The news broke after the Moroccan royal palace released a communiqué that referenced a letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to the king of Morocco on the commemoration of the silver jubilee of his coronation. The letter states that the “present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” In his correspondence with the Moroccan king, Macron added that “France intends to act consistently with this position at both national and international levels.” Although the French position explicitly references Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, it will need more clarification and translation into concrete policies in the coming months.

Nonetheless, the French decision is particularly significant given its colonial past in North Africa and its shared responsibility with Spain in largely determining the postcolonial borders of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. These borders are the origin of many of the current territorial disputes in the region. France’s endorsement of the Moroccan autonomy plan this week follows similar support from Spain in 2022 and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara expressed by the United States in 2020 and Israel in 2023, along with a growing list of Arab and African nations.

Understanding the French calculus

France’s shift of stance comes as its relations with Morrocco have been strained. Since 2020, Rabat has pressured Paris to break the status quo—a neutrality on the issue apparently intended not to upset either Morocco or Algeria—and take a clearer stance on the Western Sahara. Striking a deal with then-US President Donald Trump in 2020 over the disputed territories and normalizing ties with Israel boosted Morocco’s diplomatic confidence and helped redefine the kingdom’s foreign policy. As a result, the Sahara issue, in the words of the Moroccan king, became “the lens through which Morocco looks at the world.”

As an example of the deteriorating bilateral relations, Mohammed VI reportedly “definitely shelved” relations with Macron and declined state visit requests by the French president last year. In addition, the kingdom started to increase its divestment from business partnerships with France—previously considered its international economic partner of choice. Torn between Morocco and Algeria, France failed to balance its act in the Maghreb after a chain of unfortunate events, including the Pegasus spyware case, a visa crisis, and the recall of Rabat’s ambassador to France in February 2023. Most recently, Morocco refused French aid after the Marrakesh earthquake in September 2023.

France, however, never stopped courting Morocco, because Paris did not want to lose strategically important economic and political ground in Africa. For its part, Rabat did not break its relations with Paris entirely, continuing its intelligence and security cooperation with France. Moroccan forces, for example, are currently helping to secure the Paris Olympics. Morocco also appointed Samira Sitail, a dual national and Makhzan insider, as its ambassador to attempt to stir the stagnant waters.

Rather than trying to deter Morocco’s ambitious Atlantic Initiative—aimed at offering landlocked Sahel countries trade access to the ocean through a $1.2 billion harbor in Dakhla, Western Sahara—France is eying a share of the economic benefits promised by the project. The only catch is how to address the 2021 European Union (EU) court ruling against the Morocco-EU trade deal over Western Sahara, which the Elysée may now advocate to reverse together with other pro-Moroccan EU countries ahead of the final judgment, due in a few months.

Western Sahara and global realignment

Another defining factor in understanding the recent French decision lies in the global realignment behind old Cold War frontiers, and NATO allies engaging in historic contests against increasingly destabilizing forces. Morocco has always been a reliable partner to the global liberal West in its fight against Russian aggression and different terrorist groups. The country is also more-or-less aligned with the United States and France on a common vision of the future. As Iran and its proxies reinforce ties with the Algerian regime, which has been cultivating close relations with Russia since the 1970s, North Atlantic allies fear a new stronghold of antagonists in North Africa.

For the past five decades, Western Sahara has been a major security loophole at the doors of the Mediterranean and the Sahel. With growing rumors about Iranian and Wagner Group presence among Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps in western Algeria, where an estimated 173,600 refugees live, it’s becoming imperative for the United States and European countries to try to resolve the Western Sahara file once and for all.

Disrupting the status quo in the Maghreb

While on paper the French decision to side with Morocco may seem in line with its economic and global priorities, it does come at a price. EU neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and exclusive reliance on the United Nations peacekeeping mission to maintain the status quo between Rabat and Algiers has been central to stabilizing the region. After the United States and Spain sided with Morocco, Algeria responded by severing diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 and recalling its ambassador in Madrid in 2022. Algeria also disrupted gas exports to Spain through Morocco by closing the EU-Maghreb pipeline just as tensions were building around Russia’s gas exports ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reaction by Algiers to Macron’s swing toward Mohammed VI described France and Morocco as “colonial powers, new and old.” This was followed on Tuesday by Algeria recalling its ambassador in Paris to express its discontent.

Macron’s decision has alienated an already nervous Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is running for reelection on September 7. This week’s events may push him deeper into Iranian and Russian arms. Even though not expressly sought by any of the parties, the risk of recent events sparking up a wider regional conflict in the Maghreb is higher than ever. Even if in a way designed to avoid escalation, Algeria will likely feel it necessary to respond in some form.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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Economic diversification and foreign direct investment

The US-Morocco FTA removed tariffs and significantly reduced trade barriers between the two countries. This, alongside other FTA and advanced trade agreements with the European Union (EU), China, Egypt, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributed to Morocco’s efforts to diversify its economy and trade. Through providing access to the US market, the FTA encouraged Moroccan firms to expand into new high-tech manufacturing such as automotive and aeronautics parts, as well as electronics. The agreement has also contributed to a steady increase in bilateral trade. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, US-Morocco trade in goods and services has grown to nearly $7 billion annually. This trade growth reflects a deepening of economic ties between the two countries.

Another significant impact of the US-Morocco FTA and other trade agreements has been increased foreign direct investment (FDI). The agreement provided a framework that infused confidence in US and EU investors and caused an inflow of investment in various sectors, including manufacturing, tourism, and renewable energy. These investments have been central in creating jobs and developing the skills of the Moroccan workforce.

One example is the automotive industry, in which major companies like Japan-based Yazaki, Ireland-based Delphi Technologies, Germany-based Schlemmer, and US-based Lear Corporation have established operations in Morocco. These investments have created thousands of jobs and positioned Morocco as a regional hub for automotive parts manufacturing, generating more than $10 billion in revenue and making it a leading sector in the country’s export market. Additionally, the growth of the renewable energy sector has made Morocco a global leader in the green energy industry, with ambitious projects like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex.

Challenges and structural reforms

While Morocco’s FTA and trade agreements with the United States and other major economies have brought numerous benefits, challenges exist. One of the main issues has been guaranteeing that the gains from free trade are distributed equitably across Moroccan society. There is a need for sustained efforts to address regional disparities and support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may struggle to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a liberalized trade environment.

Moreover, the agreement has highlighted the importance of structural reforms to enhance Morocco’s competitiveness. Hence, the Moroccan government has undertaken various measures to improve the business climate, such as simplifying regulatory procedures, developing and improving infrastructure, and investing in education and vocational training, with a particular focus on empowering girls and women. These reforms are crucial for sustaining long-term economic growth and ensuring that Morocco can fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by free trade.

Future prospects

Looking ahead, the US-Morocco FTA serves as a foundation for further economic cooperation and integration between the two economies. Both countries have expressed a commitment to deepening their trade relationship and exploring new areas of collaboration. For Morocco, this includes leveraging the FTA to attract more investment in high-tech industries and innovation-driven sectors. Morocco’s strategic location and proximity to European Union and African markets, coupled with its relatively modern infrastructure and stable political environment, position it as an attractive investment destination in emerging market economies.

Alongside the agreements signed between Morocco and other countries, the US-Morocco FTA remains one of the most important as it has played an integral role in transforming Morocco’s economy and labor force, contributing to the diversification of its trade portfolio and helping to attract foreign investment. However, regulatory, legal, and labor force challenges remain, and continued efforts are needed to ensure that the benefits of free trade are more equitably shared across various sectors of Moroccan society.

As Morocco looks to the future, the strategic vision should focus on further enhancing its competitive edge and strengthening its position as a key player in the global supply chain. Morocco’s Atlantic Sahel initiative is an important step in this direction. With sustained commitment and strategic planning, the next twenty years can bring even more prosperity and development for the Moroccan economy and greater profits for US and other foreign businesses operating in the kingdom.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou leads the Bretton Woods 2.0 Project at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is also a senior lecturer of economics at the American University in Washington, DC.

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Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for both sending and receiving countries. In the Atlantic basin, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by various factors such as economic opportunities, political instability, social networks, and historical ties.

This joint report, in partnership with Policy Center for the New South and the Africa Center, aims to explore the trends in African migration within the Atlantic basin, focusing on case studies of Nigerian migration to the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa as well as Moroccan migration to the European Union. It seeks to provide valuable insights into ongoing discourse on African migration by exploring case studies from diverse regions within the Atlantic basin, it highlights the interconnectedness of migration flows and their impact on individuals, communities, and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The report examines factors such as economic disparities, political instability, educational opportunities, and family ties to explain motivations behind Nigerian and Moroccan migration. By analyzing the “push and pull factors” influencing Moroccan migration to France and Spain alongside Nigerian migration to the United States, the UK, and South Africa, it builds a nuanced understanding of migration dynamics within the Atlantic basin and what is at stake for the home countries experiencing brain drain.

Public Event Thu, June 27, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

New trends in African migration: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria

The Africa Center brings together experts to discuss current and future trends in African migration.

Africa Migration Morocco Nigeria

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

Report

Aug 3, 2023

Irregular migration from North Africa: Shifting local and regional dynamics

By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Human Rights Italy

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The latest sign of Algeria’s obsession with Morocco was its decision to confiscate the jerseys of Moroccan soccer club RS Berkane after its players traveled to Algeria on April 19 to play a CAF Confederation Cup semifinal match against USMA Alger. Algeria justified its decision by stating that the team’s equipment bore an “illegitimate” map of Morocco, which included Western Sahara. 

African soccer’s governing body intervened, ordering Algeria to drop its case and allow RS Berkane to play in the jerseys. However, Algiers disregarded the ruling, seizing any opportunity to display its support for what it describes as the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.

Many have maintained that one of the main drivers of Algeria’s hostility toward Morocco is the ideological makeup of the Algerian establishment and its strategy of seeking popular legitimacy.

Algeria’s operating philosophy is to galvanize nationalist fervor against its enemies. For the past three decades, it has constantly needed to create external enemies to mobilize national support and divert public opinion from the country’s economic, social, and political problems. 

While largely pertinent, this analysis ignores the psychological dimension of this chronic animosity between the two countries. Algeria’s military and political leaders harbor unresolved grievances against Morocco, which contribute to tensions. Additionally, Morocco is one of the oldest monarchies in the world, and has managed to maintain its sovereignty for much of its history. The same cannot be said of Algeria, a sixty-two-year-old country. 

This makes the Algerian regime reluctant to fully explore the past, out of fear that a deep dive into the country’s history might lend credence to some critics’ claim that modern Algeria is the creation of imperialist France.

It’s worth mentioning that Morocco was a strong supporter of the Algerian liberation movement, contributing financially and logistically to the war effort against French domination. Then a champion of what some have described as a strong belief in the urgency and imperative of Muslim solidarity, Morocco ignored warnings and secret deals from France, committing itself to the liberation of Algeria instead.

Yet, post-independence, Algeria’s leadership quickly whitewashed this well-documented episode of Moroccan solidarity and generosity, providing invaluable insights into what would later become Algeria’s deep-seated desire to be the Maghreb’s undisputed leader.

Morocco’s defeat of Algeria in the border war known as the 1963 Sand War created a psychological barrier, as generations of Algerian military and political elites grew up with the idea of avenging the humiliation that newly independent Algeria had suffered at Morocco’s hands.

Morocco’s “betrayal” of Algeria

Over time, Algeria’s resentment against Morocco for its humiliating defeat morphed into a radical desire to take revenge by fostering separatism on Moroccan territory. Therefore, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front is the culmination of the Algerian elite’s strategy of attaining regional primacy by establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. While proclaiming its support for the “liberation struggle” of the “oppressed Sahrawi people,” Algeria’s primary goal is to keep Morocco in check by fomenting and prolonging the dispute over the Western Sahara region to prevent Rabat from reopening the issue of unresolved Algerian-Moroccan borders.

As far as Algiers is concerned, ending the Western Sahara dispute would provide Morocco with a level of strategic continental depth that would overwhelmingly consolidate its status as a regional hegemon. Algeria has steadfastly supported the Polisario for the past four decades to prevent Morocco from settling the territorial dispute. The Algerian-Moroccan rivalry entered a new phase in 2017 when Morocco joined the African Union (AU). Algeria had tirelessly used Morocco’s absence from the AU to push for a “parallel African agenda” on the Western Sahara question. This entailed lobbying for the Polisario Front’s Sahrawi cause, which it presents as a decolonization struggle against what it describes as Moroccan occupation.

Given that the AU’s official position on Western Sahara has shifted in Morocco’s favor since 2018, some of Algeria’s anti-Moroccan agitation speaks of deepening diplomatic disarray and a profound sense of disappointment. Algeria seems to be furious that Morocco, in the short time since its return to the AU, has effectively destroyed all the work that Algerian diplomacy had done for three decades to get the AU to fully support a self-determination referendum that would culminate in the creation of an independent state in the Western Sahara region.

Algeria’s displeasure with Morocco’s growing continental influence can be seen in three regional efforts that Algiers has undertaken in recent years to contain Rabat’s rising leadership. The first is the attempted revival of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project in 2022 to derail the more promising Nigeria-Morocco pipeline project. The second is the planned creation of free-trade zones with Niger and Mali to counter Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel. Finally, the most recent is the Algerian regime’s push for the creation of a Maghreb Union without Morocco.

For all these counterattacking efforts, highlighted by the projected openings of more African consulates in Dakhla and Laayoune, the fact remains that Morocco’s African diplomacy is having morale-boosting results. In contrast, Algeria’s diplomatic influence has declined across the continent. More importantly, Morocco’s African diplomacy now extends to countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria, outside its so-called traditional francophone comfort zone. In the coming months and years, Algeria will redouble its efforts to persuade some of these countries to reconsider their cooperation with Morocco. 

Perhaps the most significant blows to Algeria’s diplomacy have come from outside Africa. These include the consistent pro-Moroccan stance reflected in all United Nations (UN) resolutions on Western Sahara since 2007, the decisive US decision in 2020 to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the region, and Spain’s 2022 declaration of full support for Morocco’s autonomy plan. While the first development has been gradual, and lacks absolute finality due to the presence of marginal pro-Polisario voices within the UN, the latter two events have shaken Algeria.

Taken together, however, these and other emerging developments clearly indicate that self-determination dreams have been buried—and that compromise is the only viable route to a politically feasible and lasting solution in the Sahara dossier. Faced with what increasingly appears to be an irreversible diplomatic setback, Algeria has shifted tactics by confronting Morocco on alternative battlefields. In recent months, as noted earlier, Algeria has used the unconventional platform of sport to settle scores with Morocco.

The goal is to open a second narrative front to rally popular sympathy and support for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Algeria’s permanent representative to the UN recently drew parallels between Palestine and Western Sahara, reflecting the regime’s overarching aspiration to distort historical facts and equate the Western Saharan and Palestinian cases. 

It is unlikely that Algeria’s continued attacks on Morocco will compel the UN to reconsider its implicit, but increasingly apparent, burying of the self-determination option on Western Sahara. At the same time, there are growing signs that many in Morocco, having grown tired of ignoring Algiers’s unrelenting hostility toward Rabat, might start pushing Morocco to discard its long-standing patience and the ensuing hope of brotherly reconciliation between the two countries.  

Time for the United States to step in

The animosity and hostility between the two countries have reached worrying levels, raising the specter of a military conflagration breaking out. Against this bleak backdrop, the United States should lead a vigorous diplomatic campaign.      

To calm the waters between the two countries and ensure that the current state does not get out of hand, the United States should give more attention to its military cooperation with Morocco, while signaling to Algeria that Washington would do everything in its power to prevent it from taking any actions that could destabilize the region. Such a move could send Algeria an unmistakable signal of Washington’s commitment to security cooperation with Rabat.     

Second, the United States must pressure the Algerian government to abide by the provisions of the UNSC Resolution on the Western Sahara issue since 2018, all of which call on Algeria to fully cooperate with the UN as it works toward a compromise-based and realistic political solution to the dispute. As Algeria’s rejection of some recent UN resolutions has shown, the only way to get it to commit to the UN-led political process is to pressure it to fully acknowledge its political responsibility for creating and prolonging this conflict and to negotiate a face-saving political solution with Morocco. 

However, this goal will remain out of reach if the United States clings to a balancing diplomacy that prevents it from unequivocally supporting Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The time has come for the United States to break with this policy. It must align its political discourse and actions by reaffirming its recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara while calling on Algeria to fully participate in the UN-led political process to achieve a political solution to the dispute.

Indeed, such a move would simply reflect the long-standing US position in the dispute. Numerous declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents show that the United States has never believed in the viability of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. Americans have long praised the proverbial friendship that unites the United States and Morocco, stressing that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. It is time for the United States to give true meaning to this friendship by fully supporting Morocco’s decades-long quest to end the dispute over Western Sahara; by doing so, it could help end the conflict between Rabat and Algiers once and for all.    

Samir Bennis is a senior political analyst specializing in Arab affairs and Morocco’s foreign policy. He is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. His upcoming book, The Self-Determination Delusion: How Victim Politics and Feel-good Advocacy Have Hijacked the Western Sahara Case, comes out in July.

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As political tensions between Algiers and Rabat have continued to mount since 2020, threatening to destabilize the entire North African and Sahel region, another front is being fought with no possible détente in sight: the cultural heritage war. The most recent chapter of this absurd dispute began when the Moroccan Ministry of Culture took legal action on May 20 by filing a complaint against Algeria with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the alleged appropriation of a unique Moroccan traditional garment known as Caftan Ntaâ El Fassi (Ntaâ Kaftan), which came originally from the Moroccan city of Fez and which Algeria is trying to inscribe among its intangible cultural heritage list.

In recent years, there has been a renewed awareness about the significance of cultural heritage symbols and their undisputable value in nation branding. This was popularized, in part, by the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage introduced by UNESCO in 2003, which calls for the documentation and preservation of living cultural expressions such as crafts, oral traditions, and performing arts. This phenomenon was also encouraged by the business opportunities presented by cultural tourism, an important source of national wealth that accounts for an estimated 40 percent of all tourism worldwide.

Starting in 2008, Morocco and Algeria raced to inscribe diverse aspects of their local traditions with UNESCO. For Morocco, these included the Tbourida equestrian performance, Gnawa music, and the Argan tree and its know-how; for Algeria, they included the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Sidi ’Abd el-Qader Ben Mohammed, Tlemcen wedding traditions, and the rituals of Sebeiba. However, many cultural elements remain the subject of fierce clashes between the two countries, which compete over the authenticity, exclusivity, and preeminence of disputed cultural symbols like Rai music, the couscous dish, or the Moorish Zellige tile.

The limits of cultural fortresses

Culture is a complex anthropological phenomenon that cannot be confined within the limits of modern nation-state borders—a more recent and contested political invention often inherited from colonial calculus over natural resources. This is particularly true in the case of the Moroccan Kingdom and Algerian Republic’s borders, which were engineered by their former occupiers after the 1845 Treaty of Lalla Maghnia. It is common knowledge by now, as demonstrated by historical maps, archive documents, and an International Court of Justice ruling, that colonial France considered Algeria one of its foreign territories—it annexed Algeria in 1830 and maintained control there until 1962—while Morocco was a mere strategic protectorate with a perpetual Alaouite monarch, which Paris would eventually need to exit with the growing decolonial movements starting in the 1930s. It was evident to France that it was more beneficial for its long-term interests to extract as many territories as possible from the Cherifian kingdom and generously subjoin them to the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.

The impossibility of drawing a line in the sand between two intertwined cultures is the very source of the recent conflict between Rabat and Algiers. Disputed bordering districts like Tlemcen, Tinduf, and Bechar are witnesses of the demographic hybridity and heritage spillover of several forms of craftsmanship, musical expressions, and culinary traditions. For instance, it would be absurd today for Morocco to claim the cultural exclusivity of Malhoun music or for Algeria to claim Rai music—though both are ironically inscribed under one country with UNESCO. This example and many others around the world demonstrate how this United Nations (UN) mechanism, while claiming to preserve cultural heritage, also contributes to the creation of imaginary borders and obsolete disputes among transnational communities that share many affinities, such as the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa.

The concept of cultural authenticity itself is historically questionable. It was established by authors like Eric Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition and David Lowenthal in The Past Is a Foreign Country that nation states handle, and often fabricate, historical narratives “celebrating certain aspects and expunging others.” It all depends on what serves their immediate interests, unity, and legitimacy. While Algeria’s oil-economy dependency and introverted military regime delayed its quest to reclaim its heritage, Morocco has benefited from its alignment with Western liberal economies and the urge to develop its tourism and services sectors to tap into its rich traditions and brand itself as an attractive destination at the doors of Europe—often caressing a certain Western orientalist fantasy about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rabat profited from its first-mover status to successfully market its souks, food, and crafts, sometimes exclusively claiming certain shared North African heritage symbols like Amazigh carpets, pottery, and the iconic dish of couscous, though such claims upset its Maghreb neighbors.

Heritage as a unifying juncture

Another recent episode illustrating this cultural heritage battle occurred in 2022, when the sports company Adidas revealed the Algerian soccer team’s jerseys comprising patterns commonly found in Moroccan ceramics, such as Fez Zellige. Morocco responded by issuing a legal warning to the company. The German sportswear brand ended up officially apologizing to Rabat and settling the dispute amicably after admitting to being inspired by Moroccan craftsmanship. Interestingly enough, back in 2015, the kingdom had engaged in patenting the Fez Zellige in the Vienna Classification of Figurative Elements of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—a more robust and legally binding mechanism to preserve national crafts compared to the UNESCO treaty. Morocco has since attempted to trademark many more cultural elements, including kaftan embroidery patterns, which closes the loop for anyone trying to “culturally appropriate” Moroccan designs and use them for commercial gains.

Local media, Wikipedia, and social platforms are becoming central fronts in this incongruous cultural war. Both Morocco and Algeria engage restlessly and spend large amounts of money on distasteful online confrontations on YouTube, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter) debating whether the kaftan is Almohad or Ottoman in origin and if the tajine is an authentic Moroccan or Algerian earthenware pot. Algerian bots, in particular, have been notorious for spreading propaganda and claiming many confirmed Moroccan traditions for themselves. Moroccan social media users carried out an outrageous, yet revealing, social experiment to prove this theory. To make a point, online users jokingly posted that the “Jaghdid” (colloquially meaning poison in Darija) is “a purely Moroccan delicacy,” prompting Algerian users to rush to claim the imaginary dish as theirs.

On the positive side, North African countries are gaining awareness of the importance of documenting and researching their history and memory, leading to a true revival in local crafts, ethnographic research, and a certain pride to showcase and reinvent those ancestral traditions long ignored in favor of Western consumerist goods. Moreover, this awareness contributed to liberating the Maghreb from the shadows of living in the periphery of Middle Eastern capitals like Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad that repetitively spread false claims that North African countries’ heritage and aesthetic beauty are all to be credited to romanticized and fictitious perceptions of “Arab” Andalucía—a claim that historical evidence strongly refutes.

Last year, “the arts, skills, and practices associated with engraving on metals (gold, silver, and copper)” were inscribed as intangible world heritage by UNESCO in ten MENA countries, including Morocco and Algeria. If the Algerian copper artisan I had encountered and Si Mohamed, the Moroccan one, were to speak today, they would surely approve of this positive collective effort to recognize their craft. The artisans would also agree that while respecting local know-how, originality, and unique historical trajectories is essential, cultural heritage can also be plural and an essential juncture for constructive exchanges beyond trivial political agendas.  

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

The post A war is raging between Algeria and Morocco. It is being fought in the heritage arena. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He announced the launch of an international initiative to “enable the Sahel countries to have access to the Atlantic Ocean.” Landlocked Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso are at the center of the Moroccan plan, which involves making Morocco’s road, port, and rail infrastructure available to them and implementing large-scale development projects.

Even if it is not detailed yet, the Moroccan initiative comes after military regimes came to power by unconstitutional means or through coups d’état, which for three of these states resulted, at various points, in having sanctions imposed on them. For example, Niger was sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Notably, Malian army officers who collaborated with the Wagner Group or were suspected of crimes were sanctioned by the United States. And the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had sanctioned Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, lifted its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February this year, a month after the three Sahelian countries left the organization and soon after the countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Chad has not yet seen sanctions imposed after the undemocratic accession of its president following the death of his father. While the sanctions imposed on the three countries are intended to apply pressure on those who seized power by force or defied the constitution, in the hopes of restoring democratic systems, these sanctions also impact the populations.

The people in these countries are essentially penalized twice: On the one hand, they are led by governments that have revoked the right of the people to choose their leaders. On the other hand, these populations also suffer from the effects of sanctions, which cause them economic hardship, limit their access to essential goods, cut them off from the world, and deprive them of trade opportunities.

That creates a quandary for the democratic world: While sanctions are intended to target unconstitutional governments, it is the ordinary people in these countries who suffer the most from them.

Behind the initiative

Morocco’s efforts to cooperate with the states in the Sahel seem inspired by Morocco’s 2011 Constitution—mainly the preamble.

In this preamble, Morocco commits itself to supporting the Maghreb Union (which it says is a “strategic option”), deepening its bonds with the Arab-Islamic Ummah, intensifying cooperation with European countries around the Mediterranean, strengthening cooperation across Africa, and diversifying its relations with the rest of the world.

Specifically, when it comes to Africa, the preamble states that Morocco intends to “consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries.” This short sentence helps explain Morocco’s initiative. The Moroccan Constitution does not drown the Sahel in the mass of Africa, but on the contrary highlights it by mentioning it separately. In his November 6 speech, the king of Morocco even called the Sahelian countries “African sister countries.”

In addition, the Moroccan Constitution’s commitment to the Islamic world—each of the three sanctioned countries are majority Muslim—and its pledging solidarity with the “peoples and countries of Africa” help explain Morocco’s new initiative. By specifying that its solidarity goes to the countries as well as to the peoples, Morocco is distinguishing people from the regimes that govern them.

As for the content of the Atlantic initiative, it has been received well by the Sahelian states because it offers alternatives for growth and development—and indeed, even survival. For example, Niger (one of the poorest countries in the world) depended on international aid for its annual budget, which was slashed by 40 percent in 2023 due to donors and creditors withholding support. Following the coup, malnutrition skyrocketed, only compounded by the fact that the United Nations (UN) World Food Program’s cargos were getting blocked from reaching Niger due to border closures, with one UN coordinator saying that their goal—to deliver humanitarian aid to at least 80 percent of 4.4 million vulnerable people—was in jeopardy.

The success of this initiative is contingent on several factors: It will require funding, a robust regulatory framework, efforts to address challenges such as piracy, and harmonization with and between maritime governance actors. In addition, the economic activity this initiative would create could have benefits for the governments, as well as the people, in the sanctioned Sahelian countries. However, the focus of this initiative is on helping the people, who have continued to suffer for decades.

The Atlantic advantage

The initiative underscores the importance placed—across centuries—on accessing the Atlantic Ocean. For example, El Hadj Omar Tall (founder of the Toucouleur Empire) and Samori Ture (a leader of the Wassoulou Empire) each governed landlocked areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo chronicled how the two African heroes, facing the inevitable advance of European colonial conquest, hurried to “capture, before it was too late, the political initiative and keep it in African hands.” They both did that by directing their troops to the ocean. Eventually, however, their efforts to reach the sea were halted by the French.

The strategic importance of the Atlantic as taught by history resonates today.

Today, over one hundred countries border the Atlantic Ocean, and importantly those countries include the world’s leading power (the United States), other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (including the United Kingdom and France), Latin American powers (such as Argentina and Brazil), and African nations stretching from Morocco (which itself has a 1,800-mile coastline on the ocean) to South Africa.

For countries that have the means to take full advantage of their coasts, such as Morocco and Senegal, the Atlantic is a boon. Indeed, Africa’s twenty-three coastal nations are home to 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent of its trade. They also contain a large amount of natural resources, including oil.

But access alone won’t grant people in Sahelian countries access to the boon. Here is what is needed for this initiative to succeed:

• Defining common strategic priorities between the countries participating in this initiative and also their partners in order to focus on the most pressing issues.
• The integration of projects already underway such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project or the Great Green Wall. Their inclusion will bring a more holistic approach to the Moroccan initiative, which focuses on road, rail, and maritime infrastructure.
• The inclusion of the African Union (through the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy) as well as maritime governance mechanisms, specialized institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, African Port Management Associations, Union of African Shippers’ Councils, maritime training institutions, the UN, and the International Maritime Organization. This inclusion in discussions will help to harmonize the maritime rules and avoid double governance systems.
• Access to substantial financing, particularly via international partners such as in the private sector and development and financial institutions. Financing will be needed to support the blue economy and the modernization of road, rail, and port infrastructure.

Sahelian civilian populations have been suffering from the effects of a twenty-year war against jihadist attacks. These populations deserve peace and prosperity. After the security failures of so many domestic and foreign military interventions and the unfolding of the coups, this proposal offers a much-needed brighter perspective for these people.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Abdelhak Bassou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

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2023 also produced moments of hope and diplomatic feats. MENA countries were included in development organizations and plans that aimed to bolster the region’s economic prosperity; Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations; and the Abraham Accords continued to prosper.

Learn about the region’s biggest moments:

January 1: Israeli Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir decisively visits Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif)

The year had a rocky start as Israel’s controversial newly appointed minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, visited the Temple Mount, also known as Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary). Since Israel won the holy sites in the 1967 war, it granted the administrative authority of al-Aqsa Mosque, the Temple Mount, and the surrounding complex to the Jordanian Islamic Waqf. Under the status quo, the site is open to Muslim worshipers while Jewish visitors are allowed only at certain times and are not permitted to pray there.

“Ben Gvir, who is the leader of the extreme-right Otzma Yehudit party, has previously been convicted for supporting terrorism and inciting racism,” highlighted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. Given his background, Ben-Gvir’s January 1 visit—and subsequent visits later in the year—angered Palestinians, Arab-Israelis, and the wider Arab and Muslim world, as he has previously voiced discontent with the status quo, making his visit appear threatening to Muslim rights at the holy sites in Jerusalem.

MENASource

Jan 30, 2023

Ben-Gvir’s controversial new position angered the Arab world. But how will it impact a potential peace deal with Saudi Arabia?

By Ksenia Svetlova

Will PM Benjamin Netanyahu find the desired equilibrium between the radical politics of his coalition partner and diplomacy with Arab capitals?

Israel Middle East

January 5: Libya’s rival governments agree to develop a constitutional basis for elections 

Since the 2011 uprising against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, the country has faced violence, uncertainty, and division, resulting in two parallel governments. In January, after more than a decade of conflict and failed attempts at unity, the two governments of Libya—the Government of National Unity in the west and the Government of National Stability in the east—entered into negotiations to find a constitutional basis to end the conflict and hold elections for a single, unity government.

The talks took place in Cairo after Egypt volunteered to host. Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, represented Tobruk and eastern Libya. In contrast, Tripoli and western Libya were represented by Khaled Al-Mishri, the head of Libya’s Higher Council of State. The representatives agreed to create a roadmap for the election process in the talks. The prime ministers of both governments also passed along the country’s constitutional document for approval from their respective legislatures.  

MENASource

Feb 1, 2023

Libya’s political impasse and the $6 billion question

By Alia Brahimi

On January 5, after months of talks brokered in Egypt, Libya’s rival legislative bodies finally agreed to begin discussions to develop the constitutional basis for elections.

Libya Middle East

February 6: Deadly 7.8 magnitude earthquake hits Turkey and Syria 

On February 6, a devastating 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck southern Turkey and northwest Syria, killing over 55,000 people and affecting 15.7 million more. The damage was widespread; homes, schools, and hospitals were destroyed as the earthquake left entire cities and villages in ruin. While it was known that war-torn Syria would not have the capacity to respond to disaster, the earthquake exposed the inadequacy of Turkey’s response system.

Despite international aid, rescue and rebuilding efforts in Turkey were insufficient, with help slow to reach many areas. The earthquake has also had detrimental economic effects. The rebuilding efforts are expected to cost upward of $130 billion—over one-eighth of Turkey’s GDP—while many industries and livelihoods have also been destroyed. But as one Syrian told senior fellow Arwa Damon hours after the earthquake struck: “It did what the Assad regime and Russians wanted to do to us all along.”

MENASource

Jun 12, 2023

I work in Syrian civil society. There were gaps in our performance after the February 6 earthquake.

By Kenda Hawasli

It is clear that humanitarian response planning in Syria requires a full review process that reconsiders existing approaches and involves local partners while listening to their experiences.

Civil Society Crisis Management

February 10: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security leads Iranian opposition gathering 

An Iranian diaspora opposition coalition known as the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (AFDI) officially came together at an event hosted by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security months after anti-establishment protests kicked off in September 2022.

Although the conference’s scope was limited and pushed important issues like the type and makeup of a future government down the road, it was a successful first gathering, resulting in the release of the Mahsa Charter a month later. Unfortunately, several months later, in May, the AFDI collapsed.

“The spirit of solidarity evident in the Women, Life, Freedom movement seems to be miles away from the acrimonious scene witnessed around the Iranian opposition abroad or on social media,” noted writer Arash Azizi.

IranSource

May 10, 2023

After a failed coalition effort, where is the Iranian opposition headed?

By Arash Azizi

Cracks within the Iranian opposition coalition were visible from the outset, with much of the division revolving around former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi’s persona.

Civil Society Iran

February 13: ‘Manifesto for Minimum Demands of Independent Trade Union and Civil Organizations of Iran’ published 

As part of the ongoing anti-regime protests, twenty trade unions, activist groups, and student organizations signed and released a manifesto for fundamental change in Iran that was quickly endorsed by other parts of civil society. The revolutionary document covered several different issues ranging from the prohibition of torture to gender equality to the privatization of religion.

The manifesto “offer[s] an articulate and elaborate meaning to the slogan ‘woman, life, freedom,’ aiming to end the formation of any power from above and to establish a society free of oppression, discrimination, tyranny, and dictatorship,” said Shadi Sadr, a human rights lawyer. Read the manifesto text here.

IranSource

Feb 23, 2023

Iran’s ‘women, life, freedom’ revolution has a manifesto. Here are the next steps.

By Shadi Sadr

Signed by twenty organizations and released on February 13, the manifesto gathered the support of many civil society organizations in Iran.

Civil Society Iran

February 14 – 16: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi goes to China 

President Ebrahim Raisi made a telling visit to Beijing, marking the first time an Iranian leader has made an official state visit to China in over twenty years. This visit was geopolitically significant, as it displayed the consolidation of the China-Russia-Iran axis, which could effectively counter US sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

During the three-day visit, President Raisi and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed twenty documents and agreements on topics ranging from trade to information technology to transportation. The projects and agreements could be worth billions of dollars. But as senior fellow Jonathan Fulton rightfully asked, “Does a visit from Iran’s president help with any of this? In material terms, probably not. China is a lifeline to Iran, while Tehran is of marginal importance to Beijing.”

IranSource

Feb 22, 2023

Iran’s economic future is uncertain. It’s no surprise why Raisi visited China.

By Jonathan Fulton

From February 14-16, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi was in Beijing for his first foreign trip of the year and the first official visit to China for an Iranian leader in twenty years.

Iran Middle East

February 20: Iran acknowledges enriching uranium at 84 percent

Under the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran was to eliminate its medium-enriched uranium, reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent, and, for the next fifteen years, only enrich uranium to 3.67 percent. After the United States pulled out of the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed unilateral sanctions, Iran incrementally stopped following the terms of the agreement.

In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed it had found uranium particles enriched at 84 percent—not far away from 90 percent, weapons-grade uranium. As Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association, spelled out, “Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were the accidental product of Iran reconfiguring its centrifuges or produced by design, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.”

IranSource

Mar 2, 2023

Iran’s nuclear program is advancing. So too should negotiations.

By Kelsey Davenport

Regardless of whether the 84 percent enriched particles were accidental, this incident underscores the increased challenge in discerning Tehran’s nuclear intentions and the growing proliferation risk of Iran’s rapidly expanding nuclear program.

Iran Middle East

March 1: Abrahamic Family House opens in Abu Dhabi, UAE 

On September 15, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the Abraham Accords, becoming one of six Arab countries to normalize relations with Israel formally. Since then, the UAE and Israel have significantly benefited from their newfound cooperation in sectors from trade and tourism to security and diplomacy.

The opening of the Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi—a place of worship for all the Abrahamic faiths, containing a synagogue, a mosque, and a church—symbolized the prosperity to be gained through peace and cooperation. The House represents the hopeful future of co-existence and respect between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. As senior fellow Marcy Grossman wrote, “It is also a beacon of light at a time when western antisemitism is at an all-time high. Perhaps, most significantly, it is a beacon of peace in the Middle East.”

MENASource

Feb 27, 2023

What the opening of the Abrahamic Family House Synagogue in the UAE means for the Jewish community and the rest of the world

By Marcy Grossman

The Abrahamic Family House, a mosque, church, and synagogue all sharing a multi-faith campus in Abu Dhabi is about to make its worldwide debut, opening its doors to the general public on March 1.

Israel Middle East

March 10: China brokers deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran 

Seven years after severing diplomatic ties following the storming of Saudi missions in Iran in response to the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations in a deal brokered by China. This event was geopolitically significant on both a regional and global level.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia and Iran have been leaders of opposing sects of the Arab world, taking different sides in practically every war and conflict since 1979. Despite housing the holy cities and sites of Islam, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly secularized in contrast to Iran. Saudi Arabia has also been opposed to the expansion of Iranian regional influence, even exploring normalization with Israel. It has yet to be seen whether restoring diplomatic ties is more than an empty nicety.

Globally, China’s role as a mediator demonstrated its aspirations to challenge America’s role in the Middle East and to present itself as a serious player. However, as fellow Ahmed Aboudouh pointed out, the deal “is beset by Saudi-Iranian mutual distrust that runs deep in their strategic thinking and a wide range of regional conflicts—Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria—that serve as a battleground for their competition.”

MENASource

Mar 21, 2023

China’s mediation between Saudi and Iran is no cause for panic in Washington

By Ahmed Aboudouh

The deal is a mere statement of intentions by both countries to improve relations, meaning reconciliation is not complete.

China East Asia

March 13: Megiddo bombing in northern Israel

On the morning of March 13, a roadside bomb went off in Megiddo, seriously injuring an Israeli Arab. The location of the bombing, the Megiddo Junction, was just thirty-seven miles from the Lebanese border. Based on shrapnel and remains of the bomb, Israeli officials did not believe the attack to be from a Palestinian group. According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the suspected terrorist crossed into Israel from Lebanon and was found hitchhiking following the attack.

“If Hezbollah was behind the Megiddo bombing,” argued senior fellow Nicholas Blanford, “it likely came within the context of supporting the growing popular unrest in the West Bank.” 

For Israelis, the incident reinforced the necessity of the wall currently being built on the border with Lebanon to replace an ineffective fence.  

MENASource

Mar 22, 2023

Was Hezbollah behind the Megiddo bombing in Israel? If yes, it’s a new escalation.

By Nicholas Blanford

The suspect was shot dead when Israeli security forces intercepted him in a vehicle traveling close to the border with Lebanon.

Lebanon Middle East

March 18: Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visits Cairo 

Following the 2013 coup d’etat in Egypt that ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi, current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi banned the Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamist group that Turkey supported. The incident brought a rift in ties. Now that Ankara has abandoned its critical approach to Sisi, the two countries have tried to mend their relationship.

At the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, President Sisi and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan were photographed shaking hands. In March, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Egypt and met with his Egyptian counterpart Sameh Shoukry. This encounter led to the first official meeting of the two presidents in over a decade on the sidelines of the September G20 summit in New Delhi.

MENASource

Apr 12, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Ankara’s perspective 

By Ali Bakir

While Turkey would prefer to speed up the normalization process, Cairo might prefer to wait until the next elections before expediting it.

Europe & Eurasia Libya

MENASource

Apr 11, 2023

Egypt-Turkey normalization: Cairo’s perspective 

By Shahira Amin

After a decade of ruptured ties and simmering tensions, Egypt and Turkey are inching towards a rapprochement—a move thought unimaginable by some observers a couple of years prior.

Africa Europe & Eurasia

March 30: International Court of Justice issues judgment on Certain Iranian Assets case 

In the case of Certain Iranian Assets, Iran challenged its responsibility to issue payments to families of victims of Iranian state-sponsored terrorism based on the now-terminated 1955 Treaty of Amity. The United States had frozen $1.8 billion from the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi) in 2012. Iran brought the case to the International Court of Justice in 2016, which issued a mixed ruling on March 30. Families of terror victims will receive compensation, but the funds and assets from which the compensation money may be obtained have been found to be narrower in scope than the United States had aimed.  

IranSource

Apr 24, 2023

What the ICJ ruling on the Central Bank of Iran means for the US and the Islamic Republic—and those seeking reparations for state-sponsored atrocities

By Celeste Kmiotek

On March 30, the International Court of Justice issued its final judgment on a case between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States on the fate of “Certain Iranian Assets.” The judgment contains wins and losses for both sides.

Iran Middle East

April 4: Iran cracks down on hijab law 

In the face of mass anti-regime protests across Iran following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in September 2022, mandatory hijab laws were laxed. However, after announcements in March and April, Tehran reversed this trend with even harsher enforcement than before the protests began.

Punishments for evading the law and servicing women without mandatory hijab now include up to $60,000 in fines, deprivation of social and public services, revocation of documents, ban of internet access, and the confiscation of property and forced closing of businesses. The clerical establishment is enforcing the hijab law by installing cameras and facial recognition technology. However, as former Young Global Professional Mahnaz Vahdati argued, “Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.” 

IranSource

Apr 20, 2023

The Islamic Republic is mobilizing all its forces against unveiled Iranian women, but they’re pushing back

By Mahnaz Vahdati

Despite all these brutal actions by the clerical establishment, many Iranian women are taking a prominent role at the forefront of the non-violent opposition to the gender apartheid system in Iran by defying the mandatory hijab.

Politics & Diplomacy

April 6: Rockets launched at Israel from Lebanon 

On April 5, Israeli police forces and Palestinians clashed at the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Palestinian and Arab media and governments claimed Israel was “storming” the mosque and had assaulted worshippers. At the same time, Israeli police justified their force with reports of masked young people barricading themselves inside the al-Aqsa Mosque with fireworks, clubs, and rocks after evening prayers. Following reports of the clashes, rockets and projectiles were allegedly launched by Hamas from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Hamas reported that the IDF then struck targets in Gaza. The next day, on April 6, thirty-four rockets were shot at Israel from Lebanon, presumably launched by Hezbollah.

The escalation of violence in early April overlapped with Hamas Political Chief Ismael Haniyeh’s visit to Lebanon to discuss the Resistance Axis, which is made up of Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). As program assistant Nour Dabboussi explained, it was a reminder of “how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country—considering itself entitled to maneuver partnerships that fall outside of the official realm of the Lebanese government—with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.” 

IranSource

Apr 12, 2023

The attacks on Israel should be a wake up call for the Lebanese people

By Nour Dabboussi

The rocket fire from Lebanon on April 6 highlights how Hezbollah continues to act as a separate military and political entity in the country, with external militia groups holding goals and ideologies that further Iran’s regional endeavors.

Iran Lebanon

April 15: Fighting breaks out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum 

On April 15, another round of fighting broke out in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, between the two factions that made up Sudan’s government. In 2021, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) overthrew Sudan’s transitional government, which was created after the 2019 military coup. For the past two years, the SAF and RSF ruled Sudan together, but now the leader of each group wants to rule Sudan independently.

“As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states,” underscored senior fellow R. Clarke Cooper. 

The conflict has displaced over six million people and has created over 1.2 million refugees.  

MENASource

May 11, 2023

Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here

By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Africa East Africa

May 7: Arab League normalizes with the Bashar al-Assad regime 

In 2011, the Arab League voted to suspend Syria from its membership based on the Bashar al-Assad regime’s violent suppression of peaceful protests. The decision to readmit Syria in May also called for a resolution of the Syrian Civil War and its spillover effects, which have impacted its neighbors and the region through the refugee crisis and drug trade. The readmission of Syria to the Arab League was controversial. Some Arab countries already have relations with Syria while others still will not be persuaded to normalize.

“Not much will change in Syria or across the region for now, but keeping Assad isolated would not be as easy as before, especially as he eyes recognition from the West followed by the removal of sanctions and funding for reconstruction,” emphasized Qutaiba Idlibi, head of the Atlantic Council’s Syria Project.

MENASource

May 19, 2023

Experts react: Assad gets warm reception at Arab summit. Where does that leave the US and its allies?

By Qutaiba Idlbi, Gissou Nia, Michel Duclos, Emadeddin Badi

Atlantic Council experts react to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s attendance at the Arab League summit in Jeddah and explain its significance below. 

Human Rights Middle East

May 9 – May 13: Israel conducts Operation Shield and Arrow against Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza 

On May 2, a prominent member of the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Khader Adnan, died after an eighty-seven-day hunger strike while in Israeli prison. Following Adnan’s death, PIJ launched 102 rockets from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, injuring seven people. The IDF responded to the rocket attack on May 9 with Operation Shield and Arrow. During the three-day operation, seven PIJ commanders were killed in targeted assassinations, approximately 938 rockets were fired into Israel by PIJ, and a total of thirty-four Palestinians (including the targeted commanders and members of PIJ) and one Israeli were killed. A ceasefire was signed on May 13, negotiated by the Egyptian government.

Operation Shield and Arrow was just one of the many escalations around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict this year. “It seems that the next Israeli operation in Gaza is inevitable,” predicted senior fellow Ksenia Svetlova. “Everyone in Israel, Gaza, and Egypt knows how it will look and how many days it might take. The only unknown factor is the operation’s future name.”

MENASource

Jun 2, 2023

In an endless series of Israeli operations, Operation Shield and Arrow in Gaza was yet another name on the list

By Ksenia Svetlova

The current Israeli government is just as unable as previous ones to produce a solution to stop PIJ and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank.

Conflict Israel

May 27: Clashes between Iran and Afghanistan over Helmand River 

The Helmand River, a major water source for Iran and Afghanistan, has been a point of contention between the two countries for centuries. The river, which flows through Afghanistan and ends in eastern Iran, is essential for farmers in both countries. Since a 1973 treaty, Iran will receive 820 million cubic meters of the river each year.

On May 18, tensions over the river and water access flared up again when Iranian President Raisi warned the Taliban to respect Iran’s water rights. Then, on May 27, fighting broke out when alleged armed drug smugglers attempted to cross the border into Iran. Iranian security forces fired at the drug smugglers, but Afghan forces, unaware of the drug smugglers, believed that Iranian forces were shooting at them unprovoked. Afghan forces then attempted to attack Iranian border villages. Each side reported that the other began shooting first. But as the Middle East Institute’s Fatemeh Aman emphasized, “Several factors have contributed to the current situation, including the impact of climate change.”

IranSource

Jul 7, 2023

Iran and Afghanistan are feuding over the Helmand River. The water wars have no end in sight.

By Holly Dagres

Fatemeh Aman, a non-resident senior fellow at MEI, on why the Islamic Republic and Taliban are bumping heads on transboundary water issues.

Afghanistan Climate Change & Climate Action

June 23-June 24: The Wagner Group rebellion 

On June 23, the Wagner Group, a Russian-funded private paramilitary organization, staged a rebellion against the Russian military and defense ministry. Wagner forces attacked and took control of Rostov-on-Don and the headquarters of the Southern Military District before continuing their offensive towards the Russian capital, Moscow. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko brokered a deal between Wagner and Russia before the rebellion reached the capital. Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, claimed the uprising was in response to the defense ministry’s attacks on his forces and demanded Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov be turned over to the group. Russian President Vladimir Putin called the rebellion treasonous. Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash. 

“It must be noted that the recent Wagner crisis affects not just those Middle Eastern countries with a Wagner presence, but all Middle Eastern countries cooperating with Russia—which is basically all Middle Eastern governments,” said senior fellow Mark Katz.

MENASource

Jun 28, 2023

The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?

By Mark N. Katz

The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]

Conflict Europe & Eurasia

June 29: Biden administration announces inter-agency counter-captagon strategy

Though the issue of the illicit captagon trade has not been covered much, its impact threatens the stability of the Middle East and has the potential to propagate the drug crisis worldwide. On June 29, the Joe Biden administration announced an inter-agency plan to counter the captagon trade. The plan includes the provision of diplomatic and intelligence resources to law enforcement agencies; applying financial pressure and economic sanctions on the Assad regime and other groups involved in the illicit captagon trade; the provision of counternarcotics training to affected countries; and diplomatic engagement and strategies to hold Syria accountable. 

MENASource

Aug 24, 2023

No quick fixes for the Middle East’s captagon crisis

By Karam Shaar

Counter-captagon policies should look further ahead and deeper into the causes of the demand in the first place.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

July 4: Iran admitted as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

Since 2009, Iran has held observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a group started in 1996 largely to manage territorial disputes that arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The SCO originally had just five members: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, adding Uzbekistan in 2001 and India and Pakistan in 2017. Iran was admitted as a full member in July. Although the group is largely ineffective, having been stalled by the rivalry between China and India, Tehran’s membership signals the failure of the United States to effectively isolate the country and the growth of an illiberal alliance. 

IranSource

Jul 13, 2023

Iran joining the SCO isn’t surprising. But Beijing’s promotion of illiberal norms in Eurasia should get more attention.

By Jonathan Fulton

Deeper coordination between Iran and other member states gives momentum to the China-centered illiberal order being promoted by Beijing.

China East Asia

July 10: Russia sides with the United Arab Emirates over Iran on territorial claims 

Iran and the UAE have had a decades-long territorial dispute over the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs in the Strait of Hormuz. Both countries claim historical ties to the islands, dating back centuries. For a large part of the twentieth century, the British controlled the islands. When they left in 1971, Iran immediately seized control of the islands and has effectively, if not legally, administered them ever since. The UAE’s efforts to diplomatically regain control of the islands have not ceased for the past fifty years. Most recently, Russia has surprised the world by voicing support for Abu Dhabi’s territorial claims despite the former’s strong relationship with Tehran.

As senior fellow Mark Katz explained, “The Russia-GCC joint statement does nothing to alter the fact that Iran remains in control of the three islands and is likely to remain so.”

MENASource

Jul 18, 2023

Is Russia really siding with the UAE against Iran?

By Mark N. Katz

For Russia to endorse the GCC’s position on three islands is especially surprising, considering how much Iran has done to support Moscow.

Iran Middle East

July 18: Israeli President Isaac Herzog visits the United States

Despite a decades-long friendship, the Joe Biden-Benjamin Netanyahu relationship has been strained by the current right-wing government in Israel—the most extreme in the country’s history. In July, Israeli President Isaac Herzog, whose role is largely ceremonial, was welcomed to the Oval Office. During the meeting, President Biden reaffirmed the “unbreakable” friendship between the United States and Israel and strengthened his commitment to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Biden also stated that a meeting between himself and Netanyahu in Washington was in the works for the coming months.

While in the United States, Herzog addressed Congress and met with American Jewish leaders. However, as senior fellow Shalom Lipner highlighted, “Israel and the United States have some tough decisions to make if they harbor any hopes of refreshing the trifecta—shared values, shared interests, and broad-based support—which has kept them famously on the same page.”

MENASource

Jul 17, 2023

At risk of separating, can Israel and the US renew their vows?

By Shalom Lipner

President Joe Biden is rolling out the red carpet for his Israeli counterpart, Isaac Herzog, who arrives in the United States on July 18.

Israel Middle East

August 10: United States reaches hostage deal with Iran 

After months of negotiations, the United States and Iran reached a deal to exchange prisoners. In September, five Iranian-Americans held hostage in Iran on unsubstantiated charges were released in exchange for five Iranians imprisoned in the United States on charges of sanction violations. “Many have criticized the deal as constituting a ransom payment, incentivizing Tehran’s hostage-taking model,” said staff lawyer Celeste Kmiotek. The United States also released $6 billion of frozen Iranian funds held in South Korean banks, which was transferred to Qatari banks for humanitarian purposes but may be re-frozen by Congress. After the American hostages returned home, the Biden administration introduced new sanctions against Iran. 

The Islamic Republic is holding at least three other hostages who may be considered nationals under the Levinson Act: Green Card holder Shahab Dalili; US permanent resident Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani; and US resident Jamshid Sharmahd.

IranSource

Aug 17, 2023

The Levinson Act means all Americans must return home—not just citizens

By Celeste Kmiotek

Shahab Dalili, Afshin Sheikholeslami Vatani, and Jamshid Sharmahd are all considered US nationals under the Levinson Act.

Human Rights Iran

August 20: Protests and strikes in Sweida, Syria begin

In August, the pan-Syrian August 10 movement was founded by Syrian opposition leaders to end poor economic conditions, violence, and sectarianism in Syria. Simultaneously, the Free Alawite Officers published a declaration expressing demands of the Assad regime, including an end to Iranian influence in the country and the creation of accountability methods. Both groups appealed to the Alawite community of Syria. Just days later, small-scale protests began.

On August 17, a general strike was called in Sweida—a predominantly Druze area—and hundreds of protesters gathered near police headquarters and the governor’s office, chanting anti-Assad regime slogans. Protesters participated in mass demonstrations, causing road closures, boycotts, and destruction of Baath party property. As the protests continued throughout August and into September, the movement became more explicitly anti-government, calling out the crimes of the Assad regime and demanding his overthrow, and even spread to areas that traditionally supported the dictator. The government responded to the protests violently, killing many demonstrators.

Despite this, it seems the regime has been unable to stop the protests thus far. “It may be unexpected to witness this scene after all the suppression and war crimes committed by the Assad regime in Syria,” emphasized writer Rima Flihan. “However, it signifies that the desire for change in Syria still exists within the Syrian people.”

MENASource

Sep 5, 2023

The uprising in Sweida will continue until the regime changes in Syria

By Rima Flihan

These demonstrations call for a change in the Syrian regime and the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254.

Middle East Politics & Diplomacy

August 22-August 24: Middle Eastern countries admitted to BRICS 

During the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit in South Africa in August, the group—which is a geopolitical rival to the G7—announced the admittance of six new countries to the bloc, including four Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. This move was made to give a greater voice to the Global South and to grow BRICS’s share of the global economy.

However, the divide that the G7 and BRICS represent between the Global North and Global South is unclear. BRICS contains important American strategic allies like India and Saudi Arabia, and there are significant geopolitical tensions between BRICS members India and China. Senior fellow Mark Katz pointed out that “For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China and that the West will just have to accept this.”

MENASource

Aug 25, 2023

The BRICS come to the Middle East and North Africa

By Mark N. Katz

For Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in particular, joining BRICS is a statement that while they cooperate with the United States and the West, they also cooperate with Russia and China

International Financial Institutions International Markets

September 9: White House Announces India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor

In September, the Memorandum of Understanding for the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was signed at the G20 summit in New Delhi. The project, seen as an American alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, aims to promote economic development, integration, and connectivity throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. The rail and shipping networks are to include many strategic American allies and will travel through India, Europe, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

“The project serves primarily as a US diplomatic tool to counter China’s influence in the Middle East. In fact, IMEC should be considered in the same light as Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): an ambitious foreign policy project that captures the world’s attention, even though it is unlikely to deliver on its lofty promises,” claimed senior fellow Jean-Loup Saman.

The IMEC is just the latest initiative in the growing global competition between the United States and China.

MENASource

Oct 6, 2023

The India-Middle East Corridor: a Biden Road Initiative?

By Jean-Loup Samaan

Economists and regional experts expressed their reservations on the feasibility—both politically and financially—of a corridor that would redraw the map of infrastructure across Eurasia.

Economy & Business Financial Regulation

September 10: Tragic floods strike Libyan city of Derna 

Tropical Storm Daniel hit Libya on September 10, becoming the deadliest storm recorded in the Mediterranean. The storm caused the failure of two dams in the city of Derna, releasing 30 million cubic meters of water, which flooded the city and resulted in an estimated 5,300-20,000 deaths. While Libyans were grieving and rescue efforts were still underway, it was revealed that the dams burst because of decades of neglect.

After Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown in 2011, the city changed hands four times and was a battleground in the Libyan civil war. As North Africa director Karim Mezran explained, “the tragedy of the dam collapse results from neglected dam maintenance, city infrastructure, and civil services, such as inadequately trained and equipped firefighters and medical personnel, the absence of a warning system, and numerous other issues.”

MENASource

Sep 22, 2023

The Derna catastrophe is a sign that the international community needs to take action in Libya

By Karim Mezran

This narrow window of opportunity is unlikely to remain open for long.

Libya Middle East

September 16: First anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death 

On September 16, 2022, twenty-two-year-old Kurdish-Iranian Mahsa Jina Amini died while in custody of the so-called morality police. Amini was arrested for “violating” mandatory hijab law. In the year since her murder, mass anti-regime protests erupted across Iran. #Mahsa_Amini reportedly broke the X (formerly known as Twitter) hashtag record, as the cause was taken up globally. Amini’s death also united the Iranian diaspora, which mirrored and amplified the voices of the people of Iran.

“I strongly believe that the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic… By no means are we going to stand back and surrender. We will be victorious,” said one Gen Z Iranian protester on the anniversary of the protest movement.

IranSource

Sep 13, 2023

Letters from women protesters inside Iran: One year after #MahsaAmini’s death 

By Khosro Sayeh Isfahani

“The people of Iran want to overthrow this regime. If you believe in freedom, equality, and human rights, remember that this regime stands against these values.”

Human Rights Iran

September 22: Senator Bob Menendez indicted in corruption case with the Egyptian government 

United States Senator and Chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Bob Menendez (D-NJ) was indicted on federal corruption charges. The charges allege that Menendez, his wife, and three New Jersey businessmen participated in a years-long bribery scheme where Menendez and his wife received hundreds of thousands of dollars in exchange for Menendez’s agreement to use his official position to benefit the businessmen and the Egyptian government. At least one of the businessmen had close connections with Egyptian government officials.

Menendez was introduced to Egyptian intelligence and military officials through the businessmen and provided them with sensitive, non-public US government information, including information on employees in the US Embassy in Cairo. Menendez also used his position to influence foreign military financing and sales of military equipment for the benefit of Egypt. Senior fellow Shahira Amin noted, “Despite the low-key coverage of the shocking corruption scheme by the mainstream Egyptian media, the bribery case stirred controversy on Egyptian social media platforms.”

MENASource

Oct 4, 2023

Menendez’s case coverage is relatively muted in Egypt. That might be intentional.

By Shahira Amin

Egypt’s predominantly pro-government media has chosen to either dismiss altogether or downplay the allegations against Senator Bob Menendez.

Corruption Democratic Transitions

October 7: Outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war 

On October 7, the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur war, Hamas carried out a brutal terror attack in southern Israel, killing between 1,200-1,400 people, injuring hundreds more, and kidnapping approximately 240 people (primarily civilians) before holding them hostage in the Gaza Strip. The attack, which saw the largest number of Jews killed in a single day since the Holocaust, included reports of torture, mutilation, decapitation, sexual violence, and immolation. Simultaneous to the ground attack, Hamas launched a rocket barrage at Israel consisting of at least three thousand rockets. Israel declared war on Hamas the same day, launching its offensive to destroy “the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”

On October 27, Israel began its ground invasion, attempting to destroy Hamas’s infrastructure and tunnels and clear northern Gaza of its operatives. Since Israel began its bombardment of Gaza, a massive humanitarian crisis has erupted. Approximately 18,400 Gazans, primarily women and children, have been killed, according to the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry. 1.9 million Gazans have been internally displaced, and essential resources, such as food, water, and fuel, are scarce. After weeks of negotiations between Israel and Hamas, orchestrated by Qatar, Egypt, and the United States, the parties reached a ceasefire deal that lasted from November 24 to December 1. The deal saw the release of 105 hostages in exchange for over 230 Palestinian prisoners and up to two hundred trucks of aid delivered to Gaza daily.

The Israel-Hamas war also has the potential to expand into a regional war. Iran’s Resistance Axis has already been active. The border between Israel and Lebanon has seen an escalation of small-scale attacks, and the Houthis have launched missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles at Israel from Yemen. The war has also paused previous diplomatic efforts in the region, like the potential normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The effects of the war will be widespread. 

Israel-Hamas war

Experts from across the Atlantic Council are providing insight and analysis at speed and in depth on the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, Israel’s response, and how the emerging conflict is upending the Middle East and the world.

October 17: Iran-backed militia strikes in Iraq and Syria 

Since the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, US troops and military personnel in Iraq and Syria have endured drone and rocket attacks launched by various Iran-backed militias and terrorist organizations. 3,400 US troops are stationed in the two countries to assist local forces in preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In the more than forty attacks in the last two months, forty-five US troops have been injured. The United States has responded to the attacks, carrying out a number of air strikes against military targets and strongholds of the militias and terror groups.

Iran’s proxies justify their attacks by asserting that the United States shares the blame for Israel’s declaration of war against Hamas. Since October 7, the United States has bolstered its military presence in the region, sending aircraft carriers and troops and increasing drone surveillance.

MENASource

Nov 22, 2023

Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears to be responsible for attacks in the country and there’s no end in sight 

By Lizzie Porter

Iraq is witnessing part of the regional fallout from the Israel-Hamas war, and Iraqi bases housing US troops are feeling that most forcefully.

Iran Iraq

November 14: Speaker of Iraq’s parliament ousted

In November, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court revoked the parliamentary membership of its speaker, Mohammed al-Halbousi, along with member Laith al-Dulaimi. Although the court did not disclose its reasoning, the decision was released following an argument between Halbousi and Dulaimi over allegations that the speaker forged Dulaimi’s signature. In reaction to the ruling, members of the speaker’s party, Takadum, resigned from parliament. Critics of the decision say it has the potential to set a dangerous, anti-constitutional precedent, as decisions from the highest court cannot be appealed.

“The timing of this development is particularly crucial, given that Iraq, like the rest of the region, is entangled in the escalating Israel-Hamas war,” explained Abbas Kadhim, director of the Iraq Initiative. “Additionally, the country is in the midst of an election campaign to reinstate provincial councils.”

MENASource

Nov 17, 2023

Iraq’s parliamentary speaker was removed. What’s next for the country?

By Abbas Kadhim

The current crisis dates back to May 2022, when Mohamed al-Halbousi removed one of his bloc’s members from parliament.

Elections Iraq

November 30-December 12: COP28 in the United Arab Emirates

The United Nations Climate Change Conference, also known as COP, convened 197 member countries in Dubai to discuss progress and plan measures to combat climate change. The decision to host this year’s conference in the UAE has caused some controversy, as the country is a major oil producer.

Just days before the conference began, news leaked alleging that the UAE planned on using its proximity to the summit as a forum to discuss oil and gas deals. Major topics of COP28 included responses to the Global Stocktake synthesis report, which revealed the failure to reduce the rise in global temperatures, the shift away from fossil fuels, and the impacts of climate change on cities.  

MENASource

Nov 30, 2023

COP28 is here. These are the Global South’s demands and expectations.

By Lama El Hatow

The COP28 negotiations will prove to be challenging given all the demands and expectations on the table in this COP.

Civil Society Energy & Environment

December 10-December 12: Egyptian presidential elections 

As Egyptians headed to the polls for presidential elections, it was all but certain that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi would serve a third term, but the election came at a challenging time: Egypt’s economy is suffering with inflation at an all-time high; its neighbors are fighting a brutal war that poses risks to Egypt’s border and security; and the country continues to experience international and domestic pressure regarding its human rights record. Despite these conditions, there was no question about Sisi’s victory.

Though there were three other candidates formally in the race, the only serious competitor, Ahmed El-Tantawy, was forced to end his campaign, and his supporters were harassed, intimidated, and arrested. The election formalized six more years of Sisi’s reign. “Be that as it may, Sisi still needs to win over the hearts and minds of disgruntled Egyptians, which may prove to be his biggest challenge during his third term in office,” highlighted senior fellow Shahira Amin.

MENASource

Dec 7, 2023

President Sisi’s third term will be his biggest challenge—not the upcoming Egyptian election 

By Shahira Amin

While it is certain that Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will win a third term, it is uncertain what will happen after the vote and when the Gaza war is over.

Elections Middle East

Rachel Friedman is a Young Global Professional with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

The post 2023: A year in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

H.E. Leila Benali is the minister of energy transition and sustainable development of Morocco and president of the UN Assembly for Environment. This essay is part of the Global Energy Agenda.

Describing the recent crush of global crises, a wise man said, “We faced a century’s worth of tragedies in less than two years.” Our health systems might have emerged more resilient following the COVID-19 pandemic, but our economies and financial systems are still struggling at a time when emerging markets, like Morocco, want to escape the middle-income trap of 3 percent GDP growth.

The Russia-Ukraine war added to the unprecedented disturbance in already dislocated commodities supply chains, threatening nations’ energy security and triggering global inflationary pressure. It is not the first time humanity faces such continuous accumulation of upheavals , but it is the first time it does so at such record levels of global debt—238 percent of global GDP in 2022. This does not leave much room to tackle the triple planetary crisis of our time: climate change, environmental degradation, and biodiversity loss.

We are more often reminded of the fragility of our environment, with extreme weather events or natural disasters. A quarter of the United Nations’ membership, mostly Small Island Developing States, is at risk of disappearing by the end of the century because of rising sea levels. Humanity will face climate-triggered questions over sovereignty and national identity for the first time. Is our post-World War II world order, including our Bretton Woods institutions, equipped to answer?

Humanity will face climate-triggered questions over sovereignty and national identity for the first time. Is our post-World War II world order, including our Bretton Woods institutions, equipped to answer?

Part of the answer is already known: decarbonization of emitting sectors and acceleration of the energy transition would soften the worst impacts of climate change. And maybe, in the twenty-first century, some countries should show the way despite low historic responsibility for causing planetary warming. Morocco has a longstanding commitment toward sustainability despite its negligible emissions. It was one of the first countries to target a reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions by 45.5 percent by 2030 in its Nationally Determined Contribution.

To achieve necessary emissions cuts, pragmatism and inclusiveness are key. When affordability, as well as economic and social development are nonnegotiable, there is no room for ideology in technology and fuel taxonomies. We must leave the traditional energy transition narrative, driven by divisions, in the twentieth century, and embrace twenty-first century narratives.

Morocco generates more than 40 percent of its electricity capacity from renewable energy, and is also a fossil fuel importer, still largely exposed to global commodities’ price volatility and supply issues. Its approach to energy and climate, built over three decades, thus takes into account the complexity of building a credible, sustainable development path, while understanding the long-term nature of energy investments, and the role of lower-carbon fuels like natural gas as key to a well-ordered energy transition.

Coal-based generation will be phased out. More importantly, we want to harness our exceptional renewable resources, and the momentum created by rising technologies like green hydrogen, e-fuels, and storage. We want to leverage our favorable legal framework and three decades of experience in structuring and developing renewable and private energy projects.

Our strategic objectives are threefold:

1. Accelerate (i.e., triple) the pace of investments in renewable energies and key sectors like transmission infrastructure and storage solutions, starting today.

2. Build resilient and agile energy systems and grids that are secure, affordable, and sustainable.

3. Put people at the center of our energy transition and net-zero pathways, permeating the new socioeconomic models we are building.

How will we achieve these objectives? The National Strategy for Sustainable Development (NSSD) is our reference framework to support policies and programs in implementing Morocco’s sustainable development priorities. It is aligned with the 2030 Agenda and its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals as well as the main orientations of the Kingdom’s New Development Model.

The NSSD aims, by 2050, to promote resilience, human development, and reduction of social and territorial inequalities; mitigate and adapt to the consequences of climate change; and protect the environment.

What is different about this strategy is the approach. Through constant consultation, we harness the collective intelligence of all stakeholders—including local authorities, the private sector, civil society, youth, Moroccans living abroad and minorities—to shape the future they want for the country, and to craft with the government the relevant tools to operationalize our social and economic sustainable development path. This inclusive and democratic approach is already having tangible impacts on our new generation of public policies.

Morocco’s development path needs to be holistic, just, and sustainable. Therefore, this is a space and time for society to define the positive and negative externalities of development and price them. These policy levers for sustainable development are defined at the local level, acknowledging the diverse needs and aspirations of our twelve regions.

Even if I am personally excited by the leaps in space technologies, there is still no Planet B, and human societies are still dependent on their environment on Planet Earth. Morocco’s sustainable development strategy is not only a response to the climate crisis, or another mere net-zero pathway, but a means to reintroduce humanity into our policies, placing people at the center of the system.

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The post A people-centric energy transformation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Many Moroccans were shaken by the flow of footage depicting the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza in the aftermath of the October 7 terrorist attacks. Akin to many Arab and global capitals, tens of thousands of citizens have marched in solidarity with the Palestinian people in recent weeks. There are undeniably long-standing affinities between many Moroccans and Palestinians today due to religious, linguistic, and cultural similarities, notwithstanding their geographical distance and often divergent political trajectories.

These protests have led some foreign commentators to proclaim that normalization is in peril. What many such commentators get wrong, however, is that these demonstrations are not happening against the wishes of the country’s leadership and are not perceived as pressure points within Moroccan political spheres. On the contrary, this social movement in support of Palestinians is organized with the state’s blessing. The government provides logistical and security arrangements for demonstrators every weekend, and it seems to view the marches as an expression of indisputable civil rights. It also has clearly formulated a position on the conflict that is in tune with public demands, calling for de-escalation, access to humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians in line with international law. 

Morocco, however, has no intention of revoking the normalization agreement it signed with Israel. Bilateral relations might traverse a period of malaise, and certain public-facing projects might even be frozen until the next Israeli government takes power, but it is highly unlikely that the kingdom will pull back from its commitments with the United States and Israel. This was apparent from Rabat’s veto, together with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Mauritania, Djibouti, Jordan, and Egypt, on November 11 that blocked a proposal to cut ties with Israel at the Arab League summit in Riyadh.

Unlike countries that share immediate borders with Israel and have a long history of conflict with it, Morocco has a greater margin to maneuver over its foreign policy. The kingdom has pragmatically shown over the years a quasi-secular approach, decoupling what it considers a religious and brotherly duty to support Palestinians and what it believes can best serve its territorial integrity and economic development agenda. Hence, Rabat often reiterated the importance of involving Palestinians in the Abraham Accords process while it gradually expanded the prospects of its cooperation with Israel. Morocco was even cautious about phrasing its agreement with Israel as a “re-establishment of diplomatic ties” rather than as normalization. The relations between the two countries never graduated from the limited status of reopening their respective liaison offices to having full diplomatic representation, despite Israel recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in July—the main pillar of the deal brokered back in 2020 by the Trump administration. 

At the same time, several anti-normalization voices are mounting in Morocco, notably influential Islamist and leftist party leaders and elites, such as Abdelilah Benkirane, the former prime minister from the PJD, and Nabila Mounib, the general secretary of the Unified Socialist Party. Many more private citizens are feeling increasingly frustrated at the humanitarian toll of the Israeli military operations in Gaza and have decided to join the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement or protest groups online and in the streets. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to use a snapshot of one part of society to make a blanket statement about what all nearly forty million Moroccans want or believe. 

Over the past few weeks, some commentators and journalists seem to be feeding sensationalism and presenting a misleading image of a country on the brink of serious civil unrest over the Israel-Hamas war. Interestingly enough, while the war on Gaza still dominates headlines, many Moroccans seem more preoccupied with rain scarcity, teacher strikes, reform of the family code, or even the new Pedro Sanchez government in Spain. The country is also linguistically, ethnically, and ideologically diverse. Many Moroccans, for example, chose to stand with Israel in the ongoing conflict using hashtags like “Morocco First” or “Taza before Gaza”—Taza being a small town in Morocco’s northeast. If one were to zoom out from the elites with internet access and social media accounts, one may very well find that a silent majority has no strong opinion on the matter.

Rather than spinning stories about civil unrest in Morocco and reenacting the failed 2011 Arab Spring forecasts about an imminent revolution awaiting the kingdom, it is perhaps better to focus instead on a recent and worrying escalation in Western Sahara. On October 29, the local authorities reported four blasts in civilian areas in the city of Smara, resulting in one dead and three injured. The attacks against civilians, which the separatist Polisario Front later claimed, could represent a kind of spillover of the Israel-Gaza conflict into North Africa, especially with the Front’s insurgents taking advantage of the current international momentum and mimicking Hamas-style speeches and narratives. The Moroccan authorities have since been in constant confrontation with the insurgents, who, for the first time in years, executed an operation in the Moroccan-controlled territories rather than along the Berm sand wall. The German newspaper Die Welt also reported earlier this month on an even more disturbing piece of intelligence, revealing that Iran might be planning an attack on the Israeli liaison office in Rabat using Polisario as a proxy.

These recent developments suggest that the kingdom may tone down its public collaboration with Israel and the United States and continue to criticize the humanitarian situation in Gaza publicly. Yet, it remains improbable to envisage a split with Israel at the security and intelligence levels, as this collaboration is now a matter of national security for a monarchy that’s succeeded in surviving for twelve centuries.

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs where she oversees the Center’s strategic communications, media relations, and social and digital marketing efforts. She previously worked as a journalist and international development professional in Morocco, Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere in the region.

The post Why Morocco will not cut ties with Israel appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a stable and forward-looking Southern shore—the countries of North Africa—for the peaceful evolution of Southern Europe’s polities. Unfortunately, that possibility is farther away than ever and the current situation can quickly get worse.

To begin with, the Morocco-Algeria rivalry, which has always been focused on the issue of the contested territory of the Western Sahara, has caused the two countries to engage in a decades-long arms race. This security issue, which is about both countries’ power and legitimacy more than anything, could very well lead to a military clash. This dispute over Western Sahara is an excuse to have an enemy at the border and justifies the power of the ruling classes in Algeria and Morocco.

Nevertheless, in recent years, efforts have been made to bring rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, such as reopening the borders and establishing a direct diplomatic relationship. Much hope was raised by various Arab populations in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring period. In the same vein, Moroccans and Algerians shared a keen interest in fostering ties. With the onset of the democratization process in their respective countries, citizens aspired to exert pressure on their governments for rapprochement.

However, this wishful thinking was short-lived, and more reasons for confrontation have recently emerged. For starters, in 2020, the normalization of certain Arab states with Israel (including Morocco) went beyond creating strong tensions within Algeria, producing a radical reaction that prompted it to join states like Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in opposing the accords at the time.

The consequences of the Algerian response are significant in the context of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war, particularly for Italy and other European nations that have come to rely on Algerian gas as a substitute for Russian gas. Irregular migration from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria has plagued Italy for years and is likely to increase as tensions between these countries remain unresolved.

Separately, in Tunisia, the newly elected President Kais Saied has centralized all constitutional powers to himself, turning the country towards authoritarianism. However, what could be more dangerous is that Tunisia is falling into the arms of its powerful neighbor: Algeria. The more Tunisia plunged into its economic and political crisis, the more President Saied needed support for its political and economic development that was not conditional from Western countries.

This issue is raising concerns for Egypt, too, which has been striving to extend its military and political rule to its neighbor and civil war-ravaged Libya. Disorder and negative consequences at Egypt’s western borders have been partially avoided by supporting one of their proxies and the ruler of Libya’s eastern provinces: General Khalifa Haftar. The strongman, supported by Russian mercenaries, the Wagner Group, achieved a moderate level of order through a bloody war against all opposing clans and tribes—which he has lumped together as Islamist terrorists—as well as through establishing a reign of terror in the country.

However, this went undetected by most until the tragedy of the September 9 floods in Derna province, which killed about ten thousand people. Now, many are beginning to question Haftar’s and, more precisely, his six sons’ involvement in the military and economic realms of the province. Since then, clashes have occurred, and the possibility of a revolt by the tribes and urban population increases by the day.

Egyptian dictator Abdel Fattah el-Sisi may try to intervene directly to alleviate the bordering region. Still, there is little doubt that this would cause a strong reaction from Algeria, which would see an attempt to expand Egyptian power as tilting the balance of power in North Africa. Moreover, the power that controls the western part of Libya, Turkey, will not sit idly by and will most probably intervene directly while having Algeria in its corner. The idea of a Turkish-Algerian entente was challenging to conceive until the summer when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan de facto joined the normalization refusal front headed by Algeria.

Given the current scenario, the situation of the Israel-Hamas war may force Egypt to face its contradictions, leading it to either a confrontation with Israel in defense of the Palestinians or against Hamas in support of its peace agreement with Israel. In either case, the consequences for Western countries would be unthinkable.

In light of these multifaceted challenges, Western countries should take into consideration the ongoing tensions in North Africa to make their decision-making process regarding the events in Gaza more precise and holistic. The only viable solution for a lasting peace—rather than a temporary fix—is to formulate a plan that facilitates the reconciliation of the Palestinians and Israelis and shapes their political and socio-economic progress in a manner that does not neglect the entirety of the Arab world. This is the only path forward.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Program at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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This week, leaders are meeting at IMF-World Bank Week in Marrakesh, Morocco, to get the world’s economic engine back on track. But with so many global crises putting countries (especially emerging markets) in a bind, audiences worldwide will be watching to see whether the IMF and World Bank can help countries respond to debt distress, climate change, and the economic impact of conflict.

With so much happening behind closed doors, we’ve dispatched our experts to Marrakesh; on the ground and in conversation with finance ministers, central bank governors, and other top leaders, they are evaluating the IMF and World Bank’s response to today’s biggest financial challenges. Below are their takeaways and insights from behind the scenes as the week unfolds.

• As the meetings wrap, macroeconomic and gender equality agendas remain tightly linked

• The final verdict: The IMF and World Bank are struggling to see how geopolitics and economics intertwine

• As IMF-World Bank Week wraps, we wonder: Is that all there is to say?

• See day five analysis

Watch all our conversations with central bank governors and finance ministers

IMF-World Bank Week at the Atlantic Council

WASHINGTON, DC APRIL 15–19

The Atlantic Council hosted a series of special events with finance ministers and central bank governors from around the globe during the 2024 Spring Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Watch key moments with ministers

As the meetings wrap, macroeconomic and gender equality agendas remain tightly linked

A month ago, on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, I discussed top risks and opportunities in the year and near years ahead with foresight experts from the Atlantic Council. On the risk side, I talked about debt and geopolitical fragmentation—and the resulting drop in investment (especially in the Global South) that undermines productivity and growth. On the opportunity side, I talked about women’s economic and labor force participation driven in part by policy reforms and investments taking root that enable women to work, start, or grow businesses; including through care.

These risks and opportunities appear to be bearing out—at least if the conversations and reports this week at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings are to be believed.

The World Economic Outlook (WEO) projects that global growth will slow to historically low levels—from 3.5 percent in 2022 to 3 percent this year and 2.9 percent next year—driven down by risks associated with weakened Chinese growth, persistent inflation and debt distress, and the geopolitical fragmentation of commodity markets. These factors are also contributing to a widening divergence in growth across countries; and though not routinely discussed in the WEO, we are also seeing widening inequality, worsening food insecurity, and increasing poverty as a result—including higher numbers of poor people in wealthy countries—as macroeconomic challenges bear disproportionate impacts for already marginalized or disadvantaged economic groups, youth, women, and rural communities.

At the same time, the dialogue this week put women’s economic participation front and center as a solution to challenges, including those that are macroeconomic in nature, such as debt: More women in the labor force increases the tax base. In a conversation on mobilizing domestic resources to boost growth, Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Chrystia Freeland touted investing in early learning and childcare as her government’s “best bang for the buck” for increasing prime age women’s labor force participation to record highs of over 85 percent (and 8 percent higher than the US record high) and increasing productivity, tax revenues, and household consumption in return. It’s a theme echoed across campus this week, including in my conversation with Hana Brixi, global gender director at the World Bank. At the same time, discussions of increasing women’s economic activity through improved financial inclusion and digital access were widespread—including in my Brixi conversation and in a conversation on digital financial inclusion with Josh Lipsky, Jesse McWaters, and Raj Kumar. In these risks and opportunities, we see the impact of the choices that policymakers make—and, increasingly, the impact of the choices that private sector leaders make.

The final verdict: The IMF and World Bank are struggling to see how geopolitics and economics intertwine

The IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh actually delivered concrete outcomes—and more than many expected going into the week. But the dark clouds of war loomed over the Meetings, and all the quota deals and debt agreements in the world couldn’t hide the fact the biggest risk to the global economy was staring the ministers right in the face—and they weren’t sure what to do or say about it. 

The IMFC couldn’t agree to a joint communique, likely because of debates over how to characterize the ongoing war in Ukraine. And the Group of Twenty finance ministers’ statement surprisingly avoided mentioning anything about the Israel-Hamas war directly. 

But the IMF’s steering committee did broker an agreement on quotas—the money all members pay to the IMF, and in return, they receive a share of voting power at the Fund. The United States got what it wanted: an “equi-proportional” increase, which means more money from everyone but no change in how the votes are allocated. China, India, and Brazil stay with their current percentages. When I interviewed Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman yesterday, she told me this was going to happen: “This solution that came from the US has been accepted.” But she also said next time around, things will have to be different. 

For the agreement on this solution, credit is due to the range of emerging countries that put the stability of the IMF ahead of the understandable desire to have the size of their economies more accurately reflected in voting share. And credit is also due to the United States for brokering an agreement that many thought wasn’t possible. 

That success would have been enough for everyone to hang their hats on. But the Zambia debt memorandum of understanding was the “will they, won’t they” question of the meetings. Early in the week, when I spoke to Zambian Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane, he confirmed it was happening. Then IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva announced it was a done deal. And then, it wasn’t. After a few days of carefully crafted press releases and hedging, the deal was officially done. The question is whether doing debt restructuring with China is going to be like developing a new pharmaceutical drug—it takes years to do the first one but then easily replicated—or if each process is going to be as torturous as Zambia’s was. 

Looking at the Marrakesh meetings by themselves, they were a success. The problem for the finance ministers and central bank governors is that the world around them is on fire. Brune Le Maire, France’s finance minister, probably said it best when he said geopolitics is the biggest risk to global growth. 

For peace and stability, the world needs geoeconomics, Spain’s Nadia Calviño said earlier today. But the best the IMF and World Bank could offer was that it was too early to tell when it comes to the economic fallout from the war in Israel. It’s an understandable but insufficient position from the world’s leading financial institutions. How many crises can the world handle at once? It seems we are at the tipping point. That was the sense of urgency that was missing in some of the language and events during the Meetings. 

So the final verdict? There was strong progress on the economics, but a missed moment on geopolitics. Geoeconomics is ultimately the lesson—hard-learned during World War II when the IMF and World Bank were created—that the two can actually never truly be separated.

As IMF-World Bank Week wraps, we wonder: Is that all there is to say?

Amid the (welcome) fundraising and quota-raising progress reports, today’s IMFC Chair Statement missed an opportunity to reassure a concerned public by providing a strong response to the extraordinary uncertainty around the global economic outlook.

The IMF’s flagship reports released this week were already in need of an update, given that their timing did not allow for a full analysis of the rise in long-term interest rates, appreciation of the US dollar, and increase in oil prices following the attack on Israel. With the Global Financial Stability Report warning particularly about the risks in the global banking system, it would have been important to emphasize a willingness to closely collaborate on economic policies to avoid further increases in volatility.

This is not to downplay the agreement to increase IMF quotas, an important step to strengthen the global safety net, but especially with a rudderless US Congress and a sharp slowing of the Chinese economy, a better understanding of how global policymakers intend to preserve global stability would have been welcome.

The lack of a policy message from the IMF-World Bank meetings further adds to the policy vacuum left after the Group of Twenty (G20) communique similarly avoided specific policy commitments. Both documents echoed the language agreed upon at the Delhi summit, leaving the impression that ministers and central bank governors were too distracted by the need to negotiate geopolitical language and secure agreement on fundraising and quota issues to focus on their most important task at hand.

Moreover, the failure to change the relative voting shares at the IMF has been criticized by the Group of Twenty-four (G24) (comprised of developing countries) as setting a bad precedent in perpetuating an unequal governance structure, which in their view continues to undermine the IMF’s legitimacy and effectiveness. This will remain a bone of contention between developing and developed member countries going forward, even if tempered by the permanent inclusion of the African Union in the G20 and the creation of a twenty-fifth seat at the IMF Executive Board, to be allocated to Sub-Saharan Africa.

• A G20 communique is turning heads in Morocco

• Equi-proportional IMF quota increase has been accepted—for now, says Indian finance minister

• Your guide to IMF Special Drawing Rights

• The EU’s plans to bolster its resilience against climate change, trade dependency, and an array of other crises

• Regional multilateral banks are having their moment in Marrakesh

• Decoding the Marrakesh G20 communique: Progress, but no inspiration

• How are IMF stakeholder countries working to mitigate climate change? The case of Morocco and renewable energy

• Inside Turkey’s plans to bounce back from economic shocks and policy challenges

• Staring into the gap between Africa as a global leader and a development challenge

• Georgieva’s emphasis on the positive is a reminder of the power of global collaboration

• See day four analysis

A G20 communique is turning heads in Morocco

This morning, the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings Plenary took place, with thousands of participants filling up the biggest hall on campus to watch remarks from Ukraine’s finance minister, the World Bank president, and the IMF managing director.

But don’t count me among those thousands: I was also hurriedly scrolling through the Group of Twenty (G20) communique that had just been released following yesterday’s meeting of G20 ministers and governors. While the group isn’t organizationally related to the IMF and World Bank, its member countries account for 85 percent of global gross domestic product and most of the votes at the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, their decisions will translate into the IMF and World Bank’s new actions and policies.

So, where is the “new”? The communique released today basically repeats the one from the New Delhi Summit in September. It encourages the World Bank and all the multilateral development banks to implement the recommendations in the G20’s capital advocacy framework (over a year old now) to optimize their balance sheets and free up more lending power. However, the communique fails to mourn the tragic loss of life in Israel and Gaza—or even acknowledge the unfolding Israel-Hamas war at all.

In addition, the communique doesn’t say anything about the proposed equi-proportional IMF quota increase—indicating that the increase is less likely to come to fruition than we, on the ground, originally thought. However today, we spoke with Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman who told us that the equi-proportional quota increase has, in fact, been approved. However, we may not know for certain until the International Monetary and Financial Committee meeting tomorrow—or even until the end of the IMF’s sixteenth quota review (to determine whether it is necessary to increase the quota and revise the distribution formula), scheduled to wrap in December this year.

Equi-proportional IMF quota increase has been accepted—for now, says Indian finance minister

The equi-proportional IMF quota increase proposed by the United States “has been accepted,” Indian Minister of Finance Nirmala Sitharaman said at Atlantic Council studios in Marrakesh. 

She said that it is a “temporary” solution, in that it is “a solution for now,” but during the next IMF four-year review cycle, “some discussions will happen” to map out how IMF stakeholder countries address the issue moving forward.

“The equi-proportional quota seems to be the less contentious way… for now” to address the IMF’s capital needs, Sitharaman argued, “because it doesn’t alter the… proportions and therefore it’s at least some more money without upsetting the balance.” However, the concerns of the countries “who are otherwise not adequately represented” still remain, she noted. 

Sitharaman spoke with GeoEconomics Center Senior Director Josh Lipsky on the ground at IMF-World Bank Week. The IMF World Economic Outlook forecast India’s 2023-2024 growth at 6.3 percent. Sitharaman chalked up that strong growth projection to the country’s agricultural industry, services sector, and manufacturing—among other aspects. But, she said, global challenges present risks to India’s growth. 

The finance minister reflected on India’s presidency of the G20, noting that New Delhi originally set out to highlight voices of the Global South throughout the year. The African Union’s joining the group “gives us immense satisfaction, Sitharaman said.  

Focusing on the Global South is important because, while they are a varied bunch of countries, “the problems which they face are fundamentally the same,” the finance minister said.  

Your guide to IMF Special Drawing Rights

The EU’s plans to bolster its resilience against climate change, trade dependency, and an array of other crises

European Commission Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis is keeping a closer eye on the EU’s relationship with China since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 

“We need to engage with China in areas like climate change” (with China being the biggest emitter of carbon dioxide) and “on current geopolitical challenges” including the war in Ukraine. But “at the same time,” he cautioned at an Atlantic Council event at IMF-World Bank Week, the EU should be careful not to establish “strategic dependencies” on China as it had on Russia for its fossil fuel supplies. “We need diversified and resilient supply chains, and we cannot be dependent on a single supplier [for] a number of critical inputs.”  

The EU recently initiated an anti-subsidy investigation into imports of electric vehicles from China, which will determine whether electric vehicle supply chains in China benefit from subsidies in a way that breaches World Trade Organization rules—and whether those subsidies inflict injury on the European electric vehicle industry. “WTO members have a right to use these tools,” Dombrovskis said. “We are going to conduct this investigation in a facts-based manner, fully in line with applicable EU and WTO rules and principles.” 

He added that as the investigation proceeds, it’ll be “important that also Chinese companies… are cooperating.” 

On trade, the EU and its biggest trade partner, the United States, are approaching a deadline for negotiating an agreement on steel and aluminum trade that (if the EU gets its way) would address global steel overcapacity, encourage a “greening” of the industry, and put an end to tariffs imposed during the Trump administration. “We are making progress,” he said, adding that he is “optimistic” any remaining gaps will be filled soon. 

In responding to this decade’s polycrisis, the EU is employing the Recovery and Resilience Facility to ensure that the bloc emerges stronger. The fund has thus far disbursed 153 million euros to eighteen member countries.  

While it was originally aimed at mitigating the economic impacts of the pandemic—through investments such as digitizing public services and boosting sustainable transport—“Russia’s aggression has brought some corrections,” Dombrovskis said. One such correction is the creation of REPowerEU Plan to roll back Europe’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels—and roll out more renewable energy sources. 

Dombrovskis also discussed EU macro-financial assistance to Ukraine, saying that the bloc is “committed to [supporting] Ukraine for as long as it’s necessary.” He explained that once this assistance program wraps (there are still about 4.5 billion euros left to be paid this year) the EU will unleash a fifty-billion-euro package of assistance to Ukraine, to last from 2024 to 2027, through the EU Multiannual Financial Framework. The “EU is definitely doing its part,” he said. “It’s important that also other major players, including [the] United States, are playing their part.” 

Regional multilateral banks are having their moment in Marrakesh

In October 2020, at the peak of the pandemic, I wrote about why and how regional development banks play a critical role in COVID-19 response and recovery, arguing that the banks and the nature of their lending and operational practices have been, and remain, especially important for the agility, complementarity, and continuity of pandemic response.

It’s clear from conversations this week—on stage, in studio, and off the record—that this is perhaps even truer today than it was then as we grapple with how to respond to polycrises: COVID-19, conflict, and climate, and the inflation, debt, food insecurity, and rising inequality and poverty that result.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with its long history in Ukraine, is at the forefront of responding to Russia’s 2022 invasion—leading from the onset in investment, advisory, and technical assistance, as well as research, planning, and coordination. Among its response measures, it has been leveraging its distinct expertise and experience working with and through the private sector. While the Asian Development Bank, with large numbers of small island developing states as well as fragile and geopolitically tense areas, is leading on climate and resilience finance and innovation, stretching its balance sheet by adjusting its disposition toward risk and expanding lending by nearly 40 percent to about $36 billion annually. To that end, the Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank are collaborating to catalyze green finance across Latin America and the Caribbean. Given the dynamics of debt and demographics on the African continent—which have been a prominent theme this week no matter the subject—the African Development Bank is uniquely positioned to lend in a way that can support policy reform and advance inclusive growth and reduce inequality with its investments. At the same time, given the scale of what’s required, more than ever it’s about coordination and leverage between regional development banks and with the World Bank and IMF.

Given this, the importance and value of regional development banks is arguably missing from the (somewhat overlooked) “Marrakech Principles for Global Cooperation” released this week, which call for enhanced collaboration between the IMF and the World Bank “and with partners.” It is a miss to skip explicitly referencing these key international financial institutions which are clearly ready to meet the moment.

Decoding the Marrakesh G20 communique: Progress, but no inspiration

The last Group of Twenty (G20) communique under India’s leadership did not break any new ground. Notwithstanding the recognition that “the G20 is not the platform to resolve geopolitical and security issues,” most of the energy spent during the negotiations seemed to have been focused on the categorization of recent geopolitical tensions.

On that front, a general expression of deep concern for “the immense human suffering and the adverse impact of wars and conflicts around the world” seemed to be an attempt to compensate for the fact that one or several participants remained opposed to condemning the Hamas attack on Israel. The communique also rehashed previously used language on the war in Ukraine and expressed concerns about attacks on food and energy infrastructure given the potentially global consequences.

On the global economy, one paragraph of the communique repeated the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and referred to the macroeconomic policy section of September’s G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration. The onus is now on the IMFC’s communique, which is due tomorrow, to react to a weakening medium-term economic outlook, as well as the rise in long-term interest rates and the strong dollar. The G20 also did not use the opportunity to push for an IMF quota increase, which could indicate that important issues have yet to be resolved behind closed doors.

The remainder of the document was similarly underwhelming. One full page on the topic of strengthening multilateral development banks mostly dealt with process issues, with words like “remain,” “reiterate,” or “reemphasize” abounding. The IMF and World Bank were asked to provide a report on domestic revenue mobilization (i.e., tax measures), most likely a concession to those G20 members that emphasize the need for responsible economic management from developing countries themselves.

Reflecting the political attention paid to individual debt restructuring cases, the communique provided a cautious welcome of progress in the cases of Zambia and Ghana, and called for a swift debt treatment for Ethiopia as well as Sri Lanka (the latter being outside the G20 Common Framework).

There is no doubt that the G20 process will be reenergized by the start of Brazil’s G20 presidency on December 1, but it is hard to escape the impression that the G20 has been diminished by the political divergences within its membership. While it still appears possible to reach consensus in some important areas, the G20 is clearly no longer the dynamic forum it was several years ago.

How are IMF stakeholder countries working to mitigate climate change? The case of Morocco and renewable energy

Inside Turkey’s plans to bounce back from economic shocks and policy challenges

After a string of “policy distortions” and economic shocks, “Turkey is back,” Turkish Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek said.

Şimşek’s gave his remarks at Atlantic Council studios in Marrakesh, on-site at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings. There, he outlined the three new Turkish economic programs to help the country bounce back, which included measures on disinflation, fiscal discipline, and structural reforms.

The finance minister explained that he wants to see inflation down to single digits over the next three years—inflation was still at 61 percent year-on-year this September. “It’s a challenging global backdrop, but we believe it is doable.”

As for the structural reforms: Şimşek pointed to several policies meant to improve the business climate, boost savings, deepen capital markets, and enhance labor market flexibility and human capital stock. He also said that Turkey is focusing on the green transition and investing in digital infrastructure.

Throughout these reforms, Şimşek said that it’ll be important to communicate with citizens so that they understand that “there are no quick fixes [and] that there are no shortcuts,” and that the reforms are designed for the medium term. “There will be trade offs,” he cautioned, adding that “for the sake of the country, sometimes you have to take harsh measures.”

At the Annual Meetings, Şimşek said that his delegation is meeting with various counterparts to boost Turkey’s economic relations. In meetings with European counterparts, he said that the discussions tend to focus on how to retighten EU-Turkey ties. “We would like to be re-anchored to [the] EU,” he said. “Europe is a source of inspiration for us… but we want Europeans also to treat Turkey with respect and as an equal partner.”

According to Şimşek, one way for the EU to show Turkey that it is an equal partner is by upgrading the EU-Turkey Customs Union, which was put into place in 1996. “The world was very different at that time,” he said, adding that “today’s enhanced free trade agreements are ahead of [the] Customs Union.” Şimşek explained that he’d like to see the customs union “expanded” to include services, agriculture, and more. “We’re not asking for any favor from our European friends; we’re asking [for]… mutually beneficial dialogue.”

Şimşek argued that the EU and Turkey should cooperate in another way: on reconstruction in Ukraine. “Peace and stability in our region is the most important global public good,” he said, so “we would like to play a constructive role, a significant role in helping rebuild the country.” He explained that combining European long-term funding with Turkish contractors could “create a great synergy.”

Regarding global governance, Şimşek said that he has been encouraged this week by discussions at the Group of Twenty about reforming multilateral development banks and equipping them with more resources to assist the Global South. And as for the IMF quota, Şimşek said that emerging markets are increasingly playing a bigger role on the world stage and their economies are increasing in size. “I think it’s important that there is better representation, better voice for everyone… We should not ignore the Global South.”

Staring into the gap between Africa as a global leader and a development challenge

Governance remains the trend line in my meetings here in Morocco. It has made an appearance in everything from my senior-level conversations with the Cameroonian delegation to discussions about the World Bank’s new president and his mandate, to more technical discussions about central bank digital currencies and new payments systems.

Thinking through these issues, I’m struck that on one hand, Africa is on the leading edge of emerging fintech like virtual currencies including CBDCs and stablecoins, while on the other, the continent is still struggling with basic representation in global institutions like the World Bank. If you’re a pessimist, you could say that many countries are still only on the lonely and winding path to the long and bumpy road of development.

But it is important to see the hope for change as I did yesterday. I sat for a conversation between one of Africa’s biggest philanthropists, Mo Ibrahim, and World Bank President Ajay Banga. Ibrahim seemed to take pleasure in pointing out the contradictions in the governance and actions of the World Bank in Africa, often comparing the Bank’s solutions for low-income countries’ problems to the better, faster, and more robust solutions deployed for Western and European countries. The crowd seemed to laugh anxiously—but it is this upfront calling to attention of the World Bank’s shortcomings that will push the Bank to change tack.

Looking forward, African countries must build a strong coalition of reform minded countries to maximize their power and voice. This coalition could more effectively push for badly needed updates to governance structures of the global economic and financial architecture—even as many Group of Seven countries seem to prefer the status quo. Africa needs these changes urgently to meet its current and future challenges.

Georgieva’s emphasis on the positive is a reminder of the power of global collaboration

There is reason for gloom at the Annual Meetings, with war still raging in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war newly under way, and the effects of natural disasters still reeling in countries like Morocco and Turkey. Against that backdrop, the economists meeting here are focusing on finding solutions to crises involving interest rates, equity, and slow economic growth—providing reason to have some optimism for the future.

Yesterday, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva focused on the positive of the World Economic Outlook—even though the forecast, to the dismay of many participants, forecasted slow recovery from the crises of the last few years. The positive: There is still time to bolster global resilience and tackle collective action problems like climate change. However, to do that, the world has to work together, build bridges, and invest in multilateral institutions and frameworks. And while time is running out to keep the global average temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius, Georgieva stressed that doing so may be feasible if the world adopts some form of carbon pricing—which is something the IMF is working on with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Georgieva’s second point of positivity: Low-income countries, especially those in Africa, have great potential to foster a more prosperous, inclusive future. With her characteristic “we all have a role to play” remarks, Georgieva made clear that the IMF sees itself as a steward for attracting more sustainable investment to low-income countries to create that future. The type of lending and investment the Bretton Woods institutions have in mind, however, will require more capital and increased quota investments in the institutions. This would align with new World Bank President Ajay Banga’s calls for a bigger and better bank, but also requires resolutions of debates and disagreements over quota shares held by high-, middle-, and low-income economies.  

And while Georgieva was more serious on the topic of high bond yields and above-average yield spread across countries, she pointed out that this market response is due to rising interest rates, which are a sign that central banks are waking up to the necessity to respond to inflationary pressures.

In these positive points lie the solutions that will empower countries as they look to recover more quickly from the last few years’ economic shocks.

• There’s still time to show that global collaboration is possible

• Ukraine’s finance minister on Russia’s blocked assets and why he’s reaching out to the Middle East

• How the MENA region is facing up to today’s biggest economic crises

• The numbers aren’t adding up on financing investment for climate change mitigation projects

• Where will the coalition of African countries take its message for reform next?

• See day three analysis

There’s still time to show that global collaboration is possible

From hallway conversations to heated debates in closed-door meetings, the inescapable topic this week in Marrakesh has been global governance.

The power structure of Bretton Woods institutions—despite the fact that they function reasonably well, even in the midst of growing geopolitical tension—is under increasing scrutiny.

The United States has been pushing for an increase in the capital that countries contribute to the IMF (their quotas) without proposing an increase in votes for China and other emerging markets who feel undervalued with their growing economies and stagnant vote shares. As I wrote in a new issue brief this week, the governance arrangements of the Bretton Woods institutions are fundamentally out of touch with economic reality.

Despite that, there are signs on the ground that the quota increase may be approved, which would provide an important boost for the world’s official lender of last resort—and show that global collaboration is still possible.

Across the IMF-World Bank Meeting campus, I’m also seeing global collaboration in another form: Widespread support for Ukraine among many of the IMF’s major shareholders. The IMF’s Ukraine program is largely successful because it is focused and because the Fund’s shareholders are stepping up to ensure that the program reaches its intended objectives—putting Ukraine’s war economy on a more solid footing and making further progress on improving economic governance. Today, we also sat down with Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko to map out the next steps for coordinated international support for Kyiv, including its war-risk insurance needs.

Ukraine’s finance minister on Russia’s blocked assets and why he’s reaching out to the Middle East

“A gear is shifting” among Group of Seven (G7) countries, said Ukrainian Finance Minister Serhiy Marchenko in conversation with the Atlantic Council’s Charles Lichfield. 

On the ground in Marrakesh, Marchenko is noticing that G7 countries are ready to discuss seizing Russian assets and repurposing them to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts. But if the G7 can’t come together on the Russian assets, he said he hopes that they can quickly agree on deploying the interest earned on these blocked assets for reconstruction efforts. 

Marchenko gave his remarks at an Atlantic Council event at IMF-World Bank Week. Marchenko told Lichfield, the deputy director of the GeoEconomics Center, that Ukraine’s economic situation has improved—with lower inflation rates—”due to the resilience of [the] Ukrainian people as well as support from our partners.” 

The IMF’s World Economic Outlook—released earlier this week—forecasts Ukrainian gross domestic product growth at 4 to 5 percent through 2024. Marchenko noted that the section on Ukraine was drafted at the beginning of the year, but now, Kyiv is fighting “a totally different war.” That means “it’s a modern war: We’re using drones, using a high level of munition.” Marchenko said the IMF was pessimistic about the Ukrainian forecast to account for uncertainty about the course of the war. “That’s why they predicted that Ukraine’s economy will be in… slow growth for [a] longer period of time,” he explained.

This week, Marchenko said the Ukrainian delegation has been having bilateral discussions not only with European countries to try to preserve their support but also with other countries, such as those in the Middle East, to “try to convince them to be more supportive of Ukraine.” In those discussions, he said that Ukraine also tried to “show [a] good example” of how to govern a country during war and invasion.  

But “it’s quite necessary to preserve… support for [the] next year,” he warned, because the next year will be “much [more] stressful,” with much more “uncertainty.” So while Ukraine’s economy is more stable, he said, international partners can’t “forget about Ukraine” now. 

How the MENA region is facing up to today’s biggest economic crises

As the crowds of IMF-World Bank Week participants get larger in Marrakesh, the Atlantic Council empowerME Initiative’s Racha Helwa got together with Moroccan Economy and Finance Minister Nadia Fettah Alaoui and Citi Head of Middle East and Africa Ebru Pakcan to talk about how the MENA region is facing up to today’s biggest economic crises.

Morocco is focusing on building a strong macroeconomic foundation and on its resilience, the finance minister said, explaining that the Moroccan government launched a reform program recently to diversify the economy and create a strong social state. But it won’t be a “peaceful” journey to implement these reforms, she argued, because at the same time, “we have also to deal with multiple crises that we have been going through.”

Pakcan said that private-public relationships may help MENA countries manage the risks they face. With these partnerships, there are “a lot more creative solutions that can be… devised,” she argued. Those solutions, she added, are needed to help MENA countries “actually ride the storm” of today’s crises so that it can “focus on what really matters in the future,” like climate change and digitalization.

The numbers aren’t adding up on financing investment for climate change mitigation projects

Here in Marrakesh, many speakers have emphasized the urgent need to mobilize substantial amounts of money to finance climate change mitigation and green transition projects. Reportedly, to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 and to prevent world average temperatures from rising by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius this century, global investment in such climate-related projects will need to total $2.7 trillion a year. Developing and low-income countries in particular would need to receive significant financial assistance from the international community to be able to cope with the challenges.

At the same time, both the IMF and World Bank have pointed out that in many countries, fiscal deficits are high, with government debt rising to record levels—faster than the pre-pandemic pace. Both of these institutions have emphasized that fiscal restraints are much needed to safeguard sustainability and rebuild fiscal buffers to be able to deal with future shocks. The IMF’s “Fiscal Monitor” has also recognized that citizens in many countries are averse to increased taxes by their governments.

Consequently, it should be clear that governments, including those of developed countries, will not be in a position to raise huge sums of money for climate-related investments, especially in support of developing and low-income countries.

That has led the World Bank and IMF to push for using public money to catalyze private sector climate investments in developing and low-income countries by offering various risk-sharing schemes to improve the risk-return profiles of those investment projects. However, officials looking to use public money to catalyze significant private sector investment—often at a rate of five times or more—are likely to see their hopes dashed: According to GlobalMarkets magazine, $1 of public sector lending can generate only $0.7 of private investment.

In short, while climate investment needs are huge, the numbers in terms of plausible financing sources from the public and private sectors simply don’t add up. Anyone concerned about climate change would have to be more realistic about to how to get the needed funding.

Where will the coalition of African countries take its message for reform next?

Kristalina Georgieva said it best: “A prosperous twenty-first century is only possible with a prosperous Africa.”

Here in Marrakesh, the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings are clearly underscoring African priorities, the urgency of climate action, and the need for increasing global coordination for policy solutions. Africa is front and center—fitting considering these are the first Annual Meetings to take place on the African continent since the Nairobi Meetings in 1973.

On the ground—just as they did in 1973—policymakers, central bankers, and international economists are looking for ways to alleviate global poverty, boost economic activity, and reinforce programs that can support sustainable development solutions. As decision makers hopping from pavilion to pavilion debate how to address growing public debt, elevated interest rates, and rising geopolitical tensions between the world’s largest economies, it is important to look at the changing trends across the African continent.

It is becoming clearer how African countries are a part of the solution to global issues, whether it is on matters of war and peace, economic development, or global governance. In regard to governance, African countries are asserting their agency in multilateral fora. A great example of this effort is the posture African countries present on Bretton Woods reform, consistently driving their message at global convenings such as recent Group of Twenty meetings in India, the UN General Assembly in New York, and here at the IMF-World Bank Meetings in Marrakesh. Against this backdrop, African countries are facing new and emerging challenges from the shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic; the spike in food, fuel, and fertilizer products due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine; and natural disasters aggravated by a changing global climate, among others. 

Despite the growing impetus for pan-African positions on things like World Bank reform, more needs to be done. Changing the political calculus of traditional powers such as the United States, France, Germany, and other Group of Seven countries (and beyond) will be important to bring reform efforts into reality. African leaders should continue to look for ways to highlight the urgent need for reforming these institutions, specifically with audiences that may be unfamiliar with the need for reforms, while continuing to drive a coalition for change. The challenges facing African countries are no longer theoretical or in the future, and the Bretton Woods institutions and multilateral development banks must take steps to meet the changing, complex, and interconnected development needs of African countries without delay.

• Signs of inspiration in dark times

• What’s next for monetary policy and Europe’s fiscal rules, according to Spain’s Nadia Calviño

• The finance world braces for impact from the Israel-Hamas war

• Africa’s demographics matter—but they’re not the only ones that do

• With the Bank abuzz, Banga begins…

• A tale of two sovereign debt restructuring processes: Why Zambia and Sri Lanka differ

• See day two analysis

Signs of inspiration in dark times

As day three wraps at the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings, the buzz is building as all quarters of campus kick into high gear—and seats are becoming harder to find in the “town square” where I’m enjoying local musicians giving melody and voice to the storied history, warmth, and resilience of the Moroccan people, who are hosting this event just weeks after a devastating earthquake.

Though the hot sun continues to shine, the mood has been darkened for some following the release of the IMF’s flagship World Economic Outlook, which forecast a more subdued recovery, and following reality checks about the extent of global debt distress. For those in the World Bank conversations, me included, talk of resilience and growth felt more uplifting.

Still there’s a sense of urgency on the ground, as participants quickly realize there is too much work to be done and plenty of opportunity at hand.

On that note, there was extra pep in my step today as it’s October 11, which means it’s International Day of the Girl—a chance to recognize the rights, celebrate the achievements, and amplify the opportunity of the world’s one billion girls and young women. And where better to mark the occasion than in Africa—the youngest continent where, if empowered and enabled, girls can help communities and countries realize a double demographic dividend through increased youth economic participation and closing gender gaps. I was reminded of this in a conversation I had with the World Bank’s Global Director for Gender and in my behind-the-scenes conversations with the inspirational generational leaders comprising the IMF youth fellows.

So heading into the remaining days of deliberation and debate, I’m hoping for meaningful movements and commitments to accelerate development, address debt, and accentuate inclusive growth on a livable planet.

What’s next for monetary policy and Europe’s fiscal rules, according to Spain’s Nadia Calviño

Just a day after the IMF released its World Economic Outlook—which forecast that Spain, among other countries, would have strong growth in 2023 and 2024—Spanish Economy Minister Nadia Calviño joined GeoEconomics Senior Director Josh Lipsky for a conversation on the ground at IMF-World Bank Week.

Calviño chalked up Spain’s good forecast in part to its “diversified energy mix.” “A high penetration of renewables and a very diversified energy mix… has enabled Spain to withstand better than others the blow coming from Russia’s war against Ukraine.”

Seeing Spain’s growth, Calviño said it would be “quite wise” for the European Central Bank to pause interest rate hikes. “You have countries such as Spain with strong growth [and] low inflation. Other countries are very close to a recession and have higher inflation,” she explained. “So we better get it right because we need to ensure that we manage… inflationary expectations.”

Currently, the EU is undergoing a review of its fiscal rules on government spending and taxes to avoid a debt crisis. She signaled the need for commitment to a new framework—one that enables growth, job creation, and the green transition—by the end of this year.

Calviño looked back to the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings, saying that while “the global economy has shown to be more resilient than many expected,” that “the world has become even more complicated” with conflict on the rise. “That makes it even more important that we gather here” at the Annual Meetings, to “find solutions.”

But Calviño’s stance on China hasn’t changed since the Spring Meetings, where she said that the EU cannot turn its back to China or ignore it. “The EU is a global trade powerhouse, and we need to keep our relations with all the main trading partners,” she said. “At the same time, we need to ensure that the global framework and our trade policies ensure that there is a level playing field and [a] fair trading framework.”

The finance world braces for impact from the Israel-Hamas war

The shockwaves of the Israel-Hamas war have finally reached Marrakesh. It took several days—as it often does in the technocratic world of international economics—for financial leaders gathered here at the Meetings to grasp that the conflict could affect everyone.

Here on the ground, the full scale of the devastating human tragedy and military conflict unleashed by Hamas’s assault on Israel last Saturday is coming into focus—and with it a focus on the war’s economic ramifications. Several conversations are happening at once. 

First and foremost, there is growing horror as reports about the terrorist attacks and fallout in Israel and Gaza play on TV screens and phones inside and outside the official venue for the Meetings.

There is also discussion of the global economic fallout. Energy prices have understandably been a big focus, with memories of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and ensuing oil embargo front of mind for ministers. But as many of the economists milling about the pavilions have noted, the global energy market has shifted dramatically in the fifty years since that war. The world doesn’t solely rely on the Middle East for energy. And—for now—the conflict hasn’t spread through the region.

Then there’s the shekel and Israel’s economy. Israel’s central bank intervened to prop up the currency by selling thirty billion dollars in foreign reserves, but the shekel’s slump continues. There is wider concern that foreign investment in Israel will dry up and create a recession in the Israeli economy.

With regard to Gaza, the question is about reconstruction—whenever that time comes. Will the World Bank and other development banks play a role and step in with aid? A European commissioner initially signaled that the Commission would stop sending some aid to Palestinians, but that decision was quickly reversed by the European Union. There are open questions in Marrakesh right now about 1) what kind of aid will flow to Gaza in the near term and 2) what kind of money will be requested in the long term. Because these are questions for the development banks, the IMF has, so far, been able to sidestep the questions.

But don’t expect avoidance of these issues to continue. By the end of the week, the ministers and governors in Marrakesh will realize what many around the world already see clearly: What is unfolding in Israel and Gaza will have global political and economic impacts.

Africa’s demographics matter—but they’re not the only ones that do

The Moroccan government has been keen to shine a light on its identity as a North African, growing economy. The resilience of Morocco and the Moroccan people, who are hosting a great Annual Meetings week despite a devastating earthquake and previous cancelations due to COVID-19, has also been spotlighted. Africa—a diverse, growing, and bustling continent that is often overlooked at conferences of international organizations—is finally getting the attention and press it deserves.   

Demographic challenges and the threat aging societies pose to the world economy are being brought up at these Annual Meetings almost as frequently as the climate crisis. Demography is the critical area where Africa has the advantage over other regions. While European countries rapidly age, fertility is slowing down in the United States, and even China is entering an era of demographic aging. Africa’s high birthrate and young labor market have the potential to massively boost the continent’s emerging market economies. This will, however, require inclusive political stability, equity investment, and the prioritization of educational and labor market skills funding. For the time being, many African ministers and officials are reveling in the chance to directly pitch for more investment in their region, and IMF and World Bank officials appear interested in highlighting newer funds (like the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust) that have benefited sustainable investments in the region.  

With the Bank abuzz, Banga begins…

On day 2 of the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, the Bank’s activity got underway in earnest with a number of flagship and civil society events. The mood was arguably more upbeat than “across campus” as the IMF released its latest World Economic Outlook portraying a dim macro picture with slowing growth and widening divergence worldwide. 

On-the-ground conversations—which touched upon everything from resilience to jobs-driven growth to digital inclusion—recognized the compound crises facing the world (although disproportionately impacting the Global South) while recognizing, if not celebrating, the opportunity. Across the conversations between officials and civil society, inclusion, especially of women and youth, was a repeated priority. There were other big themes, too, across these conversations: interconnectedness; jobs and livelihoods, and how they are critical for resilience, climate adaptation, and climate change mitigation; and improved and diffuse digital foundations, which can fuel economic dynamism and increase transparency while also strengthening systems and the provision of public services necessary for responding to shocks.

Capping the day, Ajay Banga—who took the helm as president of the Bank in June—made his formal Meetings debut with a much-anticipated town hall with civil society, where he locked in his newest mission for the Bank: “Ending poverty on a livable planet.” It’s a reflection of the fact that the number of poor people has increased after decades of decline as significant pre-pandemic gains have been lost; it also reflects how responding to climate change goes hand-in-hand with efforts to advance development and end all forms of poverty. Alongside the evolution roadmap, Banga (or Ajay, as he prefers) believes it can be done by “doing what’s right, not convenient” to “first build a better Bank, then build a bigger Bank”: a better Bank that stretches every dollar and leaves no one behind; a bigger bank that “allows what works to scale.” Over the next few days, the Bank and its partners will need to get specific on how this “knowledge and money” Bank will come to fruition.

A tale of two sovereign debt restructuring processes: Why Zambia and Sri Lanka differ

Different developments in the Zambian and Sri Lankan sovereign debt restructuring processes have commanded the attention of participants in the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, highlighting the difficulties still remaining in the international effort to improve the restructuring framework.

Zambia, having defaulted on its external debt of over $32 billion in 2020, reached agreement with its official bilateral creditor committee (including China) in June 2023 on terms to restructure the debt, giving the country a 40 percent reduction in the present value of its bilateral debt of $6.3 billion. However, the country has had to wait until now for the bilateral creditors to develop language on the comparability of treatment in the memorandum of understanding that satisfied China—so that it could be signed, reportedly by the end of the Meetings this week. This has raised the hope that China could participate in the official bilateral creditor committee; the committee could eventually agree on a deal despite delays.

By contrast, Sri Lanka defaulted on its fifty-billion-dollar external debt in April 2022; with the country not being viewed as low-income, it is not eligible for the Common Framework for Debt Treatment. As a result, Sri Lanka has had to negotiate separately with various creditor groups, including the Paris Club, Japan, and India (on $4.8 billion of debt), as well as China’s Export-Import Bank (on $4.3 billion of debt)—but not the China Development Bank (which it owes $3 billion of debt, but the bank is considered to be a commercial creditor). This process has increased the complexity of coordination problems for the restructuring negotiations—leading to delays in the first review of the Sri Lankan program with the IMF needed for additional disbursement to the country. Further complicating the comparability of treatment problem, China has announced that its Export-Import Bank has agreed to restructuring terms with Sri Lanka ahead of scheduled meetings between the Sri Lanka and Paris Club creditors this week in Marrakesh.

This unwieldy process should be improved, basically by extending the Common Framework to include vulnerable, middle-income countries so that official bilateral creditors have to form a committee to negotiate jointly with the debtor country.

• EBRD president: Supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction must happen now

• Why everyone—from participants to officials—should keep in mind Africa’s demographics

• On-the-ground signs that the IMF and client countries are diverging on monetary tightening priorities

• Why a cookie-cutter approach won’t work for debt restructuring

• Inside the IMF’s new approach to China

• A “big push” and a “first step” toward reaching Africa’s potential

• Keep an eye out for small victories

• Zambia may be days away from a debt restructuring plan. Here’s what it wants other countries to know about dealing with creditors.

• With its young and talented population, Africa has great economic potential; but “demographics are not destiny”

• The recent developments that may throw a wrench into global financial stability

• The global growth forecast hasn’t changed—but plenty more has in the World Economic Outlook

• Will the World Economic Outlook’s “soft landing” forecast flame out?

• What the “ups” and “downs” of the World Economic Outlook show about the world’s biggest economies

• See day one analysis

EBRD president: Supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction must happen now

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy continues to meet with Western leaders in a search for support and military assistance, the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center’s Charles Lichfield sat down with Odile Renaud-Basso, president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to talk about the bank’s support to Kyiv. 

“We are focusing a lot on the private sector… and infrastructure in particular,” she said, explaining that the EBRD is paying particular attention to gas and electricity companies to keep the economy running. 

When asked whether it is time to begin focusing on reconstruction assistance, Renaud-Basso said that there isn’t “a clear sort of separation” between supporting Ukraine in war and in reconstruction. “What is already needed now is to reconstruct what has been destroyed and we don’t know whether there will be further destruction—there probably will be.” 

Recently, EBRD shareholders granted the bank the ability to invest in six Sub-Saharan African countries, expanding its mandate after determining that its approach to investing in the private sector—specifically in small and medium-sized enterprises and green projects—“would add value” and would “bring something different [to] the table.”  

The EBRD currently works in over thirty countries. Renaud-Basso explained that when a country’s democratic values aren’t in line with the EBRD’s, the bank does as much as it can to “ensure progress in this area.” “Helping to develop the private sector independent from government… will help develop a middle class that will help contribute to democratization,” she argued. Currently, with the Israel-Hamas war, the EBRD—which invests in the West Bank—is reviewing its project. 

Why everyone—from participants to officials—should keep in mind Africa’s demographics

Demographics matter—and they matter a lot. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva also seems to agree; here at the Annual Meetings in Marrakesh, she has repeatedly emphasized that the only region in the world where long-term growth has the potential to accelerate is Africa because of its young population.

But how young is Africa’s population compared to elsewhere? The answer: very young. More than two-thirds of Africa’s population is under the age of thirty, and 40 percent are under the age of fourteen. Only 3 percent of African residents are sixty-five and above. Moreover, within thirty years, Africa’s population is expected to double from 1.4 billion to 2.8 billion. In other words, by the early 2050s more than a quarter of the world’s projected population of 10 billion will be on the continent.

Age breakdown of population

What does this mean for the African economy and the global economy? First, while the rest of the world will be aging at varying rates, Africa is going to be blessed with a young and vibrant labor force for many decades to come. If African countries can get the necessary capital, institutional reforms, and job creation policies, that young labor force can lead to robust growth rates for the continent. This will in turn increase the average African household’s income, leading to higher aggregate demands for consumer goods and services produced both in Africa and globally. The global aggregate demand could skyrocket if the income of a quarter of the world’s population increases by, say, 10, 20, 50, or 100 percent.

Second, over the next few decades, high-income and emerging economies will age rapidly and face severe labor shortages while Africa will have an ample supply. Hence, through effective labor migration policies, the world (especially high-income and emerging economies) can benefit significantly from Africa’s young labor force and keep itsdoors open for business for longer.

Population 65+ as a percentage of the total population

But without sound institutions and policies and investments targeted toward human capital development and job creation, Africa’s young and rapidly growing population—pushed to migrate in search of economic opportunity—could become a source of political and social instability both for the continent and elsewhere in the world. Thus, it is imperative tha­­t delegations discuss these issues at the Annual Meeting in Marrakesh.

On-the-ground signs that the IMF and client countries are diverging on monetary tightening priorities

The launch of an IMF working paper on inflation shocks over the past fifty years wound up showcasing conflicting priorities between the IMF and the academics, central bankers, and ministry officials in attendance—many of whom are from IMF client countries.

At the heart of the disagreement is not whether countries need to undertake monetary tightening to reduce inflation, but when it is appropriate to change course and lower interest rates in a way that public spending and investment become less costly. The IMF wants inflation to come back firmly to its target before easing is considered; the IMF official behind the working paper pointed to several “success” stories that actually resulted in hard, not soft, landings.

At the event, ministry and central bank officials pushed back that the current and persistent episode of inflation is not comparable to previous shocks, as the macroeconomic situation today is compounded by geopolitical, demographic, and climate risks. But for the IMF, economic orthodoxy pays off in the medium term. Given the wording and phrasing of attendees’ questions, macroeconomic officials from client countries and those facing other monetary pressures (such as pegging to the dollar) seem to be more concerned about delivering short-term economic prosperity and growth and hedging against external risks.

Why a cookie-cutter approach won’t work for debt restructuring

Over the past six months, progress has been made in taking the sovereign debt restructuring framework forward.

That was the consensus of panelists in a discussion, hosted by the GeoEconomics Center at IMF-World Bank Week in Marrakesh. The progress is important as more low-income countries face debt distress—with the sovereign bonds of twenty-one countries trading above a one thousand basis point spread over US Treasuries. These countries urgently need a speedy restructuring process to help them get back on their feet.

Progress, however, really means the ability of various stakeholders in sovereign debt—debtor countries, bilateral official creditors, multilateral development banks, private-sector creditors, and civil society organizations—to be in a room (the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, launched in April 2023) and discuss issues. A better understanding has been reached among the participants especially when it comes to difficult issues like the cut-off points for calculating the amount of debt to be restructured, the role of multilateral development banks in sovereign debt restructuring, the treatment of domestic debt in restructuring, the principle of comparability of treatment between various classes of creditors, and the discount rate to be used to calculate the extent of debt reliefs granted to debtor countries.

But concrete agreements of terms still depend on case-by-case country applications. For example, in the case of Zambia, there has been agreement about using a discount rate of 5 percent, but the agreement is not universal—many private creditors think that is too low and unrealistic.

On the comparability of treatment—an issue that has held up the signing of a debt restructuring memorandum of understanding for Zambia after the announcement of agreed terms in Paris in June—agreement on concrete language has been achieved that paves the way for a deal between Zambia and its official bilateral creditors to be signed soon, reportedly by the end of the annual meetings. However, these terms cannot simply be replicated in other countries’ cases.

Participants and observers of the annual meetings should keep this in mind as they follow developments on the sovereign debt restructuring front in the next few days.

Inside the IMF’s new approach to China

While the World Economic Outlook (WEO) made small downgrades in its forecast for China, the Fund’s view is even bleaker than the numbers suggest. Back in April, the WEO highlighted China’s rebound after its harsh zero-COVID shutdowns and confined its worries about the country’s property crisis to a single paragraph. This time, by IMF standards, both the WEO and Global Financial Stability Report take off the gloves and delve into the downsides, making clear that they see China as a potential risk to the global economy.

The WEO gives considerable attention to China in its opening chapter, highlighting the linked problems of the real estate downturn, soaring youth unemployment (each getting a chart), “subdued” consumer confidence, declining industrial output and business investment, and “weakening” exports. It even presciently singles out the debt issues at giant developer Country Garden, which today signaled a default on its international obligations. China is listed as a risk to the global economy, with the WEO’s “downside scenario” lowering China’s growth “as much as -1.6 percent in 2025.”

The GFSR builds a case for “financial stability concerns” in China. Its economic analysis closely tracks the WEO, but it adds on by addressing the financial vulnerabilities of some provincial governments (with a chart), the deep problems of local government financing vehicles exposed by the property crisis (three charts), and the recent worries about the country’s wealth management and trust industries. The report recommends to Beijing that “contingency planning should be developed to manage potential contagion” in the financial sector. Interestingly, both reports call for fiscal policy to be shifted toward supporting households—a step that the government has resisted—with the WEO suggesting such a policy would be preferable to “increasingly ineffective expensive investment in infrastructure.”

A “big push” and a “first step” toward reaching Africa’s potential

If you keep up with our Bretton Woods 2.0 Project, you know that I’m a numbers guy. Here are a couple of the numbers from my latest issue brief that I’m keeping in mind as I talk with finance ministers and central bank governors on the ground in Marrakesh:

• Severe poverty rates globally declined drastically over the past five decades, from 45 percent to 10 percent. Yet, one-third of the African population still lives in severe poverty.
• Keeping in mind that the fifty-four African economies are heterogeneous, 44 percent of the African population doesn’t have access to electricity. Put into perspective: 80 percent of the total 750 million people who don’t have access to electricity in the world are in Africa.
• And finally, the continent leads in lack of access to other forms of basic infrastructure; 73 percent lack access to safely managed drinking water and sanitation services.

Because of its young and growing population, its massive natural resources, and its strategic location, Africa has tremendous potential that (if unleashed) could move hundreds of millions out of poverty and propel growth in the global economy. For this to happen, Africa needs a big push and deeper engagement from the Bretton Woods institutions and the global investment community. However, African leaders need to take the first step by instituting good governance practices that would attract investors to the continent. The combination of the “big push” and this “first step” can be transformative.

Keep an eye out for small victories

Morocco has spared no effort to make feel delegates and guests welcome in Marrakesh. The conference venue has been constructed especially for this occasion, reminiscent of Bedouin tents, with ample outdoor features that remind delegates of the hot (and harsh) climate conditions that Moroccans and a large part of humanity face in their everyday lives.

In staying with the theme, as is usual for such meetings, there are lofty proclamations about how the world’s problems could be solved if everyone found a way to work together. Expectations abound that the ongoing revamp of the multilateral development banks’s business model and the proposed quota (or capital) increase for the IMF could provide urgently needed resources for climate change mitigation and poverty reduction in developing countries. Observing delegates from all corners of the world engaged in earnest conversations, one could be tempted to believe that larger solutions are in the realm of the possible.

Alas, like a Fata Morgana in the Sahara desert, appearances can be deceiving. Delegates were only given so much room to negotiate by leaders back home. And here the signs are not good, even beyond geopolitical tensions. Climate targets are not being met, and development assistance has been shrinking relative to what is needed. Increasing the capital base for multilateral lending (if agreed) will certainly help, but it is unlikely to be the game changer that many had hoped for.

Nevertheless, the Group of Twenty and Bretton Woods meetings still provide an important room for dialogue in troubled times. Behind the slogans and polished communiques, small victories are often won in private conversations, one country or issue at a time. The value of these meetings sometimes lies more in personal relationships that are established, a fact that was brought home during COVID-19 when professional networks ensured continuity in international dealings until in-person meetings became possible again.

With darker geopolitical and conjunctural clouds on the horizon, the sunny days of Marrakesh may soon fade from memory. But the hospitality of the Moroccan hosts will no doubt carry over to the next time the delegations meet to live up to almost impossible expectations yet again.

Zambia may be days away from a debt restructuring plan. Here’s what it wants other countries to know about dealing with creditors.

With Zambia’s debt restructuring process capturing attention here on the ground in Marrakesh, Atlantic Council Senior Directors Josh Lipsky and Rama Yade pulled aside Zambian Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane to get a sense of what is happening behind the closed doors of negotiations. 

Musokotwane told them that the problems it has encountered in debt restructuring negotiations “to a large extent, [have] been resolved” and that his team is “hoping that [it] will sign the memorandum of understanding soon.” Such a deal is expected this week at the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings. 

“We’ve moved very far ahead” on it, he added. 

With many countries around the world facing debt distress—after a series of economic crises shocked the world over the past few years—the Zambian finance minister provided advice for other countries gearing up to face their creditors in negotiations. “The most important thing is to recognize and accept you have a problem,” he said. “This sounds easy, but it’s not always the case, especially for governments that created a problem.” He added that properly recognizing debt problems will help a country “reach towards a solution.”  

In addition, the finance minister advised that countries solidify their partnerships with Bretton Woods institutions because “they are the ones that are bridges between you and the creditors” and vouch for a country’s credibility and willingness to undertake reforms. But “it is not enough to have the IMF and World Bank speak for you,” he said. “You yourselves must demonstrate that you’re serious about correcting the situation. You must undertake the reforms.” 

With its young and talented population, Africa has great economic potential; but “demographics are not destiny”

For the first time in fifty years, the Annual Meetings of the World Bank-IMF are taking place in Africa. It’s good timing: The meetings come as the African Union begins its membership in the Group of Twenty, elevating its voice and influence in the global economic order. The fact that the Meetings are being held in Africa is also quite fitting: The continent and its citizens often disproportionately experience the effects of the world’s biggest challenges; but Africa is also home to remarkable opportunity.

In addition, the location of these Meetings is a testament to the resilience of the African continent’s people and the dynamism of its economies and cultures. That was a big theme echoed through the packed “tent” during an IMF opening session yesterday that was kicked off by Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva. At that same event, Moroccan Minister of Economy and Finance Nadia Fettah Alaoui emphasized the important contribution women are making to the dynamism of Morocco’s economy, pointing to a few of the government’s policies that aim to advance women’s economic empowerment and participation. Women trailblazers in African business and finance discussed how—through corporate leadership, investment innovation, and risk taking (along with effective policy)—countries on the continent can capitalize on the energy and talents of their young and entrepreneurial populations in order to foster inclusive growth.

However, as the panelists also noted, demographics are not destiny: Inclusive growth is going to take scale; it’s going to take financing and resources (and dealing with debt); it’s going to take technology, including artificial intelligence; it’s going to take investing in human capital; and it’s going to take effective governance and public trust.

Despite that tall order, there is optimism and inspiration on the ground in Marrakesh. Africa’s promise is clearly palpable.

The recent developments that may throw a wrench into global financial stability

It was telling that the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) presentation started not with the usual presentation by the IMF’s financial counselor but went directly into a Q&A session, starting with a discussion of the sharp rise in government bond yields in recent weeks. The IMF’s Tobias Adrian put a brave face on this development, which came too late to be assessed for the GFSR, characterizing it as being in line with monetary tightening and adding that it is not being accompanied by disorderly market conditions.

On second look, however, the risks appear more concerning. The GFSR’s second chapter carries the explicit warning that, in an adverse scenario, a wide set of banks could experience significant capital losses, including several systemically important institutions in China, Europe, and the United States. Adrian’s concluding message, that policymakers could certainly prevent bad outcomes, sounds less reassuring in this context, given that the bond market sell-off was in part driven by political developments in some large countries.

The global growth forecast hasn’t changed—but plenty more has in the World Economic Outlook

The latest World Economic Outlook released in Marrakesh today predicts unchanged global growth of 3 percent this year. Behind that unchanged forecast: The United States and China’s fluctuating growth essentially net out, with the United States receiving a 0.3 percentage-point upgrade and China receiving a 0.2 percentage-point downward revision.

But these forecasts are vulnerable to change courtesy of risks in both countries. The United States’ upward revision may not fully incorporate the impact of a longer period of 5 percent bond yields and 8 percent mortgage rates which have become more likely since late summer; while China’s 5 percent predicted growth is at the top of the current range of estimates of 2 to 5 percent. Both predictions may be optimistic.

What is clearer is the lower global growth trajectory over the next five years—down to 3.1 percent compared with the five-year rate of 3.6 percent estimated before the COVID-19 pandemic. The world economy is not expected to recover the pre-COVID growth trajectory—reflecting the enduring scarring caused by the past few years of global shocks.

Will the World Economic Outlook’s “soft landing” forecast flame out?

The IMF’s World Economic Outlook foresees a soft landing for the global economy, but it also paints a distressing picture for emerging and developing countries and a pessimistic medium-term outlook. The IMF is right to point out the imbalances in the global outlook, but it overlooks how domestic inequality in advanced economies could throw the global economy off kilter. Pent-up anger at the rise in living costs will make it more difficult to conduct fiscal policy, exemplified by political dysfunction in the US Congress and the growing support for radical parties in some countries.

The recent sell-off in bond markets is at least in part a reflection of political uncertainty. The World Economic Outlook has again had the misfortune of coming out too soon after major market developments, but the IMF would do well to address the implications of higher long-term interest rates for the macro outlook and financial stability during the coming days in Marrakesh.

What the “ups” and “downs” of the World Economic Outlook show about the world’s biggest economies

It finally happened. The IMF revised down China’s projected GDP growth for both 2023 and 2024. Many thought this would happen in July, and when it didn’t, all eyes were on today’s release of the World Economic Outlook. But is it revised down enough? Five percent for this year is still very optimistic. Our new report released last week, “Running out of Road: China Pathfinder 2023 Annual Scorecard,” shows just how much China is slowing post-COVID.

What’s interesting is that the US forecast was revised up (to 2.1 percent in 2023 and 1.5 percent in 2024). So this means that on the whole, global growth remains nearly unchanged from the previous forecasts, but the composition has shifted.

But remember: The World Economic Outlook was “put to bed” several weeks ago—so none of this takes into account the impact of the war in Israel. The IMF’s chief economist addressed the issue a few minutes ago saying there could be energy impacts, specifically when it comes to higher oil prices, but it’s just too early to say. The IMF seems to think the impact on energy prices is transitory, but the situation could escalate or expand and suddenly create another energy shock for the global economy. That’s an especially problematic situation for Europe, as it gears up to face the winter and tries to adapt to the lack of Russian energy.

On the bright side, India is forecasted to be the fastest-growing major economy—revised up to 6.3 percent in 2023. I’ll ask their finance minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, about this when I interview her in Marrakesh on Friday.

• Six themes to watch as the Meetings kick off

• Fragmentation is threatening developing economies in many ways. Climate is one of them.

• Two conflicting moods prevail as financial leaders gather

• The pressure is rising on the IMF and World Bank to increase climate financing and restructure debt

• Take calls for international cooperation on commodities markets seriously

• The private sector has a tall order to fill on climate investment

• The world needs realistic fiscal solutions now—before it’s too late

Six themes to watch as the Meetings kick off

As the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings get underway, our experts put their heads together on the biggest themes to expect from the week. Below are their takes: 

Martin said that the “accumulation of risks” and whether the world can achieve a soft landing after multiple economic shocks will dominate minds across the Meetings.  

On debt restructuring conversations, Martin was skeptical that much would happen beyond “the usual kind of global sparring between China and the rest,” seeing as China has blocked attempts to restructure sovereign debt in the past. Hung said that “the international community here really should put the spotlight on China and put pressure on them to cooperate.” 

Nicole listed climate adaptation and poverty reduction as key themes. Martin pointed specifically to financing for development and climate adaptation, reporting that there are “huge expectations” that there’s going to be agreement on financing multilateral development banks. Hung said to also keep an eye on new World Bank President Ajay Banga to see whether he can convince governments to increase their contributions to the Bank to facilitate climate- and development-related grants and loans to low-income countries. 

Nicole called the Meetings “Banga’s first big show,” explaining that attendees will be watching to see what messages he raises. “But also, the expectations are really high in terms of what he will do with the private sector to really leverage and mobilize private finance,” given his experience in the sector, she said. 

Martin pointed to arguments for restoring a division of labor between the IMF and World Bank, essentially letting the Bank focus on issues such as climate change and the IMF focus on macroeconomic issues. “I would expect this to make some waves,” Martin said. Nicole said that “the concern about mission creep… is real,” but there is still some “role for the IMF to play in development [and] in climate.” Hung agreed, saying that the IMF’s role in the climate-change issue lies in “advising governments of the risks they have to be prepared to deal with, the policy to mitigate the risks,” but “not financing.” 

Each of the experts raised the topic of the proposed “equi-proportional” increase in the IMF’s quota resources, which will require countries to contribute more capital yet maintain the same voting shares—drawing criticism from members who feel as though they are undervalued, such as China and several emerging-market economies. It “may run into some resistance,” warned Martin. But, Nicole argued, “you can’t have inclusive growth if you don’t have inclusive governance.” 

Fragmentation is threatening developing economies in many ways. Climate is one of them.

This year’s IMF-World Bank Annual meetings—held in Africa for the first time in fifty years—must yield practical solutions and policy decisions that will protect low-income and developing economies against the multifaceted impacts of global geoeconomic fragmentation.

Africa’s fifty-four economies are home to nearly 1.4 billion people or 17.4 percent of the world’s population. However, they account for only about four percent of global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. At the same time, twenty-two out of the world’s twenty-six poorest economies and twenty-three out of the world’s fifty-four lower-middle income economies are in Africa. Compared to others, these economies are heavily dependent on agriculture, forestry, and fishing for their economies, which is directly and negatively impacted by climate change.

To protect the livelihoods of billions in Africa and elsewhere, large CO2 emitters such as China, the United States, the European Union (EU), and other Group of Seven (G7) economies—together responsible for more than half of global CO2 emissions—must take serious steps to reduce their emissions and speed up their green transitions.

However, the global green transition is facing a headwind that has been gaining strength. Geoeconomic fragmentation between the world’s largest economies and increasing trade barriers worldwide are poised to threaten the global economy; for example, in relation to the trade of environmental goods—which are central to green transition—China and the countries that are part of the G7 and EU are highly dependent on each other. Geoeconomic fragmentation has the potential to massively interrupt that trade and, by extension, the energy transition.

The IMF hit on this topic in its World Economic Outlook this year, in a chapter dedicated to the impact of geoeconomic fragmentation on food security and the green transition. It estimates that with geoeconomic fragmentation, investments in renewable energy and electric vehicles may potentially decrease by up to 30 percent by the year 2030, in contrast to an unfragmented global supply chain. Such a decline would severely slow down the green transition, with significant negative impacts on the climate, especially for the low-income economies that bear disproportionate climate-change effects. This is in addition to the mushrooming economic costs of geoeconomic fragmentation for the continent in terms of higher food and energy prices as well as deadlocks in debt restructuring. Realistic solutions that will protect low-income and developing economies are needed.

Two conflicting moods prevail as financial leaders gather

Flying into Marrakesh this weekend, I could see clearly how the city is split in two. The older part of the city—a medina originating from the eleventh century—is nestled within red clay walls that separate it from the newer parts of the city, where gleaming hotels line the roads and nearly every international brand is represented.

Finance ministers and central bank governors from over 180 countries are gathering right now in Marrakesh for the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings, the first time the Meetings are being held on the African continent in fifty years. And the mood—just like the city—is split in two.

There’s optimism: The IMF is hinting that tomorrow it will revise its projections upwards and that there is now an increased chance of a “soft landing” not just for the United States, but for the entire global economy. But there’s also worry: War in Europe, and now in Israel, has reminded the fourteen thousand participants at these Meetings how quickly geopolitics can change their calculations.

It is not lost on anyone here that the last time these Meetings happened in Africa was 1973—just days before the start of the Yom Kippur War, which led to an oil embargo that sent the price of gas skyrocketing.

Once again, foreign policy and finance have become intertwined. And that’s why the Atlantic Council has come to the Meetings: to help map how Bretton Woods institutions can navigate this new era of geoeconomics.

The pressure is rising on the IMF and World Bank to increase climate financing and restructure debt

Volatility in global financial markets spiked over the weekend after the Israeli government declared war following an attack from Hamas that killed hundreds of people. Oil prices rose by 5 percent at one point (before snapping back to about 3 percent), stock markets notched down worldwide, and safe haven flows pushed the US dollar and US Treasury bond prices up—adding more pressure on emerging bond markets. On average, sovereign bonds of emerging market countries trade at around eight hundred basis points above US Treasuries—with twenty-one countries facing a spread of around one thousand basis points: Basically, they’re in distress. In particular, Ethiopia is viewed as likely to default next, with spreads approaching five thousand basis points. Sri Lanka and Ghana still languish in their sovereign debt restructuring processes; meanwhile, Zambia seems like it may sign a MOU with official bilateral creditors at the end of this week’s Meetings.

These developments, coupled with escalating geopolitical rivalry, represent a somber backdrop for the opening of the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings in Marrakesh—making it even more critical for the Bretton Woods Institutions to develop policies that address emerging market countries’ biggest challenges. Those policies should include mobilizing climate financing and speedily restructuring sovereign debt, among others.

Take calls for international cooperation on commodities markets seriously

As the Marrakesh meetings proceed, it will be important not to lose sight of the bleak outlook contained in one of the very first documents released: The third chapter in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook on the potential risks posed by the fragmentation of commodities markets. The analysis (summarized here) warns about the impact of deepening global divisions on commodities trade. This trend—affecting everything from wheat to lithium—could increase inflationary pressures, reduce global growth, and even slow the energy transition.

As the world witnessed after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, wheat shortages and rising fuel prices hit the poor hardest. As the chapter points out, “the average low-income country imports more than 80 percent of the wheat it consumes,” and over forty percent of those imports come from only three countries. That means that additional shortages caused by “global fragmentation” could sharply increase food insecurity across the developing world. And while the model shows that the overall “global economic costs appear modest” from such disruptions, low-income countries that rely heavily on agricultural imports would be “disproportionately affected.”

Given that in the aftermath of COVID-19 the number of people living in extreme poverty rose for the first time in decades, there should be concern that deepening geopolitical tensions will only increase the plight of low-income communities. In addition, a slower “green transition” will only add to the burden on developing countries as they are among those already feeling the most pain from climate change. It is something to keep in mind as the Meetings this week inevitably produce calls for international cooperation.

The private sector has a tall order to fill on climate investment

Chapter 3 of the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report emphasizes the need to mobilize private financing and investment to emerging market and developing countries—who would need two trillion dollars annually by 2030 to fight climate change and adapt to its effects, five times more than currently planned $400 billion in climate investments planned for the next seven years. As public investment is limited, private funds will have to make up for 80 percent to 90 percent of the needed climate investment. Private climate investment needs to be scaled up dramatically to fit this tall order; for example, climate investments account for only a portion of the more than $2.5 trillion of assets under the management of environmental, social, and governance mutual funds.

In the chapter, the IMF then proceeded to review a list of oft-repeated measures by emerging market and developing countries to attract private investment—such as strong macroeconomic policies; deepening financial markets; policy predictability within a robust governance framework; better climate data, taxonomy, and disclosure; and risk sharing and guarantees by multilateral development banks. These are good policy ideas, but they’re not easy to implement—and they have not yet been able to generate the level of private climate investment that is needed. Against this backdrop, attention has turned to the World Bank’s Private Sector Investment Lab—comprised of chief executive officers of financial institutions and former officials aiming to bring more private financing to emerging market countries—watching to see whether the investment lab will be able to come up with concrete and actionable ideas.

The world needs realistic fiscal solutions now

In IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva’s curtain raiser speech last week, she called attention to the estimated global economic loss of $3.6 trillion caused by global shocks since 2020. More distressingly, she pointed out, the losses have been distributed very unequally, falling disproportionately on vulnerable developing and low-income countries while only one country—the United States, with the help of expensive fiscal rescue measures—has seen its gross domestic product rebound over pre-COVID levels. Now, fiscal risks are acute for all countries, and there is an urgent need for governments to rebuild fiscal space to be in a position to react to and rebound from future shocks. Furthermore, deteriorating international cooperation—due to rising geopolitical competition and distrust—has fragmented the global economy, slowing its growth.

While having described very concisely the challenges, Georgieva didn’t fully detail realistic policy measures to help the world rebound from this decade’s shocks and crises. There is an urgent need to raise two trillion dollars (needed annually, according to estimations) to help developing and low-income countries adapt to climate change and meet sustainable development goals. Formulating these policies at this week’s meetings is mission critical for the IMF and World Bank: Their failure to spur change within the next ten years would position the world on a trajectory toward increasing fiscal risks.

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I was in Marrakech, Morocco, walking with my 89-year-old mother, when the earthquake struck Haouz last Friday. After the earth shook, my mother couldn’t stop shaking. I gently carried her out of the family home, which may no longer be the refuge that it once was only seconds earlier. 

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Shortly after the earthquake, Moroccan King Mohammed VI convened an emergency meeting and ordered his military forces to break the isolation of remote villages in dire need of food, shelter, and medical attention. Images showed Moroccan helicopters and military personnel defying the forces of nature and carrying out perilous rescue missions.

The international community swiftly reacted to the earthquake, too, conveying its sympathy and offering assistance. World leaders at the G20 summit, including host country India, expressed their full solidarity and readiness to deploy rescue missions on the ground. While Morocco allowed search teams from several countries to access the disaster areas and deploy their field operations, it declined or ignored aid offered by France and Algeria. This is likely due to ongoing political and diplomatic tensions with its former colonizer and its eastern neighbor. Images of Spanish, Qatari, Italian, and Senegalese search units and sniffer dogs, among other first responders, were circulated soon after the tragedy.

Politicizing humanitarian rescue

Since the news broke late on Friday, French commentators and media outlets rushed to accuse the Moroccan authorities of incompetency and blame them for “silently killing their people.” In turn, Moroccan social media users and intellectuals saw the French response as patronizing, a legacy of colonial arrogance and interference in the country’s sovereign decisions. As the hours passed and Morocco still did not respond to Paris’ offer to assist in managing the natural disaster, voices grew accusing Morocco of “refusing humanitarian interventions at the cost of its distressed population.” In an interview with French news station BFM TV, Moroccan journalist Samira Sitail reacted strongly against this view expressed by panelists, reproaching them for “inciting a revolt among Moroccan people and spreading false claims.”

Morocco did not give in to the pressure, and the Ministry of Interior released a statement thanking the international community and explaining the rationale behind its choice to only admit rescue teams from four countries. The ministry stated that opening its territories for all solicitations would be “counterproductive and chaotic” and that it “continues to evaluate the needs and respond accordingly in conformity with international standards.”

Meanwhile, the facts suggest otherwise and point to deeper frictions between the two countries. Local reports state that the Moroccan king refused to receive a condolence call from French President Emmanuel Macron. In offering aid, Macron perhaps expected a response similar to Lebanese crowds, which cheered him and French aid during his visit to Beirut in 2020 following the deadly explosion there. If so, then he seems to have forgotten that North Africa has long waved goodbye at Mother France’s (Mama Franssa) submissive “center versus periphery” love story.

The hard reality is that even humanitarian rescue remains grounds for political calculations and tensions. Whether in response to an emergency or more generally for development, aid should never be forced on a nation, and countries in the Global South should always feel in control over who is allowed to operate in their sovereign territories. This is an especially fraught issue given Morocco’s colonial past and a recent pan-African revival rejecting French interventionism and treatment of the continent like its backyard.

In not accepting French aid, Moroccan leaders appear to view their country as refusing to victimize itself after the earthquake or to position itself as pleading for external charity. In a recent interview, Sylvie Brunel, the former president of Action Against Hunger, explained this view. Morocco would rather brand itself as autonomous and capable of mobilizing resources to address its own hardships, she clarifies, which explains why it only allows international actors that it thinks understand and respect these terms.

Additionally, Morocco became known for its singular style in foreign relations and managing crises—known as the “Mohamed VI style” in Moroccan circles—which grew more confident over the years in distancing itself from France and forging stronger ties with new and recovered allies. The North African kingdom terminated the duties of its ambassador to France, Mohamed Benchaaboun, in February 2023 following a series of disputes between the two countries, including the Pegasus spyware scandal in 2020. In reality, the Élysée and the Makhzen fell out of love as the latter started demanding clearer positions on the Western Sahara issue, as Morocco has been empowered by a stronger rapprochement with the United States, Israel, and Spain—all of whom now recognize Morocco’s claims over the disputed territory. “The Sahara issue is the lens through which Morocco looks at the world,” stated King Mohammed VI in a speech in 2022, describing his country’s foreign policy guidelines. It’s no different during such a national calamity.

In an exceptional move, the Algerian government—Morocco’s fiercest regional opponent since severing diplomatic ties back in August 2021—offered to open its airspace to humanitarian aid and medical evacuations and to offer humanitarian assistance “if Morocco asks for it,” another offer that Rabat has decided to ignore. If Morocco were to accept Algeria’s help, reciprocating Rabat’s proposal to assist Algiers in fighting wildfires in 2021, then it could be a new opening in the stalled and convoluted relationship between the two neighbors. However, given the cumulative history of mutual provocations and incidents—including the September 1 shooting by the Algerian coastguard of tourists who were visiting Morocco after they had strayed into Algerian waters—it is unlikely that any momentarily regained solidarity after a natural disaster would lead to a more substantial reconciliation.

Moroccan heritage hangs in the balance

Morocco will need significant financial and logistical support to rebuild wrecked edifices in Marrakesh and in the High Atlas Mountains. Vital civilian infrastructure has taken a toll from the earthquake, including roads, schools, hospitals, and electric plants. The culturally rich and tourism-reliant emerging market will also need urgent interventions to rehabilitate and safeguard damaged heritage sites.

Preliminary assessments show that the Kutubiyya mosque in Marrakesh, a twelfth-century structure built by the Almohad caliph Abd al-Mu’min, cracked during the earthquake. So, too, did an old citadel and several historic buildings in Marrakesh. The Great Mosque of Tinmal, the cradle of the Almohad movement and the shrine of its leader Al Mahdi Ibn Tumart, is also damaged. Other significant heritage sites affected by the tragedy include Moulay Brahim’s seventeenth-century Sufi brotherhood shrine and the Agadir Oufella fortress in Agadir.

On September 9, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Director-General Audrey Azoulay pledged to assist the local authorities in assessing the damage and reconstructing culturally and educationally significant sites. Substantial funding and post-crisis heritage rescue expertise from Morocco’s international friends and allies will be needed to address the colossal damage on the ground. The US Geological Survey has estimated that the country could lose 8 percent of its gross domestic product this year due to the earthquake exacerbating an ongoing economic contraction in the country.

While international aid is much needed to help Rabat alleviate the looming humanitarian and economic hardship, the kingdom is adamant about setting some ground rules with foreign partners and not accepting any aid that, as Morocco sees it, would come at the cost of its national dignity and sovereignty. In the past, Western countries have used development aid and disaster relief as incentives for political reforms and an array of interventions. Some may argue that disaster relief should be distinguished from development aid given the often unexpected and perilous circumstances in which the former is needed, but that is ultimately a decision that countries must make for themselves. It is clear that this paradigm is shifting, and the Global South is growing in confidence and developing its own local capacities and expertise in confronting humanitarian disasters. In the case of Morocco, it is using this crisis as a public relations opportunity to rebrand itself as a capable and autonomous nation. Today, in the Maghreb and across the African continent, the age of foreign interference through humanitarian missions seems to be over.

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs.

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Seventy-eight years after World War II, as facts fade and fewer survivors remain, the Holocaust risks being forgotten. This natural amnesia is compounded by widespread campaigns to revise or repress Holocaust history. International Holocaust Remembrance Day on January 27 and Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Hashoah) on April 17 are important annual observances to counter these trends, but much more needs to be done year-round. Surprisingly, the Arab world may soon become a world leader in rejecting denialism to reassert “Never again!”

Present events constantly reshape the perceptions of the past and, indirectly, future outcomes. There are people in every country around the world who claim that the Holocaust never took place. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Holocaust denial is mainly a trend among the younger generation due to a lack of Holocaust education in schools and after-school activities. For decades, the Holocaust has been a taboo subject, politicized and conflated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in official discourse. Historical truth is clouded, if not overshadowed, by key actors in the Arab world who connect Israeli state policies and the Jewish people worldwide—past and present, using them interchangeably, as if they were one. Opposition to Israel becomes resistance to the reality of Jewish suffering and injustice done to Jews in the past.

As a result, the Holocaust was absent from public consciousness until 2009, when Morocco’s King Mohammed VI became the first Arab leader to recognize the Holocaust by addressing the matter in a message addressed to the launch event of the Aladdin Project at UNESCO in Paris.

“Amnesia has no effect on my understanding of the Holocaust, or that of my people,” said the king, adding, “We must together endeavor to reassert reason and the values which underpin the legitimacy of a space of co-existence where the words of dignity, justice, and freedom will express themselves in the same way and will coexist, with the same requirements, regardless of our origins, cultures or spiritual ties. This is our interpretation, in Morocco, of the duty of remembrance dictated by the Shoah.”

Speaking at international conferences and forums devoted to the Holocaust and intercultural dialogue, King Mohammed VI and representatives of the Moroccan government have frequently emphasized the significance of denouncing anti-Semitism, instilling togetherness, and religious coexistence in Moroccan society, learning from the lessons of the Holocaust, and highlighting the crucial role that education plays in this context.

Challenges for Holocaust education in the Arab world

Past efforts at Holocaust education in the Arab world have too often suffered from a lack of context-specific sensitivity. In contrast to the king’s speech, which expresses the values and ideals of the Moroccan tradition as the basis for affirming Holocaust remembrance, others have simply translated Euro-centric Holocaust materials into Arabic, mainly from fear by civil society actors they would be blamed for “normalizing” with Israel if they tried to teach about the Holocaust. To effectively use Holocaust education as a tool for genocide prevention, the content should be tailored to Arab audiences using relevant wording, metaphors, names, and historical events.

In contrast to other areas of the world, World War II battles were fought, and Jews of the MENA region, directly or indirectly, experienced the Holocaust. Employing this little-known history in creating educational content is essential to sparking children’s imagination.

On the other hand, if this would only be a requirement, rather than a shared process of mutual development, educators would not take ownership of these materials and will lack the motivation to use these materials towards the essential goal of developing Holocaust education within the Arab world.

The power of participation

Today, initiatives all over the Middle East and North Africa try to promote Holocaust education through standard education approaches. However, teacher-to-student Holocaust education, while powerful, cannot reach the vast audience in need of this vital information and perspective. There is an increasing need to use state-of-the-art media, including those that allow for online sharing of ideas. While the hateful have exploited the Internet to spread racism, Holocaust denial, and other destructive ideologies, it can also serve as a powerful tool to educate and empower those fighting hate.

In 2011, the Kivunim Institute and Mimouna Association organized the first conference on the Holocaust in the Arab world commemorating the actions of the late King Mohammed V at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane. An article in the New York Times praised the event as a “first of its kind in an Arab or Muslim nation, and a sign of historical truth triumphing over conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic dogma.”

The Mimouna Association and United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in 2017 jointly created the first Arabic-language Holocaust curriculum by and for Muslims. The Holocaust education material created was tailored to the specific context of the Arab and Muslim world.

The USHMM, which is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary this month, has prioritized promoting Holocaust education in the Arab world, for example, through Holocaust commemorations in Morocco in 2018 and 2022, and Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022 and 2023. In 2022, the USHMM organized an important Holocaust commemoration in the UAE and Egypt.

In the Emirates, Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori created in 2021 the first Holocaust memorial exhibition in the Arab world at the Crossroads of Civilization Museum in Dubai. This permanent exhibit is the first of its kind in the Arab world, and offers visitors a setting within which to begin to understand the Holocaust and fight the denial of this dark chapter of human history.

In Morocco this year, the Mimouna Association, in partnership with the Council of Jewish Communities in Morocco, the United Nations Information Centre, and the ASF, provided over 120 students from different Moroccan universities and institutes, Moroccan Muslim activists, and members of the Moroccan Jewish community with an opportunity to engage and learn more about the history of the Holocaust.

In the largest synagogue of Casablanca, 350 guests—including university students, Morocco’s Minister of Education Chakib Benmoussa, diplomats from the United States, Israel, France, Germany, Poland, The Vatican, and Spain, as well as representatives from Moroccan civil society and international organizations—packed the pews to honor King Mohammed V, savior of the Moroccan Jewish community.

Recognizing the deep convictions, moral approach, and brave policy of Sultan Mohammed V, the US ambassador to Morocco, Puneet Talwar, affirmed, “His Majesty King Mohammed V protected Morocco’s Jews from the Nazis. And His Majesty King Mohammed VI has carried on that legacy. He has spoken forcefully against the denial of the Holocaust.”

The Chief Rabbi of Casablanca, Rabbi Joseph Israel, said a customary Moroccan prayer honoring the king and his forefathers. The Muslim students also heard the Chapters of Psalms, Kaddish, Yizkor, and the Kel Malei Rachamim in memory of the Holocaust victims.

On the eve of Yom Hashoah, it is no longer considered taboo in the MENA region to promote Holocaust education and genocide prevention. The region’s youth are far more receptive to discussing the events of one of the darkest chapters of human history, despite the political, religious, and educational challenges shrouding this historic move that has been praised in some nations in the region and criticized in others.

El Mehdi Boudra is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. Follow him on Twitter: @ElBoudra.

The N7 Initiative, a partnership between the Atlantic Council and Jeffrey M. Talpins Foundation, seeks to broaden and deepen normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim countries. It works with governments to produce actionable recommendations to deliver tangible benefits to their peoples.

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The single created by multi-Grammy award-winning Moroccan-Swedish producer RedOne embodies the spirit with which the Moroccan team—against all odds—kept knocking out top contenders like Portugal, Spain, and Belgium and advancing through the competition. Thus far, the defeat-free journey of the Moroccan soccer national team, the Atlas Lions, is more than a simple sports score. It is an upheaval in soccer culture—a symbolic capital for Africans, Arabs, and Muslims everywhere and a historical revenge of subaltern dreamers from the global south.

A change in the culture of soccer

Modern soccer was codified in nineteenth-century Britain and soon became a European favorite. The collective sport turned into a global sensation with the creation of the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) and organization of the first World Cup in 1930 in Uruguay. Soccer remains a largely euro-centric sport today, supported by professional leagues, media, and capitals in the old continent with outliers in the Americas. Thus, soccer culture is linked to iconic players who built their careers in Spanish, British, Italian, and other European teams. It is also largely associated with ritualistic beer drinking, ultras chanting, and shots of beautiful white models featured on television screens.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar—aside from its questionable human rights records and bribery allegations—has reconfigured the rites of the event and dictated new norms in synchronicity with its Arab and Islamic values despite western uproar and disapproval. Morocco, the North African dark horse-turned-favorite of the competition, also had a few lessons to convey.

Images of players prostrating to pray after each match, the celebration of family solidarity with players embracing their parents, and the waving of the Palestinian flag for every memorial picture are all acts of defiance of an essentially western-centric football culture and signals a more diverse and inclusive set of symbols that are epistemologically different from the usual World Cup glam. Likewise, the team’s fans have elected a new motto inspired by the religious teaching of the Arabic hashtag “trusting in God” (#ديروا_النية), which has been widely used on social media even by the newly appointed US ambassador to Morocco, Ambassador Puneet Talwar.

Shattering colonial complexes

The Moroccan team’s victories are hailed extensively by other global south countries, notably those who see the team’s resilience and combativity as a reflection of their own battle. Supporters across the African continent and the Arab and Muslim worlds spontaneously allied behind the Atlas Lions in defiance of their old Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, French, and British colonizers. Metaphorically, each victory shattered old imperialist complexes that European coaches and teams are inherently superior. For Arab countries particularly, a new pan-Arab sentiment rose and erased decades of defeatist mentality.

For the host country, Morocco’s wins are, by extension, the continuation and channeling of the Qatari dreams in the competition—an avenue for all Arabs to keep dreaming. Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani made sure to showcase his favorite team loud and clear by waving Morocco’s red flag with a green star during its December 10 match with Portugal. As a result of the Atlas Lions’ rise to the semi-final against France on December 14, millions of Arab youth and children are redefining their soccer idols after the surreal sight of Portugal’s Cristiano Ronaldo leaving the pitch crying and finding new heroes in more self-identifiable players like Hakim Ziyech, Achraf Hakimi, and Yassine Bounou. In other words, representation matters.

The tale of Moroccan players is also that of first- and second-generation migrants who had mixed experiences of integration in Europe, where many were born and raised. It points to a larger story of how Europe may have provided the investment that these athletes didn’t find “back home,” but ultimately failed to build a genuine connection to their countries of birth that have often been the source of discrimination and mistreatment to their North African immigrant communities. In the end, fourteen out of twenty-six players chose to represent the red and green colors of their forefathers for the World Cup.

As the world order starts shifting anew towards multipolarity, the Qatar World Cup and the consecutive symbolic triumphs of the Moroccan team can be seen as an illustration of shifting powers and hybrid world narratives. The shifts in the poles of power and crumbling of western hegemony that mostly one-sided western media might have obscured found an auspicious opportunity to unfold before the eyes of world viewers avidly following the competition and pondering the uneasy question: When did the world change so much?

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs. Follow her on Twitter @ZaaimiSarah.

The post <strong>Morocco’s World Cup victories are historical revenge for subaltern dreamers from the global south</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Shapiro in the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune: The ASEAN Model – A Vision of Middle East Integration Beyond the Abraham Accords appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Political analysts often look with envy at historians due to their ability to analyze events long after they have occurred, with the luxury of distance and hindsight. To analyze human history and the political and economic developments in numerous states or regions over the period of 2011 to mid-2022 would surely benefit from ten or twenty years of distance and hindsight. Yet for those dealing with events occurring in the geographical dimension of North Africa there is an overwhelming perception of a continuous, often abrupt and contradictory, but increasingly faster evolution of relations between actors—whether small or big, global or regional. 

In fact, North African countries (namely Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco) have witnessed an array of political, economic and social transformations which have all influenced geopolitical dynamics in the region. Egypt and Turkey, for example, have been at odds for the past decade due to rivaling political agendas, and in 2013 broke all diplomatic ties by calling back their respective ambassadors. Libya is entering its 11th year of civil war with rival factions contending power over the oil-rich nation through political maneuverings and violent clashes. Morocco and Algeria are still in open conflict over border disputes, opposing geopolitical alliances and an ever-growing arms race. Because of the Algeria-Morocco conflict, the Maghreb was never able to create an economic union trade agreement which would undoubtedly benefit all countries of the region. 

The purpose of this report is to identify a potential role for Italy and its diplomacy to play in North Africa, in full agreement and collaboration with the United States and the other main European actors, in resolving some of the thorniest crises in the area and fostering a climate of collaboration around the transatlantic alliance that could help it face the expanding ambitions of rival global powers.

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• The Overview of the Digital Silk Road Initiative of China
• The Role of Huawei in the Digital Silk Road Initiative of China in North Africa
• How Huawei is perceived by other countries as not being solely a commercial company
• Deep Chinese presence in North African countries
• What the North Africans think of China and its presence in the region
• Significant projects of Huawei and other Chinese tech giants in the region
• Thoughts about the relationship between China and North Africa

Timestamps

[00:00] Introduction

[02:17] An Overview of the Digital Silk Road Initiative

[05:32] How Does Huawei fit in the DSRI of China

[08:37] Other Countries See Huawei as not a Commercial Company

[15:43] Deep Chinese Presence in Countries of North Africa

[18:44] What the North Africans thought of China

[24:31] Significant Projects of Huawei in the North Africa Region

[30:13] Some Tech Projects by Chinese Tech Giants in The Region

[35:04] North Africans Appetite in Cooperation with China

[38:58] Thoughts about the Relationship between China-North Africa

[41:16] Conclusion

Dr. Tin Hinane El Kadi
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Institute for Social Science Research on Algeria (ISSRA) 

Tin Hinane El Kadi is the co-founder and co-director of ISSRA. She is a political economy researcher, currently writing a PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), looking at China’s Digital Silk Road in North Africa. She is also an associate fellow in the MENA department at Chatham House. Her research interests include information, communications technology (ICT) and development, China’s presence in Africa and the Middle East, and contemporary Algerian politics.

China has been expanding its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) around the world, while also working on a new version of BRI that utilizes the digital space. The initiative was dubbed the Digital Silk Road Initiative, or DSRI, which is already in motion across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in North Africa. Big Chinese tech companies like Huawei have been assisting North African countries in digitizing their economies to compete with First World countries. These can also lead to wonderful opportunities for North Africans since DSRI promises regional economic growth.

In this episode, we are joined by Tin Hinane El Kadi, a political economy researcher, currently writing a Ph.D. thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), looking at China’s Digital Silk Road in North Africa. Dr. El Kadi’s research includes How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns.

Host Jonathan Fulton and Dr. El Kadi discuss China’s Digital Silk Road Initiative and Huawei’s role in setting it into action. They also discussed the impression of the Chinese in North Africa, as China begins to establish a political role in the region. Moreover, they discuss Chinese ventures that focus on leveraging the digital domain. Data Centers, AI or Machine Learning, Cloud Computing, and 5G Technologies are all examples. Finally, they discuss the future connection between China and North Africa.

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The year 2020 marked a turning point for this sad chapter of history. On August 13, 2020, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, officially recognizing the State of Israel. Other Arab and Muslim-majority countries soon followed suit. Months later, on December 10, 2020, Morocco signed a normalization agreement with Israel, becoming the second North African country—after Egypt in 1978 with the Camp David Accords—to recognize the Jewish State. Israel also signed an agreement with Sudan on October 23, 2020 as part of the accords.

While the Abraham Accords brought some Arab countries closer to the West and Israel, it undoubtedly created chasms with others. The agreement between Israel and Morocco sparked a series of chain events in neighboring North African countries that will likely have lasting consequences on the economic, security, and socio-political relations in the region.

Israel and Morocco: more than just a cordial relationship

Relations between Morocco and Israel have always been more than just cordial. Although Morocco did not formally recognize Israel until the Abraham Accords, it maintained informal ties with the Jewish State and, unlike many other Arab countries, allowed Israelis to visit the country. In 2020 alone, around seventy thousand Israelis visited Morocco.

Morocco is one of four Arab League countries to normalize relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords. Rabat allegedly did so on the premise that the United States would recognize the country’s claims over Western Sahara, a disputed territory which both Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front have contended to be theirs since 1975, when Spain withdrew from the territory.

The relationship between Morocco and Israel has strong historical roots. Morocco was home to the largest Jewish community in the Arab world, most of whom came from Spain after the 1491 expulsion by the Spanish Catholic monarchy. After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, many Moroccan Jews were forced to emigrate to the country as a consequence of rising antisemitism in local cities across Morocco. Today, Israel is home to some one million Moroccan Jews and is strongly interconnected with the Kingdom.

As mentioned before, Israel and Morocco made their longstanding—albeit concealed—friendship official in December 2020 when they signed a normalization agreement that ensured “full diplomatic, peaceful, and friendly relations” under US patronage. While Morocco attempted to minimize the agreements back home, claiming that a full normalization with Israel was off the table, the international community perceived the signing of the accords as otherwise. It was clear from the beginning that the two countries had undergone a diplomatic rapprochement, strengthening bilateral ties and cooperation in the fields of trade, tourism, and defense. Even direct official flights between Tel Aviv and Marrakesh have commenced. In July, the two countries signed a formal cybersecurity agreement to share information, research, and development on cyber warfare. On August 11, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid visited Morocco, signaling that his government is placing its relationship with Morocco high on its agenda.

Moroccan-Israeli ties and what they mean for North Africa

Reactions to Morocco’s normalization with Israel were mixed amongst other North African countries. Algeria wasted no time instrumenting the Abraham Accords by using aggressive, anti-Israel rhetoric to justify its disputes with Morocco. In December 2020, Algerian Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djera decried the agreement as a move to bring “the Zionist entity” closer to Algeria’s border. Algiers has also used the agreement as a scapegoat to explain the recent wildfires that have devastated the country, insisting Israel is behind them. On August 25, Algeria announced its decision to cut all diplomatic ties with Morocco in an effort to “totally eradicate” the Movement for Self-determination of Kabylie, which is a terrorist movement that “receives the support and aid of foreign parties…Morocco and the Zionist entity,” according to Algiers.  

As a result, Algeria has also strengthened its alignment with China and Russia. Algeria shares close bilateral relations with Russia, particularly in defense cooperation, and the two countries meet regularly through a joint economic commission to discuss partnership options. Algeria and China also share close ties, evidenced by the national development plans it signed with China under the Belt and Road Initiative to boost industrialization in the country, among other things. It comes as no surprise they were signed only six months after Morocco formalized the accords with Israel. In the coming years, Algeria will likely pursue closer bilateral ties with both Beijing and Moscow to counter what it perceives to be a Western-led, pro-Moroccan plot over Western Sahara via the Abraham Accords.

Egypt unsurprisingly responded positively to the normalization of ties between Morocco and Israel, having already a lukewarm relationship with the Jewish State. However, it is hard to predict where Cairo will turn to next. Egypt and Algeria have traditionally maintained good relations dating back to Egypt’s support of Algeria’s National Liberation Front during its war of independence against France between 1954 and 1962. Egypt is deeply interested in the events in neighboring Libya given its hope to see General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army prevail in the conflict, and has recently found common ground with Algeria on the Libya crisis over achieving greater “stability and security” in the country. Cairo’s agreement with Algiers over Libya may motivate Egypt to pit itself against Morocco in an effort to showcase its support to Algeria, thus, strengthening their alliance, given that Egypt has already backed the Polisario Front over the disputed Western Sahara. Cairo’s eagerness to have a stake in Libya’s future could pivot Egypt towards distancing itself from the US’s recognition of Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara.

Tunisia, like Libya, is too busy dealing with its domestic problems to focus its attention on the Abraham Accords. Tunisia is facing a potential constitutional crisis after President Kais Saied announced the indefinite freezing of parliament in late August and is attempting to centralize powers in his hands. In August, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi supported Saied’s actions, signaling an alignment between the two North African nations. It’s worth noting that Tunisia has never hidden its disapproval of the accords. Therefore, an anti-Morocco front consisting of Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt is not out of the question.

Morocco-Israel ties: What’s next?

The ongoing strengthening of ties between Israel and Morocco sheds light, once more, over just how tense the balance in North Africa really is. While the move to recognize Israel was part of a larger US-led strategy, with the potential to unite several Arab countries under a common front, the reality is far more complex. Morocco is set to strengthen its ties with Israel as demonstrated by its August announcement to open an embassy in Israel, but will also face the daunting task of explaining to the Palestinians that Morocco still supports their cause. Regardless, it is clear that Morocco is intent on increasing its strategic importance on the world stage, particularly in North Africa, and the Abraham Accords are the perfect place to start.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Alissa Pavia is assistant director for the North Africa Initiative within the Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. 

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As part of the deal, Trump said the United States will recognize “Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara,” a stretch of disputed land south of Morocco that is jointly claimed by the Moroccan government and the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The United Nations has attempted to negotiate a settlement on the dispute, but Trump’s announcement means the United States will be the first Western nation to officially endorse Morocco’s claims.

Atlantic Council experts react to the deal between Israel, Morocco, and the United States, and what it means for the wider MENA region:

Jump to an expert reaction:

Karim Mezran: Morocco can claim victory, but potential conflict looms

Nabeel Khoury: Deal will not bring region any closer to peace

Carmiel Arbit: Deal could give Moroccan king new leverage

Shalom Lipner: Another political win for Netanyahu before Biden takes over

Sina Azodi: Mideast deal making is one of Trump’s legacies

Borzou Daragahi: A great deal for Morocco, but complications remain

Mark Katz: Don’t expect any more deals soon

Jonathan Ferziger: A nightmare for Palestinians

Morocco can claim victory, but potential conflict looms

“The announcement of the normalization of relations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the state of Israel is another positive step toward decreasing tensions in the MENA region, at least on the surface. The quid pro quo in this latest case, nevertheless, casts doubt on the agreement’s ability to achieve de-escalation, since the terms might well ignite a new conflict. In fact, with his recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara territory, President Trump may provoke an armed reaction by the Polisario front in Western Sahara, and by its supporter, the Algerian state. Tensions in the area have been on the rise for some time, but this event may accelerate a renewed clash between the two Maghrebi states. In other words, this normalization in exchange for recognition of Moroccan claims over the Western Sahara will be a success for the Moroccan monarchy if it does not plunge it into a military confrontation with Algeria.”

Karim Mezran, director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs.

Deal will not bring region any closer to peace

“The agreement is yet another transactional deal that benefits the leaders of the United States, Israel, and Morocco over a piece of land that does not belong to them. Once again, Trump cedes territory (an executive action on his part without any debate in Congress) which he does not own without even a discussion with, let along an agreement from, the Sahrawi people who have fought long and hard for self-determination. In the end, the King of Morocco revived a diplomatic relationship that his father had established after the 1994 Casablanca conference.”

“Trump has once again disregarded three decades of US and UN diplomacy that sought via referendum and consultation to come to a peaceful resolution of the Western Sahara dispute. This decision was made on the day the world is supposed to celebrate international human rights. In the name of peace (inadequate though it may be) harm was done to yet another indigenous people, and it will not bring the people of the region any closer to genuine peace.”

Nabeel Khoury, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Deal could give Moroccan king new leverage

“Peace between Morocco and Israel is a welcome addition to the Abraham Accords. The announcement is not surprising: ties between Israel and Morocco have been relatively strong for decades. Morocco was a one-time hub of Jewish life in the region and the King has increasingly embraced Jewish Moroccan heritage, naming senior Jewish advisers to his government and, most recently, incorporating Moroccan Jewish history into school curricula. There is already more than $30 million in annual trade between the two countries, tens of thousands of Israelis travel to Morocco annually, and Israelis from Morocco can already retain Moroccan citizenship.”

“The deal is expected to also include US recognition of Moroccan control over the Western Sahara—which Morocco has sought for half a century.  After seven successive US presidents insisted on neutrality, such an offer from Trump, no matter how short-lived, is surely too great to pass up on.”

“The Palestinians will undoubtedly feel deeply betrayed by the announcement, particularly given widespread Moroccan support for the Palestinian cause. But Morocco has helped lead Arab peace initiatives with Israel in the past, and the King has used his seat as chair of the Al-Quds Committee of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to advocate for a Palestinian State in the past. The agreement could give the King further leverage to advance Palestinian issues—should he choose to use it.”

Carmiel Arbit, nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Another political win for Netanyahu before Biden take over

“The announcement of Morocco’s plans to normalize its ties with Israel—with which it has a long history of “on again, off again” relations —comes on the heels of similar deals involving the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan. It offers the latest representative example of President Donald Trump’s original paradigm for peace between Israel and the Arab world. Turning conventional wisdom on its head, Trump has refuted the previous assumption that Israel’s integration into the Middle East would be achieved only through resolution of its conflict with the Palestinians, instead employing the leverage of American largesse—e.g. sophisticated weaponry to Abu Dhabi, removal from the State Department’s list of terrorist sponsors for Khartoum and now, recognition of Rabat’s claim to Western Sahara—to incentivize Arab leaders into accepting Israel as their diplomatic partner. The success of this approach is self-evident.”

“Netanyahu, who has been a famous backer of Trump and (most of) his foreign policy initiatives, is reaping the fruits of his enthusiastic investment in the outgoing administration. The Israeli prime minister’s deferential attitude toward Trump—extending also to the Israeli government’s muted congratulations for President-elect Joe Biden and open criticism of his intention to reverse Trump’s rejection of the nuclear deal with Iran—continues now to deliver gains for Israel from the current president who, in the twilight of his tenure, is eager to add notches to his belt, most particularly ones which appeal to the conservative and religiously devout constituency upon whose support he would depend in mounting an anticipated bid to recapture the White House.”

“This window may be closing. With the Biden administration less likely to submit to these kinds of quid pro quos, and few among Israel’s center-right majority inclined toward compromise with the Palestinians, it remains to be seen whether conditions will induce other Arab nations to jump on the bandwagon of normalization with Israel after January 20.”

Shalom Lipner, nonresident fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.   

Mideast deal-making is one of Trump’s legacies

“The news should be analyzed in the context of Trump administration’s transactional foreign policy. Over the past few months, and having failed to achieve any success with regards to US policy toward North Korea or Iran,  the Trump administration seems to have focused itself on convincing Muslim majority countries with no democratic institutions to establish relations with Israel, in return for either weapons or more recognition from the United States. The Trump administration can sell this as a foreign policy achievement and, upon leaving office, can be viewed as his foreign policy legacy.”

Sina Azodi, nonresident fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.   

A great deal for Morocco, but complications remain

“The United States is recognizing Moroccan claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara and weighing in on one of the longest-running frozen conflicts in the world in exchange for Rabat committing to normalize relations with a country with which it has never been at war and with which it has had secret relations for decades. Israeli passport holders have been able to visit Morocco for years, obtaining visas on arrival.”

“This is a great deal for Morocco, but one that complicates longstanding efforts to resolve the dispute over Western Sahara. It is also a deal that could easily damage relations between Washington and Morocco’s well-armed gas- and oil-rich neighbor, Algeria, which hosts the Sahrawi rebels of the Polisario Front. Many countries of the world recognize Sahrawi rule over at least part of the disputed phosphate-rich territory.”

Borzou Daragahi, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Don’t expect any more deals soon

“As predicted in September, a normalization agreement has now been signed between Morocco and Israel. But there may not be many more such agreements. Governments strongly influenced by Iran (Iraq and Syria) and Hezbollah (Lebanon) will not normalize relations with Israel. Algeria probably would not have anyway, but it definitely will not do so now that the Trump administration has sided with its rival Morocco over Western Sahara. Such a move would also be difficult for Tunisia and Kuwait which are more constrained by public opinion than other Arab governments. King Salman has made it known that he opposes such a move by Saudi Arabia, and Qatar has indicated that it will not enter into such an agreement either. Oman seems to be the most likely prospect for normalizing relations with Israel, but it may be content with the current status quo of quiet cooperation with the Jewish state.”

Mark N. Katz, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

A nightmare for Palestinians

“For Palestinians, President Donald Trump’s departure from the White House can’t come soon enough. Morocco’s decision to restore and upgrade diplomatic relations with Israel showed that Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s nightmare hasn’t ended with the election of a far more sympathetic Joe Biden. Indeed Trump predicts more governments will soon break ranks with Abbas and join the wave of Arab states warming up to Israel.”

“Like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan, which have normalized ties with Israel since September, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI professed deep concern for the Palestinians and pledged to work harder for a comprehensive Middle East peace agreement. In Ramallah, they weren’t reassured. Former Palestinian negotiator Hanan Ashrawi condemned the deal in a tweet, saying: “Between bribery and blackmail, the Trump administration is in a mad scramble to extract concessions and benefits for Israel before the new administration takes over.”

“Even under Biden, Palestinians have slim hopes for getting what they want. While the president-elect may restore hundreds of millions in aid money that Trump cut off and allow Palestinians to reopen their shuttered representative office in Washington, the US Embassy that was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem will stay put despite Palestinian protests over the city’s political status. To the Palestinians’ disappointment, Biden has praised the new willingness of Arab states to come to terms with Israel and will certainly encourage the trend as he takes over the reins of Middle East policy in Washington next month.”

Jonathan Ferziger, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs.

Further reading:

New Atlanticist Oct 23, 2020

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Democratic Transitions International Markets

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Experts react: US brokers another deal in Middle East with Israel and Bahrain

By William F. Wechsler, Kirsten Fontenrose, Marc J. Sievers, Jonathan H. Ferziger, Barbara Slavin, Carmiel Arbit, Michel Duclos, Richard LeBaron, Mark N. Katz, Thomas S. Warrick, Sina Azodi, Joze Pelayo

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The post Experts react: What the Morocco-Israel deal means for the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Arab world was strangely quiet in the wake of the United Arab Emirates’ announcement of peace with Israel. But the announcement is a strategic victory for both Israel and the UAE, with the potential to impact Arab-Israeli relations as far afield as Morocco. Read Atlantic Council Board Director Ahmed Charai’s latest in the Jerusalem Post on the prospects for Arabs and Israelis to prosper together.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and the Advisory Board of Gatestone Institute in New York.

The post Charai in the Jerusalem Post: Can Arabs and Israelis prosper together? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In recent years, America has become a country engulfed in turmoil, withdrawn from the world, wanting for leadership. Yet, all over the world, people still wish for a revival of values-driven American leadership. Read Atlantic Council Board Director Ahmed Charai’s latest in the National Interest on the need for the United States to become a global role model again.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and the Advisory Board of Gatestone Institute in New York.

The post Charai in the National Interest: America must become a world model again appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Moroccans have learned that to reach the horizon beyond the deadly virus that they must address the equality gap among themselves. Read Atlantic Council Board Director Ahmed Charai’s latest in the National Interest on how Morocco is taking on the coronavirus.

Ahmed Charai is a Moroccan publisher and an Atlantic Council Board Director. He is also an international counselor of the Center for a Strategic and International Studies and a member of the Advisory Board of The Center for the National Interest in Washington and the Advisory Board of Gatestone Institute in New York.

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It is important to monitor ­the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic, its effects on each system, and the debate between government elites and masses to better understand the situation in these countries and the long-term implications of the health crisis.

Egypt

Egypt is the worst-hit North African country with 495 coronavirus cases and at least 36 deaths confirmed deaths so far, according to the country’s health ministry. On March 23, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced that two senior generals died due to COVID-19, amid fears of possible infection in the army, which has around 920,000 personnel. In early March, Egyptian authorities started to recognize an outbreak on Nile River cruises, particularly in the city of Luxor—a popular tourist destination in upper Egypt. Several tourists returning to their home countries showed symptoms or tested positive for COVID-19, according to public health data and news reports, which suggested that there could be many more cases on the ground in Egypt. Despite the delayed reaction, the Egyptian government eventually announced a $6.4 billion fund to combat the contagion and implemented various containment measures against the pandemic, including a government-enforced lockdown. This includes the closure of schools, universities, cafes, and restaurants; a ban against travel, tourist activities, and major sporting events; and reduced work in the public sector, which employs over 5 million Egyptians. This was followed by the Awqaf ministry—in charge of religious endowments—and the Coptic Orthodox Church announcing on March 21 the closure of mosques and churches to tackle the outbreak. On March 24, the government took a further step and imposed a national curfew that requires Egyptians to stay inside their homes between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Despite these measures, some have accused the Egyptian government of underreporting the actual number of coronavirus cases, which could be much higher than the official infection rates. At the end of February, a group of infectious disease specialists from the University of Toronto had raised alarms estimating the presence of at least 6,000 people infected, with the potential of an outbreak of 19,310 cases in Egypt. The gloomy picture described by this study led to a strong reaction by the interior ministry and Egypt’s State Information Service—the official media and public relations apparatus of the state—which, between March 15 – 17, arrested at least seven Egyptians on allegations of circulating false rumors about the coronavirus, on the basis it could alarm citizens and be harmful to national security. The Egyptian authorities also expelled a journalist for The Guardian who wrote a story challenging the official count of coronavirus cases, and censured a reporter for The New York Times who tweeted the story.

The latest crackdown on freedom of expression by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s regime suggests a possible aim of distracting public opinion regarding the country’s current crisis by pointing the finger at political opponents, especially the banned Muslim Brotherhood. The recent arrests added to the already high number of political prisoners, now at 60,000, that are currently staying in overcrowded prisons awaiting hearings. According to Human Rights Watch, the spread of the contagion among prisoners kept in inadequate medical care and unhygienic conditions is a serious and alarming threat. On March 21, Egyptian authorities released a few activists, including Egyptian-British novelist Ahdaf Serif, who called for the freeing of prisoners, stressing the possible risk of a disastrous spread of the virus within prisons. However, this is not the only concern. The spread of COVID-19 could bring the fragile Egyptian healthcare system to its knees, especially in light of the incessant demographic growth that led Egypt to recently reach 100 million inhabitants, 95 percent of whom live on roughly 5 percent of the country’s land—a serious challenge for practicing the recommended social distancing. Moreover, in the very short term, coronavirus could have hard economic consequences given the country’s dependence on trade and tourism which, due to the lockdown, have predicted a loss of income of $1 billion per month.

Libya

In the western region of Libya, the coronavirus pandemic is still in its initial phase. The country confirmed its first case on March 25, but the inability of journalists to freely operate in the eastern and southern parts of Libya make it hard to obtain reliable information about the real situation of COVID-19 on the ground. 

Surprising as it may be, it looks as though the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli has gotten its act together and organized a prompt and effective reaction to the outbreak of the virus, benefiting from the wealth of information coming out of countries that have already been overwhelmed by this highly infectious disease. The government in Tripoli has issued strict orders to the population to stay home, and most businesses have been closed with the exception of pharmacies and grocery stores. Police not only monitor the effective closure of stores, but also make sure that those authorized to remain open are all equipped with masks and gloves for employees and that no more than a few people are inside at a time. A project has been undertaken to collect the enormous amount of garbage that has been accumulating in the past month, due to public services shutting down as a result of the conflict in Tripoli, as well as cleaning and disinfecting the public streets. Showing a high sense of civic duty, most inhabitants of the city are respectful of the measures taken by the government.

Initially, it looked as though all actors in Libya’s conflict would prioritize the fight against coronavirus over the fight with each other, as the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar paused their shelling of civilian zones of Tripoli. It seemed that perhaps international pressure to halt fighting amid COVID-19 concerns played a role in the cessation of attacks, which would be one of the few bright spots in an otherwise bleak picture. Unfortunately, on March 24, Haftar’s forces resumed their offensive, bombarding Tripoli with heavy shelling that killed at least five civilians on the first night, including women and children. Haftar has made it clearer than ever with this move that he is not interested in national unity and will prioritize military victory over all else.

Tunisia

As with most countries affected by the spread of coronavirus, the number of Tunisia’s confirmed cases keeps growing. As of March 27, 227 cases have been confirmed, including six deaths. 7,642 individuals remain under compulsory self-quarantine. In response to the accelerating contagion in Tunisia, the government has taken incremental measures to deal with the outbreak in the country and curb its spread.

Tunisia started screening arriving passengers with thermal cameras or frontal lasers at all ports of entry since late January, as part of a sanitary surveillance plan. Upon arrival, all passengers were required to complete a health questionnaire and observe a 14-day self-isolation period from the arrival date. Most of the first confirmed cases were visitors coming from countries heavily affected by COVID-19. Thus, the government on March 16 suspended international flights and closed maritime borders, with the exception of repatriation flights to and from Tunisia.

The health ministry is also taking the lead in other areas, including updating the public and raising awareness. The ministry provided 24-hour hotlines for urgent medical services related to coronavirus. Furthermore, to increase transparency and limit rumors that may cause public anxiety, the health ministry created a user-friendly website to disseminate real-time official information. This proactive approach was especially needed as the chronic lack of essential medical equipment in the health sector will make the response much more difficult than prevention.

The new measures included a general curfew from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.; a ban on all public gatherings and travel between cities except for proven essential needs; and the closing of schools and universities. On March 20, Tunisian President Kais Saied convened his national security council and announced additional measures. Accordingly, all Tunisians must undergo self-isolation and limit themselves to essential movements only for absolute necessities like grocery stores and pharmacies. On March 23, President Saied ordered the army to enforce the lockdown. The government also announced several measures to tackle the economic recession the crisis will cause. In addition to allocating $850 million to combat the economic and social effects of the lockdown, the government has promised to delay tax debts, postpone taxes on small- and medium-sized businesses, delay repayment of low-income employee loans, and provide financial assistance to poor families.

In Tunisia, there is public agreement on the limits of the healthcare system. To help flatten the curve, the public called on the government to implement a general lockdown. Ironically, Tunisians even went as far as petitioning the government to apply a 24-hour curfew, something no one would have ever thought could happen given the populace’s wariness of government overreach since the ouster of the repressive Ben Ali regime. There has been mounting solidarity among Tunisians to support the health ministry in its efforts, especially through donations and volunteering.

Tunisians are also closely monitoring the situation in neighboring countries, particularly in Italy. The situation in Italy has had a significant impact on Tunisian public opinion, as Rome and Tunis historically have very close ties. In conversations between Tunisians and the authors, many expressed concern that if Italy is struggling so much, the Tunisian system would struggle even more so if Tunisians increasingly contracted the virus. As such, many are now actively complying with government measures, as there is a widespread perception that if they don’t, Tunisia could head for the worse.   

Algeria

Algeria is experiencing a growing number of coronavirus contractions with 367 cases and 25 deaths as of March 27. To contain the virus, the Algerian government gradually banned travel; canceled all large-scale events, closed schools, universities, mosques, and restaurants; and asked people to stay home. Then on March 23, officially declared a lockdown and curfew from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. The government has also enforced police patrols and blockades to control movement on the streets and dispatched the military to Algiers and Blida to enforce official directives. Most importantly, the government ordered the end of mass street protests that have taken place in the country for more than a year.

The demonstrations, which began in February 2019 after President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced that he would run for a fifth term, lead to his resignation on April 2, but not the true overhaul of the elite political class that the movement has sought. Friday after Friday, people took to the streets to demand big structural changes, including the ousting of holdovers from Bouteflika’s regime and democratizing reforms. The election of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune in December 2019, prompted additional protests about his legitimacy and the inability of the regime to carry out the promised change in Algeria’s political system. Protests continued despite concerns about the spread of coronavirus.

On March 17, President Tebboune delivered an address announcing the “prohibition of rallies and marches whatever their form and their nature” in order to combat the contagion. On March 20, for the first time since it began, the street protest movement—commonly referred to as the Hirak—stopped what would have been the 57th consecutive week of protests against the political elite, leaving the streets to police vehicles parked along the main streets of the capital. Although these official measures designed to limit public gatherings have been mainly interpreted as an opportunistic attempt to muzzle the protest movement, several Hirak activists started to call for the temporary suspension of the marches, emphasizing the importance of this measure in order to stop the spread of COVID-19. But the persistent political and social instability could pose a challenge to countering the virus due to the government’s lack of political legitimacy and the serious mistrust between the population and authorities.

The announced political projects, such as the revision of the constitution by referendum and the anticipated parliamentary election, risk being postponed by the government due to the current health crisis. This emergency fits within the looming economic situation aggravated by the fall in oil prices due to Russia and Saudi Arabia’s oil price war. Petroleum revenues still represent the main source of government income. On March 10, Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad raised alarm by stating that the country is facing an unprecedented “multi-dimensional crisis” exacerbated by the oil price collapse. Together with the oil crisis, the coronavirus crisis could deliver the final blow to an already weakened system, leading to economic and political implosion, with effects spreading well beyond Algeria’s borders.

Morocco

On March 2, Morocco announced its first case of coronavirus. In response, the Moroccan authorities implemented several measures to control the spread of the virus. On March 13, the government began closing borders, suspending all international flights, cruises, and passenger ships, and enforcing restrictions on domestic flights.

Heeding World Health Organization guidelines and lessons learned from Italy, Morocco made tests available and free to all citizens. To finance the country’s coronavirus response, a special fund was created at King Mohammed VI’s instruction, so far bringing in $1.5 billion in donations from Moroccan corporations, banks, and even private individuals. Parliament, judiciary, and other government members have also donated their salary to support the Kingdom during these difficult times. Healthcare centers prepared 1,640 beds for coronavirus patients, including 250 beds reserved for life-threatening cases. On March 22, Morocco received from China a delivery of necessary medical aid to help halt the spread of COVID-19.

On March 19, the Kingdom issued a state of emergency, shutting down all schools, mosques, cafes and restaurants, sports and entertainment venues to combat the virus’ spread. To ease economic pain, Morocco will pay a stipend to people who lose their jobs and defer tax and debt payments from small businesses. Despite these measures, the Kingdom witnessed some public gatherings in violation of official guidelines. In response, the committee for the interior minister within the Moroccan parliament unanimously voted for a draft law to discipline violators and criminalize all actions that could jeopardize the country’s state of emergency and put the population at risk. Along these lines, Moroccan police have arrested at least a dozen people for reportedly spreading rumors about the coronavirus, including a woman who used her YouTube channel to claim the disease did not exist.

With 275 confirmed cases including 11 deaths as of March 27, Morocco is eager to stop the spread of COVID-19 by not only collaborating with all governmental and non-governmental institutions, but also by raising awareness among Moroccan citizens, whose participation will determine the success of the Kingdom’s response to the crisis.

Karim Mezran is a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. Follow him on Twitter: @mezrank.

Alessia Melcangi is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and a tenure track assistant professor at La Sapienza University of Rome. Follow her on Twitter: @AlessiaMelcangi.

Emily Burchfield is an assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Zineb Riboua is an intern with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

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The final text of the draft law has not yet been passed, but it has already generated confusion and debate from a concerned Moroccan population that wonders how mandatory military service will address festering economic and social issues that remain front and center priorities for Morocco’s youth. Official rhetoric about the pending military conscription largely frames the proposed law in terms of enhancing patriotism and citizenship among the youth. However, if this is the government’s answer, it must take steps to better communicate the purported benefits of conscription, and channel citizens’ concerns through the country’s institutionalized legal consultation mechanisms.

Should the conscription law indeed go into effect, it will face a challenging environment. Despite overall growth in the country, recent figures show that 29.3% of Moroccan youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four do not work, are not in school, and do not participate in any kind of training or professional development. The past two years have seen heightened tensions in Morocco as protests—many led by youth—over social and economic conditions spread in the northern Rif city of Al Hoceima and the mining town of Jerada. These figures, combined with the king’s speech demanding that economic and social programs produce better options for the youth, have set a tone and urgency in creating a better future for this demographic. Given this context, the new draft law appears tone-deaf—tackling tangential issues of patriotism and citizenship while avoiding the pressing matters of employment and basic opportunity.

In official statements, the government stressed that the conscription bill would enhance Moroccan youth’s sense of citizenship and responsibility to the nation, and allow them to contribute to the country’s development. This discourse is framed within the constitution’s Article 38 that tasks both men and women with defending the country and its territorial integrity. Service would last for twelve months and offer similar benefits as professional enlistment, including compensation, housing, and health insurance. Evasion is punishable by sentences of one to three months and fines of around $200 to $500. Exemptions include married citizens, individuals who are handicapped or have a physical illness, individuals who are financially responsible for their families, and youth who are serving a prison sentence of more than six months or have an active criminal record.

When the draft law was announced, there was confusion and alarm about whether citizens with dual nationality would have to serve. Since then, some officials have clarified that the duty only applies to Moroccans living within the country. Instead of answering questions about the draft law in a piecemeal format, these conversations should be held as part of a broader official dialogue.

The draft law is not Morocco’s first attempt at mandatory military service. On June 9, 1966, a royal decree introduced an eighteen-month mandatory military service—optional for women—which was later reduced to twelve months. In 2007, King Mohammed VI abolished mandatory military service on an “exceptional” basis, which some analysts speculated was a result of fears that terrorist groups would try to infiltrate the Moroccan army. Moreover, the conscription law was not adequately enforced due to limited government resources. These challenges could also plague the new draft law, with critics already pointing out that these funds could instead be allocated to the education system or jobs training, which could help instill the same values of discipline and responsibility as the military.

The approval of the bill at the government level was completed in an unprecedented time, without a public dialogue or consultations to discuss provisions, thus coming as a surprise to many. Without a final bill to examine, many have begun speculating about its contents. Perhaps the most fundamental point regarding the draft law is that soldiers are conscripted by the state and not enlisted voluntarily—a particularly risky initiative given the already fraught relationship between the youth and the state. Some also worry that obligating women to enlist in the military will raise the ire of Moroccan families who would not want their single daughters to serve alongside men. Other Moroccans are concerned that conscription will disproportionately impact individuals from lower social classes, and use slogans such as “the nation is for the rich and nationalism is for the poor.” A Facebook group called “Moroccans Rally Against Compulsory Military Service” was created, and members have already published a statement against draft law 44.18, arguing that the millions of dirhams (estimated at $300 million a year) that would be allocated for military training could instead be invested in the socio-economic development of youth. The group already has more than 15,000 members, and hundreds of posts in the past month alone.

Other Moroccans see the value in mandatory military service. Despite youth discontent, these individuals believe the bill is a commendable initiative that will provide young people with a meaningful career, skills, and opportunity to give back to the country. Article 6 of the draft law indicates that conscripts with technical or professional skills can be integrated into additional roles within the military for further career development. While the majority of the world’s countries have done away with mandatory military service, other states in the Arab world have returned to conscription in recent years, including the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait. While some conscripts enjoyed employment as part of the program, most of these initiatives in the Gulf were not created to directly address youth joblessness. The countries established conscription as part of national identity projects, and to increase nationalism and responsibility in young men who have grown up in rentier states.

However, Morocco is not an oil monarchy, and youth unemployment remains at the top of its priorities. While the government may acknowledge this fact, it has yet to reap benefits from existing economic and social programs targeted at youth. If the government wants to use conscription to empower youth with values and skills to become more able citizens and economic engines, then a fundamental first step would be to lead a multidisciplinary dialogue on the draft law with youth stakeholders and consultative groups. This dialogue would engage the bill’s target audience—Moroccan youth—on the bill’s potential to shape youth leadership and development, integrate youth into the military service, and tie into educational reform. As it stands, the draft bill does not specifically outline how the military fits within a coherent youth development strategy, and may instead further deteriorate the youth’s relationship with the government. If the reactions to the initial announcement are any indication of Moroccan public opinion, then the next iterations of the law would benefit from being more inclusive of youth views and responsive to their legitimate concerns about conscription.

Sarah Alaoui is a PhD candidate in the Middle East Studies department at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Leila Hanafi holds a PhD in law from the UK,  is  an international lawyer in Washington DC, with the World Bank Group and founder and principal of international development law firm ARPA Dispute Resolution www.arpainternational.org 

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Tensions between Morocco and Iran over the Western Sahara dispute ignited in March 2017, when the Moroccan authorities arrested Lebanese Hezbollah financier Kassim Tajideen in Casablance, en route to Beirut from Guinea-Bissau. According to the US Treasury Department, Tajideen  provided funding for Hezbollah in cash bundles as large as $1 million. Following his arrest, he was extradited to the United States and prosecuted for terror-related charges. Tajideen’s arrest increased tensions between Hezbollah and Morocco, and some observers argue that it had the effect of drawing the Polisario Front and Hezbollah closer together. The groups had long been aware of each other and may have drawn inspiration from each other’s actions, as both are non-state actors conveying a political message against a perceived aggressor through asymmetrical warfare tactics. Their direct relationship appears to have begun in 2016, when Hezbollah formed a committee in Lebanon to support the people of Western Sahara.

Beyond the allegations of Hezbollah’s role, Morocco directly accuses Iran of destabilizing the Western Sahara region through its Embassy in Algiers.  Bourita points out that Iran’s Cultural Attaché in Algiers, Amir al Mussawi, assisted in smuggling Hezbollah weapons to the Polisario Front through Algeria. Al Mussawi previously held positions as Iran’s Vice-Minister of Defense and Director of the Iranian Center for Strategic Studies, a prominent research institution with close ties to the government. The Iranian diplomat has also been at the centerstage of a controversy in Algeria earlier this year, targeting the former Algerian First Lady, Anissa Boumediene. In a Facebook rant, al Mussawi criticized Boumediene for supporting an Iranian movement advocating regime-change in Iran.

A designed strategic tactic that further divides the Middle East

Morocco’s allegations were quickly denied by Iran, Hezbollah, Algeria, and representatives of the Polisario. In an official statement, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Bahram Qasimi declared that “Morocco has failed to provide any evidence to substantiate [these] allegations.” Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah echoed the Iranian response by denying any relation between Hezbollah and the Polisario Front.

However, Tehran’s denial of interfering in Western Sahara is cast into doubt by its activities elsewhere in the Middle East. Iran uses its influence with its proxies to gain ground in Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq, where it explicitly demonstrates its ambition to counter Western powers. In Syria, Iran’s hands reach beyond the scope of weapons supply, reconstruction, and military advising and training, as Iran increasingly seeks to become a permanent power within Syria—an aim which threatens the alliance between Russia, Turkey, and Iran as well as the future stability of Syria. And Iran’s well-documented investment in Hezbollah as a powerful instrument to exercise foreign influence in the region continues to pose a substantial threat to the stability of the region.

Morocco has not yet provided visual proof substantiating its claims against Iran and Hezbollah, but the claims may not be entirely baseless, considering Iran’s growing ambitions in the region.  However, Rabat’s allegations occurred in timely circumstances, as the diplomatic severing with Iran followed the US administration’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal. The increasingly hostile rhetoric of the US administration towards Tehran and the rapprochement of the United States with Gulf countries may have propelled Morocco, an Arab country, to pick a side. Morocco is mindful that backing the United States and its longstanding Gulf allies will eventually benefit its efforts to garner support at the United Nations for its Autonomy Plan in Western Sahara. Morocco may also seek to tie the Polisario Front to Hezbollah to cast it as a destabilizing actor unwilling to seek a peaceful settlement of the conflict and therefore an illegitimate party to negotiate with.

The Gulf countries welcomed Morocco’s decision to cut diplomatic ties with Iran—especially Saudi Arabia, as demonstrated by the Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir’s tweeting  his support for Morocco’s decision. Morocco seems determined to stand by its Gulf allies, with which it has historic relations, against Iran. Morocco is bound to side with Saudi Arabia in particular, as Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s recent reforms align with Morocco’s policy ambitions. Whatever the reasons behind Morocco’s decision, this latest episode in the rift between Arab monarchies and Iran further exacerbates the divide in the Middle East and reinforces the prospect of large-scale sectarian conflict.

Mariam Elatouabi is a Youth Delegate at the United Nations and chairwoman of ‘Josoor’ an NGO in the MENA region advocating for dialogue and cooperation in the Middle East through youth empowerment. She tweets @MariamElat.

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The main opposition to Moroccan governance is the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a state apparatus of the Polisario that claims Western Sahara’s independence and runs its government out of Algeria. SADR also holds two offices in Spain: one in Madrid and another in Barcelona. According to a local source, SADR partisans took part in local Catalan demonstrations and raised the flag of the SADR movement, raising the profile of their campaign by visibly tying it to the Catalan referendum movement. 

SADR has a long tradition of lobbying in Madrid for independence from the Moroccan government. The Moroccan autonomy plan aims to grant a special autonomy status to the Western Sahara region but retain Moroccan sovereignty, an arrangement similar to that of the Catalan region in Spain. Spain is a vocal advocate of Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, which is also supported by the United States and France. Following the Catalan referendum, Moroccan King Mohammed VI reiterated the state’s firm position to pursue the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara in a televised speech on November 6.

In contrast to the Spanish government’s support of Morocco and its autonomy plan for Western Sahara, Spain’s left-wing parties empathize with the Sahrawi nationalist movement. Catalan President Puigdemont’s Catalan European Democratic Party has long supported self-determination for Western Sahara, as well as movements  against the Moroccan government such as the Hirak—a movement resulting from the popular protests in the Moroccan Rif region. Moroccan officials refused to meet with the Catalan president earlier this year due to the support of the Catalan government for the Rif contestations. Additionally, in November 2016, the left-wing Podemos-Unidos, the third largest party in Spain, pushed for the Spanish government to come up with a strategy that would enable a referendum process in Western Sahara.

The efforts of pro-Catalan independence political actors in Spain to bolster their own position by encouraging similar movements could ultimately have an impact on Western Sahara’s separatist movement. It is unclear how a referendum in Western Sahara would move forward, but it could have the same destabilizing effect recently seen in Spain and Iraqi Kurdistan. The threat of regional unrest triggered by such a move could motivate the Moroccan government to more vigorously pursue peaceful negotiations with SADR.

Morocco could capitalize on the referendum-driven chaos in Spain to argue that its Western Sahara autonomy plan is the reasonable path forward, contrasted with an undeveloped self-determination movement. Sahrawi nationalists may also be discouraged by the failure of the referendum in Spain. At a time when the Moroccan government is scrutinized over its poor handling of the Rif contestations and its lack of strategy in providing sensible solutions for the grievances of the Moroccan population, it could take control of the dialogue by focusing on improving the situation in Western Sahara. To do so, the government will need to focus on open negotiations, in order to avoid a situation where the opposition sees no choice but to risk a referendum.

Mariam Elatouabi is a Youth Delegate at the United Nations and chairwoman of ‘Josoor’ an NGO in the MENA region advocating for dialogue and cooperation in the Middle East through youth empowerment. She tweets @MariamElat.

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Progressive trends in the written law

Morocco’s position as a Western ally and a regional leader in women’s rights is based on its legal protections for women. In recent years Morocco has taken substantial steps to establish parity between the sexes in constitutional, family, and criminal law on the books. Feminist civil society and non-governmental organizations, composed mainly of educated, urban women, have been at the forefront of organizing and lobbying in favor of these reforms.

The 2011 Constitution guarantees equal protection and enjoyment of its laws for both men and women. The country’s progressive Family Law (Moudawana) secured important rights for Moroccan women, including the right to self-guardianship, the right to divorce, and the right to child custody. The legal marriage age changed from 15 to 18 years of age, and women are no longer required to have a male guardian approve their marriage. The criminal code has taken strides against acts of gender based violence, cracking down on non-partner sexual assault and repealing the rape marriage law, which allowed a rapist to evade punishment by marrying his victim.

However, some legislative gaps persist with disparities between the laws on the books and in practice. Some protections afforded under the 2004 Moudawana are left open to interference by gaps in the legislation, notably the prohibition on early and forced marriage which may be permitted through judicial waiver. While non-partner sexual assault is effectively addressed, marital rape is still unrecognized. Sexual harassment in public spaces is largely unchecked, with the current law defining harassment only in terms of employer-employee exchanges.

Barriers to effective implementation

While feminist groups work to push legislative standards towards equality, conservatives in civil society organizations, judicial institutions, and society fight to limit the legislation and its effects.

Some of the key barriers to effective implementation include: judicial oversight and accountability; progressive legislation by formal and informal justice mechanisms; police enforcement; legal aid and information. Judges, particularly older judges and those in rural regions, use their discretion to permit waivers for early marriage and to restrict female-initiated divorces, among other new rights. If a women obtains a favorable resolution, there is no guarantee that the decision will be enforced.

Social and cultural barriers form other key barriers for women’s equality and inherent rights. Economic needs and social traditions tend to favor antiquated female roles as early brides and domestic workers. Education and literacy among girls is still not valued. The key informant interviews conducted for this context analysis revealed that there are many social pressures in Morocco to resist change in gender justice, and these pressures are greater in rural areas. There is a sharp social divide in Morocco whereby young urban women along with civil society organizations are using their newly afforded rights and pushing for greater equality, while older, religious, and conservative rural populations stand as a barrier to effective implementation.

Balancing domestic and international law

Despite Morocco being party to several international law conventions and acknowledging the precedence of international instruments over national legislation, the 2017 UPR Review by the UN Human Rights Council noted several problems in its evaluation of Morocco’s human rights record, partially because of gender bias.

Morocco is not only bound to adhere to international standards on gender equality based on its ratification of several treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Convention on the Elimination of Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), but also under domestic law.

For the first time, in its newly reformed 2011 Constitution, Morocco declared the country’s adherence to universally recognized human rights and affirmed the preeminence of international law over national legislation. As a monist state, international treaties are automatically part of domestic law, once published in the Official Bulletin, without requiring an implementing law. In accordance with its constitutional provisions, this makes all treaties to which Morocco is party the supreme law of the land.

Since ratification of CEDAW in 1993, the Moroccan Government has submitted progress reports on the Convention to the United Nations, each showing progress towards reforming the legal code and improving the status of women. Some reservations, such as to Article 9 of CEDAW, deal with the right of a mother to transmit her citizenship to her children, have already been abandoned, there remain apparent delays in enforcing these provisions nationally.

Morocco’s gradual change approach as currently applied is insufficient for genuine progress

Not only is the government legally obliged to protect women from discrimination, it also has the power to promote progressive social change. King Mohamed VI advocated a gradual approach for empowering women and, as such, supported the transformative power of the law.

The gradual change approach to implementing women’s rights laws employs ‘constrained legalism’, requiring that laws be deployed in a way that is ‘neither utopian in its hopes for legal reform nor rejectionist in its dismissal of legal avenues of transformation.’ The gradual change approach is an attempt to balance the split in the nation between those who emphasize the universality of human rights and those who call upon a more culturally specific, if not an ‘authentic’ approach to rights and freedoms.

Would applying a more rigid reading of the law disrespect and violate the will of the people? And would a more relativist reading of the law strip individuals of their rights? Currently, there is no clear consensus among the population on what they wish the law to be. This divide is played out between feminist groups, Islamists, and conservatives who seek to define the modern national identity.

Solutions

For Morocco to harness the transformative power of the legal reforms through a more universal application of the law, strengthening the formal justice system is key. Inadequacies within the justice sector need to be addressed including high costs, lengthy proceedings, and corruption. Improved record keeping and mechanisms for oversight can address several of these limitations. Legislators should also seek to close the gaps in the law that permit the extensive use of discretion that eliminate provisions or specific judicial bases. The government should also take significant steps to improve the training of judges and traditional leaders with regard to: basic principles of fair trials; the specific rights and obligations under national and international law; and the particular needs of women and other vulnerable groups.

However, without addressing the social and cultural barriers that keep women from seeking judicial remedies, even transformative legal reforms will not be sufficient to empower women. Implementing a program on legal literacy could have substantial benefits regarding women’s legal and social empowerment. To utilize the power of legal literacy, it must be implemented in a way that reaches all Moroccan women. Thus, awareness building in various locations in both Arabic and Amazigh dialects is needed. Consideration to the medium that is most effective at communicating information is required where basic literacy and access to technology vary substantially across geographic regions.

Legal aid is one way in which the government can address lack of information, legal literacy, and engagement with the legal system for women. On the legal aid front, successful pilot legal aid projects founded upon a strong partnership is key among the bar, the judiciary, social workers, CSOs, and universities. Law faculty and students serve as valuable civil legal assistance providers through clinical programs. Legal aid clinics constitute a highly effective, successful, and increasingly global means of combating the lack of access to justice for marginalized populations throughout the world.

Morocco has the ability and opportunity to improve the conditions of women, fulfill their international and domestic laws and values, and to nurture its beneficial alliance with the United States and the Western world, more generally. Through the transformative power of legal formalism, the implementation of the reforms at ground level has the capacity to empower women.

While social realities must be considered by legislators, the law has an educational function and sets norms for what society thinks is right and what’s wrong. Patriarchal gender relations are ripe to be addressed through this function of legal reform and must be addressed collectively by the government, the judiciary, local leaders, the media, civil society, and educators. Failure to do so hinders the law from affecting meaningful change.

Danielle Hites is a legal analyst for the Alliance for Rule of Law Promotion & Alternative Dispute Resolution and has a JD from Boston University School of Law.

Leila Hanafi is a Moroccan-American international development lawyer with the United Nations and the principal of the Alliance for Rule of Law Promotion & Alternative Dispute Resolution in Washington DC.  

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As with the infamous 2011 events in Tunisia, sparked by a peddler named Bouazizi immolating himself, it is the underlying poverty and sense of humiliation of a wide swath of Rif dwellers that has fuelled this more recent uprising. Civil society leaders are warning that after an initial period of political and economic reform the monarchy (or to be precise the deep state referred to as al-Makhzen in Morocco) is again turning defensive and resorting to repression and putting the brakes on steps towards democratization.

Politically, the positive step taken by the King after 2011, accepting to name a prime minister from the party that won the most seats in parliament, led to the appointment of the country’s first Islamist prime minister, head of the opposition Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Abdelillah Benkirane, prime minister until April 2017, was able to stay as long as he did in this post by toning down his Islamist rhetoric and accepting in advance the King’s veto power over any and all decisions made by him. In effect, the King remained the real power counseled by the same close advisors he had since acceding to power while Benkirane appeared, most of all to his supporters, as a paper Islamist and ineffective opposition leader.

Economically, Morocco retains a low ranking on indices of development, corruption, democracy and youth employment. Classified as partly free on the Freedom House democracy index, at forty-one percent the country remained in the lower half of the ranked world countries for 2016. Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index gave Morocco a score of 37 out of a possible score of 100 for 2016. On the human development index for the same year, Morocco was ranked 123 (out of 188) on the United Nation’s human development index (a composite of life expectancy, education and income per capita data). This puts Morocco in the lowest third of world economies, behind Palestine and the Philippines. World bank prognosis for the year ahead projects a healthy 3.8 percent growth, but given the level of corruption and dominance by a powerful business elite, the report concludes “Morocco’s already low labor participation rate keeps declining. Looking forward, Morocco continues to face the paramount challenges of promoting stronger private-sector-led growth and job creation, and increasing shared prosperity.”

Morocco’s years of lead ended with the release of remaining political prisoners in 1991. There followed a period of optimism, with the King’s allowing the formation of civil society groups, more political freedoms, and the formation of the country’s first opposition government in 1998. Another era of optimism began after Hassan II’s death and the ascendency to the throne of his son Mohammed VI in 1999. The sense of optimism was palpable as opposition leaders and former political prisoners spoke freely of a new era in Morocco and praised the young king for being “quite different from his father.”

The years of lead, or what some refer to as the Tazmamart era, in reference to the infamous prison in the desert where most of the disappeared were incarcerated, featured the repression of university students and young political activists from the late seventies and early eighties. While some belonged to left wing parties others were simply disgruntled youth desiring a genuine democracy in their country. The authorities were alarmed when demonstrations spilled outside university campuses and connected with city workers and residents of poverty belts around major cities like Casablanca. Incarceration included the isolation and torture (of both men and women) and some of the disappeared were never returned to their families.

To be sure, Morocco can never go back to the dark days of the years of lead. Political opposition is now too entrenched in the institutions of government, the courts are not totally under the thumb of the regime and civil society organizations are too active on social media to allow for disappearances and torture to go unnoticed, not just by Moroccans, but by the whole world. That said, events in Hoceima highlight the limits of progress in civil liberties and human rights and the disappointment of human rights activists after an initial optimism in the ability of Mohammed VI to bring about positive change.

Fouad Abdelmoumni, one of those civil society leaders who emerged from the dark days of Hassan II to fight for full democratization and economic rights for all Moroccans said in a conversation with the author, “The regime is pushing as much as it can towards the monopoly of decision, the emasculation of new elites, and the militarization of the street. The state obviously feels threatened by democratization but I am confident that social demand for it can only grow and that the inability of the regime to satisfy economic needs by depleting reserves will highlight the regime’s incompetence and the need for new elites.”

Dr. Nabeel Khoury is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. He served twice in Morocco, he was the Press Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Rabat from 1994-1997 and again as U.S. Consul General from 1998-2002.

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Well back in August 2014, I wrote here about “The Military Implications of Scottish and Catalonian Secession.” After this past weekend’s events in Catalonia, I thought that I should republish a slightly updated version of that essay, this time focusing on the Catalan question. It is important to remember, after all, that the secessionist government in Barcelona has indeed endorsed joining both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Fairly, both organizations have warned that accession is not remotely automatic, depending rather on the agreement of every existing member state. Those are slightly different lists of 28 countries, and one must only remember the juvenile and endless exclusion of Macedonia by the Greeks—over a branding dispute—to understand how long a blackballing can last. As two of my Atlantic Council colleagues once questioned, the EU may not soon admit Catalonia, as some member states (particularly Belgium) have cause to fear further secessionist activity.
Even so, as ugly as the Spanish response appeared, the federal government in Madrid may not manage to block a determined move for self-determination. So, assuming that Catalonia was admitted to NATO, what would the newly independent country contribute? At the 2014 Strategic Foresight Forum at the Atlantic Council, Anne Marie Slaughter of the New America Foundation opined that an independent Catalonia would do a fine job of defending itself. After all, Catalonia is a country of over 7 million people, with more than $300 billion in GDP. Spending just 1.6% of that—well below the widely-ignored NATO threshold, of course—provides over $4.5 billion annually. That’s roughly the military budget of Denmark, which has well-regarded and efficient armed forces.

Catalonian military plans are somewhat vague, but when the issue arose back in 2014, they emphasized a navy. With excellent ports in Barcelona and Tarragona, Catalonia is well-positioned as a minor naval power, “with the Mediterranean as our strategic environment, and NATO as our framework,” as the nationalists’ think-tank on defense argued. The rough plans called for a littoral security group of a few hundred sailors at first. After a few years, Catalonia would assume responsibility as “a main actor in the Mediterranean,” with land-based maritime patrol aircraft and small surface combatants. Eventually, the nationalist ambition may include an expeditionary group with a light assault carrier and hundreds of marines, to take a serious role in collective security. That would be rather more helpful to the Alliance than Madrid’s focus on tanks and artillery to defend Ceuta and Melilla from a Moroccan invasion.

Of course, all these plans are subject to the vagaries of the country’s political process, but Catalonia’s ambitions are reasonable in part because they are restrained. If accurately characterized by the few white papers that have surfaced, the separatists’ position suggests a valuable and refreshing view of specialization in collective defense: build a navy that is comparatively focused on influencing events ashore. After all, in broad terms, the further one sits from Russia, the less important ground forces, and the more needed naval forces. By de-emphasizing the military forces that any landlocked country will have, and instead steering investments towards those it is comparatively positioned to provide, Catalonia could punch above its weight in European political affairs. There may be no further Álvaro de Bazáns in Barcelona, but there may be new littoral forces—flying the four bars of the Senyera—that NATO needs around the periphery of the Mediterranean.

In short, while NATO’s member states may not treat the eventuality lightly, I expect the Alliance need worry little about losing much through Catalonian independence. Indeed, there was only one clear loser after this past weekend’s events: the Spanish federal government. Brutalizing people going to the ballot box is never a winning argument.

James Hasík is a senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.

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As Aubrey Hruby and I documented in a report last year, those countries that rely heavily on the export of one or two resources to drive their economic growth have suffered as a result of the emerging market downturn and its knock-on effects, both in terms of demand for their commodities and in availability of financing for their major infrastructure and other development projects.

Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and one which only emerged as the continent’s biggest economy three years ago, is bedeviled not only by low petroleum prices, but decreased production due to attacks by the militants in the oil-producing Niger Delta region—at one point last year, the amount of crude being pumped nearly reached the lowest point in three decades. The rest of the economy in the West African giant essentially stagnated, hammered both by the government’s maladroit management of the currency float and by the failure of President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration to make much headway in improving the country’s overall business climate, as witnessed by Nigeria’s abysmal 169^th place ranking among 190 countries analyzed in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2017 report. 

Angola nudged ahead of Nigeria early last year to become Africa’s biggest oil producer, thanks in part to the latter country’s problems with its militants, but the distinction means less in a world of depressed hydrocarbon prices. With inflation projected to have been around 45 percent in 2016, while the country’s currency, the kwanza, lost nearly 20 percent of its value during the same period, the country’s grim prospects heading into the new year add to the uncertainty with the announced plans of longtime President José Eduardo dos Santos to retire later this year (elections are scheduled for August).

Similarly, Algeria’s heavy dependence on energy exports caused the growth to slow down to an estimated 3.6 percent in 2016 with the World Bank estimating it will plunge further in the coming year. Low oil prices will continue to weigh on government finances as inflation and unemployment both increase; the dinar has nominally depreciated 20 percent over the last two years. The 2017 budget signed by the country’s octogenarian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in late December raises taxes to compensate for declining revenues from hydrocarbons, signaling that the heavy public spending that enabled the regime to weather the so-called Arab Spring is no longer an option.

While South Africa was spared an end-of-the-year downgrade by Standard & Poor’s of its sovereign credit—it remains at BBB-, one notch above “junk” status—Moody’s opened 2017 by placing the country on a downgrade review, a step which serves notice to investors, some of whom have fiduciary obligations barring them from doing business in places branded with “junk” status. Moreover, the numerous corruption scandals surrounding President Jacob Zuma have divided the ruling African National Congress, already reeling from unprecedented rebuff in the August 2016 local government and municipal elections, adding to the political volatility that undermines investor confidence just as the country regained its title as Africa’s largest economy.

Despite its wealth of natural resources, both in terms of extractives and in potential for renewable energy, to say nothing of the extraordinary human capital in its people, the Democratic Republic of the Congo will struggle economically in the coming year. Notwithstanding a rickety last-minute political deal pushed by the country’s influential Roman Catholic bishops that is supposed to lead to presidential elections before the end of 2017, President Joseph Kabila’s decision to violate the constitution and hold on to power despite the December 19, 2016, expiration of his final term casts a long shadow over the fourth most-populous country on the African continent and the largest country by area in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Sasha Lezhnev of the Enough Project pointed out recently, the political crisis is not without its connection to economic woes, past and present: “Corruption has increased and prices for the key commodities that Congo produces have plummeted in recent years, e.g. with the price of copper going down by nearly half over the past five years. Average Congolese people are bearing the brunt of this. The price of some foodstuffs is up as high as 80 percent; the Congolese Franc has lost 27 percent of its value in 2016; inflation has increased to nearly 6 percent; Central Bank foreign exchange reserves have decreased by nearly half (45 percent) over the past two years. The Congolese government is also slashing state services, with budget cuts of 22 percent and a further 14 percent, including a 90 percent cut in spending on healthcare equipment.”

If some of the bigger and resource-dependent economies in Africa are in the doldrums, some of the continent’s medium-sized and more diversified economies will make interesting watching in the new year.

Côte d’Ivoire may well be Africa’s new economic powerhouse, with a diversified economy and growth in 2016 expected to hit 8.5 percent, the second-highest in the world. While there are occasional hiccups like the mutiny this past weekend by some soldiers left over from the country’s civil war a decade ago, by and large President Alassane Ouattara, an economist and former International Monetary Fund (IMF) director, is widely credited with sound macroeconomic management. Overwhelmingly reelected to a second and final four-year term in 2015, he has laid out an ambitious National Development Plan with major structural reforms to consolidate the private sector as well as to achieve inclusive growth. The IMF’s most recent regional economic outlook projects Côte d’Ivoire’s real gross domestic product (GDP) to continue growing at roughly 8 percent annually over the next few years, while the median for Sub-Saharan Africa will be just shy of 4.5 percent. According to data from the Ivorian government’s Center for the Promotion of Investments in Côte d’Ivoire (CEPICI), through in the first nine months of 2016, some 5,720 new enterprises were started in the country, many drawn by the business-friendly regulatory environment.

Fresh off hosting the 22^nd Conference of Parties (COP22) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change two months ago in Marrakech, Morocco continues to forge a role as an African—and, indeed, a global—leader on renewable energy. The kingdom, which is on track to meet more than 40 percent of its needs through renewable energy, primarily solar and wind, by 2020—an extraordinary turnaround given that just a few years ago the country was, according to the World Bank, the Middle East’s largest energy importer, depending on fossil fuels for over 97 percent of its energy. Moreover, in pursuit of the goal of making Morocco the commercial gateway to Africa as well as Africa’s bridge to Europe, King Mohammed VI has been busy implementing his strategy of making Africa the “top priority” of his foreign policy, with a string of official visits across Africa, including recent forays to Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, that have resulted in agreements for multibillion-dollar cross-investments in the agriculture, energy, and financial sectors, as well as the historic announcement last month of a Moroccan-Nigerian joint venture to build a gas pipeline to connect the two countries that will eventually link up to Europe. 

Senegal has long been a bastion of political stability in West Africa, a reputation consolidated in 2016 when voters in a constitutional referendum not only reaffirmed the two-term limit on the presidency, but cut the term of office itself down to five years from the current seven years, as well as enacted a raft of other measures to further good governance. President Macky Sall’s Plan for an Emerging Senegal, crafted with help from McKinsey consultants, includes twenty-seven flagship projects and seventeen major reforms, encompassing diverse sectors ranging from agriculture to energy to education to health to financial services to tourism. The objective of all this is to increase the West African country’s productivity in order to grow its GDP, create jobs, and facilitate industrialization. According to the year-end update to Ernst & Young’s Africa Attractiveness Index, Senegal—along with Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania—is expected to continue growing in the high single digits in 2017.

One possible bump in Senegal’s road to the future is that the country was counting on a second Millennium Challenge Compact from the United States to help address regional obstacles to economic growth. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) board selected the country a year ago, but the Senegalese government’s December 2016 decision to only vote for, but to actively co-sponsor, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334 on Israeli settlements not only in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), but also in the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem, may cause Congress to closely scrutinize of a major appropriation for Senegal like an MCC compact, given the broad bipartisan support in the House of Representatives last week—by a margin of 342 to 80 votes—for a measure condemning the UN resolution and the Obama administration’s abstention on it. 

A largely diversified economic base, Kenya has largely been resilient through the emerging markets downturn of the last year. While final numbers for 2016 are still being crunched, it looks like East Africa’s largest economy grew by at least the 5.9 percent forecasted by the World Bank and that may even approach the 6.8 percent growth the revised IMF prediction estimated in October. One of Kenya’s advantages has been its membership in the East African Community, which has evolved from a customs union to a common market and has long-term aspirations of a monetary union and a political federation. On the other hand, the country faces not-insignificant political, security, and economic uncertainty in 2017 with presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections scheduled for August; the ongoing threat posed by al-Shabaab terrorists operating out of neighboring Somalia (recall that 2016 began with more than 100 Kenyan soldiers killed when the al-Qaeda-linked militants overran a peacekeeping base in El Adde, Somalia); and yet-to-be-determined impact on private-sector credit following the signing last year by President Uhuru Kenyatta of legislation capping interest rates at 4 percent above the benchmark central bank rate.

If it can weather the political crises that have led to mass demonstrations and the declaration of a state of emergency in late 2016, Ethiopia will, according to IMF estimates, be positioned to overtake Kenya as East Africa’s largest economy sometime in the coming year, having posted 10.8 percent average annual growth over the last decade, before drought hit the core agricultural sector this year (and anti-government protests erupted). Nevertheless, investors continue to flock to there—some $500 million in new foreign direct investment entered in the last three months of 2016 and an additional $3.5 billion was being processed, according to one analysis—and its large internal market (Ethiopia is the 13^th most populous country in the world) and low labor costs make it an attractive location to manufacture fast-moving consumer goods. In addition, Ethiopia’s investment in hydropower—last month authorities inaugurated Africa’s tallest dam, the Gibe III dam on the Omo River, doubling the country’s electrical output—will not only give it a reliable source of energy, but provide electricity to the region, including Kenya, which has signed up to buy some of the power produced.   

African countries face many challenges in 2017, but, alongside these, there are the fundamentally positive dynamics of many of their economies, including a growing labor force, increased urbanization, and advances in technology, as I argued recently in a new Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, A Measured US Strategy for the New Africa. The 2016 Republican Party Platform affirmed: “We recognize Africa’s extraordinary potential. Both the United States and our many African allies will become stronger through investment, trade, and promotion of the democratic and free market principles that have brought prosperity around the world. We pledge to be the best partner of all African nations in their pursuit of economic freedom and human rights.” As a new US administration takes office in less than two weeks, it’s time to look for ways to fulfill that pledge so that American citizens and business can join their African counterparts in grasping the continent’s burgeoning opportunities.

J. Peter Pham is Vice President of the Atlantic Council and Director of its Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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• compounded stress on water resources facing significant strain from overexploitation and degradation at present and increased demand in the future, with drought stress exacerbated in drought-prone regions of Africa;
• reduced crop productivity associated with heat and drought stress, with strong adverse effects on regional, national, and household livelihood and food security, and given increased pest and disease damage and flood impacts on food system infrastructure;
• changes in the incidence and geographic range of vector- and water-borne diseases due to changes in the mean and variability of temperature and precipitation, particularly along the edges of their distribution.

Nowhere are the changes and their impact likely to be more dramatic than in rainfall patterns—annual precipitation is expected to decrease throughout Africa with the possible exception of the eastern part of the continent—and the resulting immediate consequence to the agricultural sector. The models in some studies have predicted mean annual rainfall to decrease by 20 percent along the Mediterranean coast, while winter rains in southern Africa will also decrease, by perhaps as much as 40 percent. Less precipitation will have a serious impact on agriculture, most of which is dependent upon on rainfall. The social, economic, and political fallout from such a decline cannot be underestimated, with some scientists warning of dramatic declines in crop yields and, consequently, net agricultural revenues, with small-scale farmers being the most vulnerable.

Broadly speaking, the challenges arising from access to water will only proliferate, with complex, but clear, linkages between environmental stress and ongoing conflicts. From the Nigeria’s Middle Belt and the Lake Chad Basin across the continent to the Horn of Africa, climate change, land degradation, and increased competition over scarcer resources among both the root causes of as well as the consequences of violence.

Nor are all of these potential conflicts will be relatively contained internal disputes involving various groups within a given country in the timeless struggle between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists over limited arable land and declining water resources. Access by the countries of the Nile basin, for example, to the great river’s water—which is itself highly dependent on precipitation levels in the Great Lakes region as well as the highlands of Ethiopia—has long been contentious, with Egypt making greater use of the waters than all the other riparian states combined. How long the current state of affairs, whereby Egypt and Sudan have claimed the use of the bulk of the river’s waters, can last is anyone’s guess. However, with more than 90 million people to feed, Ethiopia, where Blue Nile rises from Lake Tana and which contributes nearly 90 percent of the water and over 95 percent of the sediment carried by the Nile proper, will likely be making increasingly assertive claims of its own right to the water resources. On the other hand, Egypt’s successive rulers have never made a secret of their own willingness to defend their claims. While the “declaration of principles” signed in early 2015 by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, and President Umar al-Bashir of Sudan, has the potential to transform the longstanding dispute over the Nile into an opportunity for collaboration and development in a corner of the continent much in need of both, flashpoints remain.

Alongside water scarcity, encroaching deserts present another challenge, not just in terms of the impact on local communities and broader food security, but in terms of mass migrations which have the effect of redrawing the demographic maps of entire countries or regions and putting previously discrete populations in direct competition for the same resources which are possibly even scarcer now thanks to climate change. Even without the threat of Boko Haram, the drying up of Lake Chad, which straddles the borders of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, has caused large-scale displacements of the population as the once-large body of freshwater has shrunken to one-twentieth of its original size in the last fifty years, causing local lack of water, crop failures, livestock deaths, collapsed fisheries, soil salinity, and increasing poverty throughout the region.

While lack of water presents one set of problems, an excess of it lead to another. A rise in the sea-level poses significant risks to both populations and economies along Africa’s littorals. Highly productive ecosystems located in the coastal zone, including mangroves, estuaries, and deltas which form the basis for important economic activities such as tourism and fisheries come under threat from the rising oceans.

In short, climate change has the potential to impact virtually all aspects of development in Africa. Although it has contributed the least to climate change, Africa will be hardest hit by these effects. Not only will the scarcity of water resources and increased intensity and volatility of rainfall worsen livelihoods, these will increase the costs of providing basic infrastructure such as roads and sanitation. Climate change will also compromise the productivity of low-technology agriculture, on which the livelihoods of the majority of Africans, especially women, depend. The cost of doing business will similarly increase, further constraining much-needed growth.

Fortunately, there are two factors mitigating this otherwise alarming picture.

First, the recognition of Africa’s growing strategic importance on the global stage for a number of geopolitical and economic reasons has led other nations to appreciate that it is in their own self-interest to help African countries achieve stability and security for themselves and their peoples, an objective that cannot be divorced from efforts to help them cope with the effects of climate change. United States President Barack Obama, for example, used his final address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016, to not only warn of the consequences of failure to act on climate change, speaking direly of “mass migrations, and cities submerged and nations displaced, and food supplies decimated, and conflicts born of despair,” but also to call upon wealthy countries to “invest in research and provide market incentives to develop new technologies, and then make these technologies accessible and affordable for poorer countries.”

Second, and even more importantly, African countries are increasingly discovering within themselves a number of innovative solutions to the challenges they face. It is no accident that Morocco is hosting the COP22 summit. The kingdom, which is on track to meet more than 40 percent of its needs through renewable energy, primarily solar and wind, by 2020—an extraordinary turnaround given that just a few years ago the country was, according to the World Bank, the Middle East’s largest energy importer, depending on fossil fuels for over 97 percent of its energy. In fact, literally just down the N9 highway from the COP22 meetings in Marrakech, on the other side of the High Atlas is Ouarzazate, where earlier this year King Mohammed VI inaugurated the Noor complex that will be the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant. According to Climate Investment Funds, which has invested in the project along with the African Development Bank and others, the plant will produce enough energy to power over one million homes by 2018, reducing carbon emissions by an estimated 760,000 tons per year. Thus, Morocco’s extraordinary commitment to clean power—underscored by members of the COP22 Steering Committee who briefed an Atlantic Council audience recently—shows that a green agenda not only is the right thing to do in the face of greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, but can also pay handsome budgetary and diplomatic dividends.

A similar story can be told about South-South cooperation to promote agricultural development which, in many respects, is at the heart of both the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. As host of COP22, Morocco has been championing an Initiative for the Adaption of Agriculture in Africa to Climate Change (AAA), AAA is built around two pillars, advocacy to secure project financing and promoting innovative solutions, to facilitate projects to improve soil husbandry, agricultural-water control, climate-risk management, and financial-capacity building as a way to meet the challenges of climate change and food insecurity.

While Africans’ disproportionately modest carbon footprint places them among the least responsible for the massive negative impacts that their continent is experiencing because of climate change, there is no reason why the governments and people of Africa should not be taking an active role in positively shaping their own future—and that of the planet as a whole.

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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At the outset of the political uprisings that began in North Africa in 2010, the four countries of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia faced similar economic and political challenges. Over the past almost six years, the countries have adopted different approaches to address these problems, however the overall economic picture today is grim amid varied political environments. In Aftermath of the Arab Spring in North Africa, authors Mohsin Khan and Karim Mezran examine whether these four North African countries have been successful in meetings the demands of their populations as expressed in the 2010-11 uprisings and what challenges remain for them in the future. 

While the political situations in the four countries in 2010, as well as the causes of the uprisings, were similar to a large extent, Khan and Mezran closely examine the starkly different directions that the post-revolt political evolutions took. Tunisia embarked on a process of reforming its legal and political structures in order to transition to a more pluralistic and inclusive system. However, the country’s progress is threatened by growing insecurity and economic challenges. Both Algeria and Morocco prevented protests from becoming widespread and violent in 2011 by enacting some constitutional reforms. In Morocco, a political arrangement between the monarchy and the Islamists appears to have maintained stability while also allowing for a progressive, albeit slow, political opening. However, in Algeria, the political system continues to be run in the same opaque manner as always. The post-revolution elites in Libya were incapable of facing the country’s severe political and economic challenges, and made one mistake after another. Today, Libya has devolved into a de facto failed state, as UN-led negotiations failed to resolve the country’s civil strife and reunite the country under a single leadership.

On the economic front, Khan and Mezran explain that a relatively good macroeconomic picture in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia in 2010 actually hid many deep structural fault lines in the four economies. These fault lines–including high rates of unemployment, particularly among youth–were exposed by the political upheavals that took place in 2010 and 2011. Following the upheavals, economic reforms were put on the back burner, as economic stability and growth were viewed as secondary to political stability. The overall economic picture today is still grim, as the economies of all four countries are in no better shape, and in some cases much worse shape, than they were in 2010. The authors argue that labor market reforms and improvements in the business climate are necessary to help the countries get out of a low-growth and high-unemployment trap.

Khan and Mezran conclude that the main lesson to be drawn in examining the post-2011 economic and political developments in these four countries is that in the search for a new social contract that establishes wider consensus-based political legitimacy, elites must be willing to simultaneously undertake openings and reforms in the political arena and adopt far-reaching economic reforms. The experiences of these North African countries over the past five years demonstrates that the postponement of economic reforms has the ability to threaten or even undo progress made on the political front. 

MENASource Jan 14, 2018

What’s next? Seven years after Tunisia’s spring

By Andrea Taylor and Elissa Miller

Seven years after the 2011 Arab uprisings, Tunisia remains the only country to have emerged from the sweeping changes that took hold in the region as a fledgling democracy. Since then-President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali stepped down from power of January 14, 2011, Tunisia has accomplished a number of major successes, including holding free and […]

Democratic Transitions North Africa

Report Oct 5, 2018

The arc of crisis in the MENA region: Fragmentation, decentralization, and Islamist opposition

By Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is experiencing a time of great transformation and as well as tumult. Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Dr. Karim Mezran and Dr. Arturo Varvelli of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies gathered experts to explore decentralization and political Islam in six MENA countries in “The Arc of […]

Energy & Environment Middle East

Report Feb 3, 2016

Economic recovery and revitalization

By Middle East Strategy Task Force

Even as the specter of political instability weighs heavily on the region, the Middle East is quietly experiencing a technological and societal transformation that could hold the keys to a better future.

Economy & Business Education

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The PJD took control of the government following the parliamentary elections of November 2011, the first after a series of uprisings shook the region earlier that year. Morocco, while not impacted like its neighbors, did see protests that garnered nationwide crowds of tens of thousands, later identified as the February 20 movement. Bringing together diverse interests, one of the movement’s key demands was to reduce the Moroccan monarchy to a parliamentary one – an entirely symbolic role similar to the British or Spanish model. Their demands also included calls for an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and an end to corruption.

The Constitutional Reform Process

In response to the protests, King Mohamed VI publicly called for comprehensive constitutional reform. He appointed a 19-member advisory commission made up of academics and human rights activists to lead the process. Political parties, labor unions, and civil society organizations were invited to present a memorandum outlining their position on various issues. The king also established a so-called mechanism to operate alongside the commission, including representatives from most political parties and major trade unions. The mechanism’s participation in the process was meant to give a popular stamp of approval to the text drafted by the advisory committee.

Despite these attempts to create a participatory environment, the process remained opaque. Neither the public nor members of parliament were consulted over the appointments to the bodies, both headed by royal advisors. The sessions were not publically broadcast and the debate over the final text took place behind closed doors. Ultimately, the final word on the reforms went neither to the advisory commission nor to the mechanism—both asked only to give recommendations—but rather to the palace. The result was a constitution that guaranteed many individual rights and expanded the powers of parliament, but took incomplete steps toward reducing the king’s powers.

What Did Constitutional Reforms Achieve?

Overall, the new constitution included several liberal reforms, among them eleven rights previously not included, such as the right of access to justice and the right to protection of privacy. The constitution also transferred certain powers from the king to the prime minister, including appointing government officials and dissolving parliament. The prime minister himself, while still appointed by the king, must hail from the majority party in parliament. The actual progress the constitution made toward introducing democratic checks and balances on the monarch, however, remain questionable. The king continues to set the parliamentary agenda each year, and the parliament still lacks the tools for legislative oversight over certain government sectors, such as security. It requires parliament to adopt legislation specifying the terms of the constitution’s promised rights, including freedom of the press. The constitution also places the king at the head of Council of Ministers—responsible for approving legislation—and continues to grant him sole right to amend the constitution.

The eighth in a long series of constitutional reforms, the process reflected for some a certain Moroccan “exceptionalism.” Unlike many of its Arab neighbors following the 2011 uprisings, Morocco had demonstrated that both reform and stability were possible. Even if the result had not fully met protestors’ demands, the adoption of this new constitution via referendum on July 1 (in which 73 percent of registered voters reportedly participated, 98.5 percent of whom voted “yes”) was indicative of the country’s proclivity for gradual, stable change. But with little changing and many flaws in the transparency of the process itself, the grievances of the February 20 movement—mainly corruption and absence of a fully democratic government—remain.

The PJD comes to power

The 2011 parliamentary elections brought the PJD into the governing majority for the first time. The PJD represented to many voters a “fresh alternative” to the established parties whose reputation had suffered. This victory for the party, in which it won 107 out of 395 seats, was also a positive outcome for the monarchy. By creating a chance for an opposition party to govern (the first time was in 1998 in connection with an earlier set of royal reforms meant to enhance democratic legitimacy), the election result allowed the monarchy to continue permitting multi-party politics and channeling political participation without undermining its own power. And, although Morocco does not have a history of Islamist repression like Tunisia or Egypt, the crown’s own authority rests in part on its historical religious legitimacy; the result thus gave the monarchy the appearance of increased tolerance for Islamists.

In spite of its campaign promises of economic and social reform, events during its tenure, including losing its partner party in its ruling coalition, weakened the PJD’s ability to pass key legislation. This, in turn, contributed to a restoration of the status quo in which parties can compete freely in elections, but are unable to realize much-needed structural reforms. In the run-up to this year’s election, the rivalry between the PJD and its main contender, the royally-backed PAM, has been characterized as “hollow” due to the largely superficial differences between their campaigns. Rather than differentiating themselves through their programs (both parties are proposing similar platforms based on long-term economic development), the two parties are focusing their rivalry on partisan accusations, while other parties campaign on unrealistic promises. Even if the PJD is successful in retaining the largest share of parliamentary seats (a likely outcome), the results will do little to change the current status quo.

Demonstrations of public anger toward and a lack of cohesion within the government, combined with the renewed strength of the king, also suggest the upcoming elections are a sideshow within a larger story of a lack of reform and continued corruption. Thousands marched against Prime Minister and PJD Secretary General Abdelilah Benkirane on September 18 in protests sparked by a series of leaks over corruption scandals. In the wake of a July report over Morocco’s importation of toxic waste from Italy, the Minster of Environment accused her rivals of trying to damage her reputation; meanwhile, in response to a leaked list of government officials receiving land at below-market value, the Ministers of Interior and Finance defended the purchases. All three implicated ministers were members of the PJD’s governing coalition.

The consequences of the 2011 Arab uprisings in Morocco, while certainly exceptional, are far from clear. The palace is continuing to convey the image that the country has found a “formula for stability” and is moving along a path of gradual democratic reform, while the promises of 2011 remain largely unfulfilled.

Sabina Henneberg is a PhD Candidate at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

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In their remarks, El Yazami and Mouline underscored Morocco’s successes in integrating renewable energy , which include a major solar power plant in the Sahara Desert and the world’s largest wind farm. Both speakers detailed the need for continued public-private partnerships in addressing climate change and its impact on women and children, as well as opportunities to better connect African civil society with international civil society networks for accreditation and support. The subsequent discussion highlighted Morocco’s leadership vis-a-vis exporting renewable energy technology across Africa, encouraging the participation of women in the renewable energy sector, and deepening economic cooperation across the continent.

Other participants included Mr. Driss Alaoui, chargé d’affaires, a.i. of the Embassy of the Kingdom on Morocco; Ms. Vivian Derryck, president and CEO of The Bridges Institute and former assistant administrator for Africa at the US Agency for International Development; Mr. David Koranyi, director of the Eurasian Energy Futures Initiative at the Atlantic Council; and Mr. Duncan Marsh, director of international climate policy at the Nature Conservancy.

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In contrast to the colonial powers which he contends “looted Africa’s resources, stifled the potential of its sons and daughters, mortgaged their future, impeded the continent’s development and sowed the seeds of discord and strife among African countries,” contributing to “the problems plaguing African peoples today, such as backwardness, poverty, migration, wars and conflicts, in addition to despair and succumbing to extremist and terrorist groups,” the king outlined a Moroccan commitment “never made with the intention of exploiting the continent’s assets and natural resources,” but based instead on “mutual benefit.”

In fact, Mohammed VI expresses his confidence that “Africa has the means to ensure its development and to take its destiny into its own hands, thanks to the resolve of African peoples and to the continent’s human and natural resources,” citing as evidence Moroccan contributions to human development, social services, and trade and investment across the region. Singled out for mention in the royal speech was the rehabilitation of Cocody Bay in Abidjan, the commercial capital of Côte d’Ivoire, where Morocco is largest source of foreign investment. The king hailed the nearly $200 million public-private partnership between the governments and businesses of the two countries to restore the ecosystem of the lagoon and develop the infrastructure of the littoral as “a unique model of cooperation.” One could also add, among many other examples, the livelihood project at Soumbedioune Bay, in Dakar, Senegal, which I highlighted last year; the ongoing efforts by Morocco’s OCP Group, which earlier this created a special subsidiary to promote the development of the African agricultural ecosystem, to ensure smallholder farmers affordable access to appropriate fertilizers specific to their crops and soils as well as a range of services and support to turn these inputs into larger crop yields and, consequently, higher incomes; the ambitious expansion across Africa of the three largest Moroccan bank groups—Attiwarijafa, Banque Centrale Populaire, and BMCE Bank of Africa—in quest to provide accessible financial services for the continent’s burgeoning middle class; and the double-digit growth of Maroc Telecom’s Sub-Saharan subsidiaries, whose 53 million customers already outnumber those in the home market.

Overall, Morocco is driving some 85 percent of its foreign direct investment into Africa, a benchmark that drew praise from African Development Bank President Akinwumi Adesina when he visited the country last month. As Mohammed VI had cause to boast at the India-Africa Summit in New Delhi in October 2015, “Morocco has become the top African investor in West Africa and the second biggest in the continent as a whole.” According to the most recent edition of the Global Financial Centres Index, published in March 2016, not only is Casablanca ranked the second business and financial hub in Africa, but it was the only center in the entire Middle East and Africa region to have increased its overall rating and rank since the last report. The Casablanca Finance City, launched in 2010 with an array of incentives for global-level multinational enterprises to establish their African headquarters there, is an example of the business-friendly ecosystem that Morocco has developed in recent years. The 2015 edition of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks the kingdom as having the second-highest improvement in overall governance since 2011 (first place went to Côte d’Ivoire, which five years ago was in the midst of a civil war). In the category of ”sustainable economic opportunity,” Morocco scored the greatest improvement to rank third out of fifty-four countries in absolute terms (after longtime commercial stalwarts Mauritius and South Africa).

All of this, according to the monarch, “is not about goals and objectives,” because “dealing with Africa involves a commitment towards the African citizen, wherever he or she may be” because of the historical bonds which undergird the “sincere affection, appreciation, close human and spiritual relations as well as tangible solidarity” between Moroccans and other African peoples, it is nonetheless also true, as Mohammed VI freely acknowledged, that “Africa is the natural extension of Morocco and the embodiment of the country’s strategic depth.” This “should not come as a surprise since Morocco has always been at the forefront of advocates calling for the liberation of our continent… who believed in Africa, and who worked earnestly for the unity, openness and progress of its peoples.” Without mentioning it explicitly, the king’s speech hearkened to the “Casablanca Group” of pan-African-minded states in the early 1960s, a bloc in which his grandfather and father played major roles, alongside Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kwame Nkrumah, and others.  Consequently, “Morocco’s national responses [today] to many complex regional and international issues—such as development, migration and the fight against terrorism—are in line with a firm commitment to serve African peoples.”

The geopolitical and economic implications of this policy orientation are considerable.  I have repeatedly highlighted Morocco’s role both as a gateway to business in Africa given, inter alia, its free-trade agreement with the United States (the only African country to have one) and as a critical player in regional counterterrorism and security efforts (the country currently co-chairs, alongside the Netherlands, the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the king’s speech also had an important section on Morocco’s approach to countering extremism), to say nothing about its role in broader global diplomacy (the COP22 climate change conference will be hosted in Marrakech in November). Last year, in its updated National Security Strategy, the Obama administration rightly acknowledged the changing dynamic in America’s relationship with Africa: “For decades, American engagement with Africa was defined by aid to help Africans reduce insecurity, famine, and disease. In contrast, the partnerships we are forging today, and will expand in the coming years, aim to build upon the aspirations of Africans”—a stance that is the subject of rare agreement in both this year’s Republican and Democratic platforms.  To realize this important strategic objective going forward, however, US policymakers would do well to “triangulate”—or, at the very least, better coordinate—their efforts with those of African allies like Morocco that are already providing home-grown solutions to the challenges faced by the continent, its nations, and their peoples today.

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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The ministry’s statement gives detailed responses to each of these cases, but the third case is illustrative of what aggravated the Moroccans. The State Department report cited the following as an example of Internet censorship:

“[O]n June 29, a Casablanca court sentenced Hamid El Mehdaoui, editor of the news website Badil, to a four-month suspended sentence for allegedly defaming the head of the General Directorate of National Security [DGSN], Abdellatif el Hammouchi. El Mehdaoui had published an article about the death of Karim Lachaqr, an activist who died in police custody in May 2014. The court ordered both him and his source (not a journalist) to pay combined damages of 100,000 dirhams ($10,050) or face imprisonment.”      

In reality, Hammouchi was only appointed head of the DGSN by King Mohammed VI on May 15, 2015, so he could not have been responsible for the alleged death in police custody the year before. Moreover, he had not yet assumed his post when the matter of Mehdaoui was disposed by the courts. In fact, it was the previous head of the security agency, Bouchaib Rmil, who, on June 4, 2014, filed the court case against the blogger for making false claims. That the writers of the report couldn’t get such basic facts right raises significant questions about either their competence or their good faith—if not both.

In fact, a closer examination of the report on Morocco shows just how much effort its writers put into it. It is rather telling that, of the 355 words in the executive summary for 2015, 272 are cut and pasted directly from the report drawn up for 2014—and 231 of the latter were lifted verbatim from the report for 2013. So much for providing the speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with an up-to-date, “full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights” for the preceding year as required by law.

Even more damning are the omissions. Somehow, the diplomats responsible for the Morocco report didn’t think it was worth noting that on July 1, 2015, a law passed by the Moroccan parliament and promulgated by the king took effect that banned the trial or referral of civilians to military tribunals. This was a reform long sought by human rights campaigners in the country and endorsed, since 2013, by Morocco’s National Council on Human Rights (CNDH). Instead of highlighting this advance, which drew praise from the International Commission of Jurists at the 28^th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in January of last year, the authors of the State Department report concerned themselves with bemoaning “the lack of citizens’ ability to change the constitutional provisions establishing the country’s monarchical form of government.” That the American authors identified that grievance as the first of “the most significant continuing human rights problems” in the country (followed by alleged corruption and disregard for the rule of law by security forces) may well have been a Freudian slip.

All this may seem like “technicalities” or “inside baseball” on the part of analysts from the much-maligned “foreign-policy establishment,” but it has real-world implications. Amid the upheaval that swept across the Arab world beginning in 2011, Morocco has stood out as an exception. Not only has the kingdom avoided the extremes of revolutionary tumult and violent repression, but while their neighbors were still struggling to come to terms with the Arab Spring, Moroccans accelerated a process of political and social renewal already underway, ratifying a new constitution and holding elections that resulted in a coalition government led by a moderate Islamist party. While authorities have responded swiftly and decisively to the few terrorist attacks that the country has suffered, the Moroccan government has emphasized a broader campaign of countering extremist influences at their roots, not only in their country, but also sharing their experience and intelligence with other countries, including in Europe—in the process, making Morocco an anchor for security and development in northwest Africa. Moreover, with the increasing recognition, as the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa acknowledged, “Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular,” Morocco plays a unique role as a gateway to business on the continent. These geopolitical and economic considerations don’t mean that the country gets a pass, but it deserves to have its friends confront it with the truth, not slapdash and spurious accusations.

I spoke on May 19 with the deputy foreign minister, Bourita, who told me: “The reason we are upset is not because we cannot accept criticism, but it has to be based on facts. We are not challenging your right to assess, even if we may disagree on the judgment, but your presumption to do so without the facts. The report seems to us to have had its conclusions written first and then ‘facts’ were sought to ‘prove’ those conclusions. And where the facts couldn’t be found, they were simply invented.” He went on to tell me that his government couldn’t just ignore the report because “our reputation and our national pursuit of stability through reform is all we have.” Consequently, he assured me, his government would spare no effort to refute what it viewed as falsehood. More will, undoubtedly, be forthcoming and it should: we shouldn’t expect less from a true friend.

J. Peter Pham is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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The ministry’s statement gives detailed responses to each of these cases, but the third case is illustrative of what aggravated the Moroccans. The State Department report cited the following as an example of Internet censorship:

“[O]n June 29, a Casablanca court sentenced Hamid El Mehdaoui, editor of the news website Badil, to a four-month suspended sentence for allegedly defaming the head of the General Directorate of National Security [DGSN], Abdellatif el Hammouchi. El Mehdaoui had published an article about the death of Karim Lachaqr, an activist who died in police custody in May 2014. The court ordered both him and his source (not a journalist) to pay combined damages of 100,000 dirhams ($10,050) or face imprisonment.”      

In reality, Hammouchi was only appointed head of the DGSN by King Mohammed VI on May 15, 2015, so he could not have been responsible for the alleged death in police custody the year before. Moreover, he had not yet assumed his post when the matter of Mehdaoui was disposed by the courts. In fact, it was the previous head of the security agency, Bouchaib Rmil, who, on June 4, 2014, filed the court case against the blogger for making false claims. That the writers of the report couldn’t get such basic facts right raises significant questions about either their competence or their good faith—if not both.

In fact, a closer examination of the report on Morocco shows just how much effort its writers put into it. It is rather telling that, of the 355 words in the executive summary for 2015, 272 are cut and pasted directly from the report drawn up for 2014—and 231 of the latter were lifted verbatim from the report for 2013. So much for providing the speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with an up-to-date, “full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights” for the preceding year as required by law. 

Even more damning are the omissions. Somehow, the diplomats responsible for the Morocco report didn’t think it was worth noting that on July 1, 2015, a law passed by the Moroccan parliament and promulgated by the king took effect that banned the trial or referral of civilians to military tribunals. This was a reform long sought by human rights campaigners in the country and endorsed, since 2013, by Morocco’s National Council on Human Rights (CNDH). Instead of highlighting this advance, which drew praise from the International Commission of Jurists at the 28th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in January of last year, the authors of the State Department report concerned themselves with bemoaning “the lack of citizens’ ability to change the constitutional provisions establishing the country’s monarchical form of government.” That the American authors identified that grievance as the first of “the most significant continuing human rights problems” in the country (followed by alleged corruption and disregard for the rule of law by security forces) may well have been a Freudian slip.

All this may seem like “technicalities” or “inside baseball” on the part of analysts from the much-maligned “foreign-policy establishment,” but it has real-world implications. Amid the upheaval that swept across the Arab world beginning in 2011, Morocco has stood out as an exception. Not only has the kingdom avoided the extremes of revolutionary tumult and violent repression, but while their neighbors were still struggling to come to terms with the Arab Spring, Moroccans accelerated a process of political and social renewal already underway, ratifying a new constitution and holding elections that resulted in a coalition government led by a moderate Islamist party. While authorities have responded swiftly and decisively to the few terrorist attacks that the country has suffered, the Moroccan government has emphasized a broader campaign of countering extremist influences at their roots, not only in their country, but also sharing their experience and intelligence with other countries, including in Europe—in the process, making Morocco an anchor for security and development in northwest Africa. Moreover, with the increasing recognition, as the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa acknowledged, “Africa is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular,” Morocco plays a unique role as a gateway to business on the continent. These geopolitical and economic considerations don’t mean that the country gets a pass, but it deserves to have its friends confront it with the truth, not slapdash and spurious accusations.

I spoke on May 19 with the deputy foreign minister, Bourita, who told me: “The reason we are upset is not because we cannot accept criticism, but it has to be based on facts. We are not challenging your right to assess, even if we may disagree on the judgment, but your presumption to do so without the facts. The report seems to us to have had its conclusions written first and then ‘facts’ were sought to ‘prove’ those conclusions. And where the facts couldn’t be found, they were simply invented.” He went on to tell me that his government couldn’t just ignore the report because “our reputation and our national pursuit of stability through reform is all we have.” Consequently, he assured me, his government would spare no effort to refute what it viewed as falsehood. More will, undoubtedly, be forthcoming and it should: we shouldn’t expect less from a true friend.

J. Peter Pham is the Director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow the Africa Center on Twitter @ACAfricaCenter.

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In her remarks, Bouaida outlined Morocco’s perspective on the ongoing instability, especially in Libya and in the Sahel. In particular, with regard to the crisis in Libya, in which Morocco has been hosting and facilitating talks between various parties, she stressed the importance for national domestic involvement in any negotiated political solution and underscored the need for increased bilateral, regional, and international cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. Bouiada also touched on her country’s bright economic prospects and suggested several avenues through which the country plans to bolster its role as a regional economic hub. Finally, Bouaida touched on the domestic political environment in Morocco and highlighted how internal regionalization can contribute to the continued consolidation of democracy.

Also in attendance and participating in the discussion was H.E. Rachad Bouhlal, Ambassador to the United States from the Kingdom of Morocco; Abderrahim Rahhaly, Deputy Chief of Mission from the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco; the Honorable Bisa Williams, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (2013-2016); General William Ward, former Commander of US Africa Command.

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In their remarks, Rezrazi and Matsumoto outlined the findings of the 250-page report, focusing specifically on the demographics of those Moroccan citizens engaged in international terrorist activities, the success and value of Morocco’s unique approach to counterterrorism, and the future of international counterterrorism cooperation. In particular, the experts challenged the commonly assumed connection between poverty and terrorism and called for reframing of regional counterterrorism collaboration as an international obligation among states.

The original French version of the report was published last week; an updated English translation will be available shortly with new material relating to the November 13 attacks in Paris.

Atlantic Council Board Director the Honorable Mary Carlin Yates, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council, also participated in the discussion, as did a number of Council Senior Fellows from the Africa Center, the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, and the Brent Scrowcroft Center on International Security.

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The Moroccan king is well loved, and has always been perceived as a monarch of the people. He enjoys driving himself around Casablanca and Rabat, and bestows jobs and other benefits to average people he meets on street corners. Indeed, the country has a long way to go to meet all the needs of its impoverished citizens, and this kind of random generosity might not solve problems long term. But Moroccans stand by their king and by their country’s territorial integrity. That’s not a sentiment that Western governments should overlook.

Following on the policies of his father King Hassan II, Mohamed VI has made a significant investment over the years in the socioeconomic affairs of the Moroccan Sahara. “As a result of these policies, the human development indicators in the region which, four decades ago, were lower than those in the rest of Morocco, are today much higher than the national average,” wrote J. Peter Pham, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Read the full article here.

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The legendary Sahara covers a vast stretch of northern Africa, and includes a 100,000-mile expanse that is the southern half of my homeland, the Kingdom of Morocco. Regrettably, this stretch of land is also home to one of the longest enduring, and perhaps the most uselessly destructive, conflicts on the continent. Forty years ago this week, 330,000 of my fellow citizens reclaimed the Moroccan Sahara from its Spanish occupiers, firmly but peacefully, in what has become known as the “Green March”: the only movement of national resistance against European imperialism to be waged successfully without a drop of blood. Alas, fascist Spain had already managed to sow the seeds of violence in the territory before its withdrawal.

In the latter years of its imperialist adventure, the Spanish government created a separatist movement of indigenous collaborators, the “Polisario,” to lay claim to every inch of the Moroccan Sahara. In 1975, the group initially eschewed any attempt to counter the “Green March.” But the military government in Algiers subsequently began to fund, train and arm a generation of Polisario fighters—aligned at the time with the Soviet Union and seeking to bleed pro-American Morocco, it found in the group a willing proxy. Polisario guerrillas fought a devastating 15-year war with Morocco, enabling oil- and gas-rich Algeria to weaken the oil-poor kingdom at little cost to itself.

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This Friday is the 40th anniversary of one of the defining moments of the post-colonial history of Morocco and, indeed, all of Africa. At dawn on Nov. 6, 1975, some 350,000 Moroccans armed only with flags and copies of the Quran crossed the border arbitrarily imposed by 19th-century European imperialists to peacefully take back a sparsely populated, wind-swept territory that Spain claimed in the wake of the Congress of Berlin in 1885 and over which it only managed to impose a modicum of control in the 1920s.

Amid the scramble for Africa, the ancient kingdom of Morocco, for more than a thousand years the only state between the Mediterranean and the Senegal River, was itself carved up by the colonial powers. Tangier was made an international zone under the joint administration of France, Spain, Britain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and, even briefly, the United States; Spain occupied the far north and the far south of historic Morocco; and France occupied the remainder of the country with the exception of Ifni, which the Spanish took because of its position on the Atlantic coast across from the Canary Islands.

Read the full article here.

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In one of his Op-Eds published on the Congress blog, The Hill, Dr. J. Peter Pham the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center wrote ” Morocco is an African country of serious political and economic clout, integral to the continent’s development and prepared to play a leading role in its future. For policymakers in Washington, Paris, and other Western capitals long in search of a reliable partner in Africa that can direct its own resources toward enhancing regional security and prosperity, it is a signal they have been looking for.”

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At first glance, the results of the municipal elections appear to show a different picture, with the PAM gaining the first position with 21.1 percent of the votes and Istiqlal the second with 16.2 percent. The PJD came third with 15.9 percent. In reality, however, even at the municipal level the success of the PJD is evident. The Islamist party has obtained an absolute majority in such key cities as Casablanca, Tangier, Kenitra, Meknes, and, with much surprise, Fes, until now the bastion of the Istiqlal Party and its populist leader Hamid Chabat. The PJD has also obtained the majority of seats in the municipal councils of Rabat and Marrakesh.

The results of the elections can be read in many ways, and all are going to be subject to change when more data are released and a more accurate analysis can be performed. For now, one can safely make a few observations. The first derives from the fact that there has not been the massive voter abstention that some feared. The turnout Friday saw about 54 percent of the total electorate cast their vote, a percentage similar to that of the last local elections in 2009. While not particularly impressive, the turnout nonetheless shows that a majority of Moroccans still believe in the validity of the electoral process to provide them with avenues of participation in the governance of their country. The argument that reforms—both constitutional and economic—were merely a façade put up by the regime to forestall the 2011 street demands, thus causing a sense of fatigue and dissatisfaction among the population after four years, has been rejected.

In their electoral campaigns, the opposition parties’ attempt to paint the elections as a referendum on the national government’s Islamist rule and on their version of Islam, rather than a step towards institutionalizing decentralized authority and power, backfired. Benkirane and most of the PJD’s candidates were careful to eschew radical doctrinal positions and always put forward their vision of religion as a determinant of social customs and values, not of political rules and regulations. They presented themselves as loyal to the monarchy and to the existing political system in the name of ensuring stability, peace, and order. Most of the Islamist candidates waged their campaign under the slogans of fighting corruption and unemployment, not for the imposition of sharia rule. If these elections prove one result, it is that of the definitive “normalization” of Islamist governance in Morocco. One has only to compare the fears and the objections raised in 2011 when Benkirane was appointed Prime Minister with today’s general acceptance of the Islamist party’s position by the establishment and the populace at large to recognize the PJD’s acquired legitimacy.

The election results suggest a bipolar political landscape in Morocco. The communal results in particular show the Islamist PJD dominating the majority of urban centers and the secular PAM dominating the countryside. This bipolarity, both geographical and ideological, is evidenced also by the meager results of the other main political formations: the National Coalition of Independents (RNI) with 13 percent of the votes in the regional elections and the Popular Movement (MP) with 8.5 percent. Notable is the collapse of the leftist party the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) with only 7 percent of the votes. Particularly painful for this leftist party, led by the combative Driss Lachgar, was the loss of its historical bastions of Rabat and Agadir. Only Istiqlal has held its ground, but it lacks the strength to assert itself as a third pole.

The PJD’s increase in popularity in the urban centers also shows the larger appeal that the Islamist party has acquired among the middle class. It demonstrates the PJD’s evolution toward further strengthening its adherence to the monarchy’s project, largely espoused by the Moroccan middle class, of slow and gradual progression toward economic and political reforms that widen the spaces for freedoms and participation without undermining order and stability.

These elections reveal the first steps in the direction of reforms as designed by the new constitution, which takes great care in creating a more decentralized political system closer to the citizens than the highly centralized and bureaucratic one in place so far. Islamists have shown their capacity to endure the difficulties of governing at the national level and their ability to expand their reach at the local level. Now they will have to prove their capacity to govern the regions and cities that they have won in these elections. If they succeed, their road to the next year’s national elections will be much easier—and much harder for the secular opposition. The latter will have to abandon its empty anti-Islamic slogans and define real, concrete programs that touch the interests and values of the wider population.

Karim Mezranis a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, focusing on North Africa.

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