grappling other satellites. In 2022, the PRC’s Shijian-21 satellite moved a derelict satellite to a graveyard orbit above geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO).”

US Department of Defense, “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” September 2023, 2-3, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/14/2003301146/-1/-1/0/COMPREHENSIVE-REPORT-FOR-RELEASE.pdf.

The Shijian-21 demonstration was particularly threatening to US space-based NC3, as it indicated a potential capability to grapple and move or disable noncooperative satellites; many of the most important US NC3 systems are in GEO. 

The PRC continues to seek new methods to hold US satellites at risk, probably intending to pursue DA-ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to GEO. As the PRC has developed and fielded these counterspace weapons, it has simultaneously promoted false claims that it will not place weapons in space and, along with Russia, has proposed at the United Nations a draft of a flawed, legally-binding treaty on the nonweaponization of space that is inherently unverifiable and unenforceable.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3.

For decades, Russia has developed doctrine and pursued capabilities to target US satellites, including NC3 systems.

Russia reorganized its military in 2015 to create a separate space force because Russia sees achieving supremacy in space as a decisive factor in winning conflicts. Although Russia has a smaller fleet of satellites than China, Russia operates some of the world’s most capable individual ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] satellites for optical imagery, radar imagery, signals intelligence, and missile warning. Russia increasingly integrates space services into its military, though it wants to avoid becoming overly dependent on space for its national defense missions because it views that as a potential vulnerability. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding a suite of reversible and irreversible counterspace systems to degrade or deny US space-based services as a means of offsetting a perceived US military advantage and deterring the United States from entering a regional conflict. These systems include jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based DA-ASAT missile capabilities. In November 2021, Russia tested a DA-ASAT missile against a defunct Russian satellite, which created more than 1,500 pieces of trackable space debris and tens of thousands of pieces of potentially lethal but non-trackable debris. The resulting debris continues to threaten spacecraft of all nations in LEO, astronauts and cosmonauts on the International Space Station, and taikonauts on China’s Tiangong space station.”

“Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 3. Internal citations omitted.

Launch preparations for the Russian Nudol system, which serves as both an anti-ballistic missile interceptor as well as an anti-satellite weapon, 2021. Russian Ministry of Defense

In a most disturbing scenario, the efficacy of commercial LEO satellites in supporting Ukraine could lead the Russians (or the Chinese in a Taiwan invasion, for instance) to assess that the greatest military effectiveness from the limited use of nuclear weapons would be to detonate just one in LEO. A high-altitude nuclear detonation (HAND) would raise the peak radiation flux in parts of the Van Allen radiation belts by three to four orders of magnitude, cause the failure in weeks to months of most if not all LEO satellites not specifically hardened against this threat, result in direct financial damages probably approaching $500 billion and over $3 trillion in overall economic impact, and present daunting response challenges, since the attack would be outside of any state’s sovereign territory and not directly kill anyone.31

Modernization plans for space-based NC3

While the NC3 system currently appears to be sufficiently redundant, capable, and secure, it must be modernized to keep pace with the evolving geopolitical environment, technical developments, and planned modernization of the nuclear triad (submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles). As described by the DOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook

In July 2018, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally appointed the USSTRATCOM Commander to be “the NC3 enterprise lead, with increased responsibilities for operations, requirements, and systems engineering and integration.” USSTRATCOM has created an NC3 Enterprise Center inside the command’s headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. On November 5, 2018, Commander, USSTRATCOM stated, “It is imperative that the US government modernize its three-decade-old NC3 in a manner that accounts for current and future threats to its functionality and vulnerabilities.” The NC3 Enterprise Center is developing and evaluating NC3 architectures and approaches for modernization.”

Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020, 28.

In earlier congressional testimony, General Hyten had simply stated that “nuclear command and control and communications, NC3, is my biggest concern when I look out towards the future.”32

US Navy VADM David Kriete, then-deputy commander of US Strategic Command, announced the initial operational capability of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Enterprise Center in April 2019. USSTRATCOM photo.

No nuclear weapon delivery platform can execute its mission without NC3, but the NC3 system is so complex that a former commander of USSTRATCOM stated it includes over 204 individual systems.33 While many space systems contribute ISR data that supports NC3, this analysis focuses just on the space systems that were designed for and dedicated to supporting NC3. Focusing on space systems in this way is, however, becoming increasingly difficult, as the DOD works to modernize both its overall space architecture and space-based NC3. Modernizing the ground- and air-based NC3 systems supporting the triad remains on a relatively straightforward path, but the path toward modernizing space-based NC3 is being reconsidered within the context of broader changes to deploy a more resilient hybrid space architecture overall. This requires consideration of different factors and trade-offs than those that shaped legacy US space-based NC3. Defense planners must now consider the value of disaggregated, diversified, and distributed systems supporting just NC3 versus entangled systems supporting many mission areas; the role of proliferation and protection; the proper timing and phasing of deployments; appropriate ways commercial systems and deception might support space-based NC3; and the many challenges associated with balancing and integrating across an increasingly complex NC3 enterprise. A recent detailed analysis of these complex factors and trade-offs from Wilson and Rumbaugh presented the troubling finding that “the US decision to disaggregate its nuclear-conventional satellite communications capabilities poses strategic consequences, but it may not have been a strategic decision.”34 An even more detailed report analyzing just the sensor requirements and trade-offs for missile defense against hypersonic threats is over one hundred pages long.35 As the DOD’s work to field a resilient, hybrid space architecture proceeds apace, it is not always clear that the requirement for nuclear surety in space-based NC3 has been analyzed and weighted appropriately. 

The DOD has major programs and plans in place to modernize systems supporting the NC3 missions of assured communications and MW/MT. For assured communications, the plan is to augment and eventually replace AEHF with the Evolved Strategic Satcom (ESS) program by the 2030s.36 ESS will operate in GEO and will provide a worldwide and Arctic protected, secure, and survivable satellite communications system supporting critical networks for strategic operations. The ESS system is being acquired by Space Systems Command (SSC); it “is the first DOD hybrid space program that is leveraging alternate acquisition pathways for each of its segments” under the adaptive acquisition framework that the DOD implemented in 2020.37 ESS satellites are currently being acquired using a middle-tier acquisition (MTA) down-select rapid prototyping competition between Boeing and Northrop Grumman. SSC is expected to issue a request for proposals on ESS satellites in 2024, and the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.38 In May 2024, SSC announced it is seeking proposals for the development and production of four ESS satellites through a competitive contract award; the program is projected to cost about $8 billion.39 The ESS Program Office plans to transition from the MTA-rapid prototyping pathway to a tailored major capability acquisition (MCA) pathway beginning with the award of the ESS space segment production contract. The space segment is being designed to deliver an integrated system capability that is resilient, flexible, cyber secure, and utilizes a modular open system architecture to support NC3. The ground “segment is leveraging a series of Software Acquisition Pathway contracts for subsets of mission capability in agile software sprints”; in May 2023, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon each won $30 million contracts to develop prototypes of the ground system for ESS.40 Use of alternate acquisition pathways and competing teams of contractors is designed to spur innovation and speed, “allowing development to stay ahead of changing strategic need.”41 The first prototype payloads are due to launch in 2024. Much depends on validating the performance of the prototypes and successful integration of the separate acquisition pathways for the space and ground segments.

Specific details regarding how MW/MT capabilities will be improved are complex and evolving. Efforts are now divided between three separate organizations: SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA), and the MDA. MW/MT is “the first capability area to be redeveloped through a resilient-by-design approach.”42 As advocated by General Hyten and explained in a report to Congress: “This effort assessed architectures designed to meet future warfighting performance needs, establish resilience against modern military threats, and ensure cost parameters, resulting in recommendations on numbers of satellites and diversifying capabilities across orbital regimes.”43 Using a Combined Program Office construct, SSC, SDA, and MDA are teaming to develop and implement a system-of-systems integration strategy for MW/MT and missile defense (MD) constellations of satellites in LEO, GEO, medium Earth orbit (MEO), and polar orbital regimes.  

These efforts to develop next-generation overhead persistent infrared (NG-OPIR) capabilities are designed to provide MW/MT capabilities that can support MD for evolving intercontinental and theater ballistic missile threats using satellites in various orbits that are more survivable against emerging threats. “SSC’s Resilient MW/MT-MEO space and ground efforts pivot the Department of the Air Force’s legacy missile warning force design to a more resilient multi-orbit approach to counter advanced missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and fractional orbital bombardment threats.”44 SCC’s NG-OPIR will be deployed in GEO (Next Generation OPIR GEO or NGG) and Polar (Next Generation OPIR Polar or NGP) orbits.45 The original plan called for three NGG satellites and two NGP satellites; in its fiscal year 2024 request, the USSF cut the number of NGG satellites to two, and Congress has subsequently requested more information about the analysis underlying this change to the NGG program structure.46 Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract to build NGG satellites and ground systems projected to cost $7.8 billion, and Northrop Grumman won a $1.9 billion definitized contract to build two NGP satellites; the first NGP is to be launched in 2028.47 Both the NGG and NGP programs are expected to transition from the rapid prototype MTA pathway to the MCA pathway in early 2024. Additionally, SSC announced that, in November 2023, it “completed the critical design review for six [MW/MT/MD] satellites built by Millennium Space Systems that will go in MEO, clearing the way to start production ahead of a first scheduled launch by late 2026.”

The SDA, an independent space acquisition organization that was established in March 2019 and became part of the Space Force in October 2022, is leading parts of the effort to field resilient-by-design MW/MT capabilities via new proliferated space architectures. SDA’s business model values speed, simplicity, and resilience, while lowering costs by “harnessing commercial development to achieve a proliferated architecture and enhance resilience”; SDA plans to deliver a new layer (or tranche) of LEO satellites to support various missions every two years.48 The first satellites in the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer are to begin launching in late 2024 and will include “28 satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) optimized for use by Indo-Pacific Command to monitor Chinese and North Korean missile launches.”49 In September 2023, SDA issued a solicitation for the Tranche 2 Tracking Layer that will provide MW/MT capabilities by using infrared sensors for near-global continuous stereoscopic coverage and incorporating missile defense fire-control-quality infrared sensors on a selected number of satellites.50 The Tranche 2 Tracking Layer is being designed to have some capabilities against advanced missile threats, including hypersonic missile systems, and is scheduled for first launch in April 2027. 

MDA’s current MW/MT/missile defense (MW/MT/MD) program is the HBTSS (Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor), an experimental early warning mission to “demonstrate the sensitivity and fire-control quality of service necessary to support both the emerging hypersonic threat kill chain and dim upper stage ballistic missiles.”51 Two HBTSS satellites were launched on February 14, 2024; the system is intended to work with SDA’s Tracking Layer, track dim targets not visible with current sensors, and provide near-global coverage. A DOD press release about the HBTSS launch indicated: 

MDA, the US Space Force and SDA are collaborating to develop HBTSS as a space sensor prototype demonstration providing fire-control quality data required to defeat advanced missile threats. Ultimately, this data is critical to enabling engagement by missile defense weapons, including engagement of hypersonic glide-phase weapons. This “birth-to-death” tracking by HBTSS will make it possible to maintain custody of missile threats from launch through intercept regardless of location.”

“MDA, SDA Announce Upcoming Launch of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor and Tranche 0 Satellites,” DOD Press Release, February 14, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3676902/mda-sda-announce-upcoming-launch-of-the-hypersonic-and-ballistic-tracking-space/.

It is laudable that the DOD is moving in innovative ways so quickly and comprehensively to field MW/MT/MD capabilities designed to be more resilient and address evolving missile threats. However, it is not clear from unclassified sources how the various significantly different approaches will meet stringent nuclear surety requirements for MW/MT. Operationally, the new approach will require the USSF to transition from its decades of experience in interpreting high-fidelity infrared data from a few exquisite sensors toward developing improved understanding of new missile threats based on lower fidelity inputs from many more sensors. Effectively integrating across these proliferated sensors acquired by separate agencies to produce an MD “kill chain”52 is likely to be an even more significant challenge that will require focused attention and resources. In the words of one missile defense scholar: 

It remains unclear, however, how many HBTSS or HBTSS-derived payloads will eventually be fitted to SDA’s Tracking Layer constellation. While MDA requested $68 million for the program in FY 2023, funding is expected to decline after demonstration activities conclude and responsibility for fire control transfers to SSC and SDA. Following this transition, SDA aims to launch four HBTSS-derived sensor payloads as part of its Tranche 1 activities and an additional six fire control sensors in Tranche 2. Further developmental spirals, the priority accorded to the hypersonic defense mission, and SDA’s responsibilities for supporting missile defense, however, have not yet been publicly defined.”

Dahlgren, Getting on Track, 73. Internal citations omitted.

It is difficult to manage acquisition programs to meet requirements for cost, schedule, and performance. Unfortunately, however, it can be far more difficult to integrate effectively across separate systems to achieve required performance for an enterprise such as NC3. Tensions can arise between acquisition and integration objectives, which are made more acute when separate systems are acquired by separate organizations (as is the case for space-based NC3), and present daunting challenges for achieving nuclear surety. 

Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS). Image courtesy US Missile Defense Agency. 

Much of the work to integrate various MW/MT/MD efforts will be performed by the ground segment. The largest ground system effort is the USSF’s Future Operationally Resilient Ground Evolution (FORGE), a complex program to develop a new ground system for NG-OPIR that is projected to cost $2.4 billion.53 SSC has divided the FORGE program into various thrusts that include FORGE command and control, Next-Gen Interim Operations, FORGE Mission Data Processing Application Framework, Relay Ground Stations, and E-FORGE. Integration across these various thrusts within FORGE to advance unity of effort and meet nuclear surety requirements will be a significant challenge. An additional challenge relates to Assistant Secretary Calvelli’s space acquisition tenet that calls for delivery of the ground segment before launch of the space segment, a goal that may be difficult for FORGE to meet.54

There are modest programs to modernize elements of the USNDS.55 It should be noted that, as a hosted payload, USNDS does not always enjoy a high priority, and the schedule for its fielding can slip, depending on the priority of its host satellite. Additionally, a former commander of USSTRATCOM has raised concerns about the ability of USNDS data to support NC3 in timely and effective ways.56 Overall, even while modernization efforts are underway, the geopolitical and technical challenges to the system are increasing and will require generation-after-next space-based NC3. 

Conclusion and recommendations

The modernization of space-based NC3 is of vital importance to US national security objectives. While maintaining constant responsibility for enabling the employment of the world’s most capable nuclear arsenal, NC3 must be modernized to meet the significant changes and challenges presented by the evolving geopolitical and technical environment. Adding to the complexity of this modernization effort is an evolution in national security space architectures and their relationship with commercial providers of dual-use space services. The DOD must maintain a focused and sustained commitment as well as adequate resources to meet the range of daunting challenges that are entailed in modernizing space-based NC3. 

As the DOD instantiates CJADC2 programs that are working to integrate sensors and shooters on complex kill webs, the modernization of NC3 systems must continue to meet unique requirements for positive and negative control unlike any other command-and-control system. The recognition of these unique requirements drives special emphasis on understanding deterrence scenarios and objectives, technical capabilities, and potential commercial contributions. 

Based on the preceding analysis, this paper presents the following recommendations: 

  1. The United States should continue to support the modernization of space-based NC3, with specific tailoring that enables adapting to changes in the geopolitical threat environment, harnessing hybrid architectures and the evolution of national security space architectures, and meeting deterrence objectives across a range of increasingly challenging potential scenarios.
    1. Modernization efforts for space-based NC3 systems must adhere to the strict need for nuclear surety at all times, while also exploring areas where technological innovation should be embraced.
    2. LEO satellites supporting NC3 should be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND to strengthen deterrence against this type of attack.
    3. More study on the specific deterrence scenarios and objectives for space-based NC3 systems is needed. The variance in scenarios, objectives, and threats (nonkinetic and kinetic) should drive modernization priorities.
    4. More study is needed on the nuclear surety implications for the current exploration of disaggregation as a means to ensure resiliency.
  2. As one of the authors has argued previously, “A whole-of government approach is then needed to assess the commercial viability [and military utility] of those [space-based] services upon which the US government intends to rely, either wholly or in part, and the government must act to improve the commercial viability of these services.”57
    1. The government should act to improve the commercial viability of the services deemed necessary through flexible contracting mechanisms and/or procurement.
    2. The DOD should maintain unity of effort for space-based NC3 acquisitions regardless of whether the specific effector or system is ground-, air-, or sea-based.
    3. The United States should continue supporting and advancing international approaches to strengthen deterrence of attacks on commercial space capabilities and improve protection measures for these systems.
  3. The DOD should recognize the significant challenges and potential incompatibilities it faces in rapidly and simultaneously developing modernized space-based NC3 and fielding an overall hybrid space architecture that is far more resilient.
    1. Integrating systems developed by separate organizations with sometimes divergent priorities into a unified NC3 system-of-systems that meets nuclear surety requirements is a novel challenge for space-based NC3 and will require focused attention to overcome. Additionally, NC3 and CJADC2 systems-of-systems must be distinct, but also integrated for national unity of command and effort.
    2. Acquisition approaches that emphasize speed, use of commercial-off-the-shelf components, and fielding of ground systems before satellite launch are highly appropriate for deploying a resilient hybrid space architecture but may present dangerous incompatibilities with nuclear surety requirements. The DOD must not rush to deploy space-based NC3 that is not well integrated, suffers from avoidable supply chain and cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and contains other weaknesses that hackers and adversaries can exploit during the decades the next generation of space-based NC3 is likely to be in operation.

About the authors

Peter L. Hays is an adjunct professor of space policy and international affairs at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, space chair at Marine Corps University, and a senior policy adviser with Falcon Research. He supports the space staff in the Pentagon and has been directly involved in helping to develop and implement major national security space policy and strategy initiatives since 2004. Dr. Hays serves on the Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project advisory board, was a term member of the World Economic Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Space Security from 2010 to 2014, and is a member of the editorial board for Space and Defense and Astropolitics. He earned a PhD from the Fletcher School at Tufts University and was an honor graduate of the USAF Academy. Dr. Hays served as an Air Force officer from 1979 to 2004; transported nuclear weapons worldwide as a C-141 pilot; and previously taught international relations, defense policy, and space policy courses at the USAF Academy, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, and National Defense University.

Sarah Mineiro is the founder and CEO of Tanagra Enterprises, a defense, intelligence, space, science, and technology consulting firm. Over her career, Sarah has worked in venture capital-backed private industry and in the executive and legislative branches of government. Previously, she was the senior director of space strategy for Anduril Industries. Sarah was the staff lead for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee for the House Armed Service Committee, where she led the subcommittee’s activities of all Department of Defense and Military Intelligence Program space programs, US nuclear weapons, missile defense, directed energy, and hypersonic systems. Sarah was the senior legislative adviser to Chairman Mac Thornberry. In this role, she was the primary drafter and negotiator of the Space Force and Space Command legislation for the House Republicans. 

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not represent the official position of any US government organization. 

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge Robert Soofer and Mark J. Massa for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s work on nuclear and strategic forces has been made possible by support from our partners, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. The partners are not responsible for the content of this report, and the Scowcroft Center maintains a strict intellectual independence policy.

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

1    Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf, 22.
2    Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-72, “Nuclear Operations,” LeMay Center, December 18, 2020, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-72/3-72-AFDP-NUCLEAR-OPS.pdf, 17. 
3    Nuclear Matters Handbook 2020
4    Information provided by Maj. Gen. John Olsen, PhD, Space Force operations lead for CJADC2 and C3BM. For the past three years, General Olsen has served as the lead airborne emergency action officer and an instructor/evaluator on the Looking Glass Airborne Nuclear Command Post.
5    In “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract for Nuclear-Hardened Satcom Terminals,” Sandra Erwin indicates the US Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center awarded this contract to deliver an unspecified number of nuclear-hardened satellite communications force element terminals to connect B-52 and RC-135 aircraft with Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) military communications satellites. Space News, June 28, 2023, https://spacenews.com/air-force-awards-raytheon-625-million-contract-for-nuclear-hardened-satcom-terminals/.
6    “Air Force Awards Raytheon $625 Million Contract.” In 2020, Raytheon became part of the RTX Corporation.
7    Air Force Fact Sheet, “E-4B,” https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104503/e-4b/; NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury,” https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/E-6B-Mercury.
8    NAVAIR Fact Sheet, “E-6B Mercury.”
9    The original plan for SBIRS called for eight satellites; the seventh and eighth satellites were cancelled in 2019 after work began on the next-generation system.
10    Sandra Erwin, “STRATCOM Chief Hyten: ‘I Will Not Support Buying Big Satellites That Make Juicy Targets,’” Space News, November 19, 2017, https://spacenews.com/stratcom-chief-hyten-i-will-not-support-buying-big-satellites-that-make-juicy-targets/.
11    Dwayne A. Day, “Smashing Satellites as Part of the Delta 180 Strategic Defense Initiative Mission,” Space Review, July 17, 2023, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4622/1; Jayant Sharma, Andrew Wiseman, and George Zollinger, “Improving Space Surveillance with Space-Based Visible Sensor,” MIT Lincoln Laboratory, March 1, 2001, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA400541.pdf; Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, “Space Tracking and Surveillance System,” August 23, 2022, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/stss.pdf.
12    United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Advanced Extremely High-Frequency System,” July 2020, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Display/Article/2197713/advanced-extremely-high-frequency-system/.
13    United States Space Force Fact Sheet, “Space Based Infrared System,” March 2023, https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Article/2197746/space-based-infrared-system/; National Nuclear Security Administration, “NNSA delivers enduring space-based nuclear detonation detection capability,” March 22, 2018, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-delivers-enduring-space-based-nuclear-detonation-detection-capability.
14    Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Evaluation of the Space-Based Segment of the US Nuclear Detonation Detection System,” September 28, 2018, https://www.dodig.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Reading-Room/Article/2014314/evaluation-of-the-space-based-segment-of-the-us-nuclear-detonation-detection-sy/.
15    Michael J. Neufeld, Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War (New York: Vintage, 2008), is the authoritative assessment of von Braun’s contributions and legacy.
16    See, for example, Brian G. Chow, “Space Arms Control: A Hybrid Approach,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 107-32; and James Alver, Andrew Garza, and Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies” (capstone paper, George Washington University, 2019), https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf.
17    Some of the earliest and most influential analyses of the relative and ambiguous characteristics of security include John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-80; and Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4 (December 1952): 481-502. 
18    Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. In this seminal article, Jervis applied game theory approaches to scenarios commonly used to analyze causes of war such as Stag Hunt and Prisoner’s Dilemma, positing that two variables are primary determinants of how likely or unlikely it is that states can achieve cooperation: 1) whether offensive or defensive capabilities have the advantage; and 2) whether analysts can distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities. Applying this framework creates a 2 x 2 matrix in which Jervis labels situations where offense has the advantage, and analysts cannot distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities as “doubly dangerous” and situations with the opposite conditions as “doubly stable.” Some disagree, but unfortunately, today most analysts perceive that the doubly dangerous situation corresponds most closely to the current characteristics of space. Jervis finds that this situation “is the worst for status-quo states. There is no way to get security without menacing others, and security through defense is terribly difficult to obtain.” 
19    See Brad Townsend, “Strategic Choice and the Orbital Security Dilemma,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Spring 2020): 64-90; and Brad Townsend, Security and Stability in the New Space Age: The Orbital Security Dilemma (Milton Park, UK: Routledge, 2020).
20    Gertner, “What Does the US Space Force Actually Do?” 
21    See, for example, Benjamin Schmitt, “The Sky’s Not the Limit: Space Aid to Ukraine,” Center for European Policy Analysis, May 19, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/the-skys-not-the-limit-space-aid-to-ukraine/; David T. Burbach, “Early Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War as a Space Conflict,” Atlantic Council, August 30, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/airpower-after-ukraine/early-lessons-from-the-russia-ukraine-war-as-a-space-conflict/; and Jonathan Beale, “Space, the Unseen Frontier in the War in Ukraine,” BBC News, October 5, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-63109532.
22    Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sixty-Second Session, June 2019, 54-69, https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2019/a/a7420_0_html/V1906077.pdf; NATO’s decision to consider space an operational domain like land, sea, air, and cyber is helpful, but it added caveats weakening Article 5 obligations for attacks in space: “A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” See NATO, “NATO’s Overarching Space Policy,” January 17, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_190862.htm?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=nato&utm_campaign=20220117_space; and Secretary of Defense, “Tenets of Responsible Behavior in Space,” July 7, 2021, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/Publications/Pub-Display/Article/3318236/tenets-of-responsible-behavior-in-space/. On April 18, 2022, Vice President Kamala Harris announced that the United States will no longer conduct destructive tests of DA-ASAT missiles (https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/18/fact-sheet-vice-president-harris-advances-national-security-norms-in-space/). Through October 2023, thirty-seven other countries including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have made similar pledges. On December 7, 2022, 155 countries in the United Nations General Assembly voted in favor of a resolution calling for a halt for this type of ASAT testing, while nine voted against the resolution (including China and Russia) and nine (including India) abstained. Ching Wei Soo, Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Missile Tests: State Positions on the Moratorium, UNGA Resolution, and Lessons for the Future, Secure World Foundation, October 2023, https://swfound.org/media/207711/direct-ascent-antisatellite-missile-tests_state-positions-on-the-moratorium-unga-resolution-and-lessons-for-the-future.pdf.
23    For more, see Madelyn Creedon, chair, and Jon Kyl, vice chair, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, October 2023, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/Strategic-Posture-Committee-Report-Final.pdf.
24    Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, October 2023, 103-13, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
25    Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023.
26    BBC, “Ukraine War: Could Russia Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons?” September 24, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169.
27    Nina Tannenwald, “The Bomb in the Background: What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/bomb-background-nuclear-weapons.
28    See, for instance, Matthew Kroenig, A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes, Atlantic Council, April 24, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-strategy-for-deterring-russian-de-escalation-strikes/.
29    Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, 70. In April 2024, the Strategic Support Force was dissolved and split into three independent units: the PLA Aerospace Force, the PLA Cyberspace Force, and the PLA Information Support Force.  Namrata Goswami, “The Reorganization of China’s Space Force: Strategic and Organizational Implications — The rationale behind the new ‘Aerospace Force,’” The Diplomat, May 3, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/the-reorganization-of-chinas-space-force-strategic-and-organizational-implications/.
30    Military and Security Developments Involving China 2023, vii.
31    Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, “High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) against Low Earth Orbit Satellites (‘HALEOS’),” April 2001, https://spp.fas.org/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf. No satellites are known to be hardened against these nuclear effects. Estimates on financial damages from General Olsen. For further details about the threat from HAND and a discussion on a potential licensing requirement for commercial LEO satellites to be hardened against residual radiation effects following a HAND, see Peter L. Hays, United States Military Space: Into the Twenty-First Century (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 2002), 101-03. National security communications adviser John Kirby told reporters at a White House news conference that Russia “is developing an anti-satellite weapon capability, describing it as a serious threat.” Sandra Erwin, “White House Confirms It Has Intelligence on Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon, But Says No Immediate Threat,” Space News, February 15, 2024, https://spacenews.com/white-house-confirms-it-has-intelligence-on-russians-anti-satellite-weapon-but-says-no-immediate-threat. On April 24, 2024, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have reaffirmed its obligation not to station nuclear weapons in space in any manner, as stipulated in Article IV of the OST. Jeff Foust, “Russia vetoes U.N. resolution on nuclear weapons in space,” Space News, April 25, 2024, https://spacenews.com/russia-vetoes-u-n-resolution-on-nuclear-weapons-in-space/.
32    “Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements,” House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, HASC Hearing No. 115-11, March 8, 2017, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24683/html/CHRG-115hhrg24683.htm.
33    Yasmin Tadjdeh, “JUST IN: Stratcom Revitalizing Nuclear Command, Control Systems,” National Defense, January 5, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/1/5/work-underway-for-next-generation-nuclear-command-control-and-communications.
34    Robert Samuel Wilson and Russell Rumbaugh, “Reversal of Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in Outer Space,” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 1 (September 15, 2023): 3.
35    Masao Dahlgren, Getting on Track: Space and Airborne Sensors for Hypersonic Missile Defense, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/getting-track-space-and-airborne-sensors-hypersonic-missile-defense.
36    Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book Volume 1, Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Space Force, March 2023, PE1206855SF, 263-76, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY24/Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation/FY24%20Space%20Force%20Research%20and%20Development%20Test%20and%20Evaluation.pdf?ver=BQWN2ms9pfLNN_gvIz4mQQ%3D%3D.
37    Space Systems Command Media Release, “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program Uses Innovative Competition to Drive Acquisition of Threat-Focused Software,” May 2, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Evolved%20Strategic%20SATCOM%20Program%20Uses%20Innovative%20Competition%20to%20Drive%20Acquisition%20of%20Threat-Focused%20Software.pdf?ver=9hYpAExEQifvYTYBilFG2g%3D%3D; Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02, “Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,” June 8, 2022, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500002p.PDF.
38    Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.
39    “Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications (ESS) Space Vehicle (SV) Development and Production,” GOVTRIBE, May 4, 2024, https://govtribe.com/opportunity/federal-contract-opportunity/evolved-strategic-satellite-communications-ess-space-vehicle-sv-development-and-production-fa880724rb004; Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Planning $8 Billion Satellite Architecture for Nuclear Command and Control,” Space News, October 25, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-planning-8-billion-satellite-architecture-for-nuclear-command-and-control/.
40    “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program”; Sandra Erwin, “Lockheed, Raytheon to Develop Ground Systems for Nuclear-Hardened Satellite Communications,” Space News, May 3, 2023, https://spacenews.com/lockheed-raytheon-to-develop-ground-systems-for-nuclear-hardened-satellite-communications/.
41    “Evolved Strategic SATCOM Program.”
42    “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 9.
43    “Space Policy Review and Strategy on Protection of Satellites,” 19.
44    Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates.
45    Space Systems Command Media Release, “Next-Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Program Selects Mission Payload Suppliers,” March 1, 2022, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Next-Generation%20Overhead%20Persistent%20Infrared%20Program%20Selects%20Mission%20Payload%20Suppliers%20v4.pdf; Northrop Grumman, “Next Gen OPIR Polar (NGP),” https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/next-gen-polar.
46    Courtney Albon, “Congress Queries Space Force Plan for Fewer Missile Warning Satellites,” Air Force Times, July 12, 2023, https://www.airforcetimes.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/07/12/congress-queries-space-force-plan-for-fewer-missile-warning-satellites/.
47    Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Polar-Orbiting Missile Warning Satellites Move Toward Production,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/space-force-polar-orbiting-missile-warning-sats-move-toward-production/; Courtney Albon, “Northrop Missile-Warning Satellites Pass Early Design Review,” C4ISRNET, May 24, 2023, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/05/24/northrop-missile-warning-satellites-pass-early-design-review/.
48    Space Development Agency, “Who We Are,” https://www.sda.mil/home/who-we-are/.
49    Theresa Hitchens, “Budget roadblock delaying Pentagon satellite program to track hypersonic missiles,” Breaking Defense, March 1, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/03/budget-roadblock-delaying-pentagon-satellite-program-to-track-hypersonic-missiles/.
50    Space Development Agency, “Tracking,” https://www.sda.mil/tracking/.
51    “Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor Phase IIb Awards,” MDA Press Release, January 22, 2021, https://www.mda.mil/news/21news0001.html.
52    “Kill chain” is a term commonly used by the DOD to describe the ISR and C3 capabilities and processes needed to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess the effectiveness of strike operations.
53    Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Taps 4 Firms to Vie for Missile Warning C2 Prototype,” Breaking Defense, November 9, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/space-force-taps-4-firms-to-vie-for-missile-warning-c2-prototype/.
54    Summer Myatt, “How Frank Calvelli’s 9 Space Acquisition Tenets Aim to Transform Space Procurement,” GovConWire, January 10, 2023, https://www.govconwire.com/2023/01/frank-calvellis-9-space-acquisition-tenets-aim-to-transform-space-procurement/.
55    Modernizations include the Integrated Correlation and Display System and the Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System-2 and -3. Space Systems Command Media Release, “Space Systems Command’s Next-Generation Nuclear Detonation Detection System Completes System Requirements Review,” June 8, 2023, https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Space%20Systems%20Command%E2%80%99s%20Next-Generation%20Nuclear%20Detonation%20Detection%20System%20Completes%20System%20Requirements%20Review.pdf?ver=IOge6OkS_Rtl1saZF-nJLA%3D%3D.
56    Written communication to author.
57    Hays, “Is This the Space Force You’re Looking For?,” 21.

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This might be NATO’s greatest struggle yet—and it’s global https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/this-might-be-natos-greatest-struggle-yet-and-its-global/ Mon, 15 Jul 2024 11:05:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780112 At its Washington summit, NATO acknowledged how China and Russia are working together to revise the global order. But what will the Alliance do about it?

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During NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington last week, my private conversations with allied officials almost always landed on concerns about this year’s US elections, given former President Donald Trump’s doubts about NATO’s value and growing questions about US President Joe Biden’s durability. That was before this weekend’s assassination attempt against Trump at a Pennsylvania rally, which likely has only heightened allied concerns about US domestic volatility and unpredictability around the election—when gathering global challenges demand a steadiness that will be difficult to provide. 

Over a decade of remarkable leadership, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has navigated an unruly Alliance of flawed democracies through some of their greatest historical challenges, including Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. In my on-stage interview with him at the NATO Public Forum, which the Atlantic Council co-hosted, Stoltenberg addressed doubts over whether NATO will continue to forge common cause, as he prepares to step down on October 1.  

“The reality is that despite all these differences, which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong,” he said. “Because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together . . . That’s the reason why this Alliance prevails again and again.”

These new concerns over the direction of the United States were made all the more urgent by the Alliance’s recognition that NATO now faces a new axis of authoritarians—with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea in the lead—that are working more closely together on defense-industrial issues than any such grouping before them, including Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s and the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s.

The NATO Summit was expected to focus on Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine, and so it did, in ways that were both encouraging and disappointing. What was encouraging was that the Alliance did well in providing Ukraine additional military and financial support and even a devoted Alliance command, based in Wiesbaden, Germany. It fell far short by dodging two issues crucial to Ukraine’s immediate and long-term security.

First, and for reasons increasingly difficult to defend—especially in a week when Putin greeted the NATO Summit by striking a Kyiv children’s hospital in a deadly missile barrage—the Biden administration stubbornly refuses to let Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy use US missiles to hit military targets in Russian territory that are killing his people. Second, Biden also continues to stand in the way of any language promising a more certain and time-defined path to NATO membership for Ukraine, even though membership is what will provide Ukraine lasting security.

The less anticipated development of this past week—and the one with the most historic importance—was the summit’s remarkable consensus that the world has fundamentally changed since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. NATO now acknowledges the need to better address an axis of autocrats bent on revising the global order: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

As Stoltenberg wrote in Foreign Affairs ahead of the summit, foreshadowing its decisions, “Putin shows no intention of ending this war any time soon, and he is increasingly aligned with other authoritarian powers, including China, that wish to see the United States fail, Europe fracture, and NATO falter. This shows that in today’s world, security is not a regional matter but a global one. Europe’s security affects Asia, and Asia’s security affects Europe.”

That’s powerful stuff—and a significant rethink of the threats facing this transatlantic Alliance.

The bottom line, though not quite stated that way, was: Our autocratic adversaries have joined in common cause globally against us, and thus we must do more ourselves to address this gathering threat. The alternative is to live in denial until the threats advance past the point of being able to address them.

No more having it both ways

One of the more concise NATO Summit declarations I’ve read, which is worth reading to gain an overall feeling of the landscape, lambasted the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a “decisive enabler” of Putin’s war. Beyond that, it focused on significantly deepening relations with the so-called Indo-Pacific Four (IP4): Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea, all of which were represented for the third consecutive NATO Summit.

Thirty-two allies met with their Indo-Pacific partners in encouraging harmony about the challenges China poses. The declaration’s tough, unprecedented language on the PRC is worth reading in full, but note the unusual clarity in its call to action, coming from a multilateral Alliance in which language negotiations can be stultifying: “We call on the PRC . . . to cease all political and military support to Russia’s war effort. This includes the transfer of dual-use materials, such as weapons components, equipment, and raw materials that serve as inputs for Russia’s defence sector.”

In my interview with Stoltenberg, he said that although Iran and North Korea were growing more important to Russia’s war effort, “China is the main enabler.” The PRC, he said, is “delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.”

The declaration said: “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.” In his swan song summit as NATO leader, Stoltenberg told me that China “cannot have it both ways,” meaning it cannot maintain “a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies” while fueling the North Atlantic’s “biggest security challenge” since World War II.

It’s fair criticism that for all the growing recognition of China’s crucial enabling role in Russia’s war, around which there is now a welcome NATO consensus, there isn’t any agreement on what to do about it.

The sad truth, one worth saying out loud several times to recognize the gravity of the situation, is that for the moment the PRC is having it both ways. It is threatening Europe and profiting from Europe at the same time.

The world has changed much more dramatically in terms of autocratic common cause since February 2022 than Western leaders and voters have digested.

Still, this past week is a good beginning.

“I think it’s important that we recognize the reality [of China’s role], and that’s the first step toward any action,” Stoltenberg told me. “Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.”

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg speaks with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10, 2024.

Ukraine is the new West Berlin

Stoltenberg stressed that despite the presence in Washington this week of the IP4, “there will not be a global NATO. NATO will be for North America and Europe.” But, he added, the North Atlantic region faces global threats, from terrorism to cyber to space. “And, of course, the threats and challenges that China poses to our security [are] a global challenge.”

Perhaps Stoltenberg is right that there won’t be a global NATO, but this week marked the significant beginning of a NATO that understands that its global responsibilities and threats are inescapable. That realization might have started with international terrorism after 9/11, but the increasingly close China-Russia strategic relationship is now at the core of it.

Speaking to the NATO Public Forum, Senator James E. Risch, the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, guided the Alliance to a newly published report from the committee’s Republican staff, “Next Steps to Defend the Transatlantic Alliance from Chinese Aggression.”

It lays out a powerful list of recommendations for the transatlantic community, including increased national and local collaboration on countering malign influence and interference from China, as well as improving institutional knowledge about everything from the workings of the Chinese Communist Party to the operational capacity of the People’s Liberation Army.

In the spirit of NATO’s growing Indo-Pacific focus, the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino recently published a “Memo to NATO heads of state and government” on the importance of engaging with the region.

“Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe,” they write. This is the “wrong answer,” Kroenig and Cimmino explain. “Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific.”

With all that as context, this week’s NATO Summit perhaps should have done even more to ensure that Ukraine prevails and Russia fails. But allies did at least more clearly recognize that Putin’s criminal war on Ukraine isn’t just a national or even primarily a European security matter. Ukraine is the front line of a global struggle, a role that West Berlin played during the Cold War and a fact that China and Russia long ago acknowledged in their “no limits” partnership on the eve of the 2022 invasion.

Now comes the hard part

This past week, the contours unfolded for what might be NATO’s greatest struggle yet, after seventy-five years of existence.

Republican Congressman Mike Turner, the chair of the House Intelligence Committee, told me on the sidelines of the summit this week that the burden allies share isn’t only a question of defense spending but also whether they still have the political will to defend democracy and freedom.

Having this week recognized the challenge as global and focused on Russia and China, having more closely embraced Indo-Pacific partners, now comes the hard part for the world’s most enduring and successful Alliance.

What does NATO do next?


Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Pınar Dost joins Al-Monitor to discuss Turkey and NATO https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/pinar-dost-joins-al-monitor-to-discuss-turkey-and-nato/ Sun, 14 Jul 2024 10:54:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782080 The post Pınar Dost joins Al-Monitor to discuss Turkey and NATO appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Experts react: What the NATO Summit did (and did not) deliver for Ukraine https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-did-and-did-not-deliver-for-ukraine/ Fri, 12 Jul 2024 15:16:05 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779852 From an “irreversible” membership path to news about F-16s and air defense systems, Atlantic Council experts explain what the NATO Summit in Washington meant for Ukraine.

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There’s no going back. At the NATO Summit in Washington this week, heads of state and government from the Alliance’s thirty-two allies pledged to support Ukraine on an “irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” However, the allies left open when exactly that membership would come, instead noting simply that they “will be in a position to extend an invitation . . . when Allies agree and conditions are met.” Below, Atlantic Council experts are in a position now to take stock of what this pledge means, what Ukraine did get at the summit (including announcements about F-16 fighter jets and air defense systems), and what to expect next.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

John Herbst: There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

Alyona Getmanchuk: Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

Peter Dickinson: Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Shelby Magid: Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians


There was progress for Ukraine, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

It is the eleventh summit since Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 and the third annual summit since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022. Like its ten predecessors, this summit has taken incremental steps to deal with the challenge posed by the first large-scale war in Europe since Adolf Hitler was defeated. There was progress, sure, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive.

On the plus side, the communiqué states plainly that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” But the question is what steps NATO took this week to address that threat.

The answer came in two ways. The first was in its treatment of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. The hard fact is that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine joins NATO. Yes, the communiqué says the decision on Ukraine’s membership is “irreversible.” And it introduced steps to foster cooperation—putting a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, establishing a training program for Ukraine, and implementing a new venue for cooperation in the NATO-Ukraine Council.

But these steps are modest and contrast with the stronger interim advantages enjoyed by Sweden and Finland before they became members. For instance, why can’t the Ukrainian ambassador to NATO participate in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s decision-making body)? And why can’t Ukrainian officials participate within the NATO apparatus? This might explain why Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, exhibited unease at the NATO Public Forum regarding the question of how he would assess the summit, before acknowledging that Ukraine was “satisfied.”

In contrast to those modest steps, there were better results from the summit in the form of security agreements Ukraine signed with NATO members and partners. While these agreements are no substitute for the protections offered by NATO’s Article 5, in some cases—such as the agreement signed with Poland—they provide additional air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These agreements also pledge long-term security aid.

The picture is also positive when it comes to the actual weapons supplies—the most immediate need—that NATO allies committed to at and around the summit. The new packages include five Patriot batteries and other sophisticated defense systems, Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and F-16 fighter jets. Collectively, this will be a major addition to Ukraine’s defense capability—even if long overdue—and a strong signal to Russia of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

This positive story, unfortunately, has been marred by a well-timed provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin: the egregious attack on Kyiv on Monday that struck a children’s hospital. This was designed to tweak NATO and underscore to Ukrainians how vulnerable they remain. The United States could have turned this incident back on Putin if it used the occasion to remove all restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. (Such strikes are now limited to border areas against targets that are planning imminent attacks.) Instead, the White House announced publicly that its restrictions remain in place, a decision that is bad for the people of Ukraine and for US leadership.

John E. Herbst is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former US ambassador to Ukraine.


Ukraine was offered a bridge. It needs a highway.

The NATO Summit in Washington was a Biden summit, not a Ukraine summit. Even a statement on Ukraine’s “irreversible path” to NATO—clearly a step forward compared with the Vilnius summit last year—turned out to be not an easy gain, but rather a result of rounds of exhausting negotiations.

Ukraine was offered a bridge to membership when it needs a highway—with an invitation or decision to start accession talks without formal invitation. Not to mention that the symbol of a bridge has quite a negative connotation in Ukraine since the days years ago when opponents of Ukraine entering into NATO and the European Union—both inside and outside of Ukraine—stubbornly positioned Ukraine merely as a “bridge” between East and the West.

It’s a false claim that starting Ukraine’s accession process to NATO can and should happen only after the war ends. This process is needed not only after the victory, but in order to accelerate the victory. If you can’t change Putin’s calculus on the battlefield, it is important to do so by adopting political decisions that could encourage him to think about ending the war. 

It’s good that some important decisions on enhancing Ukraine’s air defense capabilities were announced in Washington, even though there was no need to wait with those announcements until the summit. Also, for those who really care that Ukraine would be able to protect its people and kids’ hospitals, those decisions should be underpinned with a green light for a deep strike on Russian launchers on its territory and the creation of an air defense shield over the western and southern parts of Ukraine. 

Alyona Getmanchuk is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and is the founder and director of the New Europe Center, a foreign policy-focused think tank based in Kyiv.


Additional aid is welcome, but language on membership is a disappointment for Kyiv

Few here in Ukraine expected this week’s NATO Summit to produce any major breakthroughs on the key issue of the country’s membership aspirations. Instead, attention was firmly focused on securing meaningful practical support for the fight against Russia. In that sense, the summit was a success, with NATO members promising to deliver much-needed air defense systems and pledging forty billion dollars in military aid over the coming year. Ukraine also used the Washington, DC, event to hold a series of useful bilateral meetings, which produced additional commitments.

At the same time, the Washington Summit Declaration’s rhetoric of Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward NATO membership failed to elicit much excitement in Kyiv, where there is widespread cynicism over past failures to match grand proclamations with meaningful progress. A majority of Ukrainians have been calling for a clear roadmap toward NATO membership since Russia’s invasion first began ten years ago. A decade later, they are still waiting. 

This mood of quiet frustration was evident during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s Thursday interview with CNN. “We have heard reassuring messages that Ukraine will be in NATO,” he commented. “But we cannot wait another seventy-five years to celebrate Ukrainian accession. It has to happen sooner rather than later.” 

Peter Dickinson is editor of the Atlantic Council’s UkraineAlert service.


Despite some wins, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians

NATO’s Washington summit was a mixed bag when it comes to deliverables for Ukraine. While the seventy-fifth anniversary summit had a celebratory tone for many in the Alliance, the week ends with a bitter taste for Ukrainians.

The summit served as another occasion for disjointed feelings for those focused on Ukraine’s security and future. The week started with Russian forces firing a cruise missile into a Ukrainian children’s hospital and ended with champagne toasts and celebrations in Washington.

As volunteers in Kyiv helped dig children’s bodies out of the hospital’s rubble, NATO allies applauded their efforts to support Ukraine. There is reason for praise—the summit’s communiqué had strong language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path toward membership, and allies made commitments for political, military, and financial support along with efforts to enable further integration into NATO. Those allied commitments included much-needed decisions to enhance Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and the launch of the Ukraine Compact with commitments to Ukraine’s long-term defense and security largely made through bilateral agreements. The NATO-Ukraine relationship grew stronger, while the Alliance also rightfully acknowledged the threat Russia continues to pose and the significant assistance it gets from China in its war effort.

While these decisions are positive, Ukraine still needs more. There are a number of NATO allies who would like to have seen the summit go further on Ukraine’s membership in NATO and immediate military support. Strong words and nonbinding agreements are important, but they don’t provide timelines, nor do they prevent missiles from destroying more hospitals. Ukraine’s leaders hoped to use the summit to get all restrictions removed on the use of US and other Western weapons against military targets in Russia. Yet even after the heinous attack against the children’s hospital, the White House shamefully announced that it is not changing its policy. When asked about those limitations on Thursday, US President Joe Biden replied that it wouldn’t make sense to strike the Kremlin, despite this being far from Ukrainian intentions. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, it is “crazy” that Ukrainian forces can’t attack the military bases firing missiles at them, including the military base that launched the attack on the hospital earlier this week.  

NATO leaders can still be proud of the steps they took in the right direction for Ukraine, but they can’t stop here. The focus on tangible steps for support to Ukraine and work toward Kyiv’s membership must continue with an urgency and quick pace. Following the summit, NATO can’t go away for summer vacation. Ukraine doesn’t have the convenience of waiting for the fall, while Russia continues to unleash criminal attacks.

Shelby Magid is the deputy director of the Eurasia Center.

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Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/five-reasons-why-ukraine-should-be-invited-to-join-nato/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 20:33:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779759 The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington failed to produce any progress toward Ukrainian membership but there are five compelling reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join the alliance, writes Paul Grod.

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NATO leaders have this week declared that Ukraine’s path to membership is “irreversible,” but once again stopped short of officially inviting the country to join the alliance. This represents another missed opportunity to end the ambiguity over Kyiv’s NATO aspirations and set the stage for a return to greater international stability.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was high on the agenda as alliance leaders gathered in Washington DC for NATO’s three-day annual summit. This focus on Ukraine was hardly surprising. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is the largest European conflict since World War II, and poses substantial security challenges for all NATO members.

Since the invasion began almost two and a half years ago, Russia has strengthened cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, who all share Moscow’s commitment to undermining the existing rules-based world order. The emergence of this Authoritarian Axis has helped underline the need for a decisive NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Alliance members are acutely aware that China in particular is closely monitoring the NATO reaction to Moscow’s invasion, with any Russian success in Ukraine likely to fuel Beijing’s own expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere.

While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, this week’s summit confirmed that there is still no consensus within NATO over Ukrainian membership. On the contrary, the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue.

Objections center around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

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There are five compelling reasons to invite Ukraine to join NATO. Firstly, it would end Russian imperial ambitions in Ukraine. By formally inviting Ukraine to join NATO and announcing the commencement of accession talks, the alliance would send a clear message to Moscow that its dreams of subjugating Ukraine and restoring the Russian Empire are futile. This would represent a watershed moment for modern Russia that would likely force the country to rethink its role in the wider world.

Secondly, Ukrainian membership would significantly strengthen NATO. Ukraine boasts one of Europe’s largest, most capable, and innovative armies. For almost two and a half years, Ukrainian troops have defied expectations and successfully resisted the Russian military, which is widely regarded as the world’s second most powerful army. As a member of the NATO alliance, Ukraine would bolster Europe’s security, contributing its unique combat experience and knowledge of the most advanced battlefield technologies.

Third, inviting Ukraine to join NATO would help deter Russia from engaging in aggression or malign actions in other parts of Europe. It would confirm the counter-productive nature of Russia’s revisionist agenda and the likelihood of further negative consequences if the Kremlin continues to pursue policies hostile to the West. The security of Ukraine, eventually guaranteed by Article Five of the Washington Treaty, would ensure stability and peace throughout the Euro-Atlantic space.

Fourth, Ukraine would be a particularly committed member of the NATO alliance. Polls consistently indicate that around three-quarters of Ukrainians back NATO membership, representing a higher level of public support than in many existing alliance members.

Ukrainian officials and Ukrainian society as a whole have a very good understanding of the responsibilities that would come with joining NATO. Throughout the past decade, Ukraine has demonstrated a high level of financial discipline, complying with NATO’s defense spending guidelines stipulating two percent of GDP. The Ukrainian military has also made major progress toward interoperability and the adoption of NATO standards.

The fifth compelling argument for Ukrainian NATO membership is the signal this would send to the international community. Inviting Ukraine to join the alliance would demonstrate the unity and resolve of the collective West at a time when Russia and other autocracies are looking for signs of weakness.

Few expected this year’s NATO summit to produce any meaningful breakthroughs toward Ukrainian membership. Nevertheless, the lack of progress will be welcomed by Russia, and will inevitably fuel frustration in Ukraine. Once again, NATO leaders have offered strong words but been unable to back this up with decisive actions.

Despite this setback, it is important to continue the debate over Ukraine’s future accession in the months ahead. Crucially, Ukrainians are not asking to join NATO immediately, and do not expect to receive the benefits of the alliance’s collective security in the context of Russia’s current invasion. Instead, they seek an invitation that will create a realistic and practical road map toward future membership.

Most Ukrainians see NATO membership as the only way to guarantee the long-term security of their nation against Russia and create the conditions for a sustainable peace in Eastern Europe. Unless a firm invitation to join the alliance is forthcoming, they fear that any ceasefire agreement with Moscow will only provide a temporary pause before Russia’s next attack.

Paul Grod is President of the Ukrainian World Congress.

Further reading

The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

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Chevron deference is dead—and US climate action hangs in the balance https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/chevron-deference-is-dead-and-us-climate-action-hangs-in-the-balance/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 18:56:36 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779613 The US Supreme Court's seismic decision to overturn Chevron deference ends decades of federal agencies’ regulatory authority to interpret laws’ where there is ambiguity. While not specifically about climate or energy, the change is deeply consequential for the current—and next—administration’s ability to act on these issues according to its agenda.

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In a seismic ruling, the US Supreme Court overturned the long-standing “Chevron deference” in its decision for Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. The ruling was not specifically concerned with energy or climate policy. But its consequences for US decarbonization are profound.

The ruling creates deep complications for the Joe Biden administration’s energy and climate agenda. But it also highlights their significance for the upcoming presidential election.

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The death of deference

The landmark 1984 ruling in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council centered on the prerogatives of federal agencies to interpret existing—and potentially decades-old—federal laws. Under the precedent enshrined as “Chevron deference,” agencies were allowed a wide berth to interpret federal laws where they were unclear or ambiguous on a specific issue. Chevron deference has proven valuable to administrations of every political inclination for forty years.

The end of deference represents a monumental shift in regulatory authority away from agencies and their technical experts—now merely accorded “respectful consideration”—and toward the hundreds of federal judges seated throughout the country.

Judges are empowered as arbiters if and when a given statute is ambiguous. They thus determine whether an agency’s interpretation of its authorities—as expressed in agency-delivered regulations—is valid. This outcome creates a more complex legal system surrounding every regulatory intervention, potentially creating a patchwork of interpretations across the ninety-four US federal judicial districts.

This development has implications for any future administration. Regardless of the outcome of the November election, both candidates must contend with the new realities of enacting their respective energy and climate visions without Chevron deference.

Overruling net zero?

For the Biden administration, the ruling undermines its sweeping regulatory efforts toward economy-wide decarbonization. Already, key agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Securities Exchange Commission have likely anticipated this court could end the Chevron deference, tailoring their recently finalized regulations accordingly.

But the Biden administration’s marquee regulations could now be challenged in whole or in part for straying too far from the letter of their foundational laws. If so, any federal judge could rule against that perceived overextension of an agency’s statutory authority.

The fate of the EPA’s regulation for fossil-fueled power plants will be a litmus test. Finalized last April, it’s expected to be extensively litigated and eventually reach the Supreme Court. Democratic leaders have anticipated this, confirming within the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, are air pollutants, giving the EPA the explicit authority to regulate it.

However, this legislative amendment does not necessarily insulate the EPA from scrutiny of how it regulates the newly labeled air pollutant—for example, by encouraging changes in generation mix, implementing power plant-level regulations not explicit within the original Clean Air Act, or, most recently, mandating the adoption of carbon capture.

This Supreme Court’s string of recent rulings, from West Virginia v. EPA and the stay of the “good neighbor rule” to extending the timeline for a federal rule to be challenged, suggests that the bench views the EPA’s authority as far more limited than the Biden administration does.

Crucially, the Loper ruling has limitations of its own. Per the majority opinion, it will not apply retroactively, meaning that previously decided cases where agency deference was at play cannot be reopened. Perhaps even more importantly, the ruling applies specifically to the federal government and not to local, state, or regional administrations.

Even if the EPA and other agencies find themselves confined to strict readings of their statutory authorizations, state regulations—including clean energy and renewable portfolio standards—cannot be challenged on this basis. On the contrary, a state attorney general could instead leverage the end of Chevron deference as a new opportunity to litigate regulations from the federal government not aligned with their state’s climate and energy goals.

Beyond November, the end of agency deference could destabilize the Biden administration’s climate agenda in a re-election scenario. Implementation of the IRA is likely to be hampered by lawsuits, and agencies may see newly issued regulations and guidelines—such as the controversial hydrogen guidance pertaining to Section 45V—become fodder for litigation. The same could be true for federal permitting and siting procedures.

Federal agencies may find it less cumbersome to simply issue broad, performance-based regulations that set a widely applicable standard, such as to power plants. These could allow for a wide range of approaches to meet a given standard rather than prescriptive rules mandating specific technologies or fuels. Programmatic approaches that concern major statutes, such as the Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act, and others, may also become the preferred means to simplify environmental reviews and preclude challenges.

Not so clear a victory

The extensive media coverage of the Loper decision has framed the outcome as an unequivocal boon to Donald Trump’s agenda, particularly in the energy and climate landscape. To some extent, this perspective is justified; a new Trump administration will leverage this ruling as justification to back away from addressing environmental or climate challenges beyond the bare minimum mandated by existing statutes.

However, agencies have long been criticized by stakeholder and environmental organizations for hiding behind Chevron deference for inadequate enforcement of environmental laws. A Trump administration, which aims for the floor, but can no longer rely on Chevron deference for protection, may discover that such lawsuits have become more numerous and disruptive.

Moreover, not every congressional statute on energy and environmental matters is ambiguous. A new Trump administration attorney general would struggle to argue that the IRA’s methane fee cannot or should not be enforced, as this requirement is explicit in the law.

There are other, more subtle, pathways to undermine the IRA and other major Biden-era climate achievements if a Trump administration were set on doing so—namely, by doing as little as possible.

The 45V credits are instructive. If a given Internal Revenue Service regulation for this section of the IRA were challenged in court as being outside the letter of the original law, it could be thrown out in a post-Loper world where agency deference is no longer assumed. A Trump administration, gifted this development, could simply refuse or delay issuing new guidance if it were uninterested in abetting the emergence of a US clean hydrogen industry.

This tactic would undermine investment certainty for large, expensive projects across technologies and fuel types while technically keeping the IRA on the books. This approach, however, assumes that federal courts will agree with sharply limited interpretations of ambiguity and not rule against thin regulations or force a Trump administration to issue guidance whether it wants to or not.

If agency deference is no longer axiomatic, then a conservative administration risks similar pushback in interpreting laws to suit ideological preference and policy goals. In a post-deference world, such an administration might face legal challenges in, for example, attempting to extend the lifetimes of operating coal plants, as much as a more liberal administration might face challenges for creative attempts to phase coal out of the US generation mix.

A volatile patchwork lies ahead

Fundamentally, the end of Chevron deference implies a new era of volatility in the legal and regulatory landscape for US energy and climate policy. Everyone from project developers and operators to investors and local stakeholders should prepare accordingly.

While federal judges are newly empowered to intervene, the Supreme Court cannot adjudicate every potential dispute in the handful of cases it reviews in a given year. As a result, it will take any suit years of litigation to reach that level—if at all—making the rulings of lower federal courts more important than ever before. Judicial opinions are likely to vary widely, making the location and timing of a suit paramount to its outcome.

For project developers, this uncertainty compounds an already serpentine US permitting landscape. Depending on which administration is in control after 2024, it is conceivable that environmental and social justice considerations around projects are given less weight than had Chevron deference been maintained. Going forward, an agency may be less inclined to propagate criteria or guidelines that would allow refusal of a permit on the basis of considerations not explicitly prescribed in existing laws. Confined to their statutory foundations, agencies may therefore be inclined to decide on leases and permits more quickly. But with fewer creative tools to mitigate project impacts authorized in their foundational statutes, agencies may simply lean toward faster denials.

Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court is the likely final stop for all major regulations going forward, implying greater uncertainty, circuitous timelines for judicial review, and whiplash aligned to the winds of political change in the executive branch. This could foster a scenario where climate action is largely blocked by the courts, and Congress is unable to meaningfully amend or write new laws to clarify the exact role of the federal government in addressing the climate crisis.

That prospect, and its implications, could exacerbate societal tensions at a time of deepening alarm over our global climate future.

David L. Goldwyn is chairman of the Atlantic Council’s energy advisory group and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

Andrea Clabough is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center and a senior associate at Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC.

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Michta in Politico, RealClearWorld, and RealClearDefense on why US policymakers should reconceptualize their understanding of the international order https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/michta-in-politico-realclearworld-and-realcleardefense-on-why-us-policymakers-should-reconceptualize-their-understanding-of-the-international-order/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:49:25 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779588 On July 9, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in Politico, RealClearWorld, and RealClearDefense on why the United States must change its thinking about the international system, which would allow policymakers to think more deeply about the “vision of victory” for the global “system-transforming war that’s been all […]

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On July 9, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in Politico, RealClearWorld, and RealClearDefense on why the United States must change its thinking about the international system, which would allow policymakers to think more deeply about the “vision of victory” for the global “system-transforming war that’s been all but declared by the newly formed  ‘axis of dictatorships.’” He emphasized that, if the United States and its democratic allies would like to preserve peace, a cultural change is critical to reorganize economic activity and mobilize resources for the future.

We need to bring national security front and center into how we prepare for the future.

Andrew Michta

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The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/the-future-of-europe-ukraine-and-the-world-order-is-not-yet-written-says-the-us-national-security-advisor/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 16:19:05 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779634 Nothing is inevitable, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said at the NATO Public Forum. “It comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.”

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Watch the full event

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jake Sullivan
National Security Advisor, United States

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, everybody in the room. Good afternoon in Europe and all around the world joining us virtually.

Throughout its history, NATO has stood as a major force for good, advancing peace, prosperity and freedom across the Euro-Atlantic and beyond. US leadership has always been a central pillar in strengthening NATO’s collective defense, maintaining stability and security, and promoting peace since the alliance’s inception in 1949. What we’ve learned the last two days and what we all know is that the alliance faces new challenges, and we face a host of new challenges to the global order—maybe the biggest threat to the global system since the 1930s. 

President Biden has called this an inflection point. The Atlantic Council has been using that language for some years, seeing it as the fourth inflection point—the period after World War I, period after World War II, period after the Cold War—and the fourth now will be the period after Ukraine prevails in its war—in Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

What all those inflection points have in common is they have been shaped by US leadership alongside partners and allies in a less favorable way at the end of World War I, a more favorable way at the end of World War II, and this is history in motion. The post-Cold-War world is over, and we’re entering a new era that our next speaker, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, has defined as an era of strategic competition in an age of interdependence. Navigating this new era will again require US leadership—principled US leadership alongside partners and allies.

It’s in that spirit that it’s my distinct honor to introduce a US strategic thinker and actor whose insights and vision are crucial as we navigate the complex challenges of this century. His dedication to safeguarding international cooperation and advancing collective security has been unwavering.

Jake Sullivan’s career is marked by high integrity, intellectual rigor, a deep commitment to diplomacy, strategic thinking, and the pursuit of peace and stability. His leadership has been instrumental in strengthening our alliances, addressing global threats, and promoting a world order based on mutual respect and cooperation. He, like all of us, is navigating wars in Europe, the Middle East, tensions with China. Seldom has a national security advisor dealt with so many challenges simultaneously, as has the Biden administration. 

Earlier this year at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Jake rightly contextualized this inflection point in which we find ourselves today. He said, and I quote, “Nothing in world politics is inevitable. We are in command of our own choices to shape the future for the benefit of our fellow citizens and future generations to come.” And that’s why we’re here today. That’s why we’re here all week, to make the right choices that shape that future.

So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the twenty-eighth assistant to the president for national security affairs, Jake Sullivan.

JAKE SULLIVAN: Well, good morning, everyone. It’s great to be here with all of you. And I really want to thank Fred for that unduly generous introduction. But I especially want to thank the entire team who made this forum possible, because this forum is a critical pillar of the summit. Every think tank, every sponsor, every NATO leader, every partner, every participant, and, frankly, every citizen who has participated in this forum, either live or virtually, over the course of this summit. I’m honored to have the chance to be here to just say a few words to such an impressive group. 

I know that one thing that has been on all of our minds throughout this summit, and in the lead up to it, is Russia’s brutal war of conquest against Ukraine. Where are we and where are we headed? Just a few months ago, the situation looked extremely grim. Security funding for Ukraine was held up in our Congress here in Washington, and we all saw the consequences. Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines running out of artillery shells, literally rationing ammo. Ukrainian families worried that Russian forces would take town after town. And we did indeed see the Russians try to press their advantage, seizing that window of opportunity to take additional territory.

And back in April, just a few months ago, there were voices predicting that by the time of this summit here in Washington today, Ukraine’s lines would crack, Russia would be making a major breakthrough, and the backdrop of this summit would be Russia surging forward across the front. And to be frank, I imagine that many of the people actually in this room today thought that might be the case as well. But Ukrainian forces stood strong. And President Biden, with bipartisan support in Congress, moved heaven and earth to get the national security funding for Ukraine passed. And since then, the picture has changed considerably.

Russia’s Kharkiv offensive stalled out. Russia is continuing to throw wave after wave of men into the fight, taking little increments of territory but at astonishing cost. By and large, the front lines have stabilized. Ukrainian mobilization efforts have improved. Ukrainian units are building stronger fortifications and defensive lines. And, day by day, they’re pushing back. This is due to the people of Ukraine, to their sheer courage and commitment to their country and its freedom. But it’s also due to the support of the United States and nations around the world, including NATO allies here gathered at this summit. So this morning I want to speak a little bit about the picture as we see it in Ukraine, and the steps that we are taking to ensure that this war is a failure for Russia and a success for Ukraine. 

I’ll start on the military side of things. The fundamentals of this conflict are artillery and air defense. And over the last few months, we’ve surged both to Ukraine, with the new resources authorized by the Congress, hundreds of thousands of rounds of 155 ammunition to the front lines to help Ukraine repel Russian attacks. And we’ve now provided Ukraine with long-range capabilities, ATACMS missiles, which the Ukrainians are employing with good effect in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, including in Crimea. And at this summit we’ve continued to make major moves. 

First, allies have committed to collectively provide Ukraine with at least forty billion euros’ worth of security assistance over the next year. And that’s not just a dollar sign; that is equipment, tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, missiles, the whole range of capabilities that Ukraine needs to be able to effectively fight and win.

Next, in partnership with our allies, we will provide Ukraine with five strategic air defense systems and dozens of tactical systems that are especially relevant to help protect Ukrainian forces on the frontlines. The strategic air systems will help Ukraine as it endures a continued pounding by Russia of its energy grid with Russian missiles and drones, and a continued assault on its frontlines by Russian planes. And we saw the horrific reality of Russia’s brutality with the attack on the children’s hospital in Kyiv just a few days ago, and we are working with the Ukrainians to deal with that attack and to respond with force and vigor.

From our own production, we’ll deliver hundreds of critical air defense missiles to Ukraine over the next year as well. There was a point earlier this year when it looked like Ukraine might run out of interceptors. But thanks to decisions President Biden has taken working with allies and partners, we will ensure that Ukraine remains supplied with the air defense missiles it needs for all of the batteries that we and our allies are now providing.

And together, the United States, Denmark, and the Netherlands have begun the transfer of F-16s to Ukrainian forces. And Ukrainian pilots will be operating in theater with those F-16s this summer. Like I said, major moves.

And we’re also steeled for the struggle ahead. President Putin thinks he can outlast Ukraine and its supporters, and he’s taken steps to put Russia’s industry—its defense industry, in fact its entire economy—on a wartime footing. And with help from Iran, from North Korea, and from the People’s Republic of China, he’s attempting to undertake Russia’s most significant defense expansion since the height of the Cold War. But make no mistake: This unsustainable war spending masks underlying weakness and fragility, and the economic costs for Russia are mounting and will compound over time.

Meanwhile, NATO allies have been making historic investments in our own defense industrial bases without distorting our national economies the way Russia has. Yesterday, for the first time ever, every ally pledged to develop plans to strengthen their defense industrial capacities at home. And like our defense spending commitment, these individual pledges are critical to our collective security. They’re going to help enable the alliance to prioritize production of the most vital defense equipment we need in the event of conflict and to produce the capabilities Ukraine needs as we speak to fight Russia on the battlefield. These pledges will also help forge new industry partnerships across the alliance, create jobs, and strengthen our economic competitiveness. And they will spur greater investment in NATO’s most significant advantage, our technology and innovation.

As the folks in this room know very well, Russia’s brutal war of conquest in Ukraine is evolving rapidly. The very shape of warfare is transforming before our eyes because of innovations—often deadly innovations—in technology and techniques and tactics. Ukraine’s continued success in this fight and our success in any future fight will depend on innovation, on creativity, on entrepreneurship, on adaptability. Ukraine and the Ukrainian people have that in spades, and they’ve demonstrated that since before the war began. But Ukraine will also have help from the collective innovation and entrepreneurship of its Western partners, and no one should bet against our collective advantage in this area. Already, we’re working with Ukraine to solve some of the key technological challenges of an evolving battlefield—electronic warfare, drones, demining—and more where that came from as the weeks and months unfold.

Now, taken all together the steps that I’ve laid out have put Ukraine in a stronger position on the battlefield, but the military side of this equation is only one part of the progress that we have seen over the course of 2024. Ukraine, with the support of the United States and other allies and partners, has made really remarkable diplomatic progress as well. Just look at the last month alone.

At the G7 summit in Italy, the United States and our partners reached a historic decision to make Russia pay for the damage they’ve caused by unlocking fifty billion from the Russian sovereign assets that we froze together. In Switzerland just a couple of days after that G7 summit, Vice President Harris and I had the honor to attend Ukraine’s peace conference to support President Zelenskyy’s vision for a just and lasting peace, in line with the UN Charter. That peace summit, attended by more than one hundred countries and international organizations, was a remarkable sign of Ukraine’s diplomatic strength and staying power—both because of the broad range of countries represented, and because those countries spoke with a single voice to say that any peace must be based on the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the basic maxim that we cannot allow one nation to take another nation’s territory by force.

In this same timeframe, around the G7 summit, President Biden and President Zelenskyy signed a bilateral security agreement reflecting a long-term commitment from the United States of America to provide Ukraine the means to ensure its future security. It was genuinely historic. And in a few hours, we’re going to make history again. President Biden will convene more than twenty world leaders, who have also signed their own bilateral security agreements with Ukraine, to launch the Ukraine Compact. This compact knits all of these countries together. And it makes clear that we will continue to support Ukraine in this fight, and we will also help build its force so it can credibly deter and defend against future aggression as well. And after this war is over, all of the countries in the compact will continue to have Ukraine’s back. just like we have it now.

Over the last couple of days, NATO has come together to announce new measures of long-term support for Ukraine. And the session this afternoon of the NATO Ukraine Council will put these on full display. This includes a new NATO military command in Germany led by a three-star general who will launch a training, equipping, and force development program for Ukrainian troops. Secretary General Stoltenberg will appoint a new NATO senior representative in Kyiv to deepen Ukraine’s institutional relationship with the alliance and engage with senior Ukrainian officials.

The alliance reaffirmed in its communique yesterday that Ukraine’s future is in NATO. This summit, the Washington Summit, is about building a bridge to NATO for Ukraine as they continue to implement important reforms. And the steps I’ve just laid out are the building blocks of that bridge. Together they make clear, Putin cannot divide us. He cannot outlast us. He cannot weaken us. And Ukraine, not Russia, will prevail in this war.

The landscape of this conflict today is far different than it was in April, when Ukraine was running out of supplies and equipment and Russia was on the move. Today on the battlefield, Russia is grinding away, but not breaking through. And Ukraine is exacting massive costs and attritting Russian strategic capabilities. Diplomatically, Ukraine has concluded a successful peace summit and signed new bilateral security agreements with more than twenty countries, as I mentioned before. And at this summit, Ukraine has secured a historic set of deliverables—air defense, F-16s, additional security assistance, a compact of nations committed to supporting Ukraine for the long term, and the concrete elements of a bridge to NATO.

It doesn’t mean the days ahead, the weeks ahead, the months ahead are not going to be difficult. They will be difficult. And no one knows that better than the people fighting on the front lines. None of the progress that we’ve seen so far was inevitable. None of it happened by accident. It took the Ukrainians stepping up, first and foremost. It also took NATO allies coming together to choose again and again to stand with them to defend the values that have always united us as democracies: freedom, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity. This is what our predecessors did for seventy-five years, and this is what we all must do in the years ahead, even when it’s tough—in fact, especially when it’s tough.

So, yes, the road ahead will be challenging. President Putin is determined to keep trying to take over Ukraine. And countries like Iran, North Korea, and China are cheerleading him. We’re clear-eyed about all of that. But we are also clear-eyed about Ukraine’s strengths and resilience and courage and commitment and effectiveness and capabilities. And we’re clear-eyed about our own, too. And we have confidence in Ukraine and confidence in ourselves. And with that, and with the actual work—the spadework that has gone into the results produced at this summit these last two days—we are demonstrating our commitment to stand with Ukraine in their current fight and into the future.

And what I would ask in closing is that as we look at the picture before us, and as we think about what we need to do to succeed and to help Ukraine succeed, that we recognize this war has been unpredictable from the start. People thought Kyiv would fall in less than a week; Kyiv still stands today. People thought earlier this year we’d be looking at a much different picture than we’re looking at today. The future, the history of Europe, of Ukraine, of the world order is not yet written. As Fred said in his opening comments, nothing is inevitable; it comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.

I believe we’ve taken some bold steps in the last few days and weeks. We will take more bold steps in the days and weeks to come. President Biden will have the chance to sit down with President Zelenskyy in a couple of hours to review all of this, and not to rest on our laurels by any stretch but to say now that we’ve come this far what more do we have to do to get the job done. And we will, together, get the job done.

So thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here today. And thank you for everything you do every day in service of our common vision for the transatlantic community and a better world for all. Thank you very much.

Watch the full event

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Rich Outzen joined WION News to discuss NATO Summit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/rich-outzen-joined-wion-news-to-discuss-nato-summit/ Thu, 11 Jul 2024 12:35:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=782090 The post Rich Outzen joined WION News to discuss NATO Summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/our-experts-read-between-the-lines-of-natos-washington-summit-communique/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 22:44:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779500 Atlantic Council experts offer their insights on NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration, released on Wednesday during the Alliance’s seventy-fifth-anniversary meeting in the US capital.

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What can thirty-two allies accomplish in forty-four paragraphs? NATO leaders on Wednesday afternoon released the Washington Summit Declaration, a consensus document setting forth what the Alliance stands for. In the case of Ukraine, it lays out a “bridge” to membership and a long-term financial commitment, but stops short of declaring when the country will be formally invited into the Alliance, as it continues to battle Russia’s full-scale invasion. The document is also notably tough on China, which it describes as the “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Our experts dig into the fine print below to break down what’s in the communiqué—and what isn’t.

Click to jump to an expert reaction:

Daniel Fried: In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

Rachel Rizzo: There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

Ann Marie Dailey: The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

Luka Ignac: NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

Wayne Schroeder: NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

Andrew D’Anieri: Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Christopher Harper: The language on Ukraine’s “irreversible” path to NATO is an important achievement

Robert Soofer: On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

Beniamino Irdi: NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

Joslyn Brodfuehrer: What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

Michael John Williams: Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them


In its support for Ukraine, the declaration ‘passed the test of seriousness’

Through its Washington Summit Declaration, NATO has strengthened its support for Ukraine’s security and its “irreversible path” to NATO membership. This language, contained in the declaration’s paragraph 16, is a step forward. More importantly, it was not a grudging compromise (as at the Vilnius NATO Summit in 2023), or a fraught showdown (as at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008). This time, the allies, especially the United States, seemed serious in asserting that, difficult as it may be to bring Ukraine into the Alliance, in the end, this may be the only way to provide long-term security to Europe in the face of Russia’s imperial ends and violent means. 

NATO also set up long-term mechanisms to provide military support for Ukraine and issued a supplemental statement that lays out details of this support. This, combined with the announcements of air defense equipment and F-16s for Ukraine, demonstrate that NATO is continuing to face down Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

The remaining US caveats on Ukraine’s authorization to use US-provided weapons to attack even legitimate military targets inside Russia remain a problem. The laws of war ought to be sufficient in restricting Ukraine’s military actions; going beyond them seems excessive.

Many will argue that NATO should have just extended an invitation to Ukraine or at least started accession negotiations. I have sympathy for these views. Nevertheless, NATO moved forward. It is easier to write an article than negotiate a communiqué with thirty-two governments. 

The decisions the allies took at the Washington summit and the language on Ukraine in the declaration passed the test of seriousness in time of war.

Daniel Fried is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former US ambassador to Poland, and former US assistant secretary of state for Europe.


There’s much to celebrate, but major questions remain

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

The final communiqué calls Ukraine’s pathway toward NATO “irreversible.” For a consensus-based organization, that’s a big deal. On top of that, we can finally see Ukraine’s “bridge” to NATO membership taking form, with the Alliance vowing to station a senior civilian in Kyiv and to set up a command in Wiesbaden, Germany for coordinating security assistance and training—with allies agreeing to send the Ukrainians a package of new air defense systems, including four Patriot batteries.

But with allied leaders saying the bridge will be short and well-lit, major questions remain about the duration and lighting. And what happens between now and Ukraine’s eventual membership, which could still be decades away?

From my conversations around town, I’m gathering that there’s also a sense of frustration amid the celebrations. Thus far there have been no announcements that the United States is willing to loosen the restrictions on how the Ukrainians can use US-supplied weapons. People seem frustrated that Ukraine can’t strike deep inside Russia, and there’s a feeling that the United States is making Ukrainians fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

There is also a somewhat somber mood regarding the US election. US President Joe Biden’s speech last night at the summit kickoff was strong and presidential, but there’s still some doubt about whether he has what it takes to pull off a win in November. And a loss for Biden means a win for former US President Donald Trump, which further rattles already-nervous Europeans. What I’ve been saying to them here at the summit is this: Tell NATO’s story, because it’s a good one. Keep increasing defense spending; twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are now spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an increase from nine allies when Biden took office. And keep shouldering more of the defense burden for the European continent. This is likely what Europeans will wind up needing to do anyway, so best to start now.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.


The communiqué contains few surprises and some missed opportunities

This communiqué contains few surprises, with the biggest announcement—the creation of a mechanism for the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine—previewed weeks in advance. The other key Ukraine-related deliverable is the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, which pledges forty billion euros in the coming year, with language loosely indicating that the support should continue in future years. While significant, this is a step down from some allies’ hope for a multiyear commitment of a percentage of each NATO nations’ GDP. With the Indo-Pacific partners on hand, the declaration missed an opportunity to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a threat to global security, not just Euro-Atlantic security. The bureaucratic, stilted language on a “bridge” to NATO for Ukraine belies ongoing disagreement within the Alliance on Ukrainian membership, but the language on Russia underscores a united NATO assessment that Russia is a long-term, strategic threat. 

The declaration is also an acknowledgment that more needs to be done to operationalize the commitments made at Madrid and Vilnius, namely that in order for NATO’s new regional defense plans to be executable, NATO nations will have to spend more than 2 percent of their GDP on national defense. Allies also acknowledged that gaps remain in key areas, including munitions stockpiles, integrated air and missile defense, command and control, and sustainment. The NATO Defense Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge aims to address some of these gaps. The declaration also acknowledges the need to partner with the European Union to counter emerging and hybrid threats, as well as the importance of working with like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific, including on support for Ukraine, cyber, disinformation, and technology. 

One major missed opportunity was the absence of Latin America in the section outlining  a new action plan for NATO’s southern neighborhood. China and Russia are conducting active disinformation and malign investment campaigns in South America. But unlike Africa and the Middle East, Latin America remains relatively stable, and it has significant economic and political cooperation potential with NATO allies. Whoever assumes the newly created role of special representative for the southern neighborhood should ensure that they include Latin America in their dialogue, outreach, and visibility. 

Ann Marie Dailey is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and is currently serving as a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation.


NATO targets the Russia-China partnership in a new way

It is significant that NATO has highlighted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This acknowledgment underscores the Alliance’s unity and awareness of the evolving geopolitical landscape. By recognizing the mutually reinforcing attempts by Russia and the PRC to undercut and reshape the rules-based international order, NATO lays a crucial foundation for formulating strategies to address and counteract this burgeoning nexus.

This statement signals a collective commitment among member states to not only monitor but also actively engage in identifying and implementing measures to mitigate the influence of this partnership.

Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.


NATO is right to look beyond the 2 percent of GDP defense target

The Washington Summit Declaration correctly addresses the need to more urgently sustain national commitments to defense. It also correctly understands that expenditures beyond 2 percent of GDP will be needed to remedy existing shortfalls and improve the capabilities, capacity, and readiness of the thirty-two NATO allies in all five defense domains—land, air, sea, cyber, and space.

To achieve the 2 percent goal or even go higher, NATO allies will have to achieve real growth in their defense spending—growth beyond the rate of inflation—and stick to that goal for multiple years. Real growth in defense spending is how most NATO countries got to 2 percent, and it is how the remaining allies can get there.

Wayne Schroeder is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.


Specific, long-term funding commitments are designed to win over Ukraine skeptics

Buried at the bottom of the NATO communiqué are key details on the Alliance’s pledge to contribute a minimum of forty billion euros over the next twelve months to Ukraine for military purposes. While forty billion euros is no small change, the communiqué notes that this pledge is in fact not an increase in military aid to Ukraine, but an approximation of annual provisions by allies since Russia began its full-scale war of aggression in 2022. 

In an effort to systematize and track military contributions to Ukraine by NATO member states, the “Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine” pegs minimum funding to countries’ GDP as a share of the Alliance total. For example, 2024 US GDP is estimated to be around $28 trillion, more than half of the roughly $46 trillion GDP total of the Alliance, so Washington would contribute approximately $26 billion in military aid to Ukraine over the next twelve months. Notably, allies must report on their contributions every six months to make sure each country is pulling their weight—a welcome dose of transparency. The first reporting period back dates to the start of 2024, so the United States is already much of the way toward fulfilling its minimum obligation.

The level of detail outlined in the pledge is no doubt aimed to mollify Ukraine skeptics (in the Trump orbit or otherwise) that allies in Europe are taking support for Ukraine seriously. Those efforts could be strengthened by continuing to source and send air defense, artillery ammunition, and long-range missiles to Ukraine on time and in appropriate quantities.

Andrew D’Anieri is a resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.


The language on Ukraine’s ‘irreversible’ path to NATO is an important achievement

The word “irreversible” in the paragraph regarding Ukraine’s path to NATO membership is powerful and important. One should not underestimate how tricky it will have been to achieve consensus on this. The implication is that this path cannot be reversed during any negotiations that might occur with Russia.

Sir Christopher Harper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. As a Royal Air Force (RAF) pilot, he was involved in active operations over Iraq and in the Balkans and has commanded at all levels of the RAF. He also served in several positions at NATO, including director general of the HQ NATO International Military Staff.


On nuclear deterrence, NATO grapples with topics once deemed off limits

As expected, the communiqué reaffirms NATO’s commitment to modernize its nuclear capabilities, strengthen its nuclear planning capability, and adapt as necessary to changes in the security environment punctuated by Russia’s nuclear intimidation and ongoing modernization of its large stockpile of theater-range nuclear weapons. 

As a former US representative to NATO’s High-Level Group (HLG) for nuclear planning, I recall how difficult it was just five years ago for the HLG to issue even a bland communiqué after each meeting—that’s how ambivalent some allies were about the nuclear mission. Today, NATO appears to be grappling with topics once considered off limits and is taking seriously the nuclear planning, exercises, and training necessary to demonstrate resolve.

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg once said that “deterrence starts with resolve. It’s not enough to feel it. You also have to show it.” This communiqué, taken in conjunction with the 2022 Strategic Concept and 2023 Vilnius communiqué, sends a strong message to Russia that nuclear deterrence remains “the cornerstone of Alliance Security.” 

Robert Soofer is a senior fellow in the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he leads the Nuclear Strategy Project. He served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy from 2017 to 2021.


NATO language on hybrid threats should be clearer and deeper

As most NATO leaders have acknowledged in recent statements, Russia fights a nonmilitary war against the West alongside its effort on the battlefield in Ukraine.

The communiqué released today does reflect an awareness of this in the paragraphs dedicated to hybrid threats. For example, it notes that Russia has “intensified its aggressive hybrid actions against allies, including through proxies.” It also lists several hybrid actions, including sabotage, cyberattacks, electronic interference, and provocations at allies’ borders, such as by provoking irregular migration. In addition, the communiqué names China as engaging in “sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation.”

However, the space and dignity reserved by the document to this challenge do not do justice to its profound strategic nature. The effort to undermine democratic societies by leveraging its freedoms is the common denominator among all of NATO’s systemic adversaries, first and foremost China, and it will remain such after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been repelled.

Perhaps distracted by the kinetic pace of war on the European continent, NATO language on hybrid threats is still somewhat unrefined, especially at the leadership level. A more explicit focus should be put on the multi-domain, or “DIMEFIL,” dimension of the challenge, especially by avoiding any confusion between the parts—such as cyberattacks, disinformation, and economic coercion—and the whole-of-society offensive coordinated campaigns they form.

Clearer and deeper language in top-level NATO communication on hybrid threats would achieve two key objectives. 

First, it would emphasize the systemic aspect of these threats, which would be an implicit reminder that NATO is an alliance based on values, at a time when some allies need to be reminded of this message. A whole-of-government offensive will only be effective if it is directed from an authoritarian regime and addressed toward a democratic society, whose openness is not only its target but also the weapon used against it. 

Second, it would inform a better counter-strategy to hybrid threats, one based on the whole picture and the adversaries’ strategic objectives rather than independent efforts in single domains.

Beniamino Irdi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.


What NATO needs is a bridge from conceptualization to operationalization

As heads of state gather to take part in this milestone NATO Summit, we are reminded that today’s security environment differs significantly from the one that twelve nations faced when signing the Washington Treaty seventy-five years ago. War is raging in Europe. Russia has threatened to send troops to new ally Finland’s border and is rebuilding its land forces in preparation for a long-term conflict with NATO. But these conventional threats are situated within a broader spectrum of challenges ranging from nuclear saber rattling to the very real hybrid activities levied against frontline allies. The Washington Summit Declaration recognizes the complexity of the increasingly connected battlespace, with commitments to “enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense against all threats and challenges, in all domains, and in multiple strategic directions across the Euro-Atlantic area.”

Maintaining NATO’s edge will hinge upon the Alliance’s ability to operate across domains at speed and scale. Allies pledged to provide the necessary forces and capabilities to resource the new defense plans in preparation for “high-intensity and multi-domain collective defense” and integrate space—NATO’s newest operational domain—into the Defense Planning Process. While developments in this year’s declaration yet again reflect a push to accelerate the Alliance’s transformation into a multi-domain-operation-enabled warfighting machine, it remains unclear as to whether NATO Allied Command Operations and its military personnel are equipped with the tools and expertise they need to facilitate coordinated activities across the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains—none of which are equal. Now is the time to move beyond NATO Allied Command Transformation’s 2023 concept by integrating capabilities across domains, increasing training on new domains, and ramping up NATO exercising. Without innovative, mutually reinforcing initiatives from allies in the short and medium term, Supreme Allied Commander Europe Christopher Cavoli will be constrained in his ability to leverage new domains to secure the advantage in a future fight. 

Joslyn Brodfuehrer is an associate director with the Transatlantic Security Initiative.


Allies are rightly concerned about Russian hybrid threats, but light on specifics for countering them

The Washington Summit Declaration covers all the familiar ground, from setting expectations for Ukraine to defense spending to Indo-Pacific strategy. But for me, the most interesting parts are sections 12-14, which are focused on collective resilience, hybrid threats, and disinformation. The inclusion of these three sections is critical, because it is highly probable that any Russian actions against a NATO ally will be specifically geared to avoid a direct violation of Article 5. It is far less probable that the Kremlin would launch a full-scale invasion against Poland or the Baltics.

The Kremlin has waged a broad campaign of “political warfare” against NATO allies for a solid decade—and this “war” shows no sign of abating. Evidence of this is found in Kremlin funding for far-right parties across Europe, cyber attacks against Estonia, assassinations in the United Kingdom, and election meddling in the United States, to name but a few of the most egregious examples. 

These sections of the communiqué convey the high level of concern within NATO around these critical issues, but they also lack specificity. For example, NATO should lead efforts across the Alliance to change national legal frameworks to recognize state-supported cyber attacks. One hopes that sections 12-14 of the communiqué will be further developed in the coming year, not least because indirect political warfare is just as popular in Beijing as it is in Moscow. 

Michael John Williams is a nonresident senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of international affairs and director of the International Relations Program at the Maxwell School for Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.


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Michta in German Council on Foriegn Relations and RealClearWorld on Germany’s defense policy and the US presidential election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/andrew-michta-german-defense-policy/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:54:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777370 On June 25, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in the German Council on Foreign Relations and RealClearWorld about Germany’s defense policy and how it may be impacted by the US presidential election. He underscored that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that […]

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On June 25, Andrew Michta, director and senior fellow in the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative, was published in the German Council on Foreign Relations and RealClearWorld about Germany’s defense policy and how it may be impacted by the US presidential election. He underscored that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well-positioned to collaborate with whichever candidate wins in November.

The relationship between the United States and Europe—and Washington and Berlin in particular—will rise or fall depending on what America’s allies in Europe do to shore up their militaries.

Andrew Michta

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Ullman in the Hill on potential US defense spending plan https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/harlan-ullman-the-hill-wicker-plan/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:50:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777291 On June 3, Atlantic Council senior advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for The Hill that analyzes Senator Roger Wicker’s (R-MS) increased defense spending plan and identified a few major missing components. He underscores the need for a broader military strategy, evidence that proves a larger force is affordable, and discussions regarding recruitment issues.

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On June 3, Atlantic Council senior advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for The Hill that analyzes Senator Roger Wicker’s (R-MS) increased defense spending plan and identified a few major missing components. He underscores the need for a broader military strategy, evidence that proves a larger force is affordable, and discussions regarding recruitment issues.

Despite the benefits of recruiting and retaining service members, the DoD cannot make the numbers to sustain an active-duty force of 1.3 million. People are crucial. And we lack a plan to deal with this most critical of issues.

Harlan Ullman

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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Ullman in United Press International on the invasion of Normandy and the US presidential election https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/harlan-ullman-upi-trump-private-ryan/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 18:47:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777320 On June 5, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for United Press International that reflects on the 80th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy, the blockbuster movie Saving Private Ryan, and the upcoming US presidential election. 

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On June 5, Atlantic Council Senior Advisor Harlan Ullman published an op-ed for United Press International that reflects on the 80th anniversary of the invasion of Normandy, the blockbuster movie Saving Private Ryan, and the upcoming US presidential election. 

The virtues of Private Ryan are what the nation desperately needs.

Harlan Ullman

International Advisory Board member

Harlan Ullman

Senior Advisor

The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world.

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‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/im-an-optimist-for-the-future-of-this-alliance-says-nato-secretary-general-jens-stoltenberg/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 16:23:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779390 The outgoing NATO secretary general spoke with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10.

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Watch the full event

Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Jens Stoltenberg
Secretary General, NATO

Moderated by

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: Good morning, if it still is the morning. It’s great to see you all here in person. It’s wonderful to have so many people here online from all over the world and, of course, across all of our allies in Europe as well.

So, it’s my honor to introduce someone I’ve known a long time now, the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg. And I’m going to moderate conversation with you at a moment—something you’ve called a pivotal moment for our Alliance. I was going to start by saluting you on something I didn’t know about, which is your great arm because you threw out the first pitch of the Nationals game. And it was an amazing. I was there in the heat, sweating while I was watching you. But it was—it was an amazing salute to NATO.

But having been at Mellon Auditorium yesterday evening, one of the most moving events I’ve been at, I’ll instead quote President Biden, what he said to you as he gave you the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a standing ovation—a really remarkable moment. He called you a man of integrity and intellectual rigor, a calm temperament in a moment—in moments of crisis, a consummate diplomat. And I think the consummate diplomat, a person who can engage with leaders across all spectrums and across all nationalities, and I just want to salute you on behalf of everyone in the audience for more than a decade of the most extraordinary leadership. So let’s start with that.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Thank you.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we at the Atlantic Council gave you our highest honor, the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Award, in 2017. And I consider that visionary. We knew you’d already accomplished a lot in your life, and I won’t go through it all—you know, prime minister of Norway, all the things you’ve done for NATO and at NATO in terms of strengthening its defense, strengthening the defense spending. And I think it would take too time—too long to go on that. And you’re a humble man, and I don’t think you would even want that. So I’m going to go right into the questions.

You laid out three goals for this summit—increasing support for Ukraine for the long haul, reinforcing collective defense, and deepening global partnerships. I’m sure they’re all important, but for this week what do you consider most crucial?

JENS STOLTENBERG: I will answer that in a moment, but let me first say that it’s great to be here, to be at the Public Forum. And many thanks to you, Fred. And also many thanks to all those who have organized and are making this event possible, because this is an important part of the summit, the public outreach which this Public Forum is a very important part of. Then thank you for your kind words. It has actually been a great privilege serving as secretary general of NATO for ten years. And I see around in the in the audience that there are many people who have helped me, supported me. And so many thanks to all of you for your advice, your help, and support throughout these years.

Then on throwing the first pitch, that is the most difficult task I ever committed as secretary general of NATO. Not least because I’ve never been at the baseball match ever before. The first time I touched a baseball, actually when I started to exercise for this, I thought it was a tennis ball. But it’s not the case. So it was a very steep learning curve. And I think my future is not in baseball. I think my future is in something else.

FREDERICK KEMPE: I was going to say in the introduction that it showed that NATO always sets lofty targets.

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah, yeah. And we have to adapt to the challenges. Then, of course, this summit. It’s, of course, a summit where we’re going to celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the strongest, most successful alliance in history. But the only way to truly celebrate that achievement, the seventy-fifth anniversary, is, of course, to demonstrate that NATO is adapting, that we are changing when the world is changing. Because we are the most successful alliance in history because we have changed when the world is changing. And now we live in a more dangerous, more challenging security environment. And therefore, NATO is changing again.

And therefore, we will make important decisions at this summit for the future, not only celebrate the past. And there are three main issues. It’s deterrence and defense. It’s our partnership with our Asia-Pacific partners. But of course, the most urgent, the most critical task at this summit, will be everything we will do and decide on Ukraine. Because this is really the time where we are tested. If we want to stand up for democracy and freedom, it’s now. And the place is Ukraine.

And I expect that NATO leaders will agree a substantial package for Ukraine. There are, affirmatively, five elements in that package.

One is that we will establish a NATO command for Ukraine to facilitate and ensure training and delivery of security assistance to Ukraine. It will be seven-hundred personnel. It will take over much of what the US have done so far in leading the coordination of security assistance and training. It will be a command in Wiesbaden in Germany, but also with logistical nodes or hubs in the eastern part of the Alliance, to ensure that we have a more institutionalized framework for our support to Ukraine.

Then it will be a long-term pledge to support Ukraine, not least to send the message to President Putin that he cannot wait those out, because the paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed for a long-term to support Ukraine, the sooner this war can end. So that’s the thing we have to do.

Then we will have—and we have already seen some of the announcements of military immediate support with the air defense systems, with F-16s, other things that allies have and will announce. We have the bilateral—that’s a third—the announcement on more military aid, and then we have the bilateral security agreements—twenty agreed between NATO allies and Ukraine.

And then the fifth element of the package for Ukraine will be more interoperability. We will have a new joint training and relations center in Bydgoszcz in Poland. We will have the comprehensive assistance package to help Ukraine implement reforms on their defense and security institutions to ensure that the armed forces are more and more interoperable with NATO.

And together, the NATO command, the pledge, the bilateral security agreements, the announcement of new military support, and interoperability—these five elements combined constitute the bridge to NATO membership for Ukraine. And later on today, you will see the language which we will agree, and the NATO declaration on how to ensure that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO membership. So these are the five important deliverables on Ukraine that I expect allies will agree later on today.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Not to press you on what’s actually going to be in the document because, of course, you can’t reveal that, but we saw at the Vilnius Summit—hearing it again in Washington—that allies closer to Russia were more eager to provide NATO membership sooner for Ukraine, and no doubt the bridge and all the elements of the bridge are pretty impressive, including the new command.

But are Ukraine’s NATO membership prospects sufficient? We did our own wargaming with our Estonian partners and the Estonian government, and we found almost under any scenario, Ukraine was safer in NATO, that Russia would respond in a way that would be less provocative within and outside. What’s your thinking on that, and have we gone far enough with Ukraine?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, the language you will see later on today in the NATO declaration or the declaration from the heads of state and government, of course that language is important because language matters. It sets an agenda. It points a direction. But, of course, action speaks louder than words. So, in addition to that language in the declaration on membership, which again is important, I think that what we actually do together with Ukraine is as important. And therefore the fact that we now have a NATO framework—will have a NATO framework around the support, the fact that we have a long-term NATO commitment when we agreed the pledge, and also the fact that we actually are delivering more weapon systems to Ukraine—all of that has helped Ukraine to become closer to NATO—come closer to NATO membership because we will now deliver F-16s. We don’t want to deliver F-16s; we deliver the training, the doctrines, the operational concepts that will actually move Ukraine closer to being fully interoperable with NATO on more and more areas.

So, again, language is important. But the elements in the package I mentioned, they are actually changing the reality, enabling Ukraine to be—to come closer to membership so we can then—when the time is right, when you have consensus and the political conditions are in place—so when an invitation then is issued, they can become members straightaway. I can’t give you a date because, as you know, there has to be consensus in this Alliance on membership.

But what I can say is that when the fighting stops in Ukraine, we need to ensure that that’s really the end. Because what you have seen is a pattern of aggression. First, Russia annexed Crimea. We said that was unacceptable. After some few months, they went to the eastern Donbas. We said that that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk I agreement, with the delimitation of the ceasefire line. That was violated. And Russia pushed the front lines further east—no, sorry—further west in Donbas in 2014. We had Minsk II, and the Russians waited then for seven years. And they had the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, because Minsk II was in 2015.

So, we have seen a pattern where they’ve taken slices of Ukraine. If there is now a new ceasefire, a new agreement, then we need to be 100 percent certain it stops there, regardless of where that line is. And therefore, I strongly believe that when the fighting stops we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia and they need security guarantees. And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article Five. So therefore, I believe that a way to ensure that it stops is actually a NATO membership.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you for that very clear answer. One more brief question on Ukraine, then we’ll move on to Indo-Pacific. In a press conference you had with President Macron a couple of weeks ago you noted recent gaps in delays in how they’ve led—in funding and weapons—and led to battlefield consequences. You said, quote, “We must give Ukraine the predictability and accountability it needs to defend itself.” So, two questions: Is everything you’ve talked about today that’s going to be agreed enough? And, secondarily, not just with uncertainties in US politics, which exist, but also uncertainties in European politics, do you worry at all about the sustainability of that support over time?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, you are right that I have referred to—I also did that in Kyiv in a meeting with President Zelensky earlier this spring—to the fact that during this winter and the early spring allies didn’t deliver on their promises to Ukraine. We saw the delays in the US, months agreeing on a supplemental. But we also saw European allies not being able to deliver the ammunition and the support they have announced. So, of course, these gaps and these delays in military support to Ukraine, they created a very difficult situation for Ukrainians on the battlefield.

The good news in that difficult situation is that, despite all the delays in our support to Ukraine, Ukrainians have actually been able to hold the line, more or less. So the Russians have not been able to utilize these delays in really making any big advantage on the battlefield. Now we are providing more support, and I’m confident that allies will now actually deliver. And we see that, for instance, ammunition moving into Ukraine, been significant increase over the last weeks.

The purpose of a stronger NATO role in providing training and security assistance, the purpose of the command, and the purpose of the pledge is, of course, to minimize the risks for future delays and gaps. But of course, you don’t have guarantees, because at the end of the day it has to be support in all the individual allied capitals and parliaments to providing this support. At the end of the day, you have to go to the Congress, to the parliaments across Europe and Canada, to get support. But I believe that when we turn this into something which is more a NATO obligation, a NATO framework, it is—the threshold for not delivering will be higher than when it’s based on a more voluntary, ad hoc, national announcements.

So the purpose of creating a stronger NATO framework is to make the support more robust and more predictable. It’s also another part of this NATO framework for the support on the pledge and the command. And that is that it will visualize and ensure burden sharing, because my impression is that, especially in the United States, there is this perception that the United States is almost alone in delivering support to Ukraine. That’s not the case. When you look at military support, roughly 50 percent of the military support is provided by European allies and Canada. Ninety-nine percent of the support—the military support to Ukraine—comes from NATO allies, but 50 percent of that comes from European allies and Canada. If you add economic, macroeconomic support, humanitarian support, the European allies are providing much more than the United States.

So the point with the pledge to ensure that we have some kind of agreed formulas for burden sharing, that we have more transparency, and also that we have more accountability, because then we can use NATO to count, to measure, and to ensure that allies deliver. It’s not the same, but it’s a bit like the 2 percent pledge because the importance with the pledge made in Wales in 2014 was actually to give NATO a role to enforce and to ensure that allies delivered, and also that we agreed how to count and what to count. And that’s also what we now will do with the pledge, to agree how to count and what to count, and to give NATO a role to having also accountability.

So, again, there are no guarantees. But by giving NATO that role, I think the likelihood for allies delivering what they have promised will increase and the likelihood of new gaps will decrease. And that’s the purpose of giving NATO a stronger role.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary General. Let’s go to China. The 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO Strategic Concept, recognized China as a challenge for the first time in the broader rules-based system. You’ve noted that Russia imports 90 percent of its microelectronics from China, which goes into military. Secretary Blinken today talked about 70 percent of machine tools that helped the military coming from China. You’ve also said that this—if this doesn’t change, as they’re fueling the greatest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, allies need to impose a cost. Is it time for that? And what cost can NATO and NATO countries actually impose?

JENS STOLTENBERG: So first of all, I think it’s important that we recognize the reality, and that’s the first step towards any action. And that is that not only are Iran and North Korea important when it comes to enabling Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, but China is the main enabler because, as you referred to, they are delivering the tools—the dual-use equipment, the microelectronics, everything Russia needs to build the missiles, the bombs, the aircraft, and all the other systems they use against Ukraine.

Well, I have said that it remains to be seen how far allies are willing to go, but I strongly believe that it—if China continues, they cannot have it both ways. They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies in North America and Europe, and then continue to fuel the war in Europe that constitutes the biggest security challenge to—for our security since the Second World War. So this is a challenge for the Alliance. Let’s see how far we’re willing to go as allies.

FREDERICK KEMPE: So we’re getting close to the end of time, so just two other brief questions. First, the Indo-Pacific four—Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand—are here. Third time taking part in a NATO summit, but it’s going to be the first NATO joint document with this group. Can you give us some insight into what might be in it? Any concrete outcomes?

JENS STOLTENBERG: Yeah. So, first I would just say that the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—that reflects a change in NATO, because that was not the case a few years ago. And as many of you may know, the first time we mentioned China in an agreed negotiated document in NATO is at the NATO summit in London in 2019. And in the previous NATO Strategic Concept, China was not mentioned with a single word; now China has a prominent place in the Strategic Concept we agreed in Madrid. And the fact that we now are engaging so closely with our Indo-Pacific partners reflects, of course, the fact that we have to take China seriously when it comes to the challenges it poses for our security, and the war in Ukraine is perhaps the most obvious example. Or, as the Japanese prime minister said several times: What happens in Ukraine today can happen in Asia tomorrow.

We are now working with our Asia-Pacific partners how we can do more together with them. We will agree some flagship projects. That’s about technology. It’s about support to Ukraine. But we are also working, for instance, as part of our defense industrial pledge, how we can ramp up defense industrial production and cooperation with these countries. They are big, some of them, on defense industry. We can work closely with them to ramp up our combined defense industrial capacity. We can exchange more information.

And I also welcome the fact that more and more allies are now also conducting joint exercises. Recently, there was a big air exercise. Allies are also more and more actively also looking into how they can also have more naval exercises with our Asia-Pacific partners. Because NATO will remain an alliance of North America and Europe. There will not be a global NATO. NATO will be North America and Europe. But this region, the North Atlantic region, we face global threats. And the reality is, that’s nothing new. Global terrorism—international terrorism brought us to Afghanistan. Cyber is global. Space, which is becoming more and more important for our armed forces, is truly global. And, of course, the threats that—and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge.

So this region, the North Atlantic region, faces global challenges. We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners, the Asia-Pacific partners, to address these global challenges. That, I guess, will be a very important issue at the next NATO summit. I will not be there, but I’m certain it will be –

FREDERICK KEMPE: Well, and that brings—and that brings me to my final question. This is your swan song summit. And as you prepare to step down, I think everybody in the audience, everybody virtually, would love to hear what gives you the most hope stepping down from this, but also what gives you the most concern.

JENS STOLTENBERG: So, first of all, I’m an optimist. Because the reality is that we are very different in this Alliance. We are different countries with different histories, different cultures, from both sides of the Atlantic, and we have different parties. And we are always very concerned that when a new party comes into government they will make bad things for the Alliance. And if you read the history of NATO, we have been concerned about since—about that for from the beginning.

There were big concerns in NATO when you had a new—when actually you got the democratically elected government in Portugal in 1975. There were concerns whether or not they were going to be committed to NATO. There were concerns when you had some left-wing parties coming into government in some European countries in the ’70s. When I formed my government in—my second government—in 2005 there were big concerns that we had the Left Socialist Party there. It went quite well, to be honest. And now there are big concerns again.

But the reality is that despite all these differences, which are part of NATO, we have proven extremely resilient and strong. Because when we face the reality, all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians, they realize that we are safer and stronger together. And that’s a very strong message. And that’s the reason why this Alliance prevails again and again.

As I said in my speech yesterday, we cannot take it for granted. It’s not a given. It was not a given in ’49. It’s not a given now. And it’s not a given in the future. But the reality is that we have a strong common interest in standing together. So therefore, I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance. That was the first question. The second I’ve forgotten. I think I answered both of them.

But I will only say one thing about this. That I remember very well when I became prime minister in 2000. First of all, I attended my first NATO Summit in 2001. That was a very different guest list. It was—President Bush, newly elected. It was Gerhard Schröder, Tony Blair. And, yeah, very different people than now. As I think it’s time for me to leave. But second, also, I remember then my predecessor when I became prime minister in 2000, she told me—Gro Harlem Brundtland, Norwegian prime minister—she told me, Jens, you have to remember that most of your life you’ll be former prime minister.

And now I have to acknowledge that most of my life, I’ll be former secretary general NATO. But that’s not so bad. And I will hang around and see you, and I look forward to then perhaps being a part of this audience next time. Thank you so much. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Fred.

FREDERICK KEMPE: Mr. secretary general, nothing more need be said.

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Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/transcript/any-attempt-to-undermine-nato-undermines-us-security-says-lloyd-austin/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 15:08:09 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779218 At the Washington summit, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed NATO’s history and the Alliance’s plans to bolster support for Ukraine.

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Event transcript

Uncorrected transcript: Check against delivery

Speaker

Lloyd Austin
US Secretary of Defense

Introductory Remarks

Frederick Kempe
President and CEO, Atlantic Council

FREDERICK KEMPE: What a great lineup to start the day—the secretary of state, the supreme allied commander Europe, secretary of defense. It’s really an honor to be here. And thanks to everyone in the room. Good morning to you all, and good afternoon to everyone joining from Europe, and hello to everyone joining from all over the world virtually.

Since its founding in 1949, since NATO’s founding, the United States has played a pivotal role in safeguarding transatlantic security. And the secretary of defense has always been at the center of that. As one of NATO’s founding members, the US has proven to be a critical part of the Alliance’s collective defense and its adaptability to deter evolving threats. And they have been evolving. America has always stood ready to defend and protect the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond, continuing its commitments to the principles of the Washington Treaty. US leadership was pivotal, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, mobilizing tremendous support—and you’ve heard more about that today, new Air Force batteries, F-16s—to bolster collective defenses on NATO’s eastern flank, fortifying the commitment to NATO allies, and extending that kind of critical assistance to Ukraine. 

So it’s my privilege to introduce a leader who embodies this commitment to transatlantic and, indeed, global security—US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. A graduate of West Point in 1975, Secretary Austin’s career in the US Army spanned more than forty years. Throughout his years of service, he has led the command at the corps, division, battalion, and brigade levels in the US armed forces. Secretary Austin was awarded the Silver Star for his leadership of the US Army’s Third Infantry Division during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

Before he concluded his uniformed service, Secretary Austin was the commander of the US Central Command from 2013 to 2016, one of our most challenging positions where he was responsible for all the military operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Under his leadership, the US Department of Defense has adapted national defense strategies to address the greatest global challenges of our time. And it’s reaffirmed the US commitment to allies and its role as a champion of the rules-based order. 

In particular, and this is really important, Secretary Austin’s leadership in the Ukraine defense contact group has proven invaluable in uniting over fifty nations to provide critical military support and security assistance to Ukraine. We saw Vladimir Putin’s message to the NATO summit on Monday this week, with a barrage of more than forty missiles on Ukraine including hitting a children’s hospital. We’ve seen an answer in more—in more air defenses. We’ve seen an answer in the F-16s. We’ve seen an answer in everything else that Secretary Austin and all the allies are doing. 

As President Biden has said, the world is at an inflection point with wars in the Middle East, Europe, rising challenge posed to China, biggest defense buildup—peacetime defense buildup in history from China. The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor. And we’re lucky to have a man of his pedigree and capability at this historic moment. So with that, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming to the stage the twenty-eighth US Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin.

LLOYD AUSTIN: Well, good morning. It’s really good to be here with all of you and, Fred, thanks for that kind introduction and for all that you’ve done for the Atlantic Council and for bringing us together on a pretty big week. 

It’s a huge honor for the United States and President Biden to host this historic summit in Washington, just down the road from the site where the original twelve NATO allies signed the North Atlantic Treaty seventy-five years ago, and together we’re marking one of the great success stories that the world has ever known. 

On April 4, 1949, those twelve democracies came together in the wake of two world wars and at the dawn of a new Cold War and they all remembered, as President Truman put it, “the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression.”

And so they vowed to stand together for their collective defense and to safeguard freedom and democracy across Europe and North America. They made a solemn commitment, declaring that an armed attack against one ally would be considered an attack against them all. 

Now, that commitment was enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the foundation of NATO and it still is.

And on that bedrock we have built the strongest and most successful defensive alliance in human history. Throughout the Cold War, NATO deterred Soviet aggression against Western Europe and prevented a third world war. 

In the 1990s, NATO used air power to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, and the day after September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda terrorists attacked our country, including slamming a plane into the Pentagon, NATO invoked Article 5 for the first and only time in its history. 

So NATO has always stood by us and we’re going to stand by NATO. Without NATO the past seventy-five years would have been far different and far more dangerous. You know, I’m proud of the ways that NATO continues to strengthen our shared security. 

I’m proud of the way that NATO and other—NATO and America’s other alliances and partnerships have grown and strengthened under the leadership of President Biden and I’m especially proud of the way that our allies and partners, including our NATO allies, have met the challenge of Putin’s increasingly aggressive Russia. 

In 2014, Putin made an illegal land grab against Ukraine’s Crimea region in eastern Ukraine and since then NATO has undertaken the largest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation with more forces, more capabilities, and more investment. 

Since 2014, our fellow allies have increased their defense spending by an average of 72 percent, accounting for inflation. In February 2022, the world again saw what President Truman called the sickening blow of unprovoked aggression as the Kremlin’s forces invaded the free and sovereign state of Ukraine.

As this administration has made very clear, we will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice but we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security. We will defend every inch of NATO and we will continue to strengthen NATO’s collective defense and deterrence.

In the wake of Putin’s imperial invasion of Ukraine, we bolstered NATO’s forward defense posture with more troops at high readiness, larger exercises, sharper vigilance, and multinational battle group—battle groups in eight countries. NATO is now larger than ever. And our new allies in Finland and Sweden have brought the alliance’s membership to thirty-two. And make no mistake, NATO’s—Putin’s war is not the result of NATO enlargement. Putin’s war is the cause of NATO enlargement.

Over the past three and a half years, we’ve also seen an historic increase in annual defense spending across the alliance by almost eighty billion dollars. All NATO allies have agreed to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. In 2014, only three allies hit that target. In 2021, only six allies did so. But this year, a record twenty-three NATO allies are meeting the 2 percent defense spending target. Now, our NATO allies are not just spending more on their own defense, they’re also spending more on America’s defense industrial base. That means platforms and munitions built in America. And that’s helping to revitalize production lines across our country and to create good jobs for American workers.

Now, all of that progress is a testament to US leadership and allied solidarity. But it’s also a testament to the leadership of our outgoing secretary general, my good friend Jens Stoltenberg. Throughout a decade of challenge, Jens has guided the Alliance with skill and steel, and we are all deeply, deeply grateful. Now we’re going to keep building on our progress, and we’ve got an ambitious agenda this week. First, we’ll continue to implement NATO’s new family of plans, the most robust since the Cold War. And that will significantly improve our ability to deter and defend against any new threat. Second, we’ll work to endorse a pledge to expand industrial capacity across the alliance. And this will help us scale up military production and send an important long-term signal to industry.

Third, we’ll deepen cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense. We’ll launch a new military effort to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine and we’re poised to agree on a new financial pledge to Ukraine. As another sign of our deep commitment to Ukraine’s self-defense, a coalition of countries has been working tirelessly to provide F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine. And today, President Biden, alongside the Dutch and Danish prime ministers, is proud to announce the transfer of F-16s is officially underway, and Ukraine will be flying F-16s this summer.

And finally, we’ll continue to deepen ties with our global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific. I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine, but that just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security. And it sends a message to the world that we are united in our values. So we have a lot to tackle together. But we’re also here to mark this moment. We’re here to strengthen an Alliance that has kept millions of people safe for seventy-five years. And we’re here to reaffirm the ironclad commitment that those twelve leaders made on April 4, 1949: An armed attack against one ally is an attack against us all. 

You know, as you heard Fred say, I had a brief forty-one-year career in uniform. I started working with NATO back in 1975, when I was Lieutenant Austin. And I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today. And we are determined to keep it that way. You know, I learned a lesson early on in my Army career. And that lesson is that, as a soldier, the last thing that you want to do is to fight alone. So here’s the blunt military reality: America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies. And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.

So we are here this week to strengthen NATO and to strengthen American and allied security for the next seventy-five years. As President Biden has said, our foes and rivals have tried to shatter our unity, but our democracies have stood unwavering. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the legacy that we celebrate. That is the vow that we uphold. And that is the work that we will continue. Thank you very much.

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State of the Order: In June, the world’s alliances strengthened—but concerning risks for the democratic order remain https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/june-2024-state-of-the-order/ Wed, 10 Jul 2024 14:37:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779036 The State of the Order breaks down the month's most important events impacting the democratic world order.

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In June, much of the world saw not only rising temperatures, but also multiplying stresses on the world order. Israel and Hamas still did not agree on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his military leadership over war aims magnified, as the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies ramped up support for Ukraine, with new measures that allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia and a new Group of Seven (G7) plan to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets for a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. European Union (EU) elections saw the far right make gains, especially in France, but the center largely held.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Tensions mount within the Israeli government as conflict grinds on. As June ended, Israel and Hamas still had not agreed on a cease-fire, despite hopes earlier in the month that both sides would sign onto a previously floated three-phase plan. Although the United States assured that Israel accepted, it is unclear whether Israel declined the latest three phase. Yet Hamas requested some unworkable changes after all the parties alleged acceptance. Even as the two sides haggled over cease-fire terms, Israeli military operations in Gaza slowed due to operational tempo, but there remained an increase in intensity in the continued tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah, driving global concern over a potential war between them that could evolve into a broader regional conflict. Netanyahu dissolved his war cabinet, the unit established to bring a unified approach to Israel’s fight against Hamas. The decision came following the resignation of former military chief Benny Gantz from the cabinet. Gantz resigned amidst protests over the continued lack of a strategic plan to defeat Hamas. Illustrating further divisions within the Israeli government over war aims, the Israeli army’s chief spokesman publicly questioned the government’s articulated goal of destroying Hamas, noting, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people—whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” Tens of thousands of Israeli people protested in Tel Aviv to demand a cease-fire and the return of hostages.

  • Shaping the order. Tensions within the Israeli government, between Netanyahu and his military leadership, came to a head as the two sides seemed at odds over end goals for Israel’s military operations. There remains limited consensus on the way forward. In February, Netanyahu presented a post-war plan aiming for local officials to govern Gaza, with Israel preparing to test the experimental model with “humanitarian bubbles.” Allies have collectively strategized various pathways and there remains widespread skepticism of the plan. Yet the Israeli government continues to struggle to advance a post-conflict plan and receive sufficient buy-in from the United States, Arab states, and others, which remains a key priority for regional stability and US interests.
  • What to do. The Biden administration should continue to work with allies in Doha and Cairo to pursue a path to a temporary cease-fire and hostage-for-Palestinian-prisoners deal—that would also enable a flood of humanitarian relief in Gaza—despite the low probability of success.

The United States and its allies step up support for Ukraine. The United States expanded its policy to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike “anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory,” according to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This builds on its May decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike a limited set of targets, largely across the border from Kharkiv.

The Biden administration, following the G7 meeting in Italy, announced it would rush the delivery of air-defense interceptors to Ukraine by delaying the delivery of them to most other nations. The G7 also agreed to use interest on immobilized Russian sovereign assets to collateralize a fifty-billion-dollar loan to Ukraine. The United States added new and strong US sanctions against Russia and finalized a US-Ukraine ten-year memorandum of understanding on security cooperation.

As US munitions began to reach the front lines in Ukraine, the Russian offensive against Kharkiv lost momentum. Although Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy generation did considerable damage (taking down almost half of Ukrainian electric generation), the US decision to rush delivery of air-defense interceptors may help further mitigate such attacks, as will Romania’s decision to send to Ukraine one of its Patriot batteries. Meanwhile, Ukrainian attacks on Russian military infrastructure in Crimea were taking an increasing toll, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea to shore up his relationship with dictator Kim Jong Un and ensure Pyongyang continues providing munitions and arms to Moscow for the war in Ukraine.

On the diplomatic front, Russia escalated its demands for a cease-fire in an unrealistic fashion, insisting that Ukraine must first abandon territory it currently holds in the four provinces partly occupied by Russia, land that Russia has been unable to take by force. Days after that, from June 15 to 16, ninety-three countries attended a peace conference in Switzerland to discuss Ukrainian terms (its ten-point plan) for a settlement and seventy-eight countries signed a document that called for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a key Ukrainian point (more countries have signed on since). China did not attend, however, and some key countries in the Global South such as South Africa, India, Brazil, and Mexico did not sign the conference document.

  • Shaping the order. The Biden administration’s decision to allow Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to strike inside Russia, beyond initial restrictions on targets near Kharkiv, is a significant, positive step in Western support for Ukraine. Using frozen Russian assets to collateralize a loan for Ukraine is another positive step, but the United States and its allies may find they need to go further, using said assets themselves rather than continuing to use their own funds exclusively.
  • Hitting home. Some US experts argue that Ukraine is a strategic liability and that US focus there diverts resources better used in the Indo-Pacific. Russian victory in the war, which is likely to result from a US withdrawal, would cause cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources.
  • What to do. The United States and its allies must marshal continued military assistance for Ukraine, including air defense and weapons that support Kyiv’s attacks on Russian military targets in occupied Ukraine, especially Crimea. The United States has the means to intensify pressure on the Russian economy and should use such tools. Washington should consider enforcing sanctions to hit smugglers of technology subcomponents utilized for Russian weapons and evaders of the oil price cap (the latter missing from the otherwise strong June 12 US sanctions package). A successful Ukrainian land offensive may not be possible in the near term. 

The center holds, but the right makes gains, in European Parliament elections. Across the EU’s twenty-seven member states, voters cast ballots to select their representatives to the European parliament. The election saw gains for the center-right and right, but it was a disappointing showing for French President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist Renew party. The European People’s Party, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and Identity and Democracy—the hard right—were the main beneficiaries of the elections. These results were overshadowed by Macron calling for a snap parliamentary election after his party’s incredibly poor performance in the European Parliament election (garnering less than half the votes of their far-right rivals, the National Rally): The snap election resulted in the left-wing New Popular Front on top, Macron’s  centrist alliance placed second, and  Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally, which finished third. Yet, the right did not do well in Scandinavia, Spain, and Romania, and had only a modest uptick in Poland, where the ruling Civic Platform came in first place. The parties in Germany’s ruling coalition—the Social Democrats, the Free Democrats, and the Greens—all lost ground in Germany, but the center-right alliance between the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union did well.

  • Shaping the order. Snap elections in France overshadowed the fact that the center mostly held its ground in the EU elections. The far right’s marginal gains will matter, however, if said forces can unite and if center-right parties are willing to engage with the far-right. Even so, the incoming parliament is likely to be more fragmented and polarized than its predecessor. And the French elections, the first round having wrapped, are pointing to a major defeat for Macron and a surge of the right, which is both nationalist and wary about the extent of French support to Ukraine.
  • Hitting home. Even though the center largely held in the European Parliament elections, the increased fragmentation will likely mean less clarity on policy issues that impact US companies.
  • What to do. The United States should constructively engage the European Parliament, encouraging it to hold firm to its moderate stances and not bend to the far right’s proposals.

Quote of the Month

The votes cast put the far-right forces at almost 40 percent and the extremes [on the right and left] at almost 50 percent. This is a political fact that cannot be ignored.
—French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking after the European Parliament elections.

State of the Order this month: Unchanged

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↔)

  • On June 30, the far-right National Rally won in the first round of the parliamentary elections, although it’s unclear whether they will get a majority with the second-round vote upcoming on July 7. Many French citizens have been protesting against the National Rally out of concern for women’s rights and minority rights, where thousands of women marched in dozens of French cities, including Paris, to protest against Marine Le Pen’s far-right National Rally.
  • Mexico elected Claudia Sheinbaum, its first female president, in the country’s largest election in history with 98 million registered voters. As Mexico City’s former mayor and the favored successor of outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Sheinbaum was favored to win. Promising to continue López Obrador’s policies, she believes the government has a strong responsibility to address economic inequality and establish robust social security.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security (↔)

  • Chinese forces seized Philippine small boats that were attempting to resupply a Philippine military outpost at Second Thomas Shoal. Multiple Philippine vessels were damaged, and sailors were injured in the incident. One US official called China’s actions “deeply destabilizing.”
  • Houthi rebels launched an aerial drone, striking and damaging the Transworld Navigator in the Red Sea, one of more than sixty attacks targeting specific vessels. The attack comes after United States recalled its USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after an eight-month deployment. Shipping in the corridor—crucial for connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia—has slowed significantly. The Houthis said they would continue the attacks as long as the Israel-Hamas war continues.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Trade (↔)

  • Amid the European Commission’s anti-subsidy investigations into electric vehicles (EVs) coming from China , the European Union announced additional tariffs on  imported Chinese EVs. The tariffs range from 17.4 to 38.1 percent—and that’s on top of the 10 percent duty already in place. As a result, Chinese car companies may consider raising prices or establishing factories in Europe, as the continent recently became China’s largest EV export market.
  • On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

  • The United Nations conducted a worldwide poll that revealed 80 percent of people want governments to take more action on addressing climate change. The survey noted majority support for stronger climate action in twenty of the world’s biggest greenhouse gas emitters and majority support globally a quicker transition away from fossil fuels. Despite the increasing state of global conflict and rise of nationalism, the desire to set aside geopolitical differences and work together on climate change is expanding.
  • Record-breaking heat, fueled by climate change, affected millions around the globe, scorching four continents and surpassing last summer as the warmest in two thousand years. There were more than forty thousand suspected heat stroke cases in India between March 1 and June 18, and in Saudi Arabia, over one thousand people died participating in the Hajj pilgrimage amid soaring temperatures. Devastating forest fires spread in Europe and northern Africa, and a heat dome trapped large regions of the United States, preventing cool air from getting in.
  • On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↑)

  • For the first time in twenty-four years, Russian President Vladimir Putin and dictator Kim Jong Un met in North Korea, reinforcing their commitment to cooperate and protect each other’s interests. As part of the meeting, they signed a mutual military-assistance treaty, with Putin announcing that Russia could provide weapons to North Korea—with potentially destabilizing effects for the democratic world order.
  • The leaders of the G7 convened in Apulia, Italy, for the 2024 G7 Summit to discuss supporting Ukraine, pushing back on unfair economic practices, combating climate change, addressing food and health insecurity, leveraging critical technologies, and partnering with like-minded countries around the globe.
  • On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged (↔)________Weakened ()

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

  • Michael Doyle, in Foreign Affairs, argues that democratic peace is back in vogue and great powers can prevent the tensions between democracies and autocracies from escalating into full-blown global cold war.
  • Robert C. O’Brien, in Foreign Affairs, outlines a Trump administration foreign policy centered on the return of peace through strength.
  • Célia Belin and Mathieu Droin explore in Foreign Policy what a far-right victory would mean for French foreign policy.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

  • Niva Yau, in an  Atlantic Council report, shows how China is training future authoritarians overseas in order to secure its interests in Global South countries and beyond.
  • Matthew Kroenig and Dan Negrea, in Foreign Policy, explain that the United States’ competition with China should be focused on weakening and defeating the Chinese Communist Party regime.
  • Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, offers seven ways to reboot G7 sanctions on Russia, stating that United States and its allies must commit to dedicating resources to identifying targets for taking economic steps against Russia.
  • Andrew Michta, in a piece for the German Council on Foreign Relations, contends that Germany must commit to significantly expanding its defense industrial base so that it will be well positioned to establish strong cooperation with whichever candidate wins the next US presidential election.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Ginger Matchett – Project Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

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How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-nato-can-prove-its-enduring-relevance-at-the-washington-summit/ Tue, 09 Jul 2024 21:32:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779252 Allies must do more to augment Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities and bring it into the Alliance, as well as boost their own spending on defense.

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In a dangerous world, NATO’s role has never been more important. Yet, to remain relevant, the Alliance needs to adapt to today’s security challenges at greater scale and speed. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it took three years for NATO to deploy the enhanced Forward Presence battalions in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, two-and-a-half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the allies have neither defined Ukraine’s path to NATO membership nor delivered what Ukraine needs to win. This “too little, too late” approach from NATO neglects the security interests of member states and empowers the Alliance’s adversaries.

At the latest NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Prague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised Ukraine a “bridge” to NATO. For a start, US President Joe Biden at the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Italy delivered a three-pronged blow to Moscow­—a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, a fifty billion dollar loan to Ukraine from several nations backed by payments from Russia’s immobilized assets, and a new bilateral US-Ukraine security pact to ensure long-term aid.

Additionally, NATO’s new report on defense spending shows that twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are on pace to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) benchmark for defense spending this year. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, twenty-three allies is “more than twice as many as four years ago and demonstrates that European allies and Canada are really stepping up and taking their share of the common responsibility to protect all of us in the NATO alliance.”

These are positive steps, but they do not solve the lack of speed and scale that plagues NATO’s decision making. NATO should tackle three big sets of deliverables at the Washington summit that began today. At the summit, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to start accession talks, augment military support to Kyiv, and substantially elevate member states’ defense budgets to reach a collective 3 percent of GDP, with an allocation of 0.25 percent of GDP to Ukraine’s military assistance. Only then will NATO be operating at the appropriate speed and scale to address the Alliance’s security challenges and deter further threats from its adversaries.

First, NATO must provide Ukraine with a credible path to membership. Ukraine’s long-term security is impossible without membership in the world’s most powerful military alliance, while Europe’s security cannot be guaranteed without Ukraine in NATO. Statements from leaders of NATO member states that they will do “whatever it takes” to support Kyiv are no longer sufficient—real steps to absorb Ukraine into the NATO family are needed.

I had a chance to serve as a member of the International Task Force (ITF) on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration, co-chaired by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Andriy Yermak. The ITF report released in May has proposed a clear path for Ukraine’s membership in NATO, which should start with NATO inviting Ukraine to start accession talks at the Washington summit this week. To empower the process, the NATO-Ukraine Council should define specific conditions for membership. The ITF also recommends setting a timeline for Ukrainian membership of no later than July 2028, provided specific conditions are met.

Second, NATO must commit to augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities to tip the balance on the battlefield. At ITF, we recommended five concrete initiatives on which NATO member states can agree at the Washington summit: 

  1. Lift all the caveats on the weapons delivered by allies to Ukraine;
  2. Create an extended air defense shield in western Ukraine;
  3. Deploy a freedom of navigation and demining mission in the Black Sea;
  4. Ramp up the training of Ukrainian forces, including inside Ukraine;
  5. Provide the so-called “fix forward” logistics support on the ground in Ukraine rather than transporting it back abroad, which wastes time and money.

The members of the ITF believe that “[t]aken together, these measures would help Ukraine deny Russia the possibility to escalate its conventional war. They would also constitute an enhanced commitment to Ukraine’s security in the interim period between an invitation and full membership.”  

Third, NATO allies must increase military spending. To address the perennial resource question, the Alliance should set an ambitious multiyear trajectory for members’ defense budgets, committing every ally to spend 0.25 percent of their GDP on military assistance to Ukraine. When NATO defense ministers first proposed the 2 percent of GDP defense spending guideline in 2006, the target was not enforceable, and many allies did not take it seriously. Many NATO members failed to meet this target even after the Wales summit in 2014, where NATO leaders signed the Defense Investment Pledge. At the Vilnius summit in 2023, 2 percent of GDP became a “floor” rather than a goalpost. That year, total NATO defense spending, which stood at $1.3 trillion, accounted for around 2.5 percent of NATO’s collective GDP, thanks in large part to the United States’ massive defense expenditure. To reach a 3 percent of GDP spending target for NATO, the allies in 2023 would have been short $234 billion. In other words, an additional 18 percent increase in defense spending would have been required on top of the already steep 18 percent growth last year. 

Adequate increases in spending will take time. At the Washington summit, NATO allies should commit to a multiyear plan of uninterrupted defense budget growth with an aim for all allies, but especially European countries and Canada, to contribute enough to breach the 3 percent spending threshold for the Alliance’s collective defense. 

At the same time, allies should agree to allocate 0.25 percent of their GDP to military support for Ukraine, which would amount to around $125 billion per year. Such an agreement could directly institutionalize NATO’s security assistance and training to Ukraine. The planned NATO command in Wiesbaden, Germany, which will coordinate training and aid to Ukraine and is set to include more than seven hundred personnel, is an important preparatory step for Ukraine’s eventual membership in the Alliance. In addition, the Atlantic Council’s Ian Brzezinski is right to recommend that such arrangements that allow Ukrainian personnel to embed in NATO structures should be accompanied by a formal acknowledgment that Ukraine is ready to join the Alliance.

This week in Washington is an important test for the Alliance. Can NATO operate at the speed and scale of relevance? Progress on paving the way to Ukraine’s NATO membership, augmenting Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities, and unambiguously elevating defense budgets would serve as proof of the Alliance’s continued relevance in a time of uncertainty.


Giedrimas Jeglinskas is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a member of the International Task Force on Ukraine’s Security and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Previously, he served as NATO’s assistant secretary general for executive management and as Lithuania’s deputy defense minister.

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NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-a-strategy-to-address-russias-arctic-expansion/ Tue, 09 Jul 2024 17:07:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778830 The Washington summit this week provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 

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This week, NATO will hold its landmark seventy-fifth anniversary summit. The Washington, DC, event is expected to focus on trade security, the war in Ukraine, and the organization’s greatest adversary, Russia. This comes on the heels of news that a record twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries will reach the Alliance’s defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product this year, according to NATO statistics published on June 17. This increase in spending is in large part a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region.

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together. 

Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing.

NATO members should note that Russia has outpaced the Alliance in its establishment and usage of trade corridors in the Arctic region, funded heavily by Chinese investment. Transporting energy and mineral commodities via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) presents strong advantages to Russia: staying within its territory and circumventing the Suez Canal shortens Russian tankers’ trips to China by about ten days per journey. As climate change warms the Arctic at a pace far exceeding other parts of the world, the viability of the NSR will increase and the region’s strategic importance will continue to grow. Historically, Russian energy in the High North has been dispatched using ships specially built to navigate sea ice, but in September 2023, the first shipment was sent using a conventional, non-ice class oil tanker due to high levels of summer ice melt, an increasingly common phenomenon. 

“The energy crisis that has emerged from the Ukraine war has been building for decades,” Paul Sullivan, an energy and international relations professor at Johns Hopkins University, told us. “Russia’s development of Arctic LNG [liquefied natural gas] and usage of the NSR should be of top concern to NATO countries with concerns about the precarity of energy sources and trade routes, respectively.”

Russia’s economic dependence on exporting its extensive energy and mineral resources has led to strengthened cooperation with China, an imperfect relationship based on mutual need. Chinese state-owned energy enterprises have in the past five years invested billions of dollars in Russian oil and gas ventures and mineral projects in the Arctic. Since facing Western sanctions, Russian reallocation of its crude oil supply to a discounted Chinese market cemented the partnership between the two nations. Since then, this infrastructure investment for ports, pipelines, mines, and railways has surged. Moscow’s interest in securing its trade routes in the High North has been boosted by Russia’s alignment with Beijing, which has affirmed its own involvement in the region as a “near-Arctic state.” For example, Russian and Chinese vessels were spotted in August 2023 conducting joint military exercises near Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. That said, NATO members rethinking Arctic strategies should take a clear-eyed approach as to the extent of the “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing. At the beginning of June, the Russian gas market announced a pause of the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline to China. The deal has reportedly stalled over monopsonistic Chinese demands to pay drastically lower prices for lower quantities of gas.

NATO’s Arctic member states—the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—remain intent on maintaining free and navigable Arctic shipping lanes and are exploring their own energy and mineral resource projects in the region. Jennifer Spence, the project director of the Arctic Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, explained to us that “in these remote areas, military and economic infrastructure development go hand in hand—securitization of the Arctic can help facilitate investments in a more diversified economy for Arctic states.”

Recent European Parliament legislation to facilitate the construction of new mines to secure critical minerals has been a boon to Swedish mining companies, which have discovered mineral resources in the country’s north. In the United States, the ConocoPhillips Willow project is set to commence in northern Alaska’s National Petroleum Reserve, and in Canada, the federal government recently announced new investments in Arctic defense. Separately, the province of Alberta has worked with the state of Alaska to promote energy development ties. Per Spence, “commercial progress in the North American Arctic is comparatively more rhetoric than action, though signals of permanent infrastructure investment seem to be not too far behind.”

NATO’s Arctic member states have increasingly focused on the region as an important operational theater—and this trend should continue. Nordic countries have announced major NATO exercises in the High North as well as training events with the United States. Canada is procuring and deploying new Arctic-proof military aircraft and ships, and recently conducted joint exercises with the United States, demonstrating an independent investment in regional security. The United States has also increased its Arctic presence. This has included an initiative by the US Coast Guard and the US Navy, which built three Polar Security Cutters, upgraded versions of heavy-duty icebreakers replete with advanced sensors and equipment. 

As of now, Russia’s pause in its Arctic developments reflects the status of commercial investment progress in the region. International sanctions, most of which were initiated by countries that are also NATO members, have taken a major toll on Russian Arctic commercial expansion (for example, Russian energy behemoth Novatek suspended production at its Arctic LNG 2 project in the spring due to sanctions and a shortage of ice-class gas tankers). As for NATO progress, according to Sullivan, the Johns Hopkins expert, the accession of Sweden and Finland “increases NATO’s Arctic footprint massively and thereby significantly improves its position.” With a vastly larger Arctic footprint and record levels of military spending, the time is ripe for NATO to further address the looming security consequences of Russia’s Arctic expansion. The NATO Summit in Washington provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 


David Babikian is a graduate from Princeton University in economics. His research practice spans from work with policymakers, investment firms, and nongovernmental organizations, pertaining to climate resilience, commodities, and critical minerals. He is a fellow at Climate Cabinet.

Julia Nesheiwat is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a member of the Atlantic Council board of directors, vice president for policy at TC Energy, and the former US homeland security advisor.

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Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/putin-xi-orban-and-modi-provide-a-disturbing-backdrop-to-the-start-of-the-nato-summit/ Tue, 09 Jul 2024 16:49:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=779133 The split screens haunting the NATO Summit include a deadly attack on a children’s hospital and meetings with autocrats in Moscow and Beijing.

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The split screen was the devastating work of Vladimir Putin. On one side, a barrage of Russian missile strikes hit Ukraine, and rescue workers search for survivors at Kyiv’s finest children’s hospital. On the other side, heads of state and government arrive in Washington for NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit, the world’s most powerful alliance being shown by Putin as unable to save Ukrainian children.

Another screen shows a NATO leader, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, paying homage to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, following his visit with Putin in Moscow. The next screen shows the leader of the world’s most populous democracy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, making his first visit to Moscow since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Yet another screen shows US President Joe Biden looking lost in his presidential debate, raising new concerns about what his health means for NATO’s future.

No one can convince me it was a coincidence that Putin chose Monday, the eve of the NATO Summit, to launch one of his largest recent barrages of missiles on Ukraine. The leaders of Hungary and India both knew the significance of the timing of their visits—one by the Alliance’s most rogue member and the other by a major power keen to underscore its autonomy of action.

It’s appropriate that today’s opening day for the NATO Summit will be marked by a Ukrainian day of mourning for the at least forty-one individuals who died and the more than 170 who were injured in Monday’s attack, not to mention the wrecked hospital infrastructure that would have saved countless other lives. It seems that Putin hasn’t read Article 18 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, ratified by the United Nations after World War II, which prohibits attacks on civilian hospitals.

Ukrainians’ shock and anger at the strike on the children’s hospital in Kyiv could give way to dismay as they watch NATO stand by in Washington. The United States has not yet fully freed up the Ukrainians to use the longer-range Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) that could hit the Russian sites from which deadly missiles are fired. NATO allies once again will likely put off a decision about when exactly Ukraine will join the Alliance, which is the only outcome that will provide the country the long-term security its neighbors in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and Hungary enjoy.

Orbán’s rogue relations with Russia and China come as he takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, something Xi acknowledged as an opportunity, just days after the European Union kicked off new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Orbán stopped in Moscow before he flew on to Beijing.

During his visit to Moscow, Modi called Russia an “all-weather friend” and a “trusted ally.” Putin reciprocated the sentiment by welcoming his “dear friend” to his official residence.

Underpinning the Russia-India partnership is energy. India is the third-biggest crude oil importer in the world, and Russia is its single largest source of seaborne oil, accounting for around 40 percent of imports in recent months, up from just 2 percent in 2021.

Modi would have known that choosing to make the trip during the NATO anniversary summit would rub some US officials the wrong way. However, he, like Orbán, knew there will be little price to pay from Western partners after the trip.

NATO began its mission seventy-five years ago amid an inflection point in history, a story former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson chronicled in his memoir Present at the Creation. Putin and Xi would very much like to be present at the conclusion of NATO and the US-led international order. But they will only be successful if allies don’t respond and if partners go out of their way to back these revisionist autocrats.


Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Bauerle Danzman cited in Nikkei Asia on CFIUS real estate rule https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bauerle-danzman-cited-in-nikkei-asia-on-cfius-real-estate-rule/ Tue, 09 Jul 2024 13:30:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=780947 Read the full article here.

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Read the full article here.

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Infographic: Could Brazil be the future of global food security? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/infographic/infographic-could-brazil-be-the-future-of-global-food-security/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:49:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778936 With an expected global population of 10 billion by 2050, the world must adjust to meet growing food demands. Learn more.

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With an expected global population of 10 billion by 2050, the world must adjust to meet growing food demands. Changes to climate and geopolitical disruptions—from war and conflict to trade—have significant implications to food security. Only a few places in the world have the potential to rise to this occasion. Brazil is top of the list.

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Turkey’s emerging and disruptive technologies capacity and NATO: Defense policy, prospects, and limitations https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/turkeys-emerging-and-disruptive-technologies-capacity-and-nato-defense-policy-prospects-and-limitations/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 21:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777748 An issue brief exploring Turkey's defense technological ecosystem and leveraging its capabilities for the benefit of NATO.

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Introduction

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee considers emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) capable of transforming future military capabilities and warfare through advanced tech applications. Today, official documents indicate that NATO’s EDT-generation efforts focus on nine areas: artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum technologies, biotechnology and human enhancement technologies, space, hypersonic systems, novel materials and manufacturing, energy and propulsion, and next-generation communications networks.

This brief does not cover all of Turkey’s defense-technological capabilities but aims to outline Turkey’s growing focus on EDTs and high-tech advancements. Some signature programs reflect Turkey’s political-military approach and the trends in defense-technological and industrial policies. These programs hint at Ankara’s future military modernization efforts and smart assets. This paper highlights some of Turkey’s critical defense tech programs, focusing on AI, robotics, directed energy weapons, and future soldier/exoskeleton technologies to illustrate the comprehensive and integrated structure of the Turkish EDT ecosystem.

Emerging and disruptive technologies, the future of war, and NATO

Breakthroughs in EDTs are essential for NATO’s future military strength. They will significantly impact defense economics and help shape NATO’s defense-technological and industrial priorities. These efforts involve not just state policies but also public-private partnerships and transatlantic cooperation for sustainable and comprehensive EDT initiatives.

NATO supports these projects through initiatives like the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO-Private Sector Dialogues, which explore collaboration between NATO and private companies on technology and defense.

According to Greg Ulmer, currently president of Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, “the decisive edge in today and tomorrow’s missions will be determined by combining technologies to bring forward new capabilities.” This view is shared by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, demonstrating the importance of AI in Washington’s military modernization efforts to deter adversaries in a future confrontation. There seems to be a consensus in the Western policy community that integrating AI and machine learning into modern battle networks, perhaps the most critical contemporary EDT applications in defense, is essential to succeed in tomorrow’s wars. In an era of increasingly digital and transparent warfare, rapid technological adaptation is key to success.

Smart technologies are proliferating fast, and continuous innovation has become a strategic requirement in today’s geopolitical landscape. AI-augmented precision kill chains, hypersonic weapons within mixed-strike packages, and satellite internet-enabled command and control nodes are already changing warfare. The use of commercial satellite imagery and geospatial intelligence has revolutionized open-source intelligence. Facial recognition algorithms are now used in war crime investigations. Robotic warfare, drone-on-drone engagements, and manned-unmanned teaming are all changing the characteristics of war for better or worse.

Defense economics is also changing. Start-ups are becoming increasingly essential actors in military innovation. According to McKinsey & Company, the number of seed funding rounds in defense and dual-use technology (in the United States) almost doubled between 2011 and 2023, hinting at a rapid proliferation of start-ups in the high-tech defense industry. This trend is fostering new collaborations. NATO is leveraging the strengths of the start-up industry with a $1.1 billion Innovation Fund and is reportedly working with several European tech companies on robotic solutions, AI-driven systems, and semiconductors.

Keeping up with innovation is like boarding a fast-moving train, where getting a good seat ensures a strategic advantage over competitors. By investing in holistic, across-the-spectrum EDT-generation efforts, Turkish decision-makers seem to recognize this imperative.

Great expectations: Turkey in the high-technology battlespace

Turkey has faced challenges with industrial advancements, lagging behind in the Industrial Revolution. For instance, the country’s first main battle tank is still not in service. Despite ambitions to operate its fifth-generation combat aircraft, Kaan, within a decade, Turkey has not ever produced third- or fourth-generation tactical military aircraft. This situation is striking given that Turkey excels in producing and exporting state-of-the-art drones but has struggled with other key conventional military assets.

According to Haluk Bayraktar, CEO of the prominent Turkish unmanned aerial systems manufacturer Baykar, missing out on the Industrial Revolution has slowed Turkey’s military modernization. However, it also pushed the country to leverage digital age technologies, building new strengths in intelligent assets and EDTs.

In recent decades, Turkey’s military-industrial sector has focused heavily on innovation and increasing research and development, driven by a desire for self-sufficiency and operational sovereignty. The country’s National Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021-2025 outlines these ambitions. Forming the central pillar of the government’s AI policy, the document “focuses on generating value on a global scale with an agile and sustainable AI ecosystem.” The strategy also lays out the strategic pillars of the effort, including strengthening international collaboration, encouraging innovation, and increasing the number of experts working on AI.

Similarly, the 2023-2027 Sectoral Strategy Document of the Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries outlines several focus areas for Turkey’s future EDT efforts. These include quantum computing, nanotechnology, and directed energy weapons. The document also highlights the importance of establishing a sustainable, resilient production and testing infrastructure for advanced aerial platforms and increasing the competitiveness of Turkey’s high-tech defense exports.

Selected military programs

Kemankeş loitering munitions baseline

Turkey’s aerial drone warfare capabilities first gained attention with medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) platforms such as the Bayraktar TB-2 MALE drone, Akıncı HALE unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and TUSAS’ Anka MALE drone baseline. Recently, Turkey’s has advanced further in this field, developing smart aerial assets such as the Kemankeş family.

The Kemankeş, introduced by Baykar in 2023, is a “mini-intelligent cruise missile” that combines features of loitering munitions and cruise missiles. It can carry a 6-kilogram payload, and operates autonomously with an AI-supported autopilot system, one-hour endurance, and a jet engine. The Kemankeş is designed for both striking targets and conducting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions. It can be integrated with other aerial drones, making it a versatile tool in modern warfare.

The Kemankeş system offers advanced datalinks and sensors, providing real-time battle updates while targeting adversaries. The upgraded version, Kemankeş-2, boasts a range of over 200 kilometers and an AI-supported autopilot system for precise, autonomous flight. Baykar announced that Kemankeş-2 passed its system verification tests in June 2024.

Kemankeş-2 can operate day and night, in various weather conditions, and in environments where GPS is jammed. Its AI-supported optical guidance system demonstrates Turkey’s rapid advancements in robotic aerial technology.

Naval and ground robotic warfare capabilities

Russia’s war on Ukraine and the ongoing turmoil in the Red Sea have highlighted the importance of kamikaze naval drones. In the Black Sea, Ukraine has used unmanned surface vehicles (USV) compensate for its lack of conventional naval capabilities. It has successfully eliminated about one-third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with naval drones and other long-range capabilities such as the Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG air-launched cruise missiles and coastal defense missiles. Similarly, in the Red Sea, Iranian-backed Houthis have employed low-cost kamikaze USVs effective anti-access/area-denial assets, disrupting global maritime trade and limiting Western commercial activities in the region. Some assessments suggest that the United States should consider forming “hedge forces” consisting entirely of unmanned, low-cost systems to counter initial aggression from a peer opponent, such as in a scenario involving China invading Taiwan. This strategy would minimize harm to military personnel and the loss of valuable equipment.

Turkey has one of the largest USV programs within NATO, with about half a dozen ongoing projects. For example, Marlin, produced by the Turkish defense giant Aselsan and Sefine Shipyards, was the first Turkish naval drone to participate in NATO joint exercises, indicating potential for coalition warfare.

Turkey is also advancing its ground warfare capabilities, leveraging its expertise in robotics. Otokar’s Alpar is a recent example of an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that can map the battlefield in 2D and 3D, navigate without a global navigation satellite system, identify friend or foe, and has Advanced Driver Assistance Systems, low thermal and acoustic signature, and autonomous patrol capability. It can also serve as a “mother tank” for smaller UGVs, enhancing mission capability. Alpar has been showcased at major international defense exhibitions, including the Eurosatory 2024 event held in Paris in June.

In addition to developing new robotic systems, Turkey is focusing on innovative concepts like Havelsan’s “digital troops,” which integrate manned and unmanned teams to act as force multipliers on the battlefield. These efforts across multiple domains demonstrate Turkey’s vision of becoming a leading player in a “Mad Max”-like battlespace that combines conventional and smart assets.

Laser precision: Turkey’s drive in directed energy weapon projects

In Turkey’s expansion of EDTs, directed energy weapons and laser guns are gaining attention. The prominent Turkish arms maker Roketsan has introduced the Alka Directed Energy Weapon System, which has successfully completed live fire tests. The Alka system combines soft kill and hard kill capabilities, featuring both an electromagnetic jamming system and a laser destruction system.

Another key initiative is Aselsan’s Gökberk Mobile Laser Weapon System, first unveiled at the Turkish defense exhibition IDEF in 2023. Gökberk can search for, detect, and track UAVs using radar and electro-optical sensors, and then intercept these threats with an effective laser weapon. Additionally, Gökberk has soft kill capabilities, using its Kangal jammer subsystem to render UAVs dysfunctional. According to Aselsan, Gökberk can protect land and naval platforms, critical national infrastructure, and border outposts.

Turkish future soldier concepts

Turkey is also advancing future soldier technologies as part of its efforts in EDTs. The concept, pioneered by the United Kingdom within NATO, aims to create a modernized force by 2030. Shifting the focus of warfighting from close to deep battles, the British program seeks to transform the army into a resilient and versatile force that can find and attack enemy targets at a greater distance and with higher accuracy.

Ankara’s efforts in this segment are not new. A few years ago, BITES, a leading defense technology and intelligent systems manufacturer owned by Aselsan, developed the Military Tactical Operation Kit ATOK. Equipped with portable and wearable integrated technology, the solution in question was designed to enhance the situational awareness of Turkish troops in a rapidly changing battlefield and maximize personnel security. In line with the future soldier concept, BITES also produced several solutions based on virtual/augmented reality to provide realistic simulation environments.

Aselsan’s “Military Exoskeleton” is another visionary initiative designed to assist troops during demanding battlefield conditions. The exoskeleton provides over 400 watts of leg support. The support is adaptive and AI-supported, meaning that it understands and responds to the needs of the soldier wearing the smart suit. It has an 8-kilometer operation range on a single charge and transfers the soldier’s weight to the ground during long missions, reducing physical strain and improving combat performance.

The way forward: Opportunities and restraints 

Keeping up with industrial trends in a competitive environment is challenging, and Turkey’s defense industry faces several obstacles that limit its full potential.

First, the Turkish defense industry is monopolized. There are structural gaps in the collaboration between the public and private sectors. Unlike other tech-driven nations like the United States, Turkey’s defense ecosystem is not very friendly to start-ups, with established companies dominating the field.

Second, Turkey has a shortage of skilled human capital, largely due to issues in higher education. According to 2022 OECD data, Turkey’s Program for International Student Assessment test scores fell below the OECD average in mathematics, science, and reading comprehension. In addition, evidence shows that in Turkey, the proportion of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral or equivalent graduates in the field of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) is among the lowest among OECD and partner countries.

For sustainable and resilient defense innovation, R&D, business, and a well-educated workforce must go hand in hand. A good example is Baykar, whose chief technology lead was educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of the United States’ leading engineering universities.

Third, high-technology goods comprise a relatively low share of Turkish exports. Despite a focus on high-tech products, over half of the gross value generated in the Turkish defense industry comes from low- and medium-technology products. In 2022, Turkey’s high-tech exports were approximately $7.5 billion, and in 2023, this figure exceeded $9 billion.

While Turkey’s strategic plans and defense industrial goals are ambitious, the abovementioned challenges could jeopardize its position as a leading EDT producer in the medium and long term. Addressing these issues is crucial not only for enhancing Turkey’s EDT edge but also for meeting NATO’s strategic needs.

About the authors

Can Kasapoğlu is a nonresident senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Follow him on X @ckasapoglu1.

Sine Özkaraşahin is a freelance defense analyst and consultant. Follow her on X @sineozkarasahin.

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

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From blueprints to battlefields: How to ensure NATO’s future readiness https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/from-blueprints-to-battlefields-how-to-ensure-natos-future-readiness/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 19:45:58 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778897 NATO’s success hinges on allies’ ability to verify readiness, overcome capability gaps, revitalize the transatlantic defense industrial base, and integrate national defense plans with NATO defense plans.

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During the Cold War, NATO relied on a “forward defense” strategy of amassing forces near the contact line to deter Soviet aggression. After the Cold War, however, the Alliance shifted its defense strategy to a “deterrence by punishment” approach, pulling back some forces but threatening severe retaliation in response to any attack. This change reflected the reduced immediacy of threats to the Alliance at the time. Now, amid Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and rising global instability, NATO is once again adapting its strategy.

This change in the Alliance’s strategy began at the Madrid summit in 2022, where allies agreed to a new Strategic Concept that acknowledged the evolving security landscape and committed them “to defend every inch of Allied territory.” The Vilnius summit in 2023 marked another crucial moment for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. It introduced an ambitious “family of plans” comprising three regional defense strategies, covering the Atlantic and European Arctic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and Black Sea. These three regional defense strategies are supported by subordinate strategic plans across seven functional domains, including cyber, space, special operations, and reinforcement.

This integrated approach aims to synchronize military operations across the Euro-Atlantic region and various domains, offering diverse responses to threats from adversaries such as Russia or terrorist groups. As part of these plans, allies will maintain up to three hundred thousand troops at high readiness (ready within thirty days), along with one hundred brigades, 1,400 fighter aircraft, and 250 ships and submarines. This initiative represents NATO’s most ambitious restructuring of its force posture since the end of the Cold War.

However, successfully executing these plans remains the ultimate challenge. At the Washington summit this week, NATO allies must address persistent issues, such as long-term capability gaps and the revitalization of arms production, to ensure these blueprints translate into actionable strategies. The Washington summit presents a critical opportunity for Allies to chart a clear path forward—not just to demonstrate that these plans exist, but also to provide a credible roadmap for effectively implementing them.

Bridging the capability gap

The fact that twenty-three allied nations are meeting the defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is important progress. However, more needs to be done to ensure NATO’s ability to successfully deploy its regional plans. Under the new regional plans, the Alliance must be capable of defending every inch of allied territory across multiple domains. To accomplish this, allies must adhere to greater capability requirements and higher levels of defense spending.

While the capability requirements based on the regional plans are still being determined as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process, the new defense plans necessitate a three-fold increase to existing military capability targets and for each ally to spend 3 percent of its GDP on defense. The key question facing allied leaders is whether they are ready to commit these resources to ensure the credibility of these regional plans.

The Washington summit presents several opportunities to solidify the implementation of NATO’s family of plans:

  • Exercise at scale and frequency: Allies must reaffirm their commitment to fully resource and regularly exercise the family of plans. This includes conducting exercises at a scale not seen in decades to rehearse, refine, and validate the plans while enhancing readiness. Steadfast Defender 24, NATO’s largest military exercise since the Cold War with more than ninety thousand troops from all thirty-two allies, is a great example of the type of exercises that the Alliance needs to conduct more frequently.
  • Continue to develop regional plans: The executability of NATO’s family of plans hinges on the availability of readily accessible resources, the ability to move forces, and the fulfillment of capability requirements by the allies. To achieve this, allies must place significant emphasis on integrating national defense plans with NATO’s defense plans. This integration will enhance force mobility, foster greater cohesion and interoperability among allies, and strengthen NATO’s overall deterrence and defense posture.
  • Revitalize the transatlantic industrial base: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine has exposed the need for a revitalized defense industrial base. Allies must ramp up defense production to not only support Ukraine but also replenish their own stocks and meet the demands of modern warfare. The Washington summit needs to facilitate collaboration among allies to procure and develop capabilities jointly, leveraging economies of scale and expertise. NATO allies need to expand existing production facilities to meet the increased demand for military equipment, ensuring the timely delivery of critical capabilities. Moving forward with the NATO defense industrial pledge is a step into the right direction to help allies boost already existing industrial capabilities, standardize equipment, and inform their national production strategies.

The Washington summit represents a pivotal moment for NATO. While the family of plans offers a promising blueprint for collective defense, its success hinges on allies’ ability to verify readiness, overcome capability gaps, revitalize the transatlantic defense industrial base, and integrate national defense plans with NATO defense plans in the face of evolving security challenges. By seizing the opportunities presented at the summit, NATO can reaffirm its commitment to collective defense and ensure the credibility of its deterrence posture in an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.


Luka Ignac is an assistant director for the Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.


NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

The post From blueprints to battlefields: How to ensure NATO’s future readiness appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Live expertise and behind-the-scenes insight as NATO leaders gather at the Washington summit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/live-expertise-and-behind-the-scenes-insight-as-nato-leaders-gather-at-the-washington-summit/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 19:16:50 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778534 As NATO leaders gathered, our experts were on the ground at the summit and NATO Public Forum giving their authoritative, up-to-the-minute analysis and insight.

The post Live expertise and behind-the-scenes insight as NATO leaders gather at the Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Over the past seventy-five years, NATO has established its place among the most powerful military alliances in history. But how will it stay fit for the future?

NATO leaders gathered in Washington, DC from July 9 to 11 to grapple with that big question and many others, ranging from Ukraine’s path forward with NATO to the Alliance’s collective defense spending and coordination.

With the global stakes so high, we dispatched our experts to the center of the action at the summit and the NATO Public Forum. Below, find authoritative, up-to-the-minute analysis and insight from behind the scenes of these gatherings.

JULY 12

JULY 12, 2024 | 5:14 PM ET

Jenna Ben-Yehuda’s main takeaways from the 2024 NATO Summit

The Atlantic Council’s executive vice president breaks down the “strengthened approach” the allies took on Ukraine, the Alliance’s language toward China, and some of the other key topics discussed in Washington, DC this week.

JULY 12, 2024 | 11:55 AM ET

Biden’s press conference showed how political drama overtook summit substance

The substantive parts of US President Joe Biden’s press conference on Thursday, at the end of the NATO Summit, were overshadowed by questions about his health and him mixing up the names of world leaders. It was a microcosm of press coverage of this consequential past week.

This year’s NATO Summit made progress on many important issues. The Alliance recognized its global role, highlighting the threats posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea while incorporating the IP-4 countries (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) into its planned response. It took meaningful steps toward strengthening deterrence and defense, including announcing the deployment of new, long-range conventional missiles in Germany. Although more work remains to be done, NATO made progress on burden-sharing, with twenty-three of the thirty-two Alliance members expected to meet or exceed the agreed-upon target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense. And the Alliance took concrete steps to help Ukraine defend itself, offering a “bridge” for Kyiv’s eventual NATO membership.   

Still, much of the coverage focused on domestic political turbulence within NATO’s member states, particularly stemming from the recently concluded elections in France and the United Kingdom, as well as elections in the United States later this year. Some of that coverage questioned whether Biden will be forced off the Democratic ticket or whether a second Trump administration would weaken NATO.

These angles risk missing the bigger picture for the sake of an immediate news hook. NATO has been a successful alliance of democracies for more than seventy-years years. It has weathered more significant domestic political turmoil within its member states before, and it has almost always emerged stronger on the other end.

That will likely be the lasting conclusion when the dust settles on this week’s meetings. NATO is entering its third strategic age. It won the Cold War, expanded in the post-Cold War era, and is now gearing up for strategic competition in an age of interdependence. Despite, or maybe even because of, its members’ vibrant democratic politics, NATO is successfully adapting to meet the new and significant challenges it faces at this inflection point in world history.

JULY 12, 2024 | 11:36 AM ET

Did the 2024 NATO Summit go far enough on Ukraine? The country’s former prime minister responds

The Atlantic Council’s Philippe Dickinson spoke with former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk on the Washington Summit Declaration and how Russian President Vladimir Putin may react to it.

JULY 12, 2024 | 10:24 AM ET

Allies sign ‘Ice Pact’ to counter Russia and China in the Arctic

It might be sweltering in Washington, but three NATO allies have ice in their veins. Yesterday, the United States, Canada, and Finland broke the ice on an Icebreaker Collaboration Effort, or “ICE Pact,” to bring as many as ninety icebreaker ships into production in the coming years—a number nearly as giant as the ships themselves compared to the United States’ current count of two. While Canada and Finland respectively have nine and twelve icebreakers, NATO lags behind Russian icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic.

As the 2024 NATO Summit winds down, the Ice Pact demonstrates how close cooperation among allies is a tremendous asset to US security. As revealed through congressional testimony, siloed US efforts to shore up the icebreaking fleet have faced budgeting complications and time delays. Icebreakers that were originally expected to be built by the summer of 2024 have been delayed to 2029, and will come at a 60 percent higher cost than anticipated. Additionally, the United States hasn’t built a heavy polar icebreaker in nearly fifty years, or a medium polar icebreaker in twenty-five years.

As authoritarian states band together to challenge the international world order, the United States and NATO stand to benefit from collaborative efforts to ensure a peaceful and stable Arctic region. The United States may be increasingly looking toward China, but China is looking north. China’s “near-Arctic” state ambitions, coupled with Russia’s desperate need for partners, are opening a historically peaceful and stable region to potential hybrid warfare and dual-use scientific research. To mitigate these challenges, the United States and NATO must ensure the ability to operate in the region. Shoring up allied icebreakers is a critical step in this direction.

JULY 12, 2024 | 10:05 AM ET

The Washington summit showcased the growing ties between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners

Over the course of this week’s summit, there’s been much attention paid to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4)—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—who are, for the third year in a row, attending the NATO Summit. The decision to extend invitations to these countries comes from a recognition, as explained in the Alliance’s summit communiqué, that the “Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” The two “theaters cannot be decorrelated,” as US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said during the NATO Public Forum on Thursday.

Cooperation and integration between countries in the IP4 and NATO outside of the Euro-Atlantic area is not new, as exemplified by Australia and New Zealand’s support for the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan between 2015 and 2021. However, there has been a significant evolution in this cooperation in recent years, reflecting shared support for Ukraine as well as mutual concern about China and its growing cooperation with Russia. NATO’s role in setting standards across the defense industry also interests the IP4 countries, especially those with a robust defense industrial base. 

First, as reflected in the communiqué, NATO and the IP4 are launching tailored projects in the areas of “supporting Ukraine, cyber defense, countering disinformation, and technology.” These projects will rely on strengthened political and technical sharing of information, especially in the case of Japan, as highlighted by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. Australia, unlike the other IP4 countries, is already well integrated since it has been an Enhanced Opportunity Partner since 2014, which allows it to partake in regular consultations and access interoperability programs, exercises, and information sharing. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said that the steps taken this week on airworthiness certification for Korean aircraft would help ensure “mutual military compatibility” with NATO.

Second, we could see more joint messaging and signaling going forward. Kishida and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg issued a joint statement, saying that NATO and Japan are coordinating to potentially hold joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic region this year. In an effort to jointly work on strategic communication, Japan will dispatch new personnel to the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia. 

Finally, representatives from the European Union (EU) were also present at the meeting Thursday between NATO and the IP4. Their presence reflects the complementary efforts that the bloc might play in the Indo-Pacific and in response to the growing Russia-China nexus. Stoltenberg expressed it best when he said on Wednesday that China “cannot have it both ways” if it continues to play a role in Russia’s defense expansion. NATO this week warned China that continuing to do so will generate negative consequences for “its interests and reputation.”

The EU can leverage funding, know-how, and security capabilities other than in military domains—and it has tools to impose political, economic, and reputational costs to respond to malign actors impacting its interests, including by preventing the flow of dual-use or defense technologies. While there is no consensus on it, some allies have apparently discussed taking action to reclaim some Chinese-owned infrastructure projects in Europe should a wider conflict with Russia break out, a domain that would directly concern the EU. As Campbell aims to “institutionalize” the links between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions, building EU-NATO and US-EU consultation frameworks on China will be key in making sure the multidomain dimension of the threat is fully taken into consideration. 

JULY 12, 2024 | 9:45 AM ET

In a war of attrition, ammunition is critical, as Swedish Minister of Defence Pål Jonson underscored

Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, the NATO Summit emphasizes the imperative of further strengthening the Alliance to defend democracy and protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. However, to secure victory, Ukraine’s forces require a consistent flow of weapons, ammunition, and critical equipment such as air defense systems and fighter jets. NATO allies and other partners have delivered ten long-range Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, roughly 250,000 anti-tank munitions, and 359 tanks, among other critical defense capabilities. 

However, as Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson highlighted at the NATO Public Forum on Wednesday, the challenge will be for NATO members to maintain this support from a production standpoint in the months ahead. 

In the panel, moderated by the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig, Jonson called attention to the fact that Europe’s defense industrial base is shaped for peacetime. But with the ongoing war in Ukraine, stockpiles are depleting and production is not keeping pace. The 1.3 million 155mm howitzer rounds that the United States and European allies are expected to produce this year fall dreadfully short of the roughly 4.3 million shells per year that then Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said last year that Ukraine would need. The inability to reconcile this production gap hinders Ukrainian defenses and detracts from NATO’s power of deterrence. 

Although a historic twenty-three NATO members now meet the target of spending at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, NATO must collectively send a demand signal to the defense industry to adequately ramp up production. Lengthy lead times simply will not suffice. The solution? Jonson argues “Spending more and spending more together.”

JULY 11

JULY 11, 2024 | 7:45 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: The pluses and minuses for Ukraine

This year’s NATO Summit will not be remembered as a seminal event, nor will it be remembered as a failure.

It is the eleventh summit since Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine began in 2014 and the third annual summit since Russia’s large-scale invasion in 2022. Like its ten predecessors, this summit has taken incremental steps to deal with the challenge posed by the first large-scale war in Europe since Adolf Hitler was defeated. There was progress, sure, but it was neither sufficient nor decisive.

On the plus side, the communiqué states plainly that “Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security.” But the question is what steps NATO took this week to address that threat.

The answer came in two ways. The first was in its treatment of the NATO-Ukraine relationship. The hard fact is that neither Ukraine nor Europe will be secure until Ukraine joins NATO. Yes, the communiqué says the decision on Ukraine’s membership is “irreversible.” And it introduced steps to foster cooperation—putting a senior NATO representative in Kyiv, establishing a training program for Ukraine, and implementing a new venue for cooperation in the NATO-Ukraine Council.

But these steps are modest and contrast with the stronger interim advantages enjoyed by Sweden and Finland before they became members. For instance, why can’t the Ukrainian ambassador to NATO participate in the North Atlantic Council (NATO’s decision-making body)? And why can’t Ukrainian officials participate within the NATO apparatus? This might explain why Andriy Yermak, the head of the Ukrainian presidential office, exhibited unease at the NATO Public Forum regarding the question of how he would assess the summit, before acknowledging that Ukraine was “satisfied.”

In contrast to those modest steps, there were better results from the summit in the form of security agreements Ukraine signed with NATO members and partners. While these agreements are no substitute for the protections offered by NATO’s Article 5, in some cases—such as the agreement signed with Poland—they provide additional air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These agreements also pledge long-term security aid.

The picture is also positive when it comes to the actual weapons supplies—the most immediate need—that NATO allies committed to at and around the summit. The new packages include five Patriot batteries and other sophisticated defense systems, Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and F-16 fighter jets. Collectively, this will be a major addition to Ukraine’s defense capability—even if long overdue—and a strong signal to Russia of NATO’s support for Ukraine.

This positive story, unfortunately, has been marred by a well-timed provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin: the egregious attack on Kyiv on Monday that struck a children’s hospital. This was designed to tweak NATO and underscore to Ukrainians how vulnerable they remain. The United States could have turned this incident back on Putin if it used the occasion to remove all restrictions on the use of US weapons against targets in Russia. (Such strikes are now limited to border areas against targets that are planning imminent attacks.) Instead, the White House announced publicly that its restrictions remain in place, a decision that is bad for the people of Ukraine and for US leadership.

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JULY 11, 2024 | 5:20 PM ET

Inside the new NATO action plan for engaging with the Alliance’s neighbors to the south

Yesterday at the NATO Public Forum, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced that the Alliance has adopted a new action plan for its southern flank. The prime minister said NATO must do more in its southern neighborhood because instability there affects NATO allies and because adversaries—namely Russia—take advantage of that instability to pursue their interests and entrench their influence.

The action plan he outlined has three parts: First, NATO will engage in enhanced political dialogue with partners in the Middle East and Africa based on mutual respect and mutual interest. A new NATO special representative for the southern neighborhood will spearhead this effort. Second, the Alliance will enhance work with international organizations such as the African Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League. It will also coordinate its efforts with the European Union, which already engages in development activities in the region. Finally, Sánchez said NATO is ready to work with southern partners to do more to combat terrorism, bolster maritime security, respond to climate change, and enhance resilience.

NATO’s new action plan for working with its neighbors to the south echoes the themes of a report released in May by a group of experts reviewing NATO’s approach to such engagement. Not all will be happy with it, however. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and leading members of her government had called for a more ambitious agreement. Expect calls for more to be done on NATO’s southern flank to come at the 2025 Hague summit.

JULY 11, 2024 | 4:33 PM ET

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

NATO leaders have this week declared that Ukraine’s path to membership is “irreversible,” but once again stopped short of officially inviting the country to join the alliance. This represents another missed opportunity to end the ambiguity over Kyiv’s NATO aspirations and set the stage for a return to greater international stability.

The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine was high on the agenda as alliance leaders gathered in Washington DC for NATO’s three-day annual summit. This focus on Ukraine was hardly surprising. The war unleashed by Vladimir Putin in February 2022 is the largest European conflict since World War II, and poses substantial security challenges for all NATO members.

Since the invasion began almost two and a half years ago, Russia has strengthened cooperation with China, Iran, and North Korea, who all share Moscow’s commitment to undermining the existing rules-based world order. The emergence of this Authoritarian Axis has helped underline the need for a decisive NATO response to Russian aggression in Ukraine. Alliance members are acutely aware that China in particular is closely monitoring the NATO reaction to Moscow’s invasion, with any Russian success in Ukraine likely to fuel Beijing’s own expansionist ambitions in Taiwan and elsewhere.

While there is widespread recognition that the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will shape the future of international relations, this week’s summit confirmed that there is still no consensus within NATO over Ukrainian membership. On the contrary, the alliance appears to be deeply divided on the issue.

Objections center around the potential for a further dangerous escalation in the current confrontation with the Kremlin. Opponents argue that by inviting Ukraine to join, NATO could soon find itself at war with Russia. Meanwhile, many supporters of Ukrainian NATO membership believe keeping the country in geopolitical limbo is a mistake that only serves to embolden Moscow and prolong the war.

Read more

UkraineAlert

Jul 11, 2024

Five reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join NATO

By Paul Grod

The 2024 NATO Summit in Washington failed to produce any progress toward Ukrainian membership but there are five compelling reasons why Ukraine should be invited to join the alliance, writes Paul Grod.

Conflict European Union

JULY 11, 2024 | 3:45 PM ET

The Washington summit shows just how much the NATO-IP4 partnership has evolved

Marking the third consecutive year of attendance by Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) leaders at the NATO Summit, it is evident that this informal grouping is becoming a regular fixture of summit activities. Beyond the symbolic family photos, the substantive engagement is also evolving. With each summit, NATO and IP4 countries are presenting increasingly ambitious agendas for cooperation.

On the final day of the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg opened the North Atlantic Council meeting by emphasizing the “strong and deepening cooperation” between NATO and the IP4. This commitment translated into the launch of four new joint projects aimed at enhancing collaboration on assistance to Ukraine, artificial intelligence, disinformation, and cybersecurity.

Furthermore, addressing one of the central themes of the Washington summit—strengthening the transatlantic defense industrial base to tackle challenges posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—there has been significant discussion about the potential for IP4 countries to co-produce weapons and engage in joint maintenance of military assets.

As an observer of Australian politics, I was particularly struck by the limited international attention given to Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s absence from the meeting, with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Richard Marles attending in his place. In Australia, this decision faced criticism for overlooking important geopolitical discussions, especially given that the gathering was intended to demonstrate that the world’s leading democracies stand united in their commitment to preserve the rules-based order.

A key question surrounding the future of the IP4 is whether there will be efforts to institutionalize this grouping in the coming years (although Stoltenberg stressed yesterday that NATO would not add Indo-Pacific members) and, of course, to evaluate the tangible outcomes based on the current plans for cooperation.

JULY 11, 2024 | 2:20 PM ET

Jake Sullivan previews the Ukraine Compact and takes stock of allied support for Kyiv

According to US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the landscape of the conflict in Ukraine is “far different” today than it was in April, thanks to Ukraine’s battlefield progress and the various steps allies have made in support; and there’s more on the way, Sullivan said today at the NATO Public Forum.

“In a few hours, we’re going to make history again,” he said in a speech where he was introduced by Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, explaining that over twenty allies will be joining together to launch the Ukraine Compact, a commitment to develop Ukraine’s forces and to strengthen them into the 2030s. It “makes clear that we will continue to support Ukraine in this fight,” Sullivan argued, “and we will also help build this force so it can credibly deter and defend against future aggression.”

Sullivan spoke ahead of the NATO-Ukraine Council gathering and US President Joe Biden’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy later today, during which the presidents will discuss the additional assistance needed to “get the job done,” as Sullivan put it.

But getting the job done will require adjusting to “an evolving battlefield,” Sullivan warned, as warfare is “transforming before our eyes” due to Russia’s efforts to expand its defense capabilities—with help from Iran, North Korea, and China—and innovations in both tactics and technology. “Already we’re working with Ukraine to solve some of the key technological challenges,” he said. “No one should bet against our collective advantage.”

The national security advisor took stock of all that allies and partners have done to support Ukraine, both on the military side (providing artillery, air defense systems, long-range missiles, and F-16 fighter jets) and on the diplomatic side (with the Group of Seven’s decision to tap Russian sovereign assets and with NATO’s “bridge” to membership for Ukraine).

“None of the progress that we’ve seen so far was inevitable. None of it happened by accident,” he said. It took NATO allies “coming together,” he explained, “to choose again and again to stand with [Ukraine] to defend the values that have always united us as democracies: Freedom, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity.

“This is what our predecessors did for seventy-five years, and this is what we all must do in the years ahead, even when it’s tough—in fact, especially when it’s tough.”

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 11, 2024

The future of Europe, Ukraine, and the world order is not yet written, says the US national security advisor

By Atlantic Council

Nothing is inevitable, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said at the NATO Public Forum. “It comes down to the choices that we make and the choices that we make together.”

Europe & Eurasia NATO

JULY 11, 2024 | 11:14 AM ET

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

Walking into King Charles Street for the first time as foreign secretary last Friday, I passed the bust of Ernest Bevin.

Bevin was an inspirational Labour foreign secretary—and is a personal hero of mine. He was proud of his working-class origins, firmly internationalist in outlook, and committed to realism, a politics based on respect for the facts.

Nowhere was this clearer than in his role helping to create the NATO alliance seventy-five years ago, which included signing the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 on behalf of the United Kingdom. As foreign secretary, he was equally committed to supporting the nascent United Nations. But he recognized that “naked and unashamed” power politics would limit its ambitions. Establishing NATO therefore became central to his strategy for how to protect Britain and its allies against future aggression.

Moscow protested that this new grouping targeted them. But while Bevin made every effort to engage the Soviet Union in dialogue, he dismissed such criticism. If that was how the Kremlin felt about a defensive alliance, that said much about its intentions.

Seventy-five years on, the wisdom of Bevin’s approach is as clear as ever.

Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations remain indispensable. But they are struggling under the strain of multiple challenges. With a return of war to our continent and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with our closest allies is firmly in the national interest.

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 11, 2024

UK foreign secretary: Why NATO remains core to British security

By David Lammy

With a return of war to Europe and security threats rising, strengthening Britain’s relationships with its closest allies is firmly in the national interest, writes UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy.

NATO Politics & Diplomacy

JULY 11, 2024 | 9:17 AM ET

What to expect on day two: Focus on China and rallying behind Ukraine

An eventful second day of the Washington summit is underway. Heads of state will meet with Indo-Pacific partners, the European Union, and the European Commission, followed by a session of the NATO-Ukraine Council. With yesterday’s communiqué labeling China a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, expect China to feature prominently on the agenda during the discussions with Indo-Pacific partners. NATO-EU cooperation also received significant attention in the communiqué, with emphasis on ensuring European defense efforts are complementary and interoperable with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication. That is reminiscent of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s three “D’s” (no diminution of NATO, no discrimination, and no duplication) regarding European defense ambitions. As the European Union gradually emerges from its election cycle, the new Commission’s defense ambitions will be under particular scrutiny.

Allied leaders will also meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the NATO-Ukraine Council. Following yesterday’s announcement of a minimum baseline funding of forty billion euros within the next year, more air defense systems, and F-16s for Ukraine, discussions will focus on reaffirming that Ukraine’s future lies in NATO. Expect talks on speeding up aid, allowing the use of allied weapons for striking targets deeper in Russia, and adopting a more forceful stance in support of Ukraine.

JULY 10

JULY 10, 2024 | 8:01 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Celebration—with a tinge of frustration and worry

One day into the summit, there is already much to celebrate (beyond the Alliance’s seventy-five years, which of course is no small feat).

The final communiqué calls Ukraine’s pathway toward NATO “irreversible.” For a consensus-based organization, that’s a big deal. On top of that, we can finally see Ukraine’s “bridge” to NATO membership taking form, with the Alliance vowing to station a senior civilian in Kyiv and to set up a command in Wiesbaden, Germany for coordinating security assistance and training—with allies agreeing to send the Ukrainians a package of new air defense systems, including four Patriot batteries.

But with allied leaders saying the bridge will be short and well-lit, major questions remain about the duration and lighting. And what happens between now and Ukraine’s eventual membership, which could still be decades away?

From my conversations around town, I’m gathering that there’s also a sense of frustration amid the celebrations. Thus far there have been no announcements that the United States is willing to loosen the restrictions on how the Ukrainians can use US-supplied weapons. People seem frustrated that Ukraine can’t strike deep inside Russia, and there’s a feeling that the United States is making Ukrainians fight with one hand tied behind their backs.

There is also a somewhat somber mood regarding the US election. US President Joe Biden’s speech last night at the summit kickoff was strong and presidential, but there’s still some doubt about whether he has what it takes to pull off a win in November. And a loss for Biden means a win for former US President Donald Trump, which further rattles already-nervous Europeans. What I’ve been saying to them here at the summit is this: Tell NATO’s story, because it’s a good one. Keep increasing defense spending; twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are now spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an increase from nine allies when Biden took office. And keep shouldering more of the defense burden for the European continent. This is likely what Europeans will wind up needing to do anyway, so best to start now.

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JULY 10, 2024 | 6:48 PM ET

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

What can thirty-two allies accomplish in forty-four paragraphs? NATO leaders on Wednesday afternoon released the Washington Summit Declaration, a consensus document setting forth what the Alliance stands for. In the case of Ukraine, it lays out a “bridge” to membership and a long-term financial commitment, but stops short of declaring when the country will be formally invited into the Alliance, as it continues to battle Russia’s full-scale invasion. The document is also notably tough on China, which it describes as the “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Our experts dig into the fine print below to break down what’s in the communiqué—and what isn’t.

New Atlanticist

Jul 10, 2024

Our experts read between the lines of NATO’s Washington summit communiqué

By Atlantic Council experts

Atlantic Council experts offer their insights on NATO’s Washington Summit Declaration, released on Wednesday during the Alliance’s seventy-fifth-anniversary meeting in the US capital.

China Europe & Eurasia

Watch our experts give their takes

JULY 10, 2024 | 3:51 PM ET

An exclusive look behind the scenes, courtesy of Philippe Dickinson

Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative Philippe Dickinson takes viewers behind the scenes of the NATO Public Forum, where allied leaders are discussing the issues at the top of NATO’s agenda.

JULY 10, 2024 | 3:23 PM ET

How Russian aggression is transforming European security 

Amid ongoing discussions on the nature of the “bridge” to Ukraine’s NATO membership, what should be the criteria for a successful Washington summit in terms of the Alliance’s support for Kyiv?

“Success is that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin makes a call to his defense minister and tells him to get out of Ukraine,” said Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski today at the NATO Public Forum, where he was joined by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielus Landsbergis and Micael Johansson, the president and CEO of Saab, for a panel moderated by Atlantic Council Executive Vice President Jenna Ben-Yehuda. 

In the more immediate future, NATO needs to give Ukraine “a very clear commitment” that “we are serious about the invitation,” Landsbergis said. Ultimately, though, Landsbergis echoed Sikorski’s answer on what constitutes success for the Alliance. “If it’s not a victory,” for Ukraine “then it’s a loss. If it’s a loss, it’s our loss,” not just Ukraine’s, he said. 

Both Sikorski and Landsbergis cited their countries’ history and geography when noting their increases in defense spending. Landsbergis highlighted that in the Baltic region, “there is no big debate whether we should be funding our defense,” touting Lithuania’s commitment to spend 3 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. Sikorski added, “We will do whatever it takes not to be a Russian colony again, irrespective of what anybody else does.” 

When it comes to the private sector’s role in bolstering European security, Johansson called Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “huge wake-up call” for industry. Johansson noted that the European defense industry is “there to support” Ukraine, but outlined some of the obstacles to a better defense investment climate on the continent. One solution to this, he noted, would be for NATO to more clearly outline its capability requirements over a ten-to-fifteen-year timeframe to justify longer-term investments. He also argued that greater European Union (EU) defense investment would help persuade the European defense industry, whose leadership was shaped by a “peace dividend period,” that defense spending will remain high into the future.

While the Washington summit is focused on European security, Sikorski sees an emerging threat from Russia taking shape in Africa. “This business of Russian mercenaries taking over African resources” and destabilizing African nations “has to end.” To counter this threat, Sikorski recommended using an EU rapid reaction force, which he hopes will be operational in a few years. “We don’t need to beg the United States to solve every problem for us,” he said.

At the same time, Landsbergis emphasized that in the event of major global conflicts, neither the United States nor Europe could act effectively alone. “We need these two pillars of the transatlantic alliance working together,” he said.

Note: Saab is a corporate partner for the NATO Public Forum. More information on forum sponsors can be found here.

JULY 10, 2024 | 2:45 PM ET

Beyond the Beltway, Americans’ support for NATO remains strong

NATO is all over Washington, DC, this week. Rows of blue banners adorn lampposts announcing the summit. Heads of state and government have been spotted weaving through the streets in motorcades. On Monday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg even threw out the opening pitch at a Nationals baseball game.

It would be easy in all this DC-based activity to overlook an important fact: Americans’ support for NATO extends well beyond the US capital. According to the latest polling among a nationwide sample of the US public by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, a strong majority—67 percent—of Americans say NATO remains “essential” to US security. Chicago Council polling from last year shows that an even larger share, 78 percent, say the United States should increase or maintain its current support of the Alliance. Moreover, this support is broadly bipartisan, with 92 percent of Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans saying the United States should increase or maintain support. 

Americans’ support for NATO extends across generations as well as across the political aisle. As the Chicago Council’s June poll reveals, 70 percent of Baby Boomers view NATO as “essential” to US security—but so do 67 percent of Generation Z, all of whom were born after the end of the Cold War. Three-quarters or more or respondents across generations—Silent, Baby Boomer, Generation X, Millennial, and Generation Z— told the Chicago Council last year that they favor maintaining or increasing the US commitment to NATO.

Finally, on the important question of NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense guarantee, majorities of respondents across all generations (though only a slim majority of Millennials) said last year that they would support US troops defending NATO allies Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia if Russia invaded. Many Americans, it seems, agree with what US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said this morning: “NATO has always stood by us, and we’re going to stand by NATO.”

JULY 10, 2024 | 1:36 PM

Stoltenberg: If China continues enabling Russia, it can’t expect a “normal relationship” with NATO allies 

“The paradox is that the stronger and the more we are committed [to] long-term support to Ukraine, the sooner this war can end,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on Wednesday. 

Stoltenberg spoke with Atlantic Council President and Chief Executive Officer Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum, saying that he expected allies to, within hours, agree on a “bridge” to NATO membership that aims to bring Ukraine’s defense systems and infrastructure closer to those in the Alliance. With the bridge in place, the hope is that once NATO extends an invitation to Ukraine, “they can become members straight away,” Stoltenberg said. 

Stoltenberg said that Ukraine’s membership in NATO would help stop Russia’s “pattern of aggression”—in which it has violated ceasefire agreements and continued to illegally annex portions of Ukraine. “When the fighting stops, we need to ensure that Ukraine has the capabilities to deter future aggression from Russia, and they need security guarantees,” he explained. “And, of course, the best and strongest security guarantee will be Article 5.” 

Stoltenberg said that “China is the main enabler” of Russia’s war in Ukraine, with China continuing to sell Russia tools and technology that Moscow is using to produce its weaponry. “If China continues, they cannot have it both ways,” Stoltenberg warned. “They cannot believe that they can have a kind of normal relationship with NATO allies . . . and then continue to fuel the war in Europe.” 

One of the major developments over Stoltenberg’s decade as secretary general is closer engagement with the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific partners. “The threats and challenges that China poses to our security is a global challenge,” Stoltenberg argued, adding that the Alliance is facing more and more global challenges—from cyberwarfare to space-security threats. During the Washington summit, Stoltenberg said, NATO and its global partners are working on flagship projects related to technology and supporting Ukraine. Still, he stressed that NATO will not add Indo-Pacific members. “We will remain a regional alliance, but we need to work with our global partners . . . to address these global challenges.” 

With a potential change in administrations raising concern about the United States’ role in NATO, Stoltenberg said he is “an optimist,” reminding the audience that over the course of NATO’s seventy-five years, similar concerns have cropped up as elections took place in various allied countries. But, he said, “we have proven extremely resilient and strong . . . all these different governments and politicians and parliamentarians—they realize that we are safer and stronger together.” 

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 10, 2024

‘I’m an optimist for the future of this Alliance,’ says NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg

By Atlantic Council

The outgoing NATO secretary general spoke with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe at the NATO Public Forum on July 10.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

JULY 10, 2024 | 1:04 PM ET

What is Poland’s role in Euro-Atlantic security?

Atlantic Council Fellow Rachel Rizzo sits down with Szymon Hołownia, marshal of Poland’s Sejm, to discuss the role of Poland in Europe, expectations for the NATO summit, and the implications of the US election for relations with Washington.

JULY 10, 2024 | 12:56 PM ET

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on the ‘blunt military reality’ about NATO

“I’ve never seen NATO stronger or more united than it is today,” US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said at the NATO Public Forum this morning. “And we are determined to keep it that way.”

To help keep it that way, the US defense secretary outlined an “ambitious” agenda that heads of state and government from NATO’s thirty-two allies would tackle at the Washington summit this week.

First, Austin said, the Alliance will continue to implement its so-called “family of plans” to ensure the defense of “every inch” of NATO. This “family” includes (as the Atlantic Council’s Luka Ignac has explained) three regional defense strategies for the Alliance covering the Atlantic and European Arctic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and Black seas. It also includes an array of subordinate plans covering areas such as cyber and space. Austin called this new defensive strategy for the Alliance the “most robust since the Cold War.”

Second, NATO allies will pledge this week to expand industrial capacity across the Alliance. This is intended to help scale up much-needed military production and to send signals to industry as it makes long-term decisions about where to focus its attention and resources.

Third, NATO this week aims to deepen its cooperation in support of Ukraine’s self-defense, Austin said. This includes a new effort by the Alliance to help coordinate some aspects of security assistance and training for Ukraine. 

Austin was unequivocal in his condemnation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “imperial invasion” of Ukraine. He likened it to the “sickening blow of unprovoked aggression” that US President Harry S. Truman, referencing the first and second world wars, spoke about at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. “We will not be dragged into Putin’s reckless war of choice,” Austin said. “But we will stand by Ukraine as it fights for its sovereignty and security,” he added, noting that F-16 fighter aircraft were at that moment on their way to Ukrainian forces. 

Fourth, Austin said that the Alliance will seek to deepen cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific and around the world. “I know that we’re all troubled by China’s support for Putin’s war against Ukraine,” Austin said. “That just reminds us of the profound links between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security.” This is the third year in a row that leaders of Japan and South Korea are attending the annual NATO Summit.

Austin’s speech underscored the wide-ranging nature of the challenges that the Alliance faces today. As Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe said when introducing Austin, “The secretary of defense is facing more simultaneous challenges than perhaps any predecessor.” 

The room was filled with visitors from across the Alliance and the world. But Austin saved his final words for an audience closer to home: Americans. 

“Here’s the blunt military reality,” said a man who spent forty-one years in uniform before becoming US secretary of defense. “America is stronger with our allies. America is safer with our allies. And America is more secure with our allies.

“And any attempt to undermine NATO only undermines American security.” 

Read the full transcript

Transcript

Jul 10, 2024

Any attempt to undermine NATO undermines US security, says Lloyd Austin

By Atlantic Council

At the Washington summit, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin discussed NATO’s history and the Alliance’s plans to bolster support for Ukraine.

Defense Policy Europe & Eurasia

JULY 10, 2024 | 12:30 PM ET

A fond (and substantive) farewell from Stoltenberg

Outgoing NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was first up after the coffee break at the NATO Public Forum this morning. Appearing in conversation with Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe, Stoltenberg came on stage caffeinated and animated, sitting forward in his chair, joking about his first pitch at the Washington Nationals game earlier this week and reminiscing on his longevity in the role.

His main announcement was the (likely) five-pillared package of support for Ukraine that he expected to be announced at the summit, comprising of:

  1. Institutionalized assistance to Ukraine, in the form of a new command in Wiesbaden, Germany, staffed with seven hundred NATO personnel to coordinate training and assistance to Ukraine;
  2. A new “substantial” long-term aid package to Kyiv;
  3. Additional military support, including air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced were currently being transferred to Ukraine;
  4. At least twenty bilateral security agreements between Ukraine and NATO members;
  5. Enhanced interoperability between NATO and Ukraine.

Reflecting on his involvement with NATO summits dating back to 2001, the secretary general projected an optimistic tone for the future of the Alliance. He has made incredible contributions to NATO over those twenty-three years. And the mutual affection was evident in the room, with a warm and prolonged standing ovation to send him on his way back across the street to the summit.

JULY 10, 2024 | 10:35 AM ET

Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s rousing kickoff speeches should linger in leaders’ heads

Sitting in the auditorium where NATO was born for Tuesday night’s official opening for the NATO Summit, it was hard not to be inspired by the unity and symbolism on display. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg gave one of the most forceful speeches of his career. “Everyone in this room has a responsibility, as political leaders, as experts, as citizens,” he said. “We must show the same courage and determination in the future, as was demonstrated in the past when NATO was founded and shaped.”

Stoltenberg was followed by an equally passionate address from US President Joe Biden, who announced a donation of new air defenses for Ukraine and awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Stoltenberg. Biden also extolled the virtues of the Alliance, pointing out how polls show that Americans in both parties back NATO. “And the American people understand what would happen if there was no NATO: Another war in Europe, American troops fighting and dying, dictators spreading chaos, economic collapse, catastrophe,” Biden said. “Americans, they know we’re stronger with our friends. And we understand this is a sacred obligation.”

Both leaders gave it their all. Now that the celebration is over, the hard work begins. Friendship, as both leaders noted, takes work, but we are ultimately stronger for it. Defending our shared future requires Europe to step up and do more on deterrence and defense, alongside the United States. As the summit continues, Biden’s and Stoltenberg’s words should be ringing in their fellow leaders’ ears.

JULY 10, 2024 | 10:01 AM ET

Allies launch new initiative to aid Ukrainian servicewomen

Yesterday, the NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Irene Fellin and the US State Department co-hosted a WPS roundtable, one of only two official side events at the Washington summit. A dedicated event focused on advancing WPS at NATO has become a fixture of the past three summits. But this WPS roundtable was different. 

As Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine with no end in sight, allies reaffirmed their commitment to the WPS agenda. But this year, several allies put their words into action by funding ten thousand specialized gear sets for women in the Ukrainian armed forces. This initiative was supported by the United States with financial contributions through NATO’s comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, and Norway. For allies that want to do more for WPS and Ukraine but have minimal resources to contribute, funding for women’s gear for the Ukrainian armed forces costs a small fraction of the forty billion euros in military aid that allies have pledged to Ukraine in the coming year. NATO should certainly celebrate this win, since ill-fitting gear has placed Ukrainian servicewomen at increased risk of injury on the battlefield. 

As NATO launches its plan for Ukraine’s “bridge to membership” this week, funding gear for women in the Ukrainian armed forces will remain a low-cost, high-impact effort that puts allied commitments for both WPS and Ukraine into action. That said, allies must also remember that this is one of several options on the table for advancing WPS within their continued support to Ukraine. It will be interesting to see how committed allies will be to including WPS considerations within efforts to shore up Ukraine’s defense capabilities, institution building, and military interoperability over the next year.

JULY 10, 2024 | 8:31 AM ET

What will NATO leaders make of Orbán’s “peace missions”?

May you live in interesting times, the old saying goes, but what about living in the weirdest of times? Reflecting the strangeness of the current situation in international politics, one of the leaders of NATO arrived in Washington on Tuesday to attend the Alliance’s historic summit straight from visiting the capitals of NATO’s main adversaries, and just shortly after criticizing NATO and its leaders for being “pro-war” in a Newsweek op-ed.

Less than a week into holding the rotating presidency of the European Union (EU), Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has been jet-setting around the world to meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, purportedly on a “peace mission” to help negotiate the ending of the war in Ukraine. In Beijing, Orbán endorsed Xi’s twelve-point peace plan for Ukraine and highlighted that Hungary will use the EU presidency “as an opportunity to actively promote the sound development of EU-China relations,” i.e. to de-escalate EU-China trade tensions and to reverse the shift to de-risking.

EU, US, and NATO leaders have been quick to condemn Orbán for his visits to Moscow and Beijing, with the representatives of the European Union also fuming at the suggestion that the Hungarian leader negotiated as “the president of the EU.”

Orbán landed in Washington with NATO allies planning to give Ukraine the necessary help for its self-defense and a “bridge to NATO membership” by setting up a new NATO command in charge of supplying arms and military aid to Kyiv.

One of the big questions swirling around the Washington summit, then, is how much further allied leaders will go in responding to one of their own going completely rogue. Another is whether Orbán will sign off at the summit on more support for Ukraine in a war that has just seen some of its bloodiest days.

But it’s worth noting that none of this is terribly new. Since the breakout of Putin’s war, Hungary has opposed Western support for Ukraine and refused to provide weapons or allow other countries to transport weapons to Ukraine through Hungarian territory. Under Orbán’s leadership, Hungary has oriented its foreign policy around Russian and Chinese interests since 2014, doing the two powers’ bidding inside the European Union and NATO and becoming increasingly hostile to the leaders of the United States and the EU. For a NATO ally, Hungary’s behavior has been strange for quite a while, but these days we are seeing even stranger things.

JULY 9

JULY 9, 2024 | 6:31 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: Learn from front-line allies

In my past job as a NATO official, I helped prepare for several of these summits, but none of them was quite like this one. This summit needs to deliver strong outcomes—not only because it’s the Alliance’s seventy-fifth anniversary, but also because we are in Washington (with the US presidential race heating up) and the world is proving more and more volatile, dangerous, and uncertain.

That’s probably weighing heavily on the allied leaders who are crowding Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium this evening for the official summit opening, hosted by US President Joe Biden. For several of those officials—specifically eight from Nordic and Baltic countries—their first stop today was Atlantic Council headquarters, to discuss cooperation in NATO’s northeast.

It is the easternmost and northernmost allies—including my home of Lithuania, where I served as deputy defense minister—that intimately understand the nature of the Russian threat. Because of that common understanding, these countries demand more from themselves: All of them (except Iceland, which doesn’t have a standing military) exceed the NATO target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense.

The Nordic-Baltic agenda for the summit rests primarily on making sure the rest of the Alliance feels that sense of urgency. I’ll be watching closely to see whether NATO increases its defense budget targets and produces clarity on Ukraine’s path to joining the Alliance. But the Nordic-Baltic agenda also includes committing capabilities to implement NATO’s defense plans that were agreed to last year in Vilnius, and reaffirming US leadership in NATO while “future-proofing”—not just “Trump-proofing,” as many are saying—the Alliance with strong commitments from Europe.

The communiqué released at the end of this summit will include dozens of carefully written paragraphs agreed to by consensus. Yet eloquent writing cannot make up for a lack of concrete decisions on capabilities, Ukraine, and investments.

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JULY 9, 2024 | 5:32 PM ET

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

In a dangerous world, NATO’s role has never been more important. Yet, to remain relevant, the Alliance needs to adapt to today’s security challenges at greater scale and speed. After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, it took three years for NATO to deploy the enhanced Forward Presence battalions in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, two-and-a-half years into Russia’s full-scale invasion, the allies have neither defined Ukraine’s path to NATO membership nor delivered what Ukraine needs to win. This “too little, too late” approach from NATO neglects the security interests of member states and empowers the Alliance’s adversaries.

At the latest NATO foreign ministerial meeting in Prague, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised Ukraine a “bridge” to NATO. For a start, US President Joe Biden at the Group of Seven (G7) meeting in Italy delivered a three-pronged blow to Moscow­—a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector, a fifty billion dollar loan to Ukraine from several nations backed by payments from Russia’s immobilized assets, and a new bilateral US-Ukraine security pact to ensure long-term aid.

Additionally, NATO’s new report on defense spending shows that twenty-three out of thirty-two allies are on pace to meet the 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) benchmark for defense spending this year. As Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, twenty-three allies is “more than twice as many as four years ago and demonstrates that European allies and Canada are really stepping up and taking their share of the common responsibility to protect all of us in the NATO alliance.”

These are positive steps, but they do not solve the lack of speed and scale that plagues NATO’s decision making. NATO should tackle three big sets of deliverables at the Washington summit that began today. At the summit, the Alliance should invite Ukraine to start accession talks, augment military support to Kyiv, and substantially elevate member states’ defense budgets to reach a collective 3 percent of GDP, with an allocation of 0.25 percent of GDP to Ukraine’s military assistance. Only then will NATO be operating at the appropriate speed and scale to address the Alliance’s security challenges and deter further threats from its adversaries.

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 9, 2024

How NATO can prove its enduring relevance at the Washington summit

By Giedrimas Jeglinskas

Allies must do more to augment Ukraine’s warfighting capabilities and bring it into the Alliance, as well as boost their own spending on defense.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

JULY 9, 2024 | 4:05 PM ET

A Nordic-Baltic message to Washington: Future-proofing NATO begins in Ukraine 

The security environment has changed in the Nordic and Baltic regions, not only with Sweden and Finland joining NATO, but also with the rise of cyber and information threats and with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  

“In a sense, it’s the old mission coming back with a vengeance,” said Norway’s foreign minister, Espen Barth Eide, at an Atlantic Council event on Tuesday. “And if we didn’t have NATO, we’d have to invent it immediately.” 

Each of the eight Nordic and Baltic foreign ministers and senior officials gathered for the event agreed that they now feel safer with Sweden and Finland having joined the Alliance. Sweden’s foreign minister, Tobias Billström, noted that it was like a “coming home” for them, as joining NATO capped off a thirty-year process of growing closer to the Alliance. Political State Secretary of Finland Pasi Rajala said that joining has been a “big mind shift” for Finns, who have come to realize that they are “no longer alone” in defense. 

As Russia’s war in Ukraine rages on, several speakers argued, continued coordination with each other—and the United States—will be important. “The policy of Russia is war. It’s not going to go away for the next few years,” said Latvia’s foreign minister, Baiba Braže. “So the actions that we take in that regard . . . we need the US to be with us on that.” 

As the NATO Summit begins in Washington, Braže said that she would remind the United States that “they have reliable allies” in NATO. “I think that is something that is very important to internalize for any leading American politician on any side of the aisle,” she said. 

Iceland’s foreign minister, Thórdís Kolbrún Reykfjörd Gylfadóttir, agreed, saying that the United States also “needs to know that they need true friends and allies.” Rajala added that “NATO is not charity; it’s a two-way street.” 

The prospect of former President Donald Trump’s return to office has raised concerns in Europe about the White House’s prioritization of NATO and support for Ukraine after the November elections. Lars Løkke Rasmussen—Denmark’s foreign minister—said that “instead of discussing whether we can ‘Trump-proof’ things, we should discuss whether we could future-proof things.” Lithuania’s foreign minister, Gabrielius Landsbergis, warned that focusing on “just an election” doesn’t answer the question of how allies will “meet this inflection point” in history marked by Russia’s aggression. 

The war in Ukraine has “highlighted the need to step up,” Estonian Undersecretary for Political Affairs Kyllike Sillaste-Elling added. “We don’t have the luxury of waiting anymore. We need to build up NATO’s defense posture.” That can be done by spending more on defense, she added, and ensuring that NATO’s defense plans are able to be implemented.  

Barth Eide argued that the Nordic and Baltic countries have a “responsibility” for maintaining American public support for the idea that backing Ukraine is important for global security. “Because if you live in Europe, it’s hard not to notice what’s happening in Russia. It might not be that obvious in the Midwest or in the deep South of America, we understand that,” he said. “We should also be part of that conversation that this is a good investment for you.”

Watch the full event

JULY 9, 2024 | 1:56 PM ET

So what’s the strategy for NATO?

Host Matthew Kroenig dives into NATO’s effectiveness and strategic posture, with the help of Benedetta Berti, the head of policy planning in the Office of the Secretary General at NATO.

Watch the full episode on ACTV.

JULY 9, 2024 | 1:07 PM ET

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

This week, NATO is holding its landmark seventy-fifth anniversary summit. The Washington, DC, event is expected to focus on trade security, the war in Ukraine, and the organization’s greatest adversary, Russia. This comes on the heels of news that a record twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries will reach the Alliance’s defense spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product this year, according to NATO statistics published on June 17. This increase in spending is in large part a direct response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

At the same time, the danger Russia poses extends well beyond Eastern Europe. The Washington summit provides the Alliance an opportune moment to develop a strategy to address Russia’s growing, and unsettling, Arctic presence, which is connected with Moscow’s complex cooperation with China in the region and with new sea lanes opening due to accelerated ice melting in the region. 

Russia has long viewed the Arctic as a crucial source of income, national pride, and strategic importance. The Russian military has continued to establish an outsized Arctic presence even during its war in Ukraine, now consisting of the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, radar stations, airfields, and missile facilities. A large share of this presence is concentrated in the Kola Peninsula, near NATO allies Finland, Sweden, and Norway. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia operates one-third more military bases in the Arctic Circle than all NATO members put together. 

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 9, 2024

NATO needs a strategy to address Russia’s Arctic expansion

By David Babikian and Julia Nesheiwat

The Washington summit this week provides the perfect moment for the Alliance to forge an even more unified approach to the future of security in the High North. 

Geopolitics & Energy Security Maritime Security

JULY 9, 2024 | 12:49 PM ET

Inflection Points Today: The split screens haunting the NATO Summit

The split screen was the devastating work of Vladimir Putin. On one side, a barrage of Russian missile strikes hit Ukraine, and rescue workers search for survivors at Kyiv’s finest children’s hospital. On the other side, heads of state and government arrive in Washington for NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit, the world’s most powerful alliance being shown by Putin as unable to save Ukrainian children.

Another screen shows a NATO leader, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, paying homage to Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing, following his visit with Putin in Moscow. The next screen shows the leader of the world’s most populous democracy, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, making his first visit to Moscow since Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Yet another screen shows US President Joe Biden looking lost in his presidential debate, raising new concerns about what his health means for NATO’s future.

No one can convince me it was a coincidence that Putin chose Monday, the eve of the NATO Summit, to launch one of his largest recent barrages of missiles on Ukraine. The leaders of Hungary and India both knew the significance of the timing of their visits—one by the Alliance’s most rogue member and the other by a major power keen to underscore its autonomy of action.

Read more

Inflection Points Today

Jul 9, 2024

Putin, Xi, Orbán, and Modi provide a disturbing backdrop to the start of the NATO Summit

By Frederick Kempe

The split screens haunting the NATO Summit include a deadly attack on a children’s hospital and meetings with autocrats in Moscow and Beijing.

China Europe & Eurasia

JULY 9, 2024 | 12:47 PM ET

For NATO, this summit is more than an anniversary—it’s a homecoming

This evening, US President Joe Biden will host heads of state and government, minister-level officials, and civil-society and private-sector representatives to officially open the NATO Summit. But it’s not only the attendees and the reason for gathering that give this event its monumental significance—it’s also the venue.

In recognition of NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, the White House selected the historic Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium as the location for tonight’s occasion. At that site seventy-five years ago (or more specifically, on April 4, 1949) then US President Harry S. Truman convened with eleven allies—Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom—in signing the historic North Atlantic Treaty, enshrining the principals of collective defense and transforming the global order in the aftermath of World War II.

Since then, the world has changed dramatically. In seventy-five years, NATO now includes thirty-two highly capable allies committed to transatlantic cooperation. Defense investments are at record-breaking highs with two-thirds of NATO member states now reaching the spending benchmark of 2 percent of their gross domestic product. The Alliance is deepening its ties with partners in the Indo-Pacific to protect the rules-based international order and counter rising cooperation between Russia and its allies.

In many ways, tonight will be a homecoming for the Alliance—one that marks an important milestone for NATO and offers allied leaders the opportunity to reflect on seventy-five years of expanding coordination on deterrence and defense.

JULY 9, 2024 | 12:03 PM ET

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

NATO’s recent defense expenditure report was a cringeworthy moment in Madrid. Despite self-applauding recent years of defense spending growth, Spain had the unenviable distinction of ranking dead last among Alliance members for defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), clocking in at an estimated 1.28 percent for 2024. Although consistently investing in equipment expenditures at or above the NATO guideline of 20 percent of its defense budget, Spain’s inability to spend on defense at a rate agreed upon by allies will lend credence to naysayers who question its commitment to the Alliance.

However, while Spain unambiguously falls short of the 2 percent of GDP metric, a careful look at Madrid’s commitment to transatlantic security shows that Spain not only actively participates in the Alliance’s military operations, it also enthusiastically leads NATO missions and supports Ukraine while helping guard Europe’s southern flank.

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 9, 2024

Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain’s contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending

By Andrew Bernard

While Spain still falls short of its defense spending goals, Madrid nevertheless leads NATO missions, supports Ukraine, and helps guard Europe’s southern flank.

Defense Industry Defense Policy

JULY 9, 2024 | 9:15 AM ET

The NSC’s Michael Carpenter details Ukraine’s “bridge to membership”

On the eve of the NATO Summit, US National Security Council’s Michael Carpenter broke down one of the summit’s biggest expected outcomes on Monday at the Atlantic Council: Ukraine’s “bridge to membership.” 

“We have a meaty, solid deliverable for Ukraine” that includes support for training and force development, a new senior civilian representative in Kyiv, and bilateral financial pledges, Carpenter explained. “We want Ukraine to have the capabilities, the readiness, to be able to essentially plug and play with the rest of the Alliance on day one when they get the invitation.”

Carpenter appeared at a curtain-raiser event held by the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. He spoke alongside Benedetta Berti, head of policy planning at NATO, and Matthew Kroenig, vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.  

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made clear that “spending in defense is not a luxury,” but rather it “is incredibly essential,” Berti said. In preparing for “resourcing our defense plans,” she explained, “a number of countries” will need to spend more than 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. But “the trajectory is positive,” she said; “they understand that 2 percent truly is the bottom, the bare minimum.” 

Ahead of US elections in November, the prospect of a new administration is raising concerns about the United States’ role in NATO. Kroenig noted that while former President Donald Trump has had “some tough words” for NATO allies, so too did former Democratic administrations. He then pointed to a study that found broad support for NATO across the US political spectrum. “The support for NATO is bipartisan and strong,” he said, “stronger than some people might think looking at the headlines.” 

Watch the full event

PRE-SUMMIT ANALYSIS

JULY 8, 2024 | 5:32 PM ET

Dispatch from the NATO Summit: What to watch this week, beyond the political fireworks

Just last week, the roads in Washington were packed with fireworks-seeking Americans celebrating the Fourth of July. Now, several downtown roads are closed and NATO flags wave in the rare breeze. Thanks to the many workers who toiled in baking heat, this city is ready for the NATO Summit.

Washington is hosting the summit for the first time since 1999—a geopolitical lifetime ago. This year is NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary, and there is a sense of anticipation that this could be a make-or-break summit for the Alliance.

There will be a lot of focus on politics—and not just because the summit is taking place in politics-obsessed Washington (where residents form long lines outside bars for presidential-debate watch parties). One of NATO’s major goals will be to project unity. On this front, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s unexpected trips to Moscow and Beijing in recent days haven’t helped.

Ukraine and the defining question of its future membership in NATO will test the display of unity. The White House has talked about building a “bridge to membership” for Ukraine. At Atlantic Council headquarters this afternoon, the US National Security Council’s Mike Carpenter hinted at what that bridge would be made of: financial pledges, numerous bilateral security agreements, and a new senior NATO civilian post in Kyiv.

But NATO is a military alliance as well as a political one. Tangible progress on military planning efforts might not get the headlines, but it will be consequential for NATO’s ability to deter aggression. NATO nerds will be keeping an eye out for how the Alliance operationalizes NATO’s regional plans, develops its multi-domain warfighting abilities, reforms its command-and-control structure, and refines how allied militaries quickly work together in a crisis.

As a co-host of the NATO Public Forum, the Atlantic Council will be at the heart of the action, guiding allied leaders and senior officials in conversations about the top issues on the agenda.

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JULY 8, 2024 | 2:37 PM ET

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

Though all eyes will be on Ukraine as NATO leaders gather in Washington this week, the Alliance cannot afford to ignore the Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies face what is perhaps the most daunting international security environment since World War II. Revisionist autocracies—China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are working together to disrupt and displace the US-led, rules-based international system, including through military aggression and coercion. The challenge facing the free world, therefore, is how to simultaneously counter multiple adversaries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe, but this is the wrong answer. Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific . . .

We propose the following actions for NATO and its constituent members to bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region. Some of these initiatives are already underway, but there is room to both intensify these activities and expand them to include fuller participation from additional transatlantic partners.

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Memo to…

Jul 8, 2024

Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

By Matthew Kroenig, Jeffrey Cimmino

NATO and its constituent members must bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around existing US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region.

Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific

JULY 8, 2024 | 12:55 PM ET

Who’s at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This week, NATO allies will gather in Washington DC, to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Alliance. Many of those allies have historically failed to meet the NATO target, set in 2014, of allocating 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, even as the United States in particular has pushed for more defense investment for the sake of burden sharing across the Alliance. However, this year, a record number of countries have stepped up. Out of the thirty-two NATO allies, twenty-three now meet the 2 percent target, up from just six countries in 2021. 

This surge in defense spending follows Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The war in Ukraine has prompted an unprecedented 18 percent increase in defense spending this year among NATO allies across Europe and Canada. In total, NATO countries now meet the 2 percent target, together spending 2.71 percent of their GDP on defense. This creates positive momentum and success to build on for the Washington summit, which is expected to highlight the Alliance’s collective strength and focus on deeper integration with Ukraine. 

Poland stands out as the biggest spender, allocating 4.12 percent of its GDP to defense. Sweden has also increased its defense spending dramatically since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Washington summit will witness Sweden’s first participation in a NATO summit as an official NATO member, following its accession in March.  

As NATO celebrates its seventy-fifth anniversary, the large increase in defense spending can help renew the Alliance’s unity and strength to continue supporting Ukraine and be prepared for the future. 

JULY 8, 2024 | 12:36 PM ET

The three items at the top of NATO’s summit agenda

Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe joins CNBC to outline what he expects allied leaders will tackle at the summit: deterrence and defense, Ukraine’s path forward with NATO, and the Alliance’s relationship with its Indo-Pacific partners.

JULY 8, 2024 | 12:18 PM ET

What to expect at the NATO Summit in Washington

Our experts Ian Brzezinski, Kristen Taylor, and Ryan Arick break down what to expect as allies gather this week: new defense plans, efforts to step up defense-industry production, support for Ukraine, and more.

JULY 8, 2024 | 7:05 AM ET

Inflection Points: The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

Amid the noise accompanying NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington this week—with the backdrop of growing concerns over US President Joe Biden’s health—you can be excused if you missed last week’s meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Kazakhstan.

The SCO’s ten member countries, led by China and Russia, reached twenty-five agreements on enhancing cooperation in energy, security, trade, finance, and information security, including the adoption of something expansively called the “Initiative on World Unity for Just Peace, Harmony, and Development.”

Western leaders often roll their eyes at the lofty language and empty agreements of the SCO, which was invented in 2001. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the intention behind the SCO’s ambition to be a counterweight to NATO and a piece of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s larger goals to supplant the existing global order of rules and institutions with something more to their own liking . . .

Even if one sets the SCO meeting entirely to the side, NATO leaders this week confront three simultaneous but underestimated threats, none of them explicitly on their agenda.

These threats are: (1) considerably increased coordination, particularly in the defense-industrial realm, among adversarial autocracies; (2) continued and growing weaknesses among democracies (underscored in the Atlantic Council’s newest edition of its Freedom and Prosperity Indexes); and (3) insufficient recognition among NATO’s thirty-two members of the gravity of the historic moment, reflected in their still-inadequate backing for Ukraine.

“Like a lightning strike illuminating a dim landscape,” wrote Jonathan Rauch in the Atlantic last week, “the twin invasions of Israel and Ukraine have brought a sudden recognition: What appeared to be, until now, disparate and disorganized challenges to the United States and its allies is actually something broader, more integrated, more aggressive, and more dangerous.”

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Inflection Points

Jul 8, 2024

The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats

By Frederick Kempe

Autocracies’ growing common cause, democracies’ continued weaknesses, and an insufficient recognition of the gravity of the historic moment confront the Alliance as it meets in Washington.

Central Asia China

JULY 7, 2024 | 10:13 PM ET

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

The NATO Summit will take place in Washington, DC, this week, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of history’s most successful military alliance. A major topic of the summit will be Russia’s war in Ukraine and Ukraine’s future relationship to the Alliance. Some believe that it is risky to talk about Ukraine joining NATO any time soon, but, on the contrary, the free world would be much safer with Ukraine in the Alliance. Membership for Ukraine would be fundamental for lasting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, benefiting both Ukraine and NATO.

At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO members declared that Ukraine would join the Alliance at some unspecified point in the future. At last year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, following Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allies reaffirmed their 2008 commitment, adding the tautological qualifier that they would only “extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

This year, the Alliance is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” which will consist of a number of measures meant to strengthen Ukraine. These measures are expected to include NATO’s stepped-up role in coordinating military assistance and pledging long-term support, as well as individual Alliance members promising investments in Ukraine’s defense industrial base and further development of bilateral security agreements. However, these steps still fall well short of an invitation to join the Alliance.

Hesitancy to extend an invitation to join the Alliance stems mostly from a concern about what Ukrainian membership would mean for the security of existing NATO allies, including the United States. Would an invitation be provocative to Russia and set off a new cycle of escalation? What does it mean to extend a NATO Article 5 security guarantee to a country already in conflict, and would this be tantamount to a NATO declaration of war against Russia? Even if the current conflict dies down, creating space for Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to abandon his deep desire to reconquer Ukraine. Would not a future Russian attack on Ukraine set off a direct NATO-Russia war?

To help answer these questions, the Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring that brought together dozens of leading experts, including current US and allied government officials, to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. Some exercises were set in the near future, after Ukraine had already joined NATO, while others gamed out the process of Ukraine joining NATO. The scenarios included variants in which Ukraine had succeeded in taking back all of its territory, and others in which parts of the country remained occupied by Russia.

The results of the exercises were unequivocal: Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. 

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New Atlanticist

Jul 7, 2024

The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why.

By Matthew Kroenig and Kristjan Prikk

The Atlantic Council recently held a series of tabletop exercises to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. The results are clear.

Europe & Eurasia NATO

GEARING UP

JULY 5, 2024 | 4:21 PM ET

NATO’s Irene Fellin: The inclusion of women, peace, and security in its plans may be the Alliance’s biggest achievement

We sat down with Irene Fellin, NATO’s special representative for women, peace, and security (WPS), to talk about why implementing the WPS agenda is important for the Alliance’s goals and future.

JULY 5, 2024 | 3:51 PM ET

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

WARSAW, Poland—After ten days in Warsaw, I’m struck by Poland’s rise, politically and militarily—even amid the dangers the country faces from Russia and Poles’ intensified post-debate doubts about the steadiness of the United States.

Poland’s strategic consensus—in support of Ukraine, opposed to Russia’s aggression, pro-NATO, and committed to its alliance with the United States—is solid, notwithstanding second-order (and avoidable) sniping between the governing coalition and the rightist opposition that controls the presidency. That’s more than can be said for France or, for that matter, the United States.

Poland’s dark assessment of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia has been vindicated. But the Poles are not indulging in declinist pessimism or Ukraine fatigue. Poland’s best analysts, including those within Warsaw’s top-notch Center for Eastern Studies, are more optimistic about the course of the war in Ukraine than I have heard in a long time. They don’t foresee easy Ukrainian success, but their bottom line is that time is no longer necessarily on the Kremlin’s side—if the West keeps up the pressure. Relative success for Ukraine is possible, the analysts maintain, if—though only if—the West keeps backing Ukraine by delivering more weapons with fewer conditions, tightening economic pressure against Russia, and generally pushing back on Putin’s imperial ambitions. (I’d come to Poland for the Atlantic Council’s “Warsaw Week” events and a Warsaw University conference on how to deter Russia.)

In a good precedent for Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, Poland’s military spending started to rise sharply under the previous government, and that trend has continued under the current one. Newly purchased heavy equipment, tanks, and fighter aircraft are arriving to replace tanks and aircraft that Poland sent to Ukraine shortly after the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022.

But the West, the key institutions of which Poland joined at great effort, is no longer looking as sure as Poland had counted on. The June 27 debate between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump came as a shock to the Poles, who, like many, had not expected such a poor showing from Biden. The next day, many Poles were more openly contemplating the increased possibility of a second Trump term and weighing Poland’s options if the former president were to return to the White House. Trump’s more critical statements about NATO and friendly statements about Putin alarm many in Warsaw. But Polish politicians on both sides of the country’s political divide have good relations with many US Republicans both inside and outside Trump world, including Trump himself. They are now considering how to use these relationships to advance Poland’s customary “free world first” strategy.

Read more

New Atlanticist

Jul 5, 2024

Dispatch from Warsaw: Poland’s military and economic rise is coming just in time, as the West wobbles

By Daniel Fried

Its rise at home and its strategic clarity about Russia have placed Poland in the first rank of European powers for the first time in centuries.

NATO Poland

JULY 5, 2024 | 1:19 PM ET

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

From July 9 to 11, the United States will host the NATO Summit in Washington, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of what has been deemed by some as the world’s “most successful military alliance.” While the summit will mark an important milestone in NATO’s history, it will also provide an opportunity to discuss the future of the Alliance and for high-level officials to engage in discussions about boosting defense and deterrence in the most dangerous security environment since the Cold War.

Among those attending the summit will be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey has been a major contributor to NATO’s operations around the world since it joined the Alliance in 1952 to defend itself and NATO’s southeastern flank against the Soviet threat. Today, as the Alliance’s second-largest military power and the gatekeeper of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey plays a critical role in European stability and security. However, the complex nature of Ankara’s relationship with Washington and a lack of dialogue between the allies have often overshadowed the successes in the transatlantic partnership and limited opportunities for cooperation.

US Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake recently said that the NATO Summit provides an opportunity for a meeting between Erdoğan and US President Joe Biden, as “there is some desire on both sides” to do so. It remains unclear, however, whether this meeting will take place. Erdoğan’s previously scheduled visit to the White House in May was canceled due to scheduling problems, as cited by both sides, and Flake said it happened at a time when the crisis in Gaza cast a “difficult political backdrop.”

Despite that backdrop, Biden and Erdoğan shouldn’t let another opportunity to meet go to waste, as close cooperation would bring to bear several geopolitical, economic, and security benefits.

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TURKEYSource

Jul 5, 2024

Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey

By Yevgeniya Gaber

Strengthening relations between the US and Turkey will be critical for the future of the Alliance’s regional defense strategies.

Conflict Eastern Europe

JULY 5, 2024 | 11:54 AM ET

This NATO Summit will be of historic importance

At this new time of global turmoil, NATO stands as a beacon of hope for freedom, democracy, and human rights, explains Atlantic Council President and CEO Frederick Kempe.

JULY 4, 2024 | 9:52 PM ET

Smart in sixty seconds: Why NATO matters

The Atlantic Council’s Ashley Semler breaks down new analysis from Richard D. Hooker Jr. explaining that NATO still matters because it has significant economic, political, and military benefits—and because it offers the United States a way to cope with China and Russia simultaneously.

Chart the Alliance’s future

Essays on the Alliance’s future

As the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces revanchist old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order. This series features seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security. 

The post Live expertise and behind-the-scenes insight as NATO leaders gather at the Washington summit appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Memo to NATO leaders: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/memo-to/nato-leaders-indo-pacific/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 18:37:04 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777885 NATO and its constituent members must bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around existing US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region.

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TO: NATO heads of state and government
FROM: Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino
SUBJECT: Why and how NATO countries should engage in the Indo-Pacific

What do world leaders need to know? The Atlantic Council’s new “Memo to…” series has the answer with briefings on the world’s most pressing issues from our experts, drawing on their experience advising the highest levels of government.

Bottom line up front: NATO countries should step up their engagement in the Indo-Pacific in a number of ways, including by protecting their economies from excessive exposure to China’s, reiterating diplomatic statements calling for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and conducting regular freedom-of-navigation operations. Transatlantic allies have self-interested reasons to engage in the Indo-Pacific; the United States cannot counter the challenges emanating from the region without European help; and transatlantic engagement in the region will help counter the reality and the perception that European allies are not contributing their fair share to NATO.

Background: Confronting multiple adversaries

Though all eyes will be on Ukraine as NATO leaders gather in Washington this week, the Alliance cannot afford to ignore the Indo-Pacific. The United States and its allies face what is perhaps the most daunting international security environment since World War II. Revisionist autocracies—China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are working together to disrupt and displace the US-led, rules-based international system, including through military aggression and coercion. The challenge facing the free world, therefore, is how to simultaneously counter multiple adversaries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Some analysts argue that the United States should disengage from Europe and pivot to the Indo-Pacific, while European countries take on greater responsibility in Europe, but this is the wrong answer. Instead, Washington should continue to lead in both theaters. European countries should take on greater responsibilities for defending Europe, but they should also assist Washington to counter China and address threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific.

This memo is directed to NATO leaders on the eve of the Washington Summit, but some of the below recommendations can also be pursued at the country level, or through other bodies, such as the European Union.

Why European countries should deepen engagement in the Indo-Pacific

  • Europe has many concrete interests in the Indo-Pacific. A major war between the United States and China, for example, would be devastating for the global economy and for the interests of European nations. The 2021 EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific states that the security of South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait may have a direct impact on European security and prosperity.
  • The United States needs Europe’s help to effectively address the China challenge. The China threat is comprehensive and includes an economic and technological dimension. While Europe is not a military superpower, it is an economic, technological, and diplomatic superpower. European nations make up roughly 20 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) and are technology leaders in many areas, including 5G. A US strategy of economic and technological de-risking from China, for example, will fail without European cooperation.
  • European engagement in the Indo-Pacific can contribute to Alliance burden sharing. By helping the United States address its most significant challenge, China, European nations can help to show that they are valuable allies meaningfully contributing to transatlantic security.
  • A European role in the Indo-Pacific can strengthen US domestic support for continued US engagement in Europe. Some Americans argue that the United States should pivot away from Europe to allocate more attention and resources to the bigger challenges posed by China and the Indo-Pacific. By helping the United States address the China challenge, Europe can demonstrate its continued value as an Alliance partner and strengthen US support for continued attention to European priorities.
  • The European and Indo-Pacific theaters are interconnected. China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership in 2022 shortly before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and they are collaborating closely in many strategic and military matters. More recently, they reaffirmed this partnership as marking a “new era.” Countering China in the Indo-Pacific will directly improve the security environment in Europe.  

We propose the following actions for NATO and its constituent members to bolster cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners and build around US efforts to secure the Indo-Pacific region. Some of these initiatives are already underway, but there is room to both intensify these activities and expand them to include fuller participation from additional transatlantic partners.

  • Transatlantic allies should join the United States in systematically de-risking their economies from China. To be most effective, a de-risking strategy will need to include all free-world allies and partners. De-risking should proceed according to the following principles:
    1. The United States and its allies should pursue a complete decoupling from China in areas sensitive to national security.
    2. In domains where China has employed unfair trade practices, the United States and its allies should counter with a coordinated campaign of tariffs or other countervailing measures.
    3. The United States and its allies should diversify their economic relationships away from China to minimize their exposure to Chinese economic coercion.
    4. In sectors of minimal national security risk where China is abiding by free-market principles, free and fair trade can continue.
  • European allies should threaten to sanction China if it engages in an armed attack on US allies and partners in Asia. If China were to attack Taiwan or other regional neighbors, Washington would encourage European and Indo-Pacific allies to join the United States in punitive economic measures. Allies should develop a sanctions package in preparation for a crisis ahead of time and communicate it to Xi Jinping as a an element of a broader deterrent.
  • The United States and its transatlantic allies should coordinate to control the commanding heights of twenty-first-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence. If China, a hostile autocratic power, succeeds in its plans to dominate the twenty-first-century technological landscape, there will be profound and negative consequences for global security, economics, and democracy. Maintaining a tech advantage that favors freedom will require:
    1. Promoting technological development and innovation ecosystems in the free world;
    2. Protecting against China’s malign technology practices through investment screening, export controls, and countering intellectual property theft; and
    3. Coordinating on regulations and standards to embed Alliance norms and values into twenty-first-century technology.
  • NATO allies should make it clear through diplomatic statements that any effort by China to disrupt peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait would trigger a break in relations with the free world. Beyond a Taiwan crisis, NATO allies can use diplomatic statements to call out human rights abuses and unfair trade practices, leveraging Europe’s moral authority in the face of China’s violations of international rules and norms. These statements should take place both collectively, in official alliance documents, and privately, in bilateral engagements between NATO members and Chinese officials.
  • The United States and Europe should work together to develop new frameworks to stitch together transatlantic and Asian allies. These frameworks can expand upon or be modeled on NATO’s relationship with the IP4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) and the Australia-UK-US agreement known as AUKUS.
  • NATO allies can help the United States in the Indo-Pacific by meeting their burden-sharing commitments. If Europe has a more robust ability to defend itself, deter Russia, and bolster Ukraine’s defense, this will free up resources for the United States to shift to deterring and, if necessary, defeating Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific.
  • European allies can serve as an arsenal of democracy for possible conflicts in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of a serious conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the United States will run out of high-end munitions quickly. Europe could play a vital support role by producing and replenishing US stocks of munitions and other weapons.
  • NATO countries should conduct freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs) in the Indo-Pacific. Several European allies, including Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, have executed FONOPs in the Indo-Pacific. More allies should do so, and on a more regular basis, to show China that in asserting its territorial claims, it is not just confronting its neighbors or the United States, but the entire free world.
  • NATO allies should participate in military exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Seven European nations are at RIMPAC 2024. Future participation by these countries and others could range from sending a ship, to a squadron of special operations forces, or even a single staff officer. These activities will improve Atlantic-Pacific cooperation and send a message to China that Europe is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the region.
  • European allies should prepare for an Article 5 scenario. If there is a major US-China war, it is possible that China would attack the continental United States, which would trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO allies should contemplate and plan for what actions they would take in the event of a major war in the Indo-Pacific. More capable allies might be able to send ships and aircraft. All allies could send personnel and munitions. Some allies could offer niche capabilities. Norway, for example, has a large merchant fleet that could be used in wartime for shipping and logistical support in the Indo-Pacific.

Jeffrey Cimmino is the deputy director of operations and a fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Matthew Kroenig served in the Department of Defense and the intelligence community during the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. He is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. 

This publication was supported in part by Airbus. The Atlantic Council maintains a strict intellectual independence policy, and the analysis and conclusions in this memo are the authors’ alone. 

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The NATO Summit faces three simultaneous threats https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/the-nato-summit-faces-three-simultaneous-threats/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 11:05:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778641 Autocracies’ growing common cause, democracies’ continued weaknesses, and an insufficient recognition of the gravity of the historic moment confront the Alliance as it meets in Washington.

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Amid the noise accompanying NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary summit in Washington this week—with the backdrop of growing concerns over US President Joe Biden’s health—you can be excused if you missed last week’s meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Kazakhstan.

The SCO’s ten member countries, led by China and Russia, reached twenty-five agreements on enhancing cooperation in energy, security, trade, finance, and information security, including the adoption of something expansively called the “Initiative on World Unity for Just Peace, Harmony, and Development.”

Western leaders often roll their eyes at the lofty language and empty agreements of the SCO, which was invented in 2001. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the intention behind the SCO’s ambition to be a counterweight to NATO and a piece of Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s larger goals to supplant the existing global order of rules and institutions with something more to their own liking.

It’s no accident that the SCO meeting came a week ahead of the Alliance summit, but perhaps a coincidence that it was on the Fourth of July.

“SCO members should consolidate unity and jointly oppose external interference,” Xi said, warning against the West’s “Cold War mentality,” according to Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency.

In his address to the SCO, Putin called for “a new architecture of cooperation, indivisible security, and development in Eurasia, designed to replace the outdated Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models, which gave unilateral advantages only to certain states.”

Putin didn’t need to mention the United States, as the SCO’s members all knew which country he meant. The organization has expanded beyond its original five members—China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—to include India, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Last week, Belarus joined as the tenth member, and there are another sixteen partners and observers.

Confronting a confluence of threats

Even if one sets the SCO meeting entirely to the side, NATO leaders this week confront three simultaneous but underestimated threats, none of them explicitly on their agenda.

These threats are: (1) considerably increased coordination, particularly in the defense-industrial realm, among adversarial autocracies; (2) continued and growing weaknesses among democracies (underscored in the Atlantic Council’s newest edition of its Freedom and Prosperity Indexes); and (3) insufficient recognition among NATO’s thirty-two members of the gravity of the historic moment, reflected in their still-inadequate backing for Ukraine.

“Like a lightning strike illuminating a dim landscape,” wrote Jonathan Rauch in the Atlantic last week, “the twin invasions of Israel and Ukraine have brought a sudden recognition: What appeared to be, until now, disparate and disorganized challenges to the United States and its allies is actually something broader, more integrated, more aggressive, and more dangerous.”

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—working with others—haven’t formed “a NATO-like formal structure,” but instead what Rauch calls an “Axis of Resistance.” This axis, he explains, “relies on loose coordination and opportunistic cooperation among its member states and its network of militias, proxies, and syndicates.” Unable to match the United States and NATO directly, “it instead seeks to exhaust and demoralize the U.S. and its allies by harrying them relentlessly, much as hyenas harry and exhaust a lion.”

Meanwhile, writes Patrick Quirk, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council: “The security of the United States, democratic partners and allies, and humanity’s future depends significantly on the state of democracy worldwide. Yet, over the past seventeen years, if we look at indices like those published by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center, authoritarianism has risen globally, while democracy shows alarming decline in regions of importance to the United States.”  

Quirk, in a significant new report for the Atlantic Council, examines the challenges and offers solutions. They range from supercharging efforts to counter China’s malign influence to shoring up key democratic institutions in strategically important countries. He concludes with a compelling set of recommendations for the US Congress and whomever is elected US president in November—recommendations as difficult to execute as they are necessary.

Building the “bridge”

The most immediate issue for NATO this week is how best to deal with defending Ukraine and offering it a path to Alliance membership. These are decisions that will underscore whether NATO allies recognize the historic context and significance of the Ukraine challenge.

The Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security.

“The results of the exercises were unequivocal,” write the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig and Estonian Ambassador to the United States Kristjan Prikk. “Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. Russia did not choose to escalate when Ukraine was offered NATO membership, and in all scenarios, Russia was much more cautious in its interactions with Ukraine once it was a member of NATO.”

The Alliance this week is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” but it will stop far short of a membership assurance. According to reports ahead of the summit, the bridge will be constructed out of increased coordination of military assistance, a pledge of long-term support, more investment in Ukraine’s defense industry, and bilateral security agreements—all measures intended to strengthen Ukraine.

Kroenig and Prikk say the lesson coming out of our exercises is clear: “[For] the sake of a better future for the entire Alliance, the bridge must be short, it must be made of steel, and it should end with a firm invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.”

That invitation is unlikely to be this week’s outcome, but a proper understanding of the historic moment requires nothing less.

Atlantic Council at the NATO Summit in Washington

Live commentary, authoritative analysis, and high-level events covering NATO’s Washington summit, courtesy of our experts.


Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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The US and Europe would be safer with Ukraine in NATO. Our war games showed why. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-and-europe-would-be-safer-with-ukraine-in-nato-our-war-games-showed-why/ Mon, 08 Jul 2024 02:13:04 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778737 The Atlantic Council recently held a series of tabletop exercises to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. The results are clear.

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The NATO Summit will take place in Washington, DC, this week, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of history’s most successful military alliance. A major topic of the summit will be Russia’s war in Ukraine and Ukraine’s future relationship to the Alliance. Some believe that it is risky to talk about Ukraine joining NATO any time soon, but, on the contrary, the free world would be much safer with Ukraine in the Alliance. Membership for Ukraine would be fundamental for lasting peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, benefiting both Ukraine and NATO.

At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO members declared that Ukraine would join the Alliance at some unspecified point in the future. At last year’s summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, following Russia’s brutal 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the allies reaffirmed their 2008 commitment, adding the tautological qualifier that they would only “extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.”

This year, the Alliance is expected to offer Ukraine a “bridge to membership,” which will consist of a number of measures meant to strengthen Ukraine. These measures are expected to include NATO’s stepped-up role in coordinating military assistance and pledging long-term support, as well as individual Alliance members promising investments in Ukraine’s defense industrial base and further development of bilateral security agreements. However, these steps still fall well short of an invitation to join the Alliance.

Hesitancy to extend an invitation to join the Alliance stems mostly from a concern about what Ukrainian membership would mean for the security of existing NATO allies, including the United States. Would an invitation be provocative to Russia and set off a new cycle of escalation? What does it mean to extend a NATO Article 5 security guarantee to a country already in conflict, and would this be tantamount to a NATO declaration of war against Russia? Even if the current conflict dies down, creating space for Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to abandon his deep desire to reconquer Ukraine. Would not a future Russian attack on Ukraine set off a direct NATO-Russia war?

Even in scenarios that started with a visible and direct Russian military attack on Ukraine, the conflict quickly de-escalated.

To help answer these questions, the Atlantic Council, in partnership with the Estonian foreign ministry, conducted a series of major tabletop exercises this spring that brought together dozens of leading experts, including current US and allied government officials, to examine future Russia-Ukraine conflict scenarios and their implications for Western security. Some exercises were set in the near future, after Ukraine had already joined NATO, while others gamed out the process of Ukraine joining NATO. The scenarios included variants in which Ukraine had succeeded in taking back all of its territory, and others in which parts of the country remained occupied by Russia.

The results of the exercises were unequivocal: Europe is more stable and secure with Ukraine in NATO. Russia did not choose to escalate when Ukraine was offered NATO membership, and in all scenarios, Russia was much more cautious in its interactions with Ukraine once it was a member of NATO. Even in scenarios that started with a visible and direct Russian military attack on Ukraine, the conflict quickly de-escalated. Both sides had strong incentives to avoid a direct NATO-Russia conflict—one that could result in nuclear war.

This finding corresponds with Russia’s behavior over the past decade and a half. Putin has been willing to use force against countries outside of NATO, including Georgia and Ukraine, but he has been deterred from attacking NATO countries.

Moreover, at present, some observers assume that only the West has an overriding incentive to avoid nuclear escalation in Ukraine. But with Ukraine in NATO, which is a nuclear-armed alliance, Putin would also have to fear the possibility of nuclear conflict, making him much more cautious in his relations with Ukraine.

The lesson coming out of these exercises is clear. This week, Western powers can offer Ukraine a bridge to NATO, but for the sake of a better future for the entire Alliance, the bridge must be short, it must be made of steel, and it should end with a firm invitation for Ukraine to join NATO.


Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Kristjan Prikk is Estonia’s ambassador to the United States.

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CBDC Tracker cited by BeInCrypto on North Carolina CBDC bill https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cbdc-tracker-cited-by-beincrypto-on-north-carolina-cbdc-bill/ Sun, 07 Jul 2024 16:37:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778817 Read the full article here.

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Read the full article here.

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Why Washington must take the opportunity of the NATO Summit to reengage with Turkey https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/why-washington-must-take-the-opportunity-of-the-nato-summit-to-reengage-with-turkey/ Fri, 05 Jul 2024 15:19:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778276 Strengthening relations between the US and Turkey will be critical for the future of the Alliance's regional defense strategies.

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From July 9 to 11, the United States will host the NATO Summit in Washington, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of what has been deemed by some as the world’s “most successful military alliance.” While the summit will mark an important milestone in NATO’s history, it will also provide an opportunity to discuss the future of the Alliance and for high-level officials to engage in discussions about boosting defense and deterrence in the most dangerous security environment since the Cold War.

Among those attending the summit will be Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey has been a major contributor to NATO’s operations around the world since it joined the Alliance in 1952 to defend itself and NATO’s southeastern flank against the Soviet threat. Today, as the Alliance’s second-largest military power and the gatekeeper of the straits connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Turkey plays a critical role in European stability and security. However, the complex nature of Ankara’s relationship with Washington and a lack of dialogue between the allies have often overshadowed the successes in the transatlantic partnership and limited opportunities for cooperation.

US Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake recently said that the NATO Summit provides an opportunity for a meeting between Erdoğan and US President Joe Biden, as “there is some desire on both sides” to do so. It remains unclear, however, whether this meeting will take place. Erdoğan’s previously scheduled visit to the White House in May was canceled due to scheduling problems, as cited by both sides, and Flake said it happened at a time when the crisis in Gaza cast a “difficult political backdrop.”

Despite that backdrop, Biden and Erdoğan shouldn’t let another opportunity to meet go to waste, as close cooperation would bring to bear several geopolitical, economic, and security benefits.

Why the timing matters

It is important that the meeting takes place this time. Biden has met Erdoğan in person only twice during his presidency, and both times on the sidelines of international summits. Erdoğan will travel to Washington for the NATO Summit shortly after his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kazakhstan and just weeks after Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement in China about Turkey’s interest in joining the developing country grouping known as BRICS.

Russia has embraced its opportunities to widen the rifts between Turkey and other NATO allies, so it’s no wonder the Kremlin was quick to welcome Ankara’s desire to join BRICS. A cold shoulder from Biden, contrasted with warm welcomes from the leaders of Russia and China, would only reinforce Ankara’s quest for what it perceives as a fair multipolarity and Turkey’s feeling sidelined by both the European Union and the United States. The perception of Erdoğan as an unwanted guest in the West would become another brick in the wall of mistrust between Ankara and Washington.

Winds of positive change

Significant progress in the F-16 deal, the successful completion of Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership processes, and increasing US-Turkey cooperation on joint military production have had a positive impact on both regional security and Turkey’s relations with the West. For example, as the Pentagon set about revamping its munitions factories, several such factories in Texas worked with Turkish company Repkon for the design and installation of machinery. Flake estimated that around 30 percent of all 155 mm rounds produced in the United States will come from these factories, boosting military production and helping support Ukraine. In addition, the effort is strengthening US-Turkey strategic ties and demonstrating to Europe that increasing cooperation with Turkey can help bolster defense capabilities.

Both the United States and Turkey stand to gain significant geopolitical and economic benefits from a reinvigorated relationship. As Asli Aydintasbas of the European Council on Foreign Relations put it, “Turkey sits in the middle of too many global flashpoints for the United States to delay a new dialogue.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war in Gaza, geopolitical realignments in the South Caucasus, and the emergence of the Russia-Iran-China axis add weight to Turkey’s already central role in NATO.

For its part, Turkey must understand that while it may gain immediate benefits from trade and energy cooperation with Russia, its economic and security interests are closely aligned with the West, not with autocratic regimes such as China and Russia. Doing business with sanctioned, unstable, and undemocratic countries is a major geopolitical risk and comes at a huge economic cost. Russia’s economy has become a war economy, and there is not much future in doing business with Moscow, especially with the prospect of secondary sanctions looming. For many years, Germany and the United States have maintained their leading positions as Turkey’s largest export partners, and while joining BRICS may help Turkey manage a balancing act between the West and the Global South, the bloc wouldn’t be likely to help sustain Turkey’s economic growth in the long run. This economic pragmatism, combined with new geopolitical realities, should provide a solid basis for revitalizing the transatlantic partnership.

To engage Turkey, make it part of the plan

The Black Sea can become a test case for Turkey’s reinvigorated cooperation with the West, as that is where core interests of NATO allies in the region—such as restoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and freedom of navigation, deterring Russia, counterbalancing Russia-Iran ties, and promoting energy diversification—largely converge. While the region remains sensitive to fluctuations in the US-Turkey relationship, it also hosts an opportunity, particularly in maritime security, to improve transatlantic relations and collectively defend the region.

Turkey has developed close cooperation with Black Sea NATO members Romania and Bulgaria and has been a vocal supporter of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Ukraine’s recent successes in degrading Russia’s naval capabilities and shifting the balance of maritime power in Turkey’s favor have made Kyiv a natural ally for Ankara, as both countries seek to counter Russian superiority in the Black Sea. This strategic connection that runs via Kyiv could anchor Turkey’s tilt to the West.

Closer maritime cooperation between Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria, potentially joined by Ukraine, would deny Russia the ability to conduct provocations and false flag operations in their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and help protect assets deployed in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. This is particularly important as both Turkey and Romania are working to develop their offshore gas fields—Sakarya and Neptun Deep. Since the successful development of these reserves would help reduce the region’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels, and thus undermine Moscow’s energy strategy in the region, one could expect the Kremlin to employ a variety of hybrid tactics to prevent the implementation of these offshore energy projects.

Since Romania and Bulgaria do not have significant naval capabilities, increased cooperation with Turkey is necessary to protect their critical infrastructure. For example, now that the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force—launched in January 2024 as a trilateral initiative between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to clear their territorial waters of floating mines—has become operational, it should become a permanent patrol mission to ensure the security of sea lines of communication and maritime trade and to curb Russia’s illegal activities in the Black Sea.

Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine are working together to shore up defense and deterrence capabilities in the Black Sea region. At the NATO Summit, Biden and Erdoğan should discuss, among many topics, how the United States and other European allies can increase support for these efforts.

While the Montreux Convention limits the ability of non-littoral states to increase their Black Sea naval presence, the United States and European allies could strengthen NATO’s defense and deterrence capabilities in the region by enhancing the air defense and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of littoral states; supporting defense industrial projects; and deploying more coastal-defense, anti-ship, anti-submarine, and electronic-warfare systems to NATO’s eastern flank. For its part, Turkey could play a central role in strengthening NATO’s sea-denial capabilities to secure Black Sea port infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Key to enabling this cooperation with the United States and European allies is first engaging in dialogue.

As the United States works on its new Black Sea strategy and prepares the agenda for the NATO Summit—which will be dominated by regional security issues—it’s time to integrate Turkey, a regional leader, into its plans. Against the backdrop of continued Russian aggression in Ukraine and the growing involvement of Iran and China in the Black Sea, increased cooperation between Turkey, Ukraine, and Western partners is critical to both European security and the democratic resilience of these countries.


Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Follow her on X, formerly known as Twitter, at @GaberYevgeniya.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.

This blog is part of a joint research project of the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies entitled “A Sea of Opportunities: Can the West Benefit from Turkey’s Autonomous Foreign Policy in the Black Sea?” The research provides a lens into Turkey’s aspirations for regional leadership and identifies possible avenues of collaboration between Ankara and its Western allies in the Black Sea region in several areas, such as defense and military cooperation, political and diplomatic dialogue, and maritime and energy security.

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What do Biden, Macron, and Sunak have in common? They brought it on themselves.  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/a-season-of-self-inflicted-consequences/ Thu, 04 Jul 2024 08:05:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778193 US President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak are suffering from self-inflicted wounds that are likely to have long-term political and economic consequences.

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This article was updated on July 5, 2024

This week, three of the Western world’s most significant leaders are suffering from self-inflicted wounds that are likely to have long-term political and economic consequences.

They are US President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, and outgoing British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, and this is no small story as their countries are all nuclear powers that represent the world’s first-, sixth-, and seventh-largest economies.

What I mean by self-inflicted is that Macron took a gamble on staging snap parliamentary elections, whose second and final round is on Sunday, in hopes of getting a fresh mandate after his party’s humiliating drubbing in European Parliament elections. He’ll pay a price with, at best, a hung parliament. At worst, he will enter into what the French call “cohabitation” with a far-right prime minister.

Sunak had until the end of the year to call elections in the United Kingdom, but picked July 4. He and his party have now been ousted, ending fourteen years of Conservative rule that has brought Brexit, historically low productivity gains, and growth levels below the European Union (EU) average.

Some Biden allies have been saying quietly since this time last year that he could best cement his legacy by stepping aside and letting a younger candidate take on former President Donald Trump. Instead, Biden has gambled on being able to arrest his own aging process—and then convince voters he has done so—a far more difficult prospect following last week’s debate.

It’s telling that these stories are coming together in a single week, with Western democracies all in anti-incumbent moods, often despite their own economic interests, which is especially the case in France.

Macron’s decision to hold these elections three years earlier than was necessary was based on the convoluted logic that voters would come to their senses and give him a fresh mandate rather than face the prospect of extreme-right rule.

Instead, the far-right National Rally is likely to produce the largest percentage of the vote in the second round of parliamentary voting on Sunday, closely followed by the newly united, left-wing New Popular Front, which includes everyone from center-left socialists to La France Insoumise, led by a former Trotskyite.

This week, more than two hundred candidates dropped out of the second round of French elections as Macron’s camp and the left are coordinating to stop National Rally from winning an absolute majority and thus the right to put in place a prime minister for three years of uncomfortable cohabitation with Macron, whose term doesn’t end until 2027. The most likely outcome on Sunday is a hung parliament, but one with a great deal of far-left and far-right leverage.

That puts at risk seven years of economic progress under Macron, during which France has cut business and wealth taxes, reformed employment and pensions to encourage hiring, and thus created two million new jobs and six million new businesses.

“The market could see both the extreme right and the extreme left promising to reverse cost-saving measures taken by the incumbent government (such as pension reform) without offsetting these with new sources of income,” write Sophia Busch and Charles Lichfield at the Atlantic Council.

This comes at a time when France’s finances are already fragile, with an annual budget deficit above 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and public debt worth some 110 percent of GDP. In June, the European Commission named France as one of seven EU members states in violation of its new fiscal rules. The Paris Olympics starting later this month, with the sparkling new venues and train lines, might be less a celebration than a denouement.

The British Labour Party’s sweeping victory, which left the Conservative Party with its lowest number of seats in Parliament in nearly 200 years, is less an endorsement of Keir Starmer’s leadership than it is a condemnation of fourteen years of Conservative rule. The Economist, hardly a fan of the British left’s proclivity for state intervention, endorsed Labour because “it has the greatest chance of tackling the biggest problem that Britain faces: a chronic and debilitating lack of economic growth.”

Starmer’s biggest success has been to quickly change course from predecessor Jeremy Corbyn’s leftist dogma to make the party electable. However, if he can’t address the country’s stagnant productivity, find new growth through investments and trade, and steer away from his party’s statist instincts, he won’t succeed.

The stakes are highest in the United States for November’s elections, as capital markets continue to shrug off the country’s dysfunctional domestic politics and growing geopolitical risks with yet another record high NASDAQ result this week.

Biden must decide within the next month whether to say in the race, and he’ll have to mull over the choice while his presidential duties carry on. Next week, the seventy-fifth NATO Summit kicks off. He will host heads of state and government from the Alliance’s thirty-one other members in Washington, DC, amid wars in Europe and the Middle East and tensions in Asia. The stakes have seldom been higher.


Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points Today newsletter, a column of quick-hit insights on a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

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Feeling the heat? Biden’s proposed protections for workers are a welcome start. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/feeling-the-heat-bidens-proposed-protections-workers/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 18:47:28 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778038 The federal proposals are a step in the right direction, but state and local efforts are also needed to protect workers from extreme heat.

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As the United States enters what has been one of its hottest months of the year, the Biden administration on Tuesday took a significant step in protecting an estimated thirty-six million workers nationwide from extreme heat. This long-awaited move—for workers, companies, and advocates alike—was paired with the announcement of new research from the US Environmental Protection Agency and new investment through the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Building Resilience Infrastructure and Communities program.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed new federal regulations to protect workers. When the heat index reaches or exceeds 80 degrees Fahrenheit, employers would be required to monitor workers and provide water and rest areas. At 90 degrees Fahrenheit, more protections kick in, including mandatory fifteen-minute rest breaks every two hours and monitoring employees for signs of heat-related illnesses.

Heat-related illnesses have been recognized as occupational hazards for a decade, with an estimated 2,300 workers in the United States dying from extreme heat exposure last year alone. However, this number is likely an undercount and does not capture the many more who suffered nonlethal or chronic heat-related illnesses, as well as workers who injured themselves on the job due to the heat. For instance, researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles found that workers in California are up to 9 percent more likely to suffer a workplace injury on days with temperatures over 90 degrees Fahrenheit than on days that are between 50 to 60 degrees Fahrenheit. This is a problem that will only get worse. The summer is only a few weeks underway in the Northern Hemisphere, and already more than one hundred million US residents have been exposed to extreme heat.

What comes next?

Despite the need for action, OSHA’s proposal will have significant opponents. Industry groups are gearing up for battle, arguing that the rule will be both administratively cumbersome and costly. This is a sentiment that some political leaders have already embraced. Earlier this year, both Florida and Texas enacted state-wide bans to prevent localities from instituting their own worker-protection ordinances. Both state governments are unlikely to accept OSHA’s proposal without protest. In fact, despite the persistent threat of extreme heat, only five states have extreme heat worker protections: California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.  

The argument that extreme heat worker protections will come at a cost often ignores the very real cost of maintaining the status quo under dangerously high temperatures. Aside from the price that workers pay with their health, extreme heat in the workplace has significant economic impacts, from lost labor productivity to healthcare costs. The high and growing price of extreme heat on US residents’ lives and livelihoods illustrates not only that this new rule is necessary, but also that, on its own, it is not enough.

Since 2021, the Biden administration has worked to reestablish the role of the United States as a leader in the fight against climate change, both domestically and abroad. This new rule could help cement the United States’ leadership role on climate—but only if it is properly enforced and expanded upon. For the rule to be effective, the administration should continue significantly utilizing OSHA’s National Emphasis Program for Outdoor and Indoor Heat-Related Hazards, which gives it latitude to direct resources toward both employer education on heat safety protocols and inspections that will better ensure compliance.

The Biden administration should also leverage existing funds to ensure that workers remain safe even when they head home for the day. As temperatures rise across the United States and the world, workplace regulations alone will not be enough to adequately protect workers. Federal agencies should incentivize states to direct Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) funding toward cooling assistance in vulnerable households, and lawmakers should ensure that LIHEAP is funded adequately to cover energy needs during both the summer and winter months. Currently, only approximately 5 percent of LIHEAP’s four billion dollars in funding goes to cooling assistance (heating receives ten times as much), despite the accelerating demand for relief from high nighttime temperatures that place a significant burden on the human body, and which can lead to heat exhaustion while on the job.  

Ultimately however, this issue cannot be solved at the federal level alone. It also requires efforts at the state and local level to ensure that the most vulnerable communities and individuals are being identified and solutions tailored to local contexts are being implemented. The appointment of a Chief Heat Officer (CHO), at the city, county, or state level, is one tool that can address the local challenges of extreme heat. Local governments such as Miami-Dade County, Phoenix, and Los Angeles have already taken this approach. Local climate leaders—like CHOs—are well positioned to work closely with their communities to tailor solutions to meet their specific needs and to create a unified response to build resilience to extreme heat both during the workday and off the clock.


Catherine Wallace is the associate director of strategic partnerships and advocacy for the extreme heat resilience pillar of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

Owen Gow is the deputy director for the extreme heat resilience pillar at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht–Rockefeller Foundation Resilience Center (Arsht-Rock).

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Hurricane Beryl spotlights the importance of climate adaptation in the Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/hurricane-beryl-spotlights-the-importance-of-climate-adaptation-in-the-caribbean/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 17:08:54 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777928 The earliest category five Atlantic hurricane on record is a reminder that governments and the private sector must prioritize adapting to climate change. COP29 is a good place to start.

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Caribbean countries are grappling with the first hurricane of the 2024 season. Hurricane Beryl, which has made history as the earliest category five Atlantic hurricane on record, has damaged infrastructure and caused widespread power outages.

Unfortunately, this is a familiar scene for the region, which routinely battles the effects of extreme weather events and climate change. Hurricane Beryl once again spotlights why focusing on the mitigation of climate change, through such methods as cutting carbon emissions, alone is insufficient. Caribbean countries must prioritize climate adaptation as the primary mechanism to withstand hurricanes and other baked-in effects of climate change.

Climate adaptation is the answer to these extreme weather events, but it requires significant investment that governments in the Caribbean cannot afford. International support, including private finance, is needed. In five months, the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties, also known as COP29, will take place in Baku, Azerbaijan. It has been dubbed the “finance COP,” and there governments and the private sector should come together and show the commercial utility of prioritizing climate adaptation. Doing so can unlock new financing and create project pipelines that are commercially attractive to global investors.

COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community.

The Caribbean is often categorized as the world’s most vulnerable region to climate change. Seventy percent of the region’s population lives or works on the coast, meaning that storm surges from hurricanes affect businesses, lifestyles, and government operations. Hurricanes and strong storms also bring the tourism industry to a halt, disproportionately affecting the region’s tourism-dependent economies and severely slowing economic growth. Hurricane Maria in 2017 cost Dominica an estimated 225 percent of its gross domestic product, while Hurricane Irma in the same year cost Antigua and Barbuda more than $136 million in damages, of which the tourism industry represented 44 percent.

Strong storms damage critical infrastructure. Downed power lines cause widespread power outages, while flooded roads and bridges can prevent rescue operations. Already, Hurricane Beryl has caused power outages in Saint Lucia, and homes in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have lost their roofs. And stronger storms lead to longer recovery periods, which can increase governments’ public debt as they borrow at high interest rates from multilateral institutions to rebuild after the storm has passed. Six years after Hurricane Maria, for example, citizens in Dominica are still rebuilding.

Withstanding strong storms and other effects of climate change requires new climate adaptation projects. For hurricanes with high wind speeds (such as Beryl, which sustained wind speeds of 150 mph at its peak), it is necessary to retrofit infrastructure to be resilient. To achieve this, governments need to require building codes for new homes and infrastructure that ensure sufficient resilience across structures. To brace for storm surges, governments need to move water and energy infrastructure underground where possible to avoid damage. New sea walls and flood protection systems also need to be built.

In all, the region needs more than $100 billion dollars in investment to meet its climate adaptation goals, but it has only been approved for less than one billion dollars from various climate funds. Governments are often left to fend for themselves, taking high-interest loans (due to the classification of many Caribbean nations as middle- and high-income economies by the World Bank) since they often do not qualify for concessional financing. At the same time, governments have borne the brunt of the responsibility because these types of climate adaptation projects are not always attractive to the private sector. Retrofitting infrastructure and other climate adaptation projects, for example, have high upfront costs with little return on investment.

COP29 is an opportunity to bring the public and private sector together to unlock new financing and advance climate adaptation projects. The private sector—both in the region and around the world—has access to needed technologies and has the capacity to undertake climate adaptation projects, from providing drainage on roads and bridges to help ease flash flooding to building decentralized energy grid infrastructure to limit widespread blackouts. Climate adaptation is, after all, in the private sector’s interest. If the effects of hurricanes and climate change worsen and the region’s economies slow, then businesses’ profits will be affected.

What will it take to get the private sector more involved? Attracting private sector participation requires regulatory reforms and carve outs by governments to ensure that companies yield a return on projects. Governments can provide incentives, such as giving exclusive benefits to companies participating in projects and providing subsidies or tax exemptions on materials used. Equally important is access to low-cost finance and capital. Governments can work with institutions such as IDB Invest and global donors that provide grant finance to funnel capital to companies undertaking long-term developments while engaging with insurance agencies that can underwrite riskier projects. 

Caribbean leaders have begun to explore private sector participation in climate adaptation projects, notably through the Bridgetown Initiative and the Blue Green Investment Corporation, but there is still work to be done. COP29 might well be the ideal forum to strengthen these initiatives and encourage commitments from governments and the business community. Doing so requires flexibility from both sectors and a focus on projects that are investment-friendly and can attract global donors. 

In the lead-up to COP29, governments will need to begin laying the regulatory groundwork and soliciting the required technical assistance from development institutions to encourage private sector participation. Moreover, Caribbean governments should consider adding or increasing the size of the private sector groups to their delegations for COP29 to ensure they have a seat at the table and are bought into any signed agreements. Building these public-private relationships can go a long way toward showing global donors and companies the viability of investing in climate adaptation projects in the Caribbean and unlock needed capital that can save lives in the long run.


Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center.

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Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: The Anti-Establishment Rises in Europe and America https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/charai-in-the-jerusalem-strategic-tribune-the-anti-establishment-rises-in-europe-and-america/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 13:57:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777963 The post Charai in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: The Anti-Establishment Rises in Europe and America appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Don’t cut corners on US nuclear deterrence https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dont-cut-corners-on-us-nuclear-deterrence/ Wed, 03 Jul 2024 13:42:12 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777804 Bipartisan support for modernizing and expanding the US nuclear arsenal will be essential for the United States to deter its adversaries.

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The nuclear threats to the United States and its allies are growing. To deter these threats, the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (a commission on which one of the authors, Matthew Kroenig, served) recently recommended that the United States plan for its first strategic forces buildup since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast to this bipartisan consensus, House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA) argued in Newsweek in May for adjustments and cuts to the US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Smith’s argument that the United States should consider mobile basing for a portion of its ICBM force has merit, but his other arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. Rather, bipartisan support for modernizing and expanding the US nuclear arsenal will be essential for ensuring that the United States and its allies have the strategic forces they need to deter aggression in the face of hostile, nuclear-armed, autocratic rivals.

There are several problems with Smith’s arguments. First, he questions whether land-based nuclear forces are needed at all. Yet, every presidential administration since the 1950s has considered this question and concluded that ICBMs are necessary. Indeed, as we have argued at length elsewhere (see here and here), ICBMs contribute to the major goals of US nuclear strategy—they deter adversaries from launching a strategic attack, assure allies, and give the United States the ability to respond if deterrence fails.

There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Second, Smith argues that an enemy nuclear attack on vulnerable ICBMs could force a US president into a use-them-or-lose-them situation and a “rushed” decision to launch a nuclear attack. But the president is not forced to launch nuclear weapons as soon as a possible enemy missile launch is detected. The president has the option to ride out the attack and retaliate with other, more survivable forces, if necessary. Moreover, it does not make sense to argue that ICBMs are, on the one hand, so important that the president would need to launch them if under attack and, on the other hand, the United States should slash their numbers. ICBMs are either important or they are not. If ICBMs are expendable, then there is no reason for the president to launch them if under attack. If they are important, as we believe they are, then it is unwise to curtail them.

Third, Smith argues that US ICBM silos are uniquely dangerous because they invite an adversary to target its nuclear weapons in the US heartland, and that such an attack could kill millions of people. But the purpose of nuclear weapons is, of course, to deter nuclear attack in the first place. If ICBMs continue to deter effectively, as they have for the past half century and more, then an attack will not come. Moreover, if the adversary did not need to target its nuclear weapons on missile silos in the isolated high plains of Montana and North Dakota, for example, then the attacker could reallocate those weapons toward major US cities, which would only result in more US deaths in the event of a nuclear war.

Fourth, Smith continues by arguing that, even if the United States does maintain some silo-based ICBMs, the Department of Defense should purchase fewer of them. But again, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued that the current US nuclear modernization program of record—which includes the new Sentinel ICBMs,* new ballistic missile submarines, new strategic bombers, and new air-launched nuclear cruise missiles—is necessary but not sufficient to maintain strategic deterrence. There is simply no room to cut the number of ICBMs at this moment.

Fifth, Smith argues that, if the United States keeps the same number of nuclear weapons, then it should shift warheads from ICBMs to the submarine leg of the nuclear triad. But there is not much room to shift large numbers of warheads to the sea-based leg without increasing the total number of submarines, and the United States is already straining to produce the planned number of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines on time. Moreover, if the United States were to build more submarines, that would be inconsistent with Smith’s stated concern about costs. Building and operating more submarines is much more expensive than modernizing ground-based missile silos.

Sixth, Smith worries that the Department of Defense does not have the resources to complete the US nuclear modernization program while making necessary investments in conventional forces. It is true that the Department of Defense must make tradeoffs in some areas, but not with nuclear deterrence, which is its highest priority. Congress should ensure that the United States has sufficient resources at its disposal to build and deploy the necessary nuclear and conventional forces.

Smith’s strongest argument is that the United States should consider putting some portion of its ICBM force on mobile launchers instead of in silos. In fact, the bipartisan congressional commission recommends this option to enhance the survivability of the ground-based leg. But this option would not result in cost savings, contrary to what Smith suggests. A mobile option would require building new missile garrisons and also result in higher operational and security costs. Given the worsening international security environment, land-mobile missiles should be a complement to, not a replacement for, the ICBM program of record.

Now is not the time to be making cuts to the US nuclear arsenal. As the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission argued in its consensus report, the United States must urgently complete its nuclear modernization program of record and take actions today to enhance its strategic posture. The future of international peace and security depends on it.


Matthew Kroenig is vice president of the Atlantic Council and senior director of its Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is currently a commissioner on the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and was a senior policy adviser in the Pentagon in support of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

Mark J. Massa is the deputy director for strategic forces policy in the Forward Defense program within the Scowcroft Center.

Note: The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security conducts work on nuclear and strategic forces that is sponsored by donors including Los Alamos National Laboratory, Northrop Grumman Corporation (which has the sole contract from the US Air Force to engineer and manufacture Sentinel ICBMs), the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Energy, and the United States Department of State, as well as general support to the Scowcroft Center. This article did not involve any of these donors and reflects only the authors’ views.

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What the Peruvian president’s state visit to China means for US economic diplomacy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-the-peruvian-presidents-state-visit-to-china-means-for-us-economic-diplomacy/ Tue, 02 Jul 2024 18:36:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777532 Peruvian President Dina Boluarte recently traveled to Beijing to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Washington should take note of the growing Peru-China relationship.

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On Friday, Peruvian President Dina Boluarte concluded her state visit to China by meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Accompanied by five ministers, she also met with other top Chinese officials, including Premier Li Qiang and top legislator Zhao Leji. In addition to political discussions, Boluarte met with business leaders from Huawei, BYD, China Southern Power Grid, and COSCO Shipping. This visit, highlighting China’s deepening economic ties with Latin America, contrasts with the United States’ limited economic engagement with Peru. This contrast is underscored by the White House’s decision not to invite Boluarte for a bilateral meeting during her last visit to Washington in November 2023. Given the limited recent US engagement with Peru and deepening ties between Lima and Beijing, Boluarte’s state visit to China should serve as an alarm bell for US policymakers.

The success of Chinese economic diplomacy in Peru

In 2024, Peru’s relevance to China will be transformed, as Lima becomes a crucial partner in China’s economic engagement with Latin America. In November, Xi plans to inaugurate the Chancay port, a $3.6 billion deep-water mega-port forty-four miles north of Lima under exclusive operating rights by China’s state-owned COSCO. The port is set to reshape global trade between Asia and Latin America, reducing the travel time for shipping vessels between both countries by ten days. COSCO’s exclusivity over the port would make Chancay China’s first logistics hub in South America. Similarly, China Southern Power Grid’s ongoing acquisition of Italian Enel’s equity stakes in Lima’s electricity distribution will put 100 percent of Lima’s electricity in the hands of Chinese companies.

Beyond these two projects, Boluarte’s state visit to China follows a decade of increased Chinese economic influence in the Andean country. Between 2018 and 2023, Peru became the second highest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the largest recipient of Chinese FDI in South America, standardized by gross domestic product.

Chinese investment has grown in Peru despite its political instability. From 2016 onward, the country has been entangled in an institutional and political crisis. With six presidents governing the country since 2016, Peru has been hardly able to offer any political stability to investors. As Chinese companies’ interests increase in an institutionally weaker Peru, it becomes essential for the Chinese government to secure support at the highest political level to shield its strategic investments from this instability. The state visit provides an example: In the months preceding the visit, both the Chancay port and China Southern Power Grid’s acquisition were scrutinized by Peru’s port and antitrust authorities, respectively. The National Port Authority even revoked COSCO’s exclusivity deal, which threatened to stymie China’s control over the port.

But after months of legal disputes, and upon the announcement of Boluarte’s state visit to China, the Peruvian government withdrew its request to revoke COSCO’s rights for Chancay, and China Southern Power Grid was able to finalize its acquisition, just days before the visit. Boluarte and her delegation even met with the presidents of COSCO and China Southern Power Grid during her trip to Beijing, demonstrating that the state visit was a successful tool of economic diplomacy for China.

What does the state visit mean for US economic diplomacy?

The United States should be concerned. Boluarte’s state visit represents the pinnacle of a successful economic engagement strategy between China and Peru that has resulted in deeper political ties between both countries. The projects that are the fruits of these deeper ties could directly counter US interests in the region.

The United States has already raised concerns over the Chancay port and the possibility that it could be used as a dual-use facility by the Chinese navy. US officials have also encouraged the Peruvian government to create a committee to vet foreign investment in strategic sectors, such as electricity, on national security grounds. But expressions of these US concerns haven’t yielded significant results. The limits of US diplomacy in Peru have much to do with its limited economic engagement with the country relative to China.

While the US-Peru free trade agreement doubled the trade volume between both countries in the fifteen years since its signing, US FDI represents about one-third of Chinese FDI in Peru, and Peruvians export five billion dollars more in goods to China than to the United States. And while the Peruvian government prides itself on its membership in the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity—the Biden administration’s pillar of economic diplomacy toward Latin America—the framework will take time to deliver tangible trade and investment benefits that can rival China’s. As Peru is still looking to recover economically from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States can open doors for closer diplomacy with the country by working with it to foster economic growth.   

Why deeper collaboration between the US and Peru matters

As the US government seeks to expand and diversify supply chains away from China and advance its energy transition, it can benefit from increased collaboration with Peru, not least because of its mineral abundance. Peru is the second largest world producer of copper, and stands among the top producers for silver, lead, and zinc.

To compete with Chinese investment, US companies will have to participate in the bidding for large infrastructure projects and should present an alternative partner for building out Peru’s critical infrastructure, such as energy, port, or telecommunications infrastructure. For this to happen, Washington needs to better align the risk appetite of US investors and firms with Peru’s project and country risks. While the United States won’t model China’s state-led investment, agencies such as the International Development and Finance Corporation should collaborate more closely with the private sector to de-risk and incentivize US bids on infrastructure projects in Peru.

Deeper US economic engagement with Peru is also in Peruvians’ interests. The United States is the only global superpower interested in and capable of assisting the Peruvian political class to exit nearly a decade of institutional corrosion. US diplomacy toward Peru has rightfully focused on addressing the country’s democratic instability and political crisis, recognizing these issues as the country’s biggest challenges. The US government has encouraged Peruvian officials to respect the constitutional order and has expressed concern when they have deviated from it, such as when then President Pedro Castillo attempted a self-coup in December 2022.

When the Peruvian government abused its power in the demonstrations of January 2023, US representatives called out the government for its human rights violations. In March of this year, as Peru’s Congress sought to weaken the judiciary watchdog, the Junta Nacional de Justicia, US senators Ben Cardin and Tim Kaine publicly expressed their concern. It is no overstatement to say that Peruvian democracy is at risk, and the United States has been right to recognize its fragility. But the United States’ capacity to assist Peru in building out its institutions will yield very little unless its statements of concern are accompanied by economic tools that incentivize cooperation with the United States.


Martin Cassinelli is a program assistant in the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council.

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US signals long-term support for Ukraine with new security pact https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/us-signals-long-term-support-for-ukraine-with-new-security-pact/ Tue, 02 Jul 2024 17:59:59 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777752 The United States has signaled its long-term commitment to Ukrainian security with a new pact but the agreement is not a formal treaty and does not oblige the US to defend Ukraine, writes Mykola Bielieskov.

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The United States and Ukraine signed a bilateral security agreement on June 13 in a bid to underline Washington’s long-term support as Ukraine fights for national survival against Russia’s ongoing invasion. The agreement is the latest in a series of similar bilateral security pacts concluded by Kyiv since the start of 2024, but has attracted additional attention due to the critical role of US support for the Ukrainian war effort.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the United States has been the single biggest provider of military aid to Ukraine. Without US hardware, ammunition, training, and intelligence, Ukraine would not have been able to defend itself in a high intensity conventional war for so long. In other words, the US has emerged over the past two and a half years as an indispensable partner for Ukraine, both in terms of the country’s current military operations and long-term security.

The new US-Ukraine security agreement contains no major surprises. Rather than breaking new ground, it aims to establish a more long-term commitment to existing forms of military cooperation including training and weapons supplies, while also setting the stage for deepening partnership in defense production. “A lasting peace for Ukraine must be underwritten by Ukraine’s own ability to defend itself now, and to deter future aggression,” President Biden commented.

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Crucially, the US-Ukraine bilateral security pact is not a formal treaty or military alliance and does not oblige the US to defend Ukraine. Instead, the terms of the agreement commit the United States to engage in high-level consultations with Ukraine within twenty-four hours of any future attacks on the country. This cautious approach is in line with well documented concerns within the Biden administration over the possibility of a direct clash between the US and Russia.

Critics claim the terms of the security agreement are deliberately broad and open to interpretation, reflecting what they see as Washington’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with anything approaching binding security guarantees. The absence of any official ratification procedures also leaves the ten-year agreement vulnerable to potential future changes in US foreign policy if Donald Trump wins the 2024 presidential election in November.

The Biden White House is not the first US administration to face claims of adopting an excessively cautious approach toward Russian aggression in Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine first began in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, three successive US presidents have all been accused of failing to effectively deter the Kremlin.

While welcomed by both sides, this latest security initiative is unlikely to convince Moscow of any fundamental change in the US stance or persuade Putin to end his invasion. It comes weeks after the end of a prolonged pause in US military aid to Ukraine caused by political deadlock in Congress over the passage of a sixty billion dollar support bill.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought to put an optimistic spin on the signing of the new security agreement, hailing it as “historic” and saying the pact would serve as a bridge toward his country’s future NATO membership. Others have been less generous, noting that the absence of specific military commitments underlines the limitations of Western support for Ukraine.

Ukraine remains heavily dependent on continued Western military aid and is clearly in no position to demand greater commitment from the country’s Western partners. However, many Ukrainians believe the US and other Western nations have a vital self-interest in maintaining their support for the country.

Amid mounting frustration at the failure to offer Kyiv any fully-fledged military alliances, advocates of stronger support for Ukraine argue that the West’s unprecedented material and political investment since the outbreak of hostilities in 2022 means a Ukrainian defeat would represent a massive blow to Western prestige. It would therefore make more sense for the US and other partners to back Ukraine now, rather than face the far higher costs that would follow a Russian victory.

In a best case scenario, this new security agreement could create the conditions to anchor Ukraine firmly within the Western world, and could serve as a gateway to eventual Ukrainian NATO membership. However, without the requisite political will in Washington, the pact could come to be seen as the successor to the infamous 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which saw Ukraine unilaterally surrendering the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances that were exposed as worthless by Russia’s subsequent invasion.

A realistic appraisal of the recently signed US-Ukraine security pact is particularly important as both countries look to strengthen their partnership amid the largest European invasion since World War II. If Kyiv and Washington wish to convince Moscow to abandon its hopes of outlasting the West, they will need to match the sentiments expressed in the security agreement with concrete steps that will set the stage for Ukrainian victory.

Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.” The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal position and do not reflect the opinions or views of NISS or Come Back Alive.

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Doing as the Romans do: Recommendations for the infrastructure development agenda for Italy’s G7 presidency https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/doing-as-the-romans-do-recommendations-for-the-infrastructure-development-agenda-for-italys-g7-presidency/ Tue, 02 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=774988 The West's plans for infrastructure development, if done effectively, could be a strategic, economic, and geopolitical feat. The G7 now must take forward meaningful action to increase coordination and cooperation to turn this ambition into reality.

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Table of contents

Introduction
The geopolitics of infrastructure
The economic realities
Coordination of project identification and implementation
Recommendations
Conclusion

Introduction

Infrastructure development is a central component of the West’s global engagement strategy. This effort, if done effectively, could be a strategic, economic, and geopolitical feat. The development of sustainable and secure infrastructure carries the potential to create economic prosperity for countries aspiring to move up the global value chain, support the world’s green transition, provide an alternative to China’s exploitative investments, and strengthen the Western-led order.

The Group of Seven (G7) countries have varying plans for infrastructure development in cooperation with various partners around the globe, with particular focus on the Global South. Launched in 2022, the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) aims to mobilize $600 billion in capital for development projects by 2027.1 In Europe, the European Union’s (EU) Global Gateway will invest 300 billion euros by 2027 in global infrastructure projects on behalf of the bloc.2 Italy’s Mattei Plan, launched in January 2024, brings a direct focus on infrastructure development in Africa.3 Further abroad, the Group of Twenty (G20) partners signed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) memorandum in 2023, which aims to directly counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and cut down transit time between India and Europe.4

These initiatives are a good start. However, all G7 members face various challenges that could ultimately hamper progress on these initiatives, most notably: geopolitical challenges, limited funds, skittishness from private sector investors, and lack of coordination. For these initiatives to have a lasting impact, the G7 and likeminded partners must closely coordinate to both avoid and overcome these pitfalls.

Some efforts to better coordinate development projects have already begun. Along with its investments and focus on leveraging private capital, the United States led in the creation of the Blue Dot Network, “a multilateral initiative aimed at advancing robust standards for global infrastructure and mobilizing investment for projects in developing countries.”5 In addition, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has launched coordinated connectivity projects between the United States and the EU in third countries including Kenya, Costa Rica, Jamaica, the Philippines, and Tunisia.6

Holding the G7 presidency for 2024, Italy has made infrastructure development and strengthening relations with the Global South, and in particular Africa, central to its priorities. The 2024 G7 Leaders’ Summit in Apulia, Italy, in June 2024 again reaffirmed the group’s commitment to PGII and investments across Africa, with announcements including the creation of a secretariat to coordinate investments and aid information sharing and a greater shared focus on unlocking investment for green infrastructure projects.7

Now, G7 countries must focus on transforming the summit’s conclusions into reality and making real progress on development coordination. This issue brief provides an actionable set of recommendations to advance the G7’s ambitions.8 It examines the geopolitical impetus for infrastructure development, the economic realities of infrastructure, and the state of coordination on project implementation before providing recommendations to take forward for the rest of Italy’s G7 presidency and beyond.

The geopolitics of infrastructure

The G7’s focus on development is rooted in the shared understanding that G7 countries must fundamentally reset relations with the Global South. Historically, countries in the Global South, particularly in Africa, have been on the receiving end of unfair and extractive relationships with the West.

The result has been growing mistrust and disillusionment, and many countries now view China as a better partner than Europe or the United States. A 2022 study conducted by the University of Cambridge noted that around seventy percent of people not living in liberal democracies held positive views of China, and those in the developing world held more favorable views of China than of the United States.9 Another 2023 survey saw China’s approval rating in Africa rise to its highest levels in a decade, with ten-point increases in some countries.10

On infrastructure development specifically, China has outcompeted the West for years. China’s outreach to the Global South has been generally successful, and the BRI has evolved into an established brand. For example, in 2021 China pledged $40 billion over three years to Africa (though this was a reduction from an earlier pledge of $60 billion), and Beijing has out-invested the United States in Africa every year since 2013.11 Though Chinese investments have yet to surpass their pre-pandemic heights, China’s rate of investment is again rising, and Africa was the largest recipient of BRI investment in 2023.12 In part, as a result, Beijing is also poised to overtake Europe’s total trade with Africa by 2030.13

There are downsides to partnering with China, however. Its values-ambivalent approach is not built for sustainability and comes with a well-documented debt trap. For example, Zambia, which had more than 50 percent of its foreign loans from China, went into default and was unable to afford interest payments on loans financing construction projects in the country including ports, mines, and power plants (though China and Zambia have agreed to a restructuring of Zambia’s debt).14 Similarly, in Kenya, the government held back paychecks to its civil-service workforce to save cash to pay foreign loans.15

G7 countries are making progress on closing this partnership gap with China. Leaders at the Apulia Summit reaffirmed their ambition to meet the spending target of $600 billion by 2027, and the summit’s conclusions have a clear focus on infrastructure development, including with an announcement of a secretariat to facilitate the coordination of development projects.16 Leaders made further announcements at a side event where Italy joined the US- and EU-led consortium on projects in the Lobito Corridor in southern Africa, and Western companies like Microsoft and Blackrock pledged more investments across Africa and beyond.17

The summit also saw the participation of countries including Algeria, Brazil, Kenya, and Tunisia, among others—something Prime Minister Georgia Meloni lauded as delivering on a pledge to make outreach to the Global South a cornerstone of Italy’s G7 presidency.18

The summit also highlighted that the West’s values-based approach can be a strategic asset to building sustainable global partnerships. A focus on good governance and environmental and labor standards allows for long-term success and, in turn, economic growth. The G7 recognizes the importance of engaging with Africa specifically, with the 2024 Communiqué positioning the PGII, the Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan as frameworks to “promote [the West’s] vision of sustainable, resilient, and economically viable infrastructure in Africa underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement, and finance.”19

This is a good start, but there is still room for improvements. Some of the West’s recent outreach has received similar criticisms to previous efforts, for example, failing to consult the very countries these efforts are meant to engage. In particular, African leaders noted Italy failed to consult them before announcing the Mattei Plan.20 Moreover, the West’s tedious approach to infrastructure development can be perceived as an obstacle, not an asset, especially if it is not applied consistently.21

G7 countries should make greater efforts to convene with PGII partners in the region including the private sector, civil society, and government—to sustain debate and discussion about the West’s ambitions and the reasoning behind its values. At the same time, more regular and targeted engagements can, in turn, expose Western public and private financial institutions to the realities of partner markets and address the misconceptions of perceived risks. It’s a win-win for both sides. Where possible, the framing should be adapted to showcase the importance of the long-term sustainability of projects, especially compared to the non-durability of Chinese infrastructure. This engagement will also be a useful tool to address criticisms that Western initiatives are organized without the feedback and involvement of partner countries.

Finally, while competition with China will be a defining element of Western global infrastructure projects, geopolitics cannot eclipse all else. Recipient countries are looking for projects for their benefit to move up the global value chain and to spur domestic growth—not to be a pawn in other parties’ geopolitical rivalries. States can and have the option to accept projects from different sources, including from China. In response, policymakers should be cognizant that countries might be interested in partnering with both China and the West, and should not be forced into a binary, mutually exclusive choice of one or the other.

It will be important, then, for transatlantic policymakers to work out how to both compete against and partner with China. This will be critical specifically in the area of information and communications technology (ICT) development, where using “untrustworthy” vendors has been an area of focus. Policymakers should be clear about where and when non-G7 countries are involved in projects, and in what respects that will not preclude partnership.

The economic realities

Geopolitics may be a key impetus for development initiatives, but policymakers must also contend with economic realities that have long-plagued development projects. Economic stability in recipient countries is important for investments, but that stability is not always a luxury the West can expect. The International Monetary Fund’s regional economic outlook from spring 2024 for sub-Saharan Africa, for example, notes “the fiscal position of many sub-Saharan African countries has deteriorated, a trend exacerbated by repeated shocks and the ensuing demand for fiscal support,” which adds to political and economic uncertainty.22 The cost of borrowing for African states is also four to eight times higher than for Western countries, making raising capital prohibitive.23

The reality is that currencies can collapse and interest rates can rise, but the need and opportunities for investments will remain. The West, therefore, cannot wait to invest in projects until after implementing structural reforms to partner states’ finances and economies.

G7 countries, the United States in particular, have stressed the importance of the private sector to achieve its financing goals. The Apulia Summit placed additional emphasis on the necessity of private-sector capital for the success of PGII. Side events on the PGII have taken place at every G7 summit since the PGII was announced, and since 2023, have prominently featured participation from major investors and companies including Citi, Nokia, Global Infrastructure Partners, Blackrock, and Microsoft—usually with investment announcements in tow.24 Policymakers should appreciate and foster a bottom-up approach to project identification from the private sector and its appetite to invest.

However, leveraging private capital to help fund infrastructure projects comes with its own challenges. Investments into large-scale infrastructure projects are inherently risky, and shaky local markets only add to the unease felt by private-sector investors as currency devaluations risk erasing investments.

G7 members will therefore need to play a greater role, in some form, as guarantors of investments to help reduce the cost of borrowing and alleviate some of the risk. This comes with its own difficulties, as unlocking government-backed funds is not a straightforward process. Certain firms may not be eligible for funding depending on where they are located. And while it makes sense for European taxpayer funds to go to European firms, for instance, multinational firms can become caught up in the bureaucratic web, impeding their involvement with investment projects. Nevertheless, governments must figure out how to play a role here. The European Union, for instance, has a AAA credit rating, and can take on the role of a guarantor for private-sector investment.25 The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has provided political-risk insurance up to $25 million for investments in Ukraine.26 The case of Ukraine is not a one-to-one comparison to investments in the Global South, but offers a useful example to consider. This is not meant to provide a blank check to the private sector for risky investments. However, investment projects cannot wait for long-term structural reforms that will impact geoeconomic changes like foreign-exchange rates. Instead, investors need to work within current economic realities.

Greater efforts are also needed to address change Western misconceptions of African markets and perceived risks that may not truly reflect realities on the ground. The metrics used by the West to measure projects, specifically environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, do not always have as strong a foothold in recipient countries, making investment look riskier or undesirable. Balancing the focus to communicate the impetus for these metrics—while maintaining a degree of flexibility and not completely sacrificing all ESG baselines—will be an important needle for policymakers and investors to thread.

Coordination of project identification and implementation 

Shared project standards are an opportunity for greater coordination. The 2023 Hiroshima G7 summit provided a starting point, highlighting forty projects of common interest.27 Italy’s G7 presidency looked to further this effort. As Meloni outlined at the G7 summit side event focusing on the PGII, Italy’s ambition was to create “structured synergies and coordinated activities to maximize efforts and investments” between G7 members’ various projects.28

The 2024 Apulia Summit specifically pledged greater effort at coordination through three prongs: establishing a secretariat “for effective implementation and investment coordination with partners,” supporting investment platforms to “enhance information sharing, transparency, and public policies on investments in Africa,” and working in particular on green investments in Africa.29 These efforts are all good starts, but they remain wide in their ambition and vague in actual substance.

Coordination on project identification should be an early priority for the PGII secretariat. As G7 countries and the private sector will necessarily look to identify more of these projects, it will be useful to have shared criteria for projects to meet quality and sustainability standards. A shared understanding of what projects G7 members are looking to support, and metrics to assess projects, would also help the private sector in more easily identifying projects in which to invest. The Blue Dot Network is a good starting point for this effort, but so far only a few European G7 countries are on its steering committee.

Additionally, coordination between the United States and the EU through the TTC to support connectivity projects provides another useful starting point for this effort. Established in 2021, the TTC has become the backbone of this US administration’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Brussels. Despite its initially limited scope, it has morphed into a clearinghouse for discussions not only on transatlantic trade and technology coordination, but also on sanctions against Russia and support for projects in third countries to support internet connectivity.30 Supporting connectivity projects at the TTC is useful, but it is limited to smaller projects. Taking coordination from the TTC to the G7 level would allow participation and coordination with countries like the United Kingdom and Japan.

In terms of project selection and implementation, the G7 must also ensure money is available for maintenance, and enough staff is available to follow-up and to make projects sustainable. Ongoing efforts must leverage available funding not just to start projects, but to fund them through their full cycle, and staff them at a level that supports medium- to long-term maintenance. Often, this will include building relationships with on-the-ground in-country partners, and then training and subsequently employing local civilians to shoulder these responsibilities. It is simply not feasible for European, US, Japanese, British, or Canadian project managers to shoulder this burden. In this respect, it is equally important to get buy-in from national and local governments in recipient countries. Locals with knowledge about projects, communities, and factors on the ground will be critical to the maintenance and durability of such projects. The G7 conclusions rightly noted the importance of working with local partners. Now, a secretariat should take forward that effort in earnest.

Maintenance also means investing in skills. This is just as important for implementation and maintenance as investing in technology or brick-and-mortar buildings. Project identification must not look past the funds and time needed to train partners on the ground. For G7 members it will be important, especially on projects in which the United States and EU are involved, to standardize, de-duplicate, or divide training efforts.

Recommendations

At the 2024 Apulia summit, G7 countries made some progress on global infrastructure development in the context of the PGII. Implementation must now follow pronouncements. Italy should lead through the rest of its G7 presidency to see that real progress is made and to ensure this remains a priority in forthcoming summits (much like the role Japan played on artificial intelligence), and each G7 member must also work to meet its national commitments. To make greater coordination a reality, the G7 should undertake the following recommendations.

  • Expand the Blue Dot Network Steering Committee. The European Union and/or all EU member states that are part of the G7—Italy, Germany, and France—should join the Blue Dot Network. The Blue Dot Network’s steering committee is currently composed of Australia, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Canada, Czechia, and Peru are network members and do not contribute funds).31 All G7 members, and the EU, should become members of the steering committee. European membership in the Blue Dot Network should not be limited just to G7 EU members, and the EU could take on a role representing all EU member states.
  • Invest in the PGII secretariat and commit to the adequate staffing of development institutions. A PGII secretariat can serve as an important hub for coordination, but it must be staffed adequately. G7 countries should assign national-level envoys to the secretariat, or at least fold them into the offices responsible, such as IMEC. Much of the work to take forward the agreements at the G7 will also fall to domestic institutions and development finance institutions. However, staffing and financing shortages have limited their effectiveness. G7 members should pledge a benchmark for spending on development financing.
  • Establish regular convenings in or with partner countries. G7 members should commit to hosting regular meetings with partners and their private sectors, civil societies, and governments. The Hiroshima G7 meeting highlighting the PGII was a good start, but the initiative should now be further developed with a partner-first mindset. G7 member officials should host annual meetings in partner countries to make the case for the West’s efforts. This would signal a departure from the West’s historically paternalistic approach to engagements with African partners, and the Global South generally. Outreach and consistent engagement at the ambassadorial level would also be useful.
  • Identify which third countries can take part in which projects. Currently, there is no clear framework for which third countries can take part in specific development projects or what limits exist to partnering with third countries, including those like China. Where issues like human rights and national security come into play, G7 countries may differ in their strategies for engaging with third countries. At the same time, there should be clearer frameworks for private companies and governments in terms of in which projects each can take part.
  • Build in long-term maintenance and implementation of projects at the development stage. Projects should begin with the end in mind. If there is no way to measure success or to educate and employ local populations, these projects will turn into basic assistance with no longevity. G7 countries should agree that investment projects under the PGII umbrella should mandate a long-term implementation and maintenance plan with substantial involvement and buy-in from the partner country. Countries want economic success and want to move up the global value chain; they don’t want to be seen as mere development recipients. It is up to the G7 to ensure such upward movement happens.
  • Map and publish all PGII-related projects. The PGII secretariat should map out all investments under the PGII umbrella, along with projects of interest. This could serve as a clearing house, especially for the private sector to identify opportunities for investment. This would also create a strong public relations tools showcasing the West’s impact and investment footprint. This effort could also be utilized to facilitate the submission of new investment projects by the private sector and potentially lead to consolidated funding for joint investments promoted or pursued by G7 members.

Conclusion

Giorgia Meloni called the dialogue around the PGII “one of the most significant achievements of the G7” to deliver “concrete action” to Africa and the Global South.32 The G7 has made progress, but such a conclusion is premature. The G7 is well on its way to turning its ideas and visions for new partnerships with the Global South into action. Putting the resources and people behind those visions will ensure that they come to life.

About the authors

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, where he supports programming on the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the center’s transatlantic digital and tech portfolio.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship.

Nick O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council. He also contributes regularly to the Atlantic Council’s Italy project, a collaboration between the Europe Center and Middle East Programs.

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The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

1    “President Biden and G7 Leaders Formally Launch the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” White House, June 26, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/26/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-formally-launch-the-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment/.
2    “Global Gateway: Up to €300 Billion for the European Union’s Strategy to Boost Sustainable Links around the World,” European Commission, December 1, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433.
3    Alissa Pavia, “Italy’s Mediterranean Pivot: What’s Driving Meloni’s Ambitious Plan with Africa,” Atlantic Council, February 5, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/italys-mediterranean-pivot-whats-driving-melonis-ambitious-plan-with-africa/.
4    “World Leaders Launch a Landmark India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” White House, September 9, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/09/09/fact-sheet-world-leaders-launch-a-landmark-india-middle-east-europe-economic-corridor.
5    “Blue Dot Network,” US Department of State, last visited May 29, 2024, https://www.state.gov/blue-dot-network/.
6    “U.S.-EU Joint Statement of the Trade and Technology Council,” White House, April 5, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/04/05/u-s-eu-joint-statement-of-the-trade-and-technology-council-3/.
7    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué,” G7 Italia, June 14, 2024, https://www.g7italy.it/wp-content/uploads/Apulia-G7-Leaders-Communique.pdf.
8    This issue brief has been adapted from a policy memo drafted following a private workshop hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, in partnership with Citi and the Centro Study Americani, in April 2024 in Rome to discuss G7 coordination on infrastructure development projects. This workshop convened government officials, private-sector representatives, and policy experts from Italy, Egypt, Nigeria, Brussels, and the United States to discuss how policymakers can align investment and development plans.
9    Roberto Stefan Foa, et al., “A World Divided: Russia, China and the West,” Bennett Institute for Public Policy, University of Cambridge, October 2022, 2, https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/342901.
10    Benedict Vigers, “U.S. Loses Soft Power Edge in Africa,” Gallup, April 26, 2024, https://news.gallup.com/poll/644222/loses-soft-power-edge-africa.aspx.
11    David Pilling and Kathrin Hille, “China Cuts Finance Pledge to Africa amid Growing Debt Concerns,” Financial Times, November 30, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/b7bd253a-766d-41b0-923e-9f6701176916; “Chinese FDI in Africa Data Overview,” China Africa Research Initiative, 2024, https://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa.
12    Christoph Nedopil Wang, “China Belt Road Initiative BRI Investment Report 2023,” Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University (Brisbane) and Green Finance & Development Center at FISF Fudan University (Shanghai), February 2024, https://greenfdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Nedopil-2024_China-BRI-Investment-Report-2023.pdf.
13    “A New Horizon for Africa-China Relations: Why Co-Operation Will Be Essential,” Economist Intelligence Unit, 2022, 2, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/a-new-horizon-for-africa-china-relations/.
14    Joseph Cotterill, “Zambia says it has signed debt restructuring deal with China and India,” Financial Times, February 24, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/5d97562f-b7a0-430b-a9e0-beb695a54f27.
15    Bernard Condon, “China’s Loans Pushing World’s Poorest Countries to Brink of Collapse,” Associated Press, May 18, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/china-debt-banking-loans-financial-developing-countries-collapse-8df6f9fac3e1e758d0e6d8d5dfbd3ed6.
16    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué.”
17    “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit,” White House, June 13, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/13/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-at-the-g7-summit-2/.
18    “Press conference of the Italian G7 Presidency,” G7 Summit, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q13U7uHMzU0; Federica Pascale, “Global South to Be at the Core of next Year’s G7 Summit in Italy,” Euracrtiv, May 22, 2023, https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/global-south-to-be-at-the-core-of-next-years-g7-summit-in-italy/.
19    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué.”
20    Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Italy’s Energy Deal Faces Backlash in Africa,” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/02/07/italys-energy-deal-faces-backlash-in-africa/.
21    See, for example, criticism regarding the EU’s memorandum of understanding signed with Rwanda in February 2024 on the supply of critical raw materials. Despite the EU’s stated focus on ESG standards in the agreement, Rwanda is noted to have been benefitting from exporting materials trafficked from neighboring countries mired by conflict. Lorraine Mallinder, “‘Blood Minerals’: What Are the Hidden Costs of the EU-Rwanda Supply Deal?” Al Jazeera, May 2, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/5/2/blood-minerals-what-are-the-hidden-costs-of-the-eu-rwanda-supply-deal.
22    “Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: A Tepid and Pricey Recovery,” International Monetary Fund, April 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/REO/SSA/Issues/2024/04/19/regional-economic-outlook-for-sub-saharan-africa-april-2024.
23    A World of Debt: A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity,” UN Global Crisis Response Group, July 2023, https://unctad.org/publication/world-of-debt#.
24    “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit;” “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment at the G7 Summit,” White House, May 20, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/05/20/fact-sheet-partnership-for-global-infrastructure-and-investment-at-the-g7-summit/.
26    Adva Saldinger, “US DFC Looks to Protect Risky Investments, Even in Ukraine,” Devex, April 9, 2024, https://www.devex.com/news/devex-invested-us-dfc-looks-to-protect-risky-investments-even-in-ukraine-107424.
27    “Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, May 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100506918.pdf.
28    “Side Event on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment,” 2024 G7 Summit, June 13, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y3Po7AZ8Vf0.
29    “G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué.”
30    Frances Burwell, “In This Year of Elections, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council Should Get Strategic,” Atlantic Council, March 26, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-this-year-of-elections-the-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council-should-get-strategic/.
31    “The Blue Dot Network Begins Global Certification Framework for Quality Infrastructure, Hosted by the OECD,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 9, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/the-blue-dot-network-begins-global-certification-framework-for-quality-infrastructure-hosted-by-the-oecd.htm.
32    “Press conference of the Italian G7 Presidency.”

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NATO allies need a better approach to industrial strategy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-allies-need-a-better-approach-to-industrial-strategy/ Mon, 01 Jul 2024 20:40:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=777267 The Washington summit next week is an opportunity for the Alliance to send clear demand signals to industry and develop more coordinated, effective industrial strategies.

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Against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine and rising aggression across the globe, allies and partners are ramping up defense investment, but increased spending is only part of the equation. Both the United States and Europe are failing to match defense priorities with industrial output. US and European efforts to increase munition production fall drastically short of the needed quantity to both sustain Ukraine’s war effort and replenish allied stockpiles. Russia is producing nearly three times more artillery munitions than allied industries. 

Allies are finding that scaling up industrial production is more difficult than expected. Decades of slashed defense budgets have left allied defense industrial bases vulnerable. As war rages in Europe and allies face increasingly depleted stocks, allies should use the NATO Summit next week in Washington as an opportunity to send clear demand signals to industry and develop more coordinated, effective industrial strategies.  

In light of growing vulnerabilities, US and European policymakers alike are courting stronger relationships with industry—evidenced by the United States and European Union advancing their own, first-ever defense industrial strategies in 2024. However, these strategies do not fully address the critical vulnerabilities facing allied militaries. The European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) is a positive step in strengthening Europe’s fragmented defense industrial bases, but this go-at-it-alone approach alienates Europe’s closest ally, the United States, and fails to tap into needed industrial capacity across the Alliance.

Instead, the United States and Europe should turn to NATO to bridge the gap and produce coordinated efforts toward defense production, in line with preexisting NATO policies and procedures designed to do just this, such as the Defense Production Action Plan. Current NATO efforts underscore the Alliance’s prioritization of defense industry issues, but due in part to insufficient buy-in from some allies, these plans fall short of orchestrating the cooperation necessary to address critical allied vulnerabilities.

Greater NATO involvement in allied industrial strategies could strike a balance between mitigating potential vulnerabilities in defense capacity, while improving defense industrial competency in the long term. This approach should: 

  • Increase joint procurement efforts. NATO should orchestrate more allied defense cooperation agreements, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative, which seeks to coordinate European air defense purchases into one common approach. Such initiatives encourage greater interoperability and allow for specialization across allied defense industrial bases. For example, NATO could coordinate a broader joint procurement effort to produce more critical military equipment, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, across the Alliance.
  • Encourage multiyear procurement and acquisition contracts. The United States and European allies must match means to ends, convincing industry that rhetoric and spending pledges will manifest into long-term investments. Allies, under the direction of the NATO Defense Planning Process and the Conference of National Armaments Directors, should invest more heavily in multiyear procurement and acquisition contracts to increase demand signals needed to support the current shift in defense prioritization.
  • Enhance allied partnerships on defense production. Rather than focusing on economic competition, allies should look for ways to reduce bureaucratic hurdles to transatlantic defense industrial cooperation. NATO’s Defense Industrial Production Board should look for ways to match industrial synergies across the Alliance to maintain its warfighting edge. In order to achieve this aim, allies should seek to reduce national requirements that make it difficult for allied companies to break into national markets.
  • Eliminate onerous export controls between allies. The United States should seek to eliminate export controls and licensing requirements for exports and transfers on select defense equipment and technology for certain NATO allies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 shifted US policy on export controls and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regulatory regime to provide more flexibility for London and Canberra under the Australia-United Kingdom-United States partnership known as AUKUS. In line with this recent shift, the United States should also seek to expand exemptions to ITAR for NATO allies such as France, Germany, and Sweden.
  • Invest in next-generation technologies. The Alliance must invest in integrating new technologies into its military assets. Allies should look to foster deeper research and development partnerships that cut across the Atlantic. In the short term, allies should look to NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and Innovation Fund to prioritize research partnerships that promulgate technological advancement and deepen industrial connections. In addition, allies should seek to deepen cooperation on military innovation projects to harness the unique skills of individual allies.

The United States and Europe should undoubtedly invest more in their own defense industrial bases in the long term. However, in the short term, allies and partners should prioritize integrating crucial efforts to address critical vulnerabilities, ramp up defense industrial capacity to speed and scale, and reduce bureaucratic hurdles and protectionist measures. As the United States and Europe court industry executives, allies and partners would do well to prioritize greater investment in NATO’s industrial policies and procedures as an important deliverable at the Washington summit to mitigate critical vulnerabilities that place the Alliance at a disadvantage to its adversaries.


Kristen Taylor is a program assistant with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.



NATO’s seventy-fifth anniversary
 is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation, and unity. However, as the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next seventy-five years, it faces the revanchism of old rivals, escalating strategic competition, and uncertainties over the future of the rules-based international order.

With partners and allies turning attention from celebrations to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative invited contributors to engage with the most pressing concerns ahead of the historic Washington summit and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series will feature seven essays focused on concrete issues that NATO must address at the Washington summit and five essays that examine longer-term challenges the Alliance must confront to ensure transatlantic security.

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Executing distributed operations in an increasingly contested maritime environment https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/executing-distributed-operations-in-an-increasingly-contested-maritime-environment/ Mon, 01 Jul 2024 13:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776148 As the United States looks ahead to increased maritime competition in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere, the US Navy needs to implement the right plans and capabilities. “Distributed maritime operations” is the warfighting concept at the heart of the Navy’s planning for current and future operations. How well is it poised for executing it?

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Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is the US Navy’s service warfighting concept. However, the concept suffers from a wide variety of interpretations across the service and needs more specificity regarding on what warfighting approaches it is concentrating. While the concept describes mass fires and decision advantage as core themes, DMO lacks sufficient coherence and concrete focus to effectively guide the Navy’s development.

DMO is a departure from how the Navy traditionally operates. In past decades, the Navy would pull forces into concentrated formations for high-end threats, or disaggregate formations into independent assets for low-end threats. Distribution in DMO describes spreading warships outward and more broadly, but still having them act with unity of purpose, and primarily with a high-end warfighting focus. DMO is a fleet-level warfighting concept, centered on a higher level of command across a broader geographic expanse compared to the strike group-centric operating norms of recent decades.

The desire to distribute naval forces is part defensive reaction and part offensive evolution. Defensively, distribution aims to improve survivability by imposing more friction on the targeting process that precedes strikes. China fields a significant array of sensors and anti-ship firepower, and distribution attempts to prevent that sensing from culminating in decisive strikes. Distribution is an asymmetric approach for circumventing an adversary’s sensing and firepower by employing nontraditional schemes of maneuver and force posturing. Offensively, distribution better postures US forces to harness new anti-ship capabilities that are emerging across the joint force. All services are now procuring long-range anti-ship missiles and introducing newfound anti-ship firepower into a broad swath of untapped force structure, including surface warships, submarines, bombers, and land-based forces. This will level the playing field against China in key respects and provide the joint force with new options for mass fires.

Deception is a natural partner to distribution by targeting decision-making. Deception operations and capabilities should form a cornerstone of the DMO approach. These capabilities can include unmanned systems and decoy missiles that help overload adversary sensing. Deception can help compensate for force generation challenges by inflating the number of contacts that appear to be confronting an adversary. These capabilities are much more affordable than the platforms they replicate, and they can be broadly distributed across existing force structure.

Distributed forces may still be commanded by heavily centralized command structures. The Navy should consider distributing its command elements by having more expeditionary and afloat Maritime Operation Centers (MOCs). It can also better distribute command by enabling platforms with considerable command-and-control (C2) capability to take on certain command functions when networks are contested. Aerial platforms such as E-2s, F-35s, and P-8s are especially strong candidates for taking on the key role of backup joint fires integrators.

The Navy’s ability to investigate and implement DMO is heavily contingent upon the service’s system of operational learning. This system needs reform to better translate the concept into concrete updates to tactical development programs, as well as warfighter training and education. This system also needs to be reformed so the warfighting development of the Navy’s siloed communities can be deliberately integrated into fleet-level approaches under the overarching framework of DMO. The Navy’s MOCs should be specifically targeted with an intensive wargaming curriculum and additional staffing to markedly increase their warfighting skill in the near term.

About the author

Dmitry Filipoff is the director of online content of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and an associate research analyst in the Operational Warfighting Division of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). He is the author of the Fighting DMO and How the Fleet Forgot to Fight series. He is coauthor of Learning to Win: Using Operational Innovation to Regain the Advantage at Sea against China.

acknowledgements

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Fincantieri, MBDA, and Thales for their generous sponsorship of this paper.

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Los Angeles and California: Environmental policy as a catalyst for cleantech ecosystems  https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/los-angeles-and-california-environmental-policy-as-a-catalyst-for-cleantech-ecosystems/ Fri, 28 Jun 2024 20:43:10 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776548 California and Los Angeles have addressed climate change through innovative policymaking and technology, but face challenges which could undermine their success as leaders in tech and climate innovation.

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California and one of its most important tech-innovation ecosystems, Los Angeles, have combatted climate change and other environmental problems through innovation in both policymaking and technological invention and scaling. This paper first examines environmental and climate policymaking at the state level, actions that have been designed, in part, to spur tech-based innovation in California. Then it shifts its analytical focus to Los Angeles, one of the most important tech-innovation ecosystems in the state, especially when it comes to environmental technologies. Finally, this paper assesses the significant risks to California’s model and asks whether its tech ecosystems can transition to a fully decarbonized economy despite these risks. 

Although California’s story is mostly one of success, both the state of California and the city of Los Angeles face several significant challenges that could undermine their longstanding formulas. First, California’s economy is at some risk of losing its luster given its longstanding reputation as a high-cost state for workers and business. Second, California’s monumental plans to combat climate change—including the massive expansion of wind and solar infrastructure—are at odds with other elements of the state’s environmental legacy, such as habitat conservation. Third, climate change itself might derail decarbonization as extreme weather worsens, threatening communities, business, and the power grid. California’s continued success as a global technology and climate innovator depends on its ability to mitigate these risks.  

AUTHOR

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Atlantic Council would like to thank Chevron for supporting our work on this project.

The author thanks Danielle Miller, Frank Willey, and Daniel Hel- meci for their research assistance.

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The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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How will Trump and Biden differ on top foreign policy issues? A post-debate primer on what we learned. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trump-biden-foreign-policy-post-debate/ Fri, 28 Jun 2024 20:23:50 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=776846 Our experts assess what the debate revealed about each candidate’s foreign policy stances and what they could mean for US partners.

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There’s been a lot of talk about the style. But what about the substance? During Thursday night’s debate between President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump, the two men drew sharp contrasts on their approaches to wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, climate and energy policies, and the future of NATO. We asked our experts to assess the most significant exchanges, what they revealed about the policy differences (or lack thereof) between the candidates, and the potential consequences for the United States’ partners.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

William F. Wechsler: The three conclusions about the Middle East to draw from the debate

Shalom Lipner: The view from Jerusalem: US-Israel cooperation will suffer with both leaders in crisis

Olga Khakova: An anticlimactic climate discussion where “energy” was only mentioned twice

Matthew Kroenig: Don’t overlook the good news on US support for NATO


The three conclusions about the Middle East to draw from the debate

First, the debate proved that it’s time once again to start taking Trump seriously, if not literally, as the odds may have just increased that he will return to office. Trump has a clear message: Hamas and Iran would not have attacked Israel if he had been president, and if he is reelected he will not put any constraints on Israel’s efforts to “finish the job” in Gaza. Biden, Trump argues, is caught in half-measures that don’t satisfy either side, which is what he meant by calling Biden a “bad Palestinian.” Taking Trump seriously requires the Democratic political and foreign policy communities—including those who have protested against the Biden administration’s approach to the war—to recognize that this message will likely resonate with more Americans than they would prefer. 

Second, the debate likely strengthened Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hand in his efforts to remain in office. Over the decades, Netanyahu repeatedly has proved his deftness in managing both party and coalition politics. Following the largest security failure in Israeli history on October 7, Netanyahu’s strategy to avoid his government’s collapse has been to urge those in his coalition to give him through the end of the Knesset session (July 28) and then to hold on until the outcome of the US election, since a potential Trump victory would reduce Washington’s pressure on Netanyahu and thus the strains on the coalition. That argument is now clearly more persuasive. Moreover, Netanyahu will feel emboldened in his strategy of publicly arguing with Biden, which resonates with the far right of his coalition, and is now much more likely to reinforce much of Trump’s underlying message when he speaks in front of Congress on July 24—all of which will be received warmly by Republicans. Trump hasn’t forgotten his own frustrations with Netanyahu, but that will be rationalized as a problem for future Bibi, not present Bibi.

Third, the debate may have increased the likelihood of Israel launching a war against Hezbollah. For many in Israel, including a not-insubstantial proportion of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) leadership, the core lesson of October 7 is that they can no longer permit the existence of any well-armed adversary on Israel’s borders. Some advocated internally for Israel to strike Hezbollah on October 11 and continue to do so today. Meanwhile, one of the most powerful political challenges for Netanyahu is how to manage the demands of the tens of thousands of Israelis who have had to flee their homes in the north under daily attack from Hezbollah. Israel has raised the volume on its threats in recent weeks, both publicly and behind closed doors, which in part is intended to incentivize Hezbollah to agree to the deal being negotiated by the Biden administration to halt the violence along the border and de-link Israel’s conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. 

Netanyahu is temperamentally risk-averse, so launching a war against Hezbollah while fighting continues in Gaza and tensions are rising in the West Bank would normally be considered uncharacteristic for him. But many in Israel will interpret Trump’s unconditioned support for Israel “finishing the job” against Hamas as also a green light to do the same against Hezbollah. Moreover, I worry that the conventional wisdom in Israel risks overestimating the probability of the rosiest war scenarios and underestimating the risk of a wider, more devastating war that would threaten Israeli population centers. 

Notwithstanding the potential for unintentional escalation of the kind that triggered the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, I still think it more likely that a wider war won’t break out before the US election—a scenario that the Biden administration is actively working to avoid. But Netanyahu is well aware that Israel previously launched Operation Cast Lead during the “lame duck” period at the end of the George W. Bush administration. Given the message Trump delivered during the debate, one wonders if Netanyahu might begin weighing the potential advantages of launching a new war against Hezbollah if Trump is elected but before he takes office.

William F. Wechsler is the senior director of Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent US government position was deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations and combating terrorism.


The view from Jerusalem: US-Israel cooperation will suffer with both leaders in crisis

Many people set their alarm clocks for an early wake-up call on Friday morning in Israel, where major networks broadcast the US presidential debate live. Interest in the spectacle among Israelis was palpable—and understandable. Washington’s influence is deeply embedded within the core of almost every hot-button issue currently on Israel’s agenda: the protracted Israeli military campaign in Gaza, the negotiations to free hostages from Hamas captivity, the attempt to resolve tensions with Hezbollah over the Israel-Lebanon border, the drive to thwart Iran’s ambitions to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability, and the effort to formalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration continues to play a pivotal role on all of these fields and others.

Against that backdrop, the prospect of a lame-duck presidency in the United States—an increasingly likely possibility, amid mounting calls within the Democratic Party for Biden to withdraw his candidacy—injects another dose of dangerous instability into the already hobbled decision-making process of Netanyahu’s government. Barring unforeseen circumstances, the remaining months until January 20, 2025, when the next US president will be inaugurated, will feature a critical US-Israel relationship in which the leaders of both countries are mired in profound crisis, consumed with electoral politics and nursing mutual grievances. Cooperation between their nations will suffer as a result of this toxic dynamic.

Biden and Netanyahu, both weakened, increasingly will be tempted to try to gain leverage in their discussions by appealing to each other’s domestic audience. For Netanyahu, who considers himself a master of US politics, July 24—the date on which he is scheduled to address a joint session of Congress—will provide an instructive bellwether of his intentions. His previous appearance in that venue, in 2015, antagonized Barack Obama’s White House and intensified perceptions of Israel as a partisan cause. A repeat of that performance could restore Netanyahu to Trump’s good graces, but would undoubtedly worsen his predicament with the incumbent US president. With the coming US election still up for grabs, and since power may yet again shift between Democrats and Republicans, it would be wise for the Israeli prime minister to tailor his words so that majorities of both US political parties can continue to advocate for a close relationship with Israel.                

Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He previously served seven consecutive Israeli premiers over a quarter-century at the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem.


An anticlimactic climate discussion where “energy” was only mentioned twice

During Thursday’s debate, the candidates zeroed in on kitchen table issues, such as the cost of living, unemployment, and immigration, along with international priorities in Ukraine and the Middle East. But the largely unmentioned implications of the changing climate and energy insecurity have an outsized impact on all of these issues—and they demand policy leadership from the United States.  

Record heat and droughts drive migration and geopolitical tensions; extreme weather events, exacerbated by climate change, cause higher energy costs and destroy housing and critical infrastructure; high temperatures pose a number of health risks. Moreover, US energy policy plays a major role in helping Europe stand up to supply blackmail from Russia and the United States address its overreliance on Chinese supply chains.

When asked how the candidates plan to address the climate crisis, Biden only briefly mentioned his biggest achievement in this area, the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act: “I’ve passed the most extensive . . . climate change legislation in history,” he said

Trump posted a screenshot of his climate and energy talking points ahead of the debate, but he did not voice most of them on the stage. The former president did mention wanting “immaculate clean water” and “absolutely clean air” and how much the Paris climate accord costs the United States, while pointing to insufficient action on climate from China and Russia. He defended his decision to leave the accord during his first term, but stopped short during the debate of committing to leave it again. Staying in the climate accord gives the United States the most leverage in putting more pressure on other polluters and ensuring fair burden-sharing in reducing carbon emissions. 

Given that the candidates avoided disclosing their climate and energy strategies on Thursday night, the moderators of the next debate should push for direct answers that give voters a clearer view of what Biden 2.0 climate ambition would entail and how Trump’s all-of-the-above energy and deregulation approach can align with emissions reductions. While climate change may fade into the background as the animating issue for many US voters, its implications for every aspect of society remain salient. Although they approach these issues from very different angles, both candidates have an opportunity to make significant progress on reducing pollution and accelerating decarbonization, and the voters deserve to know what their strategies to do so will be.   

Olga Khakova is the deputy director for European energy security at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center.


Don’t overlook the good news on US support for NATO

Among the most important topics in Thursday’s debate was the origins and handling of major ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East. Biden touted his management of the crises, including building a broad, global coalition to support Ukraine. He stated, “And by the way, I got fifty other nations around the world to support Ukraine, including Japan and South Korea, because they understand that this was this—this kind of dislocation has a serious threat to the whole world peace.”

In contrast, Trump argued that the management of the wars was secondary to their origins. He maintained that they were the result of Biden administration deterrence failures. Trump claimed that if he had been in office, Russian President Vladimir Putin “never would have invaded Ukraine. Never. Just like Israel would have never been invaded in a million years by Hamas.”

Perhaps surprisingly, the debate may have brought good news for the future of US alliances. On the topic of NATO, the candidates sparred, but from the shared assumption that a strong NATO is in the United States’ interest. Biden argued that a failure to stop Putin in Ukraine would lead to attacks against Poland, a NATO ally. He stated that “NATO allies have produced as much funding for Ukraine as we have. That’s why it’s—that’s why we’re strong.” He questioned Trump on whether he is “going to stay in NATO or you’re going to pull out of NATO?”

On the campaign trail, Trump has reassured voters that he would not pull out of NATO in a second term and has emphasized the importance of burden-sharing. In Thursday’s debate, Trump argued that he strengthened NATO in his first term because he “got [European allies] to put up hundreds of billions of dollars . . . The secretary general of NATO said, ‘Trump did the most incredible job I’ve ever seen.’”

Trump repeated his threat to free-riding allies, warning, “No, I’m not going to support NATO if you don’t pay.” Note that he did not argue that he planned to cut support to NATO, only that his approach literally paid off, stating, “And you know what happened? Billions and billions of dollars came flowing in the next day and the next months.” He criticized Biden’s unconditional support, which he claimed meant that the United States is now back to “paying everybody’s bills.”

In sum, the candidates seemed to concur that there is no electoral benefit to being seen as walking away from NATO. This assessment was supported by a new poll out this week from the Ronald Reagan Foundation and Institute, which found that 61 percent of Americans hold a favorable view on NATO and 72 percent support defending a NATO ally if it is attacked. Perhaps surprising to those who describe Trump supporters as “isolationist,” those numbers remained high, at 53 percent and 69 percent, respectively, for self-described “MAGA Republicans.”

The candidates will likely clash on major issues such as immigration and inflation between now and November, but support for NATO remains a central pillar of the bipartisan foreign policy consensus.

Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Note: This entry was updated on June 29, 2024.


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Accelerating the energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/accelerating-the-energy-transition-in-the-eastern-caribbean/ Fri, 28 Jun 2024 16:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=771816 Countries in the Eastern Caribbean are among the world’s most energy insecure nations. These countries grapple with high electricity costs that undercut economic competitiveness and growth, are heavily dependent on petroleum products, and are uniquely vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

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Table of contents

Introduction

Countries in the Eastern Caribbean1 are among the world’s most energy insecure nations. These countries grapple with high electricity costs that undercut economic competitiveness and growth, are heavily dependent on petroleum products, and are uniquely vulnerable to the effects of climate change. At the same time, a World Bank designation as middle- or high-income economies significantly limits access to concessional financing. The result is a slow transition to renewable energy power generation, including attracting commercial interest for the relevant infrastructure and unbundling utility systems that often stymie regulatory changes and curtail needed investments in the energy sector.

The time may be ripe for accelerating the pace of the transition in the Eastern Caribbean. A broad consensus exists among regional governments, the business community, and multilateral partners to further usher in a transition to renewable energy, given the unique vulnerabilities facing Eastern Caribbean countries. Meanwhile, countries in the Southern Caribbean (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname) are leaning into their hydrocarbon reserves as they balance their own energy transition, while other countries are either attracting commercial interest or are far along in their renewable energy development relative to the Eastern Caribbean. Though there is an abundance of solar and wind power potential in the Eastern Caribbean—along with significant geothermal reserves in Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Kitts and Nevis—countries in this region are faced with defining how a realistic, affordable, and just energy transition can take place and unlocking new private sector and multilateral resources.

The Atlantic Council’s Caribbean Initiative engaged in a series of consultations with the Caribbean Energy Working Group (CEWG), whose members identified two main constraints to the region’s transition: the top-down vertically integrated nature of state-owned utility systems; and limited access to low-cost financing and credit to governments and clean energy developers. While recognizing that an energy transition requires a holistic approach, CEWG members propose that the starting points must be addressing utility constraints and access to finance to ensure a reliable and resilient energy system transformation that is sustainable and affordable for consumers, governments, and the private sector in the Eastern Caribbean. An energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean must ensure reliable power to combat price volatility for consumers while energy infrastructure should be resilient to the effects of climate change, hurricanes and strong tropical storms, and rising temperatures.

The CEWG brings together up to fifteen policy and technical experts from across the Caribbean, and was first convened in 2023 by the Atlantic Council. This publication builds off the CEWG’s first report, “A roadmap for the Caribbean’s energy transition,” which was published last year and outlined a five-step process that governments, developers, and regional partners can undertake to facilitate an energy transition in the Caribbean. The five-step process includes: conducting energy modeling and analysis; modernizing energy grids; diversifying utility structures; creating bankable projects; and scaling project investment to national and subregional levels. This publication focuses on applying steps three and four of the roadmap.

The CEWG met as part of two roundtable discussions, followed by five one-on-one consultation sessions across the group to identify barriers and solutions to accelerating a reliable and resilient energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean. This publication serves as a complement to existing initiatives and projects dedicated to facilitating an energy transition, with the aim of raising additional awareness of the reality and the urgency of the moment for the world’s most vulnerable countries.

Severe consequences for energy insecurity

Countries in the Eastern Caribbean are open facing, small market economies, vulnerable to ebbs and flows of the global financial system. The region’s import dependence means that supply chain constraints and rising global interest rates have a disproportionate effect on these economies. For example, when Russia’s war in Ukraine stemmed the flow of fertilizer to agriculture commodity exporters, food inflation in the Eastern Caribbean skyrocketed and remained high even as prices eventually declined in industrialized nations.2 And although the price of renewable energy, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) power, has declined dramatically over the past decade, capital and investment in this sector naturally gravitated to the bigger economies in the Global North.

Climate change wreaks havoc across Caribbean islands that do not have the available climate-resilient infrastructure to withstand strong wind speeds and heavy rainfall. September 19, 2022. REUTERS/Ricardo Rojas

Stronger storms, more outages
Climate change is a significant driver of the energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean. Hurricanes and strong tropical storms cause flash flooding and high wind speeds that damage energy infrastructure. Global warming, as a result of increasing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), is fueling stronger and more frequent tropical storms. The result is lost power for days and weeks, as was the case in 2017 when Hurricane Irma hit Antigua and Bermuda, damaging transmission lines and generators. Similarity, in 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread power outages in Dominica.3

The makeup of these economies has resulted in Eastern Caribbean countries paying some of the highest electricity prices in the Americas, including double and sometimes triple of what the average consumer pays in the United States ($0.109 per 1 kilowatt-hour (KW/h).4 On average, consumer costs in Antigua and Barbuda ($0.367 per 1 KW/h) and Saint Kitts and Nevis ($0.333 per 1 KW/h) rank on the higher end of the spectrum, with Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ($0.185 per 1 KW/h) on the lower end, and the rest of the countries falling in between. These high costs coincide with an import dependence on petroleum products, with Antigua and Barbuda (100 percent), Dominica (92 percent), Grenada (93 percent), Saint Lucia (98 percent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (87 percent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (95 percent) all relying on fossil fuels to satisfy almost all of their energy demand.5 The cost of these imports account for almost 7 percent of the subregion’s gross domestic product, cutting into public expenditure needed to invest in climate adaptation projects and social sectors such as education and health services.6

High electricity prices and energy imports undercut the competitiveness of key economic sectors in the Eastern Caribbean—notably the hospitality sector—and limit the purchasing power of consumers. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, six of the countries prioritized in this publication rank in the global top ten of tourism-dependent economies.7 The tourism industry accounts for a significant share of energy demand in these countries, increasing the prices for hotel rooms due to high usage of air conditioning and lighting.8 Given that the tourism industry is an economic driver, high energy costs can make industries uncompetitive vis-à-vis other tourist hubs in the region such as Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Beyond the tourism sector, more than a quarter of energy demand in the Eastern Caribbean is for residential use.9 High power bills can take up a large share of household income and decrease the purchasing power of individuals, leaving them unable to spend money on local products and services, like food and transportation, which help to stimulate economic growth.

Despite the challenges facing the Eastern Caribbean, bright spots exist. Renewable energy, such as solar, wind, and geothermal reserves, are abundant. Across the region, the sun shines more than 200 days annually,10 has an estimated potential of almost 70 gigawatts of available offshore wind (excluding Dominica), and (excluding Antigua and Barbuda) houses an estimated 6,290 megawatts (MW) of available geothermal reserves.11 But this potential has not been tapped. Current installed capacity of renewable energy (as a percentage) stands at: Antigua (4 percent), Dominica (25 percent including hydroelectric power), Grenada (4 percent), Saint Lucia (3 percent), Saint Kitts and Nevis (5 percent), and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (17 percent including hydroelectric).

Geothermal development is a high priority in the Eastern Caribbean
Dominica has an estimated 1,390 MW of geothermal potential. The country’s small population and energy grid had not provided adequate incentive to develop that capacity, due to the high capital costs of exploring its geothermal reserves at scale- until recently. Commitment by the government in 2023 to develop its reserves and support this year from the World Bank have helped the country begin developing its geothermal potential. The World Bank is financing a new project at $38.5 million to support drilling of new geothermal wells and helping construct new transmission lines and substations to connect the future geothermal plants to consumers. Meanwhile, St. Kitts and Nevis is consistently looking for new partners to support its own geothermal ambitions for close to a decade, with a total project cost estimated at US $505 million. A mixture of bilateral and multilateral financing will be needed to bring this project closed to Dominica’s stage.12

Energy-transition barriers

The utility systems in the Eastern Caribbean are state-owned entities—excluding Saint Lucia, which has a public-private model—tasked with providing power to citizens. Tax revenues are used by governments to invest in critical and social services. These are top-down systems in vertically integrated structures, meaning that they single-handedly operate the generation, transmission, and distribution of power. This model can stifle innovation and competition, leaving customers without alternative choices and increasing the cost of electricity. Further, it means that introducing new clean energy technologies, when possible, must be financed and implemented by the utility, which is often devoid of the needed capital and technical assistance to act. Therefore, incorporating renewable energies into this model can be expensive—particularly since these technologies have high upfront costs. It is both a political and economic challenge that clean energy is not necessarily cheap energy.

However, unbundling utility systems is not a straightforward solution and not all state-owned entities are necessarily bad. Breaking these systems apart might divide consumer bases and may not lower the cost of electricity given the small size of Eastern Caribbean countries’ populations. Instead, as discussed below, the best-case scenario is to introduce innovation into the utility system, such as diversifying the utility structure across generation, distribution, and transmission by using public-private models. Maintaining an intact customer base is critical for utilities to keep the costs low for consumers while ensuring that utilities and the private-sector entities are still turning a profit. This does not mean that breaking up systems is the sole way to ensure low prices for renewable energy generation. Some markets, particularly in micro economies like in the Eastern Caribbean, might be too small to introduce competition and keep prices affordable. There is no one-size-fits-all solution, as changes in utility structures need to adapt to and be contextualized for each individual country.

Changing the business model of the utilities can help to create more incentives to incorporating renewable energy generation by factoring in the social cost externalities (the associated costs of fossil fuels on the broader public and society) of depending on fossil fuels as a realistic price comparison. Current models determine the price of electricity based on the cost of petroleum imports. But the emissions of fossil fuels—not just carbon dioxide but also other toxins that cause respiratory illnesses—increase cancer risks and, generally, overall poor health. The future healthcare costs for the consumer and the burden on governments to invest in adequate healthcare infrastructure are typically not added to the total cost of importing fossil fuels. If a full cost analysis and reformed business model are developed, then the price of importing fossil fuels might be higher than renewable power generation.

Utility-scale solar PV is a low-cost renewable energy option in the Eastern Caribbean, but it requires significant planning and project design work due to the unique landscapes of each country—all of which are costly. October 26, 2017. REUTERS/Alvin Baez

Commercial developers fund projects initially on their own before seeking to make projects bankable by obtaining loans that are backed by cash flow. Projects in the Eastern Caribbean take a long time to develop, given financing challenges due to unclear regulations and permitting, and a lack of investment-grade utility systems to guarantee payments under negotiated power purchasing agreements. Due to the long period of development, investors and governments look to derisk their projects by seeking full grants or convertible loan grants to help them clear these hurdles.

Commercial renewable energy projects also suffer from limited access to low cost and concessionary finance and capital. As discussed, state-owned utilities and governments are responsible for financing new renewable energy projects. These countries do not have the fiscal space or national budgets to self-finance these projects, leaving them to seek loans and grants from multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral lenders. However, the World Bank classifies Eastern Caribbean countries as middle- and high-income economies, disqualifying them from accessing low-cost loans from the World Bank and those that also use this classification, such as the US Development Finance Corporation. This also applies to the business community and energy developers who need access to financing during the pre-project phase (prefeasibility studies, production of design drawings, and environmental social and impact assessments, among others).

Applying the CEWG roadmap

Addressing utility constraints and unlocking new access to finance and capital both are needed, but a well thought-out process that takes the context and nuances of each country into account is needed. To the international community, these countries are bound by their similarities (e.g., population and market size, and geographic location). Realistically, there are enough differences between them that suggest that no solution to the region’s energy transition challenges can be a one-size-fits-all approach. Each country’s context will determine how the below solutions are applied, from unbundling utility structures to attracting finance and capital based on renewable energy. While each country needs a transition that is contextualized to its own reality, technical assistance and transmission upgrades are at the core of the energy transition. Policy action and financial resources are both required, and Caribbean governments and regional institutions will need the assistance of partners like the US Trade and Development Agency and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to deploy the assistance throughout the transition process.

Based on the small consumer bases and state-owned nature of utility systems in the Eastern Caribbean, unbundling utilities might not actually lower electricity costs. Instead, the structure of the utility might be reformed to a public-private partnership (PPP) model that also accounts for price comparisons between fossil fuel imports with social cost externalities attached to a transition to renewable energies. In essence, PPPs are a collaborative model that leverages the strengths of both the public and private sectors, which can help accelerate the deployment of renewable energy infrastructure while ensuring cost-effectiveness and financing sustainability. For example, needed transmission upgrades can be undertaken by governments to help absorb costs and prevent them from being passed to consumers. And the private sector can take responsibility for generation projects, driving down costs and improving competitiveness. Governments and utilities are still able to benefit from the revenue to use for public-sector investments while private-sector entities can streamline innovation in the energy sector, helping to attract more commercial interest.

Renewable energy projects, like offshore wind, have high upfront costs and require significant technical assistance to design, build, and implement. September 4, 2023. REUTERS/Tom Little

Designing PPP models will be complex. Each country and its utility or utilities are unique. The challenge will be designing the appropriate model. Here, entities such as the IDB should work with the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), and use input from private-sector companies in the region, to design a PPP model for utility structures. The IDB houses the experience and expertise in designing PPP models, and through its new One Caribbean program is already building a project preparation facility that can incorporate PPP designs into its model.13 The challenge is that Eastern Caribbean countries are not members of the IDB, though they are borrowing member countries of the CDB. In the past, the CDB and the IDB have worked together to streamline assistance to and analysis for the Eastern Caribbean. The same can be done here, with the added benefit of the CDB already understanding the nuances of each of the countries in the subregion.

However, designing and implementing a PPP model requires political will and government support. Governments might not be anxious to adopt renewables if the cost of the electricity does not lower prices—affecting key political constituents—and if accelerating an energy transition comes with increased public debt through high-interest loans. Simply put, a transition is only possible if governments are given assurances and feel comfortable that incorporating renewables will not affect their standing with their constituents, meaning that entities like the IDB, CDB, and partners, such as the United States, will have to secure government support before an energy transition can take place.

As utility systems are able to reform their models to ensure that renewable energy projects are affordable for governments and consumers, support to countries and investors is needed to finance projects through the project pipeline. As discussed in the CEWG’s first report, the projects in the Caribbean tend to fall in the “valley of death,” due to project delays ranging from limited site access to an inability to secure additional financing. Key to moving projects through the pipeline is to derisk them and ensure their bankability. Two steps are needed. First, Caribbean countries need access to the expertise and capacity to conduct feasibility studies, environmental social and impact assessments, and design power purchase agreements, among other things. Second, Eastern Caribbean countries need access to investment vehicles that prioritize grants or low-cost loans for the upfront costs of renewable energy projects. Entities like IDB Invest have pockets of financing that allows the institution to inject equity into projects, but the pool of funds is small relative to what is available for other countries or subregions in Latin America.

This is where regional partners like the United States and existing regional programs like the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF) and the Bridgetown Initiative14 should be utilized. The United States government, through the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), should take advantage of the current DFC reauthorization process to create a carve out for clean energy projects in the region. The scale of investment is minimal compared to other DFC-financed projects and would have outsized effects in the small markets and grids in the Eastern Caribbean. This would take an act of the US Congress—particularly for a middle-income country exception—but there is precedent and increasing appetite to prioritize energy security in the Caribbean. Further, the United States should encourage the IDB and the CDB to work with the CDF and the Bridgetown Initiative to create a project pipeline (with attached equity investments available) to attract large-scale financing and grants from global donors. Capital and finance around the world are available if regional partners and entities are able to build mechanisms that streamline funding to energy projects in the Eastern Caribbean and build a project pipeline to attract commercial investors.

A global call to action

An energy transition in the Eastern Caribbean requires political will, regional coordination, and consistent technical assistance. Relative to the cost of the global energy transition, the needed capital in the Eastern Caribbean is minimal. But the tides are changing in the region, as more political actors and financial institutions are thinking creatively of how to accelerate an energy transition. Still, human capital and capacity limitations stifle the region’s ability to undertake this process alone. Partner governments like the United States and Canada have committed to the region’s energy security in the past few years, but these two countries do not have the funding or domestic political will to direct their attention consistently to the Eastern Caribbean. Addressing the climate crisis and facilitating a global energy transition is increasing in urgency each day, meaning that more actors across governments, international bodies, the business community, and foundations are unlocking new forms of support. Tapping into these resources will be critical. Regional governments and their partners need to continue raising the profile of the Eastern Caribbean and using regional and global platforms, from the Group of Twenty to the UN General Assembly to the COP29 climate talks in November to ensure that these countries are not left behind.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council thanks board member Melanie Chen for her financial support of this publication and the corresponding working group. A thank you also goes to the CEWG members who joined the numerous one-on-one consultations and roundtables that informed this publication, including co-chairs David Goldwyn and Eugene Tiah. A special thank you goes to Jason Marczak, vice president and senior director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, which houses the Caribbean Initiative, for his guidance and comments throughout the working group and during the drafting of this publication. Maite Gonzalez Latorre managed the production flow of this publication.

About the author

Wazim Mowla is the associate director and fellow of the Caribbean Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. He leads the development and execution of the initiative’s programming, including the Financial Inclusion Task Force, the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis (PACC) 2030 Working Group, and the Caribbean Energy Working Group. Since joining the Council, Mowla has co-authored major publications on the strategic importance of sending US COVID-19 vaccines to the Caribbean, strategies to address financial derisking, and how the United States can advance new policies to support climate and energy resilience.

About the Caribbean Energy Working Group Co-chairs

David Goldwyn is president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, LLC (GGS), an international energy advisory consultancy, and chairman of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Energy Advisory Group. He is a globally recognized thought leader, educator, and policy innovator in energy security and extractive-industry transparency.

Eugene Tiah is a senior business executive with in-depth knowledge and more than forty years of experience in the oil and gas business within the United States and the Caribbean region. He is also the president and CEO of the Caribbean Energy Chamber.

Related content

The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.

1    Eastern Caribbean refers to Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.
2    Diego Arias, Melissa Brown, and Eva Hasiner, “The Worrying Phenomenon of Food Insecurity in the Caribbean,” World Bank, January 3, 2024, https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/latinamerica/food-insecurity-caribbean.
3    Source: “Several Communities without Electricity Due to Passage of TS Dorian,” Dominica News Online, August 27, 2019, https://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/several-communities-without-electricity-due-to-passage-of-ts-dorian/.
4    “The Price of Electricity per KWh in 230 Countries,” Cable.co.uk, accessed May 1, 2024, https://www.cable.co.uk/energy/worldwide-pricing/.
6    Anastasia Moloney, “Pandemic Derails Caribbean Islands’ Bid for Greener, Cheaper Energy,” Reuters, May 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/caribbean-energy-coronavirus/pandemic-derails-caribbean-islands-bid-for-greener-cheaper-energy-idUSL8N2MY64F/.
7    David Rosenblatt and Henry Mooney, “Caribbean Region Quarterly Bulletin: The Pandemic Saga Continues,” Inter-American Development Bank, accessed May 1, 2024, https://flagships.iadb.org/en/caribbean-region-quarterly-bulletin-2020-q2/the-pandemic-saga-continues.
8    Pepukaye Bardouille, “A Roadmap for Scaling Up Renewable Energy in Island Nations: Three Success Factors for the Eastern Caribbean’s Transition from Fossil Fuels,” NextBillion, June 22, 2022,  https://nextbillion.net/roadmap-scaling-up-renewable-energy-island-nations-eastern-caribbean-transition-from-fossil-fuels/.
9    Goldwyn, Tiah, and Mowla, “A Roadmap.”
10    Martin Vogt, “The Caribbean’s Untapped Renewable Energy Potential,” Renewable Energy World, February 6, 2019, https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/storage/the-caribbeans-untapped-renewable-energy-potential/#gref.
11    Goldwyn, Tiah, and Mowla, “A Roadmap.”
12    Source: “Dominica Commits to Transformative Geothermal Project Funding,”Carib Daily News, September 8, 2023, https://caribdaily.news/article/968edae7-da4d-4864-b2a6-e4d114b1766d; “The World Bank Supports Clean Energy Generation in Dominica,” Press Release, World Bank, January 26, 2024, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2024/01/26/world-bank-supports-clean-energy-generation-dominica; and Eulana Weekes, “SKN Holds Further Geothermal Discussions with Saudi Fund for Development,” Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation, February 20, 2024, https://carilec.org/skn-holds-further-geothermal-discussions-with-saudi-fund-for-development/.
13    “IDB Group Launches One Caribbean Regional Program,” Loop News, March 11, 2024, https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/idb-group-launches-one-caribbean-regional-program-4.
14    N.K Ezeobele, “Bridgetown Initiative: Rethinking Sustainable Economic Growth for the Developing World,” Business Council for Sustainable Energy, July 14, 2023, https://bcse.org/bridgetown-initiative-rethinking-sustainable-economic-growth-developing-world/#:~:text=The%20Bridgetown%20Initiative%20signifies%20a,climate%20action%20and%20infrastructure%20gaps.

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McCue quoted in the Economist regarding the damage of a potential Russian nuclear detonation in orbit https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/mccue-quoted-in-the-economist-regarding-the-damage-of-a-potential-russian-nuclear-detonation-in-orbit/ Thu, 27 Jun 2024 18:08:19 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=778068 On June 27, 2024, Forward Defense Visiting Senior Fellow Lieutenant Colonel James McCue was quoted in an article from the Economist regarding the damage a Russian nuclear detonation in orbit would cause. McCue stated that the result of such a detonation would be "satellite Armageddon."

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On June 27, 2024, Forward Defense Visiting Senior Fellow Lieutenant Colonel James McCue was quoted in an article from the Economist regarding the damage a Russian nuclear detonation in orbit would cause. McCue stated that the result of such a detonation would be “satellite Armageddon.”

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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