The news broke after the Moroccan royal palace released a communiqué that referenced a letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to the king of Morocco on the commemoration of the silver jubilee of his coronation. The letter states that the “present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” In his correspondence with the Moroccan king, Macron added that “France intends to act consistently with this position at both national and international levels.” Although the French position explicitly references Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, it will need more clarification and translation into concrete policies in the coming months.

Nonetheless, the French decision is particularly significant given its colonial past in North Africa and its shared responsibility with Spain in largely determining the postcolonial borders of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. These borders are the origin of many of the current territorial disputes in the region. France’s endorsement of the Moroccan autonomy plan this week follows similar support from Spain in 2022 and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara expressed by the United States in 2020 and Israel in 2023, along with a growing list of Arab and African nations.

Understanding the French calculus

France’s shift of stance comes as its relations with Morrocco have been strained. Since 2020, Rabat has pressured Paris to break the status quo—a neutrality on the issue apparently intended not to upset either Morocco or Algeria—and take a clearer stance on the Western Sahara. Striking a deal with then-US President Donald Trump in 2020 over the disputed territories and normalizing ties with Israel boosted Morocco’s diplomatic confidence and helped redefine the kingdom’s foreign policy. As a result, the Sahara issue, in the words of the Moroccan king, became “the lens through which Morocco looks at the world.”

As an example of the deteriorating bilateral relations, Mohammed VI reportedly “definitely shelved” relations with Macron and declined state visit requests by the French president last year. In addition, the kingdom started to increase its divestment from business partnerships with France—previously considered its international economic partner of choice. Torn between Morocco and Algeria, France failed to balance its act in the Maghreb after a chain of unfortunate events, including the Pegasus spyware case, a visa crisis, and the recall of Rabat’s ambassador to France in February 2023. Most recently, Morocco refused French aid after the Marrakesh earthquake in September 2023.

France, however, never stopped courting Morocco, because Paris did not want to lose strategically important economic and political ground in Africa. For its part, Rabat did not break its relations with Paris entirely, continuing its intelligence and security cooperation with France. Moroccan forces, for example, are currently helping to secure the Paris Olympics. Morocco also appointed Samira Sitail, a dual national and Makhzan insider, as its ambassador to attempt to stir the stagnant waters.

Rather than trying to deter Morocco’s ambitious Atlantic Initiative—aimed at offering landlocked Sahel countries trade access to the ocean through a $1.2 billion harbor in Dakhla, Western Sahara—France is eying a share of the economic benefits promised by the project. The only catch is how to address the 2021 European Union (EU) court ruling against the Morocco-EU trade deal over Western Sahara, which the Elysée may now advocate to reverse together with other pro-Moroccan EU countries ahead of the final judgment, due in a few months.

Western Sahara and global realignment

Another defining factor in understanding the recent French decision lies in the global realignment behind old Cold War frontiers, and NATO allies engaging in historic contests against increasingly destabilizing forces. Morocco has always been a reliable partner to the global liberal West in its fight against Russian aggression and different terrorist groups. The country is also more-or-less aligned with the United States and France on a common vision of the future. As Iran and its proxies reinforce ties with the Algerian regime, which has been cultivating close relations with Russia since the 1970s, North Atlantic allies fear a new stronghold of antagonists in North Africa.

For the past five decades, Western Sahara has been a major security loophole at the doors of the Mediterranean and the Sahel. With growing rumors about Iranian and Wagner Group presence among Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps in western Algeria, where an estimated 173,600 refugees live, it’s becoming imperative for the United States and European countries to try to resolve the Western Sahara file once and for all.

Disrupting the status quo in the Maghreb

While on paper the French decision to side with Morocco may seem in line with its economic and global priorities, it does come at a price. EU neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and exclusive reliance on the United Nations peacekeeping mission to maintain the status quo between Rabat and Algiers has been central to stabilizing the region. After the United States and Spain sided with Morocco, Algeria responded by severing diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 and recalling its ambassador in Madrid in 2022. Algeria also disrupted gas exports to Spain through Morocco by closing the EU-Maghreb pipeline just as tensions were building around Russia’s gas exports ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reaction by Algiers to Macron’s swing toward Mohammed VI described France and Morocco as “colonial powers, new and old.” This was followed on Tuesday by Algeria recalling its ambassador in Paris to express its discontent.

Macron’s decision has alienated an already nervous Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is running for reelection on September 7. This week’s events may push him deeper into Iranian and Russian arms. Even though not expressly sought by any of the parties, the risk of recent events sparking up a wider regional conflict in the Maghreb is higher than ever. Even if in a way designed to avoid escalation, Algeria will likely feel it necessary to respond in some form.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Economic diversification and foreign direct investment

The US-Morocco FTA removed tariffs and significantly reduced trade barriers between the two countries. This, alongside other FTA and advanced trade agreements with the European Union (EU), China, Egypt, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributed to Morocco’s efforts to diversify its economy and trade. Through providing access to the US market, the FTA encouraged Moroccan firms to expand into new high-tech manufacturing such as automotive and aeronautics parts, as well as electronics. The agreement has also contributed to a steady increase in bilateral trade. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, US-Morocco trade in goods and services has grown to nearly $7 billion annually. This trade growth reflects a deepening of economic ties between the two countries.

Another significant impact of the US-Morocco FTA and other trade agreements has been increased foreign direct investment (FDI). The agreement provided a framework that infused confidence in US and EU investors and caused an inflow of investment in various sectors, including manufacturing, tourism, and renewable energy. These investments have been central in creating jobs and developing the skills of the Moroccan workforce.

One example is the automotive industry, in which major companies like Japan-based Yazaki, Ireland-based Delphi Technologies, Germany-based Schlemmer, and US-based Lear Corporation have established operations in Morocco. These investments have created thousands of jobs and positioned Morocco as a regional hub for automotive parts manufacturing, generating more than $10 billion in revenue and making it a leading sector in the country’s export market. Additionally, the growth of the renewable energy sector has made Morocco a global leader in the green energy industry, with ambitious projects like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex.

Challenges and structural reforms

While Morocco’s FTA and trade agreements with the United States and other major economies have brought numerous benefits, challenges exist. One of the main issues has been guaranteeing that the gains from free trade are distributed equitably across Moroccan society. There is a need for sustained efforts to address regional disparities and support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may struggle to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a liberalized trade environment.

Moreover, the agreement has highlighted the importance of structural reforms to enhance Morocco’s competitiveness. Hence, the Moroccan government has undertaken various measures to improve the business climate, such as simplifying regulatory procedures, developing and improving infrastructure, and investing in education and vocational training, with a particular focus on empowering girls and women. These reforms are crucial for sustaining long-term economic growth and ensuring that Morocco can fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by free trade.

Future prospects

Looking ahead, the US-Morocco FTA serves as a foundation for further economic cooperation and integration between the two economies. Both countries have expressed a commitment to deepening their trade relationship and exploring new areas of collaboration. For Morocco, this includes leveraging the FTA to attract more investment in high-tech industries and innovation-driven sectors. Morocco’s strategic location and proximity to European Union and African markets, coupled with its relatively modern infrastructure and stable political environment, position it as an attractive investment destination in emerging market economies.

Alongside the agreements signed between Morocco and other countries, the US-Morocco FTA remains one of the most important as it has played an integral role in transforming Morocco’s economy and labor force, contributing to the diversification of its trade portfolio and helping to attract foreign investment. However, regulatory, legal, and labor force challenges remain, and continued efforts are needed to ensure that the benefits of free trade are more equitably shared across various sectors of Moroccan society.

As Morocco looks to the future, the strategic vision should focus on further enhancing its competitive edge and strengthening its position as a key player in the global supply chain. Morocco’s Atlantic Sahel initiative is an important step in this direction. With sustained commitment and strategic planning, the next twenty years can bring even more prosperity and development for the Moroccan economy and greater profits for US and other foreign businesses operating in the kingdom.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou leads the Bretton Woods 2.0 Project at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is also a senior lecturer of economics at the American University in Washington, DC.

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Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for both sending and receiving countries. In the Atlantic basin, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by various factors such as economic opportunities, political instability, social networks, and historical ties.

This joint report, in partnership with Policy Center for the New South and the Africa Center, aims to explore the trends in African migration within the Atlantic basin, focusing on case studies of Nigerian migration to the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa as well as Moroccan migration to the European Union. It seeks to provide valuable insights into ongoing discourse on African migration by exploring case studies from diverse regions within the Atlantic basin, it highlights the interconnectedness of migration flows and their impact on individuals, communities, and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The report examines factors such as economic disparities, political instability, educational opportunities, and family ties to explain motivations behind Nigerian and Moroccan migration. By analyzing the “push and pull factors” influencing Moroccan migration to France and Spain alongside Nigerian migration to the United States, the UK, and South Africa, it builds a nuanced understanding of migration dynamics within the Atlantic basin and what is at stake for the home countries experiencing brain drain.

Public Event Thu, June 27, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

New trends in African migration: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria

The Africa Center brings together experts to discuss current and future trends in African migration.

Africa Migration Morocco Nigeria

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Report

Aug 3, 2023

Irregular migration from North Africa: Shifting local and regional dynamics

By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Human Rights Italy

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This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Issue Brief Sep 19, 2023

Less freedom, weaker states, more conflict: can that cycle be broken?

By Patrick W. Quirk and Owen L. Myers

Why and how advancing freedom (political, economic, and judicial components) is the surest way to advance sustainable stability and associated prosperity.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

New Atlanticist Jan 2, 2024

Six ways for the US to put democracy back on the global agenda in 2024

By Patrick Quirk

As 2024 begins, the Biden administration must take urgent steps to put its pro-democracy rhetoric into action in key theaters around the world.

Africa Americas

New Atlanticist Mar 22, 2024

Ahead of its presidential election, Senegal shows that democracy requires the rule of law

By James Storen, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

For Senegal to cement its status as a haven of democracy, the country must prioritize judicial independence and the rule of law.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The latest sign of Algeria’s obsession with Morocco was its decision to confiscate the jerseys of Moroccan soccer club RS Berkane after its players traveled to Algeria on April 19 to play a CAF Confederation Cup semifinal match against USMA Alger. Algeria justified its decision by stating that the team’s equipment bore an “illegitimate” map of Morocco, which included Western Sahara. 

African soccer’s governing body intervened, ordering Algeria to drop its case and allow RS Berkane to play in the jerseys. However, Algiers disregarded the ruling, seizing any opportunity to display its support for what it describes as the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.

Many have maintained that one of the main drivers of Algeria’s hostility toward Morocco is the ideological makeup of the Algerian establishment and its strategy of seeking popular legitimacy.

Algeria’s operating philosophy is to galvanize nationalist fervor against its enemies. For the past three decades, it has constantly needed to create external enemies to mobilize national support and divert public opinion from the country’s economic, social, and political problems. 

While largely pertinent, this analysis ignores the psychological dimension of this chronic animosity between the two countries. Algeria’s military and political leaders harbor unresolved grievances against Morocco, which contribute to tensions. Additionally, Morocco is one of the oldest monarchies in the world, and has managed to maintain its sovereignty for much of its history. The same cannot be said of Algeria, a sixty-two-year-old country. 

This makes the Algerian regime reluctant to fully explore the past, out of fear that a deep dive into the country’s history might lend credence to some critics’ claim that modern Algeria is the creation of imperialist France.

It’s worth mentioning that Morocco was a strong supporter of the Algerian liberation movement, contributing financially and logistically to the war effort against French domination. Then a champion of what some have described as a strong belief in the urgency and imperative of Muslim solidarity, Morocco ignored warnings and secret deals from France, committing itself to the liberation of Algeria instead.

Yet, post-independence, Algeria’s leadership quickly whitewashed this well-documented episode of Moroccan solidarity and generosity, providing invaluable insights into what would later become Algeria’s deep-seated desire to be the Maghreb’s undisputed leader.

Morocco’s defeat of Algeria in the border war known as the 1963 Sand War created a psychological barrier, as generations of Algerian military and political elites grew up with the idea of avenging the humiliation that newly independent Algeria had suffered at Morocco’s hands.

Morocco’s “betrayal” of Algeria

Over time, Algeria’s resentment against Morocco for its humiliating defeat morphed into a radical desire to take revenge by fostering separatism on Moroccan territory. Therefore, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front is the culmination of the Algerian elite’s strategy of attaining regional primacy by establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. While proclaiming its support for the “liberation struggle” of the “oppressed Sahrawi people,” Algeria’s primary goal is to keep Morocco in check by fomenting and prolonging the dispute over the Western Sahara region to prevent Rabat from reopening the issue of unresolved Algerian-Moroccan borders.

As far as Algiers is concerned, ending the Western Sahara dispute would provide Morocco with a level of strategic continental depth that would overwhelmingly consolidate its status as a regional hegemon. Algeria has steadfastly supported the Polisario for the past four decades to prevent Morocco from settling the territorial dispute. The Algerian-Moroccan rivalry entered a new phase in 2017 when Morocco joined the African Union (AU). Algeria had tirelessly used Morocco’s absence from the AU to push for a “parallel African agenda” on the Western Sahara question. This entailed lobbying for the Polisario Front’s Sahrawi cause, which it presents as a decolonization struggle against what it describes as Moroccan occupation.

Given that the AU’s official position on Western Sahara has shifted in Morocco’s favor since 2018, some of Algeria’s anti-Moroccan agitation speaks of deepening diplomatic disarray and a profound sense of disappointment. Algeria seems to be furious that Morocco, in the short time since its return to the AU, has effectively destroyed all the work that Algerian diplomacy had done for three decades to get the AU to fully support a self-determination referendum that would culminate in the creation of an independent state in the Western Sahara region.

Algeria’s displeasure with Morocco’s growing continental influence can be seen in three regional efforts that Algiers has undertaken in recent years to contain Rabat’s rising leadership. The first is the attempted revival of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project in 2022 to derail the more promising Nigeria-Morocco pipeline project. The second is the planned creation of free-trade zones with Niger and Mali to counter Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel. Finally, the most recent is the Algerian regime’s push for the creation of a Maghreb Union without Morocco.

For all these counterattacking efforts, highlighted by the projected openings of more African consulates in Dakhla and Laayoune, the fact remains that Morocco’s African diplomacy is having morale-boosting results. In contrast, Algeria’s diplomatic influence has declined across the continent. More importantly, Morocco’s African diplomacy now extends to countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria, outside its so-called traditional francophone comfort zone. In the coming months and years, Algeria will redouble its efforts to persuade some of these countries to reconsider their cooperation with Morocco. 

Perhaps the most significant blows to Algeria’s diplomacy have come from outside Africa. These include the consistent pro-Moroccan stance reflected in all United Nations (UN) resolutions on Western Sahara since 2007, the decisive US decision in 2020 to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the region, and Spain’s 2022 declaration of full support for Morocco’s autonomy plan. While the first development has been gradual, and lacks absolute finality due to the presence of marginal pro-Polisario voices within the UN, the latter two events have shaken Algeria.

Taken together, however, these and other emerging developments clearly indicate that self-determination dreams have been buried—and that compromise is the only viable route to a politically feasible and lasting solution in the Sahara dossier. Faced with what increasingly appears to be an irreversible diplomatic setback, Algeria has shifted tactics by confronting Morocco on alternative battlefields. In recent months, as noted earlier, Algeria has used the unconventional platform of sport to settle scores with Morocco.

The goal is to open a second narrative front to rally popular sympathy and support for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Algeria’s permanent representative to the UN recently drew parallels between Palestine and Western Sahara, reflecting the regime’s overarching aspiration to distort historical facts and equate the Western Saharan and Palestinian cases. 

It is unlikely that Algeria’s continued attacks on Morocco will compel the UN to reconsider its implicit, but increasingly apparent, burying of the self-determination option on Western Sahara. At the same time, there are growing signs that many in Morocco, having grown tired of ignoring Algiers’s unrelenting hostility toward Rabat, might start pushing Morocco to discard its long-standing patience and the ensuing hope of brotherly reconciliation between the two countries.  

Time for the United States to step in

The animosity and hostility between the two countries have reached worrying levels, raising the specter of a military conflagration breaking out. Against this bleak backdrop, the United States should lead a vigorous diplomatic campaign.      

To calm the waters between the two countries and ensure that the current state does not get out of hand, the United States should give more attention to its military cooperation with Morocco, while signaling to Algeria that Washington would do everything in its power to prevent it from taking any actions that could destabilize the region. Such a move could send Algeria an unmistakable signal of Washington’s commitment to security cooperation with Rabat.     

Second, the United States must pressure the Algerian government to abide by the provisions of the UNSC Resolution on the Western Sahara issue since 2018, all of which call on Algeria to fully cooperate with the UN as it works toward a compromise-based and realistic political solution to the dispute. As Algeria’s rejection of some recent UN resolutions has shown, the only way to get it to commit to the UN-led political process is to pressure it to fully acknowledge its political responsibility for creating and prolonging this conflict and to negotiate a face-saving political solution with Morocco. 

However, this goal will remain out of reach if the United States clings to a balancing diplomacy that prevents it from unequivocally supporting Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The time has come for the United States to break with this policy. It must align its political discourse and actions by reaffirming its recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara while calling on Algeria to fully participate in the UN-led political process to achieve a political solution to the dispute.

Indeed, such a move would simply reflect the long-standing US position in the dispute. Numerous declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents show that the United States has never believed in the viability of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. Americans have long praised the proverbial friendship that unites the United States and Morocco, stressing that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. It is time for the United States to give true meaning to this friendship by fully supporting Morocco’s decades-long quest to end the dispute over Western Sahara; by doing so, it could help end the conflict between Rabat and Algiers once and for all.    

Samir Bennis is a senior political analyst specializing in Arab affairs and Morocco’s foreign policy. He is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. His upcoming book, The Self-Determination Delusion: How Victim Politics and Feel-good Advocacy Have Hijacked the Western Sahara Case, comes out in July.

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As political tensions between Algiers and Rabat have continued to mount since 2020, threatening to destabilize the entire North African and Sahel region, another front is being fought with no possible détente in sight: the cultural heritage war. The most recent chapter of this absurd dispute began when the Moroccan Ministry of Culture took legal action on May 20 by filing a complaint against Algeria with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the alleged appropriation of a unique Moroccan traditional garment known as Caftan Ntaâ El Fassi (Ntaâ Kaftan), which came originally from the Moroccan city of Fez and which Algeria is trying to inscribe among its intangible cultural heritage list.

In recent years, there has been a renewed awareness about the significance of cultural heritage symbols and their undisputable value in nation branding. This was popularized, in part, by the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage introduced by UNESCO in 2003, which calls for the documentation and preservation of living cultural expressions such as crafts, oral traditions, and performing arts. This phenomenon was also encouraged by the business opportunities presented by cultural tourism, an important source of national wealth that accounts for an estimated 40 percent of all tourism worldwide.

Starting in 2008, Morocco and Algeria raced to inscribe diverse aspects of their local traditions with UNESCO. For Morocco, these included the Tbourida equestrian performance, Gnawa music, and the Argan tree and its know-how; for Algeria, they included the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Sidi ’Abd el-Qader Ben Mohammed, Tlemcen wedding traditions, and the rituals of Sebeiba. However, many cultural elements remain the subject of fierce clashes between the two countries, which compete over the authenticity, exclusivity, and preeminence of disputed cultural symbols like Rai music, the couscous dish, or the Moorish Zellige tile.

The limits of cultural fortresses

Culture is a complex anthropological phenomenon that cannot be confined within the limits of modern nation-state borders—a more recent and contested political invention often inherited from colonial calculus over natural resources. This is particularly true in the case of the Moroccan Kingdom and Algerian Republic’s borders, which were engineered by their former occupiers after the 1845 Treaty of Lalla Maghnia. It is common knowledge by now, as demonstrated by historical maps, archive documents, and an International Court of Justice ruling, that colonial France considered Algeria one of its foreign territories—it annexed Algeria in 1830 and maintained control there until 1962—while Morocco was a mere strategic protectorate with a perpetual Alaouite monarch, which Paris would eventually need to exit with the growing decolonial movements starting in the 1930s. It was evident to France that it was more beneficial for its long-term interests to extract as many territories as possible from the Cherifian kingdom and generously subjoin them to the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.

The impossibility of drawing a line in the sand between two intertwined cultures is the very source of the recent conflict between Rabat and Algiers. Disputed bordering districts like Tlemcen, Tinduf, and Bechar are witnesses of the demographic hybridity and heritage spillover of several forms of craftsmanship, musical expressions, and culinary traditions. For instance, it would be absurd today for Morocco to claim the cultural exclusivity of Malhoun music or for Algeria to claim Rai music—though both are ironically inscribed under one country with UNESCO. This example and many others around the world demonstrate how this United Nations (UN) mechanism, while claiming to preserve cultural heritage, also contributes to the creation of imaginary borders and obsolete disputes among transnational communities that share many affinities, such as the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa.

The concept of cultural authenticity itself is historically questionable. It was established by authors like Eric Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition and David Lowenthal in The Past Is a Foreign Country that nation states handle, and often fabricate, historical narratives “celebrating certain aspects and expunging others.” It all depends on what serves their immediate interests, unity, and legitimacy. While Algeria’s oil-economy dependency and introverted military regime delayed its quest to reclaim its heritage, Morocco has benefited from its alignment with Western liberal economies and the urge to develop its tourism and services sectors to tap into its rich traditions and brand itself as an attractive destination at the doors of Europe—often caressing a certain Western orientalist fantasy about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rabat profited from its first-mover status to successfully market its souks, food, and crafts, sometimes exclusively claiming certain shared North African heritage symbols like Amazigh carpets, pottery, and the iconic dish of couscous, though such claims upset its Maghreb neighbors.

Heritage as a unifying juncture

Another recent episode illustrating this cultural heritage battle occurred in 2022, when the sports company Adidas revealed the Algerian soccer team’s jerseys comprising patterns commonly found in Moroccan ceramics, such as Fez Zellige. Morocco responded by issuing a legal warning to the company. The German sportswear brand ended up officially apologizing to Rabat and settling the dispute amicably after admitting to being inspired by Moroccan craftsmanship. Interestingly enough, back in 2015, the kingdom had engaged in patenting the Fez Zellige in the Vienna Classification of Figurative Elements of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—a more robust and legally binding mechanism to preserve national crafts compared to the UNESCO treaty. Morocco has since attempted to trademark many more cultural elements, including kaftan embroidery patterns, which closes the loop for anyone trying to “culturally appropriate” Moroccan designs and use them for commercial gains.

Local media, Wikipedia, and social platforms are becoming central fronts in this incongruous cultural war. Both Morocco and Algeria engage restlessly and spend large amounts of money on distasteful online confrontations on YouTube, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter) debating whether the kaftan is Almohad or Ottoman in origin and if the tajine is an authentic Moroccan or Algerian earthenware pot. Algerian bots, in particular, have been notorious for spreading propaganda and claiming many confirmed Moroccan traditions for themselves. Moroccan social media users carried out an outrageous, yet revealing, social experiment to prove this theory. To make a point, online users jokingly posted that the “Jaghdid” (colloquially meaning poison in Darija) is “a purely Moroccan delicacy,” prompting Algerian users to rush to claim the imaginary dish as theirs.

On the positive side, North African countries are gaining awareness of the importance of documenting and researching their history and memory, leading to a true revival in local crafts, ethnographic research, and a certain pride to showcase and reinvent those ancestral traditions long ignored in favor of Western consumerist goods. Moreover, this awareness contributed to liberating the Maghreb from the shadows of living in the periphery of Middle Eastern capitals like Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad that repetitively spread false claims that North African countries’ heritage and aesthetic beauty are all to be credited to romanticized and fictitious perceptions of “Arab” Andalucía—a claim that historical evidence strongly refutes.

Last year, “the arts, skills, and practices associated with engraving on metals (gold, silver, and copper)” were inscribed as intangible world heritage by UNESCO in ten MENA countries, including Morocco and Algeria. If the Algerian copper artisan I had encountered and Si Mohamed, the Moroccan one, were to speak today, they would surely approve of this positive collective effort to recognize their craft. The artisans would also agree that while respecting local know-how, originality, and unique historical trajectories is essential, cultural heritage can also be plural and an essential juncture for constructive exchanges beyond trivial political agendas.  

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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He announced the launch of an international initiative to “enable the Sahel countries to have access to the Atlantic Ocean.” Landlocked Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso are at the center of the Moroccan plan, which involves making Morocco’s road, port, and rail infrastructure available to them and implementing large-scale development projects.

Even if it is not detailed yet, the Moroccan initiative comes after military regimes came to power by unconstitutional means or through coups d’état, which for three of these states resulted, at various points, in having sanctions imposed on them. For example, Niger was sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Notably, Malian army officers who collaborated with the Wagner Group or were suspected of crimes were sanctioned by the United States. And the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had sanctioned Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, lifted its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February this year, a month after the three Sahelian countries left the organization and soon after the countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Chad has not yet seen sanctions imposed after the undemocratic accession of its president following the death of his father. While the sanctions imposed on the three countries are intended to apply pressure on those who seized power by force or defied the constitution, in the hopes of restoring democratic systems, these sanctions also impact the populations.

The people in these countries are essentially penalized twice: On the one hand, they are led by governments that have revoked the right of the people to choose their leaders. On the other hand, these populations also suffer from the effects of sanctions, which cause them economic hardship, limit their access to essential goods, cut them off from the world, and deprive them of trade opportunities.

That creates a quandary for the democratic world: While sanctions are intended to target unconstitutional governments, it is the ordinary people in these countries who suffer the most from them.

Behind the initiative

Morocco’s efforts to cooperate with the states in the Sahel seem inspired by Morocco’s 2011 Constitution—mainly the preamble.

In this preamble, Morocco commits itself to supporting the Maghreb Union (which it says is a “strategic option”), deepening its bonds with the Arab-Islamic Ummah, intensifying cooperation with European countries around the Mediterranean, strengthening cooperation across Africa, and diversifying its relations with the rest of the world.

Specifically, when it comes to Africa, the preamble states that Morocco intends to “consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries.” This short sentence helps explain Morocco’s initiative. The Moroccan Constitution does not drown the Sahel in the mass of Africa, but on the contrary highlights it by mentioning it separately. In his November 6 speech, the king of Morocco even called the Sahelian countries “African sister countries.”

In addition, the Moroccan Constitution’s commitment to the Islamic world—each of the three sanctioned countries are majority Muslim—and its pledging solidarity with the “peoples and countries of Africa” help explain Morocco’s new initiative. By specifying that its solidarity goes to the countries as well as to the peoples, Morocco is distinguishing people from the regimes that govern them.

As for the content of the Atlantic initiative, it has been received well by the Sahelian states because it offers alternatives for growth and development—and indeed, even survival. For example, Niger (one of the poorest countries in the world) depended on international aid for its annual budget, which was slashed by 40 percent in 2023 due to donors and creditors withholding support. Following the coup, malnutrition skyrocketed, only compounded by the fact that the United Nations (UN) World Food Program’s cargos were getting blocked from reaching Niger due to border closures, with one UN coordinator saying that their goal—to deliver humanitarian aid to at least 80 percent of 4.4 million vulnerable people—was in jeopardy.

The success of this initiative is contingent on several factors: It will require funding, a robust regulatory framework, efforts to address challenges such as piracy, and harmonization with and between maritime governance actors. In addition, the economic activity this initiative would create could have benefits for the governments, as well as the people, in the sanctioned Sahelian countries. However, the focus of this initiative is on helping the people, who have continued to suffer for decades.

The Atlantic advantage

The initiative underscores the importance placed—across centuries—on accessing the Atlantic Ocean. For example, El Hadj Omar Tall (founder of the Toucouleur Empire) and Samori Ture (a leader of the Wassoulou Empire) each governed landlocked areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo chronicled how the two African heroes, facing the inevitable advance of European colonial conquest, hurried to “capture, before it was too late, the political initiative and keep it in African hands.” They both did that by directing their troops to the ocean. Eventually, however, their efforts to reach the sea were halted by the French.

The strategic importance of the Atlantic as taught by history resonates today.

Today, over one hundred countries border the Atlantic Ocean, and importantly those countries include the world’s leading power (the United States), other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (including the United Kingdom and France), Latin American powers (such as Argentina and Brazil), and African nations stretching from Morocco (which itself has a 1,800-mile coastline on the ocean) to South Africa.

For countries that have the means to take full advantage of their coasts, such as Morocco and Senegal, the Atlantic is a boon. Indeed, Africa’s twenty-three coastal nations are home to 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent of its trade. They also contain a large amount of natural resources, including oil.

But access alone won’t grant people in Sahelian countries access to the boon. Here is what is needed for this initiative to succeed:

• Defining common strategic priorities between the countries participating in this initiative and also their partners in order to focus on the most pressing issues.
• The integration of projects already underway such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project or the Great Green Wall. Their inclusion will bring a more holistic approach to the Moroccan initiative, which focuses on road, rail, and maritime infrastructure.
• The inclusion of the African Union (through the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy) as well as maritime governance mechanisms, specialized institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, African Port Management Associations, Union of African Shippers’ Councils, maritime training institutions, the UN, and the International Maritime Organization. This inclusion in discussions will help to harmonize the maritime rules and avoid double governance systems.
• Access to substantial financing, particularly via international partners such as in the private sector and development and financial institutions. Financing will be needed to support the blue economy and the modernization of road, rail, and port infrastructure.

Sahelian civilian populations have been suffering from the effects of a twenty-year war against jihadist attacks. These populations deserve peace and prosperity. After the security failures of so many domestic and foreign military interventions and the unfolding of the coups, this proposal offers a much-needed brighter perspective for these people.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Abdelhak Bassou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

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Minerals often lie at the heart of this cooperation, and while the words the presidents said may have been similar, the meaning and context behind them couldn’t be more different.

Russia offers quid pro quo partnerships with promises of kinetic military, security, and political support—and assisted by faux anti-imperialist messaging. The United States, on the other hand, touts an approach that places emphasis on economic and community investment. There is a widening gulf emerging between the two models—and each model offers something that the other cannot.

Russia’s give—and take

Russia’s version of partnership has been aptly described as a “regime survival package,” in which the Russian government offers military and security assistance to struggling African governments; soon after come resource concessions for Russian companies.

This exchange has relied heavily on the Wagner Group, as the military company’s running operations allowed Moscow to distance itself via proxy. However, since the Wagner Group’s consolidation and rebranding into the Africa Corps (following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin), the exchange is arguably more direct and state-to-state, as Africa Corps activities are now reportedly being directed by the Russian state and managed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (the GRU) and the Kremlin. The Russian Defense Ministry, with the Africa Corps now reportedly in-house, is expanding its operations.

Russia’s offer of partnership has appealed particularly to governments in the Sahel. The Central African Republic is often viewed as the textbook case, with Wagner arriving in 2018 to push back rebels from the capital. Soon after, gold and diamond mining licenses were granted to a Russian-owned company that even the United Nations warns is “interconnected” with Wagner. And last year, Wagner helped Mali retake rebel-held areas in the north; in the months that followed, Russia and Mali signed agreements on gold refining and on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production.

More recently, a contingent of Africa Corps personnel arrived in Burkina Faso in January to, according to the group’s Telegram channel, “ensure the safety of the country’s leader Ibrahim Traore and the Burkinabe people.” Two months later, Burkina Faso’s minister of energy, mining, and quarries told Sputnik Africa that Russian companies can become “strategic partners” in the extraction of minerals—such as gold, zinc, manganese, copper, graphite, and lithium—from mines and quarries.

Russia’s offer is currently supplanting other forms of partnership in Niger. The junta halted military cooperation with both France and the United States—whose militaries were there to help improve the security situation for Niger’s previous democratic leadership—pushing French troops to leave the country late last year and propelling the United States to agree to withdraw its forces. Earlier this month, Russian forces and military advisors arrived in Niger, equipped with an air defense system and other security equipment—a choice reflecting the fact that US forces were allocated between two airbases, from which they used drones to target militants. Once again, resources seem to be on the table in exchange for Russia’s partnership.  

While there are some actual value-added projects being developed from Russia’s deals, such as the agreement with Mali on building a gold refinery, such deals are exceptions to the rule. A number of Russia’s grandiose economic promises to Africa have failed to fully materialize. The fact is that Russia’s economic potential for Africa cannot compete with that of the West. Russia contributes less than 1 percent of the global foreign direct investment going to the continent, and when it comes to trade revenue, it’s $17.7 billion (as of 2021) is dwarfed by the United States’ $65 billion and the European Union’s (EU) $295 billion. If economic measures were the only consideration in choosing partnership, Russia likely wouldn’t make any list.

The only market where Russia leads in Africa is the arms market. Last year, Russia overtook China as the largest supplier of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part of what makes Russia so appealing as a partner—in addition to its offers of security assistance—is Russia’s ability to market itself as anti-imperialist based on the Soviet Union’s support for African countries when they were fighting for independence. For example, when the junta seized power from a French-backed president, Russia’s Prigozhin framed the coup as a liberation from Western powers. African countries still have concerns about the remaining influence wielded by former colonial powers.

How Washington works

The United States, on the other hand, makes its appeal to African countries by promising partnership on local economic development—the critical minerals discussion is only part of that partnership. The US approach is reflected in projects such as the Lobito Corridor—which is intended to make transport, including of critical minerals, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola easier. Alongside its mineral extraction initiatives, the United States is eager to showcase regional and community benefits for its projects. 

In addition, the United States often cooperates and coordinates with its European partners when approaching investment and activity in Africa. For example, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have signed similar agreements with both the United States and EU in which the countries agree to promote responsible mineral extraction activities that build local capacity and to bring more of the minerals value chain (including processing, manufacturing, and assembly) to the region.

Partnership with Europe can be an effective strategy for the United States, as such an approach gathers more funds, capacities, and markets. Yet, there are downsides. By tying itself with Europe, the United States ties itself to a colonial legacy. In Niger, the junta took power and quickly sought to evict French forces and EU partners—but not US forces (at least initially). This generated tension in the US-France relationship and underscored the extent to which the United States is willing to deviate from cooperation with its partners to maintain engagement in Africa. Such a method lines up with the revamped US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa under which the Biden administration has been adamant that it is seeking to partner with African countries on equal footing and that it will not treat Africa as a great-power battleground. Europe is itself aware of its history. A former Latvian prime minister, for example, called for EU members without colonial pasts to lead the bloc’s engagement with countries across Africa.

The United States, for the most part, holds its engagement conditional on the health of each country’s democracy. In the case of Niger, the United States suspended financial assistance, saying that “Any resumption of US assistance will require action . . .  to usher in democratic governance in a quick and credible timeframe.” The United States has also not shied away from terminating partnership in programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (which provides duty-free entry for certain products) when the country in that partnership has seen an erosion in democratic governance, human rights, and freedoms. The United States shouldn’t shy away from doing so; but this is not a priority Russia shares.

To be fair, the United States, often alongside its European partners, does collaborate on military affairs with African countries. For example, the United States and United Kingdom joined African democratic partners in conducting a large military drill in Kenya. Many African countries, especially those that are partners with the United States, recognize the risk Russia’s support poses. Some have been vocal in making their opposition to Russia’s geopolitical actions known.

Yet, deadly incidents (and the resulting political fallout)—such as the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush or the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu—have doused US enthusiasm for assistance with direct combat. The United States focuses on supporting roles with airpower, intelligence sharing, and training. Even France, after deploying troops across the Sahel for years in Operation Barkhane, was unwilling to deploy its forces to Niger during the coup to support the president it had backed. Compare that to Russia, which seems willing to sustain partnership with blood. When the Central African Republic’s president changed the constitution last year to abolish term limits, Russian forces in the country increased their presence and provided support and security services to the president.

The United States (especially when joining with its allies) is an economic power, and that is attractive for African countries seeking much needed domestic development and value addition. Yet, US partnership does have its limitations. Should a country’s domestic policies run afoul of American principles, partnership is near impossible. Unlike Russia’s limitations, the United States’ are largely self-imposed.

Weighing the choice

Going forward, African countries must choose wisely between the United States (and its offer of economic and development support) and Russia (and its offer of direct military support) in their search for a partner on critical minerals.

Juntas and dictatorships will likely choose Russia, even if offered another choice (which seems unlikely). Russia offers them the equipment and military support they need to fight insurgent and terrorist groups.

The West will need to closely watch democratic countries in Africa. Russia is looking to make the choice easier by deploying disinformation. France has accused Russia of even staging atrocities and framing the West to promote its narrative.

As for what the United States could do: It could theoretically start adding direct kinetic security support to its offer. However, the United States isn’t likely to align itself with military leaders who trampled democracy on their road to power, and it isn’t very likely to deploy forces to protect them. The United States could, theoretically, also turn to the private sector—supporting the efforts of private military companies that are already operating in the continent. But the government would still be limited, rightly so, by laws that restrict it from supporting nondemocratic regimes.

With African minerals in high demand, Russia and the United States will continue to offer what the other can’t.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Stability at home translates to leadership abroad

Across the political divide, the consensus in Rome is that Meloni’s position is secure. A year and a half into her tenure, Meloni maintains strong approval ratings. She faces no real threats from the opposition or her coalition partners. Would-be rivals of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, including Deputy Prime Minister and Infrastructure Minister Matteo Salvini and the League, have been outflanked. Forza Italia, led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, is on the rise, but it still lags in the polls. Both those in power and in opposition predict that Meloni will last for the remaining three years of the legislature—barring any twists, which even now no one can write off in Italy.

An important part of this stability comes from the fact that Meloni’s foreign policy priorities are largely supported among Italy’s policymakers and fit within transatlantic priorities. Initially feared as another weak link in the European Union (EU), Meloni has shown herself to be staunchly pro-Ukraine. She is a Euroskeptic but not anti-EU. And while US President Joe Biden differs from her on several notable domestic policies, he has found an ally in Meloni. “We have each other’s backs,” Biden declared during their March 1 meeting in Washington. It’s an interesting turn given that, shortly after her election, Biden used Meloni as a warning to Democrats. She has played a delicate balancing act on China, officially leaving the Belt and Road Initiative—Italy being the only Group of Seven (G7) country to have signed on—while still maintaining economic ties with Beijing. If anything, Meloni’s domestic opposition criticizes her for a lack of follow-through, especially on Italy’s aid to Ukraine and the funds pledged for development projects in North Africa.

Uncontested leadership and support for its foreign policy priorities allow Italy’s government to be much more impactful abroad. This stability comes at an opportune time. Italy holds the G7 presidency in 2024 and for that reason is in the driver’s seat when it comes to advancing the vision of the “steering committee for the world’s most advanced democracies,” as described by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Stability and popularity also allow Rome to make its priorities for the West heard, most notably the security of the Mediterranean and Western outreach to Africa.

Recentering the Mediterranean

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and arguably before, much of the West’s attention has focused on Europe’s eastern flank—and with good reason. As a result, Rome’s focus on the Mediterranean can at times seem like a regional preoccupation, but the case for the area’s importance for the transatlantic alliance is strong.

The Mediterranean is NATO’s southern flank, and a rather weak one at that. Italian policymakers do not see Russia as just threatening NATO’s eastern flank. Russia has long played a destabilizing role in Libya, for example, funneling weapons into the country as well as deploying its own forces. This destabilizing activity directly affects Europe, impacting migration flows and propping up an important presence off Italy’s coast. Italy’s leadership in the EU’s naval Operation Aspides in the Red Sea provides a useful example of the role Italy can play in organizing its European counterparts, and Rome should seek to extend that leadership to provide greater security in the Mediterranean in the face of threats from Russia and other actors.

The Mediterranean region is also poised to play an important role in the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). A major deliverable of the 2023 Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in New Delhi, this rail-and-sea infrastructure network has huge potential for countries such as India and for Italy and the Mediterranean region to be a conduit that deepens Europe’s ties with emerging new global partners. Europe could provide these partners with an alternative to deepening economic ties with China and boost sustainable infrastructure investments across the network. Italy is well positioned to carry forward this effort. But it needs to make sure this massive project stays viable and on the West’s agenda. Italy should use its current G7 presidency to garner greater Western support for IMEC, and position itself as a key partner on the European link of the corridor.

The infrastructure development race to the top

Italy’s focus on infrastructure goes beyond IMEC. Rome is paying greater attention to infrastructure development across the Global South and stands ready to build on earlier efforts by the West. In June 2022, the G7 adopted the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) to facilitate six hundred billion dollars in infrastructure projects by 2027. The EU’s Global Gateway promises to provide three hundred billion dollars for EU-supported projects, also by 2027.

Meloni, too, has jumped into the infrastructure development space. She has made infrastructure a cornerstone of her foreign policy and of Italy’s relationship with Africa through the Mattei Plan for North Africa, unveiled in January 2024.

Rome’s Mattei Plan has several drivers that fit in with the West’s larger infrastructure push. First, the plan aims to help African countries build stability at home to limit migration abroad. Meloni explicitly stated this goal, as Italy remains a key port of entry from North Africa. Second, the plan is intended to position Italy as a European energy hub, deepening the economic link between Europe and Africa. Third, the plan fits within the G7’s larger effort to prove the West’s rules-based system is fit for purpose and to offset the influence of China through a truly nonexploitative partnership framework. Fourth, mineral-rich states in Africa will be critical to the twin green and digital transitions. The extraction and processing of these resources must be supported with sustainable practices that respect the rule of law and labor standards, and help countries move up the global value chain. Doing so will help in the West’s de-risking efforts to shift away from overreliance on China while boosting states’ long-term development.

Building relationships that are not extractive or exploitive will be key to ensuring long-term partnerships, and Italy has said it intends to take this approach with future infrastructure development. Creating public-private partnerships will also be important, since the private sector will play an integral role in the financing of said investments. But the private sector needs to be convinced that investing doesn’t come along with an unacceptable amount of risk. There is a role for the government to play in minimizing these risks, and focusing on the opportunities presented by these markets.

Italy is well suited to set up the mechanisms needed to coordinate these projects. With its G7 presidency, Italy should focus on deepening the coordination of projects such as the PGII, Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan. The Mattei Plan specifically will require greater effort to be successful. While the plan’s framework presents a possible blueprint for increased European and G7 engagement with the Global South, in its current form it is humble both in the number of projects and the amount of financing proposed—just over five billion euros for nine projects—compared to the PGII and Global Gateway. For this project to really take off, Rome will need to find more money to invest through the Mattei Plan and expand its scope, while fully integrating it into larger investment plans.

Until recently, political chaos and economic woes have caused Italy, the EU’s third-largest economy and a G7 member, to punch below its weight. The current political calm won’t last forever, but in this period of steadiness at home, Rome can expand its leadership role abroad.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Nicholas O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council.

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Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order below.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatens to set a date to invade Rafah amid mounting US and international pressure to limit civilian harm. The Israeli government continued attacks across Gaza before, in early April, withdrawing all but one of its battalions and reportedly setting a date for a military operation in the city of Rafah. However, significant skepticism abounds as to whether the date is real or simply a tactic to try to pressure Hamas. The United States sought to help shape Israel’s Rafah plan given concerns for civilian casualties, but did not reach an agreement on how Israel might proceed with such an operation. The United States continued high-level pressure on the Netanyahu government to limit civilian casualties and agree on a temporary ceasefire. Vice President Kamala Harris called for an immediate temporary ceasefire and US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer criticized Netanyahu, going so far as to call for fresh elections in Israel. Netanyahu canceled  a meeting between senior Israeli officials and US counterparts to discuss Rafah after the United States abstained from voting on a United Nations Security Council resolution pressing for an immediate temporary ceasefire in Gaza, which allowed the measure to pass, before allowing a virtual meeting to take place. Meanwhile, negotiations between Israel and Hamas in Qatar stalled after Israel claimed Hamas was “not interested” in talks; however, as April began the talks were expected to restart in Cairo. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza worsened, despite ongoing aid deliveries by air and sea. Conditions close to famine levels are now present, according to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, which also ruled unanimously that Israel must let food aid enter Gaza.

• Shaping the order. The Israel-Hamas war retains a high risk for spreading into a broader regional, state-on-state conflict. This risk heightened at the start of April as Israel reportedly killed two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals and five military advisors in an airstrike on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, Syria, which Israel claims is being used as a cover by the IRGC to conduct regional malign activities. Meanwhile, the manner in which the Netanyahu government has prosecuted the war has prompted significant debate between those viewing the tens of thousands of casualties as having driven support to Hamas and those who argue that Israel’s urban warfare conduct has actually set a new “gold standard.”  What does seem clear is that Hamas is turning battlefield losses into strategic advantage, as the United States warned Israel was the likely outcome if it went into Gaza in a way that causes mass civilian casualties and hunger.
• Hitting home. The war and humanitarian crisis being felt every day by Gazans is helping to shift US public opinion on Israel. Gallup’s March survey found that 55 percent of Americans now disagree with how Israel is conducting its war against Hamas, up from 50 percent in November. A group of eight Democrat senators pushed US President Joe Biden to end the US provision of military weapons to Jerusalem.
• What to do. In the immediate term, the United States must continue to press (and put pressure on) the Israeli government to limit civilian casualties and pursue a temporary ceasefire that would enable mass humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza and release all hostages. The Biden administration, even as it urges Netanyahu to limit civilian casualties, must mobilize key Middle Eastern partners, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, to devise and resource a viable plan for post-war Gaza, a core pillar of which should be a two-state solution.

Ukraine fights on with European support while US support remains stuck in Congress. Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russian territory continued, with significant impact, including the destruction of one-third of Russian naval vessels and the brief closure of (and possible damage to) the Kerch Bridge in Crimea. Despite this progress, Ukraine faced munitions and personnel shortages that could imperil its hold on the front lines. The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, debated lowering the draft age from twenty-seven to twenty-five to deal with manpower shortages, but without ammunition and with US support in doubt, morale is sagging.

The United States continued sending mixed messages on its support for Ukraine. A minority in the US Congress again held up passage of a large-scale military aid package for Kyiv, though as April started, there were signs a vote could be called soon. The Biden administration reportedly urged Kyiv not to attack Russian oil refineries, a message that generated frustration in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Europe held firm in its support for Kyiv. French President Emmanuel Macron told European allies and partners, “Today, to have peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak,” and refused to rule out Western troop deployments to Ukraine. A Czech-led ammunition initiative to supply Kyiv with artillery shells by June received additional support. Sweden announced it will help bankroll the effort with thirty million euros and Germany announced it would pay for 180,000 rounds.

• Shaping the order. US military support, in the form of weapons and munitions, along with the same from European allies, will largely determine whether Kyiv succeeds or fails on the battlefield. The minority in the US Congress preventing the military aid bill from passing is sending a message to Russia (and China) that US resolve might not hold. Absent continued US and European military support, Ukraine could lose the war. This would likely embolden Russian President Vladimir Putin to attack NATO countries and in so doing draw the United States directly into a land war in Europe to defend a NATO ally.
• Hitting home. Ukraine defeating Russia is a plausible outcome and would advance US national interests by weakening a US adversary without costing US soldiers. Despite these realities, a minority in Congress continued holding up further military support to Ukraine. Many Europeans are alarmed by rising isolationism in the United States, particularly following Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s claims that former US President Donald Trump had told him he would end military aid to Ukraine should he be elected.
• What to do. The Biden administration must continue to push Congress to pass military aid for Ukraine and work with its allies in Europe to continue their support for Kyiv.

Senegal’s democracy shows resilience. On March 24, Senegalese citizens elected Bassirou Diomaye Faye as president, just ten days after his release from prison. The election was initially scheduled for February 25, until Sall, in office for twelve years, announced a delay and pushed for legislation that rescheduled the contest for December 2024. The opposition and some analysts feared that Sall wanted to delay the election to extend his time in power; although in February, Sall promised to end his term in April. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the plan to postpone the elections and ordered the government to set the date for elections, which it set as March 24. Many had feared that the postponement of the election would result in violence, after security forces violently responded to protests against the election delay. 

• Shaping the order. Democracy in West Africa has been on the backfoot following a string of coups across the Sahel. Senegal, which looked at risk of backsliding after the unfolding of these events, showed the importance of strong and independent institutions in restoring democracy.
• Hitting home. A democratic and stable Senegal benefits the United States. More broadly, the United States benefits when there are more democracies in the world. Democracies are more reliable trading partners, are less likely to go to war with one another, and are less likely to incubate and export transnational crime and terrorism.
• What to do. The United States should continue pursuing partnerships with the new government on a range of economic, cultural, and security matters.

Quote of the Month

“My purpose tonight is to both wake up this Congress and alert the American people that this is no ordinary moment either . . . What makes our moment rare is that freedom and democracy are under attack, both at home and overseas, at the very same time.”
– Biden in his State of the Union address before the US Congress.

State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

• In the first Iranian election since protests erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini, many Iranians boycotted parliamentary elections, seemingly expressing, by refusing to cast a ballot, their opposition to the government’s oppressive rules and handling of the economy.
• Venezuela’s regime officially blocked the leading opposition candidate, Corina Yoris, from running in July’s presidential elections, a major blow to opposition hopes to unseat Nicolas Maduro. The regime’s decision is also a setback for the Biden administration, which lifted sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to encourage Maduro to hold free and fair elections.
• Article 23, Hong Kong’s new security law, came into effect, enabling officials to conduct closed-door trials and allowing the police to hold individuals for up to sixteen days without bringing charges for violating state secrets, fomenting sedition, and engaging in treason, all of which have broad definitions under the law. Radio Free Asia shut down its office in Hong Kong due to fears that its staff could endangered.
• India put in place a new citizenship law that excludes Muslim migrants and establishes a religious test for migrants of prominent faiths in South Asia other than Islam. Experts say that under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, Muslims have faced increased discrimination.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

• Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned from office, following a meeting in Jamaica of the United States, Caribbean partners, Canada, and France. An alliance of gangs, which has sowed instability across the country, including by releasing thousands of prisoners from government facilities and controlling most of the capital, had threatened civil war if Henry did not resign.
• Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham–Khorasan (ISIS-K), launched an attack on a concert hall in Moscow that left at least 144 dead. The group claimed responsibility but Putin has continued to link the attack to Ukraine.
• The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warned that the number of individuals experiencing female genitalia mutilation increased by 15 percent in the last eight years, with UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell stating that these unnecessary procedures are happening at younger and younger ages, sometimes even before children reach the age of five.
• On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

• Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced that China’s economic growth goal is 5 percent; however, he offered few details on how China would increase growth, even as its real estate crisis continued and public confidence in China’s economy declined.
• The Bank of Japan, after eight years of negative interest rates, increased short-term interest rates to 0-0.1 percent, demonstrating the central bank’s confidence in the country’s economic recovery and sustainable inflation.
• On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

• The oil and gas company Shell initiated court proceedings to formally repeal the 2021 ruling wherein a district court in The Hague ordered Shell to cut its carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030 compared to 2019 levels.
• On balance, the commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• Sweden formally joined NATO, strengthening the Alliance and positioning it to better defend its northern flank.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

• Liselotte Odgaard, in Foreign Policy, argues that NATO is not ready to deter Russia in the Arctic.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Affairs, contends that new autocratic alliances are a genuine threat.
• Sahar Halaimazi, Metra Mehran, and Marika Theros, as part of a project examining Afghanistan’s gender apartheid, map the timeline of the Taliban’s decrees restricting women.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Frederick Kempe, in Inflection Points Today, assesses that the United States needs to make the case for winning the “strategic battle for the global future,” including by banning TikTok and passing aid to Ukraine.
• Jenna Ben-Yehuda and Matthew Kroenig, in the New Atlanticist, respond to Biden’s State of the Union address.
• Andrew Michta and Jeffrey Cimmino, as part of the Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy, analyze the risks and benefits of generative artificial intelligence for diplomacy.
• Jerzy Koźmiński and Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, discuss NATO enlargement on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining the Alliance.
• Patrick Quirk, in the Hill, argues that technology companies and Russian democracy activists must work together to combat Putin’s online authoritarianism.
• Samantha Vinograd, on Face the Nation, analyzed the ISIS-K terror attack in Moscow.
• Jeffrey Cimmino, in the New Atlanticist, lays out how the United States can play a bigger role in protecting religious freedom across the globe.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Program Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Continuing challenges to the world order raise the urgency for Gaza ceasefire and Ukraine aid appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is an epilogue to months of suspense in what has long been West Africa’s most stable and democratic country. Senegal has landed back on its democratic feet. It has demonstrated to the world that its reputation as a democratic bastion in its region remains strong.

It took a combination of factors to make this outcome possible, after the country lived for months under the scrutiny of observers from around the world.

Democracy is culture

For the Senegalese, democracy is not a slogan or even simply the rule of law. It’s a way of life. Journalists, intellectuals, youth organizations, families, religious communities—all strata of society are imbued with this democratic culture, as evidenced by the high voter turnout, the positive takeaways of international observers, and the presence of nineteen presidential candidates. But there is another important element that observers who are not familiar with Senegalese culture might have missed. There is an ongoing tradition in Senegal of open dialogue between the opposition and the outgoing majority, thanks to many mediators, including former Senegalese presidents.

For the opposition parties in Africa, the Senegalese election is a lesson. Boycotting an election in protest, instead of contesting it, is not always the best solution. Moreover, no one is irreplaceable. The fate of Faye, who emerged from relative obscurity to replace the former opposition candidate Ousmane Sonko at the last moment, proves this. The Senegalese will now get to know President Faye. But it will be necessary for the new president to distinguish himself beyond the slogan that emerged during the campaign: “Diomaye moy Sonko,” or “Diomaye is Sonko.”

For the putschists in the region, some of whom have strangely welcomed Faye’s victory, this election is a stinging refutation of their seizure of power by brute force. Faye may present a program of rupture with the outgoing administration, but the fact remains that he submitted to the vote of his people. Neither Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya of Guinea, nor Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, nor General Abdourahamane Tiani of Niger had the courage to do.

In Senegal, change comes through the ballot box, not through weapons. While a few members of the Senegalese army committed the folly of whispering the names of the most eminent generals as a possible recourse, the armed forces remained stoic in their barracks, aware that their duties are not of that nature and never have been.

The outgoing president

The actions of the outgoing president should be noted here. Unlike some leaders in the region, Sall relinquished his power when it was time. He renounced a third term when he understood that his reading of the constitution on this subject was not shared by all Senegalese, despite pressure from his supporters. Then, at the height of the crisis over the postponement of the election, he complied with the decision of the Constitutional Council. It is only in a democracy with strong institutions that the president (and the national assembly) accepts the decision of a court that has just contradicted the head of state. Finally, Sall’s amnesty bill, which freed hundreds of prisoners, some of whom had been guilty of abuses and looting, displeased the members of his party, but he understood that opponents did not belong in a prison.

Undoubtedly, for Senegalese to elect Faye, a candidate whom they knew nothing of until two months ago, the power of “dégagisme”—or rejection of the current political class—had to be exceptionally strong. But as usual with outgoing presidents, it will take time for Sall’s full legacy both internationally and domestically to be fully understood.

During Sall’s presidency, Senegal led the African Union in 2022-2023, replacing Mali at the last minute. In his role as the African Union chairman, Sall brought important attention to the issue of food security during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi in June 2022, to the financing of African economies, and to the need for a permanent seat for the African Union in the Group of Twenty (G20), which was finally approved in September 2023.

In Senegal, Sall leaves an economic record that can be measured by the large number of major infrastructure projects undertaken during his tenure. This includes the new city of Diamniadio, as well as new trains, airports, stadiums, highways, and hospitals. Sall’s administration also spearheaded an emergency development plan for small rural communities. But in this country of eighteen million inhabitants, 75 percent of whom are under thirty-five years old, who have had to face economic consequences stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is the high cost of living that has given energy to the opposition. Youth unemployment and social inequalities have persisted, despite financial support for the poorest.

The incoming president

Faye takes office at a pivotal moment for his country. Important oil and gas projects are set to begin production later this year, potentially providing a boost to the country’s economy—and drawing interest from regional and global powers. At the same time, Senegal sits in a precarious region that has been hit by a series of coups d’état in recent years. In addition, the jihadist threat has never ceased, as evidenced by the regular arrests of terrorists by Senegalese military forces, which have been heavily mobilized at the border in recent years.

Faye campaigned on enacting a rupture on three levels:

• First, a break with Senegal’s former colonial power, France, by questioning the CFA franc and potentially introducing a new currency.
• Second, a break with the “resource curse” with the promise of a better distribution of revenue from oil and other natural resources.
• Third, a break with bad governance via institutional reform.

None of these will be easy, but the biggest challenge for the new president will undoubtedly be the one that all Senegalese presidents before Faye have faced as well: How to keep campaign promises and not disappoint the Senegalese youth, who have proven their ability to make the difference on election day.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

The post In Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s win shows that change comes through the ballot box appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The divergences caused by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) situations are particularly stark, as the incidence of conflict events has increased 40 percent since 2020, to the highest number of events since World War II. Half of the world’s poor live in FCV-affected countries and that number is expected to rise to 60 percent by 2030, in part as the duration of conflicts extends—to now an average of twenty years. In addition to the death, destruction, and disruptions they cause, conflict and fragility are disincentives to investment and further undermine economic growth. One-fifth of International Monetary Fund member countries are considered fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) and twenty of the most climate-vulnerable economies are also on the World Bank’s FCS list.

According to the most recent Women, Peace, and Security Index: “In 2022, approximately six hundred million women—15 percent of women in the world—lived within fifty kilometers of armed conflict, more than double the levels in the 1990s.” These numbers don’t lie, but they also don’t necessarily tell the whole truth. And the truth is that women and girls are disproportionately impacted by fragility and conflict economically, socially, and politically. The impacts are well-documented. The data show, for example, that women and girls are more likely to see their educations disrupted, are more vulnerable to gender-based violence, and are more likely to be displaced or become refugees.

Women often face much greater economic hardships than men in conflict-affected areas, as well. Notably, six out of ten of the World Bank’s FCS countries are in the lower quartile on the “Economic Participation and Opportunity” subindex on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, indicating wider gender gaps and more challenges facing women in conflict contexts. Similarly, a majority of FCV countries can be found in the bottom of the latest Women Business and the Law rankings released on March 4. These impacts also further undermine economies: The World Bank estimates that gender-based violence costs some countries up to 3.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and a 1 percent increase in violence against women lowers economic activity by 9 percent.

The roles women hold during conflict and reconstruction

But there can be opportunities for women’s economic empowerment in conflict and reconstruction, as well. Women are experiencing these outcomes despite the important role they play in economies during conflict, in post-conflict reconstruction, and in efforts to sustain peace.

Most of today’s FCV economies are characterized by low female labor force participation. For example, in 2022, the United Nations estimated that closing gender gaps in women’s labor force participation in Yemen would increase the country’s GDP by 27 percent. War has historically created windows of opportunity for women to fulfill workforce shortages—including in male-dominated fields—since men make up a majority of combatants. War—often coupled with crippling inflation—makes finding paid work more acceptable and, importantly, this openness tends to continue as income generation changes women’s economic value and power in society. In the United States, for example, women took to manufacturing and government administration for the war industry and beyond during World War II, with nineteen million women entering the US workforce during this period. Today, women continue to join or rejoin the workforce—including in the informal sector—at higher rates amid conflict and take on more culturally nontraditional jobs. For instance, Ukrainian women have joined the mining workforce, filling the gaps left by conscription after Russia’s invasion.

Like most economies worldwide, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises dominate the market landscape of fragile and conflict-torn countries.

Even though these smaller businesses face more start-up and operational constraints, they provide a key pathway for women’s economic participation during conflict and on the road to recovery. A study in Syria estimated that the proportion of female entrepreneurs increased from a low base of 4.4 percent in 2009 to 22.4 percent by 2017. This includes women-owned and -led businesses engaging in supply chains; including in the logistics, information, and communication technology, infrastructure, and public works sectors, all of which are critical to reconstruction.

And as women workers and their businesses earn more, especially in the formal economy, they can mitigate the otherwise dampening domestic resource mobilization associated with reduced economic activity, investment, and government administration during conflict or destabilization. Women’s greater participation in the economy during conflict and reconstruction can also increase consumption and income utilization (including from cash transfers or other social protection mechanisms) as women recirculate their earnings with spending on their families.

How to wield prosperity and peace dividends with and for women

Gender inclusion cannot be an afterthought. Policymakers must address the immediate economic security and income needs of women during conflict, while empowering them to contribute to and benefit from recovery, reconstruction, and growth. This means providing context-specific, targeted social protections and addressing the issues that undermine women’s economic participation. It requires mitigating and responding to gender-based violence, as well as improving accessibility and affordability of child and elder care. It also means supporting women entrepreneurs and women-led small businesses, closing education or skill gaps, and addressing social and cultural norms that limit career choices or workforce participation with conflict or fragility-sensitive knowledge, design, and delivery mechanisms.

Depending on the type, level, and stage of FCV, as well as the economic landscape, certain FCV-specific interventions can also make a difference in women’s economic empowerment. These include, for example, enabling women’s earning, employment, and entrepreneurship by expanding opportunities in gig and home-based economies and increasing safe and reliable transportation to and from work or school. Policymakers should also take steps to improve access to education and training with attention to language, as well as the demand for and portability of skills and certifications. In addition to addressing persistent systemic and policy hurdles, women business owners and entrepreneurs need targeted support with more risk financing, knowhow, and market entry and development.

This includes leveraging sizable development and humanitarian assistance and procurement. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), for example, bought over $1.8 billion worth of goods and services in 2022 from suppliers worldwide, with 56 percent local spending. Aligned with system-wide UN gender-responsive procurement initiatives, UNOPS is piloting and beginning to scale programs to train and prepare women business owners to successfully bid and execute their tenders. These women can then use the investment, experience, and credibility gained from working with UNOPS to obtain other public and private sector contracts and optimize supply chain opportunities.

Increasing digital inclusion can be transformative for women’s financial inclusion and economic participation, as well; including by training women for information and communication technology jobs in the digital economy, like the World Bank-Rockefeller Foundation’s Click-On Kaduna project in Nigeria. Policymakers should prioritize increasing women’s access to and utilization of digital tools and platforms, including digital money and financial services, as well as remote learning and government technology. Digital mechanisms can also serve as useful aspects of larger initiatives that empower women’s participation and leadership, which is critical for conflict mitigation and durable peacebuilding. 

The evidence that expanding economic opportunities for women is intertwined with building inclusive and sustainable growth, as well as peace and social progress, is only accruing with time, experience, and data. On this International Women’s Day, aptly themed “Invest in Women: Accelerate Progress,” it is incumbent upon all leaders, investors, and policymakers to heed this call. Public and private sector actors would do well to invest and enable increased women’s economic participation to catalyze prosperity and peace.

Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center.

The post Investing in women accelerates prosperity and peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

More than a decade after the revolutions collectively known as the Arab Spring, several countries in the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing democratic backsliding and a return to authoritarian rule, including Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Libya under General Khalifa Haftar, and Tunisia under President Kais Saied. This trend and some shifts in sentiments about the West in these and other MENA countries have given Russia openings to undercut Western influence in the region and frame Ukraine as a Western puppet, using its state media and public diplomacy to influence opinion.

This is playing out in the context of growing internal polarization in many countries in the region and, among the citizenry, rising disenchantment with the West and democracy as a workable governing system for them. These developments enable Russia to offer an alternative alliance to authoritarian leaders who aim to diversify their country’s resources and reduce reliance on the West and the United States in particular.

Russian state media has had a presence in the Arab World since the 2007 launch of Russia Today Arabic (now just RT Arabic), and its influence expanded with the 2014 start of Sputnik Arabic, which maintains a regional office in Cairo. Today, RT Arabic is one of the region’s top three most-watched news broadcasters after Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. As reported in the DFRLab’s previous Undermining Ukraine report, Russia signed cooperation agreements with local media in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco to formalize official cooperation on joint projects and information exchanges.

Some Arabic-speaking media outlets post the exact text of articles published on RT Arabic’s website, allowing for the spread of narratives promoted by state-run Russian media to Arabic speakers. A short RT article from January 13, 2023, pushing claims that Ukrainian soldiers were carrying chemical weapons, was posted verbatim on the news websites of Egypt’s Al-Ahram, Yemen’s Al-Ayyam, and Dubai-based news aggregator Nabd. An August 2023 RT Arabic article repeating Putin’s claim that the ban on Russian media was due to the West’s fear of the truth was also reposted by Yemen’s Al-Ayyam and Emirati newspaper Al Khaleej. An article published in state-aligned Syria’s Al-Watan and Egypt’s Al-Ahram in September quoting State Duma Member Anna Kuznetsova saying that the “Kyiv regime uses the same methods used by the terrorist organization ISIS [Islamic State group] to recruit children” was originally published in RT Arabic.

By cooperating with local media, Russia is able to spread its propaganda to a broader audience in the Arab world. The narratives amplified by Russian state media and local media partners are framed in a way that appeals to audiences in the region and their complicated history with the West. In line with authoritarian Arab leaders’ statements about the West’s interest in their countries, local media amplify narratives suggesting that the West attempts to demonize Russia in order to maintain Arab nations’ reliance on the West. Additionally, narratives about Zelenskyy being a puppet of the West and Putin standing up to them appeal to many in the Arab populations who viewed their former authoritarian leaders as puppets supported by the West at their own expense. Moreover, regional audiences point to Western hypocrisy in considering Russia’s war in Ukraine with a different lens than the US invasion of Iraq or Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip.

As Western states imposed a ban on RT and Sputnik and blocked their YouTube channels to minimize the impact of their propaganda, Russian media was further emboldened in the region as it became increasingly considered an alternative source of information after decades of Western influence in their countries. While there is some sympathy expressed online among Arabic speakers for the Ukrainian people, there is also support for Russia and Putin expressed by media and individuals, resulting from internal polarization and disenchantment with democracy and the West.

Russian media and its social media accounts capitalize on such resentment toward Western countries to gain support for Russia in the region. The X accounts of Sputnik and RT Arabic produce more content than BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera, regularly posting content that appeals to Arab audiences. For instance, on June 29, 2023, one day after an incident of Quran burning in Sweden, the three X accounts posted similar videos showing Putin holding the Quran during a visit to a mosque in the city of Derbent, Russia, while criticizing Western countries like Sweden for allowing the burning of the holy book.

Arabic-speaking journalists and influencers promoting pro-Russia narratives

X also serves as a major social media platform for several Arabic-speaking Russian state media personalities as well as unaffiliated online influencers. Many of these accounts with large followings consistently post news content aligned with the Kremlin’s preferred narratives. There are differences between the two groups, however, as affiliated journalists openly state their ties to Russian media and use their real identities, while influencer accounts appear to more frequently use stolen images and show signs of coordinated posting and engagement.

The DFRLab identified and analyzed thirty accounts of influencers and self-proclaimed journalists boasting large follower counts and posting Arabic content, mostly in the form of news updates. These accounts often promoted similar pro-Russia, anti-Western messaging and celebrated partnerships between Russia and Arab nations. Specifically, the accounts created content that would resonate more with an Arab audience and sometimes expand on regional resentment toward Western countries, accusing them of double standards following their pro-Ukraine narratives.

An analysis of the accounts revealed several suspicious indicators, including similarities in how they present themselves and the content they post. The bios of twenty-three of thirty accounts highlighted interest in Russian news, Russia-Ukraine news, or general political and war news. Many of the accounts often published similar posts on the same day or within a short window. One example showed accounts attempting to attract interest from Arab and Muslim users after Russian general Sergei Surovikin visited Algeria, with six accounts using very similar text and the same photo of Surovikin reading the Quran in an Algerian mosque, all published within a two-hour period on September 15, 2023.

These X accounts routinely promoted disinformation related to the Russia-Ukraine war as well. In one example, on October 4, 2023, three accounts used identical or nearly identical text falsely claiming that Zelenskyy was attempting to recruit Islamic State fighters held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons to join the Ukrainian army in its fight against Russia.

The DFRLab also noticed some degree of coordination between some of the accounts, such as liking, retweeting, and replying to each other’s tweets. For instance, reviewing @russiaArb4’s post engagement revealed many retweets from the same three accounts. Moreover, some of the accounts created posts to promote other accounts and asked users to follow them.

Several of the identified accounts appeared focus on retweeting other accounts, alongside retweeting specific and possibly new Arabic media accounts. This apparent coordination around retweeting could be seen in the almost identical timelines with the same set of retweets between accounts.

Furthermore, five accounts that claimed to be either media figures or Russian citizens living in Russia or somewhere else had additional suspicious indicators. According to monitoring tool Twitter ID Finder, four of these accounts were created in October 2022: three on October 20—two of them just twenty minutes apart—and one on October 28. A reverse image search also confirmed that four of these accounts reappropriated publicly available images of attractive women as their avatars. This tactic appears to be similar to one previously used by a set of pro-Russia accounts, as documented by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, in an attempt to target Arab male users to follow and engage with them. 

Russian public diplomacy in the region

As in Latin America, Russia uses the social media presence of its diplomatic missions in the Middle East and North Africa to promote its preferred narratives about the war in Ukraine. Most of the diplomatic missions post updates to their official Facebook and X accounts at varying frequencies, focusing on diplomatic affairs with the host country. Most repost content from other diplomatic missions and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s English, Russian, and Arabic X accounts about international affairs and the war in Ukraine, routinely posting falsehoods and exaggerations about the war. These include describing the war as a “special military operation” or fighting Nazis in Ukraine.

The X and Facebook accounts of Russia’s diplomatic mission in Egypt post regular international affairs updates. The accounts posted regularly about Ukraine throughout 2023 with the hashtag #الحق_مع_روسيا (“Russia is right”). Among its posts, Russia’s embassy in Egypt posted statements to Facebook about “Ukrainian Nazis” allegedly firing missiles at a hospital in Pervomaisk, Ukraine, using US-provided High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) missiles. Economic and military ties between Russia and Egypt have strengthened in recent years, especially as the latter’s government seeks to reduce its dependence on the United States, which provides Egypt with $1.3 million in annual military assistance. Egypt currently imports the majority of its wheat from Russia and has been working with Russia to construct a Russian-built nuclear plant since 2022.

The increased cooperation and aligning of economic and military priorities between the governments of Egypt and Russia allows the latter to be more aggressive in promoting its narratives to Egyptian audiences through its official channels and getting positive engagement with social media users. The embassy’s messaging about the war in Ukraine sometimes plays on anti-Western sentiment among some audiences.

On February 24, 2023—the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the Russian embassy in Egypt tweeted a statement from the ambassador expressing gratitude to Egypt for “fully understanding the reasons for the confrontation over Ukraine and for supporting Russia despite the torrents of lies about our actions launched by the West.”

In September of that year, the embassy posted about a US announcement that Russia characterized as providing tanks to “Ukrainian Nazis” and depleted uranium shells to “expose our land to radioactive pollution. Exactly what they did in Iraq.” Russian diplomatic missions reference the Iraq War as part of its strategy to capitalize on anti-Western sentiment fueled by lingering distrust of the United States.

Diplomatic missions also capitalize on holidays and other public events by posting statements promoting Russian narratives. For example, the Russian embassy in Egypt evoked its fight against “Nazis” in Ukraine in a tweet on Defenders of the Homeland Day, then repeated the same rhetoric in another tweet on Russia’s Victory Day.

The Russian embassy in Algeria posted a statement from its ambassador on the occasion of Russia Diplomats’ Day, suggesting that the West was engaging in an “open anti-Russia campaign,” adding, “In a time like now when we witness tremendous pressure on Russia by the so-called ‘collective West,’ it becomes clear who our real friends are.” The ambassador also posted on Russia’s Victory Day, saying that “our great Homeland will win this time, will once again rid the world of fascism and Nazism.”

In other posts, Russian diplomatic missions in the region promoted narratives related to specific incidents of concern to Muslim audiences, such as a post from the Russian Embassy in Egypt showing a picture of a praying hand and a copy of the Quran with a tweet condemning the alleged burning of the Quran by Ukrainian soldiers. The post stated that the soldiers did so, knowing there are Muslims fighting in the Russian army, referring to a video that appears to show Ukrainian soldiers burning copies of the Quran.

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The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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Freedom of assembly, freedom of opinion, and democracy are not just American values, “they are human values. They are also African values,” said Succès Masra, the prime minister of the Republic of Chad, on Wednesday.

Formerly the leader of the opposition Transformers party, Masra fled to the United States in the aftermath of the “Black Thursday” crackdown on dissent by the military government in October 2022. Now, after negotiations between the opposition and Chad’s government brokered by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Masra has returned to his home country and was appointed prime minister of Chad’s transition government in January. In this role, Masra has been working toward Chad’s democratic transition and reforming the country’s governmental and electoral institutions. Masra has yet to announce whether he will be a candidate in the May 6 presidential elections.

Molly Phee, assistant secretary for African affairs at the US Department of State, opened the conversation with Masra, urging the international community to support Chad’s transition government as it seeks to build stronger, more inclusive, democratic institutions and serve as an example throughout the region. Below are more highlights from Masra’s discussion of Chad’s democratic transition, economic ambitions, and the role the country should play in the region, which was moderated by Rama Yade, the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Democratic transition and reforms

• Masra said that the transitional government’s first priority was establishing governmental and electoral institutions. “Unless we have strong institutions, nothing sustainable can happen,” he said. The war in Sudan, he added, showed that “if everybody has weapons, it’s not enough to build a strong country. It’s important to make sure that institutions are also here to help.”
• These institutions include a new independent body for organizing elections and a reform to enhance the independence of the judiciary. “These are new tools that we are putting on the table to push for fair elections,” Masra said.
• Another aspect of the electoral reform initiatives is to “push for citizen involvement,” said Masra. “Our ambition is to train fifty thousand volunteers” to help with the elections in the next few weeks, he said, which will require help from institutions in the United States, civil society actors, and members of the African diaspora.
• “But we still have challenges ahead,” Masra acknowledged, which include financing the electoral process. “This is where we can also expect some support.”

Economic goals

• Masra outlined an initiative for “minimum development packages,” which would ensure that every village has a school, health system, clean water facility, road, and access to energy. Unless Chad “bets on education,” Masra said, “there is nothing sustainable we can accomplish yesterday, today, or tomorrow. The world is led by ideas.”
• “We want a Chad which could become tomorrow’s startup nation,” where both local and international actors want to invest, said Masra, who was formerly the chief economist at the African Development Bank. “This is not about philanthropy. This is about business.”
• Masra also highlighted the importance of facilitating trade among African countries, including promoting e-visas, ensuring free travel, expanding regional markets, and making the most of the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Chad’s international role

• Concerning the series of coups in the Sahel countries of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Masra said that “the reality of security and the obligation for leaders to respond to people’s needs remain the same.” Even during war, “people should continue to talk,” he said. “We speak to everybody, with the idea to use Chad as a regional player.”
• “The United States is a partner for our country, and I’m here to say we want to build a stronger partnership,” said Masra. Ongoing areas of cooperation between the United States and Chad, he said, include security, private sector development, and “pushing for a soft landing” in Chad “where people can choose their leaders.”
• “Africa must unite. This is mandatory,” Masra said, urging greater African involvement in global institutions. That means “it’s important to have a place” in the United Nations Security Council, he added.
• Before concluding, Masra called for “hope” for Chad, stating that “there is a new Chad, a new Africa, and we can build bridges” together.

Watch the full event

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Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Egypt has experienced a political roller-coaster in the decade following the Arab Spring. The militarization of power in politics has been a key feature of contemporary Egypt. At the end of 2010, massive demonstrations broke out against poverty, corruption, and political repression. These led to the ousting of President Mubarak, a former military officer. This was despite the important economic reforms Mubarak had embarked upon in his last few years in office, which had been lauded by the international community. President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood movement succeeded Mubarak after free and fair elections in 2012. A year after Morsi’s election, Army General al-Sisi took power in a coup and has since ruled Egypt with an iron fist.

The evolution of the Freedom Index for Egypt is indeed marked by the events of 2011 and 2012. The Freedom Index experienced a steep increase—reflecting the Arab Spring and the free elections that followed—before falling sharply by almost 10 points, a result of the counterrevolution led by General al-Sisi. The political freedom subindex visibly drives the movements in the overall freedom score. The 10-point increase on this subindex in 2011 vanishes, with a subsequent plummeting of almost 15 points, evident in all indicators, but especially in political rights. Al-Sisi has repressed brutally all political opposition and activism.

Economic freedom shows a somewhat erratic evolution, echoing the country’s political instability. Economic freedom seems to improve after 2014 as al-Sisi embarked on a series of reforms. Nonetheless, al-Sisi’s tenure has seen numerous economic problems: The scores on property rights and women’s economic freedom were still extremely low in 2022, and there has been a renewed acceleration toward military control over the economy. Al-Sisi embarked on large infrastructure investments, hoping that these would stimulate durable economic growth. These investments have turned to bad debt. Add to that the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have significantly reduced their aid to Egypt, making it nearly impossible to repay its ballooning debt and associated interest payments. The country is now at risk of a debt crisis.

Legal freedom presents a clear negative trend in Egypt since 2000, with this subindex losing around 10 points in that time. Clarity of the law, one of the most basic elements of the rule of law, receives a very low score throughout this period. The situation is echoed in the degradation of political freedom and the instrumentalization of the judicial system.

From freedom to prosperity

Just as on the freedom front, Egypt’s prosperity has been a roller-coaster. In what has become a familiar cycle, Egypt typically goes through periods of delayed macroeconomic stabilization followed by a balance-of-payments crisis. The country then calls on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout in exchange for drastic reforms. These so-called structural reforms often consist of cutting consumer subsidies (food and fuel), which helps consolidate budgets in the short run but leaves the structure of the economy—including vested interests and cronyism—unaltered. This, in turn, can lead to social instability and repression. The current episode is no different and does not augur well for addressing the social deficiencies affecting Egypt.

The control of the economy by the army is impeding its rapid and deep transformation.
Egypt’s prosperity score remains significantly below the regional average, although it has seen a sustained increase over the last twenty years, suffering only a small regress in 2013–15. There is still a 3-point gap between the country’s prosperity score and the MENA average.

There has been some limited progress in education, health, and the environment. The evolution of the income and education indicators in Egypt has been somewhat better than the average for the MENA region. In the latter case, Egypt has overcome a differential of 6.4 points with respect to the regional average in 2006 and is now almost 2 points above it. In terms of the health and environment components, the country scores visibly below the regional average, and the gap has actually widened since 1995. Minority rights protection dropped by almost 8 points after 2012, coinciding with the period of political turmoil, but most of that fall seems to have been recovered in the last three years.

The future ahead

Egypt will have to navigate very difficult macroeconomic challenges in next few years. The country is heavily indebted, adding to the already worrisome sociopolitical situation. Egypt is gearing up for elections in December 2023. It is likely that President al-Sisi will be re-elected, and although this would theoretically hand him a mandate for reform, it is unlikely he will do anything that would affect crony or military interests. Instead, al-Sisi might have to resort to further devaluation of the currency, which will ignite further inflation and hurt vulnerable households. What is more, it would create a damaging currency imbalance, adding to the cost of servicing foreign debts that are held in foreign currency.

Al-Sisi will have to find external sources of financing outside of capital markets, given the prohibitive spread on external borrowing. Financial aid from Gulf countries, which typically provided a lifeline, is no longer forthcoming. Gulf countries are looking to invest in strategic assets but also want to see reforms before doing more to support the country. Gulf partners are counting on the IMF to push for more market-oriented reforms.

While political reforms are unlikely given the current circumstances, deep economic reforms also seem doubtful. Indeed, they would be difficult as the militarization of politics and of the economy is entrenched. This stalled situation will continue to limit the country’s potential. It is imperative to re-embark on a balanced economic and political transition to avoid the domestic instability that could result from a frustrated youth. What is more, the geopolitical situation is also tense. The renewed escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict risks spilling over into Egypt. That could destabilize the country and spread to the whole region.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region, and a former chief of commodities at the the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. He is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development and at Harvard Kennedy School.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

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With the plan, Italy is boldly positioning itself as an energy hub for Europe and as a regional power capable of independently engaging in Mediterranean affairs, separate from other European Union (EU) countries. Moreover, through five main policy pillars (education and training, agriculture, health, water, and energy), the plan could help spur economic growth in Africa, and by default, reduce some of the economic causes driving mass migration from the continent.

Can the plan succeed? Early criticism of it centers on its perceived ambiguity, on concerns that it could jeopardize efforts to address climate change, and on its potential use as a pretext for Italy to tighten its stance on irregular migration. However, amidst these apprehensions, there are grounds for optimism. The plan presents an opportunity for Italy to emerge as a prominent player in Africa and to shift from its historically reactive approach to irregular migration toward proactive and constructive solutions.

A renewed Italian role in the Mediterranean

Since assuming office in October 2022, Meloni has made the Mediterranean a focal point of her foreign policy agenda. From addressing irregular migration to reducing reliance on Russian energy, the motivations behind this agenda are clear: the Mediterranean Sea, with its strategic location as a gateway to three continents and its abundant natural gas and oil resources, is crucial for Italy. This truth holds as much weight today as it did historically when the Roman Empire sought to assert its dominance by controlling the Mediterranean region.

In her first year as prime minister, Meloni visited Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. During her first diplomatic mission, she orchestrated a two-day visit to Algeria alongside Claudio Descalzi, the chief executive officer of Italian energy company Eni, signaling an effort to further her predecessor Mario Draghi’s strategy of reducing Italy’s dependence on Russian gas. Throughout the visit, she emphasized a “virtuous model of collaboration” between African and European partners. She also took part in numerous photo opportunities with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, to underscore her efforts to emphasize the warm relationship between Italy and Algeria. 

In early 2023, Meloni continued her engagements with North African leaders, traveling to Tripoli, Libya, where she met with Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah to finalize substantial energy investment agreements, address migration challenges, and discuss security threats posed by Sahelian Islamist groups. During her visit, Eni and Libya’s National Oil Company signed an eight-billion-dollar gas investment deal aimed at facilitating exploration and production for both domestic and European markets. Additionally, Italy provided Libya with five ships for the Libyan coast guard to bolster patrols against irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

In July 2023, Meloni made two separate visits to Tunisia in under ten days, following a surge in migration from the North African country to Italy. Along with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, Meloni negotiated the signing of a memorandum between the European Union and Tunisia worth 150 million euros, aimed at revitalizing Tunisia’s economy and strengthening its coast guard capacities to combat irregular migration.

Middle power or global player?

Italy has long grappled with formulating a cohesive foreign policy, oscillating between assertiveness and mediation. During the Cold War, Italy assumed the role of a mediator, often acting as an intermediary between the United States and the Eastern bloc in the Mediterranean. Hindered by its struggling economy and internal ideological divisions, Italy failed to attain the status of an assertive, leading power capable of guiding rather than following.

Italy’s engagement in the Mediterranean has followed a similar path, vacillating between prominent and passive stances. In the 1950s and 1960s, Eni founder Enrico Mattei positioned the company to challenge the dominance of Western oil companies in North Africa through strategic alliances with countries such as Egypt under Gamel Abdel Nasser. These efforts were in part aimed at strengthening Italy’s role in the region.

But since the early 2000s, and especially in the wake of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, Italy’s approach to the Mediterranean has been primarily reactive. Policies such as former Prime Minsiter Enrico Letta’s “Mare Nostrum,” aimed at tackling Mediterranean challenges through multilateralism and economic development, and former Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni’s “Minniti Plan,” emphasizing border control and law enforcement, were chiefly reactive strategies to the perceived migration crisis gripping Europe. These strategies often lacked a cohesive long-term vision and strategic foresight, relying instead on short-term fixes.

A path to renewal

The Mattei Plan for Africa seeks to establish an Italian agenda that prioritizes Africa’s needs and avoids predatory practices. Through investments in infrastructure and renewed energy, Italy aims to reclaim an assertive role in the region.

For this repositioning to succeed, however, the Meloni government must avoid repeating past mistakes. Instead, it should adopt forward-looking approaches aligned with global trends, such as addressing climate change and providing green energy solutions, while forging lasting relationships with African elites committed to impactful policies. While short-term gains may appeal to transient foreign policy agendas, it is the pursuit of long-term benefits that distinguishes leaders with enduring legacies.

Alissa Pavia is the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program.

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2023 also produced moments of hope and diplomatic feats. MENA countries were included in development organizations and plans that aimed to bolster the region’s economic prosperity; Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations; and the Abraham Accords continued to prosper.

Learn about the region’s biggest moments:

January 1: Israeli Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir decisively visits Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif)

The year had a rocky start as Israel’s controversial newly appointed minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, visited the Temple Mount, also known as Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary). Since Israel won the holy sites in the 1967 war, it granted the administrative authority of al-Aqsa Mosque, the Temple Mount, and the surrounding complex to the Jordanian Islamic Waqf. Under the status quo, the site is open to Muslim worshipers while Jewish visitors are allowed only at certain times and are not permitted to pray there.

“Ben Gvir, who is the leader of the extreme-right Otzma Yehudit party, has previously been convicted for supporting terrorism and inciting racism,” highlighted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. Given his background, Ben-Gvir’s January 1 visit—and subsequent visits later in the year—angered Palestinians, Arab-Israelis, and the wider Arab and Muslim world, as he has previously voiced discontent with the status quo, making his visit appear threatening to Muslim rights at the holy sites in Jerusalem.

MENASource

Jan 30, 2023

Ben-Gvir’s controversial new position angered the Arab world. But how will it impact a potential peace deal with Saudi Arabia?

By Ksenia Svetlova

Will PM Benjamin Netanyahu find the desired equilibrium between the radical politics of his coalition partner and diplomacy with Arab capitals?

Israel Middle East

January 5: Libya’s rival governments agree to develop a constitutional basis for elections 

Since the 2011 uprising against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the country has faced violence, uncertainty, and division, resulting in two parallel governments. In January, after more than a decade of conflict and failed attempts at unity, the two governments of Libya—the Government of National Unity in the west and the Government of National Stability in the east—entered into negotiations to find a constitutional basis to end the conflict and hold elections for a single, unity government.

The talks took place in Cairo after Egypt volunteered to host. Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, represented Tobruk and eastern Libya. In contrast, Tripoli and western Libya were represented by Khaled Al-Mishri, the head of Libya’s Higher Council of State. The representatives agreed to create a roadmap for the election process in the talks. The prime ministers of both governments also passed along the country’s constitutional document for approval from their respective legislatures.  

MENASource

Feb 1, 2023

Libya’s political impasse and the $6 billion question

By Alia Brahimi

On January 5, after months of talks brokered in Egypt, Libya’s rival legislative bodies finally agreed to begin discussions to develop the constitutional basis for elections.

Libya Middle East

February 6: Deadly 7.8 magnitude earthquake hits Turkey and Syria 

On February 6, a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck southern Turkey and northwest Syria, killing over 55,000 people and affecting 15.7 million more. The damage was widespread; homes, schools, and hospitals were destroyed as the earthquake left entire cities and villages in ruin. While it was known that war-torn Syria would not have the capacity to respond to disaster, the earthquake exposed the inadequacy of Turkey’s response system.

Despite international aid, rescue and rebuilding efforts in Turkey were insufficient, with help slow to reach many areas. The earthquake has also had detrimental economic effects. The rebuilding efforts are expected to cost upward of $130 billion—over one-eighth of Turkey’s GDP—while many industries and livelihoods have also been destroyed. But as one Syrian told senior fellow Arwa Damon hours after the earthquake struck: “It did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along.”

MENASource

Jun 12, 2023

I work in Syrian civil society. There were gaps in our performance after the February 6 earthquake.

By Kenda Hawasli

It is clear that humanitarian response planning in Syria requires a full review process that reconsiders existing approaches and involves local partners while listening to their experiences.

Civil Society Crisis Management

February 10: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security leads Iranian opposition gathering 

An Iranian diaspora opposition coalition known as the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) officially came together at an event hosted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security months after anti-establishment protests kicked off in September 2022.

Although the conference’s scope was limited and pushed important issues like the type and makeup of a future government down the road, it was a successful first gathering, resulting in the release of the Mahsa Charter a month later. Unfortunately, several months later, in May, the AFDI collapsed.

“The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media,” noted writer Arash Azizi.

IranSource

May 10, 2023

After a failed coalition effort, where is the Iranian opposition headed?

By Arash Azizi

Cracks within the Iranian opposition coalition were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s persona.

Civil Society Iran

February 13: ‘Manifesto for Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organizations of Iran’ published 

As part of the ongoing anti-regime protests, twenty trade unions, activist groups, and student organizations signed and released a manifesto for fundamental change in Iran that was quickly endorsed by other parts of civil society. The revolutionary document covered several different issues ranging from the prohibition of torture to gender equality to the privatization of religion.

The manifesto “offer[s] an articulate and elaborate meaning to the slogan ‘woman, life, freedom,’ aiming to end the formation of any power from above and to establish a society free of oppression, discrimination, tyranny, and dictatorship,” said Shadi Sadr, a human rights lawyer. Read the manifesto text here.

IranSource

Feb 23, 2023

Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.

By Shadi Sadr

Signed by twenty organizations and released on February 13, the manifesto gathered the support of many civil society organizations in Iran.

Civil Society Iran

February 14 – 16: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi goes to China 

President Ebrahim Raisi made a telling visit to Beijing, marking the first time an Iranian leader has made an official state visit to China in over twenty years. This visit was geopolitically significant, as it displayed the consolidation of the China-Russia-Iran axis, which could effectively counter US sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

During the three-day visit, President Raisi and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed twenty documents and agreements on topics ranging from trade to information technology to transportation. The projects and agreements could be worth billions of dollars. But as senior fellow Jonathan Fulton rightfully asked, “Does a visit from Iran’s president help with any of this? In material terms, probably not. China is a lifeline to Iran, while Tehran is of marginal importance to Beijing.”

IranSource

Feb 22, 2023

Iran’s economic future is uncertain. It’s no surprise why Raisi visited China.

By Jonathan Fulton

From February 14-16, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was in Beijing for his first foreign trip of the year and the first official visit to China for an Iranian leader in twenty years.

Iran Middle East

February 20: Iran acknowledges enriching uranium at 84 percent

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was to eliminate its medium-enriched uranium, reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent, and, for the next fifteen years, only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent. After the United States pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed unilateral sanctions, Iran incrementally stopped following the terms of the agreement.

In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed it had found uranium particles enriched at 84 percent—not far away from 90 percent, weapons-grade uranium. As Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, spelled out, “Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were the accidental product of Iran reconfiguring its centrifuges or produced by design, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.”

IranSource

Mar 2, 2023

Iran’s nuclear program is advancing. So too should negotiations.

By Kelsey Davenport

Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were accidental, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.

Iran Middle East

March 1: Abrahamic Family House opens in Abu Dhabi, UAE 

On September 15, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the Abraham Accords, becoming one of six Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel formally. Since then, the UAE and Israel have significantly benefited from their newfound cooperation in sectors from trade and tourism to security and diplomacy.

The opening of the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi—a place of worship for all the Abrahamic faiths, containing a synagogue, a mosque, and a church—symbolized the prosperity to be gained through peace and cooperation. The House represents the hopeful future of co-existence and respect between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As senior fellow Marcy Grossman wrote, “It is also a beacon of light at a time when western antisemitism is at an all-time high. Perhaps, most significantly, it is a beacon of peace in the Middle East.”

MENASource

Feb 27, 2023

What the opening of the Abrahamic Family House Synagogue in the UAE means for the Jewish community and the rest of the world

By Marcy Grossman

The Abrahamic Family House, a mosque, church, and synagogue all sharing a multi-faith campus in Abu Dhabi is about to make its worldwide debut, opening its doors to the general public on March 1.

Israel Middle East

March 10: China brokers deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran 

Seven years after severing diplomatic ties following the storming of Saudi missions in Iran in response to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations in a deal brokered by China. This event was geopolitically significant on both a regional and global level.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been leaders of opposing sects of the Arab world, taking different sides in practically every war and conflict since 1979. Despite housing the holy cities and sites of Islam, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly secularized in contrast to Iran. Saudi Arabia has also been opposed to the expansion of Iranian regional influence, even exploring normalization with Israel. It has yet to be seen whether restoring diplomatic ties is more than an empty nicety.

Globally, China’s role as a mediator demonstrated its aspirations to challenge America’s role in the Middle East and to present itself as a serious player. However, as fellow Ahmed Aboudouh pointed out, the deal “is beset by Saudi-Iranian mutual distrust that runs deep in their strategic thinking and a wide range of regional conflicts—Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—that serve as a battleground for their competition.”

MENASource

Mar 21, 2023

China’s mediation between Saudi and Iran is no cause for panic in Washington

By Ahmed Aboudouh

The deal is a mere statement of intentions by both countries to improve relations, meaning reconciliation is not complete.

China East Asia

March 13: Megiddo bombing in northern Israel

On the morning of March 13, a roadside bomb went off in Megiddo, seriously injuring an Israeli Arab. The location of the bombing, the Megiddo Junction, was just thirty-seven miles from the Lebanese border. Based on shrapnel and remains of the bomb, Israeli officials did not believe the attack to be from a Palestinian group. According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the suspected terrorist crossed into Israel from Lebanon and was found hitchhiking following the attack.

“If Hezbollah was behind the Megiddo bombing,” argued senior fellow Nicholas Blanford, “it likely came within the context of supporting the growing popular unrest in the West Bank.” 

For Israelis, the incident reinforced the necessity of the wall currently being built on the border with Lebanon to replace an ineffective fence.  

MENASource

Mar 22, 2023

Was Hezbollah behind the Megiddo bombing in Israel? If yes, it’s a new escalation.

By Nicholas Blanford

The suspect was shot dead when Israeli security forces intercepted him in a vehicle traveling close to the border with Lebanon.

Lebanon Middle East

March 18: Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visits Cairo 

Following the 2013 coup d’etat in Egypt that ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi banned the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group that Turkey supported. The incident brought a rift in ties. Now that Ankara has abandoned its critical approach to Sisi, the two countries have tried to mend their relationship.

At the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, President Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan were photographed shaking hands. In March, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Egypt and met with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry. This encounter led to the first official meeting of the two presidents in over a decade on the sidelines of the September G20 summit in New Delhi.

MENASource

Apr 12, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Ankara’s perspective 

By Ali Bakir

While Turkey would prefer to speed up the normalization process, Cairo might prefer to wait until the next elections before expediting it.

Europe & Eurasia Libya

MENASource

Apr 11, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Cairo’s perspective 

By Shahira Amin

After a decade of ruptured ties and simmering tensions, Egypt and Turkey are inching towards a rapprochement—a move thought unimaginable by some observers a couple of years prior.

Africa Europe & Eurasia

March 30: International Court of Justice issues judgment on Certain Iranian Assets case 

In the case of Certain Iranian Assets, Iran challenged its responsibility to issue payments to families of victims of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism based on the now-terminated 1955 Treaty of Amity. The United States had frozen $1.8 billion from the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi) in 2012. Iran brought the case to the International Court of Justice in 2016, which issued a mixed ruling on March 30. Families of terror victims will receive compensation, but the funds and assets from which the compensation money may be obtained have been found to be narrower in scope than the United States had aimed.  

IranSource

Apr 24, 2023

What the ICJ ruling on the Central Bank of Iran means for the US and the Islamic Republic—and those seeking reparations for state-sponsored atrocities

By Celeste Kmiotek

On March 30, the International Court of Justice issued its final judgment on a case between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on the fate of “Certain Iranian Assets.” The judgment contains wins and losses for both sides.

Iran Middle East

April 4: Iran cracks down on hijab law 

In the face of mass anti-regime protests across Iran following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, mandatory hijab laws were laxed. However, after announcements in March and April, Tehran reversed this trend with even harsher enforcement than before the protests began.

Punishments for evading the law and servicing women without mandatory hijab now include up to $60,000 in fines, deprivation of social and public services, revocation of documents, ban of internet access, and the confiscation of property and forced closing of businesses. The clerical establishment is enforcing the hijab law by installing cameras and facial recognition technology. However, as former Young Global Professional Mahnaz Vahdati argued, “Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.” 

IranSource

Apr 20, 2023

The Islamic Republic is mobilizing all its forces against unveiled Iranian women, but they’re pushing back

By Mahnaz Vahdati

Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.

Politics & Diplomacy

April 6: Rockets launched at Israel from Lebanon 

On April 5, Israeli police forces and Palestinians clashed at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Palestinian and Arab media and governments claimed Israel was “storming” the mosque and had assaulted worshippers. At the same time, Israeli police justified their force with reports of masked young people barricading themselves inside the al-Aqsa Mosque with fireworks, clubs, and rocks after evening prayers. Following reports of the clashes, rockets and projectiles were allegedly launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Hamas reported that the IDF then struck targets in Gaza. The next day, on April 6, thirty-four rockets were shot at Israel from Lebanon, presumably launched by Hezbollah.

The escalation of violence in early April overlapped with Hamas Political Chief Ismael Haniyeh’s visit to Lebanon to discuss the Resistance Axis, which is made up of Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As program assistant Nour Dabboussi explained, it was a reminder of “how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country—considering itself entitled to maneuver partnerships that fall outside of the official realm of the Lebanese government—with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.” 

IranSource

Apr 12, 2023

The attacks on Israel should be a wake up call for the Lebanese people

By Nour Dabboussi

The rocket fire from Lebanon on April 6 highlights how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country, with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.

Iran Lebanon

April 15: Fighting breaks out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum 

On April 15, another round of fighting broke out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between the two factions that made up Sudan’s government. In 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overthrew Sudan’s transitional government, which was created after the 2019 military coup. For the past two years, the SAF and RSF ruled Sudan together, but now the leader of each group wants to rule Sudan independently.

“As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states,” underscored senior fellow R. Clarke Cooper. 

The conflict has displaced over six million people and has created over 1.2 million refugees.  

MENASource

May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

May 7: Arab League normalizes with the Bashar al-Assad regime 

In 2011, the Arab League voted to suspend Syria from its membership based on the Bashar al-Assad regime’s violent suppression of peaceful protests. The decision to readmit Syria in May also called for a resolution of the Syrian Civil War and its spillover effects, which have impacted its neighbors and the region through the refugee crisis and drug trade. The readmission of Syria to the Arab League was controversial. Some Arab countries already have relations with Syria while others still will not be persuaded to normalize.

“Not much will change in Syria or across the region for now, but keeping Assad isolated would not be as easy as before, especially as he eyes recognition from the West followed by the removal of sanctions and funding for reconstruction,” emphasized Qutaiba Idlibi, head of the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project.

MENASource

May 19, 2023

Experts react: Assad gets warm reception at Arab summit. Where does that leave the US and its allies?

By Qutaiba Idlbi, Gissou Nia, Michel Duclos, Emadeddin Badi

Atlantic Council experts react to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s attendance at the Arab League summit in Jeddah and explain its significance below. 

Human Rights Middle East

May 9 – May 13: Israel conducts Operation Shield and Arrow against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza 

On May 2, a prominent member of the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Khader Adnan, died after an eighty-seven-day hunger strike while in Israeli prison. Following Adnan’s death, PIJ launched 102 rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, injuring seven people. The IDF responded to the rocket attack on May 9 with Operation Shield and Arrow. During the three-day operation, seven PIJ commanders were killed in targeted assassinations, approximately 938 rockets were fired into Israel by PIJ, and a total of thirty-four Palestinians (including the targeted commanders and members of PIJ) and one Israeli were killed. A ceasefire was signed on May 13, negotiated by the Egyptian government.

Operation Shield and Arrow was just one of the many escalations around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this year. “It seems that the next Israeli operation in Gaza is inevitable,” predicted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. “Everyone in Israel, Gaza, and Egypt knows how it will look and how many days it might take. The only unknown factor is the operation’s future name.”

MENASource

Jun 2, 2023

In an endless series of Israeli operations, Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza was yet another name on the list

By Ksenia Svetlova

The current Israeli government is just as unable as previous ones to produce a solution to stop PIJ and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank.

Conflict Israel

May 27: Clashes between Iran and Afghanistan over Helmand River 

The Helmand River, a major water source for Iran and Afghanistan, has been a point of contention between the two countries for centuries. The river, which flows through Afghanistan and ends in eastern Iran, is essential for farmers in both countries. Since a 1973 treaty, Iran will receive 820 million cubic meters of the river each year.

On May 18, tensions over the river and water access flared up again when Iranian President Raisi warned the Taliban to respect Iran’s water rights. Then, on May 27, fighting broke out when alleged armed drug smugglers attempted to cross the border into Iran. Iranian security forces fired at the drug smugglers, but Afghan forces, unaware of the drug smugglers, believed that Iranian forces were shooting at them unprovoked. Afghan forces then attempted to attack Iranian border villages. Each side reported that the other began shooting first. But as the Middle East Institute’s Fatemeh Aman emphasized, “Several factors have contributed to the current situation, including the impact of climate change.”

IranSource

Jul 7, 2023

Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Helmand River. The water wars have no end in sight.

By Holly Dagres

Fatemeh Aman, a non-resident senior fellow at MEI, on why the Islamic Republic and Taliban are bumping heads on transboundary water issues.

Afghanistan Climate Change & Climate Action

June 23-June 24: The Wagner Group rebellion 

On June 23, the Wagner Group, a Russian-funded private paramilitary organization, staged a rebellion against the Russian military and defense ministry. Wagner forces attacked and took control of Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of the Southern Military District before continuing their offensive towards the Russian capital, Moscow. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko brokered a deal between Wagner and Russia before the rebellion reached the capital. Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, claimed the uprising was in response to the defense ministry’s attacks on his forces and demanded Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov be turned over to the group. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the rebellion treasonous. Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash. 

“It must be noted that the recent Wagner crisis affects not just those Middle Eastern countries with a Wagner presence, but all Middle Eastern countries cooperating with Russia—which is basically all Middle Eastern governments,” said senior fellow Mark Katz.

MENASource

Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

June 29: Biden administration announces inter-agency counter-captagon strategy

Though the issue of the illicit captagon trade has not been covered much, its impact threatens the stability of the Middle East and has the potential to propagate the drug crisis worldwide. On June 29, the Joe Biden administration announced an inter-agency plan to counter the captagon trade. The plan includes the provision of diplomatic and intelligence resources to law enforcement agencies; applying financial pressure and economic sanctions on the Assad regime and other groups involved in the illicit captagon trade; the provision of counternarcotics training to affected countries; and diplomatic engagement and strategies to hold Syria accountable. 

MENASource

Aug 24, 2023

No quick fixes for the Middle East’s captagon crisis

By Karam Shaar

Counter-captagon policies should look further ahead and deeper into the causes of the demand in the first place.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

July 4: Iran admitted as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

Since 2009, Iran has held observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a group started in 1996 largely to manage territorial disputes that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SCO originally had just five members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, adding Uzbekistan in 2001 and India and Pakistan in 2017. Iran was admitted as a full member in July. Although the group is largely ineffective, having been stalled by the rivalry between China and India, Tehran’s membership signals the failure of the United States to effectively isolate the country and the growth of an illiberal alliance. 

IranSource

Jul 13, 2023

Iran joining the SCO isn’t surprising. But Beijing’s promotion of illiberal norms in Eurasia should get more attention.

By Jonathan Fulton

Deeper coordination between Iran and other member states gives momentum to the China-centered illiberal order being promoted by Beijing.

China East Asia

July 10: Russia sides with the United Arab Emirates over Iran on territorial claims 

Iran and the UAE have had a decades-long territorial dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Strait of Hormuz. Both countries claim historical ties to the islands, dating back centuries. For a large part of the twentieth century, the British controlled the islands. When they left in 1971, Iran immediately seized control of the islands and has effectively, if not legally, administered them ever since. The UAE’s efforts to diplomatically regain control of the islands have not ceased for the past fifty years. Most recently, Russia has surprised the world by voicing support for Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims despite the former’s strong relationship with Tehran.

As senior fellow Mark Katz explained, “The Russia-GCC joint statement does nothing to alter the fact that Iran remains in control of the three islands and is likely to remain so.”

MENASource

Jul 18, 2023

Is Russia really siding with the UAE against Iran?

By Mark N. Katz

For Russia to endorse the GCC’s position on three islands is especially surprising, considering how much Iran has done to support Moscow.

Iran Middle East

July 18: Israeli President Isaac Herzog visits the United States

Despite a decades-long friendship, the Joe Biden-Benjamin Netanyahu relationship has been strained by the current right-wing government in Israel—the most extreme in the country’s history. In July, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, whose role is largely ceremonial, was welcomed to the Oval Office. During the meeting, President Biden reaffirmed the “unbreakable” friendship between the United States and Israel and strengthened his commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Biden also stated that a meeting between himself and Netanyahu in Washington was in the works for the coming months.

While in the United States, Herzog addressed Congress and met with American Jewish leaders. However, as senior fellow Shalom Lipner highlighted, “Israel and the United States have some tough decisions to make if they harbor any hopes of refreshing the trifecta—shared values, shared interests, and broad-based support—which has kept them famously on the same page.”

MENASource

Jul 17, 2023

At risk of separating, can Israel and the US renew their vows?

By Shalom Lipner

President Joe Biden is rolling out the red carpet for his Israeli counterpart, Isaac Herzog, who arrives in the United States on July 18.

Israel Middle East

August 10: United States reaches hostage deal with Iran 

After months of negotiations, the United States and Iran reached a deal to exchange prisoners. In September, five Iranian-Americans held hostage in Iran on unsubstantiated charges were released in exchange for five Iranians imprisoned in the United States on charges of sanction violations. “Many have criticized the deal as constituting a ransom payment, incentivizing Tehran’s hostage-taking model,” said staff lawyer Celeste Kmiotek. The United States also released $6 billion of frozen Iranian funds held in South Korean banks, which was transferred to Qatari banks for humanitarian purposes but may be re-frozen by Congress. After the American hostages returned home, the Biden administration introduced new sanctions against Iran. 

The Islamic Republic is holding at least three other hostages who may be considered nationals under the Levinson Act: Green Card holder Shahab Dalili; US permanent resident Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani; and US resident Jamshid Sharmahd.

IranSource

Aug 17, 2023

The Levinson Act means all Americans must return home—not just citizens

By Celeste Kmiotek

Shahab Dalili, Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani, and Jamshid Sharmahd are all considered US nationals under the Levinson Act.

Human Rights Iran

August 20: Protests and strikes in Sweida, Syria begin

In August, the pan-Syrian August 10 movement was founded by Syrian opposition leaders to end poor economic conditions, violence, and sectarianism in Syria. Simultaneously, the Free Alawite Officers published a declaration expressing demands of the Assad regime, including an end to Iranian influence in the country and the creation of accountability methods. Both groups appealed to the Alawite community of Syria. Just days later, small-scale protests began.

On August 17, a general strike was called in Sweida—a predominantly Druze area—and hundreds of protesters gathered near police headquarters and the governor’s office, chanting anti-Assad regime slogans. Protesters participated in mass demonstrations, causing road closures, boycotts, and destruction of Baath party property. As the protests continued throughout August and into September, the movement became more explicitly anti-government, calling out the crimes of the Assad regime and demanding his overthrow, and even spread to areas that traditionally supported the dictator. The government responded to the protests violently, killing many demonstrators.

Despite this, it seems the regime has been unable to stop the protests thus far. “It may be unexpected to witness this scene after all the suppression and war crimes committed by the Assad regime in Syria,” emphasized writer Rima Flihan. “However, it signifies that the desire for change in Syria still exists within the Syrian people.”

MENASource

Sep 5, 2023

The uprising in Sweida will continue until the regime changes in Syria

By Rima Flihan

These demonstrations call for a change in the Syrian regime and the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

August 22-August 24: Middle Eastern countries admitted to BRICS 

During the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in South Africa in August, the group—which is a geopolitical rival to the G7—announced the admittance of six new countries to the bloc, including four Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This move was made to give a greater voice to the Global South and to grow BRICS’s share of the global economy.

However, the divide that the G7 and BRICS represent between the Global North and Global South is unclear. BRICS contains important American strategic allies like India and Saudi Arabia, and there are significant geopolitical tensions between BRICS members India and China. Senior fellow Mark Katz pointed out that “For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China and that the West will just have to accept this.”

MENASource

Aug 25, 2023

The BRICS come to the Middle East and North Africa

By Mark N. Katz

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China

International Financial Institutions International Markets

September 9: White House Announces India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor

In September, the Memorandum of Understanding for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was signed at the G20 summit in New Delhi. The project, seen as an American alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to promote economic development, integration, and connectivity throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The rail and shipping networks are to include many strategic American allies and will travel through India, Europe, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

“The project serves primarily as a US diplomatic tool to counter China’s influence in the Middle East. In fact, IMEC should be considered in the same light as Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): an ambitious foreign policy project that captures the world’s attention, even though it is unlikely to deliver on its lofty promises,” claimed senior fellow Jean-Loup Saman.

The IMEC is just the latest initiative in the growing global competition between the United States and China.

MENASource

Oct 6, 2023

The India-Middle East Corridor: a Biden Road Initiative?

By Jean-Loup Samaan

Economists and regional experts expressed their reservations on the feasibility—both politically and financially—of a corridor that would redraw the map of infrastructure across Eurasia.

Economy & Business Financial Regulation

September 10: Tragic floods strike Libyan city of Derna 

Tropical Storm Daniel hit Libya on September 10, becoming the deadliest storm recorded in the Mediterranean. The storm caused the failure of two dams in the city of Derna, releasing 30 million cubic meters of water, which flooded the city and resulted in an estimated 5,300-20,000 deaths. While Libyans were grieving and rescue efforts were still underway, it was revealed that the dams burst because of decades of neglect.

After Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, the city changed hands four times and was a battleground in the Libyan civil war. As North Africa director Karim Mezran explained, “the tragedy of the dam collapse results from neglected dam maintenance, city infrastructure, and civil services, such as inadequately trained and equipped firefighters and medical personnel, the absence of a warning system, and numerous other issues.”

MENASource

Sep 22, 2023

The Derna catastrophe is a sign that the international community needs to take action in Libya

By Karim Mezran

This narrow window of opportunity is unlikely to remain open for long.

Libya Middle East

September 16: First anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death 

On September 16, 2022, twenty-two-year-old Kurdish-Iranian Mahsa Jina Amini died while in custody of the so-called morality police. Amini was arrested for “violating” mandatory hijab law. In the year since her murder, mass anti-regime protests erupted across Iran. #Mahsa_Amini reportedly broke the X (formerly known as Twitter) hashtag record, as the cause was taken up globally. Amini’s death also united the Iranian diaspora, which mirrored and amplified the voices of the people of Iran.

“I strongly believe that the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic… By no means are we going to stand back and surrender. We will be victorious,” said one Gen Z Iranian protester on the anniversary of the protest movement.

IranSource

Sep 13, 2023

Letters from women protesters inside Iran: One year after #MahsaAmini’s death 

By Khosro Sayeh Isfahani

“The people of Iran want to overthrow this regime. If you believe in freedom, equality, and human rights, remember that this regime stands against these values.”

Human Rights Iran

September 22: Senator Bob Menendez indicted in corruption case with the Egyptian government 

United States Senator and Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Bob Menendez (D-NJ) was indicted on federal corruption charges. The charges allege that Menendez, his wife, and three New Jersey businessmen participated in a years-long bribery scheme where Menendez and his wife received hundreds of thousands of dollars in exchange for Menendez’s agreement to use his official position to benefit the businessmen and the Egyptian government. At least one of the businessmen had close connections with Egyptian government officials.

Menendez was introduced to Egyptian intelligence and military officials through the businessmen and provided them with sensitive, non-public US government information, including information on employees in the US Embassy in Cairo. Menendez also used his position to influence foreign military financing and sales of military equipment for the benefit of Egypt. Senior fellow Shahira Amin noted, “Despite the low-key coverage of the shocking corruption scheme by the mainstream Egyptian media, the bribery case stirred controversy on Egyptian social media platforms.”

MENASource

Oct 4, 2023

Menendez’s case coverage is relatively muted in Egypt. That might be intentional.

By Shahira Amin

Egypt’s predominantly pro-government media has chosen to either dismiss altogether or downplay the allegations against Senator Bob Menendez.

Corruption Democratic Transitions

October 7: Outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war 

On October 7, the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur war, Hamas carried out a brutal terror attack in southern Israel, killing between 1,200-1,400 people, injuring hundreds more, and kidnapping approximately 240 people (primarily civilians) before holding them hostage in the Gaza Strip. The attack, which saw the largest number of Jews killed in a single day since the Holocaust, included reports of torture, mutilation, decapitation, sexual violence, and immolation. Simultaneous to the ground attack, Hamas launched a rocket barrage at Israel consisting of at least three thousand rockets. Israel declared war on Hamas the same day, launching its offensive to destroy “the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”

On October 27, Israel began its ground invasion, attempting to destroy Hamas’s infrastructure and tunnels and clear northern Gaza of its operatives. Since Israel began its bombardment of Gaza, a massive humanitarian crisis has erupted. Approximately 18,400 Gazans, primarily women and children, have been killed, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. 1.9 million Gazans have been internally displaced, and essential resources, such as food, water, and fuel, are scarce. After weeks of negotiations between Israel and Hamas, orchestrated by Qatar, Egypt, and the United States, the parties reached a ceasefire deal that lasted from November 24 to December 1. The deal saw the release of 105 hostages in exchange for over 230 Palestinian prisoners and up to two hundred trucks of aid delivered to Gaza daily.

The Israel-Hamas war also has the potential to expand into a regional war. Iran’s Resistance Axis has already been active. The border between Israel and Lebanon has seen an escalation of small-scale attacks, and the Houthis have launched missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles at Israel from Yemen. The war has also paused previous diplomatic efforts in the region, like the potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The effects of the war will be widespread. 

Israel-Hamas war

Experts from across the Atlantic Council are providing insight and analysis at speed and in depth on the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, Israel’s response, and how the emerging conflict is upending the Middle East and the world.

October 17: Iran-backed militia strikes in Iraq and Syria 

Since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, US troops and military personnel in Iraq and Syria have endured drone and rocket attacks launched by various Iran-backed militias and terrorist organizations. 3,400 US troops are stationed in the two countries to assist local forces in preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In the more than forty attacks in the last two months, forty-five US troops have been injured. The United States has responded to the attacks, carrying out a number of air strikes against military targets and strongholds of the militias and terror groups.

Iran’s proxies justify their attacks by asserting that the United States shares the blame for Israel’s declaration of war against Hamas. Since October 7, the United States has bolstered its military presence in the region, sending aircraft carriers and troops and increasing drone surveillance.

MENASource

Nov 22, 2023

Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to be responsible for attacks in the country and there’s no end in sight 

By Lizzie Porter

Iraq is witnessing part of the regional fallout from the Israel-Hamas war, and Iraqi bases housing US troops are feeling that most forcefully.

Iran Iraq

November 14: Speaker of Iraq’s parliament ousted

In November, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court revoked the parliamentary membership of its speaker, Mohammed al-Halbousi, along with member Laith al-Dulaimi. Although the court did not disclose its reasoning, the decision was released following an argument between Halbousi and Dulaimi over allegations that the speaker forged Dulaimi’s signature. In reaction to the ruling, members of the speaker’s party, Takadum, resigned from parliament. Critics of the decision say it has the potential to set a dangerous, anti-constitutional precedent, as decisions from the highest court cannot be appealed.

“The timing of this development is particularly crucial, given that Iraq, like the rest of the region, is entangled in the escalating Israel-Hamas war,” explained Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative. “Additionally, the country is in the midst of an election campaign to reinstate provincial councils.”

MENASource

Nov 17, 2023

Iraq’s parliamentary speaker was removed. What’s next for the country?

By Abbas Kadhim

The current crisis dates back to May 2022, when Mohamed al-Halbousi removed one of his bloc’s members from parliament.

Elections Iraq

November 30-December 12: COP28 in the United Arab Emirates

The United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP, convened 197 member countries in Dubai to discuss progress and plan measures to combat climate change. The decision to host this year’s conference in the UAE has caused some controversy, as the country is a major oil producer.

Just days before the conference began, news leaked alleging that the UAE planned on using its proximity to the summit as a forum to discuss oil and gas deals. Major topics of COP28 included responses to the Global Stocktake synthesis report, which revealed the failure to reduce the rise in global temperatures, the shift away from fossil fuels, and the impacts of climate change on cities.  

MENASource

Nov 30, 2023

COP28 is here. These are the Global South’s demands and expectations.

By Lama El Hatow

The COP28 negotiations will prove to be challenging given all the demands and expectations on the table in this COP.

Civil Society Energy & Environment

December 10-December 12: Egyptian presidential elections 

As Egyptians headed to the polls for presidential elections, it was all but certain that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi would serve a third term, but the election came at a challenging time: Egypt’s economy is suffering with inflation at an all-time high; its neighbors are fighting a brutal war that poses risks to Egypt’s border and security; and the country continues to experience international and domestic pressure regarding its human rights record. Despite these conditions, there was no question about Sisi’s victory.

Though there were three other candidates formally in the race, the only serious competitor, Ahmed El-Tantawy, was forced to end his campaign, and his supporters were harassed, intimidated, and arrested. The election formalized six more years of Sisi’s reign. “Be that as it may, Sisi still needs to win over the hearts and minds of disgruntled Egyptians, which may prove to be his biggest challenge during his third term in office,” highlighted senior fellow Shahira Amin.

MENASource

Dec 7, 2023

President Sisi’s third term will be his biggest challenge—not the upcoming Egyptian election 

By Shahira Amin

While it is certain that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will win a third term, it is uncertain what will happen after the vote and when the Gaza war is over.

Elections Middle East

Rachel Friedman is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

The post 2023: A year in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Sullivan quoted in Voice of America on Egyptian elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

H.E. Leila Benali is the minister of energy transition and sustainable development of Morocco and president of the UN Assembly for Environment. This essay is part of the Global Energy Agenda.

Describing the recent crush of global crises, a wise man said, “We faced a century’s worth of tragedies in less than two years.” Our health systems might have emerged more resilient following the COVID-19 pandemic, but our economies and financial systems are still struggling at a time when emerging markets, like Morocco, want to escape the middle-income trap of 3 percent GDP growth.

The Russia-Ukraine war added to the unprecedented disturbance in already dislocated commodities supply chains, threatening nations’ energy security and triggering global inflationary pressure. It is not the first time humanity faces such continuous accumulation of upheavals , but it is the first time it does so at such record levels of global debt—238 percent of global GDP in 2022. This does not leave much room to tackle the triple planetary crisis of our time: climate change, environmental degradation, and biodiversity loss.

We are more often reminded of the fragility of our environment, with extreme weather events or natural disasters. A quarter of the United Nations’ membership, mostly Small Island Developing States, is at risk of disappearing by the end of the century because of rising sea levels. Humanity will face climate-triggered questions over sovereignty and national identity for the first time. Is our post-World War II world order, including our Bretton Woods institutions, equipped to answer?

Humanity will face climate-triggered questions over sovereignty and national identity for the first time. Is our post-World War II world order, including our Bretton Woods institutions, equipped to answer?

Part of the answer is already known: decarbonization of emitting sectors and acceleration of the energy transition would soften the worst impacts of climate change. And maybe, in the twenty-first century, some countries should show the way despite low historic responsibility for causing planetary warming. Morocco has a longstanding commitment toward sustainability despite its negligible emissions. It was one of the first countries to target a reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions by 45.5 percent by 2030 in its Nationally Determined Contribution.

To achieve necessary emissions cuts, pragmatism and inclusiveness are key. When affordability, as well as economic and social development are nonnegotiable, there is no room for ideology in technology and fuel taxonomies. We must leave the traditional energy transition narrative, driven by divisions, in the twentieth century, and embrace twenty-first century narratives.

Morocco generates more than 40 percent of its electricity capacity from renewable energy, and is also a fossil fuel importer, still largely exposed to global commodities’ price volatility and supply issues. Its approach to energy and climate, built over three decades, thus takes into account the complexity of building a credible, sustainable development path, while understanding the long-term nature of energy investments, and the role of lower-carbon fuels like natural gas as key to a well-ordered energy transition.

Coal-based generation will be phased out. More importantly, we want to harness our exceptional renewable resources, and the momentum created by rising technologies like green hydrogen, e-fuels, and storage. We want to leverage our favorable legal framework and three decades of experience in structuring and developing renewable and private energy projects.

Our strategic objectives are threefold:

1. Accelerate (i.e., triple) the pace of investments in renewable energies and key sectors like transmission infrastructure and storage solutions, starting today.

2. Build resilient and agile energy systems and grids that are secure, affordable, and sustainable.

3. Put people at the center of our energy transition and net-zero pathways, permeating the new socioeconomic models we are building.

How will we achieve these objectives? The National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD) is our reference framework to support policies and programs in implementing Morocco’s sustainable development priorities. It is aligned with the 2030 Agenda and its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals as well as the main orientations of the Kingdom’s New Development Model.

The NSSD aims, by 2050, to promote resilience, human development, and reduction of social and territorial inequalities; mitigate and adapt to the consequences of climate change; and protect the environment.

What is different about this strategy is the approach. Through constant consultation, we harness the collective intelligence of all stakeholders—including local authorities, the private sector, civil society, youth, Moroccans living abroad and minorities—to shape the future they want for the country, and to craft with the government the relevant tools to operationalize our social and economic sustainable development path. This inclusive and democratic approach is already having tangible impacts on our new generation of public policies.

Morocco’s development path needs to be holistic, just, and sustainable. Therefore, this is a space and time for society to define the positive and negative externalities of development and price them. These policy levers for sustainable development are defined at the local level, acknowledging the diverse needs and aspirations of our twelve regions.

Even if I am personally excited by the leaps in space technologies, there is still no Planet B, and human societies are still dependent on their environment on Planet Earth. Morocco’s sustainable development strategy is not only a response to the climate crisis, or another mere net-zero pathway, but a means to reintroduce humanity into our policies, placing people at the center of the system.

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Many Moroccans were shaken by the flow of footage depicting the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza in the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attacks. Akin to many Arab and global capitals, tens of thousands of citizens have marched in solidarity with the Palestinian people in recent weeks. There are undeniably long-standing affinities between many Moroccans and Palestinians today due to religious, linguistic, and cultural similarities, notwithstanding their geographical distance and often divergent political trajectories.

These protests have led some foreign commentators to proclaim that normalization is in peril. What many such commentators get wrong, however, is that these demonstrations are not happening against the wishes of the country’s leadership and are not perceived as pressure points within Moroccan political spheres. On the contrary, this social movement in support of Palestinians is organized with the state’s blessing. The government provides logistical and security arrangements for demonstrators every weekend, and it seems to view the marches as an expression of indisputable civil rights. It also has clearly formulated a position on the conflict that is in tune with public demands, calling for de-escalation, access to humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians in line with international law. 

Morocco, however, has no intention of revoking the normalization agreement it signed with Israel. Bilateral relations might traverse a period of malaise, and certain public-facing projects might even be frozen until the next Israeli government takes power, but it is highly unlikely that the kingdom will pull back from its commitments with the United States and Israel. This was apparent from Rabat’s veto, together with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Jordan, and Egypt, on November 11 that blocked a proposal to cut ties with Israel at the Arab League summit in Riyadh.

Unlike countries that share immediate borders with Israel and have a long history of conflict with it, Morocco has a greater margin to maneuver over its foreign policy. The kingdom has pragmatically shown over the years a quasi-secular approach, decoupling what it considers a religious and brotherly duty to support Palestinians and what it believes can best serve its territorial integrity and economic development agenda. Hence, Rabat often reiterated the importance of involving Palestinians in the Abraham Accords process while it gradually expanded the prospects of its cooperation with Israel. Morocco was even cautious about phrasing its agreement with Israel as a “re-establishment of diplomatic ties” rather than as normalization. The relations between the two countries never graduated from the limited status of reopening their respective liaison offices to having full diplomatic representation, despite Israel recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in July—the main pillar of the deal brokered back in 2020 by the Trump administration. 

At the same time, several anti-normalization voices are mounting in Morocco, notably influential Islamist and leftist party leaders and elites, such as Abdelilah Benkirane, the former prime minister from the PJD, and Nabila Mounib, the general secretary of the Unified Socialist Party. Many more private citizens are feeling increasingly frustrated at the humanitarian toll of the Israeli military operations in Gaza and have decided to join the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement or protest groups online and in the streets. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to use a snapshot of one part of society to make a blanket statement about what all nearly forty million Moroccans want or believe. 

Over the past few weeks, some commentators and journalists seem to be feeding sensationalism and presenting a misleading image of a country on the brink of serious civil unrest over the Israel-Hamas war. Interestingly enough, while the war on Gaza still dominates headlines, many Moroccans seem more preoccupied with rain scarcity, teacher strikes, reform of the family code, or even the new Pedro Sanchez government in Spain. The country is also linguistically, ethnically, and ideologically diverse. Many Moroccans, for example, chose to stand with Israel in the ongoing conflict using hashtags like “Morocco First” or “Taza before Gaza”—Taza being a small town in Morocco’s northeast. If one were to zoom out from the elites with internet access and social media accounts, one may very well find that a silent majority has no strong opinion on the matter.

Rather than spinning stories about civil unrest in Morocco and reenacting the failed 2011 Arab Spring forecasts about an imminent revolution awaiting the kingdom, it is perhaps better to focus instead on a recent and worrying escalation in Western Sahara. On October 29, the local authorities reported four blasts in civilian areas in the city of Smara, resulting in one dead and three injured. The attacks against civilians, which the separatist Polisario Front later claimed, could represent a kind of spillover of the Israel-Gaza conflict into North Africa, especially with the Front’s insurgents taking advantage of the current international momentum and mimicking Hamas-style speeches and narratives. The Moroccan authorities have since been in constant confrontation with the insurgents, who, for the first time in years, executed an operation in the Moroccan-controlled territories rather than along the Berm sand wall. The German newspaper Die Welt also reported earlier this month on an even more disturbing piece of intelligence, revealing that Iran might be planning an attack on the Israeli liaison office in Rabat using Polisario as a proxy.

These recent developments suggest that the kingdom may tone down its public collaboration with Israel and the United States and continue to criticize the humanitarian situation in Gaza publicly. Yet, it remains improbable to envisage a split with Israel at the security and intelligence levels, as this collaboration is now a matter of national security for a monarchy that’s succeeded in surviving for twelve centuries.

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs where she oversees the Center’s strategic communications, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts. She previously worked as a journalist and international development professional in Morocco, Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region.

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Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a stable and forward-looking Southern shore—the countries of North Africa—for the peaceful evolution of Southern Europe’s polities. Unfortunately, that possibility is farther away than ever and the current situation can quickly get worse.

To begin with, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry, which has always been focused on the issue of the contested territory of the Western Sahara, has caused the two countries to engage in a decades-long arms race. This security issue, which is about both countries’ power and legitimacy more than anything, could very well lead to a military clash. This dispute over Western Sahara is an excuse to have an enemy at the border and justifies the power of the ruling classes in Algeria and Morocco.

Nevertheless, in recent years, efforts have been made to bring rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, such as reopening the borders and establishing a direct diplomatic relationship. Much hope was raised by various Arab populations in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring period. In the same vein, Moroccans and Algerians shared a keen interest in fostering ties. With the onset of the democratization process in their respective countries, citizens aspired to exert pressure on their governments for rapprochement.

However, this wishful thinking was short-lived, and more reasons for confrontation have recently emerged. For starters, in 2020, the normalization of certain Arab states with Israel (including Morocco) went beyond creating strong tensions within Algeria, producing a radical reaction that prompted it to join states like Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in opposing the accords at the time.

The consequences of the Algerian response are significant in the context of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, particularly for Italy and other European nations that have come to rely on Algerian gas as a substitute for Russian gas. Irregular migration from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria has plagued Italy for years and is likely to increase as tensions between these countries remain unresolved.

Separately, in Tunisia, the newly elected President Kais Saied has centralized all constitutional powers to himself, turning the country towards authoritarianism. However, what could be more dangerous is that Tunisia is falling into the arms of its powerful neighbor: Algeria. The more Tunisia plunged into its economic and political crisis, the more President Saied needed support for its political and economic development that was not conditional from Western countries.

This issue is raising concerns for Egypt, too, which has been striving to extend its military and political rule to its neighbor and civil war-ravaged Libya. Disorder and negative consequences at Egypt’s western borders have been partially avoided by supporting one of their proxies and the ruler of Libya’s eastern provinces: General Khalifa Haftar. The strongman, supported by Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group, achieved a moderate level of order through a bloody war against all opposing clans and tribes—which he has lumped together as Islamist terrorists—as well as through establishing a reign of terror in the country.

However, this went undetected by most until the tragedy of the September 9 floods in Derna province, which killed about ten thousand people. Now, many are beginning to question Haftar’s and, more precisely, his six sons’ involvement in the military and economic realms of the province. Since then, clashes have occurred, and the possibility of a revolt by the tribes and urban population increases by the day.

Egyptian dictator Abdel Fattah el-Sisi may try to intervene directly to alleviate the bordering region. Still, there is little doubt that this would cause a strong reaction from Algeria, which would see an attempt to expand Egyptian power as tilting the balance of power in North Africa. Moreover, the power that controls the western part of Libya, Turkey, will not sit idly by and will most probably intervene directly while having Algeria in its corner. The idea of a Turkish-Algerian entente was challenging to conceive until the summer when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan de facto joined the normalization refusal front headed by Algeria.

Given the current scenario, the situation of the Israel-Hamas war may force Egypt to face its contradictions, leading it to either a confrontation with Israel in defense of the Palestinians or against Hamas in support of its peace agreement with Israel. In either case, the consequences for Western countries would be unthinkable.

In light of these multifaceted challenges, Western countries should take into consideration the ongoing tensions in North Africa to make their decision-making process regarding the events in Gaza more precise and holistic. The only viable solution for a lasting peace—rather than a temporary fix—is to formulate a plan that facilitates the reconciliation of the Palestinians and Israelis and shapes their political and socio-economic progress in a manner that does not neglect the entirety of the Arab world. This is the only path forward.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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Our team analyzed the relative strength and weakness of these countries using the “Misery Index”—the sum of the inflation and unemployment rates—weighting the data by GDP.

The results clearly show how this time is different, from an economic perspective. Today, the Misery Index for these countries is higher than at any point since 2000.

Egypt’s inflation soared to 38 percent in September and its currency reserves are rapidly drying up. Lebanon has had triple-digit inflation for the past three years and its entire economy is in crisis. Jordan is comparatively better off but unemployment has hit a new high of 22 percent in 2023.  

While past flashpoints posed challenges for Israel’s neighbors, they did not have to contend with the risk of recession or worse at the same time. And that means that economic statecraft by the United States and its partners could be particularly effective in navigating the current crisis.

Right now, policymakers are rightly focused on how to limit Iran’s involvement in the conflict—largely through “negative” economic statecraft like sanctions. But economic statecraft has a “positive” side, too, comprised of policies that reward countries for desired behavior. Those inducements have the potential to be particularly effective given the economic difficulties that Israel’s neighbors face.

For instance, there is currently a $5 billion stalled IMF program and Cairo is desperate to have access to at least part of the money. Jordan was supposed to receive a $100 million loan from Japan for an upgrade to its electricity grid. Before October 7, France had committed (but not yet fully sent) over 30 million euros in financial relief to Lebanon.

There are dozens of similar financial levers the West could pull in the days ahead to get more collaboration on the Rafah crossing for humanitarian relief, reconstitute the cancelled Arab Leaders Summit in Amman with President Biden, and send a deterrence signal to Hezbollah to avoid escalation in the north. If ever there was a moment to leverage the combined influence of the dollar, pound, euro, and yen this is it.

There are limits to this approach that the Biden administration should also bear in mind.

In 1956, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser that the United States was withdrawing its financial support of $70 million (nearly $800 million in today’s dollars) for the construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile. Dulles was upset that Egypt had formally recognized the new communist Chinese government in Beijing (and abandoned the nationalists in Taiwan). He thought Egypt’s economy was so weak they couldn’t build the dam without US support. He was wrong. The Soviets stepped in. An emboldened Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which brought the UK, France, and Israel into a war.

Today, Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar are in a much stronger economic position—closer to Israel’s than its neighbors’—and they could step in to fill the void.

One of the lessons from 1956 is that if countries don’t get support from the West, they will get it from somewhere else. With China serving as the world’s largest bilateral lender, that’s even more likely today than it was then.

The bottom line is that all conflicts, especially those of the past several years, have a military and economic dimension. It’s time for the G7 to start using all the tools at its disposal.

Josh Lipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former adviser at the International Monetary Fund.

Phillip Meng, Niels Graham, and Sophia Busch contributed to this piece. This post is adapted from the GeoEconomics Center’s weekly Guide to the Global Economy newsletter. If you are interested in getting the newsletter, please email SBusch@atlanticcouncil.org.

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The core questions for achieving this objective are how to promote green hydrogen development and not just hydrogen production per se, and the feasibility of long-distance transportation from regions with favorable conditions for production to the markets that will consume it.

In that vein, connecting hydrogen-hungry Europe and the potential green hydrogen powerhouse of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a critical part of this international decarbonization objective.

The state of Europe-MENA hydrogen interdependence

Since COP27 last year in Egypt, countries within the MENA region have adopted national strategies and pursued new projects in hydrogen development aimed at transitioning their economies to clean energy exports.

Yet, with a few exceptions, several memoranda of understanding (MoUs) signed since the conference have not turned into actual investment decisions so far, notably in the case of COP27 host Egypt.

Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) and most of its member states are slowly but surely building their hydrogen supply chains, with plans that in most cases involve interdependence with the MENA region.

The quest for hydrogen

Demand for hydrogen in Europe is growing. The EU as a whole aims to import 10 million tons (MT) of green hydrogen by 2030 per the objectives of REPowerEU, the bloc’s overall plan to cut dependence on Russian fuels.

Germany and some of its companies are particularly active in concluding agreements with the Gulf states to buy hydrogen. Germany foresees importing between 50 percent and 70 percent of its hydrogen demand from abroad, corresponding to 95-130 Terawatt-hours (TWh).

On the whole, investments within Europe appear to be lagging behind its goal of producing 10MT of green hydrogen by 2030. This is due to uncertainties in demand, regulatory frameworks, and the crowding out effect of the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States.

Still, a number of initiatives for Europe to import hydrogen from the MENA region are on the horizon.

The H2 Med project—a hydrogen pipeline that would link Spain, France, and Germany—might be further connected with Morocco and possibly Mauritania to bring solar-produced green hydrogen to Europe.

Similarly, Italy is mulling fresh investments in gas production in Algeria. Gas pipelines running through Italy might be partially repurposed in the future to transport hydrogen from Northern Africa. Algeria, Tunisia and Libya—currently connected through gas pipelines to Italy—are the potential partners for such a scheme. New dedicated hydrogen pipelines might also be built. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni set out this vision during her visits to Algeria and Libya earlier this year.

According to a recent industry discussion paper, a hydrogen pipeline connecting Qatar to Europe could transport 10TWh or approximately 2.5MT of hydrogen per year at a levelized cost of around €2.7 ($2.9) per kilogram by 2030, later decreasing to €2.3 ($2.46) per kg. Such hydrogen is likely to be carbon-neutral to conform to EU regulations, but may be “blue” rather than “green,” meaning it would be produced from fossil fuels with carbon capture.

Steel to shipping

Demand for green steel and green iron is also poised to grow, in part because of an EU carbon border adjustment mechanism which will require certification of low-carbon production.

The MENA region holds significant potential in this regard, and projects are already under consideration. Oman is planning to set up a plant that would produce 5MT green steel annually by 2026, the year when the EU carbon border tax would come into effect. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia are also considering investments in green metals production. A company based in Bahrain is involved in a green steel project in Saudi Arabia.

Ambitions to decarbonize maritime transport is also spurring demand for green fuels from the MENA region. The International Maritime Organization has launched a strategy to reduce emissions from shipping between 20 percent and 30 percent by 2030 and between 70 percent to 80 percent by 2040. At the Paris Summit on a New Global Financing Pact last June, 23 countries and regional organizations supported the principle of a levy on greenhouse gas emissions from international maritime transportation.

The MENA region has an opportunity to benefit from these developments. Maersk, a major player in international shipping, is planning an investment in Egypt, worth $3 billion, for the production of green methanol and its derivatives, beginning at 300,000 tons a year in a first phase, set to increase later to 1 million tons per year. 

Egypt is positioning itself as a green bunkering hub to attract marine traffic. Last August, the first green methanol-powered container ship transited through the Suez Canal and refueled in East Port Said on its maiden voyage from South Korea to Denmark.

The future of the Europe-MENA hydrogen trade

Despite these opportunities, the road ahead for hydrogen development and new patterns of interdependence between the MENA region and Europe appears bumpy, with many elements of uncertainty, including costs, financing, scalability, and inadequate development of hydrogen value chains.

Nevertheless, a changing dynamic is in motion in the MENA region, with agreements and projects in the process of elaboration and implementation.

The pace of this shift must be sped up. A multi-stakeholder effort is needed, involving both public and private players. Investments will come if there is a steady growth in demand, which in turn, requires incentives to support investors from governments and institutions.

The EU has come up with its own legislation on building its hydrogen industry, although the IRA is widely believed to remain a better model in terms of the simplicity and predictability it offers.

Much remains to be done in terms of demand creation, setting emissions requirements for hard-to-abate industries, and investments in hydrogen-dedicated infrastructure and value chains, among others.

Investments also need clear regulatory frameworks. The certification of green hydrogen products must be made certain, in light of the EU carbon tax coming into force in a few years.

Politics remain a factor on the European side. The task of pursuing the design of this new EU-MENA interdependence will fall to the new European Commission, which will come to office following elections for the European Parliament in June 2024.

None of that must disrupt this emerging partnership. There is far too much at stake for Europe’s security and stability.

Giampaolo Cantini is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center

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This week, leaders are meeting at IMF-World Bank Week in Marrakesh, Morocco, to get the world’s economic engine back on track. But with so many global crises putting countries (especially emerging markets) in a bind, audiences worldwide will be watching to see whether the IMF and World Bank can help countries respond to debt distress, climate change, and the economic impact of conflict.

With so much happening behind closed doors, we’ve dispatched our experts to Marrakesh; on the ground and in conversation with finance ministers, central bank governors, and other top leaders, they are evaluating the IMF and World Bank’s response to today’s biggest financial challenges. Below are their takeaways and insights from behind the scenes as the week unfolds.

• As the meetings wrap, macroeconomic and gender equality agendas remain tightly linked

• The final verdict: The IMF and World Bank are struggling to see how geopolitics and economics intertwine

• As IMF-World Bank Week wraps, we wonder: Is that all there is to say?

• See day five analysis

Watch all our conversations with central bank governors and finance ministers

IMF-World Bank Week at the Atlantic Council

WASHINGTON, DC APRIL 15–19

The Atlantic Council hosted a series of special events with finance ministers and central bank governors from around the globe during the 2024 Spring Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Watch key moments with ministers

As the meetings wrap, macroeconomic and gender equality agendas remain tightly linked

A month ago, on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, I discussed top risks and opportunities in the year and near years ahead with foresight experts from the Atlantic Council. On the risk side, I talked about debt and geopolitical fragmentation—and the resulting drop in investment (especially in the Global South) that undermines productivity and growth. On the opportunity side, I talked about women’s economic and labor force participation driven in part by policy reforms and investments taking root that enable women to work, start, or grow businesses; including through care.

These risks and opportunities appear to be bearing out—at least if the conversations and reports this week at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings are to be believed.

The World Economic Outlook (WEO) projects that global growth will slow to historically low levels—from 3.5 percent in 2022 to 3 percent this year and 2.9 percent next year—driven down by risks associated with weakened Chinese growth, persistent inflation and debt distress, and the geopolitical fragmentation of commodity markets. These factors are also contributing to a widening divergence in growth across countries; and though not routinely discussed in the WEO, we are also seeing widening inequality, worsening food insecurity, and increasing poverty as a result—including higher numbers of poor people in wealthy countries—as macroeconomic challenges bear disproportionate impacts for already marginalized or disadvantaged economic groups, youth, women, and rural communities.

At the same time, the dialogue this week put women’s economic participation front and center as a solution to challenges, including those that are macroeconomic in nature, such as debt: More women in the labor force increases the tax base. In a conversation on mobilizing domestic resources to boost growth, Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Chrystia Freeland touted investing in early learning and childcare as her government’s “best bang for the buck” for increasing prime age women’s labor force participation to record highs of over 85 percent (and 8 percent higher than the US record high) and increasing productivity, tax revenues, and household consumption in return. It’s a theme echoed across campus this week, including in my conversation with Hana Brixi, global gender director at the World Bank. At the same time, discussions of increasing women’s economic activity through improved financial inclusion and digital access were widespread—including in my Brixi conversation and in a conversation on digital financial inclusion with Josh Lipsky, Jesse McWaters, and Raj Kumar. In these risks and opportunities, we see the impact of the choices that policymakers make—and, increasingly, the impact of the choices that private sector leaders make.

The final verdict: The IMF and World Bank are struggling to see how geopolitics and economics intertwine

The IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh actually delivered concrete outcomes—and more than many expected going into the week. But the dark clouds of war loomed over the Meetings, and all the quota deals and debt agreements in the world couldn’t hide the fact the biggest risk to the global economy was staring the ministers right in the face—and they weren’t sure what to do or say about it. 

The IMFC couldn’t agree to a joint communique, likely because of debates over how to characterize the ongoing war in Ukraine. And the Group of Twenty finance ministers’ statement surprisingly avoided mentioning anything about the Israel-Hamas war directly. 

But the IMF’s steering committee did broker an agreement on quotas—the money all members pay to the IMF, and in return, they receive a share of voting power at the Fund. The United States got what it wanted: an “equi-proportional” increase, which means more money from everyone but no change in how the votes are allocated. China, India, and Brazil stay with their current percentages. When I interviewed Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman yesterday, she told me this was going to happen: “This solution that came from the US has been accepted.” But she also said next time around, things will have to be different. 

For the agreement on this solution, credit is due to the range of emerging countries that put the stability of the IMF ahead of the understandable desire to have the size of their economies more accurately reflected in voting share. And credit is also due to the United States for brokering an agreement that many thought wasn’t possible. 

That success would have been enough for everyone to hang their hats on. But the Zambia debt memorandum of understanding was the “will they, won’t they” question of the meetings. Early in the week, when I spoke to Zambian Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane, he confirmed it was happening. Then IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva announced it was a done deal. And then, it wasn’t. After a few days of carefully crafted press releases and hedging, the deal was officially done. The question is whether doing debt restructuring with China is going to be like developing a new pharmaceutical drug—it takes years to do the first one but then easily replicated—or if each process is going to be as torturous as Zambia’s was. 

Looking at the Marrakesh meetings by themselves, they were a success. The problem for the finance ministers and central bank governors is that the world around them is on fire. Brune Le Maire, France’s finance minister, probably said it best when he said geopolitics is the biggest risk to global growth. 

For peace and stability, the world needs geoeconomics, Spain’s Nadia Calviño said earlier today. But the best the IMF and World Bank could offer was that it was too early to tell when it comes to the economic fallout from the war in Israel. It’s an understandable but insufficient position from the world’s leading financial institutions. How many crises can the world handle at once? It seems we are at the tipping point. That was the sense of urgency that was missing in some of the language and events during the Meetings. 

So the final verdict? There was strong progress on the economics, but a missed moment on geopolitics. Geoeconomics is ultimately the lesson—hard-learned during World War II when the IMF and World Bank were created—that the two can actually never truly be separated.

As IMF-World Bank Week wraps, we wonder: Is that all there is to say?

Amid the (welcome) fundraising and quota-raising progress reports, today’s IMFC Chair Statement missed an opportunity to reassure a concerned public by providing a strong response to the extraordinary uncertainty around the global economic outlook.

The IMF’s flagship reports released this week were already in need of an update, given that their timing did not allow for a full analysis of the rise in long-term interest rates, appreciation of the US dollar, and increase in oil prices following the attack on Israel. With the Global Financial Stability Report warning particularly about the risks in the global banking system, it would have been important to emphasize a willingness to closely collaborate on economic policies to avoid further increases in volatility.

This is not to downplay the agreement to increase IMF quotas, an important step to strengthen the global safety net, but especially with a rudderless US Congress and a sharp slowing of the Chinese economy, a better understanding of how global policymakers intend to preserve global stability would have been welcome.

The lack of a policy message from the IMF-World Bank meetings further adds to the policy vacuum left after the Group of Twenty (G20) communique similarly avoided specific policy commitments. Both documents echoed the language agreed upon at the Delhi summit, leaving the impression that ministers and central bank governors were too distracted by the need to negotiate geopolitical language and secure agreement on fundraising and quota issues to focus on their most important task at hand.

Moreover, the failure to change the relative voting shares at the IMF has been criticized by the Group of Twenty-four (G24) (comprised of developing countries) as setting a bad precedent in perpetuating an unequal governance structure, which in their view continues to undermine the IMF’s legitimacy and effectiveness. This will remain a bone of contention between developing and developed member countries going forward, even if tempered by the permanent inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the creation of a twenty-fifth seat at the IMF Executive Board, to be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa.

• A G20 communique is turning heads in Morocco

• Equi-proportional IMF quota increase has been accepted—for now, says Indian finance minister

• Your guide to IMF Special Drawing Rights

• The EU’s plans to bolster its resilience against climate change, trade dependency, and an array of other crises

• Regional multilateral banks are having their moment in Marrakesh

• Decoding the Marrakesh G20 communique: Progress, but no inspiration

• How are IMF stakeholder countries working to mitigate climate change? The case of Morocco and renewable energy

• Inside Turkey’s plans to bounce back from economic shocks and policy challenges

• Staring into the gap between Africa as a global leader and a development challenge

• Georgieva’s emphasis on the positive is a reminder of the power of global collaboration

• See day four analysis

A G20 communique is turning heads in Morocco

This morning, the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings Plenary took place, with thousands of participants filling up the biggest hall on campus to watch remarks from Ukraine’s finance minister, the World Bank president, and the IMF managing director.

But don’t count me among those thousands: I was also hurriedly scrolling through the Group of Twenty (G20) communique that had just been released following yesterday’s meeting of G20 ministers and governors. While the group isn’t organizationally related to the IMF and World Bank, its member countries account for 85 percent of global gross domestic product and most of the votes at the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, their decisions will translate into the IMF and World Bank’s new actions and policies.

So, where is the “new”? The communique released today basically repeats the one from the New Delhi Summit in September. It encourages the World Bank and all the multilateral development banks to implement the recommendations in the G20’s capital advocacy framework (over a year old now) to optimize their balance sheets and free up more lending power. However, the communique fails to mourn the tragic loss of life in Israel and Gaza—or even acknowledge the unfolding Israel-Hamas war at all.

In addition, the communique doesn’t say anything about the proposed equi-proportional IMF quota increase—indicating that the increase is less likely to come to fruition than we, on the ground, originally thought. However today, we spoke with Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman who told us that the equi-proportional quota increase has, in fact, been approved. However, we may not know for certain until the International Monetary and Financial Committee meeting tomorrow—or even until the end of the IMF’s sixteenth quota review (to determine whether it is necessary to increase the quota and revise the distribution formula), scheduled to wrap in December this year.

Equi-proportional IMF quota increase has been accepted—for now, says Indian finance minister

The equi-proportional IMF quota increase proposed by the United States “has been accepted,” Indian Minister of Finance Nirmala Sitharaman said at Atlantic Council studios in Marrakesh. 

She said that it is a “temporary” solution, in that it is “a solution for now,” but during the next IMF four-year review cycle, “some discussions will happen” to map out how IMF stakeholder countries address the issue moving forward.

“The equi-proportional quota seems to be the less contentious way… for now” to address the IMF’s capital needs, Sitharaman argued, “because it doesn’t alter the… proportions and therefore it’s at least some more money without upsetting the balance.” However, the concerns of the countries “who are otherwise not adequately represented” still remain, she noted. 

Sitharaman spoke with GeoEconomics Center Senior Director Josh Lipsky on the ground at IMF-World Bank Week. The IMF World Economic Outlook forecast India’s 2023-2024 growth at 6.3 percent. Sitharaman chalked up that strong growth projection to the country’s agricultural industry, services sector, and manufacturing—among other aspects. But, she said, global challenges present risks to India’s growth. 

The finance minister reflected on India’s presidency of the G20, noting that New Delhi originally set out to highlight voices of the Global South throughout the year. The African Union’s joining the group “gives us immense satisfaction, Sitharaman said.  

Focusing on the Global South is important because, while they are a varied bunch of countries, “the problems which they face are fundamentally the same,” the finance minister said.  

Your guide to IMF Special Drawing Rights

The EU’s plans to bolster its resilience against climate change, trade dependency, and an array of other crises

European Commission Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis is keeping a closer eye on the EU’s relationship with China since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

“We need to engage with China in areas like climate change” (with China being the biggest emitter of carbon dioxide) and “on current geopolitical challenges” including the war in Ukraine. But “at the same time,” he cautioned at an Atlantic Council event at IMF-World Bank Week, the EU should be careful not to establish “strategic dependencies” on China as it had on Russia for its fossil fuel supplies. “We need diversified and resilient supply chains, and we cannot be dependent on a single supplier [for] a number of critical inputs.”  

The EU recently initiated an anti-subsidy investigation into imports of electric vehicles from China, which will determine whether electric vehicle supply chains in China benefit from subsidies in a way that breaches World Trade Organization rules—and whether those subsidies inflict injury on the European electric vehicle industry. “WTO members have a right to use these tools,” Dombrovskis said. “We are going to conduct this investigation in a facts-based manner, fully in line with applicable EU and WTO rules and principles.” 

He added that as the investigation proceeds, it’ll be “important that also Chinese companies… are cooperating.” 

On trade, the EU and its biggest trade partner, the United States, are approaching a deadline for negotiating an agreement on steel and aluminum trade that (if the EU gets its way) would address global steel overcapacity, encourage a “greening” of the industry, and put an end to tariffs imposed during the Trump administration. “We are making progress,” he said, adding that he is “optimistic” any remaining gaps will be filled soon. 

In responding to this decade’s polycrisis, the EU is employing the Recovery and Resilience Facility to ensure that the bloc emerges stronger. The fund has thus far disbursed 153 million euros to eighteen member countries.  

While it was originally aimed at mitigating the economic impacts of the pandemic—through investments such as digitizing public services and boosting sustainable transport—“Russia’s aggression has brought some corrections,” Dombrovskis said. One such correction is the creation of REPowerEU Plan to roll back Europe’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels—and roll out more renewable energy sources. 

Dombrovskis also discussed EU macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, saying that the bloc is “committed to [supporting] Ukraine for as long as it’s necessary.” He explained that once this assistance program wraps (there are still about 4.5 billion euros left to be paid this year) the EU will unleash a fifty-billion-euro package of assistance to Ukraine, to last from 2024 to 2027, through the EU Multiannual Financial Framework. The “EU is definitely doing its part,” he said. “It’s important that also other major players, including [the] United States, are playing their part.” 

Regional multilateral banks are having their moment in Marrakesh

In October 2020, at the peak of the pandemic, I wrote about why and how regional development banks play a critical role in COVID-19 response and recovery, arguing that the banks and the nature of their lending and operational practices have been, and remain, especially important for the agility, complementarity, and continuity of pandemic response.

It’s clear from conversations this week—on stage, in studio, and off the record—that this is perhaps even truer today than it was then as we grapple with how to respond to polycrises: COVID-19, conflict, and climate, and the inflation, debt, food insecurity, and rising inequality and poverty that result.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with its long history in Ukraine, is at the forefront of responding to Russia’s 2022 invasion—leading from the onset in investment, advisory, and technical assistance, as well as research, planning, and coordination. Among its response measures, it has been leveraging its distinct expertise and experience working with and through the private sector. While the Asian Development Bank, with large numbers of small island developing states as well as fragile and geopolitically tense areas, is leading on climate and resilience finance and innovation, stretching its balance sheet by adjusting its disposition toward risk and expanding lending by nearly 40 percent to about $36 billion annually. To that end, the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank are collaborating to catalyze green finance across Latin America and the Caribbean. Given the dynamics of debt and demographics on the African continent—which have been a prominent theme this week no matter the subject—the African Development Bank is uniquely positioned to lend in a way that can support policy reform and advance inclusive growth and reduce inequality with its investments. At the same time, given the scale of what’s required, more than ever it’s about coordination and leverage between regional development banks and with the World Bank and IMF.

Given this, the importance and value of regional development banks is arguably missing from the (somewhat overlooked) “Marrakech Principles for Global Cooperation” released this week, which call for enhanced collaboration between the IMF and the World Bank “and with partners.” It is a miss to skip explicitly referencing these key international financial institutions which are clearly ready to meet the moment.

Decoding the Marrakesh G20 communique: Progress, but no inspiration

The last Group of Twenty (G20) communique under India’s leadership did not break any new ground. Notwithstanding the recognition that “the G20 is not the platform to resolve geopolitical and security issues,” most of the energy spent during the negotiations seemed to have been focused on the categorization of recent geopolitical tensions.

On that front, a general expression of deep concern for “the immense human suffering and the adverse impact of wars and conflicts around the world” seemed to be an attempt to compensate for the fact that one or several participants remained opposed to condemning the Hamas attack on Israel. The communique also rehashed previously used language on the war in Ukraine and expressed concerns about attacks on food and energy infrastructure given the potentially global consequences.

On the global economy, one paragraph of the communique repeated the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and referred to the macroeconomic policy section of September’s G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration. The onus is now on the IMFC’s communique, which is due tomorrow, to react to a weakening medium-term economic outlook, as well as the rise in long-term interest rates and the strong dollar. The G20 also did not use the opportunity to push for an IMF quota increase, which could indicate that important issues have yet to be resolved behind closed doors.

The remainder of the document was similarly underwhelming. One full page on the topic of strengthening multilateral development banks mostly dealt with process issues, with words like “remain,” “reiterate,” or “reemphasize” abounding. The IMF and World Bank were asked to provide a report on domestic revenue mobilization (i.e., tax measures), most likely a concession to those G20 members that emphasize the need for responsible economic management from developing countries themselves.

Reflecting the political attention paid to individual debt restructuring cases, the communique provided a cautious welcome of progress in the cases of Zambia and Ghana, and called for a swift debt treatment for Ethiopia as well as Sri Lanka (the latter being outside the G20 Common Framework).

There is no doubt that the G20 process will be reenergized by the start of Brazil’s G20 presidency on December 1, but it is hard to escape the impression that the G20 has been diminished by the political divergences within its membership. While it still appears possible to reach consensus in some important areas, the G20 is clearly no longer the dynamic forum it was several years ago.

How are IMF stakeholder countries working to mitigate climate change? The case of Morocco and renewable energy

Inside Turkey’s plans to bounce back from economic shocks and policy challenges

After a string of “policy distortions” and economic shocks, “Turkey is back,” Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek said.

Şimşek’s gave his remarks at Atlantic Council studios in Marrakesh, on-site at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings. There, he outlined the three new Turkish economic programs to help the country bounce back, which included measures on disinflation, fiscal discipline, and structural reforms.

The finance minister explained that he wants to see inflation down to single digits over the next three years—inflation was still at 61 percent year-on-year this September. “It’s a challenging global backdrop, but we believe it is doable.”

As for the structural reforms: Şimşek pointed to several policies meant to improve the business climate, boost savings, deepen capital markets, and enhance labor market flexibility and human capital stock. He also said that Turkey is focusing on the green transition and investing in digital infrastructure.

Throughout these reforms, Şimşek said that it’ll be important to communicate with citizens so that they understand that “there are no quick fixes [and] that there are no shortcuts,” and that the reforms are designed for the medium term. “There will be trade offs,” he cautioned, adding that “for the sake of the country, sometimes you have to take harsh measures.”

At the Annual Meetings, Şimşek said that his delegation is meeting with various counterparts to boost Turkey’s economic relations. In meetings with European counterparts, he said that the discussions tend to focus on how to retighten EU-Turkey ties. “We would like to be re-anchored to [the] EU,” he said. “Europe is a source of inspiration for us… but we want Europeans also to treat Turkey with respect and as an equal partner.”

According to Şimşek, one way for the EU to show Turkey that it is an equal partner is by upgrading the EU-Turkey Customs Union, which was put into place in 1996. “The world was very different at that time,” he said, adding that “today’s enhanced free trade agreements are ahead of [the] Customs Union.” Şimşek explained that he’d like to see the customs union “expanded” to include services, agriculture, and more. “We’re not asking for any favor from our European friends; we’re asking [for]… mutually beneficial dialogue.”

Şimşek argued that the EU and Turkey should cooperate in another way: on reconstruction in Ukraine. “Peace and stability in our region is the most important global public good,” he said, so “we would like to play a constructive role, a significant role in helping rebuild the country.” He explained that combining European long-term funding with Turkish contractors could “create a great synergy.”

Regarding global governance, Şimşek said that he has been encouraged this week by discussions at the Group of Twenty about reforming multilateral development banks and equipping them with more resources to assist the Global South. And as for the IMF quota, Şimşek said that emerging markets are increasingly playing a bigger role on the world stage and their economies are increasing in size. “I think it’s important that there is better representation, better voice for everyone… We should not ignore the Global South.”

Staring into the gap between Africa as a global leader and a development challenge

Governance remains the trend line in my meetings here in Morocco. It has made an appearance in everything from my senior-level conversations with the Cameroonian delegation to discussions about the World Bank’s new president and his mandate, to more technical discussions about central bank digital currencies and new payments systems.

Thinking through these issues, I’m struck that on one hand, Africa is on the leading edge of emerging fintech like virtual currencies including CBDCs and stablecoins, while on the other, the continent is still struggling with basic representation in global institutions like the World Bank. If you’re a pessimist, you could say that many countries are still only on the lonely and winding path to the long and bumpy road of development.

But it is important to see the hope for change as I did yesterday. I sat for a conversation between one of Africa’s biggest philanthropists, Mo Ibrahim, and World Bank President Ajay Banga. Ibrahim seemed to take pleasure in pointing out the contradictions in the governance and actions of the World Bank in Africa, often comparing the Bank’s solutions for low-income countries’ problems to the better, faster, and more robust solutions deployed for Western and European countries. The crowd seemed to laugh anxiously—but it is this upfront calling to attention of the World Bank’s shortcomings that will push the Bank to change tack.

Looking forward, African countries must build a strong coalition of reform minded countries to maximize their power and voice. This coalition could more effectively push for badly needed updates to governance structures of the global economic and financial architecture—even as many Group of Seven countries seem to prefer the status quo. Africa needs these changes urgently to meet its current and future challenges.

Georgieva’s emphasis on the positive is a reminder of the power of global collaboration

There is reason for gloom at the Annual Meetings, with war still raging in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war newly under way, and the effects of natural disasters still reeling in countries like Morocco and Turkey. Against that backdrop, the economists meeting here are focusing on finding solutions to crises involving interest rates, equity, and slow economic growth—providing reason to have some optimism for the future.

Yesterday, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva focused on the positive of the World Economic Outlook—even though the forecast, to the dismay of many participants, forecasted slow recovery from the crises of the last few years. The positive: There is still time to bolster global resilience and tackle collective action problems like climate change. However, to do that, the world has to work together, build bridges, and invest in multilateral institutions and frameworks. And while time is running out to keep the global average temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius, Georgieva stressed that doing so may be feasible if the world adopts some form of carbon pricing—which is something the IMF is working on with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Georgieva’s second point of positivity: Low-income countries, especially those in Africa, have great potential to foster a more prosperous, inclusive future. With her characteristic “we all have a role to play” remarks, Georgieva made clear that the IMF sees itself as a steward for attracting more sustainable investment to low-income countries to create that future. The type of lending and investment the Bretton Woods institutions have in mind, however, will require more capital and increased quota investments in the institutions. This would align with new World Bank President Ajay Banga’s calls for a bigger and better bank, but also requires resolutions of debates and disagreements over quota shares held by high-, middle-, and low-income economies.  

And while Georgieva was more serious on the topic of high bond yields and above-average yield spread across countries, she pointed out that this market response is due to rising interest rates, which are a sign that central banks are waking up to the necessity to respond to inflationary pressures.

In these positive points lie the solutions that will empower countries as they look to recover more quickly from the last few years’ economic shocks.

• There’s still time to show that global collaboration is possible

• Ukraine’s finance minister on Russia’s blocked assets and why he’s reaching out to the Middle East

• How the MENA region is facing up to today’s biggest economic crises

• The numbers aren’t adding up on financing investment for climate change mitigation projects

• Where will the coalition of African countries take its message for reform next?

• See day three analysis

There’s still time to show that global collaboration is possible

From hallway conversations to heated debates in closed-door meetings, the inescapable topic this week in Marrakesh has been global governance.

The power structure of Bretton Woods institutions—despite the fact that they function reasonably well, even in the midst of growing geopolitical tension—is under increasing scrutiny.

The United States has been pushing for an increase in the capital that countries contribute to the IMF (their quotas) without proposing an increase in votes for China and other emerging markets who feel undervalued with their growing economies and stagnant vote shares. As I wrote in a new issue brief this week, the governance arrangements of the Bretton Woods institutions are fundamentally out of touch with economic reality.

Despite that, there are signs on the ground that the quota increase may be approved, which would provide an important boost for the world’s official lender of last resort—and show that global collaboration is still possible.

Across the IMF-World Bank Meeting campus, I’m also seeing global collaboration in another form: Widespread support for Ukraine among many of the IMF’s major shareholders. The IMF’s Ukraine program is largely successful because it is focused and because the Fund’s shareholders are stepping up to ensure that the program reaches its intended objectives—putting Ukraine’s war economy on a more solid footing and making further progress on improving economic governance. Today, we also sat down with Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko to map out the next steps for coordinated international support for Kyiv, including its war-risk insurance needs.

Ukraine’s finance minister on Russia’s blocked assets and why he’s reaching out to the Middle East

“A gear is shifting” among Group of Seven (G7) countries, said Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko in conversation with the Atlantic Council’s Charles Lichfield. 

On the ground in Marrakesh, Marchenko is noticing that G7 countries are ready to discuss seizing Russian assets and repurposing them to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. But if the G7 can’t come together on the Russian assets, he said he hopes that they can quickly agree on deploying the interest earned on these blocked assets for reconstruction efforts. 

Marchenko gave his remarks at an Atlantic Council event at IMF-World Bank Week. Marchenko told Lichfield, the deputy director of the GeoEconomics Center, that Ukraine’s economic situation has improved—with lower inflation rates—”due to the resilience of [the] Ukrainian people as well as support from our partners.” 

The IMF’s World Economic Outlook—released earlier this week—forecasts Ukrainian gross domestic product growth at 4 to 5 percent through 2024. Marchenko noted that the section on Ukraine was drafted at the beginning of the year, but now, Kyiv is fighting “a totally different war.” That means “it’s a modern war: We’re using drones, using a high level of munition.” Marchenko said the IMF was pessimistic about the Ukrainian forecast to account for uncertainty about the course of the war. “That’s why they predicted that Ukraine’s economy will be in… slow growth for [a] longer period of time,” he explained.

This week, Marchenko said the Ukrainian delegation has been having bilateral discussions not only with European countries to try to preserve their support but also with other countries, such as those in the Middle East, to “try to convince them to be more supportive of Ukraine.” In those discussions, he said that Ukraine also tried to “show [a] good example” of how to govern a country during war and invasion.  

But “it’s quite necessary to preserve… support for [the] next year,” he warned, because the next year will be “much [more] stressful,” with much more “uncertainty.” So while Ukraine’s economy is more stable, he said, international partners can’t “forget about Ukraine” now. 

How the MENA region is facing up to today’s biggest economic crises

As the crowds of IMF-World Bank Week participants get larger in Marrakesh, the Atlantic Council empowerME Initiative’s Racha Helwa got together with Moroccan Economy and Finance Minister Nadia Fettah Alaoui and Citi Head of Middle East and Africa Ebru Pakcan to talk about how the MENA region is facing up to today’s biggest economic crises.

Morocco is focusing on building a strong macroeconomic foundation and on its resilience, the finance minister said, explaining that the Moroccan government launched a reform program recently to diversify the economy and create a strong social state. But it won’t be a “peaceful” journey to implement these reforms, she argued, because at the same time, “we have also to deal with multiple crises that we have been going through.”

Pakcan said that private-public relationships may help MENA countries manage the risks they face. With these partnerships, there are “a lot more creative solutions that can be… devised,” she argued. Those solutions, she added, are needed to help MENA countries “actually ride the storm” of today’s crises so that it can “focus on what really matters in the future,” like climate change and digitalization.

The numbers aren’t adding up on financing investment for climate change mitigation projects

Here in Marrakesh, many speakers have emphasized the urgent need to mobilize substantial amounts of money to finance climate change mitigation and green transition projects. Reportedly, to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 and to prevent world average temperatures from rising by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius this century, global investment in such climate-related projects will need to total $2.7 trillion a year. Developing and low-income countries in particular would need to receive significant financial assistance from the international community to be able to cope with the challenges.

At the same time, both the IMF and World Bank have pointed out that in many countries, fiscal deficits are high, with government debt rising to record levels—faster than the pre-pandemic pace. Both of these institutions have emphasized that fiscal restraints are much needed to safeguard sustainability and rebuild fiscal buffers to be able to deal with future shocks. The IMF’s “Fiscal Monitor” has also recognized that citizens in many countries are averse to increased taxes by their governments.

Consequently, it should be clear that governments, including those of developed countries, will not be in a position to raise huge sums of money for climate-related investments, especially in support of developing and low-income countries.

That has led the World Bank and IMF to push for using public money to catalyze private sector climate investments in developing and low-income countries by offering various risk-sharing schemes to improve the risk-return profiles of those investment projects. However, officials looking to use public money to catalyze significant private sector investment—often at a rate of five times or more—are likely to see their hopes dashed: According to GlobalMarkets magazine, $1 of public sector lending can generate only $0.7 of private investment.

In short, while climate investment needs are huge, the numbers in terms of plausible financing sources from the public and private sectors simply don’t add up. Anyone concerned about climate change would have to be more realistic about to how to get the needed funding.

Where will the coalition of African countries take its message for reform next?

Kristalina Georgieva said it best: “A prosperous twenty-first century is only possible with a prosperous Africa.”

Here in Marrakesh, the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings are clearly underscoring African priorities, the urgency of climate action, and the need for increasing global coordination for policy solutions. Africa is front and center—fitting considering these are the first Annual Meetings to take place on the African continent since the Nairobi Meetings in 1973.

On the ground—just as they did in 1973—policymakers, central bankers, and international economists are looking for ways to alleviate global poverty, boost economic activity, and reinforce programs that can support sustainable development solutions. As decision makers hopping from pavilion to pavilion debate how to address growing public debt, elevated interest rates, and rising geopolitical tensions between the world’s largest economies, it is important to look at the changing trends across the African continent.

It is becoming clearer how African countries are a part of the solution to global issues, whether it is on matters of war and peace, economic development, or global governance. In regard to governance, African countries are asserting their agency in multilateral fora. A great example of this effort is the posture African countries present on Bretton Woods reform, consistently driving their message at global convenings such as recent Group of Twenty meetings in India, the UN General Assembly in New York, and here at the IMF-World Bank Meetings in Marrakesh. Against this backdrop, African countries are facing new and emerging challenges from the shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic; the spike in food, fuel, and fertilizer products due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; and natural disasters aggravated by a changing global climate, among others. 

Despite the growing impetus for pan-African positions on things like World Bank reform, more needs to be done. Changing the political calculus of traditional powers such as the United States, France, Germany, and other Group of Seven countries (and beyond) will be important to bring reform efforts into reality. African leaders should continue to look for ways to highlight the urgent need for reforming these institutions, specifically with audiences that may be unfamiliar with the need for reforms, while continuing to drive a coalition for change. The challenges facing African countries are no longer theoretical or in the future, and the Bretton Woods institutions and multilateral development banks must take steps to meet the changing, complex, and interconnected development needs of African countries without delay.

• Signs of inspiration in dark times

• What’s next for monetary policy and Europe’s fiscal rules, according to Spain’s Nadia Calviño

• The finance world braces for impact from the Israel-Hamas war

• Africa’s demographics matter—but they’re not the only ones that do

• With the Bank abuzz, Banga begins…

• A tale of two sovereign debt restructuring processes: Why Zambia and Sri Lanka differ

• See day two analysis

Signs of inspiration in dark times

As day three wraps at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings, the buzz is building as all quarters of campus kick into high gear—and seats are becoming harder to find in the “town square” where I’m enjoying local musicians giving melody and voice to the storied history, warmth, and resilience of the Moroccan people, who are hosting this event just weeks after a devastating earthquake.

Though the hot sun continues to shine, the mood has been darkened for some following the release of the IMF’s flagship World Economic Outlook, which forecast a more subdued recovery, and following reality checks about the extent of global debt distress. For those in the World Bank conversations, me included, talk of resilience and growth felt more uplifting.

Still there’s a sense of urgency on the ground, as participants quickly realize there is too much work to be done and plenty of opportunity at hand.

On that note, there was extra pep in my step today as it’s October 11, which means it’s International Day of the Girl—a chance to recognize the rights, celebrate the achievements, and amplify the opportunity of the world’s one billion girls and young women. And where better to mark the occasion than in Africa—the youngest continent where, if empowered and enabled, girls can help communities and countries realize a double demographic dividend through increased youth economic participation and closing gender gaps. I was reminded of this in a conversation I had with the World Bank’s Global Director for Gender and in my behind-the-scenes conversations with the inspirational generational leaders comprising the IMF youth fellows.

So heading into the remaining days of deliberation and debate, I’m hoping for meaningful movements and commitments to accelerate development, address debt, and accentuate inclusive growth on a livable planet.

What’s next for monetary policy and Europe’s fiscal rules, according to Spain’s Nadia Calviño

Just a day after the IMF released its World Economic Outlook—which forecast that Spain, among other countries, would have strong growth in 2023 and 2024—Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calviño joined GeoEconomics Senior Director Josh Lipsky for a conversation on the ground at IMF-World Bank Week.

Calviño chalked up Spain’s good forecast in part to its “diversified energy mix.” “A high penetration of renewables and a very diversified energy mix… has enabled Spain to withstand better than others the blow coming from Russia’s war against Ukraine.”

Seeing Spain’s growth, Calviño said it would be “quite wise” for the European Central Bank to pause interest rate hikes. “You have countries such as Spain with strong growth [and] low inflation. Other countries are very close to a recession and have higher inflation,” she explained. “So we better get it right because we need to ensure that we manage… inflationary expectations.”

Currently, the EU is undergoing a review of its fiscal rules on government spending and taxes to avoid a debt crisis. She signaled the need for commitment to a new framework—one that enables growth, job creation, and the green transition—by the end of this year.

Calviño looked back to the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings, saying that while “the global economy has shown to be more resilient than many expected,” that “the world has become even more complicated” with conflict on the rise. “That makes it even more important that we gather here” at the Annual Meetings, to “find solutions.”

But Calviño’s stance on China hasn’t changed since the Spring Meetings, where she said that the EU cannot turn its back to China or ignore it. “The EU is a global trade powerhouse, and we need to keep our relations with all the main trading partners,” she said. “At the same time, we need to ensure that the global framework and our trade policies ensure that there is a level playing field and [a] fair trading framework.”

The finance world braces for impact from the Israel-Hamas war

The shockwaves of the Israel-Hamas war have finally reached Marrakesh. It took several days—as it often does in the technocratic world of international economics—for financial leaders gathered here at the Meetings to grasp that the conflict could affect everyone.

Here on the ground, the full scale of the devastating human tragedy and military conflict unleashed by Hamas’s assault on Israel last Saturday is coming into focus—and with it a focus on the war’s economic ramifications. Several conversations are happening at once. 

First and foremost, there is growing horror as reports about the terrorist attacks and fallout in Israel and Gaza play on TV screens and phones inside and outside the official venue for the Meetings.

There is also discussion of the global economic fallout. Energy prices have understandably been a big focus, with memories of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and ensuing oil embargo front of mind for ministers. But as many of the economists milling about the pavilions have noted, the global energy market has shifted dramatically in the fifty years since that war. The world doesn’t solely rely on the Middle East for energy. And—for now—the conflict hasn’t spread through the region.

Then there’s the shekel and Israel’s economy. Israel’s central bank intervened to prop up the currency by selling thirty billion dollars in foreign reserves, but the shekel’s slump continues. There is wider concern that foreign investment in Israel will dry up and create a recession in the Israeli economy.

With regard to Gaza, the question is about reconstruction—whenever that time comes. Will the World Bank and other development banks play a role and step in with aid? A European commissioner initially signaled that the Commission would stop sending some aid to Palestinians, but that decision was quickly reversed by the European Union. There are open questions in Marrakesh right now about 1) what kind of aid will flow to Gaza in the near term and 2) what kind of money will be requested in the long term. Because these are questions for the development banks, the IMF has, so far, been able to sidestep the questions.

But don’t expect avoidance of these issues to continue. By the end of the week, the ministers and governors in Marrakesh will realize what many around the world already see clearly: What is unfolding in Israel and Gaza will have global political and economic impacts.

Africa’s demographics matter—but they’re not the only ones that do

The Moroccan government has been keen to shine a light on its identity as a North African, growing economy. The resilience of Morocco and the Moroccan people, who are hosting a great Annual Meetings week despite a devastating earthquake and previous cancelations due to COVID-19, has also been spotlighted. Africa—a diverse, growing, and bustling continent that is often overlooked at conferences of international organizations—is finally getting the attention and press it deserves.   

Demographic challenges and the threat aging societies pose to the world economy are being brought up at these Annual Meetings almost as frequently as the climate crisis. Demography is the critical area where Africa has the advantage over other regions. While European countries rapidly age, fertility is slowing down in the United States, and even China is entering an era of demographic aging. Africa’s high birthrate and young labor market have the potential to massively boost the continent’s emerging market economies. This will, however, require inclusive political stability, equity investment, and the prioritization of educational and labor market skills funding. For the time being, many African ministers and officials are reveling in the chance to directly pitch for more investment in their region, and IMF and World Bank officials appear interested in highlighting newer funds (like the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust) that have benefited sustainable investments in the region.  

With the Bank abuzz, Banga begins…

On day 2 of the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, the Bank’s activity got underway in earnest with a number of flagship and civil society events. The mood was arguably more upbeat than “across campus” as the IMF released its latest World Economic Outlook portraying a dim macro picture with slowing growth and widening divergence worldwide. 

On-the-ground conversations—which touched upon everything from resilience to jobs-driven growth to digital inclusion—recognized the compound crises facing the world (although disproportionately impacting the Global South) while recognizing, if not celebrating, the opportunity. Across the conversations between officials and civil society, inclusion, especially of women and youth, was a repeated priority. There were other big themes, too, across these conversations: interconnectedness; jobs and livelihoods, and how they are critical for resilience, climate adaptation, and climate change mitigation; and improved and diffuse digital foundations, which can fuel economic dynamism and increase transparency while also strengthening systems and the provision of public services necessary for responding to shocks.

Capping the day, Ajay Banga—who took the helm as president of the Bank in June—made his formal Meetings debut with a much-anticipated town hall with civil society, where he locked in his newest mission for the Bank: “Ending poverty on a livable planet.” It’s a reflection of the fact that the number of poor people has increased after decades of decline as significant pre-pandemic gains have been lost; it also reflects how responding to climate change goes hand-in-hand with efforts to advance development and end all forms of poverty. Alongside the evolution roadmap, Banga (or Ajay, as he prefers) believes it can be done by “doing what’s right, not convenient” to “first build a better Bank, then build a bigger Bank”: a better Bank that stretches every dollar and leaves no one behind; a bigger bank that “allows what works to scale.” Over the next few days, the Bank and its partners will need to get specific on how this “knowledge and money” Bank will come to fruition.

A tale of two sovereign debt restructuring processes: Why Zambia and Sri Lanka differ

Different developments in the Zambian and Sri Lankan sovereign debt restructuring processes have commanded the attention of participants in the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, highlighting the difficulties still remaining in the international effort to improve the restructuring framework.

Zambia, having defaulted on its external debt of over $32 billion in 2020, reached agreement with its official bilateral creditor committee (including China) in June 2023 on terms to restructure the debt, giving the country a 40 percent reduction in the present value of its bilateral debt of $6.3 billion. However, the country has had to wait until now for the bilateral creditors to develop language on the comparability of treatment in the memorandum of understanding that satisfied China—so that it could be signed, reportedly by the end of the Meetings this week. This has raised the hope that China could participate in the official bilateral creditor committee; the committee could eventually agree on a deal despite delays.

By contrast, Sri Lanka defaulted on its fifty-billion-dollar external debt in April 2022; with the country not being viewed as low-income, it is not eligible for the Common Framework for Debt Treatment. As a result, Sri Lanka has had to negotiate separately with various creditor groups, including the Paris Club, Japan, and India (on $4.8 billion of debt), as well as China’s Export-Import Bank (on $4.3 billion of debt)—but not the China Development Bank (which it owes $3 billion of debt, but the bank is considered to be a commercial creditor). This process has increased the complexity of coordination problems for the restructuring negotiations—leading to delays in the first review of the Sri Lankan program with the IMF needed for additional disbursement to the country. Further complicating the comparability of treatment problem, China has announced that its Export-Import Bank has agreed to restructuring terms with Sri Lanka ahead of scheduled meetings between the Sri Lanka and Paris Club creditors this week in Marrakesh.

This unwieldy process should be improved, basically by extending the Common Framework to include vulnerable, middle-income countries so that official bilateral creditors have to form a committee to negotiate jointly with the debtor country.

• EBRD president: Supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction must happen now

• Why everyone—from participants to officials—should keep in mind Africa’s demographics

• On-the-ground signs that the IMF and client countries are diverging on monetary tightening priorities

• Why a cookie-cutter approach won’t work for debt restructuring

• Inside the IMF’s new approach to China

• A “big push” and a “first step” toward reaching Africa’s potential

• Keep an eye out for small victories

• Zambia may be days away from a debt restructuring plan. Here’s what it wants other countries to know about dealing with creditors.

• With its young and talented population, Africa has great economic potential; but “demographics are not destiny”

• The recent developments that may throw a wrench into global financial stability

• The global growth forecast hasn’t changed—but plenty more has in the World Economic Outlook

• Will the World Economic Outlook’s “soft landing” forecast flame out?

• What the “ups” and “downs” of the World Economic Outlook show about the world’s biggest economies

• See day one analysis

EBRD president: Supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction must happen now

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to meet with Western leaders in a search for support and military assistance, the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center’s Charles Lichfield sat down with Odile Renaud-Basso, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to talk about the bank’s support to Kyiv. 

“We are focusing a lot on the private sector… and infrastructure in particular,” she said, explaining that the EBRD is paying particular attention to gas and electricity companies to keep the economy running. 

When asked whether it is time to begin focusing on reconstruction assistance, Renaud-Basso said that there isn’t “a clear sort of separation” between supporting Ukraine in war and in reconstruction. “What is already needed now is to reconstruct what has been destroyed and we don’t know whether there will be further destruction—there probably will be.” 

Recently, EBRD shareholders granted the bank the ability to invest in six Sub-Saharan African countries, expanding its mandate after determining that its approach to investing in the private sector—specifically in small and medium-sized enterprises and green projects—“would add value” and would “bring something different [to] the table.”  

The EBRD currently works in over thirty countries. Renaud-Basso explained that when a country’s democratic values aren’t in line with the EBRD’s, the bank does as much as it can to “ensure progress in this area.” “Helping to develop the private sector independent from government… will help develop a middle class that will help contribute to democratization,” she argued. Currently, with the Israel-Hamas war, the EBRD—which invests in the West Bank—is reviewing its project. 

Why everyone—from participants to officials—should keep in mind Africa’s demographics

Demographics matter—and they matter a lot. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva also seems to agree; here at the Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, she has repeatedly emphasized that the only region in the world where long-term growth has the potential to accelerate is Africa because of its young population.

But how young is Africa’s population compared to elsewhere? The answer: very young. More than two-thirds of Africa’s population is under the age of thirty, and 40 percent are under the age of fourteen. Only 3 percent of African residents are sixty-five and above. Moreover, within thirty years, Africa’s population is expected to double from 1.4 billion to 2.8 billion. In other words, by the early 2050s more than a quarter of the world’s projected population of 10 billion will be on the continent.

Age breakdown of population

What does this mean for the African economy and the global economy? First, while the rest of the world will be aging at varying rates, Africa is going to be blessed with a young and vibrant labor force for many decades to come. If African countries can get the necessary capital, institutional reforms, and job creation policies, that young labor force can lead to robust growth rates for the continent. This will in turn increase the average African household’s income, leading to higher aggregate demands for consumer goods and services produced both in Africa and globally. The global aggregate demand could skyrocket if the income of a quarter of the world’s population increases by, say, 10, 20, 50, or 100 percent.

Second, over the next few decades, high-income and emerging economies will age rapidly and face severe labor shortages while Africa will have an ample supply. Hence, through effective labor migration policies, the world (especially high-income and emerging economies) can benefit significantly from Africa’s young labor force and keep itsdoors open for business for longer.

Population 65+ as a percentage of the total population

But without sound institutions and policies and investments targeted toward human capital development and job creation, Africa’s young and rapidly growing population—pushed to migrate in search of economic opportunity—could become a source of political and social instability both for the continent and elsewhere in the world. Thus, it is imperative tha­­t delegations discuss these issues at the Annual Meeting in Marrakesh.

On-the-ground signs that the IMF and client countries are diverging on monetary tightening priorities

The launch of an IMF working paper on inflation shocks over the past fifty years wound up showcasing conflicting priorities between the IMF and the academics, central bankers, and ministry officials in attendance—many of whom are from IMF client countries.

At the heart of the disagreement is not whether countries need to undertake monetary tightening to reduce inflation, but when it is appropriate to change course and lower interest rates in a way that public spending and investment become less costly. The IMF wants inflation to come back firmly to its target before easing is considered; the IMF official behind the working paper pointed to several “success” stories that actually resulted in hard, not soft, landings.

At the event, ministry and central bank officials pushed back that the current and persistent episode of inflation is not comparable to previous shocks, as the macroeconomic situation today is compounded by geopolitical, demographic, and climate risks. But for the IMF, economic orthodoxy pays off in the medium term. Given the wording and phrasing of attendees’ questions, macroeconomic officials from client countries and those facing other monetary pressures (such as pegging to the dollar) seem to be more concerned about delivering short-term economic prosperity and growth and hedging against external risks.

Why a cookie-cutter approach won’t work for debt restructuring

Over the past six months, progress has been made in taking the sovereign debt restructuring framework forward.

That was the consensus of panelists in a discussion, hosted by the GeoEconomics Center at IMF-World Bank Week in Marrakesh. The progress is important as more low-income countries face debt distress—with the sovereign bonds of twenty-one countries trading above a one thousand basis point spread over US Treasuries. These countries urgently need a speedy restructuring process to help them get back on their feet.

Progress, however, really means the ability of various stakeholders in sovereign debt—debtor countries, bilateral official creditors, multilateral development banks, private-sector creditors, and civil society organizations—to be in a room (the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, launched in April 2023) and discuss issues. A better understanding has been reached among the participants especially when it comes to difficult issues like the cut-off points for calculating the amount of debt to be restructured, the role of multilateral development banks in sovereign debt restructuring, the treatment of domestic debt in restructuring, the principle of comparability of treatment between various classes of creditors, and the discount rate to be used to calculate the extent of debt reliefs granted to debtor countries.

But concrete agreements of terms still depend on case-by-case country applications. For example, in the case of Zambia, there has been agreement about using a discount rate of 5 percent, but the agreement is not universal—many private creditors think that is too low and unrealistic.

On the comparability of treatment—an issue that has held up the signing of a debt restructuring memorandum of understanding for Zambia after the announcement of agreed terms in Paris in June—agreement on concrete language has been achieved that paves the way for a deal between Zambia and its official bilateral creditors to be signed soon, reportedly by the end of the annual meetings. However, these terms cannot simply be replicated in other countries’ cases.

Participants and observers of the annual meetings should keep this in mind as they follow developments on the sovereign debt restructuring front in the next few days.

Inside the IMF’s new approach to China

While the World Economic Outlook (WEO) made small downgrades in its forecast for China, the Fund’s view is even bleaker than the numbers suggest. Back in April, the WEO highlighted China’s rebound after its harsh zero-COVID shutdowns and confined its worries about the country’s property crisis to a single paragraph. This time, by IMF standards, both the WEO and Global Financial Stability Report take off the gloves and delve into the downsides, making clear that they see China as a potential risk to the global economy.

The WEO gives considerable attention to China in its opening chapter, highlighting the linked problems of the real estate downturn, soaring youth unemployment (each getting a chart), “subdued” consumer confidence, declining industrial output and business investment, and “weakening” exports. It even presciently singles out the debt issues at giant developer Country Garden, which today signaled a default on its international obligations. China is listed as a risk to the global economy, with the WEO’s “downside scenario” lowering China’s growth “as much as -1.6 percent in 2025.”

The GFSR builds a case for “financial stability concerns” in China. Its economic analysis closely tracks the WEO, but it adds on by addressing the financial vulnerabilities of some provincial governments (with a chart), the deep problems of local government financing vehicles exposed by the property crisis (three charts), and the recent worries about the country’s wealth management and trust industries. The report recommends to Beijing that “contingency planning should be developed to manage potential contagion” in the financial sector. Interestingly, both reports call for fiscal policy to be shifted toward supporting households—a step that the government has resisted—with the WEO suggesting such a policy would be preferable to “increasingly ineffective expensive investment in infrastructure.”

A “big push” and a “first step” toward reaching Africa’s potential

If you keep up with our Bretton Woods 2.0 Project, you know that I’m a numbers guy. Here are a couple of the numbers from my latest issue brief that I’m keeping in mind as I talk with finance ministers and central bank governors on the ground in Marrakesh:

• Severe poverty rates globally declined drastically over the past five decades, from 45 percent to 10 percent. Yet, one-third of the African population still lives in severe poverty.
• Keeping in mind that the fifty-four African economies are heterogeneous, 44 percent of the African population doesn’t have access to electricity. Put into perspective: 80 percent of the total 750 million people who don’t have access to electricity in the world are in Africa.
• And finally, the continent leads in lack of access to other forms of basic infrastructure; 73 percent lack access to safely managed drinking water and sanitation services.

Because of its young and growing population, its massive natural resources, and its strategic location, Africa has tremendous potential that (if unleashed) could move hundreds of millions out of poverty and propel growth in the global economy. For this to happen, Africa needs a big push and deeper engagement from the Bretton Woods institutions and the global investment community. However, African leaders need to take the first step by instituting good governance practices that would attract investors to the continent. The combination of the “big push” and this “first step” can be transformative.

Keep an eye out for small victories

Morocco has spared no effort to make feel delegates and guests welcome in Marrakesh. The conference venue has been constructed especially for this occasion, reminiscent of Bedouin tents, with ample outdoor features that remind delegates of the hot (and harsh) climate conditions that Moroccans and a large part of humanity face in their everyday lives.

In staying with the theme, as is usual for such meetings, there are lofty proclamations about how the world’s problems could be solved if everyone found a way to work together. Expectations abound that the ongoing revamp of the multilateral development banks’s business model and the proposed quota (or capital) increase for the IMF could provide urgently needed resources for climate change mitigation and poverty reduction in developing countries. Observing delegates from all corners of the world engaged in earnest conversations, one could be tempted to believe that larger solutions are in the realm of the possible.

Alas, like a Fata Morgana in the Sahara desert, appearances can be deceiving. Delegates were only given so much room to negotiate by leaders back home. And here the signs are not good, even beyond geopolitical tensions. Climate targets are not being met, and development assistance has been shrinking relative to what is needed. Increasing the capital base for multilateral lending (if agreed) will certainly help, but it is unlikely to be the game changer that many had hoped for.

Nevertheless, the Group of Twenty and Bretton Woods meetings still provide an important room for dialogue in troubled times. Behind the slogans and polished communiques, small victories are often won in private conversations, one country or issue at a time. The value of these meetings sometimes lies more in personal relationships that are established, a fact that was brought home during COVID-19 when professional networks ensured continuity in international dealings until in-person meetings became possible again.

With darker geopolitical and conjunctural clouds on the horizon, the sunny days of Marrakesh may soon fade from memory. But the hospitality of the Moroccan hosts will no doubt carry over to the next time the delegations meet to live up to almost impossible expectations yet again.

Zambia may be days away from a debt restructuring plan. Here’s what it wants other countries to know about dealing with creditors.

With Zambia’s debt restructuring process capturing attention here on the ground in Marrakesh, Atlantic Council Senior Directors Josh Lipsky and Rama Yade pulled aside Zambian Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane to get a sense of what is happening behind the closed doors of negotiations. 

Musokotwane told them that the problems it has encountered in debt restructuring negotiations “to a large extent, [have] been resolved” and that his team is “hoping that [it] will sign the memorandum of understanding soon.” Such a deal is expected this week at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings. 

“We’ve moved very far ahead” on it, he added. 

With many countries around the world facing debt distress—after a series of economic crises shocked the world over the past few years—the Zambian finance minister provided advice for other countries gearing up to face their creditors in negotiations. “The most important thing is to recognize and accept you have a problem,” he said. “This sounds easy, but it’s not always the case, especially for governments that created a problem.” He added that properly recognizing debt problems will help a country “reach towards a solution.”  

In addition, the finance minister advised that countries solidify their partnerships with Bretton Woods institutions because “they are the ones that are bridges between you and the creditors” and vouch for a country’s credibility and willingness to undertake reforms. But “it is not enough to have the IMF and World Bank speak for you,” he said. “You yourselves must demonstrate that you’re serious about correcting the situation. You must undertake the reforms.” 

With its young and talented population, Africa has great economic potential; but “demographics are not destiny”

For the first time in fifty years, the Annual Meetings of the World Bank-IMF are taking place in Africa. It’s good timing: The meetings come as the African Union begins its membership in the Group of Twenty, elevating its voice and influence in the global economic order. The fact that the Meetings are being held in Africa is also quite fitting: The continent and its citizens often disproportionately experience the effects of the world’s biggest challenges; but Africa is also home to remarkable opportunity.

In addition, the location of these Meetings is a testament to the resilience of the African continent’s people and the dynamism of its economies and cultures. That was a big theme echoed through the packed “tent” during an IMF opening session yesterday that was kicked off by Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva. At that same event, Moroccan Minister of Economy and Finance Nadia Fettah Alaoui emphasized the important contribution women are making to the dynamism of Morocco’s economy, pointing to a few of the government’s policies that aim to advance women’s economic empowerment and participation. Women trailblazers in African business and finance discussed how—through corporate leadership, investment innovation, and risk taking (along with effective policy)—countries on the continent can capitalize on the energy and talents of their young and entrepreneurial populations in order to foster inclusive growth.

However, as the panelists also noted, demographics are not destiny: Inclusive growth is going to take scale; it’s going to take financing and resources (and dealing with debt); it’s going to take technology, including artificial intelligence; it’s going to take investing in human capital; and it’s going to take effective governance and public trust.

Despite that tall order, there is optimism and inspiration on the ground in Marrakesh. Africa’s promise is clearly palpable.

The recent developments that may throw a wrench into global financial stability

It was telling that the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) presentation started not with the usual presentation by the IMF’s financial counselor but went directly into a Q&A session, starting with a discussion of the sharp rise in government bond yields in recent weeks. The IMF’s Tobias Adrian put a brave face on this development, which came too late to be assessed for the GFSR, characterizing it as being in line with monetary tightening and adding that it is not being accompanied by disorderly market conditions.

On second look, however, the risks appear more concerning. The GFSR’s second chapter carries the explicit warning that, in an adverse scenario, a wide set of banks could experience significant capital losses, including several systemically important institutions in China, Europe, and the United States. Adrian’s concluding message, that policymakers could certainly prevent bad outcomes, sounds less reassuring in this context, given that the bond market sell-off was in part driven by political developments in some large countries.

The global growth forecast hasn’t changed—but plenty more has in the World Economic Outlook

The latest World Economic Outlook released in Marrakesh today predicts unchanged global growth of 3 percent this year. Behind that unchanged forecast: The United States and China’s fluctuating growth essentially net out, with the United States receiving a 0.3 percentage-point upgrade and China receiving a 0.2 percentage-point downward revision.

But these forecasts are vulnerable to change courtesy of risks in both countries. The United States’ upward revision may not fully incorporate the impact of a longer period of 5 percent bond yields and 8 percent mortgage rates which have become more likely since late summer; while China’s 5 percent predicted growth is at the top of the current range of estimates of 2 to 5 percent. Both predictions may be optimistic.

What is clearer is the lower global growth trajectory over the next five years—down to 3.1 percent compared with the five-year rate of 3.6 percent estimated before the COVID-19 pandemic. The world economy is not expected to recover the pre-COVID growth trajectory—reflecting the enduring scarring caused by the past few years of global shocks.

Will the World Economic Outlook’s “soft landing” forecast flame out?

The IMF’s World Economic Outlook foresees a soft landing for the global economy, but it also paints a distressing picture for emerging and developing countries and a pessimistic medium-term outlook. The IMF is right to point out the imbalances in the global outlook, but it overlooks how domestic inequality in advanced economies could throw the global economy off kilter. Pent-up anger at the rise in living costs will make it more difficult to conduct fiscal policy, exemplified by political dysfunction in the US Congress and the growing support for radical parties in some countries.

The recent sell-off in bond markets is at least in part a reflection of political uncertainty. The World Economic Outlook has again had the misfortune of coming out too soon after major market developments, but the IMF would do well to address the implications of higher long-term interest rates for the macro outlook and financial stability during the coming days in Marrakesh.

What the “ups” and “downs” of the World Economic Outlook show about the world’s biggest economies

It finally happened. The IMF revised down China’s projected GDP growth for both 2023 and 2024. Many thought this would happen in July, and when it didn’t, all eyes were on today’s release of the World Economic Outlook. But is it revised down enough? Five percent for this year is still very optimistic. Our new report released last week, “Running out of Road: China Pathfinder 2023 Annual Scorecard,” shows just how much China is slowing post-COVID.

What’s interesting is that the US forecast was revised up (to 2.1 percent in 2023 and 1.5 percent in 2024). So this means that on the whole, global growth remains nearly unchanged from the previous forecasts, but the composition has shifted.

But remember: The World Economic Outlook was “put to bed” several weeks ago—so none of this takes into account the impact of the war in Israel. The IMF’s chief economist addressed the issue a few minutes ago saying there could be energy impacts, specifically when it comes to higher oil prices, but it’s just too early to say. The IMF seems to think the impact on energy prices is transitory, but the situation could escalate or expand and suddenly create another energy shock for the global economy. That’s an especially problematic situation for Europe, as it gears up to face the winter and tries to adapt to the lack of Russian energy.

On the bright side, India is forecasted to be the fastest-growing major economy—revised up to 6.3 percent in 2023. I’ll ask their finance minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, about this when I interview her in Marrakesh on Friday.

• Six themes to watch as the Meetings kick off

• Fragmentation is threatening developing economies in many ways. Climate is one of them.

• Two conflicting moods prevail as financial leaders gather

• The pressure is rising on the IMF and World Bank to increase climate financing and restructure debt

• Take calls for international cooperation on commodities markets seriously

• The private sector has a tall order to fill on climate investment

• The world needs realistic fiscal solutions now—before it’s too late

Six themes to watch as the Meetings kick off

As the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings get underway, our experts put their heads together on the biggest themes to expect from the week. Below are their takes: 

Martin said that the “accumulation of risks” and whether the world can achieve a soft landing after multiple economic shocks will dominate minds across the Meetings.  

On debt restructuring conversations, Martin was skeptical that much would happen beyond “the usual kind of global sparring between China and the rest,” seeing as China has blocked attempts to restructure sovereign debt in the past. Hung said that “the international community here really should put the spotlight on China and put pressure on them to cooperate.” 

Nicole listed climate adaptation and poverty reduction as key themes. Martin pointed specifically to financing for development and climate adaptation, reporting that there are “huge expectations” that there’s going to be agreement on financing multilateral development banks. Hung said to also keep an eye on new World Bank President Ajay Banga to see whether he can convince governments to increase their contributions to the Bank to facilitate climate- and development-related grants and loans to low-income countries. 

Nicole called the Meetings “Banga’s first big show,” explaining that attendees will be watching to see what messages he raises. “But also, the expectations are really high in terms of what he will do with the private sector to really leverage and mobilize private finance,” given his experience in the sector, she said. 

Martin pointed to arguments for restoring a division of labor between the IMF and World Bank, essentially letting the Bank focus on issues such as climate change and the IMF focus on macroeconomic issues. “I would expect this to make some waves,” Martin said. Nicole said that “the concern about mission creep… is real,” but there is still some “role for the IMF to play in development [and] in climate.” Hung agreed, saying that the IMF’s role in the climate-change issue lies in “advising governments of the risks they have to be prepared to deal with, the policy to mitigate the risks,” but “not financing.” 

Each of the experts raised the topic of the proposed “equi-proportional” increase in the IMF’s quota resources, which will require countries to contribute more capital yet maintain the same voting shares—drawing criticism from members who feel as though they are undervalued, such as China and several emerging-market economies. It “may run into some resistance,” warned Martin. But, Nicole argued, “you can’t have inclusive growth if you don’t have inclusive governance.” 

Fragmentation is threatening developing economies in many ways. Climate is one of them.

This year’s IMF-World Bank Annual meetings—held in Africa for the first time in fifty years—must yield practical solutions and policy decisions that will protect low-income and developing economies against the multifaceted impacts of global geoeconomic fragmentation.

Africa’s fifty-four economies are home to nearly 1.4 billion people or 17.4 percent of the world’s population. However, they account for only about four percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. At the same time, twenty-two out of the world’s twenty-six poorest economies and twenty-three out of the world’s fifty-four lower-middle income economies are in Africa. Compared to others, these economies are heavily dependent on agriculture, forestry, and fishing for their economies, which is directly and negatively impacted by climate change.

To protect the livelihoods of billions in Africa and elsewhere, large CO2 emitters such as China, the United States, the European Union (EU), and other Group of Seven (G7) economies—together responsible for more than half of global CO2 emissions—must take serious steps to reduce their emissions and speed up their green transitions.

However, the global green transition is facing a headwind that has been gaining strength. Geoeconomic fragmentation between the world’s largest economies and increasing trade barriers worldwide are poised to threaten the global economy; for example, in relation to the trade of environmental goods—which are central to green transition—China and the countries that are part of the G7 and EU are highly dependent on each other. Geoeconomic fragmentation has the potential to massively interrupt that trade and, by extension, the energy transition.

The IMF hit on this topic in its World Economic Outlook this year, in a chapter dedicated to the impact of geoeconomic fragmentation on food security and the green transition. It estimates that with geoeconomic fragmentation, investments in renewable energy and electric vehicles may potentially decrease by up to 30 percent by the year 2030, in contrast to an unfragmented global supply chain. Such a decline would severely slow down the green transition, with significant negative impacts on the climate, especially for the low-income economies that bear disproportionate climate-change effects. This is in addition to the mushrooming economic costs of geoeconomic fragmentation for the continent in terms of higher food and energy prices as well as deadlocks in debt restructuring. Realistic solutions that will protect low-income and developing economies are needed.

Two conflicting moods prevail as financial leaders gather

Flying into Marrakesh this weekend, I could see clearly how the city is split in two. The older part of the city—a medina originating from the eleventh century—is nestled within red clay walls that separate it from the newer parts of the city, where gleaming hotels line the roads and nearly every international brand is represented.

Finance ministers and central bank governors from over 180 countries are gathering right now in Marrakesh for the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings, the first time the Meetings are being held on the African continent in fifty years. And the mood—just like the city—is split in two.

There’s optimism: The IMF is hinting that tomorrow it will revise its projections upwards and that there is now an increased chance of a “soft landing” not just for the United States, but for the entire global economy. But there’s also worry: War in Europe, and now in Israel, has reminded the fourteen thousand participants at these Meetings how quickly geopolitics can change their calculations.

It is not lost on anyone here that the last time these Meetings happened in Africa was 1973—just days before the start of the Yom Kippur War, which led to an oil embargo that sent the price of gas skyrocketing.

Once again, foreign policy and finance have become intertwined. And that’s why the Atlantic Council has come to the Meetings: to help map how Bretton Woods institutions can navigate this new era of geoeconomics.

The pressure is rising on the IMF and World Bank to increase climate financing and restructure debt

Volatility in global financial markets spiked over the weekend after the Israeli government declared war following an attack from Hamas that killed hundreds of people. Oil prices rose by 5 percent at one point (before snapping back to about 3 percent), stock markets notched down worldwide, and safe haven flows pushed the US dollar and US Treasury bond prices up—adding more pressure on emerging bond markets. On average, sovereign bonds of emerging market countries trade at around eight hundred basis points above US Treasuries—with twenty-one countries facing a spread of around one thousand basis points: Basically, they’re in distress. In particular, Ethiopia is viewed as likely to default next, with spreads approaching five thousand basis points. Sri Lanka and Ghana still languish in their sovereign debt restructuring processes; meanwhile, Zambia seems like it may sign a MOU with official bilateral creditors at the end of this week’s Meetings.

These developments, coupled with escalating geopolitical rivalry, represent a somber backdrop for the opening of the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh—making it even more critical for the Bretton Woods Institutions to develop policies that address emerging market countries’ biggest challenges. Those policies should include mobilizing climate financing and speedily restructuring sovereign debt, among others.

Take calls for international cooperation on commodities markets seriously

As the Marrakesh meetings proceed, it will be important not to lose sight of the bleak outlook contained in one of the very first documents released: The third chapter in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook on the potential risks posed by the fragmentation of commodities markets. The analysis (summarized here) warns about the impact of deepening global divisions on commodities trade. This trend—affecting everything from wheat to lithium—could increase inflationary pressures, reduce global growth, and even slow the energy transition.

As the world witnessed after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, wheat shortages and rising fuel prices hit the poor hardest. As the chapter points out, “the average low-income country imports more than 80 percent of the wheat it consumes,” and over forty percent of those imports come from only three countries. That means that additional shortages caused by “global fragmentation” could sharply increase food insecurity across the developing world. And while the model shows that the overall “global economic costs appear modest” from such disruptions, low-income countries that rely heavily on agricultural imports would be “disproportionately affected.”

Given that in the aftermath of COVID-19 the number of people living in extreme poverty rose for the first time in decades, there should be concern that deepening geopolitical tensions will only increase the plight of low-income communities. In addition, a slower “green transition” will only add to the burden on developing countries as they are among those already feeling the most pain from climate change. It is something to keep in mind as the Meetings this week inevitably produce calls for international cooperation.

The private sector has a tall order to fill on climate investment

Chapter 3 of the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report emphasizes the need to mobilize private financing and investment to emerging market and developing countries—who would need two trillion dollars annually by 2030 to fight climate change and adapt to its effects, five times more than currently planned $400 billion in climate investments planned for the next seven years. As public investment is limited, private funds will have to make up for 80 percent to 90 percent of the needed climate investment. Private climate investment needs to be scaled up dramatically to fit this tall order; for example, climate investments account for only a portion of the more than $2.5 trillion of assets under the management of environmental, social, and governance mutual funds.

In the chapter, the IMF then proceeded to review a list of oft-repeated measures by emerging market and developing countries to attract private investment—such as strong macroeconomic policies; deepening financial markets; policy predictability within a robust governance framework; better climate data, taxonomy, and disclosure; and risk sharing and guarantees by multilateral development banks. These are good policy ideas, but they’re not easy to implement—and they have not yet been able to generate the level of private climate investment that is needed. Against this backdrop, attention has turned to the World Bank’s Private Sector Investment Lab—comprised of chief executive officers of financial institutions and former officials aiming to bring more private financing to emerging market countries—watching to see whether the investment lab will be able to come up with concrete and actionable ideas.

The world needs realistic fiscal solutions now

In IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva’s curtain raiser speech last week, she called attention to the estimated global economic loss of $3.6 trillion caused by global shocks since 2020. More distressingly, she pointed out, the losses have been distributed very unequally, falling disproportionately on vulnerable developing and low-income countries while only one country—the United States, with the help of expensive fiscal rescue measures—has seen its gross domestic product rebound over pre-COVID levels. Now, fiscal risks are acute for all countries, and there is an urgent need for governments to rebuild fiscal space to be in a position to react to and rebound from future shocks. Furthermore, deteriorating international cooperation—due to rising geopolitical competition and distrust—has fragmented the global economy, slowing its growth.

While having described very concisely the challenges, Georgieva didn’t fully detail realistic policy measures to help the world rebound from this decade’s shocks and crises. There is an urgent need to raise two trillion dollars (needed annually, according to estimations) to help developing and low-income countries adapt to climate change and meet sustainable development goals. Formulating these policies at this week’s meetings is mission critical for the IMF and World Bank: Their failure to spur change within the next ten years would position the world on a trajectory toward increasing fiscal risks.

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On September 18, 2023, the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program in partnership with the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) hosted a hybrid event, “New Power Dynamics in the MENA Region after the Ukraine Crisis.” The event featured an array of expert panelists who shed light on regional tensions, cooperation patterns in the eastern Mediterranean, and North Africa’s role in regional and international power competition.

The event opened with remarks by Fred Kempe, President and CEO of the Atlantic Council; Alessandro Gonzales, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Italian Embassy to the United States; and Giampiero Massolo, President of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI); with closing remarks by Lorenzo Fruganti, Junior Research Fellow, Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). The discussion encompassed three thought-provoking panels, each featuring renowned regional experts and practitioners. Each section was moderated separately to facilitate diverse questions and was followed by a Q&A session.

Takeaways

I. Shifting Relations Since the Ukraine War
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has raised questions about many of the assumptions of the United States led global order. At the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was presumed that America’s partners in the Middle East would perceive Russia as a threat, as Western countries did. This, however, proved to be incorrect. The United States failed to recognize discontent among its Middle Eastern partners. Dr. Mark Katz explained that due to the perceived inadequate support from the United States in the region – notably the absence of US intervention following the Iranian drone strikes on Saudi Arabia in 2019 and criticism directed at specific governments, such as candidate Biden’s statement to treat Saudi Arabia as a pariah state – MENA countries did not feel obligated to back the United States against other global powers.

Many policy experts also predicted that Russia’s presence in the region would diminish following its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Moscow managed to bolster its position despite the economic challenges manifested by the war. Nikolay Kozhanov, in an effort to explain this phenomenon, pointed to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s leveraging of economic advantages and resources in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia provides, for example, essential agricultural supplies to countries like Egypt. These pre-existing relationships have allowed Russia to manage its economic situation while maintaining an influential role and exerting power in the region, especially in the face of global shortages.

The Russia-Ukraine war has also highlighted the importance of relations in the face of global power competition. China, while seeking to bolster its own power, must balance its relationship with the United States and simultaneously support Russia and North Korea in their confrontations with the West. China’s role is further complicated, Gangzheng She noted, by its evolving role in the Middle East. While Russia is reliant upon China, Gulf states have options. They consider China as a contributor or an alternative option to their interests and security but are unlikely to purposefully diminish their relationship with the United States. In essence, currently in the process of understanding its global role and is hedging its bets rather than adopting a definitive stance in the region. For example, while China actively participated in peace negotiations between Riyadh and Tehran, it maintained a more reserved posture to prevent further regional escalation, distinct from its 1950 North Korea war involvement.

II. Tensions and Cooperation Patterns in the East-Med
Over the past decade, new leadership has emerged in the Eastern Mediterranean as economic and political conditions have evolved, creating new patterns of tension and cooperation. The 2015 discovery of the Zohr gas field in Egypt’s Exclusive Economic Zone marked a new chapter in its economic ventures as well as its bilateral relations. The resources enabled Egypt to foster greater economic ties with Israel through liquefied natural gas (LNG) initiatives. According to Dalia Ziada, Egypt’s leadership role in the Eastern Mediterranean was not premeditated, rather it emerged organically from economic imperatives and national security considerations. Egypt’s newfound leadership did not go unopposed. It faced, what Ziada termed “Eastern Mediterranean momentum,” stemming from Turkey’s intervention in Libya. But this momentum is also what drew global attention to the region’s geostrategic significance, positioning Egypt as a key player.

Like with Egypt, the discovery of natural gas reserves in Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone changed the scope of its interests. Natan Sachs pointed out that while there were obvious economic benefits from this discovery, especially considering the surge in gas prices caused by the war in Ukraine, it also created new concerns for regional dynamics. The natural gas reserves, for example, created security challenges as they could be a target of Hezbollah attacks on maritime facilities. Diplomatically, Israel is also in a tricky position. While the United States is a major ally of Israel, it must maintain relations with Moscow, given Russia’s presence in Syria. Sachs concluded that Israel must aim to maintain a pragmatic approach, striving to strike a balance between the United States and Russia while safeguarding its security interests.

Despite the prevalence of competition in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the past year has displayed signs of increased cooperation and adjustment to the economic powers of Egypt and Israel. Turkey’s unequivocal support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas strained regional relations, especially with Egypt and Israel. Consequently, Turkey saw an increased marginalization in the region, which Soner Cagaptay explained, led to a twofold response: military action in the Libyan civil war and improved diplomatic relations with Egypt and Israel. General Haftar of Libya’s eastern government sought to take control of Libya’s western capital city Tripoli. While Haftar had support from certain Emirati, Egyptian, Greek, and Russian factions, the United States and the West opposed this new offensive. Turkey’s military intervention, which prevented Haftar from succeeding, was met with praise from the West and allowed a favorable recalibration of Turkey’s position in the region.

Simultaneously, in an effort to end its regional isolation, Turkey sought to improve diplomatic relations with Egypt and Israel. Turkey hoped to align itself with what Cagaptay termed as the “new Middle Eastern quad” of Egypt, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. This diplomatic process required significant political concessions, most notably discontinuing public support for the Muslim Brotherhood, and consenting to a power-sharing arrangement in Libya. The agreement required Turkey to acknowledged Egypt’s sphere of influence in the East but preserved its own influence in the West. This realignment was marked by the meeting of President Erdogan and President Sisi for the first time in a decade. Turkey, at the time, had also begun pursuing stronger ties with Israel by encouraging robust economic cooperation, energy collaboration, and pipeline diplomacy.

III. The Role of North Africa in Regional and International Power Competition
North Africa has historically avoided great power competition between Russia, China, and the United States, but is now drawn in by the effects of the Ukraine war. While Russia’s interests in the MENA region have not changed, the means through which Russia exerts influence in North Africa have evolved. Jon B. Alterman emphasized how these means, such as the deployment of the Russian affiliated private military corporation Wagner Group, complicate the situation in the region, specifically in Libya and may impact Egyptian investments in Russia.

While Russia is playing an indirect but active role in North Africa, Alessia Melcangi noted the change in European policies and approaches toward the Mediterranean and North Africa. She observed a shift from active engagement to a more passive stance. This trend is especially prevalent among European countries and their former colonies. Melcangi contends that this transformation is a critical oversight. The diminishing role of Europe in the region creates a void for other actors to fill and could create a new front for great power competition.

Some trends suggest that North African countries will not be picking sides in this competition any time soon though. Intissar Fakir contended that Morocco and Algeria do not align with Russia or the West in their foreign policy interests. Rather, their decisions are influenced by regional factors such as the Western Sahara dispute and ties with Israel, rather than the war in Ukraine. The dynamics between North African countries are also determined by these regional factors. Morocco’s relationship with Israel, formalized December 2020 as a signatory to the Abraham Accords normalization treaty, has strained its ties with Algeria. The countries find themselves engaged in low-level military competition, largely focused on aerial defense. Morocco and Algeria benefit from maintaining diplomatic tension while avoiding active conflict, as a significant crisis could potentially destabilize the entire region.

Recommendations
Dr. Katz suggested that the United States should change its method of engagement in the region to acknowledge these governments are autonomous and resistant to external directives. To effectively engage with them, the United States must adopt a policy of non-interference when it comes to policy formation. Additionally, Dr. Katz urged the West to focus on practical, material assistance instead of the current emphasis on abstract principles relating to human rights and democratization. Providing reassurance, support during conflicts, and addressing concerns related to Iran’s influence are key factors in building closer alignment between the United States and MENA governments and producing favorable policy outcomes.

Cagaptay recommended that the United States acknowledge Turkey’s distinct geopolitical profile in the region, as its influence stretches from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf to the broader Middle East. The ability to constructively engage with Turkey is essential to United States foreign policy interests across these intersecting regions. Turkey holds a unique and evolving role as a middle power and NATO member. The United States must recognize and utilize Turkey’s position in order to advance its interests and foster cooperation in the MENA region.

Sachs asserted that both Israel and Saudi Arabia serve as valuable regional allies to enhance American influence and partnerships in the Middle East. He also suggested that Israel should cooperate with Lebanon to protect its maritime border and critical assets. This strategic alignment would have implications that extend beyond the region, impacting global dynamics and U.S. interests in the context of great power competition.

The post EVENT RECAP: New power dynamics in the MENA region after the Ukraine war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As the body ultimately with the most influence on prosperity, governments must ensure the correct balance of interventions to ensure citizens’ economic, political, and legal freedoms are upheld.  

The following essay will explore the nature of the particular balancing act that exists, and which must be maintained, between the economic and legal freedoms currently outlined by the Nigerian federal government, and the arguments that are to be made for either expanding upon or decreasing government intervention with regards to those freedoms so as to ultimately ensure the overall prosperity of the Nigerian public. To this end, this essay will be in two halves: The first, an assessment of the federal government’s approach to economic freedoms, with particular emphasis on the role of subsidies and subsidy reform in poverty reduction. The second half will address the central importance of order and security (the “legal freedoms” as identified by the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes),¹ and the role they play in underpinning societal prosperity more broadly. 

At the time of writing (January 2023), a general election is looming large in Nigeria. Exactly a century after the nation’s first general election—albeit to a colonial legislative council—the public will return to the polls in February and March 2023 to elect a new president and national assembly, and state governors and state houses of assembly, respectively. Any election cycle brings with it an intense period of scrutiny and speculation as to how a new administration will seek to address the elusive balance. The issues at stake are significant: the past few years have seen the nation’s security situation deteriorate drastically,² with non-state armed actors and bandits continuously encroaching within the nation’s borders, threatening livelihoods and civil liberties. Economically, a country whose meteoric development once led to it being dubbed a “rising star” in West Africa has stagnated, leaving 80 million in poverty by 2020, up from 68 million just a decade before.³  

With broad prosperity amongst the Nigerian people clearly lacking, it would seem the balance between economic and legal freedoms in Nigeria, when viewed through the lens of government involvement and intervention, is in need of alteration. With a focus on the correlation and causality between economic freedom, security, and prosperity, the Nigerian government could engineer a return to past economic successes. 

Economic freedom and the state’s intervention 

The economic potential of this former “rising star” still exists—after all, Nigeria remains the continent’s largest economy. It is a question, in part, of redressing the elusive balance in order to release said potential. Though there are myriad ways in which this can be approached, from a private sector perspective, the government’s first step should be to reassess its relationship with its economic freedoms—and focus on the level of intervention the state is willing to forgo to create the space for economic growth, and therefore greater prosperity, in the medium to long term.  

At present, Nigeria is not alone in its cautious approach to free trade. Protectionist policies have increased on a global scale in recent years, and this trend is anticipated to continue as the war in Ukraine rages on. In Nigeria, the past two decades have seen import bans, tariffs, and foreign exchange restrictions slow the flow of goods into the country,⁴ culminating with the closure of its land borders to goods in 2019—a move that contrasted sharply with the nation’s outward push for wider West African market integration in the shape of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which Nigeria joined that same year. The government’s rationale for closing the borders was that it was an attempt to mitigate cross-border illicit trade, and to curb the smuggling of goods, the federal government wished to increase production of, particularly rice.⁵ World Bank analysis at the time found that the decision in fact contributed to higher inflation—particularly in relation to food items such as rice, despite the relatively low impact the policy had on agricultural output. By the following year, Nigerians were paying 100 percent more for the same goods basket, resulting in a negative impact on consumption.⁶ Though the reasoning for these protectionist policies may be sound, more often than not they represent a significant missed opportunity, since a more open approach to free trade has been shown to support poverty reduction. As Jonathan Lain and Jakob Engel note in their article on the World Bank’s 2022 report: A Better Future for All Nigerians: Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2022, the ripple effects of open trade in the shape of increased investment, and knowledge and technology transfer (as well as the crucial competition it brings), all serve to boost job creation, raise domestic value added, and finally reduce the price of goods available to the Nigerian public. In short, by removing trade barriers rather than creating new ones, the government would be reducing poverty levels in Nigeria.⁷

Indeed, data aggregated in May 2022 by the World Bank’s Household Impacts of Tariffs (HIT) analysis (which accounts for both the value of what households produce as well as what they consume) indicates that, were trade fully liberalized in Nigeria, household income would increase by an average of 3.8 percent, whilst simultaneously seeing a reduction in the share of people living in poverty by 2.3 percent. More specifically, the HIT data suggests average incomes would be set to increase across all states, with the sole exception of Cross River, whilst poverty was predicted to increase in just four of the thirty-six states—Benue, Cross River, Edo, and Ondo. Liberalization would have a mitigable negative impact on some vulnerable Nigerians in those four states, in part due to the mix of income-generating activities that are prevalent in those regions. Lain and Engel argue that mitigation of these potential risk factors could take a variety of forms: In the short term, it could entail social protection schemes from the government to support those whose well-being is at risk. In the medium to long term, deeper reforms, in part aided by the act of liberalization itself, could include the improvement of infrastructure, which, if coupled with an increase in private investment from abroad, would result in significant and much needed domestic job creation.⁸

Another policy emblematic of the government’s stranglehold on economic freedoms is the enduring presence of a range of subsidies whose existence is widely recognized as inhibitive to overall prosperity. Nowhere is this clearer than in the state’s approach to fuel subsidies. Though the rationale for this historic subsidy is to allow its citizens to benefit from the fact that it is an oil-producing nation, the benefits are widely argued to be hugely outweighed by the drain it places on the federal government’s financial reserves, a drain that only intensifies in times of economic volatility—the likes of which we are currently experiencing due to the on-going war in Ukraine. Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that these subsidies do little to benefit poorer households due to their already low consumption expenditure. According to World Bank estimates, the nominal cost of the petrol subsidy reached a staggering 1.43 trillion naira in 2021, amounting to approximately 0.8 percent of GDP—double the government’s spending for that year on health and social protections combined.⁹  

At present, the government is on course to spend an estimated 3.36 trillion naira until mid-2023, when the subsidy is due to end.¹⁰ Since as long ago as 1982, several governments have attempted—unsuccessfully—to reform subsidies. The repeated failures illustrate the scale and complexity of the challenge of subsidy reform. However, Jun Erik Rentschler of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies is among those who have argued that, in other countries, past reforms of similar subsidization policies suggest a successful change is possible, if approached adroitly. He suggests that if 100 percent of existing subsidies were removed, and the funds reallocated via direct cash transfers to the poor, there would be an instant and significant reduction in poverty levels.¹¹  

Though any sweeping generalizations should be made with caution, the above exercise does make for a compelling argument for subsidy removal and redistribution of revenue for improvement of both short-and long-term prosperity through poverty reduction. Overall, when one considers this in tandem with the possibilities that a broadening of economic freedoms via the liberalization of trade could bring, the opportunities for a tangible improvement to national prosperity (when assessed in terms of household income particularly) are compelling.  

Legal freedom and the state’s intervention  

Within the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes’ definition of legal freedoms sit two crucial measures: those of order and security, which “evaluate the ability of the state to protect citizens from harm.”¹² An absence of these factors in any society makes for perhaps the most immediate indicator of a lack of prosperity with regards to more tangible short-term factors such as health, education, general rights, or indeed citizen happiness. However, for the purposes of this essay, we will emphasize the correlation between order and security on one hand, and income as a measure of prosperity on the other. Though the previous section argued for an increase in economic freedoms through liberalization of trade, there is an argument to be made for an intensified government approach with regards to security and order. Namely, sparing nothing to engage more decisively with the issues of security and order—and to ensure the legal freedoms of the Nigerian people—are fundamental means to ensure greater economic prosperity. 

This is perhaps best illustrated in the case of the Boko Haram insurgency in the north of the country, which has had a marked impact on the region’s agricultural sector for well over a decade. The group has been known to levy taxes on farms and on the sale of agricultural products in the regions it takes over,¹³ and its presence has also been shown to lead to a “sharp decline in agricultural production, as farmers suffer the consequences of a destruction of assets, lost access to farm inputs, and in some cases faced total displacement.” According to a report by the World Bank, between 2010 and 2015 the northeast region suffered an accumulated output loss of US$8.3 billion.¹⁴ As is to be expected, the loss of work and severe reduction in agricultural output due to sustained attacks in the region have a significant impact on the cost of food for average households. This, in turn, leads to inflation and subsequently a reduction in people’s incomes, ultimately leading to a reduction in overall prosperity. 

In the longer term, these perennial security challenges and the difficult economic conditions they entail lead to a more pervasive impact on prosperity in the form of the so called “brain drain,” as skilled Nigerians seek to leave the country in search of both security and financial reward. As Adebisi Adenipekun rightly observes in his article on the brain drain phenomenon: “The push factor in Nigeria transcends the challenges with the healthcare system. . . . Healthcare providers and their families are not immune to the impact of inflation, increased rates of banditry, and kidnapping experienced in the country.”¹⁵ With those able to leave doing so in droves (between 2021 and 2022 alone, the United Kingdom received 13,609 healthcare workers from Nigeria¹⁶) and those who choose to stay suffering from a significant impact on their economic well-being, there is little doubt that a redress of the security and order balance in Nigeria is a priority for its government.  

However, significant funding gaps have emerged in Nigeria’s security forces over the past two decades, inhibiting any improvements. In 2022, Nigeria’s budget for military defence expenditure was about 1.19 trillion naira ($2.87 billion), amounting to 0.6 percent of GDP.¹⁷ That same year, spending on fuel subsidies across the country amounted to about 4.4 trillion naira ($10 billion), measuring 2.20 percent of GDP.¹⁸ At present, Nigeria has one of the lowest military-to-population ratios in the world, the Nigerian military stands at 223,000 with a military personnel per 1,000 capita of 1.14. In contrast, the United States military stands at 2.13 million with a military personnel per capita of 6.5, China has 4.02 million personnel with 2.9 per capita, Egypt has 1.3 million personnel with 13.21 per capita and Indonesia has 1.1 million personnel with 4.11 per capita.¹⁹ These figures highlight the significant disparity in the availability of the military personnel between Nigeria and these countries in comparison to their population sizes. With increased security threats posed by insurgencies in the northeast, conflict between herders and farming communities in the northwest, and the high levels of recurrent abductions and banditry across the nation, this force requires commensurate funding in order to guarantee order and security for the Nigerian public. 

Both the more tangible threats to physical safety, and longer-term issues such as food insecurity and mass migration that are in part a direct result of these threats, lead to the following conclusion: a reevaluation and ultimate strengthening of government’s role in the shaping of the nation’s legal freedoms—with particular reference to order and security—is needed to ensure prosperity in both the immediate and long term. Ultimately, hypotheticals surrounding the liberalization of trade or the removal of subsidies prove aimless if they fail to take into account the fact that they are underpinned by security needs that must also be met. 

Conclusion 

As a businessperson, one may enjoy the freedom of hypothesizing from the sidelines, and perhaps indulging in a degree of blue-sky thinking, that is not enjoyed by those in government. In exploring these two indicators of prosperity—economic and legal freedoms—in the context of an excess or lack of government intervention, the equation that emerges is one of significant potential surplus with regards to the former, with a marked level of need in the latter. How then would this equation look were government to liberalize trade, remove subsidies, and redirect funding to nurture other freedoms, such as security and order? Could this, perhaps, be a step toward solving the elusive equation of true, sustained prosperity? One thing, however, is left in no doubt: Nigeria boasts immeasurable potential, and with its abundant natural resources and a young, growing population, its star has the potential to rise once again. 

Danladi Verheijen is CEO of Verod Capital, a leading West African private equity firm.

The post The freedom and prosperity equation: Government interventions in Nigeria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

I was in Marrakech, Morocco, walking with my 89-year-old mother, when the earthquake struck Haouz last Friday. After the earth shook, my mother couldn’t stop shaking. I gently carried her out of the family home, which may no longer be the refuge that it once was only seconds earlier. 

The post Charai in The Hill: We survived Morocco’s earthquake. Its reconstruction is another story appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Shortly after the earthquake, Moroccan King Mohammed VI convened an emergency meeting and ordered his military forces to break the isolation of remote villages in dire need of food, shelter, and medical attention. Images showed Moroccan helicopters and military personnel defying the forces of nature and carrying out perilous rescue missions.

The international community swiftly reacted to the earthquake, too, conveying its sympathy and offering assistance. World leaders at the G20 summit, including host country India, expressed their full solidarity and readiness to deploy rescue missions on the ground. While Morocco allowed search teams from several countries to access the disaster areas and deploy their field operations, it declined or ignored aid offered by France and Algeria. This is likely due to ongoing political and diplomatic tensions with its former colonizer and its eastern neighbor. Images of Spanish, Qatari, Italian, and Senegalese search units and sniffer dogs, among other first responders, were circulated soon after the tragedy.

Politicizing humanitarian rescue

Since the news broke late on Friday, French commentators and media outlets rushed to accuse the Moroccan authorities of incompetency and blame them for “silently killing their people.” In turn, Moroccan social media users and intellectuals saw the French response as patronizing, a legacy of colonial arrogance and interference in the country’s sovereign decisions. As the hours passed and Morocco still did not respond to Paris’ offer to assist in managing the natural disaster, voices grew accusing Morocco of “refusing humanitarian interventions at the cost of its distressed population.” In an interview with French news station BFM TV, Moroccan journalist Samira Sitail reacted strongly against this view expressed by panelists, reproaching them for “inciting a revolt among Moroccan people and spreading false claims.”

Morocco did not give in to the pressure, and the Ministry of Interior released a statement thanking the international community and explaining the rationale behind its choice to only admit rescue teams from four countries. The ministry stated that opening its territories for all solicitations would be “counterproductive and chaotic” and that it “continues to evaluate the needs and respond accordingly in conformity with international standards.”

Meanwhile, the facts suggest otherwise and point to deeper frictions between the two countries. Local reports state that the Moroccan king refused to receive a condolence call from French President Emmanuel Macron. In offering aid, Macron perhaps expected a response similar to Lebanese crowds, which cheered him and French aid during his visit to Beirut in 2020 following the deadly explosion there. If so, then he seems to have forgotten that North Africa has long waved goodbye at Mother France’s (Mama Franssa) submissive “center versus periphery” love story.

The hard reality is that even humanitarian rescue remains grounds for political calculations and tensions. Whether in response to an emergency or more generally for development, aid should never be forced on a nation, and countries in the Global South should always feel in control over who is allowed to operate in their sovereign territories. This is an especially fraught issue given Morocco’s colonial past and a recent pan-African revival rejecting French interventionism and treatment of the continent like its backyard.

In not accepting French aid, Moroccan leaders appear to view their country as refusing to victimize itself after the earthquake or to position itself as pleading for external charity. In a recent interview, Sylvie Brunel, the former president of Action Against Hunger, explained this view. Morocco would rather brand itself as autonomous and capable of mobilizing resources to address its own hardships, she clarifies, which explains why it only allows international actors that it thinks understand and respect these terms.

Additionally, Morocco became known for its singular style in foreign relations and managing crises—known as the “Mohamed VI style” in Moroccan circles—which grew more confident over the years in distancing itself from France and forging stronger ties with new and recovered allies. The North African kingdom terminated the duties of its ambassador to France, Mohamed Benchaaboun, in February 2023 following a series of disputes between the two countries, including the Pegasus spyware scandal in 2020. In reality, the Élysée and the Makhzen fell out of love as the latter started demanding clearer positions on the Western Sahara issue, as Morocco has been empowered by a stronger rapprochement with the United States, Israel, and Spain—all of whom now recognize Morocco’s claims over the disputed territory. “The Sahara issue is the lens through which Morocco looks at the world,” stated King Mohammed VI in a speech in 2022, describing his country’s foreign policy guidelines. It’s no different during such a national calamity.

In an exceptional move, the Algerian government—Morocco’s fiercest regional opponent since severing diplomatic ties back in August 2021—offered to open its airspace to humanitarian aid and medical evacuations and to offer humanitarian assistance “if Morocco asks for it,” another offer that Rabat has decided to ignore. If Morocco were to accept Algeria’s help, reciprocating Rabat’s proposal to assist Algiers in fighting wildfires in 2021, then it could be a new opening in the stalled and convoluted relationship between the two neighbors. However, given the cumulative history of mutual provocations and incidents—including the September 1 shooting by the Algerian coastguard of tourists who were visiting Morocco after they had strayed into Algerian waters—it is unlikely that any momentarily regained solidarity after a natural disaster would lead to a more substantial reconciliation.

Moroccan heritage hangs in the balance

Morocco will need significant financial and logistical support to rebuild wrecked edifices in Marrakesh and in the High Atlas Mountains. Vital civilian infrastructure has taken a toll from the earthquake, including roads, schools, hospitals, and electric plants. The culturally rich and tourism-reliant emerging market will also need urgent interventions to rehabilitate and safeguard damaged heritage sites.

Preliminary assessments show that the Kutubiyya mosque in Marrakesh, a twelfth-century structure built by the Almohad caliph Abd al-Mu’min, cracked during the earthquake. So, too, did an old citadel and several historic buildings in Marrakesh. The Great Mosque of Tinmal, the cradle of the Almohad movement and the shrine of its leader Al Mahdi Ibn Tumart, is also damaged. Other significant heritage sites affected by the tragedy include Moulay Brahim’s seventeenth-century Sufi brotherhood shrine and the Agadir Oufella fortress in Agadir.

On September 9, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Director-General Audrey Azoulay pledged to assist the local authorities in assessing the damage and reconstructing culturally and educationally significant sites. Substantial funding and post-crisis heritage rescue expertise from Morocco’s international friends and allies will be needed to address the colossal damage on the ground. The US Geological Survey has estimated that the country could lose 8 percent of its gross domestic product this year due to the earthquake exacerbating an ongoing economic contraction in the country.

While international aid is much needed to help Rabat alleviate the looming humanitarian and economic hardship, the kingdom is adamant about setting some ground rules with foreign partners and not accepting any aid that, as Morocco sees it, would come at the cost of its national dignity and sovereignty. In the past, Western countries have used development aid and disaster relief as incentives for political reforms and an array of interventions. Some may argue that disaster relief should be distinguished from development aid given the often unexpected and perilous circumstances in which the former is needed, but that is ultimately a decision that countries must make for themselves. It is clear that this paradigm is shifting, and the Global South is growing in confidence and developing its own local capacities and expertise in confronting humanitarian disasters. In the case of Morocco, it is using this crisis as a public relations opportunity to rebrand itself as a capable and autonomous nation. Today, in the Maghreb and across the African continent, the age of foreign interference through humanitarian missions seems to be over.

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

The post The politics behind Morocco turning down help after the devastating earthquake appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The news provoked several protests and incidents in Tripoli and elsewhere in Libya, which does not recognize Israel. Demonstrators stormed a house owned by the United Nations–backed Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah and torched it. An attempted attack against the main offices of the foreign ministry was also carried out. Disorder in the streets has continued in the days since. Reports that the meeting was championed by Italy, Libya’s former colonizing power, and held in Rome added to the demonstrators’ fury given Italy’s contentious past relations with the country and its people.

Libyans’ outrage is fairly easy to understand. The first criticism is that the Libyan government took a big risk in carrying out such important diplomacy without any public discussion and, in so doing, underestimated the feelings of the population. The second criticism is that the Libyan government appeared open to engagement with an Israeli government widely perceived in the region as very right-wing and uncompromising on the Palestinian issue. Thirdly, news of the meeting provided a unique opportunity for the opponents of Dbeibah’s government, which is widely perceived in Libya as corrupt and nepotistic, to take to the street and attempt to oust the prime minister.

Multiple motivations

Given these easily expected outcomes, what was driving this diplomacy in Rome? The different actors’ thought processes are easily understandable. For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this was an important opportunity to demonstrate his foreign policy prowess while he is confronted by political challenges at home. Furthermore, by taking steps to further increase the number of Arab states that recognize Israel, the Israeli leader might hope to improve relations with key governments in Europe and establish positive momentum while negotiations continue regarding Israel-Saudi normalization.

Dbeibah, too, was attuned to the changing political winds in the international community toward Libya, from a supportive stance a few years ago to a more critical one as of late. He must have wanted to generate as much support internationally for his leadership as possible. What better way than making the Jewish communities happy and grateful? This belief, albeit evidently flawed, that by making Israel happy one could gain the support of the whole Jewish population of the world, and thus of the states where its individuals live, is a deeply rooted belief in the Arab world—and a longstanding anti-Semitic trope.

For the Italians, the reason for playing a part in this meeting may be harder to comprehend but is very similar. Italy’s government must have sensed an opportunity to win over the influential Libyan Jewish diaspora and the votes that the community carries in Italian elections, especially in Rome. Italian officials might have also considered the idea of being lauded for having played an important role in such a breakthrough in international politics. Nevertheless, none of the actors involved is so naive to have believed that such a step could be kept secret indefinitely. For Israel in particular, secrecy would have defeated a main purpose of why it was interested in advancing relations with Arab states—that it hoped to increase its popularity in the international community.

People I have spoken with both in Libya and in Italy who are close to the decisionmakers all agree on one point: It is more probable that the goal among the parties was not for the meeting to remain totally secret, but rather for each of the participants not to actively divulge the news about it. That is, not to give it much publicity in order to defuse opposition and thus reap the fruits of the deed and avoid the repercussions. This hasn’t happened, and now Libya is back to instability and potential conflict among the various armed groups.

The Libyan prime minister has been on damage control in the days since. To stress his government’s distance from the event, Dbeibah fired Mangoush, who has since fled Libya. She seems to be a scapegoat, who most probably will not serve in Dbeibah’s government going forward as he tries to keep his increasingly shaky hold on power. Another potentially more problematic consequence is that of the sudden resurgence of radical Islamist leaders in Libya in response to the news. Finally, there is also a wider, geopolitical consequence that should not be overlooked. The signing by some states of the Abraham Accords has radicalized the position of regionally important players such as Algeria (and its neighbor Tunisia as well). If Dbeibah is ousted from office and a new government that includes the forces that pushed him out comes to power, then the new government could be tempted to join the Algerian-Tunisian entente, and in so doing move away from the influence of Egypt.

Even if the situation calms down, there still remains the bitter feeling that this crisis could have been easily avoided if the various internal and international actors had acted with more knowledge and care.

Back to school

What are the lessons to be learned from this incident? Western actors in particular should realize that any regime, even the most authoritarian one, has some form of internal give-and-take with the various constituencies that compose its sociopolitical environment. Therefore, any external pressure should be exercised with attention to the peculiarity of each state in order not to cause uproars and instability. This lesson is particularly important for Italy, whose new government is expressing its intention to play a more active foreign policy, one that sees it acting more energetically abroad. 

For the Israelis, it is tempting to think that the lesson is that such discussions should be handled through intelligence channels, which may be better able to keep secrets, rather than through the foreign ministry. But perhaps today it is no longer possible to keep such matters secret at all, at least not on such a politically sensitive topic. Therefore, the lesson should be that it cannot afford such unforced errors in the future, and that any publicity about its diplomacy with Arab countries should be carefully planned and only executed with the full agreement of its partners. Therefore, Israel’s approach should be more pragmatic and focused on the general benefit of whatever action is undertaken, so as to minimize eventual backlashes.

For the Libyan government of Dbeibah in particular, the lesson is that trying to pursue personal interests through international agreements and accords of any kind stands little chance of success if the interest is not widely shared with the population. The question of legitimacy cannot be avoided.

As the Libyan example shows, the principle of searching for a way to begin a process of cooperation, if not regional integration, between Arab states and Israel is an important and noteworthy endeavor that should be nevertheless treated with extreme care. An approach lacking sufficient care can end with a setback to the cause of regional peace and stability.

Karim Mezran is a distinguished Libyan-Italian scholar, director of the North Africa Initiative, and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

The post Israel, Libya, and Italy were just reminded that diplomacy requires more than diplomats appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Rethinking Stability initiative was a partnership between Interpeace, the Atlantic Council, and the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (BAKS). The initiative was made possible thanks to the generous contributions of the German Federal Foreign Office.

In the last twenty years, stabilization has become perhaps the main approach through which international actors have engaged in conflict affected areas. Yet almost all stabilization efforts have struggled, with the sources of instability more complicated and difficult to remedy than first envisaged. The definition of what ‘stabilization’ actually constitutes remains ambiguous, with the term used inconsistently over time and in different contexts, so that aims and approaches have varied enormously in ambition and application between actor and place. Stabilization successes have been scant, and the field appears to be in something of a definitional and operational limbo, where despite their stated purpose of reducing violence and laying the structural foundations for longer-term security, most stabilization efforts have too often not only failed but occasionally made conflict environments worse.

This context provided the rationale for the Rethinking Stability initiative. Launched in July 2020, it recognized that stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, the Sahel, and in north, east and central Africa were all struggling to build lasting peace and stability. The initiative sought to ask why, and in doing so discern how stabilization efforts could better contribute to positive social and political changes in fragile environments.

Based on five private dialogues on three continents, in-depth desk and country research, and discussions with circa 1,000 policy makers, academics, practitioners, and conflict-affected citizens, this final paper sets out the project’s key lessons and suggests actionable recommendations for how the field can improve.

The Transatlantic Security Initiative, in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, shapes and influences the debate on the greatest security challenges facing the North Atlantic Alliance and its key partners.

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The Scowcroft Strategy Initiative works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to tackle security challenges.

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The post Rethinking Stability: Key findings and actionable recommendations appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Then there is what did not happen. On July 30, Bola Tinubu, the Nigerian president and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) chair, gave the coup leaders a one-week ultimatum to restore the country’s previous leadership or face a military intervention from the regional bloc—a deadline that came and went with no action. On August 10, ECOWAS leaders met and issued a statement with a mixed message: it ordered the activation of a “standby force,” but also resolved to “keep all options on the table for the peaceful resolution of the crisis.”

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer the crucial questions these developments raise for policymakers in the Sahel, Europe, and the United States.

Click to jump to a question:

1. Why has ECOWAS backed away from its ultimatum?

2. Did the coup in Niger just succeed?

3. What is at stake for France and the European Union?

4. Should the United States now get more involved?

5. Have Burkina Faso and Mali come out stronger by supporting the coup?

6. What does this reveal about Nigeria’s regional leadership?

1. Why has ECOWAS backed away from its ultimatum?

Tinubu is politically weak and facing significant pushback domestically, including from major northern Nigerian Muslim leaders. He was only recently elected after a contested election, and his recent decisions aimed at improving Nigeria’s economy, above all his move to end Nigeria’s fuel subsidy, are unpopular and causing disruption to the economy. At the same time, Nigeria is struggling with its own insurgencies in northern Nigeria, and northern Nigerians and southern Nigeriens are more or less the same people. There is a great deal of cross-border movement and commerce, which sanctions disrupt. While many Nigerians, northerners included, appreciate that the coup hurts their neighbor’s stability and security, they also appreciate the harm done by sanctions and have a difficult time rallying to the idea of a military intervention.

In addition, in practical terms, marshaling a military force requires more time and planning than Tinubu probably realized. These countries tend not to have significant rapid reaction forces; they can’t just drop battalions wherever they want on short notice, as France and the United States can. What exactly would Nigeria and ECOWAS do if they could put together the required forces? But the longer it takes, the more politically untenable any military intervention becomes.

ECOWAS’s failure to effect any change will be a blow to its influence. There will be important ramifications in terms of ECOWAS’s relations with Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, which all have juntas that ECOWAS has been pushing to transition to civilian rule. ECOWAS has forced them to accept “transition timetables” for holding elections and has been trying to push these juntas to comply. ECOWAS’s ability to do so is much reduced by this affair. The region’s juntas, I am sure, feel emboldened.

—Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Besides setting an initial deadline that gave the putschists time to consolidate support within the Nigerien military and rally the Nigerien population, especially among the youth, against what it could point to as outside interference, ECOWAS violated the first rule of diplomatic engagement: never make a promise or a threat unless you are prepared to follow through. ECOWAS has never successfully intervened to reverse a coup. (The case of Senegal’s intervention in The Gambia in 2017 is a unique circumstance that does not really count. The Gambia is a very small country surrounded on three sides by Senegal, whose army was the force mandated by ECOWAS to intervene in a case where a president was refusing to accept an election loss.) Moreover, ECOWAS has not prepared for an intervention in Niger. In the end, only two members, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, would even say that they would support a military intervention with forces and they offered no specific commitments.

This elementary mistake was compounded by another one by Nigeria: never make an international commitment unless you have broad domestic support. Tinubu soon found that the Nigerian senate, where his party holds the majority, would not back intervention and both the main Muslim umbrella organization led by the sultan of Sokoto and the Nigerian Catholic Bishops’ Conference came out against the use of force.

—J. Peter Pham is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he served as the first-ever US special envoy for the Sahel region.

I am not sure that ECOWAS has backed away from its ultimatum. The last news I read was calling for a meeting of the chiefs of staff of the member states. Nevertheless, I do agree that a military intervention is highly unlikely for a simple reason: the lack of military capabilities, especially for the transportation of troops. At a minimum, logistical support from the United States or France would be a requisite, and I doubt the two countries would be ready to provide it. A de facto blockade of Niger may be the decision by default, even if its effectiveness would be limited.

—Gérard Araud is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center and a former ambassador of France to the United States (2014-2019).

The ultimatum was conceived as a negotiation strategy rather than a timetable to prepare for an intervention. ECOWAS hoped to push the junta to back off. If the likelihood of the intervention decreased with time, though, Niger is still not off the hook. Coastal ECOWAS countries understand that much is at stake and if putschists in Niamey aren’t put in line, their own political survival is at risk. Successful examples are appealing. That’s why ECOWAS decided at today’s meeting to retain intervention as an option on the table. However, it’s still more likely that ECOWAS would rather exercise its pressure through sanctions, which have an even greater potential to bite than in the case of Mali or Burkina Faso.  

—Petr Tůma is a visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

2. Did the coup in Niger just succeed?

Yes, the coup succeeded, as France decided not to intervene in its first hours. Now it is too late.

—Gérard Araud

Yes. The only hope for reversing it is a domestic rebellion and possible civil war. A prominent Tuareg former rebel leader has announced he was forming a group to do precisely that. Western countries should stay far away from him.

—Michael Shurkin

Yes.  The “golden hour” for reversing a coup is the first day or two, at most. After that, it becomes very difficult unless there is active opposition within the military. In Niger, to avoid fratricidal conflict, the senior brass acquiesced to the coup. And with the appointment of a new cabinet, the junta is increasingly getting settled in.

—J. Peter Pham

New Atlanticist

Aug 3, 2023

What Niger’s coup means for West Africa’s geopolitical contest

By Rama Yade

The ongoing coup in Niamey and others that have taken place in West Africa in recent years reflect significant geopolitical changes underway.

Africa Conflict

3. What is at stake for France and the European Union?

The coup is confirming the collapse of France’s policy in the Sahel, which it has implemented since its intervention in Mali in 2013 and, more widely, of its policy in Francophone Africa. The question is whether it will stop there or if it will affect other countries where the same anti-French feeling is flaming (Senegal?). France has to radically change its policy: this will be painful for its armed forces, which have always played a major role in its conception. For the European Union (EU), the questions will be more pedestrian: How to relate with military juntas? How to dissociate itself from France without antagonizing it?

—Gérard Araud

In the aftermath of the 2021 Mali military coup, when the junta opted for cooperation with the Wagner group, France and its European partners had to withdraw their forces from the country. As Burkina Faso suffered a military coup soon after, Niger appeared as the best option for Europeans to continue helping local governments in fighting against terrorism. Importantly, Russia had no presence in the country. The current coup risks upending European military deployments not only in Niger but also in the broader Sahel region, as there are not many other options available. One can still consider Chad or Mauritania, but these are fortunately not the hot spots of terrorist activities.  

Further instability in Niger, which may follow if the coup succeeds, could become an even bigger challenge for Europeans than Mali or Burkina Faso. One of the main migration routes to the southern Mediterranean coast from Sub-Saharan Africa goes through Niger, namely the city of Agadez, a well-known regional crossroad for migrants.  

—Petr Tůma

France clearly is suffering a blow to its prestige and influence in the region. (France will be fine in the long term—the Sahel just isn’t that important to it.) Recent events have proven that there is not much France can do that will not be negatively perceived by many if not most Sahelians, regardless of France’s intentions or the utility of French assistance. It is time for France to leave Africa and close its bases there.

The EU can weather this storm, as other bloc members do not provoke the same allergic reaction that France does. That said, the coup almost certainly will exacerbate the region’s security problems, which among other things adds to the refugee crisis.

—Michael Shurkin

France will probably have to withdraw its 1,500 troops from Niger, dealing another blow to its postcolonial ambitions of having a special role in its former colonies. The junta has already announced the withdrawal of Niger from five different military and security cooperation agreements. In many respects, the fact that the coup was not reversed and Bazoum was not rescued from his safe room in the first hours of the mutiny are indicative of the state of affairs. In the heyday of Françafrique, there is no question of how it would have played out. To use another French term, the dénouement is complete.

—J. Peter Pham

4. Should the United States now get more involved?

Yes. The United States can go where France cannot and should not. It can and should do more in terms of all manner of assistance. The catch is that by essentially acquiescing to the coup in Niger, not to mention those in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali, it is betraying its own rhetoric regarding democracy promotion. 

—Michael Shurkin

Yes. Not only has the United States made a significant investment—over $500 million in military assistance and roughly $2 billion in humanitarian and development aid over a decade, stretching across three administrations of both parties, as well as lives sacrificed, something we should not forget—but that commitment has paid off in gains on both the security and human development fronts. The first six months of this year saw the lowest levels of extremist violence in Niger since 2018—and this was at a time when the Global Terrorism Index recorded jihadist activity spiking across the rest of the Sahel.

Moreover, it is rather telling that while anti-French rhetoric has reached a fever pitch in Niger and the French embassy was even attacked by mobs who set its gates on fire, there has not been a single protestor at the new US Embassy nor any call for the departure of the more than one thousand US military personnel on the two air bases in Niger.

Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland mentioned an offer of US “good offices.” The United States can do that as well as much more. It is in the United States’ own interests.

—J. Peter Pham

ECOWAS should take the lead and the United States should support it. Yet, there is space for parallel US diplomatic engagement in explaining to the junta what it would really mean to cut cooperation with the West, as well as the pitfalls of getting into bed with Russia.  

—Petr Tůma

The United States may be tempted to step in for the reasons other experts have emphasized, but I am deeply skeptical considering what has happened in Niger: a fairly correct democratic process, a reformed French policy striving to respect local sensitivities, an approval of the French presence by the parliament, etc., and still, a military coup. I understand that military requirements will lead the United States to try to stay in Niger, but any legitimization of the junta would be a blow to our friends within ECOWAS.

—Gérard Araud

5. Have Burkina Faso and Mali come out stronger by supporting the coup?

In terms of popular opinion, yes, although Niger’s decline over the long term only compounds their own problems.

—Michael Shurkin

No. Despite getting some publicity for chest-thumping, especially from Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the head of the junta in Burkina Faso, their own inadequacies showed even more clearly. At the end of the day, for all the talk of declarations of war and standing by Niger, all they could do was send a joint delegation in “solidarity.” This is no surprise since both countries have enough of a challenge fighting extremists in their own territory and no capacity for even getting forces deployed abroad even if they had them.

—J. Peter Pham

Yes, Mali and Burkina Faso may see the coup in Niger, the closest partner of France in the region, as a political success and the confirmation of popular support for their policies. It may also have an echo elsewhere in the region.

—Gérard Araud

I don’t believe so, especially from a long-term perspective. Both countries are economically dependent on cooperation and aid coming from abroad. Their behavior, which contributes to instability in the region, will certainly make their partners and donors more reluctant, and working with Russia will not make up for it. Their project is not sustainable in the long run, especially amid the spread of terrorism, which is likely to follow the current turmoil. 

—Petr Tůma

6. What does this reveal about Nigeria’s regional leadership?

It shows that Nigeria’s leadership is limited by its own domestic problems, as well as the popular sentiment that views it and ECOWAS as instruments of Western powers, however irrational that view is.

—Michael Shurkin

The problem with Nigeria’s foreign policy has always been its domestic limitations, but it also suffers from the dismal state of its military forces, as has been shown in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

—Gérard Araud

The ongoing crisis—with a new putschist alliance being shaped in the region—creates an even stronger demand for leadership among ECOWAS countries. It will depend on how the situation evolves, but there’s a good chance that it’ll further strengthen Abuja’s position in the region. There are still plenty of options for pressuring Niger’s junta beyond military intervention and Nigeria is well-positioned here.

—Petr Tůma

A “work-in-progress” would be a generous characterization.

—J. Peter Pham

The post Did the Niger coup just succeed? And other questions answered about what’s next in the Sahel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On August 4, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest article, Kroenig and Ashford debate the impetus of coups in fragile states, using the recent 2023 Niger coup as an emblematic case study. Does US military training of foreign officials inflate the tendency for coups, and other instances of state-based violence? Or are underlying economic and institutional concerns the catalyzing factor?

Staff

Matthew Kroenig

Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security

China Defense Policy

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate the impetus of the Niger coup appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In Africa too, the ongoing coup in Niger seems to trigger a harder reaction than the previous ones in Mali and Burkina Faso. After earlier sending Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby to Niger to lead mediation talks, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—under Nigerian President Bola Tinubu’s leadership—threatened to use force if the coup leaders don’t reinstate Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum by August 6 and announced new sanctions, harder than those used for other junta-led Sahelian countries. That is predicted to deal a blow to Niger, a country that depends on external aid. This unusual firm answer can be explained by several reasons:

• First, there is a strong fear that the region may collapse now that the G5 Sahel—a regional group of countries promoting development and security—is led by four juntas. Among the five members, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Chad have recently experienced an undemocratic transition; Mauritania remains. Niger is the fifth country in West Africa to experience a coup d’état over the past three years.

• Second, despite numerous African Union and ECOWAS sanctions over the past few years, the regional coup leaders seem to taunt the African organizations for whom this recent coup in Niger is an ultimate test of credibility.

• Third, Nigeria—which chairs ECOWAS and shares a one-thousand-mile border with Niger—needs a win in this moment, as Tinubu just assumed presidential office a little over two months ago. 

The coup in Niger seems to have been triggered by a very light justification: Bazoum was reportedly going to remove the military head, which is far from the typical reasons—or excuses—given for coups, such as security or governance failures. Even while the country faced attacks coming from groups ranging from the local branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) to Boko Haram, Bazoum was doing better than his neighbors (but obviously not enough) to remain in power—his ability to remain in power was surprising given the weakness of his security guard and his support base. The alarm signaling that weakness had been blaring even before Bazoum’s inauguration, as a group attempted a coup just two days before the then president-elect’s swearing-in ceremony in March 2021. One of the sources of that weakness may have been his attachment to his partnership with France, as his internal opponents vocally criticized his France-friendly policy.

For Paris, a lot is on the line. Its remaining influence in the Sahel is collapsing. As of earlier this summer, 2,500 of its troops were based in Chad and Niger—France’s last two key strategic partners in the region. The troops were left without any clear roadmap after Operation Barkhane ended in 2022 and France withdrew from Mali after ten years of presence; French-commanded European troops under the Takuba Task Force also withdrew from Mali at the time, while French troops who were part of Operation Sabre withdrew from Burkina Faso less than a year later. A total withdrawal from Niger would be a disaster for France, which is why the coup has occupied French attention. France’s vital interests in Africa have been hit. 

The French government has seemed to run out of solutions to the region’s challenges. But critics are wondering why France thinks it needs to get things under control in Africa; even before the coup, those critics wondered why a military answer to the problems in the Sahel (an answer that has already failed) is still and exclusively on the table. And in finding new answers to this problem, it isn’t just about adjusting aid to the region: France needs to change its paradigm. A growing part of the French population, including experts in military and security circles, are aligned with these views and are requesting changes.

There is still time for the French government to do things differently. It can renew old networks and reshape its Africa policy for its approach toward Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Gabon (its other West African partners), countries that have been shaken by demonstrations questioning French presence. At this point, these countries are still in the situation to welcome the French troops without risking domestic political turmoil.

Africa has deeply changed; the new generation, with a politically conscious middle class, has demands. They won’t accept double or low standards when it comes to Africa. This motivation is stronger than the generation’s so-called attachment to Russia, a geopolitical player that opportunistically wants to advance its interests in the region by raising its flags at demonstrations. That scene unfolded last week in Niger as the Russia-Africa Summit kicked off over five thousand miles away in St. Petersburg, without Bazoum in attendance (he had already planned not to attend the summit). Of course, speculation was rife about Russia’s involvement in the coup given this timing, even though Russia recently condemned the coup.

This coup and others that have taken place across West Africa in recent years reflect significant geopolitical changes underway, from France’s retreat to Russia’s angling for opportunity, but also the need of West African governments to be better supported by their partners and allies. Most Africans don’t explicitly want to oust France or other Western partners from their countries: Instead, they are seeking a renewed partnership on a healthier and more equal basis. When it comes to the war against jihadists, Africans expect more wins than a ten-year military presence. To renew their partnerships globally, African governments are diversifying their roster of international partners, adding countries such as China, Turkey, Israel, and India to their lists. Niger itself has worked with China for years on oil exploration—which has included work on a pipeline that runs from Niger to Benin—and it has worked with Western allies such as Canada on uranium.

As these geopolitical changes have unfolded, Niger has seen many domestic challenges, including coups—experiencing four since its independence in 1960—in addition to other attempts to cut back on the government’s power such as Tuareg rebellions. In recent years, the country has also seen terrorist attacks launched by ISIS affiliate groups, al-Qaeda affiliate groups, and Boko Haram. As a landlocked and desert country with a population of about 26 million people (about half of whom live below the poverty line) and with the highest birth rate in the world, hardships are accumulating in Niger; the region’s coups and terrorist activity make those hardships even worse. 

Knowing the severity of these hardships, and knowing that a few officers abandoned the Nigerien government in the hours leading up to its fall, one may wonder on what basis these regimes rested: the much-vaunted popular vote or the police? If a military leader tried to bring down a government every time he or she had personal concerns that contradicted elected leaders—whether it be France’s General Pierre de Villiers or US General Mark Milley—many governments based on the popular vote would have already fallen apart. This problem is much deeper than a simple dispute; it is about the strength of the institutions. The Sahelian governments don’t have such strong institutions, as they face pressure from terrorist movements that aim to see institutions crumble. 

Russia is quick to lend its support to countries under coup leadership, solidifying its role as a partner to these countries. But the West, in striking contrast, tends to stick with old paradigms, easily exploited by Russia in its misinformation strategy. At times, Western partners—who know at least one way to save threatened regimes (via defense agreements)—seem no longer able to find their satellite navigation quickly enough to rescue government leaders held in their residences (such as Burkina Faso’s Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, Mali’s Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, or Niger’s Bazoum). Caught between inefficient strategies and noninterference, Africa’s Western partners are leaving these presidents to face their downfall without any strategy that would help them to connect with the civilian populations and their request of renewed partnership.

Russia, determined to prove that it is not isolated after the international response to the war in Ukraine, has been able to use Africa to circumvent Western economic sanctions and rebuild its forces via the Wagner Group, which is active in the Central African Republic and Mali. There, the countries’ gold, diamonds, and sugar serve as bargaining chips for the security services of the private militia. The United States, meanwhile, has redirected its focus to the European continent to support Ukraine and also to protect its strategic interests. But the Niger events show that US strategic interests still run through Africa.

However, while the field may be wide open for Russia, it may not be so easily navigable. After all, Russian troops are blamed, along with Malian forces, for the terrible March 2022 massacre in Moura, which will haunt the Sahel for a long time. And Russia is starting to appear weaker globally, especially after Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s rebellion exposed the leaks in the Russian defense apparatus. The redeployment of Wagner’s forces to Africa following their ousting from the Ukrainian ground was also negatively perceived in African circles. 

Even the Russia-Africa Summit has revealed a weakened impression of Moscow: This year’s convening in St. Petersburg gathered only seventeen heads of state, whereas the first convening in Sochi in October 2019 gathered forty-three heads of state—as Russia was just beginning to re-engage with the continent for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s recent suspension of the agreement to export grain from Ukraine only accelerated the weakening of its image on the continent. Clearly, Africa remains a challenge for Russia, too.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Europe Center. She is a professor at Sciences Po Paris and Mohammed 6 Polytechnic University in Morocco. She was a member of the French cabinet, serving as deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights and ambassador to UNESCO.

The post What Niger’s coup means for West Africa’s geopolitical contest appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Back to war in Western Sahara

The conflict between Morocco and the Western Sahara’s pro-independence Polisario Front goes back to the end of Spanish colonial rule. It was ignited in 1975 after Spain relinquished control of Spanish Sahara, later known as Western Sahara. Morocco and Mauritania divided the territory between themselves, while the pro-independence Polisario Front, backed by Algeria, proclaimed a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and launched a military struggle against what it viewed as two occupying powers. Mauritania withdrew from its part of the territory in 1979 after a series of military defeats at the hands of the Polisario, leaving it to Morocco. Over the following years, Rabat consolidated control over most of Western Sahara, building a defensive wall along the entire territory known as the “sand berm,” which de facto left 80 percent of the area in Moroccan hands and 20 percent under Polisario control. 

The ensuing military stalemate laid the basis for a 1991 UN-mediated settlement plan, which established a cease-fire and a UN buffer zone along the sand berm; called for a self-determination referendum; and set up a mission, MINURSO, to monitor the cease-fire and organize the referendum. The vote never took place due to Moroccan objections. Subsequent negotiations failed to achieve a breakthrough, even though the two sides continued to abide by the cease-fire. In 2007, under pressure from France and the United States, Morocco proposed an autonomy plan that would provide for a degree of self-government for Western Sahara under its sovereignty. The Polisario rejected it out of hand for denying the Sahrawi population’s right to self-determination.

The conflict remained frozen until a series of events in 2019-2021 reignited hostilities, spreading tensions through the wider region. Starting in 2019, Rabat convinced a number of Arab and African governments to open consulates in Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, signaling their recognition of Rabat’s sovereignty over the territory. In November 2020, the 1991 cease-fire collapsed when Morocco seized a section of the UN buffer zone to clear a blockade of a key route by Polisario activists and in response the Front resumed its attacks against Morocco in Western Sahara. Tensions escalated further in December 2020 when the Donald Trump administration extended US recognition to Morocco’s control of Western Sahara, and again in August 2021, when Algeria broke off diplomatic relations with Morocco, partly over the latter’s unilateral moves in Western Sahara.

A low-intensity conflict

The intensity of the hostilities over Western Sahara during the conflict’s latest round has remained fairly limited, mainly due to a military imbalance in favor of Rabat. Since the end of the cease-fire in 2020, the Polisario has been able to do little more than fire at the Moroccan sand berm in a series of hit-and-run attacks. Yet the vast majority of its attacks are confined to a northeastern section of the former UN buffer zone inside Western Sahara, suggesting that the group is unable to carry out attacks in the rest of the territory. The Front largely demobilized after the 1991 cease-fire, maintaining only minimal forces; it then lost one of its main arms suppliers, Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi, in 2011, leaving it mostly dependent on outdated equipment. Morocco, from its side, can deploy technologically advanced weapons, including drones, which have granted it air superiority.

The most destabilizing incidents have come from alleged Moroccan attacks on Algerian and Mauritanian civilian convoys. These have threatened to widen the conflict to the rest of the region. In November 2021, an alleged Moroccan drone strike in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara resulted in the deaths of three Algerian truck drivers en route to Mauritania. The incident prompted the Algerian presidency to publicly pin the blame on Rabat and vow retaliation. A second such incident occurred in April 2022, when Algeria accused the Moroccan air force of killing another three people in an attack on a civilian truck convoy near the Mauritanian border.

More recently, an attack inside Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara has highlighted the potential for further military escalation. On May 20, an alleged bomb attack reportedly targeted a segment of a 100-kilometer conveyor belt used by Morocco to export phosphates from a mine located deep within Western Sahara to the coast. Moroccan and pro-Polisario media outlets refrained from reporting on this incident, but the pro-Polisario nongovernmental organization Western Sahara Resource Watch released a series of videos supporting the claim that the incident had happened. If the incident did in fact take place, it would mark the first such attack in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara since the cease-fire’s collapse. While the fact that neither side publicized the alleged event suggests a shared interest in avoiding an escalation at this stage, this kind of attack hints at the possibility of a new, more dangerous phase in the conflict, should diplomacy fail to contain tensions.

The UN Security Council’s hesitations and de Mistura’s role

Divisions and inaction marked the UN Security Council’s initial response to the restart of the conflict in 2020. The council remained inactive for weeks after the cease-fire collapsed due to deep divisions within its ranks between pro-Polisario (such as Russia among the permanent members, as well as several African and Latin American countries) and pro-Morocco member states (such as France and many Arab and West African governments). Pro-Polisario members wanted the council to publicly put more pressure on Rabat, while pro-Morocco states supported the kingdom’s reluctance to allow any form of international scrutiny of the conflict.

All attempts to push the council to discuss and take a position failed. When Germany requested consultations on the matter in December 2020, Rabat suspended diplomatic ties in retaliation. In April 2021, the United States tried to push the council to take a stance on the need to avoid an escalation and appoint a new UN envoy, but this initiative crashed on a roadblock thrown up by India, which acted on Morocco’s behalf. This move was enough to block the US initiative, as Washington realized that the costs of overcoming New Delhi’s objection would far outweigh the initiative’s benefits.

Faced with a paralyzed Security Council, the Joe Biden administration tried to ease hostilities in Western Sahara. It pushed for the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the new UN envoy, overcoming Rabat’s initial rejection. Yet, it refrained from clarifying its position on former President Trump’s decision to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, in an apparent attempt to avoid antagonizing either side.

The Security Council’s divisions and widening gap between Morocco and the Polisario meant that de Mistura had to operate within a very tight policy space. Following the collapse of the cease-fire, the two sides presented diverging views regarding the format and substance of future negotiations. For Rabat, the only way to return to talks was to resume the 2019 roundtable format, which included Algeria, Mauritania, and the Polisario, and to discuss acceptance of its 2007 autonomy plan. The roundtable format was a short-lived negotiating arrangement introduced in 2019 by former UN envoy Horst Kohler, who resigned after only two negotiating sessions for personal reasons, leaving the position vacant until de Mistura’s appointment. The Moroccans view the Polisario as an Algerian proxy and contend that only a grand bargain with Algeria and Mauritania can end the conflict. From its side, the Polisario insists on direct bilateral talks with Morocco to set the terms for a self-determination referendum.

De Mistura embarked on rebuilding ties with regional actors through the use of constructive ambiguity. By prioritizing direct bilateral consultations and keeping a relatively low profile, he gradually expanded his scope of action. His use of the phrasing “all concerned” to avoid precisely describing who should be involved in future negotiations, and invitation to Morocco and the Polisario Front to move beyond their current positions, provided a basis for moving forward. In particular, the “all concerned” language allowed him to sidestep the issue of who should be involved in diplomatic efforts related to Western Sahara by addressing all the parties with a stake in this conflict, whether as direct parties or regional observers. Through such constructive ambiguity, he was able to avoid defining exactly which actors should be involved and which plan should be the basis for negotiations. In October 2022, the Security Council adopted amendments to its annual resolution on Western Sahara that echoed the envoy’s wording, thus providing him with much-needed backing and placing pressure on the parties to engage with him.

Washington’s role 

The Biden administration has started playing a somewhat more assertive role in efforts to revive UN-brokered negotiations. Over the past months, US officials have engaged with all parties involved, aiming to contain regional tensions and rebuild the UN framework for Western Sahara. Washington’s unique position as the only external actor capable of engaging with all stakeholders makes it a critical interlocutor.

Other external actors have struggled to have any impact. France has strengthened its relations with Algeria over the past months, to the detriment of its traditionally close ties with Morocco. Two events in particular contributed to the deterioration. In January 2023, President Emmanuel Macron met with Algerian Chief of Staff Said Chengriha in Paris; and Morocco accused French members of the European Parliament of backing, if not championing, a resolutioncondemning Moroccan violations of press freedom. For its part, in 2022 Spain publicly endorsed the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan as “the most serious, realistic and credible basis” to solve the conflict, angering the Polisario and Algeria. Germany also expressed its support for the Moroccan plan, having mended its ties with Rabat. And Morocco sees Russia, which is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, as too close to Algeria’s and the Polisario’s stancesto be a credible mediator.

Despite its privileged position, Washington has been reluctant to invest significant political capital in ending the conflict, considering it a low-priority issue. Instead of applying pressure, the administration has tried to build confidence among all the main stakeholders by leveraging their desire for strong ties with the United States. To this end, the Biden administration has worked to establish closer economic and security ties with Algeria, maintained relations with Morocco, and offered the Polisario the prospect of an expanded diplomatic relationship. But its reluctance to make a bigger push for negotiations could hamper the UN envoy’s efforts. 

Indeed, Morocco has yet to modify its position. Moroccan diplomats continue to engage with the UN envoy, but refuse to abandon the 2019 roundtable format or negotiate beyond their autonomy plan. The Polisario remains open to discussing the envoy’s proposals, but skeptical of the current circumstances for negotiations due to a lack of international attention toward the conflict and a weak negotiating position. 

Israel’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara

Despite the temporary lull in tensions, Israel’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara has further exacerbated regional tensions. The Moroccan media celebrated the July 17 announcement as another diplomatic victory for the kingdom. The move did not go unchallenged. Three days later, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned it as “a blatant violation of international law.”

Israel’s step may have bolstered Morocco’s efforts to formalize its control over the territory but is unlikely to inject real momentum in its strategy to secure international support for its claim. International media highlighted how the move strengthens the dominant narrative that Rabat has the upper hand in this conflict, but Israel’s controversial role in the region suggests that few other states will follow its example. 

Supporting a fragile path back to negotiations

The Western Sahara conflict continues to present significant challenges to regional stability, but recent diplomatic efforts offer hope for progress. With some modest backing from the Security Council, de Mistura has managed to open some limited space to pursue a political solution. To ensure that the UN envoy’s efforts to revive talks have any chance of success, Washington should engage more proactively as a relatively impartial broker by extracting concessions from both sides to create a climate more conducive to resuming negotiations. As a first confidence-building step, the United States could ask Rabat to release at least some of the Sahrawi activists who have been detained since protests in Gdeim Izik in 2010 and grant the UN envoy unrestricted access to Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. On the other side, it should encourage the Polisario to unilaterally suspend its military operations against Morocco. Such steps, if successful, could be enough to lay the basis for a resumption of negotiations.

Riccardo Fabiani is the project director of the North Africa program at the International Crisis Group 

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The focus on elections did not bring the establishment of a new political regime but, by crystalizing differences among the forces on the ground, caused the perpetuation of the same civil war, which is still ongoing today, albeit in a different form.

The other big mistake was the enactment, on April 11, 2013, of the General National Congress’s Political Isolation Law “with the aim of removing former [Gaddafi] personnel from the country’s political, economic, educational, and security institutions. This law represented a purely punitive instrument, without any of the conciliatory measures that have proved instrumental” The enactment of this law—barring individuals from holding government positions or participating in Libya’s political life if they had supported or been involved to any extent with the previous regime—caused the definitive break between old and new elites and the system’s polarization. 

The rest of Libya’s more recent history is the continuance of this dynamic with relative differences among actors and players. The fragmentation of the country in various diverse and antagonistic poles occurred in all the milestones of today’s Libya’s history, such as the clashes in 2014 between General Khalifa Haftar’s militias in the Eastern part of Libya (what is historically known as Cirenaica) and a set of mostly Islamist militias dominant in the western part operating under the name of Libya Dawn. It became clear that the political fragmentation that caused the proliferation of militias and warlords and determined the paralysis of the Libyan system was the inevitable outcome of the previous structural socio-political conditions described above.

The intervention of external actors, in particular those regional and international powers that have projected their national interests onto the country, should be added to the conditions that led to this internal situation . A geopolitical confrontation soon turned into full support for rival Libyan local political factions and/or armed militias, heightening internal fragmentation. For example, the maintenance of a division between an eastern region dominated by General Haftar and his militias and another area in the west under the United Nations–recognized government of Fayez Serraj is the result of strongly Egyptian and Emirati support for Haftar versus Italian, Turkish, and Qatari support for Tripoli.

For a long period, the situation in Libya was considered a de facto proxy war. Deeper studies showed this was only partially the case; it was evident that the domestic actors were not simply proxies but maintained a relative degree of independence and the capacity to manipulate the foreign backers according to their interests.

With the passing of time and the lack of oversight and control from a central government, the various militias turned into gangs while the international community stood idly by and discussed phantasmal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and army training programs. Little by little, the gangs entrenched themselves in diverse territories, primarily through illegal means such as extortion and racketeering, beyond their increasing involvement in the various smuggling trades.

After the failure of the attack by General Haftar’s forces against the city of Tripoli in 2019, the international community, led by Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Libya Stephanie Williams, devised and planned for the election of a government of national unity (GNU) to be elected by an assembly of Libyan representatives selected by the United Nations, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF). This assembly, formed by seventy-five members representing multiple constituencies, elected a three-person Presidential Council headed by President of the Presidential Council Mohamed Mnefi and Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah.

The government’s task was mainly to prepare the country for a round of presidential and parliamentary elections. For multiple reasons, the GNU failed in doing so. The parliament in Tobruk, the House of Representatives, demanded the resignation of Dbeibah. At his refusal, they proceeded to appoint Fathi Bashaga as the new prime minister. However, Bashaga never succeeded in entering Tripoli and assuming the role of prime minister. Dbeibah was elected by bribing some of the voters in the LPDF and continued to govern the country through a vast system of corruption and cooptation.

This allowed the various gang-like militias to entrench their positions further and strengthen their grip on the local territories. While Libya remained formally divided, very recently, behind-the-curtain deals among Haftar’s sons and relatives of Dbeibah seem to lead to an agreement to form a new Dbeibah-led reshuffled government. The main purpose of this new government would be to lead the country to elections. However, according to most, it will only be a continuation of the previous one—which means a continuation of corruption and pillage of the country’s resources by these ruling groups.

This most probable outcome of the Libyan process—the progressive creation of a mafia-like state in the middle of North Africa—seems to be the most certain outcome. Such an end could hypothetically be avoided by a military intervention by a more substantial power, such as Turkey or Egypt, that conquers the country and exercises overwhelming power to establish the rule of law. It is a possibility but not highly probable. The alternative, constituted by the potential agreement among healthy Libyan elites, is also improbable as there is no sign of these elites. Another possible scenario could be a conscious decision by a Western country to exercise pressure and other means to force Libyan elites to follow a direct path to election, creating a shared government of national unity and the slow progressive establishment of a pluralistic modern system.

However, almost none of these scenarios will likely bring a positive outcome. All the pain and suffering that the Libyan population has been enduring since 2011 could have been avoided had the international community and the new Libyan elite paid more attention to the reconstruction and rebuilding of the state rather than the conquest and appropriation of power.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council 

Alessia Melcangi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, associate professor of contemporary history of North Africa and the Middle East at the Department of Social Sciences and Economics at the Sapienza University of Rome.

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Tinubu is inheriting a country burdened by concurrent security and economic challenges. Nigerians expect Tinubu to unify the country and address economic hardship caused in part by the removal of unsustainable subsidy regimes that constrain the government’s ability to finance growth and development. Tinubu has made initial efforts already. For example, the Nigerian government spent $10 billion in 2022 on just the petroleum subsidy, and another $2.41 billion in the first five months of 2023. Now with Tinubu having removed the subsidy and also having implemented foreign-exchange reforms, Nigeria is expected to save $5.10 billion in the second half of 2023, which could go toward the government’s financing of growth and development projects.

Meanwhile, at this inflection point for African leadership on the global stage, Tinubu has been elected chairman of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). There is currently a grave need for leadership among and better coordination between African countries, as shown by dissonance between African countries on their visions for a new global financial architecture during the recently concluded Summit for a New Global Financing Pact and bilateral deals by African Union members. For example, Senegal and the International Partners’ Group—including France, Germany, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada—signed a 2.5-billion-euro clean-energy agreement, while Zambia negotiated a $6.3 billion debt restructuring plan with its creditors. While these deals will offer relief to Senegal and Zambia, they are mere palliatives that distract from united African positions and fall short of systemic recommendations from the Africa High-Level Working Group on the Global Financial Architecture, including structural reforms that lower financing costs and availability, overhaul the Group of Twenty (G20) Common Framework, and amplify African voices in global forums. Tinubu should lead the coordination of a united African movement on the global stage that pushes wealthy countries to support African debt relief and new financing for climate action.

Domestic challenges

The Nigerian government’s social contract with the country’s citizens is broken and made harder to repair by economic-inclusion and inequality challenges that often manifest in bouts of insecurity and banditry.

The Tinubu administration certainly did not create these conditions, but it must now address them with economic and security measures. The administration has responded with new security measures and bold economic policies, including the removal of the fuel subsidy; it has also signed the Student Loan Act, a much-needed mechanism for increasing access to higher education, and suspended the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) governor, a step taken to depoliticize the office. Newly installed Acting Governor of the CBN Folashodun Shonubi ended the practice of using multiple exchange rates and replaced it with a liberalized exchange rate regime. The arbitrage between the black-market and official foreign-exchange rates, in the previous regime, fueled rent-seeking uneconomic profits of round-tripping, where banks divert foreign exchange obtained from the CBN at a lower official rate to the parallel market for higher profits.

But there’s plenty more Tinubu must do. First, to help maintain the public’s support, the administration needs to clearly communicate that it faces a tradeoff in addressing Nigeria’s two major economic challenges: high inflation and high unemployment. Any attempts to address either will exacerbate the other in the short run. Even so, the Tinubu administration should prioritize economic growth and job creation, especially as there are endogenous and exogenous inflationary pressures that economic tools at the disposal of the president will simply lack the scope to address.

Exogenous inflationary pressures are driven primarily by two concurrent events. First, while the World Bank expects global commodity prices to fall in 2023, food prices will be at the second-highest level since 1975. A projected 2023 crude oil average price of eighty-four dollars a barrel is expected to inflate the price of goods and services; in addition, the strength of the US dollar increases the cost of most internationally traded commodities. That doesn’t bode well for an import-dependent economy such as Nigeria. Endogenously, the removal of the petrol subsidy has increased the costs of goods and services, and the liberalization of the foreign exchange market has prompted Nigeria’s currency to rapidly devalue. Yet, Tinubu’s economic reforms are needed to reduce Nigeria’s estimated debt service-to-revenue ratio—73.5 percent in 2023—and its debt-to-GDP ratio, which is projected to reach 37.1 percent this year.

To its credit, the Tinubu administration is also balancing economic reforms with increased social programs. The Nigerian Senate approved the administration’s request to borrow $800 million from the World Bank to mitigate inflationary pressures from the subsidy removal. The administration has further declared affordable food and clean water as national-security imperatives. However, debt-funded measures are only temporary, and the administration needs to increase internally generated revenue (but not necessarily increase taxes) and invest in improved infrastructure to drive economic growth and job creation—even if increased liquidity and purchasing power exacerbate short-term inflation. To this end, the administration must improve the ease of paying taxes in Nigeria; in a ranking of countries according to the ease of paying taxes there, Nigeria currently stands at 159 out of 189 countries. Accordingly, Taiwo Oyedele, a former partner at PWC who now heads the Presidential Committee on Fiscal Policy and Tax Reforms, must bring coherence to Nigeria’s often conflicting tax laws and fiscal policy and harmonize taxes and revenue administration to improve the ease of doing business which should grow the tax base and increase the tax collection rates. The alternative would be a worsening economy and increased emigration of talented young Nigerians.

Investments in infrastructure should prioritize the implementation of the recently signed 2023 Electricity Act, which authorizes states, corporations, and individuals to generate, transmit, and distribute electricity, encouraging private-sector investment. Currently, Nigeria generates an inadequate four thousand megawatts of electricity, even though its population of more than 210 million people needs an estimated 30,000 megawatts of electricity. Reliable electricity supply is a precondition for industrialization, increased productivity, and improved quality of life. Overall, the administration should implement a bottom-up regional industrialization framework to move the 80 percent of workers who are employed in informal sectors or sectors with low productivity to the formal sector.

More broadly, the administration should focus on fostering better economic integration among Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. The Nigerian National Economic Council (NEC)—a presidential economic planning advisory group composed of the vice president and state governors, among others—can help create such integration. Nigeria’s constitution requires principal political officeholders to reflect the “federal character”—or diverse tribal, religious, and regional differences—of its six geopolitical zones. But the diversity, equity, and inclusion intent of federal character has devolved into a political arrangement to distribute national resources and patronage. The NEC should reappropriate the six geopolitical zones as regional economic development clusters that leverage regional comparative advantages into productive, rather than distributive, economic activity.

Furthermore, the Tinubu administration should reorganize the country’s chronically underfunded tertiary education system. It should do that by creating entrepreneurship and green-technology innovation centers that gather universities and polytechnic colleges to develop solutions to the country’s challenges and, ultimately, bolster Nigeria’s economic competitiveness. This will generate additional well-thought-out and intentional solutions for tackling domestic challenges. For example, Nigeria is reported to spend $22 billion annually to fuel private electricity generators to satisfy the country’s energy demands, but has only 2 percent solar-power adoption. The federal government has introduced a $550-million off-grid solar electrification program, which should partner with polytechnics to develop domestic solution for powering homes and small businesses with clean energy—but that’s just one solution; Nigeria needs more.

Global expectations

The Tinubu administration will also need to prove that Nigeria can be a leader on the global stage. The administration should start by intentionally engaging with Nigeria’s highly educated diaspora, many of whom represent or lead organizations that can become natural conduits to international markets, capital, and foreign direct investment.

Of the countries in Africa, Nigeria has the largest economy and population. Coupled with Tinubu’s position as chair of ECOWAS, this heightens expectations for the Nigerian president to shape an African consensus on a host of issues, including the defense of a rules-based international order that reflects African equity and strategic interests. These are the prerequisites if Nigeria is to successfully lead the advancement of African interests in the G20—there are proposals for African Union membership in that forum—and other international forums such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and United Nations. Regional challenges remain, not only domestically, but also with the recent coup in Niger and ECOWAS’s response under Tinubu. What is clear is that Tinubu faces a myriad of challenges and that the world is closely watching how his leadership will seek to address and confront them on the world stage.

Inclusive domestic economic policy and a well-prepared foreign policy agenda are critical for Nigeria’s international engagement. The international order is demonstrably replete with opportunities for the Nigerian government to deliver for its citizens and the African continent. Tinubu must seize the opportunity.

O. Felix Obi is a member of the Executive Office of the US president’s Trade Advisory Committee on Africa at the Office of the US Trade Representative. He is also chair of the Economic & Trade Development Taskforce (Africa Commission) at the Maryland Governor’s Office of Community Initiatives.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post There are high expectations for Nigeria’s new president. Here’s how he can fulfill them. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Ukraine pushes Russian forces along multiple fronts

Tracking narratives

Increased tensions along Belarus-Poland border

Relatives of Wagner fighters share details about their current status

International affairs

Putin releases op-ed prior to 2023 Russia-Africa Summit

Pro-Russian Telegram channel depict Niger coup as a new opening for Wagner

Ukraine pushes Russian forces along multiple fronts

Fighting continues along different parts of the front line in eastern and southern Ukraine as Kyiv’s forces expand their counteroffensive operations. The Russian army retreated from its positions in Andriivka, south of Bakhmut, after a successful Ukrainian attack, according to a July 25 briefing by Andrii Kovalov, spokesperson for the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. DFRLab monitoring of open source channels suggests that Ukrainian forces have now entered the village; fighting is still ongoing near Andriivka, however.

Ukraine is currently conducting offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut. Kovalov said that Russian units were unsuccessful in advancing south of Ivanivske and west of Klishchiivka. Fighting in Klishchiivka remains active, with the site increasingly becoming a frontline hotspot. Kovalov also noted that Russian troops “continue to put up strong resistance, move their units, and use reserves.” In a separate statement, Kovalov reported that Russian forces were pushed out from their positions near the village of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.

Meanwhile, Serhii Cherevatyi, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Military Command, told the Kyiv Independent that Ukrainian forces are “using the entire line of armaments provided to us by our partners.” Cherevatyi also confirmed that Ukraine had used US-provided cluster munitions in battle. The munitions were likely used around Bakhmut, given that’s where the fighting has been concentrated, but this is not yet verified. 

On July 26, US officials told the New York Times that they believed Ukraine had initiated a significant push southward in Zaporizhzhia Oblast; a Russian defense ministry spokesperson noted that Ukraine had launched a “massive” assault south of Orikhiv and Robotyne. “Ukrainian officials declined to confirm that the assaults took place,” the New York Times added.

Ukraine is also considering a response to Russian strikes against grain infrastructure and cultural heritage, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on July 24 after a meeting with leading military staff. Russia withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17, effectively terminating the deal that permitted Ukraine to export its agricultural goods. In addition, Russian forces have attacked the strategically important Odesa region, hitting grain silos and cultural heritage sites, including a cathedral.

Speaking to CNN, a Ukrainian defense intelligence official said Kyiv was responsible for the July 24 drone attack on Moscow. Russian authorities reported that Ukrainian drones targeted two buildings in the Russian capital. The Kremlin said it thwarted the attack and neutralized the drones. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs added that the drones were suppressed by “electronic warfare” and crashed, damaging two non-residential buildings. One drone detonated on Komsomolsky Avenue, located within the perimeter of a defense ministry compound and close to a building used by the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). 

Also on July 24, the occupying Russian authorities in Crimea claimed that Ukrainian drones struck an ammunition depot in the Dzhankoi region, where the Russian army maintains an active presence. Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov said that unspecified unmanned aerial vehicles attacked the Crimean capital and warned that more UAV attacks would be carried out against Russia. Oleg Kryuchkov, an advisor to the occupying Russian authorities, said that officials would closely monitor social media for posts that could help Ukrainian forces identify targets in Crimea. 

That same day, Agence France-Presse video journalist Dylan Collins was reportedly wounded in a drone attack while reporting from a Ukrainian artillery position near Bakhmut. Collins sustained non-life-threatening shrapnel injuries.

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Increased tensions along Belarus-Poland border

On July 20, the Belarusian defense ministry reported that Wagner participated in joint drills with the Belarusian military at a training field in Brest, near the Polish border. In response, Poland relocated military units from the western part of the country to supplement units in the east.  

Responding to Poland’s military movement, Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 21 accused Poland of having hostile territorial ambitions toward Ukraine and Belarus, and claimed that any aggression against Belarus would be considered an attack on Russia. He threatened that Russia “will respond to this with all the means at our disposal.” 

Two days later, Putin hosted Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka in Saint Petersburg. During the meeting, Lukashenka asserted that Poland intends to annex western Ukraine, which he said was unacceptable. Lukashenka claimed that if western Ukraine asked for help, Russia and Belarus would support it against Polish aggression. Lukashenka also thanked Putin for confirming that an attack on Belarus is equal to an attack on Russia, stating that Putin is “the first person in Russia who spoke about this openly, clearly, and understandably.”

Lukashenka also noted that he brought Putin a map that allegedly shows the deployment of Polish troops along the borders of Russia and Belarus. According to Lukashenka, one Polish military brigade was positioned forty kilometers from the Belarusian city of Brest, while another brigade was one hundred kilometers from Grodno. Lukashenka also claimed that Wagner members in Belarus are pushing him to allow them to go “west”—in other words, Poland—saying that Wagner members want to “go on an excursion to Warsaw and Rzeszow.” He then clarified that he was aware of the fact that many Wagner fighters are belligerent toward Poland and he would keep them within the boundaries of Belarus.

—Givi Gigitashvili, research associate, Warsaw, Poland

Relatives of Wagner fighters share details about their current status

New details about Wagner’s deployment to Belarus appeared this week. Sibir.Realii, a service of the independent US-funded RFE/RL in Russian, investigated online chats involving family members of Wagner fighters. Chat members complained that there was no news from Wagner soldiers for almost a month prior to July 23. During part of this period, many Wagner fighters were at a military camp near Molkino in Krasnodar Krai, Russia, and any external communications were forbidden. Previous reporting by Zerkolo, a Belarusian independent media outlet in exile, corroborated their location, as its correspondents talked with people living near Molkino about their experience with Wagner soldiers who had maintained a presence there since at least 2017. 

According to Sibir.Realii, Wagner fighters who had signed contracts prior to the invasion of Ukraine had transferred to Belarus, though no exact number was given. Other Wagner fighters reportedly returned home. These fighters might include convicts recruited in 2022; on June 28, a Russian court ruled that completing active service in the war in Ukraine would result in a pardon for their previous crimes. 

Sibir.Realii cited relatives of Wagner fighters who stated that Wagner troops had relocated to a camp near Osipovichi, Belarus. This is most likely the recently renovated military camp in the village of Tsel, where Wagner fighters have reportedly trained with Belarusian soldiers. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin recently registered his company, Concord Management and Consulting, with an address in Tsel, listing its primary enterprise as “real estate management.”

Wagner family members additionally claimed that the fighters cannot leave the camp in Belarus, and that “they cannot withdraw money they allegedly received before the mutiny.” One chat member claimed that fighters would receive a salary of 150,000 rubles (USD $1,670) a month, and that their salary for July would be transferred to them in August. Sibir.Realii noted that a recent Wagner recruitment advertisement on Telegram had promised Wagner troops a monthly salary of 240,000 rubles (USD $2,670).

Family members in the chat also referenced Prigozhin’s recent statements on Central African Republic television that Wagner was expanding its presence there. They added that some Wagner fighters had returned to Russia to receive new passports for foreign travel, but faced a number of problems, including long processing times and official requests to not leave the country due to unpaid debts.

—Nika Aleksejeva, resident fellow, Riga, Latvia

Putin releases op-ed prior to 2023 Russia-Africa Summit

Three days prior to this week’s Russia-Africa Summit and Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, the Kremlin published an op-ed written by Putin. The essay, “Russia and Africa: Joining Efforts for Peace, Progress, and a Successful Future,” detailed Russia’s vision for the future of its relations with African nations. It also outlined multiple Kremlin narratives routinely deployed across the continent. 

In the essay, Putin reiterated the narrative of a Russia historically opposed to colonial oppression, while also underlining how Moscow has always supported the development of the continent. “We have consistently supported African peoples in their struggle for liberation from colonial oppression,” he wrote. “We have provided assistance in developing statehood, strengthening their sovereignty, and defense capability.”

Subtly referring to anti-Western narratives employed by the Kremlin, Putin said that contrary to Western powers, Russia has “always strictly adhered to the ‘African solutions to African problems’ principle” and has “never tried to impose on partners our own ideas about the internal structure, forms and methods of management, development goals, and ways to achieve them.” 

In a reference to the emerging multipolar world order, Putin stated, “[T]here is no doubt that Africa, along with Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, will take its worthy place in it and finally free itself from the bitter legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism, rejecting its modern practices.” 

Putin reiterated Kremlin narratives blaming Ukraine and the West for Africa’s food, grain, and fertilizer shortages. He specifically referenced the grain deal that Russia recently abandoned. “While it was publicly advertised by the West as a gesture of goodwill that benefited Africa, has in fact been shamelessly used solely for the enrichment of large US and European businesses that exported and resold grain from Ukraine.” Putin failed to note how Africa has directly suffered the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however.

The first Russia-Africa Summit, held in 2019, kickstarted a series of official visits, diplomatic initiatives, and arms deals to African countries. It also helped broaden the role of state-sponsored actors like the Wagner Group in African affairs, expanding Russia’s reach in the region. With Putin’s op-ed, his remarks seem to suggest that this week’s summit will continue in the same direction, with Russia will sparing no effort to reinforce its influence on the African continent.

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

Pro-Russian Telegram channel depict Niger coup as a new opening for Wagner

Russian Telegram channels are following events in Niger closely after Nigerien soldiers announced the removal of democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum on July 26. As the coup unfolded, the channels portrayed Bazoum as a vassal of the West, and Niger under Bazoum’s leadership as being “directly dependent on France” and “part of the remnants of the French neo-colonial empire.” The Telegram channels emphasized that Central African Republic, Mali, and Burkina Faso—countries in which Wagner is confirmed to be present or allegedly present—had extricated themselves from French military influence in recent years.

Some channels also claimed the coup leaders were associated with Wagner Group, alleging that Wagner supported the faction of Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, which seized control of the presidency. One Russian military blogger, Boris Rozhin, reported on his channel that Wagner would soon receive an invitation from a “free” Niger.

The coup is also seen as a confirmation of Prigozhin’s recent statements about expanding Wagner’s presence in Africa. The channels emphasized the importance of Niger’s uranium mines to France, possibly alluding to the fact that Wagner’s presence in African states is often linked to them receiving local mining concessions.

Bazoum insisted the day after the coup that “hard-won gains will be safeguarded.” But the coup will likely change Europe’s political calculus regarding Niger, which had become central to France and the European Union’s new approach to a region plagued by a growing Jihadist insurgency and political instability, particularly in the wake of French forces pulling out of Mali in 2022.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

—Mattia Caniglia, associate director, Brussels, Belgium

The post Russian War Report: Kremlin seeks stronger ties in Africa as Wagner eyes Niger coup appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In partnership with

North Africa is, once again, the theater of local and global challenges, which makes it a highly unstable regional complex. Unresolved crises like the ones in Libya and Western Sahara create obstacles to regional security, economic integration, and peaceful coexistence. The presence and influence of regional players like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Russia—each having competing interests, priorities, and methods of operation, opens new pathways for conflict and instability. Moreover, the climate crisis is paving the way for additional challenges, with high temperatures soaring across the Mediterranean, scarce crops, and a looming global health crisis. Meanwhile, the number of migrants attempting to reach Europe rose threefold in comparison to this time last year, leaving European countries scurrying to find solutions while maintaining strong ties with North African leaders and standing for human rights—a somewhat impossible task. 

What is in store for the region, and what can global players such as the European Union (EU), the United States, and the African Union do to contain the side effects stemming from crises rising in North Africa?  The US withdrawal from the Middle East has clearly shaped its involvement, or lack thereof, in North Africa. Despite President Joe Biden announcing a more robust US presence in the continent, his feeble attempt to restore the status quo between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara is telling a different tale. Meanwhile, the European Union has heavily engaged with Tunisia by signing a memorandum of understanding which aims to stem migration flows while also improving the country’s economic conditions. However, European powers have failed to address the democratic backsliding occurring in the country, which in turn has fueled violence, poverty, and economic uncertainty. The following set of essays, edited by the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program and the Institute for International Political Studies, seeks to address these challenges and others while also offering concrete recommendations for policymakers. 

Alissa Pavia is the Associate Director of the North Africa Program  

Chiara Lovotti is an ISPI Research Fellow and Scientific Coordinator of “Rome MED-Mediterranean Dialogues”, ISPI’s and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ annual flagship event. 

Report

Aug 3, 2023

Libya: Back to the future?

By Karim Mezran and Alessia Melcangi

The current Libyan situation is complex, influenced by numerous factors, including the conditions of the 2011 revolution. The misconception of it being a whole people’s revolution led to a focus on elections instead of national reconciliation, hindering the rebuilding of consensus and a new social contract.

Civil Society Conflict

Report

Aug 3, 2023

The Western Sahara conflict: A fragile path to negotiations

By Riccardo Fabiani

The long-dormant conflict over Western Sahara has resurged in recent years, challenging regional stability. Diplomatic tensions between the main sides, coupled with the collapse of the 1991 UN-brokered cease-fire and US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in 2020, have complicated the situation. The appointment of UN envoy Staffan de Mistura in 2021 offers hope for the revival of cease-fire talks, while the UN and the United States aim to stabilize the conflict through renewed diplomatic efforts.

Conflict International Organizations

Report

Aug 3, 2023

Gulf engagement in Tunisia: Past endeavor or future prospect? 

By Sebastian Sons

Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar regard Tunisia as an important foreign policy partner within their regional sphere of influence. They also welcome Tunisia’s current autocratization under President Kais Saïed. However, Gulf states no longer pursue strategic goals there. As the region is undergoing a geopolitical shift toward more conflict management and reconciliation, the Gulf states consider Tunisia as a partner of choice in regional stability but no longer as a partner of necessity in terms of economic investment or development cooperation.

Civil Society Democratic Transitions

Report

Aug 3, 2023

Egypt’s stability is the GCC’s top priority in the region. Here’s why. 

By H.A. Hellyer

After the 2011-2013 revolution in Egypt, the author discussed the GCC’s relationship with Egypt with a senior minister, who emphasized the importance of Egypt’s stability. This sentiment has been shared by most GCC leaders over the past decade, though the way it has been expressed may have evolved. Political nuances in Cairo were considered less crucial, while the focus remained on the pragmatic and straightforward need for stability in Egypt.

Defense Policy Economy & Business

Report

Aug 3, 2023

Irregular migration from North Africa: Shifting local and regional dynamics

By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Human Rights Italy

The post The North African complex: Regional players, global challenges appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Below, Atlantic Council experts answer four pressing questions about what just happened and what to expect next.

1. Why did Russia pull out of the deal?

Moscow’s notification to the UN, Kyiv, and Ankara that it was suspending participation in the grain deal and would not renew the deal further is part of a negotiating strategy to loosen sanctions and gain more freedom of maneuver. Russian standard practice is to make humanitarian measures conditional upon concessions that serve its military, economic, and political interests—as it has with earlier negotiations on the grain deal and numerous times over relief and aid deliveries in Syria. 

Specific demands in this case include readmitting the Russian agricultural lender Rosselkhozbank back into the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) mechanism, allowing Russia to import repair parts for agricultural machinery, and unfreezing other assets. Moscow claims that the deal, known as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, has not delivered on points that were to benefit Russia, but this round of pressure is certainly about more than the letter of the deal; it is about easing sanctions pressure.

—Rich Outzen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a geopolitical analyst and consultant currently serving private sector clients as Dragoman LLC.

2. What’s the next move for Ukraine and its Western partners?

In October 2022, Russia left the grain deal, actually suspended its participation, and there were only three parties left: the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. The grain corridors at that time functioned well, in part because the Russian inspectors had been disrupting the grain deals from inside. The most rational way to react to this withdrawal is to proceed in the trilateral format with the UN, Ukraine, and Turkey. I don’t think Russia has a lot of options now. In the northwestern part of the Black Sea, Russia lacks capacity to inflict any major damage. Since Ukrainian armed forces retook Snake Island last year, the maritime area has been largely controlled by the Ukrainian side. So there is little possibility for a major disruption by Russian vessels in this part of the Black Sea.

Russia could say that continuing the deal in a trilateral format crosses a “red line.” But if Russian forces attack a vessel transporting grain, it could trigger a major reaction that Moscow would not want to face, depending on which country the vessel belongs to, who is the owner, and who the sailors are. I would not be surprised if after a meeting or phone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the next few weeks, Russia rejoins the grain deal.

Meanwhile, messages from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have been very clear that there has been no deal between Ukraine and Russia. The deal is among Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN. What Putin undermines now is his agreement with the UN and Turkey, not with Ukraine. Russia’s halt of its participation in the deal will likely further increase insurance costs, but in June the Ukrainian government approved a maritime compensation scheme so that vessels calling at Ukrainian ports will be compensated if they are damaged due to Russian military activity. So, from the Ukrainian side, there is readiness to proceed with the deal.

While trying to keep the grain corridors functioning, it’s also important to step up efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, a basic principle of international law. Crimea must be de-occupied and should not become a bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow, because Russia will continue to use Crimea to threaten security in the Black Sea and global food markets for as long as it is allowed to do so.

—Yevgeniya Gaber is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and a former foreign-policy adviser to the Ukrainian prime minister. 

In practice, the deal had pretty much collapsed some time ago when ships started to disappear from the horizon off of Odesa’s Black Sea coast. Normally, up to a dozen bulk carriers are waiting to be loaded; in the past couple weeks, one or two at best—indicating things weren’t working well at the joint clearance center in Istanbul. (Ukrainians have blamed Russian inspectors for deliberately slowing down clearance procedures.) 

So what happens next? The UN and Western nations should not succumb to the Kremlin’s blackmailing tactics. Russia should not be given another chance to weaponize food—nor be given sanctions relief in exchange for allowing ships carrying food to sail through international waters.

A global food emergency should be declared and, as I told BBC World News this morning, arrangements made for ships to sail under armed escort through the Black Sea. Of course, such a measure would never get past Russia’s veto in the UN Security Council. So creative diplomacy is required, perhaps with the European Union taking the lead.

In the near term, Ukraine should also be assisted with moving grain transport onto alternative arteries such as the Danube River and onto trains and trucks. Poland can play a key role by alleviating the days-long waits truck drivers currently face entering Poland from Ukraine. 

—Michael Bociurkiw is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center based in Odesa, Ukraine.

3. What are the prospects for getting the deal back, and what could the UN and Turkey do right now?

The deal will likely survive because Ukraine, Turkey, and Europe more broadly, as well as a number of developing nations, benefit from it, which likely makes modest concessions to the Russian position acceptable to the leaders of those countries. Given the disinclination of either the Turks or NATO to directly intervene in the conflict, it is unlikely that there will be direct military escorts for grain ships rather than a negotiated deal. Nor do the Russian forces appear ready for a major naval escalation in the Black Sea, so there is a fair chance they will settle in the end. The reputational and economic costs of a prolonged end to grain shipments will hurt Russia, too, so I do not expect a prolonged or permanent cancellation of the deal.

—Rich Outzen

4. What impact does this have on the developing world?

The threat to global economic landscape and food security—especially in Africa and other developing regions—is hard to overstate. While once soaring food prices amid pandemic supply chain disruptions and Russia’s war had begun to stabilize, thanks in large part to the more than thirty million tons of wheat exported from Ukraine under this deal, the situation remains volatile. Down from its peak of 160 in March of 2022, the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Food Price Index was at 122 in June, still a third higher than June 2020, when it was 93. Globally, food price inflation remains higher than 5 percent per year in more than 60 percent of low-income countries and nearly 80 percent of lower-middle-income and high-income countries. Real food inflation is as high as 80 percent in Zimbabwe, 30 percent in Egypt, and 14 percent in Laos. And within countries, women and already vulnerable communities tend to be hardest hit. In just the last two weeks, the World Bank reported that wheat prices had decreased by 3 percent globally—gains Monday’s announcement are all but certain to reverse.

—Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and global head, inclusive economic growth at Abt Associates.

The post Russia just quit a grain deal critical to global food supply. What happens now? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Despite a long-term military counterterrorism effort, Nigeria still ranks as the eighth most-affected country on the Global Terrorism Index. Because of the persistence of the problem, Tinubu will need all the help he can get, including from the United States. Thus—especially at a time when the Sahel and coastal West Africa are embroiled in ever-worsening security crises—it may seem illogical for the US State Department to remove Boko Haram, once considered the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO).

However, this action is long overdue. To designate a group as an FTO, the State Department must demonstrate that 1) the group is a foreign organization, 2) the group is engaged in, or retains the capability and intent to engage in, terrorist activity and 3) this activity threatens US citizens, interests, or national security. The US secretary of state must revoke a listing if they find “that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.”

Sure, the circumstances have not changed. But the circumstances never met these criteria to begin with because Boko Haram, one of Africa’s most well-known terrorist organizations, does not exist at all. Ultimately, “unlearning” this term will yield more accurate and valuable insights into the reality of the threat. Revoking the designation will set the United States and its partners on a more productive path toward finally resolving the violence in Nigeria.

The source of the misnomer

Around 2005, a fundamentalist Islamist sect emerged in northern Nigeria under the direction of Mohammed Yusuf. He began preaching a specific interpretation of the Quran, and one of his core arguments was that Nigerian Muslims should reject Western education and schools that had been introduced under British colonial rule. Because of this message, locals began calling him and his followers “Boko Haram,” which translates to “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language. Outsiders used this phrase as a derisive term to refer to this secretive sect, their followers, and other suspected affiliates.

In 2009, Yusuf’s sect staged an uprising across several northern states following escalating tensions with the state police. Within a matter of days, the movement was essentially eliminated by security services in a brutal crackdown (killing approximately eight hundred members in just a few days) and Yusuf was taken into custody and then executed shortly after. Since then, several movements have emerged in the region. The most active group has been Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (JAS), which was founded around 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. His organization is responsible for many of the murders and violent incidents in the country over the last decade. Several factions have split from JAS, including Ansaru in 2012, which later rejoined JAS and then splintered again. In 2016, a third group emerged that called itself Islamic State-West Africa Province. They have all, at various times, been active across the region.

What’s in a name?

“Boko Haram” doesn’t really fit into that history. From the first uses of the term to describe Yusuf’s sect, locals have repurposed the name to describe suspected fundamentalist and Islamist extremism in the region. All these operations and more, including a wide array of non-terrorist criminal and gang activity, have variously been attributed to “Boko Haram” by government officials, state security forces, journalists, and locals who lacked complete information about what they were describing.

In short, the use of the name survived even as the actual insurgent organizations in the region changed affiliations, splintered, or disbanded.

Thus, since the early years of the violence, many observers believed they were witnessing the rise of “Boko Haram,” but this perception did not correspond with the activity on the ground and the constellation of terrorist organizations (none of whom used the name) in the region. The ultimate challenge, therefore, isn’t just the use of the wrong name, but what it signifies: It gives an inaccurate impression that there is a singular operational group with a clear ideology and an organizational history. Researchers and experts have analyzed the activity in the region through this lens, bringing a host of largely unrelated activity under the umbrella of the supposed entity. In late 2013, when the State Department designated “Boko Haram” as an FTO, US decision makers seemed to be influenced by what the British anthropologist Ruben Andersson has called “the Timbuktu syndrome”—the mapping of the West’s jihadist fears onto the world’s less familiar peripheries.

Why delisting matters

The State Department’s FTO designation is essentially targeting a ghost. Delisting the organization would have several tangible benefits.

Most importantly, it would streamline the resources the United States dedicates to countering terrorist activity in northern Nigeria. An FTO designation unlocks new authorities for government agencies to target terrorists, but it also requires agencies to follow through and enforce these designations. Due to the host of violence and petty criminal activity that has mistakenly been attributed to “Boko Haram,” the United States is pouring resources into addressing unaffiliated crime and issues that fall solely under the jurisdiction of the Nigerian government without realizing any stabilizing counterterrorism benefits.

Removing “Boko Haram” and instead correctly listing JAS will also benefit the national research apparatus, including academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies. Since the early years of the violence, independent researchers have helped shape the US approach toward “Boko Haram” and informed US counterterrorism strategies, including military involvement, intelligence collection, and humanitarian assistance. Researchers and academics have had no reason to question the existence of “Boko Haram” when conducting research on the region, which has allowed for persistent uncertainty to dominate the field. As a result, attempts to analyze the confusing array of activity and operations that have been linked to “Boko Haram” have yielded weak insights and less productive recommendations.

For example in 2021, two of the most influential and long-standing leaders in the region—Shekau and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi—were declared dead. For counterterrorism officials, whom Shekau had eluded for almost a decade, this development marked a welcome shift. With the en masse surrender of fighters formerly associated with JAS, some hoped that they had finally witnessed the end of “Boko Haram.” However, many scholars and experts believe that a fundamental aspect of the “group” is its perpetual adaptability, which in fact is largely driven by the loose application of the term to violent events in Nigeria. Thus media organizations, for example, are still publishing articles on new purported attacks by the “organization.” Absent a rejection of “Boko Haram,” the reliance on the term thus ultimately invites a perpetual motion of resurgence that leaves no real end to the violence in sight.

By delisting “Boko Haram,” the State Department will serve its own interests by setting new analyses and inquiries on the right track to accurately identifying terrorist activities and trends in the region. Without this change, there are two grim yet likely consequences. Counterterrorism research projects and resulting US strategies will continue to operate based on avoidable misconceptions and incomplete information on the violence. And more concerningly, without a real reckoning over the existence of the “group,” every new instance of violence in northern Nigeria risks becoming engulfed in the thickening fog of suspected “Boko Haram” activity.

The responsibility now lies with the global collective, and with these US State Department officials in particular, to consciously and deliberately unlearn the deep-seated belief in the “organization’s” very existence.

Alexandra Gorman is a young global professional with the Africa Center and is a masters’ candidate at Johns Hopkins University in the Global Security Studies program. As an undergraduate at Duke University, she received high honors on her senior thesis, “Nigeria’s Militant Jihadism in the Mirror of the Media: the Creation of ‘Boko Haram.’”

New Atlanticist Mar 1, 2023

Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria?

By Atlantic Council experts

What went wrong with election administration and what can Bola Tinubu do to win over his critics? Atlantic Council experts, one of whom served on the ground as an election monitor, weigh in.

Africa Democratic Transitions

AfricaSource Oct 7, 2022

How Niger’s safety net helps its most vulnerable citizens thrive amid crises

By Ouhoumoudou Mahamadou and Mamta Murthi

The World Bank’s Wadata Talaka safety-net partnership program with Niger aims to empower women in the country and protect its human-capital gains in the face of overlapping shocks.

Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Sep 27, 2022

Here’s what a Marshall Plan for the DRC could look like

By Jean-Paul Mvogo

The development progress the DRC witnessed in the 1970s is now lost. A massive economic assistance program equivalent to the Marshall Plan may be necessary to recover what’s been lost.

Africa Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

The post Boko Haram is a ghost. The US needs to recognize that. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

The prominence of West Africa, and Africa as a whole, within the global disinformation ecosystem cannot be ignored. A report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies released in April 2022 identified twenty-three disinformation campaigns targeting African countries dating back to 2014. Of these campaigns, sixteen are linked to Russia.

The listed disinformation campaigns—nine of which were identified by the DFRLab—reveal two key points. First, there has been a marked increase in the number of publicly identified disinformation campaigns in recent years. Whether this is due to an increase in the scrutiny, analytical capacity, or efforts on the part of bad actors is unclear. Second, the characteristics of each of these influence operations are distinct—these operations target a wide variety of issues, such as elections, the war in Ukraine, commercial interests, and domestic and international politics.

Further, relations between France and francophone West Africa have, following years of amicable relations built on the back of military cooperation, seen a marked erosion that was underscored by the exit of the last of the French troops from Mali in August 2022. Anti-France and pro-Russia sentiments have surged contemporaneously, with overlapping narratives positioning Russia as a viable alternative to Western aid. When French forces began their departure from Mali in June 2022, Russian private military companies (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group stood ready to fill the void.

This report examines several influence operation case studies from the West African region, with a particular emphasis on Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger. The narratives, actors, and contexts supporting these influence operations are summarized alongside their impact on regional stability. Russian influence plays a significant role in these case studies, an unsurprising fact considering the geopolitical history of this region.

This report also includes case studies from outside the Sahel region, consisting of thematically distinct but strategically noteworthy influence campaigns from elsewhere on the continent. For example, the Nigerian government used social media influencers to suppress citizen participation in the #EndSARS movement. Elsewhere, the Ethiopian diaspora used innovative click-to-tweet campaigns to spread international awareness of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. In South Africa, the rise in violent xenophobic demonstrations was precipitated by a popular social media campaign that normalized prejudice against foreign nationals.

The plethora of actors, targets, strategies, and tactics make a blanket approach to studying African disinformation networks difficult. The depth and breadth of these campaigns shows that Africa is facing the same challenges as the rest of the world insofar as disinformation is concerned. Moreover, the interest shown by foreign governments attests to the region’s geopolitical significance. This combination of geopolitical importance and a vulnerability to influence campaigns makes Africa a notable case study.

Background

Africa’s information environment is not monolithic Analog channels such as radio and film are used in conjunction with digital efforts to reach audiences, but Internet penetration rates and the accompanying reli- ance on analog media differ significantly from country to country For example, as of January 2022, Morocco, the Seychelles, and Egypt maintained Internet penetration rates of higher than 70 percent, nearly ten times the rate of the country with the lowest penetration rate, the Central African Republic (7 percent).

In the countries mentioned in the table above, Facebook and Instagram maintain a leading position insofar as social media penetration is concerned This can be partly ascribed to Facebook’s Free Basics service that “zero-rates” data (including Facebook and Instagram data) on participating mobile networks. These mobile networks can then bundle Facebook and Instagram data into a consumer’s service plan without the consumer having to pay extra for that data use Considering that mobile connections outstrip desktop connections, and that mo- bile data is more expensive than fixed broadband, it is clear why this has been effective to expand Facebook and Instagram’s footprint Meta shuttered the Free Basics program in some regions at the end of 2022 as the program’s spiritual successor – Meta Discover – was being rolled out The impact this will have on the information environment remains to be seen.

Social media and internet penetration rates in some of the African countries referenced in this report

With contributions from

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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The post The disinformation landscape in West Africa and beyond appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The summit and recent visits by high-ranking Biden administration officials to Africa were the culmination of an effort led by the White House to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the African continent in a wide variety of aspects.

This approach by the Biden administration is quite different from the one adopted by the Donald Trump administration, which saw the continent as a playground for superpower rivalry between China, Russia, and the United States. As part of this great power competition, the Biden administration seeks to enhance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to block Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.

However, one area both administrations completely ignore is Iran’s growing influence on the continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action in Africa.

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979—and even more so following the heavy political pressure on Tehran—Africa has become an attractive continent for the Islamic Republic. Iran views the African continent as a “battleground” for influence, power, and territory against Saudi Arabia, and has also sought to counter Western influence—particularly that of the United States—within Africa, working with elements that are opposed to colonialism and seeking to chart a more independent course.

Moreover, Iran seeks to utilize their worldwide network of religious and cultural organizations, including universities and charities, to increase its influence over the vast Shia minorities in Africa, using them for political support, fundraising, and even to recruit to terrorist cells.

But Iranian terrorist activities in Africa are not the only problem. Iran is not hesitating to interfere in the internal affairs of many African countries to preserve its interests and protect the individuals who serve its policies. A prominent example is the unprecedented Iranian involvement in 2019 to free Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky from his detention in Nigeria, with Iran using its control on Hausa TV to push for his release.

The Iran-West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, which was held on March 7, is another indication that Iran is seeking to enhance its relations with African countries and strengthen its foothold, especially in the west of the continent. This is part of President Ebrahim Raisi’s vision regarding relations between West African countries and Iran, which was exemplified in his visit to Guinea-Biassau in August 2021, when he pledged to continue expanding ties between Iran and the continent. In many regards, this activity resembles the policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Africa, which sought to improve relations significantly.

Apart from Iran’s traditional interests in Africa, several new ones have emerged that must be considered in the context of preventing Iran from consolidating its interests in the continent.

First and foremost is the campaign that Tehran is waging against US allies in Africa that dared to take part in the normalization efforts with Israel: Sudan and Morocco. In order to achieve this goal, Iran has enhanced its military and diplomatic ties with Algiers and increased military aid to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. The latter contribution has improved the front’s ability to inflict severe damage on the Moroccan army and challenge Moroccan control over the territory. Iran is also working in Mauritania and sees this country as a priority zone for its influence schemes in the Sahara region, which is extremely important for Moroccan security.

In the case of Sudan, Iran’s bid to further its influence in the strategic Horn of Africa suffered after Khartoum joined the Abraham Accords. In order to change this negative trend, Iran is blaming Israel for causing political instability in Sudan’s domestic issues. Furthermore, Iran is still actively trying to spread its Shia doctrine in the country while conspiring to create a political vacuum in Sudan that will weaken the forces who agreed to sign a normalization agreement with Israel.

Through its actions, Tehran is demonstrating that there is a price for joining the Abraham Accords and that it can pose a direct or indirect threat to Sudan and Morocco. Iran is also conducting a powerful political campaign to prevent Israel from enhancing its relations with other African countries and improving its diplomatic presence in various African institutions, such as the African Union.

In addition to the illegal arms smuggling network that Iran managed to build in the Horn of Africa, which allows Tehran to smuggle weapons to the countries of the continent, it also appears to be planning to significantly increase its sales of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) to the African continent. Evidence of this can be seen in Iran’s involvement in the civil war in Ethiopia and the sale of Mohajer-6 UAVs to the Ethiopian army.

Against the background of Iranian involvement in Ukraine and Tehran’s desire to increase sales of its military equipment in the war in Ukraine, Africa is a natural continent for this desire, and the transfer of these capabilities to the Polisario Front constitutes another indication of that.

Third, there is a need to pay close attention to the plots that were revealed in several African countries after the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020—the foiled plot to assassinate the US ambassador in South Africa, chief among them. During the past year, several plans were discovered in which Iran sought to harm American or Israeli interests in Africa or use its presence in the continent to recruit terrorists.

In order to protect its allies in Africa and preserve its interests in the continent, the Biden administration cannot focus solely on the growing presence of China and Russia. It must also consider Tehran’s deepening foothold in Africa, which is a growing challenge to US policy on the continent. The administration must prepare an orderly work plan with the cooperation of African countries—and possibly Gulf countries—that are very disturbed by Iranian expansion. The goal of this would be to reduce Iranian influence in Africa and prevent Iran from using African countries to achieve its interests.

Looking to the future, Africa will continue to be an attractive target for Iranian policy under Raisi. Without a well-thought-out action plan, the US will have minimal ability to push Tehran out of Africa and prevent it from coordinating with China and Russia, with the latter having engaged in an unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran in recent months. Thus, countering Iran’s influence in Africa must become a priority for the Biden administration sooner rather than later.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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The situation is, in part, being made worse by climate change, which is increasing temperatures and changing weather patterns, compounding the hardship already caused by droughts. According to the International Monetary Fund, a third of the world’s droughts occur in Sub-Saharan Africa; meanwhile, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Horn of Africa is experiencing the longest and most severe drought on record. These conditions are weakening food systems across Sub-Saharan Africa, an area in which agriculture, forestry, and fishing make up 17.2 percent of the gross domestic product—and substantially more in countries like Sierra Leone and Chad.

But there’s more to this food insecurity trend than climate change; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused uncertainty in the global food market, disrupting the production and trade of key commodities. Russia and Ukraine are significant suppliers of oil, wheat, and maize, and disruptions to the supply chain, combined with local conflicts in some countries, have caused inflation to soar, with food prices increasing as much as 55.6 percent in the Horn of Africa.

Fighting these rising levels of food insecurity requires a whole-of-nation approach. But countries in these food-insecure regions aren’t doing enough to harness the economic and agricultural potential of half their populations: women. For example, discriminatory laws that hamper women’s access to land and financial services are still in place in some countries. In order to fight food insecurity in full force, these countries must ensure that women are equipped with the exact same resources as men: both land itself and the decision-making power to determine how to use that land in the most productive way possible. Policymakers in these food-insecure countries should take the following actions:

Equalize inheritance rights

Some countries in these food-insecure regions have made significant strides recently in passing reforms that impact women’s lives in some respects—but they have faltered in passing meaningful reforms related to improving access to assets and entrepreneurship opportunities for women.

According to the Center for Global Development, agriculture accounts for 56 percent of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and women account for 57 percent of agricultural workers. The informal sector accounts for 50 to 80 percent of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa—activity that includes the sale of food. And like the agricultural sector, the informal sector is a major employer of women: In Africa, 89.7 percent of employed women work in the informal sector. Yet despite the roles that women play in these sectors, only 30 percent of women own land in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The discrepancy in land ownership extends in part from inheritance laws. In some of these food-insecure countries, inheritance plays the primary role in determining land ownership. Some inheritance laws across the region are—or were initially—patriarchal, favoring men in the division of property. There have been some signs of progress in protecting women’s rights to inherit property; for example, in Uganda, lawmakers recently amended the Succession Act to ensure equal inheritance rights between men and women.

However, Uganda’s Succession Act was the first inheritance reform implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa since Mali’s in 2011, according to the World Bank, demonstrating the slow pace of progress. More countries must follow suit by implementing their own amendments or fresh, new laws on inheritance rights.

Support women’s entrepreneurship

Owning land goes hand-in-hand with access to financial services. In countries across these food-insecure regions of Africa, farmers must have land titles in order to access the credit necessary to increase agricultural productivity by hiring workers, purchasing animals or farming equipment, and covering transportation and storage costs of their goods. Credit supports entrepreneurship, which promotes innovation and the accumulation of wealth—both of which are integral to fighting food insecurity in the region. However, just as women’s rights to own land are hindered in some countries, their rights to enterprise are sometimes hindered as well.  

According to the World Bank, 71 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have laws that prohibit financial institutions from discriminating based on gender, and women often face more stringent loan arrangements than men when they do access credit. Furthermore, according to the International Monetary Fund, in Sub-Saharan Africa, just 37 percent of women own bank accounts compared to 48 percent of men. If a woman must rely on a man to open a bank account, take out a loan, or register a business, she cannot fully exercise her rights as an entrepreneur to hire workers or freely determine the agricultural methods she uses with the hopes of increasing output.

All countries in these food-insecure regions of Africa should criminalize gender-based discrimination with regard to credit. Allowing women an equal opportunity to receive loans encourages entrepreneurship, leading to more production and competition in the agricultural market. Benin’s Order No. 2349-5—which was implemented in 2022 and prohibits credit, banking, and decentralized financial systems from using discriminatory practices in granting access to credit—can serve as a model for other countries.

Putting the law into practice

Laws are only part of the solution. Guaranteeing equal access to land and credit requires systemic change. Localities and financial institutions need to make a concerted effort to ensure that women are aware of their rights and encourage them to embrace the opportunities to own land or become entrepreneurs.

Activists and government officials should work with local leaders to hold seminars for women, outlining their rights to own land and offering to process land titles. In the private sector, financial institutions can create campaigns specifically marketed towards women, publishing advertisements in print, social, and broadcast media that encourage women to apply for credit.

By taking concrete steps to ensure that women have equal access to land and entrepreneurship, countries can empower their full populations, bringing major benefits for the economy, agricultural productivity, and food security.

James Storen is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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Seventy-eight years after World War II, as facts fade and fewer survivors remain, the Holocaust risks being forgotten. This natural amnesia is compounded by widespread campaigns to revise or repress Holocaust history. International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 and Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoah) on April 17 are important annual observances to counter these trends, but much more needs to be done year-round. Surprisingly, the Arab world may soon become a world leader in rejecting denialism to reassert “Never again!”

Present events constantly reshape the perceptions of the past and, indirectly, future outcomes. There are people in every country around the world who claim that the Holocaust never took place. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Holocaust denial is mainly a trend among the younger generation due to a lack of Holocaust education in schools and after-school activities. For decades, the Holocaust has been a taboo subject, politicized and conflated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in official discourse. Historical truth is clouded, if not overshadowed, by key actors in the Arab world who connect Israeli state policies and the Jewish people worldwide—past and present, using them interchangeably, as if they were one. Opposition to Israel becomes resistance to the reality of Jewish suffering and injustice done to Jews in the past.

As a result, the Holocaust was absent from public consciousness until 2009, when Morocco’s King Mohammed VI became the first Arab leader to recognize the Holocaust by addressing the matter in a message addressed to the launch event of the Aladdin Project at UNESCO in Paris.

“Amnesia has no effect on my understanding of the Holocaust, or that of my people,” said the king, adding, “We must together endeavor to reassert reason and the values which underpin the legitimacy of a space of co-existence where the words of dignity, justice, and freedom will express themselves in the same way and will coexist, with the same requirements, regardless of our origins, cultures or spiritual ties. This is our interpretation, in Morocco, of the duty of remembrance dictated by the Shoah.”

Speaking at international conferences and forums devoted to the Holocaust and intercultural dialogue, King Mohammed VI and representatives of the Moroccan government have frequently emphasized the significance of denouncing anti-Semitism, instilling togetherness, and religious coexistence in Moroccan society, learning from the lessons of the Holocaust, and highlighting the crucial role that education plays in this context.

Challenges for Holocaust education in the Arab world

Past efforts at Holocaust education in the Arab world have too often suffered from a lack of context-specific sensitivity. In contrast to the king’s speech, which expresses the values and ideals of the Moroccan tradition as the basis for affirming Holocaust remembrance, others have simply translated Euro-centric Holocaust materials into Arabic, mainly from fear by civil society actors they would be blamed for “normalizing” with Israel if they tried to teach about the Holocaust. To effectively use Holocaust education as a tool for genocide prevention, the content should be tailored to Arab audiences using relevant wording, metaphors, names, and historical events.

In contrast to other areas of the world, World War II battles were fought, and Jews of the MENA region, directly or indirectly, experienced the Holocaust. Employing this little-known history in creating educational content is essential to sparking children’s imagination.

On the other hand, if this would only be a requirement, rather than a shared process of mutual development, educators would not take ownership of these materials and will lack the motivation to use these materials towards the essential goal of developing Holocaust education within the Arab world.

The power of participation

Today, initiatives all over the Middle East and North Africa try to promote Holocaust education through standard education approaches. However, teacher-to-student Holocaust education, while powerful, cannot reach the vast audience in need of this vital information and perspective. There is an increasing need to use state-of-the-art media, including those that allow for online sharing of ideas. While the hateful have exploited the Internet to spread racism, Holocaust denial, and other destructive ideologies, it can also serve as a powerful tool to educate and empower those fighting hate.

In 2011, the Kivunim Institute and Mimouna Association organized the first conference on the Holocaust in the Arab world commemorating the actions of the late King Mohammed V at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. An article in the New York Times praised the event as a “first of its kind in an Arab or Muslim nation, and a sign of historical truth triumphing over conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic dogma.”

The Mimouna Association and United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in 2017 jointly created the first Arabic-language Holocaust curriculum by and for Muslims. The Holocaust education material created was tailored to the specific context of the Arab and Muslim world.

The USHMM, which is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary this month, has prioritized promoting Holocaust education in the Arab world, for example, through Holocaust commemorations in Morocco in 2018 and 2022, and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 and 2023. In 2022, the USHMM organized an important Holocaust commemoration in the UAE and Egypt.

In the Emirates, Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori created in 2021 the first Holocaust memorial exhibition in the Arab world at the Crossroads of Civilization Museum in Dubai. This permanent exhibit is the first of its kind in the Arab world, and offers visitors a setting within which to begin to understand the Holocaust and fight the denial of this dark chapter of human history.

In Morocco this year, the Mimouna Association, in partnership with the Council of Jewish Communities in Morocco, the United Nations Information Centre, and the ASF, provided over 120 students from different Moroccan universities and institutes, Moroccan Muslim activists, and members of the Moroccan Jewish community with an opportunity to engage and learn more about the history of the Holocaust.

In the largest synagogue of Casablanca, 350 guests—including university students, Morocco’s Minister of Education Chakib Benmoussa, diplomats from the United States, Israel, France, Germany, Poland, The Vatican, and Spain, as well as representatives from Moroccan civil society and international organizations—packed the pews to honor King Mohammed V, savior of the Moroccan Jewish community.

Recognizing the deep convictions, moral approach, and brave policy of Sultan Mohammed V, the US ambassador to Morocco, Puneet Talwar, affirmed, “His Majesty King Mohammed V protected Morocco’s Jews from the Nazis. And His Majesty King Mohammed VI has carried on that legacy. He has spoken forcefully against the denial of the Holocaust.”

The Chief Rabbi of Casablanca, Rabbi Joseph Israel, said a customary Moroccan prayer honoring the king and his forefathers. The Muslim students also heard the Chapters of Psalms, Kaddish, Yizkor, and the Kel Malei Rachamim in memory of the Holocaust victims.

On the eve of Yom Hashoah, it is no longer considered taboo in the MENA region to promote Holocaust education and genocide prevention. The region’s youth are far more receptive to discussing the events of one of the darkest chapters of human history, despite the political, religious, and educational challenges shrouding this historic move that has been praised in some nations in the region and criticized in others.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter: @ElBoudra.

The N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, seeks to broaden and deepen normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. It works with governments to produce actionable recommendations to deliver tangible benefits to their peoples.

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After a decade of ruptured ties and simmering tensions, Egypt and Turkey are inching towards a rapprochement—a move thought unimaginable by some observers a couple of years prior. This thawing of relations was most recently symbolized by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu’s visit to Cairo on March 18.  

However, the true turning point came during the FIFA World Cup opening ceremony in Qatar in November 2022, where Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan met each other briefly and engaged in a highly publicized handshake. This signaled the end of hostilities between the former rivals. Later in February, Egypt’s top diplomat Sameh Shoukry traveled to the southern Turkish city of Mersin to offer solidarity and support in the wake of massive earthquakes that hit southern and central Turkey and neighboring Syria, wreaking havoc and claiming tens of thousands of lives. These overtures and gestures were necessary to repair the mistrust and animosity that had grown over the years.

Relations between Egypt and Turkey soured in 2013 after the overthrow of Egypt’s former President Mohamed Morsi, who hailed from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist movement designated as a “terrorist organization” by Cairo that very year. Morsi, a key ideological ally of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), was deposed by military-backed mass protests, later condemned as “a coup” by Turkish politicians. From that point onwards, relations between Cairo and Ankara deteriorated, and the two sides continued to trade recriminations.

Tensions between the two countries escalated in 2020, threatening to blow up into a full-fledged military confrontation after Turkey intervened militarily in Libya’s civil war—a move that drew backlash from President Sisi, who perceived it as a blatant threat to Egypt’s national security. During a visit to a military base in the Western Desert close to the Libyan border on June 22, 2020, Sisi ordered the Egyptian army to “be ready to carry out any mission outside the country”—a clear message to Ankara that he was contemplating the use of military force to defend Egypt’s Western border. Sisi’s threat came after Turkish-backed Syrian mercenaries who were fighting alongside forces of the United Nations-recognized Government of National Authority (GNA), succeeded in halting the eastward advance of opposing troops led by Libyan General Khalifa Haftar, whom Cairo backed. 

“Any military intervention in Libya would be a legitimate means of self-defense as Sirte is a red line for Egypt,” Sisi warned in reference to the strategic central Libyan city that serves as a gateway to eastern Libya, a region with vast oil reserves. Gaining control of Sirte, which lies 1,000 km (approximately 621.37 miles) away from the Egyptian border, would have meant access to nearby air bases, posing a direct threat to Egypt’s security.  

Egyptian media has welcomed the new era in Egyptian-Turkish relations but Cairo appears to be less enthusiastic than Ankara about restoring diplomatic ties and is treading cautiously. Thus with Turkish presidential elections slated for mid-May, the Egyptian leadership would rather wait until after the Turkish elections to move forward with normalization.  

The political standoff has not impacted economic and trade ties between Egypt and Turkey, which have remained robust throughout the past decade. Separating their economic exchanges from their political dispute has proved mutually beneficial: Turkish investments in Egypt amounted to an estimated $2.5 billion in 2021, and the volume of trade between the two countries nearly tripled in the period between 2007 and 2020, reaching $11.4 billion in 2020. Turkish companies across a wide range of sectors—such as electronics, textiles, and medical supplies—have continued their operations throughout, unfettered by the diplomatic rift. Nevertheless, expectations are rife that the warming of ties will reflect positively on the two countries’ ailing economies through the further bolstering of trade and investments.

Foreign Minister Shoukry has, meanwhile, conditioned the resumption of relations with Turkey on “real actions showing Turkey’s alignment with Egypt’s principles and goals.”

Cairo would like to see Turkish authorities clamp down on exiled Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters residing in Turkey and extradite fugitives accused of committing acts of violence against the Egyptian state. Additionally, it wants Istanbul-based media channels, fiercely critical of the Egyptian government, shut down.  

From Cairo’s perspective, Ankara has taken steps to show it is serious about rapprochement. In March 2021, Turkish officials urged hostile opposition channels to tone down their criticism of the Egyptian president. Not long afterwards, Mekameleen, a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated channel notorious for its persistent lambasting of Sisi, announced the suspension of its broadcasts from Istanbul, saying it was moving its headquarters “elsewhere.”   

Another pre-condition set by Cairo for normalizing relations is non-interference by Turkey in Libya’s internal affairs. Cairo insists on the withdrawal of Ankara-backed Syrian militias in Libya, which Egypt sees as a threat. While it is highly unlikely that Ankara will acquiesce to this demand—Turkey has turned a deaf ear to earlier calls by French President Emmanuel Macron to remove all foreign troops from Libya, including those financed by Ankara—some kind of compromise may be reached, such as keeping the Turkish military advisors that were sent to Libya at the behest of the previous GNA while withdrawing the Syrian troops which Cairo labels “extremist militia.” 

Egypt’s warming up to the new unity government in Tripoli—after years of siding with opposing forces led by warlord Haftar—may pave the way for future talks with Libya and Turkey to defuse tensions over the foreign troop presence that Cairo finds unsettling.         

There is also a need for multilateral talks to de-escalate inflamed regional tensions over maritime borders: an October 2022 agreement with the unity government in Libya allowing Turkey to explore for oil and gas in an exclusive economic zone off the coast of Libya has drawn protests from Cairo and Athens—as well as other regional governments—which slammed the deal as “illegal.” 

To the chagrin of the Tripoli-based GNU, Egypt took the bold step two months later in December 2022 by unilaterally delineating its maritime border with Libya. Some analysts said the decision was “aimed at protecting Egypt’s economic interests.”   

Enhanced energy cooperation with Egypt—which has ambitions of becoming a regional energy hub and a major gas exporter to Europe and eastern Mediterranean markets—is something Cairo would welcome. Therefore, Turkey would do well to win over regional rivals by joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum or at least by engaging with its members—a crucial step toward ironing out its differences with Greece and the Greek Cypriots. 

Finally, the Turkish offer to mediate between Egypt and Ethiopia in the Renaissance Dam dispute may serve as an olive branch that could speed up Ankara’s reconciliation process with Cairo. Serious commitment to mediation efforts between the two Nile Basin countries may allay Cairo’s concerns over the expansion of Turkish ties with Ethiopia—in particular, the sale of Turkish armed drones to Addis Ababa, which Cairo and the US fear may be used by the Ethiopian government against rebel forces in Tigray.

While the Ethiopian parliament has removed the Tigray National Liberation Front from the country’s terrorism list after the government signed a ceasefire agreement with the leftist ethnic party ruling Ethiopia’s northern region in November 2022, tensions remain high between the government and Oromo Liberation Army, an armed opposition group seeking autonomy for the country’s largest ethnic community in the Oramia region of Ethiopia. 

With all this in mind, Turkey must turn the page on past rivalries and its quest for regional influence. It should instead build on its deep-rooted social and economic ties with Egypt and shared historical heritage to start a new era of fruitful cooperation. This would very much be in the interests of the two countries and the region.

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

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Online Event Mon, March 27, 2023 • 1:30 pm ET

Live from the Freedom Online Coalition: How the FOC works for people around the world

The DFRLab hosts the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman along with civil society and industry experts for a discussion on the Freedom Online Coalition and how the world’s democratic tech alliance advances human rights online.

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Ahead of the Biden administration’s second Summit for Democracy, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman gave a sneak peek at what to expect from the US government on its commitments to protecting online rights and freedoms.

The event, hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab on Monday, came on the same day that US President Joe Biden signed an executive order restricting the US government’s use of commercial spyware that may be abused by foreign governments or enable human-rights abuses overseas.

But there’s more in store for this week, Sherman said, as the United States settles into its role as chair of the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)—a democratic tech alliance of thirty-six countries working together to support human rights online. As chair, the United States needs “to reinforce rules of the road for cyberspace that mirror and match the ideals of the rules-based international order,” said Sherman. She broke that down into four top priorities for the FOC:

1. Protecting fundamental freedoms online, especially for often-targeted human-rights defenders
2. Building resilience against digital authoritarians who use technology to achieve their aims
3. Building a consensus on policies designed to limit abuses of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI)
4. Expanding digital inclusion  

“The FOC’s absolutely vital work can feel like a continuous game of catch-up,” said Sherman. But, she added, “we have to set standards that meet this moment… we have to address what we see in front of us and equip ourselves with the building blocks to tackle what we cannot predict.”

Below are more highlights from the event, during which a panel of stakeholders also outlined the FOC’s role in ensuring that the internet and emerging technologies—including AI—adhere to democratic principles.

Deepening fundamental freedoms

• Sherman explained that the FOC will aim to combat government-initiated internet shutdowns and ensure that people can “keep using technology to advance the reach of freedom.”
• Boye Adegoke, senior manager of grants and program strategy at the Paradigm Initiative, recounted how technology was supposed to help improve transparency in Nigeria’s recent elections. But instead, the election results came in inconsistently and after long periods of time. Meanwhile, the government triggered internet shutdowns around the election period. “Bad actors… manipulate technology to make sure that the opinions and the wishes of the people do not matter at the end of the day,” he said.
• “It’s very important to continue to communicate the work that the FOC is doing… so that more and more people become aware” of internet shutdowns and can therefore prepare for the lapses in internet service and in freely flowing, accurate information, Adegoke said.
• On a practical level, once industry partners expose where disruptions are taking place, the FOC offers a mechanism by which democratic “governments can work together to sort of pressure other governments to say these [actions] aren’t acceptable,” Starzak argued.
• The FOC also provides a place for dialogue on human rights in the online space, said Alissa Starzak, vice president and global head of public policy at Cloudfare. Adegoke, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, stressed that “human rights [are] rarely at the center of the issues,” so the FOC offers an opportunity to mainstream that conversation into policymakers’ discussions on technology.

Building resilience against digital authoritarianism

• “Where all of [us FOC countries] may strive to ensure technology delivers for our citizens, autocratic regimes are finding another means of expression,” Sherman explained, adding that those autocratic regimes are using technologies to “divide and disenfranchise; to censor and suppress; to limit freedoms, foment fear, and violate human dignity.” New technologies are essentially “an avenue of control” for authoritarians, she explained.
• At the FOC, “we will focus on building resilience against the rise of digital authoritarianism,” Sherman said, which has “disproportionate and chilling impacts on journalists, activists, women, and LGBTI+ individuals” who are often directly targeted for challenging the government or expressing themselves.
• One of the practices digital authoritarians often abuse is surveillance. Sherman said that as part of the Summit for Democracy, the FOC and other partners will lay out guiding principles for the responsible use of surveillance tech.
• Adegoke recounted how officials in Nigeria justified their use of surveillance tech by saying that the United States also used the technology. “It’s very important to have some sort of guiding principle” from the United States, he said.
• After Biden signed the spyware executive order, Juan Carlos Lara, executive director at Derechos Digitales, said he expects other countries “to follow suit and hopefully to expand the idea of bans on spyware or bans on surveillance technology” that inherently pose risks to human rights.

Addressing artificial intelligence

• “The advent of AI is arriving with a level of speed and sophistication we haven’t witnessed before,” warned Sherman. “Who creates it, who controls it, [and] who manipulates it will help define the next phase of the intersection between technology and democracy.”
• Some governments, Sherman pointed out, have used AI to automate their censorship and suppression practices. “FOC members must build a consensus around policies to limit these abuses,” she argued.
• Speaking from an industry perspective, Starzak acknowledged that sometimes private companies and governments “are in two different lanes” when it comes to figuring out how they should use AI. But setting norms for both good and bad AI use, she explained, could help get industry and the public sector in the same lane, moving toward a world in which AI is used in compliance with democratic principles.
• Lara, who also serves in the FOC advisory network, explained that the FOC has a task force to specifically determine those norms on government use of AI and to identify the ways in which AI contributes to the promise—or peril—of technology in societies worldwide.

Improving digital inclusion

• “The internet should be open and secure for everyone,” said Sherman. That includes “closing the gender gap online” by “expanding digital literacy” and “promoting access to safe online spaces” that make robust civic participation possible for all. Sherman noted that the FOC will specifically focus on digital inclusion for women and girls, LGBTI+ people, and people with disabilities.
• Starzak added that in the global effort to cultivate an internet that “builds prosperity,” access to the free flow of information for all is “good for the economy and good for the people.” Attaining that version of the internet will require a “set of controls” to protect people and their freedoms online, she added.
• Ultimately, there are major benefits to be had from expanded connectivity. According to Sherman, it “can drive economic growth, raise standards of living, create jobs, and fuel innovative solutions” for global challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and good governance.

Katherine Walla is an associate director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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This evolving discourse provides an ideological framework for Sub-Saharan African migrants subjected to documented instances of racism and expulsion during their stay in North African countries by local inhabitants and authorities. This new narrative transcends the conventional motivation of seeking exile or improved livelihoods in Europe and using these countries as a route to cross the Mediterranean clandestinely. It also supports a grotesque and historically misleading account about the origins of native Amazigh people of the region being inherently non-African because of their light skin color.

Resisting racism with Afrocentrism

In a speech on February 21, Tunisian President Kais Saied claimed that Sub-Saharan migrants “threaten the country’s national identity and must be stopped,” renewing the debate regarding xenophobia and discrimination against black communities in Tunisia. The divisive comments instigated the outrage of human rights activists at the national and international levels as the Maghreb region has been overwhelmed by waves of migrants and asylum seekers looking for dignity and improved living standards for the past two decades, aggravated by the Libyan crisis.

North African countries, already migration departure nations with over 12.3 million migrants internationally, have mixed records in dealing with the Sub-Saharan migration issue ranging from mass repatriations and ghettoization to limited efforts of naturalization and integration. Soaring inflation and unemployment rates in some countries led to a growing sentiment of prejudice and chauvinistic hate speech. It’s impossible to forget the outrageous scenes of stranded migrants left to starve in the open desert between Algeria and Niger over the past few years or others beaten to death as they attempted to climb the fence surrounding the fortified enclave of Melilla.  

Sub-Saharan migrants, infuriated by decades of mistreatment by Europeans and now by North Africans, found refuge in a new Afrocentric discourse to justify their right to exist and stay in the Maghreb facing racism with reversed racism and asking Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians, and Libyans to “go back to Asia” where they supposedly originated from. Afrocentric adepts even assert that the real Moorish people were black, and so were the pharaohs, and claim all civilizational glories that took place on African soil as inherently black.

The circulating social media clips and comments call to re-Africanize the Maghreb through mixed marriages and mass immigration. This movement is capitalizing on the Black Lives Matter movement, which reignited a pan-African sentiment and repositioned blackness in the political agendas in the United States and Europe to create the buzz and hide a more complex demographical and discursive phenomenon.

Historical misconceptions and racist legacies

The problem with this approach lies primarily in its erroneous historical accuracy. North Africa has always been the ancestral land of the Amazigh or Imazighen people, as proven by neolithic archeological excavations going back to at least 10,000 BC and known accounts from the antiquity encounters of Greek, Roman, and Phoenician with the Numidian, Mauri, and Libu people. Amazighs are also a distinct group anthropologically with specific genetic make, language, and culture processing ties with all of Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean. Arab settlers from the gulf and Levant colonized the region much later and were faced with fierce resistance by the autochthones led by their queen Al-Kahina in the eighth century.

The Berber and Arab people of the Maghreb have ongoing ethno-nationalistic divergences, as some Amazighs continue to claim to be ostracized by a ruling Arab class. This was exacerbated by French colonial rule, which intentionally distinguished between Arabs and Berbers in education, local government, and laws. Certain groups, like the Kabyles in Algeria, still sustain separatist demands and even have a government in exile. Nevertheless, the truth is that centuries of intermarriages and assimilation have created an amalgamation of both communities and gave birth to today’s North African identity, where it is impossible to proclaim ethnic purity. Black Africans themselves could not be reduced today to one race or culture, and it is utterly reductionist and essentialist to say an Ethiopian is the same as a Congolese or to compare a Sudanese with a South African.

The recent tensions between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa may be explained by the historical ties between the two regions of the continent, where the latter repetitively subjugated the first and annexed them as part of its empires. The Maghreb, additionally, has an undeniable dark heritage legacy of being slave owners and traders. In his book Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam, Arizona University professor Chouki El Hamel revisits this least-known chronicle of the region’s past, where western Africans were captured, emasculated, and used as soldiers or sold off to slave merchants and shipped to the new continent. Domestic slaves had a much grimmer faith, as they were subjected to physical violence, rape, and exploitation.

North Africa undoubtedly faces a serious migration problem that will continue to aggravate if not addressed regarding its social, cultural, and historical dimensions and root causes. The Sahara and the Sahel are already extremely precarious zones, with flourishing mercenaries and extremist groups recruiting migrants and utilizing them to destabilize the entire region. The security approach that Tunisian President Saied is preaching for would not suffice; only a more prosperous and economically integrated West Africa with its northern neighbors could provide a pathway to stabilization.

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs 

The post <strong>Afrocentrism is trending in the Maghreb. It’s because Sub-Saharan migrants are rewriting their narrative.</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It was a close call. Ruling party candidate Bola Tinubu was declared the narrow winner of Nigeria’s presidential election on Wednesday after balloting delays and scattered violence, with his two closest challengers saying they will dispute the results in court. Assuming Tinubu takes office as planned in May, he will lead a nation that is at once making big strides on the world stage and reeling from crises at home. Why was the election so rocky, and what should the new president’s priorities be? Our experts share their insights.

• Constance Berry Newman: Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center, former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and official international observer of Nigeria’s 2023 elections 
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Senior director of the Africa Center
• Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and co-founder of Tofino Capital

Notes from the ground

• Constance, who monitored the elections as part of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission, says the government did many things right in administering the election, including technological improvements and getting all political parties to commit to using only peaceful, legal means to challenge the results.
• But she says the government made several key mistakes, including long delays in opening polling sites. “This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities,” Constance reports.
• Another failure, she adds, was “a seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.”
• Constance attributes the surprisingly low voter turnout (27 percent) to “a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures.”
• But she comes away most impressed with the enthusiastic young people in a country where around 70 percent of the population is younger than age thirty. “Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country.”

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Tinubu’s agenda

• While Peter Obi, an outsider candidate from the Labour Party, garnered a ton of international press and led in some polls, Rama tells us that Tinubu’s win is “not a surprise.”
• That’s because Tinubu, 70, hails from the ruling All Progressives Congress party, “is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos,” Rama adds.
• But the fact that Tinubu lost Lagos—where he served as governor from 1999 to 2007—“demonstrates the power of the message” from Nigeria’s disaffected youth to their country’s political leaders, Aubrey says. Tinubu spoke directly to their concerns in his victory speech, referring to young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.”
• It won’t be easy for him to deliver: Aubrey points to Nigeria’s 42.5 percent youth unemployment, rampant inflation, soaring debt burden, and plummeting oil production. Tech and entrepreneurship are “a bright spot” in the economy, but amid a brain drain that’s seeing fifty doctors leave per week to work overseas, she adds, “Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide.” 

On the world stage

• Tinubu will be immediately thrust into a leadership role on the continent. “The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands,” Rama tells us.
• And as Africa seeks a larger role in the G20 and Bretton Woods Institutions, “Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue,” Rama adds. “The expectations have never been so high.”

The post What’s in store for Nigeria after a messy election appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Constance Berry Newman: The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

Aubrey Hruby: To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

Rama Yade: Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

The view from the ground: Where election administration fell short

On the ground, where I served in recent days as an election observer, it is about the Nigerian people—the voters, non-voters, youth, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other government officials, political parties, media, and civil society. Around ninety-three million Nigerians were registered to vote, but only 26 percent of those registered turned out to vote. Those who voted were engaged, standing in lines sometimes for hours, staying for the final counts, saluting each announced winner in their polling site. 

One puzzle not yet solved is: Why did so many more people decide not to vote than in previous elections? It’s probably all the same reasons Nigerians did not vote in the past—a belief that nothing will change anyway, a fear of violence and other intimidation factors, and a lack of an understanding of the voting procedures. However, the youth are amazing. We saw them at the polling sites, though exact turnout numbers are yet to be verified, and the National Youth Service Corps ran the election at the polling site level. My conversations with many of the youth led to an observation that Nigeria has reason to hope for a better future because many of the youth are really engaged and understand what is right and wrong for their country. There are mixed reviews regarding the role of the media, because there are barriers to media having the freedom to do its job, and parts of the media allow for and even provide misinformation and hate speech. 

With regard to the civil-society participants, many are sophisticated in data collection and analysis, questioning government officials with facts, using media and social media in effective ways. However, neither they nor the government nor the political parties has been effective in getting the citizens to vote in any meaningful numbers. Also, the political parties have a long way to go in terms of improving inclusion for youth, women, persons with disabilities, and internally displaced persons in the political process.

With regard to the government’s role in the administration of the election, one can draw both positive and negative conclusions. On the positive side: 

1. The Electoral Act of 2022 took steps to improve electoral integrity. However, conclusions are yet to be determined about the implementation of those steps across the board. 
2. Preparations for the election started earlier than for previous elections, which should have resulted in improved Election Day activities at the polls and final reporting of the results. 
3. Generally speaking, the technology worked, but it would have worked better had INEC pilot tested the technology on a national level prior to the February election. INEC piloted the key new systems in three off-cycle elections but never conducted a nationwide test.  
4. The government secured signatures from the eighteen political parties to the 2023 Peace Accord. Therefore, each presidential candidate and the candidate’s party committed to accepting the outcome of the elections or seek legitimate means of remedy in the event of divergent viewpoints.

For the various governmental entities charged with playing a role in the election, currency and fuel shortages were a negative. Also, while some may argue that it is unfair to assign blame, the fact is that the government did not stop election violence such as the assassination of the Labour Party senatorial candidate for Enugu East.

Specially for INEC, there were three main negatives: 

1. A lack of transparency, so voters and the general public did not understand why election data was published late, for example. 
2. Very late openings of polling sites because of late transportation of materials, missing materials, and late arrival of staff. This led to frustrated, often angry, voters, a limited number of whom left and a small number of whom engaged in violent activities. 
3. A seemingly ineffective and late tabulation announcement process that raised concerns about the announced results.

—Constance Berry Newman is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former US assistant secretary of state for African affairs. She is a member of the joint International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute Observer Mission to Nigeria’s 2023 presidential and legislative elections.

To win over his younger skeptics, Tinubu needs economic results—and fast

After one of the closest elections in recent Nigerian history, Tinubu has called for an “era of renewed hope,” asking for peace, patience, and solidarity. He acknowledged the role that the youth have played in the elections and the need to address young people’s “pains, your yearnings for good governance, a functional economy, and a safe nation.” The fact that the “godfather of Lagos” lost his home city to Peter Obi demonstrates the power of the message Nigerian youth sent in this election.  

In order to address the concerns of the youth, the septuagenarian Tinubu will need to turn his immediate attention to the economy. Food inflation, at a seventeen-year high, is up 28 percent year on year from 2021 to 2022, official youth unemployment hit 42.5 percent (according to the national bureau of statistics) and oil production has fallen to a forty-year low. Power is still expensive—Nigeria is home to sixty million diesel generators and fuel products are still imported—and the World Bank estimates that over 40 percent of Nigerians live below the poverty line. Borrowing on international markets to invest in infrastructure is not really an option for the new Tinubu administration, as Nigerian debt has nearly doubled since 2015 and is now over one hundred billion dollars.  

In the campaign, Tinubu committed to removing the fuel subsidies that cost Nigeria more than ten billion dollars in 2022, but this is not the first time a president tried to take on this beast. Then President Goodluck Jonathan’s efforts to remove the fuel subsidies ended after nationwide protests in 2012. This time around also promises to be politically difficult given the financial hardships faced by Nigerians.

Tinubu will also be asking a lot of Nigerians who are dependent on day-to-day imports should he push for the free float of the naira. The central bank currently restricts access to foreign exchange and rations dollars to prop up the naira, which is now valued at half of what it was when outgoing President Muhammad Buhari was first elected in 2015, resulting in a large spread between the official and street exchange rates. By the time Tinubu officially takes office at the end of May, hopefully the current government will have rationalized the demonetization plan that has caused cash shortages and long lines at ATMs.  

Despite all of these economic challenges, the Nigerian spirit has remained resilient. The informal economy (which, based on my experience doing business in the country for twenty years, is two-to-three times the size of the official economy) continues to absorb newcomers to the labor market, and there is a bright spot within Nigerian tech and entrepreneurship. The country is home to Africa’s largest venture capital and tech hub, and Nigerian companies such as Sabi, SeamlessHr, Moniepoint, and Moove are expanding to other economies in the region. 

But Tinubu will have an uphill battle in renewing young people’s faith in Nigeria. Young Nigerians are leaving the country in record numbers—those going to the United Kingdom to work has quadrupled since 2019—and the Nigerian Medical Association says that at least fifty doctors are leaving every week to work abroad. Tinubu will have to show quick results on the economic front to stem the tide. 

—Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, a co-founder of Tofino Capital, and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Tinubu will play a pivotal role in the continent—and the world

What we can say today is that even if the election was highly disputed, with Bola Tinubu, logic prevailed. Tinubu’s victory is not a surprise. He was running on behalf of the ruling All Progressives Congress. He is Muslim from the Yoruba-speaking southwest, and even if he lost there, he has strong support in Lagos. If the result is confirmed, the largest African democracy will have passed one of its most important tests since military rule ended in 1999. And it is not over: Beyond the presidential election, Nigerians are also electing their 469 representatives in the Senate and the House of Representatives. Democracy is a tough path.

This election is special, too, because Nigeria is transitioning to a new environment marked by an economic turning point and a changing continental and international context. The expectations have never been so high. Tinubu will lead a country that is expected to become the world’s third most populous by 2050. At the African level, Nigeria is a major actor whose economy represents 70 percent of the West African gross domestic product. The future of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the new Eco currency (which has been postponed to 2025), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (which needs to be accelerated) are in Nigeria’s hands. Even as it faces major shifts, it will tremendously impact the rest of the continent. At the global level, the African continent will negotiate its role in international bodies from the Bretton Woods system to the Group of Twenty (G20) nations, and Nigeria will play an important role in this unprecedented dialogue.

—Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Experts react: As the ruling party’s Tinubu wins a contested election, what’s next for Nigeria? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

If fully implemented, such projects, might act as a catalyst for more investments in hydrogen production and infrastructure in the region and for the process of demand creation that remains at the core of the future of hydrogen development.

Furthermore, the potential in the MENA goes well beyond the region itself and its relationship with Europe. Some Gulf countries are set to export green hydrogen products to Asia and their sovereign funds and renewables companies are looking at hydrogen investments in several African countries.

The implications of the MENA region’s commitment to renewables development and to hydrogen in particular are thus wide-ranging and should be supported at the policy and operational level by, among others, the EU, the multilateral finance development institutions, and other international partners.

Many projects were announced at COP27. Egypt, the host country, was the main protagonist: 9 memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on feasibility studies on production of green hydrogen and green ammonia were signed. Such products would mostly be exported to European and Asian markets. If turned into investment decisions and implemented fully, the nine projects are supposed to be worth around $83 billion and to produce collectively 7.6 million tons of green ammonia and 2.7 million tons of green hydrogen per year, when fully operational. Also at COP27, the Egyptian authorities and a consortium of local and international investors announced the commissioning of the first phase of what is supposed to become the first integrated green hydrogen plant in Africa.

The most noticeable development at a political level in the field of hydrogen development regarded EU-Egypt cooperation, when the President of the European Commission von der Leyen and Egypt’s President al-Sisi issued a Joint Statement on the EU-Egypt Renewable Hydrogen Partnership and the Vice President of the European Commission and its Energy Commissioner signed a MoU, with the Egyptian Ministers of Oil/Petroleum and Electricity/Renewables, to establish a strategic partnership on renewable hydrogen. The two sides agreed to set up an EU-Egypt Hydrogen Coordination Group and to organize an annual meeting of a Business Forum that would include industrial and energy players.

Furthermore, on November 9, Egypt’s President and Belgium’s Prime Minister launched a new international platform on hydrogen, named the “Global Renewable Hydrogen Forum”.

After COP27, seven more MoUs were signed by the relevant Egyptian agencies with various investors to conduct feasibility studies on new projects with a view to setting up facilities to produce green hydrogen and its derivatives.

Egypt is not the only Arab country to move dynamically on this front. Governments, sovereign funds, and industrial players in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Morocco are acting quickly and boldly.

Saudi Arabia, which launched a comprehensive Saudi Green Initiative in 2021, is planning a substantial development of green hydrogen and green ammonia production centered around NEOM, a new city and area to be developed in the northwestern corner of the country. If fully implemented, the project would set up the world’s largest utility green hydrogen facility. The Green Initiative also includes thirteen renewable energy projects, with a combined capacity of 11.3 GW that would help reduce some 20 million tons of carbon emissions per year.

Oman launched recently a new Strategy on Green Hydrogen that foresees $140 billion in investment by 2050, targeting an annual production of 1-1.25 megatons (MT) of green hydrogen by 2030, rising to 3.25-3.75 MT by 2040 and 7.5-8.5 MT by 2050. Oman is also working on a project to establish a green steel plant fed by hydrogen, with an annual production of 5 million tons. Such product would be exported to other Middle Eastern countries as well as to Europe, Japan, and other Asian markets.

The UAE, the host of COP28 in 2023, is also very active through different channels: at COP27 it announced a joint initiative (denominated “PACE”, Partnership to Accelerate Transition to Clean Energy) with the United States, with the aim to “catalyze $100 billion in financing, investment, and other support and to deploy globally 100 gigawatts (GW) of clean energy by 2035 to advance the energy transition and maximize climate benefits.” The UAE is also in the process of developing green hydrogen within its borders and abroad, mainly through Masdar, a key player with plans stretching from Africa to Central Asia.

Qatar has launched a project for establishing the largest blue ammonia facility worldwide and is very active in acquisitions in international renewables companies. Its sovereign fund QIA is also considering support to projects in Egypt, for developing green ammonia and green fuel for navigation.

At a regional level, according to the recently issued IEA report “Renewables 2022”, rapid growth in wind and solar will see renewables capacity across MENA rise faster than expected earlier. Such capacity is indeed set to triple to reach 45 GW in five years, with a significant upward revision from the IEA’s 2021 report (that estimated a capacity of 32 GW to be reached between 2021 and 2026). The IEA expects Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, Oman, Morocco, and Egypt to account for 85 percent of renewable capacity growth in the region between 2022 and 2027.

Underlying most of these efforts is the goal, especially for gas-producing countries, to push ahead with renewables projects with the aim to liberate, in the short-medium term, gas resources for export, in light of the European quest for diversification of gas supplies and of the global energy crunch.

Two trends should thus be monitored over the coming months and years:

• In spite of the harsh debate at COP27 on the role of oil and gas in the transition, including the claims by most fossil fuel-producing (or would-be producing) countries in MENA (and in Africa) on the need to continue to invest in oil and gas, these same countries are already investing to a significant extent in renewables development. This may not be occurring at the pace necessary, without a common strategy and with a number of uncertainties, but nonetheless signifies a rising level of ambition.
• The idea of interconnecting these countries with European and Asian markets for exporting green renewables appears to gradually be taking shape, initially through the export of blue and green ammonia and, at a later stage, green hydrogen through converted or dedicated infrastructure. The initiatives jointly launched by the EU and Egypt at COP27 hopefully will advance this aim.

Giampaolo Cantini is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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The post Hydrogen in the MENA region: Priorities and steps forward appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In a ceremony to be held at Washington, D.C.’s John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, Rafik Hariri Award recipients will include: Sir Magdi Yacoub, founder of the Magdi Yacoub Global Heart Foundation, Magdi Yacoub Foundation, and Chain of Hope for the Social Impact Award; Fatma Said, award-winning soprano for the Artistic Excellence Award; and Ahmad Abu Ghazaleh, executive vice chairman of Abdali Hospital for the Business Leadership Award.

February 14 also marks the 18^th anniversary of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was a firm believer in unlocking and investing in the economic and human potential of the Middle East and North Africa. Inspired by his legacy, the Hariri Center for the Middle East was founded in 2011 by his son Bahaa Hariri and the Atlantic Council to perpetuate this vision.

“Through this unique celebration, we are delighted to salute the legacy of the late prime minister Rafik Hariri and the groundbreaking efforts of his son Bahaa to empower that legacy to live on,” said Frederick Kempe, president and CEO of the Atlantic Council. “The center’s work will continue to capture his vision for a vibrant and dynamic Middle East and North Africa long into the future. These awards honor that vision, and the tremendous work of the honorees.”

Kempe will join businessman and philanthropist Bahaa Hariri in providing opening remarks. The ceremony will also feature a keynote speech by Brett McGurk, White House coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa.

A Special Tribute Award will be awarded to the late Dame Zaha Hadid for her contribution to global architecture, arts, and design.

“During the past ten years, the Rafik Hariri Center has been instrumental in amplifying voices from the MENA region in Washington with a focus on unique ways to unlock the human potential of the region,” said William F. Wechsler, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. “Today, we come together to honor those inspiring leaders steering change across the Arab world in their respective fields.”

The evening will conclude with a performance by Fatma Said and Grammy Award-winning pianist Craig Terry, which will feature classic opera and Middle Eastern musical staples.

For more information, please contact press@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post Atlantic Council’s inaugural Rafik Hariri Awards to honor Arab leaders in business, social entrepreneurship, and arts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

With the support of European investment, North Africa could become the world’s foremost producer of green hydrogen, capitalizing on vast swaths of uninhabited land, solar radiation intensity, offshore wind capacity, and existing pipeline networks. In October, Morocco hosted the Executive Vice President of the European Commission for the European Green Deal to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the establishment of a Green Partnership between the signatories. The Moroccan MoU preceded an agreement signed in November between the EU and Egypt creating a strategic partnership on green hydrogen.

Developing hydrogen infrastructure at scale will be costly and come with a range of challenges—particularly regarding regional water scarcity—but long-term investments utilizing existing resources could spur clean manufacturing and industrial development for hydrogen producing states while also generating export revenues for decades to come. Already, African states are organizing resources to invest in the requisite technologies. The African Green Hydrogen Alliance—comprised of Morocco, Mauritania, Namibia, Egypt, South Africa, and Kenya—was launched in May, and hopes to expand its membership on the continent. 

Among the alliance’s members, Morocco is well positioned to be a regional leader in a green hydrogen economy, ranking alongside the United States, Saudi Arabia, Australia, and Chile as the five countries most likely to produce cost competitive green hydrogen. In 2019, the Moroccan Ministry of Energy established the National Hydrogen Commission, which released a hydrogen roadmap aiming to mobilize a $10-billion investment for 14 terawatt-hours of new renewable energy capacity required to generate green hydrogen for both domestic consumption and export.

To accommodate a rise in green hydrogen production and support other net-zero goals, Morocco aims to increase renewables’ share of power generation to 52 percent by 2030, 70 percent by 2040, and 80 percent by 2050. The Ministry of Energy projects that an additional 14 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy will be added to the grid by 2027, mainly from solar and wind sources, although interest in nuclear energy has picked up. The Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy is leading the country’s effort to expand domestic solar energy capacity with the multi-stage Noor Solar Project, a massive project expected to invest $2.6 billion by 2030. Noor’s multiple concentrated solar power (CSP) sites—located in the Ouarzazate municipality, which boasts the highest level of solar radiation in the world—include the largest CSP plant currently in operation which produces 500 megawatts (MW) daily and is slated for expansion later this year. The fourth phase of Noor projects is currently under development and is expected to generate 950 MW upon completion.