Eritrea - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/eritrea/ Shaping the global future together Thu, 22 Feb 2024 14:39:21 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/favicon-150x150.png Eritrea - Atlantic Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/region/eritrea/ 32 32 What the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal means for Washington’s strategy in the Red Sea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/ Thu, 22 Feb 2024 14:39:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=738300 Developments around the deal could bring simmering conflicts to a boil—or they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region.

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Tensions from the Israel-Hamas war have spilled into the Red Sea. But while global leaders are focusing intently on everything happening in the waters of the Red Sea and to the north of it, they’ll also need to monitor geopolitical developments to the south—on the Horn of Africa.

Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MOU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MOU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MOU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counterterrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.


Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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What to watch next on Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-to-watch-next-on-ethiopias-peace-deal-in-tigray/ Fri, 04 Nov 2022 18:17:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=582786 What are the chances that this deal will hold? What role should international institutions play? Our regional experts help sketch out the answers.

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This week, negotiators from the Ethiopian government and rebels in the Tigray region reached a truce to end their two-year war—one that has killed hundreds of thousands of people through fighting and starvation, and included accusations of war crimes. With the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) reportedly agreeing to lay down its arms and the government agreeing to restore essential services to its battered northern region, what are the chances that this deal will hold? What role should international institutions play? Our regional experts help sketch out the answers.

1. What do you make of this peace deal, and what should we be watching to see if it holds?

Less than forty-eight hours before the two-year anniversary of the conflict, it is a step forward that has created great hope. It is also a salutary break for the civilian populations after almost two years of conflict. Since November 2020, the war has displaced more than two million Ethiopians and plunged hundreds of thousands into famine. But this agreement is not yet peace: It is the cessation of hostilities. The composition and determination of the members of the committee responsible for the implementation of the agreement will be decisive. Above all, major questions remain unresolved, including the question of Eritrea. The neighboring nation’s role in the peace deal is not clear after it joined the war on Ethiopia’s side, which is cause for concern considering all the crimes Eritrean soldiers have committed in Tigray over the past two years. Can there be peace without justice? This is the question that Tigrayan civilians must ask themselves these days.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Council’s Africa Center.

The peace deal is excellent news; bringing an immediate end to this particularly cruel war is good for everyone. It remains to be seen, however, if the Tigrayans will uphold their promise to disarm, and if the Ethiopians will open access so that aid organizations can bring desperately needed help to civilians. We also have to watch the actions of the Eritreans, who are a party to the conflict but have not been included in the peace deal. Are they going to suspend their military operations? Will they go home and demobilize?

Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center.

2. What role will outside countries in Africa or the West, or institutions such as the African Union and United Nations, need to play going forward? What guidance would you give them?

This is a success for African Union head and Senegalese President Macky Sall, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who all helped broker the deal. The implementation of the road map will be crucial. While the agreement claimed that TPLF combatants will be “disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated,” fighting has been continuing in Tigray, where Ethiopian federal troops, backed by the Eritrean army and forces and militias from the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions, have been advancing since mid-October.

—Rama Yade

The West and international organizations like the UN and AU can play a vital role in monitoring the three sides of the conflict (the third being Eritrea) and holding them accountable. They of course need to be balanced, but that does not mean they can’t be tough—they shouldn’t pull their punches.

—Michael Shurkin

3. How can and should Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed move forward with governing the country as a whole? What kind of mark does this conflict leave for him?

Among the main points of the declaration signed by the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, the two sides committed to “safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia” and “restore constitutional order in the Tigray region.” This is a fundamental question. It is up to Abiy to prove that the Nobel committee was not wrong by awarding him its most prestigious recognition: The Peace Prize.

—Rama Yade

Abiy has to try to calm militants on all sides and ensure that everyone benefits from what should come next: reconstruction and development. On a regional level, a successful end to the war does not resolve other issues such as Ethiopia’s development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan oppose. That was put on the back burner because of the war but may now return to the fore.

—Michael Shurkin

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Alyemany in the Independent Arabia: Red Sea Council https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/alyemany-in-the-independent-arabia-red-sea-council/ Mon, 03 Jan 2022 20:39:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=480969 The post Alyemany in the Independent Arabia: Red Sea Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Global Sanctions Dashboard: Holiday edition https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-holiday-edition/ Thu, 16 Dec 2021 15:55:24 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=468578 Coordinated actions against Belarus and global human rights abusers, sanctions on African states, and anti-kleptocracy reform.

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In our previous edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we covered the US Treasury Department’s targeting of criminal cryptocurrency exchanges and what the Pandora Papers say about the efficacy of sanctions. For this month’s ‘holiday edition,’ we zoom in on coordinated actions against Belarus, global human rights abusers, and examine targets in Africa across multiple regimes. But our story would not be complete without the greatest gift of all—anti-kleptocracy reform. 

Last week, the White House unveiled the first-ever United States Strategy on Countering Corruption, which outlines a plan to curb abuse of US jurisdiction for illicit financial purposes. The announcement from the White House came just days before the Summit for Democracy on December 9th, giving political legs to overdue regulatory reform, such as tightening reporting requirements for the real estate sector, a notorious loophole to stash ill-gotten cash or to launder criminal proceeds. Real estate reporting requirements dovetails with ongoing efforts to implement the beneficial ownership legislation that came out of the 2021 defense authorization.

Preventative measures go hand in hand with sanctions enforcement. US authorities have had little ability to track whether sanctioned actors move money within the US despite best efforts by commercial banks. This is a question of government priorities. In focusing on punitive measures versus prevention, the US has effectively operated as if the hard work is issuing the sanction itself when in reality, that is the easy part. Implementation and compliance are actually where the success of any policy hangs in the balance, as well as the ability and willingness of the private sector to cooperate. 

Democracy Summit

The Summit pledged a hefty $424 million in anti-corruption assistance last week, while Treasury rolled out a series of high-profile designations against nationals from Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. On the same day, the State Department—pursuant to its Section 7031(c) visa restriction authority—designated nine individuals over similar corruption charges. Amongst State’s designees were Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former Angolan dictator José Eduardo dos Santos and formerly the richest woman in Africa, and Oleksandr Tupytskyi, the former Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. 

In recognition of the annual global Human Rights Day, OFAC designated fifteen individuals and ten entities from Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia over their involvement in widespread human rights abuses. Notably, these designations included two officials linked to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau—the entity responsible for facilitating the ongoing genocide in China’s westernmost province. OFAC released Global Magnitsky sanctions every single day last week, underscoring that financial corruption erodes the validity of democratic governance and civil society.

Focus Africa

As the crisis in Tigray worsened in September, President Biden issued Executive Order 14046, authorizing sanctions on those responsible for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Last month, OFAC sanctioned four entities and two individuals for undermining the stability and integrity of the Ethiopian state, including the Eritrean Defense Force and Eritrea’s ruling political party—the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, criticized EU member states for not following suit. But the EU did introduce a new Mali sanctioning authority as French troops withdrew from the region after eight years, implicitly replacing military involvement with the spectre of financial remediation.

The EU has also sanctioned eight individuals and three entities linked to the Russian private military contractor, Wagner Group (including a sanction against the group itself). The organization, led by Vladimir Putin’s close associate Yevgeny Prigozhin, recently expanded its operations to conflict zones in Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and the Central African Republic. According to EU officials, three of the Wagner mercenaries sanctioned were designated for their activities in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions were welcomed by Washington, where Wagner and its affiliated individuals have been sanctioned since 2017. But it was the Group’s expansion into Africa that in the end triggered the EU designation. 

Sanctions on African state or semi-state actors can be very impactful because many countries maintain limited access to Western financing, particularly through correspondent banking relationships. Sanctions by the US and Europe can sever financial systems overnight, but they also risk exacerbating humanitarian crises and incentivize banks to de-risk from countries or entire regions because they see greater liability than profit. Our projection map shows a complicated web of sanctions by a wide array of global actors. 

Belarus

After flying in over 8,000 migrants in an effort to force them into the Schengen area through Poland, the US, EU, and UK took coordinated action against those responsible in Minsk. In a remarkably quick response, the EU also agreed to impose sanctions on Belavia, the airline primarily responsible for flying the migrants in from the Middle East. OFAC joined its European partners with sanctions against 20 individuals, 12 entities, and three aircraft. After over a decade of Western sanctions and pause in IMF assistance, the US has relatively little leverage over Belarus and must decide carefully when to pull the levers it does have. US prohibitions on debt and equity in secondary markets and on the potash sector shows that a fabricated migration crisis was reason enough.

More crypto sanctions… 

In coordination with both Latvian and Estonian authorities, Treasury designated another virtual currency exchange. The designation against the Latvia-based Chatex follows an inaugural round against Russia-based Suex. According to Treasury, the two exchanges have direct ties with each other, and Chatex has been “using Suex’s function as a nested exchange to conduct transactions.” Both exchanges have been used to launder the proceeds of ransomware by cyber criminals. 

These actions are part of the Biden administration’s broader efforts to counter a number of recent ransomware attacks. As part of this package, OFAC also designated Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Russian national Yevgeniy Polyanin, both of whom perpetuated recent ransomware attacks carried out by REvil—the group responsible for the attack against the IT firm Kaseya Limited in July of this year. These actions are further examples of sanctions used as tools of law enforcement. 

On the radar

As fears swell regarding a second possible incursion by Russian military forces in Ukraine, the United States and its partners are finalizing a slate of punitive measures they hope will deter the Kremlin from following through. Much analysis has been written over the past weeks that many of our readers are surely following. The most impactful is likely to be potential restrictions on Russian debt on the secondary market, which would inhibit the ability to clear dollar-denominated transactions. As touched upon previously in our Dashboard, sanctions against Russian oligarchs are also an untapped resource given their ties to Russian state assets. The US and EU partners are projecting a more decisive response now than in 2014– but escalation options are tricky to work out if the Kremlin doesn’t choose war, but something in between. And none of these options come without repercussions. Western investors see a downside risk now that they have re-entered Russian markets. As the US ramped up pressure on Iran, Venezuela and China over the past five years, investors came to view Russia as a relatively stable emerging market. In fact, US markets may be even more exposed to financial market restrictions than they were before little green men touched the Donbas the first time. 

Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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Bruton Joins BBC to Discuss Eritrea Sanctions https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-joins-bbc-to-discuss-eritrea-sanctions/ Wed, 14 Nov 2018 14:44:23 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-joins-bbc-to-discuss-eritrea-sanctions/ Listen to the full discussion here.

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Eritrea and Ethiopia: Troops remain, but is peace closer? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/eritrea-and-ethiopia-troops-remain-but-is-peace-closer/ Tue, 11 Sep 2018 18:50:01 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/eritrea-and-ethiopia-troops-remain-but-is-peace-closer/ Events on September 11 suggest that the troop withdrawal—and with it, the normalization of politics on both sides of the border—is getting much closer.

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In June this year, Africa’s longest-running conflict appeared to come to a sudden end as Abiy Ahmed, the newly-installed prime minister of Ethiopia, made a compelling peace overture to his counterpart in neighboring Eritrea. After a couple of short meetings with Eritrea’s president, Isaias Afwerki, peace was summarily declared. Parades were held, banners festooned both capitals, and the habitually cheery Abiy and the often surly Isaias were photographed arm in arm, with broad smiles on their faces.

A series of historical reversals then occurred: telephone lines were unblocked for the first time in decades, airplanes started flying between Asmara and Addis Ababa, and families that had been separated for twenty years—since 1998, when the border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia broke out— were joyously reunited.

History was made again on September 11 as Abiy and Isaias ceremoniously reopened several border crossings, including at the Debay Sima-Burre border point, which sits on the road to the Eritrean port of Assab. Opening this crossing will give Ethiopian exports new access to the Red Sea, with economic dividends in store for both countries.

But even as both governments have rushed headlong toward peace, Ethiopia’s former ruling party has threatened to be a spoiler. That group, the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), controls key territory along the Eritrean border and has deep influence over the local population on the Ethiopian side of the line. Because of this, peace festivities have been tinged with uncertainty over when, and whether, Abiy would actually be capable of prying Ethiopian troops—many of whom are presumed loyal to the old guard—away from Eritrea’s border.

As the weeks have dragged on, concern inside Eritrea (and within its restive diaspora) has grown. Though desperate for peace, Eritreans have withstood two decades of harsh martial law in their efforts to protect the country’s territorial sovereignty, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the border, especially from the flashpoint town of Badme, remains of paramount importance. For most Eritreans, there can be no peace without it.

But there may have been a significant development on that front on September 11, though it was overlooked by most reporters. In his remarks, Abiy actually seemed to suggest for the first time that Ethiopia may begin some sort of a demobilization process for the troops stationed on the border, and that Eritrea would join in.

“As of today,” Abiy stated, Ethiopian troops stationed on the border “will be gathered to camps and ease tension that was extreme. The same will be done from the Eritrean side.” He then mentioned the possibility of training or livelihoods programs for the troops. It was a strange and vaguely worded statement, but he seemed to be suggesting the start of a demobilization and reintegration program for the troops stationed along the border. If so, that would be game-changing news. It would indicate that Abiy believes he has succeeded in wresting enough power from the TPLF hardliners that he is able to disarm their troops.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from the border will also have enormous implications for Eritrea, which has effectively been in a state of emergency since 1998. The decisive end of the war will require the Eritrean government to normalize its military conscription program, which is currently indefinite, and to implement the country’s long-shelved constitution (political repression and the indefinite military service have, along with a range of economic factors, led to large outpouring of refugees from Eritrea.)

That presents challenges to the Eritrean government because before either of those things can happen Eritrea’s economy will need hard kickstarting. After all, the government says that 80 percent of Eritrea’s military conscripts are not actually under arms, but are instead working as bureaucrats, teachers, construction workers, and in other occupations at sub-market wages. For Eritrea, “demobilization” will mostly mean not putting down weapons, but transitioning those positions into market-wage, at-will jobs.

Eritrea’s military conscripts can’t be eased into the private sector economy until the economy is rolling again. And currently, the government can’t afford to pay public servants a living wage. The imperative of boosting Eritrea’s economy before any political improvements are made explains why both Abiy and Isaias are so focused on resuming economic ties and trade lines between their countries. It also explains why both of them have hesitated to give a timeline on troop withdrawal. But events on September 11 suggest that the troop withdrawal—and with it, the normalization of politics on both sides of the border —is getting much closer.

Bronwyn Bruton is deputy director and director of programs and studies at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @BronwynBruton.

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Bruton Quoted in Vox on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Treaty https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-vox-on-the-ethiopia-eritrea-peace-treaty/ Tue, 31 Jul 2018 15:06:38 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-quoted-in-vox-on-the-ethiopia-eritrea-peace-treaty/ Read the full article here.

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Bruton Joins BBC to Discuss Peace Between Ethiopia and Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-joins-bbc-to-discuss-peace-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea/ Thu, 26 Jul 2018 18:30:01 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-joins-bbc-to-discuss-peace-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea/ Listen to the full discussion here.

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Bruton Quoted in Andover Caller on Peace Between Eritrea and Ethiopia https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-andover-caller-on-peace-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia/ Tue, 17 Jul 2018 20:16:42 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-quoted-in-andover-caller-on-peace-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia/ Read the full article here.

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Charai in Gatestone Institute: Ethiopia-Eritrea: A New Hope for Peace https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/charai-in-gatestone-institute-ethiopia-eritrea-a-new-hope-for-peace/ Thu, 12 Jul 2018 17:52:27 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/charai-in-gatestone-institute-ethiopia-eritrea-a-new-hope-for-peace/ The post Charai in Gatestone Institute: Ethiopia-Eritrea: A New Hope for Peace appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Why Djibouti is the loser of the Horn of Africa’s new peace https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/why-djibouti-is-the-loser-of-the-horn-of-africa-s-new-peace/ Thu, 12 Jul 2018 17:13:39 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/why-djibouti-is-the-loser-of-the-horn-of-africa-s-new-peace/ At the least, this tectonic shift will reduce the revenues available to President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, and undermine his ironclad grip on the country.

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Ethiopians and Eritreans alike are celebrating the breakneck speed of a rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara, two longtime enemies. Closer ties between the two, while not necessarily a done deal, could usher in a new era of peace and prosperity for the Horn of Africa, resuming a thriving trade relationship and granting landlocked Ethiopia access to a new port. Unfortunately, nearby Djibouti—which has successfully exploited its prime territory on the Red Sea to offer both port access and military bases to foreign countries—stands to lose. At the least, this tectonic shift will reduce the revenues available to President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in power since 1999, and undermine his ironclad grip on the country. At worst, Djibouti could prove a spoiler, which would threaten prospects for regional peace as well as longstanding US strategic interests in the Horn of Africa.

For decades, Djibouti was the undisputed winner of Ethiopian-Eritrean hostility and the latter’s international isolation. The New Jersey-sized country of just under one million people has unique geostrategic advantages—its coastline spans the meeting of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a chokepoint through which significant amounts of the world’s energy supply and commerce pass every year. While ports exist in Sudan, Somaliland, and Eritrea, Djibouti’s developed facilities, political stability, and investment-friendly atmosphere have proven more attractive than anywhere else in the region. As a result, Djibouti has enjoyed a near-monopoly on moving goods to and from landlocked Ethiopia.

The United States also has longstanding security interests in Djibouti, including the only permanent US military base on the continent—a vital component of US counterterrorism operations in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Some 4,000 US military personnel are stationed at the American base, which extends to the nearby airport used to launch both armed and reconnaissance drones that operate in Somalia and Yemen. Underscoring the country’s strategic importance to the Pentagon, US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis visited Djibouti in April 2017, just months ahead of the opening of China’s first overseas military base there. Additionally, France, Japan, Italy, and Saudi Arabia have bases of various sizes and capabilities in Djibouti.

Ethiopia and Djibouti have traditionally maintained a close political and economic relationship out of mutual necessity. When the Ethiopia-Eritrea border war broke out in 1998, Ethiopia lost access to Eritrea’s port, an existential crisis for a landlocked country. Since then, Ethiopia has overwhelmingly relied on Djiboutian ports to process its imports and exports: some 95 percent of Ethiopian imports transit through Djibouti. Djibouti, too, relies on its larger neighbor, from which it imports freshwater and electricity. Profits from Ethiopia’s use of Djiboutian ports—estimates top $1 billion annually—are a key source of Guelleh’s government revenue. But Ethiopia finds this arrangement deeply flawed, and is interested in more diverse, and better, deals for port access. The United States, as well, is deeply dissatisfied with Guelleh’s partnership. Specifically, his penchant for extracting costly rents from as many foreign militaries as possible, including allowing a Chinese military base just kilometers from the US one, has left the United States discontented.

Eritrea and Djibouti have a more restive history, and unresolved tensions could flare up again. Djibouti’s western border with Eritrea has been militarized since the end of border clashes in 2008. Qatar attempted to mediate the dispute, and it even managed to facilitate a 2016 prisoner swap before withdrawing its peacekeepers from the Eritrean-Djiboutian border in protest of both countries’ decision to side with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Gulf crisis.

Djibouti’s shipping and land lease profits directly supplement Guelleh’s tight political control over the country. The Chinese will reportedly pay $20 million a year until 2025 for their base, though that figure does not include more than $1 billion in Chinese loans. The Americans pay some $70 million annually for at least another six years, and the French pay another $30-plus million yearly for their military facility. These profits contribute to what appears to be a booming economy: Djibouti’s annual GDP growth is expected to remain around 7 percent into the near future. But despite Djibouti’s ostensible riches, most of the country remains desperately poor, underdeveloped, and subject to Guelleh’s authoritarianism. Nearly a quarter of the population lives in extreme poverty, and Djibouti ranks abysmally on political rights and civil liberties.

Ethiopia-Eritrea peace talks are bad news for Guelleh, who has staked his country’s growth on its role as the port of choice for economic giants like Ethiopia. Assuming normalization efforts continue, Ethiopia could soon have the option to use Eritrea’s ports, which are closer and more convenient than Djibouti. While it is unlikely that Ethiopia will cease using Djiboutian ports altogether, it will have options—and thus will be less inclined to settle for usurious port usage rates. Eritrea may even prove a welcoming partner to foreign militaries, as the country previously allowed Emirati use of its port at Assab to prosecute the war in Yemen. One constraint on Ethiopia’s turn away from Djibouti, however, is its imperative to pay back nearly $3 billion in Chinese loans for the newly opened Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway.

Lastly, if foreign militaries follow Ethiopia’s lead and diversify their security partners, Guelleh will rapidly lose a key source of income, making the four-term president vulnerable to longstanding grievances about his government’s corruption and repression. Once his resources dry up, the little political support he has been able to cajole or co-opt will likely follow.

In recent years, the UAE’s increasing interest in the Horn of Africa adds a new complication to Djibouti’s predicament. The UAE has acquired rights to a naval base in Eritrea, a military base and commercial port in Somaliland, and a multi-purpose port in Puntland. But relations between Djibouti and the UAE have been fraught since February 2018 when the Djiboutian government cancelled the contract of Emirati firm Dubai Ports World (DP World) to operate Djibouti’s main container shipping terminal. Early reports suggest that the UAE might have even played a role in the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The UAE’s growing partnership with Ethiopia—which recently acquired a 19 percent stake in the Berbera port alongside DP World and Somaliland—is also noteworthy evidence of regional diversification.

While it is unfortunate that Guelleh perceives normalization with Eritrea as a zero-sum game, he has some reason to be nervous that Addis Ababa and Asmara are warming up to one another. The faster they normalize relations, the faster Djibouti’s strategic advantages disappear—and with them, Guelleh’s cash flow. Resolving a decades-long conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would strengthen overall regional stability and open new doors for economic trade and prosperity. But there are very real losers in that scenario, and the opportunity to spoil the well-deserved peace should be carefully scrutinized.

Kelsey Lilley was associate director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter at @KelseyDegen.

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Bruton in Foreign Policy: Ethiopia and Eritrea Have a Common Enemy https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-in-foreign-policy-ethiopia-and-eritrea-have-a-common-enemy/ Thu, 12 Jul 2018 15:30:47 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-in-foreign-policy-ethiopia-and-eritrea-have-a-common-enemy/ Read the full article here.

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Finally, peace in the Horn of Africa? https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/finally-peace-in-the-horn-of-africa/ Mon, 09 Jul 2018 19:33:31 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/finally-peace-in-the-horn-of-africa/ The summit between Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, on July 9 marked the first time that the neighbors’ heads of state have met in nearly two decades.

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Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (left) welcomed Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh (wearing garland) and his delegation at the Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on June 26. Abiy and Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki on July 9 signed a declaration ending the state of war between the two Horn of Africa neighbors. (Reuters/Tiksa Negeri)

The leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea on July 9 signed a declaration ending the state of war between the two countries.

The summit between Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in the Eritrean capital, Asmara, on July 9 marked the first time that the neighbors’ heads of state have met in nearly two decades.

Nearly 100,000 people were killed in a border war between the two Horn of Africa neighbors from 1998-2000. Ethiopia and Eritrea had been in a state of “no war, no peace” ever since.

Bronwyn Bruton, director of programs and studies and deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, discussed this important development in the Horn of Africa with the New Atlanticist’s Ashish Kumar Sen. Here are excerpts from our interview.

Q: What have the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to and why is it significant?

Bruton: The peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea in some sense is completely shocking because it has taken so long to get to. But it is important to bear in mind that the reason it has taken so long is entirely because of a small group of people inside Ethiopia—the old liberation fighters from the Tigrayan ethnic minority—who have refused to make peace in violation of  international law since 2002.

Ever since an international boundary commission ruled in 2002 that flashpoint territories belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has put up one excuse after another to avoid giving that territory back. This refusal to surrender the territory has been partially pragmatic and partially a matter of pride. After fighting alongside Eritrea to liberate Ethiopia from the communist Derg party, the leaders of the revolutionary movement felt indebted and consented to Eritrea’s independence. But then the Tigrayans were blamed by the majority tribes for “losing” Eritrea and, along with it, Ethiopia’s only access to the sea. It was considered to be one of [the late prime minister of Ethiopia] Meles Zenawi’s greatest failure—a black mark hanging over his and his party’s head. So the Tigrayans have always conspired to get Eritrea back and it has been a matter of national pride.

Q: How after years of stalemate has this declaration happened so quickly?

Bruton: Since the Tigrayan elite has lost power, sanity has simply prevailed. Once you take the issue of Tigrayan pride out of the equation, the plain logic of this situation is that both Ethiopia and Eritrea stand to gain immeasurably from peace—not only in terms of the massive economic benefits, which will accrue to both sides, but also in terms of regional peace and stability. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have pursued proxy warfare in the absence of a regular armed conflict. Now that that’s done, the entire Horn of Africa region stands to benefit.

Q: What specifically does this mean for Ethiopia and Eritrea?

Bruton: It is not entirely clear what it means right now. Events have unfolded at breakneck speed, and it appears that many of the details have yet to be determined. What the leaders of both Eritrea and Ethiopia have jointly stated is that a full normalization of relations will occur, and in the short term that will involve opening the border, giving Ethiopia access to the ports, reopening the embassies that have been shuttered since 1998, and resuming flights between the capitals. People will apparently be able to cross the border at will—and no mention has been made of any tariffs on goods. (That was one of the sources of conflict before the war.)

Q: What does this development mean for the United States?

Bruton: For the United States it presents some challenges. In the first place, it is a magnificent opportunity because it will allow for increased stability. On the other hand, the United States has set up a kind of alternate reality in the Horn of Africa for many years, in which Eritrea was a “spoiler,” and was sanctioned, while the Tigrayan minority regime in Ethiopia was held up as a model partner and the shining white knights of US counterterrorism efforts. Now the Tigrayans have been thrown out of power, and overnight, democracy and peace seems to be spreading magically across the Horn of Africa—showing what might have been achieved so much earlier, if only the United States had not fought so hard to keep the old authoritarian regime in power. Neither the Eritrean government nor the Ethiopian people are likely to forget the US role in their long years of suffering, so Washington has some real repair work to do. In this one respect, it may actually be helpful that the Trump administration has put so much distance between itself and the Obama administration’s approach. They can try to disown the old policies and get a fresh start. But it may or may not work. By all appearances, Abiy intends to be a truly democratic, populist leader, and as such he may or may not be interested in courting US favor by pursuing Washington counterterror objectives across the region, at the risk of Ethiopian soldiers’ lives. That remains to be seen.

Washington will also have to contend with a newly invigorated Eritrea, which is poised to take a leadership role on the regional stage. There’s a strong upside to that: Eritrea could be extremely helpful in resolving the conflict in South Sudan, for example, and could help the United States make progress in Somalia. But Eritrea is likely to seek progress by pointing out how badly US policy has performed in those countries, and by suggesting entirely new approaches that the United States may or may not find palatable. Eritrea, for example, has always talked about the importance of negotiating with all the actors in the Somali conflict, not just the pro-government actors—including parts of the terrorist group al Shabaab. That is the right approach to take, in my view, but something that the United States has fiercely resisted, and may continue to resist now, even in the face of an overwhelming lack of progress in resolving the conflict in Somalia.

The bottom line is that a partnership between Isaias in Eritrea and a true democratic leader in Ethiopia will allow for the creation of a more authentic regional voice to counter American assumptions about the Horn. Washington is likely to find itself out of the driver’s seat at a time when it’s already worried by the growing Arab influence in the Horn. This is a reality that’s evident in the peace process itself: it’s something that Ethiopia and Eritrea sorted out completely by themselves, with precious little reference to the United States. To the extent that any outside actor is receiving credit for massaging the peace process along, it’s Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that people are pointing to. That is unfortunately the “new normal” that Washington is going to have to contend with—it used to be the only game in town, and now it’s not even the biggest game in town. In terms of influence, it’s lining up behind China and the Gulf States.

Q: How should the United States respond to this development?

Bruton: The United States will certainly celebrate the end of the border conflict, but I fear that it is poorly positioned to capitalize on the development because the Trump administration is so distracted by other events.

The United States is going to be challenged because a lot of the newly empowered actors in the Horn of Africa—including the Ethiopian opposition that is now in power and the Eritreans—have long regarded it as a malign influence. The United States has put all of its military, political, and economic weight behind the Tigrayan elite and this Tigrayan elite has brutalized the Horn of Africa. They have robbed the Ethiopian people, they have kept Eritrea in a state of emergency for twenty years, they have imprisoned journalists and democrats as terrorists, they have invaded Somalia. They have done a whole host of awful things that the United States has either actively supported and condoned.

Now that the balance of power has shifted, the United States has to come to terms with what it has done. It is going to have to envision a new way forward that is much more constructive and much more collaborative than the strategy that it has used in the past. It now doesn’t have an authoritarian regime doing business with it [in Ethiopia].

Ashish Kumar Sen is deputy director of communications, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @AshishSen.

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Bruton Quoted in Voice of America on the Conflict Between Ethiopia and Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-voice-of-america-on-the-conflict-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea/ Wed, 27 Jun 2018 19:45:22 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-quoted-in-voice-of-america-on-the-conflict-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea/ Read the full article here.

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Bruton in The New York Times: A Peace Best Delayed https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-in-the-new-york-times-a-peace-best-delayed/ Fri, 22 Jun 2018 20:42:50 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-in-the-new-york-times-a-peace-best-delayed/ Read the full article here.

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Bruton Quoted in TesfaNews on Ambassador Yamamoto’s Visit to Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-tesfanews-on-ambassador-yamamoto-s-visit-to-eritrea/ Fri, 27 Apr 2018 14:46:13 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-quoted-in-tesfanews-on-ambassador-yamamoto-s-visit-to-eritrea/ Read the full article here

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Roundtable with Louis Mazel https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/roundtable-with-louis-mazel/ Tue, 27 Jun 2017 20:40:38 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/roundtable-with-louis-mazel/ On Tuesday, June 27, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center hosted a roundtable discussion with Mr. Louis Mazel, former chargé d’affaires at the embassy of the United States to the State of Eritrea. In his remarks, Mazel stressed the importance of Eritrea’s extensive coastline and strategic location in the Horn of Africa. He also discussed Eritrea’s […]

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On Tuesday, June 27, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center hosted a roundtable discussion with Mr. Louis Mazel, former chargé d’affaires at the embassy of the United States to the State of Eritrea.

In his remarks, Mazel stressed the importance of Eritrea’s extensive coastline and strategic location in the Horn of Africa. He also discussed Eritrea’s potential contribution to counterterrorism measures in the region.

Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Constance Berry Newman introduced Mazel and Amb. Princeton Lyman, former assistant secretary of state for African affairs and senior adviser to the President at the United States Institute of Peace, moderated the ensuing discussion, which included current and former US government officials and representatives from the non-profit and private sectors.

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Bruton Quoted by The New Yorker on Broken Government in Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-by-the-new-yorker-on-broken-government-in-eritrea/ Mon, 12 Dec 2016 15:17:43 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-quoted-by-the-new-yorker-on-broken-government-in-eritrea/ Read the full article here.

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Mr. Trump, Put the Ball in Eritrea’s Court https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/mr-trump-put-the-ball-in-eritrea-s-court/ Thu, 08 Dec 2016 21:52:09 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/mr-trump-put-the-ball-in-eritrea-s-court/ With the growing threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Africa and shifting alliances in the region with the Arab Gulf states and Egypt, it is in the best interest of the incoming US administration to reassess engagement with Eritrea, a country which could play a significant strategic role in countering conflict […]

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With the growing threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham in Africa and shifting alliances in the region with the Arab Gulf states and Egypt, it is in the best interest of the incoming US administration to reassess engagement with Eritrea, a country which could play a significant strategic role in countering conflict and extremism, an expert on African politics said at the Atlantic Council on December 8.

According to Dan Connell, a visiting scholar from Boston University’s African Studies Center, “there’s a lot of reasons that if [the situation in Eritrea] is left unattended, it’s not going to stay the same, it’s going to get worse.” He added, “for a dealmaker, this is not a hard deal to make,” referring to US President-elect Donald Trump.

While US relations with Eritrea are “not on the top ten list” for the Trump administration, said Seth Kaplan, a professorial lecturer at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, he claimed that addressing instability and the threat of conflict in the Horn of Africa is a way to make a positive change, in the best interest of the United States, without taking an excessive diplomatic risk.

In particular, Connell cited the resolution of border tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The border has been contested since Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1991, and continued hostilities contribute to instability in the region. Kaplan also stressed the importance of lifting US economic sanctions on Eritrea, and addressing economic issues which drive many to emigrate to Europe.  

Kaplan said: “For the new administration, it is not a high priority, but for those senior diplomats whose focus is Africa… those are major areas where we’re trying to reduce conflict, stabilize situations, [and] reduce the spread of terrorism.”

Connell and Kaplan joined Bronwyn Bruton, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center; and Athony Carroll, a nonresident senior associate with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, to discuss the recent publication of two reports on Eritrea. The first report, Eritrea: Coming in from the Cold, authored by Bruton, argues that reengagement with Eritrea is in the best interest of the United States and examines the means of achieving an improved relationship. Kaplan wrote the second report, Eritrea’s Economy: Ideology and Opportunity, which examines the dichotomy between ideology and economy in Eritrea, using that understanding as a basis from which to encourage reform.

Connell said that the central issue at stake is “what direction Eritrea is trending in now, and what can the United States do to encourage constructive change.”

Bruton’s report contains “recommendations for a rethought US approach to the Eritrean government and the situation in Eritrea,” she said. Calling for the United States to lift sanctions, cease the personalization of politics in the region, and address the threat posed by Ethiopia, Bruton said that “the United States should make it clear to Asmara through a series of actions, a series of gestures, that the door is open for a better relationship.” Not intervention, but “positive, reinforcing steps” should end the policy of isolation, which “has not been a force for good in Eritrea,” she said.

According to Kaplan, “lack of interaction with the international community has reduced the country’s ability to learn, develop, and modernize itself.”

Kaplan compared Eritrea to other countries with socialist nationalist ideologies, such as China, Vietnam, Rwanda, and Cuba, claiming that “Eritrea’s whole economic system is based upon a certain worldview, a certain ideology.” This ideology is defined by self-reliance focused on local solutions. Consequently, Eritrea has pursued an economic policy that is more stable than dynamic. “There’s a logic to trading dynamism for stability,” said Kaplan, “but it limits the economy… and has great repercussions for the country’s financial stability.”

One major factor to be considered is the element of Eritrea’s National Service, a program which enlists the country’s youth into service as soldiers and civil servants. To escape enforced service, many young people flee the country, contributing to a significant flow of emigrants to Europe. Additionally, the program poses a serious risk to the reputation of investors involved in the country.

However, according to Kaplan, the ideology of Asmara will not change. He claimed “the country is unlikely to change dramatically, therefore change can only take place if we work where Eritrea is, and not where we want Eritrea to be.” He described how the international community, due to issues of human rights and emigration, has strong opinions on Eritrea’s path, and he said countries seeking to provide assistance should not change their goals, but reconsider the most appropriate means to achieve them.

In particular, Kaplan said that US sanctions have caused foreign investment in Eritrea to plummet since 2005.

However, Carroll, who also serves as vice president of Manchester Trade Limited, an investment advisory firm, described the challenges facing potential investors in Eritrea. He cited issues related to governance, rule of law, competitiveness of the service sector, availability of foreign exchange, engagement with partners, policy predictability, risk insurance, and threat to a company’s reputation as serious deterrent. Thought the situation in Eritrea is “not all doom and gloom,” Carroll said, “as an investor, you can’t be naïve or ignore these many challenges.”

While he believes there will be no immediate appreciable change, Carroll described a five-year horizon for the opportunity for greater investment in the region. He cited sectors such as agriculture and tourism as routes for potential growth and exploration. In particular, Carroll said that, in the wake of the British vote to leave the European Union, the United Kingdom will need a new trade agreement, and Eritrea could present an option for agriculture exports.

Kaplan added that, while Eritrea’s government is taking steps to reengage on the world stage and he sees potential for improvement, fundamental change is unlikely.

However, according to Connell, economic potential is contingent upon the region’s stability, and “engagement is the best route out of these crises.” He said there is no way to encourage positive change in isolation from the wider regional context, particularly the hostility between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Connell said that settling the border war is the vehicle by which to rebalance relationships while simultaneously curbing refugee flows and the spread of radicalism. “The cycle itself needs to be broken,” he said. “We need not a truce, but a genuine peace where each side gives up efforts to undermine and overthrow the other.”

According to Connell, “this is a really good time to be rethinking not just Eritrea, but the wider region.” He said, “engagement is the vehicle here, not the end.”

Contending that the recommendations made in her report are free, easy, and devoid of diplomatic risk, Bruton called for the US government to “put the ball in Asmara’s court. No one is going to pay attention to Asmara if they don’t do something.” She added, “if Washington makes it clear that the door is open, they need to walk through.”

Rachel Ansley is an editorial assistant at the Atlantic Council. 

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Rethinking Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/rethinking-eritrea-2/ Thu, 08 Dec 2016 21:13:48 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/rethinking-eritrea-2/ On Thursday, December 8, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center launched two new publications on Eritrea. The first, Eritrea’s Economy: Ideology and Opportunity, authored by fragile states expert Seth Kaplan, examines the nexus between the ideology of Eritrea’s leadership and the country’s struggling economy. The second, Eritrea: Coming In from the Cold, authored by Africa Center […]

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On Thursday, December 8, the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center launched two new publications on Eritrea. The first, Eritrea’s Economy: Ideology and Opportunity, authored by fragile states expert Seth Kaplan, examines the nexus between the ideology of Eritrea’s leadership and the country’s struggling economy. The second, Eritrea: Coming In from the Cold, authored by Africa Center Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton, examines the US-Eritrean relationship and makes the case that now is the time for the US to reengage with Eritrea.

Africa Center Director J. Peter Pham welcomed participants to the panel discussion and introduced Bruton, who laid out the findings of her report before turning the microphone over to Kaplan. The following panel discussion featured Anthony Carroll, senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Africa Program and vice president of Manchester Trade Limited, and Dan Connell, visiting scholar at Boston University’s African Studies Center. The event concluded with a question and answer session with the government.

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Seth Kaplan, author of Eritrea’s Economy: Ideology and Opportunity; professorial lecturer, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University

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Eritrea’s economy: Ideology and opportunity https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eritrea-s-economy-ideology-and-opportunity/ Wed, 07 Dec 2016 19:36:23 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/eritrea-s-economy-ideology-and-opportunity/ Eritrea is often in the news for all the wrong reasons: its high rates of migration to Europe (it has sent more refugees to Europe in recent years than any other African nation), its conflicts with neighboring Ethiopia and Djibouti, and controversy over its mandatory and indefinite national service conscription program. Human rights activists, in […]

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Eritrea is often in the news for all the wrong reasons: its high rates of migration to Europe (it has sent more refugees to Europe in recent years than any other African nation), its conflicts with neighboring Ethiopia and Djibouti, and controversy over its mandatory and indefinite national service conscription program. Human rights activists, in particular, have long singled out the country for criticism, calling it “the North Korea of Africa.” The inappropriateness of that comparison is increasingly recognized—but misunderstandings about the nature of the Eritrean regime continue to abound.

 

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]]> Eritrea: Coming in from the cold https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/eritrea-coming-in-from-the-cold/ Wed, 07 Dec 2016 19:36:23 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/eritrea-coming-in-from-the-cold/ Eritrea has long been stigmatized as a regional “spoiler” by Washington, and despite little evidence of wrongdoing, the country remains under Security Council sanctions for supporting terrorist groups in Somalia. Now is the time to rethink that relationship, argues Atlantic Council Africa Center Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton in a new issue brief entitled “Eritrea: Coming […]

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Eritrea has long been stigmatized as a regional “spoiler” by Washington, and despite little evidence of wrongdoing, the country remains under Security Council sanctions for supporting terrorist groups in Somalia.

Now is the time to rethink that relationship, argues Atlantic Council Africa Center Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton in a new issue brief entitled “Eritrea: Coming in from the Cold. In the brief, Bruton traces the contours of the US-Eritrean relationship since the country’s independence in 1991, before making the case that a number of recent, surprising developments in the country illustrate its determination to constructively reengage with the international community.

Bruton points out that the US insistence on perpetuating Eritrea’s isolation has not had the desired effect on the widely-criticized human rights situation in the country. Instead, she argues, continuing the policy of isolation creates a host of medium-term risks for the United States, as Eritrea pivots away from the West and deepens its relationship with China and the Gulf. Furthermore, with rising instability in Ethiopia and ongoing state failure in South Sudan and Somalia, Washington’s strategic interest in engaging with Asmara has never been stronger.

Bruton concludes the publication by making the case that it is not too late to repair the US-Eritrea relationship, and lays out recommendations for how US policymakers in the upcoming administration could begin to move the relationship onto a more constructive footing.

 

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]]> Eritrea: Coming in from the cold https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/eritrea-coming-in-from-the-cold-2/ Wed, 07 Dec 2016 19:36:23 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/ trea has long been stigmatized as a regional “spoiler” by Washington, and despite little evidence of wrongdoing, the country remains under Security Council sanctions for supporting terrorist groups in Somalia.

The post Eritrea: Coming in from the cold appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>
 

Eritrea has long been stigmatized as a regional “spoiler” by Washington, and despite little evidence of wrongdoing, the country remains under Security Council sanctions for supporting terrorist groups in Somalia.

Now is the time to rethink that relationship, argues Atlantic Council Africa Center Deputy Director Bronwyn Bruton in a new issue brief entitled “Eritrea: Coming in from the Cold. In the brief, Bruton traces the contours of the US-Eritrean relationship since the country’s independence in 1991, before making the case that a number of recent, surprising developments in the country illustrate its determination to constructively reengage with the international community.

Bruton points out that the US insistence on perpetuating Eritrea’s isolation has not had the desired effect on the widely-criticized human rights situation in the country. Instead, she argues, continuing the policy of isolation creates a host of medium-term risks for the United States, as Eritrea pivots away from the West and deepens its relationship with China and the Gulf. Furthermore, with rising instability in Ethiopia and ongoing state failure in South Sudan and Somalia, Washington’s strategic interest in engaging with Asmara has never been stronger.

Bruton concludes the publication by making the case that it is not too late to repair the US-Eritrea relationship, and lays out recommendations for how US policymakers in the upcoming administration could begin to move the relationship onto a more constructive footing.

Introduction1

The Horn of Africa, long recognized as one of the world’s most unstable regions, is undergoing a round of seismic shifts. Massive and sustained anti-government demonstrations in Ethiopia have laid bare the fundamental brutality and instability of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, which is Washington’s major security partner in the region. Tiny Somaliland and Djibouti are on high alert, bracing for a tide of Ethiopian refugees that—particularly in the midst of drought—could easily overwhelm those territories. South Sudan, the youngest nation on earth, has become a killing field. And the Westernfunded peacekeeping coalition in Somalia, which has been fighting the al-Qaeda linked terror group al-Shabaab since 2007, is critically fatigued and losing ground. These multiple nodes of instability pose a significant and immediate threat to US interests in the region.

Eritrea has long been stigmatized as a “spoiler” by Washington and stands accused of supporting terrorism. In 2009, at Washington’s urging, Eritrea was sanctioned by the United Nations for supporting al-Shabaab and for refusing to settle a border dispute with Djibouti. However, years of scrutiny by the United Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (UNSEMG) have yielded no evidence that Eritrea continues to be involved in Somalia, and the Djibouti conflict is mediated by Qatar.2

A number of surprising developments have recently occurred in Eritrea, suggesting that the country is determined to throw off isolation for positive engagement in its foreign policy since the sanctions were applied. An engaged Eritrea would be very good news for the region at a time when Washington’s status quo approaches to Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Sudan are visibly failing.

If the United States can encourage Eritrea on a trajectory of re-engagement, it should. But to do that, Washington must drop outdated notions about the threat that Eritrea poses. At a time when the Kenyan army has annexed parts of southern Somalia and is trafficking with al-Shabaab,3 when the Ugandan army is taking sides in South Sudan,4 and Ethiopian forces have killed hundreds and detained tens of thousands of protestors calling for government reform,5 Eritrea truly ranks among the least of the United States’ security concerns.

A disordered Ethiopia will make Eritrea more important to US security interests. By virtue of its geographic position between Ethiopia and Yemen, Eritrea is bound to serve either as a bridge or a barrier to the passage of terrorists between the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. Thus far, Eritrea has repelled jihadists and proven immune to radical ideologies. This is a role for which it has received little credit. But Washington cannot afford to take Eritrea’s implicit cooperation in its counterterror efforts for granted.

If Eritrea is overwhelmed with refugees, or otherwise sucked into the Red Sea region’s growing unrest, the United States could find itself facing instability and perhaps a terror threat on both sides of the Mandeb Strait, which is a critical chokepoint for the $700 billion dollars of trade passing annually between the European Union (EU) and Asia. Threats to this trade route have in recent years led the United States to pour millions of dollars into combating Somali piracy—an indication of the Strait’s importance to US interests.6

For these reasons, the United States ought to be concerned about its inability to project influence in Eritrea. This paper aims to assist the incoming US administration in securing US interests by offering a blueprint for improving relations with Asmara.

US relations with Eritrea

Historical overview

In 1991, after thirty years of trench and mountain warfare, Eritrean rebels overthrew the Communist Derg regime and won independence from Ethiopia. The tenacity and bravery of the Eritrean rebels captured the hearts and imaginations of people across the globe. The period between 1991 and 1998 were watershed years for the country: a referendum establishing Eritrea’s independence was held, a democratic constitution was written (though never enacted), and Eritrea’s economy prospered.

However, separation from Ethiopia proved impossible. By 1996, a collection of small, unavoidable disputes between the two countries (over such matters as the regulation of cross-border trade, the creation of an Eritrean currency, and the demarcation of the border) had piled up, adding tension to a more substantive disagreement between Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi over Ethiopia’s decision to pursue a model of ethnic “federalism.”7 In 1998, only seven years after the end of Eritrea’s thirty-year battle for independence, these many differences escalated into a full-scale war between the countries that lasted for two years and killed some 90,000 people.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean border war ended when both sides agreed to sign the Algiers Agreement, which established a cease-fire and an independent border commission in The Hague (called the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, or EEBC). The United States, the EU, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union), and the United Nations signed the Algiers Agreement as witnesses. As it was desperately attempting to broker a peace, the United States allegedly made closed-door promises to both sides that it would serve as guarantor to the EEBC’s ruling.8 However, when the EEBC eventually awarded most of the disputed border territory to Eritrea—including the flashpoint town of Badme—Ethiopia reneged on the agreement, and the witnesses to the treaty did nothing. Indeed, for the past fifteen years, Ethiopian troops have been permitted, by a silent international consensus, to flout the treaty and occupy Eritrean territory. In consequence, the border between the two countries is heavily militarized and skirmishes occasionally claim lives. And Eritrea has been trapped in a painful stasis known as “no peace, no war.”

Ethiopia’s refusal to comply with the firm and final ruling of the Boundary Commission is a major source of instability in East Africa. In efforts to destabilize each other’s territory, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have supported armed rebel groups, which inflame conflicts across the region. Eritrea has exhibited especially poor judgment in its choice of proxies. As noted earlier, one of the groups that it supported early on was the al-Shabaab militia group in Somalia. Eritrean support of al-Shabaab appears to have been short-lived and relatively insubstantial.9 There has been no evidence of Eritrean support for al-Shabaab since 2011. Eritrea has, nonetheless, remained under sanction by the United Nations (UN) Security Council since 2009.

Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in late 2006, and the Ethiopian army’s subsequent occupation of Mogadishu, by contrast, has done immeasurable harm to US security interests.10 Ethiopia’s invasion destroyed an innocuous and potentially constructive Somali grassroots governance movement called the Union of Islamic Courts. At the time, Ethiopia falsely alleged that the Union of Islamic Courts was a proxy of al-Qaeda and persuaded Washington to back this interpretation. When Ethiopia invaded Somalia and destroyed this moderate Union of Islamic Courts, it cleared the field for the rise of al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab—which before the invasion was unpopular in Somalia—was able to rise to power on a wave of public fury against the atrocities that the Ethiopian army was committing in Mogadishu.11 It was the rage of the Somali people against Ethiopian and US meddling in their country that permitted alShabaab to become a national resistance movement; to seize most of southern Somalia’s territory; and to provide the long-feared sanctuary to al-Qaeda.12 Worse still, outrage over the rapes and atrocities perpetrated by Ethiopian troops in Somalia sparked the transit of dozens of Somali-Americans from Minnesota to join al-Shabaab’s war against the Ethiopian army in Mogadishu, creating, for the first time, a problem of homegrown radicalization in the United States.13

Recent developments in Eritrea

Despite the profound insecurity that Eritrea faces, the government is attempting to emerge from the economic and political stasis of the post-border war period. In the past two years, Asmara has made serious efforts to improve its relations with European countries. It has formed new alliances with Arab and African partners, has sought to reenter the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and has ramped up its participation in the African Union. There are also positive indicators for those seeking access to Eritrea: approximately fifty foreign journalists have been permitted to enter and report on the country;14 the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights was recently permitted to tour a prison, and several foreign NGOs have been permitted to reenter Eritrea and to open programs in the country. One of these groups, Finn Church Aid, recently visited Sawa, a school and military training camp that has been off-limits to Westerners for about a decade and is thought be the epicenter of human rights abuses in the country.

Eritrea has also recently released all of the living Djiboutian prisoners of war, a major development that bodes well for regional stability. The judicial code has been revised, though the changes are not yet implemented.15 It appears that the government is raising the salaries of National Service (NS) conscripts, which it says is the first step toward normalizing the program and converting the NS posts into civil service and private sector jobs. Implementation has been slow on many of these fronts but not unexpectedly, given Eritrea’s financial and capacity problems.

Washington has determinedly overlooked these positive developments and continues to focus on human rights and exaggerated or outdated notions of Eritrean misbehavior in the region. Simultaneously, Washington has downplayed human rights violations and regional meddling by Ethiopia, presumably because of the key role that Ethiopia plays in US counterterrorism efforts in East Africa.

The asymmetry of the United States’ treatment of these two countries has created the perception among Eritrean officials that Washington is “hostile” to Eritrea and directly responsible for most aspects of the country’s suffering over the past eighteen years. As Eritrea’s senior presidential advisor recently commented: “The problem with Eritrea is not Ethiopia: It is the United States.”16

The risk to US Interests

Over the years, US rhetoric has helped to establish a fictional dichotomy between the “good” Ethiopia and the “spoiler” Eritrea. While this may seem expedient to US counterterror efforts in the short term, it actually creates a host of medium-term risks for Washington. The dichotomy is not supported by facts on the ground, and thus has a detrimental effect on US credibility17. and counter-radicalization efforts, particularly in Ethiopia, where the government has imprisoned thousands of journalists, politicians, and bloggers under the guise of counterterrorism. Washington has consistently praised Ethiopian governance despite strong evidence of government repression. (Irreversible harm was done to Washington’s credibility, for example, when President Obama visited Addis Ababa and referred to the Ethiopian government as “democratically elected,” directly after the ruling party won 100 percent of the parliamentary seats in an election.18) US political and financial support of the Ethiopian government is also widely viewed as instrumental to the regime’s continuing stranglehold on power—a perception that may assist al-Shabaab or other jihadist actors to foment a homegrown terror movement in Ethiopia amidst the general dissatisfaction and insecurity there. Al-Shabaab has flourished in Kenya, where police and military brutality, class grievances, and the estrangement of the Muslim community have proved fertile ground for jihadist recruitment efforts. Conditions in Ethiopia are not dissimilar.

If Ethiopia’s instability worsens, the United States may, within the next few years, be faced with a situation of multiple state failures in the Horn: a swath of instability that stretches from Somalia, through Ethiopia, across the water to Yemen, through Sudan, and onward to the Sahel. And, in this worst-case scenario, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland will be the vital buffers between that instability and the billions of dollars of trade passing every day through the Mandeb Strait.

Furthermore, if the West does not re-engage with Eritrea, other countries will step in to fill the diplomatic void. Eritrea has already begun to form new military alliances with Gulf states and new economic partnerships with China. Prolonging the status quo does not mean that Eritrea will remain isolated, but it does mean that the United States will continue to be unable to project influence in an increasingly important region of the world. For these reasons, the United States cannot afford to continue its policy of isolating Eritrea.

Fortunately, it is not too late to repair the relationship. Despite his many concerns about US policy and the lingering bad blood between the nations, President Isaias has stated that the relationship between the United States and Eritrea is fundamentally sound,19 and that he is convinced the two countries should—and will—be friends. However, concrete steps will need to be taken by the incoming US administration to move the relationship onto a more constructive footing.

Diplomatic disputes

Friendship between the United States and Eritrea is in the interest of both countries. But the impediments to a normalization of diplomatic relations are numerous and complex. On the US side, they include the ongoing imprisonment of four former employees of the US embassy; the restriction of US embassy personnel to a perimeter of twenty kilometers around Asmara; the opening of diplomatic pouches and the recalling of Eritrea’s ambassador from the embassy in Washington; the expulsion of the US Agency for International Development (USAID); human rights abuses and the closure of participatory democratic space (including the failure to enact the constitution or convene the parliament); Eritrea’s holding of Djiboutian prisoners of war (though Eritrea claims to have released all of its Djiboutian prisoners and has withdrawn from Djiboutian territory in compliance with an international ruling and the mediation process being led by Qatar); Eritrea’s refusal to permit the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group unfettered access to the country; and Eritrea’s continued funding of armed groups to perpetuate its proxy conflict with Ethiopia. There is also a clear and pervasive irritation among American officials over the fact that Eritrea, despite the firm and final ruling of the EEBC in its favor, has not simply accepted the current situation, given up on Badme, and moved on.20

Eritrea also holds a substantial list of grievances against the United States. These include: Washington’s refusal to grant Eritrean independence following the second World War, which directly necessitated the thirty-year war that killed an uncounted number of Eritreans; Washington’s failure to enforce the Algiers Agreement and its apparent prioritization of Ethiopia’s interests over those of Eritrea; the Washington-led effort to sanction Eritrea for its actions in Somalia and around the region; Washington’s continued refusal to lift those sanctions, despite the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group’s failure to find any evidence of Eritrean meddling in Somalia over the past four years;21 Washington’s travel ban and sanctions on various Eritrean officials; and finally, what is perceived as a Washington-led effort to use UN human rights instruments as a mechanism for bringing Eritrea to the International Criminal Court. (This last grievance persists, despite the fact that the United States does not appear to support the forwarding of the Commission of Inquiry’s report to the UN Security Council.) Eritrea resents the United States’ refusal to hold Ethiopia accountable for its continued military aggressions, including the assaults on the border and the bombings of Eritrean territory.

Eritrea is also stung by Washington’s willingness to turn a blind eye to Ethiopian abuses. Despite the Ethiopian regime’s role in the rise of al-Shabaab, Washington has repeatedly praised it for supporting US counterterror efforts.22 Additionally, the Ethiopian regime’s abysmal record on human rights and democracy notwithstanding, Washington has, since 2006, provided it with billions of dollars in economic, budgetary, and humanitarian assistance.23 Despite the Ethiopian army’s long and alarming record of regional and domestic human rights abuses, the United States also provides extensive financial and military support (via the African Union) to Ethiopian troops deployed in Somalia.

Recommendations

These multiple grievances cannot be rectified overnight. However, a couple of key actions could quickly put US relations with Eritrea on a positive trajectory.

1) Lift the UN sanctions on Eritrea

President Isaias was explicitly clear during our meeting in February 2015 that he considers the lifting of the UN Security Council sanctions on Eritrea to be a precondition of any serious effort to improve relations between the two countries. These sanctions should have been lifted years ago—as noted, the UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group has found no substantial violations by Eritrea of international law. Washington should consider, too, that the arbitrary continuation of sanctions on Eritrea, in the absence of any visible wrongdoing by Asmara, will diminish the credibility of sanction regimes in general, and at a time when the impartiality of international justice mechanisms (the International Criminal Court in particular) is widely questioned in Africa.

Lifting the sanctions will, of course, require cooperation from Asmara. But numerous discussions in Asmara have suggested that a visit from the SEMG to Eritrea is not beyond the realm of possibility—provided that Washington makes clear that it is open to the possibility of lifting the sanctions. Washington’s threat to veto the removal of sanctions on Eritrea effectively precludes any attempt by other UN member states to do so.24

Moreover, sanctions do not work. In this multipolar global environment, it is not possible for the United States to isolate Eritrea. Sanctions, verbal condemnations of the government, the United Nation’s Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea, and other such devices have simply compelled the government to give up on the United States and to pivot toward China and the Gulf for support. Indeed, the success of that pivot is the primary political development of the past eighteen months in Eritrea. Asmara has formed strong strategic alliances with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, providing a base for their counterterror efforts in the Red Sea basin.25 It has also scaled up its relations with Egypt, deepened ties to South Africa, and secured a series of new Chinese mining investments.26

2) Reject Ethiopian irredentist claims on Eritrea

The threat to Eritrea from Ethiopia is genuine; the Eritrean government does not simply use it as an excuse to crack down on dissent. The failure of the international community to appreciate the extent to which Ethiopia’s actions have destabilized Eritrea is a serious flaw in our analysis of the Horn. The military threat from Ethiopia is real and pressing. Indeed, Ethiopian aggression toward Eritrea has been steadily escalating over the past eighteen months, and the increased threat of an Ethiopian annexation of Eritrean territory is a major threat to regional stability.

In March 2015, Ethiopia bombed Eritrea twice, striking a military depot in Asmara and killing eight people, and striking the perimeter fence of the Bisha mine (causing no casualties and little damage). Ethiopia’s bombing of the Bisha site, a civilian target and a foreignowned investment, is a clear violation of the Geneva Convention. However, neither Washington nor the UN Security Council so much as commented on the attack. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, has repeatedly announced—both on the floor of the parliament and in Ethiopia’s governmentcontrolled press—that Ethiopia intends to attack Eritrea.27 In June 2016, Ethiopia did exactly as it had announced, initiating a major conflict on the Eritrean border (at the area known as the “Tsorona front”)28 that killed hundreds of soldiers and displaced an unknown number of civilians. Despite Ethiopia’s admission that it initiated the assault, Washington merely called for “both parties” to exercise restraint.29

Since 1998, Eritreans have lived with the threat of a hostile army within its borders. The presence of Ethiopian troops on Eritrean soil has created conditions of constant insecurity and a limbo in which economic and political development have proved all but impossible. The continued closure of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border has done serious damage to Eritrea’s economy: prior to the border war, the vast majority of Eritrea’s trade was with Ethiopia. Since the war, that portion of Eritrea’s gross domestic product has entirely disappeared. And the resulting effort to maintain Eritrea’s defenses has continuously consumed an inordinate amount of its budget, which in turn diminishes Eritrea’s ability to develop its schools, hospitals, and industries.30 The need to maintain a large standing army remains partially responsible for the extension of Eritrea’s program of mandatory military conscription far beyond its intended duration of eighteen months. This practice of mandatory, indefinite military conscription in Eritrea (known as the “National Service”) is the primary objection from international human rights activists.

Asmara does not expect Washington to send troops to its border to enforce the Algiers Agreement. But it would be tremendously helpful for Washington to signal its continuing commitment to the “firm and final” nature of the EEBC ruling on the border and to clearly condemn Ethiopian aggressions when they occur. A Congressional resolution or a simple statement from the State Department could help to accomplish that.

3) De-personalize US policy toward Eritrea

US policy has been derailed by disapproval of President Isaias and his proxies. US officials, from the very top down, have been scalded by their interactions with the Eritrean regime. (For example, even the current US assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, was rebuffed when she sought to extend an olive branch to Asmara at the beginning of her tenure—and many other diplomats have fared worse.) These experiences have created widespread antipathy toward President Isaias and his representatives. In interviews, US officials regularly describe the regime as “recalcitrant,” “irredeemable,” and “impossible” and insist that no engagement with Eritrea is possible as long President Isaias remains in office. Of course, 3.5 million Eritreans31 would benefit from a different point of view—but policymakers and analysts continue to insist that in Eritrea, l’État, c’est lui.

Change in Eritrea is clearly possible, as evidenced by its small but significant warming with Europe, Arab partners, and the increased access it has granted to international journalists and NGOs.

Given the government’s limited finances and bureaucratic capacity, progress has indeed been frustratingly slow. Nevertheless, there are positive steps. Eritrea is undertaking these measures of its own accord—not as a result of foreign pressure, nor in pursuit of foreign funding, which it has often refused. Because the changes are voluntary, they have a better chance of being sustainable.

Eritrea is an authoritarian state, and President Isaias inarguably exerts disproportionate control over national and civic affairs. However, there are factions and differences of opinion within the Eritrean regime— as there are in every government. As in Ethiopia, most of these differences of opinion are carefully contained. But the Eritrean government is not monolithic and is certainly not uniformly evil, incompetent, or intransigent.

Most important, villainizing the regime does not reflect the political realities on the ground. There is no organized opposition inside Eritrea to President Isaias or his government, and little, if any appetite for revolt. There is certainly unhappiness and unspoken dissent inside Eritrea; increasingly, that dissent is voiced aloud. Yet, Eritreans are very much aware that there is no viable alternative to the present government and that lack of alternatives has produced a tangible sense of resignation. As in Ethiopia, the lack of political alternatives is caused by the government’s imprisonment and exile of the best and brightest of the political opposition. However, it remains a fact that the Eritrean opposition is not perceived as more credible than the government, and in the case of any government collapse, a protracted and violent power struggle would likely occur.

4) Let Europe lead

Eritrea has made great progress in improving its relations with individual European nations and with the EU. Because of migration, the EU has a vested interest in Eritrea’s development. That makes Europe an inherently better partner for Eritrea, and Washington would be wise to let Brussels and other European capitals lead the way on development assistance. It would also be prudent for Washington to resist any action that may spoil EU efforts to normalize relations with Eritrea as part of a broader strategy to ease immigration concerns.

The US should be especially supportive of European efforts to support development in Eritrea, since direct development support from the United States to Eritrea would be difficult to achieve and politically problematic. In the first place, delivering US support to Eritrea would likely need to be preceded by negotiations to reestablish an office in the country for the US Agency for International Development. USAID’s preference for high-visibility projects is likely to clash with the Eritrean government’s insistence on self-reliance. (For example, Eritrean officials have frequently expressed horror at the idea of allowing a fleet of the shiny white sports-utility vehicles [SUVs] associated with foreign aid workers into the country. The SUV is a symbol that is regarded with derision across Africa, even more so in Eritrea, where they are politically toxic.) Moreover, negotiations over the form of development assistance would be likely to drag out for years. Even when Eritrea has relatively good relations with a donor—as it does with the EU, for example—the negotiation of aid packages has been a lengthy and fraught affair. In the case of the United States, discussions of aid would likely aggravate diplomatic tensions, not assuage them. However, the United States could and should make smaller gestures—such as lifting travel restrictions on Eritrean officials in the United States—that would encourage reciprocal actions from Asmara.

5) Insist on improvements in the human rights situation in Eritrea—but do not single out Eritrea for criticism

It is inappropriate and counter to US interests to single out Eritrea for criticism on human rights concerns. The situation there is not demonstrably worse than it is in the other nations of the Horn.

Though extensive human rights violations occur in Eritrea, the country is extremely stable and appears to have very low rates of crime or chronic hunger. The populations of Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan experience far higher levels of violence. In terms of repression, Eritrea is on par with two privileged US allies, Ethiopia and Djibouti.32 A recent UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea entirely failed to make the case that Eritrean human rights abuses were either systemic or the result of deliberate government policy, and the report’s allegations have not been pursued by the Human Rights Council.33

This is not to minimize the human rights abuses that do take place in the country, but the narrative of Eritrea as singularly evil, as in the moniker, the “North Korea of Africa,” is not only too simplistic but could also mislead Washington into policy errors.

Eritreans are passionately nationalistic. Despite the virulent tribal and ethnic conflicts plaguing the rest of the region, the Eritrean government appears to have been exceptionally successful in its own nationbuilding project. Eritreans seem largely unified across tribal and religious categories. Eritreans across the world, whether or not they support the government, demonstrate a strong sense of national identity and display pride in their country.

Given this dynamic, the United States should consider the possibility that international criticism of Eritrea— reflected in the shrill condemnations of the Isaias regime, the imposition and continuation of sanctions, the failure to enforce the Algiers Agreement, and continued silence regarding the presence of Ethiopian troops on Eritrean soil—may have counterproductive effects on the ground. Many Eritreans take the insults directed at their government personally, and many are prone to blame Washington rather than Asmara for the current state of affairs in their country. Sanctions and other punitive devices may actually lend credence to government narratives that Eritrea is being persecuted by the international community. Such perceptions can easily lead to increased support for the government, both inside Eritrea and in the diaspora.

Washington must learn to be more even-handed in its response to human rights abuses in the Horn. That is certainly not to say that Washington should stop pressing for human rights reforms in Eritrea—US outrage simply needs to be spread more proportionately around the Horn (louder criticism of Ethiopia’s human rights abuses would also help). And Washington needs to do this regardless of whether it wishes to improve relations with Eritrea, in order to combat the common African perception that the United States dismisses human rights and democracy concerns whenever more important counterterror objectives are in play.

Conclusion

Washington has a strategic interest in repairing relations with Asmara, and the upcoming change in administration offers a convenient opportunity for a reset in relations. Nevertheless, Eritrea has already pivoted successfully toward new alliances in the Gulf and a new economic partnership with China, and its leaders are reluctant to invest scarce diplomatic resources in a hopeless cause. In order to improve relations, a strong signal needs to be sent from Washington to Asmara.

President Isaias and his advisers will not swivel back toward Washington unless they have good reason to do so. However, numerous conversations and meetings in Asmara lead to the conviction that President Isaias would very much like to put his relations with Washington on a more constructive footing. Given the high stakes in the Horn of Africa, and very low level of effort that would be required to set the stage for a much better relationship in the future, it is surely in Washington’s interest to try.

Bronwyn Bruton is is deputy director of the Africa Center and author of many reports, journal essays, and special reports on the Horn of Africa, including the widely-read 2010 Council on Foreign Relations special report Somalia: A New Approach and the recent New York Times op-ed “It’s Bad in Eritrea, but Not That Bad.

1    This issue brief draws on congressional testimony given by the author to the US House
of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations hearing, “Eritrea: A Neglected Regional Threat,” September 14, 2016, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-eritrea-neglected-regional-threat/
2    In March 2016, and after negotiations mediated by Qatar, Eritrea released four Djiboutian prisoners of war, who had been imprisoned since their capture in June 2008. Both
countries were optimistic that the act would be part of a broader warming of relations
between Eritrea and Djibouti. See Salem Solomon, “Eritrea Releases Four Djiboutian
Soldiers After Eight Years Imprisonment,” VOA News, March, 20, 2016, http://www.
voanews.com/a/eritrea-releases-4-djiboutian-soldiers-after-eight-years-imprisonment/3246435.html
. While UNSEMG has had little access to Eritrea, it has monitored
Eritrean activities in Somalia and Djibouti and found no evidence of Eritrea’s continued meddling in Somalia. See footnote 21 for further information
3    Aislinn Laing and Ilya Gridneff, “Kenyan Army Profiting from Illicit
Trade that Props Up al-Shabaab,” Telegraph, November 12, 2015,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/11991497/Kenyan-army-profiting-from-illicit-tradethat-props-up-al-Shabaab.html
4    Patrick McGroarty, “South Sudan’s Kiir Says Uganda Helping to
Fight Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2014, http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303465004579324240269
459308
5    Human Rights Watch, “Ethiopia: State of Emergency Risks
New Abuses,” October 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2016/10/31/ethiopia-state-emergency-risks-new-abuses
6    Through its involvement in the multinational Combined Task Force
151, in coordination with NATO, the European Union, and unilateral
counter-piracy efforts, the United States has been a key player in
reducing the number of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia.
7    Federalism is a controversial system of government in both Ethiopia and Somalia; it is effectively a system of ethnic segregation.
8    Author interviews with Eritrean and former US officials.
9    Aaron Maasho, “Exclusive: Eritrea Reduces Support for alShabaab – UN Report,” Reuters, July 16, 2012, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-eritrea-somalia-un-idUSBRE86F0AK20120716
10    Bronwyn Bruton, “Somalia: A New Approach,” Council on Foreign
Relations Special Report, No. 52, March 2010, http://www.cfr.org/
content/publications/attachments/Somalia_CSR52.pdf
11    “So Much to Fear: War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia,”
Human Rights Watch, December 8, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/
report/2008/12/08/so-much-fear/war-crimes-and-devastation-somalia
12    Bronwyn Bruton and Paul Williams, Counterinsurgency in Somalia:
Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-
2013, report no. 14-5, Joint Special Operations University, ix-110
13    The United States estimates that up to forty Somali-Americans
have succeeded in joining al-Shabaab. These individuals were
radicalized in the United States and traveled to Somalia to join
al-Shabaab, some dying there—and others returning to the United States to face prosecution for aiding a terrorist group. More
recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham has proven adept
at radicalizing Somali-Americans and convincing them to travel
abroad to Syria. See Joshua Meservey, “Exposed: ISIS’ Somali-American Terrorist Pipeline,” National Interest, March 3, 2015,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/exposed-isis%E2%80%99-somali-american-terrorist-pipeline-12352
14    Author interview in Asmara and with US, European, and African
press
15    This is perhaps not surprising, given the limited capacity and
funding available
16    Deutschlandfunk, “INTERVIEW: Mr. Yemane Gebreab with German
Reporter,” RAIMOQCOM, July 15, 2016, http://www.raimoq.com/
interview-mr-yemane-gebreab-with-german-reporter-oliver/
17    Meeting with Ethiopian opposition leaders, August 2016
18    Peter Baker and Jacey Fortin, “Obama, in Ethiopia, Calls Its
Government ‘Democratically-Elected,’” New York Times, July
27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/world/africa/
obama-calls-ethiopian-government-democratically-elected.
html?_r=0
19    Author interviews in Asmara, February 2015
20    Author interviews with State Department officials. In his memoirs,
former US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton describes the efforts of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Jendayi Frazer to overturn the border ruling in Ethiopia’s favor. See
Michela Wrong, “America’s Latest African Blunder,” Slate, November
29, 2007, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2007/11/americas_latest_african_blunder.html
21    The UNSEMG has been denied access to Eritrea since 2009.
Instead, it conducts research from neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti,
and Somalia, the latter of which is the alleged location of Eritrean
meddling
22    Mehari Tadele Maru, “The Secret to Ethiopia’s Counter Terrorism
Success,” Al Jazeera, July 31, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2015/07/secret-ethiopia-counterterrorism-success-150728112317438.html
23    “Ethiopia,” Security Assistance Monitor, last accessed on November 22, 2016, http://securityassistance.org/africa/ethiopia
24    Author’s interviews with representatives of UN member states
and UN diplomats and staff
25    United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, “Report
of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014): Eritrea,” October 19, 2015,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_802.pdf, p. 3
26    Edmund Blair, “Eritrea Looks to Build Mining Sector to Kick-Start
Economy,” Reuters, February 26, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-eritrea-mining-idUSKCN0VZ13S
27    “Ethiopia Threatens Action against Eritrea,” Sudan Tribune, July
8, 2016, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55622
28    Bronwyn Bruton, “A Frightening Flare-up on the Ethiopia/Eritrea
Border, and Another Resounding Silence from Washington,” AfricaSource, June 14, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
africasource/a-frightening-flare-up-on-the-ethiopia-eritrea-border-and-another-resounding-silence-from-washington
29    US Department of State, “The United States Calls for Restraint
on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border,” June 14, 2016, http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258489.htm
30    For more on Eritrea’s economy, see Seth Kaplan, Eritrea’s Economy: Ideology and Opportunity, Atlantic Council, December 2016,
http://www.publications.atlanticcouncil.org/eritrea-economy/
31    Estimates of the size of the Eritrean population vary widely, but
Eritrean government officials regularly cited a population size of
3.5 million during the author’s interviews in Asmara
32    In Freedom House’s annual “Freedom in the World” survey, for
example, Ethiopia rates as “Not Free” (ranking a seven, the worst
possible score, on political rights and a six on civil liberties). Djibouti also ranks “Not Free,” with a six on political rights and a six
on civil liberties. Eritrea, by comparison, is “Not Free” with a seven on both political rights and civil liberties. See Freedom House,
“Freedom in the World 2016,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/freedom-world-2016
; in its “Freedom on the
Net” index, Freedom House ranks Ethiopia as behind only China,
Syria, and Iran for its restrictions on access to information and
the internet (Eritrea and Djibouti were not rated). Lily Kuo, “Only
China, Syria, and Iran Rank Worse in Internet Freedom Than Ethiopia,” Quartz Africa, November 16, 2016, http://qz.com/838908/
internet-freedom-in-ethiopia-is-the-fourth-worst-in-the-worldafter-iran-syria-and-china/
; Freedom House, “Freedom on the
Net 2016,” 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/
freedom-net-2016
33    Bronwyn Bruton, “It’s Bad in Eritrea, but Not That Bad,” New York
Times, June 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/opinion/its-bad-in-eritrea-but-not-that-bad.html

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Bruton Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs Committee on Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-testifies-before-house-foreign-affairs-committee-on-eritrea/ Wed, 14 Sep 2016 15:37:00 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-testifies-before-house-foreign-affairs-committee-on-eritrea/ Read the full testimony here.

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Read the full testimony here.

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Bruton in the New York Times: It’s Bad in Eritrea, but Not That Bad https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-in-the-new-york-times-it-s-bad-in-eritrea-but-not-that-bad/ Thu, 23 Jun 2016 18:30:27 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-in-the-new-york-times-it-s-bad-in-eritrea-but-not-that-bad/ Read the full article here.

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Read the full article here.

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Bruton Quoted by the Eritrean Ministry of Information on the COI Eritrea Report https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-by-the-eritrean-ministry-of-information-on-the-coi-eritrea-report/ Thu, 23 Jun 2016 14:54:27 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/bruton-quoted-by-the-eritrean-ministry-of-information-on-the-coi-eritrea-report/ Read the full press release here.

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Read the full press release here.

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A Frightening Flare-up on the Ethiopia/Eritrea Border, and Another Resounding Silence from Washington https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/a-frightening-flare-up-on-the-ethiopia-eritrea-border-and-another-resounding-silence-from-washington/ Tue, 14 Jun 2016 21:04:46 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/a-frightening-flare-up-on-the-ethiopia-eritrea-border-and-another-resounding-silence-from-washington/ According to Eritrean officials, in the early hours of Sunday, June 12, Ethiopian forces launched an unprovoked assault over the Eritrean border at the town of Tsorana. Heavy fighting lasted throughout the day and continued after dark, when the Eritrean forces managed to launch a counter-offensive that ended the assault. Near midnight on June 12, […]

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According to Eritrean officials, in the early hours of Sunday, June 12, Ethiopian forces launched an unprovoked assault over the Eritrean border at the town of Tsorana. Heavy fighting lasted throughout the day and continued after dark, when the Eritrean forces managed to launch a counter-offensive that ended the assault.

Near midnight on June 12, Eritrea’s information minister released a press statement accusing Ethiopia of the attack, and stating that “the purpose and ramifications of this attack are unclear.” Privately, officials expressed concern that the skirmish could presage a return to full-scale war.

Eritrean officials suggest a review of satellite images of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border, which they claim will show that Ethiopia has been building up its forces over the past two months. That would not be surprising, as Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has repeatedly and very recently warned of his intention to use “proportionate military force” against Eritrea in response to its “provocations,” though the United Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) has found little evidence of destabilizing acts by Eritrea in recent years.

The United States, EU, and United Nations Security Council should act quickly to ensure that Sunday’s border skirmish does not escalate further. And for once it should point the finger of blame firmly at Ethiopia. Past aggressions by Ethiopia have failed to draw censure from the international community, but the refusal to assign blame in this latest incident would dangerously threaten stability in the Horn. The details of the current conflict may be unclear, but Ethiopia has been frank about its desire to punish Eritrea militarily. Given that, the dire escalation of the conflict on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border was utterly predictable. And the international community is complicit in this escalation, because it has consistently failed to censure Ethiopia for its past aggressions.

Who is to blame?

Ethiopia has denied that it initiated the conflict at the Tsorona front on Sunday, but only weakly. When questioned, Ethiopia’s information minister, Getachew Reda, initially claimed to know nothing about the fighting. Later, he vaguely accused Eritrea of provoking the skirmish, calling the fighting “an Eritrean initiative,” and referring to “an incident on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border” and “a provocation”—one that apparently triggered a rapid and unprecedentedly large-scale deployment of Ethiopian heavy artillery and tanks.

Gedab News has subsequently offered what seems, on its face, to be a fairly credible account of what might have occurred. The account alleges that Eritrean forces chased a group of deserters onto Ethiopian territory, where they skirmished with at least three of the Eritrean rebel groups that are being illicitly backed by Ethiopia. The article notes that neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia would want the details of such an incident to slip out, since it suggests not insubstantial misconduct by both sides. But whether or not this particular account is accurate, it’s fairly likely that some minor incident along these lines occurred on Sunday at the Tsorona front—as such incidents do, with some regularity, along the militarized border—and that Ethiopia seized the opportunity to pursue Eritrea’s forces back across the border with tanks and heavy artillery, apparently causing a substantial loss of life. The pursuit of Eritrean forces over the border (which has not been demarcated due to Ethiopia’s refusal to comply with the terms of a 2000 peace treaty and subsequent boundary determination) was predicted by Hailemariam’s ongoing threats to punish Eritrea with military force.

I cannot of course rule out the possibility that Eritrea may be single-handedly responsible for this latest border skirmish. But Ethiopia’s failure to offer any specific explanation of what Eritrea has actually done to provoke such a significant strike should be regarded as a red flag of blame, as should Getachew’s press statement in Addis Ababa on Tuesday morning, in which he argued that Eritrea simply deserved to be attacked: “We believe that the regime doesn’t have any moral ground whatsoever to complain to the international community that it has been attacked because it has all along been working to invite such an attack from any responsible country in the region.”

Getachew then referred to Eritrea’s efforts to “destabilize” the region. This is a constant Ethiopian refrain, but because he made no specific allegation, it remains unclear what Ethiopia thinks Eritrea has done to provoke an attack.

(The SEMG is charged with monitoring the arms embargoes on Somalia and Eritrea, and routinely investigates Eritrea’s activities in the region. For the past several years, it has reported that both Ethiopia and Eritrea have continued to fund rebel and opposition groups operating on each other’s territories. But it has failed to uncover any significant destabilizing acts or violations by Eritrea. And there is no doubt that the volume of funding provided to rebel groups by Ethiopia vastly exceeds that which is provided by the much smaller, and poorer, Eritrea.)

Ethiopia has recently complained about efforts by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to improve Eritrea’s ports, which they hope to use as a launching pad for assaults against Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen. But there is no evidence that the UAE cooperation will adversely affect Ethiopia’s security. Unrelatedly, Ethiopia has also recently accused Eritrea of fomenting protests by Oromos in the southern part of the country. But that claim is wholly unsubstantiated, has been denied by the Oromo protesters, and is routinely dismissed by security analysts and human rights investigators.

Earlier this year, in March, Ethiopia’s prime minister publically threatened to take military action against Eritrea in response to various alleged acts of “provocation” and “destabilization.” It is very likely that the attack on the Eritrean border is simply a fulfillment of what was, in effect, a public pledge to escalate the conflict with Eritrea at the earliest opportunity.

Previous Ethiopian assaults on Eritrea

Ethiopia has a history of attacks on Eritrea. In March 2012, Ethiopia illegally sent troops across the Eritrean border to attack three military bases that it claimed were operated by the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front. In March 2015, Ethiopia bombed two targets in Eritrea, apparently in retaliation for an EU decision to provide development funding to Eritrea. (Neither Eritrean nor Western diplomats will consent to discuss this incident on the record, but the basic facts of the incident are already in the public arena.) Eight soldiers were killed in the strike on a military depot in Asmara; and in violation of the rules of war, the other strike was directed at a civilian target, a Canadian-operated mining venture at Bisha. No-one was killed in that attack, and it appears to have been intended to undermine investor confidence in Eritrea’s security.

The United States, European nations, and the United Nations Security Council failed to censure Ethiopia for these attacks—nor have any of these bodies respond to Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s very public threats to use military force against Eritrea (for example, in speeches made in October 2015, November 2015, and March 2016). This failure to contain Ethiopia’s repeated aggression has unquestionably contributed to a sense of impunity on the part of Ethiopia, which is also considered an essential partner of US counterterror efforts in the Horn of Africa region. Because of Ethiopia’s key role in US security efforts, Washington has typically avoided criticizing Ethiopia’s regional aggressions, as well as its escalating domestic civil and human rights violations.

Who benefits from the skirmish?

Some analysts have argued that Eritrea stands to benefit from the conflict, because “it diverts attention away from the alleged crimes against humanity, and [justifies Eritrea’s] need for an enormous and compulsory conscription,” according to Charlotte King of the Economist Intelligence Unit.

That could be so – I would be the first to admit that the motivations of both the Eritrean and Ethiopian regimes are inscrutable to distant eyes. But I would assess that the Eritrean regime has little to gain from contributing to a media narrative that is already focused on its “bad behavior” at home and in the Horn. And, given the ongoing and illegal occupation of Eritrean territory by Ethiopian troops, on top of the aggressions cited above, Eritrea does not have to work that hard to prove that has significant national security concerns stemming from its border conflict with Ethiopia. If anything, media headlines about the border are likely to draw more attention to the crimes against humanity charges, by keeping Eritrea’s affairs in the news.

Giving Ethiopia an excuse to restart the border war would also be a dangerous gamble by Eritrea. In the years since the last border war ended (in 2000) Ethiopia has been flooded with development and military assistance, the latter given by the US and EU in exchange for Ethiopia’s participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. At the same time, Eritrea has been starved of both economic investment and development support, and has lost hundreds of thousands of youth to migration. Both factors have no doubt caused a substantial decline in Eritrea’s military capabilities. If Ethiopia and Eritrea go back to war, it’s clear who would win. And it would be suicide for Eritrea to provoke such a conflict at time when the world’s opprobrium is focused on Asmara. The odds of any nation or intergovernmental body rising to Eritrea’s defense is painfully slim – as the muted response to Sunday’s fighting has shown.

If Ethiopia wants a war, on the other hand, there’s good reason to think that there will never be a better time. The US national security advisor, Susan Rice, is a committed defender of the Ethiopian regime and will remain in her office for only a few more months. With the allegations of crimes against humanity, international criticism of Eritrean has certainly plateaued. And Ethiopia is facing a worrying pile-up of domestic problems, particularly among its Muslim and Oromo populations, but also in the Gambella and Somali regions, among others. The temptation to quell domestic unrest by uniting the population against an external foe must be fairly strong, and Ethiopia’s Tigrean elite has long desired absolution for its loss of Eritrea and, in particular, the port of Asab. “A second round of full-scale war between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be ruled out,” Ethiopia’s information minister says. 

No pragmatic analyst of US foreign policy could demand that Washington exercise its responsibility to ensure the implementation of the Algiers Agreement, which Ethiopia has violated for the past thirteen years. No matter how just that demand, no matter how long overdue, no matter how profoundly such action would increase the stability and peacefulness of the Horn, it is simply not realistic to expect Washington to take up this burden at a time of global economic instability and ever-escalating security concerns. But there is no excuse for Washington’s silence in the face of Ethiopia’s clearly announced intention to restart hostilities against Eritrea, and in the face of its continued military aggressions. Ethiopia is testing the waters for a return to war.

For now, the Ethiopian forces have withdrawn, and it is to be hoped that Washington is exerting pressure on Addis Ababa behind closed doors. Because: If Ethiopia and Eritrea go back to war, Washington, the European Union, and in particular the UN Security Council, will have no one but themselves to blame. 

Bronwyn Bruton is deputy director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council

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What the UN Gets Wrong About Rights in Eritrea https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-the-un-gets-wrong-about-rights-in-eritrea/ Tue, 07 Jun 2016 21:11:00 +0000 http://live-atlanticcouncil-wr.pantheonsite.io/what-the-un-gets-wrong-about-rights-in-eritrea/ A finding of crimes against humanity would be indefensible, said the Atlantic Council’s Bronwyn Bruton A UN panel’s expected conclusion that crimes against humanity are being committed in Eritrea would be legally indefensible because of the flawed methodology in the compilation of the report and would further erode the credibility of the International Criminal Court […]

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A finding of crimes against humanity would be indefensible, said the Atlantic Council’s Bronwyn Bruton

A UN panel’s expected conclusion that crimes against humanity are being committed in Eritrea would be legally indefensible because of the flawed methodology in the compilation of the report and would further erode the credibility of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Africa, said the Atlantic Council’s Bronwyn Bruton.

The UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea (COIE) will present its findings on June 8. “Based on my interactions with the Commission, I do expect the COIE to recommend that the government of Eritrea be referred to the ICC for crimes against humanity, despite the weakness of the evidence,” said Bruton, deputy director of the Council’s Africa Center. [Update: The COIE said “widespread” human rights abuses have been committed in Eritrea and should be referred to the International Criminal Court as crimes against humanity.].

The report will likely name Isaias Afwerki, who has served as Eritrea’s president since the country won independence in 1991 after a three-decade-long war with Ethiopia, as well as generals and senior-ranking politicians in the country, she added.

The United Nations Human Rights Council established the Commission in 2014 to investigate human rights abuses in Eritrea. A year later, the Commission issued a scathing report saying the Eritrean government’s systematic use of extrajudicial killing, torture, rape, indefinite national service, and forced labor may amount to crimes against humanity.

“The [People’s Front for Democracy and Justice], the ruling and only party in Eritrea, has held on to power by progressively dismantling or refraining from implementing reforms aimed at establishing democracy and rule of law in the country,” the report concluded. Public freedoms have been eroded, a rule of fear has been established, and opposition is not tolerated, it added.

Based on its findings, the COIE’s mandate was renewed for another year in July of 2015, and the team was charged with determining whether crimes against humanity have taken place in Eritrea.

Eritrea’s government, which prevented members of the Commission from visiting the country, has rejected the report and argued that the creation of the COIE violates international law by unfairly singling out Eritrea for scrutiny. From the Eritrean government’s point of view, engaging with the Commission would lend legitimacy to a process that is unlawful and politically motivated, said Bruton.

“I am critical of Eritrea for not engaging more with the Commission of Inquiry because I have visited Eritrea many times and I believe that if the Commission had been allowed into the country, they would have had a very different impression of what is happening there,” said Bruton.

The Eritrean government has cooperated with the UN’s Universal Periodic Review—a human rights review that all countries are subjected to—and has recently permitted a separate team of officials from the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit Eritrea to examine the human rights conditions in the country.

A flood of refugees

The Commission has said indefinite military conscription, which it compared to slavery, was in part to blame for the state of human rights in Eritrea. Thousands of Eritreans flee the country every month. In fact, in the first six months of 2015, Eritreans were the second-largest number of migrants (after Syrians and on par with Afghans) to flee to Europe, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

“There has been a lot of talk about how Eritrea, a nation of 3.5 million people, loses 60,000 people a year to migration, which must be proof in itself that terrible human rights abuses are taking place there,” said Bruton.

“However, Puerto Rico is also a territory of 3.5 million people, and it loses around 50,000 people a year because of the economic crisis it faces. The mere fact that 60,000 people are leaving Eritrea isn’t necessarily proof of a massive human rights crisis. Puerto Rican migration is of course facilitated by access to the United States; but Eritreans have also, until extremely recently, been granted automatic asylum rights in Europe. There are push and pull factors at play.”

“The costs of migration are high; but so too are the rewards for those who can gain residence in the rich countries of Europe,” she added.

Many Eritreans who flee their homeland undertake hazardous journeys through Libya, Egypt’s tumultuous Sinai Peninsula, and across the Mediterranean in their desire to reach Europe. Many fall prey to human traffickers who imprison them, deny them food and water, subject them to torture, and demand ransoms from their families. A disproportionately large number of Eritreans have perished attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea.

The European Union, which is grappling with a historic influx of migrants, in March struck a controversial deal to send to Turkey Syrian migrants who fled across the Aegean Sea to Europe. The Guardian reported this week that the EU is also planning to work with the governments of Sudan and Eritrea to stem the flow of migrants from both the African nations.

“The idea of simply shoveling refugees back to Eritrea where they don’t have economic prospects and face an uncertain political future is problematic, and could in fact be destabilizing to Eritrea, which has—counter to the claims of the COIE—actively promoted migration over the years, both as a source of remittances and as a kind of pressure release valve, an alternative to those who are most frustrated with the regime,” said Bruton.

“It is far preferable for the European Union to seek to engage with Eritrea to promote development and to improve standards of living in the country,” she noted.

Bronwyn Bruton spoke in an interview with the New Atlanticist’s Ashish Kumar Sen. Here are excerpts from the interview.

Q: In 2015, a United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea found that the Eritrean government has committed “systemic, widespread, and gross human rights violations.” The COIE’s new report will be released on June 8. Do you expect the report to conclude that crimes against humanity have been committed?

Bruton: Based on my interactions with the Commission, I do expect the COIE to recommend that the government of Eritrea be referred to the ICC for crimes against humanity, despite the weakness of the evidence. In particular, the charges of forced labor would be very hard to substantiate and bring to trial. When you think of forced labor in Africa you tend to think of people chained underground in diamond mines, not extended military service or office work, which is typically the case in Eritrea.

I also feel deeply worried about the impact that Eritrea’s referral to the International Criminal Court would have in Africa, where there is already a backlash against Western human rights mechanisms, and in particular a strong push within the African Union—not by pariah states but by strong Western allies like Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda, and Kenya—to withdraw the continent’s nations en masse from the Rome Statute.

Q: Why is that?

Bruton: There are complaints from the African nations that the ICC has disproportionately—in fact more or less exclusively—targeted African leaders for human rights abuses while giving other continents a pass. There’s an impression that these prosecutions are politically motivated, neo-colonial, or even overtly racist. I fear that the COIE’s referral of Eritrea on charges of crimes against humanity will simply inflame tensions against the ICC, because it does appear to be politically motivated. Why, for example, is Eritrea being targeted by a Commission of Inquiry, when Ethiopia and South Sudan are guilty of similar or worse human rights abuses?

There are also a lot of problems with the Commission of Inquiry’s research methodology in producing the original report. The Commission refused to consider the academic literature on Eritrea; refused to use press reports; refused to speak with experts who’d traveled recently to the country; refused to speak to UN staff and Western diplomats inside the country; and refused to consider the testimony of many thousands of Eritreans who supported the government. They spoke only to refugees who self-identified as having suffered violations of their rights, and because Sudan and Djibouti refused (like Eritrea) to host the COIE, the team was only able to do field research in Ethiopia, which is effectively at war with Eritrea. Obviously, this is shockingly poor scholarship—if a college undergrad tried to ignore all academic scholarship and spoke only to people who agreed with him, he’d get flunked out of school. But this methodology might nevertheless send Eritrea to the ICC. And it has, not surprisingly, provoked a strong sense of outrage among many Eritreans, and I think it will add to this narrative in Africa that the ICC, and Western human rights organizations more broadly, are unjust institutions.

The COIE has spent the second year of its mandate trying to address some of its methodological flaws by speaking to a few experts and a handful of “pro-government” diaspora, but my honest sense is those efforts are too little, too late. I testified before the COIE in March 2016, and was told that the Commission was uninterested in visiting Eritrea because its conclusions were already drawn.

The primary problem with the Commission’s original report is that it failed, in my opinion, to prove that systemic human rights abuses were taking place. The COIE has produced a laundry list of human rights violations that have taken place in the twenty-five years since Eritrea’s independence—but as Western diplomats in Eritrea have privately pointed out, you could examine any country in East Africa and come up with a list of human rights abuses that is four or five or six hundred pages long. The COIE’s report didn’t indicate clearly when most of those abuses had taken place—yesterday or a decade ago?—and also didn’t convincingly demonstrate that the abuses were systemic and ordered by the government, instead of being bad behavior by individual, war-traumatized people in an impoverished country. And I don’t believe that the ICC could meet that burden either, which raises the specter of another failed prosecution, along the lines of the Kenya debacle. I don’t think that the ICC’s mandate in Africa could survive that. So, frankly, I feel strongly that human rights defenders should be wary of pushing the Human Rights Council or the ICC in that direction.

I am critical of Eritrea for not engaging more with the Commission of Inquiry because I have visited Eritrea many times and I believe that if the Commission had been allowed into the country, they would have had a very different impression of what is happening there.

I have made five trips to Eritrea in roughly the past year and have had a good opportunity to observe the country at close hand. Some veteran Horn of Africa reporters—Mary Harper of the BBC and Colette Braekman of Le Soir—have also visited Eritrea very recently and reported positively on the situation there. In particular, and in spite of the COIE’s assertion that diaspora members who return to Eritrea face arbitrary imprisonment and torture, they report that Asmara is flooded by thousands of returnees who have come back to celebrate independence. They have spoken freely, and on camera, with dozens of Eritreans about the political situation in the country, despite the COIE’s assertion that Eritreans exist in a climate of fear without the ability to speak their minds.

I do believe that terrible human rights abuses take place in Eritrea, as they occur throughout the Horn of Africa. There is an urgent need for improvement in human rights and democracy in that country, and I certainly believe that government officials have been cavalier about addressing human rights abuses in the military and in the National Service program. But I do not believe that the human rights situation described in the Commission of Inquiry’s report is reflective of the reality on the ground. The COIE’s claim that Eritrea maintains a “shoot to kill” policy on the border is an especially egregious example—I’ve never heard of any meaningful evidence that would support that claim, except perhaps in a few, highly militarized spaces along the border, where Eritrea is actively in conflict with its neighbors. But even there, the evidence seems thin.

Q: Do you expect the Commission to name names?

Bruton: Yes. Eritrea has been governed by a single person—Isaias Afwerki—since and even before independence. If there is a case to be made that crimes against humanity are occurring, and again I dispute whether that is appropriate, then I would expect the COIE to name Afwerki, and possibly a number of generals and senior-ranking politicians in the country.

Q: Why has the government been reluctant to give the Commission access?

Bruton: Eritrea has been a victim of a number of politically-motivated efforts to undermine the government. That includes sanctions that were put on Eritrea in 2010 for supporting al-Shabaab, which have dragged on for years despite an utter lack of evidence that Eritrea has continued to support the group after providing it with some early, opportunistic support. The fact that the Security Council’s sanctions have been maintained for so many years despite an utter lack of any evidence of Eritrean wrongdoing has created a (not wholly unjustified) conviction in Asmara that these UN mechanisms are created to punish Eritrea, not to independently pursue the truth. The government’s perspective is, roughly, that the Monitoring Group and the COIE are not about terrorism, or about human rights, but are out to punish Eritrea for being in a situation of no-peace-no-war with Ethiopia, which has illegally occupied Eritrean territory since 2002, and the international community is taking Ethiopia’s side because Ethiopia is larger and because it supports US counterterror concerns. So, from their point of view, engaging with the Commission would simply lend legitimacy to a process that is inherently biased against them.

Q: Did the Eritrean government take any measures to improve the human rights situation following the 2015 report?

Bruton: Eritrea has consistently cooperated with the Universal Periodic Review, which is different from the Commission of Inquiry. It is a UN body, but the difference is the Universal Periodic Review is something that all countries submit to, and since Asmara doesn’t feel unjustly targeted by the UPR’s requirements, it has largely cooperated. It is important to emphasize that because we are often given the impression that Eritrea never cooperates with human rights research or human rights groups. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also recently visited and gained access to a prison. These are small steps in the right direction, but important to recognize, because they suggest that if human rights activists were to take a different, less combative approach, they might be able to work constructively with Asmara to improve the rights situation in the country.

Q: Has the Eritrean government been given a chance to present its side to the Commission?

Bruton: The government has not attempted to work with the COIE, for the reasons I’ve described above. But one of Asmara’s major complaints against the Commission is its refusal to allow pro-government members of the Eritrean diaspora to give testimony. I understand that there have been thousands and thousands of such requests from North America alone. Perhaps because of the volume of these requests, the Commission has not spoken to many of these people. On the other hand, they have spoken to hundreds of people who have offered testimony of human rights abuse. So the criticism of the Commission is that they have taken an entirely one-sided point of view. Again, on that point, Eritrea itself is more than partially to blame. But I also think that the COIE could and should have done much more to address these accusations of bias.

Q: Eritreans make up one of the largest groups of refugees fleeing to Europe. What are your thoughts on the EU plan to reportedly work with the governments of Sudan and Eritrea to stem the flow of these migrants?

Bruton: I believe that the key to improving the situation of human rights in Eritrea is engagement with the current regime to promote development and democratic governance. It will simply be impossible to reform Eritrea’s controversial National Service Program, which the COIE has described as forced labor, without improving the economy. Simply releasing those people to joblessness would cause insecurity, and of course the country would completely cease functioning, since National Service workers staff all of the schools and government offices.

The EU should be working with Eritrea to promote development on Eritrea’s terms. This may not be entirely palatable to European nations, but there is no alternative. There is no viable opposition in Eritrea, and continually adding stress to the current regime in Asmara, for example through sanctions and indictments, is likely to simply make Eritreans more miserable without producing any real change.

There has been a lot of talk about how Eritrea, a nation of 3.5 million people, loses 60,000 people a year to migration, which must be proof in itself that terrible human rights abuses are taking place there.

However, Puerto Rico is also a territory of 3.5 million people, and it loses 50,000 people a year because of the economic crisis it faces. The mere fact that 60,000 people are leaving Eritrea isn’t necessarily proof of a massive human rights crisis. Puerto Rican migration is of course facilitated by access to the United States; but Eritreans have also, until extremely recently, been granted automatic asylum rights in Europe. There are push and pull factors at play.

The costs of migration are high; but so too are the rewards for those who can gain residence in the rich countries of Europe.

When it comes to the treatment of Eritrean refugees in the future, my view is that repatriating them arbitrarily is problematic. It is false to say that people from the diaspora don’t regularly go back to Eritrea; they do. Thousands of wealthy diasporans were just back for the twenty-fifth independence celebrations, which I witnessed first-hand.

Nevertheless, the idea of simply shoveling refugees back to Eritrea where they don’t have economic prospects and face an uncertain political future is problematic, and could in fact be destabilizing to Eritrea, which has—counter to the claims of the COIE—actively promoted migration over the years, both as a source of remittances and as a kind of pressure release valve, an alternative to those who are most frustrated with the regime.

It is far preferable for the European Union to seek to engage with Eritrea to promote development and to improve standards of living in the country.

I am hopeful that the situation in Eritrea will improve. But I also think that a good outcome depends on more constructive efforts by the EU and the United States to improve the economy in Eritrea and to repair the country’s sense of isolation and grievance. Look, I can certainly understand that people in European and American statehouses hate the idea of making nice to President Isaias. But it’s not about him—it’s about the 3.5 million people living in Eritrea with him. They deserve better, and the naming and shaming approach simply isn’t going to help them.

Ashish Kumar Sen is deputy director, editorial, at the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on Twitter @AshishSen.

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