Kenya is a prime example: In 2007, a local telecommunications provider launched a form of mobile money called M-PESA, which enabled peer-to-peer money transfers between mobile phones and became wildly successful. Within five years, it grew to fifteen million users, with a deposit value approaching almost one billion dollars. To address rising security concerns, in 2013, the Kenyan government implemented a law requiring every citizen to officially register the SIM card (for their cell phone) using a government identification (ID). The measure was enforced swiftly, leading to the freezing of millions of SIM cards. Over ten years later, SIM card ID registration laws have become common across Africa, with over fifty countries adopting such regulations. 

But that is not the end of the story. In parallel, a practice called third-party SIM registration has become rampant, in which cell phone users register their SIM cards using someone else’s ID, such as a friend’s or a family member’s. 

Our recent research at Carnegie Mellon University, based on in-depth user studies in Kenya and Tanzania, found that this phenomenon of third-party SIM registration has both unexpected origins and unintended consequences. Many individuals in those countries face systemic challenges in obtaining a government ID. Moreover, some participants in our study reported having privacy concerns. They felt uncomfortable sharing their ID information with mobile money agents, who could repurpose that information for scams, harassment, or other unintended uses. Other participants felt “frustrated” by a process that was “cumbersome.” As a result, many users prefer to register a SIM card with another person’s ID rather than use or obtain their own ID.

Third-party SIM registration plainly undermines the effectiveness of the public policy and has additional, downstream effects. Telecommunications companies end up collecting “know your customer” information that is not reliable, which can impede law enforcement investigations in the case of misconduct. For example, one of our study subjects shared the story of a friend lending their ID for third-party registration, and later being arrested for the alleged crimes of the actual user of the SIM card. 

A core implication of our research is that the Kenyan government’s goals did not fully take into account the realities of the target population—or the feasibility of the measures that Kenya and Tanzania proposed. In response, people invented their own workarounds, thus potentially introducing new vulnerabilities and avenues for fraud.

Good policy, bad consequences 

Several other case studies demonstrate how even well-intentioned regulations can have unintended consequences and practical problems if they do not appropriately consider security, privacy and usability together. 

• Uganda: Much like our findings in Kenya and Tanzania, a biometric digital identity program in Uganda has considerable unintended consequences. Specifically, it risks excluding fifteen million Ugandans “from accessing essential public services and entitlements” because they do not have access to a national digital identity card there. While the digitization of IDs promises to offer certain security features, it also has potential downsides for data privacy and risks further marginalizing vulnerable groups who are most in need of government services.
  
• Europe: Across the European Union (EU), a landmark privacy law called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been critical for advancing data protection and has become a benchmark for regulatory standards worldwide. But GDPR’s implementation has had unforeseen effects such as some websites blocking EU users. Recent studies have also highlighted various usability issues that may thwart the desired goals. For example, opting out of data collection through app permissions and setting cookie preferences is an option for users. But this option is often exclusionary and inconvenient, resulting in people categorically waiving their privacy for the sake of convenience.
  
• United States (health law): Within the United States, the marquee federal health privacy law passed in 1996 (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known as HIPAA) was designed to protect the privacy and security of individuals’ medical information. But it also serves as an example of laws that can present usability challenges for patients and healthcare providers alike. For example, to comply with HIPAA, many providers still require the use of ink signatures and fax machines. Not only are technologies somewhat antiquated and cumbersome (thereby slowing information sharing)—they also pose risks arising from unsecured fax machines and misdialed phone numbers, among other factors.
  
• Jamaica: Both Jamaica and Kenya have had to halt national plans to launch a digital ID in light of privacy and security issues. Kenya already lost over $72 million from a prior project that was launched in 2019, which failed because of serious concerns related to privacy and security. In the meantime, fraud continues to be a considerable problem for everyday citizens: Jamaica has incurred losses of more than $620 million from fraud since 2018.
  
• United States [tax system]: The situation in Kenya and Jamaica mirrors the difficulties encountered by other digital ID programs. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had to hold off plans for facial recognition based on concerns about the inadequate privacy measures, as well as usability concerns—like long verification wait times, low accuracy for certain groups, and the lack of offline options. The stalled program has resulted in missed opportunities for other technologies that could have allowed citizens greater convenience in accessing tax-related services and public benefits. Even after investing close to $187 million towards biometric identification, the IRS has not made much progress.
  

Collectively, a key takeaway from these international experiences is that when policymakers fail to simultaneously balance (or even consider) usability, privacy, and security, the progress of major government initiatives and the use of digitization to achieve important policy goals is hampered. In addition to regulatory and legislative challenges, delaying or canceling initiatives due to privacy and usability concerns can lead to erosion in public trust, increased costs and delays, and missed opportunities for other innovations.

Policy as product design

Going forward, one pivotal way for government decision makers to avoid pitfalls like the ones laid out above is to start thinking like product designers. Focusing on the most immediate policy goals is rarely enough to understand the practical and technological dimensions of how that policy will interact with the real world.

That does not mean, of course, that policymakers must all become experts in creating software products or designing user interfaces. But it does mean that some of the ways that product designers tend to think about big projects could inform effective public policy.

First, policymakers should embrace user studies to better understand the preferences and needs of citizens as they interact digitally with governmental programs and services. While there are multiple ways user studies can be executed, the first often includes upfront qualitative and quantitative research to understand the core behavioral drivers and systemic barriers to access. These could be complemented with focus groups, particularly with marginalized communities and populations who are likely to be disproportionately affected by any unintended outcomes of tech policy. 

Second, like early-stage technology products that are initially rolled out to an early group of users (known as “beta-testing”), policymakers could benefit from pilot testing to encourage early-stage feedback. 

Third, regulators—just like effective product designers—should consider an iterative process whereby they solicit feedback, implement changes to a policy or platform, and then repeat the process. This allows for validation of the regulation and makes room for adjustments and continuous improvements as part of an agency’s rulemaking process.

Lastly, legislators and regulators alike should conduct more regular tabletop exercises to see how new policies might play out in times of crisis. The executive branch regularly does such “tabletops” in the context of national security emergencies. But the same principles could apply to understanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities or user responses before implementing public policies or programs at scale.

In the end, a product design mindset will not completely eliminate the sorts of problems we have highlighted in Kenya, the United States, and beyond. However, it can help to identify the most pressing usability, security, and privacy problems before governments spend time and treasure to implement regulations or programs that may not fit the real world.

Karen Sowon is a user experience researcher and post doctoral research associate at Carnegie Mellon University.

JP Schnapper-Casteras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the founder and managing partner at Schnapper-Casteras, PLLC.

Giulia Fanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

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Less freedom, weaker states, more conflict: can that cycle be broken?

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The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.  

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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Despite various peace initiatives undertaken by the international community—including efforts by the United States, Arab countries, and other African nations—regional and international responses have thus far failed to produce any meaningful resolution. In seeking to resolve the war, the absence of accountability for supporters of Burhan and Hemedti looms large, and foreign powers have a crucial role to play. Peace efforts have been unsuccessful because mediator Arab countries—like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—are not acting in good faith but are supporting opposing sides. Halting external support to the generals is crucial to achieving peace in Sudan and setting it on the path to civilian-led rule. 

A fertile ground for foreign meddling

Sudan’s civil war is a battle for legitimacy and power between two ambitious generals, each wielding a distinct advantage but without sufficient power to achieve victory. Currently, al-Burhan positions himself as Sudan’s legitimate ruler and has Cairo’s support. Conversely, Hemedti—with backing from the UAE and control over Sudan’s goldmines—leverages the advantage gained from former President Omar al-Bashir’s coup-proofing policies, which gave the RSF independence from civilian and SAF control. He not only rejects Burhan’s claim, but is determined to emerge as the sole ruler of Sudan.  

The intricate power dynamics of smaller, independent militias in Sudan add layers of complexity and uncertainty, creating an anti-peace equation that outside forces could easily exploit through proxies.

While Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have proven ineffective in stopping Sudan’s war, they play a significant role in its continuation. All three countries have vital interests in Sudan, motivating them to choose sides that will maximize their benefit, even if it undermines Sudan’s. 

Egyptian President Fattah el-Sisi sees Burhan as a stable partner to safeguard its regional interests, particularly in the Nile River, which the countries share. While Egypt has participated in mediation efforts and started the Neighbors of Sudan Initiative, it hasn’t been able to leverage its relationship with Burhan to progress toward a peace deal. Instead, it has assisted the SAF’s military efforts by providing drones and warplanes. 

In contrast, the UAE supports Hemedti and the RSF by providing military and financial assistance disguised as humanitarian aid. Abu Dhabi serves as a financial haven for Hemedti’s gold business, hosting RSF front companies and bank accounts. Despite being part of peace efforts, the UAE has directed its influence toward assisting Hemedti’s diplomatic efforts rather than fostering negotiations.  

Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia views Burhan as a reliable ally to protect its investments in Sudan’s key sectors and its strategic interests in the Red Sea region. However, Riyadh finds it more beneficial to bolster its image as a neutral mediator, potentially giving it an advantage over the UAE in establishing regional dominance and emerging as a credible international partner.  

Key US lawmakers have highlighted the UAE’s involvement in supporting the RSF, as seen during the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee for Africa hearing on December 5, 2023. Earlier, members of Congress urged Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) to UAE cease support for the RSF via a formal letter. Most importantly, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the need to ensure peace in Sudan with MBZ in January. While Egypt’s support for SAF has also faced criticism, the involvement of Cairo and Riyadh with the warring sides has not received sufficient attention. The external meddling of these countries has run counter to their involvement in peace efforts. This must be stopped to achieve any solution in Sudan.

 US response and course correction 

Several peace efforts are in place, but progress remains elusive. The RSF and SAF consistently violate agreements, resulting in brief ceasefires and escalating civilian casualties. Even opportunities flaunted as promising—such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s meeting on January 18, before Burhan suspended Sudan’s membership in the East African bloc—have met persistent challenges. There is pressure from the United Nations as well as the United States for a ceasefire, but calls for a Ramadan truce were rejected by Burhan. These efforts, inclusive of US sanctions for human rights abuses and undermining peace and security in the region, have been unable to stop external support, let alone the war.   

As the war continues, there is still an opportunity for course correction. US Special Envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello’s recent trip to African countries, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt from March 11–23 was a step in this direction. The objectives of this trip highlighted the need to align mediation efforts that are spread across various international platforms, including the IGAD, the African Union, and the respective initiatives led by Arab countries. It also emphasized engaging civilian actors, including resistance committees, trade unions, protest groups, women, and the youth in democratic transition and peace talks. Thus, this trip could be the catalyst needed to advance key priorities in Sudan.   

The upcoming Jeddah talks on April 18 could be another opportunity to build on the objectives outlined on Perriello’s trip. The most significant is unifying various peace efforts and making these talks inclusive. This would signal to all parties involved that mediators are willing to collectively pressure the generals, adding seriousness to the peace talks. Additionally, bringing mediating countries together will prevent the creation of competing circles of influence. It will ensure a unified front, rather than fragmented efforts, toward achieving the desired goal. 

However, aligning mediation efforts would only be fruitful if the United States were also adamant about aligning mediators’ priorities vis-à-vis Sudan. This begins with prioritizing Sudan in its foreign policy agenda and maintaining a consistent approach. Despite other global priorities like the Israel-Hamas war, and potential time constraints posed by the upcoming US presidential election, the United States must continue building momentum in its engagement in Sudan. One way to do so is to support Perriello and ensure his office is fully staffed. In a recent interview, Perriello acknowledged that “a lot more international engagement is needed” and mentioned “raising the heat on all those who are fueling the conflict.” While commendable, this is a belated recognition of the situation’s gravity, similar to Perriello’s late appointment as special envoy. The key now is for the United States to add weight to its words with constructive actions, which could mean serious backchannel dialogues with its Gulf allies and Egypt to stop their support of the RSF.

As peacekeeping efforts aim for an immediate ceasefire, deploying United Nations peacekeepers in Sudan to ensure the safety of its people and eventually oversee the transition process (akin to the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan) should be considered. This proposed UN mission should be granted access to effectively monitor Sudan’s entry points, including seaports, air routes, and land borders, to curb weapons smuggling and establish humanitarian corridors. To facilitate humanitarian assistance, international efforts should utilize existing networks of local emergency responses. Most importantly, the United States and the international community must provide the much-needed funding to support these efforts. The upcoming humanitarian conference in France could be the chance to hit the nail on its head.  

Past efforts have underscored that, unless the underlying issue of mediator support for the generals is addressed, these well-intentioned efforts risk being futile. They will fail to deter ongoing atrocities and leave a power vacuum that attracts actors like Iran and Russia, which also have interests in establishing naval bases on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.  

It must be made clear that those providing weapons and funding for Sudan’s civil war are accessories to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the country. If the international framework lets them fall through the cracks with no accountability, its ripple effects will be felt globally in the form of a refugee crisis and an increase in proxy warfare in the region. 

Manal Fatima is a program assistant with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Follow her on X: @mafasaad.

The post A diplomatic solution in Sudan demands greater US engagement with its Arab allies appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Aggregate freedom in Kenya has increased substantially and constantly since 1995, but the data correctly show a marked structural change in 2010. This was a crucial year in the recent politico-economic history of the country as it marked the inauguration of the new constitution, which has been the driving force behind many of the trends shown in the Freedom Index and subindexes. The 2010 Constitution reformed Kenya’s highly centralized institutional architecture, creating a devolved and highly decentralized system. This ensured that lower levels of government (regions and counties) receive much higher levels of funding, that can be better allocated according to the needs of local populations.

The economic freedom subindex clearly presents a jump around 2010, mainly attributable to a significant increase in women’s economic freedom. Legal changes that accompanied the constitutional reform had important effects on women’s empowerment and freedom. The endorsement of the 2010 Constitution established vital rights and encouraged additional reforms towards greater legal gender equality, including reserving seats for women’s political participation and encouraging nondiscrimination and equality. For example, the constitution outlined new principles relating to land policy, including the elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs, and practices related to land. Financial inclusion of women is an important area of improvement, and the Central Bank data—based on various FinAccess Surveys—clearly show that women are becoming much more economically included and empowered. Also, when you look at the disaggregated data for different regions of the country, you find that the gender gap in financial access is actually declining in many counties in Kenya. The growing economic empowerment of women is also evidenced by increasing employment rates of women and a reduction in the gender wage gap in many professions. Legislative changes have allowed women to hold and manage property, and placed them on a more equal legal footing with men in matters relating to property. For example, the passage of the Land Act and Land Registration Act in 2012 increased women’s rights over marital property. Regarding access to education, the gender gap is closing very fast. For example, in many university courses, the proportion of women and men enrolling is now much more equal than was the case a decade ago. The new decentralized constitutional framework has been crucial in creating the conditions in which women’s freedoms can improve. The situation of women is significantly worse in rural areas, but now local and regional governments have the autonomy and resources to provide and generate economic opportunities for women at a devolved level.

The economic freedom subindex also shows a sustained increase in property rights protection, which seems to reflect the judicial reforms that have been introduced since the 1990s. In the last three decades, there has been a significant improvement in the speed of judicial processes, and in the reliability of the guarantees given to domestic and foreign owners. For example, since the inauguration of the new constitution in 2010, parliament has enacted four major land laws aimed at improving land property rights: the Land Act of 2012, the Land Registration Act of 2012, the National Land Commission Act of 2012, and the Community Land Act of 2016. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index also undoubtedly incentivized Kenyan governments in this period to improve the institutional architecture of the country in order to facilitate economic activity. For example, the move towards “e-government”—the myriad reforms aimed at digitalizing interactions between citizens and government agencies—received a big push in order to improve Kenya’s position in the Doing Business ranking. This was, in fact, achieved in several successive years. The recent digitization of land records in Kenya is a means to improving security, by requiring a landowner to approve all applications relating to a specific property. Digitized records will also reduce the cost and time of land transactions. Section 9 of the Land Registration Act of 2012 facilitated the coming wave of digitalization and e-government by providing the Registrar of Lands with the right to maintain relevant documents in a secure and accessible format, including in electronic files.

Political freedom shows a substantial increase during the 1990s, which captures the movement from a one-party political system to a multiparty system. This was a generalized change in Sub-Saharan Africa, with levels of political freedom increasing in several countries. But such changes are always complicated, because it is easy to introduce political competition on paper, but always difficult in practice. This was a period of great political agitation in Kenya, reflecting broader political liberalization across Africa, with a very intense push for constitutional reform from civil society, resulting in significant achievements. External pressures to liberalize the political space were also crucial.

Kenya is probably one of the countries in Africa with the highest levels of civil and political liberties. However, the data show a significantly lower score for civil liberties than for the rest of the indicators of political freedom. It is likely that this relates to the protests, campaigning, and activism before and after electoral periods, which reached a peak with the serious electoral violence of 2007–08. But in general, Kenya is a society in which civil and political freedom is high, where citizens can express freely their political views, with a vibrant opposition in evidence. Electoral results have been challenged various times in recent years, accompanied by judicial reviews of the electoral results after several recent elections.

The large increase in legal freedom observed in 2010 is single-handedly driven by improved judicial independence and effectiveness, and this again is a product of the new constitution. The judicial system has proven to be very independent from political pressures; the challenges to—and judicial reviews of—the electoral results are a clear sign of this. The clarity of the law also improved significantly during the constitutional reform discussions that crystalized in 2010, and that is also evident in the data. In 2015, the judiciary adopted a nationwide case-tracking tool which enhanced the level of judicial accountability. There has been an attempt to standardize and speed up the handling of cases.

But the decentralization of power brought about by the new constitution has also had a negative side, at least in the short term. This is because now there is an additional level of government, the regional level, which necessarily increases the bureaucracy in the country. Moreover, three levels of government means a significant effort of coordination is required in order to efficiently provide the public services that were concentrated in the central government. These difficulties explain why bureaucracy quality does not show a significant change after 2010. Also, more bureaucracy opens the door for more corruption, especially with such a large structural change in the institutional framework. In recent years, there has been a clear aim to improve bureaucratic quality—for example, with the push for e-government—but Kenya has still a lot of room for progress.

From freedom to prosperity

The rapid growth in income in Kenya starts in 2002, a critical year for the country. In 2002 the country experienced a major political transition when the president, who had run the country for twenty-five years, stepped down. The new leadership was very keen on detailed government planning. They introduced a long-term development plan, called Vision 2030, with the objective of making Kenya an upper middle-income country by the year 2030. It was based on some crucial pillars, one of them being innovation. Kenya has led the region in some critical sectors thanks to this forward-thinking approach. Today, approximately 54 percent of Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by the services sector, parts of which are particularly vibrant and innovative, like tourism and financial services. The latter is a great example. Thanks to the innovative tool of mobile money, financial inclusion increased from 25 percent of the population in 2006 to about 84 percent in 2021, according to the 2021 FinAccess Survey, one of the highest levels in the whole Sub-Saharan Africa region. Mobile money in Kenya, which gained local popularity through the M-PESA application, allows users to deposit, withdraw, transfer money, make payments for goods and services, and access credit through cell phones. Mobile money products have evolved considerably since their introduction to Kenya in 2007, with a considerable range of innovative products and mobile service providers emerging. The agricultural sector, even though it is still very important in terms of employment, has been declining in terms of its contribution to GDP in Kenya and in several Sub-Saharan African countries. For several decades it represented about 30 percent of GDP in Kenya, but this has declined to about 20 percent—a fact reflected in the country’s debasing of GDP, which was carried out in 2021. Kenya is also trying to diversify its exporting industries towards nontraditional sectors. Today, 40 percent of Kenya’s exports are within the region, and these are mostly manufactured goods. With a strong base in manufacturing, Kenya is uniquely placed to benefit from the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area.

Regarding inequality, the country clearly benefited from the constitutional change of 2010, because the devolved system of government significantly reduced regional disparities. Historically, the northern part of the country, for example, has lagged behind in terms of development because of its severe (semi-desert) climatic conditions. With the new system, funds are more easily transferred and more effectively administered by the regional and local governments, and inequality between rural and urban areas has clearly been reduced. The process of financial inclusion mentioned above, which was given major impetus by the introduction of mobile money in 2007, has been a second driver of reduced inequality. Segments of the population at the lower end of the income distribution have benefited most from this process, because it has opened the door to financing opportunities to start businesses, increase human capital, and so on.

Minority rights are also better protected with the decentralized system of government. The 2010 Constitution enables the state to put in place affirmative action programs to protect minorities and marginalized groups. Communities and ethnic groups that were somewhat marginalized before have been empowered in different regions. Even at a political level, it is clear that there is an effort to include previously silenced communities. The work carried out by civil society organizations has also been crucial on this point, in terms of creating an awareness about minority rights and demands in different parts of the country. This was demonstrated by the broad-based civic education carried out during the constitutional review process that culminated in the 2010 Constitution.

One of the primary goals of the political leadership that took power after 2002 was to improve the level and quality of education in the country. The aim was to reach 100 percent enrollment in primary education, and to increase significantly the enrollment levels in secondary and university education. However, the starting point was very low, so there is still a long way to go, particularly in secondary and tertiary enrollment. According to UNICEF, before the COVID-19 pandemic, nationwide enrollment in primary education in Kenya was at 93 percent while secondary school enrollment was only at 53 percent. Another important aspect is that increasing enrollment at a very fast pace requires vast resources to ensure that the quality of the education pupils receive is high. And this is not always the case in Kenya, even though education forms a very large part of the government budget. Some educational indicators, like the number of teachers, have not kept up with the levels of enrollment. The pupil-to-teacher ratio remains very high in some Kenyan counties. For example, in Turkana County in northern Kenya, it is at 77:1 according to UNICEF. So, the big challenge for the country at present is to improve both quality and quantity.

Once again, the 2010 Constitution will have major effects on life expectancy, and health more generally, but these are probably going to take longer to materialize in the data. Moreover, the slowing of progress on the health indicator in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic may be explained by the same reason. The implementation of healthcare is now decentralized and run by the regional governments, even though healthcare policy is still in the hands of the central government. It is not easy to start running a regional health service from scratch, and there is obviously a learning period when indicators may even deteriorate. Inadequate resources provided by the national government to the counties and understaffed health facilities in many areas remain critical challenges. But in the medium and long run, once the implementation constraints begin to ease, it seems likely that healthcare services will be delivered more efficiently, and health statistics will show the results.

The future ahead

One of the critical issues that Kenya faces now is how to keep improving productivity. I see manufacturing as an obvious area for improvement, and this should include growing its share of GDP. Today, it is slightly below 10 percent, and Kenya should almost double that. I think we have a big opportunity in Africa with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It would create tremendous opportunities for countries like Kenya that have some manufacturing base. Kenya is competing with manufactured goods from Asia and other places that have major cost advantages. Bigger markets, such as those that will become available through the African Continental Free Trade Area, can generate productivity improvements through export competition and also provide economies of scale benefits.

An important challenge for Kenya relates to the large share of informal employment. Moving part of these workers and firms towards formalization will ensure that economic opportunity and development are more stable. And, obviously, higher levels of formal employment and production generate larger and more stable sources of government revenue, as tax compliance is easier with formal sector firms. This will help the already firm path of fiscal consolidation that Kenya has followed in recent years. The current account deficit has also been declining, partly because of reduced imports, but also due to stronger and more competitive exports. This is a very promising path for Kenya, and the country now needs to take advantage not only of regional value chains, but also global value chains, particularly in areas like tourism where Kenya has long-standing experience and a diversity of tourist attractions.

But economic reform and development needs to be accompanied by continued institutional reform and transformation. Further pushing the inclusivity of institutions is the only way to ensure that increasing prosperity in Kenya is based on solid foundations and is therefore sustainable in the long run.

Robert Mudida is currently the director of the Research Department of the Central Bank of Kenya. He was a full-time academic for seventeen years, having taught and carried out extensive research at two leading universities in Africa: the University of Nairobi and Strathmore University. At Strathmore University he was full professor of political economy. He has published four books and numerous articles in top international peer-reviewed journals in the areas of political economy, financial economics, macroeconomics, and industrial organization.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

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Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.

Beyond the Biden administration, US Representative Ilhan Omar (D-MN)—the first Somali-American to serve in Congress—gave a speech to Somali constituents largely in support of Somalia, invoking ire from both Republicans in Congress and Somalilanders with US ties. 

The United Kingdom, one of Somaliland’s closest Western partners, has also expressed deep concern over the MOU, encouraging restraint and acknowledging its support of Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, one member of parliament called for the United Kingdom to recognize Somaliland in light of these developments. 

The Arab League, led by Egypt (which has a complicated relationship with Ethiopia), has been steadfast in its support for Somalia. However, DP World, a Dubai-based developer that is already heavily invested in Berbera Port, has continued to express interest in developing the port alongside Ethiopia and Somaliland. This could be an indication that the United Arab Emirates could shift its policies vis-à-vis Somaliland and the Arab League. 

The African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have joined the international community’s call for restraint and reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, Somalia rejected African Union mediation, arguing that there was no room for mediation until Ethiopia retracts the MOU and reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, Ethiopia sat out a recent IGAD meeting that was set to address conflict in Sudan and—to a lesser extent—tensions between Ethiopian and Somalia over the MOU. Though the Ethiopian government claimed its absence was due to the meeting clashing with a “commitment to a prior engagement,” Abiy was still present at a nearby summit for the Non-Aligned Movement the next day, suggesting that he snubbed the IGAD meeting.

Despite global reactions, the MOU has persisted, and progress toward Ethiopian port access continues.

The risk of the escalation of tensions across this region—which includes Sudan, the site of calamitous security, political, and humanitarian crises—is rising. If these tensions are managed poorly, conflict could spread across the Horn of Africa and then potentially even spill into the Red Sea. However, if managed properly, the tensions could subside, making way for prosperity and economic growth.

The security interests of many countries—particularly the United States—are at stake. As tensions flare between the United States and Yemen-based Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, Washington may be looking for ways to expand its military presence in the region beyond its significant presence based in Djibouti. Over the past two years, the United States has reportedly expressed interest in using Somaliland’s Berbera port and airfield as a base for the purposes of countering al-Shabaab. Though US visits to Berbera have been carefully coordinated with the Somalian government, this engagement could be interpreted as a major victory for Somaliland in bolstering its sovereignty. With Berbera, and an eagerness for international engagement, Somaliland could potentially help the United States gain a footing to protect vital maritime routes and diversify its regional footprint away from the already crowded military hub of Djibouti. However, since Somaliland remains unrecognized, the United States would first need to get Somalia’s approval—an arrangement that could be made easier by the cooperation outlined in the initial communiqué signed in Djibouti, although such easing could be jeopardized if tension around the Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU continues to increase.

Moreover, armed conflict involving Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Somalia could complicate security cooperation agreements between Somalia and the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab. This further emphasizes the importance of US leadership and diplomacy in ensuring this tension doesn’t escalate further.

The United States should use financial and diplomatic leverage to ensure that the governments of Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Somalia act cautiously in the coming weeks, while seeking to preserve US security interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, specifically regarding Berbera and its counterterrorism efforts.

The agreements seem contradictory: One calls for cooperation between Somalia and Somaliland, to some undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty, while the other outlines political and economic cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which to Somalia undermines its sovereignty. But the agreements are each rooted in promoting regional cooperation, negotiation, and partnership. In lending focus to this region, international actors must emphasize the strategic benefit that comes with cooperation. This must be the path forward, lest the world see more conflict in 2024.

Maxwell Webb is an independent Horn of Africa and Middle East analyst who currently serves as the coordinator of leadership initiatives at the Israel Policy Forum’s IPF Atid program.

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The direct impacts of increased shipping time and fuel costs have captured the attention of market watchers and policymakers—but these are just the tip of the iceberg. As the disruption continues, firms will face challenges with increased insurance costs, decreased ship security, and wider ESG impacts, among others. The longer it lasts and the wider the area covered, the more numerous the challenges become.

The situation in the Red Sea also provides a small taste of the future of geopolitical risk. The Red Sea is one of the main trade routes between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, with Clarksons estimating that 10 percent of world trade by volume utilizes this route. This includes 20 percent of all container shipping, nearly 10 percent of seaborne oil, and 8 percent of LNG. However, the Red Sea is not unique in its importance: Strategic chokepoints for maritime trade exist all around the globe, from canals to naturally occurring straits and funnels. As actors observe the impacts of Houthi threats and attacks, others will begin to consider their ability to orchestrate something similar. Of particular concern would be the potential for a global economic crisis if these methods were to be mimicked on other high-volume routes, in particular the South China Sea.

To prepare for and prevent these disruptions, policymakers need to understand the long shadow of disruptions to major shipping routes. And to do that it helps to explore the impact that the Red Sea disruption will have, depending on how long it lasts.

Effects of a disruption lasting one week to one month

Ship availability

In the medium term, one of the largest issues will be ships simply being in the wrong place. Supply chains have evolved to meet just-in-time strategies. This creates a delicate balance between each part of the supply chain, which is especially pressured between containers and ships.

Ports have limited berths, many of which are size specific, and limited physical space. Berths are booked months in advance to schedule appropriate port-side support for offloading, reloading, and refuelling. The ground delivery of containers and other goods are scheduled around these berth bookings.

As ships reroute or take alternative routes, the delays create a knock-on effect at the ports. When ships do not arrive at their berths on time, containers and goods fill the ports waiting for onward shipment. By rerouting or anchoring vessels, not only are supply chains slowed, but availability of transport options from ports is disrupted. Rerouted ships can overwhelm alternative ports, leading to back-ups at berths and clogged passage in/out of the ports.

As during the covid pandemic, containers quickly pile up in ports due to delays in ship arrival. This is exacerbated as vessels are repeatedly rerouted or ordered to anchor in an attempt to wait out the risk.

Insurance

Vessels “going dark”, when ships turn off transponders connected to tracking systems, has long posed a major risk. This is done to enable a wide range of illicit activities from evading sanctions to circumventing IMO rules or contractual limitations. The Red Sea has long been a hotspot for this activity due to its central positioning to countries bound by international trade sanctions. This is reflected in insurance premiums for vessels travelling through the area. Yet premiums will likely increase as the technique is utilised by ships to attempt to evade attacks from Houthi forces.

As ships go dark they become invisible to others in the area, both friend and foe. Ships are increasingly using this technique in the Red Sea as they anchor in place to avoid targeting. By masking their location, activity, and information from all parties they avoid detection by hostile forces, but also make the shipping lanes more dangerous. Transponders are utilised by other vessels to understand traffic, identify other ships in the area, and determine safe routes, particularly in crowded areas. An area such as the Red Sea filled with “dark” vessels would be equivalent to driving on a crowded highway in the dark without headlights. Without the information provided by trackers the risk of a major accident between large vessels increases substantially. That added risk will increase the cost of insurance.

Insurance costs will also be affected by the fact that the trip around the Cape of Good Hope is inherently riskier than Red Sea routes. Logistically, ships are required to not only navigate a longer route, but one battered by challenging weather patterns. Though ports across the Western coast of Africa are often better equipped to receive Capemax ships, this also enables possibilities for illicit activities based from and at ports. Geopolitically, vessels face increased danger from West African piracy, which is known for being particularly violent. This is further complicated by high levels of unrest across the area and limited state power should an incident occur.

Effects of disruptions lasting one to three months

Increase in shipping costs

Backlogs in ports, diversions, a decrease in ship availability, and the increase in insurance and other running costs will trigger pricing pressures. Shipping costs, which have already risen in the immediate term, will continue to rise. This is without considering the potential pricing impact if any vessel is significantly damaged during this period. Firms are likely to pass any price increase onto consumers to avoid substantial losses. This will hinder policymakers’ efforts to tame rising prices in an already high inflationary environment.

Carbon footprint

Shipping is already one of the most polluting industries in the world, contributing to nearly 3 percent of all global GHG emissions. “The sector, whose greenhouse gas emissions have risen 20 percent over the last decade, operates an ageing fleet that runs almost exclusively on fossil fuels,” according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. But prolonged avoidance of the Red Sea will make that footprint worse.

The Cape of Good Hope route is not only considerably longer than the Red Sea-Suez Canal route—it also requires ships to burn significantly more fuel due to distance and the physical dynamics of the route. As more firms decide to send ships around the Cape, the carbon footprint of the industry is bound to increase.

For businesses, this comes as the EU rolls out their Emissions Trading System (ETS). As of January 1, maritime emissions are now included in the EU ETS for vessels calling at EU ports. The EU ETS levies a carbon tax based on the distance between the last port of call outside of the EU (excluding UK, Tangier and Port Said) and the first call into the EU. The charges are based on 50 percent of vessel emotions, half of the journey from a non-EU country into and out of the EU. As vessels increase the length of their routes and alternative ports become clogged, they will likely increase this distance and hence increase their tax liability. As the EU ETS system continues its rollout in the coming years, this added cost will only increase.

Effects of disruptions lasting three months or more 

Increasing pressure to “friendshore”/onshore

Outsourcing and importing of goods have long been a focus of ire for politicians. An increase in shipping lead times and impact of foreign actors on the availability of critical items only exacerbates this. As the disruption in the Red Sea continues, the pressure for policies which encourage onshoring, and where not possible “friendshoring”, crucial trading goods will increase. In the next year sixty-four countries will hold elections, including the United States and the UK. A geopolitical environment which already turned domestic first following recent supply chain pressures will prove ripe for politicians looking to further onshore activities.

The future is green, or is it?

One of the biggest challenges facing the maritime industry is decarbonising the global fleet. Though many options are being explored, there is still no easy solution or currently fully viable and agreed upon solution or fuel alternative.

Firms are investing vast sums to test and explore the practicality of alternative fuel options. Requiring ships to reroute quickly, for whatever reason, has the potential to undermine these efforts.

The first hurdle of the transition is costs. The massive costs and challenges inherent in outfitting ships limits the ability of firms to investigate their viability. Building ships capable of operating on alternative fuels takes a significant amount of time and money. If the baseline costs of shipping increase, specifically insurance and fuel consumption of existing vessels in the fleet due to longer routes and time at anchor, the availability of capital will be squeezed further. The transition in shipping cannot happen without vast sums of money and any cut in profit will be felt first in R&D for future ships.

Alongside this, alternative fuels, such as LNG, LPG, methanol, biofuel, electric, and hydrogen, are currently distance and route limited. Though there are numerous initiatives being trialled across the globe, testing remains in the very early stages.

For some options, current technology means longer routes are just not feasible. This includes electric alternatives which are only used for short-distance routes at the moment. For others, such as hydrogen or LNG, the distance may not be a hindrance, but refuelling is. The port infrastructure to support alternative fuels is in its infancy and availability is spotty at best. This limits viable refuelling stops for vessels along every route. Redirection further limits these options until routes become impractical. Increasing the complexity of testing by changing pre-established routes, along which the refuelling prospects and sea conditions may be vastly different, can prohibit firms from further exploring alternative fuels.

Going forward the maritime industry needs to seriously consider how to finance the transition to greener fuels and ensure their availability, regardless of route. The current reality is far from this.

Long-term security of shipping routes

Current ship security is based on armed personnel and, in extreme cases, state-sponsored military support. These systems were based on a history of small-scale, sea-based operatives and independent actors posing the greatest threats to vessels.

Recent attacks in the Red Sea open a new frontier in shipping security risk. The Houthis have relied heavily on drones and ballistic missiles for their attacks. These are more complicated, difficult to counter, and at times, more precise than small-boat piracy, which has been accepted as “standard.”

On-board armed security is no longer enough, nor are smaller military vessels without the ability to tackle these threats. As this technology becomes more easily accessible, ensuring ship safety will be more costly and require more advanced technology.

The future of shipping risk

Despite recent efforts by Western powers to restore shipping in the Red Sea, the genie is now out of the bottle. The widespread redirecting of global trade has illustrated the power non-state and state actors can exert.

Even if a lasting ceasefire is agreed to immediately, ships cannot simply turn around and go back to their original routes. The substantial change in situational risk of the route will require a significant amount of contract renegotiation between shipowners and operators. Some owners may even restructure contracts to bar their vessels from being utilised on these routes. Nor will insurers and financiers be particularly willing to return to pre-ceasefire risk assessments. The Houthi attacks have opened the possibility of more sophisticated attacks through relatively accessible technology in busy shipping lanes.

There is a real risk that this model could be repeated by actors bordering other high-volume shipping routes. An area of similar, if not larger, risk would be a repeat of these actions in the South China Sea. It carries up to a third of all trade by volume and is a main energy transport route; any redirection there would have massive effects on global trade. Unlike the Red Sea, which acts as a funnel towards the Suez Canal, a high concentration of South China Sea routes require transport through the relatively narrow Strait of Malacca. Acting as a strategic chokepoint, this area is incredibly vulnerable. Though alternative routes exist, the physical limitations of these waterways make it a practical impossibility for the vast majority of ships. The combination of high volume and narrow passage means a disruption of this route of comparable scale could easily trigger a global economic crisis.

The coming weeks will determine whether we are facing a minor inconvenience or a larger challenge for international shipping. However, like the COVID-19 pandemic, this incident has underlined not only the importance of maritime trade routes but provided insight into the future of geopolitics. The ability to apply pressure to global trade structures is steadily becoming more accessible. States must adapt their international strategies to mirror the reality of the outsized impact certain actors, state and otherwise, can have on global trade.

Alex Mills is an international trade expert focused on services trade, international investment, maritime law, and ESG. They have nearly a decade of experience across the private and public sector, including in UK and US politics and the financial sector.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post The long shadow of the Red Sea shipping disruption appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In the aftermath of the assassination of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse in 2021, the Caribbean republic has seen escalating gang violence that has threatened the political system and security. Between January and August of this year, 2,439 Haitians were killed, 951 were kidnapped, and 902 were injured. On October 3, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted resolution 2699, which approved a multinational mission, led by Kenya, to help the Haitian National Police defeat the onslaught of criminal gangs perpetrating violence and other crimes. Although the mission is UN-authorized, it is not an official UN peacekeeping mission. Kenya plans to lead the mission by sending over a thousand officers, a number that will be supplemented further by the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Antigua and Barbuda.

An intervention in a Caribbean state by an African country could perplex some given the vast physical distance between the regions and a lack of historic military and security support. However, the planned deployment aligns closely with Ruto’s foreign relations agenda.

Under Ruto’s presidency, Kenya has stepped up to play a more active role in regional and international politics and to secure for itself a leadership role in championing African interests. Kenya hosted the first Africa Climate Summit in September which concluded with the Nairobi Declaration, a document laying out a consensus among participating African countries about their climate priorities. Ruto also recently announced that Kenya will no longer require visas for visitors from all countries beginning January 2024 in an effort to boost tourism and international connectivity.  

A policing mission to Haiti could further raise Kenya’s profile as a champion of African interests. While there has been little collaboration between African countries and Haiti historically, many Haitians are a part of the African diaspora. Since Haiti’s 1804 revolution and independence, the country has experienced repeated bouts of instability further worsened by nearly two decades of occupation by the United States (from 1915 to 1934), and subsequent UN-approved intervention missions, including one led by Brazil that ran from 2004 to 2017. For Kenya to achieve its newly oriented foreign-policy goals through this intervention, it would have to avoid repeating the failures seen in past missions and steer clear of channeling US paternalism.

In October 2022, Acting Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry authorized a request for foreign intervention through a written appeal to international partners. However, observers including the National Haitian American Elected Officials Network and the Family Action Network Movement are highly skeptical of further intervention and are concerned that supporting the unelected Henry government could worsen the nation’s political crisis. Those organizations have called on the Biden administration to withdraw US support for the mission.

Critics in Kenya have been asking another question: Who asked Kenya, specifically, to intervene? Officially, Kenya volunteered to lead the security force on July 29 in a statement by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Alfred Mutua. According to Mutua, the commitment came after a request by the “Friends of Haiti Group of Nations.” However, some observers argue that Kenya is leading the intervention to be a good “friend” to the United States. In September, the United States pledged one hundred million dollars in support to the intervention; days later, the United States and Kenya signed a defense agreement that included resources and support for security deployments.

Putting theories and unknowns aside, it is clear that Kenya is taking a newly proactive approach to the crisis in Haiti. That new approach underscores Ruto’s atypical foreign policy strategy, which aims to distinguish Kenya from its African peers globally and add to Nairobi’s list of accomplishments as a pan-African leader. Success in achieving that strategy could pave the way for greater influence in regional and international politics, setting Kenya up to challenge South Africa and Nigeria, who have historically been regional hegemons. But success in Ruto’s foreign policy approach depends, in part, on the success of this mission to Haiti—one that will be hard to come by.

To be sure, Ruto’s plan has faced numerous domestic challenges. On November 16, Kenya’s high court extended an order blocking the mission’s deployment pending a final decision in January 2024. Despite the court order, the mission was approved by the Kenyan Parliament.

There have also been signs that public support is mixed, as some people have questioned Nairobi’s priorities, arguing that it should focus on protecting lives in Kenya first. Currently, insurgencies are underway along the Somalia border and cattle banditry and clashes between nomadic pastoralists have challenged communities in Northern Kenya.

Amnesty International has also condemned the deployment, not just because of a “troubling history of abuses” associated with past interventions in Haiti, but also because of extrajudicial killings and excessive force used by the Kenyan police. These concerns about human rights violations raise questions as to whether the Kenyan police will be able to succeed in Haiti where other missions have failed.

Regardless, the first batch of police officers have begun training for their planned mission in Haiti. In preparation for the deployment, the director general of the Haitian National Police, alongside a delegation from the Haitian government, visited Kenya last week. However, in early November, Interior Minister Kithure Kindiki asserted that police officers will not be deployed to Haiti “unless all resources”—perhaps including extra funding from the United Nations, recently requested by Kenya—“are mobilized and availed.”

Former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta oriented Nairobi’s foreign policy more closely towards China. Ruto, on the other hand, appears more interested in seeking out partnerships with the West—particularly the United States. This year alone, at least six high-level US officials have visited Kenya: First Lady Jill Biden, United States Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Trade Representative Katherine Tai, Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. Kenya and the Millennium Challenge Corporation also signed a sixty-million-dollar threshold program focused on urban mobility and growth in September.

At the same time, Ruto’s administration has also developed a new policy focused on pan-Africanism and, in its dealings beyond the continent, South-South cooperation. If Kenya were to achieve success in Haiti, which would require learning from the tough lessons of past interventions while incorporating the aspirations of Haitians, its global profile could benefit, and Nairobi could secure a status as a reliable ally to the United States both on the continent and beyond.

It remains to be seen whether Kenyan police will eventually be deployed to Haiti. If the deployment occurs, watch the mission closely: Success in helping Haiti secure its future, if attained properly and without repeating mistakes of the past, could see Kenya amplify its bid to claim a bigger seat on the world stage.

Sibi Nyaoga was a young global professional at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post What Kenya’s proposed mission to Haiti says about Nairobi’s foreign policy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Security

Strike on Ukrainian cafe leaves more than forty dead

Tracking narratives

Website impersonating Ukrainian news agency spreads narratives aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale

Media policy

Russia increasingly using criminal charges for online activities, says digital rights group

Russia’s federal budget draft indicates a funding boost for state media

International affairs

Putin meets South Sudanese President Salva Kiir

Strike on Ukrainian cafe leaves more than forty dead

An attack on the village of Hroza in northeast Ukraine left more than four dozen people dead, according to a Telegram statement from Ukraine’s Office of the General Prosecutor. According to the statement, the attack occurred around 1:25 p.m. local time on October 5, destroying a local cafe shop. It also noted local prosecutors have launched a pre-trial investigation. In a separate Telegram post, which included graphic imagery, Ukrainian presidential adviser Oleksiy Kuleba blamed Russia for the attack, stating, “A terrorist country deliberately kills peaceful Ukrainians. The world needs to see what true evil is.”

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) also condemned the attack. “Intentionally directing an attack against civilians or civilian objects is a war crime,” UN OCHA Humanitarian Coordinator for Ukraine Denise Brown stated. “Intentionally launching an attack knowing that it would be disproportionate is a war crime.”

Meanwhile, a Reuters report published on October 3 claimed that the Russian army has embedded so-called “Storm-Z” units within conventional Russian units to conduct counterattacks against Ukrainian gains in crucial front sectors. Reuters reported that the Storm-Z units comprise 100-150 personnel, including civilian penal recruits and Russian soldiers under punishment. The Russian army and defense ministry have not confirmed the existence of the Storm-Z units.

—Andy Carvin, managing editor, Washington DC

—Ruslan Trad, resident fellow for security research, Sofia, Bulgaria

Website impersonating Ukrainian news agency spreads narratives aimed at undermining Ukrainian morale

The DFRLab has identified at least one Facebook ad promoting a website impersonating a Ukrainian news agency. The now-defunct Facebook page “Onaqaq online shop” published the ad. It accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Ukrainian leadership of corruption and misusing aid provided by the United States. The ad featured a caricature of the president alongside text noting the creation of a US team to monitor how aid to Ukraine is being used. The ad declared that all of Ukraine’s elite are corrupt and shared a debunked claim about a former “commander-in-chief,” likely a reference to Oleksii Reznikov, buying a villa for his daughter. 

The ad included a link to the website thumbra.com, which when accessed by the DFRLab redirected to unian.in, a page masquerading as the website for the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency, unian.ua. At the time of writing, the website no longer redirected to the copycat website. Much of the content on the copycat website links back to UNIAN’s actual website, including share buttons. The link in the ad led to a forged story regarding Ukraine’s allies becoming skeptical of its ability to succeed in the war against Russia. The article cited decreased military aid as an indicator that allies are abandoning Ukraine.

Multiple aspects of the forgery point to it likely being of Russian origin. The strongest indicator is that the URL address includes “skepsis-i-podozritelnost,” which is transliterated from Russian, not Ukrainian. Second, the article is written in Ukrainian, but the tone and style differ from that of the information agency. Third, the faux article’s banner image, a stock photo, does not have a caption, as is standard for UNIAN. The image was also edited to include a text overlay, which reads “Allies don’t believe in us anymore?” UNIAN does not edit the stock photography it uses for banner images.

These types of forgeries are not unique. On September 18, a Ukrainian researcher found a similar forgery replicating the UNIAN website, which spread a narrative claiming that Ukraine’s allies are decreasing weapons shipments to Ukraine to force it to negotiate with Russia. The article stated that Ukraine’s losses were “in vain” as its allies plan to “sacrifice” the country for their own self-interest. 

Campaigns such as this are likely intended to decrease the morale of Ukrainians. The DFRLab has previously covered similar attempts by Russia to impersonate media, including Operation Doppelganger, in which Russian assets impersonated prominent European news outlets.

—Roman Osadchuk, research associate

Russia increasingly using criminal charges for online activities, says digital rights group

In its latest monthly digest, Russian digital rights organization Roskomsvoboda examined high-profile cases in which Russian politicians or activists were punished, via administrative or criminal charges, for their online activities. According to Roskomsvoboda, the cases illustrate an increasing use of criminal charges rather than administrative ones, a reversal of what it observed in 2022.

The report also noted instances of Russians being punished for Telegram posts that “disrespect” or “discredit” Russian authorities or the army. One person was criminally charged for giving an interview to Ukrainian media, while another was charged for “participating in an extremist community.”

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia’s federal budget draft indicates a funding boost for state media

On September 29, the Kremlin submitted the 2024-2026 draft federal budget to the State Duma. According to the independent Russian news outlet Verstka, the Kremlin plans to increase funding for its state-run platforms, which are known to sow disinformation and propaganda. The increase coincides with Russia’s 2024 presidential elections. 

The budget reportedly allocates 315 billion rubles ($3 billion) to support Russian media for the next three years. The budget assigns 121.3 billion rubles ($1.2 billion) for 2024, 94.1 billion rubles ($945 million) for 2025, and 99.5 billion rubles ($1 billion) for 2026. Overall, the draft media budget represents a decrease of 20 billion rubles ($200 million) from the previous budget; according to Verstka, the draft indicates that state-owned media will receive the largest funding stream in the election year, after which funds will decrease.

The report also noted that in 2024, RT will receive 1.8 billion rubles ($18 million) more than it received last year, and Vladimir Solovyov’s channel Solovyov LIVE will receive 750 million rubles ($7.5 million).

—Eto Buziashvili, research associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Putin meets South Sudanese President Salva Kiir

South Sudanese President Salva Kiir travelled to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday, September 28, where the two reportedly agreed to strengthen the relationship between the two countries, particularly focusing on trade, energy, and oil.

According to a transcript posted by the Kremlin, Putin told Kiir, “This is only the beginning. We have many good opportunities in a variety of fields, including energy.”

Oil-rich South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011 with Kiir at the country’s helm. South Sudan was admitted to the United Nations in the same year. The country has had a tenuous relationship with the international body, however, which extended an arms embargo against South Sudan in 2022; Russia abstained from that vote. Given that Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Kiir may look to Russia as an ally in his bid to have the embargo lifted. Notably, Kiir told Putin that Russia was a “strong friend” of South Sudan. 

In his statement, Putin claimed Russia would also support South Sudan on the domestic front. Kiir is facing mounting pressure from the international community to move forward with a peace deal signed in 2018 and prepare for elections in 2024.

Putin’s meeting with Kiir comes off the back of the July 2023 Russia-Africa summit, in which Russia attempted to strengthen and solidify its relationships with African countries. In May 2023, the African Union warned that African countries should “resist all forms of instrumentalization” in a conflict that threatens to “transform Africa into a geostrategic battleground,” adding that it would come at the detriment of the continent.

—Tessa Knight, research associate, London, United Kingdom

The post Russian War Report: Civilian cafe attacked and a fake Ukrainian news site is exposed appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction

In August 2022, British anti-surveillance group Privacy International filed a complaint against the United Kingdom (UK) government for the use of GPS tagging and ankle monitors on refugees and migrants arriving in the country via the Channel. The group argued that the practice—leveraging tactics used to manage criminal populations—traumatizes and stigmatizes refugees and migrants, and by extension, criminalizes the search for asylum. Some of the victims of the practice asserted that it made them feel “like prisoners,” and others showed psychological impacts such as reluctance to engage with outsiders or even to leave their homes.

This is just one of the many instances of the growing use of technology to manage refugee and migrant populations around the world. In 2021, there were an estimated 281 million migrants globally, comprising: refugees and asylum seekers; students; those fleeing environmental and natural disasters; and those who relocated for employment or leisure. By this count, an estimated 3.6 percent of the world’s population was on the move in one year—the highest in history and a rate likely to continue if circumstances remain unchanged.

Policymakers and analysts have interpreted data on the rising number of global migrants and refugees to mean that there is a crisis underway that requires increasingly elaborate methods of policing and control, leading many to turn inward toward law enforcement or security-based technologies. However, data and research suggest that there is not so much a crisis of migrants as there is a crisis within policymaking, where the humanitarian instinct to protect those in search of safety and opportunity is being displaced by a desire to project power at the expense of vulnerable populations. Without critical evaluation of these claims, governments are increasingly accepting, normalizing, and indeed championing claims about fears of invasion and replacement that are, by extension, making dangerous room for extremist rhetoric that undermines democracy globally. Put differently, the absence of policy space for humane conversations around refugees and migrants is directly undermining democracy.

Technology has become a major mechanism to manage the movement of people both domestically and internationally, triggering ethical debates about its impact, particularly when employed by democratic governments in ways that are at odds with universal human rights. Countries are deploying tools to address the questions of digital citizenship and digital identity, but the leap between legal and technical definitions of identity is not insignificant and has major social implications, as discussed here. The rise of technosolutionism, or reliance on technology to solve complex social and political issues better suited to social approaches, reinforces exclusionary ideologies such as ethnonationalism and racism. That same technology, developed in securitized immigration contexts with fewer legal protections, is then often redeployed more broadly within democratic societies, or sold overseas to governments with less responsive governance structures, muddying citizens’ expectations of due process, civil rights, and democratic protections.

This paper intends to better inform the conversation around technology’s impact on democracy by evaluating technosolutionism and its application to the management of human mobility.

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

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The post Digital identities and border cultures: The limits of technosolutionism in the management of human mobility appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

In recent years, Sudan has seen significant political upheaval, from the 2019 ouster of autocratic ruler Omar al-Bashir and the October 2021 military coup that unseated the transitional government, to the outbreak of violent conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023. The result is a country—and its hopes for a democratic transition—now derailed, despite years of civil protests that themselves were disrupted by police maneuvering and the threat of full-blown civil war. This societal discord is manifested not just in real life but also in the country’s online information environment. This report examines the state of digital affairs in Sudan in the lead-up to the current conflict, focusing on the period from the October 2021 coup through December 2022.

While online networks played a crucial role in exposing brutalities committed by al-Bashir’s security apparatus and in organizing protests, almost 70 percent of the Sudanese population remained offline as of January 2022.

Despite less than a third of the country having access to the internet, both the al-Bashir regime and the subsequent ruling councils viewed online communication as a potentially dangerous tool in the hands of protesting citizens. Between December 2018 and December 2022, Sudanese citizens were subjected to 138 days of internet disruptions.

Overall, the legal infrastructure was typical of autocratic regimes in that it was designed to limit free speech and enable punitive actions against dissenters and opposition figures. Authorities used deliberately vague laws to enforce internet disruptions and confiscate protesters’ cell phones. For example, the Criminal Act of 1991 criminalized the spreading of false information, while the 2020 amendment to the Cybercrimes Law, which was passed in secret, made the spread of disinformation punishable with up to four years in prison, flogging, or both. While many laws from al-Bashir’s time remain in place, there have also been tangible improvements to Sudan’s legal infrastructure since his removal. Independent citizens took to the courts to fight against internet shutdowns, and journalists defied the Press and Publications Act to create a media union.

Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service formed a Cyber Jihad Unit to monitor online dissent and spread disinformation. During the 2018–19 protests that led to al-Bashir’s ouster, internal disinformation from the regime painted protesters as violent. After al-Bashir’s removal, internal campaigns worked to promote the military apparatus and target the transitional government.

Yet activists who spoke to the authors indicated they were primarily concerned with being identified by intelligence agents for sharing legitimate evidence of violence committed against protesters. Despite the danger, activists used Facebook Live to stream evidence of the regime’s brutality and ensured the evidence could not be easily dismissed as old or fake by including the time, date, and location of incriminating incidents in social media posts.

An important form of online resistance took place on women-only Facebook groups. Previously used to identify cheating men, the groups turned into investigative platforms where women posted images of suspected plain-clothed members of the intelligence services accused of abusing protesters. The groups were so successful at unearthing personal information about undercover intelligence officers that many officers took to wearing masks to hide their identities.

Foreign entities orchestrating disinformation campaigns primarily focused on promoting their relationship with Sudan or pushing Sudanese politics in a way to their own benefit. Yevgeny Prigozhin, who oversees Russian private military company the Wagner Group, told al-Bashir to spread disinformation depicting protesters as violent, while later Russian campaigns focused on promoting Russia’s own interests around a naval base in Port Sudan. Public relations firms from Gulf states that were supportive of the coup that toppled al-Bashir spent thousands of dollars promoting the military, seeing a greater opportunity of a beneficial relationship with the latter.

Meanwhile, rumors spread offline posed a threat to grassroots organizations that struggled to combat false information shared via word of mouth. Sudan’s unique information environment features a combination of a media ecosystem attempting to build a trustworthy reputation after years of censorship, a legal system designed to limit it further, and, despite these things, a populace striving toward greater governmental representation and democracy in spite of the autocratic rivalries that have violently hijacked it. In light of the ongoing conflict, with Sudanese civil society caught in the middle, the near horizon remains bleak, but in the long term, only greater transparency and accountability around the free flow of information in conjunction with a cessation in violence will provide the stepping stones necessary to build a resilient democracy in Sudan.

الملخص التنفيذي

ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻨﻮات اﻷﺧﻴﺮة، ﺷﻬﺪ اﻟﺴﻮدان اﺿﻄﺮاﺑﺎت ﺳﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻛﺒﻴﺮة، ﻣﻦ اﻹﻃﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺎﻛﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي ﻋﻤﺮ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎم ،٢٠١٩واﻧﻘﻼب ٢٠٢١اﻟﺬي أﻃﺎح ﺑﺎﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ، ﻹﻧﺪﻻع اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﻌﻨﻴﻒ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻘﻮات اﻟﻤﺴﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ وﻗﻮات اﻟﺪﻋﻢ اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻊ اﻟﺸﺒﻪ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﺑﺮﻳﻞ .٢٠٢٣ﻣﻤﺎ أﺛﻤﺮ ﻋﻦ ﺧﺮوج اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺎرﻫﺎ وآﻣﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﻮل اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻲ، ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻌﻄﻠﺖ ﻫﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﻣﻨﺎورات اﻟﺸﺮﻃﺔ واﻟﺘﻬﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﺤﺮب أﻫﻠﻴﺔ ﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ. ﻻ ﺗﻨﺤﺴﺮ اﻧﻌﻜﺎﺳﺎت ﻫﺬا اﻟﺨﻼف اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﻲ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺤﻴﺎة اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﻴﺔ ﻓﺤﺴﺐ، ﺑﻞ أﻳﻀً ﺎ ﻋﲆ ﺑﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ. ﻳﺘﻨﺎول ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل اﻟﺮﻗﻤﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺒﻘﺖ اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻲ، ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﺮﻛﻴﺰ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة ﻣﻦ اﻧﻘﻼب أﻛﺘﻮﺑﺮ ٢٠٢١ﺣﺘﻰ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ٢٠٢٢.

ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻌﺒﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺷﺒﻜﺎت اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ دورا ًﺣﺎﺳﻤًﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت واﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻷﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻮﺣﺸﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ارﺗﻜﺒﻬﺎ ﺟﻬﺎز أﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، ﻇﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺮب ﻣﻦ ٪٧٠ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻜﺎن اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻨﻘﻄﻌﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرًا ﻣﻦ ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ ٢٠٢٢.

ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ أن أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻠﺚ اﻟﺴﻜﺎن ﻳﻤﻠﻜﻮن إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﱃ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، اﻋﺘﺒﺮ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ واﻟﻨﻈﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﻛﻤﺔ اﻟﻼﺣﻘﺔ أن اﻻﺗﺼﺎل ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ أداة ﺧﻄﺮة ﻓﻲ أﻳﺪي اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﺠﻴﻦ. ﺑﻴﻦ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ٢٠١٨ ودﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ،٢٠٢٢ﺗﻌﺮض اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻮن اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﻮن إﱃ ١٣٨ﻳﻮﻣًﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ.

ﻋﻤﻮﻣﺎً، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻧﻤﻮذﺟﻴﺔ ﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ أﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺼﻤﻤﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﻴﺮ وﺗﻤﻜﻴﻦ اﻹﺟﺮاءات اﻟﻌﻘﺎﺑﻴﺔ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﻴﻦ. ﺣﻴﺚ وﻇﻔﺖ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎت ﻗﻮاﻧﻴﻨﺎً ﻏﺎﻣﻀﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻋﻤﺪ ﻟﻔﺮض ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﻣﺼﺎدرة اﻟﻬﻮاﺗﻒ اﻟﻤﺤﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻋﲆ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل، ﻳﺠﺮّم اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﻨﺎﺋﻲ ﻟﻌﺎم ١٩٩١ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ، ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ ﻋﺎم ٢٠٢٠ ﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻴﺔ، واﻟﺬي ﺗﻢ إﻗﺮاره ﺳﺮاً، أﻗﺮ أن ﻋﻘﺎب ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﺠﻦ ﻟﻤﺪة ﺗﺼﻞ إﱃ أرﺑﻊ ﺳﻨﻮات أو اﻟﺠﻠﺪ أو ﻛﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ. ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻬﺪ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ ﻻ ﺗﺰال ﺳﺎرﻳﺔ، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﻨﺎك أﻳﻀًﺎ ﺗﺤﺴﻴﻨﺎت ﻣﻠﻤﻮﺳﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺒﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻨﺬ إﻗﺎﻟﺘﻪ. ﻟﺠﺄ ﻣﻮاﻃﻨﻮن ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﻮن إﱃ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻛﻢ ﻟﻤﺤﺎرﺑﺔ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﺤﺪى اﻟﺼﺤﻔﻴﻮن ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺼﺤﺎﻓﺔ واﻟﻤﻄﺒﻮﻋﺎت ﻹﻧﺸﺎء ﻧﻘﺎﺑﺔ إﻋﻼﻣﻴﺔ.

ﺷﻜﻞ ﺟﻬﺎز اﻷﻣﻦ واﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻲ وﺣﺪة ﻟﻠﺠﻬﺎد اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ ﻟﻤﺮاﻗﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺎرﺿﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ وﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ. ﺧﻼل اﺣﺘﺠﺎﺟﺎت ٢٠١٩-٢٠١٨اﻟﺘﻲ أدت إﱃ اﻹﻃﺎﺣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، وﺻﻔﺖ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻀﻠﻠﺔ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﻒ. وﺑﻌﺪ إﻗﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ، ﻋﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﺠﻬﺎز اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي واﺳﺘﻬﺪاف اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎﻟﻴﺔ.

أﺷﺎر اﻟﻨﺸﻄﺎء اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﺛﻮا إﱃ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﻲ اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺮ إﱃ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻛﺎﻧﻮا ﺣﺬرﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻣﻦ ﺗﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻤﻼء اﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات ﻣﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻫﻮﻳﺎﺗﻬﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺘﻬﻢ أدﻟﺔ ﻣﺸﺮوﻋﺔ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﻜﺐ ﺿﺪ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺨﻄﺮ، اﺳﺘﺨﺪم اﻟﻨﺸﻄﺎء Facebook Live ﻟﺒﺚ أدﻟﺔ ﻋﲆ وﺣﺸﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﺗﺄﻛﺪوا ﻣﻦ أﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻜﺬﻳﺒﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﻬﻮﻟﺔ ﺑﺎدّﻋﺎء أﻧﻬﺎ ﻗﺪﻳﻤﺔ أو ﻣﺰﻳﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﻀﻤﻴﻦ وذﻛﺮ وﻗﺖ وﺗﺎرﻳﺦ وﻣﻮﻗﻊ ﺣﻮادث ﻫﺬه اﻟﺠﺮاﺋﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرات وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘﻮاﺻﻞ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ.

ﻇﻬﺮ ﺷﻜﻞ ﻣﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ أﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﻤﻘﺎوﻣﺔ ﻋﺒﺮ اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﻓﻴﺴﺒﻮك اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﺴﺎء ﻓﻘﻂ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﺬه اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﺗُﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﺳﺎﺑﻘًﺎ ﺑﻐﺮض اﻟﺘﻌﺮف ﻋﲆ اﻟﺮﺟﺎل اﻟﺨﺎﺋﻨﻴﻦ ﻟﺰوﺟﺎﺗﻬﻢ، ﺛﻢ ﺗﺤﻮﻟﺖ إﱃ ﻣﻨﺼﺎت ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﺗﻨﺸﺮ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﺴﺎء ﺻﻮرًا ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺘﺒﻬﻴﻦ ﺑﺄﻧﻬﻢ أﻋﻀﺎء ﺟﻬﺎز اﻷﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺗﺪﻳﻦ ﻣﻼﺑﺴﺎً ﻣﺪﻧﻴﺔ وﻣﺘﻬﻤﻴﻦ ﺑﺈﺳﺎءة ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت ﻧﺎﺟﺤﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺿﺒﺎط اﻟﻤﺨﺎﺑﺮات اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻴﻦ ﻟﺪرﺟﺔ أن اﻟﻌﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺒﺎط ﺑﺪأوا ﺑﺎرﺗﺪاء اﻷﻗﻨﻌﺔ ﻹﺧﻔﺎء ﻫﻮﻳﺎﺗﻬﻢ.

رﻛﺰت اﻟﻜﻴﺎﻧﺎت اﻷﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻨﻈﻢ ﺣﻤﻼت اﻟﺘﻀﻠﻴﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻋﲆ ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﻼﻗﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺴﻮدان أو دﻓﻊ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺠﺎه اﻟﺬي ﻳﺨﺪم ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﺎ. ﻗﺎم ﻳﻔﻐﻴﻨﻲ ﺑﺮﻳﻐﻮزﻳﻦ، اﻟﻤﺸﺮف ﻋﲆ ﺷﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﺴﻜﺮﻳﺔ روﺳﻴﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻓﺎﻏﻨﺮ، ﺑﺈﺧﺒﺎر اﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ أن ﻳﻨﺸﺮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﻀﻠﻠﺔ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻤﺘﻈﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﻋﲆ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻋﻨﻴﻔﻮن، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ رﻛﺰت اﻟﺤﻤﻼت اﻟﺮوﺳﻴﺔ ﻻﺣﻘًﺎ ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺢ روﺳﻴﺎ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺣﻮل ﺑﻨﺎء ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﺑﺤﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻮرﺗﺴﻮدان. ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻔﻘﺖ ﺷﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺎت اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ دول اﻟﺨﻠﻴﺞ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ داﻋﻤﺔ ﻟﻼﻧﻘﻼب اﻟﺬي أﻃﺎح ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺸﻴﺮ آﻻف اﻟﺪوﻻرات ﻋﲆ اﻟﺘﺮوﻳﺞ ﻟﻠﺠﻴﺶ، ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ رأت اﻟﻔﺮص اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻣﻔﻴﺪة ﻣﻌﻪ.

ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬه اﻷﺛﻨﺎء، ﺷﻜّﻠﺖ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻌﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺸﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻹﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﺗﻬﺪﻳﺪًا ﻟﻠﻤﻨﻈﻤﺎت اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﺎﻓﺢ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ ﻣﺤﺎرﺑﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺎذﺑﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﻠﻬﺎ ﺷﻔﻬﻴﺎً.

ﺗﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻴﺌﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻔﺮﻳﺪة ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﺑﻤﺰﻳﺞ ﻳﺠﻤﻊ ﻧﻈﺎم إﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﻳﺤﺎول ﺑﻨﺎء ﺳﻤﻌﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺮة ﺑﺎﻟﺜﻘﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﻨﻮات ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﺔ، وﻧﻈﺎم ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻲ ﻣﺼﻤﻢ ﻟﻠﺤﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻹﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﺗﻠﻚ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﺷﻌﺐ ﻳﺴﻌﻰ إﱃ زﻳﺎدة اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﻤﺜﻴﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻲ. ﻓﻲ ﺿﻮء اﻟﺼﺮاع اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺮ، ﻻ ﻳﺰال اﻷﻓﻖ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻗﺎﺗﻤﺎ. وﻟﻜﻦ ﻋﲆ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ، ﻟﻦ ﺗﺘﻮﻓﺮ ﻧﻘﺎط اﻻﻧﻄﻼق اﻟﻼزﻣﺔ ﻟﺒﻨﺎء دﻳﻤﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻣﺮﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ أﻛﺒﺮ ﻗﺪر ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ ﺣﻮل اﻟﺘﺪﻓﻖ اﻟﺤﺮ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺰاﻣﻦ ﻣﻊ وﻗﻒ اﻟﻌﻨﻒ.

Related content

Issue Brief

Aug 8, 2023

A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment

By Cameron Hudson

A brief on how the United States and Sudan can collaborate on combatting disinformation and building up the African nation’s democratic potential.

Africa Disinformation

Report launch

Online Event Tue, August 8, 2023 • 8:00 am ET

Democracy derailed: Sudan’s precarious information environment

The DFRLab hosts the launch of its newest report, Democracy Derailed: Sudan’s Precarious Information Environment. The report looks at the intricacies of Sudan’s information and media ecosystem between 2019 and 2022 in light of the current conflict.

Africa Digital Policy Disinformation East Africa

The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

The post Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Lessons learned for improving the timeliness and effectiveness of combatting disinformation and supporting civilian rule

There are few African countries that have received the same degree of high-level and sustained attention from the US government, during the administrations of both Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as the Republic of Sudan. While this engagement stems in large part from a long history of Washington leading diplomatic efforts to isolate the Sudanese government for its support for terrorism during the 1990s, advance the peace process in the country’s north-south civil war, and eventually punish the government for the Darfur genocide, Washington’s renewed diplomatic engagement at the time of Sudan’s 2018 popular uprising reflected a sense of opportunity that real change was potentially coming to the country.

The historic events during the spring and summer of 2019, beginning with longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir’s arrest and removal by senior army officers and the brokering of a civilian-military hybrid government, created both an opportunity and what many in Washington saw as an obligation to help Sudan’s transition succeed. After decades of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the installation of a civilian-led government created the minimal condition that allowed Washington and Western allied governments to begin the task of providing a trusted local partner with the assistance to begin reforming the political system, stabilizing the economy, and transforming the armed forces that would eventually enable a full transition to democracy, one of the popular demands of the revolution.

By late 2019, during a historic visit to Washington by Sudan’s newly named prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, the Trump administration announced a process to normalize diplomatic relations with Sudan through an exchange of ambassadors, among other steps. Privately, the Trump administration also set about the task of constructing an assistance package that would meet the moment and provide the technical, financial, and development assistance needed to demonstrate a true “democracy dividend” to the vast majority of average Sudanese who were by this time struggling under the weight of financial collapse brought on by the one-two punch of regime neglect and, soon, COVID-19 shutdowns.

Washington, however, was both ill-postured and slow to foresee the monumental political opening occurring in the early days of the revolution and then further delayed by an interlocking web of restrictions and prohibitions, some of them self-imposed and some imposed by the US Congress, that limited its ability to scale up resources in a timely manner. In addition to the challenges of having to undo more than twenty-five years of bureaucratic restrictions and red tape, Washington also needed to scale up its human resources inside Sudan that had largely dwindled over the years.

Many of those we spoke with both inside and outside the US government and on the ground in Sudan acknowledged that the speed of change in late 2018 and early 2019, leading to the April 2019 arrest and removal of al-Bashir from office, was so dizzying that Washington was forced into a “wait-and-see” approach. As such, it was more inclined to stand back and assess events as they unfolded and only act to prevent what many feared could result in a mass atrocity against civilian protesters instead of actually trying to shape an outcome that would more immediately deliver on the aims of the protesters. This posture was aided by the fact that the US government had no recent history of partners and programming around the kind of democracy and governance issues that were needed in the early days of the revolution. Nor was the US government postured to provide other forms of assistance owing to its own existing restrictions on the al-Bashir regime. 

Many of these issues were exacerbated by the lack of an ambassador at post; the state sponsor of terrorism label that until December 14, 2020, still applied; and the personal restrictions imposed on US diplomats in Khartoum that meant critical positions were left unfilled at the time of the revolution, leaving them to be filled by an acting junior officer or those who did not have a deep understanding of the unique challenges in countries seeking to transition from autocracy to democracy. Illustrating the severity of this point, through the popular wave of protests until six months after a civilian government was installed in September 2019, the US government remained unable to initiate any new Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance (DRG) programming related to ongoing restrictions from the al-Bashir era, a lack of policy direction from Washington, and a dearth of programmatic staff in the field.

One observer noted in testimony to the US Senate in February 2022, “While assistance opportunities may have been limited in post-secession Sudan, there has not been adequate staffing up [of the embassy] since the 2019 revolution…. More personnel could be devoted to messaging and public affairs outreach, both in person in Sudan and on social media.”

This problem persisted until early 2020 when, after Hamdok’s visit to Washington in December 2019, US officials accelerated their efforts to shore up the new prime minister’s standing vis-à-vis the security services, which remained the dominant force in the country, while helping Hamdok deliver some early wins to his government that could be passed on to the Sudanese people. In fact, some of Washington’s caution was well-intended, if not well-founded, as it struggled to ensure that the civilian component was in fact functioning as an independent and responsible arm of the Sudanese government and was not operating under duress or influence of the military. In retrospect, however, that delay in programming ultimately provided Russia and other malign external influencers more time to cement their operational and influential roles with Sudan’s security services, giving the other powers an advantage in setting and controlling the narrative around the new government, as was only later evident.

Comfortable in the view that the West could work with the civilian government, by November 2019, the first assessment team from the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was on the ground in Sudan identifying needs and opportunities. According to its website, OTI “provides fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs. Strategically designed for each unique situation, OTI has laid the foundation for long-term development by promoting reconciliation, supporting emerging independent media, and fostering peace and democracy through innovative programming. In countries transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy, from violence to peace, or following a fragile peace, OTI’s programs serve as catalysts for positive political change.” Starting with the OTI team’s arrival in February 2020, it would lead all US government programmatic activity around these areas, including the growing concern around disinformation.

During its time in Sudan, the OTI team took its programmatic direction from the prime minister’s office in the belief that, as the central reformist figure and symbol of the change brought about by the revolution, those around the prime minister would know how best to design and manage the technical resources that OTI provided. However, as one USAID employee said, echoing a point made by several colleagues in interviews, “our programming needed to be sensitive to the politics of the country, but the cabinet of technocrats were themselves not sensitive to the politics of their own country, especially the PM.” Themes quickly emerged as a large impediment to effective US programming and messaging, specifically those of government leaders being divorced from the politics and public opinions in Sudan and, therefore, unable to tailor messages to them or adequately respond to active disinformation campaigns led by the security services and their foreign backers.

Nearly six months after OTI’s engagement began, a United Kingdom-based contractor was engaged via a US contract to provide the prime minister’s office, as well as the US government, a window into the kinds of disinformation, public attitudes, and trending news items that were circulating on a daily basis across Sudanese social media networks. The project also aimed to identify which ministries and ministers were being particularly targeted with disinformation campaigns so that efforts could be made to counter those stories, prepare ministers to get ahead of trending news events, and empower individual social media influencers with accurate information for dissemination. Through the firm’s weekly social media monitoring reports and more frequent spot reports, civilian leaders and those inside the US Embassy with access to the reports had a real-time view as to which issues were trending among local social media users, a measure of evolving public attitudes toward those issues, and which local and foreign accounts were responsible for driving these narratives.

While these efforts to share and disseminate this “intelligence” were viewed inside of USAID as having mixed levels of success inside the prime minister’s office and with other ministries, depending on the quality of the people on the inside responsible for acting on and sharing these reports, it was nonetheless viewed as critical that these efforts and this contract transition to a wholly owned and operated program of the civilian government. By mid-2021, efforts were being made to create a disinformation unit inside of the Ministry of Information and Culture that would move the center of gravity on this issue away from the prime minister’s office, which was often inundated with reports and visitors and had difficulty making decisions in a timely way, to a central command center where information could be more effectively disseminated across the cabinet in a more timely manner and where policy questions could perhaps get a decision faster.

In talks with representatives of the British contractor, on many occasions civilian government officials were presented with data on manipulated content emanating from collections of accounts driven by, inter alia, pro-Islamist, pro-military, and pro-Hemedti accounts and given options that the contractor could pursue on the government’s behalf, including notifying Facebook to shut the accounts down and offering counter-messaging. [Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and commonly known as Hemedti, served as deputy chairman of the Transitional Military Council after al-Bashir’s ouster in 2019.] In many instances, “decision-making paralysis” often meant that timely decisions on fast-moving messaging issues went unaddressed. However, in one instance, the contractor was able to notify Facebook of the inauthentic behavior, prompting the platform to shut down more than one thousand accounts. Several months later, Facebook shut down an additional tranche of inauthentic accounts without prompting from the Sudanese or their contractor, suggesting to the contractor at least that Sudan had been “put on the map” for Facebook as a place of concern that they should continue to monitor. In response, however, one former OTI staffer noted that “shutting down Facebook accounts is great, but they keep churning out new ones. It only helps if it is in service of a larger strategy, which we didn’t have.”

Beyond these efforts, with the help of outside contractors, the government was able to train journalists, including citizen journalists, to identify misinformation and perform their own investigative work to push back against false narratives circulating about the civilian government. Contractors also compiled a list of the most influential social media voices in the country and worked with government officials to ensure those influencers were engaged with regularly to ensure they had access to accurate information and could promote it. These efforts also included financial support to a Sudanese-operated nongovernmental organization that actively fact-checked news reports and published deep-dive analyses behind military and foreign-backed disinformation campaigns. One policy request, not acted upon, was the creation of a network of “500 or more newly trained journalists who could sit inside the Ministry of Information and push out factual information, reasoning that if the Islamists and military had troll farms churning out fake news why couldn’t the government counter that with its own team pushing out real news?”What the government routinely failed to realize was that it had the power to defuse these narratives and their accounts if it only used the tools and took their contractor’s advice.

However, just as these nascent efforts were beginning to take hold, two simultaneous events derailed those efforts: the October 25, 2021, military coup in which Hamdok was detained and the civilian cabinet dissolved and the simultaneous internet shut down, which not only halted most of the information sharing but also limited pro-democracy groups’ ability to use online tools to organize and coordinate their activities. And since the US government programming came well after the internet shutdowns that defined the early days of the popular revolution, its efforts to empower online activism were immediately and completely undermined by the military’s renewed control over the internet after the coup.

According to several USAID employees at the US Embassy in Khartoum at the time, there was initially serious consideration and effort given to bringing in internet hardware from outside the country to create a parallel, albeit temporary, internet infrastructure that would get around the junta’s shutdown of the service. One former OTI official interviewed noted “there were three to four weeks of intense effort given to identify the technology, the resources, and the requirements of the system,” but that Washington ultimately decided that it would be too difficult to procure and to get into the country without being discovered.

But while some on the USAID side felt that the risk to reward was worth it, more conservative voices within the US Department of State worried that, if their efforts were discovered by the military, it could result in the expulsion of US diplomats and a worsening of the military’s response against protesters. The effort was ultimately abandoned with no other serious conversation beginning that could help to empower civilian protesters with virtual private networks (VPNs), burner phones—sometimes call “protest phones”—or other means of circumventing the junta’s control over private communications.

Indeed, as the internet controls became more widespread post-coup, resistance committees and others reverted to previous, decidedly low-tech communication and organization efforts, including the use of printed pamphlets and flyers or word-of-mouth organization. Here, too, there was little the United States or others could offer in the way of support to these efforts.

Recommendations

Washington was caught flat-footed in 2019 when al-Bashir was removed from office after nearly thirty years in power. No day-after plan existed for supporting a transition, nor had any efforts been foreseen to untie the hands of US policy so that the full diplomatic toolkit of rewards, incentives, and punitive measures could be deployed in a timely manner. This was as true in efforts to push back against online disinformation efforts as it was in providing technical assistance to ministries or direct financial and organizational support to pro-democracy organizations still on the frontlines. In the ten months from the fall of the National Congress Party regime to the first deployment of OTI advisers to Sudan, Russia and other malign actors demonstrated an ability to build relations, become operational, and begin to influence the media and political environment in favor of their allies in the security services. This left the United States and its Western allies playing an even bigger game of catch-up when their staffing was in place and when their programs were finally ready to be rolled out.

In watching the events in Sudan unfold through the revolution and speaking to Sudanese stakeholders and US government officials on the ground since that time, a number of important insights and recommendations, specifically around countering online influence from malicious actors, have emerged:

1. Invest in resources, strategies, and lessons learned for combatting disinformation. The United States needs a specific strategy for combatting disinformation. The United States has never had a strategy for pushing back against online content that is intended to weaken civilian and pro-democracy governance and empower security actors. Both Sudanese actors, working closely with the United States, along with US staff-level officers from across USAID variously described US efforts as “ad hoc,” “inconsistent,” and “haphazard,” in some cases responding to requests from the prime minister’s office and in some cases surmising what was needed. While one former OTI staffer noted that, while OTI was still “brand new to the communications and disinformation space, there must have been some case studies or resident knowledge somewhere in the US government that could have served as a kind of playbook.” Given the explosive growth in the use of disinformation and online authoritarianism and the shrinking of internet freedom in Sudan and across the region, the United States would be well-served to invest in further developing its expertise in this space, while at the same time conducting a lessons-learned process of what worked and what did not in Sudan and other analogous settings for future use.
2. Do not just detect misinformation, respond and combat it. The United States must make better use of the information that it collects about online disinformation and get it into the hands of those who need it in time to be useful. In particular, many in USAID noted that US diplomats did not know how to make use of the information and insights in the reports they were generating, viewing the information merely as “interesting data points” rather than intelligence that could better inform policy choices or programmatic efforts. One former OTI staffer sounded a similar note that “the products were useful and provided us with ongoing sentiment analysis of the protest movement, but we could never operationalize what we were learning.” Interviewees mentioned similar arguments regarding Sudan’s civilian government, which had difficulty deciding what it should do since acting on advice to shut down, for example, pro-Islamist accounts could have unleashed a backlash those officials could not foresee. In those cases, the United States would be well advised to consider its own ability to act in support of its allies in the civilian government and authorize action against inauthentic networks in a bid to “decontaminate the information space for the sake of civilian rule and democracy.”
3. Shine a light on disinformation. The United States should make public its findings and research on the information space in Sudan. While the training of journalists, promotion of media freedom, and advocacy around free speech is important, the speed at which fake accounts and fake news can be put up, taken down, and spread, to paraphrase Mark Twain, happens before the truth can put on its boots. Part of an offensive would be the more immediate and regular release of disinformation reporting that is being collected to shine a light on bad actors in real time. To a large extent, this requires treating that information not as intelligence, with a limited and tightly controlled distribution, but simply as public information. Creating a stand-alone website or dashboard or sharing that information in real time with a trusted Sudanese source for posting and dissemination would have compelled not just governments to act, but empowered civil society, including many young people, who might have made better use of the information.
4. Improve working relationships with Sudanese civil society. The United States needs to develop more effective ways of working with local civil society organizations. This holds true in regard to both US efforts in the counter-disinformation space and its entire engagement in support of pro-democracy forces throughout the revolution. It is clear that government-to-government ties and assistance relationships are the most natural and comfortable way for the United States to engage, but in circumstances like in Sudan, where civilian leaders were either too constrained or too paralyzed to act, empowering civil society actors must become a more available alternative. While some of that was accomplished through the sharing of disinformation reporting with local influencer and fact-checking organizations, more could have been done to creatively support their efforts to circumvent military shutdowns of the internet or the near continuous churn of new disinformation campaigns that actively sought to undermine civilian rule and the popular revolution.

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Report
Aug 8, 2023
Sudan’s precarious information environment and the fight for democracy
By Tessa Knight, Lujain Alsedeg
An examination of the time from December 2018, when protests against then-president Omar al-Bashir first broke out, and December 2022, when a framework agreement between civilian and military leaders came into play.
Africa Civil Society

---

Report launch

Online Event Tue, August 8, 2023 • 8:00 am ET
Democracy derailed: Sudan’s precarious information environment
The DFRLab hosts the launch of its newest report, Democracy Derailed: Sudan’s Precarious Information Environment. The report looks at the intricacies of Sudan’s information and media ecosystem between 2019 and 2022 in light of the current conflict.
Africa Digital Policy Disinformation East Africa




The Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) has operationalized the study of disinformation by exposing falsehoods and fake news, documenting human rights abuses, and building digital resilience worldwide.

learn more

The post A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/podcast/mercenary-bloodline-the-war-in-sudan/ Fri, 07 Jul 2023 13:19:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661879 Host and Nonresident Senior Fellow Alia Brahimi speaks with Africa experts Cameron Hudson and Munzoul Assal about the mercenary pedigree of the Rapid Support Forces.

The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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In Season 1, Episode 5 of the Guns for Hire podcast, host Alia Brahimi is joined by two guests. She speaks with Cameron Hudson, the former US government expert on Sudan, about the mercenary pedigree of one of the two main belligerent parties, the Rapid Support Forces, and the determinative impact this has had on the current conflict in Sudan. By fighting as mercenaries in Libya, and especially Yemen, the RSF secured a cash windfall that let it recruit in numbers to rival the size of the national army, it forged regional relationships that are now central to its resupply, and it has committed crimes and abuses in the conduct of the war which represent a detached mercenary mindset.

Alia also chats with Professor Munzoul Assal of the University of Khartoum about the danger of two parallel governments emerging in Sudan along the lines of the bifurcation in Libya; the presence of RSF fighters at the Sudanese border with the Central African Republic where the Wagner Group is deeply entrenched; and the clear and alarming possibilities of a regional conflagration.

“The origin story of the wealth is really sending the RSF out into the region as a mercenary force… Hemedti has now been able to return back to his fighting roots but doing it with a war chest that has allowed him to recruit and to resupply in such a way that he is now a rival to the authority of the country.”

Cameron Hudson, Former US government expert on Sudan

Find the Guns For Hire podcast on the app of your choice













About the podcast

The Guns for Hire podcast is a production of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Initiative. Taking Libya as its starting point, it explores the causes and implications of the growing use of mercenaries in armed conflict.

The podcast features guests from many walks of life, from ethicists and historians to former mercenary fighters. It seeks to understand what the normalisation of contract warfare tells us about the world as we currently find it, but also about the future of the international system and about what war could look like in the coming decades.

Further reading


MENASource Jun 28, 2023
The Wagner rebellion is over—for now. But how will the events reverberate in the Middle East and North Africa?
By Mark N. Katz
The June 23-24 rebellion led by Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin—aimed, he claimed, at replacing the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov (not Russian President Vladimir Putin)—has ended. However, reverberations from it are likely to continue being felt beyond Russia, such as in the Middle East and North […]
Conflict Europe & Eurasia

MENASource Jun 1, 2023
Is Egypt planning a full-scale invasion of Sudan? 
By Shahira Amin
With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.
East Africa Middle East

MENASource May 11, 2023
Experts react: Sudan at the crossroads—where the conflict goes from here
By Benjamin Mossberg, Alia Brahimi, Thomas S. Warrick, Shahira Amin, R. Clarke Cooper
Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.
Africa East Africa



Through our Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, the Atlantic Council works with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US interests, build peace and security, and unlock the human potential of the region.

Learn more

The post Mercenary bloodline: The war in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cbdc-tracker-cited-by-statista/ Wed, 28 Jun 2023 16:11:23 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661596 Read the full piece here.

The post CBDC tracker cited by Statista appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Read the full piece here.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cbdc-tracker-cited-by-decrypt/ Mon, 26 Jun 2023 16:17:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=661600 Read the full piece here.

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]]> Read the full piece here.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/egypt-sudan-military-invasion/ Thu, 01 Jun 2023 14:27:15 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=650746 With the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are that an Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent.

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]]> The crisis in Sudan, which has now entered its second month, has serious implications for neighboring states. This is particularly the case for economically-challenged Egypt, which is watching a humanitarian crisis unfold on its side of the border as tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees flee the conflict. 

Since the fighting erupted in mid-April, at least 259,000 people have crossed over from Sudan into neighboring countries—namely Egypt, Chad, Eritrea, and the Central Africa Republic—according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). But Egypt—which shares its southern border with Sudan—is the worst affected.  

A primary destination for people fleeing the violence, Egypt has received more than fifty thousand people from across the border. Hundreds of thousands more are expected to cross into the country in the coming months if the fighting continues. The mass influx not only threatens to aggravate the humanitarian crisis on Egypt’s side of the border, but it also threatens to overstretch the country’s resources at a time when it faces a deepening economic crisis, which risks further disgruntling its disaffected population.   

But the Egyptian government has a lot more to worry about than rising public discontent caused by the immense economic pressure. The possible infiltration of extremist groups into Egypt is currently a prime concern for authorities. It’s a case of once bitten, twice shy.

Over the past decade, the Egyptian army and police have been the target of multiple terrorist attacks by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)-affiliated jihadists that crossed into Egypt from the shared eastern border with the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, troops have been deployed along Egypt’s Western border with Libya to curb terrorist infiltration and a repeat of similar attacks. The recent release of pro-Muslim Brotherhood figures from a prison in Sudan has heightened Cairo’s fears of the opening of a new front in Egypt’s war on terrorism. 

Another major concern for Egypt is the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) strong ties with Ethiopia. Egypt has sought the backing of Sudan in its ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the downstream country’s share of Nile waters. This, following the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), considered by Egypt to be an “existential threat.” Should Egypt decide to use the military option against Ethiopia at any time in the future, it may have to do so unilaterally, as it would no longer have Sudan on its side.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has ruled out any intervention in Sudan, arguing that the Sudanese crisis was an “internal” matter. He has also pledged that Egypt would not take sides in the conflict and has offered to mediate between Sudan’s rival factions. However, skeptics suggest that Egypt is already deeply involved in Khartoum. They affirm that the Egyptian military backs the Sudanese army with which it forged strong ties following the overthrow of the Islamist-leaning former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2019.  

Some analysts argue that the stakes are too high for Cairo to stand idly by and watch as the situation deteriorates.

It is no secret that Cairo has long backed the Sudanese army with the conviction that it is the sole institution that can restore stability in Sudan. Egypt cemented its ties with the Sudanese army by conducting joint military exercises with Sudan after Bashir was deposed by the military in the wake of mass protests in Sudan. Egyptian authorities are looking to Abdel Fattah El-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto military leader, to quash the nascent pro-democracy movement that emerged during Sudan’s 2019 mass uprising and to restore security and stability in Sudan—moves that Cairo perceives as serving its interests. 

The capture of two hundred Egyptian soldiers—the majority of whom were air force personnel—at a military base in the northern Sudanese town of Meroe by the RSF in mid-April, as well as a leaked video showing the soldiers in a state of defeat, were perceived as an act of provocation by Cairo. The humiliating episode also provoked an outcry on social media platforms. 

The RSF believed Egyptian soldiers were siding with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) but later apologized for releasing the video. Meanwhile, in an apparent attempt to save face, Sisi insisted that the Egyptian troops were in Sudan “for training purposes” and gave the RSF a seventy-two-hour ultimatum to return the soldiers home safely. The troops were indeed sent back to Egypt on April 19, but some analysts believe that the incident has not been forgotten and are guessing Cairo may be waiting for the right moment to retaliate.      

There have been unconfirmed reports that Egypt has provided the SAF with military intelligence and tactical support. Sources have also cited unconfirmed bombings of RSF positions by Egyptian fighter jets and say Egypt is contemplating invading Sudan to fight the powerful paramilitary forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemetti. 

If the reports are accurate, this will this pit Egypt against the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—Egypt’s longtime ally and principal financial backer—which has thrown its weight behind the RSF. It would also pit Egypt against Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar,  another RSF supporter, whose forces control much of eastern Libya and who was backed by Egypt and the RSF during his failed onslaught on Tripoli in 2019.

All of this puts Egypt in a dilemma. On the one hand, it would like to see stability and security restored in Sudan for fear of violence spilling over into its territory. On the other, Sudan’s northern neighbor does not wish to risk ruffling the feathers of the UAE by overtly taking an opposing side in the conflict. Cash-strapped Egypt has been selling government-owned assets to the wealthy Gulf nation to shore up its troubled economy. Agitating the UAE may cause it to halt its investments in Egypt, denying the North African country the cash it badly needs to plug a financing gap of $17 billion over the next four years.  

It is safer for Egypt to continue to support the SAF covertly or indirectly without publicly announcing its anti-RSF position. Still, with the evacuation of foreigners from Sudan nearly complete, expectations are rife that a full-scale Egyptian military invasion of Sudan is imminent—assuming the conflict drags on. According to some analysts, invading Sudan would give Egypt an opportunity to reassert its leadership role in the region.

By brokering a truce between rival factions in Sudan, Egypt also stands to win favor with global powers—the United States in particular—which had been pinning their hopes on a  handover of power to a civilian government. A return to civilian rule had been a bone of contention between Burhan and the RSF, with the latter accusing Sudan’s military leaders of clinging to power. 

Helping end the conflict in Sudan would also allow Egypt to align its foreign policy and interests with the United States, reversing a previous trend of having conflicting viewpoints on regional issues. This would pave the way for greater cooperation between the US and its longtime Middle Eastern ally, and would undoubtedly help in defusing tensions over opposing stances on several issues, including Egypt’s backing of Haftar during the civil war in Libya and recently leaked reports of Egypt’s secret plans to supply rockets to Russia.  

Egypt’s strategic relations with Russia have irked the United States the most. It may now be the time for Cairo to show the Biden administration that Egypt’s cooperation with Russia—which has included arms deals and a contract for a civilian nuclear facility—is not an attempt to turn its back on US support, but rather, diversify its sources of support. 

Thus, while there are many complex factors that might dissuade Egypt from intervening overtly in Sudan, the possibility of an invasion cannot be ruled out. The chance to smooth over ties with the US is a juicy incentive, as are the benefits that would arise from bringing stability and security to the surrounding region. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative and an independent journalist based in Cairo. A former contributor to CNN’s Inside Africa, Amin has been covering the development in post-revolution Egypt for several outlets including Index on Censorship and Al-Monitor. Follow her on Twitter @sherryamin13.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-us-and-g7-allies-target-russias-evasion-and-procurement-networks/ Thu, 25 May 2023 13:42:39 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=649118 Tackling export controls circumvention by Russia; the enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap; the failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

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]]> A few days ago, the Group of Seven (G7) allies met in Hiroshima and reasserted their determination to further economically isolate Russia and impose costs on those who support Russia’s war effort. To do so, they will have to close loopholes in existing sanctions and export control regimes, which in turn requires enhancing interagency coordination within the US government and developing a common vernacular among allies on the targeting of sanctions and export control evasion networks. 

In this edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we cover:

• New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit.
• How the United States is tackling export controls circumvention and what should improve moving forward.
• The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap.
• The failure of the US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

New sanctions packages against Russia released ahead of the G7 Summit

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment from 2022 indicated that forty out of fifty-two components recovered from the Iranian Shahed-136 drone that was downed in Ukraine last fall had been manufactured by thirteen different American companies, while the remaining twelve were made in Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Taiwan, and China. The case revealed that it was not enough to impose sanctions and export controls on Russian defense companies. Not only was Iran providing drones to Russia, but also certain entities and individuals in countries such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have procured materials on Russia’s behalf. This is why the United States released a new sanctions package ahead of the G7 summit, targeting a much wider international network of Russia sanctions and export controls evasion. 

Finland, Switzerland, Cyprus, United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore—these are just a few locations associated with individuals and entities included in the Treasury Department’s newest designations against Russia. Entities and individuals located in these countries have aided Russia’s circumvention efforts or provided materials for Russia’s military procurement. Among the sanctioned individuals are Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti and his colleagues in Germany and India, who have sold advanced technology to Russian state-owned enterprises. Liechtenstein-based Trade Initiative Establishment (TIE) and its network of two companies and four individuals have been procuring semiconductor production equipment for sanctioned Russian entities since 2012. 

Along with the United States, the United Kingdom also imposed sanctions against eighty-six individuals and entities from Russian energy, metals, financial, and military sectors who have been enhancing Russia’s capacity to wage the war. Additionally, the European Union (EU) is developing its eleventh package of sanctions which will reportedly, for the first time, target Chinese entities facilitating Russia’s evasion efforts. Coordinating the designation and enforcing processes among the G7 allies will be key in synchronizing the targeting of Russia’s evasion and procurement networks.

Export controls circumvention: How the US is tackling it and what should improve moving forward

While sanctions aim to cut entities and individuals procuring technology for the Russian military out of the global financial system, export controls are designed to prevent them from physically acquiring components. G7 allies have levied significant export controls on Russia, but enforcing export controls is easier said than done. Third countries from Russia’s close neighborhood have stepped up to fill Russia’s technology shortages caused by other countries complying with export controls. Central Asian and Caucasus countries had a significant uptick in exports of electronic components to Russia, while Turkey, Serbia, and Kazakhstan have been supplying semiconductors to Moscow. Even if exported electronic components are not designed for military application, Russians have been able to extract semiconductors and electronic components for military use even from refrigerators and dishwashers. The sudden boost in electronic equipment exports from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Russia can only be explained by Russia’s efforts of repurposing them for military use. 

In response to Russia’s efforts to obtain technology by all means possible, the US Departments of Commerce and Justice have jointly launched the Disruptive Technology Strike Force. The goal of the Strike Force is to prevent Russia and adversarial states such as China and Iran from illicitly getting their hands on advanced US technology. The Strike Force recently announced criminal charges against individuals supplying software and hardware source codes stolen from US tech companies to China. The Strike Force embodies the whole-of-government approach the United States has been taking in investigating sanctions and export controls evasion cases. The prosecutorial and investigative expertise of the Justice Department, coupled with the Treasury’s ability to identify and block the sanctions evaders from the US financial system, will amplify the impact of the Commerce Department’s export controls and enhance their investigations and enforcement.  

The US Department of Commerce has also teamed up with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to publish a joint supplemental alert outliniing red flags for potential Russian export controls evasion that financial institutions should watch out for and report on, consistent with their compliance reporting requirements. The red flags include but are not limited to:

• Payments for dual-use goods to companies located outside of the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) countries. 
• A new customer who trades in the nine Harmonized System (HS) codes, is located outside of the GECC countries and was incorporated after February 24, 2022. 
• A consumer who refuses to provide details to banks about end users or company ownership. 

Providing information to the public in the form of alerts and advisories is an effective step to increase awareness, financial institution reporting, and compliance with Western sanctions and exports controls. The Disruptive Technology Strike Force should consider issuing a multilateral advisory on export control evasion with G7 allies to bring in foreign partner perspectives, similar to the multilateral advisory issued in March on sanctions evasion by the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Task Force (REPO)

Regarding third-country intermediaries suspected of supplying Russia with dual-use technology, G7 allies should prioritize capacity building and encouraging political will in these countries to strengthen sanctions and customs enforcement. Building up their capacity to monitor and record what products are being exported to Russia could be the first step towards this goal. For example, Georgian authorities returned goods and vehicles destined for Russia and Belarus in 204 cases. However, registration certificates did not identify the codes of returned goods in fifty cases, and clarified that the goods were sanctioned only in seventy-one cases. Developing a system for identifying controlled goods and making the customs data easily accessible to the public could both salvage Georgia’s reputation and enhance export control enforcement against Russia.

The enforcement and effectiveness of the oil price cap

The US Department of the Treasury recently published a report analyzing the effects of the oil price cap, arguing that the novel tool has achieved its dual objective of reducing revenue for Moscow while keeping global oil prices relatively stable. A recent study by the Kyiv School of Economics Institute backs up this statement with detailed research of the Russian ports and the payments made to Russian sellers. However, Russian crude oil exports to China through the Russian Pacific port of Kozmino might be examples of transactions where the price cap approach does not hold.

In response, the Department of the Treasury warned US ship owners and flagging registries to use maritime intelligence services for detecting when tankers are disguising their port of call in Russia. Meanwhile, commodities brokers and oil traders should invoice shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs separately, and ensure that the price of Russian oil is below 60 dollars. 

Despite China’s imports of Russian crude oil, the world average price for Russian crude oil in the first quarter of 2023 was 58.62 dollars, which supports the claim about the success of the oil price cap, at least for now. Notably, Russia’s energy revenues dropped by almost 40 percent from December 2022 to January 2023, likely in part due to the price cap combined with lower global energy prices.

Beyond Russia: The failure of US sanctions policy towards Sudan, and how to fix it.

While the world has been focused on the G7 summit, the crisis worsened in Sudan. In April 2023, President Biden issued Executive Order 14098 (EO 14098) authorizing future sanctions on foreign persons to address the situation in Sudan and to support a transition to democracy and a civilian transitional government in Sudan. The use of sanctions to support policy goals in Africa is not new. In the case of EO 14098, policymakers seek to use future sanctions on individuals responsible for threatening the peace, security, and stability of Sudan, undermining Sudan’s democratic transition, as well as committing violence against civilians or perpetuating other human rights abuses. 

Much has been written and studied about the effectiveness of sanctions programs in Africa with many programs suffering from being poorly designed, organized, implemented, or enforced. Sudan faced statutory sanctions from its designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism from 1993 to 2020 and US Treasury sanctions from 1997 to 2017 both of which produced limited results due to ineffective enforcement and maintenance of the program. A near-total cut-off of Sudan from the US financial system pushed Sudan to develop financial ties beyond the reach of the US dollar.

Sanctions in Sudan can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in these relevant countries. Cutting off those links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply weapons, and pay their soldiers, which could force them back to the negotiating table.

Kimberly Donovan is the director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @KDonovan_AC.

Maia Nikoladze is the assistant director at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @Mai_Nikoladze.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Castellum.AI partners with the Economic Statecraft Initiative and provides sanctions data for the Global Sanctions Dashboard and Russia Sanctions Database.



Global Sanctions Dashboard

The Global Sanctions Dashboard provides a global overview of various sanctions regimes and lists. Each month you will find an update on the most recent listings and delistings and insights into the motivations behind them.

Explore Here



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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/quirk-in-just-security-on-adapting-the-us-strategy-towards-hybrid-regimes/ Fri, 19 May 2023 14:06:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=647646 On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US' commitments to democratic values.

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]]> original source

On May 17, Scowcroft Strategy Initiative Nonresident Senior Fellow Patrick Quirk co-authored a piece for Just Security on the importance of developing a US strategy towards hybrid regimes that promotes US interests whilst remaining steadfast in the US’ commitments to democratic values.

The authors go on to posit that prolonged engagements with hybrid regimes, in the long term, risks impeding upon the US’ global interests, as non-democratic regimes are less likely to uphold the US’ interests on the global stage, and may prove detrimental to the US’ posture in its strategic competition with China.

Failing to address the democratic deficiencies of hybrid regimes sets up the United States for long-term strategic failure and hinders American economic prosperity. To avoid these outcomes, the United States must carve out a new path forward that preserves near-term US interests while also pressing these States to make democratic progress.

Patrick Quirk


Fellow
Patrick Quirk
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Freedom and Prosperity Center Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Civil Society Conflict

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/experts-react-sudan-at-the-crossroads-where-the-conflict-goes-from-here/ Thu, 11 May 2023 13:09:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=644644 Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

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]]> On April 15, fighting broke out in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary force, Rapid Support Forces (RSF). General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of SAF, and General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the leader of the RSF, had run Sudan together since the 2021 coup d’état (when the military took full control), which dissolved the transitional government that was put in place after nonviolent pro-democracy protests in 2019. The current conflict between the two leaders—each of whom is seeking full control of Sudan—has permeated to urban civilian areas, creating a humanitarian crisis with a rising death toll and more than seven hundred thousand internally displaced people.

As the scope of fighting widens and the number of Sudanese refugees grows, neighboring countries fear the impact on their populations, potentially igniting political turbulence. While there have been diplomatic efforts to coordinate a ceasefire, it’s unclear whether it will hold and what could be done otherwise to stop the fighting.

Atlantic Council experts react to the conflict in Sudan and discuss how it will impact the region and beyond.

Benjamin Mossberg: ‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

Alia Brahimi: Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Thomas Warrick: ‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

Shahira Amin: Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

R. Clarke Cooper: The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

‘The United States must continue to prioritize the Sudanese people’

The significant policy failure that the United States faces in Sudan cannot be understated. The importance of Sudan’s stability to Africa, Europe, and the Middle East is closely linked to the events inside the country as it faces ongoing fighting, the potential for a significant humanitarian disaster, and human rights abuses. While there is no easy solution to help Sudan exit this period of instability, the international community must act.

There appears to be little popular support for the violence facing the people of Sudan, as a majority of the Sudanese people face significant challenges in securing food, water, electricity, and shelter. Significant pressure must be brought to bear on General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the commander of the RSF, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the SAF, to encourage a firm cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations over the civilian-led future of the country.

The announcement of an Executive Order—“Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition”—on May 3 by the United States can be useful if applied in concert with more concrete action. US policymakers who do not work on Africa specifically must elevate Sudan on their priority list and engage their counterparts at sufficiently senior levels in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and elsewhere to encourage them to apply pressure on the Sudanese generals. This could be done by freezing and seizing their financial, business, real estate, and other assets in the relevant countries. Cutting off these links will impede the two generals’ ability to fight, resupply their arms, and pay their soldiers, which would force them back to the negotiating table. 

The United States must continue prioritizing the Sudanese people and rely on Sudanese leaders that have support and roots in the country. While it is unlikely that either the SAF or RSF can win a decisive military victory, the United States should not abandon the country regardless. Geopolitical competition by China, Russia, and others continues to play out in Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa. It is critical that the United States continue to assert its values, communicate its interests, share its redlines consistently, and avoid the transactional nature of relationships that its geopolitical competitors value.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. 

Libya’s Haftar is resupplying the conflict in Sudan

Libya is particularly exposed to developments in Sudan. The first point of vulnerability is the heavily partisan role of General Khalifa Haftar, who controls the east of Libya and large parts of the south and is a central node in the alliance between the UAE, Hemedti, and the Wagner Group. External support to the RSF ideally runs through southeastern Libya, a vast area largely in the grip of Haftar proxies. The border between Libya and Sudan, for example, is manned by Subul al-Salam, a Salafist militia in the pay of Haftar’s fourth son, Saddam. Additionally, Haftar’s 128th Brigade controls many of the transit routes in central and southern Libya. It is led by Hassan al-Zadma, who has strong personal links with Darfuri militias and has taken charge of sourcing mercenaries for Haftar from Sudan and Chad.  

Haftar’s role in the resupply of the RSF is more than a detail in this conflict—it is important to the war’s viability. There have already been documented reports of ammunition shipments, missile deliveries, and intelligence sharing. However, fuel is the critical resource for Hemedti’s Darfur-based fighters who must cross great tracts of the desert by truck to reach Khartoum. Thus, Saddam Haftar has personally overseen the effort to divert Libyan fuel towards the RSF, redirecting the refining capacity at the Sarir oil field—ten thousand barrels a day—over the border to Hemedti. 

The second point of danger is Libya’s status as an optimal rear base. Libya is a major black market logistics hub—for weapons, food, fuel, fighters, fresh dollars—and, thus, an ideal base to launch attacks into Sudan or Chad. If Hemedti retreats from Khartoum to Darfur, tribal fighting within the Darfur region and the collapse of the peace deal there threatens to pull Libya into a regional conflagration. 

The third source of vulnerability is a lesson that might be drawn from the descent into war in Sudan. The international community may rightly conclude that the strategy of dealing with warlords—empowering them as legitimate “stakeholders” in democratic transition—has been exposed as deeply flawed by Sudan. Most Libyans would agree. At the same time, Haftar will note that Hemedti was an integral part of the United Nations-approved power-sharing deal and a party to official political agreements. However, his position was ultimately insecure. Haftar and his sons may, therefore, recommit to growing their military power and leveraging their relationship with the Wagner Group to obtain a preponderance of military power in Libya. This would upend the delicate balance in Libya and portend a regional war.  

Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow in the Middle East Programs.

‘Governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges’

I have two memories of Sudan. The first is in 2016, when I was just about to fly out to Khartoum to lead the first high-level US government delegation to Sudan in a decade. My boss called me into his office to give me the benefit of his experience leading such a delegation more than a decade earlier. “The people are warm and friendly towards Americans,” he recalled, “but their government has a history of disappointing them.”

My second memory is of when I was there to discuss rebuilding counterterrorism ties with the Sudanese government. They helicoptered us to an important remote base in the northwest that lay astride one of Africa’s major human smuggling routes from east Africa to southern Europe. As we flew out of Khartoum, a US official with years of experience there pointed out the two bridges over the White Nile: “You do realize that the government’s remit stops at the west end of that bridge?”

Seven years later, and after a brief period of hope, governance remains one of Sudan’s greatest challenges. The popular support for civilian leaders who came to power in 2019 was undercut by generals vying for power, each afraid that “second place” meant “last place.” Yet Sudan remains strategically important to the United States, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East because of its role at a crossroads. During the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) time controlling parts of Syria and Iraq, Sudan was a transit country for ISIS operatives and money transiting in and out of Libya. Human traffickers carried Ethiopians and others toward Libyan ports, taking advantage of false hopes of leaving behind drought and food crises.

Sustained pressure now needs to be brought by the Quad—the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and UAE—and others on the countries supporting the warring generals in order to reach a resolution that will benefit the Sudanese people. They deserve better than another decade of disappointment.

Thomas S. Warrick is a senior fellow and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

Sudanese are fleeing to Egypt while the country’s resources are overstretched

Concerns are rising in Egypt as the fighting in neighboring Sudan rages on. Since the outbreak of the conflict in mid-April, tens of thousands of Sudanese fleeing the violence have crossed over into Egypt through a shared southern border with Sudan. The mass influx threatens to put an additional strain on Egypt, which is already facing an acute economic crisis.

But the added burden on Egypt’s already-overstretched resources isn’t Cairo’s only concern. Egyptian leadership is even more worried about prospects of a Muslim Brotherhood resurgence next door, which may, subsequently, pave the way for infiltration over the border. This follows the April 26 release of imprisoned, key figures from Sudanese ex-President Omar al-Bashir’s deposed regime. The SAF reportedly ordered the release of members of the former Islamist regime after protests by inmates broke out inside Kober prison, where they had been jailed after Bashir’s overthrow by the military in 2019. 

Egypt’s army is already stretched thin: troops have been deployed on Libya’s western border to guard against foreign infiltrators. Moreover, after more than a decade of battling an insurgency fueled by Islamic State militants—many of whom had allegedly crossed into Northern Sinai from the Gaza Strip by way of underground tunnels—the last thing the Egyptian military wants is a new front in its war on terrorism.  

The ongoing conflict also pits Egypt against its longtime ally, the UAE, which backs the RSF (the powerful paramilitary forces embroiled in a power struggle with the SAF, which is backed by Egypt). Supporting opposing sides may cause tensions between the two countries at a time when Egypt is in dire need of financial backing to shore up its ailing economy. The sale of Egyptian assets to Gulf countries, including the UAE, has provided Egypt with the lifeline it needs to avert economic collapse and a looming debt default (so far, at least).

Egypt has also relied heavily on Sudan’s support in the ongoing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which sources say threatens to exacerbate Egypt’s water shortage challenge. There are growing concerns in Egypt that the instability in Sudan may overshadow or even derail the negotiations with Ethiopia.

While the Egyptian leadership has insisted it is not taking sides in the conflict, Cairo is watching the developments in Sudan with trepidation, as the unfolding crisis may have far-reaching implications for its northern neighbor. 

Shahira Amin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

The conflict in Sudan will have broad transregional impacts

As with previous civil wars in Sudan, the collapse of security and the displacement of the population will have broad transregional impacts beyond immediate neighboring states. Some internally-displaced Sudanese may eventually return home, while others will seek permanent refuge anywhere outside of Sudan—be it on the African continent or further afield in Europe or North America. Exasperating an already fragile security environment, the disruption from the weeks-long conflict is already enabling a more permissive environment for transnational crime and illicit trafficking and terrorism.

Unfortunately, in the multilateral space, there is diminishing capacity to properly address Sudan’s increasingly dire humanitarian and security issues. War in Ukraine, earthquake recovery in Turkey, and flood relief in Pakistan already occupy significant amounts of attention and resources from United Nations agencies, various NGOs, and the national governments of the world. Still, beyond the immediate humanitarian appeal to help the civilian populous of Sudan, this latest iteration of civil conflict also requires global attention in the peacekeeping, security, and conflict resolution space. If ignored, Sudan’s humanitarian and security crisis will manifest itself elsewhere in the world well beyond the Middle East and North Africa.

Absent conflict resolution led by a group of responsible states or a multilateral body, there is an increasing risk that the conflict will become a regional war. Neighboring states have already aligned with either of the two generals and, bizarrely, in some cases, aligned with both sides. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has the affirmed support of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The UAE, and General Haftar of Libya, however, support the RSF. As other international actors assess where to align, a united front of regional and Western states is required to stop the march toward greater conflict, and the time for such a united front is now. 

R. Clarke Cooper is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/when-it-comes-to-great-power-competition-in-africa-one-equation-is-missing-iran/ Tue, 09 May 2023 18:56:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=643727 One area the United States completely ignores is Iran's growing influence on the African continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action there.

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]]> In mid-December 2022, President Joe Biden invited the leaders of African countries to a summit in Washington. There, they discussed cooperation with the United States regarding solutions to the economic, civil, and security problems accompanying the African continent.

The summit and recent visits by high-ranking Biden administration officials to Africa were the culmination of an effort led by the White House to strengthen the relationship between the United States and the African continent in a wide variety of aspects.

This approach by the Biden administration is quite different from the one adopted by the Donald Trump administration, which saw the continent as a playground for superpower rivalry between China, Russia, and the United States. As part of this great power competition, the Biden administration seeks to enhance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation to block Chinese and Russian influence in Africa.

However, one area both administrations completely ignore is Iran’s growing influence on the continent and the need to formulate a policy that will work to limit Tehran’s freedom of action in Africa.

Since the Islamic revolution in 1979—and even more so following the heavy political pressure on Tehran—Africa has become an attractive continent for the Islamic Republic. Iran views the African continent as a “battleground” for influence, power, and territory against Saudi Arabia, and has also sought to counter Western influence—particularly that of the United States—within Africa, working with elements that are opposed to colonialism and seeking to chart a more independent course.

Moreover, Iran seeks to utilize their worldwide network of religious and cultural organizations, including universities and charities, to increase its influence over the vast Shia minorities in Africa, using them for political support, fundraising, and even to recruit to terrorist cells.

But Iranian terrorist activities in Africa are not the only problem. Iran is not hesitating to interfere in the internal affairs of many African countries to preserve its interests and protect the individuals who serve its policies. A prominent example is the unprecedented Iranian involvement in 2019 to free Shia cleric Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky from his detention in Nigeria, with Iran using its control on Hausa TV to push for his release.

The Iran-West Africa Economic Summit in Tehran, which was held on March 7, is another indication that Iran is seeking to enhance its relations with African countries and strengthen its foothold, especially in the west of the continent. This is part of President Ebrahim Raisi’s vision regarding relations between West African countries and Iran, which was exemplified in his visit to Guinea-Biassau in August 2021, when he pledged to continue expanding ties between Iran and the continent. In many regards, this activity resembles the policy of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Africa, which sought to improve relations significantly.

Apart from Iran’s traditional interests in Africa, several new ones have emerged that must be considered in the context of preventing Iran from consolidating its interests in the continent.

First and foremost is the campaign that Tehran is waging against US allies in Africa that dared to take part in the normalization efforts with Israel: Sudan and Morocco. In order to achieve this goal, Iran has enhanced its military and diplomatic ties with Algiers and increased military aid to the Polisario Front in Western Sahara. The latter contribution has improved the front’s ability to inflict severe damage on the Moroccan army and challenge Moroccan control over the territory. Iran is also working in Mauritania and sees this country as a priority zone for its influence schemes in the Sahara region, which is extremely important for Moroccan security.

In the case of Sudan, Iran’s bid to further its influence in the strategic Horn of Africa suffered after Khartoum joined the Abraham Accords. In order to change this negative trend, Iran is blaming Israel for causing political instability in Sudan’s domestic issues. Furthermore, Iran is still actively trying to spread its Shia doctrine in the country while conspiring to create a political vacuum in Sudan that will weaken the forces who agreed to sign a normalization agreement with Israel.

Through its actions, Tehran is demonstrating that there is a price for joining the Abraham Accords and that it can pose a direct or indirect threat to Sudan and Morocco. Iran is also conducting a powerful political campaign to prevent Israel from enhancing its relations with other African countries and improving its diplomatic presence in various African institutions, such as the African Union.

In addition to the illegal arms smuggling network that Iran managed to build in the Horn of Africa, which allows Tehran to smuggle weapons to the countries of the continent, it also appears to be planning to significantly increase its sales of Unmanned Arial Vehicles (UAVs) to the African continent. Evidence of this can be seen in Iran’s involvement in the civil war in Ethiopia and the sale of Mohajer-6 UAVs to the Ethiopian army.

Against the background of Iranian involvement in Ukraine and Tehran’s desire to increase sales of its military equipment in the war in Ukraine, Africa is a natural continent for this desire, and the transfer of these capabilities to the Polisario Front constitutes another indication of that.

Third, there is a need to pay close attention to the plots that were revealed in several African countries after the assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020—the foiled plot to assassinate the US ambassador in South Africa, chief among them. During the past year, several plans were discovered in which Iran sought to harm American or Israeli interests in Africa or use its presence in the continent to recruit terrorists.

In order to protect its allies in Africa and preserve its interests in the continent, the Biden administration cannot focus solely on the growing presence of China and Russia. It must also consider Tehran’s deepening foothold in Africa, which is a growing challenge to US policy on the continent. The administration must prepare an orderly work plan with the cooperation of African countries—and possibly Gulf countries—that are very disturbed by Iranian expansion. The goal of this would be to reduce Iranian influence in Africa and prevent Iran from using African countries to achieve its interests.

Looking to the future, Africa will continue to be an attractive target for Iranian policy under Raisi. Without a well-thought-out action plan, the US will have minimal ability to push Tehran out of Africa and prevent it from coordinating with China and Russia, with the latter having engaged in an unprecedented rapprochement with Tehran in recent months. Thus, countering Iran’s influence in Africa must become a priority for the Biden administration sooner rather than later.

Danny Citrinowicz is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He served for twenty-five years in a variety of command positions units in Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) including as the head of the Iran branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in the Israeli defense intelligence and as the division’s representative in the United States. Follow him on Twitter: @citrinowicz.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/kroenig-and-ashford-debate-responses-to-advancements-in-north-korean-nuclear-capabilities/ Tue, 02 May 2023 17:26:31 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=640646 On April 7, Foreign Policy published its biweekly "It's Debatable" column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

The post Kroenig and Ashford debate responses to advancements in North Korean nuclear capabilities appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> original source

On March 10, Foreign Policy published its biweekly “It’s Debatable” column featuring Scowcroft Center Vice President and Senior Director Matthew Kroenig and Emma Ashford assessing the latest news in international affairs.

In their latest column, they discuss the recent leak of sensitive government documents, the ongoing conflict in Sudan, and North Korea’s recent advancements in nuclear weapon capabilities. Specifically, in light of the developments in North Korea, the pair debate the utility and feasibility of nuclear disarmament.

Washington should stick to its long-standing policy that North Korea must completely disarm. Striking an arms control agreement is contrary to that principle. It would essentially say that the world is willing to live with a nuclear North Korea. It would also undermine nuclear nonproliferation more broadly.

Matthew Kroenig

North Korean disarmament is a nonstarter, at least while the Kim family regime rules. And the result has been bad when it comes to proliferation: It shows that a determined state can succeed in building a nuclear program under sanctions; it creates a bad actor willing to sell its technology to other states for hard currency; and it has prompted debate in South Korea about whether it needs to develop its own nuclear program in response.

Emma Ashford


Staff
Matthew Kroenig
Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
China Defense Policy

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/to-stop-the-fighting-in-sudan-take-away-the-generals-money/ Mon, 01 May 2023 13:25:35 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=641030 It is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power.

The post To stop the fighting in Sudan, take away the generals’ money appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> International partners are scrambling to limit the humanitarian disaster created by the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan that erupted on April 15 while the last steps of discussions leading to a civilian and democratic transition were expected. Now, it is not enough to simply call for a ceasefire and a return to negotiations because those outcomes could reestablish the fraught balance of power between the SAF and RSF that stymied the eighteen-month-long negotiations for a return to a civilian government—the type of government that most people in Sudan are demanding.

Rather, international partners must increase financial pressure on the RSF, former Bashir-era government officials, and the SAF to change their political calculations at the negotiation table.

Sudan cannot be stable if there are two armies and if former regime elites/Islamists are allowed to sow discord. International partners need to put coordinated financial pressure on RSF leaders to commit to integrating rapidly into the army and on former regime leaders to stop inciting violence; international partners should also put SAF generals on notice that they must honor their pledges to hand over power.

Sudan’s long-ruling former dictator, Omar al-Bashir, was able to stay in power for thirty years by fragmenting the security services and deftly playing them against each other to prevent any one of them from becoming powerful enough to launch a successful coup. In return for their obedience, military and political leaders were allowed to gain control over large parts of the economy and accumulate great wealth. Sustained protests led to Bashir’s April 2019 ouster, a brief period of military rule, and eventually a civilian-military transitional government nominally headed by then Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who governed in “partnership” with SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF General Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the chair and vice-chair respectively of the Transitional Sovereignty Council.

International partners acquiesced to the generals taking these positions of power, thinking that it would help prevent conflict from breaking out between the two rival forces—and that competition between the SAF and the RSF would keep either from dominating the country and would allow the heavily constrained Hamdok and his civilian ministers to implement at least some reforms. While the prime minister was able to introduce some difficult but necessary economic reforms, Burhan and Hemedti launched another coup on October 25, 2021, to block a planned transfer of the Transitional Sovereignty Council chair to a civilian.

The return of military rule was roundly rejected by the Sudanese people, who held frequent protests, and donors, who paused more than four billion dollars in planned economic assistance. The coup leaders came under enormous economic and diplomatic pressure to negotiate another transition, but they occupied irreconcilable positions on security-sector reform. Burhan and his hardline generals wanted the RSF to be rapidly subsumed into the SAF, while Hemedti (backed by his supporters from the periphery) wanted to keep his independent power base and played for time. As “negotiations” dragged on, the two leaders employed different tactics to try to strengthen their own position and weaken the other’s, including importing more weapons, arming communities, trying to splinter their rival’s forces, cutting off sources of funding, allying with civilian politicians, developing bonds with foreign leaders (including Russia), and—at least according to persistent chatter in Khartoum—planning coups in case these other efforts failed to change the balance of power. Tensions waxed and waned over the past one-and-a-half years, and external actors had to intercede a number of times to prevent combat from breaking out. Unfortunately this time, with the Islamists reportedly exacerbating strife and the political negotiations seemingly about to conclude, diplomats have been unable to avert a war.

Neither the SAF nor RSF is capable of a decisive victory, particularly given Sudan’s size and its fractured political landscape. Barring decisive intervention, the most likely scenario is a long and bloody multisided civil war and a staggering humanitarian disaster, like ones seen in Somalia, Syria, or Yemen. This disaster would not be limited to Sudan; it could also destabilize the greater region and drive tens of millions of Sudanese people to flee to neighboring states, the Middle East, and Europe.

That scenario needs to be prevented in a way that ensures the political and military calculations of Hemedti, Burhan, and their supporters change when serious negotiations to restore a civilian government resume. Simply calling for ceasefires or evenly applying diplomatic pressure is not enough. This would only preserve the rough parity of military power between the RSF and SAF. This is not to suggest that either Hemedti or Burhan is “better.” Both have failed the Sudanese people and should be encouraged to move on from power. However, international partners must aim to immediately stop the fighting, bring back negotiations for a transition to civilian government, and then ensure both generals honor their public pledges to hand over power.

Thus, international and regional leaders must, in coordination, begin to strategically apply pressure by freezing Sudanese bank accounts and temporarily blocking the business activities of Sudanese leaders and their forces. This cutoff in money and revenue will impact those actors’ abilities to pay their soldiers and allies to fight and resupply. More importantly, it will impact their calculations about their willingness to return to serious negotiations and to compromise. Given the RSF is unlikely to prevail against the SAF with its heavy weapons and support from Egypt, the least bad option to stop the fighting is to first apply pressure on Hemedti’s business empire, which funds the RSF—his soldiers are loyal because they are paid better, not for any ideological reason. External actors, particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (where, because of past Western sanctions, most Sudanese have their bank accounts and base their businesses), should freeze known RSF and Hemedti-family bank accounts and business activities until RSF leaders commit to rapidly integrating their troops into the SAF. Some of the most important assets have been identified and others are known by the Emirati and Saudi governments. Similarly, international partners must quickly freeze the assets of known Bashir-regime/Islamist leaders who are inciting violence in an effort to return to power. 

Finally, partners should identify foreign-held SAF assets and business interests for possible freezing and seizure in case the army does not honor its pledge to hand over power—or perpetuates the historic political and economic dominance of elites from Khartoum at the expense of Sudanese people living in the rest of the country. Only in this way is a sustainable ceasefire and peace possible.

Ernst Jan “EJ” Hogendoorn is a former senior advisor to the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and former deputy Africa Program director at the International Crisis Group.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/tackling-food-insecurity-in-africa-will-require-securing-womens-rights-here-are-two-ways-to-start/ Thu, 20 Apr 2023 18:47:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=638530 Policymakers should equalize inheritance rights and support women's entrepreneurship as ways to enhance food security.

The post Tackling food insecurity in Africa will require securing women’s rights. Here are two ways to start. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Large parts of Africa are currently facing record levels of hunger, and the trend is heading in a more worrying direction. West and Central Africa are seeing increasing food insecurity year after year, and tens of thousands of people across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are expected to experience “catastrophic” hunger in the coming months.

The situation is, in part, being made worse by climate change, which is increasing temperatures and changing weather patterns, compounding the hardship already caused by droughts. According to the International Monetary Fund, a third of the world’s droughts occur in Sub-Saharan Africa; meanwhile, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Horn of Africa is experiencing the longest and most severe drought on record. These conditions are weakening food systems across Sub-Saharan Africa, an area in which agriculture, forestry, and fishing make up 17.2 percent of the gross domestic product—and substantially more in countries like Sierra Leone and Chad.

But there’s more to this food insecurity trend than climate change; Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has caused uncertainty in the global food market, disrupting the production and trade of key commodities. Russia and Ukraine are significant suppliers of oil, wheat, and maize, and disruptions to the supply chain, combined with local conflicts in some countries, have caused inflation to soar, with food prices increasing as much as 55.6 percent in the Horn of Africa.

Fighting these rising levels of food insecurity requires a whole-of-nation approach. But countries in these food-insecure regions aren’t doing enough to harness the economic and agricultural potential of half their populations: women. For example, discriminatory laws that hamper women’s access to land and financial services are still in place in some countries. In order to fight food insecurity in full force, these countries must ensure that women are equipped with the exact same resources as men: both land itself and the decision-making power to determine how to use that land in the most productive way possible. Policymakers in these food-insecure countries should take the following actions:

Equalize inheritance rights

Some countries in these food-insecure regions have made significant strides recently in passing reforms that impact women’s lives in some respects—but they have faltered in passing meaningful reforms related to improving access to assets and entrepreneurship opportunities for women.

According to the Center for Global Development, agriculture accounts for 56 percent of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and women account for 57 percent of agricultural workers. The informal sector accounts for 50 to 80 percent of economic activity in Sub-Saharan Africa—activity that includes the sale of food. And like the agricultural sector, the informal sector is a major employer of women: In Africa, 89.7 percent of employed women work in the informal sector. Yet despite the roles that women play in these sectors, only 30 percent of women own land in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The discrepancy in land ownership extends in part from inheritance laws. In some of these food-insecure countries, inheritance plays the primary role in determining land ownership. Some inheritance laws across the region are—or were initially—patriarchal, favoring men in the division of property. There have been some signs of progress in protecting women’s rights to inherit property; for example, in Uganda, lawmakers recently amended the Succession Act to ensure equal inheritance rights between men and women.

However, Uganda’s Succession Act was the first inheritance reform implemented in Sub-Saharan Africa since Mali’s in 2011, according to the World Bank, demonstrating the slow pace of progress. More countries must follow suit by implementing their own amendments or fresh, new laws on inheritance rights.

Support women’s entrepreneurship

Owning land goes hand-in-hand with access to financial services. In countries across these food-insecure regions of Africa, farmers must have land titles in order to access the credit necessary to increase agricultural productivity by hiring workers, purchasing animals or farming equipment, and covering transportation and storage costs of their goods. Credit supports entrepreneurship, which promotes innovation and the accumulation of wealth—both of which are integral to fighting food insecurity in the region. However, just as women’s rights to own land are hindered in some countries, their rights to enterprise are sometimes hindered as well.  

According to the World Bank, 71 percent of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have laws that prohibit financial institutions from discriminating based on gender, and women often face more stringent loan arrangements than men when they do access credit. Furthermore, according to the International Monetary Fund, in Sub-Saharan Africa, just 37 percent of women own bank accounts compared to 48 percent of men. If a woman must rely on a man to open a bank account, take out a loan, or register a business, she cannot fully exercise her rights as an entrepreneur to hire workers or freely determine the agricultural methods she uses with the hopes of increasing output.

All countries in these food-insecure regions of Africa should criminalize gender-based discrimination with regard to credit. Allowing women an equal opportunity to receive loans encourages entrepreneurship, leading to more production and competition in the agricultural market. Benin’s Order No. 2349-5—which was implemented in 2022 and prohibits credit, banking, and decentralized financial systems from using discriminatory practices in granting access to credit—can serve as a model for other countries.

Putting the law into practice

Laws are only part of the solution. Guaranteeing equal access to land and credit requires systemic change. Localities and financial institutions need to make a concerted effort to ensure that women are aware of their rights and encourage them to embrace the opportunities to own land or become entrepreneurs.

Activists and government officials should work with local leaders to hold seminars for women, outlining their rights to own land and offering to process land titles. In the private sector, financial institutions can create campaigns specifically marketed towards women, publishing advertisements in print, social, and broadcast media that encourage women to apply for credit.

By taking concrete steps to ensure that women have equal access to land and entrepreneurship, countries can empower their full populations, bringing major benefits for the economy, agricultural productivity, and food security.

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James Storen is the program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/cohen-in-the-hill-russias-fingerprints-are-on-sudan-coup-attempt/ Tue, 18 Apr 2023 17:12:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=669429 The post Cohen in the Hill: Russia’s fingerprints are on Sudan coup attempt appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/as-sudans-transition-to-democracy-accelerates-reforming-the-security-forces-must-be-a-top-priority/ Wed, 12 Apr 2023 20:21:53 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=635383 The Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan.

The post <strong>As Sudan’s transition to democracy accelerates, reforming the security forces must be a top priority</strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Sudan’s political factions are negotiating the formation of a new transitional government, a major step toward a civilian-led government that is long overdue nearly eighteen months after a military coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Once the parties do form a new government—talks are continuing past a previously announced April 11 target date—perhaps its most critical task will be to clarify what role Sudan’s security forces will have in the country going forward.

To ensure that Sudan’s transition to democracy succeeds, its leaders must put limits on the power of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). For a successful political transformation, the SAF, led by Burhan, and the paramilitary RSF, led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, must be governed by the rule of law and work to protect democracy and human rights in Sudan. Absent meaningful reform to rein in the existing power of the security services, institutional tension between the services could spark a wider conflict that would destabilize the country and threaten the transition to democracy.

Reform of the security services will not be easy, and it is the subject of ongoing debate as the factions try to strike a deal on a transitional government. But there are steps Sudan’s leaders and those who support Sudan’s transition to democracy can take now.

The struggle for reform

Sudan’s military has played a major role in the political landscape of the country since its independence in 1956. Omar al-Bashir came into power in a military coup and, following thirty years of autocratic rule, was removed in 2019 by another military coup. Following his ouster, civilian and pro-democracy leaders called for fundamental reforms of the security sector, but Sudan continues to struggle with attempts at reform.

During the transition to democracy since 2019, the SAF and RSF have both cooperated and competed with one another for power in the country. For example, in an October 2021 coup ousting Sudan’s civilian leadership led by then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdock, the SAF and RSF joined forces with an array of Sudan’s armed movements and marginalized groups. At the same time, the RSF and SAF compete with each other behind the scenes to retain as much economic and political power, influence, and control as possible.

Managing the tension between the SAF and RSF will be a paramount concern for Sudan’s leadership as it seeks to avoid future conflict between the security forces that could trigger greater violence. This is a key element to establishing peace, security, and sustainable development in the country while allowing for the development and modernization of Sudan’s security institutions.

Meaningful security sector reform must address the role of the SAF and the professionalization and integration of the RSF into the SAF. It must also place the security services firmly under civilian control and oversight. In the security sector, reforms to Sudan’s legal framework must include formally establishing the role of the security forces and a single national army trusted by local communities across Sudan, especially in the conflict areas of the country.

Another critical step is untangling the military institutions from the economy. This will be very difficult and will require careful planning, as the SAF and RSF currently dominate nearly all facets of political, economic, and media power in Sudan—and work to protect this influence. Civilian authorities should seize the moment and take steps to address the challenges of security sector reform in Sudan during the transition to civilian leadership. The Bashir regime created a vast array of expensive, corrupt, and ineffective security forces accused by critics of operating outside of the law, committing human-rights abuses, and creating an economy that directly benefits the security institutions—preventing more robust economic reform and development. To set the country on a better path, Sudan’s civilian leaders must enact reforms that begin to disentangle the military from the construction, telecommunication, aviation, and banking sectors.

Steps Sudan’s military and civilian leaders should take

In concert with the new civilian leadership, the military must commit to reform that helps modernize and develop the SAF. This includes ensuring that the SAF is tasked with protecting civilians and is accountable to the country’s civilian leadership. The SAF needs to be respected and not feared by those it is assigned to protect.

Civilian and military leaders must adopt legislation that addresses the specific gaps in Sudan’s transitional documents. Using the legal framework, civilian authorities should work with the military leadership to scale down the size of the SAF, find meaningful economic opportunities for former fighters, identify core priorities for its mission, and deploy a military that is able to meet the needs of the country. Sudan’s authorities should also identify funding to create and support a broad disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration strategy that avoids a sole focus on the reintegration of militia fighters and includes appropriate financial oversight.

Outside of these efforts, civilian authorities must look for ways to reform Sudan’s economy that help to disentangle the vast array of companies linked to the security services, create opportunity to improve the business environment, and send the signal to investors, banks, and credit rating agencies that Sudan is open for business. Civilian authorities must take steps to increase transparency and accountability in the illicit gold trade to disrupt illicit financial flows to Sudan’s militias, including the RSF.

As Sudan’s economy faces uncertainty due to elevated food, fuel, and transportation prices, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank must balance the need for economic reforms in the country with the imperative to not destabilize a new civilian-led government. This government will need to walk a difficult line to implement reforms that address economic mismanagement by the SAF, the rising cost of living, and stubbornly high prices for basic goods that have further complicated efforts to secure international funding and support for the economy.

Steps the United States should take

The United States can help Sudan’s transition to democracy and help facilitate security sector reform. The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act included the Sudan Democratic Transition, Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act of 2020, elevating Sudan on the foreign policy agenda and sending a signal to Sudan’s new leadership that the United States is ready to support Sudan as it enacts difficult reforms. This law is an effective messaging tool, encourages a coordinated US government response to support the civilian leadership, and can direct public reporting on sensitive issues, support a sanctions regime, and show the private sector that Sudan is not open for business as usual. Policymakers can use this legislation to support Sudan’s economic reforms, stability, and oversight of the security and intelligence services in the short term while seeking to hold human-rights abusers, spoilers to the transition, and those seeking to exploit Sudan’s natural resources accountable for their actions.

Working with other countries, the United States can also play a leading role to encourage international financial institutions to carefully leverage the approval of World Bank projects, consider withholding IMF disbursements, and institute public reporting to ensure that economic and security sector reforms remain on track. The diplomatic community must continue to apply coordinated pressure on Sudan’s authorities to ensure that they follow through on their verbal commitments and work with key external actors—including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—to encourage them to be meaningful contributors to Sudan’s democratic progress.

Sudan’s transition to democratic leadership provides another critical opportunity for security sector reform in the country. As the transitional government moves forward, Sudan’s civilian leadership can show investors, banks, and its people that greater connectedness to the global economy, a modern security apparatus, and a commitment to fighting corruption is in its long-term interest. Doing so would solidify a path toward a peaceful and democratic Sudan.

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Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously, he led US Treasury Department efforts to combat corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crimes on the African continent.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/episode-seven-dr-nasredeen-abudlbari/ Mon, 27 Mar 2023 20:20:40 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=628866 The post Episode Seven – Dr. Nasredeen Abudlbari appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/china-in-sub-saharan-africa-reaching-far-beyond-natural-resources/ Mon, 06 Mar 2023 16:30:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=619198 What are the implications of China's expanding involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa's investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape?

The post China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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download pdf

This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. 

The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent.

In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively.

The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). 

Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/how-the-international-community-can-help-restore-sudans-democracy/ Mon, 30 Jan 2023 19:18:22 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=606534 A number of challenges confront Sudan on its road to democracy. How the country's leaders and the international community address them could either make or break the dreams of the 2019 revolution.

The post <strong>How the international community can help restore Sudan’s democracy </strong> appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> The 2019 Sudanese revolution was a uniquely inspiring moment for the world. The road to Sudan’s new dawn was paved by the extraordinary courage and tenacity of its citizens to liberate themselves from dictatorship and civil war, address historical wrongs, and rebuild their state on the principles of democracy and justice.

The international community then committed to supporting Sudan’s transition toward democratization, reconstruction, and sweeping reforms across politics, economics, and the security structure to meet the aspirations of the country’s people after the revolution.

Yet the transitional process began to unravel almost immediately after the overthrow of the government of Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, amid turmoil and instability. The Transitional Military Council—the military junta that took power after Bashir’s ouster—and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)—a coalition of civilian and rebel groups—agreed on the Constitutional Charter and on the formation of a Sovereignty Council to lead the country during the transition to democracy through fresh elections. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) between the transitional government and rebel groups in October 2020 appeared to be cementing those gains toward peace and democracy.

On October 25, 2021, however, a military coup upended that progress. Now, as the international community and domestic Sudanese actors, including the military and civilian groups, work toward a restoration of democracy, a number of challenges confront them. How they address them could either make or break the dreams of the young Sudanese behind the 2019 revolution.

A fresh start

The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), African Union, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development have helped restart dialogue and have initiated a road map for transition. On December 5, 2022, the army, FFC, other political forces, civil society organizations, and some youth resistance committees signed a framework agreement to establish a civilian government to manage a democratic transition for two years, ending with free and fair elections.

Planning for general elections after a short transitional period must incorporate creative arrangements that account for the multiple political, security, and economic crises that Sudan faces.

The prospects for elections in Sudan must be discussed within the framework of the transition process as a whole. A crucial decision to be made by the political actors is the timing and sequencing of the election in relation to other transitional tasks, including peace-making and implementation or revision of the JPA, transitional justice, dismantling the power structures of the previous regime, economic reform, and constitution-building.

The election dilemma

The relationship between elections and constitution-building is particularly important. If elections are to be held, the question is to what? There must be some body—with a defined constitutional structure, powers, roles, and terms of office—that is being elected, and which once elected can fulfil its mandate.

Holding credible elections means more than the elections themselves being free and fair. It also means that the parameters defining the body to be elected must be broadly accepted and legitimate. Without that, losers of the election will challenge the legitimacy of the elected institutions, while the winners will push their victory to extremes and potentially have no limits in power. It’s an invitation to instability.

There is no scope for elected institutions under the 2019 Constitutional Charter. In August 2022, the Steering Committee of the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) proposed a new draft constitution as a framework for restoring the democratic path and regulating the procedures of the transitional period. This draft did not provide provisions for holding elections. All its institutions are appointed, not elected. This is because, until now, it has always been assumed that the transition will culminate with elections, rather than elections being part of a broader transitional process. The requirement for elections to be held at the end of the transitional period is specified in Article 13 of the JPA.

This is unusual. Often elections happen at some point in the middle of a transition process. In many cases, transitional institutions—such as a constituent assembly—are elected under a transitional constitution, and a final or permanent constitution is then developed by that elected body.

Elections or Constitution: What comes first?

The requirement that elections will happen only at the end of the transition places a huge burden on unelected transitional institutions to develop a permanent constitution before elections can take place.

Holding elections after the transitional period, and not in the middle of it, also means the transitional period has to be relatively short. Elections, which are vital to public legitimacy and to the establishment of normal institutionalized politics, cannot be postponed indefinitely. At some point the people of Sudan must decide on who and how they will be governed.

Yet there is reason to be concerned that there might not be enough time to develop a permanent constitution, based on a sufficient consensus, before the planned end of the transitional period.

There are only three (non-attractive) possible solutions:

1. Amend transitional constitutional documents, to allow for elections to transitional institutions, before the end of the transition process, with a permanent constitution to be developed after the election—although that is against Article 13 of the JPA.
2. Rush permanent constitution-building, to get a constitution in place before the scheduled end of the transition, with necessary compromises on the quality of document and on the extent to which the process can be fully inclusive.
3. Delay elections indefinitely until after the completion of permanent constitution-making, which may result in the ebbing away of the legitimacy of transitional institutions and raise the risk of extra-constitutional military intervention.

Whatever the case, the signatories to the Framework Agreement have begun to hold stakeholder conferences to discuss four fundamental issues necessary for signing the final political agreement: security sector reform, transitional justice issues, the regional case of eastern Sudan, and the issue of amending the JPA.

It is important to make use of these ongoing consultations to discuss extending the transitional period to accommodate institutional and legislative reforms and the necessary logistical preparations for elections. The international community, including UNITAMS, can help transfer technical expertise, international experiences, lessons learned, and resources to assist a democratic transition and plan elections, and to support sustainable peace and stability in Sudan.

Aside from the constitution, Articles 12 and 13 of the JPA establish other preconditions for the holding of credible elections. They include:

• arrangements for international monitoring
• implementation of the agreed-upon plan for the voluntary return of the displaced and refugees
• the conduct of the population census, “in an effective and transparent manner before the end of the transitional period, with international support and oversight”
• the enactment of a Political Parties Law
• the formation of the Electoral Commission

Similar preconditions are also specified in the draft constitution presented by the SBA. Additionally, it is necessary to conduct a campaign to make voters aware of the new constitution and of the electoral system.

This is a lot to do, and Sudan is starting from a low baseline. If the transition period is to be just two years, Sudan will require considerable technical support, and investment of resources, to meet the requirements of the JPA and the SBA’s draft transitional constitution.

Role of the international community

Since the formation of the transitional government in August 2019, a broad international campaign has been launched to support the democratic transition in Sudan. My organization, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), has joined this effort by providing technical support to the transitional government, especially in supporting the formation of the Electoral Commission and the Constitution Making Commission, and in enacting laws related to these commissions. This support from international institutions must continue and be consistent with the political changes that occur.

There is a mandate for such support. Security Council Resolution 2425 of 2020, establishing UNITAMS, gave the UN mission in Sudan a mandate to provide assistance related to the transition and peace. Given the scale of the task and tight deadline, such financial and programmatic support must be provided urgently. Much of the preparatory work, both on elections and on the constitution, can be started now, for example the formation of working groups and technical committees.

There is also precedent for this support. The Electoral Assistance Mission in Iraq was formed within the larger Iraq mission, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution No. 2576 (2021), to provide advice, support, and technical assistance to Iraq in planning, preparing, and conducting elections and referendums. Similarly, the European Union delegation assisted Jordan (2016) and Lebanon (2022). The African Union deployed, in May 2019, a team of observers and a team of technical experts ahead of the elections in Malawi.

The threats that may result from holding elections amid challenging security conditions—including the weaknesses and divisions within the state’s security institutions—cannot be overlooked. In addition to financial and logistical assistance, an international assistance mission should provide a qualified, trained, and experienced security force.

No time to waste

It is necessary to start soon and move fast to help build political consensus around the design of the process and the sequencing of the transition.

Failure to reach a political agreement on the electoral processes, on the constitutional structures that give rise to elections, and on legal rules regulating elections, may cause political tension, which could disrupt the elections and undermine the democratic transition.

The opportunities currently available to the Sudanese people to discuss issues of democratization, including the issue of organizing free and credible elections, with the help of the international community, might not last forever.

The international community needs to provide substantial support for the coming elections in Sudan at the end of the transitional period. This is vital for security, peace, and political stability in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. Failure to do so would create security, political, and social risks that are difficult to count—or predict.

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Sami A. Saeed is the head of the Sudan program at the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. He previously served at the United Nations as a legal advisor in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan from 2006–2020.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-sudanese-bar-association-drafted-a-transitional-constitution-how-can-it-be-improved/ Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:03:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=588580 The initiative demonstrates the importance of professional institutions and trade unions in bringing political organizations together and restoring the democratic transformation process. However, there are key issues that require further discussion and inclusion in the draft constitution.

The post The Sudanese Bar Association drafted a transitional constitution. How can it be improved? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Following the recent declaration on July 4 by the Sudanese military leadership that it would accept the establishment of a civilian government and fully withdraw from politics pending a civilian consensus, the Sudanese Bar Association (SBA) prepared a draft transitional constitution that Sudan’s pro-democracy forces could unite around.

The initiative has been applauded by domestic groups, stakeholders, and the international community. It demonstrates the importance of professional institutions and trade unions in bringing political organizations together and restoring the democratic transformation process. The draft constitution provides that the new transitional government be entirely civilian, thereby avoiding one of the mistakes of the 2019 Constitutional Charter, which established a civilian-military partnership. However, there are key issues that require further discussion and inclusion in the draft constitution.

The transitional constitution, by definition, is intended to govern the transitional period, during which the government should embark on a proper comprehensive, inclusive, transparent, and participatory constitution-making process to construct a permanent and democratic constitution. The current SBA constitution-production process does not, in any event, substitute the proper democratic constitution-making process that the transitional government should organize.

The most important point that the constitution drafters and reviewers should consider is that any re-established transitional period should not be a conventional transitional period. Rather, it is a foundational transitional period that should address as many fundamental problems of Sudan as possible. Historically speaking, during transitional periods, caretaker governments have only been empowered to organize elections and run the country in the interim, before handing power over to the party or parties that won the elections. Similarly, the discussion of the fundamental problems of the Sudanese state, such as the relationship between state and religion, language policies, and the constitutional relationship between the central government and the peripheries, has been pushed back to the post-transitional period.

However, experiences of other African nations—such as Ethiopia and South Africa—demonstrate that addressing these issues during the transition contributes to laying the foundations for democracy, peace, and stability. Learning from their experiences, conventional Sudanese political organizations, which tend to be politically conservative, should, therefore, not be allowed to make Sudan’s next transitional period another failure in the political and constitutional history of the country.

What a draft constitution must entail

Another equally important point is the need for the draft constitution to reasonably address and rectify the shortcomings of the previous transitional period, which had partially resulted from the deficiencies of the 2019 Constitutional Charter. A clear example was the charter’s silence on the powers of the state or regional governments and their relationship with the central government; this proved to be extremely problematic, as neither level had clear limitations on the powers they exercised, creating confusion and tensions between them.

It seems that the SBA draft constitution has not learned from the 2019 charter in this regard, as it also fails to mention this significant distribution of powers. This exclusion is particularly perplexing given that the SBA explicitly establishes a federal state in which the exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and state or regional units should be expressly set out.

The draft constitution should contain a detailed article on citizenship, which is the indispensable foundation of any modern democratic state. For a nation that has been destabilized and embroiled in civil wars because of ethnic and religious dichotomies, enshrining universal citizenship principles and rules in the transitional constitution would be a necessary indication that the ethnic, religious, cultural, and regional policies that have fragmented the Sudanese nation and caused the deterioration of the state have no place in Sudan.

Relatedly, the article on the nature of the state should provide for establishing an impartial state that does not adopt a religious, ethnic, cultural, or regional identity. The drafters and reviewers of the new transitional constitution should consider the historical demands of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, led by Abdulaziz Alhilu, calling for the separation of state and religion. In this regard, the progress made during the transitional period, namely, the signing of a declaration of principles that separated the state from religion, should be reflected in and reaffirmed by the draft constitution.

Finally, the draft constitution should not overlook the linguistic diversity of the country—both ensuring that ethnic groups have the right to use their vernacular languages and dedicating a separate foundational article that conspicuously recognizes the right of state and regional governments to adopt a vernacular language as a working or official language. It should recognize the right of any state or region to adopt such a language as the language of instruction in its local schools.

In this regard, Sudan should learn from the Malaysian experiment, where the use of vernacular languages is constitutionally recognized, while at the same time promoting English and Malay as linguae francas and mediums of instruction in higher education institutions. To support these efforts, the draft constitution should establish a board, similar to that established by the South Africa Constitution, to ensure the continuous promotion of the use of vernacular languages as well as its development.

Technocratic government

The experience of the second government (February 2021-October 2021) during the previous transitional period (August 2019-October 2021) indicated that the participation of political parties in the government would spark unnecessary, paralyzing political differences and conflicts. It is, therefore, important that the draft constitution unequivocally provide that the transitional government be technocratic. That is the only way to avoid the repetition of the political differences and conflicts that the transitional governments witnessed in the months that preceded the October 25, 2021 coup, which would have probably been impossible had those differences and conflicts not existed.

The SBA draft constitution provides that political forces sign the political declaration, according to which the draft constitution shall be adopted, and nominate individuals for the senior positions of prime minister, Sovereignty Council member, and cabinet roles, among others. The draft constitution, surprisingly, goes as far as enabling those forces to nominate and appoint the members of the independent commissions, chief justice, president, members of the Constitutional Court, and judges of the Supreme Court.

Vesting the power to nominate the prime minister and members of the Sovereignty Council in the political forces that sign the political declaration will, undoubtedly, ignite deep and irreconcilable political differences that might make the establishment of the transitional government impossible. Furthermore, the nomination of the members of the independent commissions, the chief justice, the president and members of the Constitutional Court, and the judges of the Supreme Court is obviously incompatible with the principles of democracy, as well as the independence of these institutions and positions.

To avoid political differences or impossibility of agreement between the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change and other political groups, and to ensure the independence of the institutions that should be independent in a democratic and open society, the draft constitution should consider creating independent and impartial mechanisms, such as a committee or council of wise persons, that will have the power to select the prime minister and nominate individuals for the other high constitutional positions. 

More significantly, providing for a federal system without constitutionally enshrining the detailed exclusive and concurrent powers of each level or unit of the federal union undermines the very idea of federalism. It is, therefore, extremely important that the draft constitution contain three comprehensive lists of exclusive and concurrent powers of the federal and regional or state governments: one for the federal government (exclusive federal powers); a second for the state or regional governments (exclusive state or regional powers); and a third for both levels of government (concurrent powers).

Finally, the Bill of Rights of the draft transitional constitution, which is, in fact, taken almost verbatim from the 2005 Interim Constitution and the 2019 Constitutional Charter, should be more elaborate and comprehensive, explicitly providing for the procedures and principles that ensure the actual protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms by state institutions, especially the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court. It should also empower lower courts across the country to admit and decide human rights cases in some specific situations, as is the case in the United States.

In this regard, an alternative comprehensive and detailed new bill of rights, ideally based on and adapted from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution Bill of Rights, should seriously be considered by the Sudanese Bar Association or the reviewers of its draft constitution. The Kenyan Constitution’s Bill of Rights is one of the most comprehensive and elaborate bills of rights on the African continent.

In essence, the initiative undertaken by the Sudanese Bar Association and its production of a draft constitution has created robust political momentum. Additionally, it has created real possibility for uniting pro-democracy forces at a critical point in history—something that would put the pro-democracy civilian camp in a strong position to establish an entirely civilian government.

For this draft constitution to be a solid foundation for a new democratic transformation process, its provisions should be based on an important assumption that the transitional period is a foundational period and not merely conventional transitional period, where a caretaker government runs the state and organizes elections within a year or so. The resolution of some of Sudan’s historical problems—such as the relationship between state and religion, addressing its diversity management issues, and rectifying the deficiencies and shortcomings of the previous transitional period and those of the 2019 Constitutional Charter—should be genuinely considered as much as possible by the SBA draft constitution. 

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He is Sudan’s former justice minister.

Mutasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

The post The Sudanese Bar Association drafted a transitional constitution. How can it be improved? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/what-to-watch-next-on-ethiopias-peace-deal-in-tigray/ Fri, 04 Nov 2022 18:17:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=582786 What are the chances that this deal will hold? What role should international institutions play? Our regional experts help sketch out the answers.

The post What to watch next on Ethiopia’s peace deal in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> This week, negotiators from the Ethiopian government and rebels in the Tigray region reached a truce to end their two-year war—one that has killed hundreds of thousands of people through fighting and starvation, and included accusations of war crimes. With the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) reportedly agreeing to lay down its arms and the government agreeing to restore essential services to its battered northern region, what are the chances that this deal will hold? What role should international institutions play? Our regional experts help sketch out the answers.

1. What do you make of this peace deal, and what should we be watching to see if it holds?

Less than forty-eight hours before the two-year anniversary of the conflict, it is a step forward that has created great hope. It is also a salutary break for the civilian populations after almost two years of conflict. Since November 2020, the war has displaced more than two million Ethiopians and plunged hundreds of thousands into famine. But this agreement is not yet peace: It is the cessation of hostilities. The composition and determination of the members of the committee responsible for the implementation of the agreement will be decisive. Above all, major questions remain unresolved, including the question of Eritrea. The neighboring nation’s role in the peace deal is not clear after it joined the war on Ethiopia’s side, which is cause for concern considering all the crimes Eritrean soldiers have committed in Tigray over the past two years. Can there be peace without justice? This is the question that Tigrayan civilians must ask themselves these days.

—Rama Yade is senior director of the Council’s Africa Center.

The peace deal is excellent news; bringing an immediate end to this particularly cruel war is good for everyone. It remains to be seen, however, if the Tigrayans will uphold their promise to disarm, and if the Ethiopians will open access so that aid organizations can bring desperately needed help to civilians. We also have to watch the actions of the Eritreans, who are a party to the conflict but have not been included in the peace deal. Are they going to suspend their military operations? Will they go home and demobilize?

—Michael Shurkin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center.

2. What role will outside countries in Africa or the West, or institutions such as the African Union and United Nations, need to play going forward? What guidance would you give them?

This is a success for African Union head and Senegalese President Macky Sall, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who all helped broker the deal. The implementation of the road map will be crucial. While the agreement claimed that TPLF combatants will be “disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated,” fighting has been continuing in Tigray, where Ethiopian federal troops, backed by the Eritrean army and forces and militias from the neighboring Amhara and Afar regions, have been advancing since mid-October.

—Rama Yade

The West and international organizations like the UN and AU can play a vital role in monitoring the three sides of the conflict (the third being Eritrea) and holding them accountable. They of course need to be balanced, but that does not mean they can’t be tough—they shouldn’t pull their punches.

—Michael Shurkin

3. How can and should Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed move forward with governing the country as a whole? What kind of mark does this conflict leave for him?

Among the main points of the declaration signed by the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, the two sides committed to “safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia” and “restore constitutional order in the Tigray region.” This is a fundamental question. It is up to Abiy to prove that the Nobel committee was not wrong by awarding him its most prestigious recognition: The Peace Prize.

—Rama Yade

Abiy has to try to calm militants on all sides and ensure that everyone benefits from what should come next: reconstruction and development. On a regional level, a successful end to the war does not resolve other issues such as Ethiopia’s development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which Egypt and to a lesser extent Sudan oppose. That was put on the back burner because of the war but may now return to the fore.

—Michael Shurkin

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/middle-eastern-nations-should-learn-from-history-and-back-sudans-democratic-forces/ Tue, 23 Aug 2022 17:18:18 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=559077 The Middle Eastern countries that are interested in establishing political relations with Sudan, such as Israel, and those that are interested in investing, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should stand on the side of pro-democracy civilian forces.

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]]>

اقرأ باللغة العربية

دولُ الشرق الأوسط ينبغي أن تتعلم من التاريخ وتدعم القوى الديمقراطية في السودان

بقلم

نصرالدين عبدالباري* ومعتصم علي**

لقد كان مَثَل الحكومة الانتقالية السودانية، التي كُوِّنت في أعقاب اسقاط نظام الرئيس السابق عمر البشير، كمَثَلِ طائرة أقلعتْ بعسر فاستوت لتنطلق عندما تم ضربها واسقاطها. إن الحكومة الانتقالية، تحت قيادة رئيس الوزراء السابق عبد الله حمدوك، كافحت من أجل التصدي لتحديات أمنية واقتصادية متنوعة، تمثلت في الصراعات القبلية، وتعدد الجيوش، وانخراط الجيش في الصناعات غير العسكرية، وضعف الحوكمة وسيادة حكم القانون، وعجز النظام التنظيمي للاقتصاد. كان السودانيون، الذي خرجوا إلى الشوارع مُتُحَدِّين بشجاعة دكتاتورية وحشية استمرت ثلاثين عاماً، يتوقعون تحسناً فورياً في الوضع الاقتصادي بعد انهيار وسقوط نظام البشير. لكن الأوضاع الاقتصادية، التي تفاقمت بسبب التهريب الواسع للوقود والسلع الأخرى وعدم استقرار سعر الصرف، استمرت في التدهور. في ظل تلك الظروف، انخفضت قيمة الجنيه السوداني أكثر، وظل نقص الوقود في كافة أرجاء البلاد مريعاً، تماماً كما كان في ظل حكم البشير. 

بعد قيام حكومة حمدوك بتوحيد سعر الصرف في مارس 2021 ورفع الدعم عن الوقود في يونيو من ذلك العام، تغيَّر الوضع كثيراً. إذ اختفت صفوف الوقود، ولمدى سبعة أشهر على التوالي من مارس إلى أكتوبر، استقر الجنيه السوداني وحافظ على قوته في وجه الدولار الأمريكي—وذلك لأول مرة منذ انفصال جنوب السودان في العام 2011. 

بتشجيع من هذه الإصلاحات المحلية، بدأ البنك الدولي، وصندوق النقد الدولي، والولايات المتحدة، والاتحاد الأوربي تقديم مساعدات مالية للسودان. وأصبح من المتوقع أن تستلم البلاد أكثر من أربعة مليار دولار بنهاية السنة المالية 2022. كان من شأن هذا الاستقرار السياسي والاقتصادي أن يشجع استثمارات القطاع الخاص بالبلاد. ومن ناحية أخرى، كانت جهود الإصلاح الدستوري والعدالة الانتقالية، وكذلك خطط البنيات التحتية لوضعِ حدٍ للانقطاع المزمن للتيار الكهربائي وزيادة إنتاج النفط، قد وصلت أطواراً متقدمة.

لقد أنهى الانقلاب العسكري، الذي وقع في الخامس والعشرين من أكتوبر من العام 2021، التقدم الذي كان السودانُ يحرزه ببطءٍ. والسؤال الذي يطرح نفسه هو: لماذا خاطر الجيش بتعريض البلاد للرقابة والعزلة الدوليتين بالانقلاب على الحكومة الانتقالية واسقاطها؟ لربما اعتقد قادةُ الانقلاب بأنهم سوف يتلقون دعماً من دول شرق أوسطية يُعتقد أنها تربطهم بها علاقات لصيقة—وهي على وجه التحديد المملكة العربية السعودية، والإمارات العربية المتحدة، وإسرائيل، ومصر. لذلك فإن دور هذه الدول محوريٌ في استمرار تقويض أو استعادة عملية التحول الديمقراطي في السودان. 

وفي هذا الصدد، فإن أهم دولتين شرق أوسطيتين، المملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة، قد اتخذتا إلى الآن موقفاً سبب بكل تأكيد إحباطاً لزعماء الانقلاب في السودان. إذ لم تقدم أي من الدولتين دعماً مالياً معلناً للتعويض عن فقدان دعم المؤسسات المالية الدولية ودعم الشركاء الغربيين كالولايات المتحدة، والمملكة المتحدة، وأوروبا.

بدلاً عن ذلك، انضمت الدولتان إلى الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة في الأول من نوفمبر من العام 2021 ل “تؤكد على وقوفها إلى جانب شعب السودان، وتؤكد على أهمية دعم تطلعاته نحو إقامة دولة ديمقراطية وسلمية.” وقد دعا البيان “…إلى الاستعادة الكاملة والفورية للحكومة والمؤسسات الانتقالية بقيادة مدنية.” فضلاً عن ذلك، انضمت المملكة السعودية إلى الولايات المتحدة لتيسير اجتماع بين قادة الانقلاب والمجلس المركزي لقوى الحرية والتغيير، وهي تحالف من المنظمات والجماعات السياسية والمدنية التي قادت الاحتجاجات التي أدت إلى سقوط البشير. وكان تحالف الحرية والتغيير قد رفض قبل ذلك الانضمام إلى ما يسمى بمفاوضات الآلية الثلاثية، التي تيسرها الأمم المتحدة، والاتحاد الأفريقي، والهيئة الحكومية للتنمية (إيقاد)، وذلك بسبب مشاركة قوى سياسية كانت قد شاركت في حكومة البشير الأخيرة، مما قوَّض من مصداقية تلك المفاوضات، دون تقويض مصداقية العملية برمتها.

على الرغم من ذلك، فإن المجتمع الدولي ينبغي عليه مراقبة دول الشرق الأوسط التي ربما تَوَقَّع الانقلابيون منها دعماً. إذ وردت تقارير في العشرين من يونيو بأن الإمارات العربية المتحدة، بالتعاون مع رجل أعمال سوداني، سوف تستثمر ستة مليار دولار لبناء ميناء في السودان وتزويد البنك المركزي بثلاثمائة مليون دولار كوديعة، مما يمكن أن يخفف الضغط الذي يواجه قادة الانقلاب. لكن شركة موانئ أبو ظبي نفت ببيان مكتوب توقيع اتفاقيات لبناءِ ميناءٍ في السودان، لكنها بينت بأن هنالك مناقشات أولية مع السلطات السودانية. إن مجرد وجود مثل هذه المناقشات هو أمرٌ مثير للقلق، لأنها، إذا نجحت، سوف تقوِّي من موقف العسكريين في أي مفاوضات مع القوى المدنية.

إن الموقف الذي لا زال أكثر غموضاً بخصوص الانقلاب هو موقف إسرائيل، إذ فسرت القوى الديمقراطية في السودان فشل إسرائيل في إدانة الانقلاب بأنه دعم ضمني للحكومة العسكرية ومؤشر على نيتها للمضي قدماً في مسار التطبيع، الذي بدأ في عهد الحكومة الانتقالية في العام 2020. وبينما يُعتقد بأن إسرائيل لازالت محافظة على اتصالاتها مع القادة العسكريين السودانيين، إلا أنه ليس هنالك ما يشير إلى أنها تعمل بنشاط على إكمال عملية التطبيع في الظروف الحالية. وهذا يتسق مع موقف الولايات المتحدة، التي حثت على ايقاف عملية التطبيع إلى أن يعود السودان إلى مسار التحول الديمقراطي بقيادة مدنية. 

في هذه الأثناء، يبقى موقف مصر غامضاً للغاية، على الرغم من أن دعمها من غير المرجح أن يحدث فارقاً كبيراً، لأن مصر نفسها متورطة في أزمة اقتصادية لم يسبق لها مثيل، لا يسمح لها بتقديم أي مساعدات مالية للانقلابيين في السودان. علاوة على ذلك، فإن تأثير مصر الجيوسياسي قد تضعضع، وذلك في مقابل صعود المملكة العربية السعودية، والإمارات العربية المتحدة، وقطر، وتركيا، التي باتت الآن تلعب أدواراً إقليمية متزايدة. بناءً على ذلك، من الأهمية بمكان أن تُنَسِق دول الترويكا—التي دعمت باتساق الحكم الديمقراطي المدني في السودان—جهودها بشكل مشترك مع هذه الدول. وبهذا الخصوص، على دول الترويكا اشراك المملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة في جهودها لاستعادة مسار الانتقال الديمقراطي. وعليها كذلك تشجيع إسرائيل، التي ما زالت تحتفظ باتصالاتها مع قادة السودان العسكريين، على الرغم من عدم وجود علاقات دبلوماسية، على تعزيز رسائل المجتمع الدولي بأن تقويض ديمقراطية السودان أمر لا يمكن قبوله وبأنه ينبغي اتخاذ خطوات عملية لتأسيس حكومة مدنية كاملة، ومسنودة شعبياً.

إن التنسيق بين الترويكا وهذه الدول الثلاثة ينبغي أن يركز على ما لا ينبغي القيام به، وكذلك على ما ينبغي القيام به لمساعدة السودانيين على استعادة مسار التحول الديمقراطي. فالإمارات العربية المتحدة يجب أن تمتنع عن الانخراط في أي نقاشات بشأن استثمارات محتملة مع حكومةِ أمرٍ واقعٍ يقاومها باستمرار وإصرار السواد الأعظم من الشعب السوداني. وينبغي أن توقف المناقشات التي تجريها مع السلطات السودانية لبناءِ ميناءٍ في السودان. بدلاً عن ذلك، على الإمارات العربية المتحدة أن تنضم إلى الولايات المتحدة والمملكة العربية السعودية في جهودهما لإنهاء الأزمة السياسية الحالية، وهو خطوة مهمة لاستقرار وتنمية السودان، ومهمة كذلك لخلق بيئة مناسبة للاستثمار الأجنبي المستدام. 

إن دول الترويكا، بانضمام المملكة العربية السعودية وربما الإمارات العربية المتحدة، يجب أن تبذل جهوداً لإحياء وتعزيز الآلية الثلاثية، وذلك بتعزيز مشاركة أكبر للمبعوثين الخاصين وممثلين لهذه الدول. ويمكن بدلاً عن ذلك أن تكون هنالك مبادرة دولية جديدة لتسهيل التفاوض بين الأطراف السودانية. وفيما يتعلق بإسرائيل، فإن قرارها بعدم إكمال التطبيع يستحق الإشادة وينبغي تشجيعه بقوة. 

إن إحياء وتعزيز الآلية الثلاثية أو إنشاء بديلاً لها أمرٌ مهم للغاية بعد إعلان قيادة الجيش مؤخراً بأنها لن تكون جزءاً من أي حوار مع المدنيين، وأنها سوف تسلم السلطة للمدنيين فقط إذا توصلوا إلى توافق. إن الغاية من هذا الموقف هي تقويض المساعي الإقليمية والدولية الجارية لتيسير المفاوضات بين القوى الديمقراطية التي تناضل من أجل الحرية والحكم المدني، من ناحية، والعسكريين، الذي قوَّضوا الانتقال، من ناحية أخرى.  إنه يشير إلى أن العسكريين لا ينوون التخلي عن السلطة، لأن التوصل إلى توافق في الظروف الراهنة أمرٌ مستحيل. ومن المرجح أن تستخدم القيادة العسكرية هذه الاستحالة كمبرر لتكوين حكومة تتحكم هي عليها. ولربما، في سيناريو مرجح آخر، تنظم انتخابات، البلادُ غير مستعدة لها، وهي ممارسة شائعة لشرعنة الأمر الواقع. 

يبيِّن تاريخ السودان أن الشعب دائماً منتصر في معركته ضد الدكتاتوريين من أجل الحرية والديمقراطية. وعلى دول الشرق الأوسط، التي ترغب في تأسيس علاقات سياسية مع السودان، كإسرائيل، أو تلك الراغبة في الاستثمار، كالمملكة العربية السعودية والإمارات العربية المتحدة، الوقوف بجانب القوى المدنية المناصرة للديمقراطية. وعلى أقل تقدير، عليها ألا تعرقل النضال المستمر للشعب السوداني لهزيمة الانقلاب والعودة إلى التحول الديمقراطي. 

* نصرالدين عبدالباري يعمل باحثاً رفيعاً ببرامج الشرق الأوسط بالمجلس الأطلسي.

** معتصم علي يعمل مستشاراً قانونياً بمركز راؤول ويلينبيرج لحقوق الأنسان، ويقيم في واشنطن، دي سي.

 

إن النسخة الإنجليزية الأصلية من هذا المقال نُشرت بموقع المجلس الأطلسي بتاريخ 23 أغسطس، 2022.

Sudan’s transitional government, formed in 2019 following the overthrow of former President Omar al-Bashir, was like an airplane that after a rocky takeoff, was just about to level off when it was shot down. Under former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the transitional government struggled to address a variety of deep security and economic challenges, such as tribal conflicts, multiple armies, the involvement of the military in non-military industries, poor governance and rule of law, and an inefficient economic regulatory regime. The Sudanese people, who had taken to the streets in bold defiance of a brutal thirty-year dictatorship, expected an immediate improvement in their economic situation after the collapse of al-Bashir’s regime. However, economic conditions, aggravated by extensive smuggling of fuel and other commodities and instability in the local currency, continued to deteriorate. The Sudanese pound depreciated further, and national fuel shortages remained as dire as they had been under al-Bashir’s regime.

After Hamdok’s government unified the exchange rate in March 2021 and lifted subsidies that June, the situation changed significantly. Fuel queues disappeared and for seven continuous months from March to October 2021, the Sudanese pound stabilized and maintained its strength in the face of the US dollar—for the first time since South Sudan seceded from Sudan in 2011.

Encouraged by these domestic reforms, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and the European Union started providing financial support. It was expected that the country would receive more than four billion dollars in assistance by the end of the 2022 fiscal year. This economic and political stability would have encouraged private sector investment in the country. The government’s constitutional reform and transitional justice efforts, as well as infrastructure plans to end chronic power outages and increase oil production, were in advanced stages.

The military coup on October 25, 2021, upended the progress Sudan was slowly making. So why did the military risk international censure and isolation by overthrowing the transitional government? The coup leaders might have thought that they would be supported by Middle Eastern countries with whom, it is believed, they have close ties—namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, and Egypt. The role of these countries is, therefore, pivotal as far as the undermining or restoration of Sudan’s democratic transitional process is concerned.

The two most important Middle Eastern countries in this regard, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have thus far taken positions that have certainly disappointed the military. Neither country has provided any public financial assistance to compensate for the withdrawal of aid from international financial institutions and Western partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe.

Rather, both countries joined the United States and United Kingdom in affirming on November 1, 2021, the four “countries’ stance with the people of Sudan and emphasiz[ing] the importance of supporting their aspirations for a democratic and peaceful nation.” The statement called for “the full and immediate restoration of… civilian-led transitional government and institutions.” Saudi Arabia also joined the United States in facilitating a meeting between the leaders of the coup and the Central Committee of the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), a political coalition of the political and civil society organizations and groups that led the protests leading to al-Bashir’s ouster. The FFC had previously refused to join the so-called Tripartite Mechanism talks mediated by the United Nations, African Union, and Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD), due to the participation of political forces previously part of al-Bashir’s government, which undermined the credibility of the talks, but not that of the whole process.

Still, the international community must keep its eyes on the Middle Eastern nations that the coup leaders might have expected help from. It was reported on June 20 that the UAE, in collaboration with a Sudanese businessman, would invest six billion dollars to build a port in Sudan and provide a three-hundred-million-dollar deposit to the Central Bank of Sudan, which would help to slightly ease the economic pressure faced by coup leaders. The Abu Dhabi Port Company denied that it signed any agreements to build a port, but stated that preliminary discussions are taking place with Sudanese authorities. The existence of such discussions is worrisome, as they, if successful, would embolden the military in any negotiations with the civilian forces.

More ambiguous still is Israel’s stance vis-a-vis the coup, as pro-democracy forces in Sudan interpreted Israel’s failure to condemn the coup as tacit support for the military government and a sign of its intention to proceed with normalization efforts, started under the transitional government in 2020. While Israel is thought to have remained in contact with Sudanese military leaders, there is no indication that it is actively working on finalizing the normalization process under the current circumstances. This is in line with the US position, which has urged for the process to be halted until Sudan returns to a democratic transformation process under the leadership of a civilian government.

Egypt’s position meanwhile remains quite unclear, although its support is unlikely to make a huge difference as it is itself embroiled in an unprecedented economic crisis and is not in a position to offer the Sudanese military financial support. In addition, Egypt’s geopolitical influence has declined vis-a-vis the rise of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Turkey, which are now increasingly playing bigger regional roles.

Against this backdrop, it is extremely important that the Troika of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway—which has consistently supported democratic civilian rule in Sudan—jointly coordinate its efforts with these states. The Troika should involve both Saudi Arabia and the UAE in efforts to help restore the transition process. It should encourage Israel, which maintains communications with Sudan’s military leaders, despite not having diplomatic relations, to reinforce the messages of the international community that the undermining of Sudan’s democracy is unacceptable and that practical steps must be taken to establish a purely civilian, popularly supported government.

This coordination between the Troika and these three states should focus on what shouldn’t be done, as well as on what should be done to help the Sudanese people restart the democratic transition process. The UAE should refrain from engaging in any potential investment discussions with a de facto government that is continuously and persistently resisted by the vast majority of the Sudanese people. It should halt discussions with Sudanese authorities to build a port in Sudan. Instead, the UAE should join the United States and Saudi Arabia in their efforts to end the current political crisis, an important step for the stability and development of Sudan, as well as for the creation of a suitable environment for sustainable foreign investments.

Efforts by the Troika, joined by Saudi Arabia and possibly the UAE, should also be undertaken to revive and strengthen the Tripartite Mechanism by fostering greater involvement by the special envoys and representatives of these countries. Alternatively, there should be a new international initiative to facilitate negotiations between the Sudanese parties. As for Israel, the decision to not finalize the normalization of relations with Sudan is also one that should be applauded and strongly encouraged.

The revival and strengthening of the Tripartite Mechanism or establishment of an alternative one is profoundly important following the recent announcement by the military leadership that it won’t be a part of any dialogue with civilians and that it would hand over power to civilians only if they reach a consensus. The aim of this position is to undermine regional and international endeavors to facilitate negotiations between the pro-democracy forces that struggle for political freedom and civilian rule, on the one hand, and the military that upended the transition, on the other. It indicates that the military does not intend to give up power, as reaching a consensus under the current circumstances is impossible. The military will most likely use this impossibility as a justification for establishing a government that it can control. It might, in anonther likely scenario, hold elections for which the country is not ready, which is a common practice to legitimize the status quo.    

The history of Sudan demonstrates that the people have always won the battle for freedom and democracy against dictators. The Middle Eastern countries that are interested in establishing political relations with Sudan, such as Israel, and those that are interested in investing, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, should therefore stand on the side of pro-democracy civilian forces. At the very least, they should not hinder the continued struggle of the Sudanese people to defeat the coup and return to a democratic transition.

Nasredeen Abdulbari is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs.

Mustasim Ali is a legal advisor at the Raoul Wellenberg Center for Human Rights, based in Washington, DC.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/whats-next-for-kenya-after-a-contested-election/ Wed, 17 Aug 2022 14:15:42 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=556821 As the contest between William Ruto and Raila Odinga appears headed to court, Africa Center experts paint a bigger picture of what this East African powerhouse faces.

The post What’s next for Kenya after a contested election? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> While Kenyan Vice President William Ruto was finally declared this week the winner of that country’s August 9 presidential election, the dust has yet to settle: Former Prime Minister Raila Odinga, who reportedly received 48.85 percent of the vote to Ruto’s 50.49 percent, has dug in by officially challenging the result.

Odinga has said he will challenge the result in court—adding to Kenya’s spotty recent history of contested elections. But in the meantime, we asked Atlantic Council Africa Center nonresident senior fellows Constance Berry Newman and Aubrey Hruby to paint a bigger picture of what this East African powerhouse faces in the longer term.

This election has been characterized as a test of democracy in East Africa. Why? 

Since East Africa includes politically troubled countries such as Eritrea, South Sudan, and Somalia, where would one go to seek a model of democracy? Maybe Kenya. Since 1992, it has had uneven election experiences—some in which the results were contested, yet in the end were accepted by citizens—but it has had a functioning multiparty democracy since 2002. Even the election crisis of 2007-08 resulted in a workable democratic compromise through a government of national unity, which laid the basis for a new reform constitution. So there is reason to hope that Kenyan democracy and its elections will become models. More broadly, the country is home to many positive trends, including one of the highest literacy rates in Africa, a growing middle class, and some of the most vibrant media on the African continent.

—Constance

Given the concerns around democracy that emanate from Kenya’s neighbors, mainly Uganda and Rwanda, it is natural to look to Kenya as a democratic stronghold in East Africa. Yet still, seeing this election as a test of democracy is a bit too general; more accurately, it is a test of the institutional reform (particularly in the judiciary) that came in the new constitution promulgated in 2010 after the post-election political violence in 2008 that killed 1,200 Kenyans. As Odinga challenges the election outcome in court, the judiciary will have to stand strong against heavy political pressure and maintain its independence and faith in the integrity of the process.  

—Aubrey 

The economy drove many voters’ concerns. Is Ruto equipped to reverse Kenya’s fortunes? 

As a candidate, Ruto indicated his commitment to building one hundred thousand affordable housing units for poor Nairobi residents, creating four million jobs a year, and providing national hospital health insurance for all Kenyans—including those in the informal sector—within the first one hundred days of his presidency. These are extremely ambitious commitments for Kenyans who are all too familiar with disappointment. But Ruto knows the good, the bad, and the ugly of Kenya; therefore if anyone can manipulate the levers of government and the private sector to make life better for the Kenyans, it is him.

—Constance

Like many countries around the world, Kenya is struggling with high inflation and slower growth as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the reduction in tourism in African markets, and the war in Ukraine. Inflation crested 8 percent in July—a more than five-year high—and youth unemployment is rampant. Growth slowed in 2022 and is expected to end up somewhere between 5 and 6 percent, down from the 7.5 percent of 2021. Election uncertainty will be the enemy of business in all of East Africa, which is why the heads of neighboring states moved quickly to congratulate Ruto. As investment has slowed and the strong dollar has made additional borrowing on the Eurobond market prohibitively expensive, it will be critical for the new president to play a strong commercial-diplomacy role abroad with the aim of attracting investment into critical sectors such as agriculture and financial services. Domestically, he will need to focus on expanding credit for small and medium-sized enterprises and making agriculture more productive and climate resilient. 

—Aubrey 

What else should the new administration expect to accomplish in the coming weeks and months? What challenges will they face? 

Key to effective elections is the citizens’ acceptance of the results; this is the responsibility of the election commission, media, opposition, and, importantly, the citizens themselves. Because the results of the election will likely be challenged in court, Ruto must encourage calm while the judicial process unfolds. Depending on the results of the process, whoever is inaugurated will face the challenge of fostering national unity by demonstrating genuine commitment to govern in the interests of all Kenyans. The general population will be concerned about social spending (for example, education and health care) and public discussions about the options could be encouraged. Although debt relief is not a bread-and-butter issue, it will affect all citizens—while the new administration will likely be required to restructure public expenditures, thanks to the terms of a $2.3 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund in 2021.

—Constance

Early indications show Nairobi quite calm despite the challenges to the election, perhaps as a result of the still-fresh memories of 2007. Given that Kenya has been a fast-growing economy over the past decade, whether or not Ruto can deliver economic advancement for the “hustler nation” in the near term will be determined by three factors: how long election uncertainty lasts (and if the election has to be rerun), how quickly he can earn the trust of the Nairobi business and political elite, and his ability to effectively attract investment to fuel Kenya’s return to growth. 

—Aubrey 

What does a stable and functional Kenya mean for the rest of the region? 

The following words describe the role of a stable Kenya: “peacebuilder,” “critical trader,” and “strategic partner.” The country is usually thought of as the regional player to address conflicts (except when it needed help in addressing its own conflict in 2007). In 2005, for example, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the civil war in Sudan was largely brokered because of Kenyan perseverance. It has also had historically close political ties with the United States, China, and India, which makes its stability important for East Africa.

—Constance

Kenya is the dominant player of East Africa, constituting more than 40 percent of the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) and playing home to Mombasa—the coastal city through which most trade with the region happens. As much as 85 percent of Ugandan imports and exports go through Mombasa, and the further expansion of the standard gauge railway in the region will serve to deepen the economic connections. That’s why a stable Kenya is absolutely critical for the region. It is not only the connector of the Horn to the mineral richness of eastern Congo, but also the economic, financial, and logistical hub of East Africa more broadly.

—Aubrey

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/amb-rahmani-in-extinction-rebellion-ensuring-women-have-equal-rights-to-inheritance-and-property-ownership-is-key-to-tackling-climate-change/ Wed, 22 Jun 2022 19:55:46 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=540164 The post Amb. Rahmani in Extinction Rebellion: Ensuring women have equal rights to inheritance and property ownership is key to tackling climate change appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-bidens-limited-somalia-deployment-is-the-right-move/ Fri, 03 Jun 2022 10:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=532306 Given the persistent terror threat from al-Shabaab, Washington's decision to send US troops into Somalia deserves credit and support.

The post Why Biden’s limited Somalia deployment is the right move appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> In counterterrorism and security, failures make front-page news while quiet successes seldom get the credit they deserve. Last month’s deadly gun attacks in Buffalo, New York, and Uvalde, Texas, are prime examples of the former. But there was also a prime example of the latter around the same time: a key announcement by the Biden administration on May 16 that could lead to hundreds of lives being saved from terror attacks.

The US deployment of about 450 Special Operations troops back to Somalia will help Washington’s local counterterrorism partners pressure the increasingly dangerous al-Shabaab terrorist group—which most Americans do not realize has become al-Qaeda’s largest, wealthiest, and deadliest franchise. Apart from the decision to send US forces to shore up NATO’s defenses against Russian aggression in Europe, the Somalia deployment may represent the largest new commitment of US forces overseas by President Joe Biden.

As counterterrorism professionals with more than fifty-five years of national-security experience between us—in the White House and three cabinet departments, and under four presidents from both parties—we are increasingly concerned about the popular perception that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) have been defeated. As far back as 2018, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism foresaw that groups such as ISIS and al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in Somalia, would continue to threaten US interests, and that terrorists would seek to gain control of safe havens in countries whose governments are too weak or distracted to contain them without outside help. Premature declarations of victory are dangerous. 

This is why Somalia is an important story. The recent election of president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud represents progress, but al-Shabaab—whose leaders frequently call for attacks on Americans—is gaining power in southern and central Somalia and is close to being able to mount external operations targeting the United States. One such plot was already disrupted: In December 2020, the Department of Justice unsealed an indictment for a plot by al-Shabaab’s leaders to carry out a 9/11-style aircraft hijacking in the United States. The Philippines extradited an alleged al-Shabaab operative to the United States to stand trial for the scheme.

Al-Shabaab also has a history of luring young Somali-Americans to Somalia to fight foreign invaders, then using them for terrorist attacks against civilians. Such attacks have reached beyond Somalia, killing sixty-seven at a shopping mall in 2013 and 147 at a university in 2015, both in Kenya. A plot to bring down a passenger plane in February 2016 failed only by good luck and a skillful aircrew. And in 2020, Al-Shabaab killed three Americans who were training Kenyan counterterrorism forces.

For all these reasons, Biden’s order to resend US service members—which reversed a December 2020 decision by the Trump administration to withdraw the then-remaining 750 US military personnel in Somalia—was the right move. Conditions on the ground in 2020 did not justify confidence that Somali forces were ready to take on al-Shabaab without help. Early that year, US Africa Command said publicly (and repeated it just before then President Donald Trump’s decision) that al-Shabaab “remains adaptive, resilient, and capable of attacking US partner interests in Somalia and East Africa.” 

Since the US withdrawal, al-Shabaab has grown in power and wealth. Open sources estimate that the group has grown to seven thousand fighters and receives annual revenues of $130 million from criminal activities, which have included forcing Somalis to give their charitable contributions to al-Shabaab instead of actual charities. For comparison, the Somali government’s total revenue in 2019 was $342 million. Given the number of people living in al-Shabaab-controlled areas, that makes the terrorist organization more than twice as rich per capita as the Somali government.

In February, when the United States carried out a drone strike in defense of Somali military forces being attacked by al-Shabaab, US forces advised and assisted Somali partners from outside the country. But this is hardly the best approach to working effectively with partner counterterrorism forces. 

The Biden administration’s decision will allow US troops to once again train and work alongside the Danab, Somalia’s most effective counterterrorism unit. This will result in better battlefield intelligence collection, especially the kind of gritty tactical intelligence from local human sources needed to successfully counter al-Shabaab. A persistent presence also enhances security for US diplomats and civilian specialists to carry out their vital work. 

A small footprint, especially of US Special Operations Forces, will strengthen and rebuild Somali counterterrorism capabilities in ways that an “over-the-horizon” presence never could. This will keep the pressure on al-Shabaab, limiting the group’s ability to plan and mount external operations that threaten Americans in the US homeland and overseas.

Experience has shown that we ignore growing terrorism threats in contested spaces at our peril. Biden’s decision to send a small number of US troops into Somalia with a limited mission needs to be given the credit and support it deserves. American lives may well depend on it.

---

Thomas S. Warrick is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, director of the Future of DHS Project, and co-director of the Future of Counterterrorism Project. He is a former senior official at the US Department of State and deputy assistant secretary for counterterrorism policy at the US Department of Homeland Security.

Christopher P. Costa is the executive director of the International Spy Museum and a former career US Army intelligence officer. He served as special assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018. 

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/shapiro-quoted-in-sudan-tribune-on-how-israel-would-need-us-support-for-normalization-between-israel-sudan/ Fri, 27 May 2022 16:42:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=536978 The post Shapiro quoted in Sudan Tribune on how Israel would need US support for normalization between Israel-Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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original source

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/the-days-of-elite-deals-in-sudan-should-be-over/ Mon, 11 Apr 2022 18:34:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=511598 It is not too late for Washington to correct the course on Sudan and help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact.

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]]> It was only a year ago that Sudan—newly removed from the US terrorism list—was negotiating the terms of its upcoming debt-relief package and proposing ways to invest more than one billion dollars in promised international financial assistance toward propping up democracy. At the time, the world was still talking about the country as a potential model for others to follow on the road from dictatorship to democracy. 

Today, the country is on a knife’s edge. 

The promised road to reform is now fully blocked by security forces bent on what they claim is an effort to “save” the country from civilian leaders. But as these forces hold ever tighter to power, they are squeezing the life out of the country: Since their October 25 coup that effectively brushed aside the civilian transition and reignited a popular revolution, the economy has gone into a death spiral. Inflation is rising above 250 percent, the value of the country’s currency has plummeted against the dollar, and the price of key imported commodities in Sudan, such as wheat and fuel, have risen by more than 30 percent. 

In other words, a loaf of bread that cost two Sudanese pounds when civilians assumed office two years ago now costs more than fifty. The United Nations World Food Program projects that 40 percent of the country’s population will face “acute food insecurity” later this year if nothing changes, leading donors to begin planning for a new humanitarian emergency in the country’s urban areas.

As Sudan’s supporters watch this calamitous economic situation unfold, they are desperately searching for any defensible reason to restart lending and debt-relief programs to help avoid the coming financial collapse and humanitarian emergency. But, here too, the military has given no reason to show any leniency: Since the October coup d’état, dozens of leading political figures and protest leaders have been targeted for disappearance or arrest, while ninety-three pro-democracy demonstrators have been killed by security forces (which continue to use a nationwide state of emergency as justification for their brutality).

Last week, the country’s military leader, General Abdallah Fattah al-Burhan, even threatened to expel the head of the country’s UN peace-support mission for “lying publicly” and failing to report to the UN Security Council the supposed progress under the junta’s rule.

As the junta hunkers down internally, its emissaries are on a globetrotting tour of friendly capitals, from Moscow to Abu Dhabi, seeking political backing and a financial rescue. So far, no one has been willing to wager on the military or against the will of the Sudanese people, whose demands for democratic change have not abated.

But that could soon change. A series of recent meetings in Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi suggest that Sudan’s longtime friends are rapidly losing patience with the political deadlock and impending economic collapse, and are searching for a way to create a soft landing (even if it comes at the expense of the Sudanese population’s democratic aspirations).

For Gulf partners, who bought up Khartoum real estate and commercial holdings at fire-sale prices in the waning days of the Omar al-Bashir regime (and since his ouster), Sudan’s unraveling would spell disaster for their investments. Egypt, which continues to view Sudan as its vassal, fears a mass exodus of Sudanese northward and political chaos on its southern border. Khartoum’s ability to stay in political lockstep with Cairo in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations with Ethiopia—Egypt’s single biggest foreign-policy priority—is also a major question.

Considering Sudan’s political history, the time appears ripe for another notorious elite deal, with regional buy-in, that walks the country back from the financial brink—but, in the process, short-circuits any hope that the bottom-up political movement will lead to genuine civilian rule and democracy.

Washington needs to get serious

For weeks, Khartoum has been awash in rumors that the hapless former prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, seen as capable of putting financial markets at ease, could return. The re-establishment of a civilian and technocratic—but compliant—cabinet, which puts a more acceptable face on the regime, might also follow. But most concerning is the discussion of the establishment of a new Security and Defense Council that would ensure security interests remain firmly in the military’s hands and separate from civilian-led ministries. This would leave the military with ultimate executive authority. 

Such a set-up would pave the way for quick elections, which the military and its political allies would surely dominate, and thereby provide new surface-level legitimacy for unreformed security interests and their foreign backers. As they likely see it, the only real losers under such a deal are the 44 million Sudanese not in the military or associated with the previous regime, who will once again see their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic future dashed by political expediency and regional stability.

Sudan’s dedicated pro-democracy movement would categorically reject any deal engineered with outside backing and did not emerge from a process they were fully a part of—but that doesn’t mean that the military and their allies might not still try. Importantly, it is not too late to prevent this scenario. But it requires the United States and partners to step up and demonstrate a strategic focus on long-term change and a return to core principles that bring it into greater alignment and allegiance with Washington’s true partners: the Sudanese people.

First, the international community must remind itself that Sudan’s revolution was never merely about overthrowing a dictator or dismantling his party; it was about undoing the corrupt, racist, and authoritarian power structures that have governed Sudan since independence. 

Western calls for the military to enact “confidence-building measures” only plays into the existing discriminatory power dynamics in the country and elevate the security services as an equal, if not legitimate, part of Sudan’s political future (and therefore undermines a core tenet of the revolution). Instead, the military should be getting constant reminders that their days are numbered and a return to the pre-coup, pre-revolution status quo is both impossible and unacceptable.

Second, Washington needs to improve its public messaging in the face of the military’s political double-dealing. It is no longer enough for the United States to say it’s “on the side of the protesters.” If it were, it would call out every single abuse and death suffered by pro-democracy activists at the hands of the security services, as well as demand an investigation of crimes committed under the coup government. Instead, Washington’s numbness to the sustained deluge of crimes normalizes the deaths of innocent people and reinforces the military’s hold on power.

Third, the United States needs to start listening to the demands of the people and let them inform its public statements. Calling for a “return to civilian-led transitional government” or the “full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement,” as recent US and Troika statements have, reflects deafness to popular calls for a new way forward, tells allies on the ground that stability is more important than transformation, and suggests that Washington would rather save face by salvaging formulas it once endorsed rather than seeing the writing on the wall and changing tack.

Lastly, it is well past time that the United States rebalance the negotiating table by imposing targeted sanctions on the individuals directing these abuses and profiting from the current stalemate. Since the military’s coup, those most responsible for the disruption of the transition and human-rights abuses have suffered no direct consequences for their actions. While symbolic, the recent sanctioning of Sudan’s Central Reserve Police by the US Treasury was short on impact and rang hollow with both the victims and the perpetrators: With no dollar-denominated bank holdings or large physical presence outside of Sudan, the sanctions have little to no practical effect. And by targeting an institution with far less responsibility for Sudan’s failing state than the military, even the symbolism of the action was lost on most. 

Instead, Washington continues to betray a lack of real understanding of what is happening on the ground, who is responsible, and how to impact the calculations of the principal belligerents. But it is not too late to correct the course. Making clear the conditions required to restart lending and avoiding sanctions, conceived in consultation with its democratic allies on the streets, could help stave off another democracy-delaying elite pact and demonstrate that Washington is giving real weight to the popular will.

In the long run, this is what is required to achieve actual stability—not the cheap imitation Sudan has always known.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-social-platforms-crack-down-on-kremlin-media-as-kremlin-demands-compliance/ Wed, 02 Mar 2022 20:41:51 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=494112 Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online.

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]]> As Russia expands its assault on Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian Hybrid War Report.

Exploitation of social platforms

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops

Documenting dissent

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

Tracking narratives

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires  

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

Security

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire 

Regional reactions

Ugandan general tweets support for Russia

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context 

Social media companies crack down on Kremlin media outlets amidst government demands for compliance  

Google, Meta, and Twitter are taking action against Russian state-owned media accounts to limit the spread of harmful information online. At the request of the European Union, Meta will restrict access to Kremlin-owned outlets RT and Sputnik across the EU. Earlier, Meta announced it would also restrict access to several Russian state media accounts in Ukraine at the government’s request. In addition, the company has demonetized the accounts of Russian state-owned media organizations and prohibited them from posting ads on Facebook and Instagram.  

In a similar move, Google has blocked RT and Sputnik’s YouTube channels across Europe. It will also prevent RT and other relevant outlets from receiving funding from ads on their websites and apps.  

Meanwhile, Twitter announced actions to reduce the spread of articles from Russian state-affiliated media. Links to Kremlin media will now include a “stay informed” label. Since the start of the invasion, there has been an uptick in the sharing of Kremlin media articles on Twitter, with more than 45,000 tweets a day directing users to state-affiliated outlets. 

https://twitter.com/yoyoel/status/1498343849273425921?s=20&t=bbY92V0jXWxei_PNFobwow

Twitter also said that advertisements in Ukraine and Russia are on pause to ensure that critical public safety information is “elevated.” To this end, users in the two countries will no longer see tweet recommendations from accounts they don’t follow. 

Responding to social media companies’ increased moderation efforts, the Russian government ordered companies to comply with a new law that mandates social media platforms operating in Russia must set up local offices and register with Russia’s media watchdog, Roskomnadzor.  Under this legislation, local representatives could be held liable if Russia feels platforms are not abiding by local laws. These actions have been widely condemned by digital rights experts, as the law could be used as justification to intimidate employees with the threat of arrest and pressure companies to engage in censorship. 

Both Russian independent news outlets and Tik Tok have already fielded requests from the government to take down content related to the war in Ukraine. In response to what Russia claims is “censorship” by social media companies, Roskomnadzor announced restrictions on access to Facebook, and access to Twitter appears to be limited as of February 26. 

Over the weekend, Facebook and Twitter removed two covert influence operations targeting Ukrainians. One operation was tied to Russia, and another had connections to Belarus. Facebook also said the pro-Belarus hacking group Ghostwriter was targeting Ukrainians, including the military.

—Jacqueline Malaret, Assistant Director, Washington, DC

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington, DC

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Russian parliament proposes fifteen years in prison for sharing “fakes” about Russian troops 

Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, approved a proposal by the Security and Anti-Corruption Committee to draft a law introducing criminal liability for sharing “fake” content related to Russia’s armed forces. Members of the ruling United Russia party previously proposed introducing such a bill, citing “a lot of disinformation” on social media.  The bill passed its first reading on March 2 and is expected to be presented for its second reading in several days.

The draft law states that the punishment for sharing fake content about Russian troops would be fifteen years in prison. The move could be a reaction to the increasing amount of footage showing Russia targeting civilian areas in Ukraine, which Russia denies. The law might intimidate Russian internet users and discourage them from sharing or saving such footage, particularly anything documenting war crimes. Meanwhile, Karim Khan, a prosecutor with the International Criminal Court, announced that he would investigate Russia for possible war crimes or crimes against humanity in Ukraine. 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Kremlin blocks independent outlets Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain, threatens Wikipedia

On March 1, Wikipedia shared a notice they received from Russia’s Roskomnadzor information agency threatening to block the crowdsourced platform due to its Russian-language article on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notice cited the inclusion of information about Russian military personnel casualties and Ukrainian civilian victims. In response, Wikipedia shared workarounds for users if Wikipedia does become blocked in Russia. 

That same day, Russian users found themselves unable to access the websites for the liberal radio station Ekho Moskvy and the independent broadcaster TV Rain. Around the same time, the Russian Prosecutor General’s office released a statement on Telegram saying they had submitted demands to Roskomnadzor to restrict access to both channels. The statement accused the outlets of calling for extremism and violence, spreading “false information” regarding Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, and calling for “mass public events.” 

The Prosecutor General’s office stated that the restrictions could legally be put in place due to Article 15.3 Federal Law No. 149-FZ Paragraph 1, “On Information, Information Technologies and Data Protection,” which covers the restriction of access to information inciting mass riots, extremist activities, and participation in mass public events. According to Article 15.3, the Russian government must first notify the online publication hosting the problematic content and request that it be removed; if the content is not immediately removed, they may then proceed with restricting access to the online publication.

TV Rain posted on Telegram that the Prosecutor General’s office did not identify specific materials on their website that violated Russian laws. It also said it strictly followed legal standards and used trusted sources when covering events in Ukraine.

Both Ekho Moskvy and TV Rain began trending on Twitter in Russia as these events unfolded. 

—Ingrid Dickinson, Young Global Professional, Washington DC 

Kremlin ramps up pressure on independent media outlets  

On February 24, Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor stated that Russian media outlets were “obliged” to rely on information received from Russian official sources while covering Russia’s “special operation” in Ukraine. The statement also argued that Roskomnadzor would block all attempts of disseminating “knowingly false information” on the internet. Considering the fact that Russia has generally avoided disclosing information about the exact number of casualties and military loss in Ukraine, Roskomnadzor’s announcement might be an attempt to prevent independent media from reporting casualty statistics. Having said that, Kremlin outlet RBK reported on March 2 that Russia had experienced a total of 498 deaths and 1,597 injuries since the invasion, according to the Ministry of Defense.

On February 28, Roskomnadzor claimed that it found instances of Google Ads being used to spread “unreliable socially significant information” about Russian and Ukrainian casualties. Consequently, Roskomnadzor demanded that Google restrict access to such materials, and warned Russian Internet sites against distributing such ads to avoid administrative fines or website bans. Roskomnadzor did not specify what false information it had found, but its statement suggests it wishes to prevent the distribution of any kind of information about Russian casualties to prevent public outrage. 

Russian authorities have already taken actions against multiple independent media outlets. On February 28, Roskomnadzor blocked to access to Current Time and Krym.Realii, both projects of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, as well as the New Times. Following the ban, Current Times wrote that they were accused of “spreading unreliable socially significant information about the Russian military allegedly killed and captured within the territory of Ukraine.” RFE/RL President Jamie Fly assessed the Kremlin’s move as “an attempt to hide the terrible truth about the human price of Putin’s criminal war against Ukraine.”  

On top of blocking internet resources, journalists at independent media outlets also face physical threats. On February 24, Interfax journalist Dmitry Gavrilov was arrested during an anti-war rally in Saint Petersburg while he was taking a photograph of an anti-war banner. Gavrilov showed his press credentials to police but was nonetheless detained.  The following day, Russian police arrested three RFE/RL journalists covering anti-war protests in Moscow, even though they too had all the necessary credentials to work during mass protests.

—Givi Gigitashvili, Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland  

In Belarus, protests and calls for soldiers to renounce the war in Ukraine

Videos of a February 27 protest in Belarus have surfaced on social media. The protests were in response to several recent developments in the country, including Belarus joining the war against Ukraine, serving as a transit point for Russian weapons, and Belarus revoking its non-nuclear status after a February 27 constitutional referendum. Crowds gathered near the defense ministry chanting “Glory to Ukraine!” and “Long live Belarus.” The Belarusian government responded aggressively, sending in riot police to detain protesters.   

Meanwhile, Belarusians living in Vilnius, Lithuania climbed over the fence of the Belarusian embassy and replaced the official state flag hanging outside the building’s entrance with the opposition nationalist flag and a Ukrainian flag.  

Lastly, a video of Belarusian lieutenant colonel Sakhashchik Valery Stepanovich discouraging soldiers from joining the war in Ukraine went viral online. “This is not our war,” he said. “Find a way not to follow criminal orders. Sometimes saying ‘no’ takes the most courage.”

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Cyber activists disrupt Russian and Belarusian state-controlled media and public services

When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the cyber activist collective Anonymous announced their “war against the Kremlin.” Over the next several days they took credit for successful attacks on public services and state-controlled media in Russia and Belarus. As there is no official Anonymous account on Twitter, the collective used hashtags #OpRussia and #OpKremlin to share news and updates about the cyber-attack campaign.

On February 26, Anonymous claimed they had hacked Kremlin-owned TV channels, which suddenly started showing footage from Ukraine that contradicted the official Kremlin narrative. Many anonymous Twitter accounts reported on the hack.

The following day, Anonymous took credit for taking down a long list of Russian government websites, including the Russian pension fund, the State Service, the presidential administration, customs, the national government site, Moscow’s mayor, and the Chechnya Republic. As of March 2, many of these sites – Mos.ru, government.ru, customs.gov.ru, kremlin.ru, gosuslugi.ru, and pfr.gov.ru – remained offline. Chechnya.gov.ru had been restored, but now required users to demonstrate they were not automated bots using “captcha” tests before being allowed to proceed to the site.


On February 28, Anonymous claimed they had downed Russian propaganda websites, three Belarusian banks, and multiple Belarusian government sites, including the Information Ministry, Military Industry Authority, and Defense Ministry. While one Belarusian bank, Belinvestbank.by, has been restored, belarusbank.by and priorbank.by remained compromised at the time of writing, alongside the government sites mil.by, vpk.gov.by, and mpt.gov.by.

In additional to shutting down websites, Anonymous also took credit for leaking information from Russia’s Ministry of Defense and the Russian Nuclear Institute. 

Anonymous is not the only cyber activist collective attacking Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. The DFRLab previously reporting about the Belarusian Cyber Partisans hacking the Belarus Railway company, while the IT Army of Ukraine is also engaging in cyber activism.

—Nika Aleksejeva, Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia 

Georgians protest against their government, expressing solidarity with Ukraine

On March 1, a large rally in Tbilisi demanded the Georgian government’s resignation and snap elections. The latest protest took place in solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky after he announced that Ukraine was recalling its ambassador to Georgia due to the government’s “immoral position” on sanctions and barring Georgian volunteers from flying to Ukraine.

Georgia has seen four consecutive days of protests, as thousands take to the street to express their solidarity with Ukraine and condemn the Georgian government’s position on Ukraine. Volodymyr Zelensky expressed support for the protesters when he tweeted on February 26, “Incredible Georgian people who understand that friends must be supported! Grateful to everyone in Tbilisi and other cities who came out in support of Ukraine and against the war. Indeed, there are times when citizens are not the government, but better than the government.”  

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russian TikTok users allegedly compensated to produce near-identical videos

Multiple Russian TikTok users published now-deleted videos with the hashtag #давайзамир (#letsgoforpeace), in which they included near-identical phrases such as “All are blaming Russia, but close their eyes that Donbas has been under fire for eight years,” and “Please check all the news, we’re fighting for peace.” Notably, the text in many of these videos was also extremely similar, and on some occasions identical, strongly suggesting either coordination or the distribution of talking points for Russian video creators. Indeed, some Russian TikTok users pushed back publishing messages claiming they were offered payment to post peace symbols and express the message that Russia is stopping the war rather than starting it, and that the world has ignored the Donbas for eight years.

The scope of the narrative operation caught the eye of other TikTok users, who compiled videos of TikTokers voicing similar statements, then shamed them for being corrupt. Some of these TikTokers muted comments to avoid criticism, while others ultimately deleted their videos.

Not long after this first wave of similar narratives, a second wave appeared, when multiple users published videos featuring the lines, “In 2015, a new memorial named Alley of Angels was built in Donetsk” and “Russia wants to bring peace.” These videos were available at the time of publishing but may soon be deleted as well.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Georgian far left push message that Ukraine war is a battle between US and Russian empires

Georgian far-left groups are promoting the narrative that the war in Ukraine is a battle between two empires over Ukrainian resources. The narrative portrays the US and Russia as equal threats to Ukraine. On February 24, Politicano, a Facebook page known for Soviet Union nostalgia and affiliated with the Kremlin-linked News Front Georgia, posted that Ukraine has become a battleground for Western and Russian empires. Another Facebook page, “ნაპერწკალი“ (“Spark”), which describes itself as an “independent Marxist collective initiative,” posted that the war in Ukraine is a conflict between Russian and Western imperialists, fighting over spheres of influence and resources. 

The narrative that Ukraine is stuck between the imperial interests of the West and Russia aligns with messaging coming from far-right Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin. On February 27, Dugin posted, “This is not a war with Ukraine. This is a confrontation with globalization…on all levels, including geopolitical and ideological.” According to him, Russia is creating a global resistance zone. “When we win, everybody benefits from it,” he said.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

South Ossetia supports Russian invasion, blaming rise of neo-Nazis

On February 28, the KGB of South Ossetia issued a statement claiming that there is raise of neo-Nazi and nationalistic sentiments in Georgia. The claim refers to Georgians willing to join Ukraine’s international legion of territorial defence, that allows foreign volunteers to support Ukraine’s defense efforts. The South Ossetia KGB described Georgian volunteers as “aggressive Georgian volunteers from the ranks of [former President] Mikheil Saakashvili’s radical followers.” It continued, “Instead of recognising its responsibility for crimes committed against humanity from 1920s till 2008, the Tbilisi regime expresses support for Ukrainian Banderovtsi [followers of the 20^th century Ukrainian nationalist Stepan Bandera] who in turn are nurturing their own revanchist goals.”

That same day,  South Ossetia’s information agency published a story with the headline, “South Ossetia and Russia unite against Nazism.” The article claimed that citizens of South Ossetia launched a flash mob on social networks with the hashtag #Мирбезнацизма (“World without Nazism”). As of March 2, the DFRLab could not find a single public post on either Facebook or Twitter featuring the hashtag during the alleged time span of the flash mob.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Belarusian paratroopers expected in Ukraine as Lukashenka confirms missile fire

On the morning of February 28, the Kyiv Independent reported that the first Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft was expected to deploy Belarusian paratroopers into Ukraine. Meanwhile, reports of ballistic missiles launched from Belarus into Ukraine continue to surface, with some reports suggesting the use of Iskander missiles. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka later confirmed missiles were launched from Belarus on February 27.  

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium 

Ugandan General tweets support for Russia

Ugandan Lieutenant General Mahoozi Kainerugaba, son of President Yoweri Museveni and leader of the country’s land forces, tweeted on February 28, “The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine.”  The DFRLab previously identified a network of inauthentic Facebook assets working to prime Lt. Gen. Kainerugaba as the next president of Uganda.



The Ugandan Embassy in Moscow called on nationals living in Ukraine to remain cautious and follow instructions issued by the Ukrainian government. The embassy said, “It is our prayer that the situation will be short lived, and that normality will soon be restored.” The presidency has yet to issue any further comment on the war. 

On February 24, Vladlen Semivolos, Russia’s ambassador to Uganda, spoke to Uganda’s permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vincent Waiswa Bagiire, about developing bilateral cooperation in the United Nations. 

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Sudan Foreign Ministry says Russian media reported military leader’s comments out of context

The deputy head of Sudan’s military council, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, was quoted by Russian media outlet FAN as having recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Daglo, who visited Moscow last week, was quoted saying, “The whole world must realize that it is [Russia’s] right to defend herself.” However, the Sudan Tribune reported a statement from Sudan’s Foreign Ministry claiming Daglo’s quote was taken out of context and used as a “cheap attempt to fish in troubled waters.”  

On February 27, Sudan’s state news agency reported that the meeting between Sudanese and Russian officials had been scheduled prior to the war in Ukraine, and that Sudan called for de-escalation “on both sides.”

—Tessa Knight, Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-hybrid-war-report-belarus-joins-conflict-against-ukraine/ Fri, 25 Feb 2022 03:13:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=491721 The Council's open-source researchers break down the Kremlin's latest moves online and on the battlefield in its war in Ukraine.

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]]> As the crisis in Europe over Ukraine heats up, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) is keeping a close eye on Russia’s movements across the military, cyber, and information domains. With more than five years of experience monitoring the situation in Ukraine, as well as Russia’s use of propaganda and disinformation to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union, DFRLab’s global team presents the latest installment of the Russian Hybrid War Report.

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

Belarus enters the conflict after crossing Ukraine’s northern border

Not long after dawn on February 24, tanks were recorded moving into Ukrainian territory from southwestern Belarus, crossing over at the Senkivka checkpoint. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and Russian heavy flamethrower systems can be identified in the videos. Videos showing missiles being launched from the Mogilev area towards Ukraine have also surfaced, yet have not been specifically geolocated as of now. CNN and Newsweek reported that Belarusian troops are also taking part in the attack against Ukraine, despite previous insistence from Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus would not participate in any military action against the country.

In an urgent meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Lukashenka announced that they had agreed to keep Russian troops stationed in Belarus. Lukashenka previously denied that Belarusian troops would take part in the Ukrainian invasion. He also proclaimed that Ukraine is losing the war and offered to host talks in Minsk.

New Maxar satellite imagery released the day before the attack showed Russian military deployment changes on February 21 and 22. The new images revealed Russia had deployed more than one hundred vehicles and dozens of troop shelters at Bolshoi Bokov airfield in southern Belarus, near the city of Mazyr. This new deployment is less than twenty kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The same set of new images also documented ground being cleared southwest of Belgorod, Russia, in the general vicinity of where Russia later began its attack on Kharkiv.

That same day, the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service announced the implementation of a number of security measures along its borders with Russia and Belarus. The new measures included limiting vehicle traffic; using radio stations, drones, and filming and taking pictures; as well as keeping non-residents away from the border zone. Meanwhile, Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya urged Western countries to impose tougher sanctions on both Russia and Belarus to deter them from further aggression. According to her, the current sanctions packages are not enough, as Russia and Belarus are not showing any responsiveness to them.

Viktor Gulevich, head of the Belarusian army, previously stated on February 21 that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Belarus would depend on regional NATO troop withdrawals. According to Reuters reporting, Gulevich said Minsk believed it was within its rights to demand that US and NATO member forces withdraw from near Belarusian borders, including from near borders with neighboring countries Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Lastly, new footage has surfaced of Russian Ka-52 Alligator and Mi-24P combat helicopters in the Gomel region of Southeastern Belarus, potentially near the R-35 highway; however, this video has not yet been geolocated. Additional as-yet-unverified videos suggest that the southern Belarusian border where Russian troops are stationed is becoming more muddy, which might impact the tactical capabilities of Russian ground troops in the region.

—Lukas Andriukaitis, Associate Director, Brussels, Belgium

Ukraine government and civil society websites targeted by cyberattacks prior to invasion

A pair of cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites during the twenty-four hours leading up to the Russian invasion. Targets included the web pages for the Ukrainian parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Cabinet of Ministers.

According to the internet monitoring website IsItDownRightNow.com, the websites for the MFA and Cabinet of Ministers were temporarily taken offline on Wednesday. Over several hours, the DFRLab also observed that Ukraine’s security services website would only partially load. 

Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s Minister of Digital Transformation, confirmed a large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack had occurred. He claimed that unknown actors attacked Ukrainian banks, state servicer provider Diia, and the websites for the Ukrainian parliament, the MFA, and the Cabinet of Ministers. Fortunately, many of the services continued working despite the ongoing attack.

Fedorov confirmed that cyberattacks continued throughout the night and were ongoing. He claimed that all information sources in Ukraine were under attack, but assured citizens that the situation was under control. As of Thursday morning, the websites were accessible from Ukraine.

Meanwhile, open-source research collective InformNapalm also reported a DDoS attack on their webpage. A similar attack was directed at Censor.net, a popular Ukrainian online media outlet. The organizations successfully defended against the attacks and webpage performance was not impacted.

Lastly, cybersecurity firms Symantec and ESET said they had discovered a new destructive malware wiping data from Ukrainian machines.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Ukraine reports OSCE cars used as shields for Russian tanks

On February 24, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine reported that columns of Russian tanks entered the Luhansk region of Eastern Ukraine through Krasna Talivka, Milove, and Horodyshche. According to the Border Guard, the columns were led by white cars bearing the logo for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has monitored the conflict on a daily basis for years.

The OSCE previously announced on February 13 that it was pulling out its staff from eastern Ukraine. At the time, Kremlin outlet RT reported that OSCE had evacuated their car fleet but left behind armored vehicles.

At the time of writing, the OSCE had not commented on the matter and the DFRLab cannot independently confirm whether the OSCE vehicles allegedly being used by Russia are authentic or were Russian vehicles with OSCE logos affixed to them.

—Roman Osadchuk, Research Associate

Twitter says ‘human error’ caused researcher accounts to be suspended 

Twitter cited “human error” after suspending the accounts of several open-source researchers on Wednesday. The social media company dismissed rumors that the removals were the result of a mass reporting campaign. “A small number of human errors as part of our work to proactively address manipulated media resulted in these incorrect enforcements,” said Yoel Roth, head of site integrity at Twitter. “We’re fixing the issue and reaching out directly to the affected folks.”

Bellingcat analyst Nick Waters published a thread listing more than a dozen legitimate accounts that Twitter had suspended. Those with suspended accounts included Roman Burko, the founder of the open-source research collective InformNapalm; Kyle Glen, OSINT researcher and cofounder of Conflict News; Serhii Sternenko, a Ukrainian right-leaning activist from Odesa; and Maria Avdeeva, research director at the European Expert Association. By Thursday, all of the accounts cited by Waters except @ukrwarreport had been restored.

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Putin’s United Russia party suspected of initiating online flash mob to support separatist independence 

Shortly after Putin recognized the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples republics on February 21, a pro-Russia online flash mob began tweeting using the hashtags #СвоихНеБросаем (#WeDoNotAbandonOurPeople) and #МыВместе (#WeAreTogether). The campaign expressed support for people living in Donetsk and Luhansk, alleging that they are suffering under Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Twitter campaign created the impression that there is public support for Putin’s decision.

Open-source evidence suggests Putin’s United Russia party could have initiated the flash mob. United Russia started using the #СвоихНеБросаем hashtag on February 20, the day before the Putin’s announcement, calling on its audience to give humanitarian assistance to people evacuated from Donbas to Rostov Oblast. Later, United Russia continued to use the hashtag for other purposes. 

The DFRLab analyzed the hashtags on Twitter and found 59 percent of the mentions were original tweets (1005 out of 1709). Each tweet received an average of 26.4 engagements, suggesting the campaign failed to go viral. The most popular tweet had 223 engagements.

Analyzing the hashtags on Facebook using the monitoring tool CrowdTangle, the DFRLab found that the most engaged–with content came from United Russia accounts or the accounts of their prominent members. The highest number of engagements a post received was 1,300 reactions, 140 comments and 124 shares, which is not considered particularly high. A CrowdTangle query identified 202 posts on Facebook pages, public groups, and verified profiles that received an average of 39 engagements. Meanwhile, a CrowdTangle analysis of Instagram found that 509 posts have used the hashtag since February 20, receiving an average of 720 engagements.

The DFRLab found the hashtag was also used on other social media platforms, such as VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, and Telegram, but has yet to determine their levels of engagement. 

—Nika Aleksejeva, DFRLab Lead Researcher, Riga, Latvia

Georgian breakaway region South Ossetia announces combat alert

Anatoly Bibilov, president of the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia, announced a “combat alert” after an emergency security council meeting on Thursday. According to Bibilov, all units of the Ministry of Defense “must be ready to advance to concentration points.” Bibilov also ordered full cooperation with the Russian military base in the region. He cited the Treaty of Alliance and Integration between South Ossetia and Russia, signed in 2015, when reiterating South Ossetia’s “full support” for Russia’s actions.

Bibilov also said security forces were monitoring the situation along the Georgian border “to ensure readiness to respond to all provocations potentially originating from Georgia.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Russia and Azerbaijan sign declaration on allied cooperation, consider military support

On February 22 in Moscow, Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliev and Vladimir Putin signed a declaration regarding allied cooperation. Azerbaijan’s state information agency Azertag published a Russian version of the declaration, which reiterated cooperation between the two states in different fields, including the economy, energy, transportation, trade, health, and education.

Notably, three sections of the declaration mention military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Russia:

• Paragraph 11 of the declaration states that Russia and Azerbaijan will suppress activities of organizations and entities on their territory, targeting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each party.
• According to paragraph 13, “The parties will deepen cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, including holding joint operational and combat trainings, as well as developing other areas of bilateral military cooperation.”
• Lastly, in paragraph 16, they state, “In order to ensure security, maintain peace and stability, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan may consider the possibility of providing each other with military support on the basis of the UN Charter, different international agreements and considering the existing international-legal obligations of each party.”

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Ukrainian Defense Minister calls on all Ukrainians to mobilize

Ukraine’s Minister of Defense Oleksiy Reznikov called on all Ukrainians “who are ready and able to hold a weapon” to mobilize. According to a statement posted on Facebook early Thursday morning, Ukraine has entered “total defense mode.” Reznikov said all that is required to join the ranks of the armed forces is a passport. “The enemy is attacking, but our army is indestructible,” he added.

Following the defense minister’s statement, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy tweeted a similar statement: “We will give weapons to anyone who wants to defend the country. Be ready to support Ukraine in the squares of our cities.”

Also Thursday, Ukraine banned all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 from leaving the country. “This regulation will remain in effect for the period of the legal regime of martial law,” the State Border Guard Service said.

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

Baltic countries and Poland invoke NATO’s Article 4 

Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland invoked Article 4 of NATO’s founding treaty Thursday, triggering consultations with Alliance members. Article 4 states that “the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”

Following initial consultations, NATO issued a statement saying “we have decided, in line with our defensive planning to protect all allies, to take additional steps to further strengthen deterrence and defense across the alliance.”

This comes as NATO held an emergency meeting to discuss Russia’s assault on Ukraine. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia’s attack on Ukraine “is a grave breach of international law, and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” 

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia 

OSINT researchers debate when Putin recorded his war declaration

On February 24, the official website of the Russian presidency published a video in which Vladimir Putin effectively declared war on Ukraine, announcing that he was ordering the Russian armed forces to conduct a special military operation in Ukraine in accordance with Article 51 of United Nations Charter and in pursuance of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.

After the video’s release, Russian independent media outlet Novaya Gazeta wrote on Facebook and Twitter that the speech had been recorded on February 21, based on an analysis of the recording’s metadata. The story was quickly picked up by the Russian edition of Delfi Estonia media outlet on Facebook, by Ekho Moskvy on Twitter, and Turkish state-controlled media TRT’s Russian language Facebook page.

However, CNN journalist Gianluca Mezzo wrote that when he checked the metadata of Putin’s video, he concluded that it was recorded on February 24 at 03:35:44. He also published a screenshot of metadata info of a file from the website metadata2go.com.

The DFRLab team could not download a video from Kremlin’s website to independently verify its metadata; at the time of writing, Kremlin.ru was no longer functional.

—Givi Gigitashvili, DFRLab Research Associate, Warsaw, Poland

Facebook restricts Russian state-owned TV channel for 90 days

Facebook restricted the page of Zvezda TV, the Russian state-owned TV channel run by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Zvezda published a screenshot of a restriction notice from Facebook on its website, saying that the page is restricted from the platform for ninety days for “repeatedly publishing false information.”

StopFake, the Ukrainian fact-checking organization, had previously flagged two publications from Zvezda on Facebook as false information. The first article claimed that Russia had already suppressed the air-defense forces of Ukraine, while the second reported that Ukrainian military border guard units did not resist Russian forces.

—Sopo Gelava, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Sudanese paramilitary leader arrives in Moscow

The commander of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as “Hemedti,” arrived in Moscow for bilateral talks with senior Russian government officials on February 23. According to the RSF Twitter account, Dagalo will act in his capacity as deputy head of the military-led ruling council, leading a delegation of ministers. Dagalo and the RSF led a military coup in Sudan last October, which has seen sustained violent protests over the last four months.

According to VOA News, Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Khalid Farah said, “This visit was scheduled ahead and has nothing whatsoever to do with what is happening in Ukraine.” Similarly, Dagalo tweeted in Arabic that he hopes the trip will “advance relations between Sudan and Russia to broader horizons and strengthen the existing cooperation” between the two countries.

The DFRLab previously uncovered a network of inauthentic accounts with links to the Internet Research Agency that worked to amplify pro-Russian content in Sudan, promoting Russia as a friend to the Sudanese people.

—Tessa Knight, DFRLab Research Associate, Cape Town, South Africa

Russia’s communications regulator warns Russian media to cite only “official Russian sources”

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s communications regulator, issued a statement warning the media and online outlets against spreading “unverified information.” Roskomnadzor referred to Article 49 of Russia’s Mass Media Law, which obliges editors to verify the authenticity of their reporting prior to publishing it.

According to Roskomnadzor, “When preparing their materials and publications related to the conduct of a special operation in connection with the situation in the Lugansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, they are obliged to use information and data obtained from official Russian sources.”

Roskomnadzor also noted, “The dissemination of knowingly false information entails liability under Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation in the form of an administrative fine in the amount of up to 5 million rubles.” The statement warned that failure to follow this law would result in “immediate blocking of such materials by Roskomnadzor in accordance with Article 15.3 of Federal Law No. 149-FZ, ‘On Information, Information Technologies, and Information Protection.’”

—Eto Buziashvili, Research Associate, Tbilisi, Georgia

Venezuela aligns with Russian narrative in Telegram and Twitter broadcasting

The official Telegram channel of Venezuela’s government-owned TV network posted a news update about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, written in alignment with Kremlin messaging. The post stated, “Russia launches special operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Last Monday, after recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, President Vladimir Putin announced the dispatch of Russian troops with the aim of demilitarizing and denazifying the regions.” 

The post by the Venezuelan government TV network also aligned with President Nicolas Maduro’s February 22 Twitter broadcast, in which he stated, “The Bolivarian Revolution is with Russia…. We know that Putin is defending the right to peace and dignity of the Russian people and the peoples of the world and the world balance.” He continued, “Imperialism and NATO have tried to bury diplomatic agreements based on international law to disrespect Russia. Patiently, President Putin has raised the breach of these agreements and the danger that NATO deploys its weapons offensive, including its atomic weapons aimed at Russia.”

—Iria Puyosa, DFRLab Visiting Fellow, Ann Arbor, Michigan

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-risks-losing-its-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa-heres-how-to-get-it-back/ Tue, 11 Jan 2022 10:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=473180 Evolving crises in Ethiopia and Sudan have exposed Washington’s lack of a clear and coherent policy for the region.

The post The US risks losing its influence in the Horn of Africa. Here’s how to get it back. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his freshly resigned Sudanese counterpart, Abdalla Hamdok, are arguably the most pro-US leaders in the Horn of Africa (HoA)—if not the entire continent. 

But today, the evolving crises in their countries have exposed Washington’s lack of a clear and coherent policy for the region. Whether in Ethiopia’s year-old insurgency or amid Sudan’s military coup, the United States was ill-prepared to respond.

As a keen observer of the region through my regular contacts with officials in both Ethiopia and Sudan, and as a longtime colleague of Hamdok’s, I’ve seen this dynamic up close. By not being visible and sufficiently engaged, Washington could lose the capacity to influence policy and action to address the region’s many vexing problems. 

As the HoA undergoes dramatic changes, including sustained economic growth, a rising middle class, and a transition to stable democracy, Washington would be wise to rethink its approach to regional cooperation and use of sanctions—among other issues—and lay out a more inclusive, values-driven, and future-oriented strategy for the region. 

‘Either you’re with us or against us.’ 

During the Cold War, US engagement in the region centered on containing communist encroachment. In the ensuing years, US policy became static over several administrations and lacked strategy and coherence—not a good fit for a rapidly changing region. Then, shortly after the collapse of communism, the tragic fallout from the US intervention in Somalia stunted enthusiasm for engaging more actively in the region. 

American attention was only refocused after a string of terrorist attacks—including the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the September 11 attacks—and incidents of maritime piracy. The superseding objective became disrupting local Islamic extremists linked to a global jihadi network, and the full might and resources of the United States and its Western allies descended on the region. 

But combating terrorism and promoting trade held preeminence over all pretense of interest in addressing what Africans deemed to be more pressing priorities, such as combating drought and desertification, alleviating poverty, and promoting good governance. 

The implicit US mantra of “either you’re with us or against us” coaxed countries to choose sides in a conflict which did not offer neutrality as a position. In return for prioritizing counterterrorism and trade, countries were offered ample humanitarian aid, assistance for democratic governance, and enhanced foreign direct investment (FDI). As the war on terrorism intensified, the United States established Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in 2002 as the region’s operational centerpiece.

In the absence of an overarching framework to understand and address complex regional priorities, the United States pursued singular agendas and responded to challenges and crises when and where they arose—preferring to focus on individual countries rather than adopting a comprehensive regional strategy. This broad agenda was deficient in depth and obligation, and as a result, long-term vision and regional diplomacy declined. 

Without clear direction and purpose, Washington was accused of abetting African despots bent on prolonging their power, either through election-rigging or violating term limits, in exchange for their cooperation in the war on terror. This dented US credibility and its ability to inspire popular policymaking and civic-minded diplomacy among the local populations. 

For example, the United States cozied up to the Meles Zenawi regime in Ethiopia and that of his successor—fully aware of their stained human-rights records and reprehensible governance. A 2018 mass uprising that drove out the US-backed Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front caught Washington flat-footed and short on credibility to influence the turn of events. Abiy Ahmed, the charismatic new leader installed in Addis Ababa, lost no time in seeking broad international support and championing Ethiopia’s interest. 

Why messaging matters

Another consequence of the lack of a clearly articulated US regional policy is the inadvertent message Washington conveys to both democratically installed governments and insurgents-in-waiting: Coming to power through free and fair elections matters—but other interests and priorities take precedence over democratic governance. 

In Ethiopia, for instance, US hesitancy to vigorously condemn a rebel assault on a democratically installed government and constitutional order was the oxygen that fueled the conflict there. The muted response by Washington and Brussels to the aggression emboldened the rebels to set their eyes on Addis Ababa, and the forcible ouster of Abiy became their end game. 

On a continent where political leaders and regional institutions have, at least officially, banned all forms of unconstitutional power grabs, the subdued US response to the unfolding rebel attempt was diplomatically unsettling and politically misguided. 

Ethiopia: The trouble with sanctions

Today, Ethiopia is mired in internal conflict with Tigrayan forces seeking to forcibly replace a democratically elected government. Faulting the United States for overt and covert assistance to one side over the other, both warring parties are snubbing Washington’s appeals and warnings at will. Daily pleas from the Pentagon and White House to cease fire and come to the negotiating table continue to fall on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the new White House special envoy to the region, Jeffrey Feltman, learned the hard way that being the US president’s emissary no longer carries the same sway it once did—and he announced this month that he’s stepping down.

While the war has quieted down somewhat as the rebels have withdrawn to Tigray, sporadic airstrikes and artillery exchanges continue to cause collateral damage. In what is nothing less than a diplomatic mea culpa, US President Joe Biden spoke directly to Abiy by phone on Monday. Biden expressed his concern about recent civilian deaths from the conflict and Abiy briefed him on efforts to address humanitarian assistance, human rights, and reconstruction. Such a gesture, though highly welcome, is unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome of the conflict and events in the region, given the United States’ limited leverage.

Before expending sufficient diplomatic energy to reconcile the conflict, the United States has expelled the Abiy government from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for violating that trade pact’s prohibition on human-rights abuses—a clear case of punitive economic policy gone astray. 

First, many of the allegations have since been investigated by the United Nations (UN) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, which accuse all sides of the conflict of committing them. Investigators also accused all sides of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid and stated that they could not verify whether starvation was used as a weapon of war, as previously alleged by the UN and the US State Department. Investigators were barred from entering certain parts of Tigray and proposed further investigation into claims of forced starvation by government forces as well as gross human-rights violations in areas under rebel control. 

Second, the enforcement of AGOA violations has been selective and inconsistent. Past US administrations have been mute in the face of similar violations committed by other AGOA beneficiaries. This is why the haste to terminate Ethiopia’s eligibility before giving bilateral and multilateral diplomacy a sufficient chance to succeed has far-reaching consequences, including on US business and strategic interests in the region. 

The American-Ethiopian Public Affairs Committee estimates that termination potentially means a loss of some two hundred thousand jobs, with young factory workers—mostly poor young women and the heads of households—hard-hit, along with the mostly small- and medium-sized enterprises that supply and service those factories. An AGOA termination “would deal a serious blow to the welfare of millions of low-income workers,” Mamo Mihretu, Ethiopia’s chief trade negotiator, wrote in Foreign Policy.

Moreover, the impact will disproportionately fall on the poorest of the poor, who can least survive such a punitive action and who can least influence the war. In the longer term, this will significantly set back Ethiopia’s long-term trajectory to become the region’s manufacturing hub. 

Beyond Ethiopia, the termination would also disrupt countless livelihoods in Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland—neighbors whose ports Ethiopia uses for the import and export of raw materials and finished products. 

It is not lost on US policymakers that effective economic punishments must be smart and purposely targeted. Coupling trade agreements with imprecise political conditions is counterintuitive and achieves neither objective. Coming at a period of turbulence in the HoA, the termination of the trade deal throws into question the resourcefulness of US foreign policy to resolve political disputes through mature diplomatic insight before resorting to punitive measures. 

It is worth pointing out that smart sanctions and other economic tools can address specific policy goals and objectives. But sanctions should never be the first tool out of the box to resolve bilateral disputes; rather, they should be a diplomatic standby of last resort. Nor should they be applied uniformly in vastly different circumstances around the world. 

In the final analysis, hastily designed and poorly targeted economic penalties attest to the failure of diplomatic endeavors and portray a global power gradually losing influence over events and actors on the ground.

Sudan: Tuning out the US

The unfolding crisis in Sudan, where longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a 2019 revolution, is proving to be just as risky for the United States. 

The Trump administration’s endorsement of a debt-relief package helped the country financially recover, while the Biden administration helped strengthen the transition by supporting a hybrid Sovereignty Council. The West, along with Sudan’s Gulf neighbors, lavished Hamdok (who resigned on January 2) with promises of economic aid and FDI—on the condition, of course, that he implement painful structural reforms including removing food and fuel subsidies, harmonizing the exchange rate, cracking down on corruption, signing the Abraham Accords normalizing relations with Israel, and transitioning to elections in 2023. 

Legions of US, EU and other international officials—including Feltman, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, and US Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power—descended on Khartoum for endless consultations. The pace and substance of the transition excited the world about the promise of a new Sudan. Meanwhile, the country’s political and military posture, guided mainly by the generals in the Sovereignty Council, pulled further away from traditional allies in the Horn and closer to Egypt. 

They conducted provocative military exercises with Cairo just miles away from Sudan’s borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea—a move that ratcheted up regional tensions at a time when Egypt and Ethiopia are feuding over a dam on the Nile River. The Trump administration’s botched attempt to mediate the Nile dispute was oddly led by the US Treasury at the exclusion of the State Department. The White House attempt to coerce Ethiopia into signing a three-way peace agreement caused the latter to withdraw from the negotiations and disqualified the United States as an honest broker. The collapsed mediation process was replaced by an African Union (AU) initiative focused on the pursuit of African solutions for African problems. 

The US strategy in Sudan is being defined without input from Ethiopia and Eritrea, consequential neighbors with a long history of influencing peace in Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan are presently in a low-intensity dispute over their long and unmarked border. This is not the first time such disputes have arisen, and both countries are committed to peacefully resolve the conflict through the Joint Border Commission. But, regrettably, neither party can mediate in each other’s internal matters. 

However, there is a bigger lesson here for Washington: Short-lived and frequently recurring rows among neighbors should not cause the United States to exclude regional influencers and neighborhood peacekeepers from its national and regional calculus, or from the list of countries to consult. 

Following a round of “successful” meetings with both sides of the Sovereignty Council, and hours after Feltman’s departure from Khartoum, the generals staged a successful coup d’état in late October. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan seized power, arrested the prime minister, dissolved the council and suspended the coalition government. 

Working with limited intelligence on the ground and fewer friends in the region, Washington strategists were once again caught off guard. Condemned by the United States and its allies—with the exception of Egypt—and threatened with sanctions and other punitive measures, the generals continued to pay only lip service, claiming that the army had acted to prevent a civil war.

Within weeks of Hamdok’s reinstatement as prime minister and amid a deadlock with the generals over the appointment of a technocratic government, the differences in the end proved insurmountable. He finally resigned his position on January 2, and in a televised address, he told his people that Sudan’s very survival was questionable and that he had tried “to avoid the country from sliding into disaster” and wanted to “give a chance to another man or woman.” 

The voices of democracy continue to denounce any power-sharing with the military and call on it to immediately hand over power to a civilian government. For its part, the military on December 30 announced the reinstatement of the notorious national intelligence service—now rebranded as the General Intelligence Service. This can only mean more civil unrest on the streets in the coming days and the grim prospect of the use of deadly force to squelch it. 

Once again, escalating tensions in Khartoum expose a US Africa policy with limited diplomatic sway and few allies in the region who could be implored to mediate peace in Sudan. The United States must expend robust diplomatic energy to fully grasp the problems in their totality. It must also work with countries in the region in pursuit of a lasting solution. Barring that, the threat of sanctions and punitive economic measures in lieu of effective diplomacy will simply ring hollow and not give it the eminence and influence it seeks. 

Meet the new powers

The US goal of regaining commanding heights in foreign policy within the first one hundred days of Biden’s administration was an ambitious target. It is now evident that it takes more than an “America is back” mantra to reverse Washington’s eroded leadership position in the HoA.

Non-traditional partners, driven by geo-strategic interests and economic opportunism, have branded themselves as credible alternatives in the economic, political, and security spaces.

Gulf countries, plus Turkey, India, and Iran, view the Red Sea as a lifeline of global maritime logistics and seek to gain a military and commercial foothold in the region. Turkey, in particular, is quickly gaining new commercial and military traction. Distant powers such as China and Russia view the Red Sea and countries in the vicinity as an opening into the rest of Africa, a potential source of tomorrow’s raw materials, and a market for their goods and services. Supporting voices in global politics and establishing strategic military footholds are also a consideration.

In return, these new partners offer African countries financial and technical assistance, defense agreements, and access to their markets. But most important—and perhaps a key differentiator from the United States—is their policy of “non-interference” in their partners’ internal affairs. While these partners are not even a distant second to the United States in terms of foreign aid and technical, financial, and military superiority, they provide sufficient support to cause African countries to believe they have a choice of credible alternative partners. 

For instance, with thirty-nine African countries signed up, China’s dominance in infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative is a case in point. This is an alarming trend the United States cannot afford to ignore. 

After decades of alliance with the United States on regional and global matters—consider, for instance, Ethiopia’s UN Security Council vote to approve the 1991 Gulf War when the evidence wasn’t compelling—most African countries regrettably claim they’ve gained little in return for their longstanding ties to Washington. In 2021, the same Security Council discussed the Tigray conflict almost a dozen times, but the United States did not once support Ethiopia’s position. 

A forward-looking US-HoA engagement policy must embrace strategic competition and cooperation with new partners that have gained a new foothold in the region. As in the recent past, containing the advance of an adversary—China, in this case—is no longer a sufficient objective for engaging with the region. 

In a geo-strategic theater with competition from China and other entrants, it’s essential for the United States to assert its values and clearly communicate the interests it stands for (including the red lines in any relationship that cannot be crossed). Africans must know this with a degree of certainty, and well beyond the four-year election cycles. Consistency and predictability are imperative in international relations. 

Since early December, the US embassy in Addis Ababa, out of an abundance of caution following the collapse of Kabul, has flooded US citizens with alerts about the deteriorating security situation and encouraged them to leave the city. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Wang Yi of China flew into the same Addis Ababa and reaffirmed his government’s support for the government and people of Ethiopia, while also discussing other regional interests. Then after a sweeping visit to several countries in the region in early January, Wang announced that China would name a new special envoy to the Horn of Africa, garnering an enthusiastic reception. This is the contrasting friendship and influence that the United States is missing out on. 

The way forward

A progressive reset of US relations with the continent is long overdue. A new Africa policy between partners, anchored in a framework of shared principles and a vision centered on economic, social, and environmental justice, as well as the democratic aspirations of citizens, would be a good place to begin. There should be relationships in which both parties recognize that each side has something to offer and gain. 

Compelling Africans to choose between the United States and new partners is a relic of the Cold War; twenty-first century Africans are capable of defining and articulating their interests and partners of choice. The Prosper Africa trade initiative is an example of a positive pivot away from the traditional donor-recipient model to bilaterally negotiated trade and investment pacts. It allows countries to benefit from their US ties and also uphold their right to cooperate with other partners. But for this to work, all sides must actively invest in building the capacity of African countries and institutions to negotiate from a position of strength and close the knowledge and information asymmetry. 

A defining feature of the HoA is its high degree of interconnectedness, both organically and by design. In 2020, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia agreed to form a new regional bloc—the Horn of Africa Cooperation, with other neighbors to possibly join later. A regional bloc within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—built on a convergence of economic and social interests as well as political, military, and security priorities—it deserves weighty consideration in Washington as part of its HoA engagement strategy. 

Going forward, a US-HoA policy must pay particular attention to the role of African institutions at various levels. It must focus on strengthening the capacity of African-led regional bodies such as the AU, IGAD, and the African Continental Free Trade Area. Such institutions serve to develop and enforce neighborhood consensus and standards of good governance while also collectively repelling assaults on democracy and constitutional orders. 

Biden’s remarks at the February 2021 AU summit struck the right foreign-policy chords, centering on democracy, human rights, and mutual prosperity. The administration has since declared a policy focus on counterterrorism and security, climate change, the pandemic, inclusive democracy and constitutional rule, and rebuilding post-COVID economies. But these lofty pronouncements must now be backed by resources and action on the ground. 

An Afrobarometer survey in 2019-20 showed that Africans prefer to follow the United States’ development model rather than China’s by 32 percent to 23 percent. Meanwhile, 68 percent of African citizens prefer democracy over other forms of government. Despite its convergence of values with Africans, the United States still lags behind the new partners. 

The Biden administration is well-placed to reverse past missteps and set HoA-US relations on the right course. But the fast-changing region will not wait for the United States to catch up; US rhetoric must be backed with action and signal a perceptible change of course, anchored on mutual trust and tilted toward shared values. 

Building loyal allies and gaining influence in the Horn will take time. Even then, the United States may not win over all the countries nor solve all the region’s problems. But either way, tomorrow’s US foreign policy must sufficiently exploit the HoA-US values convergence, a unique advantage not enjoyed by new entrants. This requires a shift from the transactional brand of yesterday and building on shared values and principles. 

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Gabriel Negatu is a nonresident senior fellow with the Africa Center, managing director at Invest Afrique Inc., and a former Eastern Africa director general for the African Development Bank.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/alyemany-in-the-independent-arabia-red-sea-council/ Mon, 03 Jan 2022 20:39:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=480969 The post Alyemany in the Independent Arabia: Red Sea Council appeared first on Atlantic Council.
]]>
original source

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-democratic-transition-is-over-now-its-time-to-support-the-revolution/ Mon, 03 Jan 2022 19:33:26 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=472412 The resignation of Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok offers new clarity: The United States should take a hard line against the military and back pro-democracy protesters.

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]]> To anyone who has watched Sudan’s civilian leaders attempt to wrest power away from the country’s all-powerful security services over the past two years, the resignation late Sunday of beleaguered Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok should have come as no surprise.

Yet there’s no road map for what comes next.

Since the October 25 military coup that led to Hamdok’s detention, Sudan’s democratic transition has existed in name only. Upon seizing power, the military stacked state and federal institutions with generals and other allies, dismantled civilian committees aimed at seizing the former regime’s assets, reinstated the powers of the domestic intelligence services to arrest and detain, and, most significantly, ratcheted up pressure on pro-democracy protesters. Since the coup more than fifty unarmed protesters have been murdered, dozens have been raped, and hundreds more injured and illegally detained.

With billions of dollars in international assistance suspended and the country’s historic debt-relief process in serious doubt, the military succeeded in undoing two years’ worth of progress in a matter of weeks and shredded an internationally recognized political road map that would have seen civilians gradually assume greater executive authority in the lead-up to national elections in 2023.

Donor governments were quick to welcome the surprise reinstatement of Hamdok in late November, which seemingly resuscitated the political deal into which they’d invested so heavily and allowed the military to keep up the guise that Sudan’s was still a civilian-led transition. But lasting damage to both the transition and Hamdok’s personal standing—thanks to the deal’s seeming absolution of the military’s many crimes—had been done.

In retrospect, Hamdok faced an uphill battle from the outset. With his lack of political acumen and inability to harness and transform the raw power of the streets into a true agenda for bold action, the affable former United Nations bureaucrat became a political prisoner within a system he helped establish—caught between political forces unable to reach consensus on the way forward and a military regime increasingly bent on undermining the democratic process.

Either way, Sudan’s formal transition to democracy is over, even though its revolution lives on in the hearts of millions of peaceful pro-democracy protesters. Washington and its international partners have now lost the final pretense of what allowed them—for too long—to frame their engagement in terms of supporting a “civilian-led transitional government.”

Time to get tough

With no political agreement or civilian leader left to undermine, Washington and its allies should now pursue a more hardline approach toward the military that holds it accountable for the October coup and the deadly response to peaceful protests since then. That should mean sanctions against figures such as Yasser Mohammed Osman, the director of military intelligence; Jamal Abdelmagid, the director of the General Intelligence Service; and Abdarahim Daglo, the deputy commander of the notorious Rapid Support Forces. All played a direct role in orchestrating the deadly crackdown on demonstrators.

Beyond punitive measures, Washington needs to more actively shape an outcome that meets the demands of the Sudanese people, supports US strategic interests in the region, and reflects President Joe Biden’s own purported commitment to democracy and human rights. 

First, the Biden administration must announce a nominee to serve as US ambassador to Sudan—a promise made two years ago by then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo but still not fulfilled—and challenge the Senate to fast-track the confirmation process. For too long, Washington has done itself a great disservice by not sending an appropriately senior official to ensure international consensus on the ground and to navigate Sudan’s complicated political environment.

In the meantime, the administration should dispatch Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman, who has been largely underutilized in the current crisis, to Khartoum with a letter from Biden explaining the logic behind US sanctions and giving the generals a choice: Engage in a credible, transparent, and inclusive political dialogue to select a new prime minister; refrain from any further abuses against peaceful protesters; and return to full implementation of the 2019 Constitutional Declaration—or face a new wave of sanctions targeting regime leaders and their vast network of financial interests and military companies. 

But to be credible, this choice must have the backing of Sudan’s other international partners, from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to Cairo and Ankara.

Lastly, Washington must move beyond tired bromides claiming to “stand with the people of Sudan” and unabashedly throw its weight behind the country’s pro-democracy movement in tangible and meaningful ways that will begin to swing the balance of power more in the protesters’ favor. That involves funneling some of the currently frozen financial assistance to resistance committees and neighborhood committees to help them better organize, communicate, and develop their own political platform—to become a more formal part of the political process. 

Ultimately, Sudan’s people will decide what the road ahead looks like. But Washington can give them a fighting chance by seeing this moment of peril for what it is: an opportunity to rebalance its approach, recommit to the fundamental ideals of the revolution, and expose the military for what it has always been—not a partner in politics or a defender of the revolution, but a malign force bent on its own wealth and survival at the expense of the country’s well-being.

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Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/global-sanctions-dashboard-holiday-edition/ Thu, 16 Dec 2021 15:55:24 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=468578 Coordinated actions against Belarus and global human rights abusers, sanctions on African states, and anti-kleptocracy reform.

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]]> In our previous edition of the Global Sanctions Dashboard, we covered the US Treasury Department’s targeting of criminal cryptocurrency exchanges and what the Pandora Papers say about the efficacy of sanctions. For this month’s ‘holiday edition,’ we zoom in on coordinated actions against Belarus, global human rights abusers, and examine targets in Africa across multiple regimes. But our story would not be complete without the greatest gift of all—anti-kleptocracy reform. 

Last week, the White House unveiled the first-ever United States Strategy on Countering Corruption, which outlines a plan to curb abuse of US jurisdiction for illicit financial purposes. The announcement from the White House came just days before the Summit for Democracy on December 9th, giving political legs to overdue regulatory reform, such as tightening reporting requirements for the real estate sector, a notorious loophole to stash ill-gotten cash or to launder criminal proceeds. Real estate reporting requirements dovetails with ongoing efforts to implement the beneficial ownership legislation that came out of the 2021 defense authorization.

Preventative measures go hand in hand with sanctions enforcement. US authorities have had little ability to track whether sanctioned actors move money within the US despite best efforts by commercial banks. This is a question of government priorities. In focusing on punitive measures versus prevention, the US has effectively operated as if the hard work is issuing the sanction itself when in reality, that is the easy part. Implementation and compliance are actually where the success of any policy hangs in the balance, as well as the ability and willingness of the private sector to cooperate. 

Democracy Summit

The Summit pledged a hefty $424 million in anti-corruption assistance last week, while Treasury rolled out a series of high-profile designations against nationals from Angola, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. On the same day, the State Department—pursuant to its Section 7031(c) visa restriction authority—designated nine individuals over similar corruption charges. Amongst State’s designees were Isabel dos Santos, daughter of former Angolan dictator José Eduardo dos Santos and formerly the richest woman in Africa, and Oleksandr Tupytskyi, the former Chairman of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. 

In recognition of the annual global Human Rights Day, OFAC designated fifteen individuals and ten entities from Bangladesh, China, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia over their involvement in widespread human rights abuses. Notably, these designations included two officials linked to the Xinjiang Public Security Bureau—the entity responsible for facilitating the ongoing genocide in China’s westernmost province. OFAC released Global Magnitsky sanctions every single day last week, underscoring that financial corruption erodes the validity of democratic governance and civil society.

Focus Africa

As the crisis in Tigray worsened in September, President Biden issued Executive Order 14046, authorizing sanctions on those responsible for the ongoing humanitarian crisis. Last month, OFAC sanctioned four entities and two individuals for undermining the stability and integrity of the Ethiopian state, including the Eritrean Defense Force and Eritrea’s ruling political party—the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, criticized EU member states for not following suit. But the EU did introduce a new Mali sanctioning authority as French troops withdrew from the region after eight years, implicitly replacing military involvement with the spectre of financial remediation.

The EU has also sanctioned eight individuals and three entities linked to the Russian private military contractor, Wagner Group (including a sanction against the group itself). The organization, led by Vladimir Putin’s close associate Yevgeny Prigozhin, recently expanded its operations to conflict zones in Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and the Central African Republic. According to EU officials, three of the Wagner mercenaries sanctioned were designated for their activities in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. These sanctions were welcomed by Washington, where Wagner and its affiliated individuals have been sanctioned since 2017. But it was the Group’s expansion into Africa that in the end triggered the EU designation. 

Sanctions on African state or semi-state actors can be very impactful because many countries maintain limited access to Western financing, particularly through correspondent banking relationships. Sanctions by the US and Europe can sever financial systems overnight, but they also risk exacerbating humanitarian crises and incentivize banks to de-risk from countries or entire regions because they see greater liability than profit. Our projection map shows a complicated web of sanctions by a wide array of global actors. 

Belarus

After flying in over 8,000 migrants in an effort to force them into the Schengen area through Poland, the US, EU, and UK took coordinated action against those responsible in Minsk. In a remarkably quick response, the EU also agreed to impose sanctions on Belavia, the airline primarily responsible for flying the migrants in from the Middle East. OFAC joined its European partners with sanctions against 20 individuals, 12 entities, and three aircraft. After over a decade of Western sanctions and pause in IMF assistance, the US has relatively little leverage over Belarus and must decide carefully when to pull the levers it does have. US prohibitions on debt and equity in secondary markets and on the potash sector shows that a fabricated migration crisis was reason enough.

More crypto sanctions… 

In coordination with both Latvian and Estonian authorities, Treasury designated another virtual currency exchange. The designation against the Latvia-based Chatex follows an inaugural round against Russia-based Suex. According to Treasury, the two exchanges have direct ties with each other, and Chatex has been “using Suex’s function as a nested exchange to conduct transactions.” Both exchanges have been used to launder the proceeds of ransomware by cyber criminals. 

These actions are part of the Biden administration’s broader efforts to counter a number of recent ransomware attacks. As part of this package, OFAC also designated Ukrainian national Yaroslav Vasinskyi and Russian national Yevgeniy Polyanin, both of whom perpetuated recent ransomware attacks carried out by REvil—the group responsible for the attack against the IT firm Kaseya Limited in July of this year. These actions are further examples of sanctions used as tools of law enforcement. 

On the radar

As fears swell regarding a second possible incursion by Russian military forces in Ukraine, the United States and its partners are finalizing a slate of punitive measures they hope will deter the Kremlin from following through. Much analysis has been written over the past weeks that many of our readers are surely following. The most impactful is likely to be potential restrictions on Russian debt on the secondary market, which would inhibit the ability to clear dollar-denominated transactions. As touched upon previously in our Dashboard, sanctions against Russian oligarchs are also an untapped resource given their ties to Russian state assets. The US and EU partners are projecting a more decisive response now than in 2014– but escalation options are tricky to work out if the Kremlin doesn’t choose war, but something in between. And none of these options come without repercussions. Western investors see a downside risk now that they have re-entered Russian markets. As the US ramped up pressure on Iran, Venezuela and China over the past five years, investors came to view Russia as a relatively stable emerging market. In fact, US markets may be even more exposed to financial market restrictions than they were before little green men touched the Donbas the first time. 



Global Sanctions Dashboard

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/ashford-in-inkstick-debating-the-efficacy-of-us-sanctions-on-venezuela-and-ethiopia/ Mon, 13 Dec 2021 17:19:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=469231 On December 13, Emma Ashford was featured in Inkstick’s Adults in a Room column, writing on the Biden administration’s review of sanctions policy. “The Biden administration’s recently released sanctions review was emblematic of a core problem faced by advocates of sanctions reform. To the surprise of many, the review laid out extremely clearly some of […]

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]]> original source

On December 13, Emma Ashford was featured in Inkstick’s Adults in a Room column, writing on the Biden administration’s review of sanctions policy.

“The Biden administration’s recently released sanctions review was emblematic of a core problem faced by advocates of sanctions reform. To the surprise of many, the review laid out extremely clearly some of the problems with existing sanctions frameworks. It then created a clear, if vague, set of guidelines for implementing future sanctions that are more likely to be effective, and less likely to have substantive humanitarian impacts. In a town where it can be hard even to get people to acknowledge that a policy has failed, this should be viewed as a win for reformers. At the same time, the review did not address the question of existing sanctions regimes.”

More about our expert


Former staff
Emma Ashford
Former Resident Senior Fellow, New American Engagement Initiative
New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Conflict Economic Sanctions

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-democratic-transition-is-inevitable-says-the-countrys-just-resigned-foreign-minister/ Tue, 23 Nov 2021 19:40:38 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=460708 Al-Madhi warned that the political agreement signed Sunday by Hamdok and Sudan’s top general “was more supportive to the coup” than the pro-democracy movement.

The post Sudan’s ‘democratic transition is inevitable,’ says the country’s just-resigned foreign minister appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> The Sudanese military’s reinstallation of Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok “seems to have shaken the picture,” and for some people, the situation may be “a little more hazy” than it was since the October coup, said former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariam al-Mahdi. Despite that uncertainty, al-Madhi warned that the political agreement signed Sunday by Hamdok and Sudan’s top general “was more supportive to the coup” than the pro-democracy movement.

Al-Mahdi dissected the evolving political crisis in her country at an event hosted by the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center on Monday. She said she heard the news of the agreement on television before meeting with Hamdok and other members of his cabinet Monday to express her surprise and disagreement. In the end, all except five of the ministers who attended the meeting submitted their resignations, al-Madhi told the Atlantic Council.

In doing so, they reminded Hamdok that “the democratic transition is inevitable,” Mahdi recounted.

Kholood Khair, managing partner of Khartoum-based think tank Insight Strategy Partners, and Mohanad Hashim, former director of content for Sudan’s national radio and TV broadcaster, also joined in to share their perspectives on how Sudan’s protest movement is reacting to the recent developments, as well as to offer advice on how the United States and western allies can better support the pro-democracy movement.

Below are more highlights from the event, which was moderated by Africa Center nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, including an update on pro-democracy protests and al-Mahdi’s message to international supporters.

The road to democracy

• Sunday’s agreement “didn’t take into consideration” serious developments on the ground in Sudan, such as the escalation of violence by authorities at street protests, said al-Mahdi. On November 17, for example, security forces killed at least fifteen people. She added that the agreement marked a “setback in trust” specifically from Sudanese youth—who are driving the pro-democracy movement and now have more trust in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) political coalition, which refused to recognize the deal.
• Khair added that the “agreement itself is not that significant” because it “doesn’t really mention the ‘how’s’ or the timeframes” for the promised political transition, making it “difficult to implement.”
• Khair, meanwhile, explained that although the agreement met the international community’s demands, the street protesters were left unsatisfied. “The deal itself is kind of unstable,” she said. “The international community needs to get behind the street or get out of its way.”
• Hashim added that the base which provided the prime minister legitimacy “has just walked away” from him because of the deal. “They view that this… is a continuation” of the prior 2019 coup. “Hamdok might have miscalculated this big time,” he said.

Call for back-up

• Al-Mahdi said international support for the people of Sudan is “overwhelming,” particularly because partners were “well-prepared by the first coup attempt” in September. Even countries she suspected “wanted to support the coup”—such as Egypt and Israel—didn’t do so outwardly.
• The White House and US Congress seemed united in “one line in support of the revolution of Sudan and the transition,” al-Mahdi said, praising the United States for its support. That support, she said, went beyond mere words and extended to key meetings between US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman and Sudanese leaders.
• Hashim argued that US support “seemingly is cautious, perhaps even timid,” pointing to the fact that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the region last week but didn’t visit. “There hasn’t been a clear US policy for Sudan,” he said.
• But “we need for the United States to continue with us,” al-Mahdi urged, and the United States must tell the military—“while not frightening them”—that it “cannot mess with political parties” because it would pose a “serious threat to democratic transformation” in Sudan.

What’s to come

• Al-Mahdi explained that the coup “was not really, in essence, a surprise” and that she had a sense it could take place “at any moment since the early months of 2020.” But it was still a crime: “All the violators should be put into jail and…condemned,” she said.
• In order to secure this transition period, the FFC should work with the military to clarify its role to protect the state and constitution and at the same time “stop the killing in the street.” And after the first post-coup election, it’ll be important for “everyone to go and abide by their role as agreed [upon] by everybody” to build a strong state and continue Sudan’s democratic transition, al-Mahdi said.

Katherine Walla is the assistant director of editorial at the Atlantic Council.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-ethiopia-is-on-the-brink/ Wed, 03 Nov 2021 15:57:34 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=452622 What moves does Abiy have left? What role is US policy playing? What other dominos may fall in the region? Our experts keep you ahead of the curve on this fast-moving story.

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]]>

GET UP TO SPEED

The tide is turning quickly. Northern rebels are rapidly advancing on Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declares a state of emergency and issues a call to arms for regular citizens. The reversal in the country’s brutal year-long war comes as the United States is moving to revoke Ethiopia’s trade privileges because of the government’s human-rights violations in the Tigray region, detailed in a new United Nations report. What moves does Abiy have left? What role is US policy playing? What other dominos may fall in the region? Our experts keep you ahead of the curve on this fast-moving story.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former director of African affairs at the National Security Council
• Aubrey Hruby (@aubreyhruby): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and investor in African start-ups
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center

On the march

• Originally involving limited strikes against Tigrayan separatist leaders, Abiy’s war has since spiraled out of control—with Ethiopia now facing potentially tragic consequences. “State-sponsored genocide and even state collapse remain frighteningly real scenarios,” Cameron tells us. 
• Abiy, the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize-winner, appears to have overplayed his hand by underestimating his opponents, who have traditionally been among the Ethiopian army’s best fighters and tacticians. “The government has slowly seen its overwhelming strategic advantage eroded against a rump force more adept at insurgency combat and clearly more motivated by a fight for its literal survival,” Cameron adds.
• Meanwhile, a government blockade of the Tigray region has left nearly one million civilians in danger of famine as the conflict has expanded to neighboring regions—as “hateful and dehumanizing speech” villainizing Tigrayans more broadly suggests that Abiy and his loyalists may be “inciting genocide as part of [their] last-ditch defense effort,” Cameron believes. Case in point is Abiy’s speech today, in which he declared: “We will bury this enemy with our blood and bones and make the glory of Ethiopia high again.” 

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Sullied success story

• That’s all the more tragic considering Ethiopia has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, Aubrey notes, averaging nearly 10 percent growth per year for the past decade. But the war’s crippling effect on the economy has led to soaring food prices while “scarce foreign exchange has halted production and curtailed access to basic imported goods,” she adds. The National Bank of Ethiopia ordered the suspension of commercial lending, drying up credit and choking off investment.
• In response to Abiy’s offensive, the United States slapped sanctions on his government in September and this week moved to terminate duty- and quota-free access to the US market as part of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Aubrey believes that while the trade restrictions probably won’t compel Abiy to end the fighting, they “will likely result in the loss of around two hundred thousand direct jobs, mainly for women working in factories, and a million or so additional jobs servicing export-oriented factories—another cause of suffering for everyday Ethiopians.”
• At this point, Cameron adds, any US effort to bring about a ceasefire through the threat of additional sanctions “rings hollow in what has emerged as an existential battle for survival for both sides.”
• And the “dire economic consequences” of the violence won’t stop at Ethiopia’s borders, Aubrey warns, with the recent military takeovers in Guinea and Sudan combining to spook investors: “The already-skewed perception of risk in African markets will sadly only intensify.”

A new geopolitical order

• A year ago, Abiy appeared to be aiming for a swift and limited “blitzkrieg” in Tigray, Rama tells us. But “from day one, it has been a regional war,” drawing in neighboring Eritrea and sending tens of thousands of refugees spilling across borders.
• The outcome is all the more jarring, Rama says, because Ethiopia has long been a “hub of stability in a volatile area” afflicted by conflicts in the Sudans, Somalia, and Eritrea. Now that Ethiopia has become the main source of instability in the Horn of Africa, she expects to see a broader “blast effect.”  
• Zooming further out, Rama points to how rampant instability in the region has created an opening for outside influence beyond traditional players like the United States and European powers. These new influencers, she says, include Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Israel, and China, which is heavily invested in a railroad linking Addis Ababa to the sea via its Belt and Road Initiative.
• “What the increasingly noisy presence of these (re)emerging regional powers reveals is not a simple destabilization,” Rama tells us, “but a new global geopolitical order” with a focus on Africa.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-coup-wasnt-a-failure-of-us-diplomacy-it-was-the-dawn-of-a-new-era-in-africa/ Fri, 29 Oct 2021 21:24:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=451079 In a context where Washington’s voice is diluted amid competing powers vying for influence in Africa, Sudan has emerged as the ultimate battleground.

The post Sudan’s coup wasn’t a failure of US diplomacy. It was the dawn of a new era in Africa. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> US diplomats had barely cleared Sudanese airspace when the country’s military began deploying across the capital, Khartoum, in the early hours of Monday and rounding up the civilian leaders it believed betrayed the democratic revolution that toppled long-time dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

By Monday morning, a state of emergency had been imposed, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok was detained, and critical parts of the country’s transitional constitution were suspended.

Since June, Hamdok, a civilian technocrat, had been warning about exactly this turn of events. In perhaps its most transparent act of its takeover, the military had even signaled to observers at home and abroad that a coup d’état remained a lifeline of last resort, as pressure mounted on the military to transfer its chairmanship of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council to civilian leadership. That message came in the form of a foiled coup attempt earlier this month which many observers viewed as a trial balloon to test local and international reaction.

The response could not have been more clear: International envoys descended on Khartoum, warning of aid suspensions, targeted sanctions, and delays in international assistance on critical needs such as debt relief.

The public’s response was equally swift and clear. More than one million pro-democracy protesters took to the streets across Sudan. Demand for civilian rule hasn’t dimmed since 2019. If anything, military efforts to blame civilian leaders for the slow implementation of reforms and sclerotic economic progress have failed—instead fueling demand for democratic governance as the only way out of the country’s morass.

The only surprise from this week’s development is the timing—coming just hours after Sudan’s military head of state assured US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman that he remained committed to the core tenets of the transition to civilian rule, and was prepared to work cooperatively with Sudan’s fractious political parties to advance the most controversial and unimplemented aspects of the transitional charter.

That promise unraveled quickly. 

New realities in Africa

Few could argue the United States was insufficiently engaged in Sudan, or that it hadn’t brought its highest-level actors to bear on the events leading up to the coup. Between multiple visits from Feltman and high-level calls from both National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Washington has rarely been as coordinated and consistent in its message as it has been with Khartoum.

Instead, this may reflect a new era for US diplomacy in Africa—one in which the United States is one of many powerful actors vying for influence to shape political outcomes. In a context where Washington’s voice is diluted amid competing powers, Sudan has emerged as the ultimate battleground. Although Sudan has always sat at a strategic crossroads, the revolution has re-shuffled the political deck in the country, and opportunity has emerged for new global players eager to exploit more than just the country’s rich gold deposits or strategic location.

Egypt has long looked paternalistically at Sudan, and while its official statements have called for calm, no one expects Cairo to demand a restoration of civilian rule or adherence to the transitional constitution considering the circumstances of General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi’s own rise to power. Similarly, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have long seen Sudan as a national-security imperative—not only as a vital security partner across the Red Sea, but as a principal source of the livestock and grain that those desert societies demand in abundance. 

Though late to the party, Russia has shrewdly engaged Sudanese security officials through negotiations over a naval basing agreement and growing informal ties between Sudan’s notorious Rapid Support Forces militia and the Russian mercenary group Wagner. Underpinning Moscow’s engagement has been a sustained and sophisticated information campaign—which has provoked three Facebook takedown actions so far—intended to sow doubt in the minds of Sudan’s youth over the efficacy of civilian rule.

The not-so-hidden hand of Turkey, Qatar, and Kuwait—all in search of bigger military contracts, investment opportunities, or political leverage against larger Gulf states—has only widened the options available to Sudanese leaders searching for a lifeline.

All these influences now explain the flurry of phone calls to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others from US officials seeking guarantees that these countries’ leaders gave no nod to the military’s move. While US influence in Sudan may be diluted, there still seems to be hope that Washington can impress upon backers of factions among Khartoum’s power players that Sudan won’t know stability—and that their interests there will remain at risk—as long as popular demands for democratic rule remain unmet.

But it feels like misplaced hope to expect genuine assistance from countries that have never hidden their preference for like-minded military rulers and which likely fear the domestic consequences of civilians successfully overthrowing a military in the Arab world. Even more misplaced would be the expectation that the streets of Khartoum would accept a deal bearing Riyadh or Abu Dhabi’s fingerprints.

Time to get tough

After the West failed to prevent the seemingly inevitable coup last week, the prospects for reversing it now appear even more dim.

That’s because the military, which was fully aware of the consequences of its takeover, believes it has chosen the only path available to ensure its own security. Knowing the United States would suspend its $700 million financial assistance program—the vast majority of which was going to subsidize incomes and basic foodstuffs for Sudan’s poorest—it has once again cravenly put its own survival above that of its people.

For the United States and its partners, this black eye will not quickly fade and could well create lasting ripple effects across the region. If hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid and intensive diplomatic engagement can’t convince Sudan’s military to stay the democratic course, what chance does Washington have in countries like Guinea, Mali, or Chad—where Western diplomats are also pushing back against military takeovers in favor of civilian regimes?

That’s why it’s critical that Washington rejects any other deal among international elites that relieves the growing near-term pressure, but which ultimately betrays the demands of the millions of Sudanese calling for genuine change. While it has a painful history of thirty years of sanctions in Sudan, the United States must seriously consider targeted measures against military leaders and their political allies (and even external actors) that have aided the takeover and undermined civilian rule.

The United States must also redouble its efforts to support Sudan’s vibrant civil society groups, which have become virtually the last hope for the country’s revolution, by funneling money to sustain their work and skirt the military’s insidious control of the internet.

Another attention-grabbing move would be a US State Department designation of the country’s Rapid Support Forces—a paramilitary force responsible for the arrests and torture of several prominent politicians and activists this week—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, a precedent set when the Trump administration designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Further isolating and discrediting Sudan’s ultimate bad actor would show solidarity with the streets and would help remove a perennial spoiler from the country’s political future.

Lastly (and as odious as it may be), the United States must remain open to the possibility of facilitating a soft landing for military leaders in exchange for their exit from the political and economic space they control. While they clearly can’t imagine a Sudan they don’t totally control, Sudan’s military brass likely also can’t imagine a future for themselves in which the threat of accountability hangs over them as it does now. Legislation absolving military leaders of past crimes and granting them immunity is a betrayal to Sudan’s many victims of atrocity and oppression, to say nothing of the blow it levels against international criminal justice. But it may be required to send the army back to the barracks.

As Sudan rests on a knife’s edge, there are no simple solutions. But as the United States contemplates a way forward, it should learn from hindsight—namely, that if two years of transition hasn’t changed the military’s fundamental nature, nor will two more years of shared governance with civilians. 

US policy must recognize that Sudan’s military is bent on its own survival above all else. The military fooled Washington once—and cannot be allowed to do so again.

---

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-whats-behind-the-coup-in-sudan/ Mon, 25 Oct 2021 19:17:33 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=448309 What’s next for Sudan and the global partners in its state-building project? Our experts weigh in.

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]]>

GET UP TO SPEED

On Monday, Sudan’s military arrested the country’s civilian leaders—including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok—in an apparent coup that’s likely to stymie the country’s already-slow progress toward political reform. The move comes just weeks after a failed takeover attempt by loyalists to ex-dictator Omar al-Bashir and amid repeated warnings that tensions between Sudan’s civilian and military leaders were reaching their breaking point. What’s next for Sudan and the global partners in its state-building project? Our experts weigh in.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

• Cameron Hudson (@_hudsonc): Nonresident senior fellow at the Africa Center and former chief of staff to the US special envoy to Sudan
• Rama Yade (@ramayade): Director of the Africa Center
• Will Wechsler (@WillWechsler): Director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs

Out of balance

• The delicate balancing act of Sudan’s political transition had “hit a wall” lately, Cameron tells us. And the writing for the coup was on that wall. For months, the transitional governing structure—split between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir in 2019 and Sudan’s powerful security services—had been unraveling, with the military particularly fearful of losing its grip on power.
• “Civilian leaders had essentially reached the limits of their ability to reform the political and economic space without the military giving an inch,” Cameron adds.
• Now, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken charge, dissolving that structure and declaring a state of emergency. The military says it will install a new technocratic government until the country holds elections in July 2023. Which makes Rama wonder: “Who will run? A soldier? A Sudanese Sisi?” referring to the Egyptian strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

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Money matters

• As Sudan’s economy spiraled in recent weeks—inflation, for instance, has topped 400 percent—the military seized the moment to “accuse the government of ignoring the people’s needs,” Rama notes.
• While foreign aid has helped Sudan muddle along, Cameron adds, “a full-fledged recovery… was never going to be achieved without the military relinquishing its control over the major revenue-generating parts of the economy,” from port operations to gold mining to livestock exports.
• As for the Western countries expressing shock and dismay at the upheaval in Sudan, Rama recommends they look in the mirror, considering the strictures that came with Sudan’s International Monetary Fund loans in recent years. “On the economic front, they should perhaps have supported this government rather than suffocating it with tough austerity measures that ended up plunging the population into despair and offering the military the ideal pretext they wanted to pull off this coup,” she tells us.  
• And even tougher economic times are likely ahead as a result of the coup, Cameron predicts, since “international assistance will be quickly suspended, including Sudan’s debt-relief process” with the IMF.

Regional rumblings

• The military’s power grab will reverberate far beyond Sudan, Will says. Most regional powers “with interests in Sudan have never fully shared Washington’s commitment to a democratic transition,” he notes, and “some neighbors will undoubtedly quietly welcome the coup and its supposed promise of greater stability” in a country that has now suffered some sixteen coup attempts since 1956.
• It also throws into question the country’s much-vaunted normalization with Israel, Will adds. Sudanese Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari met with Israeli officials on the margins of our N7 Conference earlier this month, “the first multilateral gathering between Israel and the six Arab states that have announced normalizations,” Will points out. 
• But a formal normalization ceremony, for which the Biden administration had negotiated a substantial US aid package for Sudan, had been waylaid by scheduling problems, Will says. And now he thinks it won’t happen “anytime soon,” particularly since US law prevents most kinds of foreign assistance following a coup. The State Department announced Monday that it was halting $750 million in aid.
• Meanwhile, Cameron advises against any expectations that the West can push back against the coup. In fact, he says, just hours before the coup Burhan told Jeffrey Feltman, the US special envoy to the Horn of Africa, that he’d stay committed to civilian rule. “The military took this decision knowing full well the likely consequences of their actions,” Cameron explains. “So while the [international] condemnation will be quick and unanimous, it is unlikely to be sufficient to reverse this setback.”

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/sudans-pm-warned-of-a-failed-state-in-2019-now-hes-under-arrest/ Mon, 25 Oct 2021 15:45:41 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=448175 Here's what Abdalla Hamdok told the Atlantic Council during a 2019 visit to Washington.

The post Sudan’s prime minister warned of a ‘failed state’ in 2019. Now he’s under arrest. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Sudan’s post-revolutionary transition was thrown into question Monday after an apparent coup in which the military arrested leading civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Just months after the April 2019 ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir, Hamdok traveled to Washington—the first Sudanese head of government to be welcomed by US officials since 1985—where he appeared at the Atlantic Council.

In an address and subsequent discussion with nonresident senior fellow Cameron Hudson, a hopeful Hamdok outlined his country’s challenging transition from dictatorship.

Perhaps most striking was his statement about the delicate governing structure between the civilian leaders who helped topple Bashir and the country’s powerful military. While praising the “homegrown” nature of the compromise, Hamdok also warned that any backsliding could lead to “a failed state.”

“It will be Yemen. It will be Libya. It will be Syria. It will be all those,” he warned.

Watch the full video:

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/time-is-running-out-for-abiys-new-beginning-in-ethiopia/ Thu, 07 Oct 2021 21:11:20 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=443155 Cheering crowds and soaring rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s troubles run deeper than just one restive region.

The post Time is running out for Abiy’s ‘new beginning’ in Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> After being sworn in this week in front of tens of thousands of jubilant supporters, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promised “a new beginning” for Ethiopia as he begins a new five-year term. That’s precisely what Ethiopia needs after his first three years in office.

Inflation stands at a record-high 34 percent, the nation’s debt has reached a crippling $30 billion, and efforts to privatize some of the country’s corporate crown jewels, such as Ethio telecom, have floundered amid allegations of genocide and predictions of mass starvation as the conflict over the country’s Tigray region rages on. With the country’s trade benefits under the US African Growth and Opportunity Act likely to be suspended by the end of the month, what was once one of the world’s fastest growing economies suddenly finds itself on life support.

Cheering crowds and soaring rhetoric cannot hide the fact that Abiy’s troubles run deeper than just one restive region.

Since war broke out nearly a year ago in the northern region of Tigray, Ethiopia’s ethnic patchwork has only unraveled even further. Ethnic-based violence in the regions of Benishangul-Gumuz, Somali, Oromia, Afar, Amhara, and Southern Nations all suggest that Abiy’s original political ideology of “medemer”—an Amharic expression to convey a coming together beyond ethnic identity—has failed. Facts on the ground demonstrate that a military response alone will not suffice in addressing these mounting security threats and the level of displacement they’ve engendered.

As part of his “new beginning,” Abiy pushed through a new parliament—94 percent of which is controlled by his Prosperity Party—as well as the appointment of new cabinet ministers at the finance, defense, and peace ministries, nominally from opposition groups, in a move spun by his office as his “commitment to inclusivity.” But in tapping close allies and former subordinates, the move has prompted many to instead view the personnel change as style over substance—a deliberate attempt to re-assert control over key ministries involved in the war effort in advance of a new offensive intended to achieve a total victory.

Abiy’s biggest promise this week to mollify domestic opponents and international critics has been to convene a national political dialogue, which he claims will address the shortcomings associated with his original vision of “medemer.”

But nothing suggests the dialogue will fundamentally alter the failed attempt to create a unitary Ethiopian state and dismantle the system of ethnic federalism that lies at the heart of Ethiopia’s current crisis. With his strongest opposition likely to be excluded from that dialogue—particularly armed groups from Tigray and Oromia, which have been labeled terrorist organizations—there is reason to question the sincerity of any reconciliation process that does not engage the specific grievances that caused Abiy’s foes to take up arms.

Lower on Abiy’s list of priorities, but no less important, should be an effort to re-establish some goodwill with the international community before actors such as the United States make good on the punitive measures they’ve long threatened. With the expulsion earlier this month of seven high-level United Nations (UN) officials from Ethiopia on grounds—labeled by the UN secretary-general himself as baseless—of meddling in the country’s internal affairs, Abiy has instead put himself on a collision course with countries that questioned the legality of that decision and have demanded the officials’ reinstatement.

Will Abiy budge?

If he fails to abide calls to bring back UN officials, it’s difficult to imagine that the United States won’t designate top Abiy aides under the sanctions regime it introduced last month. But it’s even harder to imagine Abiy publicly relenting at this point in the face of international pressure after ignoring so many off-ramps to avoid punitive measures.

His government’s continuing humanitarian blockade of Tigray—beyond the widespread human-rights abuses that prompted the US government to open a genocide investigation—means that any national reconciliation must be preceded by mediation, peace-building, justice, and accountability for all the transgressions of the past year.

Judging by the triumphalism of Abiy’s remarks this week, that feels like an unlikely scenario. As the rainy season ends this month, fueling fears of a massive new government offensive, the situation on the ground in Tigray is likely to get far worse before it gets better. As the already dire humanitarian and human-rights situations worsen, so too will Ethiopia’s foreign relations.

But with an electoral victory, a vast parliamentary majority, and a seeming mandate to lead, Abiy now has some of the political capital he might need to begin to escape from the corner into which he’s painted himself.

As a first step—and on the advice of the three African members of the UN Security Council—he could compel his compliant parliament to rescind the terrorist designations against the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front, an essential first step toward ceasefire talks and eventual political dialogue. It is also entirely within his power to lift the blockade of Tigray and save as many as one million lives in the process.

To help him on this path, the African Union recently deployed a lifeline in the form of its new Horn of Africa envoy, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. Privately, Ethiopian officials seem open to an African solution to their decidedly African problem: They appear to have faith in Obasanjo’s ability to keep Western powers at bay while offering Abiy a face-saving way to de-escalate, going so far as to invite him to establish a backchannel to the TPLF. As he builds out his team, Washington would do well to communicate its support for Obasanjo’s mission—but also stay at arm’s length, since any American fingerprints on this process could well undermine it.

Abiy’s call for “a new beginning” suggests at least an acknowledgement that Ethiopia is at a perilous point in its history. Although he continues to blame and punish those who oppose him, we must hope he realizes that more of the same war-making, ethnic division, and human-rights abuses will only produce more of the same poor results for the economy and his foreign relations. Abiy still has the possibility to live up to the spirit of the Nobel Peace Prize he received in 2019 for making peace with neighboring Eritrea. Let’s see whether he can do the same within his own country.

---

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a former director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council.

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/biden-finally-gets-bold-on-ethiopia-sanctions-tigray/ Fri, 17 Sep 2021 20:47:49 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=435851 The Biden team has launched its final and most elaborate warning shot before cracking down with sanctions against human-rights abusers in the Tigray region.

The post Biden finally gets bold on Ethiopia. But will it bring peace? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> For months, the Biden administration warned that it would sanction the Ethiopian government and its allies for the human-rights abuses, war crimes, and other mass atrocities they have allegedly committed in their year-long war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). As the nationalist group has carried out its own reprisal killings, those warnings have expanded to include all parties to a conflict that’s left thousands dead and nearly one million people languishing in famine-like conditions. 

Then came today’s executive order—the latest in a long series of escalatory efforts by the White House to push the belligerents toward ceasefire talks and to allow in humanitarian aid. Repeated press statements expressing the administration’s “grave concern” looked more like platitudes than policy, which is why it faced increasing pressure from human-rights activists to act.

The administration chose to issue what the Treasury Department calls an “empty EO,” meaning a sanctions regime is now in place but the executive order does not designate any individuals or companies. Instead, the Biden team has launched its final and most elaborate warning shot, effectively giving both sides a few more weeks to engage in serious negotiations, cease their attacks on civilians, and open up the free flow of humanitarian assistance before sanctions are imposed. US officials have been clear to say that designations will come “in weeks not months” if progress isn’t made quickly.

The order goes further than sanctioning only human-rights offenses, as is allowed under the Global Magnitsky Act. Instead, the order is purpose-built to create a sanctions regime specific to the conflict in Ethiopia, giving the administration broad authority to target asset freezes at not just those committing rights abuses, but also those blocking humanitarian aid, inhibiting ceasefire negotiations, undermining democratic processes, engaging in corruption, and targeting civilians and international aid workers.

While we don’t know who will be targeted, it will likely include a representative sample of all the warring sides, including Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials, Amhara state representatives and militia leaders, as well as Tigrayan political and military figures.

Abiy under fire?

If the United States chooses to sanction Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his close associates before his expected reappointment as prime minister in the coming weeks, it could plant serious doubt about his leadership in the minds of his supporters. Such a move—though it’s unlikely—would probably also be met with renewed accusations that the United States was meddling in Ethiopia’s internal political affairs and effectively seeking regime change.

Because Washington has been accused of taking sides against Addis Ababa, today’s order takes great pains to appear even-handed by recognizing the complicity of all sides in committing rights abuses and prolonging the conflict. The order singles out not just Ethiopian and Eritrean government officials but also “the TPLF, the Amhara regional government or the Amhara regional or irregular forces,” essentially any party alleged to have committed abuses to date.

In a smart move, the administration also rolled out wide carveouts to those sanctions for “personal remittances to non-sanctioned persons, humanitarian assistance to at-risk populations, and longer-term assistance programs and commercial activities that address basic human needs.” That suggests it has learned from past cases, in which broad unintended consequences followed sanctions by hurting civilians.

Beyond the direct effect of sanctions, the reputational effect associated with them will also likely be substantial. Ethiopia will now be associated with neighbors such South Sudan and the Central African Republic on the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list of sanctioned countries—company it will surely not want to keep when just two years ago it found itself on a very different list: the International Monetary Fund’s ranking of the world’s fastest-growing economies.

Although today’s announcement is a serious step forward on pressuring the Abiy government, it still leaves open the possibility that progress on the ground can be made over the next several weeks and that the worst of Washington’s sanctions can be avoided.

Timing is everything

As fighting has become increasingly widespread over the last few months, many fear the war could quickly escalate and get dramatically worse for non-combatants, who have borne the brunt of the violence.

Moreover, East Africa’s rainy season will end in a few weeks, allowing for heavy weapons and larger troop deployments to wider, previously unreachable swaths of the country. While the TPLF currently appears to be on its back foot, the coming start of the dry season will level the battlefield once again. US officials estimate that all sides are preparing major new offenses next month.

Ethiopia will also be concluding parliamentary elections, which were delayed this summer in several regions due to the fighting. This will be followed almost immediately by a party congress for Abiy’s Prosperity Party, which he hopes will not only renew his mandate but also give him support to press forward with the war. To that end, the Biden administration’s order leaves Abiy with a choice: Use that new mandate to push for total victory, or initiate some type of political settlement.

Lastly, coming just days before the start of the United Nations General Assembly—and as former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo heads to Ethiopia as the African Union’s new Horn of Africa envoy—today’s effort could catalyze a new and concerted international diplomatic push for ending the fighting.

All sides have expected this announcement for some time. Still, US-Ethiopia relations are sure to nosedive even further as a result. Just hours after today’s sanctions announcement, Abiy issued an open letter to US President Joe Biden in which he stridently proclaimed that “Ethiopia will not succumb to consequences of pressure engineered by disgruntled individuals.”

However, viewed from Washington, diplomacy alone hasn’t worked either. The question is whether Abiy will see this latest move from Washington as the end of the road—or as an exit ramp to avoiding even greater pain.

Cameron Hudson is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading


AfricaSource May 25, 2021
Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it?
By Rama Yade
Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.
Africa Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Apr 21, 2021
A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net
By Jeremy Mark and Vasuki Shastry
The international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19, but much more is needed to assist low-income countries. While the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights are a good start, G20 nations must help restructure the debts of developing nations and fund vaccine distribution.
Africa China

AfricaSource Mar 3, 2021
The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan
Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.
Africa Conflict

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/blog-post/state-of-the-order-assessing-august-2021/ Wed, 15 Sep 2021 05:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=434037 The State of the Order breaks down the month's most important events impacting the democratic world order.

The post State of the Order: Assessing August 2021 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Taliban Takeover. Afghanistan’s Western-backed government collapsed as the Taliban took control of Kabul and declared the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, while President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. Nearly twenty years after being toppled in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban returned to power having capitalized on the Biden administration’s (and previously, the Trump administration’s) decision to withdraw all US forces from the country. After evacuating most of their citizens, as well as tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted their mission, US and NATO troops completed their final withdrawal at the end of August.

• Shaping the Order. The return of the Taliban is a tragedy for Afghans who sought to live in an open society and a setback to the advance of a rules-based order — underscoring that despite two decades of sustained US and NATO combat support and economic aid, the establishment of a stable, democratic government proved out of reach. The developments in Afghanistan could embolden America’s adversaries, as China and Russia sought to portray the United States as a weak and defeated power upon which US allies cannot confidently rely.
• Hitting Home. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan puts an end to US involvement in the “forever war” that most Americans felt had dragged on far too long. But the re-emergence of the Taliban could provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups – potentially threatening the security of Americans in the region and even in the homeland.
• What to Do. The Biden Administration should make clear that its withdrawal from Afghanistan is not a sign of retreat from US global leadership nor an abandonment of efforts to advance democracy and a rules-based order. Building on Biden’s initial remarks after the fall of Kabul, the administration should reinforce its determination to work with NATO and its Asia-Pacific treaty allies to strengthen U.S. alliances, while taking affirmative steps to support front-line democracies, such as Ukraine, and pro-democracy movements around the world.

US-Israel Realigned. In his first meeting with Israel’s new prime minister Naftali Bennett, at the White House, President Biden provided a forceful recommitment to Israeli security, vowing that the US and Israel have an “unshakeable partnership.” The two leaders reportedly agreed on a common strategy to halt Iran’s nuclear program, creating a joint team at the national security advisers level, while Biden indicated his administration would be prepared to move to “other options” if diplomacy fails to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

• Shaping the Order. A strengthened US-Israeli partnership can serve as an anchor for stability in the Middle East, facilitating more effective cooperation to advance shared interests in regional security, nonproliferation, and a rules-based order. But the Israeli government’s unwillingness to relaunch peace talks with the Palestinians and work toward a two-state solution could be a thorny obstacle in the US-Israeli relationship.
• Hitting Home. A nuclear-armed Iran would constitute a direct security threat to the United States and its allies and could lead to a more dangerous world.
• What to Do. Working through their newly-created joint team, the US and Israel should expand cooperation to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, while countering Iran’s destabilizing influence across the region. To ensure a unified front, these efforts should also be coordinated with other regional allies, as well as the G7 or D-10.

Democracy Summit. The Biden administration announced that it plans to host a virtual Summit for Democracy this year, with invited heads of state coming together on December 9-10 to focus on three main themes: defending against authoritarianism, fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights. The White House aims to organize a follow-up summit one year later, in-person if feasible, providing a venue to take stock of commitments made during the initial convening.

• Shaping the Order. Coming on the heels of the fall of Afghanistan, the Summit could serve as a timely opportunity for the Biden administration to rally support for democratic norms and showcase common resolve among the world’s democracies, at a time when democracy has suffered significant setbacks around the world.
• Hitting Home. A more democratic world is likely to provide greater security and stability for the United States and generate increased trade and economic opportunities.
• What To Do. To ensure the Summit’s success, the Biden administration should limit the guest list to leaders of democracies (as opposed to friendly non-democracies) that are prepared to set forth meaningful commitments in support of the Summit’s core themes. The outcome should include a democracy charter, in which participating leaders pledge to take active measures to counter authoritarianism and bolster support for democratic norms.

Quote of the Month

“[W]e all recognize that the decision to leave Afghanistan was extremely difficult. It entailed risks. But that doesn’t change the fundamental value of U.S. and Europe being committed to each other, especially in a time where we see the rise of China and the shifting global balance of power that makes it even more important, both for Europe and United States, to stand together in an alliance as NATO.”

– Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General



State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order    

Democracy (↓)

• The fall of the Afghan government, despite nearly 20-years of military and economic support from the US and its NATO allies, represents a significant blow to efforts to advance democracy, especially in the Islamic world.
• With President Nicolas Maduro tightening his grip on the country, Venezuela’s main opposition parties announced an end to their three-year boycott of elections, abandoning one of the main tactics of their ongoing struggle against the country’s dictatorship.
• Poles took to the streets to protest a parliamentary bill widely viewed as an effort by the country’s nationalist ruling party to silence government criticism by an independent television network (owned by the US-based media company Discovery), a leading source of news for many in Poland.
• The United States imposed a new round of sanctions against Belarusian strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka—timed to mark the one-year anniversary of his fraudulent re-election. The US also issued new sanctions against Cuban officials involved in the crackdown on anti-government protestors in July.
• Overall, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

• The re-emergence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan could provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups that could pose a direct threat to the United States and Europe, as well as India and other nations in the region.
• Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous nation and a longstanding US partner against Islamist militancy, descended into an escalating civil war between the ruling government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. In May, the Biden administration imposed sanctions against Ethiopian officials for their role in abetting human rights atrocities.
• Particularly in light of developments in Afghanistan, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

• The United Kingdom indicated that it aims to start negotiations on a free trade agreement with India by the end of the year, while India also expressed interest in free trade agreements with the European Union and Australia.
• The global economic recovery from the pandemic has begun to wane, as the widespread outbreak of the Delta variant negatively impacted manufacturing centers in East Asia.
• Overall, the global trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

• A major scientific study by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that human activity is changing the climate in unprecedented and irreversible ways, underlining the urgent need for global action as the United Kingdom prepares to host an upcoming global climate summit (COP26) in November.
• In its first Indo-Pacific naval voyage in twenty years, Germany deployed a frigate intended to cross the South China Sea in the coming weeks, joining the US and other democratic allies in efforts to reaffirm freedom of navigation amid China’s maritime ambitions.
• Overall, the global commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances (↓)

• The US withdrawal from Afghanistan drew criticism from US allies, particularly in Europe, where many expressed disappointment with the level of consultation ahead of the decision to withdraw. President Biden sought to assuage allies in a special G7 summit meeting convened virtually by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the wake of the Taliban takeover.
• Frustrated with the continuing US travel ban on European travelers, the European Union recommended reinstatement of restrictions on US travelers, citing the significant increase in coronavirus cases across the United States.
• As discussed above, Israeli Prime Minister Bennett’s visit to the White House strengthened relations between the two allies.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was weakened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order     

• Anne Applebaum, in The Atlantic, defends the value of fighting for liberal democracy, a potent ideology opposed by America’s adversaries.
• Anders Fogh Rasmussen, writing in Foreign Affairs, argues that despite the Afghan government’s collapse, America and its allies cannot abandon the fight for democracy.
• Kevin Rudd, in Foreign Affairs, suggests that the success of the Indo-Pacific Quad poses a threat to Beijing’s long-term ambitions to dominate the East Asian region.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Barry Pavel, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could be even more dangerous than it was prior to September 11, 2001.
• Dan Fried, in the New Atlanticist, suggests that despite its failure in Afghanistan, the United States can come back strong to advance the cause of freedom and democracy, just as it did after its debacle in Vietnam.
• Amanda Rothschild offers recommendations to the Biden administration in The Dispatch on how to avert a growing humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan.
• Dan Fried and Brian O’Toole, in the New Atlanticist, suggest that the new series of US sanctions on Belarus will not be powerful enough to rattle the autocrat Lukashenka.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Ash Jain – Director for Democratic Order
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Jeffrey Cimmino – Assistant Director
Joel Kesselbrenner – Program Assistant
Paul Cormarie – Georgetown Student Researcher

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email AJain@atlanticcouncil.org.

The post State of the Order: Assessing August 2021 appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/kamal-alam-with-bbc-somali-reconciliation-of-war-how-will-the-taliban-deal-with-resistance-in-the-panjshir-valley/ Sun, 22 Aug 2021 22:44:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=427893 The post Kamal Alam with BBC Somali: Reconciliation of war: “How will the Taliban deal with resistance in the Panjshir Valley?” appeared first on Atlantic Council.
]]>
original source

The post Kamal Alam with BBC Somali: Reconciliation of war: “How will the Taliban deal with resistance in the Panjshir Valley?” appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/china-and-sub-saharan-africa-trade-a-case-of-growing-interdependence/ Thu, 22 Jul 2021 20:02:14 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=415199 China’s total merchandise trade with Sub-Saharan Africa has increased by 1864% since 2001. Its increased presence in the region not only increases its access and influence, but also poses significant economic and security risks for the US and EU.

The post China and Sub-Saharan Africa trade: A case of growing interdependence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> In the past two decades, the Chinese economy has been the most widely discussed economy in the world. When China began its economic reforms in the early 1980s, it was a poor country with a GDP per capita of less than $200 and a GDP of less than $200 billion. Forty years later, China has a GDP per capita of more than $10,000 – 50 times larger than in 1980 – and an economy of around $15 trillion, 75 times larger than it was in 1980. To put things in perspective, during the same period, the US economy grew by seven times (from around $3 trillion in 1980 to $21 trillion in 2020) and its GDP per capita by five times (from around $13,000 in 1980 to $65,000 in 2020). Smaller economies do tend to grow faster than more mature and larger economies, but China’s continuous average annual growth rate of 10 percent per year in the past four decades has been unparalleled in modern economic history. One important consequence of such rapid economic growth has been the lifting of more than 800 million Chinese citizens out of poverty, putting China in the upper-middle-income category of countries. Trade has been the main driver in the Chinese growth story. Chinese exports grew by more than 143 times between 1980 ($18.1 billion) and 2020 ($2.6 trillion). In other worlds, while China was responsible for less than 1 percent of global merchandise exports in 1980, today, it commands more than 15 percent of the total merchandise exports around the world.

Over the past two decades, the Sub-Saharan Africa region (SSA) has gained significant importance in Chinese state-directed industrial and trade policies, leading to an increasing share of China in SSA’s total trade and vice versa. China’s total merchandise trade (referred to for simplicity here as “trade”) with SSA has increased by a whopping 1,864 percent between 2001 and 2020. As shown in Figure 1, China has been emerging as a major trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, while the commercial ties of the European Union and mostly that of the United States with SSA has been on the decline. Specifically, the share of China in SSA’s total trade – imports and export – has increased from 4 percent in 2001 to 25.6 percent in 2020, while during the same period the share of the EU and the United States in SSA’s total trade declined from 30.3 to 22.3 percent and from 15.5 to 5.6 percent, respectively.

Minerals, metals, agricultural products, and crude oil are the main exports of SSA economies to China. Specifically, in 2019, SSA accounted for more than 16 percent of all crude oil imported by China, and the size of SSA crude exports to China grew by more than 100 percent between 2008 and 2019 – 0.7 million barrels per day in 2008 to 1.5 million barrels per day in 2019. 

It is critical to note here that China overtook the United States as a trading partner of SSA immediately after the 2007-09 global financial crisis (GFC). Less affected by the GFC, the size of China’s trade with SSA continued to increase during GFC, while that of the United States declined sharply and has continued to decline since 2011 (see Figure 2). In this way, there is a stark similarity between SSA and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regions as China’s trade with MENA also overtook US-MENA trade immediately after the GFC (see Figure 2). One reason has been diverging trends in energy imports: while there has been growing demand in China for energy imports in the past two decades, US crude and natural gas imports started declining from their peak in 2007 as the United States took serious steps towards energy independence after the GFC through the expansion of shale oil and gas production – justified by the high oil prices through most of the 2007-14 period. Moreover, China’s investment has also been increasing in similar sectors across the two regions in the past decades: energy, metals, real estate, and transportation. The glaring similarity of China’s growing role in investment and trade in SSA and MENA points to a shifting of balance and realignment from West to East in these regions, at least in economic and trade fronts.

Not only has China become an increasingly strategic trade partner for SSA in the past two decades, SSA’s share in China’s total trade has also increased during the same period: from 1.48 percent of China’s total trade in 2001 to 3.18 percent in 2020. At the same time, SSA’s weight in the EU’s total trade stayed relatively the same – 1.3 percent in 2001 and 1.2 percent in 2020 – while it experienced a decline in the United States – 1.5 percent in 2001 to 0.85 percent in 2020 (see Figure 3). In other words, SSA’s weight in China’s total trade increased by more than two-fold in the past two decades, while it remained relatively constant for the EU and declined for the United States.

This is further illustrated by the fact that in 2019, out of the forty-two SSA countries with available trade data, China was the top exports destination and imports origin for thirteen and twenty-six SSA economies, respectively. Moreover, China was among the top three exports destinations and imports origins for twenty-two and thirty-nine SSA economies, respectively. In the same year, China accounted for more than 20 percent of a country’s imports and exports for sixteen SSA economies, while more than 50 percent of imports of eight SSA countries were originated from China (see Figure 4).

Finally, similar to the findings on Chinese investment and construction in SSA, on average, while SSA countries with access to seaports have an advantage over the landlocked ones when it comes to trade with China, the commercial ties of forty-five out of forty-nine SSA economies experienced substantial growth rates ranging from 439 to 184,101 percent in the past two decades (see Figure 5).

The evidence highlighted above suggests that SSA and China view each other as increasingly strategic trading partners, and the commercial ties between SSA and the US and EU has relatively declined in the past two decades. While the EU has negotiated a set of free trade agreements with most of SSA economies, such agreements have done little to slow down the growth of commercial ties between SSA and China, even though the EU has clear advantages over China in terms of geographic proximity and historical ties to the region. Moreover, Brexit has introduced some challenges in the ability of the EU to successfully negotiate as one common market with SSA. In the case of the United States, since 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has provided eligible SSA economies with tariff-free access to 1,800 products in the US market. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), thirty-eight countries were eligible for AGOA program in 2020. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, the commercial ties between the US and SSA have deteriorated, and China has been filling up most of this gap.

The increasing presence of China in SSA alongside the relative decline of commercial and economic ties of the United States and EU in this region have increased the risk of supply chain disruptions for the United States and the EU in many strategic commodities, such as Cobalt. At the same time, China’s growing economic activities and investments in SSA has meant greater access in the region, with Beijing eying many SSA countries as potential political and military allies, posing serious geo-security challenges for the United States and the EU in the long run. As a result, the growing strategic importance of SSA for the United States and the EU necessitates a common US-EU front to face China’s expanding commercial, investment, and construction activities in this region. The latest joint action of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the EU to impose sanctions on Chinese entities who are believed to be associated with serious human rights violations in Xinjiang region of China, is an example of US collaborating with its close allies to confront China’s human rights violations. Although, this move has threatened the ratification of China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on both ends, it has sent a clear signal to China, that despite their disagreements, the United States and the EU are once again ready to partner in confronting China’s human rights violations and global ambitions. The recent launch of Build Back Better World (B3W) by President Biden and G7 leaders is an example of a partnership model that could show the commitment of the United States, the EU, and their allies to the development of SSA – and other less developed regions – while also confronting China’s seemingly limitless expansion in SSA and the developing world. Complementing B3W initiatives in SSA with bilateral and multilateral trade agreements could restore dwindling economic ties between the United States and strategic SSA economies. It is true that Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is eight years ahead of B3W and 139 countries – including Italy – are formally affiliated with it, but there remains significant infrastructure gaps in SSA for initiatives such as B3W to address. After all, it is better late than never.

Related content


Blog Post
Jun 10, 2021
Development finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Chinese model
By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou
In recent years Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has outpaced distributions by the World Bank Group by more than $20 billion USD. These investments have been focused in energy, transport, metals, and real estate imply a modern bartering system is at play where developing countries in these regions pay for Chinese investment and construction in their economies through guaranteed long-term supply of hydrocarbons, agriproducts, or minerals.
Africa China



At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post China and Sub-Saharan Africa trade: A case of growing interdependence appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/prof-severine-autesserre-says-that-its-time-for-the-peacekeeping-community-to-walk-the-walk-when-it-comes-to-localized-peacebuilding/ Wed, 30 Jun 2021 03:53:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=410372 On Tuesday, June 29, the Africa Center convened a private event with award-winning author Professor Séverine Autesserre for a discussion on localized peacebuilding and her new book, The Frontlines of Peace.

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Tuesday, June 29, the Africa Center convened a private event with award-winning author and Barnard College, Columbia University Professor Séverine Autesserre. The discussion centered around her recently published book The Frontlines of Peace, which examines the well-intentioned, but inherently flawed, top-down nature of international peacebuilding (referred to by the author as ‘Peace Inc.’) and posits that peace is actually achieved and maintained through grassroots efforts created, managed, and led by local actors. The Africa Center conversation focused on examples of localized and international peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somaliland.

Africa Center Distinguished Fellow Ambassador J. Peter Pham, former US Special Envoy for the Sahel Region as well as former US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, moderated the conversation, opening with a discussion on the evolution of Prof. Autesserre’s distinguished career from identifying flaws in international peacebuilding norms and practices to offering an alternative localized solution, noting that her often provocative work has influenced policy discussions at some of the highest levels in international organizations and governments.  

In Prof. Autesserre’s remarks, she highlighted the need to move peacebuilding away from the traditional practices of premature elections and a focus on elite-bargaining, towards a process that is locally led and prioritizes local definitions of peace, democracy, and justice. She also spoke of the growing support for localized peace processes but noted that international organizations often merely “talk the talk” when it comes to supporting genuinely locally driven peace processes.

Prof. Autesserre also engaged on the role of locally led peace processes in Idjwi (DRC), Somaliland, and lessons that can be brought from these contexts to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (​MINUSMA), whose annual mandate renews on June 30 and which Amb. Pham noted, has “found progress difficult to come by” despite the “billions of dollars spent since 2013 and the hundreds of lives lost, making MINUSMA the deadliest ‘peacekeeping’ mission in the world today.”

Further reading


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Prof. Séverine Autesserre says that it’s time for the peacekeeping community to ‘walk the walk’ when it comes to localized peacebuilding appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/responding-to-acute-challenges-in-the-horn-of-africa-with-finnish-fm-pekka-haavisto/ Fri, 18 Jun 2021 18:29:25 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=406589 On Friday, June 18, the Africa Center hosted a private conversation on the situation in the Horn of Africa in advance of the June 21 Ethiopian general elections. The conversation featured Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Pekka Haavisto, who visited the region earlier this year under the mandate of European Union High Representative Josep Borrell.

The post Responding to acute challenges in the Horn of Africa, with Finnish FM Pekka Haavisto appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Friday, June 18, the Africa Center hosted a private conversation on the situation in the Horn of Africa in advance of the June 21 Ethiopian general elections. The conversation featured Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs H.E. Pekka Haavisto, who visited Ethiopia and Gulf states earlier this year under the mandate of European Union High Representative Josep Borrell. Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Cameron Hudson moderated the discussion, and Director Amb. Rama Yade provided opening remarks.

In his remarks, the Minister provided a readout of his February and April trips to the region, describing stakeholder meetings and the status of humanitarian access and reporting. He also commented on the negotiations surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), due for its second filling this summer, and regional border disputes.

Throughout the subsequent discussion, participants engaged the Minister on election implications, expectations around Prime Minister Abiy’s post-election policy, the role of regional organizations, and the parameters for a credible national reconciliation. Hudson closed, remarking that the conversation is a reflection of the importance of US and EU cooperation on key regional issues.  

Further reading


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Responding to acute challenges in the Horn of Africa, with Finnish FM Pekka Haavisto appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/africa-is-americas-greatest-geopolitical-opportunity-does-the-us-know-it/ Tue, 25 May 2021 15:32:19 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=395286 Biden can further build ties with Africa: He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations, but also because they offer innovative solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19.

The post Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Today the world celebrates Africa Day, which commemorates the founding of the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963. On that day, as two-thirds of the continent obtained independence, thirty-two African nations met in Addis Ababa, hosted by Haile Selassie, in order to establish the institution.

“May this convention of union last 1,000 years,” the Ethiopian leader said, while Angola and Mozambique (still Portuguese colonies) along with South Africa and South Rhodesia (under apartheid rule) were fighting for their freedom.

Since then, that union has been succeeded by the 55-member African Union, “inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States,” according to its Constitutive Act.

If Africa seems geographically distant to Americans, it shouldn’t; the United States wouldn’t be what it is today without the labor force of Africans brought to the country as part of a bloody multi-century transatlantic trade. As the US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently pointed out, that experience is “just three generations back from me.”

Rather than being defeated by this mass depopulation—which cost it one-hundred million of its own, directly or indirectly, according to the macabre accounting of W.E.B Du Bois—Africa survived. Now it is the new frontier, full of all the promise presented by its youth, its dynamism, and its universalism despite the persistent presence of poverty on the continent.

As it re-engages with the world, Joe Biden’s United States will find a vigorous and uninhibited Africa, at least in the civil-society sector and among young generations, that does not expect leadership from the United States but rather a win-win partnership. With each passing day, Africa grows more critical for the United States in national-security and especially economic terms.

US policy in Africa has been thrown off course by China, which is methodically implementing a grand, 21st-century Marshall Plan for the continent through its Belt and Road Initiative. And Beijing is hardly to blame. As home to a large share of the world’s water resources, untapped arable land, and by 2050 nearly 25 percent of the world’s population, Africa has emerged as the most important piece on the geopolitical chessboard. Without a drastic shift in strategy, the United States is on the verge of being on the outside looking in for decades to come.

China is playing the long game in Africa and has strategically invested in infrastructure projects including railroads, ports, dams, and hydropower-generation sources. But these investments could be the warm-up act for China’s entry into fields traditionally dominated by the United States—namely technology and banking—where it aspires to compete with American heavyweights like Microsoft, Boeing, Google, and General Electric. Such game-changing moves would play into China’s larger ambition of unseating the US dollar.

All of these measures reflect the coming surge in economic demand from Africa. As the population grows, so too does its pool of potential consumers and clients. The African middle class, which stood at 355 million people in 2010, will reach 1.1 billion by 2060.

From Morocco to Ethiopia, Africa has become the workshop of the world. It was home to six of the world’s ten most dynamic economies in 2018. The world’s largest free-trade zone—the African Continental Free Trade Area—was launched in 2019 to put an end to the dramatic effects of the old colonial policy that prevented Africans from trading with each other. A cosmopolitan billionaire class has sprouted, largely from the tech sector, as Africa has experienced the largest telecommunications revolution in the world. Kenya is a global leader in developing mobile-payment systems. Smart cities are cropping up in Ghana and Angola. And companies like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon invested two billion dollars in African tech ventures in 2019.

Encouragingly, the new generation of Africans driving this change do not want to live in a Leninist system. They want democracy, an open market, and free trade. This gives the United States an opening—if it is willing to act on it.

The Biden administration has sent strong signals that it is eager to engage. Biden earned positive reviews following his appearance at the 34th African Union Summit—his first international forum in office—during which he committed to stand as Africa’s partner and support African nations’ entrepreneurship and innovation.

A new policy toward Africa needs to chiefly reflect the realities that competition among global powers (Russia, Turkey, and others are vying with China for influence on the continent) and the major changes underway in African societies have a significant impact on the strategic long-term interests of the United States. The continent should be viewed through the lens of opportunity rather than risk. The Chinese have maximized the opportunity by being explicit with their investments, which prioritize long-term projects that minimize risk. As Senegalese President Macky Sall puts it, “What handicaps the continent is prejudice and the stigmatizing gaze on it. When it comes to investing in Africa, the perception of risk is always exaggerated, which further increases the cost of investment and debt. In fact, the risk in Africa is no higher than in many other parts of the world.”

China’s rapid advance in infrastructure investments will be difficult for Americans and Europeans to match. But Americans should invest in an area where they don’t yet have a competitor: cultural soft power. Fashion, entertainment, and even sports convey values of fair play, freedom, and success. During the Cold War, they enabled the American way of life to spread everywhere. Culture proved stronger than nuclear weapons. And that’s a good thing: Africa’s cultural industries are in dire need of investment. From the African Development Bank to the African Export-Import Bank, pan-African investors are working to address this. To launch this cultural and geopolitical revolution, the United States has a tremendous asset: its African American community, whose interest in the African continent is growing. Cooperation is beckoning from both sides of the Atlantic—from one new world to another.

Biden can further build ties with Africa by working to give its nations more influence on the global stage. He should do so not only because these countries have long been underrepresented within leading multilateral organizations—including the UN Security Council—but also because they offer innovative yet often unnoticed solutions to global challenges including terrorism, climate change, migration, debt, and COVID-19. African marginalization is no longer an option, and its nations will not soon forget who gave them a long-overdue seat at the table.

A new start with Africa is possible for the United States. It turns out that the world’s oldest continent is also the youngest. In this dual capacity, Africa has much to say. It’s time to listen to it.

Ambassador Rama Yade is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @ramayade.

Further reading


AfricaSource Apr 23, 2021
Climate change will not be fixed without Africa
By Rama Yade
When Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi spoke at the virtual Leaders Summit on Climate this week, he had the force of the continent behind him. And his message was that developed countries must do more. As the summit comes to a close, the world still has so much to learn from Africa about how to tackle the climate crisis—if the world would only listen.
Africa Climate Change & Climate Action

AfricaSource Apr 6, 2021
Keys to African recovery: Vaccines, debt, and commodities
By Rabah Arezki
In the wake of COVID-19, African markets are consumed by uncertainty about the economic recovery. Because of its large population—1.2 billion people—developments in Africa will weigh heavily on the world. The recovery from COVID-19 in Africa will depend on three factors—vaccines, debt, and commodities.
Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 22, 2020
African outlook 2021: The Africa Center reflects on 2020 and looks ahead
By Africa Center
African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s […]
Africa Coronavirus

The post Africa is America’s greatest geopolitical opportunity. Does the US know it? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-world-apart-how-wealthy-nations-can-strengthen-the-covid-safety-net/ Wed, 21 Apr 2021 20:23:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=380586 The international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19, but much more is needed to assist low-income countries. While the IMF's Special Drawing Rights are a good start, G20 nations must help restructure the debts of developing nations and fund vaccine distribution.

The post A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> By enabling the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide substantial amounts of foreign-exchange reserves to its 190 member countries, the international community has delivered important progress in combating the impact of COVID-19. But much more is needed to assist low-income countries that remain burdened by the pandemic’s economic and human costs.

This month, senior government officials who gathered virtually under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank authorized the issuance of $650 billion of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a reserve asset that will be exchangeable for hard currency. In addition, the Group of Twenty (G20) governments agreed to extend until the end of this year a moratorium on debt-service payments by the poorest countries on loans from G20 lenders. That moratorium already has freed up $5.7 billion for forty-three countries since it went into effect a year ago, with another $7.3 billion of deferral possible by the end of June, according to World Bank President David Malpass.

However, these measures will not be enough. Low-income countries were hit by the same recession that the advanced and emerging-market economies experienced in 2020, but the IMF projects that their rebound will be much slower. So the tens of millions of people in low-income countries who have fallen back into extreme poverty because of the pandemic have little hope for improvement in the coming year. More action is needed in several areas:

• No rich nations have stepped up to offer new country-to-country assistance to help poor nations counter the public-health and economic impacts of the pandemic. This presents a stark contrast to the willingness of Group of Seven (G7) countries to provide bilateral aid to African countries at the height of the 2008 global financial crisis.
• The G20 has made little concrete progress on implementing its framework for restructuring the debts of countries whose loan obligations have become unsustainable during the pandemic.
• The G20 so far has not responded to the failure of private-sector creditors—who hold a major portion of low-income country debt—to join its debt-relief and debt-restructuring initiatives.
• A broad swath of the globe has little prospect of gaining significant access to COVID vaccines before 2022, or even 2023, meaning that the virus and its variants could continue to spread, mostly affecting low-income countries.

These intertwined issues, if left unaddressed, could lead to a long delay in the resumption of growth across the developing world at levels that could offset the human impact of the crisis, meaning debt burdens will deepen. The IMF has offered a brighter economic outlook for 2021 than many would have expected a year ago, with global growth now expected to reach 6 percent this year, largely because of a resurgent US economy. But the fund issued a stark warning that the debts of countries that have achieved emerging-market status could become a serious burden if the pandemic continues. “The future presents daunting challenges,” wrote IMF Chief Economist Gita Gopinath. “The pandemic is yet to be defeated and virus cases are accelerating in many countries. Recoveries are also diverging dangerously across and within countries.”

The agreement to issue SDRs can help, although many bureaucratic obstacles remain. This summer the IMF will make available the equivalent of about $21 billion in SDRs to low-income countries as reserves—an allocation from the total $650 billion that represents their weighting in the global economy. But the assets will not be immediately available as currency. First, the fund’s membership will have to agree on the procedures for each country to make use of its allocations by exchanging them for other currencies. Second, the members will have to agree on how wealthier countries may redistribute their own SDR allocations to low-income countries. In the absence of significant bilateral assistance from wealthy countries—either grant aid or low-interest loans—the transfer of SDRs could be crucial to help low-income countries respond to the pandemic. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has said that the United States looks forward to discussing ways to deploy SDRs to support low-income countries.

Debt restructuring remains another serious hurdle. Three African countries—Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia—have asked to restructure their debt burdens under a Common Framework for Debt Treatments agreed to by the G20 last year, and more countries are expected to follow. But that process has remained stalled by procedural issues like the composition of creditor committees that would negotiate with the debtor governments. Governments involved in the negotiations over the Common Framework are still unsure how much money and influence China—the largest bilateral creditor to low-income countries, with hundreds of billions of dollars in loans—is prepared to commit to the restructuring.

There are also differences over the role of private-sector lenders, which range from Eurobond holders in Ethiopia, Zambia, and other countries to the commodities trading and mining giant Glencore, which holds the largest single portion of Chad’s debt. Private-sector lenders have declined to participate in the G20 debt-service moratorium in the absence of country-by-country negotiations, and their role in debt restructuring remains unclear.

While the private sector’s role merited several mentions in the communiqués issued this month by the G20 finance ministers and IMF, there was little evidence at the respective meetings that the governments were prepared to take a harder line against the financiers. However, officials have suggested that private-sector participation in the Common Framework will be an integral and unavoidable part of the G20’s overall strategy in dealing with debt distress. It is likely only a matter of time before we see the official sector deploy the necessary carrots (and sticks) to bring a recalcitrant private sector into the restructuring process. Over the past year, senior officials have spoken of mandating the participation of private bondholders in any restructuring of sovereign debts. Private-sector misgivings about the Common Framework forcing them to disclose proprietary information have also been discounted because officials see the public and private interest best served through greater transparency on all debt owed by low-income countries, but officials are prepared to be flexible about how certain categories of debt data are released publicly. 

Finally, there is the issue of “vaccination, vaccination, vaccination,” as Swedish Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson declared during an IMF press conference. Only a tiny percentage of COVID vaccines so far have been made available to developing countries. Pandemic-fighting tools for low-income countries, including the COVAX Facility to supply vaccines, face a $19 billion funding shortfall, even after the Biden administration, the World Bank, and other donors have chipped in $14.1 billion. India’s commitment to provide millions of shots to other countries has ground to a halt as it struggles with a severe resurgence of the virus, and questions have arisen about the effectiveness of China’s Sinovac vaccine, which has been supplied to countries from Indonesia to Turkey and Brazil. By some estimates, dozens of countries across the Global South will not receive adequate supplies of vaccines until 2023.

While the IMF has made important progress in finding ways to assist low-income countries during the pandemic, many others—especially creditor governments and private lenders—have failed to respond adequately. That means the developing world faces a deepening crisis just as some countries begin to gain the upper hand against COVID-19. Those diverging fortunes do not bode well for a global recovery.

Jeremy Mark is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center. He previously worked for the IMF and the Asian Wall Street Journal. Follow him on Twitter @JedMark888.

Vasuki Shastry, formerly with the IMF, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Standard Chartered Bank, is the author of the book Has Asia Lost It? Dynamic Past, Turbulent Future. Follow him on Twitter @vshastry.

The post A world apart: How wealthy nations can strengthen the COVID safety net appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/the-unintended-consequence-of-ethiopias-civil-war-might-be-a-border-war-with-sudan/ Wed, 03 Mar 2021 14:18:08 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=360230 Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies.

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Ethiopia is at war with itself—and the international community is struggling to respond. In nearly four months of fighting across Ethiopia’s Tigray region, more than sixty thousand Tigrayan refugees have fled into neighboring Sudan and 80 percent of the region’s six million citizens have been cut off from life-saving humanitarian access. Despite rolling media and internet blackouts, a steady trickle of stories has emerged that paint a gruesome picture of mass atrocities, widespread rape, summary executions, and the wholesale destruction of the region’s critical infrastructure.  

In recent weeks, the United States and its European allies have launched a diplomatic campaign to convince Ethiopia’s once-venerated prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, to relent in his campaign to vanquish militarily his greatest political threat in the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). I once feared the onset of a bloody struggle for control over Tigray that would pit near-equally matched foes against each other in something approximating conventional, interstate war. But what has instead emerged is a widespread TPLF insurgency that could drag on and take as many lives through deprivation as it does through combat.

The stakes in Tigray are high and the civilian toll could be considerable. But there’s another scenario, with the potential to exact an even higher toll, that many observers are overlooking: conventional war that could break out at any moment between Sudan and Ethiopia and their many allied proxies. Indeed, it is this possible unintended consequence of Abiy’s “law and order operation” in Tigray that could well do the most extensive damage in the region. In contrast to the conflict in Tigray, however, it is not too late for the United States and its allies in the region and beyond to do something to prevent a border war that would amount to a historic strategic blunder.

The seeds of this potential calamity were planted at the start of the last century when the border between Ethiopia and Sudan was first agreed to, though never formally demarcated, by modern Ethiopia’s founding father, Emperor Menelik II, during the British-Sudanese condominium. Since 1993, a patch of agricultural land on the Sudanese side of the border, referred to as the al-Fashqa Triangle, has been occupied by Amhara farmers. Many of them were relocated there by the Sudanese government in recognition of historic claims to the area by this powerful minority group. Since 2008, a de-facto agreement has existed whereby Ethiopia has acknowledged the historic legal boundary putting al-Fashqa inside Sudan, while Sudan has granted Amhara farmers continued rights to cultivate the land. Efforts to definitively demarcate the border have been stalled since the last meeting of an ad-hoc border commission last year, but Sudan’s designs on the region have never abated. Indeed, as recently as August 2020, in remarks by the head of the Sudanese army and chairman of the transitional government’s Sovereign Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to the Army General Command, he predicted that they would “raise the flag of Sudan above al-Fashqa… and not waste one inch of the homeland.”

What has broken that decade-plus status quo is the onset of conflict in Tigray and a series of strategic and tactical calculations by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Unlike many outsiders, senior-level Sudanese officials claim not to have been surprised by the brutal assault by the TPLF on the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) Northern Command outpost in Mekelle, the Tigrayan regional capital, on the night of November 4. Only a week prior, a delegation led by the deputy head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council and head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, General Mohammed “Hemedti” Dagalo, met with Abiy in Addis, where the restive Tigray region, mounting border tensions, and the stalemated negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) were all reportedly topics of discussion.

More surprising to the Sudanese was the Ethiopian government’s near-immediate need for supplementary troops—pulled in from Ethiopian deployments in Somalia and, most notably, the al-Fashqa Triangle—to respond to the TPLF attack in Mekelle. The subsequent entry into the Tigray conflict of Eritrean forces and Amhara state militias further indicated that the ENDF was unable to subdue the TPLF uprising on its own and was operating from a greater position of relative weakness than was perhaps anticipated. 

By December, as primarily SAF forces gathered along the Sudanese side of the border to monitor the crossing of Tigrayan refugees and possible retreating TPLF forces, SAF and ENDF troops found themselves in closer proximity than ever before—increasing the risk of clashes. Multiple ENDF surprise assaults on SAF army officers prompted SAF forces to move in on the night of December 29. In that incursion, SAF forces reportedly destroyed Ethiopian army outposts and administrative centers while also displacing Amhara farmers and destroying crops in their successful bid to reclaim the entirety of the al-Fashqa Triangle. 

Sudan has presented its tactical decision as a legitimate response in light of the ENDF’s own unprovoked incursions against Sudanese patrols and Khartoum’s historic and legal claims to the area. But there is no question that the SAF, which has witnessed its traditional importance in Sudan’s body politic decline substantially under the country’s civilian-led transitional government, see in their defense of Sudan’s territorial integrity an opportunity to once again assert its primacy as the protector of the Sudanese state. 

It is also true that in its effort to change facts on the ground, whether justified or not, the SAF has now further aggravated an inherently unstable situation in the region and may have disrupted the delicate balance among security forces inside Sudan that has kept the transition there on track.

As bellicose rhetoric by both sides has increased in recent weeks, Khartoum and Addis have come to frame the threat of territorial loss in national-security and even existential terms—similar in certain respects to how each side has recently described the contentious and protracted GERD talks. Sudan’s ambassador to Ethiopia was recently recalled to Khartoum, and various peace envoys and proposed mediators from the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Sudan, and the African Union (AU) have all largely seen their willingness to help the parties achieve a negotiated solution rebuffed. Even Eritrea, whose peace agreement with Ethiopia has emerged as more of a mutual-security pact, tried unconvincingly to paint itself as a peacemaker in a letter last week from President Isaias Afwerki to Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Sudan’s newly appointed foreign minister, Mariam al Saddig, suggested in late February that Sudan would be open to talks under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). But that regional body, currently chaired by Hamdok and historically controlled by Ethiopia, has not yet offered its good offices and likely lacks the independence to offer impartial mediation.

In the absence of concerted external mediation, both sides risk turning their cold war much hotter. And with such intertwined politics and long histories, both sides have the points of leverage to do it. Ethiopia currently supplies the totality of troops (more than five thousand) to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in Abyei, the highly contested region along the Sudan-South Sudan border that remains at the heart of the tensions between those two countries. Concerns abound that Ethiopia could withdraw those troops, potentially forcing the SAF to fill a security vacuum there that could well spark renewed conflict with Juba. There are also worries that Sudan could unilaterally expel those forces out of fear that Ethiopia could use these forces as a fifth column in the event of a sustained outbreak of violence along its border—opening a new front against Sudan and vastly expanding their zone of conflict. Addis, for its part, is right to fear Khartoum’s ability to re-arm and re-supply TPLF rebels should Sudan wish to open its own additional front in a border conflict.

Adding to the volatility has been an influx of allied armies and militias into the border zone between Sudan and Ethiopia. On the Ethiopian side, it is not just the ENDF, but also Amhara militias and Eritrean Defense Forces. Similarly, on the Sudanese side of the border, the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have also been identified in increasingly large numbers.

Given the lack of interoperability among many of these forces, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of this mobilization is occurring in a narrow band along the border that is only a few kilometers wide, the chances are high that the slightest misstep or miscalculation could result in a large-scale outbreak of violence and a rapid escalation among three national armies and many state and national militias. This is particularly true inside Sudan, where the SAF, the RSF, and local militias have even turned on each other in the past year in areas like Darfur and Kordofan when they have been deployed in close proximity.

Absent some kind of international monitoring, there are simply too many well-armed forces in too close proximity with too little experience working with each other to discount the risk of a cataclysmic conflict breaking out.  

The tense standoff has bred rumors that additional outside forces could light the spark that ignites that conflict. Egypt, which has grown increasingly frustrated with the state of GERD negotiations, is often identified as a prime potential instigator. But while there is no question that Egypt has sought to use its historic ties to Sudan to produce a GERD outcome to its liking, Egyptian officials privately express a clear-eyed understanding that an Ethiopia wracked by internal war and interstate conflict will be incapable of focusing on, let alone reaching, a binding political and technical agreement on the demanding issues that the GERD presents. 

So where do we go from here? It seems unlikely that ad-hoc bilateral demands for de-escalation and withdrawal from contested areas will be sufficient at this stage. Late last month, AU Commission Chairman Moussa Faki Mahamat dispatched retired Mauritanian diplomat Mohamed Lebatt to Addis and Khartoum to probe each side’s willingness to accept outside meditation on the brewing border conflict. While no progress was made, it is a conversation worth building on.

Coordinated, high-level outside mediation is urgently required to avert the potentially dire consequences of a conflict for not just the civilian populations in the border area, but also the countries at the center of the dispute and the Horn of Africa as a whole. Sudan recently proposed outside mediation for the final phase of the GERD negotiations that would include the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union. Some sponsorship of border mediation by this grouping—under the leadership of an eminent, empowered figure—is worth pursuing given the substantial risks to international peace and security and the potential for the parties’ largest donors to bring financial leverage to efforts to reach a resolution.

While all these disputes are linked, there is no single process, individual, or institution that will be able to untangle the overlapping and complicated politics of the competing conflicts. What is essential is coordination. Any process that can be put in place to help with the de-escalation of war in Tigray should be kept on its own track. So too with the GERD. And so too with a process for unwinding the military buildup and tensions on the border, which should be narrowly defined and time-limited so as not to be exploited as a potential leverage point in any other mediation processes. But these must all be coordinated by a central Contact Group with the power, leverage, and legitimacy to advance options for resolution and enforce outcomes that contribute to overall peace.

Such processes must be jumpstarted now to avoid a downward spiral, and there are several immediate steps that Washington can take to do just that. In a fortunate coincidence, the United States took up the presidency of the UN Security Council in March. The newly installed US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, should prioritize a special session of the Security Council to discuss the manifold crises emerging in the Horn of Africa, with added attention to the still-unfolding conflict in Tigray and the stalemated GERD talks. Given the many competing interests at play in the Horn from all manner of external powers, the session should include discussion of an International Contact Group that can promote dialogue and transparency and ensure that potential spoilers remain in the tent rather than outside of it.

To support and complement this effort, the United States should also appoint a Horn of Africa envoy who is capable of both setting the policy agenda in Washington and corralling leaders in Europe and the region in the near term. In the long run, an envoy can only succeed if he or she is equipped with a clear set of policy objectives and the tools to advance them. In contrast to its approach in the Great Lakes or Sahel regions, Washington has for too long viewed the countries in the promising but volatile Horn of Africa in a vacuum or else simply provided wide berth to the area’s anchor state, Ethiopia, to project its power and influence to police regional disputes. With Addis having lost the ability to play that role any longer, the burden has shifted to Washington to become more actively involved in protecting its interests in the region. 

That process promises to be complicated and messy. But preventing a war is surely more attractive an enterprise than ending one.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.

Further reading


AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021
Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.
Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021
WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip
By Africa Center
On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Africa Conflict

The post The unintended consequence of Ethiopia’s civil war might be a border war with Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/dr-berhanu-nega-speaks-on-expectations-for-ethiopias-upcoming-elections/ Wed, 24 Feb 2021 13:56:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=357378 On Wednesday, February 24, the Africa Center welcomed back to the Atlantic Council platform Dr. Berhanu Nega, chairman of the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice party, for a private virtual roundtable focused on Ethiopia’s upcoming elections.

The post Dr. Berhanu Nega speaks on expectations for Ethiopia’s upcoming elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Wednesday, February 24, the Africa Center welcomed back to the Atlantic Council platform Dr. Berhanu Nega, chairman of the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ) party, for a private virtual roundtable focused on Ethiopia’s upcoming elections. Africa Center Senior Fellow Gabriel Negatu provided opening remarks, before ceding the floor to Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton to moderate.

Responding to questions, Dr. Nega described Ethiopia’s general election, slated for June, as a historic moment, with implications for the broader Horn of Africa region. He outlined his party’s unique non-ethnic platform and grassroots approach, while reflecting on the campaign environment, the timeline of the election, political participation, and how the United States and others could play a role in supporting the National Electoral Board’s capacity.

Dr. Nega concluded with the hope that by the end of June, the people of Ethiopia will have spoken and that the election results will reflect the will of the people. This would need to be built upon further but would represent a significant step in Ethiopia’s democratic growth.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Dr. Berhanu Nega speaks on expectations for Ethiopia’s upcoming elections appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/wfp-head-offers-readout-on-horn-of-africa-trip/ Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:16:17 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=351786 On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.

The post WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton opened the event, before passing to Senior Fellow Cameron Hudson to moderate.

In his remarks, Gov. Beasley briefed participants on the humanitarian situation in the Horn and the latest from his conversations with regional leaders. He placed considerable weight on the developments in Ethiopia, where his visit facilitated an initial agreement on humanitarian access. This issue of access remained a point of interest for participants, representing the US government, diplomatic community, and humanitarian NGOs. Gov. Beasley also reflected on Sudan’s progress and the continued humanitarian need in South Sudan.

Looking ahead, Beasley underscored that the WFP has helped get the ball rolling but that more progress will be needed, toward which the United States and others can play a constructive role.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/sudans-outgoing-state-minister-of-foreign-affairs-reflects-on-regional-issues/ Wed, 10 Feb 2021 22:16:13 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=351778 On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan.

The post Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Omer Gamereldin Ismail, the outgoing Sudanese state minister of foreign affairs, for a discussion on key regional and bilateral issues for Sudan. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton provided opening remarks, before ceding the floor to Senior Fellow Cameron Hudson to moderate.

Responding to questions, the Minister outlined Sudan’s position on issues including the status of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), tensions on the border with Ethiopia and the need to deescalate the situation in Tigray, and the security environment in Darfur. Particular interest was also given to the role the United States and other friends of Sudan could play in contributing to reform efforts.

Hudson closed by reflecting that Sudan remains at the heart of both the opportunities and challenges facing the Horn of Africa, but that he is reassured that US stakeholders, including those in attendance, are committed to seeing Sudan succeed.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Sudan’s outgoing state minister of foreign affairs reflects on regional issues appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/ethiopian-deputy-prime-minister-provides-humanitarian-update/ Thu, 28 Jan 2021 20:00:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=345541 On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

The post Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Thursday, January 28, the Africa Center hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Demeke Mekonnen Hassen, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, for a wide-ranging update on the security and humanitarian situation in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. Africa Center Senior Fellow Gabriel Negatu opened with introductions of the speakers, before ceding the floor to H.E. Demeke for an opening statement.

In his remarks, H.E. Demeke focused on the government’s humanitarian response and the status of regional refugees, while providing an update on the government’s law enforcement operation. He was joined for comments by H.E. Redwan Hussein, state minister for foreign affairs and state of emergency spokesperson, and H.E. Tesfahun Gobezay, director general of Ethiopia’s Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs. Among other contributions, H.E. Tesfahun reported on the status of four key refugee camps near the border with Eritrea and the latest efforts to restore full access and services.

In the ensuing discussion, participants across government, the diplomatic corps, and relevant non-profit organizations engaged the Deputy Prime Minister on a variety of topics. These included issues related to humanitarian and journalistic access, the alleged role of Eritrean forces, the potential for border conflict with Sudan, and the timetable on restoring telecommunications to affected areas. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Bronwyn Bruton closed the session, thanking all speakers and participants for convening under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.  


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

The post Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister provides humanitarian update appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-financial-times-on-relations-between-sudan-and-western-countries/ Mon, 25 Jan 2021 17:00:16 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=412969 The post Hudson quoted in the Financial Times on relations between Sudan and Western countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.
]]> Original Source

The post Hudson quoted in the Financial Times on relations between Sudan and Western countries appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-national-on-the-relationship-between-sudan-and-africom/ Mon, 25 Jan 2021 16:57:37 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=412970 The post Hudson quoted in The National on the relationship between Sudan and AFRICOM appeared first on Atlantic Council.
]]> Original Source

The post Hudson quoted in The National on the relationship between Sudan and AFRICOM appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/atlantic-council-hosts-foreign-minister-of-somalia-for-a-high-level-roundtable/ Fri, 15 Jan 2021 22:24:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=340648 On Friday, January 15, the Africa Center and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative co-hosted a private roundtable featuring H.E. Mohamed Abdirizak, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia. In his remarks, Mr. Abdirizak addressed issues of security, governance, elections, and regional relationships from Somalia’s perspective.

The post Atlantic Council hosts foreign minister of Somalia for a high-level roundtable appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Friday, January 15, the Africa Center and the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative co-hosted a private virtual roundtable featuring H.E. Mohamed Abdirizak, the minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative Director Kirsten Fontenrose provided introductory remarks before turning to Africa Center Senior Fellow Gabriel Negatu to moderate a discussion with Minister Abdirizak.

In his remarks, Mr. Abdirizak addressed issues of security, governance, elections, and regional relationships from Somalia’s perspective, emphasizing that Somalia itself must be the key actor in building a better future for the country. Regional ambassadors in attendance were offered the opportunity to respond to the Minister’s remarks, providing reflections of their own on regional relations and the role of regional institutions such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Dignitaries in attendance included H.E. Ali Sharif Ahmed, ambassador of Somalia; H.E. Lazarus Amayo, ambassador of Kenya; H.E. Nureldin Satti, ambassador of Sudan; and Berhane Solomon, chargé d’affaires of the Embassy of Eritrea to the United States.

Others in attendance included current State Department officials, former US ambassadors to African countries, African and European diplomats, and the senior leadership of relevant non-profit organizations, among others. Participants took advantage of the forum to ask the Minister questions on a wide variety of topics, including civil society, journalistic freedom, regional integration, relations with key partners, and efforts to combat Al-Shabaab. Mr. Negatu closed the conversation by emphasizing his hope for stronger regional relationships through dialogue and collaboration on important challenges, as well as by pledging to continue further discussions on Somalia and the Horn of Africa throughout 2021 under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.


Event Recap May 25, 2021
Mali coup: White House official calls for ‘unconditional and immediate’ release of president and prime minister
By Africa Center
Speaking at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Day celebration, White House official Dana Banks responded to topical issues in African affairs, including the coup in Mali, calling for “the unconditional and immediate release of the president and the prime minister.”
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Apr 13, 2021
Reflecting on the Bring Back Our Girls movement
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, April 13, the Africa Center convened a private event with Wall Street Journal reporters Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw for a discussion of their recently published investigative book Bring Back Our Girls, chronicling the infamous abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and the resultant social media-driven advocacy campaign and international response.
Africa Extremism

New Atlanticist May 25, 2021
Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Africa’s most overlooked crises and opportunities
By Katherine Walla
Thomas-Greenfield spoke about US President Joe Biden’s outlook on Africa with Ambassador Rama Yade, director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, at an event celebrating Africa Day and introducing the Africa Center’s new team and mission.
Africa Crisis Management

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-bloomberg-on-us-policy-in-the-horn-of-africa/ Sun, 10 Jan 2021 20:04:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=408128 The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on US policy in the Horn of Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.
]]> Original Source

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-african-business-on-the-normalization-of-diplomatic-ties-between-israel-and-sudan/ Fri, 08 Jan 2021 16:37:28 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=412964 The post Hudson quoted in African Business on the normalization of diplomatic ties between Israel and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-npr-to-discuss-us-support-of-sudanese-debt-relief/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 19:49:04 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=406569 The post Hudson joins NPR to discuss US support of Sudanese debt relief appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-pris-the-world-to-discuss-the-impact-of-debt-relief-on-sudans-transitioning-government/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 17:21:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=407391 The post Hudson joins PRI’s The World to discuss the impact of debt relief on Sudan’s transitioning government appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-bloomberg-on-increased-border-tensions-between-amhara-militias-and-sudan/ Wed, 06 Jan 2021 16:07:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=399923 The post Hudson quoted in Bloomberg on increased border tensions between Amhara militias and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/african-outlook-2021-the-africa-center-reflects-on-2020-and-looks-ahead/ Tue, 22 Dec 2020 19:12:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=334329 African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s […]

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]]> African nations have mostly escaped the heavy death toll and hospital bed shortages faced by Western countries, but the COVID-19 pandemic has dealt a disproportionately severe blow to the continent’s economic ambitions. Fortunately, robust collaboration between African public and private sectors, and particularly innovative financing measures from African development institutions—including members of the Africa Center’s new Afro-Century Initiative, such as the Africa Finance Corporation and Trade and Development Bank—have helped to address what Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta described (in public remarks to an Atlantic Council audience in June) as an urgent need for fiscal space.

The Africa Center’s Coronavirus: Africa page documented the early impact of the pandemic, and our virtual convenings with the leadership of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention and the World Food Programme highlighted the early successes and agency of African stakeholders in combatting the crisis. The likelihood of greater pan-African collaboration in the wake of COVID-19 was a key finding of the Center’s report on great power competition in Africa in the post-COVID landscape. That report was the result of a newly-launched collaboration with the Policy Center for the New South, which seeks to explore and reframe perceptions of Africa through a series of paired research papers written from both North and South lenses.

COVID-19 did not slow the pace of political developments in Africa this year. Sudan’s transitional government achieved a watershed when the US State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) designation was finally lifted and a massive aid package was bestowed on the nation in exchange for normalization of relations between Khartoum and Tel Aviv. The Africa Center’s convenings and analysis on this topic provided thought leadership across the political spectrum that helped steward the SST lifting to a successful conclusion. The Center’s robust analysis of the conflict in northern Ethiopia between the administration of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and members of the former authoritarian regime helped to shape perceptions of the dispute both regionally and in Washington, DC.

Looking ahead, it’s clear that in 2021 the new Biden administration will be challenged by the need to repair and reinvigorate key bilateral relationships on the continent (including Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa), and there is a major question mark over how many of the former administration’s initiatives will be abandoned. Prosper Africa’s launch was problematic, but in concert with the launch of the new US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its equity capability, it signaled a concrete shift in US priorities to “trade, not aid” that was long overdue. The Africa Center marked that transition with a summit-level conference hosted in cooperation with the DFC, which laid out the United States’ all-of-government approach to Africa policy and, importantly, underscored both the strong bipartisan support for Prosper Africa’s expanded toolkit and the essential role of African development finance institutions in the process.

An event under the auspices of our new Afro-Century Initiative—which unites a coalition of African development finance institutions in an effort to forge a more authentic, optimistic narrative on Africa—capped the Center’s year of programming. An esteemed panel of economists and business leaders offered the following observations and predictions for what 2021 has in store for Africa’s economies:   

What to watch for in 2021:

• African markets have an advantage in 2021 and beyond, says Renaissance Capital’s Global Chief Economist Charlie Robertson, because the continent has been the least hurt by COVID-19 relative to other regions (a story similar to that of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis). Consequently, low interest rates in the West could push more institutional investors to chase high yields in Africa by increasing portfolio exposure in African fixed income and equities.
• Getting Africa to “catch up” is the wrong framing, says AfroChampions Co-Founder Edem Adzogenu. To him, the attitude must rather be: “can you turn in a completely different direction and perfect another model that passes the others but also learns from them.”
• The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can be a “game-changer,” says the Africa Finance Corporation’s Chief Economist Rita Babihuga-Nsanze, but there is still a lot of work that needs to be done to build an enabling environment, especially when it comes to infrastructure.
• While China will remain a key financing partner, the scaling back of Belt and Road Initiative lending will provide space for new international lenders and other financial institutions to support the continent’s growth ambitions, says Standard Chartered Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa Razia Khan. According to Babihuga-Nsanze, African development finance institutions can play a critical role in closing the financing gap that emerges.
• Chinese growth—not lending—is going to lift the whole continent, says Robertson, but African countries need to invest in the right infrastructure. China’s GDP is likely to grow about $2.3 trillion next year and another $2.3 trillion the year after: equaling the size of the entire African market. This growth could help drive commodity price increases and create a lever for wealth creation in Africa, lifting the whole continent. Yet, key to cashing in on this Chinese growth will be Africa’s ability to build infrastructure to enable it, while forgoing projects that do not.
• Value addition and industrialization are two critical trends, according to Babihuga-Nsanze. The post-COVID reset will provide a push to shore up local supply chains and double down on the building of local industrial parks, which can promote investment.
• Ghana is a market set for growth, Khan and Robertson agree. But Nigeria must make good on its diversification promises, while South Africa’s political reforms will have investors watching.  
• Observers are missing the huge SME-driven informal sector, notes Adzogenu, as well as the huge creatives space. For African Development Bank Chief Economist and Vice President Rabah Arezki, the bottom-up wave of fintech and innovation will transform the continent, including in rural areas where growing digitization could be critical for improved agriculture. To Africa Center Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby, digitization is the single most significant trend coming out of 2020 for Africa.

The last word:

• “For a continent that has the youngest population, [Africa] should be the center of the world. I mean this should be the center for the freshest ideas for innovation and everything, and the center for which people can come and bring their ideas to bring growth that will benefit the entire world as well.” –Edem Adzogenu, AfroChampions

Explore highlights from the Africa Center’s year of programming


New Atlanticist Oct 16, 2020
The US government makes its big push for investment in Africa
By David A. Wemer
Buoyed by bipartisan commitment and a new government agency, the United States has taken new and significant steps to help drive investment in Africa, strengthen the region’s dynamic economies, create lucrative opportunities for US and African businesses, and advance US foreign-policy goals in the region.
Africa Future of Work

New Atlanticist Jun 18, 2020
Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta says his country needs ‘fiscal space’ amid the COVID-19 crisis
By Larry Luxner
“Coronavirus is mainly a health issue, and our key focus is ensuring that we keep our people safe,” Kenyatta said. “But this is also an economic crisis because it has resulted in some key sectors hugely affected by lockdowns. We were forced to close our airspace, which affected tourism, a very critical part of our economy.”
Africa Coronavirus

Report Nov 30, 2020
African agency in the new Cold War: Traditional power competition in the post-COVID-19 African landscape
By Bronwyn Bruton
In a resource-scarce post-COVID environment that will accelerate competition between traditional external powers on the African continent, some African nations will find themselves in the crosshairs of a new Cold War mentality that could threaten African agency, regionalization, and the blooming ethos of pan-Africanism. African leaders’ pursuit of collective interests will be decisive in setting the continent’s trajectory—toward a new African Century, or another period of thwarted ambitions.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020
Reducing Africa’s infrastructure deficit: An interview with AFC President & CEO Samaila Zubairu
By Africa Center
The Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), a pan-African development finance institution, has been developing and financing infrastructure, natural resources, and industrial assets to increase economic prosperity and growth across the continent since 2007. Watch Samaila Zubairu, president and chief executive officer of the Africa Finance Corporation, join Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby for an interview to discuss AFC’s investment philosophy, innovation, and future growth, along with the critical role of African development finance institutions in improving economic prosperity.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 15, 2020
An interview with US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy
By Africa Center
US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador Tibor Nagy, joins Atlantic Council Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton to discuss bipartisan support for increased US trade and investment in African countries.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Oct 16, 2020
Financing African trade and development: An interview with TDB Group President & CEO Admassu Tadesse
By Africa Center
The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB) has been financing trade and development projects and promoting economic integration and prosperity in the region since 1985. Watch an interview below between Mr. Admassu Tadesse, president and chief executive officer of TDB Group and Ms. Aubrey Hruby, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Mr. Tadesse covers what makes TDB unique and different, the role African development finance institutions (DFIs) play in returning the African continent to economic growth post-COVID, how TDB can interface with US investors, and ways DFIs can be catalytic in increasing capital flows to African markets.
Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist May 8, 2020
WFP’s David Beasley warns of dire famines in Africa, Mideast if COVID-19 supply chains damage continues
By Larry Luxner
Up to 300,000 people could starve to death every day if the COVID-19 pandemic ruptures global food supply chains—even more than the roughly 275,000 people who have died of the disease worldwide so far.
Coronavirus International Markets

AfricaSource Nov 13, 2020
Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war
By Bronwyn Bruton
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven […]
Africa Conflict

New Atlanticist Apr 29, 2020
Africa still sees a massive pandemic in its future, but partnerships may lessen blow
By Katherine Walla
With an uncertain future for the pandemic that lies ahead, the Africa CDC is encouraging pivotal partnerships to act quickly to secure Africa amid haphazardly understood policies, little access to water and sanitation, and resource constraints.
Africa Coronavirus

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020
Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis
By David A. Wemer
A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”
Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Jul 10, 2020
Dr. Dambisa Moyo, panel reinvigorate debate on a Marshall Plan for Africa
By Africa Center
On Friday, July 10, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on whether the time has come for a Marshall Plan for Africa. The panel featured Global Economist and Author Dr. Dambisa Moyo, former US Congressman Dr. David Brat, and Africa Center Senior Fellow Ms. Aubrey Hruby. The virtual conversation was moderated by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, with opening and concluding remarks given by the Center’s Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton.
Africa Corruption



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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/fighting-for-influence-in-africa-report-launch-events-held-with-the-policy-center-for-the-new-south/ Wed, 16 Dec 2020 21:53:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=331865 On Monday, December 14, and Wednesday, December 16, the Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) hosted joint public events to launch twin reports on the evolving roles of the traditional and emerging external powers in Africa, with the events focusing regionally on the Red Sea and the Sahel.

The post Fighting for influence in Africa: Report launch events held with the Policy Center for the New South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> On Monday, December 14, and Wednesday, December 16, the Africa Center and the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) hosted joint public events to launch twin reports on the evolving roles of the traditional and emerging external powers in Africa.

The first session, viewable here, focused on external influence in the Red Sea region. Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton moderated the panel, which included Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu, alongside PCNS International Relations Specialist Ms. Maha Skah and PCNS Senior Fellow Dr. Khalid Chegraoui. The event served as an opportunity to highlight the role of foreign actors in multiple arenas across the region, including in negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, the lifting of Sudan from the US state sponsors of terrorism list, and maritime trade diplomacy, among other topics.

Dr. Chegraoui gave opening remarks by providing a comprehensive overview of how emerging powers—such as the Gulf countries, Turkey, Iran, and others—are wielding influence in different parts of the region, and how the new relations between Israel and Arab states could create a new security dynamic in East Africa. Mr. Negatu then followed up by discussing how the situation in Ethiopia marks the beginning of a post-TPLF-dominated Ethiopia, which creates the opportunity for an Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance that could redefine the region’s outlook. Though an inward-looking trend in Ethiopia, as the country reconstructs and rehabilitates the Tigray region, could open the Horn to further strategic competition as external powers look to capitalize. Lastly, Ms. Skah reflected on the role of Emirati port building, Turkey’s enhanced commercial role in Somalia, and how Horn countries are essential to Israel’s commercial and strategic interests, creating an impetus for further engagement. Ms. Bruton concluded the discussion by striking a hopeful tone that the shifting regional security arrangement will bring newfound economic prosperity to countries in the region.

The second session, viewable here, zeroed in on the Sahel region, another geostrategic flashpoint where external powers are wielding influence. PCNS Senior Fellow Dr. Khalid Chegraoui moderated the panel, which included Africa Center Senior Fellows Dr. Pierre Englebert and Mr. Abdoul Salam Bello alongside PCNS Senior Fellow Mr. Rida Lyammouri. The event presented an opportunity to discuss the ongoing security situation in the region, how local, state, and regional governments are responding, and the role foreign actors are playing in the military and economic spheres.

Mr. Bello opened his remarks by framing the conversation around population growth trends and how they are putting pressure on Sahel countries to provide basic services to their population. The role of state governments is weakened by their inability to provide security, education, healthcare, and jobs, creating a void for non-state actors—including prominent terrorist groups—to gain legitimacy by providing some basic services to populations in rural areas. Dr. Englebert then followed up by emphasizing how foreign military interventions in the region, such as France’s Operation Barkhane, are band-aid solutions to the structural crisis posed by weak state institutions. Dr. Englebert suggested short and long-term solutions to improve security and governance in the region, both of which include granting more agency and capacity to African institutions rather than relying on external powers. Mr. Lyammouri reiterated these points by emphasizing that international solutions to address the Sahelian crisis have largely failed, contributing to a pervasive sense of mistrust between citizens and state governments.

Dr. Chegraoui then stepped in to pose various questions to the panelists around where external powers—namely China, Russia, and the United States—are engaged in the region, if France can remain the major external player in the Sahel, and how the COVID-19 pandemic may affect humanitarian efforts. Dr. Chegraoui concluded the discussion by thanking the panelists and expressing his hope further collaboration between the Africa Center and PCNS.


AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

New Atlanticist Dec 8, 2020
Mo Ibrahim: Why Africa must emerge more resilient from the COVID crisis
By David A. Wemer
A well-known Afro-optimist, Ibrahim has invested in the continent’s democratic progress and has focused on tackling practical governance issues. While the pandemic has exposed such problems across the world, he noted, one of its lessons is that Africa must be “more self-sufficient” and “resilient.”
Africa Coronavirus

AfricaSource Dec 9, 2020
Startup Acts are the next form of policy innovation in Africa
By Jordan Wolken
Africa’s COVID recession certainly hasn’t hit the continent’s tech industry. In fact, as countries adapt to the expanding digital universe created by COVID-19, technology ecosystems across the continent are booming—and global investors have noticed. Attempting to cash in, African countries are trying to bolster their own innovation ecosystems through supportive legislation.
Africa Economy & Business

The post Fighting for influence in Africa: Report launch events held with the Policy Center for the New South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-sudans-terror-delisting-really-means/ Tue, 15 Dec 2020 00:49:07 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=330660 The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

The post What Sudan’s terror delisting really means appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.

Leaving aside for a moment the last-ditch effort by the Trump Administration to exploit Sudan’s efforts to remove the terror designation to expand its own Middle East peace plan, the Administration should be acknowledged for betting on the prospects of democratic transition in Sudan. From the early days of the transition, Washington and many other capitals were skeptical that the civilian half of the transitional government was strong enough to stay the course and to keep at bay revanchist forces within the security sector. Equally questionable was the prospect that Sudan’s security forces would not overstep their constitutional limits and remain partners in steering Sudan toward a definitive, civilian-led future. While the transition is not yet complete, and faces increasingly stiff headwinds, today’s removal of the terror designation should be seen as affirmation that the sometimes-competing wings of the transitional government have and are largely abiding by the principals of the revolution: Freedom, Peace, and Justice.

Procedurally, today’s announcement is the culmination of a process of bilateral negotiations that started early this year that saw Sudan meet policy and statutory requirements demonstrating that it no longer supported international terrorism and would work with US counterterror efforts going forward. It removes perhaps the greatest sticking point and inconsistency in US policy and the bilateral relationship: the US treatment of Sudan as both a reliable counterterror partner and a terrorist state. For nearly two decades, this has been the first and last talking point of every Sudanese official in any bilateral conversation with an American diplomat. With this hypocrisy removed, the chances for deeper and more serious bilateral relations are at last possible.

Statements today from Treasury Secretary Mnuchin and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Risch both suggest that with the terror restrictions out of the way, the United States will lean forward on arrears clearance, bridge loans, and ultimately debt relief to revive Sudan’s failing economy. This represents perhaps the most tangible and immediate prize associated with Sudan’s delisting. Other promises—such as trade delegations, investment summits, and subsidized staple imports, offered as part of the Administration’s Israel gambit—may not materialize in the waning days of Trump’s term. But setting in motion a multilateral process that allows Europeans and the international financial institutions to move forward this critical engagement is what is most necessary now.

But despite today’s news, challenges in this terror saga still remain. Negotiations are still ongoing over when and how Sudan will have its sovereign immunity restored and be granted the legal peace it seeks to be protected against future terror-related claims. The greatest impediment to sovereign immunity stems from a claim from a group of 9/11 victims who have tried to argue that because of Sudan’s complicity in other al-Qaeda orchestrated terror attacks, like the USS Cole and the US Embassy bombings, Sudan should now also be tried for its possible involvement in the September 11 attacks. 

Ironically, these claims have emerged now because 9/11 victims felt for the first time that Sudan had recognized the legitimacy of the US justice system over them and were prepared to pay large sums of money to meet the political demands for getting off the terror list. Under Omar al-Bashir, 9/11 families never thought their suits would go anywhere and never thought Sudan could be compelled to pay, so they chose not to pursue their suits when the opportunities were abundant. But that all changed under the transitional government, which has showed a willingness to negotiate and make amends. The idea that the Sudanese are now being potentially punished for their cooperation is regrettable. That these groups have found champions among the Senate’s Democratic leaders is even more disheartening. 

Good faith efforts to resolve the obstacle to a final settlement appear to be continuing within the Senate and among victim groups. The Trump Administration has even offered substantial financial settlements—from US taxpayer funds—to compensate victims who don’t even have a legal court judgement in their favor. If they don’t succeed, Sudan could be faced with future lawsuits from terror claimants and US businesses could have liens placed on the repatriation of revenues coming from Sudan. This would undermine and deter the kind of reputational cleansing and investment promotion removal from the terror list was intended to promote. It would also represent another self-inflicted wound to US policy of the kind that today’s announcement was trying to correct.

But in the end, today’s announcement ultimately moves the US out of the way of Sudan’s own success or failure. As inflation soars and the Sudanese pound continues its precipitous decline, what Sudan makes of this opportunity is now up to its leaders.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.


AfricaSource Dec 14, 2020
What Sudan’s terror delisting really means
The announcement today that the forty-five day notification period to Congress had elapsed and Sudan was finally off the US State Sponsors of Terrorism list is historic. It validates the new direction of the country, which it was set upon nearly two years ago by nationwide, peaceful street protests. More importantly, it represents a definitive break with Sudan’s troubled past—the true end of the Bashir era, which began more than thirty years ago—and holds out the hope for a more prosperous future for all Sudanese. The weight of the moment cannot be understated.
Africa Democratic Transitions

Event Recap Feb 23, 2021
Pan-African partnerships advance continental vaccine access
By Africa Center
On Tuesday, February 23, the Africa Center hosted a panel discussion on global vaccine inequality, featuring an esteemed panel of global health, finance, and advocacy leaders.
Africa Coronavirus

Event Recap Feb 10, 2021
WFP head offers readout on Horn of Africa trip
By Africa Center
On Wednesday, February 10, the Africa Center had the privilege of welcoming back Gov. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), to the Atlantic Council platform for a private virtual briefing on his latest trip to the Horn of Africa, where he met with civilian and military leaders in Sudan, South Sudan, and Ethiopia.
Africa Conflict

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-national-on-hurdles-to-the-finalization-of-sudans-removal-from-the-us-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list/ Sat, 05 Dec 2020 17:28:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346505 The post Hudson quoted in the National on hurdles to the finalization of Sudan’s removal from the US state sponsors of terrorism list appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-pbs-news-hour-to-discuss-the-impact-of-conflict-in-ethiopia-on-regional-stability/ Sat, 05 Dec 2020 17:23:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346499 The post Hudson joins PBS News Hour to discuss the impact of conflict in Ethiopia on regional stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-abc-news-on-how-allegations-of-atrocities-will-affect-the-trajectory-of-ethiopias-stability/ Fri, 04 Dec 2020 17:18:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346495 The post Bruton quoted in ABC News on how allegations of atrocities will affect the trajectory of Ethiopia’s stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-joins-the-skimm-to-discuss-conflict-in-ethiopias-tigray-region/ Thu, 03 Dec 2020 17:14:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=346493 The post Bruton joins the Skimm to discuss conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-bbc-world-to-discuss-the-capture-of-mekelle-by-ethiopian-forces/ Sun, 29 Nov 2020 22:33:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335682 The post Hudson joins BBC World to discuss the capture of Mekelle by Ethiopian forces appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-voice-of-americas-nightline-africa-to-discuss-conflict-in-tigray/ Sat, 28 Nov 2020 22:31:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335680 The post Hudson joins Voice of America’s Nightline Africa to discuss conflict in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-asharq-to-discuss-the-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-somalia/ Fri, 27 Nov 2020 22:28:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335675 The post Hudson joins Asharq to discuss the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-the-wall-street-journal-on-battle-between-ethiopian-forces-and-the-tplf-for-mekelle/ Thu, 26 Nov 2020 22:26:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335671 The post Bruton quoted in the Wall Street Journal on battle between Ethiopian forces and the TPLF for Mekelle appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-cnn-to-discuss-the-consequences-of-further-conflict-in-tigray/ Thu, 26 Nov 2020 22:23:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335663 The post Hudson joins CNN to discuss the consequences of further conflict in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-temperature-is-rising-the-fever-white-hot-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-as-flashpoint-between-egypt-and-ethiopia/ Wed, 25 Nov 2020 13:15:29 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=323625 Once considered unlikely by regional experts, military confrontation along the Nile is a growing possibility, as a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian stand-off recedes. Outside observers may not understand why Egypt considers the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) an “existential threat” to its existence, but, regardless, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his advisors see it as such.

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Once considered unlikely by regional experts, military confrontation along the Nile is a growing possibility, as a diplomatic solution to the Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian stand-off recedes. Outside observers may not understand why Egypt considers the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) an “existential threat” to its existence, but, regardless, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his advisors see it as such.

A new Atlantic Council issue brief, “The Temperature is Rising, the Fever White Hot: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as Flashpoint between Egypt and Ethiopia,” authored by Christopher D. Booth, describes the relationship between water scarcity and government stability in Egypt. The current Egyptian government is aware of the the role that water scarcity may have played in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, and of the continuing threat that water issues pose nearly ten years later, particularly in light of Egypt’s political and economic challenges. 

Booth warns that, given the inconclusive diplomacy of the West regarding the threat the GERD poses to Egypt, the Egyptian regime may determine that it has no other choice but to take up arms against its “oppressors” and roll the dice in an attack against the dam.

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Fast Thinking Nov 20, 2020
FAST THINKING: Get up to speed on the crisis in Ethiopia
By Atlantic Council
A fast-developing crisis in Ethiopia has the crucial US ally edging closer to all-out war, just two years after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office promising democratic reforms and a year after he won the Nobel Peace Prize. So what happened? Today we’re turning to Cameron Hudson, an expert on the region and former US diplomat and intelligence officer, for a look behind the headlines.
Africa Conflict

Issue Brief Sep 29, 2020
The impact of COVID-19 on either shore of the Mediterranean
By Karim Mezran, Emily Burchfield, Paolo Alli, Emadeddin Badi, Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, Alessia Melcangi
This report draws on case studies of Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and migration to the EU to illuminate the key challenges faced in the Mediterranean community, and warns of the undesirable outcomes ahead if international inaction toward the region persists.
Coronavirus North Africa

MENASource Jul 10, 2020
Nile Basin’s GERD dispute creates risks for Egypt, Sudan, and beyond
By Amal Kandeel
Competition for the Nile Basin’s freshwater has been growing markedly for three decades. In 2011, it intensified after Ethiopia started building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).
Ethiopia North Africa



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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-sbs-on-escalating-conflict-in-tigray/ Tue, 24 Nov 2020 22:21:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335660 The post Hudson quoted in SBS on escalating conflict in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-associated-press-on-escalating-conflict-in-ethiopias-tigray-region/ Tue, 24 Nov 2020 22:19:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335658 The post Hudson quoted in the Associated Press on escalating conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/ethiopian-government-officials-provide-briefing-on-the-conflict-in-tigray/ Tue, 24 Nov 2020 21:30:21 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=324097 On Tuesday, November 24, the Africa Center hosted a private roundtable with Ethiopian Attorney General H.E. Gedion Timothewos Hessebon (PhD), Senior Policy Advisor and Chief Trade Negotiator Mr. Mamo Mihretu, and Ambassador to the United States H.E. Fitsum Arega.

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]]> On Tuesday, November 24, the Africa Center hosted a private roundtable with Ethiopian Attorney General H.E. Gedion Timothewos Hessebon (PhD), Senior Policy Advisor and Chief Trade Negotiator Mr. Mamo Mihretu, and Ambassador to the United States H.E. Fitsum Arega.

The event served as an opportunity to discuss the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region between government-led forces and forces allied with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The event was opened by Africa Center Director of Programs and Studies Ms. Bronwyn Bruton, followed by introductions from Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Gabriel Negatu and moderation by Africa Center Senior Fellow Mr. Cameron Hudson.

H.E. Gedion provided opening remarks to frame the conversation around the Ethiopian government’s strategy to reclaim TPLF strongholds in Tigray, following the attempted seizure of military assets by TPLF forces earlier this month. Participants, representing the US government, Congressional offices, think tanks, and not-for-profits, then directed questions to both H.E. Gedion and Mr. Mihretu about limiting civilian casualties in the region; the conflict’s economic impact on Ethiopia; coordination with humanitarian agencies; and repatriating refugees who fled to neighboring Sudan. Mr. Hudson concluded the discussion reflecting on hope for peace, stability, and justice while pledging to maintain regular discussions regarding Tigray under the auspices of the Atlantic Council.



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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-middle-east-eye-on-the-influence-of-external-powers-in-sudan/ Sun, 22 Nov 2020 22:15:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335652 The post Hudson quoted in the Middle East Eye on the influence of external powers in Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/fast-thinking-get-up-to-speed-on-the-crisis-in-ethiopia-africa-conflict-abiy-ahmed/ Fri, 20 Nov 2020 12:04:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=322713 A fast-developing crisis in Ethiopia has the crucial US ally edging closer to all-out war, just two years after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office promising democratic reforms and a year after he won the Nobel Peace Prize. So what happened? Today we’re turning to Cameron Hudson, an expert on the region and former US diplomat and intelligence officer, for a look behind the headlines.

The post FAST THINKING: Get up to speed on the crisis in Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]>

GET UP TO SPEED

A fast-developing crisis in Ethiopia has the crucial US ally edging closer to all-out war, just two years after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took office promising democratic reforms and a year after he won the Nobel Peace Prize. So what happened? Today we’re turning to Cameron Hudson, an expert on the region and former US diplomat and intelligence officer, for a look behind the headlines.

TODAY’S EXPERT REACTION COURTESY OF

• Cameron Hudson: Former director for African affairs at the National Security Council and senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center

The backstory

Abiy’s governing coalition has from the start faced resistance from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the core element of the former ruling party based in the country’s north. Months of tensions boiled over after an alleged TPLF attack on government forces. Abiy has dispatched troops to the northern region and hundreds of people have been killed in the fighting. The prime minister has so far refused calls for international mediation, calling the conflict an “internal law and order operation.”

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What’s Abiy up to?

• “He’s trying to reform the Ethiopian state. He came to power in 2018 with a popular mandate to break with decades of authoritarian rule and ethnic politics. But his vision of a pan-Ethiopian political and social movement has been stymied by the TPLF.”
• “Abiy has proven to be a perplexing figure. A PhD in peace and conflict resolution, his image as prime minister was made by early moves to make peace with neighboring Eritrea and the release of his own domestic political prisoners. But he rose to positions of authority through military intelligence under an authoritarian system.”

Did the Nobel Committee get Abiy wrong?

• “The prize was premature. In retrospect it represented more of a celebration of Ethiopia’s move away from authoritarianism and the prospects of a democratic transition and stable Horn of Africa than the fully realized product of his vision.”

What should we make of the TPLF?

• “There should be no love lost for the TPLF. Under their long rule, Ethiopian media was censored, political opponents were jailed, and a vast security state kept the country’s 110 million population largely in check. But they also present legitimate grievances with respect to Abiy’s reform agenda, which are shared in part by other ethnic groups.”
   
• “Unlike those other groups, the TPLF has the military hardware and the experience of as many as 250,000 battle-hardened troops to not only present an alternative political vision, but aggressively pursue it.”​​​​​​
• “While Abiy came to power through a popular protest movement, he does not govern with an electoral mandate. When he canceled national elections earlier this year due to the COVID pandemic—elections that would have legitimized and formalized not only his rule but his broader reform agenda—he became, in the eyes of the Tigrayan leaders, an illegitimate leader serving in violation of the constitution. In response, this fall, Tigray held its own regional elections, contravening federal authorities, and thus calling into question their own legitimacy in the eyes of Abiy’s government.”

What role does Ethiopia play in regional stability?

• “Ethiopia has been the lynchpin of security in the Horn of Africa region for the better part of two decades—whether contributing peacekeepers under UN and African Union mandates to conflict zones around the continent; partnering with the US on counterterror operations, most notably in neighboring Somalia; using its political leaders to intervene and mediate in hot conflicts in places like Sudan and South Sudan; or simply playing host to the African Union headquarters. Reversing this trend—or worse, seeing Ethiopia become a net exporter of violence and instability—will most assuredly have a devastating effect.”

What should we watch to understand where the conflict is headed next?

• “First, the degree to which ethnicity is being weaponized. Underpinning this entire conflict is Ethiopia’s troubled history of managing ethnic diversity. If the conflict spreads to Ethiopia’s other ethnic regions and we see score-settling based on ethnic divides, many are cautioning that we could quickly see the dissolution of the Ethiopian state, akin to the breakup of Yugoslavia.”
• “Second, many regional actors will have a stake in the outcome of an Ethiopian civil war—including Egypt, which has been in heated negotiations with Abiy over the use of Nile waters, and Eritrea, which fought a long border war against mostly Tigrayan troops and is now allied with Abiy. In a battle of near-equals, outside actors could be the difference-maker.” 

What can a Biden administration do?

“This conflict is a reminder that Ethiopia, along with Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, are the continent’s ‘too big to fail’ countries. Considerable diplomatic effort needs to be put into repairing the Trump administration’s ill-advised record of non-engagement in the region so that we once again have influence and credibility. Biden will face calls to appoint a first-ever Horn of Africa envoy, which makes increasing sense. The US needs a coherent strategy for this region and the capacity to carry it out.”

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-trt-world-to-discuss-the-battle-for-tigray-in-ethiopia/ Wed, 18 Nov 2020 22:13:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335647 The post Hudson joins TRT World to discuss the battle for Tigray in Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-alhurra-to-discuss-military-base-agreement-between-russia-and-sudan/ Wed, 18 Nov 2020 22:10:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335645 The post Hudson joins Alhurra to discuss military base agreement between Russia and Sudan appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/warrick-in-houston-chronicle-on-the-dangers-of-trumps-planned-troop-withdrawals/ Wed, 18 Nov 2020 18:37:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=324374 On November 18, Forward Defense and Hariri Center non-resident senior fellow Thomas Warrick wrote an op-ed for the Houston Chronicle titled “Trump gambles with national security by removing troops.”

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On November 18, Forward Defense and Middle East Center non-resident senior fellow Thomas Warrick wrote an op-ed for the Houston Chronicle titled “Trump gambles with national security by removing troops.” In this piece, Warrick argues that President Trump is taking significant risks by withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, which will most likely not pay off.

I would urge that we not throw in our cards—at least not before we have started to invest more in civilian security programs that we and our allies need to turn the threat from groups like ISIS and Al-Qaida into a local law enforcement problem that can be handled without our troops.

Thomas Warrick


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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-joins-bbc-world-to-discuss-the-causes-of-conflict-in-ethiopia/ Sun, 15 Nov 2020 22:04:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335630 The post Hudson joins BBC World to discuss the causes of conflict in Ethiopia appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-the-washington-examiner-on-the-implications-of-conflict-in-tigray-for-regional-stability/ Sun, 15 Nov 2020 22:02:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335628 The post Hudson quoted in the Washington Examiner on the implications of conflict in Tigray for regional stability appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/calls-for-negotiation-driving-ethiopia-deeper-into-war/ Fri, 13 Nov 2020 22:10:24 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=320812 Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven […]

The post Calls for negotiation are driving Ethiopia deeper into war appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who won the Nobel Prize for his peacemaking with Eritrea, has confounded allies by resisting all attempts to dampen the ongoing military confrontation with a powerful northern insurgent group, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The TPLF effectively controlled the Ethiopian government from 1991 until February 2018, when it was driven from power by a surge of popular revolt. Global officials fear that the fighting between the TPLF and Abiy’s government forces may provoke widespread unrest in Ethiopia and a humanitarian crisis in the Horn; spark international war if neighboring states are drawn into the conflict; or cause Ethiopia to break apart like the former Yugoslavia.

But there is a worse alternative: and that is the very realistic prospect that the two sides will fight each other nearly to the death, then agree to negotiations that will allow both sides to heal and re-arm, until some provocation inevitably retriggers a new round of conflict, which will lead to another conflagration with immense costs to human life, and so on, as the cycle endlessly repeats itself. This is the scenario that has played out time and again in South Sudan, and it is by far the likeliest outcome of current demands for negotiation between the TPLF and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF).

The reason for this is simple: the TPLF has good reason to think that it can attack the Ethiopian government forces, and yet not be held accountable by the Western democracies that wield so much influence in the country.

Despite the massive human rights violations that were associated with the TPLF’s rule—despite the authoritarianism and theft, the imprisonments and the torture that have been laid at its door—the TPLF’s international allies have never repudiated it, nor examined their inappropriate investment in the TPLF’s welfare. International analysts have pointedly and repeatedly failed even to raise the TPLF’s maladministration and intransigence in their assessments of this current crisis. This has created an attitude of impunity in the TPLF, but it has also undermined the Ethiopian leadership’s faith that international mediation and diplomacy can work on their behalf. And that is an awful tragedy, because if Abiy had any reason to believe that the international community could fairly and impartially mediate his conflict with the TPLF, he might actually be persuaded to stand down.

An unfinished revolution and the road back to insurgency

The TPLF took power in Ethiopia in 1987. Its leader, Meles Zenawi, effectively ruled Ethiopia unilaterally until his death in 2012, although he exercised his power through a four-party ethnic-based coalition called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF was successful in producing a period of seeming ethnic calm and economic prosperity in Ethiopia; but it lost popular elections in 2005, at which time it took an alarming authoritarian turn, and grew increasingly repressive. Under Zenawi and his successor, Hailemariam Desalegn, the EPRDF effectively outlawed the freedoms of assembly and speech, banned most civil society organizations, and imprisoned tens of thousands of youths, Muslims, political opposition members, and journalists. Many of these individuals were cruelly tortured in prison. During this time period, the EPRDF—under the TPLF’s influence—launched a misguided invasion of Somalia and refused to withdraw its forces from Eritrean territory, violating the terms of a peace agreement and the ruling of a United Nations-backed border commission. Both of these actions have produced profound instability in the greater Horn of Africa region—in Somalia, by bringing the extremist al Shabaab militia to power, and in Eritrea, by prolonging a two-decade period of cold war that has isolated and impoverished the Eritrean people. But because the TPLF was widely viewed as an ally of the United States’ war on terrorism, it was insulated from international criticism, and also benefited from immense flows of foreign aid, which in turn allowed it to build a massive military and intelligence apparatus that was helpful in controlling the Ethiopian population, and further prolonged the EPRDF’s nondemocratic rule.

After years of public uprisings, in which many Ethiopians lost their lives, Desalegn was forced to resign as prime minister and the TPLF lost much of its hold on power. The group was largely forced to withdraw to its northern enclave, where it retained an arsenal of weaponry vastly disproportionate to its presumed political constituency (which represents approximately 6 percent of Ethiopia’s population). Though these allegations have not been definitively proved—and should therefore be referenced with caution—the new Ethiopian government has repeatedly and credibly accused the TPLF of working to incite ethnic conflicts and to undermine the new political order. Tensions have continued to rise, and have been aggravated by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has prevented the timely holding of national elections that might have produced some consensus on proposed reforms to the federalist system and the Ethiopian constitution.

In its impatience, the TPLF defied government orders and called Tigrayans to the polls. The lack of observers and the nature of the announced results—which showed the TPLF winning 98 percent of the popular vote—prevent this exercise from being described as an election.

The international community failed at that point—and at innumerable points leading up to it—to condemn the TPLF’s goading and irresponsible actions, and in particular, its blunt refusal to recognize the authority of Abiy’s administration. This international silence has persuaded the TPLF that it has retained the sympathies of its old international backers, and has inadvertently emboldened the hardliners at the top of the party. Prime Minister Abiy, who could have chosen to ignore what was at best a flimsy provocation, likewise chose to escalate rather than defuse the situation. He retaliated by cutting funding to the TPLF leadership. That in turn, appears to have goaded the TPLF into attacking an Ethiopian Defense Forces base located in the Tigray region. Non-Tigrayan soldiers, in a foreshadowing of ethnic-based violence by TPLF-aligned forces to come, were allegedly executed during the attack, and other federal soldiers still remain hostage.

And yet, at no point has any Western or African power called for the TPLF to lay down its arms. At no point have Western powers discussed leveling sanctions on the TPLF officials who authorized the attack. In fact, pointed op-editorials in premier publications have actually blamed the Prime Minister for “marginalizing” the TPLF from power, and held him equally responsible for the escalating tensions.

In fact, Abiy has been right to call the TPLF’s assault on federal forces a “red line” provocation. There is no government in the world that would tolerate such an assault. The moment that it took up arms against the federal government, and oversaw the execution of federal soldiers, TPLF forfeited its status as a political party and regional administration, and returned to its old roots as a rebel movement. There is thus no precedent in international law for calling its military assault an act of war. It is an act of insurgency; it is an act of armed revolt; and most dangerously, it is a revolt being prosecuted on ethnic lines, as the TPLF is politically isolated and lacks any political constituency outside of Tigray. TPLF forces—having consumed the narrative of ethnic-based persecution being fed to them by the TPLF leadership—have subsequently been implicated in the massacre of scores or hundreds of innocent non-Tigrayan bystanders at Mai-Kadra (though we should absolutely assume, given the previous conduct of the Ethiopian Defense Forces in Oromia and elsewhere, that there will be atrocities on both sides).

The urgent question is, how can the international community intervene to stop the fighting, and what actions can prevent a recurrence of the fighting?

Moving forward

First, the diplomatic community must recognize what is painfully obvious: that its lack of credibility has rendered it powerless to exercise influence on this conflict. This extends beyond the Western democracies to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), who are equally guilty of abetting the abuses of the TPLF, especially insofar as Somalia and Eritrea are concerned.

But the United States, in particular, has for too long failed to confront the abusiveness of the TPLF ruling cadre. US President Barack Obama’s repeated references to the Ethiopian government as “democratically elected” in spite of the flagrant rigging of elections—in which the unpopular ruling party always won between 97 percent and 100 percent of seats in the parliament—was widely viewed in Ethiopia as a betrayal of fundamental American principles. The international community has also maintained a pointed silence about the TPLF since Abiy took power. Time and time again, as the TPLF has been implicated in serious acts of provocation and violence, as the TPLF has rejected the authority of the central government—and the popular will that brought the new dispensation into being—Washington and its allies, particularly those in the chattering classes, have utterly failed to repudiate the TPLF.

If any of these international actors wish to stand as credible mediators, they must admit to their previous bias and address the threat that the bias poses moving forward. They must acknowledge and act on the recognition that the international silence on the TPLF’s conduct has played a significant role in creating the conditions for this current crisis.

Second, the international community must understand that Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea have long understood that the TPLF would never be constrained or barred from a return to power by Ethiopia’s external allies. While analysts claim that “no military solution is possible,” the ongoing international toleration of the TPLF has convinced them that the very opposite is true—and that both Abiy and Isaias believe that they can quickly win this battle.

Abiy has been widely lauded for making peace with Eritrea after decades of near-war over a border dispute. But the alliance served a vital tactical purpose of containing the powerful TPLF in its northern corner, where it has been surrounded by unfriendly forces: the Eritreans, the rival Amhara ethnic police and militias, and the federal troops controlled by Abiy. This coalition of forces—as well as fears that too-aggressive action by the TPLF could trigger broad ethnic reprisals against the innocent Tigrayan population—combined for a few years to keep a northern insurgency in check. But the TPLF is thought to control several hundreds of thousands of soldiers and irregular militia, and has a powerful modern arsenal. Until now, Abiy has not had the military strength to confront it, even as the TPLF has been widely accused of fomenting ethnic unrest around the country.

But since the day he came to power, Abiy has been frantically working to reduce the TPLF’s stranglehold on Ethiopia’s military resources and manpower. He is a calculating leader, and his willingness to take action to confront the TPLF in its stronghold, after years of strategic patience, indicates that he believes that he can win. Here is why he may be confident:

First, the US Department of State has formally indicated its concern about reports of the TPLF attack on ENDF bases on November 3. This puts down a marker that the Trump Administration considers the TPLF to be the instigator of the current round of violence, and gives Abiy a political green light to quell the unrest. That may change when the Biden administration takes control of the US government, but Abiy surely expects the conflict to be over by then.

State Department personnel have also pointedly resisted the temptation to echo descriptions of the conflict between the TPLF insurgency and the ENDF a “civil war.” The term is widely being used in the press, but it is alarmist: Abiy’s assault on the TPLF is certainly a gamble, and there is a possibility that a prolonged conflict in the far northern corner of Ethiopia could eventually spark unrest elsewhere. But there is a better than even chance that the military confrontation will play out in a matter of days rather than weeks. Prime Minister Abiy’s round rejection of outside intervention suggests that he is indeed confident of this result. It’s also important to understand that the TPLF, regardless of its residual military strength, is a politically isolated faction with few internal or external allies. Its grievances are unlikely to spark widespread unrest, as long as the Ethiopian population can resist the temptation to act out reprisals on innocent Tigrayans around the country.

And in spite of speculation that the TPLF may attempt to push an attack towards Addis Ababa, the battle is unlikely to spread southward. Abiy came to power when millions on millions of Ethiopians took to the streets to overthrow the TPLF-dominated regime. Anger against the TPLF—and unfortunately, against the broader Tigrayan ethnic group, precious few of whom have truly benefitted from TPLF rule—ran so high in the months following Abiy’s rise that many feared that a genocide against the Tigrayans could be imminent. For all the popular disenchantment with Abiy’s government, a launch of TPLF forces towards Addis Ababa, for the explicit purpose of overthrowing the government by force, would almost certainly produce an avalanche of popular anger. Abiy seems to have done a pretty good job of convincing average Ethiopians that his military assault is indeed a law and order operation designed in the long run to reduce conflicts across the country. Abiy’s popular standing has also benefitted from the nationalist fervor rising over Egyptian threats against the GERD, and US President Donald Trump’s casual incitement of a conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. (Another powerful reason, frankly, for the Ethiopian government to distrust any Western attempts at mediation.) The TPLF seems aware of this risk: apart from some bombast, its rhetoric has squarely emphasized a goal of self-defense.

A regional conflagration as a result of the fighting between the TPLF and ENDF is also unlikely. Neighboring states—all of whom have good relations with Abiy and poor relations with the TPLF—have so far resisted any impulse to insert themselves into the crisis. Sudan immediately closed its border with Tigray, and far more importantly, Eritrea has not launched troops into Ethiopian territory. (There have been unconfirmed reports of fighting between Eritrean and TPLF troops at various points along the border, but these have not been confirmed, and there is reason to think that Abiy and Isaias will resist Eritrea’s entry into the conflict unless it is absolutely necessary.) At a time of great uncertainty in Ethiopia, the restraint of the neighboring nations is a profoundly important asset: in Africa, “civil wars” are often sparked and aggravated by the meddling of foreign forces. Ethiopia’s strong relations with neighboring states are likely to prevent this outcome.

There is a risk that the TPLF may, out of desperation, attempt to push into Eritrean territory—as it did most recently in June 2016, at a time when the TPLF was at the height of its political and military power, in control of the entire Ethiopian military apparatus, and in possession of strong international support. (That attack also led to panicked headlines about the potential for a new war in the Horn.) But Eritrea successfully deflected the attempted invasion and is just as likely to be able to defend itself now. Plus, if the TPLF moves into Eritrean territory, Asmara will be able to justify a counterattack—and the TPLF will then be forced to fight powerful enemies on two fronts, with good reason to think that the ENDF and Eritrean forces would seek to coordinate their assaults. Again, that is not an outcome that the TPLF is likely to seek out.

This conflict has been years in the making, and it’s hard to see how it can be resolved through dialogue. By allowing most of the TPLF leadership to live unmolested in the north after losing power—without a truth and reconciliation commission, and with few attempts to hold the old regime accountable for human rights abuses or thefts of Ethiopian treasure—Abiy, willingly or not, had embarked on a grand experiment. The TPLF has not kept its side of that bargain. It’s true that if Abiy’s military gamble now misfires, Ethiopia and the rest of the region may be in for a miserable round of suffering. But neither can Abiy govern the country with an intransigent, heavily-armed spoiler in the north. There is no indication that any of these actors are willing to negotiate, and Abiy probably feels that this military confrontation is his best chance of achieving long-term peace.

Indeed, Abiy probably fears that if he fails to answer the TPLF’s overt attacks on the Ethiopian state and its citizens, it will cause him to lose control of his government. And all Ethiopia’s allies should fear that outcome, because we have no idea at all what might come next.

The most effective means of discouraging the continuation of this conflict is to finally put pressure on TPLF leaders—especially Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael—to stand down his forces in the interest of protecting the local population. Abiy urgently needs to be persuaded that he can rely on the international community—and not only his army—to ensure that the TPLF will be prevented from returning to power. Counterintuitively, the fastest way for the international community to do that is to stop calling for negotiations, and to start demanding accountability for the TPLF.

Calling for negotiations, as so many are advocating, will only encourage TPLF leaders to believe that violence will permit them to fight their way to a bigger chair at the table. That is not only a losing strategy in Ethiopia—it sets up an extraordinarily dangerous precedent for the next armed insurgency that wants to challenge central authority.

Bronwyn Bruton is the director of programs and studies of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Follow her on Twitter @BronwynBruton.


AfricaSource Nov 11, 2020
Experts react: Understanding the conflict in Tigray
By Africa Center
As conflict breaks out in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, Africa Center experts react and analyze what this means for the country and its neighbors.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/hudson-quoted-in-der-spiegel-on-the-implications-of-conflict-breaking-out-in-tigray/ Thu, 12 Nov 2020 21:59:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335626 The post Hudson quoted in Der Spiegel on the implications of conflict breaking out in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/experts-react-understanding-the-conflict-in-tigray/ Wed, 11 Nov 2020 19:32:24 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=319042 As conflict breaks out in Ethiopia's Tigray region, Africa Center experts react and analyze what this means for the country and its neighbors.

The post Experts react: Understanding the conflict in Tigray appeared first on Atlantic Council.

]]> Recent events in the Tigray region of Ethiopia have made international headlines. Read as Atlantic Council Africa Center experts react, analyzing what the conflict means for the country and its neighbors:

Gabriel Negatu: War in the Tigray region of Ethiopia

Cameron Hudson: What impact will the fighting have on the Horn of Africa?

War in the Tigray region of Ethiopia

On November 4, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed launched a military offensive against forces of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which is the governing authority of the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray. Coming after months of rising tensions between the TPLF and the Abiy administration, the latest military action was precipitated by an alleged surprise night-time assault by the TPLF on a major Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) base in Tigray that resulted in the killing of non-Tigrayan soldiers and the attempted looting of heavy artillery and weapons. Declaring that the assault on the federal army base had “crossed the last red line,” Prime Minister Abiy maintains that his hand was forced by the TPLF leadership into sending the army “to save the country and the region.” More than a week on, the military operation is still reportedly targeting Tigray’s militia establishments and the TPLF leadership, and not its citizens—though there are worrying reports of civilian casualties, which are difficult to confirm due to an Internet and telephone blackout imposed by the government on the entire Tigray region. The Council of Representatives has also imposed a state of emergency on Tigray, effectively isolating it from the rest of Ethiopia.

For the judicious observer of Ethiopia’s ethnic politics, there have been signs of ominous tensions between Tigray and the central government since Abiy came to power two years ago. The TPLF had held a stranglehold on power for decades, since taking power in 1991. Following a months-long popular revolt that ushered him to power in early 2018, Abiy swiftly curbed the TPLF’s dominance over Ethiopia’s political and economic life, leaving its leaders feeling targeted and purged. The President of the Tigray region charged the Prime Minister with trying to ‘sideline and even criminalize’ the TPLF.

The TPLF had exerted power in Ethiopia through a governing coalition, composed of four ethnic-based parties, called the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). But in 2019, shortly after Abiy took power, the other three parties annulled the EPRDF coalition and moved to replace it with a single national Prosperity Party that was not organized on ethnic lines. The TPLF countered by breaking away from the new governing coalition and launching a vain attempt to unite opposition forces under a new federalist coalition. Failing that, it has now isolated itself from the political process.

In March, the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), an autonomous body accountable to the House of Peoples’ Representatives temporarily postponed the national and regional elections scheduled for August 2020 due to COVID-19 concerns. Legislators from Tigray, including the speaker of the Upper House, withdrew from the national parliament in protest. Relations soured further in September 2020 when the TPLF, in open defiance of the constitution and federal government, held elections in Tigray and reported a 98 percent victory in the popular vote. (The election was not overseen by international observers.) The newly-installed regional legislators in Tigray immediately declared that the federal government lacked legitimacy to govern the country and refused to recognize it.

The national assembly then countered by annulling Tigray’s election results and refusing to acknowledge the newly-elected leadership. Federal funding to the region was also slashed significantly, limiting the flow of resources only to local governments to protect basic services, and bypassing the TPLF. The leadership in Mekele, the capital of Tigray, called the cessation of their funding a declaration of war. Days before the assault by federal forces, the region’s president, Debretsion G. Michael, warned the public that the Prime Minister was planning an attack to punish Tigray for its defiance.

Having controlled all facets of state power incontestably for the twenty-eight years prior to its ouster in 2018, the TPLF views Abiy’s democratic reforms and liberalization zeal with a great deal of edginess. His interest in reforming the federalist structure of the Ethiopian state—which divides Ethiopia into nine self-governing ethnic territories—especially threatens to undermine the order that has historically permitted the small Tigrayan ethnic group to wield a power disproportionate to its population. Abiy is an Oromo by origin, and thus a member of Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, and his espousal of a broader nationalist agenda over narrow ethnic priorities is viewed by many of the smaller ethnic groups, and not only the TPLF, as eroding the right to self-rule, including secession, that is granted by the Ethiopian Constitution to ethnically organized regions. The TPLF is also uneasy with Abiy over his intentions to amend the Constitution, which provides the basis of the current ethnic federalism. 

Meles Zenawi, a founding member of the TPLF, created the Ethiopian constitution in the earliest days of his rule and the group’s present leaders sanction the constitution as a canonical text. They consider Abiy’s constitutional reform agenda as a ‘red line.’ The system of ethnic federalism under the EPRDF had privileged the TPLF as first among equals in a coalition government, according it an oversize share of political and economic power relative to its population size of 6 percent. Amending the constitution to redistribute power in proportion to population size would significantly reduce the TPLF’s share of power, which is something that Mekele is not prepared to concede. 

Lastly, Mekele remains highly suspicious of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, which includes the signing of a peace agreement and a promise by Abiy to honor a long-violated United Nations ruling on the demarcation of the border between Eritrea and Tigray. Rivalry between Eritrea’s ruling party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ, and formerly known as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, or EPLF) and the TPLF runs deep, dating back to their time in the bushes fighting the Derg. Both Addis Ababa and Asmara stand hostile to the TPLF, albeit for different reasons. Abiy’s cozying up to Asmara without including Mekele is viewed as forsaking Tigray in favor of Eritrea. Consequently, the TPLF accuses Asmara of siding with Abiy to attack Tigray in an effort to settle old scores. Despite TPLF claims to the contrary, however, there is currently no evidence of PFDJ action in this war. This is far from saying Eritrea would not retaliate if provoked. 

Since losing power in 2018, the TPLF has worked to undermine Abiy’s reform efforts. Hard evidence is scarce, but the TPLF is alleged to be behind much of the internal tensions and ethnic violence that has plagued Ethiopia since the Abiy administration took control. Whether or not these reports are true, social media networks in Ethiopia are rife with accusations that the TPLF, working mainly through surrogates and break-away groups, has been fomenting conflict by organizing, training, and financing forces opposed to the federal government. (The recent school yard massacre of Amharas in the Wollega region of Oromia sparked exactly such a round of accusations on social media networks.)

International analysts may be right to fear that, if extended indefinitely, the present conflict may possibly rouse discontented TPLF surrogates in various pockets of Ethiopia to rise against the Abiy government. In the meantime, however, the declaration of war seems to have the opposite effect. Media accounts suggest the rest of the country is galvanized behind what the Prime Minister describes as a ‘rule of law operation’ to guarantee peace and stability and to bring a group that is widely perceived as the perpetrators of instability to justice. Certain ethnic groups along the border could also specifically benefit from the conflict. Amharas living in areas bordering Tigray, for example, harbor territorial claims over land illegally annexed by the TPLF while it assumed power. Such groups have been drawn into the present conflict on the side of the government and are already celebrating the recapture of annexed territory. As of now, no such claims have been made on the Afar-Tigray Border.

The breakout in fighting comes at a time when Ethiopia is contemplating several sweeping reforms. But the two years since the TPLF was ousted from power have not been long enough for Abiy’s brand of politics, and his transformational agenda, to set down firm roots. The democratic opening he has unleashed is yet to fully address the many ethnic grievances that were bottled up under the TPLF, and sporadic ethnic flare-ups continue to occur across the country, even as the region struggles to cope with rising COVID-19 infections rates with consequential impact on economic and social life. The security forces now under Abiy’s control have been accused of not responding appropriately to many of these conflicts. Lastly, Ethiopia remains in the midst of protracted negotiations with Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Renaissance Dam. The recent phase of negotiations resumed days before the breakout of hostilities, attended by water ministers from the three countries and experts from the African Union, European Union, and the World Bank.   

The war in Tigray is unfortunate and could have tragic consequences, almost certainly including the loss of innocent lives. It is important for both sides to take extra measures to protect civilians. Abiy’s protestations that this is a war against the TPLF and not the people of Tigray will be credible only if the government also ensures the safety and wellbeing of Tigrayans in other parts of the country. Many are not at all affiliated with the TPLF or the war efforts, but they may yet be subjected to unwarranted reprisals. But as of now, at least, concerns that Eritrea may be drawn into the war, or that the war may escalate into a regional conflict, are unfounded, or premature at best.

Gabriel Negatu is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and former director general for eastern Africa at the African Development Bank. Follow him on Twitter @Gabnegatu.

What impact will the fighting have on the Horn of Africa?

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy’s November 4 decision to launch federal troops into the country’s western Tigray region have sent shockwaves across the Horn of Africa region and beyond. With a population of 110 million people, Ethiopia is the second largest country in Africa and borders six other African nations astride the Horn and East African regions. Chronic instability and acute humanitarian needs are rife across the region. A prolonged conflagration between well-armed factions inside of Ethiopia could send hundreds of thousands of refugees across borders, disrupt trade routes, and force Addis Ababa to abandon its role of regional anchor state, mediator, policeman, and peacekeeper. That would be a potentially cataclysmic scenario for a region ill-equipped to handle additional tumult or a humanitarian fallout that could affect more than nine million people, according to the UN this week. 

Nowhere are the threats of instability more acute than in neighboring Sudan, which two days after fighting began announced a closure of portions of its eastern border with Ethiopia, and reportedly began positioning more than six thousand of its own forces inside of Gedaraf state, which borders Tigray. Anecdotal reports from inside Sudan suggest that the normally heavy volume of trade at border checkpoints has already been curtailed, and that Tigrayan truck drivers are being prevented from bringing their shipments into Sudan out of fear that federal authorities in Addis could see this as an effort to aid in the Tigrayan resistance.   

Earlier this week, the first truckloads of Ethiopian refugees began crossing into Gedaraf state, according to local media, and will be housed in the first of what could be many new refugee camps being set up to receive people fleeing the fighting in Tigray. At the same time, shipments of arms and ammunition headed for Tigrayan forces were also stopped en route from Sudan, adding to the potentially explosive mix inside Sudan. Sudan’s far eastern states have already been witness to growing tribal and militia-led violence in recent months, and have even skirmished with forces on the Ethiopian side of the border. If Sudan has its own powder keg, it is here. A significant influx of weapons, fighters, and refugees to the area could well unleash substantial new tensions that Sudan’s transitional government has already been proven ill-equipped to handle.

In a table-turning moment last week, Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok—who lived for the past twenty years in Addis and who benefitted at numerous points from Ethiopian mediation during Sudan’s still ongoing transition and internal peace process—reportedly reached out to his counterpart Abiy, as well as regional Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front leaders in their regional capital of Mekele, to urge caution and restraint. Sudan’s leading army general and leader of the country’s Transitional Sovereignty Council similarly offered to mediate a ceasefire and was rebuffed.

While neither of the two belligerents appear open to formal outside mediation at this time, Sudan is uniquely positioned to play such a role should an opening emerge. Riding high from the recent announcement to remove Sudan from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and benefiting from renewed backing from Gulf state actors who approved of Sudan’s equally recent announcement of a rapprochement with Israel, Sudan’s Prime Minister has some political capital to spend. As the current Chairman of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, he is positioned to marshal the often-underutilized mediation and peacemaking resources of that body to assist. Furthermore, as a party to the ongoing negotiations over Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance dam, and as an important buffer in those talks between Egypt and Ethiopia, Hamdok already has some credibility in seeking to find common ground on issues striking at the heart of Ethiopia’s national security interests.

No less affected by the potential consequences of a war between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF, but in no significant position to assist on the political front, are Somalia and South Sudan, both of which have sizable refugee populations inside Ethiopia as a result of their own on-again, off-again civil conflicts. Neither nation is prepared to have hundreds of thousands of their nationals repatriated in the near term as a result of an Ethiopian civil war. 

Both Somalia and South Sudan have come to rely on a substantial Ethiopian peacekeeping presence to help reduce sectarian bloodshed in their own countries. Last week, Ethiopia withdrew approximately six hundred of the troops it has deployed in Somalia’s western border region (though it has so far left its troop contributions to the African Union peacekeeping mission to Somalia intact). Though they are reportedly being replaced with Ethiopian police units, a United Nations security report obtained by Reuters warned that these “redeployments from near the border with Somalia will make that area more vulnerable to possible incursions by Al Shabaab,” which is the al Qaeda-linked insurgency trying to overthrow the government in Somalia. As Somalia’s presidential elections draw near—they are now slated for early 2021 after multiple postponements—a security vacuum in Somalia produced by a drawdown of Ethiopian troops could rapidly undo years of international efforts to bring a semblance of security and stability to the long restive nation. Admittedly, this is a worse-case scenario that will only occur if the fighting between the TPLF and Abiy’s federal forces is prolonged and requires a greater redeployment of Ethiopian military resources than has yet taken place. But the threat is alarming.

Ethiopia’s hard security presence among its neighbors is a source of stability in the region, but even more at risk is Ethiopia’s well-earned reputation as a peacemaker and mediator. In a region with a troubled history of political, military, and humanitarian crises, Ethiopia in recent years has been a net contributor to regional stability—even as internal fault lines were emergent.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. Previously he served as the chief of staff to the special envoy for Sudan and as director for African Affairs on the National Security Council in the George W. Bush administration. Follow him on Twitter @_hudsonc.


AfricaSource Oct 19, 2020
Sudan is removed from the terror list. Now what?
After twenty-seven years on the US State Sponsor of Terrorism list, President Trump today announced, via Twitter, that Sudan’s terror designation was at long last being removed. While many details of the deal struck between the Trump Administration and the transitional authorities in Sudan have yet to emerge, the announcement by itself should be welcomed as a major achievement for both Washington and Khartoum.
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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/kroenig-and-ashford-discuss-us-election-results-and-the-potential-for-hostile-actions-by-adversaries/ Thu, 05 Nov 2020 22:16:56 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=317850 On November 5, Foreign Policy published a biweekly column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and New American Engagement Initiative senior fellow Emma Ashford discussing the latest news in international affairs. In this column, they discuss uncertain US presidential election results, the possibility that adversaries could take advantage of the United States while it is awaiting a […]

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]]> original source

On November 5, Foreign Policy published a biweekly column featuring Scowcroft Center deputy director Matthew Kroenig and New American Engagement Initiative senior fellow Emma Ashford discussing the latest news in international affairs.

In this column, they discuss uncertain US presidential election results, the possibility that adversaries could take advantage of the United States while it is awaiting a definitive outcome, and the potential for civil war in Ethiopia.

I think the fear of a fait accompli on Taiwan—or elsewhere—during the election aftermath or a transition period is seriously overblown.

Emma Ashford

I do fear that an adversary might try to take advantage of the United States’ internal fixation on the election and the possible uncertainties of a transition to a new administration.

Matthew Kroenig


Staff
Matthew Kroenig
Vice President and Senior Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
China Defense Policy

Former staff
Emma Ashford
Former Resident Senior Fellow, New American Engagement Initiative
New American Engagement Initiative Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
Conflict Economic Sanctions

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]]> https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/insight-impact/in-the-news/bruton-quoted-in-the-washington-post-on-tanzanias-2020-presidential-election/ Tue, 27 Oct 2020 20:50:00 +0000 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/?p=335611 The post Bruton quoted in the Washington Post on Tanzania’s 2020 presidential election appeared first on Atlantic Council.
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