That risk is due to a number of factors, but one glaring reason is the limited availability or mining of these minerals in the United States. That is increasingly problematic as demand for these minerals rises, considering the role they play in building a green economy globally.

In contrast, across the Atlantic, Africa is home to over 30 percent of the world’s known reserves of critical minerals. While international interest and investment in the African critical-minerals industry have been lagging, it is rapidly picking up; this is welcome news for resource-rich African nations.

But history shows that mining interest and investment—even if welcome—can have inadvertent negative effects. In recent years, mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, and South Africa have been found to be polluting waterways, contributing to acid rain, and poisoning residents. Thus, the US public and private sectors should develop strategies surrounding mining projects that ensure African workers’ health is protected, the environment is not damaged, and the opinions of local communities are sought out, heard, and respected.

Acknowledge the checkered history of mining in Africa

It is important for mining companies and foreign governments to be cognizant of the historical context that surrounds the African mining industry.

For example, in South Africa in the nineteenth century, the discovery of diamonds and gold brought Africans and Europeans alike to mining areas such as the Witwatersrand and mining towns such as Kimberley. After the initial boom, the South African government passed the Natives Land Act in 1913, which restricted Black Africans from buying or occupying land outside of specified areas, except as employees. This policy restricted many Africans from benefiting from the proceeds of mining minerals, and for these people, their main access to any financial gain from the mines came only from working as miners.

While the legislation was repealed in 1991—and others like it are firmly in Africa’s past—it created the conditions for a variety of socioeconomic challenges, including poverty, inequality, and landlessness. Thus, as the US public and private sectors look to get more involved on the continent with mining projects, they should integrate into their strategies a plan for increasing economic opportunity for local communities.

The US government seems to be headed in this direction already with its support for and investment in the Lobito Corridor project, which aims to update the infrastructure along an economic route stretching from the DRC and Zambia to an Angolan port in order to improve the flow of mining-related trade and also to create jobs for local communities. Concerns still remain, but this form of holistic engagement is essential to ensuring mutual prosperity in mining projects.

Don’t exacerbate the “resource curse”

Many African countries have been associated with a “resource curse,” a term that refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to fully benefit from their natural resources.

For example, Cabo Delgado, a small province in Mozambique’s north, is one of the country’s poorest regions, despite the region’s many natural resources. This has led many in Cabo Delgado to feel marginalized and angry at the central government. A 2011 discovery of a massive natural gas field off the northeastern coast of Mozambique further exacerbated this dissatisfaction. Specifically, youth in the region felt sidelined as foreigners and Mozambicans from elsewhere in the country benefited from the jobs and wealth associated with the discovery.

As the government formalized the mining sector and centralized control of it, artisanal miners were displaced. A widely held sense of injustice gave rise to an Islamist militant group, Mozambique’s al-Shabaab, which took advantage of these grievances to gain popularity among youth in the region. The activities of various armed groups in Cabo Delgado have resulted in around five thousand deaths and the displacement of 582,000 people since 2017.  

In conducting mining projects on the continent, the US public and private sector should add to their strategies specific plans to ensure that the benefits of natural-resource endowment reach local communities.

Botswana provides a positive example. In recent years, the country—one of the world’s leading producers of diamonds and also among the least corrupt on the African continent—has developed a “pro-equity based extractive sector strategy,” taking revenues from extractive sectors and investing them in health and education infrastructure and also into long-term savings through an asset fund. There are also various mechanisms and institutions set up to prevent or catch corruption, such as a constitutionally independent body in charge of cases of corruption. Botswana shows that strong business and the fight against corruption are perfectly compatible.

As part of any strategy, US stakeholders should support African countries in their anti-corruption endeavors and empower human-rights organizations that risk much to protect the resources of these countries and ensure benefits from mining reach local communities. Doing so would encourage African countries to take corruption issues seriously and, in the long run, would create a more attractive environment for sustainable investments. That contradicts the naive belief of some people—such as Israeli businessman Dan Gertler, who was sanctioned by the Trump administration for what it called “corrupt mining and oil deals” in the DRC (he has denied wrongdoing)—that lifting sanctions would be a way to bring back foreign investors.

Strategize for stability

Over time, mismanaged mining projects have contributed to instability, violence, and conflict across Africa.

That dynamic can be seen not only in the Mozambique case but also in Kivu, a region in the DRC’s east. The DRC is central to the production of several critical minerals. For example, as much as 70 percent of global cobalt comes from the DRC. A conflict has gripped the region for almost three decades, and armed groups have wrestled control of mining areas to finance their operations. The DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and China have often put their interests ahead of those of the residents, who are hoping to see their quality of life improve. Currently, six million people are internally displaced within the DRC, and since the start of the conflict in 1996, six million people have been killed.

With this history in mind, US mining companies with projects on the continent must strategize on how to limit the role mining plays in exacerbating conflicts and tensions. They can do that by bringing more of the supply chain—specifically, value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing—to the continent.

Industrializing the mineral sector in Africa

Historically, mining in Africa has been exploited by foreign partners. China, for example, controls 80 percent of the world’s raw mineral refining and owns fifteen of the seventeen cobalt mining operations in the DRC.

But the US public and private sector can change this status quo by bringing more of the value-adding stages of critical-mineral processing to the African continent, rather than extracting the minerals and bringing them immediately overseas for processing. Not only would this appeal to local populations—as it would encourage industrialization—but employing this different strategy would offer the United States a comparative advantage over China.

A strategy that brings value-adding steps of the value chain to the continent should promote local job creation, prioritize environmental protection in areas with high floral and animal biodiversity, and protect workers’ health. It should also prioritize the deployment of cleaner mining techniques (including those mobilizing artificial intelligence) and encourage countries to adopt a tax that allows for a more fair and just distribution of revenues from mining.

Economic communities—such as the Southern African Development Community—should also play a role in promoting regional value chains. Through such groupings, countries should take advantage of opportunities to share information and data, build capacities, and harmonize legal frameworks.

Stakeholders from the United States must remember that this is about more than curbing Chinese and Russian influence on the continent; rather, it is about avoiding past wrongdoings on the continent, by supporting local communities and preventing mining operations from contributing to various forms of instability and conflict.  

But there’s also a bigger picture to keep in mind: By getting mining investment right, the United States can set a new precedent for its collaboration with African countries in other areas, such as in health, security, and technology.

Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

Sibi Nyaoga is a program assistant for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center where he supports the center’s work on critical minerals and migration. 

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Kenya is a prime example: In 2007, a local telecommunications provider launched a form of mobile money called M-PESA, which enabled peer-to-peer money transfers between mobile phones and became wildly successful. Within five years, it grew to fifteen million users, with a deposit value approaching almost one billion dollars. To address rising security concerns, in 2013, the Kenyan government implemented a law requiring every citizen to officially register the SIM card (for their cell phone) using a government identification (ID). The measure was enforced swiftly, leading to the freezing of millions of SIM cards. Over ten years later, SIM card ID registration laws have become common across Africa, with over fifty countries adopting such regulations. 

But that is not the end of the story. In parallel, a practice called third-party SIM registration has become rampant, in which cell phone users register their SIM cards using someone else’s ID, such as a friend’s or a family member’s. 

Our recent research at Carnegie Mellon University, based on in-depth user studies in Kenya and Tanzania, found that this phenomenon of third-party SIM registration has both unexpected origins and unintended consequences. Many individuals in those countries face systemic challenges in obtaining a government ID. Moreover, some participants in our study reported having privacy concerns. They felt uncomfortable sharing their ID information with mobile money agents, who could repurpose that information for scams, harassment, or other unintended uses. Other participants felt “frustrated” by a process that was “cumbersome.” As a result, many users prefer to register a SIM card with another person’s ID rather than use or obtain their own ID.

Third-party SIM registration plainly undermines the effectiveness of the public policy and has additional, downstream effects. Telecommunications companies end up collecting “know your customer” information that is not reliable, which can impede law enforcement investigations in the case of misconduct. For example, one of our study subjects shared the story of a friend lending their ID for third-party registration, and later being arrested for the alleged crimes of the actual user of the SIM card. 

A core implication of our research is that the Kenyan government’s goals did not fully take into account the realities of the target population—or the feasibility of the measures that Kenya and Tanzania proposed. In response, people invented their own workarounds, thus potentially introducing new vulnerabilities and avenues for fraud.

Good policy, bad consequences 

Several other case studies demonstrate how even well-intentioned regulations can have unintended consequences and practical problems if they do not appropriately consider security, privacy and usability together. 

• Uganda: Much like our findings in Kenya and Tanzania, a biometric digital identity program in Uganda has considerable unintended consequences. Specifically, it risks excluding fifteen million Ugandans “from accessing essential public services and entitlements” because they do not have access to a national digital identity card there. While the digitization of IDs promises to offer certain security features, it also has potential downsides for data privacy and risks further marginalizing vulnerable groups who are most in need of government services.
  
• Europe: Across the European Union (EU), a landmark privacy law called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has been critical for advancing data protection and has become a benchmark for regulatory standards worldwide. But GDPR’s implementation has had unforeseen effects such as some websites blocking EU users. Recent studies have also highlighted various usability issues that may thwart the desired goals. For example, opting out of data collection through app permissions and setting cookie preferences is an option for users. But this option is often exclusionary and inconvenient, resulting in people categorically waiving their privacy for the sake of convenience.
  
• United States (health law): Within the United States, the marquee federal health privacy law passed in 1996 (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, known as HIPAA) was designed to protect the privacy and security of individuals’ medical information. But it also serves as an example of laws that can present usability challenges for patients and healthcare providers alike. For example, to comply with HIPAA, many providers still require the use of ink signatures and fax machines. Not only are technologies somewhat antiquated and cumbersome (thereby slowing information sharing)—they also pose risks arising from unsecured fax machines and misdialed phone numbers, among other factors.
  
• Jamaica: Both Jamaica and Kenya have had to halt national plans to launch a digital ID in light of privacy and security issues. Kenya already lost over $72 million from a prior project that was launched in 2019, which failed because of serious concerns related to privacy and security. In the meantime, fraud continues to be a considerable problem for everyday citizens: Jamaica has incurred losses of more than $620 million from fraud since 2018.
  
• United States [tax system]: The situation in Kenya and Jamaica mirrors the difficulties encountered by other digital ID programs. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has had to hold off plans for facial recognition based on concerns about the inadequate privacy measures, as well as usability concerns—like long verification wait times, low accuracy for certain groups, and the lack of offline options. The stalled program has resulted in missed opportunities for other technologies that could have allowed citizens greater convenience in accessing tax-related services and public benefits. Even after investing close to $187 million towards biometric identification, the IRS has not made much progress.
  

Collectively, a key takeaway from these international experiences is that when policymakers fail to simultaneously balance (or even consider) usability, privacy, and security, the progress of major government initiatives and the use of digitization to achieve important policy goals is hampered. In addition to regulatory and legislative challenges, delaying or canceling initiatives due to privacy and usability concerns can lead to erosion in public trust, increased costs and delays, and missed opportunities for other innovations.

Policy as product design

Going forward, one pivotal way for government decision makers to avoid pitfalls like the ones laid out above is to start thinking like product designers. Focusing on the most immediate policy goals is rarely enough to understand the practical and technological dimensions of how that policy will interact with the real world.

That does not mean, of course, that policymakers must all become experts in creating software products or designing user interfaces. But it does mean that some of the ways that product designers tend to think about big projects could inform effective public policy.

First, policymakers should embrace user studies to better understand the preferences and needs of citizens as they interact digitally with governmental programs and services. While there are multiple ways user studies can be executed, the first often includes upfront qualitative and quantitative research to understand the core behavioral drivers and systemic barriers to access. These could be complemented with focus groups, particularly with marginalized communities and populations who are likely to be disproportionately affected by any unintended outcomes of tech policy. 

Second, like early-stage technology products that are initially rolled out to an early group of users (known as “beta-testing”), policymakers could benefit from pilot testing to encourage early-stage feedback. 

Third, regulators—just like effective product designers—should consider an iterative process whereby they solicit feedback, implement changes to a policy or platform, and then repeat the process. This allows for validation of the regulation and makes room for adjustments and continuous improvements as part of an agency’s rulemaking process.

Lastly, legislators and regulators alike should conduct more regular tabletop exercises to see how new policies might play out in times of crisis. The executive branch regularly does such “tabletops” in the context of national security emergencies. But the same principles could apply to understanding cybersecurity vulnerabilities or user responses before implementing public policies or programs at scale.

In the end, a product design mindset will not completely eliminate the sorts of problems we have highlighted in Kenya, the United States, and beyond. However, it can help to identify the most pressing usability, security, and privacy problems before governments spend time and treasure to implement regulations or programs that may not fit the real world.

Karen Sowon is a user experience researcher and post doctoral research associate at Carnegie Mellon University.

JP Schnapper-Casteras is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and the founder and managing partner at Schnapper-Casteras, PLLC.

Giulia Fanti is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and an assistant professor of electrical and computer engineering at Carnegie Mellon University.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

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The news broke after the Moroccan royal palace released a communiqué that referenced a letter from French President Emmanuel Macron to the king of Morocco on the commemoration of the silver jubilee of his coronation. The letter states that the “present and future of Western Sahara fall within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty.” In his correspondence with the Moroccan king, Macron added that “France intends to act consistently with this position at both national and international levels.” Although the French position explicitly references Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, it will need more clarification and translation into concrete policies in the coming months.

Nonetheless, the French decision is particularly significant given its colonial past in North Africa and its shared responsibility with Spain in largely determining the postcolonial borders of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. These borders are the origin of many of the current territorial disputes in the region. France’s endorsement of the Moroccan autonomy plan this week follows similar support from Spain in 2022 and recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara expressed by the United States in 2020 and Israel in 2023, along with a growing list of Arab and African nations.

Understanding the French calculus

France’s shift of stance comes as its relations with Morrocco have been strained. Since 2020, Rabat has pressured Paris to break the status quo—a neutrality on the issue apparently intended not to upset either Morocco or Algeria—and take a clearer stance on the Western Sahara. Striking a deal with then-US President Donald Trump in 2020 over the disputed territories and normalizing ties with Israel boosted Morocco’s diplomatic confidence and helped redefine the kingdom’s foreign policy. As a result, the Sahara issue, in the words of the Moroccan king, became “the lens through which Morocco looks at the world.”

As an example of the deteriorating bilateral relations, Mohammed VI reportedly “definitely shelved” relations with Macron and declined state visit requests by the French president last year. In addition, the kingdom started to increase its divestment from business partnerships with France—previously considered its international economic partner of choice. Torn between Morocco and Algeria, France failed to balance its act in the Maghreb after a chain of unfortunate events, including the Pegasus spyware case, a visa crisis, and the recall of Rabat’s ambassador to France in February 2023. Most recently, Morocco refused French aid after the Marrakesh earthquake in September 2023.

France, however, never stopped courting Morocco, because Paris did not want to lose strategically important economic and political ground in Africa. For its part, Rabat did not break its relations with Paris entirely, continuing its intelligence and security cooperation with France. Moroccan forces, for example, are currently helping to secure the Paris Olympics. Morocco also appointed Samira Sitail, a dual national and Makhzan insider, as its ambassador to attempt to stir the stagnant waters.

Rather than trying to deter Morocco’s ambitious Atlantic Initiative—aimed at offering landlocked Sahel countries trade access to the ocean through a $1.2 billion harbor in Dakhla, Western Sahara—France is eying a share of the economic benefits promised by the project. The only catch is how to address the 2021 European Union (EU) court ruling against the Morocco-EU trade deal over Western Sahara, which the Elysée may now advocate to reverse together with other pro-Moroccan EU countries ahead of the final judgment, due in a few months.

Western Sahara and global realignment

Another defining factor in understanding the recent French decision lies in the global realignment behind old Cold War frontiers, and NATO allies engaging in historic contests against increasingly destabilizing forces. Morocco has always been a reliable partner to the global liberal West in its fight against Russian aggression and different terrorist groups. The country is also more-or-less aligned with the United States and France on a common vision of the future. As Iran and its proxies reinforce ties with the Algerian regime, which has been cultivating close relations with Russia since the 1970s, North Atlantic allies fear a new stronghold of antagonists in North Africa.

For the past five decades, Western Sahara has been a major security loophole at the doors of the Mediterranean and the Sahel. With growing rumors about Iranian and Wagner Group presence among Sahrawis in the Tindouf camps in western Algeria, where an estimated 173,600 refugees live, it’s becoming imperative for the United States and European countries to try to resolve the Western Sahara file once and for all.

Disrupting the status quo in the Maghreb

While on paper the French decision to side with Morocco may seem in line with its economic and global priorities, it does come at a price. EU neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict and exclusive reliance on the United Nations peacekeeping mission to maintain the status quo between Rabat and Algiers has been central to stabilizing the region. After the United States and Spain sided with Morocco, Algeria responded by severing diplomatic relations with Morocco in 2021 and recalling its ambassador in Madrid in 2022. Algeria also disrupted gas exports to Spain through Morocco by closing the EU-Maghreb pipeline just as tensions were building around Russia’s gas exports ahead of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reaction by Algiers to Macron’s swing toward Mohammed VI described France and Morocco as “colonial powers, new and old.” This was followed on Tuesday by Algeria recalling its ambassador in Paris to express its discontent.

Macron’s decision has alienated an already nervous Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, who is running for reelection on September 7. This week’s events may push him deeper into Iranian and Russian arms. Even though not expressly sought by any of the parties, the risk of recent events sparking up a wider regional conflict in the Maghreb is higher than ever. Even if in a way designed to avoid escalation, Algeria will likely feel it necessary to respond in some form.

Sarah Zaaimi is a cultural studies researcher and the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

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While African athletes that year had won thirty-seven medals, including eleven golds, it is expected that they will rake in much more—about fifty—in Paris. There is a lot expected of several stars, including Kenyan marathon runner Eliud Kipchoge (considered the greatest marathoner of all time), Botswanan sprinter Letsile Tebogo, Burkinabé triple jumper Hugues Fabrice Zango, Senegalese tae kwon do champion Cheick Cissé Sallah, and Moroccan breakdancer Fatima El-Mamouny (who competes as Elmamouny). Some athletes are already meeting these expectations, with South African swimmer Tatjana Smith having already won a gold medal and Tunisian fencer Fares Ferjani having earned the silver. Beyond individual athletes, there is also optimism about various teams: For example, the Bright Stars of South Sudan were the object of great attention after giving the US team a wake-up call in a shockingly close exhibition game earlier this month (but on Wednesday, they lost to the United States).

There are also athletes who, in search of better training conditions, have migrated from Africa to countries in the West and will compete under those countries’ flags.

It is a challenge to be a high-level athlete in Africa. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC’s) initiatives in Africa, which fund projects to support sports on the continent, do not solve the structural problems that push African athletes to leave the continent. Usually, these expatriates blame the lack of African infrastructure and mentoring programs, in addition to the costs of training and other professional challenges. While some of the African athletes who train in the United States are still competing under the flags of African countries—such as Ivoirian sprinter Marie-Josée Ta Lou or world-record-holding Nigerian hurdler Oluwatobiloba “Tobi” Amusan—time away from the African continent can easily turn into a permanent departure and end with a change of citizenship.

With that being the case, the Olympic performances of African countries don’t fully reflect the true power of the continent in sport.

As a former French deputy minister of sports, I see a paradox in Africa’s sports sector: the youngest continent in the world (70 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is under thirty years old) is a place where people aren’t engaging as much in physical activity such as sports. Plus, a recent survey highlighted that the sports sector is “underdeveloped” with key deficits in data, public strategy, and private investments.

Sports are much more than hobbies for personal fulfillment or ways to improve health. They are also powerful tools for development, major business opportunities, and pivotal ways to exercise soft power.

The opportunity at hand

According to the United Nations (UN), sports play a role in achieving many of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, including goals such as eradicating poverty and famine, securing education for all, supporting victims of disasters or emergency situations, and fighting diseases. Sports can also help promote gender equality, as taking part in sports is associated with getting married later in life. The UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization runs a flagship initiative called Fit for Life, which uses sports to not only improve youth wellbeing and empowerment but also support more inclusive policymaking. The African Union (AU) has recognized the role that sports can play, as a driver of the cultural renaissance outlined in its Agenda 2063; the AU proposed a Sports Council to coordinate an African sports movement.

But the international recognition of the role sports play in development has come late—and there are issues that have yet to be sorted out. Olympic Agenda 2020, adopted by the IOC in 2014, outlines recommendations for countries to make the most of sports’ impact on society, encouraging them to align sports with economic and human development, build climate-friendly infrastructure, promote gender equality, protect the rights of children and laborers, acquire land ethically and without causing displacement, improve security, and protect the freedom of the press.

At previous global sport gatherings (notably the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar) human-rights communities have raised these issues. Their voice over many years has pushed organizations, such as FIFA and the IOC, to adopt various human-rights policies and frameworks. In considering the host nation for the 2026 World Cup, FIFA for the first time required bidding countries and cities to commit to human-rights obligations. Such requirements could have an impact in Africa, although that remains to be seen; an African country has only once hosted a global sport gathering (South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup), while Egypt currently has its eye on the 2036 Summer Olympics, over a decade from now.

Beyond development, sports are major business opportunities. South Africa has continued to argue that hosting the World Cup was worth it, as the billions it spent went toward much-needed infrastructure that has supported an increase in tourism—and thus, economic activity—that lasted for more than a decade. The global sports industry was worth $512 billion in 2023 and is projected to grow to $624 billion in 2027. 

In Africa, the contribution of sports to the continent’s gross domestic product is more limited (0.5 percent) than it is for the world at large (3 percent). And while North America has the largest share of the sports market, Africa’s share is growing at a rate of 8 percent each year. The National Basketball Association’s investment in the Basketball Africa League is a signal to other investors of the positive outlook for African sports and the new ecosystem of opportunities. With Africa’s middle class estimated to reach 1.1 billion by 2060, and with the continent urbanizing and growing more connected, Africa is a premier market for ventures in the sports industry.

If this business opportunity is harnessed, there is reason to be optimistic that African talent will no longer have to seek earnings abroad and that African markets will see added value, including in the form of new infrastructure, hospitality offerings, merchandising, and content/media. Upcoming major sports events on the continent are slated to generate such growth, with Senegal organizing the 2026 Youth Olympic Games and Morocco co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup.

Well-structured and adequately supported sports are also tools of soft power, and countries around the world, notably Saudi Arabia, are investing in them. In Africa, the Olympic Games have always been an opportunity for African countries to speak more loudly than in the UN fora. For example, African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics, protesting New Zealand’s participation after the country’s national rugby team played several matches in South Africa (which had been banned from the Olympics because of its apartheid policy). At the 1992 Barcelona Olympics, as apartheid came to an end, the finalists of the ten-thousand-meter race—Derartu Tulu, a Black athlete from Ethiopia, and Elana Meyer, a white athlete from South Africa—hugged each other to celebrate South Africa’s return.

A new sports agenda

Africa had a late introduction to global sport competition. No African country has ever hosted the Olympic Games. The first Black African athletes—South African runners Len Taunyane and Jan Mashiani—didn’t get the opportunity to compete until 1904, eight years after the first modern Olympic Games were held. It wasn’t until the 1960 Olympic Games in Rome that the first Black African athlete took the gold: Ethiopian Abebe Bikila won the marathon running barefoot. Since then, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Africa have been the leading Olympic teams from Africa.

To be able to compete with the best teams today and to hold onto its talents, Africa needs a more robust agenda that covers all dimensions of sports.

First, it is essential to address youth education. Governments should include sports in education systems, and sports federations should organize regular competitions within local leagues for youth. Governments should also consider making their funding of training centers contingent on the number of enrolled athletes; it has been shown that sports help improve enrollment and attendance at school, and thus sporting excellence can lead to academic excellence. Of course, in addition to investing in sports facilities at schools, it is crucial to also invest in infrastructure that helps underserved populations access these facilities, thus easing regional inequalities.

However, the financing of African sports cannot be too dependent on governments’ budgets (as it currently is) seeing as national budgets are limited. African governments should provide a fiscal and regulatory framework that supports the work of the private sector. Rather than abandoning the athletes to themselves, governments should consider creating national centers of excellence or institutes for training—similar to France’s National Institute of Sport, Expertise, and Performance—which would allow athletes to access better training conditions on the continent, hopefully keeping them in Africa.

Governments should also ensure that foreign clubs and teams that continue to host the greatest African athletes financially support the development of the African sports industry, which would not only help cultivate more star talent but also foster job creation in advertising, sports medicine, journalism, and fitness.

Sports have much greater geopolitical significance than many decision makers realize. Moving forward, they should integrate sports into their foreign policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

For Africa, the surge in athletic talent is evidence that its people are committed to a new era for the continent. Leaders should harness this opportunity to supercharge Africa’s transformative sports movement.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. She was formerly the French deputy minister of sports and also served as the ambassador of France to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

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The Mattei Plan is not supposed to operate in a vacuum but is solidly affected and conditioned by the wider international community. However, evolving international dynamics among superpowers and regional powers do not bode for much optimism. Despite some positive events—such as French center-left parties’ relative containment of what was initially expected to be a glamorous victory for right-wing populism and extremism, as well as some successes in cohesion and policymaking by international organizations and institutions such as the Group of Seven (G7), Group of Twenty (G20), and NATO—the trend doesn’t look positive at all. In the background lie the war in Ukraine, the Gaza war, and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The renewed rivalry for world dominance and the great-power competition between the United States, China, and Russia loom above everything.

North Africa is particularly vulnerable to these dynamics. The ideal part of the Mattei Plan is that it can positively defuse regional tensions. It has been a long-held belief of the European Union (EU), the United States, and the main international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that, to create a beneficial environment for economic development and political evolution, the five North Africa states of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania should agree to form some sort of “union.”

The Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) was born out of this thinking in 1989. In reality, the regimes then in power created it to fight the Islamist-led popular revolts, which, starting in the mid-1980s, were occurring in each of the North African countries in increasing numbers. UMA was also created to facilitate the exchange of security personnel and intelligence cooperation by these regimes. Because of this, no other sectors—such as the social, political, and cultural sectors—were developed. And once each UMA country felt more secure, it de facto withdrew from the union.

For a brief moment following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings—which were poised to bring to power, in a more or less democratic way, new elites more responsible for the wellbeing of their populations—international actors thought there was a will to renew a pledge to the UMA. However, the five North African regimes were generally unresponsive to their populations’ demands. There was an expectation that things would improve through democratic elections and that, once in power, the populations would be more prone to engage their neighbors in some kind of integration. But that didn’t happen. Instead, each country backslid into authoritarianism and, thus, in a more isolationist direction.

With this in mind, the prevailing trend, as determined by today’s evolution of the international system, may lead North Africa not toward integration but toward creating rival blocs. Morocco, which has elites strongly tied to Western nations and with Western values, has adapted a policy of cooperation and alliance with Western countries, especially the United States, and institutions such as NATO and the EU. Clear evidence of this pro-Western position is King Mohammed VI’s adhesion to the Abraham Accords pushed by then President Donald Trump as a way to create a new peaceful path to collaboration between Arab states and the state of Israel, in exchange for the US president’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara.

Morocco’s ruler has exerted enormous effort for Moroccan banks and commercial entities to penetrate the West African region’s economy. The success of this action has also gained much support for the ruler’s political ambitions.

Just to the East of Morocco and in contrast to its policies and economic activities, is the country of Algeria. The military-backed regime in power—which values nationalism, Arabism, and third-worldism—finds its legitimacy in the Algerian people’s war for independence from France in the late 1950s.

Algeria has been a staunch supporter of revolutionary and liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere. Thus, support for the Palestinian struggle against Israel quickly became a rallying cry in Algeria. Its relative closeness with the Soviet Union, and with Vladimir Putin’s Russia today, is the natural outcome of these positions. It is easy to see how Algeria could constitute an bloc adversarial toward Morocco. Add to this the wide influence that Algeria exerts on Tunisian President Kais Saied’s quest for absolute power and the natural gravitation of western Libya toward Algeria and Tunisia, and it’s easy to see the formation of bloc in opposition to that represented by Morocco.

Eastern Libya today is controlled by the rogue General Khalifa Haftar and his family, which is almost entirely dependent on Egyptian military support, and will probably detach the region from the western part of the country. Sadly, this would mean the end of a united Libya. This is a scenario that the West should do whatever it can to avoid. The United States seems too distracted by other issues and incapable of reacting to these trends. On the other hand, Italy and some of its European partners could use the idea behind the Mattei Plan to play a neutral role in the North Africa contest and help a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco. This requires not making Algeria feel isolated from Western countries.

Prime Minister Meloni’s personal visit to Algeria in January 2023 was important for this reason, as was the one made afterward. Italian diplomacy was also active in keeping relations open and ongoing with Tunisian President Saied and in the warm relationship with the United Nations-recognized government in Tripoli. While this might sound ideal, Italy and its allies must take one step forward, which would foster a faster and deeper rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. This could lead to an agreement in Libya in which the western part, strongly under the influence of Turkey, and the eastern part, which is entirely dependent on Egyptian support, may be convinced to find a way out of their crisis that entails the unity of the country rather than separation. A united Libya under the protection of NATO member Turkey and longtime US ally Egypt will not fall into the radical bloc. On the contrary, it might even be able to help lure Tunisia away from the pro-Russian potential bloc, while exerting an opposing influence on Algeria’s historical pro-Russian tendency by showing the benefits of standing with the West and collaborating with the Mattei Plan.

The Piano Mattei, a new vision of cooperation and collaboration on all fronts with the emerging societies of Africa, will be a great engine for this Italian and, ergo, Western policy of utilizing soft power to overcome issues that have previously created many problems for European countries.

Those who criticize the plan as empty of content, or cite its lack of purpose or precise allocation of resources, are missing the point. It is not only an economic plan but a political intuition to move away from today’s stagnant international cooperation policies and toward new dynamics that could produce extraordinary results if carefully implemented.

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

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It’s often easy to spot where repression and hardship are severe. Parts of Europe and the Middle East are now entrenched in brutal war, and Russia and China are promoting autocratic models of governance around the world. Yet it would be a mistake to overlook some of the less visible efforts to advance democracy, freedom, and prosperity in response to these challenges. In particular, the Biden administration has made several important strides to adjust and adapt how the United States engages in international development.

US President Joe Biden, who announced on Sunday that he would not seek reelection, and his administration have sought greater inclusion of developing nations in addressing economic, social, and climate-related issues. Not only rooted in a battle for soft power against China and Russia, these efforts are also advancing global prosperity. They define how the United States interacts with the developing world, and they help shape how the United States is perceived abroad.

Shortly after Biden came into office in January 2021, his administration reengaged with international organizations. The administration has, for example, viewed the United Nations (UN) as an important venue for realizing US foreign policy goals and demonstrating global leadership. While US contributions to the UN have remained steady, the Trump administration sought to reduce or eliminate voluntary contributions to some UN programs, targeting peacekeeping operations and several specialized agencies. Biden restored funding to agencies that faced cuts under Trump, and he halted the planned US exit from the World Health Organization, allowing US contributions to continue uninterrupted. Biden also restarted funding for the UN Population Fund to support its work on ending preventable maternal death, reducing the unmet need for family planning, and ending gender-based violence. Under Biden, the United States contributed nearly $100 million to this fund in 2021, and more than $160 million in both 2022 and 2023, making it the largest single country contributor.

But international organizations are only part of the equation when dealing with the developing world. A more consequential legacy for Biden will be the Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), the rebrand of his “Build Back Better World” initiative.

Over the past two decades, China has shifted its international development strategy, building influence through traditional global organizations and launching initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative. China’s expanding influence through these initiatives has raised concerns about its impact on the developing world. While allegations of debt-trap diplomacy might be wrong, Beijing’s approach of decoupling human rights from governance risks fueling the rise of autocratic societies.

The BRI, now a one-trillion-dollar endeavor, has prompted the United States and its G7 partners to create their own alternative, the PGI. The PGI aims to counter the BRI’s influence by boosting investments in sustainable infrastructure around the world and driving transparent investment in quality infrastructure.

At the 2024 G7 summit in Italy, Biden and other G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the PGI, emphasizing sustainable infrastructure investment. Biden highlighted historic progress, including mobilizing more than sixty billion dollars toward the PGI through federal financing, grants, and leveraged private-sector investments over the past three years—in effect doubling the contributions announced at the previous year’s G7 summit. The Biden administration’s stated goal is to mobilize $200 billion by 2027 to support the G7 target of $600 billion.

Successful implementation of the PGI will be essential to regaining the trust of developing countries by providing much-needed investment in social infrastructure. There is hope that the effort will continue beyond 2025 no matter who the next president is. A sister initiative, the Blue Dot Network, which aims to advance robust standards for global infrastructure, was launched in 2019 by the Trump administration and is rooted in the same principles as the PGI. The Biden administration continued this initiative and officially launched it in April of this year, at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris.

By securing support from the G7 and the OECD, Biden’s PGI might not only endure but significantly improve how other nations view the United States. The initiative has the potential to foster a win-win relationship in development finance, something that the United States and the West have been failing at over the past ten years.

Joseph Lemoine is the director of the Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Center. Previously, he was a private sector specialist at the World Bank.

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If the United States does not collaborate more with Africa on space-related activities, it risks not only losing strategic and geopolitical influence to China and Russia and missing out on a growing market but also hindering scientific and technological advancements. That would limit the contribution of space-based solutions to solving challenges, for example ones related to sustainability, climate change, and disaster management. A lack of collaboration would also leave behind an opportunity to shape space security and strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries.

Collaboration as it stands today

Following the US-Africa Leaders Summit in October last year, the US Departments of Commerce and State and the African Union organized the US-Africa Commercial Space Stakeholders Meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, to build multilateral space partnerships and foster space commerce. At the meeting, the African Union representatives highlighted the African Outer Space Programme—which looks to strengthen the African Union’s use of space—and the role it plays in realizing Africa’s Agenda 2063 and powering development. Meanwhile, the US Office of Space Commerce, tasked with protecting conditions for economic growth and technological innovation in space, outlined how African institutions can reach US space institutions to explore collaborations on capacity building, Earth observation, positioning and navigation, satellite communications, and more—although no clear plans for such collaboration were finalized.

Currently, the United States’ main space-related projects with Africa are SERVIR and Harvest. SERVIR, an initiative by NASA and the US Agency for International Development, helps countries use Earth observation data and geospatial technologies to improve environmental management and climate resilience. SERVIR West Africa, launched in 2016, gathers several science and research institutions in promoting the use of satellite imagery and geospatial tools to help stakeholders and decision makers across the Sahel make informed decisions about agriculture, water resources, the weather, the climate, and ecosystems. SERVIR Eastern and Southern Africa ran from 2008 to 2023 and developed geospatial services using Earth observations and NASA data to support resilient development.

NASA Harvest, led by researchers at the University of Maryland, aims to advance the use of satellite Earth observations to benefit food security, agriculture, and environmental resilience. The Harvest Africa initiative applies Earth observation-based data to agricultural monitoring and assessments conducted across East and Southern Africa. National and regional agencies work together to ensure a smooth transition to respective government agencies or partners. Projects include enhancing Tanzania’s agrometeorological services, developing Earth observation-based agricultural monitoring systems, and improving food security and resilience.

Skyrocketing opportunity

Out of approximately $4.7 billion in satellite contracts from Africa between 1998 and 2023, $1.396 billion went to China and Russia, while only $250 million went to US companies, according to a report by my analytics company, Space in Africa (based in Nigeria and Estonia). Furthermore, out of 187 space collaboration agreements with African institutions from 2001 to 2023, fifty-eight were with Chinese and Russian entities and only twenty-seven with US institutions. Additionally, Egypt and South Africa have joined the International Lunar Research Station mission led by Russia and China, with Ethiopia and Kenya recently signing memorandums of understanding to join as well.

Significant satellite communications infrastructures—such as NigComSat-1R for Nigeria, AngoSat-2 for Angola, and AlComSat-1 for Algeria—were developed by China or Russia. For instance, in addressing national security, Nigeria’s Defence Space Administration launched the DelSat-1 satellite, contracted and launched by China, with plans for five additional satellites.

But while many US foreign policies towards Africa aim to counter China and Russia’s influence, this approach should not extend to the space sector. Space cooperation offers the opportunity to achieve broader US foreign-policy goals independently.

Africa’s space industry presents the United States with economic opportunity. For example, according to the Space in Africa report, Africa’s space industry currently generates about $19 billion annually, with projections indicating growth to over $22.64 billion by 2026. US satellite communications companies such as ViaSat and Starlink—along with Earth observation data providers such as Maxar Technologies, Tomorrow.io, and Planet Labs, and geographic-information-system (GIS) software companies such as Esri—have found a robust market in Africa.

Africa offers significant opportunities for space diplomacy as well. For instance, Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group signed an agreement with Djibouti to build a launch site there, and Turkey announced a space program that would build a launch site in Somalia. The United States can similarly leverage these opportunities to foster mutual benefits including capacity development, technology transfer, and ecosystem development. African space programs, at both national and continental levels, often embrace nonaligned diplomacy, allowing them to cooperate with a variety of countries based on mutual interests. While the United States is taking some steps in the right direction and showing its willingness to collaborate with Africa on space issues—as US stakeholders did at the NewSpace Africa Conference, which my company and the African Union co-hosted—it is time for the United States to identify mutual interests with Africa to develop a robust space partnership.

The United States, as a global leader in the space sector, has an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic relations with African countries and the African Union (through the African Union’s African Space Agency). African countries have demonstrated their capability to contribute to critical technology development, supporting ambitious space missions and building satellite components for global markets. For example, South Africa provides tracking support for the Artemis mission, and Rwandan students have developed artificial-intelligence algorithms for onboard satellite image processing. The United States can capitalize on these developments to foster a mutually beneficial space partnership with Africa.

The United States can, for example, support African policies aligned with US best practices that promote space sustainability at the grassroots level, which can enhance US space diplomacy in select African countries. This support can help African nations establish standards for safe and responsible space activities, thereby promoting stability, security, and long-term sustainability in alignment with several US policies and strategies. Additionally, fostering US participation in African space innovation can build strategic partnerships, increase trade opportunities, facilitate technology transfer, and encourage US investments in the African space market, boosting its global competitiveness. Facilitating market and trade exposure for small to medium US businesses to engage with Africa, along with providing networking opportunities, can deepen relationships between US and African space enterprises—much in alignment with the broader US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa and the White House’s previous efforts to expand the US-Africa partnership.

While recent US engagements have advanced discussions on collaboration with Africa in space development, it is now time to implement clear actions backed by strong strategies.

Temidayo Oniosun is the managing director of Space in Africa, an analytics and consulting company in the African Space and satellite industry.

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But, as entertainment and media experts from PwC warn, growth in Africa’s entertainment industries “will be distributed unevenly, with some sectors stagnating while others skyrocket.” African governments, international partners, and global investors can all play a strategic role in unlocking the commercial potential of overlooked markets and creative economies across the continent.

African music, for example, has witnessed a meteoric global rise, with the likes of Wizkid and Tems “reshaping the sound and texture of pop music,” according to Rolling Stone. Afrobeats artists were streamed over thirteen billion times on Spotify in 2022. Revenue from the music industry in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by 24 percent last year, the fastest growth globally. Between 2017 and 2023, royalties for South African artists on Spotify have increased by 500 percent; Tyla, a twenty-two-year-old who earlier this year referred to herself as a “Jozi girl living the dream,” won the first Best African Music Performance award at the 2024 Grammys. And major labels like Audiomack and Universal Music Group have opened offices on the continent, investing heavily in African talent.

Africa’s television and film industry is also reaching new global audiences. Showmax, a streaming platform headquartered in South Africa, is ramping up production on twenty-one new and original African shows. Since 2016, Netflix has invested more than $175 million in African films, including a multi-title deal with a Nigerian production company. The Nigerian movie The Black Book was watched by over twenty million people in its first weeks, becoming at one point the third most-streamed movie worldwide. African film companies have inked deals with the likes of Walt Disney Animation Studios for original productions released globally on services such as Disney+, including the animated Iwájú series, for which Disney collaborated with London-based African storytelling company Kugali Media. Nollywood, the world’s second-largest film industry by production volume, generates $1.2 billion in annual revenues.

With Africa’s population projected to nearly double to 2.5 billion people by 2050, the continent will host one-third of the planet’s young people and the fastest-growing consumer markets for the entertainment industry. Music streaming revenues in Africa are expected to rise from $92.9 million in 2021 to $314.6 million by 2026. Platforms like Spotify, Paramount+, and Netflix are vying for a share of this expanding market with compelling, locally produced content. Nigeria, poised to become one of the ten biggest economies in the world by 2050, generated $45.2 million in revenues from music, television, and film streaming in 2022—a 55 percent increase compared to the year before.

Other creative industries, like gaming, have significant growth potential in Africa but haven’t yet seen breakthrough moments comparable to music, television, and film. The continent is the fastest-growing global market for the gaming industry, expected to generate more than one billion dollars in 2024 for the first time ever, with the number of African gamers doubling over the past five years—mostly driven by youth gaming on their phones. But local game developers have yet to gain a strong foothold on the continent or beyond, despite the clear potential for new and culturally rich gaming experiences rooted in the African context. Innovators like Guzo Technologies (which has participated in programs backed by Meta, where one of the authors works) are developing innovative gaming and learning experiences harnessing virtual reality, but there remain significant barriers to access and use for many Africans.

Some African governments, international partners, and investors are striving to boost their creative industries to stimulate growth, attract investment, and create jobs. In April 2024, Côte d’Ivoire partnered with a venture capital firm and bank to create a fund for entertainment startups. In October 2023, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Sony collaborated to invest in Africa’s creative industries. In announcing the initiative, the IFC highlighted the African creative economy’s “significant, untapped potential . . . for boosting economic growth and improving employment opportunities for young people and women.” Zambia announced a $100-million investment plan to transform its film industry. Actor Idris Elba is backing new film studios in Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Ghana, while Senegalese Director Mati Diop is opening a new film production house.

But African governments, their international partners, and investors can do more to ignite Africa’s creative industries. Artists have too often succeeded in spite of, not thanks to, the state—where regulatory barriers, weak intellectual property protections, and exacting tax regimes may inhibit the creative economy. Development finance institutions can follow the IFC’s lead by offering blended finance options to de-risk similar investments in other countries. The Democratic Republic of Congo—historically considered a regional cultural superpower, especially in music—shows significant growth potential, for example. Contemporary Congolese stars are yet to experience success akin to that of their Nigerian and South African peers; even Congolese icon Fally Ipupa has less than 7 percent of Nigerian artist Burna Boy’s monthly listeners on Spotify.

Beyond their remarkable economic impacts, Africa’s cultural entrepreneurs are reshaping global perceptions of the continent. As one African analyst noted, “historically, when we talk about global soft power, Africa has never really been top of mind.” But through television series and films set in Africa and written by Africans, artists are rewriting the infamous “single story” that has shaped international perceptions of a continent ravaged by war, poverty, and disease. One African-British journalist wrote about how “Afrobeats artists were the best [public relations] team we could ever have asked for—talented, arrogant, and unapologetically African.” The World Economic Forum has heralded a “rising Afro Wave inspired by the arts and cultural leaders of African and Afro diaspora . . . [empowering] nations to participate more actively in global conversations, enhancing their diplomatic influence, and forging connections that extend beyond geopolitical boundaries on key themes, issues, and business opportunities.”

Some caution that there are challenges presented by the rapid rise and commercialization of African cultural industries. Nollywood’s roots in the Yoruba people’s traveling theater tradition, with rapid recording and distribution networks, may become consigned to history as the local film industry transforms. Some African artists have also rejected the ubiquitous term “Afrobeats”—they argue it is a catchall term for an incredibly broad and diverse set of musical genres. Burna Boy, the first African artist to sell out a US stadium, said, “it’s not fair to just join everybody . . . It’s almost like joining hip-hop, R&B, and dancehall into one thing and [calling] it ‘Ameribeats.’ It doesn’t do justice to what’s really going on.”

African governments, international partners, and investors can all play a critical role in further unlocking the potential and impact of the continent’s creative industries. However, they must ensure that African artists and entrepreneurs retain ownership and creative control amid increasing international engagement and investment. Whether that is successfully done will determine whether Africa’s cultural economies benefit from the hard work of the artists and whether creative industries across the continent can build a new, better-informed international appreciation for Africa’s economic and cultural power.

Tom Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a 2023 Millennium fellow at the Atlantic Council and Meta’s head of misinformation policy for Europe, Middle East, and Africa.

Josefina Bonsundy-O’Bryan is a Women in Africa laureate, La Caixa Foundation fellow, and lawyer at Withersworldwide.

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The post It’s time to invest in the African creatives shaping global trends appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The higher demand for critical minerals is expected to cause a significant expansion in the extraction and production of an array of mineral resources. For example, the World Economic Forum projects that the production of minerals including graphite, cobalt, and lithium could increase by nearly 500 percent by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean-energy technologies. Estimated to hold approximately 30 percent of the volume of critical-mineral reserves, the African continent is situated at the very center of the energy transition.

A considerable amount of minerals—for example, 25 percent of tin and 26 percent of tantalum production—is sourced by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM): low-tech, labor-intensive mining operations in which workers (largely unskilled labor) use rudimentary tools and techniques to access mineral ore. ASM is an important source of rural employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated ten million people in the region working as artisanal and small-scale miners—sourcing critical minerals but also other minerals such as gold. These workers are often driven to the sector by poverty. At least sixty million other individuals facilitate these informal supply chains.

However, many of these artisanal and small-scale miners work informally and face harsh conditions. Before critical-mineral production ramps up even further, African communities, stakeholders, and governments must take steps to formalize these workers—and the international community, including the United States, should help.

What is the problem?

In contrast with ASM, large-scale mining (LSM) is industrial and long-term, utilizing heavy machinery to extract resources. Furthermore, LSM has more geological information available to it and better access to capital and finance. Most importantly, LSM generally operates within the rules of law and adheres to international standards and regulations. It is accompanied by many challenges, however, including causing ecological and habitat damage; polluting the water, air, and soil; and threatening human health. Even where mining operations are conducted legally and formally, they still pose significant environmental and socioeconomic problems.

Although vastly different types of mining, ASM and LSM often take place in overlapping spaces, with ASM operations appearing on the periphery of larger industrial sites. Artisanal miners frequently live and work in areas earmarked for large-scale mining projects, blurring the line between the two. This is exemplified by the presence of illicit or licit networks of middlemen who transport ore from ASM sites to LSM companies and processing facilities. Middlemen often aggregate minerals from various sources, including both ASM and LSM operations, making it especially difficult to trace the origin of the minerals. The fragmented and opaque nature of the mineral supply chain complicates the traceability of products from upstream suppliers to downstream companies.  

There are many challenges associated with artisanal mining. At least 90 percent of artisanal miners work informally, without the necessary licenses or permits required by law. Securing permits improves miners’ access to services they are unable to access in the informal economy—such as microfinance credit, grants, and government loan facilities, which, in turn, place the miners in a better position to accumulate wealth. In many cases, ASM activities are found in regions that are out of reach of regulators, where the institutional presence of the government is weak. By operating outside of state recognition, it becomes impossible for the government to establish and enforce health and safety standards and regulations.

With informal mining operations flying under the radar of the government, either by the design of mining site owners or willful ignorance on the part of the government, workers are routinely exposed to poor labor conditions and dangerous situations. Artisanal miners often work without proper tools and protective gear in unsupported and poorly ventilated underground shafts where, as Amnesty International points out, temperatures can be extremely high. Exposure to the dust and mineral waste generated from these mines can lead to potentially fatal diseases and health conditions, and the dust and waste also contributes to pollution and environmental degradation in the area surrounding the mine.

Across the African continent, artisanal mining has been linked to human-rights violations, forced labor, crime, and conflict. These issues, compounded with artisanal miners’ lack of legal rights, exacerbates their vulnerability and the cycles of poverty and exploitation they face.

More at stake

The problems in ASM often present a significant barrier to sustainable foreign investment in African critical minerals. The aforementioned problems in the artisanal sector have made Western business interests hesitant to invest in Africa’s critical minerals. Poor labor practices and human rights violations associated with ASM could expose global companies to reputational and regulatory risks. These concerns—combined with pressure from non-governmental and human-rights organizations—make investment in ASM a complicated and risky proposition.

This barrier is present in artisanal cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Cobalt is a critical component of many lithium-ion batteries, including ones used to power electric vehicles, produce components for wind and solar energy technologies, and power portable electronic devices such as smartphones. The DRC accounts for more than 74 percent of global cobalt mining, and 20 to 30 percent of that is via ASM.

In some regions of the DRC, artisanal miners are exploited by armed groups that seek to control mining areas and siphon revenue to finance their operations, purchase weapons, and sustain conflicts. Militias have abducted and trafficked children to extract cobalt as well as copper, in a bid to fund their groups. In addition, some ASM cobalt operations employ children. It was once estimated that forty thousand children were mining for cobalt, working in life-threatening conditions and exposed to violence, extortion, and intimidation.

Such problems associated with informality, including the absence of regulatory standards and the occurrence of human-rights violations, make it difficult for potential investors to justify long-term investments. Without clear, enforceable laws, investors face a high-risk business environment and unpredictable changes in mining policies, which undermine investor confidence.

In addition to posing these immediate risks to artisanal miners and their communities, informal mining exacerbates economic and market instability on a macroeconomic level. Informal miners typically earn a meager and unstable income, which is subject to fluctuation based on the market prices and demand for cobalt. Miners’ economic instability translates into broader economic uncertainty for the sector and limits opportunities for community development. The presence of such substantial unregulated economic activity leads to significant tax revenue losses for the government, because these transactions primarily occur outside of official channels. This undermines the state’s capacity to invest money in necessary social programs, build infrastructure, and quell violence in other regions of the DRC. In spite of these challenging economic implications, African governments might resist formalization efforts, unwilling to disrupt the vital role ASM plays in the livelihoods of many individuals and communities across Africa.

While artisanal cobalt mining in the DRC provides a case study, some of these issues associated with informality are also prevalent in the mining of critical minerals in other African nations, such as lithium production in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Across the continent, the volatility of ASM creates a less attractive investment environment, given that investors seek dependable production to ensure stable supply chains and therefore profitability.

What might formalization look like?

Despite the complications associated with the informal production of many critical minerals, the solution is not to disengage from ASM; it employs 90 percent of the mining workforce. Rather, the solution lies in formalizing and legalizing ASM, which will help mitigate the risks inherent to these mining operations while fostering a more regulated and stable environment for international investment in Africa’s critical minerals.

Integrating the ASM sector into the formal economy would help improve local security, stabilize incomes, and ensure that safer and more environmentally sustainable practices are implemented. It would also help create national regulations and international standards, pressuring the ASM sector to improve practices to become compliant.

Formalization means that miners are registered with proper mining titles. Even in some countries where ASM is recognized by law, governments have not made it possible for miners to obtain the necessary permits and licenses. But in addition to these permits and licenses, formalization also includes—according to the Washington-based nonprofit Pact—efforts by the mining industry to enact chain of custody and supply chain transparency measures; health, safety, and environmental protections; security and human-rights protections; measures that improve access to finance; and requirements to use proper mining techniques. In addition, formalization includes sound industry policies, procedures, and due diligence systems, which should be in place throughout the life cycle of a mine. These components of formalization create a framework within which artisanal miners can operate safely and legally, contributing positively to community-wide and country-wide development goals and global supply chains.

Given the complexity of the informal economy, there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to formalization. We can, however, look for strategies that have been effective in other countries or industries and use them to guide the approach towards formalizing ASM. For example, Rwanda’s 2010 Land Tenure Reform Programme initiated a systematic registration effort to promote land access and address tenure insecurity. This program registered over ten million land parcels in less than five years and enabled landowners to use their property as collateral for loans, facilitating access to credit. The program has been widely regarded as successful in integrating the informal economy, particularly due to its simple registration process and involvement of community members and stakeholders in the reform. Transitioning ASM to the formal economy must also use an integrated whole-of-society approach, centering African communities, stakeholders, and governments. This might mean starting small at a grassroots level by engaging local communities in social dialogue, allowing informal miners to express their views and defend their interests. Their inclusion at an early stage of the formalization process will ensure that policies address informality efficiently and enhance the effectiveness of such measures.

There have been some efforts in recent years to support the formalization of ASM workers and improve social and environmental practices in the sector. For example, as the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) explains, international Fairtrade and Fairmined standards set minimum standards for responsible mining, which support formalization. Furthermore, chain of custody initiatives trace supply chains from mine to market to ensure that supply chains are not associated with any conflicts or human rights abuses and that they meet international regulations. These are certainly steps in the right direction but, as the IGF explains, there are concerns about the long-term sustainability of these initiatives and whether they are reaching the most marginalized communities.

Formalization is a very complex but necessary process that can improve the lives of miners and address issues in the critical-mineral supply chain—and therefore attract more sustainable investment to the sector, contributing to the broader development goals of African countries.

How the international community can help

As mineral extraction in Africa is only expected to increase in the foreseeable future, it would be strategically unwise for the international community, and in particular the United States, to sit idly by on the issue of formalizing artisanal mining.

Going forward, the United States can focus on capacity building and simplifying trade processes and market access to help formalize artisanal mining in Africa, which could lead to increased global investment in critical minerals. To build the foundation for policies and programs that provide legal protection for ASM miners, the United States could fund and support training programs for artisanal miners, local authorities, and government officials on sustainable mining practices, health and safety standards, regulatory compliance, and business skills. By strengthening local and national institutions responsible for overseeing the ASM sector, governments would be better able to enforce regulations, protect the rights of artisanal miners, and formalize the sector.

The United States could also work with African governments and international organizations—such as the African Union and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—to simplify trade procedures, enabling miners to participate legally and more fully in global supply chains. In December 2022, the United States signed a memorandum of understanding with the DRC and Zambia to develop a productive electric-battery supply chain—from the extraction of minerals to the assembly line. The agreement also serves as a commitment to respect international standards and to prevent, detect, and fight corruption and build a sustainable industry in Africa that benefits workers and local communities, as well as the US private sector. At this time, it is more political than actionable, although it creates a framework for future negotiations and strengthened partnerships. Deepening ties with African nations and collaborating with international organizations can help leverage the resources, expertise, and global networks to ensure a more conducive environment for investment and sustainable growth. Increasing institutional capacity would also allow governments to strengthen tenure security and clarify property rights for ASM, particularly reducing the incidence of ASM-LSM conflict.

The creation of more legal channels for miners to sell their products could enhance supply chain transparency and promote more sustainable market practices. Implementing an international certification mechanism, similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), offers the ASM sector an opportunity for empowerment and a pathway towards legitimacy. Originally established to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain, the KPCS mandates that member countries adhere to strict certification requirements, import and export controls, regular audits, and controlled trade. The principles of the Kimberly Process might be adapted to the extraction of critical minerals so as to increase the security of artisanal miners and their access to legal markets.

Not only would these policy actions benefit African countries in the context of the critical-minerals boom and improve the livelihoods of miners, but they would allow the United States to strengthen its economic and strategic partnerships with African countries. As critical minerals will continue to advance the clean-energy transition, decisive action is essential to make the future of mining a pathway for inclusive, sustainable development for the countries that supply minerals to the world.

Sarah Way is a graduate of the University of Colorado Boulder’s International Affairs Program with a specialization in Africa and the Middle East. Her research centers on the intersection of natural resources and development, with a specific focus on extractive minerals in Africa.

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One of the IMF’s tasks is indeed to deflect some of the political blame from a government that has committed to fiscal adjustment measures and faces public opposition. Even after the bill was withdrawn, however, public anger has yet to subside, fueled by killings of demonstrators and accusations of corruption and misuse of public money.

The truth is, of course, that Kenya’s decline into fiscal trouble has been entirely predictable, led by the ambitions of past leaders who followed the path of easy money. Especially during the mid-2010s, under President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya was looking for ways to leverage its “frontier market” status into higher growth via debt-financed investments and infrastructure projects. As a result, within a decade, Kenya’s public debt ratio almost doubled from 41 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014 to a projected 78 percent of GDP in 2024.

One prominent creditor has been China’s Export-Import Bank, which provided Kenya with $3.2 billion to build a Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) between Nairobi and the port of Mombasa—a project that has been criticized because of its weak governance and high cost but, according to recent reports, will be extended to Kenya’s western border with Uganda.

Although public investment does have an important role in raising a country’s economic fortunes, Kenyans are still waiting to see the social returns of the debt-financed investment spree. GDP growth has hovered around 5 percent since the mid-2000s, real GDP per capita has stagnated in recent years, and the poverty rate (at just below 40 percent) remains above pre-COVID-19 levels. It is no wonder that the fiscal belt-tightening now required to arrest a further run-up of public debt has met with resistance, amid legitimate questions about who benefited from the loans that ordinary Kenyans now have to repay.

Ruto, in office since 2022, carries his share of responsibility for the fiscal sins of the past, having been vice president in the previous administration and a proponent of the Chinese railway loan. His government is also dealing with droughts and the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, which hit Kenya and other frontier markets particularly hard, including through spillover effects from global inflation and higher interest rates. Being caught out in a weak fiscal position and facing eventual default, Kenya turned to the IMF in 2021 to help stabilize its finances, including a “multi-year fiscal consolidation effort centered on raising tax revenues and tightly controlling spending.”

The government did reasonably well under this program, which originally foresaw a steady pace of fiscal adjustment (at about 1 percentage point of GDP per year over five years) and allowed for measures to absorb its social impact. Both the primary fiscal deficit and the trade balance improved, and the shilling unwound much of its decline vis-à-vis the US dollar as Kenya surprised markets by repaying a two-billion-dollar Eurobond last month. Moreover, the program unlocked a considerable amount of concessional multilateral financing, including from the World Bank.

But the country remains in a financial hole from which it will be very difficult to climb out. One problem is that higher interest rates keep adding to Kenya’s debt dynamics, as illustrated by the hefty 10 percent interest rate on a smaller Eurobond that Kenya issued in February to meet its June payment. Therefore, despite an improvement of the primary deficit broadly in line with program targets, Kenya’s public debt is still projected to increase this year.

While the government planned to continue on its programmed adjustment path, the latest package of measures—including tax measures to offset gradual revenue slippages over the years—appears to have been the political straw that broke the camel’s back. So, what are the alternatives available to the government now?

• First, “keep calm and carry on” may be the motto of the day. The government appears to be looking for spending measures to substitute for lost revenues, but this will not be viable in the long term. Expenditure compression has its own distributional (and political) consequences, and the overall fiscal adjustment strategy will need to be balanced across revenue and spending items.
• Second, with interest payments accounting for more than a quarter of total revenue, the Kenyan government may decide to seek a debt restructuring. This is not something the IMF could impose on Kenya, unless it judged that public debt was unsustainable. However, the government went to great lengths in the past to service its debt and retain access to financial markets. It would have been cynical on the part of IMF shareholders, who routinely call for strong ownership from program countries, to force Kenya into an unwanted debt operation—as long as there was still a realistic chance of avoiding it. This now looks less assured, and it may be the only avenue left for the government.
• Third, however, the Export-Import Bank of China is the biggest bilateral lender to Kenya, holding claims worth $6.5 billion, close to two thirds of all bilateral debt. China has a special responsibility to provide debt relief, given the history of corruption and questionable economic value of the SGR project it helped finance. Kenya would have to request a debt treatment under the Group of Twenty (G20) Common Framework, which has recently become more efficient in dealing with problem cases. However, bilateral debt negotiations could still take a long time to resolve, and Kenya would risk being cut off from external financing for a considerable period.

As the government needs to chart a fresh course in this difficult environment, it is also very likely that supporters in the West will call for more money and fewer fiscal adjustment as the solution to Kenya’s problems. The Nairobi-Washington Vision, formulated during Ruto’s state visit to the United States in May, has also called for increased financial support for developing countries. The question is, where should this money come from?

• First, anyone who has looked at a financing needs table of an IMF program (for example, see Table Six here) understands that spending can either be financed by revenues, grants, or borrowing. Since grants don’t carry any interest or repayment burden, they would be ideal for a country in Kenya’s situation. But taxpayers in rich countries have shown less and less inclination to finance development aid, let alone through direct transfers or outright debt relief for poorer countries.
• Second, the IMF and other multilateral institutions have raised funds and mobilized special drawing rights (SDRs) in recent years to subsidize interest rates paid by poorer member countries, and Kenya is already benefiting from this effort. However, there are limits to this approach. Subsidies have to be either financed from donor countries’ budgets (with less and less political support) or they are generated from richer countries’ SDR holdings.
• Third, SDR-based lending works only to a limited extent. SDRs derive their value from their status as foreign exchange reserves and being exchangeable for dollars and other hard currencies held by central banks in wealthy countries. Any overuse or exposure to default risk (for example, from rising public debt in recipient countries) could compromise their reserve-asset status, which would impact both the IMF’s financing model and its capacity to lend to countries in distress.
• Fourth, could the IMF and World Bank provide larger loans? The two institutions regularly review the amounts that countries can access under various conditions. Ceilings have gone up over time, but shareholders (who carry the ultimate risk) generally require that larger loans come with stricter macroeconomic conditionality, an approach that would presumably have triggered a similar outcome for Kenya. Moreover, multilateral loans already account for more than a quarter of Kenya’s public debt. Since these loans cannot be restructured, private creditors might be more hesitant to invest in the country, because any future debt operation might need to be deeper than in similar countries with a smaller share of multilateral debt.

To sum up, Kenya’s predicament is largely homemade, albeit with help from willing external lenders. The COVID-19 crisis exacerbated a lack of fiscal discipline, eventually forcing the country to adopt a stabilization program. While meeting with some initial success, recent events have made it clear that the government’s adjustment strategy needs to change, putting a possible debt operation on the table. The IMF did its best to support an initially credible effort by the government, but it must also ask itself what could have been done to prevent the sharp increase in public debt that is at the heart of Kenya’s problems today.

Martin Mühleisen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center and a former IMF official with decades-long experience in economic crisis management and financial diplomacy.

The post Kenya’s fiscal troubles are largely homemade. Now the country is running out of options. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Introduction
The geopolitics of infrastructure
The economic realities
Coordination of project identification and implementation
Recommendations
Conclusion

Introduction

Infrastructure development is a central component of the West’s global engagement strategy. This effort, if done effectively, could be a strategic, economic, and geopolitical feat. The development of sustainable and secure infrastructure carries the potential to create economic prosperity for countries aspiring to move up the global value chain, support the world’s green transition, provide an alternative to China’s exploitative investments, and strengthen the Western-led order.

The Group of Seven (G7) countries have varying plans for infrastructure development in cooperation with various partners around the globe, with particular focus on the Global South. Launched in 2022, the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) aims to mobilize $600 billion in capital for development projects by 2027.¹ In Europe, the European Union’s (EU) Global Gateway will invest 300 billion euros by 2027 in global infrastructure projects on behalf of the bloc.² Italy’s Mattei Plan, launched in January 2024, brings a direct focus on infrastructure development in Africa.³ Further abroad, the Group of Twenty (G20) partners signed the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) memorandum in 2023, which aims to directly counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and cut down transit time between India and Europe.⁴

These initiatives are a good start. However, all G7 members face various challenges that could ultimately hamper progress on these initiatives, most notably: geopolitical challenges, limited funds, skittishness from private sector investors, and lack of coordination. For these initiatives to have a lasting impact, the G7 and likeminded partners must closely coordinate to both avoid and overcome these pitfalls.

Some efforts to better coordinate development projects have already begun. Along with its investments and focus on leveraging private capital, the United States led in the creation of the Blue Dot Network, “a multilateral initiative aimed at advancing robust standards for global infrastructure and mobilizing investment for projects in developing countries.”⁵ In addition, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has launched coordinated connectivity projects between the United States and the EU in third countries including Kenya, Costa Rica, Jamaica, the Philippines, and Tunisia.⁶

Holding the G7 presidency for 2024, Italy has made infrastructure development and strengthening relations with the Global South, and in particular Africa, central to its priorities. The 2024 G7 Leaders’ Summit in Apulia, Italy, in June 2024 again reaffirmed the group’s commitment to PGII and investments across Africa, with announcements including the creation of a secretariat to coordinate investments and aid information sharing and a greater shared focus on unlocking investment for green infrastructure projects.⁷

Now, G7 countries must focus on transforming the summit’s conclusions into reality and making real progress on development coordination. This issue brief provides an actionable set of recommendations to advance the G7’s ambitions.⁸ It examines the geopolitical impetus for infrastructure development, the economic realities of infrastructure, and the state of coordination on project implementation before providing recommendations to take forward for the rest of Italy’s G7 presidency and beyond.

The geopolitics of infrastructure

The G7’s focus on development is rooted in the shared understanding that G7 countries must fundamentally reset relations with the Global South. Historically, countries in the Global South, particularly in Africa, have been on the receiving end of unfair and extractive relationships with the West.

The result has been growing mistrust and disillusionment, and many countries now view China as a better partner than Europe or the United States. A 2022 study conducted by the University of Cambridge noted that around seventy percent of people not living in liberal democracies held positive views of China, and those in the developing world held more favorable views of China than of the United States.⁹ Another 2023 survey saw China’s approval rating in Africa rise to its highest levels in a decade, with ten-point increases in some countries.¹⁰

On infrastructure development specifically, China has outcompeted the West for years. China’s outreach to the Global South has been generally successful, and the BRI has evolved into an established brand. For example, in 2021 China pledged $40 billion over three years to Africa (though this was a reduction from an earlier pledge of $60 billion), and Beijing has out-invested the United States in Africa every year since 2013.¹¹ Though Chinese investments have yet to surpass their pre-pandemic heights, China’s rate of investment is again rising, and Africa was the largest recipient of BRI investment in 2023.¹² In part, as a result, Beijing is also poised to overtake Europe’s total trade with Africa by 2030.¹³

There are downsides to partnering with China, however. Its values-ambivalent approach is not built for sustainability and comes with a well-documented debt trap. For example, Zambia, which had more than 50 percent of its foreign loans from China, went into default and was unable to afford interest payments on loans financing construction projects in the country including ports, mines, and power plants (though China and Zambia have agreed to a restructuring of Zambia’s debt).¹⁴ Similarly, in Kenya, the government held back paychecks to its civil-service workforce to save cash to pay foreign loans.¹⁵

G7 countries are making progress on closing this partnership gap with China. Leaders at the Apulia Summit reaffirmed their ambition to meet the spending target of $600 billion by 2027, and the summit’s conclusions have a clear focus on infrastructure development, including with an announcement of a secretariat to facilitate the coordination of development projects.¹⁶ Leaders made further announcements at a side event where Italy joined the US- and EU-led consortium on projects in the Lobito Corridor in southern Africa, and Western companies like Microsoft and Blackrock pledged more investments across Africa and beyond.¹⁷

The summit also saw the participation of countries including Algeria, Brazil, Kenya, and Tunisia, among others—something Prime Minister Georgia Meloni lauded as delivering on a pledge to make outreach to the Global South a cornerstone of Italy’s G7 presidency.¹⁸

The summit also highlighted that the West’s values-based approach can be a strategic asset to building sustainable global partnerships. A focus on good governance and environmental and labor standards allows for long-term success and, in turn, economic growth. The G7 recognizes the importance of engaging with Africa specifically, with the 2024 Communiqué positioning the PGII, the Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan as frameworks to “promote [the West’s] vision of sustainable, resilient, and economically viable infrastructure in Africa underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement, and finance.”¹⁹

This is a good start, but there is still room for improvements. Some of the West’s recent outreach has received similar criticisms to previous efforts, for example, failing to consult the very countries these efforts are meant to engage. In particular, African leaders noted Italy failed to consult them before announcing the Mattei Plan.²⁰ Moreover, the West’s tedious approach to infrastructure development can be perceived as an obstacle, not an asset, especially if it is not applied consistently.²¹

G7 countries should make greater efforts to convene with PGII partners in the region including the private sector, civil society, and government—to sustain debate and discussion about the West’s ambitions and the reasoning behind its values. At the same time, more regular and targeted engagements can, in turn, expose Western public and private financial institutions to the realities of partner markets and address the misconceptions of perceived risks. It’s a win-win for both sides. Where possible, the framing should be adapted to showcase the importance of the long-term sustainability of projects, especially compared to the non-durability of Chinese infrastructure. This engagement will also be a useful tool to address criticisms that Western initiatives are organized without the feedback and involvement of partner countries.

Finally, while competition with China will be a defining element of Western global infrastructure projects, geopolitics cannot eclipse all else. Recipient countries are looking for projects for their benefit to move up the global value chain and to spur domestic growth—not to be a pawn in other parties’ geopolitical rivalries. States can and have the option to accept projects from different sources, including from China. In response, policymakers should be cognizant that countries might be interested in partnering with both China and the West, and should not be forced into a binary, mutually exclusive choice of one or the other.

It will be important, then, for transatlantic policymakers to work out how to both compete against and partner with China. This will be critical specifically in the area of information and communications technology (ICT) development, where using “untrustworthy” vendors has been an area of focus. Policymakers should be clear about where and when non-G7 countries are involved in projects, and in what respects that will not preclude partnership.

The economic realities

Geopolitics may be a key impetus for development initiatives, but policymakers must also contend with economic realities that have long-plagued development projects. Economic stability in recipient countries is important for investments, but that stability is not always a luxury the West can expect. The International Monetary Fund’s regional economic outlook from spring 2024 for sub-Saharan Africa, for example, notes “the fiscal position of many sub-Saharan African countries has deteriorated, a trend exacerbated by repeated shocks and the ensuing demand for fiscal support,” which adds to political and economic uncertainty.²² The cost of borrowing for African states is also four to eight times higher than for Western countries, making raising capital prohibitive.²³

The reality is that currencies can collapse and interest rates can rise, but the need and opportunities for investments will remain. The West, therefore, cannot wait to invest in projects until after implementing structural reforms to partner states’ finances and economies.

G7 countries, the United States in particular, have stressed the importance of the private sector to achieve its financing goals. The Apulia Summit placed additional emphasis on the necessity of private-sector capital for the success of PGII. Side events on the PGII have taken place at every G7 summit since the PGII was announced, and since 2023, have prominently featured participation from major investors and companies including Citi, Nokia, Global Infrastructure Partners, Blackrock, and Microsoft—usually with investment announcements in tow.²⁴ Policymakers should appreciate and foster a bottom-up approach to project identification from the private sector and its appetite to invest.

However, leveraging private capital to help fund infrastructure projects comes with its own challenges. Investments into large-scale infrastructure projects are inherently risky, and shaky local markets only add to the unease felt by private-sector investors as currency devaluations risk erasing investments.

G7 members will therefore need to play a greater role, in some form, as guarantors of investments to help reduce the cost of borrowing and alleviate some of the risk. This comes with its own difficulties, as unlocking government-backed funds is not a straightforward process. Certain firms may not be eligible for funding depending on where they are located. And while it makes sense for European taxpayer funds to go to European firms, for instance, multinational firms can become caught up in the bureaucratic web, impeding their involvement with investment projects. Nevertheless, governments must figure out how to play a role here. The European Union, for instance, has a AAA credit rating, and can take on the role of a guarantor for private-sector investment.²⁵ The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has provided political-risk insurance up to $25 million for investments in Ukraine.²⁶ The case of Ukraine is not a one-to-one comparison to investments in the Global South, but offers a useful example to consider. This is not meant to provide a blank check to the private sector for risky investments. However, investment projects cannot wait for long-term structural reforms that will impact geoeconomic changes like foreign-exchange rates. Instead, investors need to work within current economic realities.

Greater efforts are also needed to address change Western misconceptions of African markets and perceived risks that may not truly reflect realities on the ground. The metrics used by the West to measure projects, specifically environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, do not always have as strong a foothold in recipient countries, making investment look riskier or undesirable. Balancing the focus to communicate the impetus for these metrics—while maintaining a degree of flexibility and not completely sacrificing all ESG baselines—will be an important needle for policymakers and investors to thread.

Coordination of project identification and implementation 

Shared project standards are an opportunity for greater coordination. The 2023 Hiroshima G7 summit provided a starting point, highlighting forty projects of common interest.²⁷ Italy’s G7 presidency looked to further this effort. As Meloni outlined at the G7 summit side event focusing on the PGII, Italy’s ambition was to create “structured synergies and coordinated activities to maximize efforts and investments” between G7 members’ various projects.²⁸

The 2024 Apulia Summit specifically pledged greater effort at coordination through three prongs: establishing a secretariat “for effective implementation and investment coordination with partners,” supporting investment platforms to “enhance information sharing, transparency, and public policies on investments in Africa,” and working in particular on green investments in Africa.²⁹ These efforts are all good starts, but they remain wide in their ambition and vague in actual substance.

Coordination on project identification should be an early priority for the PGII secretariat. As G7 countries and the private sector will necessarily look to identify more of these projects, it will be useful to have shared criteria for projects to meet quality and sustainability standards. A shared understanding of what projects G7 members are looking to support, and metrics to assess projects, would also help the private sector in more easily identifying projects in which to invest. The Blue Dot Network is a good starting point for this effort, but so far only a few European G7 countries are on its steering committee.

Additionally, coordination between the United States and the EU through the TTC to support connectivity projects provides another useful starting point for this effort. Established in 2021, the TTC has become the backbone of this US administration’s efforts to strengthen its relationship with Brussels. Despite its initially limited scope, it has morphed into a clearinghouse for discussions not only on transatlantic trade and technology coordination, but also on sanctions against Russia and support for projects in third countries to support internet connectivity.³⁰ Supporting connectivity projects at the TTC is useful, but it is limited to smaller projects. Taking coordination from the TTC to the G7 level would allow participation and coordination with countries like the United Kingdom and Japan.

In terms of project selection and implementation, the G7 must also ensure money is available for maintenance, and enough staff is available to follow-up and to make projects sustainable. Ongoing efforts must leverage available funding not just to start projects, but to fund them through their full cycle, and staff them at a level that supports medium- to long-term maintenance. Often, this will include building relationships with on-the-ground in-country partners, and then training and subsequently employing local civilians to shoulder these responsibilities. It is simply not feasible for European, US, Japanese, British, or Canadian project managers to shoulder this burden. In this respect, it is equally important to get buy-in from national and local governments in recipient countries. Locals with knowledge about projects, communities, and factors on the ground will be critical to the maintenance and durability of such projects. The G7 conclusions rightly noted the importance of working with local partners. Now, a secretariat should take forward that effort in earnest.

Maintenance also means investing in skills. This is just as important for implementation and maintenance as investing in technology or brick-and-mortar buildings. Project identification must not look past the funds and time needed to train partners on the ground. For G7 members it will be important, especially on projects in which the United States and EU are involved, to standardize, de-duplicate, or divide training efforts.

Recommendations

At the 2024 Apulia summit, G7 countries made some progress on global infrastructure development in the context of the PGII. Implementation must now follow pronouncements. Italy should lead through the rest of its G7 presidency to see that real progress is made and to ensure this remains a priority in forthcoming summits (much like the role Japan played on artificial intelligence), and each G7 member must also work to meet its national commitments. To make greater coordination a reality, the G7 should undertake the following recommendations.

• Expand the Blue Dot Network Steering Committee. The European Union and/or all EU member states that are part of the G7—Italy, Germany, and France—should join the Blue Dot Network. The Blue Dot Network’s steering committee is currently composed of Australia, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Canada, Czechia, and Peru are network members and do not contribute funds).³¹ All G7 members, and the EU, should become members of the steering committee. European membership in the Blue Dot Network should not be limited just to G7 EU members, and the EU could take on a role representing all EU member states.

• Invest in the PGII secretariat and commit to the adequate staffing of development institutions. A PGII secretariat can serve as an important hub for coordination, but it must be staffed adequately. G7 countries should assign national-level envoys to the secretariat, or at least fold them into the offices responsible, such as IMEC. Much of the work to take forward the agreements at the G7 will also fall to domestic institutions and development finance institutions. However, staffing and financing shortages have limited their effectiveness. G7 members should pledge a benchmark for spending on development financing.

• Establish regular convenings in or with partner countries. G7 members should commit to hosting regular meetings with partners and their private sectors, civil societies, and governments. The Hiroshima G7 meeting highlighting the PGII was a good start, but the initiative should now be further developed with a partner-first mindset. G7 member officials should host annual meetings in partner countries to make the case for the West’s efforts. This would signal a departure from the West’s historically paternalistic approach to engagements with African partners, and the Global South generally. Outreach and consistent engagement at the ambassadorial level would also be useful.

• Identify which third countries can take part in which projects. Currently, there is no clear framework for which third countries can take part in specific development projects or what limits exist to partnering with third countries, including those like China. Where issues like human rights and national security come into play, G7 countries may differ in their strategies for engaging with third countries. At the same time, there should be clearer frameworks for private companies and governments in terms of in which projects each can take part.

• Build in long-term maintenance and implementation of projects at the development stage. Projects should begin with the end in mind. If there is no way to measure success or to educate and employ local populations, these projects will turn into basic assistance with no longevity. G7 countries should agree that investment projects under the PGII umbrella should mandate a long-term implementation and maintenance plan with substantial involvement and buy-in from the partner country. Countries want economic success and want to move up the global value chain; they don’t want to be seen as mere development recipients. It is up to the G7 to ensure such upward movement happens.

• Map and publish all PGII-related projects. The PGII secretariat should map out all investments under the PGII umbrella, along with projects of interest. This could serve as a clearing house, especially for the private sector to identify opportunities for investment. This would also create a strong public relations tools showcasing the West’s impact and investment footprint. This effort could also be utilized to facilitate the submission of new investment projects by the private sector and potentially lead to consolidated funding for joint investments promoted or pursued by G7 members.

Conclusion

Giorgia Meloni called the dialogue around the PGII “one of the most significant achievements of the G7” to deliver “concrete action” to Africa and the Global South.³² The G7 has made progress, but such a conclusion is premature. The G7 is well on its way to turning its ideas and visions for new partnerships with the Global South into action. Putting the resources and people behind those visions will ensure that they come to life.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center, where he supports programming on the European Union, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the center’s transatlantic digital and tech portfolio.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. Her research focuses on European security, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship.

Nick O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council. He also contributes regularly to the Atlantic Council’s Italy project, a collaboration between the Europe Center and Middle East Programs.

New Atlanticist Apr 24, 2024

Dispatch from Rome: Political stability gives Italy a chance to step into the spotlight

By Jörn Fleck, Rachel Rizzo, James Batchik, Nicholas O’Connell

With newfound steadiness at home, Rome can make its priorities for the West heard, especially the security of the Mediterranean and outreach to Africa.

Economy & Business Europe & Eurasia

Report Apr 3, 2024

The case for African social infrastructure

By Tom Koch

Investment in African social infrastructure can be defined as African real estate that serves an essential societal purpose.

Africa Economy & Business

New Atlanticist Feb 5, 2024

Italy’s Mediterranean pivot: What’s driving Meloni’s ambitious plan with Africa

By Alissa Pavia

The Mattei Plan for Africa was presented on January 29-30 to a delegation of more than twenty-five African leaders. It seeks to establish an Italian agenda that prioritizes Africa’s needs and avoids predatory practices.

Africa Economy & Business

The Europe Center promotes leadership, strategies, and analysis to ensure a strong, ambitious, and forward-looking transatlantic relationship.

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The post Doing as the Romans do: Recommendations for the infrastructure development agenda for Italy’s G7 presidency appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Economic diversification and foreign direct investment

The US-Morocco FTA removed tariffs and significantly reduced trade barriers between the two countries. This, alongside other FTA and advanced trade agreements with the European Union (EU), China, Egypt, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contributed to Morocco’s efforts to diversify its economy and trade. Through providing access to the US market, the FTA encouraged Moroccan firms to expand into new high-tech manufacturing such as automotive and aeronautics parts, as well as electronics. The agreement has also contributed to a steady increase in bilateral trade. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, US-Morocco trade in goods and services has grown to nearly $7 billion annually. This trade growth reflects a deepening of economic ties between the two countries.

Another significant impact of the US-Morocco FTA and other trade agreements has been increased foreign direct investment (FDI). The agreement provided a framework that infused confidence in US and EU investors and caused an inflow of investment in various sectors, including manufacturing, tourism, and renewable energy. These investments have been central in creating jobs and developing the skills of the Moroccan workforce.

One example is the automotive industry, in which major companies like Japan-based Yazaki, Ireland-based Delphi Technologies, Germany-based Schlemmer, and US-based Lear Corporation have established operations in Morocco. These investments have created thousands of jobs and positioned Morocco as a regional hub for automotive parts manufacturing, generating more than $10 billion in revenue and making it a leading sector in the country’s export market. Additionally, the growth of the renewable energy sector has made Morocco a global leader in the green energy industry, with ambitious projects like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex.

Challenges and structural reforms

While Morocco’s FTA and trade agreements with the United States and other major economies have brought numerous benefits, challenges exist. One of the main issues has been guaranteeing that the gains from free trade are distributed equitably across Moroccan society. There is a need for sustained efforts to address regional disparities and support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may struggle to compete with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a liberalized trade environment.

Moreover, the agreement has highlighted the importance of structural reforms to enhance Morocco’s competitiveness. Hence, the Moroccan government has undertaken various measures to improve the business climate, such as simplifying regulatory procedures, developing and improving infrastructure, and investing in education and vocational training, with a particular focus on empowering girls and women. These reforms are crucial for sustaining long-term economic growth and ensuring that Morocco can fully capitalize on the opportunities presented by free trade.

Future prospects

Looking ahead, the US-Morocco FTA serves as a foundation for further economic cooperation and integration between the two economies. Both countries have expressed a commitment to deepening their trade relationship and exploring new areas of collaboration. For Morocco, this includes leveraging the FTA to attract more investment in high-tech industries and innovation-driven sectors. Morocco’s strategic location and proximity to European Union and African markets, coupled with its relatively modern infrastructure and stable political environment, position it as an attractive investment destination in emerging market economies.

Alongside the agreements signed between Morocco and other countries, the US-Morocco FTA remains one of the most important as it has played an integral role in transforming Morocco’s economy and labor force, contributing to the diversification of its trade portfolio and helping to attract foreign investment. However, regulatory, legal, and labor force challenges remain, and continued efforts are needed to ensure that the benefits of free trade are more equitably shared across various sectors of Moroccan society.

As Morocco looks to the future, the strategic vision should focus on further enhancing its competitive edge and strengthening its position as a key player in the global supply chain. Morocco’s Atlantic Sahel initiative is an important step in this direction. With sustained commitment and strategic planning, the next twenty years can bring even more prosperity and development for the Moroccan economy and greater profits for US and other foreign businesses operating in the kingdom.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou leads the Bretton Woods 2.0 Project at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He is also a senior lecturer of economics at the American University in Washington, DC.

The post Diversification and growth: How the US-Morocco FTA boosts Rabat’s modern trade appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa is central to the global energy transition. The necessary resources for a low-carbon economy are abundant in Africa, with the continent possessing 30 percent of the world’s known mineral reserves—many of which are critical for the manufacturing of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, and other clean energy technologies. Africa’s untapped potential is greater yet, with research suggesting that the continent holds 85 percent of manganese reserves, 80 percent of platinum and chromium reserves, 47 percent of cobalt reserves, and 21 percent of graphite reserves, much of which is unexplored or underexplored. Demand for these resources is also on the rise, expected to more than double between now and 2030.

While Africa is rich in minerals and strategically located, it risks losing out on a historic investment opportunity. The infrastructure investment problems that have hindered non-Chinese capital flows into African markets for decades are front and center as investors and governments assess the strategic role the continent could and should play in the global shift to cleaner energy sources. While infrastructure investment has shown growth in recent decades, a significant financing gap persists, estimated to be around $100 billion each and every year.

To counterbalance China’s dominance in battery supply chains, the United States must leverage its strengths in technology, education, and capital markets. Initiatives such as Prosper Africa need to be dynamically scaled and optimized to provide meaningful support, ensuring that US investors can more easily and rapidly navigate the complex landscape of Washington.

With this urgency in mind, this report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and the state of mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

This report is the first in a series on the critical minerals sector in Africa, and is part of the Africa Center’s Critical Mineral Task Force.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

AfricaSource Jun 7, 2024

Increasing investment in African mining should be a higher priority for the United States

By Aubrey Hruby

If governments, investors, and development partners don’t make dramatic changes in the next five years, the United States will fail to counter Chinese influence in supply chains.

Africa Energy & Environment

AfricaSource Mar 18, 2024

The critical-minerals boom is here. Can Africa take advantage?

By Alexander Tripp

The critical minerals discussion on extraction, national security, and supply chains will move past Africa unless the moment is seized.

Africa Economy & Business

The post From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Migration is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that has significant implications for both sending and receiving countries. In the Atlantic basin, the movement of people across borders has been shaped by various factors such as economic opportunities, political instability, social networks, and historical ties.

This joint report, in partnership with Policy Center for the New South and the Africa Center, aims to explore the trends in African migration within the Atlantic basin, focusing on case studies of Nigerian migration to the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa as well as Moroccan migration to the European Union. It seeks to provide valuable insights into ongoing discourse on African migration by exploring case studies from diverse regions within the Atlantic basin, it highlights the interconnectedness of migration flows and their impact on individuals, communities, and societies on both sides of the Atlantic.

The report examines factors such as economic disparities, political instability, educational opportunities, and family ties to explain motivations behind Nigerian and Moroccan migration. By analyzing the “push and pull factors” influencing Moroccan migration to France and Spain alongside Nigerian migration to the United States, the UK, and South Africa, it builds a nuanced understanding of migration dynamics within the Atlantic basin and what is at stake for the home countries experiencing brain drain.

Public Event Thu, June 27, 2024 • 10:00 am ET

New trends in African migration: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria

The Africa Center brings together experts to discuss current and future trends in African migration.

Africa Migration Morocco Nigeria

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Report

Aug 3, 2023

Irregular migration from North Africa: Shifting local and regional dynamics

By Matteo Villa and Alissa Pavia

Irregular migration from North Africa to Europe, especially through the Central Mediterranean route connecting Libya and Tunisia to Italy, is increasing once more. Italy has witnessed a surge in irregular arrivals, with approximately 136,000 migrants disembarking between June 2022 and May 2023, almost comparable to the high arrival period of 2014-2017 when around 155,000 migrants landed each year.

Human Rights Italy

The post Migration dynamics in the Atlantic basin: Case studies from Morocco and Nigeria appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Dollar Dominance Monitor featured by Reuters on BRICS de-dollarization efforts appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The statement released by G7 leaders after their summit last week garnered ample attention for its strong language on China’s unfair economic practices and ongoing support for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and triggered a predictably sharp Chinese response. The back-and-forth is another reminder of China’s worsened relations with developed democracies over the past few years.

Beijing is by no means abandoning those relationships – Premier Li Qiang’s visit to Australia and New Zealand this week, not to mention President Xi’s trip to Europe last month, underscore a drive to mend damaged ties. But the incident is another piece of evidence confirming that Beijing’s positions on global and economic issues receive a more welcoming reception in the developing world, where China’s economic and political ties are growing by the day.

China’s strategic shift toward greater focus on the so-called Global South is unmistakable. One need only look at where China is spending diplomatic attention and propaganda dollars.

As colleagues at the Digital Forensics Research Lab explore in a new report on China’s messaging in Africa, China is increasingly promoting pro-Russian narratives about Ukraine in sub-Saharan Africa using its media platforms, commentators, social media, and broadcasting infrastructure. The effort aims to portray China as a force for peace while the United States prolongs the war, in line with Beijing’s drive to enhance its reputation relative to Washington across the developing world.

This effort to shape perceptions of China’s responsible global role in contrast to the United States is now routinely reflected in the content of high-level diplomatic engagements with developing countries.

In his speech just last week at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries in Russia, Foreign Minister Wang Yi not only underscored China’s leadership of the Global South as the “largest developing country” but also called for the convening of “a true international peace conference” on the Ukraine war that involves Russia – after Beijing pulled out all the stops to try to scuttle the Swiss-organized conference earlier this month – and threw in some choice words on US efforts to “maintain its unipolar hegemony” for good measure.

As I and the Global China Hub team discovered on a trip to Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras earlier this month, China is also ramping up diplomatic, economic, and technological engagement across Latin America, and pairing those efforts with a push to shape understanding of China across the region. Our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts dives into that and much more in this issue of Global China – take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, Senior Director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

Fellow

Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

China Chinese

Latin American officials flood Beijing revealing China’s global priorities

Want to know one key region of the Global South China is now focusing on? Take a look at who visited Beijing in early June. Before the first week of the month was even over, Brazil’s Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, Venezuela’s Foreign Minister Yván Gil, and special envoy of Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla had all passed through China’s capital (the Brazilian vice president met with Xi Jinping and secured $4.49 billion in credit concessions. Brazil has been a key market for China too, as evidenced by an eighteen-fold surge in Chinese EV sales by value).

Latin America, with its rich resources, is a key target as China expands its global economic and political reach, and that’s a concern for the US. Testifying before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing “Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field: Trade, Investment, and Technology,” Pepe Zhang of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center called for a development-focused economic partnership with LAC that would make the Western Hemisphere more competitive, resilient, and better integrated with the US.

Economics used to bolster authoritarian power in Global South training

China’s commerce ministry isn’t just fretting about EU tariffs (see below). It has also spearheaded an effort to train officials in countries across the Global South. And perhaps not surprisingly, the instruction is about more than trade and economics: “This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule,” writes the Global China Hub’s Niva Yau in a June 12 report called “A Global South with Chinese Characteristics” (watch the launch event here). The 795 training descriptions reviewed by Yau show “how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.”

The report certainly got the PRC’s attention. The Chinese Embassy responded, saying the report is “full of Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice,” with the Foreign Ministry adding that “China has always respected the peoples of all countries in independently choosing their development paths and social systems,” which is very reassuring.

A new, coordinated transatlantic response to China emerges on trade?

In a widely expected move, the European Union announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on June 12, up as much 38.1% on top of existing taxes of 10% before, affecting companies including BYD, SAIC, and NIO. Also to no surprise was the heated response from Beijing: the move by the EU “undermines the legitimate rights and interests of China’s EV industry,” and is “blatant protectionism,” Ministry of Commerce spokesperson He Yadong said in a press briefing. On June 17, Beijing officially launched an anti-dumping probe on imported pork and its by-products from the EU in response.

With the EU action coming just over a month after US President Joe Biden imposed tariffs on EVs of 100%, is a new, more coordinated transatlantic response to the Chinese trade juggernaut emerging? On June 3rd, in an ACFrontPage conversation with United States Trade Representative Katherine Tai, she did not mince words on how the US and the EU should adapt the transatlantic trade relationship to reflect the realities of China’s economic system, saying “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics… I haven’t heard that term used in many, many years. At this point, I think it’s less diplomatic than just sort of ahistorical. The China that we’re dealing with now, the PRC, is not a democracy. It’s not a capitalist, market-based economy.”

In an Econographics article exploring a similar theme entitled “Biden’s electric vehicle tariff strategy needs a united front,” the GeoEconomics Center’s Sophia Busch and Josh Lipsky write, “tariffs, working in isolation, can’t fully achieve all the objectives—no matter how high they go. It’s only when tariffs are relatively aligned across countries… that the trajectory could change.”

And it’s not just EVs that pose a threat to global industries. Without tariffs, the EU faces a flood of Chinese imports of the “new three” clean tech exports—lithium-ion batteries, solar panels, and, of course, electric cars (along with the action against EVs, the White House also raised tariffs simultaneously on lithium-ion batteries and solar cells to 25%.) “Imports of the new-three cleantech export categories have skyrocketed in recent years. Over the course of 2023, China’s exports to the EU totaled $23.3 billion for lithium-ion batteries, $19.1 billion in solar panels, and $14.5 billion for electric vehicles,” the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster wrote in a piece for EnergySource.

• Beginning on June 17, Atlantic Council President and CEO Fred Kempe and former President of Latvia Egils Levits have co-led the Atlantic Council’s annual delegation trip to Taiwan, hosted by the Taiwanese government. Joined by former Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Tomáš Petříček, they will meet with Taiwan government leaders, including President Lai, think tanks, and business representatives to discuss security and economic issues facing Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific.
• The Global China Hub hosted a public conversation on allied solutions to de-risking tech supply chains from Chinese investment to spur collective action between the United States and government and private sector partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The event was a continuation of the Hub’s work on tech competition and China’s drive to dominate emerging technologies and relevant supply chains.
• China’s trade with Russia has risen substantially since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, significantly bolstering Moscow’s war aims, according to new research by the Global Energy Center’s Joseph Webster.
• Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Europe was in part intended to divide it as the EU increasingly hardens its stance on China. The Global China Hub’s Zoltán Fehér explores the degree to which Xi was successful in these efforts in a New Atlanticist piece.

Global China Hub

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its 16 programs and centers.

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The post Global China Newsletter – Sharp words, sharper tools: Beijing hones its approach to the Global South appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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These agreements have drawn attention to Ankara’s presence in the Horn of Africa and build upon a long history of Turkish engagement in the region. They hold great potential for expanding the security and economic benefits of Turkey-Somalia cooperation, but implementing them will not be easy. Great-power competition over influence in Mogadishu, regional rivalries, security challenges, and a fractured Somali government will all pose significant challenges to these agreements and Turkey’s bid for a greater role in the Horn of Africa.

What’s the big deal?

On February 22, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Turkish Armed Forces as a partner in Somalia’s maritime security and law enforcement for the next ten years. Per reports about the MOU, Turkey will reconstruct, equip, and train the Somali Navy while receiving 30 percent of the revenue from Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. Proponents say that the stability and security brought to Somalia’s seas outweigh the costs. Somalia loses $500 million dollars annually to illegal fishing, for example to Iranian and Chinese fishermen, while Somalia’s oil and gas reserves of up to thirty billion barrels remain largely untapped since civil war broke out in 1991. A brief period of stability has led oil and gas companies to cautiously return to Somalia. In 2019, ExxonMobil and Shell indicated a potential return to the country, and in 2022, Coastline Exploration struck a seven-block exploration deal, though an increase in fighting once again prevented any major steps forward. Shortly following this agreement with Turkey, Liberty Petroleum announced that it had secured three offshore blocks for exploration.

Shortly after reaching the maritime defense and security deal, Ankara and Mogadishu announced another MOU, establishing Turkey as a partner in Somalia’s exploration, appraisal, and extraction of petroleum blocks, with the possibility of Turkey taking over sales and distribution. Though the first agreement of its kind for Turkey, Ankara is increasingly factoring hydrocarbons into its diplomatic efforts, including in Libya.

Guns and roses

Turkey’s reaching out to Somalia has been in the making for nearly two decades, though then Turkish Prime Minister (and current president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia during a devastating famine in 2011 was the watershed moment. The first non-African head of state to visit Somalia in twenty years, Erdoğan toured refugee camps and hospitals, pledging aid and drawing international attention to the crisis. His visit was warmly received by the Somali people, many of whom felt abandoned by the global community.

In the years since Erdoğan’s visit, Turkey has integrated deeply into Somali affairs, in everything from its security to its garbage collection and wastewater treatment to its management of seaports and airports. According to Erdoğan, Turkey provided more than one billion dollars in aid to Somalia between 2011 and 2022. Though Turkey’s presence has not been entirely without controversy, evidence of its popularity is widespread, whether through popular fundraising efforts for Turkish earthquake relief in 2023 or in day-to-day life—“Istanbul” is now a common girl’s name in Somalia.  

Turkey receives major attention for the aid it provides, especially considering that it is in the middle on the list of providers of official direct aid to Somalia. This is likely because of Turkey’s tendency to heavily brand its projects, its willingness to operate in dangerous areas of the country, and the close political ties between the two countries. The Turks often capitalize on shared cultural and religious ties to legitimize and optimize their operations, while the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (also known as the Diyanet) facilitates some projects.

At the heart of the Turkey-Somalia relationship is military cooperation, which began in 2015. In 2017, Turkey established its first African military base, Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, and it has reportedly trained up to sixteen thousand troops. Alongside the United States, Turkey has conducted drone strikes against the terrorist group al-Shabaab, with at least nineteen confirmed strikes since 2022. In April 2023, Ankara sold Bayraktar TB2 drones to Mogadishu as part of counterterrorism efforts (a sale for which the United Nations accused Ankara of violating an arms embargo). Turkey also plays an important role in training and arming the Haramcad paramilitary unit and Gorgor commando brigade— one of two major elite units in the Somali National Army (SNA), with the other being the Danab brigade, which is trained by the United States. In collaboration with the Danab brigade, the Gorgor has played an important role in combatting al-Shabaab, particularly in renewed fighting in 2021 and 2022.

Turkey turns southward

Ankara’s presence in Somalia is part of a Turkish push toward Africa that started in 1998, with the creation of the Africa Action Plan. By 2008, Turkey had been declared a strategic partner of the African Union and opened at least a dozen embassies across the continent. When Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2009, it was supported by fifty-one of the fifty-three African states. In 2013, Turkey became a member of the African Development Bank Group. Turkey has varying interests in Africa, including ideological motivations, economic and trade priorities, and a desire to build up Ankara’s own defense industries and capabilities. Now, Turkey has a large presence in the region in the areas of humanitarian aid and military cooperation. As of 2022, some thirty African states had signed security cooperation agreements with Turkey, nineteen of which included troop training.

The Horn of Africa is critical for Turkish interests because of its its geographical position, rich mineral resources, and development potential. The region has seen increasing great-power competition involving a diverse cast of characters including Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, China, and the United States. Since 2001, at least eighteen foreign military bases have been constructed in the region, primarily for counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations.

Over the past two decades, Ankara has developed a complex web of economic and military ties with the region, including by leasing the Sudanese island of Suakin, selling drones to Ethiopia, and participating in a decades-long anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa under NATO’s Combined Task Force 151. In 2017, Djiboutian officials invited Turkey to establish a military base near the critical Bab el-Mandeb Strait in an effort to promote freedom of navigation and regional stability. On February 20 this year, Djibouti and Turkey signed a military training cooperation agreement.

The Emirati angle

Turkey is far from the only power involved in Somalia. As recently as mid-February, Mogadishu signed an MOU with Washington to open five new military bases in the country and increase training for its Danab brigade. Qatar and the United Kingdom are also players in Somalia. Turkey’s primary competitor in Somalia, however, is the UAE, which has historically seen the region as critical to its strategic interests.

Flush with cash, the Emiratis have embarked on a campaign of infrastructure projects and security agreements across the region, including building major ports in Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991), Eritrea, and Djibouti. It also armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Sudan and the Ethiopian government during conflicts in those countries. In November 2022, according to Middle East Eye, Somalia reportedly signed a secretive deal with the UAE to train ten thousand Somali troops and police officers in Egypt. However, frustration among officials with the terms of the agreement, as well as continued Emirati projects in Somaliland, have complicated the UAE-Somalia relationship. On January 1, Ethiopia (also close with the UAE) announced it had reached an MOU with Somaliland exchanging recognition for sea access and the lease of a military base. Following the two major Turkey-Somalia agreements of 2024, the Emiratis severely cut their support for the SNA, which included providing an additional $256 in monthly salary for the 14,400 soldiers trained by the UAE.

The Emirati factor carries two major risks for Turkish ambitions in Somalia. First, Abu Dhabi has played a critical role in the fight against al-Shabaab, including through air strikes. Manpower shortages have plagued the SNA for decades, an issue that Emirati coffers have helped alleviate. The withdrawal or reduction of Emirati support in the fight against terrorism will have a compounding effect as the African Union’s Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), abiding by a request from Somalia, plans to withdraw its forces by the end of 2024. The withdrawal of both ATMIS and the UAE risks Turkey becoming further burdened by the region’s fight against terrorist groups. Second, the UAE has faced several setbacks across the region as the number of players continues to grow, and its attempts to reinforce its position will create effects that will impact Turkey. The UAE is entering increasing competition with China in Djibouti, especially now that Djibouti’s government nationalized the Doraleh Deep Water Port, which was previously owned by an Emirati company; meanwhile, in Sudan, the Emirati-backed RSF has seen its first major setbacks in months with the loss of Omdurman to the Sudanese Armed Forces, who have purchased weapons from Iran. As the UAE seeks to reassert itself and reinforce its position in the region, it will likely double down on its already substantial investments in Puntland, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Whether the emboldening of Somalia’s rivals and the geopolitical balancing in the Horn will have a stabilizing or destabilizing effect remains to be seen, but it will likely be closely watched by Turkey.

Known unknowns

Though Somali and Turkish officials maintain that the recent agreements are unrelated to the major deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia, the timing is difficult to ignore. The Somali cabinet labeled the Somaliland-Ethiopia MOU as a “blatant assault” on its sovereignty and said it was an example of Ethiopian “interference against the sovereignty of [Somalia].” Unsurprisingly, Somalilanders reacted similarly to the Turkey-Somalia agreements that followed. Though the regional backlash to the MOU may in part steer Ethiopia and Somalia to dissolve it, this is far from certain. It remains unknown if Turkey’s enforcement of Somali maritime security will extend to Somaliland waters, which Ankara recognizes as part of Somalia. In May, Somaliland’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Turkish naval vessels would not be welcome in its territorial waters. This issue will be particularly important if Ethiopia proceeds with its plans to build a naval facility in Somaliland. Despite a strong Turkish-Ethiopian relationship, the Turkish Navy supported joint Somalia-Egypt naval exercises days after the January 1 agreement was signed. It is also unclear how the Turkish Navy will interact with the Puntland Maritime Police Force, which has received funding support from the UAE. Though the semi-autonomous Somali region of Puntland does not claim total independence, it pulled recognition of the Somali federal government in March.

Equally uncertain is how Ankara will react should the Houthis attack a ship transiting through the Somali waters that it will be charged with protecting. Handcuffed by the group’s connection to the war in Gaza, Turkey has balanced a precarious relationship with the extremist group, quietly opposing them over the last seven years while refusing to label them a terrorist organization and shying away from joining the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian.

A winding path forward

It is uncertain how Turkey and Somalia will deliver on the major agreements and continue the upward trajectory in their bilateral relations. Turkey faces a complex and challenging Somali political landscape. Both MOUs were quickly ratified by the Somali parliament (members perhaps had little choice in the matter, according to one Somaliland-based researcher), though the deal is not without detractors. Beyond concerns over sovereignty, Mohamud is in need of an influential patron as he faces allegations of consolidating power. For Mohamud, Turkey may be the answer, as Turkey largely disregards Somalia’s domestic politics and offers near unconditional support for Villa Somalia, which has led some analysts to describe Turkey as an “all-weather friend.” Mohamud recently proposed a series of constitutional changes, including transitioning to a presidential system, arguing that it would combat clan politics and unite the country. The reforms have prompted protests and polarized the parliament. The Puntland region declared on March 31 that it would be withdrawing from the federal government until a new constitution was put in place. Days later, the Daily Somalia reported that Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni traveled to the UAE and Ethiopia.

Furthermore, Mohamud’s government lacks unity. The same day that the Liberty Petroleum deal was signed by Somali Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Abdirizak Omar Mohamed, Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre expressed concerns and called for revoking the deal. Similarly, the Somali government lacks a clear strategy toward al-Shabaab. Following a successful first phase of “total war” in 2022, both battlefield and political gains have slowed, and al-Shabaab has struck back with a series of horrific attacks. Barre declared his support for peace talks with al-Shabaab in direct opposition to Mohamud, garnering public and private support from within a fractured cabinet.

Moreover, the recent battlefield gains by al-Shabaab undermine the legitimacy of Turkey’s military presence in the country. The concessions required for a peaceful settlement with the terrorist group may include ejecting Turkey’s military, the presence of which al-Shabaab has condemned harshly.

As Turkish officials and lawmakers consider ratification and implementation, they will no doubt look to the past decades of Turkish engagement with Somalia—but also the challenges that lay ahead. The difficulties posed by external influences, great-power competition, tumultuous domestic politics, widespread corruption, high costs, and continued conflict in Somalia will make Turkey’s enormous promises extremely difficult to fulfill. The future of these agreements and thus the future of Turkey’s relations with Somalia and position in the Horn of Africa, though built upon a strong foundation, remains to be seen.

Kiran Baez is a young global professional at the Atlantic Council Turkey program. Add him on LinkedIn.

The views expressed in TURKEYSource are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

The post Turkey signed two major deals with Somalia. Will it be able to implement them? appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Training future authoritarians
• Party governance as the root of all success
• Global implications and recommendations
• Dataset of Chinese government files

Introduction

At the peak of China’s economic growth toward the end of the 2010s, Beijing began to advocate for an alternative model of governance that prioritizes economic development and rejects the centrality of the protection of individual rights and “Western” democratic processes. At the heart of this new push to legitimize authoritarian governance was the example of China’s own remarkably rapid economic development under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and an implicit assertion that such successful growth legitimizes not only China’s own autocratic system, but also other non-democratic political systems. The global implications of this development have grown clearer as Beijing has embarked on a steadily expanding mission to promote its political system alongside its economic success in countries across the Global South.

As early as 1985, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping explained, in plain language, that the Chinese political system would resist changes despite economic integration with the world. He told the Tanzanian president at the time, “Our reform is an experiment not only in China but also internationally, and we believe it will be successful. If we are successful, it can provide some experience for developing countries.”¹ In 2017, a new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, repeated this sentiment using similar language.

The path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.”

Source: “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, November 4, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long pursued foreign acceptance of Chinese political narratives and encouraged their adoption to further China’s interests.² However, China typically does not need to cajole countries into accepting its messaging about successful development. Many developing country leaders, having witnessed the Chinese “economic miracle” in which it developed at a remarkable pace after first opening its economy to the world in the late 1970s, take seriously China’s narrative about the benefits of a more authoritarian system and are willing to consider the calculated risk of experimenting with what Beijing is offering. Even as China’s economic growth has slowed significantly and its political system has grown more repressive under Xi, the number of countries welcoming Chinese governance lessons continues to grow, enhancing Beijing’s global influence. This has significant implications for the future of democracy, the protection of individual rights, and the nature of the global order.

Training future authoritarians

One of the most direct ways that Beijing promotes authoritarian governance is through training programs for foreign government officials on Chinese governance practices. This report investigates a new dataset of Chinese government files on such trainings, uncovering how Beijing uses these sessions to directly promote ideas and practices that marry economics and politics to make a case for its authoritarian capitalism model. Beyond encouraging sympathy for Chinese narratives among officials across the Global South, the programs also provide practical assistance for host countries to fast-track adaptation of Chinese practices. The sessions also appear to serve intelligence-collection purposes by requiring each participant to submit reports detailing their prior exchanges and engagements with other foreign countries on specific training subjects. This report outlines the content Beijing teaches officials in various developing countries and the anticipated benefits to Beijing from these programs. It also explains how these initiatives fit into China’s broader ambitions to undermine the liberal democratic norms that currently underpin the global order.

The author obtained 1,691 files from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) containing descriptions of 795 governmental training programs delivered (presumably online) in 2021 and 2022 during the pandemic. Each program description contains a title indicating the subject of training; the name of the Chinese entity subcontracted to deliver the training; the timing and language of instruction; invited countries and regions; group size; the professional background and demographic requirements for trainees; and training program objectives. Additionally, each description included an outline of the training content, including names of instructors and contact information for subcontracted entities.

In 1981, Beijing began delivering training programs, first branded as foreign assistance, in coordination with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as part of an effort to provide aid and basic skills to developing countries.³ In 1998, the Chinese government broke away from that cooperation arrangement and began offering its own centrally planned training programs directly to governmental officials from countries across the Global South. Beijing reportedly hosted 120,000 trainees from the Global South between 1981 and 2009, with 4,000 programs across twenty fixed areas. With initial success, the programs expanded from their original objective and the number of trainees increased in the next decade, with 49,148 trainees in 1,951 programs between 2010 and 2012, and more than 200,000 trainees in around 7,000 programs between 2013 and 2018.⁴

Evidence in the newly obtained 2021 and 2022 files indicates that the objectives of Chinese governmental training programs for foreign officials have changed significantly. Trainings are no longer foreign assistance programs with primarily humanitarian assistance aims, but clearly serve to directly inject narratives that marry authoritarian governance with economic development—in other words, to promote an autocratic approach to governance.

According to a cross reference of public releases, the current protocol of governmental training programs involves receiving foreign officials sent to mainland China in accordance with bilateral agreements.⁵ These training programs focus on specific areas, and are centrally planned by the Chinese government with designated regional quotas.⁶ A review of these ”specific areas“ also shows that these programs differ from trainings on humanitarian aid, foreign assistance, and basic skills that Beijing delivered in cooperation with UNDP in the 1980s and 1990s. Rather, the trainings offer authoritarian principles in areas such as law enforcement, journalism, legal issues, space technologies, and many other topics. Given that in China, law enforcement is designed to protect the state and the Party rather than the people, journalism is prescribed to create national unity rather than act as a check against the system, and the law is intended to protect the regime rather than its citizenry, these training programs naturally offer foreign officials different lessons than they would receive from democratic countries.

According to the files obtained, the Chinese embassy in a country identified for training typically is notified roughly three months before a training program is expected to be hosted, and the relevant desk at the Chinese embassy is tasked with selecting and inviting targeted individuals in the host country. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security attaché at the embassy would be responsible for inviting local law-enforcement representatives to join programs organized by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security. At least eleven Chinese government ministries and Party departments have delivered training programs to foreign government officials in the past three years, including the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, National Health Commission, Ministry of Emergency Management, International Liaison Department, and Ministry of Public Security.⁷ According to the files, within each of these Chinese ministries and departments, an “international cooperation and exchange” office then coordinates to subcontract the delivery of the training program to a hosting entity, often with a quasi-civilian Chinese entity with extensive ties to the government. The MOFCOM files show that the 795 training programs were subcontracted to 111 hosting entities in 2021 and 2022.

Given the vast number of Chinese ministries and departments found to have provided trainings to foreign government officials in the past few years, it is reasonable to conclude that these programs were not paused during the pandemic but simply moved to an online format. A review of the 795 descriptions shows that 21,123 individuals participated in online training programs that were provided by MOFCOM in 2021 and 2022. These programs were centered on lectures and included relevant virtual site visits. They ranged from one to 60 days in length: 42 percent of all programs were between twelve and fourteen days, and 34 percent were between 19 and 21 days. Program size was between 15 and 60 participants, and 68 percent of the programs were designed for 25 participants. Based on the training description, nearly all the programs targeted developing countries.

Because this research dataset was limited to program-description files from the MOFCOM, there remain obvious blind spots to understanding the full scope and depth of Chinese governance-export training programs for foreign governmental officials. However, precisely because the dataset here concerns those trainings delivered by the MOFCOM, examination of the files permits unique insights into how the PRC marries economics and politics in its trainings, revealing that Chinese economic achievements are used to support authoritarian ideals.

This report maps the governance practices Beijing is promoting in countries across the Global South. It does not attempt to examine the effectiveness of these efforts, which is outside the scope of this project. Follow-on research endeavors involving local experts will be necessary for exploration of individual governments’ receptivity to PRC narratives and practices, which is likely determined by a mix of local interests and political contexts.

Party governance as the root of all success

Chinese training programs focused specifically on governance practices have traditionally been implemented by the International Liaison Department (ILD), an agency under the Central Committee of the CCP whose core function is party-to-party diplomacy. In its political engagement with other countries’ political parties, the ILD has long conducted training sessions on Chinese governance to promote CCP ideology, with the stated intent to conduct “state governance experience exchange [治国理政经验交流].” Initially such trainings were held exclusively between the CCP and countries with one-party rule or corresponding Leninist party structures, such as Vietnam.⁸ This is no longer the case. The ILD training sessions have expanded to include sessions in non-communist and non-authoritarian countries. At the same time, other entities in the Chinese government have begun conducting their own “state governance experience exchanges.” In the late 2000s, similar language on “state governance experience exchange” began to surface in foreign policy documents describing engagements with developing regions and countries, including Latin America in 2008, Kazakhstan in 2009, Laos and Myanmar in 2010, and Mongolia in 2011,⁹ demonstrating the expanded reach of Chinese governance training sessions.

Since then, each training, no matter the subject, has contained language on CCP ideology and organization and related contributions to the PRC’s achievements in that subject area. In this way, authoritarian governance choices are being promoted even in the most niche of subject areas.

Even programs on seemingly innocuous topics like beekeeping, bamboo forestry, meteorology, or low-carbon development all begin by briefing participants about the Chinese reform and guiding management principles raised at the latest plenary sessions of the Party committee. The programs highlight where successful tactics for poverty alleviation or pandemic management originated, and then relate these principles to the technical subject areas being covered. This approach is employed to maintain consistency of narrative delivery to a variety of audiences. In the program descriptions obtained, targeted foreign government officials range from the highest political level to the technocratic level, and from senior-level directorships to junior staff members of departments working on political affairs, the economy, education, agriculture, science, and more.

According to a review of the 795 training descriptions obtained in the course of this research project, MOFCOM trainings cover a vast variety of topics, including trade-related areas such as port management, international application of BeiDou (the Chinese global navigation satellite system), and blockchain and information security technologies. However, despite MOFCOM’s remit, it also provides training on topics that do not seem immediately related to trade, such as the role of think tanks for implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, national policy on ethnic minorities, new-media affairs, population management and development, university management, governance practices for presidential advisers, urban governance, social security and welfare, and smart cities.¹⁰

For the purpose of this research, the 795 training programs were reviewed and categorized into six groups based on their reported activities as outlined in the files. The following group labels were created by the author.

1. Clearly authoritarian: The first group describes training programs which include explicit lessons on PRC practices that are widely regarded in liberal democracies as direct infringements on personal freedom. This includes PRC endorsement of non-democratic regime practices in political, government, and legal affairs, including administrative control over the media, information, and population.

2. Potentially authoritarian: These training programs contain lessons on PRC practices which have, in some cases, infringed on personal freedom or indirectly aided infringement of personal freedoms and individual rights. This includes, for example, training on dual-purpose technologies that could be exploited to access individuals’ data in ways that expand state surveillance and control over citizens’ personal lives.

3. Infrastructure and resource access: These training programs are centered on setting standards and imparting industrial technical skills for various aspects of infrastructure and resource extraction, which may further PRC access to critical resources. This includes, for example, renewable energy application, mechanization of the agricultural sector, and technologies in mining, copper processing, and biotechnology.

4. Information operation access: These training programs are centered on activities that might further PRC access for its information operations, such as programs on Chinese culture and Mandarin-language promotion for foreign officials.

5. Security access: The fifth group involves and describes training programs centered on activities that may further PRC access to the sensitive security infrastructure of a foreign country, such as programs on aviation emergency, satellite imagery, and geochemical mapping.

6. Others: The sixth group includes all other training programs that do not fit into the above categories, such as pest control, climate change, soybean production, tourism development, and preschool-education sector capacity building.

Among the 795 training courses offered by MOFCOM between 2021 and 2022, about 25 percent of the programs were categorized as clearly authoritarian, 10 percent as potentially authoritarian, 22 percent as related to infrastructure and resource access, five percent as related to security access, two percent as information-operation access, and 35 percent as “others.”

Based on this categorization, the research then focused on examining files of training programs that were not categorized as clearly authoritarian or potentially authoritarian. This revealed the extent to which Beijing used potentially authoritarian means to influence governance choices by injecting narratives that marry authoritarianism with various successes related to the economy. It further demonstrates that PRC training programs that appear to be focused on trade, infrastructure, and other nominally non-political topics are also efforts to promote China’s governance model.

The following are just two examples out of the hundreds of files in which the same pattern can be observed. In one file entitled “Seminar on international application of BeiDou and remote sensing,” and in another, “Seminar on port management for Central and Eastern European countries,” the training content specifies ten and fifteen sub-categories, respectively. At least two or three sub-categories are completely unrelated to the training subject, instead focusing on China’s reform and opening-up process, poverty-alleviation programs, and management of the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the success of China’s particular governance model in handling these challenges. The training programs consistently and repeatedly remind trainees across the Global South that all of China’s achievements are attributed to its political choices and authoritarian governance practices.

Despite the lack of access to the exact lecture materials used in these programs, a review of the list of instructors yields insights into the kind of narratives the lecturers delivered to foreign governments. For example, Dr. Ding Yifan (丁一凡) was one of six instructors for the 13-day training on port management. A researcher at the state-backed Development Research Center of the State Council, Ding has written in support of internationalizing China’s currency to bypass “Western control” over financial mechanisms and setting up overseas Chinese economic zones to relocate parts of Chinese production to developing countries before commodities are finalized for export to Europe and North America, ensuring China’s stake in the global supply chain and embedding Chinese assets abroad.¹¹ These are positions commonly held by many Chinese academics and experts.

Ding, however, also has a more distinctive track record as an advocate for China’s authoritarian system. For example, in a lengthy 2017 online lecture titled “Advantages of the Chinese system of governance” (“中国的制度优势”)¹², Ding explicitly explained that the Chinese economic miracle is a result of “a good democratic system of socialist governance with Chinese characteristics, our democracy is the real democracy” (“是因为中国特色社会主义民主制度好，我们的民主是真正的民主”) and that “sometimes people don’t know how their own society should develop, and they need to be guided by strong leaders to show the way.”( “有时候民众并不知道他们希望社会朝哪个方向发展，需要强有力的领导人去指明方向.”) Ding’s online lecture details flaws in voting-based democratic systems, pointing to the constant change of governments and party politics as inefficient and a waste of resources. Ding makes the case that one-party authoritarian politics is the only feasible system for China: “We are a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country. If we have multi-party politics, then our country will break apart and fall into civil war, destroying all we have built.” (中国是一个多民族、多文化国家，如果实行多党政治，那么，一定会四分五裂，陷入严重的内战，毁掉我们建国以来所做的一切努力.) Ding has also fueled disinformation against Japan and the United States, claiming Japan dared “to release nuclear-contaminated water because it has the backing of the United States” (日本胆敢排核污水底气在于背后老板是美国人) when Tokyo released wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant that was hit by a tsunami in 2011 after receiving approval to do so from the International Atomic Energy Agency.“¹³

Global implications and recommendations

The findings catalogued in this report underscore that the PRC is engaged in a concerted effort to promote authoritarian governance across the developing world, using its own economic success as the primary argument for why countries need not adopt “Western” democratic practices to achieve their development goals. This is occurring across Chinese training programs in Global South countries, regardless of the often-unrelated subjects purportedly addressed. While Beijing often suggests that countries should pursue approaches specific to their own local contexts, rather than adopting the Chinese model completely, PRC trainings clearly highlight aspects of its authoritarian model as central to the blueprint of successful development that others can emulate.

China is likely to continue expanding training efforts to promote autocratic governance. Numerous training programs currently conducted in China for foreign government officials are already being moved to countries across the Global South, with new Chinese institutions set up to deliver programs that are both longer term and more sophisticated. In 2022, a Chinese political leadership school was opened in Tanzania, delivering the same type of governance training program outlined above that marries authoritarianism with economic success.¹⁴ If successful, this kind of setup is likely to be recreated elsewhere. For example, Luban Workshops were introduced in 2016 as a vocational equivalent of the Confucius Institutes and there are now 27 workshops worldwide, an increase from 18 in 2021.¹⁵ Where Confucius Institutes are state-sponsored centers teaching Chinese language and culture, Luban Workshops are state-sponsored classrooms teaching Chinese industrial skills and standards. Given the findings in this report, it is reasonable to assume these workshops will weave lessons on the benefits of China’s authoritarian model into vocational classes.

Beijing’s growing drive to promote its model appears unaffected by the marked slowdown in China’s economic growth and the well documented structural challenges facing China’s economy, many of which are a result of an authoritarian system under the CCP that increasingly prioritizes political control and absolute security over unleashing the power of market innovation and consumer demand.¹⁶ In other words, the very example at the heart of China’s promotion of authoritarian governance—its own remarkable development since the late 1970s into the world’s second largest economy—may be falling apart.

Many developing countries, however, are not attuned to the mounting challenges China is facing and still value the lessons of the country’s success under authoritarian rule, presenting ample opportunities for the PRC to expand and deepen its training programs across the Global South. The potential implications of these continued efforts are significant and wide ranging.

First, more countries may entertain and potentially adopt authoritarian governance practices shared by Beijing as they seek the potential benefits of economic engagement with China. More research is needed to determine the ultimate impact of China’s governance trainings abroad on recipient countries’ political practices. However, foreign leaders already routinely accept and endorse Beijing’s perspective on Chinese domestic issues and international positions in the hopes of maintaining or increasing Chinese investment and contributions to their nation’s domestic development.¹⁷ As China’s combined economic and political influence mounts, more countries dependent on China will likely welcome its lessons and may even sacrifice their own immediate interests in return for the long-term promises that Beijing offers. In some cases, China’s success in “elite capture”—the extensive corruption of a country’s key political and business leaders, resulting in their serving China’s interests above those of their own citizens—will likely contribute to local officials’ willingness to welcome Chinese trainings. The elite capture dynamic may also increase the likelihood that lessons learned in these trainings will be incorporated into their country’s governance practices.

Second, China’s clear propaganda effort through these trainings will combine with the CCP’s broader effort to shape narratives in countries around the world regarding China’s successes and the benefits of engagement with the PRC to advance Beijing’s preferred messaging. Beijing is engaged in a global propaganda effort to “tell China’s story well,”¹⁸ as Xi has put it, and counter decades of perceived dominance of the global information space by the United States and other developed democracies, including regarding the legitimacy of non-democratic governance systems such as its own. Included in this endeavor are efforts to train and cultivate local journalists to write positive stories about China, insert official Chinese propaganda in local media outlets, deliver tailored disinformation regarding the United States and the failings of democratic governance¹⁹, and deploy United Front groups²⁰ to co-opt local elites.²¹ Across these efforts, Beijing’s messaging consistently underscores its development successes while ignoring inconvenient statistics about China’s more recent economic downturn, reinforcing the notion that countries in the Global South might benefit from following China’s developmental path.

Third, China’s expanding promotion of authoritarian practices may foster greater ideological and political polarization globally as democracy’s presumed status as the ideal form of government is thrown into greater doubt. Even if most countries exposed to CCP trainings do not adopt a wholesale authoritarian approach to governance, the selective adoption of aspects of China’s system will mean that more countries choose not to align with the United States and other democracies on a range of policy choices that will shape global governance and connectivity. For example, a number of countries have been inspired to adopt aspects of China’s top-down regulatory policies on the internet.²² This dynamic is complicating efforts to maintain a more united approach to internet management, potentially fragmenting the internet into competing technospheres. More fundamentally, potential PRC success in encouraging more sympathetic views of autocratic methods—and critical views of democracy—across the Global South would gradually undermine the ability of the United States and other democracies to credibly speak of a common future and interests among countries bonded by democratic values and aspirations.

The first step in addressing these dynamics is to recognize the extent of the problem, conducting further studies such as this one on the nature of various PRC efforts to promote its model and then, most critically, determining the actual impact of these efforts in increasing developing countries’ acceptance, adaptation, and implementation of authoritarian governance practices.

Local interests, political context, and feasibility of adaptation are all reasonable major factors that determine whether a government will ultimately import authoritarian practices and narratives. Only once the effectiveness of various PRC activities has been determined should significant effort be directed at developing tailored measures to counter them, thereby avoiding unnecessary expenditure of very limited resources on addressing the large and expanding number of CCP efforts across countries.

Even as such studies are undertaken, the United States and other democracies should increase efforts to address the relative paucity of knowledge and objective information about China and its approach to governance at home in the majority of developing countries. This lack of reliable, home-grown information on China is perhaps the PRC’s greatest asset in its efforts to promote its authoritarian model because it allows Beijing to set the dominant narrative in many countries regarding China’s rapid economic development and the role of its governance system in that achievement.

As noted, in PRC training programs, foreign government officials are fed disproportionally positive economic stories about China in an environment where Beijing is able to censor as it pleases, creating an illusion of near perfect implementation. This bolsters the strong impressions still held by many across the Global South about the Chinese economic miracle from decades ago and the discourse around authoritarian performance legitimacy.²³ It is essential that more developing countries have access to objective information on current realities in China, including the country’s economic downturn, particularly given concurrent PRC efforts to shape media ecosystems and narratives on China and leverage coopted elites.²⁴

Relatedly, it is necessary to assist countries across the Global South in cultivating and promoting authoritative expertise on China, to ensure that local voices are offering objective analysis of China’s domestic affairs, governance practices, and engagement abroad. This local expertise is also critical for broadening public and elite understanding of PRC policies and affairs that is not accessible through simply translating Chinese government documents that may be unintelligible to the uninformed. For decades, the Chinese government has tried to influence the development of authoritative foreign voices on PRC affairs, relying on PRC-educated China experts as elite proxies to distribute its narratives, set agendas, and influence foreign policymakers and the public alike. In the Global South, Beijing often controls who can study and develop an authoritative voice on PRC affairs by monopolizing the means to visit and research China, study Chinese language, and access research materials through PRC institutions.

One crucial step toward addressing this problem in the medium to long term is fostering more opportunities for independent research on PRC issues, providing alternatives to PRC-sponsored education. Countries with vast non-PRC-sponsored expertise on China should expand their global outreach, including programs for students from countries across the Global South who may wish to undertake professional Chinese studies outside of the PRC. Such independent expertise is essential to fostering objective discussions on China and competing perspectives that allow the public and their leaders to make informed judgments about the kind of Chinese success they want to replicate.

Lastly, at the basic level, countries across the Global South must be encouraged to create a debriefing process for all returning officials who take part in a PRC training program to determine and catalog the level of effort to shape perceptions and decision-making in different policy areas, including regarding authoritarian governance practices, as well as the extent to which related reporting serves China’s intelligence collection efforts.

China’s promotion of authoritarian governance and undermining of support for democratic practices and principles is likely to increase across the Global South, with Beijing further scaling up the type of trainings documented in this report. This effort is integral to the PRC’s drive to transform a global order currently predicated on the centrality of democracy and individual rights to one more “values-agnostic” and thus suited to China’s rise under authoritarian CCP rule. To counter this effort, countries across the Global South should be encouraged to make independent, informed decisions about their own development path, with access to objective information about China’s political system, domestic affairs, and economic trajectory. Despite democracy’s evident flaws, it remains the system of governance overwhelmingly preferred by publics around the world.²⁵ Beijing’s revisionist efforts to popularize autocracy will fail if citizens in the Global South have the freedom and information to determine the sort of government under which they want to live.

About the author

Fellow

Niva Yau

Nonresident Fellow

Global China Hub

Africa Central Asia

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Rana Siu Inboden and other participants at a May 2024 workshop Understanding China’s Authoritarian Projection: Training and Normative Propaganda with Other States, organized by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin, for feedback and review of an earlier draft.

Dataset of Chinese government files

These are 14 training program description files from the full dataset of 795, with personal identifying information removed, but remaining available upon requests for research purposes. The English-language text following the Chinese text is entirely written by the program description planner, not the author, and may consist of broken translation. We are currently planning to release all 795 of the remaining training program descriptions and the other administrative files related to their logistics.

• Marine geologic survey and coastal protection training class
• Seminar on blockchain and information security technology for developing countries
• Seminar on enhancing university governance for developing countries (online)
• Seminar on ethnic policies and practices for Belt and Road countries
• Seminar on international application of Beidou and remote sensing
• Seminar on inviting heads of foreign volunteer organizations to China
• Seminar on planning capability of safe city for African countries
• Seminar on population and development program for developing countries
• Seminar on port management for Central and Eastern European countries
• Seminar on national governance for presidential advisers of developing countries
• Seminar on new-developing urban governance for developing countries
• Seminar on new media for Belt and Road countries
• Seminar on social security and social welfare for developing countries
• Seminar for think tank scholars of the Belt and Road countries

The Global China Hub researches and devises allied solutions to the global challenges posed by China’s rise, leveraging and amplifying the Atlantic Council’s work on China across its fifteen other programs and centers.

Learn more

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Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Israel initiates Rafah offensive, despite increased US pressure against it. On May 6, Israel initiated a military offensive in and around the southern city of Rafah, with the aim of destroying Hamas’ final stronghold. The offensive (which drove more than a million Palestinians to flee the city and its surrounding areas) and the extraordinarily dire humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip led to calls from most of the international community for Israel to cease its operations. The International Court of Justice ordered Israel to immediately stop the offensive, while the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced he would apply for arrest warrants for Israeli leaders and Hamas leaders—including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, and Ismail Haniyeh—for “criminal responsibility” for “war crimes and crimes against humanity.” US President Joe Biden rejected the ICC application, saying there is “no equivalence between Israel and Hamas.” Also this month, Spain, Norway, and Ireland announced they would recognize an independent State of Palestine, joining the over 140 countries which have already done so, though the immediate impact is likely to only be symbolic.

• Shaping the order. Tension between Israel and the United States, as well as intra-Israeli tensions, grew in May with Netanyahu still not having articulated a plan for postwar Gaza. In failing to do so, he was criticized by his own defense minister. The lack of strategic clarity threatens to undermine the stability of the war cabinet with opposition leader Benny Gantz threatening to leave the coalition by June 8 if a postwar plan is not in place. The US administration made clear the Rafah operation did not violate Biden’s redline and continued efforts to advance a trilateral agreement which would see Saudi Arabia receive new US security guarantees and support for a civilian nuclear program, and would see a commitment by Riyadh to favor the United States over China when it comes to sensitive technologies and to normalize with Israel
• Hitting home. Protests on US college campuses continued into May, with the total number of arrests by police during demonstrations reaching three thousand. As the school year ends, protests seem poised to decline. Israel, a core US ally, is increasingly isolated internationally over its conduct of the war in Gaza.
• What to do. The United States should continue engaging with the Israeli government to limit civilian casualties and pursue at least a temporary ceasefire that would lead to the release of some hostages, the release of some Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and a pause in military operations to allow a flood of humanitarian aid into Gaza. The Biden administration should continue pursuing a regional path to a two-state solution.

Russia steps up its offensive as Ukraine benefits from an injection of US assistance and arms. Russia used glide bombs and other weapons to attack sites in Kharkiv and seized territory in the Kharkiv region though, as May concluded, its ground offensive seemed to have slowed. US policymakers, having passed a military aid package in April, turned to debating whether to lift restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US arms to attack targets inside Russia. The Biden administration partially lifted such restrictions—only for the area around Kharkiv—at the end of the month. This came after NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called on NATO allies to end similar restrictions. The US debate on the restrictions followed after repeated US indecision and dithering over assistance to Ukraine, with the United States only to provide aid following a prolonged period of time, after it would have been maximally useful to Kyiv. This time, however, the decision process was faster. Reports emerged of Russian sabotage operations in Europe and Russian attempts to intimidate European countries by threatening to redraw maritime boundaries in the Baltic Sea and moving demarcation buoys on the Narva River boundary with Estonia. The United States and European Union, as well as a number of European governments, have criticized the Kremlin border provocations.

• Shaping the order. International decisions over the scope and scale of arms allies provide to Ukraine, and how Kyiv can deploy such arms, will be a key determinant in the war’s result. The US aid package, passed in April, sent a strong message to Russian President Vladimir Putin that the United States stands with Ukraine. The US decision to partially allow Kyiv to use US provided arms to strike inside Russia to defend Kharkiv is another strong signal, but more is needed to demonstrate international resolve, and possibly, weaken Russian domestic support for Putin’s campaign.
• Hitting home. Russian victory in the war would result in cascading security problems in Europe that would draw on even more US resources. By allowing Ukraine to use US-provided weapons to attack inside Russia, the Biden administration would further sustain and demonstrate lasting support for Kyiv’s efforts against Russia’s invasion,  therefore advancing broader US interests.
• What to do. The Biden administration and Congress—building on the Biden administration’s partial lifting of the ban on using US arms to target sites inside Russia—should allow Kyiv to use US-provided arms to attack sites deep inside Russia and urge other NATO allies providing arms. In addition, the United States and Europe should continue to respond swiftly to continued Russian border provocations. If reports of Russian sabotage operations in Europe are accurate, Russia should pay a price—for example, the United States could start with expulsions of Russian officials and stricter vetting or restrictions on Russian visitors. More generally, the United States and Europe will need to prepare for a long-term period of bad relations with Russia and a need to contain Putin’s aggressive Russia.

Iran’s president and foreign minister die in helicopter crash. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and the country’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, died in a helicopter crash in northwestern Iran, while returning from a visit to Azerbaijan. Raisi, who died at age sixty-three, was a hardliner and largely viewed as a protégé and potential successor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iran confirmed the deaths but did not cite a cause for the crash. Khamenei named the first vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, as caretaker president, which is consistent with Iran’s constitution. Iran will hold an election to select a new president on June 28. Raisi’s death seems unlikely to change Iran’s foreign policy and stance vis-à-vis the United States and broader West. However, the election could ignite a new round of protests and activism against the regime.

• Shaping the order. Raisi and Amir-Abdollahian executed Khamenei’s foreign policy centered on expanding the country’s regional malign influence, deepening relations with China and Russia, and calming tensions with Gulf neighbors. Iranian foreign policy is unlikely to change significantly due to Raisi’s death. However, it reignites global attention on the question of who will succeed Khamenei as supreme leader.
• Hitting home. Iran is a chief adversary of the United States. The question of who serves as president matters somewhat, but the question of who serves as the next supreme leader matters more significantly for the United States and world if the next supreme leader continues to have the same level of authority to direct Iran’s domestic and foreign policy as Khamenei enjoys today.
• What to do. Raisi’s death does not warrant any change in foreign policy toward Iran. The United States should carefully track who wins the June 28 election, since this individual could be the most likely successor to Khamenei and therefore the most consequential to the United States for the coming decades.

Quote of the Month

“Democracy is perceived to be retreating worldwide. The accelerating drift towards regimes indifferent to democratic values is a big concern to us, and I believe it is time the US, working with Kenya, deploys its capabilities and [rallies] likeminded democratic countries to set up the cause for democracy.“
—Ruto in his speech at the White House.

State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order 

Democracy ()

• On May 29, South Africans voted in one of the country’s most pivotal general elections since the end of apartheid. The African National Congress (ANC) lost its majority in parliament, which it had previously held for thirty years. In recent years, the ANC, once led by Nelson Mandela, has been plagued by concerns over corruption and mismanagement, with South Africa having received its lowest score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index last year.
• Lai Ching-te, also known as William Lai, was inaugurated as Taiwan’s president, succeeding Tsai Ing-wen, also of the Democratic Progressive Party. Like with the previous administration, Lai’s priorities include strengthening ties with the United States through importing technology and advanced military technology, expanding the manufacturing of submarines and aircraft, and increasing cooperation with regional partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.
• In the world’s largest democratic general election—with nearly one billion eligible voters—India hosted its election of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the national parliament. The election took place in seven staggered phases between April and early June and determined that the Bharatiya Janata Party, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, maintained its popular majority but claimed fewer seats than expected and now needing to form a coalition with allies.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was unchanged.

Security (↓)

• On May 23, China initiated two days of military drills around Taiwan, calling them “strong punishment” for Taiwan’s “separatist acts.” The drills unfolded three days after the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president and his declaration for China to cease threats and accept the existence of Taiwan’s democracy. Taiwanese military experts said that the military drills marked the first time that China simulated a full-scale attack rather than just an economic blockade, with China targeting the Taipei-controlled islands close to the Chinese coast and sending naval and air patrols to the eastern coast which contains Taiwan’s developed military infrastructure.
• The Pentagon released a statement that Russia likely launched a counterspace weapon, or a spacecraft capable of attacking satellites in low-Earth orbit, in mid-May. It follows their previous satellite launches in 2019 and 2022. Concerns over Russia’s efforts to develop nuclear space weapons with the ability to destroy satellites are increasing, as Russia vetoed the United States and Japan’s United Nations Security Council resolution in April that called for United Nations member states not to develop space-based nuclear weapons.
• On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade () 

• The Biden administration increased tariffs on Chinese semiconductors, solar cells, electric vehicles, and other strategic technologies, building on tariffs first imposed by former US President Donald Trump. The move aims to increase US domestic production in these areas, and experts assess that the decision simultaneously demonstrates Biden’s attempt to prevent China from using unfair trading practices and his resignation that Beijing will not change its model in the near term.
• The United States and Kenya, during a state visit by Kenyan President Willliam Ruto to Washington, announced the Nairobi-Washington Vision, a call to the international community to support countries with high debt levels and to invest in economic growth.
• On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons (↓)

• The space race has continued, with China sending an uncrewed craft to the far side of the moon to retrieve the first samples from that lunar area. Bill Nelson, administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, feared that much of China’s so-called civilian space program is actually a military program, and that China could attempt to restrict access to lunar areas.
• A new study underlined that climate change, shrinking biodiversity, the expansion of invasive species, and other anthropogenic changes on the planet are increasing the danger of infectious diseases for plants, animals, and human beings. While previous studies have connected individual diseases to specific ecosystem effects, this study showed the impact in aggregate and the need for prevention and mitigation strategies to decrease risks.  
• On balance, the commons pillar was weakened.

Alliances () 

• Biden welcomed Ruto to the White House, making Ruto the first African leader to be honored with a state visit in Washington since 2008. During the visit, Biden announced that he would work with Congress to designate Kenya a major non-NATO ally (which would make Kenya the first Sub-Saharan country to receive this designation) and the two leaders agreed to new partnerships on security, technology, and debt relief.  
• Putin visited Chinese leader Xi Jinping, reinforcing the countries’ strategic ties, underscoring the leaders’ personal relationship with one another, and showcasing an alternative to the United States’ global influence. They discussed bilateral trade, technology, and education expansion. The meeting reinforces Russia and China’s “no-limits” relationship that they established shortly before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was unchanged.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

• US Senator Roger Wicker (R-MS), in the New York Times, explains why investing in the US military is the best way to prevent—and prepare for—war.
• Neha Wadekar, in Foreign Policy, argues that the global response—or lack thereof—to the refugee crisis created by Sudan’s civil war means that a new path forward is desperately needed.
• Shannon K. O’Neil, in Foreign Affairs, contends that the US and Mexican presidential elections may pave the way for a reconsideration of the bilateral relationship.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weight in on this month’s events

• Frederick Kempe, in Inflection Points Today, explains why Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Europe may very well be a moment of truth for China’s relations with the continent.  
• General Christopher Cavoli, commander of US European Command and supreme allied commander Europe, outlined NATO’s efforts to modernize and prepare for the many challenges the Alliance is facing in an Atlantic Council event.
• Matthew Kroenig and Andrew Michta, in the New Atlanticist, react to the meeting between Xi and Putin.
• Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, assesses that the Group of Seven should proceed with the plan to use frozen Russian assets for Ukraine, noting that the international community must be even more ambitious in its approach to condemn Russia’s war.
• Samantha Vinograd, on CBS News, lays out the implications of the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Program Assistant
Ginger Matchett – Project Assistant

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This paper is the first in the Freedom and Prosperity Center’s “State of the Parties” series analyzing the strength of multi-party systems in different regions of the world.

In 2024, as many as seventeen countries across Africa, with a total population of nearly 300 million people, will hold national elections. These electoral processes are consequential because whether they are free, fair, and transparent will help determine if the troubling trend in several countries across the continent of democratic regression, military coups, or political instability worsens—or ebbs and begins to reverse, as was recently demonstrated in Senegal.

The stakes are clearly high in these contests, which will occur in the so-called year of elections wherein more than four billion people globally are eligible to cast ballots. While the elections are important to Africa’s democratic trajectory, they are not single-handedly determinative of it.

Strong and institutionalized political parties are also key to the future of democracy on the continent; however, policymakers have not afforded this key institution much attention or associated resources. For example, the US’s national security strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa does not reference strengthening political parties despite the document’s emphasis on democracy promotion. Further, the Biden administration’s Summits for Democracy—the third of which took place in March 2024—have not included commitments from participating governments (the United States included) to strengthen political parties.

Robust political parties inform whether a political system delivers for citizens, provide a key link between citizens and their government, and foster measurable resilience against democratic erosion. For these and other reasons, therefore, political parties as a core institution of democracy will help chart the continent’s future, both in terms of freedom and prosperity.

This piece analyzes the state of political parties in sub-Saharan Africa and uses Atlantic Council Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data and other sources to show why parties are essential to democratic progress. It examines this argument through four case studies and concludes with a path forward for re-centering democracy assistance work in Africa to shore up this critical component.

Issue Brief Sep 19, 2023

Less freedom, weaker states, more conflict: can that cycle be broken?

By Patrick W. Quirk and Owen L. Myers

Why and how advancing freedom (political, economic, and judicial components) is the surest way to advance sustainable stability and associated prosperity.

Democratic Transitions Freedom and Prosperity

New Atlanticist Jan 2, 2024

Six ways for the US to put democracy back on the global agenda in 2024

By Patrick Quirk

As 2024 begins, the Biden administration must take urgent steps to put its pro-democracy rhetoric into action in key theaters around the world.

Africa Americas

New Atlanticist Mar 22, 2024

Ahead of its presidential election, Senegal shows that democracy requires the rule of law

By James Storen, Annie (Yu-Lin) Lee

For Senegal to cement its status as a haven of democracy, the country must prioritize judicial independence and the rule of law.

Elections Politics & Diplomacy

The Freedom and Prosperity Center aims to increase the prosperity of the poor and marginalized in developing countries and to explore the nature of the relationship between freedom and prosperity in both developing and developed nations.

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The post The missing piece: Political parties are critical to democracy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

• Introduction
• Research questions
• Methodology
• Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing
• Assessment
• Recommendations
• Acknowledgments
• About the author
• Appendix 1

Introduction

In the United States, the military procurement bureaucracy tends to sponsor development of new technologies to fill requirements. The bureaucracy also largely seeks domestic sources for all new charismatic military megafauna: aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems. Security “cooperation” in US policy and practice is largely a one-way process, neglecting the benefit of learning and sourcing from other countries. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s concomitant threats from India to Korea, point to the need for coordinating the industrial capabilities of allies. As the United States faces simultaneous competition with two revisionist, nuclear-armed, major-power rivals, not to mention a challenging budgetary and fiscal environment, the additional research and development (R&D) costs assumed by the Department of Defense through its disregard of foreign suppliers, while never ideal, are no longer tenable.

Law, regulation, and policy can conspire against good economic thinking, though with clear exemptions. The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1983 prohibited the construction of naval vessels in foreign shipyards, unless the president first informs Congress of a national security need otherwise (10 U.S.C. §§ 7309–7310). The Buy American Act of 1933 demands preference for domestic manufactures in federal procurement, though this is waived for imports from dozens of allied countries through reciprocal agreements (41 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8305). Note, though, that these laws say nothing of where products are designed, merely where they are manufactured. Further, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 mandates a “preference for commercial products . . . to the maximum extent practical,” with “market research . . . before developing new specifications for a procurement” (10 U.S.C. § 3453). Official policy periodically reemphasizes this mandate for off-the-shelf procurement.¹

Much of the procurement bureaucracy in the Defense Department seems not to understand the exemptions and the mandates for off-the-shelf procurement of military capabilities. In contrast, the US Special Operations Command, imbued with its own procurement authority, has been far more open to procuring military systems off the shelf, and then heavily customizing them against specific military needs. The US Coast Guard, housed under the Department of Homeland Security, has also long preferred off-the-shelf solutions, often of foreign design and even manufacture—and with much less customization. Indeed, decades of procurement debacles and the economics of international commerce indicate that broad domestic preference is wrongheaded. At least three reasons point to the need for broader sources of supply:

• Quality: With military off-the-shelf solutions, many of the qualities are observable, from performance in testing to actual use in battle. In developmental programs, quality is not so observable ex ante, and may disappoint ex post. Global procurement invites buyers to find the best equipment available anywhere, and often from countries with competitive advantages in particular industries.
• Urgency: Off-the-shelf solutions may be sought as interim solutions to immediate military problems. If not restrained by production capacities or bottlenecks, they will arrive presently. What is purchased immediately may then suffice for anticipated problems, becoming enduring solutions, if the political and technological conditions do not too greatly change in the long run. In contrast, technological development requires greater lead time, delaying fielding.
• Economy: Off-the-shelf solutions may come at lower upfront prices, if the development costs are spread among multiple national customers, or otherwise already amortized. With domestic development, the cost is disproportionately borne by the sponsoring government, and this roughly averages 20 percent of the life-cycle cost of more advanced systems. Spending on R&D competes with spending on procurement, but, in fielding capabilities, the measure of merit is procurement. Simultaneously, when immediate needs are adequately filled by off-the-shelf procurements, monies can be husbanded for developing systems targeted at more challenging, long-range problems. Later, the wider supply base for the off-the-shelf system, which should remain largely interoperable with foreign versions, will contribute to lower sustainment costs.

Because autarky is illusory, greater “friend-sourcing” can provide US forces with quick access to proven, economical solutions, while maintaining the option for domestic production when that is strategically desirable.² Informal consortia of allied buyers could then naturally divide responsibilities for development and production, through an emergent but controlled market process. Allowing US forces more opportunities to acquire military technologies abroad would then restructure security cooperation as a two-way process, with the avid participation of friendly countries. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently described Kyiv’s emerging military-industrial cooperation with the United States, “Ukraine does not want to depend only on partners. Ukraine aims to and really can become a donor of security for all our neighbors once it can guarantee its own safety.”³ Access to that sort of battled-hardened experience is part of the return on US assistance.

Research questions

Historical case studies can provide tangible evidence as to how well friend-sourcing approaches have fared in the recent past. The results can demonstrate whether actual procurements should more closely follow this course of action, already supported by law, policy, and economic theory. This study then poses two important and timely research questions. In the United States, since the end of the Cold War, how has the procurement of off-the-shelf systems developed for allied militaries:

• Affected the quality, availability, and cost of national military capabilities?
• Affected the long-term market for national, military-industrial R&D?

Methodology

To answer these questions, this paper seeks to identify all recent cases of off-the-shelf military procurements in the United States, subject to some boundaries. The set is limited to major end systems—aircraft, ships, ground vehicles, and missile systems—because the international trade in subsystems among friendly countries is already much more liberal. Also, the set includes only those US procurements undertaken since the end of the Cold War because global security dynamics changed radically at that point. Note that this excludes from consideration, for example, the US Army’s procurement of its Austrian-designed Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, and the US Marine Corps’ procurement of LAV-25 armored vehicles, as these both began in the 1980s.

This paper further restricts the set to systems already in use by US forces, so that a firm decision for adoption, and some record of operation, can be observed. The study includes, however, customizations of off-the-shelf systems, as most countries have needs for subsystems (radios, racks, left- or right-hand drive, etc.) specific to their own military services, and modest customization is common in the international arms trade.

After review of histories and the author’s consultations with a wide set of experts on US military procurement, this paper identifies only nine cases—two missile systems, four aircraft, one ship, and two armored vehicles—in this set (see Appendix 1 for a summary):

• The RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile (NSM)
• The Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS)
• The UH-72A Lakota helicopter
• The MH-139A Grey Wolf helicopter
• The HC-144 Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft
• The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft
• The Sentinel-class Fast-Response Cutter
• The RG-31 mine-protected vehicle
• The Stryker LAV III Interim Armored Vehicle

Neither the author nor the Atlantic Council intends to endorse or oppose the specific platforms mentioned or the procurement choices made. Rather, the following section outlines how these systems were procured and what advantages the acquiring service derived from the purchase. The following assessment section gathers lessons from the case studies in aggregate to inform how the Department of Defense should consider friend-sourcing more military procurement.

Historical cases of successful US military friend-sourcing

RGM-184A Naval Strike Missile

The RGM-184A NSM is a 400 kilogram, jet-powered, sea-skimming, anti-ship cruise missile. In September 2014, seeking a lightweight but lethal anti-ship missile for its littoral combat ships (LCSs), the US Navy test-fired Kongsberg’s NSM from the USS Coronado. In 2015, the Navy undertook a competitive procurement to equip its LCSs. Kongsberg and Raytheon announced a teaming arrangement to bring the Norwegian missile to the United States.⁴ Boeing initially offered an extended-range RGM-84 Harpoon, and Lockheed Martin a surface-launched version of its AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. The latter two firms, however, withdrew their entries in 2017. In May 2018, the Navy selected the NSM for its Independence-class LCSs, its Freedom-class LCSs, and its Constellation-class frigates. The Marine Corps subsequently selected the NSM to equip its new land-based, mobile anti-ship missile batteries, with two NSMs mounted on each robotic Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (see below), deemed the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS).

The missiles are mostly built in Norway, as they have been in production there since 2007, and they cost “slightly less than the Raytheon Tomahawk Block IV cruise missile.”⁵ In a press release, Raytheon noted that undertaking final assembly and testing of an already operational missile “saves the United States billions of dollars in development costs and creates new high-tech jobs in this country.”⁶ More labor, at possibly higher cost, would be required in the United States if production were fully domesticated, and Kongsberg and Raytheon have discussed a second production line to deliver yet more missiles.⁷ Navigation is provided by satellite, inertial, and terrain contour matching; terminal guidance relies on imaging infrared and a target-image database. With the latter technologies, the NSM is designed to strike specific, vulnerable points on an enemy ship, and detonate with its void-sensing fuse at the point of maximum damage. A single missile can thus render even a large warship hors de combat.

The NSM was initially developed by and for Norway. Missiles for mobile coastal defense batteries were quickly sold to Poland. Since then, the NSM has been adopted as well by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Indonesia, Latvia, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. In summary, with the NSM, the Navy and Marine Corps obtained one of the best anti-ship missiles in the world, from a running production line, and at a cost below that of its best alternative in inventory. The US Navy and Air Force have continued to fund development of other, longer-range cruise missiles.

Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System

The NASAMS (pronounced NAY-sams) is a ground-based, anti-aircraft missile system. NASAMS was developed in the 1990s by Kongsberg and Hughes Aircraft to replace the Nike Hercules batteries of the Royal Norwegian Air Force. (Raytheon acquired Hughes Aircraft in 1997.) NASAMS integrates Raytheon’s MPQ-36A Sentinel trailer-mounted radar and AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) with Kongsberg’s launcher and battle-management system. In an apparently sole-source deal, the US Army procured several launchers for the medium-range air defense of Washington, DC, in 2005, and they have served in that role ever since, at a variety of locations in Virginia, the District of Columbia, and Maryland.⁸ The NASAMS case is remarkable in that the Norwegian-US team integrated two off-the-shelf components from a US manufacturer into its system before providing that system as an off-the-shelf product back to the US military.

The United States was the third user of NASAMS, after Norway and Spain. NASAMS is now in service with thirteen countries, including Australia, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Oman.“⁹ In 2022 and 2023, the United States, Norway, Lithuania, and Canada all provided NASAMS units to Ukraine.¹⁰ The Canadian purchase is notable because Canada itself had no ground-based air defenses; the Canadian federal government simply identified a cost-effective and already-available system to send.¹¹

In summary, with the NASAMS, the US Army obtained a medium-range air defense system that remains at the forefront of air defense against the most challenging (Russian) threats, from a running production line, and at a cost that global customers still willingly pay. The US Army and Navy have continued to fund several other families of medium- and long-range air defense missiles.

UH-72A (EC145) Lakota utility helicopter

The EC145 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying nine passengers. In its Light Utility Helicopter program of 2005, the US Army sought a proven helicopter for logistical and medical missions within the United States. In its request for proposals (RFP), the Army specifically sought only off-the-shelf aircraft, and received such offers from Bell, AgustaWestland (now Leonardo), and Eurocopter (now Airbus Helicopters). In June 2006, the Army selected a version of Eurocopter’s EC145, and designated it the UH-72A Lakota. The EC145 first flew in 1999 and was itself developed from the MBB/Kawasaki BK 117, which had first flown in 1979.

All UH-72s have been assembled at Airbus’s factory in Columbus, Mississippi. The program has experienced no significant delays. The UH-72 was competitively sourced, and the Army has been sufficiently satisfied with its performance and cost-effectiveness that the service has purchased 481 of the aircraft. Along the way, the Army awarded Airbus further orders under the original contract to fully recapitalize its fleet of training helicopters.¹² The Army’s Lakota was subsequently upgraded into the UH-72B, as Airbus continued to develop its EC145 into the H145M.¹³

Military versions of the EC145 have also been in service with the military forces of thirteen other countries: Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Germany, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Serbia, Thailand, and the Cayman Islands. The US Army has several times rebuffed suggestions that the domestic-service helicopters could be deployed overseas, asserting that adding armor and decoys would be uneconomical. However, in December 2023, Airbus and the German Defense Ministry announced a deal for at least sixty-two H145Ms, configured as either commando transports or missile-firing anti-tank helicopters.¹⁴ In this way, the case provides an example of a US military service overestimating its need for technological development when an off-the-shelf product would suffice.

In summary, with the EC145, the US Army obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a price that won a competitive tender. The US Army continued to fund rotorcraft development, though more notably of tilt-rotor aircraft through its Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft program.

MH-139A (AW139) Grey Wolf helicopter

The AW139 is a twin-turboshaft, utility helicopter capable of carrying up to fifteen passengers.

In the late 1960s, Bell Helicopter developed its UH-1 Huey helicopter, a workhorse of the Vietnam War, into the twin-engine UH-1N Twin Huey, to meet a requirement of the Royal Canadian Air Force.¹⁵ The US Air Force began buying Twin Hueys in 1970, for a variety of utility functions. About forty-five years later, the USAF was ready to replace them, seeking up to eighty-four aircraft for passenger transport and other utility functions. The aircraft had two particularly important roles: flying commandos to any missile silos in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota that might come under attack, and evacuating government officials from Washington, DC should the capital city again come under attack.¹⁶ The USAF initially planned a sole-source award to Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky for UH-60s. Under the Economy Act of 1932 (31 U.S.C. § 1535), an agency can select a system already in service with another branch of government in lieu of a competitive procurement. Congressional objections soon scuttled that idea, whether to provide others an opportunity to bid or simply because the UH-60 might not have been the best-value solution.¹⁷ In September 2016, the USAF released a request for information (RFI) from industry, and in December, a draft RFP.¹⁸

The Air Force asked for a proven helicopter, and in response, five companies or teams offered four types of aircraft. Sikorsky offered its HH-60U Pave Hawk, already in service with the USAF. Sierra Nevada offered to rebuild existing, out-of-service US Army UH-60As to a -60U configuration. Airbus offered its UH-72A, already (see above) in service with the US Army. Textron’s Bell Aircraft offered its UH-1Y, already in service with the US Marine Corps, which was developed in the 1990s under a perhaps questionable sole-source contract.¹⁹ Leonardo teamed with Boeing to offer a military version of the Italian company’s AW139. That aircraft had been developed initially by Agusta (later AgustaWestland, now Leonardo) and Bell in the late 1990s, though Agusta bought Bell’s interest in the program in 2005.

The Air Force rejected the Airbus and Bell offerings outright as too small and short-ranged for the missile security mission. In September 2018, the service chose the AW139. At the announcement, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson told the assembled that “strong competition drove down costs for the program, resulting in $1.7 billion in savings to the taxpayer.”²⁰ In this instance, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act beat the Economy Act at economy. At first delivery, in December 2019, the service named it the MH-139A Grey Wolf.²¹ Flight testing started in 2020, but did not conclude for several years. Leonardo and Boeing agreed to some requested modifications, and the aircraft had some unexpected difficulties with FAA certification.²² Low-rate production started in Philadelphia in March 2023.“²³ The Grey Wolves are today built on the north side of Philadelphia, where Leonardo has been building AW139s since 2007, and they are then customized on the south side of Philadelphia, by Boeing.

Prior to the Air Force’s purchase, AW139s were flying with at least three air services in the United States: the New Jersey State Police (since 2012), the Maryland State Police (2012), and the Los Angeles City Fire Department (2013). Miami-Dade Fire Rescue joined that group in 2020. Air forces or other public flying services in twenty-four other countries also operate AW139s.

In summary, with the AW139, the US Air Force obtained a proven helicopter in wide military service around the world, with a two-year delay, though at a price that won a competitive tender. The Air Force had not spent significant sums previously on rotorcraft development, and, with relatively few requirements for rotary-wing aircraft, the service has not since.

HC-144 (CN-235) Ocean Sentry maritime patrol aircraft

The CN-235 is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying fifty-one passengers or thirty-five paratroopers. In May 2003, the US Coast Guard selected the CN-235-300M maritime patrol aircraft from the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) as part of its “Deepwater” program to recapitalize much of its aircraft and ship fleets.“²⁴ In February 2004, Deepwater contractor Lockheed Martin ordered the first two aircraft from EADS on the Coast Guard’s behalf.²⁵ The service had specifically requested a proven, off-the-shelf aircraft to replace its HU-25 Guardian jets, Dassault Falcon 20s similarly purchased off the shelf in the early 1980s and originally developed in the early 1960s. The CN-235 was developed, starting in 1980, by a joint venture of Spain’s Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA (CASA, then part of EADS, now Airbus) and Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (IPTN, now Indonesian Aerospace). The first flight was in 1983, and production began in 1986.

Deliveries to the USCG proceeded slowly, with the availability of funding. The first unit arrived in December 2006, and the eighteenth in October 2014, at which point the Coast Guard retired its last HU-25. The aircraft were largely built in Spain but fitted out with equipment specific to the Coast Guard at EADS’s facility in Mobile, Alabama. The USCG had initially intended to procure thirty-six, but the availability of surplus C-27Js (see the next case study) led the service to reduce its plan by half. By September 2017, the Coast Guard’s HC-144 fleet had flown for one hundred thousand hours—more than that of any country with CN235s besides France and South Korea. At that point, more than two hundred CN-235s were flying in more than twenty-four countries.²⁶

The US Air Force also flies a few CN-235s within its Special Operations Command.²⁷ Notably, Air Force Special Operations also flies twenty Dornier 328 twin-engine turboprops, termed C-146A Wolfhounds; and a few CN212 Aviocars from CASA, termed C-41As.²⁸

In summary, with the CN-235, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, at the pace it desired, and at an ongoing total cost that the service continues to support. The Coast Guard has generally not spent significant sums on aircraft development, and specifically not multiengine, fixed-wing aircraft development, preferring off-the-shelf purchases.

C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft

The C-27J Spartan is a twin-turboprop, fixed-wing cargo aircraft capable of carrying sixty passengers or forty-six paratroopers.

In the early 2000s, the US Army and the US Air Force individually were seeking ideas for twin-engine turboprop transport aircraft. The Army sought to replace its C-23 Sherpas, C-12 Hurons, and C-26 Metroliners with a common fleet. The USAF sought to supplement its C-130s with a smaller aircraft capable of flying from shorter fields, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2006, Under Secretary of Defense Ken Krieg instructed the two services to combine all these requirements into plans for a single airplane, the JCA.²⁹

Lockheed Martin offered a shortened version of its four-engine C-130. In August 2006, the Army (which was managing the program for the Air Force as well) eliminated that aircraft from the program. CASA, teamed with Raytheon, offered its C-295 aircraft, a larger derivative of the CN-235, developed in the 1990s. Alenia, teamed with L3 Communications, offered its C-27J Spartan. The latter had begun development in 1996 as an improvement of the Aeritalia (later Alenia, later Leonardo) G.222. The USAF had purchased ten G.222s in 1990, designating them C-27As. The C-27J would feature more powerful engines and the glass cockpit of the C-130J, which explains the choice of modifying letter. The first flight was in September 1999, and the Italian air force ordered twelve that November.“³⁰

In June 2007, the US Army and US Air Force jointly chose the C-27J as the JCA.³¹ The Army planned to buy seventy-five for the National Guard, and the Air Force seventy for both the Air National Guard and its component of Special Operations Command. The Army soon found the aircraft very useful for relieving the workload of its Chinook heavy helicopter fleet.³² The Air Force, however, was never enthused about splitting the mission with the Army, and questions of the economy of the arrangement persisted.³³ In 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates decided to transfer all the aircraft to the Air Force. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta decided just to retire the entire fleet, as the United States reefed back its enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. Over the next two years, fourteen of the surplus aircraft were provided to the US Coast Guard, and another seven went back to the Army for its Special Operations Aviation branch.³⁴

Prior to the US order, the C-27J had been ordered by Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Australia, Chad, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Zambia ordered aircraft subsequently.³⁵

In summary, with the C-27J, the US Army and Air Force initially obtained a proven turboprop aircraft in wide military service around the world, relatively quickly, and at a competitive price that they were willing to pay. Those aircraft continue to fly for the United States, just with different services or branches than initially intended. That is more a matter of changing requirements than the quality, availability, or cost of the aircraft. Regarding development funding, the US Air Force has only once spent a large sum on new multiengine fixed-wing aircraft since the C-17 Globemaster III program in the 1990s. Its recent orders for KC-46 Pegasus aerial refueling aircraft included development funds, but under the fixed-price deal, Boeing (the contractor) would eventually come to assume most of that cost through repeated overruns.

Sentinel-class (Damen Stan 4708) fast response cutter

The Damen Stan 4708 is a 42 meter patrol ship designed for a variety of naval and maritime constabulary missions.

In March 2007, the US Coast Guard terminated its contract with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman to modify its 110-foot Island-class cutters with a 13 foot midship hull extension, intended to produce a more capable ship with an extended service life. The Island-class ships had been built in the 1980s by Bollinger Shipyards of Louisiana to an off-the-shelf design of the 1960s by Britain’s Vosper Thornycroft, which had been sold to several other naval forces, including those of Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Singapore.³⁶ The concept was reasonable in principle, as hull plugs are not uncommon in naval architecture and shipbuilding. The problem was that the Island-class ships were already proving susceptible to late-in-life hull cracking, but neither the service nor the contractors were fully forthcoming with one another about the difficulties. After taking delivery of eight of the rebuilt ships, the Coast Guard terminated the program, and indeed withdrew the eight from service.³⁷

In September 2008, the USCG awarded a contract, after an open competition, to Bollinger to build a replacement class of “fast response cutters.” The Coast Guard had expressly requested an off-the-shelf solution, with at least two vessels from the parent design in patrol boat service for one year, or one vessel in patrol boat service for at least six years. Bollinger brought a design based on the Damen Stan (“Standard”) 4708 patrol vessel, by Damen Shipyards of the Netherlands. With options, the fixed-price contract called for twenty-four to thirty-six cutters. The first, USCGC Bernard C. Webber was launched in April 2011 and commissioned in April 2012. The Coast Guard was sufficiently pleased with the cost and quality that the service now has fifty-four in service, and another eleven in sea trials, under construction, or planned. Bollinger’s work has been noticed, bringing forth suggestions that the US Navy could also purchase 4708s to replace its Cyclone-class patrol boats, and perhaps for other uses.³⁸

Three ships of the design had entered service in 2004 and 2005 in South Africa as the Lilian Ngoyi class of environmental inshore patrol vessels. In its explanation of the decision, the Coast Guard described Damen as an “internationally recognized ship designer with more than 30 shipyards and related companies worldwide [and] 4,000 vessels in service since [it was] founded in 1929.”³⁹ The 4708 was itself a development of the Damen Stan 4207, which has served in the navies, coast guards, or maritime constabularies of Albania, the Bahamas, Barbados, Bulgaria, Canada, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

In summary, with the Sentinel class, the US Coast Guard obtained a proven patrol ship whose preceding designs were in wide military service around the world, and at a price that led to procurement of scores more. The first ship was not available for forty-three months after contract signing, which is neither particularly fast nor slow by historical US standards. By avoiding much development spending with the Damen Stan 4708, the USCG saved those funds for its next-larger class of cutters in the Deepwater recapitalization program, of a wholly new design: the Heritage-class offshore patrol cutter.

RG-31 Charger (Nyala) mine-resistant armored vehicle

The RG-31 Nyala is a four-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, specifically designed for resistance to land mines. In 1996, the US Army purchased a few RG-31 mine-protected vehicles to equip its land-mine disposal squads on peacekeeping duty in Bosnia. Later described as a “rolling bank vault” of a troop carrier, the RG-31 had been developed in South Africa from the Mamba, an earlier mine-protected troop carrier that was built on a Unimog truck chassis and powered by a Mercedes-Benz six-cylinder diesel.⁴⁰ The “Bush Wars” of the 1970s and 1980s had culminated by the 1994 election that marked the end of apartheid, but part of the legacy was a remarkable industrial capability for developing armored vehicles. However, through a series of licensing arrangements and corporate mergers, the marketing rights for the RG-series vehicles in North America resided with GDLS-Canada. The vehicles were thus built in South Africa, but fitted out in Ontario, at the same plant that produced Strykers (see below).⁴¹

By the middle of 2003, the US-led coalition’s occupation of Iraq had elicited attacks by insurgents with leftover land mines and more improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Eager to get into the market of supplying the bomb squads, General Dynamics Land Systems looked globally in 2003 for an off-the-shelf solution and remembered its license for the RG series of vehicles.⁴² The US Army then ordered a small number of additional RG-31s. Service on the ground in Iraq created impressions of quality. In an urgent request to Quantico in 2003, the 1st Marine Brigade in Anbar Province requested one thousand mine-protected armored vehicles “similar to the South African RG-31, Casspir, or Mamba.”⁴³

In June 2004, General John Abizaid, the commander of US Central Command, which oversaw all military operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff explaining his situation and requesting help. His most poignant statement was that “IEDs are my No. 1 threat. I want a full court press on IEDs . . . a Manhattan-like Project.” In November 2004, the Army ordered a further fifteen RG-31s. The vehicles were priced well below $1 million each—far below the price of a Stryker or Bradley troop carrier. The Army’s enthusiasm grew in February 2005, when the service entered into a $78 million contract for another 148 RG-31s from Canadian Commercial Corporation, the national armaments marketing firm, on behalf of GDLS. In that contract, the armored trucks were oddly termed “ground effect vehicles,” and the Army’s official nickname would be Charger. Deliveries took some time, as the supply line stretched almost the length of the Atlantic Ocean. Deliveries were scheduled to continue, however, through December 2006.⁴⁴

The first fatality in an RG-31 did not occur until May 2006. Early on, the US armed forces also ordered vehicles from Force Protection Industries of South Carolina. These were not off the shelf, but rather, had been developed domestically with technology licensed from the South African government. Eventually, the Army and the Marine Corps ordered over one thousand RG-31s, and thousands of other vehicles termed MRAPs—Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected vehicles—from multiple domestic producers.

In 2005, the Army and the Marines began work on an ambitious project for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JTLV)—a vehicle only slightly larger than a Humvee, but with the protection of an MRAP. Developing the JLTV would ultimately require ten years, and full-rate production would not begin until 2019. During this time, US troops were protected from land mines by MRAPs, including RG-31s, and the origins of all that work reside in South Africa.

In summary, with the RG-31, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle long proven against land mines, relatively quickly, and at a price far below that of its other troop-carrying armored vehicles. While procuring the RG-31, and afterward, the US Army and Marine Corps would spend large sums developing the JLTV.

Stryker Light Armored Vehicle III

The LAV III is an eight-wheeled, all-wheel-drive, armored troop carrier, designed for higher road speeds and lighter weight than comparable tracked vehicles.

In June 1999, less than a week after assuming office, US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki signaled his intention to restructure much of the service.⁴⁵ The immediate impetus came from the Army’s difficulty over the preceding several months with deploying its Task Force Hawk, of attack helicopters and accompanying ground troops, from Germany to Albania for the Kosovo War. As analysts at RAND later described the problem, the Army needed to “expand ground force options to improve joint synergies.”⁴⁶ As Shinseki would more clearly say, its light forces were too light for fighting opponents with heavy weaponry, and its heavy forces too heavy for strategic mobility.⁴⁷ Neither bookend of capability had properly contributed to the overall war-fighting effort.

In October 1999, Shinseki described a plan to rebuild the Army around motorized formations equipped with wheeled armored vehicles small enough to fit on C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.⁴⁸ In February 2000, General Motors (GM) Canada and GDLS announced that they would together enter the pending competition with a version of the Canadian LAV III, itself a development of the Piranha series of armored vehicles, first developed in the early 1970s by the Swiss firm MOWAG (Motorwagenfabrik AG). Back in 1983, the US Marine Corps had procured a version of the Piranha I, armed with a 25 millimeter (mm) cannon, for reconnaissance and screening duties.

GM Canada held the license from MOWAG to build the vehicles in London, Ontario. The Army would later also receive offers from United Defense LP (UDLP) for a combination of remanufactured M113A2 tracked troop carriers and M8 medium tanks, from ST Engineering for Bionix tracked troop carriers, and another from GD for six-wheeled, Austrian-designed Pandur armored vehicles. Neither UDLP nor ST Engineering seem to have taken account of Shinseki’s strong and openly stated preference for wheels, though UDLP did suggest that a split purchase could include its tracked tank.

In March 2000, the Army reequipped the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division—a heavy brigade with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—at Fort Lewis, Washington, with LAV IIIs borrowed from the Canadian Army, and a variety of other vehicles under consideration.⁴⁹ In April 2000, the Army released an RFP for the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV). The program was so named because almost simultaneously, the Army launched its Future Combat Systems (FCS) program to reequip all its heavy brigades (and eventually the “interim” brigades as well) with a common fleet of medium-weight vehicles of entirely new design. In March 2002, the Army selected a team of Boeing and SAIC to oversee development of the fourteen different vehicular and aerial systems, manned and unmanned, within the FCS.⁵⁰

In November 2000, after reviewing the four more-of-less off-the-shelf proposals, the Army awarded GM and GD a contract for 2,131 vehicles, in a variety of variants of the LAV III, to equip six brigades by 2008. Shinseki had wanted the first vehicles by the end of 2001, but at contract award, that schedule was clearly infeasible.⁵¹ The US Army’s order was far larger than any yet received, and the US vehicle required a significant redesign from the Canadian standard, with more armor (resistant to 14.5 mm armor-penetrating rounds) but less firepower (a remote 12.7 mm machine gun rather than a manned 25 mm turret). Thus, the first new-production Strykers to equip further brigades would not arrive until 2003. In those numbers, the price was considered reasonable, at roughly $1.42 million each. This considerably exceeded the procurement price of the M113 alternative, but the Stryker’s life-cycle costs were expected to be lower.⁵²

In November 2003, the 3rd Brigade from Fort Lewis deployed to Iraq with Strykers. Also that year, GD consolidated the design-and-production arrangement by buying both GM Defense Canada and MOWAG. The next year, Shinseki’s successor as chief of staff, General Peter Schoomaker, became similarly enthused about the Stryker. In seeking what he called an “infantry-centric army,” in which troops were not defined by their means of conveyance to the battlefield, he specifically noted that Stryker brigades brought twice as many dismounts to the field as brigades equipped with Abrams and Bradleys.⁵³ The Strykers were also performing well in combat. Through early 2004 in Iraq, they had survived attacks from at least fifty-five IEDs, twenty-four RPGs, and a 500 pound car bomb without a single fatality.

On the other hand, the Army’s effort to field a version of the Stryker with a 105 mm assault gun did not fare as well. The service purchased enough to equip each of eventually eight Stryker brigades with twelve guns, but retired all the vehicles in 2022. Then again, the Army’s goal of “Future Combat Systems” as survivable as Abrams tanks but somehow fitting on C-130 aircraft did not survive past 2005.⁵⁴ Development continued for several years, but without tangible progress. In April 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates canceled most of the FCS program, which had not produced any operational vehicles, despite $19 billion in spending and six years of effort.⁵⁵

Because the vehicles were considered an interim solution, the Army initially chose to forego developing its own maintenance depot for Strykers, and to instead rely substantially on GDLS through an arrangement the US military calls contractor logistics support (CLS). The Army’s reliance on CLS was, in retrospect, a costly one, but it did subsequently facilitate modifying the vehicles for greater survivability, after battlefield lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁶ After the FCS program was clearly terminated, the Army began assuming more of the maintenance burden organically.

While only the US Army employs its customized Stryker series, LAV IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Canada, Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia. Piranha IIIs have been procured to equip land forces in Belgium, Botswana, Brazil, Denmark, Moldova, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In 2011, GDLS began producing an upgraded version, the LAV 6, for the Canadian Army and the Saudi National Guard. In 2019, GDLS began building a development of the LAV 6, the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV), to replace the Canadian Army’s M113s and LAV IIs. In 2022 and 2023, the United States sent surplus Strykers to Ukraine, and Canada sent new ACSVs.⁵⁷ In November 2023, the United States offered a coproduction deal to build Strykers, including air-defense variants, in India for the Indian Army.⁵⁸

In summary, with the LAV III, the US Army obtained an armored vehicle in wide service around the world, though somewhat more slowly than hoped, and at a price and life-cycle cost deemed acceptable. The Army’s heavy reliance on contractor logistics support was, in retrospect, a costly decision, but one which centralized management of upgrades at an important juncture. The Army spent a modest sum on development of the LAV IIIs, which required customization for its particular preferences. However, this was a small fraction of the funds spent developing the Future Combat Systems, the later and then-cancelled Ground Combat Vehicle, and the current effort with the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle. None of these programs have delivered vehicles to the field, but Strykers continue to serve.

Assessment

systems were procured starting between 2003 and 2008, during the comparatively free-trading George W. Bush administration, for which military-industrial cooperation with allies was a priority. Two of the systems were adopted in 2018, during the comparatively protectionist Trump administration. Plans for accepting off-the-shelf concepts for those two requirements, however, got their start during the preceding Obama administration. While the US Air Force’s twenty-year drama of aerial tanker procurements from Boeing—and not Airbus—does provide a counterpoint, all the military services but the Space Force have smoothly adopted at least one major system of foreign design. The summary record of these procurements has been largely positive.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military proven systems of lasting quality.

In the first seven cases described, the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard bought off-the-shelf systems to provide enduring capabilities, in lieu of developing new systems, and all seven are still in US service. The Army bought the RG-31 to provide a present capability, while also funding (with the Marine Corps) the development of enduring capabilities, culminating in that of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. For years along the way, the RG-31 provided very valuable protection to US troops against land mines. The Army similarly bought the Stryker LAV III to provide an interim capability, but it never succeeded in developing an enduring replacement. The Stryker thus continues in the Army’s force structure and inventory more than twenty years on. As the Army’s first program manager for Stryker recently put it, “The Army likes the vehicle, and still likes the vehicle”—for if it did not, it would not persist in service.⁵⁹

Note also that the Defense Department would not have entrusted the air defense of the federal capital to NASAMS for eighteen years if it had meaningful questions about its capabilities.

This finding in evidence comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally feature observable quality. Indeed, if one is trying to sell an important system to the Americans, it is wise to bring a quality product. Any US military service is an important customer to whom a sale conveys great reputation.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has mostly fulfilled US military needs comparatively quickly.

The RG-31 was procured in an emergency and was available in small quantities within months. The NASAMS was not quite procured in an emergency, but its immediate availability was appreciated, with fresh memories of the aerial attack on the Pentagon in 2001. The NSM was sought urgently, in that the rising threat from the Chinese navy could not be adequately opposed with the US Navy’s existing anti-ship missiles. The Stryker (or any interim armored vehicle) was sought quickly, because the Army chief of staff was embarrassed by his service’s failure to contribute during the Kosovo War. Its service in Iraq was impressive, but only because it was available three years after contract award. That proved adequate under the circumstances, but General Shinseki initially had much quicker delivery in mind.

In all the other cases, the driving motivation for an off-the-shelf procurement was either economy or assured quality. This does not mean that speed was wholly unimportant. The MH-139A arrived after a flight-testing delay of a few years, and the Sentinel-class cutters also did not arrive quickly. In none of those cases, however, did the procuring service experience operationally damaging delays.

This finding also comports with the logic of the market. Off-the-shelf products generally can be provided more quickly, sometimes because the production process is running, and always because significant product development lead time is not required.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has generally brought the US military cost-competitive matériel.

Three of the cases were not fully competitive procurements. The NSM was chosen as the Navy’s next anti-ship missile after Boeing and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the competition, apparently because neither could quite offer the combination of capabilities the Navy sought in a ship-killing missile for a small ship. The case of the NASAMS seems to have been a sole-source procurement, without a record of a competition. The case of the RG-31 was similarly a sole-source emergency purchase.

The remaining six cases were all competitive procurements, which indicates that foreign-designed systems have repeatedly delivered value for money to the US armed forces.

This finding further comports to the logic of the market. Any US military service is a customer with great buying power. As noted above, concluding the sale reinforces the seller’s reputation, which can be leveraged for many years in pursuing other sales. For these two reasons, offerers have strong incentives to bring good deals to American buyers.

Buying foreign military hardware off the shelf has had no strong effect on US capacity for military-industrial R&D.

The nine off-the-shelf procurements neatly fall into five industries. None have seen a strong effect from this pattern of spending.

• In the two cases of missile manufacturing, the United States purchased two different missile systems, the NSM and NASAMS, from the same original designer, Kongsberg of Norway. On both projects, Kongsberg has cooperated with one of the US national champions in guided missiles, Raytheon Technologies. Over that time of the ongoing procurement, the US Defense Department has spent many more billions on missile development, for both offensive and defensive missions.
• In two cases of rotorcraft manufacturing, the Army bought hundreds of EC145s, and the Air Force is planning to buy scores of AW139s. The Army could have paid a contractor to design a wholly new aircraft for utility and training purposes, but the marginal advantage in an industry with a slow cycle of technological development could not be cost effective. The Air Force’s requirements may have been somewhat more demanding, but a new design for a fleet of less than one hundred helicopters would be similarly foolish.
• In two cases of fixed-wing transport aircraft manufacturing, the Coast Guard, the Army, and the Air Force took delivery of just eighteen CN-235s and twenty-one C-27Js. Developing new aircraft for small fleets would be a very bad use of money. The special operations commands of the US services understand this well, and thus sources most of their aircraft from existing designs.
• In the one case of shipbuilding, the Coast Guard’s off-the-shelf purchase of the 300 ton Sentinel-class cutter freed up money for the development of the 3000 ton Heritage-class cutter—a much larger project. Additionally, none of this spending by the Coast Guard seems to have affected the Navy’s spending on ship design and development.
• In two cases of armored vehicle manufacturing—those of the RG-31 and the Stryker—the Army did continue to spend large sums on follow-on systems: the JLTV and the FCS.

Recommendations

Since the end of the Cold War, the US armed forces have quite successfully taken into service nine major, off-the-shelf systems of foreign design. Again, this is good because a preference for the already available for federal procurement is federal law. Most of these products have been manufactured in the United States, and all have been serviced there. This is reasonable because the United States has huge industrial capacity and some strategic interest in domestic servicing. More pointedly, this technology transfer has effectively constituted security assistance from allies—a valuable concept too often overlooked by military policymakers.

Formulating a strategic framework

The federal government can better avail itself of the advantages in quality, speed, and economy offered by allies’ proven solutions, by adopting a two-part analytical framework for considering their procurement.

Consider the global extent of the market

Seven of the nine systems in this study were widely adopted by military forces around the world before a US military service purchased them. In all other cases, the procuring services had long lists of satisfied customers to consult for insights into the equipment. For future procurements, if the needs of the service do not genuinely exceed the global state-of-the art, the best design should be sought from any friendly source. As several of these cases demonstrate, for large production runs, production can be brought to the United States, if desired.

Measure the technological speed of the industry

Seven of the systems in this study represented modest technological developments. Only the naval strike missile constituted a great advancement over preceding options on the market. In all other cases, the procuring services were purchasing systems from industries with modest cycle speeds of technological development. Four of the procurements were from industries with substantially commercial underlying technologies and observably slow paces of change: helicopters and multiengine fixed-wing aircraft. If firms around the world are investing over the long-term for gradual technological progress, then a program to develop a wholly new system is duplicative.

Educating the procurement bureaucracy

Despite the logic, the procurement bureaucracy—outside US Special Operations Command and the Coast Guard—may remain disinclined to seek proven solutions, and especially those of foreign provenance. In the short run, this puts the onus of securing best value on the political leadership of the military departments and defense agencies. For better quality, speed, and economy, these leaders must meet military desires for novel equipment with demands for frank justification and global market research. This approach fits within the civil-military model of military innovation, which holds that beneficial change most often comes when “statesmen intervene in military service doctrinal development, preferably with the assistance of maverick officers from within the service.”⁶⁰

This last point addresses a longer-term approach. In the apparatus of any administrative state, career bureaucrats greatly outnumber appointees.⁶¹ Even if they are economically minded, the politicians cannot oversee everything. The “positive arbitrariness” of their occasional intervention can produce useful results, but it is also no way to build enduring institutional capacity.⁶² Officials beyond the mavericks need further schooling in the mandate for and economy of buying military systems off the shelf. This means education in the market research techniques of routinely surveying global markets for military off-the-shelf solutions that can inform processes for developing requirements for new procurements. In theory, educational opportunities exist through the Defense Acquisition University, the Eisenhower School of the National Defense University, and the military acquisition elective courses at the various other war colleges.

The benefits could be far-reaching. Procuring what others have already developed can permit the military to focus its R&D funds on its most challenging problems. Then, when war comes, procuring agencies and industrial enterprises will better understand, as organizations, how to put others’ designs into production here to meet the immediate needs of mobilization.

Acknowledgments

The Atlantic Council is grateful to Airbus for its generous sponsorship of this paper.

About the author

James Hasik is a political economist studying innovation, industry, and international security. Since September 2001, Hasik has been advising industries and ministries on their issues of strategy, planning, and policy. His work aims to inform investors, industrialists, technologists, and policymakers on how to effect, economically, a secure future.

Appendix 1

Forward Defense, housed within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, generates ideas and connects stakeholders in the defense ecosystem to promote an enduring military advantage for the United States, its allies, and partners. Our work identifies the defense strategies, capabilities, and resources the United States needs to deter and, if necessary, prevail in future conflict.

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The post Friend-sourcing military procurement: Technology acquisition as security cooperation appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The US elections are quickly approaching. But while there may be a shift in administrations, critical minerals are poised to remain a central theme in US policy: Deep bipartisan support for remaking global supply chains and reducing dependence on China’s current dominance in processing have virtually election-proofed focus on the issue.

Rich in minerals and with a strategic location, African countries should be benefiting from this growing US interest. But currently—due to the investment-intensive nature of greenfield projects, the United States’ and Europe’s increased focus on self-reliance, and competition from other countries with more established mining industries—African countries risk largely losing out on this historic opportunity to attract more investment in the minerals that will fuel future industries,

To ensure that supply chains are restructured to best advance both US and African strategic interests, the US government must accelerate an integrated approach that combines investment facilitation, technological innovation, and capacity building.

New mines take a long time and a large amount of capital to build. Such challenges have hindered non-Chinese capital flows into African markets for decades; but non-Chinese investors and governments are aware of the strategic role the continent could and should play in the global shift to cleaner energy sources. For example, 56 percent of global cobalt reserves, key to electrical vehicle manufacturing, can be found in African countries, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While investment in critical-mineral infrastructure has grown in recent decades, a significant financing gap persists, estimated to be up to $108 billion each year.

The United States and the European Union (EU) are unable to finance infrastructure projects through the government-to-government lending model that China typically employs; thus, the emphasis is put on the private sector to make large-scale investments that must be financed from the firms’ balance sheets or through the capital markets rather than from government coffers. Yet, many Western companies view Africa through a lens of risk, which could be attributed to persisting negative narratives about African markets and people and the heightened scrutiny of global brands by nongovernmental organizations. Western companies’ concerns about political risk and corruption often override their assessments of opportunities. This is in sharp contrast with companies, such as ones from China, the Middle East, or even Turkey, that seem to focus more steadily on the opportunity in African economies created by young populations, rapid digitalization, and wide diversification, motivating these companies to work to mitigate the risks as they encounter them.

Another challenge for African countries hoping to attract Western investment for mining is the growing onshoring focus of the United States and EU. Western countries have resurrected industrial policy in a big way in recent years, ramping up billions in financing and guarantees for mining projects as the strategic vulnerability posed by dependence on Chinese supply chains becomes clearer. African and Western governments are united in their goal to change the current supply chain.

In response to China’s approach to critical minerals, onshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring have proven a bipartisan priority in the United States. And, on both sides of the Atlantic, hundreds of billions of dollars are being pumped into this effort. This can be seen in the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the US CHIPS and Science Act, and both the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act and its batteries regulation of 2023, which all seek to make progress toward net zero and reduce dependence on China’s role in critical-mineral supply chains. The expanded processing capacity that will result from IRA-incentivized investment in the United States will require more inputs and, therefore, a dramatic expansion in mining—over three hundred new mines will be needed to meet electric-vehicle battery demand alone by 2035.

African countries will be home to many of these new mines. Including them in US friendshoring efforts in the years ahead will require investment that is responsibly structured to overcome historical sins. The history of mining and colonialism in Africa—with its extractive, exploitative, and environmentally damaging legacy—has fostered a deeply emotional context for conversations about the future of the industry on the continent. But while mining was part of an ugly past, it is also a necessary part of a brighter and greener future. To advance this vision, Western governments, investors, and development partners must ensure that economic benefits are broadened to meaningfully include local communities, national companies, and environmental and academic groups.

Africa, as a region, has vast potential to build value-adding mining industry capabilities; but potential, if left untapped, won’t attain the economic growth African countries are searching for. Tangible economic progress will require billions of dollars of investment. Washington must invest in its partnership with African countries by derisking increased investment from the private sector and by encouraging the adoption of transparent, equitable, and sustainable practices.

If governments, investors, and development partners don’t make dramatic changes in the next five years (during this administration and the next one) African nations may miss this opportune moment to leverage historic levels of demand for critical minerals to fuel industrial growth, foreign-exchange generation, skills acquisition, and job creation—and the United States may fail to counter Chinese influence in the supply chains that are critical for sustained US global competitiveness and national security. 

Read more

Report

Jul 1, 2024

From greenfield projects to green supply chains: Critical minerals in Africa as an investment challenge

By Aubrey Hruby

This report provides a snapshot of Africa’s mineral wealth and mining industries, draws out the similarities between the mining and infrastructure investment attraction challenges, describes the competitive landscape African nations find themselves in, and makes innovative recommendations—namely to the US government—to rapidly accelerate investment in sustainable mining industries in African markets.

Africa Economy & Business

Aubrey Hruby is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and co-founder of Insider and Tofino Capital.

The post Increasing investment in African mining should be a higher priority for the United States appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meet Abdul Karim Abdullah, a Ghanaian-American creative and entrepreneur who is bringing together the diaspora to shift the narrative about the African continent and provide a space to celebrate African music, food, art, and fashion. 

Born in the Bronx, New York, Abdullah has always felt connected to his Ghanian roots, inspiring his vision to start Culture Management Group, an Africa-focused media management company. In 2017, Abdullah launched Afrochella, now known as AfroFuture Fest, an annual celebration in Accra, Ghana, that began as a festival fusing music, art, food and fashion and transformed into a multi-faceted global platform amplifying Africa’s thriving talent.  

In 2023, Abdullah was named a goodwill ambassador of tourism to Ghana to continue promoting tourism to the country. His work has been featured in Forbes, BBC, CNN, Vogue, GQ, and other publications. Abdullah believes that investing in the creative economy will bring jobs and new opportunities to the youth on the continent. 

African creatives spotlight series

Meet the creatives redefining narratives about Africa and proving why investing in local talent matters

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The post Cultural curator Abdul Karim Abdullah elevates African culture from the Bronx to Ghana  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In partnership with Africa Development Solutions (ADS) Group, the Africa Center released a report on “Digital services for e-government: Opportunities for a future 2.5 billion African demographic market” by Atlantic Council, GeoTech Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nii Simmonds.  

This report argues that e-government solutions have the potential to revolutionize service delivery across the African continent. E-government services refers to the process of providing technology-enabled public services. With Africa’s population projected to reach 2.5 billion people by 2050, nearly one-quarter of the world’s population, countries like Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo will need to strengthen their government and infrastructure to manage the administration of critical services.  As the middle class continues to expand, so will the demand for access to everyday services such as healthcare, renewing a driver’s license, and filing tax returns. 

This report highlights the potential for growth in African markets through e-governance and the importance having strong policies and frameworks in place to secure data. Additionally, the report offers case studies on Estonia, Canada, and India, three countries that have made tremendous commitment to bridging the gap between citizens and government through digital service delivery. With key recommendations for institutions ranging from African governments and regional bodies to DFIs and private sector companies, it is clear that each have an important role to play in the digitization of public services in Africa.  

Nii Simmonds is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center and an expert in emerging and frontier markets having held top leadership positions in corporate finance, entrepreneurial ecosystems, supply chains, and research commercialization.

Executive Summary Jul 11, 2023

In brief: The future of US-Africa trade and investment

By Frannie Léautier

Since 2000, US trade policy for Africa has been the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which gives duty-free access to the US market for eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa. With AGOA due to expire in 2025, policymakers must decide the future of US-Africa trade going forward to build on its previous achievements.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource May 5, 2023

The EU global investment initiative that could close Africa’s infrastructure gap

By Emilie Bel

The initiative could provide the African continent with the billions needed to close the infrastructure gap. But for it to be a success, several conditions must be met.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Mar 3, 2023

Critical connectivity: Reducing the price of data in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

This report analyzes the current state of the digital transformation in Africa and outlines how affordable and accessible data is imperative for further development.

Africa Digital Policy

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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The post Digital services for e-government: opportunities for a future 2.5 billion African demographic market appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The latest sign of Algeria’s obsession with Morocco was its decision to confiscate the jerseys of Moroccan soccer club RS Berkane after its players traveled to Algeria on April 19 to play a CAF Confederation Cup semifinal match against USMA Alger. Algeria justified its decision by stating that the team’s equipment bore an “illegitimate” map of Morocco, which included Western Sahara. 

African soccer’s governing body intervened, ordering Algeria to drop its case and allow RS Berkane to play in the jerseys. However, Algiers disregarded the ruling, seizing any opportunity to display its support for what it describes as the self-determination of the Sahrawi people.

Many have maintained that one of the main drivers of Algeria’s hostility toward Morocco is the ideological makeup of the Algerian establishment and its strategy of seeking popular legitimacy.

Algeria’s operating philosophy is to galvanize nationalist fervor against its enemies. For the past three decades, it has constantly needed to create external enemies to mobilize national support and divert public opinion from the country’s economic, social, and political problems. 

While largely pertinent, this analysis ignores the psychological dimension of this chronic animosity between the two countries. Algeria’s military and political leaders harbor unresolved grievances against Morocco, which contribute to tensions. Additionally, Morocco is one of the oldest monarchies in the world, and has managed to maintain its sovereignty for much of its history. The same cannot be said of Algeria, a sixty-two-year-old country. 

This makes the Algerian regime reluctant to fully explore the past, out of fear that a deep dive into the country’s history might lend credence to some critics’ claim that modern Algeria is the creation of imperialist France.

It’s worth mentioning that Morocco was a strong supporter of the Algerian liberation movement, contributing financially and logistically to the war effort against French domination. Then a champion of what some have described as a strong belief in the urgency and imperative of Muslim solidarity, Morocco ignored warnings and secret deals from France, committing itself to the liberation of Algeria instead.

Yet, post-independence, Algeria’s leadership quickly whitewashed this well-documented episode of Moroccan solidarity and generosity, providing invaluable insights into what would later become Algeria’s deep-seated desire to be the Maghreb’s undisputed leader.

Morocco’s defeat of Algeria in the border war known as the 1963 Sand War created a psychological barrier, as generations of Algerian military and political elites grew up with the idea of avenging the humiliation that newly independent Algeria had suffered at Morocco’s hands.

Morocco’s “betrayal” of Algeria

Over time, Algeria’s resentment against Morocco for its humiliating defeat morphed into a radical desire to take revenge by fostering separatism on Moroccan territory. Therefore, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front is the culmination of the Algerian elite’s strategy of attaining regional primacy by establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. While proclaiming its support for the “liberation struggle” of the “oppressed Sahrawi people,” Algeria’s primary goal is to keep Morocco in check by fomenting and prolonging the dispute over the Western Sahara region to prevent Rabat from reopening the issue of unresolved Algerian-Moroccan borders.

As far as Algiers is concerned, ending the Western Sahara dispute would provide Morocco with a level of strategic continental depth that would overwhelmingly consolidate its status as a regional hegemon. Algeria has steadfastly supported the Polisario for the past four decades to prevent Morocco from settling the territorial dispute. The Algerian-Moroccan rivalry entered a new phase in 2017 when Morocco joined the African Union (AU). Algeria had tirelessly used Morocco’s absence from the AU to push for a “parallel African agenda” on the Western Sahara question. This entailed lobbying for the Polisario Front’s Sahrawi cause, which it presents as a decolonization struggle against what it describes as Moroccan occupation.

Given that the AU’s official position on Western Sahara has shifted in Morocco’s favor since 2018, some of Algeria’s anti-Moroccan agitation speaks of deepening diplomatic disarray and a profound sense of disappointment. Algeria seems to be furious that Morocco, in the short time since its return to the AU, has effectively destroyed all the work that Algerian diplomacy had done for three decades to get the AU to fully support a self-determination referendum that would culminate in the creation of an independent state in the Western Sahara region.

Algeria’s displeasure with Morocco’s growing continental influence can be seen in three regional efforts that Algiers has undertaken in recent years to contain Rabat’s rising leadership. The first is the attempted revival of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project in 2022 to derail the more promising Nigeria-Morocco pipeline project. The second is the planned creation of free-trade zones with Niger and Mali to counter Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative for the Sahel. Finally, the most recent is the Algerian regime’s push for the creation of a Maghreb Union without Morocco.

For all these counterattacking efforts, highlighted by the projected openings of more African consulates in Dakhla and Laayoune, the fact remains that Morocco’s African diplomacy is having morale-boosting results. In contrast, Algeria’s diplomatic influence has declined across the continent. More importantly, Morocco’s African diplomacy now extends to countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Nigeria, outside its so-called traditional francophone comfort zone. In the coming months and years, Algeria will redouble its efforts to persuade some of these countries to reconsider their cooperation with Morocco. 

Perhaps the most significant blows to Algeria’s diplomacy have come from outside Africa. These include the consistent pro-Moroccan stance reflected in all United Nations (UN) resolutions on Western Sahara since 2007, the decisive US decision in 2020 to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the region, and Spain’s 2022 declaration of full support for Morocco’s autonomy plan. While the first development has been gradual, and lacks absolute finality due to the presence of marginal pro-Polisario voices within the UN, the latter two events have shaken Algeria.

Taken together, however, these and other emerging developments clearly indicate that self-determination dreams have been buried—and that compromise is the only viable route to a politically feasible and lasting solution in the Sahara dossier. Faced with what increasingly appears to be an irreversible diplomatic setback, Algeria has shifted tactics by confronting Morocco on alternative battlefields. In recent months, as noted earlier, Algeria has used the unconventional platform of sport to settle scores with Morocco.

The goal is to open a second narrative front to rally popular sympathy and support for the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. Algeria’s permanent representative to the UN recently drew parallels between Palestine and Western Sahara, reflecting the regime’s overarching aspiration to distort historical facts and equate the Western Saharan and Palestinian cases. 

It is unlikely that Algeria’s continued attacks on Morocco will compel the UN to reconsider its implicit, but increasingly apparent, burying of the self-determination option on Western Sahara. At the same time, there are growing signs that many in Morocco, having grown tired of ignoring Algiers’s unrelenting hostility toward Rabat, might start pushing Morocco to discard its long-standing patience and the ensuing hope of brotherly reconciliation between the two countries.  

Time for the United States to step in

The animosity and hostility between the two countries have reached worrying levels, raising the specter of a military conflagration breaking out. Against this bleak backdrop, the United States should lead a vigorous diplomatic campaign.      

To calm the waters between the two countries and ensure that the current state does not get out of hand, the United States should give more attention to its military cooperation with Morocco, while signaling to Algeria that Washington would do everything in its power to prevent it from taking any actions that could destabilize the region. Such a move could send Algeria an unmistakable signal of Washington’s commitment to security cooperation with Rabat.     

Second, the United States must pressure the Algerian government to abide by the provisions of the UNSC Resolution on the Western Sahara issue since 2018, all of which call on Algeria to fully cooperate with the UN as it works toward a compromise-based and realistic political solution to the dispute. As Algeria’s rejection of some recent UN resolutions has shown, the only way to get it to commit to the UN-led political process is to pressure it to fully acknowledge its political responsibility for creating and prolonging this conflict and to negotiate a face-saving political solution with Morocco. 

However, this goal will remain out of reach if the United States clings to a balancing diplomacy that prevents it from unequivocally supporting Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara. The time has come for the United States to break with this policy. It must align its political discourse and actions by reaffirming its recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara while calling on Algeria to fully participate in the UN-led political process to achieve a political solution to the dispute.

Indeed, such a move would simply reflect the long-standing US position in the dispute. Numerous declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents show that the United States has never believed in the viability of establishing a satellite state in southern Morocco. Americans have long praised the proverbial friendship that unites the United States and Morocco, stressing that Morocco was the first country to recognize US independence. It is time for the United States to give true meaning to this friendship by fully supporting Morocco’s decades-long quest to end the dispute over Western Sahara; by doing so, it could help end the conflict between Rabat and Algiers once and for all.    

Samir Bennis is a senior political analyst specializing in Arab affairs and Morocco’s foreign policy. He is the co-founder and publisher of Morocco World News. His upcoming book, The Self-Determination Delusion: How Victim Politics and Feel-good Advocacy Have Hijacked the Western Sahara Case, comes out in July.

The post Algeria’s Morocco obsession has killed reconciliation prospects appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In 2017, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on Gertler, accusing him of “opaque and corrupt mining and oil deals” that cost the DRC more than $1.36 billion in revenues from 2010 to 2012 alone. Gertler has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing and, through a representative, said that he would abide by sanctions. The news that the Biden administration may ease these sanctions should be viewed positively, as an indication that US sanctions can achieve both economic and geopolitical goals.

Eased sanctions, whether a formal delisting or the issuing of a general license to Gertler, would allow for the sale of currently sanctioned entities. Following the easing of sanctions in this case, US firms could gain access to new investment opportunities by investing in mining projects that currently have links to Gertler, leading to economic growth in the United States and the DRC. In addition, the DRC has an opportunity to showcase the improvements that the country is making in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. While some senior officials, human-rights defenders, and anticorruption fighters have valid concerns about easing sanctions on Gertler, the decision could be a win for the DRC and the United States.

The choice—and the history behind it

Both the Trump and Biden administrations have gone back and forth over the tightening and easing of sanctions on Gertler. That has drawn much attention, but what hasn’t is the fact that the United States has quietly used sanctions effectively in this case to get its way.

In 2019, The Sentry—an investigative organization that aims to hold to account predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy—conducted a six-month-long study on the effectiveness of sanctions in Africa in the twenty-first century. The study found that better strategies for achieving identified goals in each sanctions program must be developed if sanctions effectiveness was to improve. The Sentry study set the stage for the Treasury 2021 Sanctions Review, which drew conclusions on how to modernize US sanctions and make them more effective. Treasury recommended a “structured policy framework” that “links sanctions to a clear policy objective.” The Biden administration has made no secret of its desire to improve access to critical minerals, diversify its supply chains, and work with US partners to achieve those goals. Since 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output is owned by Chinese companies, US policymakers should be seeking ways to reduce barriers to entry in the DRC’s mining sector and to actively promote investment there. 

As the United States seeks to gain greater access to critical minerals and diversify its supply chains away from Chinese influence, Biden administration officials hope that granting Gertler a general license to sell his holdings in the DRC would increase US or Western firms’ willingness to invest in the country. That’s because those firms have been largely boxed out as Gertler, according to the US Treasury, used his closeness with government officials to secure below-market rates for mining concessions for his companies. Beyond Gertler, the business environment of the DRC ranks 183 out of 190 on the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Easing sanctions, through a coordinated US government effort that seeks to maximize this move, could send an important signal to Western investors that the DRC is open for business. Western firms could lift their bottom lines while stimulating the DRC economy by paying market rates.

The potential delisting of Gertler and his companies is a good example of an instance in which sanctions—or, in this case, the easing of sanctions—are being used in support of a specific policy objective.

Delisting would be good—but more must be done

Building on a potential delisting, the Biden administration should work with Congress to expeditiously pass the bipartisan BRIDGE to DRC Act—which helps the United States secure access to critical-mineral supply chains and sets human-rights and democracy benchmarks for strengthening the US-DRC relationship. These moves could be further timed or calculated to magnify the impact of ongoing foreign assistance programs led by the United States Agency for International Development or other US government agencies.

The United States should coordinate additional moves to support the DRC. In October 2022, the Financial Action Task Force, the standard-setting international organization that seeks to strengthen the global financial system, placed the DRC on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring—also known as the “grey list”—for the country’s dismal record in fighting money laundering and terrorist financing. While many African countries are on the grey list, the impact is considerable, as it limits capital inflows, makes investors wary of doing business, and leads to reputational damage and a reduction of correspondent banking relationships, among other consequences. The US Treasury should look to bolster the DRC government’s approach to anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) by equipping the country with the knowledge, know-how, and capacity that it needs.  

Regardless of whether the delisting happens or whether the BRIDGE Act becomes law, the DRC must do more to help itself. News of a failed coup attempt in Kinshasa on May 19 certainly does not help, especially since—according to local reports—the assailants were linked to exiled DRC politician and US citizen Christian Malanga, who was killed by the country’s security forces in a firefight. Three US nationals were allegedly also involved in the attempt to overthrow the government of President Felix Tshisekedi.

The DRC must continue to take concrete steps to improve the business environment and reduce its political and economic risk factors. Since 2022, the DRC built on its high-level political commitments to improve its AML/CFT regime, finalize its three-year national AML/CFT strategy, and improve its macroeconomic performance—boosting its credit rating. The DRC has an opportunity to continue to make progress in its fight against corruption, money laundering, and terrorist financing that threaten the stability of the country from Matadi on the Atlantic seaboard to Goma in the Great Rift Valley.

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A win in the heart of Africa

Delisting Gertler would not only help the United States get its way, but it would show that its sanctions policy in Africa can be effective; its industrial and national security policies can be successfully implemented; and that all of this can be done in a manner that can help an African partner generate greater economic growth, jobs, and the foreign investment it seeks.

The United States can’t do it alone. It must also partner with the DRC in a serious manner to help strengthen the DRC’s framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, improve Kinshasa’s image, and reduce barriers to investment such as perceived political and economic risk.

The DRC occupies a central role on the African continent and with its economic potential could serve as a future hub for transportation, logistics, mineral processing, and more. If the DRC wins, all of Africa benefits—as do the United States and the West.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

The post In a Congolese mining case, Biden can secure a win for US sanctions policy in Africa appeared first on Atlantic Council.

As political tensions between Algiers and Rabat have continued to mount since 2020, threatening to destabilize the entire North African and Sahel region, another front is being fought with no possible détente in sight: the cultural heritage war. The most recent chapter of this absurd dispute began when the Moroccan Ministry of Culture took legal action on May 20 by filing a complaint against Algeria with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for the alleged appropriation of a unique Moroccan traditional garment known as Caftan Ntaâ El Fassi (Ntaâ Kaftan), which came originally from the Moroccan city of Fez and which Algeria is trying to inscribe among its intangible cultural heritage list.

In recent years, there has been a renewed awareness about the significance of cultural heritage symbols and their undisputable value in nation branding. This was popularized, in part, by the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage introduced by UNESCO in 2003, which calls for the documentation and preservation of living cultural expressions such as crafts, oral traditions, and performing arts. This phenomenon was also encouraged by the business opportunities presented by cultural tourism, an important source of national wealth that accounts for an estimated 40 percent of all tourism worldwide.

Starting in 2008, Morocco and Algeria raced to inscribe diverse aspects of their local traditions with UNESCO. For Morocco, these included the Tbourida equestrian performance, Gnawa music, and the Argan tree and its know-how; for Algeria, they included the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Sidi ’Abd el-Qader Ben Mohammed, Tlemcen wedding traditions, and the rituals of Sebeiba. However, many cultural elements remain the subject of fierce clashes between the two countries, which compete over the authenticity, exclusivity, and preeminence of disputed cultural symbols like Rai music, the couscous dish, or the Moorish Zellige tile.

The limits of cultural fortresses

Culture is a complex anthropological phenomenon that cannot be confined within the limits of modern nation-state borders—a more recent and contested political invention often inherited from colonial calculus over natural resources. This is particularly true in the case of the Moroccan Kingdom and Algerian Republic’s borders, which were engineered by their former occupiers after the 1845 Treaty of Lalla Maghnia. It is common knowledge by now, as demonstrated by historical maps, archive documents, and an International Court of Justice ruling, that colonial France considered Algeria one of its foreign territories—it annexed Algeria in 1830 and maintained control there until 1962—while Morocco was a mere strategic protectorate with a perpetual Alaouite monarch, which Paris would eventually need to exit with the growing decolonial movements starting in the 1930s. It was evident to France that it was more beneficial for its long-term interests to extract as many territories as possible from the Cherifian kingdom and generously subjoin them to the Ottoman Regency of Algiers.

The impossibility of drawing a line in the sand between two intertwined cultures is the very source of the recent conflict between Rabat and Algiers. Disputed bordering districts like Tlemcen, Tinduf, and Bechar are witnesses of the demographic hybridity and heritage spillover of several forms of craftsmanship, musical expressions, and culinary traditions. For instance, it would be absurd today for Morocco to claim the cultural exclusivity of Malhoun music or for Algeria to claim Rai music—though both are ironically inscribed under one country with UNESCO. This example and many others around the world demonstrate how this United Nations (UN) mechanism, while claiming to preserve cultural heritage, also contributes to the creation of imaginary borders and obsolete disputes among transnational communities that share many affinities, such as the indigenous inhabitants of North Africa.

The concept of cultural authenticity itself is historically questionable. It was established by authors like Eric Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition and David Lowenthal in The Past Is a Foreign Country that nation states handle, and often fabricate, historical narratives “celebrating certain aspects and expunging others.” It all depends on what serves their immediate interests, unity, and legitimacy. While Algeria’s oil-economy dependency and introverted military regime delayed its quest to reclaim its heritage, Morocco has benefited from its alignment with Western liberal economies and the urge to develop its tourism and services sectors to tap into its rich traditions and brand itself as an attractive destination at the doors of Europe—often caressing a certain Western orientalist fantasy about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Rabat profited from its first-mover status to successfully market its souks, food, and crafts, sometimes exclusively claiming certain shared North African heritage symbols like Amazigh carpets, pottery, and the iconic dish of couscous, though such claims upset its Maghreb neighbors.

Heritage as a unifying juncture

Another recent episode illustrating this cultural heritage battle occurred in 2022, when the sports company Adidas revealed the Algerian soccer team’s jerseys comprising patterns commonly found in Moroccan ceramics, such as Fez Zellige. Morocco responded by issuing a legal warning to the company. The German sportswear brand ended up officially apologizing to Rabat and settling the dispute amicably after admitting to being inspired by Moroccan craftsmanship. Interestingly enough, back in 2015, the kingdom had engaged in patenting the Fez Zellige in the Vienna Classification of Figurative Elements of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—a more robust and legally binding mechanism to preserve national crafts compared to the UNESCO treaty. Morocco has since attempted to trademark many more cultural elements, including kaftan embroidery patterns, which closes the loop for anyone trying to “culturally appropriate” Moroccan designs and use them for commercial gains.

Local media, Wikipedia, and social platforms are becoming central fronts in this incongruous cultural war. Both Morocco and Algeria engage restlessly and spend large amounts of money on distasteful online confrontations on YouTube, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter) debating whether the kaftan is Almohad or Ottoman in origin and if the tajine is an authentic Moroccan or Algerian earthenware pot. Algerian bots, in particular, have been notorious for spreading propaganda and claiming many confirmed Moroccan traditions for themselves. Moroccan social media users carried out an outrageous, yet revealing, social experiment to prove this theory. To make a point, online users jokingly posted that the “Jaghdid” (colloquially meaning poison in Darija) is “a purely Moroccan delicacy,” prompting Algerian users to rush to claim the imaginary dish as theirs.

On the positive side, North African countries are gaining awareness of the importance of documenting and researching their history and memory, leading to a true revival in local crafts, ethnographic research, and a certain pride to showcase and reinvent those ancestral traditions long ignored in favor of Western consumerist goods. Moreover, this awareness contributed to liberating the Maghreb from the shadows of living in the periphery of Middle Eastern capitals like Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad that repetitively spread false claims that North African countries’ heritage and aesthetic beauty are all to be credited to romanticized and fictitious perceptions of “Arab” Andalucía—a claim that historical evidence strongly refutes.

Last year, “the arts, skills, and practices associated with engraving on metals (gold, silver, and copper)” were inscribed as intangible world heritage by UNESCO in ten MENA countries, including Morocco and Algeria. If the Algerian copper artisan I had encountered and Si Mohamed, the Moroccan one, were to speak today, they would surely approve of this positive collective effort to recognize their craft. The artisans would also agree that while respecting local know-how, originality, and unique historical trajectories is essential, cultural heritage can also be plural and an essential juncture for constructive exchanges beyond trivial political agendas.  

Sarah Zaaimi is the deputy director for communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East programs.

The post A war is raging between Algeria and Morocco. It is being fought in the heritage arena. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

But chances are you’ve heard little about this conflict or the other security tensions throughout East Africa given the lack of traditional media coverage or social media buzz in the United States. That’s due in part to a lack of consistent high-level engagement from the US government in the conflict. Those who are working on this region and care about security and instability need to do more to raise the profile of the disaster in Sudan and in the larger Horn of Africa—because more visibility can help light the way toward solutions.

The United States did not cause a civil war in Sudan, but the inability to deliver quickly on promises of development-related aid in 2021 left the country off balance, leading to an overthrow of the nascent democracy taking shape. Ultimately, the two primary and current belligerents—the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces—took up arms after attempts to retain power failed, leaving a path of destruction in their wake and destroying a country in the process.

It’s been just over a year since US forces evacuated the US embassy in Sudan in a daring operation that resulted in the rescue of just under one hundred Americans and a handful of foreign diplomats from the country. Due to the fighting devastating the country, the economy of Sudan collapsed as millions of people struggle to survive amid the chaos, suffering, and misery. US officials point out that regional players continue to fund and provide weapons to both sides of this conflict, claims that the United Arab Emirates and others deny.

From outside government, it is easy to spot the difficult nature of the policy problems in play: There are belligerents who are not interested in an end to the violence, economic collapse, and human suffering that they are causing. Outside actors are waging a proxy war perpetuating the violence. Diplomats seem to be unable to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict.

The United States is not addressing the confluence of these challenges with its full effort—and it is clear to anyone who follows these issues closely that the efforts it is making are not working. The US government has put in place multiple rounds of targeted financial sanctions on bad actors perpetuating the violence. In February 2024, the State Department announced a special envoy for Sudan to coordinate policy. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee seem to be the loudest voices when it comes to Sudan, drawing attention to the atrocities, the ineffectiveness of US sanctions, and the modest policy successes, but their reach has limits. The executive branch appears to be quietly trying to do its critical work but has said very little publicly beyond the setting of testy congressional hearings. The nongovernmental organization and advocacy community continues to try to shed light on the problem through task forces, letter-writing campaigns, demonstrations, and articles like this one. The problem is that nobody in the broader public seems to be listening.

Where does this leave the people of Sudan? US efforts to mediate between the parties have not been successful to date. Fighting continues, sanctions are not working, and people are dying. Behind-the-scenes work by the diplomatic community is useful, but more should be done in public to raise the profile of the conflict, get more attention from people who do not work on Africa every day, and bring about more public pressure to end it.

This should include visits to Sudan by top Biden administration officials, as security allows, similar to what we’ve seen with senior-level visits to Israel during its war in Gaza or to Kyiv repeatedly in the past three years. Media appearances by senior US officials, as well as the advocacy community, can be helpful too. Alternatively, civil society, diaspora organizations, the nongovernmental organization community, and the general public should encourage journalists to ask US officials tough questions about their approach to Sudan, providing an additional avenue to reach a wider audience. Sudan’s dynamic diaspora in the United States, as well as everyday Americans, should also encourage continued bipartisan attention on Sudan on Capitol Hill.

East Africa’s security challenges extend well beyond Sudan. As one foreign diplomat told me recently on condition of anonymity, the region is full of “division and risks fracture.” Fighting in Sudan damaged an oil pipeline used by neighboring South Sudan to export oil from Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The disruption in oil exports from South Sudan, where a tenuous peace is under threat, led to an economic meltdown in the country and threatens the patronage system placating the delicate political coalition of elites. Continued violations of a United Nations Security Council arms embargo on South Sudan could fuel a return to conflict or perpetuate the fighting in Sudan to the north. Eritrean troops, who helped Ethiopia in its fight against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, remain in northern Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s prime minister continues to make public moves to secure access to a Red Sea port, leaving its neighbors uneasy and further contributing to regional instability. Longstanding security challenges continue in Somalia, which remains locked in a fight against rising threats from al-Shabbab and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

In all of these areas, the United States appears to be largely ineffective and viewed externally as not doing enough or lacking the political will necessary to have significant impact, particularly in Sudan. We can ask ourselves if this is another example of the waning influence of the United States in Africa in real time, a string of bad bureaucratic decisions, or, worse, acceptance that senior levels of the Biden administration lack a coordinated strategy for the country (and the wider Horn of Africa), but they would prefer to avoid dealing with it so as to divert their limited attention elsewhere.  

If the United States does not have the will to engage more forcefully in Sudan, its geopolitical rivals will continue to exploit the security vacuum in the country for their own gain and the region will be worse off for it. As East Africa teeters on the brink, US rivals are increasingly setting the terms of engagement. It’s time to pay attention, before it’s too late.

Benjamin Mossberg is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center. He previously served in the US Treasury Department and US State Department with a focus on Africa policy.

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On April 27, 1994, nearly twenty million South Africans voted in the country’s first-ever democratic election, electing Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) as the country’s president. Propelled into a new era, South Africa ushered in a new constitution, formed a multiparty National Assembly, and officially ended the policy of racial apartheid that had plagued the country for much of the twentieth century.

Thirty years later, up to twenty-eight million South Africans will cast ballots in the country’s seventh national election, one that could be the most consequential since the 1994 vote. The ANC, the party that pushed for the end of apartheid and has led South Africa’s government since 1994, has undoubtedly been responsible for many of the country’s accomplishments. But with growing concern among South Africans about issues such as corruption and inequality, the ANC risks losing its majority.

With South Africa’s political landscape poised to shift once again, it provides a perfect opportunity to examine how the country has fared in the thirty years since overcoming apartheid and becoming a democratic state. Data from the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes, two separate indexes measuring 164 countries around the world according to nineteen different indicators of freedom and prosperity, provide a snapshot into the progress made, the progress lost, and the ongoing challenges and opportunities facing the rainbow nation.

Women’s economic freedom, one of the thirteen indicators in the Freedom Index, stands out as one of South Africa’s most successful accomplishments. Between 1995 and 2022, women’s economic freedom in the country rose from 63.9 to 94.4 out of one hundred, jumping eighteen points between 1995 and 1999 and improving incrementally since. South Africa outpaces its neighbors Botswana and Namibia, two other countries that achieved independence from colonial rule and have since maintained democracy, scoring eighteen points above Namibia and forty-seven above Botswana in 2022.

Notably, women’s economic freedom in South Africa surpassed the average of the world’s freest countries in 1999. Today, South Africa scores just as highly as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and higher than the United States and Singapore. While disparities in legislation still exist, South Africa has made impressive strides in strengthening women’s economic freedom through numerous reforms. These include the Employment Equity Act of 1998, which prohibits gender-based discrimination in the workplace, the increase of paid maternity leave to fourteen weeks in 2003, and legislation protecting women from sexual harassment in the workplace in 2013. Transitioning from an apartheid state that heavily discriminated on the basis of both race and gender to a democratic country with one of the highest women’s economic freedom scores on the globe, South Africa can serve as an example of progress in this metric.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is inequality, one of the six indicators in the Prosperity Index. In the Index, inequality is measured through the share of a country’s pretax income accrued to the top ten percent of earners. With ten percent of the population owning more than 80 percent of wealth, South Africa suffers from significant income inequality, with wide disparities owing to one’s race, education level, and land ownership. With a score of just 13.3 in 2022, South Africa ranks last worldwide in inequality. As the graph below shows, both Botswana and Namibia struggle with inequality as well. In fact, all three countries ranked in the bottom eight in 2022 and are more than forty-five points behind the free country average. Yet South Africa stands alone in that inequality has worsened rather than improved. In 1995, South Africa’s inequality score stood at 50, twenty-six points below the score of free countries and over forty-five points above Botswana and Namibia. By 2022, South Africa’s score had plummeted by nearly 37 points, while Botswana and Namibia saw improvements and the free country average remained relatively the same.

While the nature of the apartheid system actively fostered inequality with a minority of the population controlling the country’s government and wealth, South Africa’s democratic era exacerbated rather than remedied the issue. The country may be more equal politically, but from an income standpoint, power is more concentrated and unequal than ever.

In the middle lies education. Another of the Prosperity Index’s six indicators, education is measured through both expected and mean years of schooling. South Africa’s education score has improved in the past thirty years, increasing from 37.2 in 1995 to 54.5 in 2022. Additionally, the country scores higher than its neighbors; however, its score remains well below that of free countries.

As the data show, South African education has undoubtedly come a long way since the country became a democracy. South Africa has achieved universal enrollment for primary school students, now has fully integrated schools after decades of segregation, and has established a unified department of education. But numerous challenges persist that keep South Africa’s education from reaching the level of the freest countries; while nearly all South Africans enroll in primary school, just 54 percent pass matric (the equivalent of graduating high school). In addition, many schools suffer from a lack of adequate building and sanitation facilities, and transportation to and from school for students is nonexistent in a number of both rural and urban areas. South Africa’s education trajectory is particularly important as about a third of the population is under the age of eighteen.

As South Africans prepare to cast their ballots on May 29, they will not only decide on who will best represent their interests in the future but have the chance to reflect on how their country has changed since transitioning to democracy in 1994. Overall, freedom and prosperity have seen little fluctuation—South Africa’s freedom saw a slight decrease from 72.5 in 1995 to 70 in 2022, and prosperity remained essentially the same, changing from 60.1 to 60. But this data also points to several important areas that the next administration will likely need to address, especially education and inequality.

James Storen is the program assistant at the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

Nina Dannaoui is the associate director at the Freedom and Prosperity Center.

The post Thirty years of South African democracy, visualized appeared first on Atlantic Council.

He announced the launch of an international initiative to “enable the Sahel countries to have access to the Atlantic Ocean.” Landlocked Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso are at the center of the Moroccan plan, which involves making Morocco’s road, port, and rail infrastructure available to them and implementing large-scale development projects.

Even if it is not detailed yet, the Moroccan initiative comes after military regimes came to power by unconstitutional means or through coups d’état, which for three of these states resulted, at various points, in having sanctions imposed on them. For example, Niger was sanctioned by the United States, European Union (EU), and European countries such as France and the Netherlands. Notably, Malian army officers who collaborated with the Wagner Group or were suspected of crimes were sanctioned by the United States. And the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had sanctioned Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, lifted its sanctions on Niger and Mali in February this year, a month after the three Sahelian countries left the organization and soon after the countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Chad has not yet seen sanctions imposed after the undemocratic accession of its president following the death of his father. While the sanctions imposed on the three countries are intended to apply pressure on those who seized power by force or defied the constitution, in the hopes of restoring democratic systems, these sanctions also impact the populations.

The people in these countries are essentially penalized twice: On the one hand, they are led by governments that have revoked the right of the people to choose their leaders. On the other hand, these populations also suffer from the effects of sanctions, which cause them economic hardship, limit their access to essential goods, cut them off from the world, and deprive them of trade opportunities.

That creates a quandary for the democratic world: While sanctions are intended to target unconstitutional governments, it is the ordinary people in these countries who suffer the most from them.

Behind the initiative

Morocco’s efforts to cooperate with the states in the Sahel seem inspired by Morocco’s 2011 Constitution—mainly the preamble.

In this preamble, Morocco commits itself to supporting the Maghreb Union (which it says is a “strategic option”), deepening its bonds with the Arab-Islamic Ummah, intensifying cooperation with European countries around the Mediterranean, strengthening cooperation across Africa, and diversifying its relations with the rest of the world.

Specifically, when it comes to Africa, the preamble states that Morocco intends to “consolidate relations of cooperation and solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa, particularly the countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries.” This short sentence helps explain Morocco’s initiative. The Moroccan Constitution does not drown the Sahel in the mass of Africa, but on the contrary highlights it by mentioning it separately. In his November 6 speech, the king of Morocco even called the Sahelian countries “African sister countries.”

In addition, the Moroccan Constitution’s commitment to the Islamic world—each of the three sanctioned countries are majority Muslim—and its pledging solidarity with the “peoples and countries of Africa” help explain Morocco’s new initiative. By specifying that its solidarity goes to the countries as well as to the peoples, Morocco is distinguishing people from the regimes that govern them.

As for the content of the Atlantic initiative, it has been received well by the Sahelian states because it offers alternatives for growth and development—and indeed, even survival. For example, Niger (one of the poorest countries in the world) depended on international aid for its annual budget, which was slashed by 40 percent in 2023 due to donors and creditors withholding support. Following the coup, malnutrition skyrocketed, only compounded by the fact that the United Nations (UN) World Food Program’s cargos were getting blocked from reaching Niger due to border closures, with one UN coordinator saying that their goal—to deliver humanitarian aid to at least 80 percent of 4.4 million vulnerable people—was in jeopardy.

The success of this initiative is contingent on several factors: It will require funding, a robust regulatory framework, efforts to address challenges such as piracy, and harmonization with and between maritime governance actors. In addition, the economic activity this initiative would create could have benefits for the governments, as well as the people, in the sanctioned Sahelian countries. However, the focus of this initiative is on helping the people, who have continued to suffer for decades.

The Atlantic advantage

The initiative underscores the importance placed—across centuries—on accessing the Atlantic Ocean. For example, El Hadj Omar Tall (founder of the Toucouleur Empire) and Samori Ture (a leader of the Wassoulou Empire) each governed landlocked areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century. Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo chronicled how the two African heroes, facing the inevitable advance of European colonial conquest, hurried to “capture, before it was too late, the political initiative and keep it in African hands.” They both did that by directing their troops to the ocean. Eventually, however, their efforts to reach the sea were halted by the French.

The strategic importance of the Atlantic as taught by history resonates today.

Today, over one hundred countries border the Atlantic Ocean, and importantly those countries include the world’s leading power (the United States), other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (including the United Kingdom and France), Latin American powers (such as Argentina and Brazil), and African nations stretching from Morocco (which itself has a 1,800-mile coastline on the ocean) to South Africa.

For countries that have the means to take full advantage of their coasts, such as Morocco and Senegal, the Atlantic is a boon. Indeed, Africa’s twenty-three coastal nations are home to 46 percent of the continent’s population, 55 percent of its gross domestic product, and 57 percent of its trade. They also contain a large amount of natural resources, including oil.

But access alone won’t grant people in Sahelian countries access to the boon. Here is what is needed for this initiative to succeed:

• Defining common strategic priorities between the countries participating in this initiative and also their partners in order to focus on the most pressing issues.
• The integration of projects already underway such as the Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline project or the Great Green Wall. Their inclusion will bring a more holistic approach to the Moroccan initiative, which focuses on road, rail, and maritime infrastructure.
• The inclusion of the African Union (through the 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy) as well as maritime governance mechanisms, specialized institutions, and other important stakeholders such as the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, African Port Management Associations, Union of African Shippers’ Councils, maritime training institutions, the UN, and the International Maritime Organization. This inclusion in discussions will help to harmonize the maritime rules and avoid double governance systems.
• Access to substantial financing, particularly via international partners such as in the private sector and development and financial institutions. Financing will be needed to support the blue economy and the modernization of road, rail, and port infrastructure.

Sahelian civilian populations have been suffering from the effects of a twenty-year war against jihadist attacks. These populations deserve peace and prosperity. After the security failures of so many domestic and foreign military interventions and the unfolding of the coups, this proposal offers a much-needed brighter perspective for these people.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

Abdelhak Bassou is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South.

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But just as important as Ruto’s visit to the United States is how soon the US president visits Nairobi in return. Such a visit is vital to keep momentum up on several important ongoing initiatives by the two countries. The danger to avoid here is that, as soon as Ruto boards the plane back to his country, US attention on Kenya and Africa falls away again.

Trade, climate, and security on the agenda

On a continent where the United States and European allies are struggling to maintain historic partnerships, Nairobi is an enthusiastic partner in security and trade. These will undoubtedly be a focus of Ruto’s visit this week.

Since 2022, the United States and Kenya have been working on a Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership, which has been supported by recent visits by US Trade Representative Katherine Tai and US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo to Nairobi. A Free Trade Agreement between Kenya and the United States was under discussion during the Trump administration, but it was halted during the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently, House Democrats introduced the US-Africa Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership Act this month.

For Kenya, a new trade agreement would be a shift away from the “Look East” policy that previous Kenyan presidents followed in search of investment. Kenya, for example, partnered with China on a new railway connecting Nairobi and Mombasa, as well as on a prominent expressway project, during President Uhuru Kenyatta’s administration. In contrast, Ruto may discuss funding for the construction of a new two billion dollar international airport in Nairobi with US partners during his visit to Washington. Bringing in the United States as the main financier for this project would challenge China as Kenya’s primary partner for large infrastructure projects.

Regarding security, Kenya has put forward a plan to lead a police mission to Haiti to help stabilize the country following widespread violence by rival gangs and a collapse of the government’s authority. Kenya’s judiciary has so far blocked the plan, but Haiti will likely nonetheless be on the agenda for both leaders. In preparation for the arrival of a Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti led by Kenya, the US military has been providing extensive logistical support on the ground. The United States had previously pledged a hundred million dollars in support of the mission. Kenya’s Defense Minister Aden Bare Duale also visited the Pentagon in February and, in the same month, Kenya hosted US Africa Command’s largest exercise in East Africa. All of these developments indicate that a greater degree of security cooperation between the two countries is possible.

No major breakthroughs during Ruto’s visit this week are expected, though it is possible. Nonetheless, the past few months already indicate that Washington and Nairobi are making steady, gradual progress on trade and security initiatives. Climate—which Ruto has championed since the start of his presidency—will likely be another important focus. His state visit is an opportunity to focus attention on these initiatives to continue this progress. The challenge, then, is to make sure that this week builds momentum on these initiatives that continues into the weeks and months ahead.

The wider US-African relationship

But Ruto’s visit must also be seen in terms of broader US-African relations, the course of which has not run smoothly in recent years.

The United States was caught flatfooted by the outbreak of civil war in Sudan in 2023. Its forces have been expelled—and in some cases replaced by Russian forces—or asked to leave from Niger and Chad. And opinion polls show that the United States has lost its historic leadership in Africa. South Africa’s relations with the United States, for instance, are strained over Israel’s campaign in Gaza, leaving the two countries at odds. These events also come at a time when the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa grouping known as BRICS is expanding in Africa, gaining Egypt and Ethiopia as partners in its goal to build an increasingly multipolar world. All these are potentially affronts to US standing in Africa.

A reset in US policy toward Africa is desperately needed.

In the White House announcement of Ruto’s visit, Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre was eager to highlight and reaffirm the principles set forth during the 2022 US-Africa Leaders Summit. During this summit, the Biden administration pledged that it is all in on Africa. It also made clear that under its strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, it would seek equal partnership with African nations, regardless of their ties with other powers. At the conclusion of the summit, in front of the assembled visiting leaders and delegations, US President Joe Biden pledged to visit Africa in 2023.

He did not.  

This has had an effect, and while the Biden administration is right to tout an impressive lineup of senior US officials and cabinet members who did make the trip to the continent in 2023, the fact remains that the president’s pledge was left unfulfilled.

It is also worth noting that while both the leading Republican and Democrat in the House Foreign Affairs Committee requested that Ruto be issued an invitation to address a joint session of Congress, Speaker Mike Johnson declined to issue the invitation. In the past several years, leaders from Japan, Israel, India, Ukraine, and South Korea have addressed a joint meeting of Congress. But much like Biden’s travel itinerary, Africa is again left off the list.

Equally as important to Ruto’s visit to Washington is Biden’s visit to Nairobi—or to another African capital—soon. While this would be particularly challenging in an election year, fulfilling his pledge as soon as possible would be a much-needed step. It would be a symbol of Africa’s importance to US interests and help move substantive issues in US-Africa relations forward. When it comes to Africa, where policy has a tendency to get stuck or move too slowly, a US presidential visit can be a forcing mechanism to move important projects forward.

Ruto’s state visit this week is very much welcomed by Africa watchers and policymakers, but it serves to keep US-Africa relations on life support. New approaches, further engagement, and firm commitments that bear results are sorely needed.

Sibi Nyaoga is a program assistant at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post Ruto’s state visit to the White House is overdue. So is Biden’s visit to Africa. appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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The commitment of “phasing out coal by 2035 or on a timeline consistent with the 1.5 temperature limit” marks a further step in the direction indicated last year by the UN climate summit, known as COP28, to reduce the use of fossil fuels, of which coal is the most polluting. Mentioning the IEA’s Net-Zero Roadmap report, G7 countries say that “phase-out of unabated coal is needed by 2030s in advanced economies and by 2040 in all the other regions, and that no new unabated coal power plant should be built.” This represents the first agreement on a timeline for phasing out coal after the initiative had previously failed due to opposition by some members. However, it should be noted that, despite the positive step towards a common goal, by using the term “unabated” in the communication, members of the G7 leave open a potential path for the use of coal beyond the indicated timeline. 

In addition to the importance of ending coal reliance, it is now widely recognized that the success of the energy transition is linked to a technology-inclusive approach both for reaching climate neutrality and strengthening energy security. The communication of the G7 promotes members’ increasing use of diverse low-carbon energy technologies including renewable energy, energy efficiency, hydrogen, carbon management, storage, nuclear energy, and fusion.

Energy ministers fully committed to the “implementation of the global goal of tripling installation of renewable energy capacity by 2030 to at least 11 terawatts (TW)” and to “double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030 to 4%,” signaling the intention to create a strong connection with COP28 pledges.

On energy storage, G7 members agreed to a global goal in the power sector of 1500 gigawatts (GW) in 2030, a more than six-fold increase from 2022. Introducing this target for storage is very important to support renewable implementation and ultimately reach the installation capacity target set in Dubai.

The communication highlights the importance for countries to reduce reliance on civil nuclear technologies from Russia and commits to strengthening the resilience of the nuclear supply chain. Countries opting for nuclear energy would work to deploy next generation nuclear reactors.

Fusion made it in the final text with a strong emphasis on the potential of this technology to provide a lasting solution to the global challenges of climate change and energy security in the future, marking an important addition to the G7 joint communication, since in the Hiroshima Communique, fusion was not mentioned.

In order to implement these targets and scale technologies, the G7 countries this year also reaffirmed their commitment to jointly mobilize $100 billion per year until 2025 and their intention to scale up public and private finance. “We stress the need to accelerate efforts to make finance flow consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development,” and “we acknowledge that such efforts involve the alignment of the domestic and international financial system.” Attention is now directed toward the upcoming G7 finance meeting, the G20 in Brazil, and the “finance COP” in Azerbaijan.

Finally, convergence and cooperation with countries outside the G7 will play a crucial role in the success of the transition. The joint communication acknowledges that developing countries represent “an important partner in the just energy transition” and recognizes “the great potential of the African continent in becoming a global powerhouse of the future.”

At this year’s energy ministerial meetings, Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister on Energy Elnur Soltanov (representing the 2024 COP29 presidency), Brazil’s Minister of the Environment and Climate Change Marina Silva (representing the 2024 G20 presidency), and Kenya’s Principal Secretary on Energy Alex K. Wachira, participated along with the G7 partners. This approach shows recognition of the fundamental role that inclusivity plays in a successful transition and the willingness to create strong synergies with the upcoming multilateral forums.

It would be difficult to overstate just how critical pragmatism and convergence are to the energy transition. But this message, in addition to being successfully incorporated in the communication was further reinforced during the Future of Energy Summit, a half-day event hosted by the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, Politecnico di Torino, and World Energy Council Italy as part of Planet Week on the sidelines of last weekend’s G7 ministerial meeting. Experts and speakers at the Summit emphasized the need to strengthen a technology-inclusive, not exclusive, approach and cooperation among countries.

The IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE) envisages that by 2030, advanced economies would end all power generation by unabated coal-fired plants, making the new G7 historic commitment unfit for purpose. However, the overall success of the transition will not be determined by pledges, but more so by the will of countries to transform pledges into action. Whether G7 countries will be able to succeed in the energy transition will depend on their capacity to create resilient clean energy supply chains, implement diversified energy mixes, promote collaboration with developing countries, scale up public and private finance, and it seems like many steps are being taken in the right direction. 

Elena Benaim is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center.

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These condemnations sharply contrast with the past decade, which had largely been positive for Jerusalem on the global stage. Indeed, the Abraham Accords boosted Israel’s diplomacy and regional integration in the Middle East and North Africa, while the Jewish state’s expertise in technology, water, and irrigation was acclaimed worldwide. Israeli leaders were even among the few delegations to have been welcomed in Washington, Moscow, and New Delhi with warmth.

The war in Gaza has also affected African countries’ postures toward Israel, which had seen a sharp improvement in the past twenty years. Several nations on the continent, in addition to the African Union (AU), have directly criticized Israel for its actions in Gaza. However, as of now, most of these criticisms haven’t materialized into major diplomatic setbacks for Israel. It appears that the political, economic, and security dynamics that have been steadily developing since the early 2000s may be able to survive the public condemnation of Israel in several African capitals.

Impact of the war on Africa-Israel relations

Even though Jerusalem initially received wide international support following Hamas’s onslaught, numerous African countries soon voiced criticism as the number of Palestinian casualties swelled.

In South Africa, the criticism has echoed historical Palestinian support for the African National Congress. At the end of December 2023, South Africa filed a lawsuit against Israel at the International Court of Justice, and Pretoria positioned itself as one of the major critics of the Jewish state globally. The president of the AU Commission, Chad’s Moussa Faki, publicly condemned Israel during the AU’s most recent summit in February. He called the Israeli offensive in Gaza “the most flagrant” violation of human rights. Comoros President Azali Assoumani went as far as denouncing “the genocide Israel is committing in Palestine under our nose.” Additionally, the prime minister of the Palestinian Authority was given a place of honor at the AU summit, while no Israeli delegation was invited. Finally, thirty-eight African countries voted in favor of a United Nations (UN) resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.

However, unlike with the Yom Kippur War (during which most African states suspended their diplomatic relations with Israel), the Second Intifada (during which Tunisia and Morocco cut ties with Israel), and the first Gaza War of 2009 (in response to which Mauritania told the Israeli ambassador to leave), African countries today have largely avoided drastic diplomatic steps against Israel.

Even Muslim-majority nations such as Morocco, Chad, and Sudan (the latter having had no official relations with Israel until a few years ago) have not gone beyond public condemnation of the war in Gaza. A number of Sub-Saharan nations—such as Togo, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, and South Sudan—abstained from voting for the UN ceasefire resolution. Kenya and Malawi agreed to send workers to Israel after Jerusalem stopped issuing work permits to Palestinians. Meanwhile, Ugandan Judge Julia Sebutinde was the only one at The Hague who opposed every single accusation leveled against Israel in South Africa’s case during preliminary hearings in January.

A long history of unique North-South cooperation

The refusal (at least thus far) of African nations to break ties with Israel over the Gaza war, despite deep and publicly articulated differences, is rooted in an old relationship that has survived previous ups and downs. 

Even before the creation of Israel, Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, expressed interest in the fate of Africa. One of the characters in his 1902 book Altneuland declares: “Once I have witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish also to assist in the redemption of the Africans.”

After Israel’s independence, cooperation developed spontaneously and at full speed with many African countries. The 1960s have even been called the “golden age” of Israel-Africa relations. At that time, Israel maintained thirty-three ambassadors in Africa and its development aid, in proportion to Israel’s population, exceeded that of most Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development members. Furthermore, Israel offered Africa a model of decolonization: It had managed to secure its self-determination from the British, win what is known in Israel as the war of independence against an alliance of armies from Middle East countries, and quickly overcome the challenges of self-sufficiency and development. Nelson Mandela himself took inspiration from Zionist paramilitary groups like the Irgun in leading the African National Congress’ armed wing.

Finally, the socialist model adopted by Israel’s first leaders established from the start a model of “egalitarian” cooperation with African countries, an approach which differed greatly from the one promoted by former European colonial powers.

However, as the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973, Israel saw its relations with most Sub-Saharan African countries break down under the pressure exerted on the continent’s governments by the Arab League. Israel’s leaders felt deeply betrayed, which likely partly explains the absence of coherent reinvestment by Israel in Africa in the following decades. In the 1980s, African leaders expressed their frustration with Arab nations that had not kept their promises—in particular in the field of energy—in exchange for the break with Israel.

Following that frustration, and in the favorable context of the Oslo Accords, Israeli-African diplomatic relations were gradually re-established. From the mid-2000s onward, Avigdor Lieberman, while minister of foreign affairs from 2009 to 2012 and then from 2013 to 2015 , began a diversification of Israel’s diplomatic alliances and focused his efforts on African states. In 2016, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu followed with a historic visit to East Africa. Then in June 2017, the Economic Community of West African States invited Netanyahu to address its summit. The Israeli prime minister was back in Kenya in November 2017 to meet eleven African leaders for a discussion on security cooperation in the geostrategically important Horn of Africa.

New paradigms

Still, as of 2024, Israel lacks ambitious economic and diplomatic policies to develop its ties with Africa. While it had thirty-three ambassadors on the continent in the 1960s, the Jewish state has today only thirteen diplomatic missions, three economic representations, and a single military attaché in Africa. This can be attributed to some combination of a limited Israeli strategy, narrow resources dedicated to its relationship with Africa, or the fact that African countries have been focusing their efforts on developing links with other international actors. Israel also continues to approach its diplomatic relationship with the continent mostly through the lens of its relations with the Muslim world. As such, the normalizations with Morocco and Sudan as well as the resumption of diplomatic relations with Chad were celebrated in Jerusalem as diplomatic breakthroughs within the Middle East and its periphery.

At the same time, several dynamics that have emerged in the past two decades are fueling an impressive acceleration in Africa-Israel relations beyond the periphery of the Middle East.

First, the Abraham Accords significantly modified the paradigm that had prevented Israel from fully integrating into the region without a peace treaty with the Palestinians. In the wake of these agreements, Jerusalem was able to undertake normalization discussions with other countries, with reports indicating it had initial conversations with Somalia, Comoros, and Niger. Israel inaugurated a diplomatic mission in Rwanda and recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Malawi recently opened an embassy in Tel Aviv, while Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo announced their intention to do the same in Jerusalem. Israel has, in turn, committed to reopening a representation in Kinshasa after an absence of thirty years. In May 2022, the first diplomatic conference on Africa-Israel was organized in Paris by the Embassy of Israel in France and the American Jewish Committee. (The authors of this article were the organizers.) In January 2023, El Al, Israel’s national airline, commenced its first flights to West Africa, serving the Nigerian cities of Abuja and Lagos. Finally, the prospect of Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia, which is still being discussed behind closed doors despite the current war, could further accelerate normalization with Muslim-majority African nations such as Somalia, Niger, Comoros, Mauritania, or Djibouti.

Second, Israel has been active at the multilateral level so as to strengthen its position on the continent. The Jewish state initially regained its observer status at the African Union in 2021, which it had lost in 2002 under Libyan pressure. The decision was however overturned the following year in a dramatic move that Jerusalem blamed on South Africa and Algeria. Before the current crisis, Israel had also initiated a quiet campaign at the United Nations to convince specific African states to move away from the non-aligned movement. These efforts had initial signs of success before the current war brought them to a halt.

Third, after experiencing the influence of former colonial powers, Cold War competitors, and powerful petrostates, Africa’s countries are now polishing their fully independent foreign policies. Their economies are rapidly growing, the continent’s political influence is starting to be felt globally, and major powers are competing with each other to put in place local partnerships. As such, African nations today are arguably less vulnerable to the external pressure that led to the diplomatic shutdowns of the Yom Kippur War and the Second Intifada. Israel appears to many of them as a pragmatic partner whose know-how in fields such as agriculture, water, and technology is essential to development.

Surviving the war in Gaza

The current war in Gaza is certainly a major step back for Israel’s diplomatic standing worldwide, including in Africa. The international pressure on Jerusalem might also increase as the IDF gears up for an offensive in Rafah, or if Israel’s tit-for-tat exchange of direct attacks with Iran continues.

However, the public criticism of the war does not appear to lead to the diplomatic consequences that prevailed during previous crises in the Middle East. Israel can be a pivotal partner in addressing many of the continent’s foremost development challenges for the decades to come, and most African leaders today seem unwilling to sacrifice this partnership.

The Abraham Accords, cemented in mutual security, diplomatic, and economic interests between Israel and several Muslim countries, appear to be strong enough to survive the current war. They could, in the long term, open the door to cooperation between Israel, other countries in the Middle East, and Africa. For example, Jerusalem could benefit from Morocco’s diplomatic and economic networks in Africa—particularly in the areas of banking and infrastructure. Likewise, sovereign funds from Gulf states interested in African markets represent an extraordinary financing opportunity for innovative Israeli companies supporting economic development on the continent.

After the war in Gaza ends, a new, integrated architecture could play a significant role for the two regions as they seek a more prosperous and secure future.

Anne-Sophie Sebban-Bécache is the director of American Jewish Committee Paris (AJC Paris) and was formerly an attaché at the political chancellery of the French embassy in Israel and at the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York. She holds a PhD in geopolitics focusing on Israel’s perceptions and politics towards the Horn of Africa.

Simon Seroussi is currently undertaking a mid-career master’s in public administration at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. He previously served as the spokesperson of the Israeli embassy in France and the deputy chief of mission of the Israeli embassy in Cameroon.

The post Why Israel’s ties with Africa will survive the war in Gaza appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Meet Elroy Fillis-Bell, the innovative South African chief executive officer of Joburg Ballet. 

Fillis-Bell has committed himself to advocating for artists and championing the importance of the arts to South Africa and the global community. He has done so in various ways, from building a more copyright-compliant arts industry in South Africa at the Dramatic, Artistic and Literary Rights Organization to managing the Javett Art Centre at the University of Pretoria. 

As head of the Joburg Ballet, Fillis-Bell is focused on investing in the professional development of the company’s dancers and implementing education initiatives to invest in the next generation of artists. According to him, it is essential to showcase the arts as an invaluable part of community growth and to invest in the next generation of African artists. 

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The post Creative visionary Elroy Fillis-Bell showcases the impact of dance across the continent  appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Minerals often lie at the heart of this cooperation, and while the words the presidents said may have been similar, the meaning and context behind them couldn’t be more different.

Russia offers quid pro quo partnerships with promises of kinetic military, security, and political support—and assisted by faux anti-imperialist messaging. The United States, on the other hand, touts an approach that places emphasis on economic and community investment. There is a widening gulf emerging between the two models—and each model offers something that the other cannot.

Russia’s give—and take

Russia’s version of partnership has been aptly described as a “regime survival package,” in which the Russian government offers military and security assistance to struggling African governments; soon after come resource concessions for Russian companies.

This exchange has relied heavily on the Wagner Group, as the military company’s running operations allowed Moscow to distance itself via proxy. However, since the Wagner Group’s consolidation and rebranding into the Africa Corps (following the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin), the exchange is arguably more direct and state-to-state, as Africa Corps activities are now reportedly being directed by the Russian state and managed by Russia’s military intelligence agency (the GRU) and the Kremlin. The Russian Defense Ministry, with the Africa Corps now reportedly in-house, is expanding its operations.

Russia’s offer of partnership has appealed particularly to governments in the Sahel. The Central African Republic is often viewed as the textbook case, with Wagner arriving in 2018 to push back rebels from the capital. Soon after, gold and diamond mining licenses were granted to a Russian-owned company that even the United Nations warns is “interconnected” with Wagner. And last year, Wagner helped Mali retake rebel-held areas in the north; in the months that followed, Russia and Mali signed agreements on gold refining and on oil, gas, uranium, and lithium production.

More recently, a contingent of Africa Corps personnel arrived in Burkina Faso in January to, according to the group’s Telegram channel, “ensure the safety of the country’s leader Ibrahim Traore and the Burkinabe people.” Two months later, Burkina Faso’s minister of energy, mining, and quarries told Sputnik Africa that Russian companies can become “strategic partners” in the extraction of minerals—such as gold, zinc, manganese, copper, graphite, and lithium—from mines and quarries.

Russia’s offer is currently supplanting other forms of partnership in Niger. The junta halted military cooperation with both France and the United States—whose militaries were there to help improve the security situation for Niger’s previous democratic leadership—pushing French troops to leave the country late last year and propelling the United States to agree to withdraw its forces. Earlier this month, Russian forces and military advisors arrived in Niger, equipped with an air defense system and other security equipment—a choice reflecting the fact that US forces were allocated between two airbases, from which they used drones to target militants. Once again, resources seem to be on the table in exchange for Russia’s partnership.  

While there are some actual value-added projects being developed from Russia’s deals, such as the agreement with Mali on building a gold refinery, such deals are exceptions to the rule. A number of Russia’s grandiose economic promises to Africa have failed to fully materialize. The fact is that Russia’s economic potential for Africa cannot compete with that of the West. Russia contributes less than 1 percent of the global foreign direct investment going to the continent, and when it comes to trade revenue, it’s $17.7 billion (as of 2021) is dwarfed by the United States’ $65 billion and the European Union’s (EU) $295 billion. If economic measures were the only consideration in choosing partnership, Russia likely wouldn’t make any list.

The only market where Russia leads in Africa is the arms market. Last year, Russia overtook China as the largest supplier of arms to Sub-Saharan Africa.

Part of what makes Russia so appealing as a partner—in addition to its offers of security assistance—is Russia’s ability to market itself as anti-imperialist based on the Soviet Union’s support for African countries when they were fighting for independence. For example, when the junta seized power from a French-backed president, Russia’s Prigozhin framed the coup as a liberation from Western powers. African countries still have concerns about the remaining influence wielded by former colonial powers.

How Washington works

The United States, on the other hand, makes its appeal to African countries by promising partnership on local economic development—the critical minerals discussion is only part of that partnership. The US approach is reflected in projects such as the Lobito Corridor—which is intended to make transport, including of critical minerals, from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to Angola easier. Alongside its mineral extraction initiatives, the United States is eager to showcase regional and community benefits for its projects. 

In addition, the United States often cooperates and coordinates with its European partners when approaching investment and activity in Africa. For example, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have signed similar agreements with both the United States and EU in which the countries agree to promote responsible mineral extraction activities that build local capacity and to bring more of the minerals value chain (including processing, manufacturing, and assembly) to the region.

Partnership with Europe can be an effective strategy for the United States, as such an approach gathers more funds, capacities, and markets. Yet, there are downsides. By tying itself with Europe, the United States ties itself to a colonial legacy. In Niger, the junta took power and quickly sought to evict French forces and EU partners—but not US forces (at least initially). This generated tension in the US-France relationship and underscored the extent to which the United States is willing to deviate from cooperation with its partners to maintain engagement in Africa. Such a method lines up with the revamped US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa under which the Biden administration has been adamant that it is seeking to partner with African countries on equal footing and that it will not treat Africa as a great-power battleground. Europe is itself aware of its history. A former Latvian prime minister, for example, called for EU members without colonial pasts to lead the bloc’s engagement with countries across Africa.

The United States, for the most part, holds its engagement conditional on the health of each country’s democracy. In the case of Niger, the United States suspended financial assistance, saying that “Any resumption of US assistance will require action . . .  to usher in democratic governance in a quick and credible timeframe.” The United States has also not shied away from terminating partnership in programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (which provides duty-free entry for certain products) when the country in that partnership has seen an erosion in democratic governance, human rights, and freedoms. The United States shouldn’t shy away from doing so; but this is not a priority Russia shares.

To be fair, the United States, often alongside its European partners, does collaborate on military affairs with African countries. For example, the United States and United Kingdom joined African democratic partners in conducting a large military drill in Kenya. Many African countries, especially those that are partners with the United States, recognize the risk Russia’s support poses. Some have been vocal in making their opposition to Russia’s geopolitical actions known.

Yet, deadly incidents (and the resulting political fallout)—such as the 2017 Tongo Tongo ambush or the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu—have doused US enthusiasm for assistance with direct combat. The United States focuses on supporting roles with airpower, intelligence sharing, and training. Even France, after deploying troops across the Sahel for years in Operation Barkhane, was unwilling to deploy its forces to Niger during the coup to support the president it had backed. Compare that to Russia, which seems willing to sustain partnership with blood. When the Central African Republic’s president changed the constitution last year to abolish term limits, Russian forces in the country increased their presence and provided support and security services to the president.

The United States (especially when joining with its allies) is an economic power, and that is attractive for African countries seeking much needed domestic development and value addition. Yet, US partnership does have its limitations. Should a country’s domestic policies run afoul of American principles, partnership is near impossible. Unlike Russia’s limitations, the United States’ are largely self-imposed.

Weighing the choice

Going forward, African countries must choose wisely between the United States (and its offer of economic and development support) and Russia (and its offer of direct military support) in their search for a partner on critical minerals.

Juntas and dictatorships will likely choose Russia, even if offered another choice (which seems unlikely). Russia offers them the equipment and military support they need to fight insurgent and terrorist groups.

The West will need to closely watch democratic countries in Africa. Russia is looking to make the choice easier by deploying disinformation. France has accused Russia of even staging atrocities and framing the West to promote its narrative.

As for what the United States could do: It could theoretically start adding direct kinetic security support to its offer. However, the United States isn’t likely to align itself with military leaders who trampled democracy on their road to power, and it isn’t very likely to deploy forces to protect them. The United States could, theoretically, also turn to the private sector—supporting the efforts of private military companies that are already operating in the continent. But the government would still be limited, rightly so, by laws that restrict it from supporting nondemocratic regimes.

With African minerals in high demand, Russia and the United States will continue to offer what the other can’t.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

The post With Africa’s minerals in demand, Russia and the US each offer what the other can’t appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Stability at home translates to leadership abroad

Across the political divide, the consensus in Rome is that Meloni’s position is secure. A year and a half into her tenure, Meloni maintains strong approval ratings. She faces no real threats from the opposition or her coalition partners. Would-be rivals of Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party, including Deputy Prime Minister and Infrastructure Minister Matteo Salvini and the League, have been outflanked. Forza Italia, led by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, is on the rise, but it still lags in the polls. Both those in power and in opposition predict that Meloni will last for the remaining three years of the legislature—barring any twists, which even now no one can write off in Italy.

An important part of this stability comes from the fact that Meloni’s foreign policy priorities are largely supported among Italy’s policymakers and fit within transatlantic priorities. Initially feared as another weak link in the European Union (EU), Meloni has shown herself to be staunchly pro-Ukraine. She is a Euroskeptic but not anti-EU. And while US President Joe Biden differs from her on several notable domestic policies, he has found an ally in Meloni. “We have each other’s backs,” Biden declared during their March 1 meeting in Washington. It’s an interesting turn given that, shortly after her election, Biden used Meloni as a warning to Democrats. She has played a delicate balancing act on China, officially leaving the Belt and Road Initiative—Italy being the only Group of Seven (G7) country to have signed on—while still maintaining economic ties with Beijing. If anything, Meloni’s domestic opposition criticizes her for a lack of follow-through, especially on Italy’s aid to Ukraine and the funds pledged for development projects in North Africa.

Uncontested leadership and support for its foreign policy priorities allow Italy’s government to be much more impactful abroad. This stability comes at an opportune time. Italy holds the G7 presidency in 2024 and for that reason is in the driver’s seat when it comes to advancing the vision of the “steering committee for the world’s most advanced democracies,” as described by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Stability and popularity also allow Rome to make its priorities for the West heard, most notably the security of the Mediterranean and Western outreach to Africa.

Recentering the Mediterranean

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and arguably before, much of the West’s attention has focused on Europe’s eastern flank—and with good reason. As a result, Rome’s focus on the Mediterranean can at times seem like a regional preoccupation, but the case for the area’s importance for the transatlantic alliance is strong.

The Mediterranean is NATO’s southern flank, and a rather weak one at that. Italian policymakers do not see Russia as just threatening NATO’s eastern flank. Russia has long played a destabilizing role in Libya, for example, funneling weapons into the country as well as deploying its own forces. This destabilizing activity directly affects Europe, impacting migration flows and propping up an important presence off Italy’s coast. Italy’s leadership in the EU’s naval Operation Aspides in the Red Sea provides a useful example of the role Italy can play in organizing its European counterparts, and Rome should seek to extend that leadership to provide greater security in the Mediterranean in the face of threats from Russia and other actors.

The Mediterranean region is also poised to play an important role in the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). A major deliverable of the 2023 Group of Twenty (G20) Summit in New Delhi, this rail-and-sea infrastructure network has huge potential for countries such as India and for Italy and the Mediterranean region to be a conduit that deepens Europe’s ties with emerging new global partners. Europe could provide these partners with an alternative to deepening economic ties with China and boost sustainable infrastructure investments across the network. Italy is well positioned to carry forward this effort. But it needs to make sure this massive project stays viable and on the West’s agenda. Italy should use its current G7 presidency to garner greater Western support for IMEC, and position itself as a key partner on the European link of the corridor.

The infrastructure development race to the top

Italy’s focus on infrastructure goes beyond IMEC. Rome is paying greater attention to infrastructure development across the Global South and stands ready to build on earlier efforts by the West. In June 2022, the G7 adopted the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGII) to facilitate six hundred billion dollars in infrastructure projects by 2027. The EU’s Global Gateway promises to provide three hundred billion dollars for EU-supported projects, also by 2027.

Meloni, too, has jumped into the infrastructure development space. She has made infrastructure a cornerstone of her foreign policy and of Italy’s relationship with Africa through the Mattei Plan for North Africa, unveiled in January 2024.

Rome’s Mattei Plan has several drivers that fit in with the West’s larger infrastructure push. First, the plan aims to help African countries build stability at home to limit migration abroad. Meloni explicitly stated this goal, as Italy remains a key port of entry from North Africa. Second, the plan is intended to position Italy as a European energy hub, deepening the economic link between Europe and Africa. Third, the plan fits within the G7’s larger effort to prove the West’s rules-based system is fit for purpose and to offset the influence of China through a truly nonexploitative partnership framework. Fourth, mineral-rich states in Africa will be critical to the twin green and digital transitions. The extraction and processing of these resources must be supported with sustainable practices that respect the rule of law and labor standards, and help countries move up the global value chain. Doing so will help in the West’s de-risking efforts to shift away from overreliance on China while boosting states’ long-term development.

Building relationships that are not extractive or exploitive will be key to ensuring long-term partnerships, and Italy has said it intends to take this approach with future infrastructure development. Creating public-private partnerships will also be important, since the private sector will play an integral role in the financing of said investments. But the private sector needs to be convinced that investing doesn’t come along with an unacceptable amount of risk. There is a role for the government to play in minimizing these risks, and focusing on the opportunities presented by these markets.

Italy is well suited to set up the mechanisms needed to coordinate these projects. With its G7 presidency, Italy should focus on deepening the coordination of projects such as the PGII, Global Gateway, and the Mattei Plan. The Mattei Plan specifically will require greater effort to be successful. While the plan’s framework presents a possible blueprint for increased European and G7 engagement with the Global South, in its current form it is humble both in the number of projects and the amount of financing proposed—just over five billion euros for nine projects—compared to the PGII and Global Gateway. For this project to really take off, Rome will need to find more money to invest through the Mattei Plan and expand its scope, while fully integrating it into larger investment plans.

Until recently, political chaos and economic woes have caused Italy, the EU’s third-largest economy and a G7 member, to punch below its weight. The current political calm won’t last forever, but in this period of steadiness at home, Rome can expand its leadership role abroad.

Jörn Fleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Rachel Rizzo is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Nicholas O’Connell is the deputy director for public sector partnerships at the Atlantic Council.

The post Dispatch from Rome: Political stability gives Italy a chance to step into the spotlight appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Executive summary

Within the short span of three years, the global economy has needed to contend with the COVID-19 pandemic, subsequent inflation, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the impact of that conflict on commodity shortages, rising energy costs, and declining energy security. As a result, short-term reliance on fossil fuels has increased, fewer resources are available for the energy transition, and coordination among regional and global partners has become more complicated. In the longer term, the crisis underscored the dangers of reliance on fossil fuel imports and exposure to price volatility.

All of this augers broadly for accelerating the energy transition. But narrow approaches to the transition run the risk of curtailing existing energy sources before viable alternatives are sufficiently scaled and integrated.

In their crudest form, policies to incentivize investment into decarbonization are based on categorizing energy sources as either “clean” or “dirty”—despite a wide range of emissions implications depending on the particular energy source. In the case of natural gas, the reality is that there are gradations of “clean.”

Alternatives also matter. Gas replacing coal or upgrading older gas-fired turbines to highly efficient modern ones are major wins. But greenfield unabated gas-fired generation will not be sustainable and will often be more costly than the renewable alternative.

Even under a credible net-zero scenario, gas demand will likely persist, both for technical reasons and to create low-carbon fuels like blue hydrogen. In the medium term, natural gas can be part of a solution in which sustainable economic development is a corollary (or prerequisite) to climate action. In developing countries where industrial activities are a source of growth and are particularly effective at addressing poverty, such development can equip societies with the resources and space to address climate concerns.

About the author

Phillip Cornell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center. He is a specialist on energy and foreign policy, global energy markets and regulatory issues, critical energy infrastructure protection, energy security strategy and policy, Saudi Arabian oil policy, Gulf energy economics, and sustainable energy transition policy. He currently leads the global practice for energy and sustainability at Economist Impact, part of the Economist Group.

New Atlanticist Feb 8, 2024

Global LNG markets are transforming. It’s an opportunity to enhance energy security.

By David L. Goldwyn, Joseph Webster

Climate change and technology are decreasing European natural gas demand in the winter, at the same time as the “equatorialization” of LNG demand is changing world markets.

Energy & Environment Europe & Eurasia

TURKEYSource Jul 26, 2023

A new Black Sea natural gas project could be a game changer for the region—and a challenge for Putin

By Arnold C. Dupuy

Romania’s efforts to develop Black Sea gas can weaken Moscow’s influence. Here’s how.

Eastern Europe Energy & Environment

The Atlantic Council in Turkey, which is in charge of the Turkey program, aims to promote and strengthen transatlantic engagement with the region by providing a high-level forum and pursuing programming to address the most important issues on energy, economics, security, and defense.

Learn more

The Global Energy Center develops and promotes pragmatic and nonpartisan policy solutions designed to advance global energy security, enhance economic opportunity, and accelerate pathways to net-zero emissions.

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The post Natural gas and the energy transition: Security, equity, and achieving net zero appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Faye’s impressive first-round win over his main challenger and former Prime Minister Amadou Ba was met with messages of congratulations from international partners such as France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, with French President Emmanuel Macron even tweeting in Wolof, the most prominent of Senegal’s national languages. Macron’s overture was widely seen as an outstretched hand from a country that was often on the receiving end of Faye’s campaign rhetoric.

It is true that some in Faye’s coalition of self-styled left-wing pan-Africanists have called for Senegal to break from its traditional relationship with France. Faye himself has promised to renegotiate oil and gas contracts with foreign operators to reach more favorable terms, which has garnered attention in Western diplomatic circles.

Yet, early indications suggest that fears about Senegal severing its relationship with its foreign partners may have been overblown, as Faye has emphasized the importance of maintaining strong international relationships while focusing on domestic priorities.

In one of his first public appearances as president-elect, Faye called upon the countries that seceded from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at the start of the year—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—to return to the regional economic union. In his inaugural speech, Faye promised once more that Senegal would remain a friendly country for international partners rather than a confrontational one.

This complex reality has opened a window for countries in the West to establish more tightly knit relationships with Senegal and the region—but only if they’re willing to create equitable partnerships that foster development and stability.

Embracing change: Senegal’s transformation and Western relations

Faye’s victory clearly reflects frustration among the youth in Senegal, where high unemployment rates have been a pressing issue. According to data from 2023, youth unemployment in Senegal stood at around 4.2 percent. But with 84 percent of employment in the informal sector, many people under age thirty-five live in a precarious situation, with very little access to education, formal employment, or basic necessities.

This is why Faye’s determination to reform the economy, introduce anti-corruption measures, and promote national companies to enhance Senegal’s control over its natural resources has struck a chord with young people in urban areas, the disenfranchised, and older intellectuals who always viewed Senegal’s friendly relationship with the West as problematic. These policy goals address the demands of citizens for a fairer and more transparent system that can provide them with better prospects for economic stability and good governance based on merit, accountability, and integrity.

This represents a golden opportunity for Western countries to redefine their engagement strategy in Senegal and help stem the hostile narrative against them in the region. By supporting the fight for transparency, job creation, and the growth of a strong national private sector through technical and financial cooperation, the West can demonstrate its commitment to a more equitable partnership that benefits both Senegal and the Western countries involved.

Moreover, the windfalls from Senegal’s newly discovered oil and gas reserves will, from this year onward, completely transform the economic and social outlook of the country. Through constructive dialogue on issues such as natural resource management and sustainable development, Western interests can actively support a mutually beneficial partnership with Senegal.

The mining industry serves as a cautionary tale for how Western economic engagement with Senegal can lead to anti-Western backlash when the needs of locals are not considered. The expansion of the mining industry has caused forced evictions and damaged livelihoods. Over the past decade, local communities have led a number of protests, some turning violent and deadly, over the practices of these mining companies. This highlights the importance of ensuring that foreign economic activity respects the rights and livelihoods of local communities if anti-Western sentiment in Senegal is to recede.

Opportunity to reshape alliances in the Sahel

Initially met with apprehension abroad due to his antiestablishment stance, Faye’s presidency gained acceptance as his commitment to transparency, humility, and anti-corruption measures became evident, prompting a shift in the international community’s perception of him.

As further proof of this increased confidence, the price quoted on Senegal’s bonds due in 2048 rose by 1.4 cents to 75.88 cents on the dollar on the day following the election, the best performance for that day among sovereign dollar-debt issuers in emerging markets. This postelection bounce suggests a new cautious optimism from investors about the governance and economic outlook under Faye’s leadership.

This optimism could translate to acceptance of Faye’s positions on regional diplomacy: advocating a sovereigntist ideology; calling for Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali to return to ECOWAS; promoting African integration; and challenging the use of the CFA franc. These positions starkly contrast with former President Macky Sall’s approach of seeking ECOWAS consensus before defining Senegal’s position on regional issues.

Faye also demonstrated his commitment to regional integration by exclusively inviting key African dignitaries to his inauguration, including Nigerian President Bola Tinubu, Moroccan Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, and Guinean Interim President Mamadi Doumbouya.

This shift in diplomatic strategy under Faye’s leadership presents an opportunity for Western countries to collaborate closely with Senegal on issues of African integration to reset and reshape relations with the countries that have distanced themselves from ECOWAS. Such partnerships would improve stability and economic cooperation in a region increasingly marked by great power politics.

Faye’s brand of left-wing pan-Africanism not only aligns with his vision for Senegal’s national sovereignty and economic empowerment but also presents an opportunity for Western countries to engage in a more equitable partnership that fosters development and stability in Senegal and the broader Sahel. As Senegal navigates this transition, the international community has the chance to prove it is serious about meeting this administration halfway. If it does, a new era of cooperation and shared prosperity in the region is a real possibility. If it doesn’t, then the West’s declining popularity in the region is likely to become a permanent trend.

Mayecor Sar was a 2016 Millennium Leadership fellow with the Atlantic Council. He is currently a senior policy advisor in strategy, citizen-centric delivery, and government transformation in Africa. Mayecor is also the founder of a think tank called Initiative pour un développement endogène de l’Afrique (IDEA).

The post Senegal’s new political landscape offers a new start for the West appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On April 21st, Global China Hub Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Schuman published an article in The Atlantic discussing China’s consumption of donkeys in Africa and its broader implications for exploitation in the Global South. Nonresident Fellow Oscar Meywa Otele was interviewed on the need for responsible leadership from China in its engagement with African countries.

The post Global China Hub Nonresident Senior Fellow Michael Schuman and Nonresident Fellow Oscar Meywa Otele in The Atlantic appeared first on Atlantic Council.

In partnership with the Policy Center for the New South, the Africa Center is proud to present a joint report, “The Reform of the Global Financial Architecture: Toward a System that Delivers for the South,” by Otaviano Canuto, Hafez Ghanem, Youssef El Jai, and Stéphane Le Bouder.

This report issues specific and urgent calls for reform, including more representative global governance, increasing the World Bank’s operational and financial capacity, prioritizing programs that would integrate Africa into the global economy, connecting the continent’s critical infrastructure and trade routes, and increasing participation and collaboration with bilateral public and private lenders and investors, such as China, sovereign wealth funds, and multinationals.

2024 marks eighty years of the Bretton Woods system. It is crucial to implement extensive reforms and substantial policies to support African nations’ efforts and maximize their chances to unleash their immense economic potential.

These recommendations presented during the 2024 IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings reflect the urgency of both operational and more inclusive reforms for the African continent.

About the authors

Otaviano Canuto
Senior Fellow
Policy Center for the New South

Biography

Otaviano Canuto is a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, principal at the Center for Macroeconomics and Development and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institute. Canuto is also a former vice president and executive director at the World Bank, executive director at the International Monetary Fund and vice president at the Inter-American Development Bank. He was also deputy minister for international affairs at Brazil’s Ministry of Finance, as well as professor of economics at University of São Paulo (USP) and University of Campinas (UNICAMP).

Hafez Ghanem
Senior Fellow
Policy Center for the New South

Biography

Hafez Ghanem holds a PhD in economics from the University of California, Davis and is a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South. Ghanem is a development expert with a large number of academic publications, and more than forty years’ experience in policy analysis, project formulation and supervision, and management of multinational institutions.  He has worked in more than forty countries in Africa, Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and South East Asia.

Youssef El Jai
Economist
Policy Center for the New South

Biography

Youssef El Jai works at the Policy Center for the New South as an economist. He joined the center in 2019 after earning a master’s degree in Analysis and Policy in Economics from the Paris School of Economics and the Magistère d’Economie from the Sorbonne.

Stéphane Le Bouder
Nonresident Senior Fellow
Africa Center

Biography

Stéphane Le Bouder is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and the chief operating officer of MiDA Advisors, a global advisory firm specializing in facilitating institutional investments and trade in Africa and other emerging markets.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

Learn more

Report Apr 3, 2024

The case for African social infrastructure

By Tom Koch

Investment in African social infrastructure can be defined as African real estate that serves an essential societal purpose.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Mar 3, 2023

Critical connectivity: Reducing the price of data in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

This report analyzes the current state of the digital transformation in Africa and outlines how affordable and accessible data is imperative for further development.

Africa Digital Policy

Issue Brief Oct 9, 2023

Reimagining Africa’s role in revitalizing the global economy

By Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou

The African continent potential to revitalize the world economy and reverse the downward trend in global growth. However, for this to materialize, it needs substantial investments in its physical and social infrastructure.

Africa China

The post Delivering results for the South: The Bretton Woods system we need appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The post Ellinas in Cyprus Mail: Sending Cyprus gas to Egypt appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Read up on the events shaping the democratic world order below.

Reshaping the order

This month’s topline events

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatens to set a date to invade Rafah amid mounting US and international pressure to limit civilian harm. The Israeli government continued attacks across Gaza before, in early April, withdrawing all but one of its battalions and reportedly setting a date for a military operation in the city of Rafah. However, significant skepticism abounds as to whether the date is real or simply a tactic to try to pressure Hamas. The United States sought to help shape Israel’s Rafah plan given concerns for civilian casualties, but did not reach an agreement on how Israel might proceed with such an operation. The United States continued high-level pressure on the Netanyahu government to limit civilian casualties and agree on a temporary ceasefire. Vice President Kamala Harris called for an immediate temporary ceasefire and US Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer criticized Netanyahu, going so far as to call for fresh elections in Israel. Netanyahu canceled  a meeting between senior Israeli officials and US counterparts to discuss Rafah after the United States abstained from voting on a United Nations Security Council resolution pressing for an immediate temporary ceasefire in Gaza, which allowed the measure to pass, before allowing a virtual meeting to take place. Meanwhile, negotiations between Israel and Hamas in Qatar stalled after Israel claimed Hamas was “not interested” in talks; however, as April began the talks were expected to restart in Cairo. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza worsened, despite ongoing aid deliveries by air and sea. Conditions close to famine levels are now present, according to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, which also ruled unanimously that Israel must let food aid enter Gaza.

• Shaping the order. The Israel-Hamas war retains a high risk for spreading into a broader regional, state-on-state conflict. This risk heightened at the start of April as Israel reportedly killed two Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) generals and five military advisors in an airstrike on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, Syria, which Israel claims is being used as a cover by the IRGC to conduct regional malign activities. Meanwhile, the manner in which the Netanyahu government has prosecuted the war has prompted significant debate between those viewing the tens of thousands of casualties as having driven support to Hamas and those who argue that Israel’s urban warfare conduct has actually set a new “gold standard.”  What does seem clear is that Hamas is turning battlefield losses into strategic advantage, as the United States warned Israel was the likely outcome if it went into Gaza in a way that causes mass civilian casualties and hunger.
• Hitting home. The war and humanitarian crisis being felt every day by Gazans is helping to shift US public opinion on Israel. Gallup’s March survey found that 55 percent of Americans now disagree with how Israel is conducting its war against Hamas, up from 50 percent in November. A group of eight Democrat senators pushed US President Joe Biden to end the US provision of military weapons to Jerusalem.
• What to do. In the immediate term, the United States must continue to press (and put pressure on) the Israeli government to limit civilian casualties and pursue a temporary ceasefire that would enable mass humanitarian aid to flow into Gaza and release all hostages. The Biden administration, even as it urges Netanyahu to limit civilian casualties, must mobilize key Middle Eastern partners, namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, to devise and resource a viable plan for post-war Gaza, a core pillar of which should be a two-state solution.

Ukraine fights on with European support while US support remains stuck in Congress. Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russian territory continued, with significant impact, including the destruction of one-third of Russian naval vessels and the brief closure of (and possible damage to) the Kerch Bridge in Crimea. Despite this progress, Ukraine faced munitions and personnel shortages that could imperil its hold on the front lines. The Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, debated lowering the draft age from twenty-seven to twenty-five to deal with manpower shortages, but without ammunition and with US support in doubt, morale is sagging.

The United States continued sending mixed messages on its support for Ukraine. A minority in the US Congress again held up passage of a large-scale military aid package for Kyiv, though as April started, there were signs a vote could be called soon. The Biden administration reportedly urged Kyiv not to attack Russian oil refineries, a message that generated frustration in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Europe held firm in its support for Kyiv. French President Emmanuel Macron told European allies and partners, “Today, to have peace in Ukraine, we must not be weak,” and refused to rule out Western troop deployments to Ukraine. A Czech-led ammunition initiative to supply Kyiv with artillery shells by June received additional support. Sweden announced it will help bankroll the effort with thirty million euros and Germany announced it would pay for 180,000 rounds.

• Shaping the order. US military support, in the form of weapons and munitions, along with the same from European allies, will largely determine whether Kyiv succeeds or fails on the battlefield. The minority in the US Congress preventing the military aid bill from passing is sending a message to Russia (and China) that US resolve might not hold. Absent continued US and European military support, Ukraine could lose the war. This would likely embolden Russian President Vladimir Putin to attack NATO countries and in so doing draw the United States directly into a land war in Europe to defend a NATO ally.
• Hitting home. Ukraine defeating Russia is a plausible outcome and would advance US national interests by weakening a US adversary without costing US soldiers. Despite these realities, a minority in Congress continued holding up further military support to Ukraine. Many Europeans are alarmed by rising isolationism in the United States, particularly following Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s claims that former US President Donald Trump had told him he would end military aid to Ukraine should he be elected.
• What to do. The Biden administration must continue to push Congress to pass military aid for Ukraine and work with its allies in Europe to continue their support for Kyiv.

Senegal’s democracy shows resilience. On March 24, Senegalese citizens elected Bassirou Diomaye Faye as president, just ten days after his release from prison. The election was initially scheduled for February 25, until Sall, in office for twelve years, announced a delay and pushed for legislation that rescheduled the contest for December 2024. The opposition and some analysts feared that Sall wanted to delay the election to extend his time in power; although in February, Sall promised to end his term in April. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the plan to postpone the elections and ordered the government to set the date for elections, which it set as March 24. Many had feared that the postponement of the election would result in violence, after security forces violently responded to protests against the election delay. 

• Shaping the order. Democracy in West Africa has been on the backfoot following a string of coups across the Sahel. Senegal, which looked at risk of backsliding after the unfolding of these events, showed the importance of strong and independent institutions in restoring democracy.
• Hitting home. A democratic and stable Senegal benefits the United States. More broadly, the United States benefits when there are more democracies in the world. Democracies are more reliable trading partners, are less likely to go to war with one another, and are less likely to incubate and export transnational crime and terrorism.
• What to do. The United States should continue pursuing partnerships with the new government on a range of economic, cultural, and security matters.

Quote of the Month

“My purpose tonight is to both wake up this Congress and alert the American people that this is no ordinary moment either . . . What makes our moment rare is that freedom and democracy are under attack, both at home and overseas, at the very same time.”
– Biden in his State of the Union address before the US Congress.

State of the Order this month: Weakened

Assessing the five core pillars of the democratic world order

Democracy (↓)

• In the first Iranian election since protests erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini, many Iranians boycotted parliamentary elections, seemingly expressing, by refusing to cast a ballot, their opposition to the government’s oppressive rules and handling of the economy.
• Venezuela’s regime officially blocked the leading opposition candidate, Corina Yoris, from running in July’s presidential elections, a major blow to opposition hopes to unseat Nicolas Maduro. The regime’s decision is also a setback for the Biden administration, which lifted sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to encourage Maduro to hold free and fair elections.
• Article 23, Hong Kong’s new security law, came into effect, enabling officials to conduct closed-door trials and allowing the police to hold individuals for up to sixteen days without bringing charges for violating state secrets, fomenting sedition, and engaging in treason, all of which have broad definitions under the law. Radio Free Asia shut down its office in Hong Kong due to fears that its staff could endangered.
• India put in place a new citizenship law that excludes Muslim migrants and establishes a religious test for migrants of prominent faiths in South Asia other than Islam. Experts say that under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, Muslims have faced increased discrimination.
• On balance, the democracy pillar was weakened.

Security (↓)

• Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned from office, following a meeting in Jamaica of the United States, Caribbean partners, Canada, and France. An alliance of gangs, which has sowed instability across the country, including by releasing thousands of prisoners from government facilities and controlling most of the capital, had threatened civil war if Henry did not resign.
• Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham–Khorasan (ISIS-K), launched an attack on a concert hall in Moscow that left at least 144 dead. The group claimed responsibility but Putin has continued to link the attack to Ukraine.
• The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warned that the number of individuals experiencing female genitalia mutilation increased by 15 percent in the last eight years, with UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell stating that these unnecessary procedures are happening at younger and younger ages, sometimes even before children reach the age of five.
• On balance, the security pillar was weakened.

Trade ()

• Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced that China’s economic growth goal is 5 percent; however, he offered few details on how China would increase growth, even as its real estate crisis continued and public confidence in China’s economy declined.
• The Bank of Japan, after eight years of negative interest rates, increased short-term interest rates to 0-0.1 percent, demonstrating the central bank’s confidence in the country’s economic recovery and sustainable inflation.
• On balance, the trade pillar was unchanged.

Commons ()

• The oil and gas company Shell initiated court proceedings to formally repeal the 2021 ruling wherein a district court in The Hague ordered Shell to cut its carbon emissions by 45 percent by 2030 compared to 2019 levels.
• On balance, the commons pillar was unchanged.

Alliances (↑)

• Sweden formally joined NATO, strengthening the Alliance and positioning it to better defend its northern flank.
• On balance, the alliances pillar was strengthened.

Strengthened (↑)________Unchanged ()________Weakened (↓)

What is the democratic world order? Also known as the liberal order, the rules-based order, or simply the free world, the democratic world order encompasses the rules, norms, alliances, and institutions created and supported by leading democracies over the past seven decades to foster security, democracy, prosperity, and a healthy planet.

This month’s top reads

Three must-read commentaries on the democratic order

• Liselotte Odgaard, in Foreign Policy, argues that NATO is not ready to deter Russia in the Arctic.
• Hal Brands, in Foreign Affairs, contends that new autocratic alliances are a genuine threat.
• Sahar Halaimazi, Metra Mehran, and Marika Theros, as part of a project examining Afghanistan’s gender apartheid, map the timeline of the Taliban’s decrees restricting women.

Action and analysis by the Atlantic Council

Our experts weigh in on this month’s events

• Frederick Kempe, in Inflection Points Today, assesses that the United States needs to make the case for winning the “strategic battle for the global future,” including by banning TikTok and passing aid to Ukraine.
• Jenna Ben-Yehuda and Matthew Kroenig, in the New Atlanticist, respond to Biden’s State of the Union address.
• Andrew Michta and Jeffrey Cimmino, as part of the Scowcroft Center’s project on twenty-first-century diplomacy, analyze the risks and benefits of generative artificial intelligence for diplomacy.
• Jerzy Koźmiński and Daniel Fried, in the New Atlanticist, discuss NATO enlargement on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining the Alliance.
• Patrick Quirk, in the Hill, argues that technology companies and Russian democracy activists must work together to combat Putin’s online authoritarianism.
• Samantha Vinograd, on Face the Nation, analyzed the ISIS-K terror attack in Moscow.
• Jeffrey Cimmino, in the New Atlanticist, lays out how the United States can play a bigger role in protecting religious freedom across the globe.

__________________________________________________

The Democratic Order Initiative is an Atlantic Council initiative aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. Sign on to the Council’s Declaration of Principles for Freedom, Prosperity, and Peace by clicking here.

Patrick Quirk – Nonresident Senior Fellow
Dan Fried – Distinguished Fellow
Sydney Sherry – Program Assistant

If you would like to be added to our email list for future publications and events, or to learn more about the Democratic Order Initiative, please email pquirk@atlanticcouncil.org.

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Despite various peace initiatives undertaken by the international community—including efforts by the United States, Arab countries, and other African nations—regional and international responses have thus far failed to produce any meaningful resolution. In seeking to resolve the war, the absence of accountability for supporters of Burhan and Hemedti looms large, and foreign powers have a crucial role to play. Peace efforts have been unsuccessful because mediator Arab countries—like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—are not acting in good faith but are supporting opposing sides. Halting external support to the generals is crucial to achieving peace in Sudan and setting it on the path to civilian-led rule. 

A fertile ground for foreign meddling

Sudan’s civil war is a battle for legitimacy and power between two ambitious generals, each wielding a distinct advantage but without sufficient power to achieve victory. Currently, al-Burhan positions himself as Sudan’s legitimate ruler and has Cairo’s support. Conversely, Hemedti—with backing from the UAE and control over Sudan’s goldmines—leverages the advantage gained from former President Omar al-Bashir’s coup-proofing policies, which gave the RSF independence from civilian and SAF control. He not only rejects Burhan’s claim, but is determined to emerge as the sole ruler of Sudan.  

The intricate power dynamics of smaller, independent militias in Sudan add layers of complexity and uncertainty, creating an anti-peace equation that outside forces could easily exploit through proxies.

While Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have proven ineffective in stopping Sudan’s war, they play a significant role in its continuation. All three countries have vital interests in Sudan, motivating them to choose sides that will maximize their benefit, even if it undermines Sudan’s. 

Egyptian President Fattah el-Sisi sees Burhan as a stable partner to safeguard its regional interests, particularly in the Nile River, which the countries share. While Egypt has participated in mediation efforts and started the Neighbors of Sudan Initiative, it hasn’t been able to leverage its relationship with Burhan to progress toward a peace deal. Instead, it has assisted the SAF’s military efforts by providing drones and warplanes. 

In contrast, the UAE supports Hemedti and the RSF by providing military and financial assistance disguised as humanitarian aid. Abu Dhabi serves as a financial haven for Hemedti’s gold business, hosting RSF front companies and bank accounts. Despite being part of peace efforts, the UAE has directed its influence toward assisting Hemedti’s diplomatic efforts rather than fostering negotiations.  

Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia views Burhan as a reliable ally to protect its investments in Sudan’s key sectors and its strategic interests in the Red Sea region. However, Riyadh finds it more beneficial to bolster its image as a neutral mediator, potentially giving it an advantage over the UAE in establishing regional dominance and emerging as a credible international partner.  

Key US lawmakers have highlighted the UAE’s involvement in supporting the RSF, as seen during the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee for Africa hearing on December 5, 2023. Earlier, members of Congress urged Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ) to UAE cease support for the RSF via a formal letter. Most importantly, Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the need to ensure peace in Sudan with MBZ in January. While Egypt’s support for SAF has also faced criticism, the involvement of Cairo and Riyadh with the warring sides has not received sufficient attention. The external meddling of these countries has run counter to their involvement in peace efforts. This must be stopped to achieve any solution in Sudan.

 US response and course correction 

Several peace efforts are in place, but progress remains elusive. The RSF and SAF consistently violate agreements, resulting in brief ceasefires and escalating civilian casualties. Even opportunities flaunted as promising—such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)’s meeting on January 18, before Burhan suspended Sudan’s membership in the East African bloc—have met persistent challenges. There is pressure from the United Nations as well as the United States for a ceasefire, but calls for a Ramadan truce were rejected by Burhan. These efforts, inclusive of US sanctions for human rights abuses and undermining peace and security in the region, have been unable to stop external support, let alone the war.   

As the war continues, there is still an opportunity for course correction. US Special Envoy to Sudan Tom Perriello’s recent trip to African countries, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt from March 11–23 was a step in this direction. The objectives of this trip highlighted the need to align mediation efforts that are spread across various international platforms, including the IGAD, the African Union, and the respective initiatives led by Arab countries. It also emphasized engaging civilian actors, including resistance committees, trade unions, protest groups, women, and the youth in democratic transition and peace talks. Thus, this trip could be the catalyst needed to advance key priorities in Sudan.   

The upcoming Jeddah talks on April 18 could be another opportunity to build on the objectives outlined on Perriello’s trip. The most significant is unifying various peace efforts and making these talks inclusive. This would signal to all parties involved that mediators are willing to collectively pressure the generals, adding seriousness to the peace talks. Additionally, bringing mediating countries together will prevent the creation of competing circles of influence. It will ensure a unified front, rather than fragmented efforts, toward achieving the desired goal. 

However, aligning mediation efforts would only be fruitful if the United States were also adamant about aligning mediators’ priorities vis-à-vis Sudan. This begins with prioritizing Sudan in its foreign policy agenda and maintaining a consistent approach. Despite other global priorities like the Israel-Hamas war, and potential time constraints posed by the upcoming US presidential election, the United States must continue building momentum in its engagement in Sudan. One way to do so is to support Perriello and ensure his office is fully staffed. In a recent interview, Perriello acknowledged that “a lot more international engagement is needed” and mentioned “raising the heat on all those who are fueling the conflict.” While commendable, this is a belated recognition of the situation’s gravity, similar to Perriello’s late appointment as special envoy. The key now is for the United States to add weight to its words with constructive actions, which could mean serious backchannel dialogues with its Gulf allies and Egypt to stop their support of the RSF.

As peacekeeping efforts aim for an immediate ceasefire, deploying United Nations peacekeepers in Sudan to ensure the safety of its people and eventually oversee the transition process (akin to the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan) should be considered. This proposed UN mission should be granted access to effectively monitor Sudan’s entry points, including seaports, air routes, and land borders, to curb weapons smuggling and establish humanitarian corridors. To facilitate humanitarian assistance, international efforts should utilize existing networks of local emergency responses. Most importantly, the United States and the international community must provide the much-needed funding to support these efforts. The upcoming humanitarian conference in France could be the chance to hit the nail on its head.  

Past efforts have underscored that, unless the underlying issue of mediator support for the generals is addressed, these well-intentioned efforts risk being futile. They will fail to deter ongoing atrocities and leave a power vacuum that attracts actors like Iran and Russia, which also have interests in establishing naval bases on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.  

It must be made clear that those providing weapons and funding for Sudan’s civil war are accessories to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the country. If the international framework lets them fall through the cracks with no accountability, its ripple effects will be felt globally in the form of a refugee crisis and an increase in proxy warfare in the region. 

Manal Fatima is a program assistant with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. Follow her on X: @mafasaad.

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Moscow is trying to increase Africa’s dependence on its imports further by blocking the exports of Ukrainian grain. Russia pulled out of the Grain Deal that allowed Ukraine to export its grain despite Russia’s war. The Kremlin then offered Africa free grain transport to increase its sales and Africa’s reliance on Russian grain. Additionally, Russian propaganda has gained huge traction in Africa claiming that Western sanctions are to blame for the increases in grain prices and not Russia’s war against Ukraine.

By helping Ukraine sell its grain, the West can offer the African continent an alternative to Russia’s grain and decrease Russia’s profits.

New solutions are needed for Ukrainian grain exports

Ukrainian grain is key to global food security, which is why the West should protect and invest in Ukraine’s agriculture sector. Before the war, about 90 percent of Ukraine’s agricultural products were exported by sea. By blocking the Black Sea ports at the beginning of the war, Russia brought exports to a standstill, raising global food prices. Moreover, Ukraine’s grain production dropped by 29 percent in 2022-2023. The US and EU should help Ukraine modernize its infrastructure and create alternative shipping routes both through land and sea.

Since exiting the Grain Deal in July 2023, Russia has damaged about 200 facilities in Ukrainian ports. While the current grain arrangement allows Ukraine to export about 22 million tons of grain, Russia constantly attacks the ports and shipments, damaging infrastructure, destroying and stealing shipments, and taking human lives. Despite the risks, Ukrainians are trying to quickly rebuild and modernize the ports. And, even with the current arrangement, Ukraine can further increase sea exports of grain. The West should invest in the rebuilding and modernization of existing Ukrainian ports and connecting infrastructure, such as roads and railways, which could allow an increase of exports by a quarter, at least. This positive economic statecraft measure will also attract private investors to the Ukrainian agricultural and infrastructure sectors, helping Ukraine to make up for lost production and build new capacity.

To make up for sea export losses, Ukraine, with the European Union’s help, also developed land routes that allowed the shipping of grain. This solution, however, was temporary, since Polish farmers blocked the border and destroyed around 160 tons of Ukrainian grain. These protests are undermining Polish support for Ukraine and further damaging global food security. The EU needs to intervene and negotiate a deal for Ukraine to continue shipping grain through Poland. While this is in the works, the EU should help increase the capacity of other EU routes for Ukrainian grain to Africa, such as through Romania and Slovakia.

Positive economic statecraft can help Africa ensure food security

Multilateral organizations, including the World Bank and the Group of Seven (G7), have been trying to mitigate the effects of the food crisis in Africa. Among other projects in Africa, the World Bank provided $2.75 billion to the Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa which helps countries in Eastern and Southern Africa tackle growing food insecurity. The G7 also committed billions to mitigate food insecurity. These actions, however, are not enough, as nearly 50 million people are expected to go hungry in West and Central Africa this year. Moreover, millions in southern Africa are threatened with hunger due to extreme drought.

The West should employ positive economic statecraft tools to deal with war-caused food security issues. That should include working with its allies and partners in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which can help increase food security, by increasing the availability of affordable fertilizer. Positive measures can also help African countries to develop their own agriculture sectors. Africa has over 65 percent of the world’s uncultivated land, which shows the continent can sustain its food needs if the infrastructure is in place. Supporting existing organizations, such as the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), can allow applying local expertise to build government and private capacity to expand agricultural sectors on the continent.

Positive economic statecraft, such as increasing Ukraine’s exports to the continent and supporting African initiatives like AfCFTA and AGRA will help Africa increase food security. These measures will also help Ukraine make up for export losses from Russia’s war and allow African countries to decrease reliance on Russian grain exports.

Yulia Bychkovska is a former young global professional at the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. Follow her at @YuliaB.

At the intersection of economics, finance, and foreign policy, the GeoEconomics Center is a translation hub with the goal of helping shape a better global economic future.

Learn more

The post Ukraine’s grain exports are crucial to Africa’s food security appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa is in urgent need of social infrastructure to support its rapidly growing population. As the demand for education, housing, hospitals, and public facilities continues to grow, investment is needed now more than ever. With emerging challenges ranging from pandemics, climate change disasters, food insecurity, and conflict, sustainable infrastructure is critical to averting the exacerbation of existing issues facing the continent. However, recognizing this growing demand presents a unique opportunity for investors, DFIs, and stakeholders from both public and private sectors to intervene in this emerging market.

Investment in African social infrastructure–simply put–can be defined as African real estate that serves an essential societal purpose, according to the author. Despite the existing barriers to investing in this sector, including limited data, the lack of proper regulatory and urban planning frameworks and limited financing options that hinder the development, investors who are willing to make risk-conscious investments would reap the long-term benefits of higher relative yields and the portfolio diversification that the African real estate market provides. This report argues that African social infrastructure can provide attractive investment opportunities that offer profitability and mutually beneficial impact across the continent.

About the author

Tom Koch is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and is an emerging markets investment professional. He was previously director of global capital and strategy at FCA Corp, the advisor to a multi-sector Africa focused private equity fund. Prior to that, he worked within Deloitte Consulting’s mergers and acquisitions group.

The Africa Center works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.

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Executive Summary Jul 11, 2023

In brief: The future of US-Africa trade and investment

By Frannie Léautier

Since 2000, US trade policy for Africa has been the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which gives duty-free access to the US market for eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa. With AGOA due to expire in 2025, policymakers must decide the future of US-Africa trade going forward to build on its previous achievements.

Africa Economy & Business

AfricaSource May 5, 2023

The EU global investment initiative that could close Africa’s infrastructure gap

By Emilie Bel

The initiative could provide the African continent with the billions needed to close the infrastructure gap. But for it to be a success, several conditions must be met.

Africa Economy & Business

Report Mar 3, 2023

Critical connectivity: Reducing the price of data in African markets

By Aubrey Hruby

This report analyzes the current state of the digital transformation in Africa and outlines how affordable and accessible data is imperative for further development.

Africa Digital Policy

The post The case for African social infrastructure appeared first on Atlantic Council.

This “democratic winter” is not unique to Africa. In the United States, according to Gallup, only 28 percent of Americans—a record low, fewer even than in the aftermath of the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021—are satisfied with the way their democratic system works. In France, two in five voters dream of an unelected strongman at the head of the country.  It is not surprising that the value of democracy is also disputed in Africa, and that arguments against it take the form of claims to national sovereignty and are mainly directed against the former colonial powers. Wherever recent coups have taken place, the putschists have publicly rejected the influence of former colonial powers (as in the Sahel region with France) or Western institutions (as in Sudan, where General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan used the structural reforms inspired by the World Bank to justify his coup in October 2021). Coup leaders have accused the previous governments of having installed falsely democratic regimes, which they claim were weak and responsible for the persistence of underdevelopment. In Niger, President Mohamed Bazoum is still being held against his will, accused by a military junta of having had “exchanges” with “foreign heads of state” and “heads of international organizations.”

How has the concept of democracy, at least in terms of aspiration, become so divisive that its rejection is no longer even taboo? No international conference lacks African putschists who have not been elected by anyone claiming their legitimacy to take power by force with the cheers of their supporters. While some of the allegedly “spontaneous” demonstrations in the streets they refer to are organized, these events resonate deeply in African opinions, especially among the younger generations.

These are poor excuses, not to mention that there is something deeply insulting about suggesting that Africans do not deserve to choose their leaders and, therefore, to live freely. Besides, why should anyone believe that democracy is only a Western concept?

An African vision of democracy

The Manden Charter, proclaimed in 1222 at the time of the Mali Empire—centuries before the UK Bill of Rights—is considered in Africa to be the first declaration of human rights in history. The charter celebrated the preservation of life (Article 5: “Everybody has a right to life and to the preservation of physical integrity”) and organized coexistence between communities (Article 11: “When your wife or your child is missing, stop running after them in the neighbour’s house”). It also protected the rights of women (Article 14: “Never offend women, our mothers”; Article 16: “Women, apart from their everyday occupations, should be associated with all our managements”), foreigners (Article 24: “In Manden, do not maltreat the foreigners”), the homeless (Article 31: “We should help those who are in need”) and even the enemy in battle (Article 41: “You can kill the enemy, but not humiliate him”).

As we can see, Africans are very familiar with democratic practice, and that is true well beyond the Mali Empire. Among the Yoruba, the power of the chief was revocable. Among the Ashanti in Ghana, the village chief was chosen by the heads of families, who formed a council. An association of adults from each village represented public opinion and elected a president.

Today, there are plenty of examples of democratic successes in Africa. In its 2023 report, Freedom House wrote, “Freedom in Africa slightly advanced in 2022 with 11 countries seeing improvements in their political rights and civil liberties and 9 experiencing declines.” In Liberia in January 2024, Joseph Bokai peacefully succeeded George Weah, who had succeeded Africa’s first female president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, in January 2018. In Botswana, all elections since independence in 1966 have been conducted peacefully, in a multiparty institutional system where minorities are represented. Botswana has no curse around raw materials: Diamonds, which generate half of public revenues, ensure the prosperity of the country and the government finances the primary and secondary education of all students. From Mauritius to the Seychelles to Cabo Verde, African islands enjoy remarkable political stability. According to Freedom House, “Cabo Verde (receiving a total score of 92 on Freedom in the World’s 100-point scale), Mauritius (85), and São Tomé and Príncipe (84) have the highest aggregate scores in the region. All are rated Free.” Namibia is notable for having only three presidents since 1990. The third—Hage Geingob, who died in February 2024—was first elected in November 2014 in Africa’s first fully electronic elections. He succeeded Hifikepunye Pohamba, who respected the constitution and stepped down after two terms in office.

Ghana is one of the countries that has made progress in its democratic practice. Since the 1992 constitutional reform, Ghana has held eight free elections, while the current president, Nana Akufo-Addo, is preparing to leave power in December 2024 after two terms.

In Zambia, President Hakainde Hichilema took office in August 2021 following a smooth political transition with outgoing President Edgar Lungu, despite a longstanding rivalry between the two men. Hichilema was running for president for the sixth time, three of them against Lungu. This was the third time since 1991 that power passed to the opposition in Zambia.

In Tanzania, former President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who introduced multiparty democracy and recently died at the age of ninety-eight, was called the “champion” of democracy in East Africa by US Vice President Kamala Harris during her March 2023 visit. Under his successor, Samia Suluhu Hassan—in office since April 2021 and one of two women leading African nations, a distinction she shares with Ethiopia’s Sahle-Work Zewde, who has been in office since 2018—Tanzania is fighting for a democratic practice that began with Julius Nyerere, the Mwalimu (“the Teacher”), the president of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985.

In Senegal, recent upheavals—including a February announcement, since rescinded, by President Macky Sall that he would delay the previously scheduled February 25 elections—have not derailed the institutional system. Sall and the National Assembly have complied with the decision of the top legal authority that set the date of the presidential election, confirming the exceptional democratic journey of Senegalese society. In sixty years, the country has had only four presidents, and each transition has taken place under the watchful eye of communities and institutions—including the army, which is known for its peacemaking role.

At the level of regional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been criticized by commentators for failing to prevent recent coups d’état in the region and for the withdrawals of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso from the organization. However, the majority of ECOWAS members have upheld democratic norms—including Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, which previously faced war and conflict. Notably, from 2015 to 2020, ECOWAS maintained peace and stability in the region, without any coups.

It is worth noting that while all these successful experiences are individually celebrated as exceptions, they represent a significant trend of African democratic successes. Out of fifty-four African countries, 17 percent are considered “free” by Freedom House and 37 percent are considered “partially free.” Added together, the majority of African nations (54 percent) are at least partially free. In comparison, of the twelve countries in the Eurasia region (the countries of the former Soviet Union), 67 percent are considered “unfree” and none are perceived as “free.” According to Freedom House, people live freer in Africa than in Eurasia thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the popular belief that Africa is a land of inter-ethnic wars, the continent’s significant cultural diversity, far from being only a challenge, is one of the most original elements of African democratic systems. For example, Senegal was led for twenty years by a president who belonged to two minority groups, Serers and Catholics, in a country that is predominantly Wolof and Muslim. With more than three thousand languages spoken and multiethnic cultural challenges, African political models have no equivalent elsewhere in the world. 

Africa’s history is full of experiences of multicultural governance. In the Mali Empire, diverse ethnic peoples—Tuareg, Wolof, Malinke, Bamba, Fulani, and Toucouleur—lived together, and a religious tolerance prevailed in which no Malian king waged a holy war (jihad). The Ghana Empire, which covered a large area from Tekrour to Awdaghost, included populations as diverse as the Bambara, Toucouleur, Wolof, and Serer. While the emperor practiced animist religion, he showed tolerance toward Muslims and chose most of his ministers from among them, as recalled by the Burkinabe historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo.

There’s no conflict between democracy and sovereignty

But if the arguments against democracy made by coup leaders and their supporters hit the nail on the head, it is because modern democratic practice, far from this African heritage, has disappointed them. First, the colonial period resulted in the destruction of traditional African participatory structures such as “acephalous societies, centralized kingdoms, elective theocracies, independent city-states, and oligarchic republics,” as researchers Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla reported in a January 2024 book. Democracy in Africa was then the collateral victim of geopolitical rivalries, as ordinary men who sought power in the aftermath of independence—such as Patrice Lumumba in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Samora Machel in Mozambique, and Amilcar Cabral in Guinea-Bissau—were killed during or after running for office. Secondly, security was prioritized over democracy in countries where jihadist danger needed to be contained. In several cases, containing such danger has been a convenient excuse to muzzle dissidents, and to dodge or even rig elections. In the 1990s, the democratic opening was able to sweep away old leaders—such as the first president of Zambia, defeated in 1991 after twenty-seven years in power, or the first president of Malawi, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, defeated in 1994 after thirty years—but family and military transitions are a widely shared reality in Africa. The most successful democratic experiences have been akin to national liberation struggles and have come at a high price, as symbolized by South Africa, where the story of former President Nelson Mandela demonstrates the harshness of the democratic struggle.

Undoubtedly, these hardships have created a “democratic fatigue” that has been reinforced by the persistence of underdevelopment in countries richly endowed by nature.

The restoration of the democratic ideal requires going far beyond simple rankings with points awarded according to indicators of freedoms or rights. It also requires doing better than the use of election-observation missions in Africa. Although there are numerous such missions (including those by the African Union, International Organisation de la Francophonie, European Union, ECOWAS, foundations, and nongovernmental organizations), and they are governed by the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation (2005), the Code of Conduct for International Election Observers (2007), and the Declaration of International Principles for the Impartial Observation and Monitoring of Elections by Citizens’ Organizations (2012), election-observation missions are often perceived as illegitimate because they are externally funded and, in some cases, do not prevent protests or violence. Moreover, missions can fail for security reasons, such as when the European Union withdrew from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in November 2023. Solutions to restore the luster of these missions have been widely documented, including greater integration of in-country residents, improvement of civil-status registers, better distribution and security of polling stations, and national financing of electoral missions.

But in an ideal situation, Africa would still be able to do without such solutions. Democracy is bigger than any one election. No matter how perfectly organized an election is, if the turnout is low, if the political parties competing are on the same side, if the conditions for competition are biased, if citizens are not educated or informed about the stakes, or if there is no possible appeal, a country is still falling short of the democratic ideal. These things are matters of education policy, civic training, and strong institutions, and often escape international observation missions and rankings.

With its population expected to double in the next twenty-five years, and a generation emerging with the ambition of making its voice heard, Africa holds much of global democracy’s future in its hands. The youth of Africa are fiercely committed to public affairs. There is a clear gap between the young Africans, including movements such as Le Balai Citoyen and Lucha, who are chasing away authoritarian regimes,  and those who applaud the Sahelian putschists. Young Africans are united by their desire for stronger national sovereignty. To regain value in the eyes of the people, the African version of democracy will not only have to renew some of their leaders (the new forty-year-old leaders of West Africa contrast with the advanced age of African leaders) but also embody their aspiration for sovereignty and a regained dignity. Neither Washington nor Beijing can bring this to Africans. As for the Westerners who want to reconnect with this old continent with such a young population, it is important that they do not practice the double standards, and instead apply to Africa the level of democratic demands they have for their own citizens. This is a competitive advantage they have over the Russians and the Chinese. This path holds great promise, as it is not certain that African youth—more educated and attached to their freedom of expression—would let Russia and China drag them onto the authoritarian path they promote.

African leaders must understand that democracy, far from being a simple electoral operation, is first and foremost an act of patriotism. That is why it is fundamental to teach the democratic history of Africa, so that democracy and national sovereignty on the continent no longer clash. It is also essential to strengthen civic education, starting in elementary school. In the political arena, the strengthening of institutions is crucial, including the administrations, federal institutions and services, and checks and balances such as the judiciary and media. It will also be necessary to reform institutions so that they better reflect African realities, including better representation of elders, strengthening of local governance, and inclusion of youth associations. Finally, it is crucial that the opponents—often weakened by years or even decades of opposition, exile, or prison—be equal to their heavy task. While men in fatigues are in vogue today, we can bet that this will not always be the case, and it will then be necessary for visionary patriots to be ready to take over.

Ambassador Rama Yade is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center. She is also a professor of African affairs at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University in Morocco and at Sciences Po Paris.

She is a Senegalese and French citizen.

Prior to joining the Council, she was a consultant for the World Bank. She also has strong experience in the private sector as an editor in London and as director for development at a French consulting firm in corporate and social responsibility.

Yade has over a decade of experience working in French, European, and international politics. At the age of thirty, she was appointed as the deputy minister for foreign affairs and human rights of the Republic of France: the first ever French minister for human rights and the first woman of African descent to become a member of the French cabinet. In recognition of her work, she was Nelson Mandela’s personal guest on his ninetieth birthday in Johannesburg. At that time she was also recognized as Young Leader by the World Economic Forum.

She was subsequently appointed to the position of deputy minister of sports. Yade was also appointed as the ambassador of France to UNESCO. She started her professional career as a parliamentary high civil servant at the French Senate and director of communications of the TV network of the Parliament.

New Atlanticist Aug 3, 2023

What Niger’s coup means for West Africa’s geopolitical contest

By Rama Yade

The ongoing coup in Niamey and others that have taken place in West Africa in recent years reflect significant geopolitical changes underway.

Africa Conflict

AfricaSource Mar 13, 2023

The US has gotten the day to day right in Africa policy. Time to think bigger.

By Aubrey Hruby

The Biden administration’s commitment to high-level engagement with African leaders is welcome, but its recent US-Africa Leaders summit should have been a launch pad for big, bold ideas.

Africa English

AfricaSource Feb 23, 2023

The African Union is at a crossroads. It’s time to seize its moment.

By Rama Yade

The African Union needs to be strong inside to be strong outside. The new chair will need to kick off an exploration of the Union’s organization, identity, role, and means.

Africa General Africa

The post Why Africans hold the future of global democracy in their hands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

The Governors left unresolved the more challenging problem of changes in the relative distribution of quotas, and thus voting shares, in favor of emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs). Instead, Governors requested the Fund to develop and propose a new quota formula by June 2025.

Starting with the Spring 2024 meetings, the debate will focus on quota reform to better reflect the changing weights and roles of member countries in the global economy and financial system. There are two related issues to be addressed: changing the quota formula used to produce the so-called Calculated Quota Shares (CQS); and the political negotiations to determine the Actual Quota Shares (AQS). The current AQSs were set at the end of the 14th Quota Review in 2010 and are not aligned with the CQSs as last updated in 2021 by the IMF staff.

Changing the quota formula: More complicated than it looks

The IMF quota formula has been specified as follows.

CQS = (0.50 GDP + 0.30 Openness + 0.15 Variability + 0.05 Reserves)*k

GDP is a blend of 60 percent GDP at market rates and 40 percent at PPP exchange rates. Openness is the sum of annual current payments and current receipts on goods, services, income, and transfers. Variability is the standard deviation of current receipts and net capital flows. Reserves are twelve-month running averages of FX and gold reserves.

And k is a compression factor set to be 0.95 to reduce the dispersion of the results.

Quota is the basis to calculate members’ capital contributions to the Fund; to specify their access to Fund resources (borrowing up to 200 percent of a member’s quota annually, 600 percent cumulatively, and more in exceptional cases); and to help determine their voting shares. Specifically, each member has 250 basic votes (all together set at 5.502 percent of total votes). The rest of the voting shares are determined based on the actual quota shares (AQSs) and denominated in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR): one vote per SDR 100,000 of quota. This arrangement with basic votes leads to a mathematical adjustment whereby big members’ voting shares are adjusted to be slightly less than their AQSs while the opposite is true for small members.

As mentioned above, the current AQSs are mis-aligned with the 2021 CQSs for important countries—basically China’s AQSs are significantly less than its CQSs, the US CQSs are substantially under-represented relative to its GDP, while Europe’s AQSs are way over-represented compared to its GDP.  But a simple reform changing members’ AQSs to match their CQSs would lead to outcomes not necessarily welcomed by many countries.

Specifically, China is quite under-represented with AQS of only 6.389 percent compared with its CQS of 13.715 percent. However, boosting China’s AQS to its CQS means reducing the AQSs of many other countries towards their CQSs. For example, the United States would have to go from 17.395 to 14.942 percent (thus losing its veto power over important decisions requiring 85 percent support); the EU from 25.3 to 23.4 percent (its over-representation is more pronounced when compared to its blended GDP ranking of 17.29); Japan from 6.46 to 4.91 percent; Latin America from 8.1 to 6.55 percent and Africa from 5.25 to 3.93 percent. Except for China, this outcome is hardly what many EMDCs have in mind. Moreover, many in the United States could object to the fact that both its CQS and AQS significantly underweight its share of the global economy—at 21 percent on a blended basis and even more at 24.4 percent at market rates.

As a consequence, there will be intense debate on changing the quota formula itself to produce CQSs more favorable to different groups of members.

First of all, emerging market and developing countries, represented by the G24, have been pushing for only using purchase power parity (PPP) exchange rates in calculating GDP shares. This would increase their weight in the global economy from 42.7 percent at current market rates to 58.9 percent on a PPP basis—helping to boost their IMF quota shares. However, since the PPP methodology is designed to compare the purchasing power of people living in different countries, favoring those with low levels of prices of non-tradable goods and services, it is questionable if that is the right metric to compare the relative weight of countries in international economic interactions which are conducted at market rates.

Secondly, the importance given to the openness of the current account reflects the 1950-1970 era when trade dominated international economic interactions. Since the 1980s, capital flows— and with them, the size, liquidity, and sophistication of capital markets and the currencies most used in denominating international assets and liabilities—are becoming much more important in affecting global financial stability. Taking these developments into consideration would rank the United States higher than focusing only on current account transactions. By contrast, China would rank lower in such a comprehensive approach.

Finally, the emphasis on reserves is overstating their usefulness in contributing to global financial stability. Under the current dollar-based financial system, it is the US Federal Reserve (Fed) that can act as a lender of last resort to supply dollars to stabilize global financial crises—like in 2008 and subsequent dollar funding crises. To give the United States very low ranking on this variable (1.164 versus China’s 28.125) because it hardly needs to hold FX reserves—being the country issuing the reserve currency—doesn’t make a lot of sense.

What else should be included in quota calculations? Addressing efforts to deal with climate change, the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) has proposed adding a new variable in the formula to reflect members’ shares of cumulative CO2 emission since 1944. This approach would significantly reduce the voting shares of large CO2 emitters and increase those of low emitters. Consequently, the US voting share would fall from 16.5 percent to 5.65 percent, China from 6.08 percent to 5.26 percent, while the share of the Global South collectively would rise from 37 percent to 56.4 percent at the expense of advanced countries. The problem with this idea is that countries’ contributions to CO2 emission do not correspond to their relative capacity to support the IMF mandate of maintaining global economic and financial stability.

Further fragmentation is the path of least resistance

At the end of the day, the direction of any changes in the quota formula and relative distribution depends on political negotiation among members. Basically, there exists a gap between aspirations in the Global South for a “fairer and more just” distribution of voting power at the IMF and the reality of countries’ contributions to helping the Fund carry out its mandate. Africa vividly illustrates this gap: many have complained of the fact that the continent accounts for almost 18 percent of the world population but commands only 6.5 percent of the voting share at the IMF—however, its share of the global economy is only 2.7 percent.

But any aspiration for reform needs to account for the reality of political negotiation. In an international negotiation, positive outcomes depend on a sufficient degree of mutual trust among negotiating partners. Given the current geopolitical rivalry, trust has been replaced by mutual distrust and antagonism, making it extremely difficult to reach agreement among major countries to change the quota formula and relative distribution.

As a result, the path of least resistance for the international community is to continue the recent trend of fragmentation, particularly in global financial safety net arrangements. Countries have strengthened self-insurance by accumulating FX reserves—worth almost $12 trillion at last count, more than $7.5 trillion of which held by EMDCs. More efforts have been made to develop regional rescue facilities. These include the European Stability Mechanism (with maximum lending capacity of €500 billion or $540 billion), the Chiang Mai Initiative Multinationalization (with $240 billion of pooled reserves) and the BRICS Contingent Reserves Arrangements (worth $100 billion now but will be increased by contributions from new members such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE). More important has been the growth of major central banks’ currency swap and liquidity provision arrangements—such as the Fed’s unlimited swap lines with five major Western central banks, made permanent in 2013; and its standing repurchase agreement (repo) facility with foreign and international monetary authorities (FIMA repo facility) launched in 2021. China’s PBOC has concluded currency swap agreements with more than forty counterparties totaling more than $550 billion.

Naturally such a fragmented global financial safety net would be cumbersome and difficult to coordinate to reach a forceful and timely response to crises—let alone coping with the possibility of some of these facilities working at cross purposes—thus imposing a cost on the global economy in terms of lost efficiency. But as Walter Cronkite used to say: “That’s the way it is!”.

Hung Tran is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center, a former executive managing director at the Institute of International Finance and former deputy director at the International Monetary Fund.

The post Understanding the debate over IMF quota reform appeared first on Atlantic Council.

It is an epilogue to months of suspense in what has long been West Africa’s most stable and democratic country. Senegal has landed back on its democratic feet. It has demonstrated to the world that its reputation as a democratic bastion in its region remains strong.

It took a combination of factors to make this outcome possible, after the country lived for months under the scrutiny of observers from around the world.

Democracy is culture

For the Senegalese, democracy is not a slogan or even simply the rule of law. It’s a way of life. Journalists, intellectuals, youth organizations, families, religious communities—all strata of society are imbued with this democratic culture, as evidenced by the high voter turnout, the positive takeaways of international observers, and the presence of nineteen presidential candidates. But there is another important element that observers who are not familiar with Senegalese culture might have missed. There is an ongoing tradition in Senegal of open dialogue between the opposition and the outgoing majority, thanks to many mediators, including former Senegalese presidents.

For the opposition parties in Africa, the Senegalese election is a lesson. Boycotting an election in protest, instead of contesting it, is not always the best solution. Moreover, no one is irreplaceable. The fate of Faye, who emerged from relative obscurity to replace the former opposition candidate Ousmane Sonko at the last moment, proves this. The Senegalese will now get to know President Faye. But it will be necessary for the new president to distinguish himself beyond the slogan that emerged during the campaign: “Diomaye moy Sonko,” or “Diomaye is Sonko.”

For the putschists in the region, some of whom have strangely welcomed Faye’s victory, this election is a stinging refutation of their seizure of power by brute force. Faye may present a program of rupture with the outgoing administration, but the fact remains that he submitted to the vote of his people. Neither Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya of Guinea, nor Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso, nor General Abdourahamane Tiani of Niger had the courage to do.

In Senegal, change comes through the ballot box, not through weapons. While a few members of the Senegalese army committed the folly of whispering the names of the most eminent generals as a possible recourse, the armed forces remained stoic in their barracks, aware that their duties are not of that nature and never have been.

The outgoing president

The actions of the outgoing president should be noted here. Unlike some leaders in the region, Sall relinquished his power when it was time. He renounced a third term when he understood that his reading of the constitution on this subject was not shared by all Senegalese, despite pressure from his supporters. Then, at the height of the crisis over the postponement of the election, he complied with the decision of the Constitutional Council. It is only in a democracy with strong institutions that the president (and the national assembly) accepts the decision of a court that has just contradicted the head of state. Finally, Sall’s amnesty bill, which freed hundreds of prisoners, some of whom had been guilty of abuses and looting, displeased the members of his party, but he understood that opponents did not belong in a prison.

Undoubtedly, for Senegalese to elect Faye, a candidate whom they knew nothing of until two months ago, the power of “dégagisme”—or rejection of the current political class—had to be exceptionally strong. But as usual with outgoing presidents, it will take time for Sall’s full legacy both internationally and domestically to be fully understood.

During Sall’s presidency, Senegal led the African Union in 2022-2023, replacing Mali at the last minute. In his role as the African Union chairman, Sall brought important attention to the issue of food security during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi in June 2022, to the financing of African economies, and to the need for a permanent seat for the African Union in the Group of Twenty (G20), which was finally approved in September 2023.

In Senegal, Sall leaves an economic record that can be measured by the large number of major infrastructure projects undertaken during his tenure. This includes the new city of Diamniadio, as well as new trains, airports, stadiums, highways, and hospitals. Sall’s administration also spearheaded an emergency development plan for small rural communities. But in this country of eighteen million inhabitants, 75 percent of whom are under thirty-five years old, who have had to face economic consequences stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is the high cost of living that has given energy to the opposition. Youth unemployment and social inequalities have persisted, despite financial support for the poorest.

The incoming president

Faye takes office at a pivotal moment for his country. Important oil and gas projects are set to begin production later this year, potentially providing a boost to the country’s economy—and drawing interest from regional and global powers. At the same time, Senegal sits in a precarious region that has been hit by a series of coups d’état in recent years. In addition, the jihadist threat has never ceased, as evidenced by the regular arrests of terrorists by Senegalese military forces, which have been heavily mobilized at the border in recent years.

Faye campaigned on enacting a rupture on three levels:

• First, a break with Senegal’s former colonial power, France, by questioning the CFA franc and potentially introducing a new currency.
• Second, a break with the “resource curse” with the promise of a better distribution of revenue from oil and other natural resources.
• Third, a break with bad governance via institutional reform.

None of these will be easy, but the biggest challenge for the new president will undoubtedly be the one that all Senegalese presidents before Faye have faced as well: How to keep campaign promises and not disappoint the Senegalese youth, who have proven their ability to make the difference on election day.

Rama Yade is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.

The post In Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s win shows that change comes through the ballot box appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Africa’s growth potential

Over the past four decades, extreme poverty rates in the world, measured as share of population living with less than $2.15 a day (2017 PPP), declined from around 44 percent to less than 10 percent. However, as of 2019, the share in Sub-Saharan Africa was around 35 percent—and is expected to have risen to 45-50 percent in the past five years because of the back-to-back shocks of the pandemic, debt and inflation crises, and increasing food and energy prices caused in part by the Russia-Ukraine war. Clearly, Sub-Saharan Africa has missed the benefits of globalization in the past four decades which lifted billions out of poverty around the world through trade and an integrated global supply chain.

At the same time, Africa has tremendous potential which, if unleashed, can lead to rapid growth in the continent and higher aggregate demand for globally produced goods and services. Africa’s growth could revitalize global growth, which has been decelerating for various structural reasons over the past two decades. With deeper engagement of BWIs and other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), African economies can seize the moment and become the engine of global growth.

Promoting public-private partnerships

As the World Bank’s and other MDBs’ financial and technical resources are becoming increasingly limited, they need to shift their focus from merely providing loans and various forms of financial assistance to actively catalyzing the flow of other quasi-public and private resources into the development of Africa’s human capital and social and physical infrastructure. Therefore, BWIs and other MDBs should prioritize strengthening financial governance and legal structures of African economies which would encourage private investment in the continent. The establishment of the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF) by the World Bank marks a significant stride in this direction. However, much more needs to be done to establish infrastructure as a new asset class in global capital markets and the BWIs, engaging with more than forty other MDBs and IFIs, have a unique position to lead the global discussion on this front. The case of quasi-state institutional investors is of particular importance. With more than $70 trillion of assets under management (AuM) and long-term investment horizons, SWFs, public and private pension funds, and various retirement saving vehicles are uniquely positioned to bridge Africa’s growing infrastructure financing gap.

Accelerating Africa’s regional integration

BWIs including the World Trade Organization (WTO) can play crucial roles in promoting regional integration in Africa through various mechanisms and initiatives. First and foremost, the MDBs, with the World Bank leading the efforts, can provide financial support for regional infrastructure projects, such as transportation networks, energy grids, and communication systems. These projects can facilitate the movement of goods, services, and workers between countries in the region, promoting economic cooperation and development. Trans-Saharan Highway and Trans-African Railway are two examples of such projects that could facilitate intra-continental trade in Africa. Second, the IMF can help countries in the region manage their monetary and exchange rate policies to facilitate cross-border financial flows and reduce currency volatility. This can enhance economic stability and create a conducive and fairer environment for regional trade and investment. Third, the MDBs with WTO leading the efforts, can support the negotiation and implementation of regional trade agreements or customs unions, which aim to reduce trade barriers and increase market access among participating countries. Efforts such as African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) must be enhanced and supported with relevant regulatory and infrastructure development project.

Prioritizing Africa’s integration into global supply chains

Given its triple advantages—vast natural resources, growing and young population, and its geo-strategic location and access to open seas—Africa can play a central role in the global economy and supply chain. However, Africa is currently responsible for only about 5 percent of global trade. BWIs, and other MDBs and IFIs should therefore prioritize programs and projects that would leverage Africa’s triple advantages in the global economy, making Africa an essential and indispensable part of the global supply chains, energy, and labor and consumer markets for decades to come.

Programs that could speed Africa’s inclusion in global supply chains include:

• Vocational training programs would provide African youth with the skills in highest demand in today’s globalized economy.
• Construction of ports and linking them via railways and roads would reduce the cost of trade with and inside Africa and help accelerate Africa’s integration.
• Development of solar, wind, and green hydrogen energy production could make Africa the global hub of renewable energy with massive export potential, especially to Europe and Middle East.
• Agricultural development would help Africa benefit from its massive agricultural potential and potentially allow it to become the world’s major supplier of food and agricultural products.
• Developing Africa’s tourism industry should be a priority since Africa is home to some of the world’s magnificent natural and historical attractions. Given that tourism industry makes up more than 10 percent of global GDP, MDBs should prioritize developing Africa’s tourism industry, which can contribute significantly to the continent’s development and long-term employment.

Multilateralism is the key

Africa’s needs go beyond debt restructuring. The continent has tremendous potential and a “big push” from BWIs, other MDBs and IFIs, and global private sector and institutional investors, mixed with meaningful steps by Africa’s leaders to improve their governance structure, can unleash an economic renaissance in Africa. The revival of multilateralism, with Africa having more voice and representation in BWIs and other institutions of global economic governance, is a necessary first step.

Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou  is a macroeconomist with the GeoEconomics Center and leads the Atlantic Council’s Bretton Woods 2.0 Project. He is also a senior lecturer of economics at American University in Washington DC. Follow him on X at @AMohseniC.

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That was the main takeaway from the latest group of Women Leaders in Energy and Climate Fellows to go on their study tour to Washington, DC, an experience offered as part of their fellowship program. For this tour, the 2023 fellows met with government officials and civil society groups to discuss women’s participation to drive progress toward a cleaner and more efficient energy system. Below are our fellows’ takeaways from the trip—supported by the Royal Bank of Canada—touching upon how leaders should prioritize a more sustainable and inclusive environment for women in the energy sector to not only accelerate the adoption of cleaner technologies but also foster social equity and economic empowerment. 

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Maitha Al Shimmari

2023 Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow

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Jeanette Gitobu

2023 Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow

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Georgette Udo

2023 Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow

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Lin Yuan

2023 Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow

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The Women Leaders in Energy and Climate study tour in Washington, DC, was a transformative, inspirational, and thought-provoking experience. Throughout the week, we had the opportunity to engage in direct and open conversations with esteemed leaders from Iceland, Sweden, the UAE, and the United States who shared invaluable insights into global energy dynamics and climate challenges from their perspectives. 

The conversations underscored the critical role women play in shaping the energy transition. From navigating policy landscapes to driving innovation, it is evident that our voices are indispensable in addressing climate change. Each discussion emphasized the urgency and importance of cross-sector collective collaboration to combat ongoing geopolitical tensions and the global energy crisis. 

This experience has reaffirmed my commitment to advocating for sustainable solutions in the energy and climate sector. I am inspired to leverage my newfound knowledge and network to drive meaningful change in the upcoming years. The strong connections made with my fellows in the program and lessons learned will undoubtedly shape my approach as a woman leader in energy and climate. 

Maitha Al Shimmari is a 2023 Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow currently studying at the University of Oxford to obtain a DrPhil (PhD) in engineering science.

My week in Washington, DC, illuminated the pivotal role women play in the global energy transition. The welcome dinner and icebreaker fostered a collaborative spirit, setting the tone for shared insights.

Interactions with industry experts underscored the resonant theme that “energy security equals national security.” The ongoing conflict in Ukraine and Russia spotlighted the vulnerability of our energy systems, emphasizing the need for resilience in the face of geopolitical challenges.

The alumnae roundtable reinforced the idea that the energy sector’s success hinges on the full participation of women. Data-backed insights affirmed that diversity is not just a buzzword but a catalyst for better performance and innovative problem-solving.

As I reflect, the call for mentorship, networking, and capacity-building programs for women in the energy sector resounds. Collaboration across sectors emerges as the linchpin for maximizing results and ensuring accountability. 

Moving forward, I see my role not merely as an individual participant but as part of a collective force advocating for a more secure and sustainable energy future. This journey has affirmed the urgency of our mission, emphasizing that our actions today are intrinsically linked to the broader fabric of national security and global resilience. In this collaborative pursuit, energy security becomes synonymous with national security.

Jeanette Gitobu is a 2023 Women Leader in Energy and Climate Fellow who currently serves as the director of the Women in Wind Global Leadership Program and policy advisor on Africa at the Global Wind Energy Council.

The Women Leaders in Energy and Climate Fellowship has fostered career growth through trainings and coaching, bringing together a cohort of women passionate about championing change and soaring in their careers. At the midpoint of the fellowship, the cohort takes a study tour to garner experience and learn from key stakeholders in this field. This year we had the opportunity of having the tour in Washington DC.  

This tour reinforced the role energy plays in economies of the world, the role of women in contributing to energy transition, and the interrelationship between the government, the private sector, and education. I had the opportunity to learn about cross-sectoral pathways to net zero, meeting with high-level officials from Iceland, the United States, Sweden, and the UAE, distinguished alumni, and executives. The conversations revealed unique perspectives from these leaders, and I left inspired to continue leaving my mark as a woman in the energy sector. 

Georgette Udo is a 2023 Women Leaders in Energy and Climate Fellow and the CEO of the Renewable Energy for the African Girl Initiative.

The three-day study tour in Washington, DC, convened this year’s cohort of Women Leaders in Energy and Climate Fellows, and created a space for sharing diverse perspectives on the clean energy transition.

It was undeniable from the conversations with many global climate policy leaders that the shift to a low-carbon economy is creating a window for more inclusive and sustainable growth for both the Global North and South.

Through dialogues with leaders from the US Department of State, the Department of Energy, the International Trade Administration, and the Development Finance Corporation, we heard the importance of energy transition as a key driver of growth for the US economy and a central principle to the US diplomatic agenda. The push to expand the domestic low-carbon transportation and renewable energy manufacturing industries will create numerous opportunities for cross-sectoral and cross-border collaboration to ensure the resiliency of a worldwide green industrial supply chain. The flow of investments in the process could create a catalytic effect to elevate the economic, social, and environmental standards for development for many communities, particularly those in emerging markets.

The conversation with the Icelandic Ambassador Bergdís Ellertsdóttir and her team provides a hopeful beacon of what this development opportunity could look like. By embracing geothermal, hydropower, and the fledgling climate technology industry, Iceland has attracted significant foreign investments from Europe and the United States, and at the same time championed gender-inclusive development that led to the growth of women-led climate startups and women’s participation in the clean energy workforce.

While we recognized in our discussion there are limitations to the replicability of Iceland’s development model, one can imagine the potential for a more sustainable and inclusive future that will be unleashed through the wave of government policies and market-based incentives from the United States. and beyond. It is therefore crucial for public and private sector partners to collaboratively create the enabling conditions for investments, scale capital mobilization, and set the common standards for impact and safeguards to maximize the potential socioeconomic benefits brought by the global energy transition.  

Lin Yuan is a 2023 Women Leaders in Energy and Climate Fellow and an associate director at Pollination.

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Just as important as a technology’s impact is the technology’s origin—or origins. Any given technology can be traced back, through its individual components and materials, to a number of sources. And the question about where those components and materials come from matters. Modern technology, economies, livelihoods, and weapons depend on critical minerals such as magnesium, cobalt, lithium, or even copper. Where countries source these minerals makes a difference for national and strategic security.

Since Africa is home to 30 percent of the world’s known critical minerals, the continent is at the forefront of conversations. But currently, African nations aren’t getting their fair share of the benefits of the critical-minerals boom and buzz generated by the evolution of modern technologies. For that to happen, Africa will need more investment in its capacities to refine or add value to minerals within the continent; such investment could fuel a long-awaited boost in development.

Africa is home to many critical-mineral reserves, but it is not home to industry that adds value to the minerals, such as the processing and refining of them. While Africa does have some processing and refining capacity for certain minerals, substantial value-additive steps across the sector remain absent. To be blunt, Africa will only reap the benefits from the critical-minerals boom associated with mineral extraction. Concrete action toward the goal of the development of long-awaited value chain enhancement and investment in the continent remains elusive.

The African Union (AU) and various African nations have long been aware of the continent’s need (and right) to benefit from its mineral wealth, instead of supplying the minerals to the rest of the world for others to process and then reap economic benefits. In 2009, the AU released its African Mining Vision, highlighting the importance of value-adding industry. In 2019, the AU released the African Commodities Strategy, calling for the transformation of Africa from a continent that is merely a raw materials supplier to a continent that is integrated into global value chains. The AU created a African Minerals Development Centre to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the African Mining Vision. But since it was created in 2016, the center hasn’t been ratified by enough member states, meaning that it hasn’t been fully put into operation. 

At this year’s Mining Indaba—for which heads of state, ministers, and thousands of mining-industry leaders and experts descended upon Cape Town, South Africa to chart a new future for African mining—it was clear that several topics are slated to dominate the critical-mining space on the continent in the years to come. Among the conference’s participants were members of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center, who were there as part of a newly launched task force on critical minerals. Here are a few insights into the topics that will dominate Africa’s critical mining space in the near future and what the Africa Center will be focusing on in the sector over the next three years.

Minerals matter—for now

As the ever-growing importance of critical minerals continues to influence geopolitical gamesmanship, so too does a growing desire to find alternatives to the current supply chains in order to alleviate overreliance. Resources are being poured into initiatives that could lessen dependence on the extraction of critical minerals.

Take battery recycling for example. The global lithium-ion battery recycling market alone was valued at $6.5 billion in 2022 and is projected to reach $35 billion by 2031. On the public investment side, the United States has deployed funding and regulatory incentives for the recycling of batteries. The European Union (EU) adopted a regulation that sets target percentages for the recovery of critical minerals from batteries. Part of the regulation includes the introduction of a new “battery passport,” a digital record that accompanies each battery and includes information about its history and components to ensure it is recycled responsibly. Beyond efforts to increase battery recycling, there are also initiatives underway to develop batteries that are not reliant on rare-earth elements.

Private investment in research about battery replacement and alternative materials is rising—and with it, so too rises the likelihood that the economic benefits from today’s critical-minerals boom will bypass Africa. Today, the world needs what Africa has, but that may not be the case tomorrow.

US presence and prose

This year’s Mining Indaba was notable for the large delegation sent by the United States, which included high-level government officials such as Amos Hochstein, Jose Fernandez, British Robinson, and Reta Jo Lewis. That delegation is a clear demonstration of Washington’s level of interest regarding Africa’s critical minerals sector.

Perhaps the cornerstone of public US investment in Africa’s mining sector today is the Lobito Corridor project, which is looking to lay over a thousand miles of railroad to help transport critical minerals from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to a port in Angola. The United States has emphasized that its interest in the project is not just about mineral extraction. As Hochstein highlighted at Mining Indaba, a train runs both ways. For the United States, publicly highlighting associated energy and livelihood projects is a way to show that the country is in Africa to do more than just national resource extraction.

Following Mining Indaba, US delegates made the trip from South Africa to Zambia for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI) Lobito Corridor Private Sector Investor Forum. The forum sought to gather up private-sector investment for the Lobito Corridor. At the forum, the US International Development Finance Corporation announced a new $250 million debt facility to the Africa Finance Corporation to support infrastructure across the continent. Other attendees—from the public and private sectors—rolled out projects for and investments in building energy power plants and storage facilities, and struck various mining and refining deals, including one that will seek to build the continent’s first refinery for electric-battery-grade cobalt sulphate.

While these are promising developments, most of the investment in the corridor is from the public sector: The United States, in partnership with the EU, has joined with the African Development Bank and the Africa Finance Corporation to inject over one billion dollars into the project. While the EU and United States are involved, private sector involvement is crucial for economic success. Just because Washington wants something doesn’t mean that it’ll happen; plus, what the US government wants and what private sector companies do does not always align. For example, while the US was relatively inactive in the minerals sector in Africa, China purchased cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from sources including a US-based mining company. The private sector, and the money and operations it chooses to conduct, will steer the success of projects such as the Lobito Corridor.

At Indaba, Hochstein stressed that there is no expectation from the US side for African nations to side exclusively with any country. The Biden administration has gone to great lengths to deemphasize great-power competition in its strategy toward Africa. This aligns with the US Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, which the White House released in 2022. Yet, some experts view US and EU investment in the Lobito Corridor as an effort to counter China, amid concerns about Beijing’s dominant position over the African critical-minerals market.

Ideally, investment in Africa’s critical-mineral sector would support the continent’s capacity to add value to minerals before shipping. But efforts are needed beyond the Lobito Corridor which is, after all, intended to help transport—and eventually export—critical minerals. The underlying impetus of this project is the minerals; so if the demand for minerals falls, investment may begin to wane too.

The connection between Africa’s natural mineral wealth and the continent’s strategic importance for the United States is hardly new. The United States has sought out Africa’s critical minerals, for example for its geopolitical objectives, in the past: Infamously, the uranium used in the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was sourced from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Congo.

What the Africa Center is doing

The critical minerals discussion on extraction, national security, and supply chains will move past Africa unless the moment is seized.

The Africa Center’s task force will aim to unite stakeholders from the United States, Europe, and Africa, including representatives from the financial sector, development institutions, and government. Together, this group will regularly convene to explore the role and potential of African minerals in critical supply chains, strategies for greater inclusion of African nations and suppliers, and ways to mobilize the private sector. The task force will host public conversations on topics ranging from the need for private investment (and how to best facilitate it) to domestic African policymaking. The task force hopes to contribute to the building of a new business and development model through strategic and win-win partnerships.

If Africa is to truly benefit from the critical-minerals boom and buzz, then it will need support in developing its ability to add value to its minerals on the continent. Unless African nations can break from a history of serving only as a minerals supplier, they will be left behind.

Alexander Tripp is the assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

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Meet Laureen Kouassi-Olsson, a trailblazing Franco-Ivorian executive with over a decade of experience investing in private companies and financial institutions on the African continent. 

Throughout her career, she has helped unlock capital flows and financial opportunities across Africa’s private sector. After holding roles at Lehman Brothers and Proparco, Kouassi-Olsson joined the founding team of Amethis, a French private-equity fund specializing in the African market. In 2016, she moved to Abidjan to launch Amethis West Africa, supporting small to medium-sized enterprises in Francophone West and Central Africa.  

Inspired by the vibrant fashion industry across the continent, in 2020, she founded Birimian Ventures, the first financial institution dedicated to the sustainable development of African heritage luxury brands. She currently serves as the chief executive officer of Birimian. Through this company, Kouassi-Olsson aims to cultivate African designers striving to lead sustainable creative enterprises capable of driving lasting economic value across the continent. 

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On March 12, Transatlantic Security Initiative senior fellow Elisabeth Braw wrote an article in Foreign Policy on expansionist tactics employed by Russian Orthodox Church in Africa.

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Elisabeth Braw

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The divergences caused by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) situations are particularly stark, as the incidence of conflict events has increased 40 percent since 2020, to the highest number of events since World War II. Half of the world’s poor live in FCV-affected countries and that number is expected to rise to 60 percent by 2030, in part as the duration of conflicts extends—to now an average of twenty years. In addition to the death, destruction, and disruptions they cause, conflict and fragility are disincentives to investment and further undermine economic growth. One-fifth of International Monetary Fund member countries are considered fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) and twenty of the most climate-vulnerable economies are also on the World Bank’s FCS list.

According to the most recent Women, Peace, and Security Index: “In 2022, approximately six hundred million women—15 percent of women in the world—lived within fifty kilometers of armed conflict, more than double the levels in the 1990s.” These numbers don’t lie, but they also don’t necessarily tell the whole truth. And the truth is that women and girls are disproportionately impacted by fragility and conflict economically, socially, and politically. The impacts are well-documented. The data show, for example, that women and girls are more likely to see their educations disrupted, are more vulnerable to gender-based violence, and are more likely to be displaced or become refugees.

Women often face much greater economic hardships than men in conflict-affected areas, as well. Notably, six out of ten of the World Bank’s FCS countries are in the lower quartile on the “Economic Participation and Opportunity” subindex on the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, indicating wider gender gaps and more challenges facing women in conflict contexts. Similarly, a majority of FCV countries can be found in the bottom of the latest Women Business and the Law rankings released on March 4. These impacts also further undermine economies: The World Bank estimates that gender-based violence costs some countries up to 3.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and a 1 percent increase in violence against women lowers economic activity by 9 percent.

The roles women hold during conflict and reconstruction

But there can be opportunities for women’s economic empowerment in conflict and reconstruction, as well. Women are experiencing these outcomes despite the important role they play in economies during conflict, in post-conflict reconstruction, and in efforts to sustain peace.

Most of today’s FCV economies are characterized by low female labor force participation. For example, in 2022, the United Nations estimated that closing gender gaps in women’s labor force participation in Yemen would increase the country’s GDP by 27 percent. War has historically created windows of opportunity for women to fulfill workforce shortages—including in male-dominated fields—since men make up a majority of combatants. War—often coupled with crippling inflation—makes finding paid work more acceptable and, importantly, this openness tends to continue as income generation changes women’s economic value and power in society. In the United States, for example, women took to manufacturing and government administration for the war industry and beyond during World War II, with nineteen million women entering the US workforce during this period. Today, women continue to join or rejoin the workforce—including in the informal sector—at higher rates amid conflict and take on more culturally nontraditional jobs. For instance, Ukrainian women have joined the mining workforce, filling the gaps left by conscription after Russia’s invasion.

Like most economies worldwide, micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises dominate the market landscape of fragile and conflict-torn countries.

Even though these smaller businesses face more start-up and operational constraints, they provide a key pathway for women’s economic participation during conflict and on the road to recovery. A study in Syria estimated that the proportion of female entrepreneurs increased from a low base of 4.4 percent in 2009 to 22.4 percent by 2017. This includes women-owned and -led businesses engaging in supply chains; including in the logistics, information, and communication technology, infrastructure, and public works sectors, all of which are critical to reconstruction.

And as women workers and their businesses earn more, especially in the formal economy, they can mitigate the otherwise dampening domestic resource mobilization associated with reduced economic activity, investment, and government administration during conflict or destabilization. Women’s greater participation in the economy during conflict and reconstruction can also increase consumption and income utilization (including from cash transfers or other social protection mechanisms) as women recirculate their earnings with spending on their families.

How to wield prosperity and peace dividends with and for women

Gender inclusion cannot be an afterthought. Policymakers must address the immediate economic security and income needs of women during conflict, while empowering them to contribute to and benefit from recovery, reconstruction, and growth. This means providing context-specific, targeted social protections and addressing the issues that undermine women’s economic participation. It requires mitigating and responding to gender-based violence, as well as improving accessibility and affordability of child and elder care. It also means supporting women entrepreneurs and women-led small businesses, closing education or skill gaps, and addressing social and cultural norms that limit career choices or workforce participation with conflict or fragility-sensitive knowledge, design, and delivery mechanisms.

Depending on the type, level, and stage of FCV, as well as the economic landscape, certain FCV-specific interventions can also make a difference in women’s economic empowerment. These include, for example, enabling women’s earning, employment, and entrepreneurship by expanding opportunities in gig and home-based economies and increasing safe and reliable transportation to and from work or school. Policymakers should also take steps to improve access to education and training with attention to language, as well as the demand for and portability of skills and certifications. In addition to addressing persistent systemic and policy hurdles, women business owners and entrepreneurs need targeted support with more risk financing, knowhow, and market entry and development.

This includes leveraging sizable development and humanitarian assistance and procurement. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), for example, bought over $1.8 billion worth of goods and services in 2022 from suppliers worldwide, with 56 percent local spending. Aligned with system-wide UN gender-responsive procurement initiatives, UNOPS is piloting and beginning to scale programs to train and prepare women business owners to successfully bid and execute their tenders. These women can then use the investment, experience, and credibility gained from working with UNOPS to obtain other public and private sector contracts and optimize supply chain opportunities.

Increasing digital inclusion can be transformative for women’s financial inclusion and economic participation, as well; including by training women for information and communication technology jobs in the digital economy, like the World Bank-Rockefeller Foundation’s Click-On Kaduna project in Nigeria. Policymakers should prioritize increasing women’s access to and utilization of digital tools and platforms, including digital money and financial services, as well as remote learning and government technology. Digital mechanisms can also serve as useful aspects of larger initiatives that empower women’s participation and leadership, which is critical for conflict mitigation and durable peacebuilding. 

The evidence that expanding economic opportunities for women is intertwined with building inclusive and sustainable growth, as well as peace and social progress, is only accruing with time, experience, and data. On this International Women’s Day, aptly themed “Invest in Women: Accelerate Progress,” it is incumbent upon all leaders, investors, and policymakers to heed this call. Public and private sector actors would do well to invest and enable increased women’s economic participation to catalyze prosperity and peace.

Nicole Goldin is a nonresident senior fellow at the GeoEconomics Center.

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All eyes are on China’s “Two Sessions” this week, the annual gatherings of China’s rubber-stamp legislature and top political advisory body, where the hope is Premier Li Qiang’s first government work report will produce something – anything – to spur confidence in China’s economic trajectory.

While Li is likely to announce tactical measures to boost short-term confidence in the economy, there is little sign more robust stimulus measures are coming.

More fundamentally, as noted in this month’s edition of Global China, Xi Jinping has not indicated he will relax government control over the economy or initiate long-deferred structural reforms required to prevent economic stagnation.

Meanwhile, Li’s work report may underscore China’s strategy to push back on US global leadership through greater engagement with the Global South, as laid out in Xi’s speech to the Party’s Foreign Affairs Work Conference in December.

But will China’s bid to “lead” the Global South be hobbled by long-term economic stagnation?

That was a central question at the Global China Hub’s conference last month, “China in the Global South: Development and influence in a shifting global order”. Experts debated the impact of a sharp contraction of Belt and Road Initiative-related loans in the wake of China’s slowdown and Beijing’s shifting risk appetite in developing countries – and whether this opens up opportunities for other lenders.

Bottom line: Given the strategic importance Beijing has assigned the Global South, Beijing will devise new ways to bolster its influence in the developing world – particularly in the technology domain – even as it pivots from bankrolling new infrastructure projects.

Our editor-in-chief Tiff Roberts has much more on all this and everyone’s favorite hot topic, TikTok, below… Take it away, Tiff!

-David O. Shullman, Senior Director, Atlantic Council Global China Hub

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Dexter Tiff Roberts

Nonresident Senior Fellow

Global China Hub Indo-Pacific Security Initiative

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China and the Global South: the push into Latin America

China benefits from the “stability and the opportunity that the international order provides but … [undermines] those principles,” the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, said at the Atlantic Council’s China-Global South Conference, citing the PRC’s use of economic coercion and attempts to subvert universal human rights. As it becomes “more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad,” China pushes “an alternative vision for global governance.”

A key arena in the Global South where China is intent on displacing US influence is in Latin America, partly driven by its interest in tapping the region’s rich energy resources. “China’s increasing role in the economies of LAC countries in recent years is well documented,” writes our senior director, David Shullman, citing the $138 billion in loans provided by China’s policy banks between 2005 and 2020 and soaring regional trade with China up from $12 billion in 2000 to $445 billion in 2021.

Shullman describes China’s efforts to differentiate its approach from the US, “emphasizing a mutually beneficial (“win-win”) arrangement with countries irrespective of their politics or internal affairs.” To counter Beijing’s narrative, Washington should use “strategic messaging with greater attention to LAC countries’ needs,” he writes.

TikTok: a national security risk for the US?

Worries that China could use the wildly popular app TikTok to undermine national security are widespread across the US and not just in Washington. That includes Montana, where I write from and run a China program at the University of Montana’s Mansfield Center. Montana became the first state in the country to pass legislation mandating a full ban of the app, only to see it temporarily halted by a federal judge, who called it potentially unconstitutional.

How real are the fears? Rose Jackson, Seth Stodder, and Kenton Thibaut of the Council’s Digital Forensics Research Lab dig into that question in, “TikTok: Hate the Game, Not the Player,” concluding that Chinese ownership of TikTok poses a “unique risk” to the US Under China’s National Intelligence Law, its intelligence agencies could “commandeer TikTok” and require it hand over data on US users, as well as “assist in influence operations and disinformation campaigns against the United States.”

But a focus on TikTok ignores bigger picture “systemic risks” from the “ungoverned social media ecosystem,” while a ban would not make Americans safer, they argue. China and other foreign adversaries can legally purchase data on Americans from multiple other sources, and as Russia has repeatedly shown, the US’s own social media platforms including Facebook and X, are “easy to exploit” to “shape US public opinion and divide Americans amongst themselves.”

Behind the Headlines: Why China’s foreign minister cares about de-risking

The global economy is hurt by protectionism, and attempts “to shut China out in the name of de-risking” is an “historical mistake,” warned Wang Yi on February 18. Why did China’s foreign minister sound the alarm about the perils of economic decoupling at the Munich Security Conference, where discussions usually focus instead on matters of war and peace? That’s because Chinese officials recognize that if countries and companies continue to pull investment from China – and FDI last year grew at the slowest pace in thirty years – it will hurt its struggling economy, further deepen a crisis of confidence amongst consumers and companies, and even undermine social stability and national security.

How bad is it? A long-running collapse in the value of Chinese stocks driven in part by US-China tensions has erased trillions of investment dollars, delivering “another blow to an economy beset by property crisis, slow growth, and deflation, and… may be the last straw for foreign institutional investors, writes the GeoEconomics Center’s Jeremy Mark.

“Capital outflows are expected to continue,” predicts an issue brief from the GeoEconomics Center and Rhodium Group which notes increasing skepticism about China’s optimistic official data which put growth last year at 5.2 percent (the real figure was at best 1.5 percent its authors say.) “Beijing must soon acknowledge that slower growth… is here to stay” which will “bring spillovers to trading partners,” the brief concludes.

Ultimately, China’s economic problems are self-inflicted, argues the GeoEconomics Center’s Dan Rosen: “more secular stagnation will come – until Beijing gets back to long-deferred structural reform work that President Xi Jinping started in 2013 only to pause in the face of challenges.”

Unfortunately, that’s unlikely to happen at the ongoing Two Sessions or anytime soon afterwards. As I told VOA, Xi “doesn’t believe in releasing control over the economy,” which is what China needs to meet the challenges. (Fun fact: I covered almost two dozen annual legislative meetings as a reporter in China. Here’s one from 1998, when China also faced economic strife.)

• The Hub’s Didi Kirsten Tatlow writes in Newsweek how China is building a vast, AI-based intelligence platform, known as “Supermind,” to track millions of scientists and researchers worldwide. This platform would reportedly assist Beijing’s efforts to capture breakthrough technologies for industry and the military, and recruit potential talent.
• The Europe Center’s Francis Shin published an article in The Diplomat on EU-Taiwan relations following the Taiwanese general election last month. The article discusses how the EU can deepen its trade and investment relations with Taiwan and the political support it can provide through interparliamentary channels.
• Two years after the initial invasion, Russia’s imports have stabilized, as the GeoEconomics Center’s Niels Graham writes about how Chinese exports have replaced the EU as the lifeline of Russia’s economy. New industrial and consumer exports from China have replaced trade from the US, EU, and G7.
• It’s Italy’s time to cement itself as the indispensable Mediterranean nation, according to the Hub’s Kaush Arha and Europe Center’s Paolo Messa, particularly after refusing to renew its memorandum of understanding with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and as this year’s host of the G7.

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More than a decade after the revolutions collectively known as the Arab Spring, several countries in the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing democratic backsliding and a return to authoritarian rule, including Egypt under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Libya under General Khalifa Haftar, and Tunisia under President Kais Saied. This trend and some shifts in sentiments about the West in these and other MENA countries have given Russia openings to undercut Western influence in the region and frame Ukraine as a Western puppet, using its state media and public diplomacy to influence opinion.

This is playing out in the context of growing internal polarization in many countries in the region and, among the citizenry, rising disenchantment with the West and democracy as a workable governing system for them. These developments enable Russia to offer an alternative alliance to authoritarian leaders who aim to diversify their country’s resources and reduce reliance on the West and the United States in particular.

Russian state media has had a presence in the Arab World since the 2007 launch of Russia Today Arabic (now just RT Arabic), and its influence expanded with the 2014 start of Sputnik Arabic, which maintains a regional office in Cairo. Today, RT Arabic is one of the region’s top three most-watched news broadcasters after Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera. As reported in the DFRLab’s previous Undermining Ukraine report, Russia signed cooperation agreements with local media in Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco to formalize official cooperation on joint projects and information exchanges.

Some Arabic-speaking media outlets post the exact text of articles published on RT Arabic’s website, allowing for the spread of narratives promoted by state-run Russian media to Arabic speakers. A short RT article from January 13, 2023, pushing claims that Ukrainian soldiers were carrying chemical weapons, was posted verbatim on the news websites of Egypt’s Al-Ahram, Yemen’s Al-Ayyam, and Dubai-based news aggregator Nabd. An August 2023 RT Arabic article repeating Putin’s claim that the ban on Russian media was due to the West’s fear of the truth was also reposted by Yemen’s Al-Ayyam and Emirati newspaper Al Khaleej. An article published in state-aligned Syria’s Al-Watan and Egypt’s Al-Ahram in September quoting State Duma Member Anna Kuznetsova saying that the “Kyiv regime uses the same methods used by the terrorist organization ISIS [Islamic State group] to recruit children” was originally published in RT Arabic.

By cooperating with local media, Russia is able to spread its propaganda to a broader audience in the Arab world. The narratives amplified by Russian state media and local media partners are framed in a way that appeals to audiences in the region and their complicated history with the West. In line with authoritarian Arab leaders’ statements about the West’s interest in their countries, local media amplify narratives suggesting that the West attempts to demonize Russia in order to maintain Arab nations’ reliance on the West. Additionally, narratives about Zelenskyy being a puppet of the West and Putin standing up to them appeal to many in the Arab populations who viewed their former authoritarian leaders as puppets supported by the West at their own expense. Moreover, regional audiences point to Western hypocrisy in considering Russia’s war in Ukraine with a different lens than the US invasion of Iraq or Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip.

As Western states imposed a ban on RT and Sputnik and blocked their YouTube channels to minimize the impact of their propaganda, Russian media was further emboldened in the region as it became increasingly considered an alternative source of information after decades of Western influence in their countries. While there is some sympathy expressed online among Arabic speakers for the Ukrainian people, there is also support for Russia and Putin expressed by media and individuals, resulting from internal polarization and disenchantment with democracy and the West.

Russian media and its social media accounts capitalize on such resentment toward Western countries to gain support for Russia in the region. The X accounts of Sputnik and RT Arabic produce more content than BBC Arabic and Al Jazeera, regularly posting content that appeals to Arab audiences. For instance, on June 29, 2023, one day after an incident of Quran burning in Sweden, the three X accounts posted similar videos showing Putin holding the Quran during a visit to a mosque in the city of Derbent, Russia, while criticizing Western countries like Sweden for allowing the burning of the holy book.

Arabic-speaking journalists and influencers promoting pro-Russia narratives

X also serves as a major social media platform for several Arabic-speaking Russian state media personalities as well as unaffiliated online influencers. Many of these accounts with large followings consistently post news content aligned with the Kremlin’s preferred narratives. There are differences between the two groups, however, as affiliated journalists openly state their ties to Russian media and use their real identities, while influencer accounts appear to more frequently use stolen images and show signs of coordinated posting and engagement.

The DFRLab identified and analyzed thirty accounts of influencers and self-proclaimed journalists boasting large follower counts and posting Arabic content, mostly in the form of news updates. These accounts often promoted similar pro-Russia, anti-Western messaging and celebrated partnerships between Russia and Arab nations. Specifically, the accounts created content that would resonate more with an Arab audience and sometimes expand on regional resentment toward Western countries, accusing them of double standards following their pro-Ukraine narratives.

An analysis of the accounts revealed several suspicious indicators, including similarities in how they present themselves and the content they post. The bios of twenty-three of thirty accounts highlighted interest in Russian news, Russia-Ukraine news, or general political and war news. Many of the accounts often published similar posts on the same day or within a short window. One example showed accounts attempting to attract interest from Arab and Muslim users after Russian general Sergei Surovikin visited Algeria, with six accounts using very similar text and the same photo of Surovikin reading the Quran in an Algerian mosque, all published within a two-hour period on September 15, 2023.

These X accounts routinely promoted disinformation related to the Russia-Ukraine war as well. In one example, on October 4, 2023, three accounts used identical or nearly identical text falsely claiming that Zelenskyy was attempting to recruit Islamic State fighters held in Iraqi and Syrian prisons to join the Ukrainian army in its fight against Russia.

The DFRLab also noticed some degree of coordination between some of the accounts, such as liking, retweeting, and replying to each other’s tweets. For instance, reviewing @russiaArb4’s post engagement revealed many retweets from the same three accounts. Moreover, some of the accounts created posts to promote other accounts and asked users to follow them.

Several of the identified accounts appeared focus on retweeting other accounts, alongside retweeting specific and possibly new Arabic media accounts. This apparent coordination around retweeting could be seen in the almost identical timelines with the same set of retweets between accounts.

Furthermore, five accounts that claimed to be either media figures or Russian citizens living in Russia or somewhere else had additional suspicious indicators. According to monitoring tool Twitter ID Finder, four of these accounts were created in October 2022: three on October 20—two of them just twenty minutes apart—and one on October 28. A reverse image search also confirmed that four of these accounts reappropriated publicly available images of attractive women as their avatars. This tactic appears to be similar to one previously used by a set of pro-Russia accounts, as documented by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, in an attempt to target Arab male users to follow and engage with them. 

Russian public diplomacy in the region

As in Latin America, Russia uses the social media presence of its diplomatic missions in the Middle East and North Africa to promote its preferred narratives about the war in Ukraine. Most of the diplomatic missions post updates to their official Facebook and X accounts at varying frequencies, focusing on diplomatic affairs with the host country. Most repost content from other diplomatic missions and the Russian Foreign Ministry’s English, Russian, and Arabic X accounts about international affairs and the war in Ukraine, routinely posting falsehoods and exaggerations about the war. These include describing the war as a “special military operation” or fighting Nazis in Ukraine.

The X and Facebook accounts of Russia’s diplomatic mission in Egypt post regular international affairs updates. The accounts posted regularly about Ukraine throughout 2023 with the hashtag #الحق_مع_روسيا (“Russia is right”). Among its posts, Russia’s embassy in Egypt posted statements to Facebook about “Ukrainian Nazis” allegedly firing missiles at a hospital in Pervomaisk, Ukraine, using US-provided High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) missiles. Economic and military ties between Russia and Egypt have strengthened in recent years, especially as the latter’s government seeks to reduce its dependence on the United States, which provides Egypt with $1.3 million in annual military assistance. Egypt currently imports the majority of its wheat from Russia and has been working with Russia to construct a Russian-built nuclear plant since 2022.

The increased cooperation and aligning of economic and military priorities between the governments of Egypt and Russia allows the latter to be more aggressive in promoting its narratives to Egyptian audiences through its official channels and getting positive engagement with social media users. The embassy’s messaging about the war in Ukraine sometimes plays on anti-Western sentiment among some audiences.

On February 24, 2023—the first anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—the Russian embassy in Egypt tweeted a statement from the ambassador expressing gratitude to Egypt for “fully understanding the reasons for the confrontation over Ukraine and for supporting Russia despite the torrents of lies about our actions launched by the West.”

In September of that year, the embassy posted about a US announcement that Russia characterized as providing tanks to “Ukrainian Nazis” and depleted uranium shells to “expose our land to radioactive pollution. Exactly what they did in Iraq.” Russian diplomatic missions reference the Iraq War as part of its strategy to capitalize on anti-Western sentiment fueled by lingering distrust of the United States.

Diplomatic missions also capitalize on holidays and other public events by posting statements promoting Russian narratives. For example, the Russian embassy in Egypt evoked its fight against “Nazis” in Ukraine in a tweet on Defenders of the Homeland Day, then repeated the same rhetoric in another tweet on Russia’s Victory Day.

The Russian embassy in Algeria posted a statement from its ambassador on the occasion of Russia Diplomats’ Day, suggesting that the West was engaging in an “open anti-Russia campaign,” adding, “In a time like now when we witness tremendous pressure on Russia by the so-called ‘collective West,’ it becomes clear who our real friends are.” The ambassador also posted on Russia’s Victory Day, saying that “our great Homeland will win this time, will once again rid the world of fascism and Nazism.”

In other posts, Russian diplomatic missions in the region promoted narratives related to specific incidents of concern to Muslim audiences, such as a post from the Russian Embassy in Egypt showing a picture of a praying hand and a copy of the Quran with a tweet condemning the alleged burning of the Quran by Ukrainian soldiers. The post stated that the soldiers did so, knowing there are Muslims fighting in the Russian army, referring to a video that appears to show Ukrainian soldiers burning copies of the Quran.

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The post Complicated history helps Russian narratives about Ukraine find a foothold in the Middle East appeared first on Atlantic Council.

On August 16, 2023, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba promised to “free Africa from Russia’s grip,” claiming that Russia’s primary “tools for its work in Africa” were propaganda and the Wagner Group.

In our previous Undermining Ukraine report, the DFRLab analyzed Russia’s use of Kremlin media and diplomatic channels in Africa to spread Russian narratives, as well as the manipulation of social media to spread content supportive of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia’s efforts to court African leaders did not decrease in 2023. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited multiple countries on the continent throughout the year, Putin welcomed African leaders to the Russia-Africa Summit in Saint Petersburg, and the Wagner Group maintained its regional ties, despite the death of Wagner co-founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.

Russian disinformation in Africa

Russia’s endeavors to deploy false narratives and disinformation campaigns in Africa cannot be understood in isolation: They are integral to a broader dual strategy toward Africa that has yielded substantial results over the past year. These results have facilitated the Kremlin’s efforts to bolster its influence on the continent while simultaneously undermining Ukraine on the global stage.

Russia’s approach to Africa still consists of two facets. On one hand, there are the official relationships with individual countries, characterized by trade and investment, diplomatic initiatives, public diplomacy, defense and security agreements, and engagements within the United Nations, among other official channels. On the other hand, there is an unofficial and covert aspect of the relationship involving hybrid tactics and the illicit trade of arms for resources, most notably by the Wagner Group. Alongside Wagner’s presence, there is an emphasis on disinformation campaigns and the propagation of false narratives.

Russian influence campaigns in Africa are as varied and unique as the countries they target. The two-pronged Russian strategy also has a significant impact on the Kremlin’s disinformation approach on the continent. In some countries, Moscow predominantly relies on formal engagements, including media and journalist training agreements and official diplomatic channels, particularly in contexts where Moscow has long-standing historical ties, like it has with South Africa, where relations with the African National Congress (ANC) are deeply rooted. These formal engagements serve as a means to exert influence through traditional diplomatic and media avenues.

Conversely, in countries like those in the Sahel and West Africa, Russia adopts a more covert approach. Here, the focus shifts toward nontraditional methods, including payments to local influencers, disinformation campaigns, or financial support for local political associations. In these regions, Moscow aims to exploit existing vulnerabilities and capitalize on local dynamics. This dual approach allows Russia to tailor its disinformation efforts to the specific circumstances and receptivity of individual African nations, adapting its tactics to maximize its influence and achieve its geopolitical objectives. Tied to this are successful false narratives that portray Russia as the “benevolent benefactor,” a “state unsullied by the taint of colonialism,” and a perception of Russian media as ‘independent’ sources of information.

This two-pronged approach was evident at the July 2023 Russia-Africa Summit held in Saint Petersburg. While the summit purportedly aimed to showcase the public face of Russia-Africa relations, it also harbored elements of Russia’s covert foreign policy strategy. Beyond its official foreign policy objectives, the summit served as a platform for reinforcing narratives disseminated by Russia in Africa, designed to undermine Ukraine and weaken its Western allies. These narratives have been amplified by local influencers and communication channels cultivated by Russia, capitalizing on long-standing African grievances, such as anti-French sentiments and broader anti-colonialist feelings in Sahelian countries.

Russian officials, including Putin, portray a changing and tumultuous global order where both Africa and Russia are under siege from the West on multiple fronts. In this context, Russia and Africa are portrayed as cooperative partners, reminiscent of their Cold War-era collaboration, working together to counter Western aggression and establish a multipolar world where Africa can claim its rightful place, free from the lingering legacies of colonialism and neocolonialism.

Conversely, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine received minimal public discussion at the 2023 summit, with narratives instead repeatedly blaming Ukraine and the West for Africa’s shortages of food, grains, and fertilizers. Despite encountering challenges related to its actual capacity to strengthen economic and trade ties, the messaging from the summit, as analyzed by the DFRLab at the time, confirmed Russia’s unwavering commitment to enhancing its influence on the African continent.

This aligns with additional observations concerning the Wagner Group throughout 2023. Following Prigozhin’s attempted mutiny, questions arose regarding the future of Wagner’s operations on the continent. Although the principle of plausible deniability, which had made Wagner highly effective and valuable to Moscow as an extension of its foreign policy and influence operations in Africa, appeared to have been compromised, the Wagner Group has persisted in promoting its services in Africa. The group’s representatives on the continent have reiterated their intention “not to curtail, but to expand” their presence in Africa, and evidence suggests the group is in fact expanding its presence and disinformation focus in West African coastal states.

While disavowing direct connections to Wagner’s actions in Africa may have become more challenging for the Kremlin, Russia is unlikely to forsake the network of influence and disinformation capabilities painstakingly constructed by the group in recent years. Instead, Moscow will likely continue to employ hybrid tools, albeit in different configurations, to displace Western influence, exploit natural resources, and circumvent sanctions through numerous front companies operating under the group’s umbrella.

Pro-Kremlin narratives in African media

Numerous African media outlets promoted a variety of pro-Kremlin messaging, including narratives glorifying the role of the Wagner Group in Africa and the Russian armed forces in the war, criticism of the West’s handling of the grain crisis, and presenting Russia as a humanitarian stakeholder and security provider. In each case, these narratives appeared in Russian media prior to their amplification by African outlets.

Russian and African media signed several cooperation agreements in 2023, including a reported collaboration between RT and Afrique Media TV, which influenced the latter’s coverage of the war in Ukraine and Russia’s role in global diplomacy. Afrique Media TV is a francophone Pan-Africanist television channel founded in 2011 that also operates an English news website. In a September 2023 investigation, African Digital Democracy Observatory found that Afrique Media TV is linked to Russian assets, including a Wagner front company. Reportedly, Afrique Media TV is partnering with the Association for Free Research and International Cooperation(AFRIC) and the Officers’ Union for International Security (COSI), both of which operate on behalf of the Wagner Group.

The DFRLab found that Afrique Media TV reposted content from Russian propaganda outlets RT and Sputnik that portrayed Russia’s security interests in pulling out of the grain deal, as well as its reported military successes against the Ukrainian armed forces. It also often hosts shows with RT France TV presenter Xavier Moreau, who was an observer during the illegal 2022 referendum on the annexation of the territories of Donetsk to Russia, according to the European Platform for Democratic Elections.

African media also echoed Kremlin narratives around Ukrainian grain supplies. The Kremlin used the continent’s reliance on Ukrainian grain as a means by which to cast blame on Ukraine and the West when supplies started to become more constricted, despite the Black Sea Grain Initiative, an agreement brokered by the United Nations and Turkey between Russia and Ukraine that helped maintain grain exports from Ukraine. Russian retaliation against Ukraine’s southern port infrastructure, however, was a leading cause of supply shortages. Narratives regarding this new “grain crisis,” first pushed by the Kremlin and its allies and then echoed in African media, arose after Russia formally announced its withdrawal from the grain deal. Russia also engaged in raiding dry grain cargo ships, which effectively resulted in another blockade of Ukrainian grain transiting the Black Sea.

Narratives originally published by the African branch of the pro-Kremlin Russian news outlet Sputnik were disseminated by African French-language media outlets. For example, Sputnik Afrique spread unfounded narratives that claimed that the West had lied about delivering grain to African countries from Ukraine; the narratives subsequently reappeared on both a Cameroonian online news outlet and a Hezbollah-affiliated outlet. Notably, these narratives spread ten days before the second gathering of the Russia-Africa Summit in Saint Petersburg, when Russia pulled out from the grain deal by letting it lapse.

Russia also expanded its media operations in 2023 by engaging in new partnerships with BRICS-based outlets. As noted by French nonprofit  OpenFacto, Russia has consistently created websites that operate as showcases for the cooperation among the BRICS countries, an operation suspected to be affiliated with InfoRos, an online outlet with ties to Russia’s main intelligence directorate, the GRU. For example, Daily News Egypt signed a new cooperation agreement with Russia-owned television channel TV BRICS in October 2023. TV BRICS also signed partnerships with the African News Agency (ANA) and Chinese press agency Xinhua.

In addition to Russian content being spread to African media, there was also evidence of local citizens repackaging and distributing Russian propaganda of their own volition. In the spring of 2022, the DFRLab investigated a small inauthentic network from Côte d’Ivoire, which used the name MARIGONEWS, that a Meta spokesperson confirmed to the DFRLab was run by a single individual “with pro-Russian sentiment.”

Following the invasion of Ukraine, Facebook assets using the MARIGONEWS name and logo, with one group maintaining over 62,000 members, promoted a Telegram channel called Opération de Dénazification et de Démilitarisation de l’Ukraine (Operation to Denazify and Demilitarize Ukraine), which was subsequently renamed Marigo News—Opération ZOV.

While the channel claimed to have Russian correspondents, almost all of the content posted to the channel was copied from pro-Kremlin Telegram channels and websites and translated from Russian into French.

Following the DFRLab’s report and Meta’s removal of the group’s Facebook assets in the spring of 2022, it continued to post content copied from Kremlin channels to its Telegram group. Although it did lose followers and was periodically inactive for several months, the Telegram channel started posting regularly in October 2023, after changing its logo and name to MARIGONEWS. Some of the Facebook assets were also recreated, but at the time of publishing had received very little engagement.

Calls for Putin’s arrest amid BRICS summit preparations

In late August 2023, South Africa hosted the fifteenth annual BRICS summit in Johannesburg. Immediately following the announcement of the summit, Putin’s planned attendance was mired in controversy because of an ICC warrant for his arrest due to alleged wartime deportation and transfer of children. Following pressure from opposition parties and nongovernmental organizations, Putin opted instead to attend the summit via video link and delivered a prerecorded seventeen-minute address.

Prior to the summit, there had been speculation regarding Putin’s attendance given the arrest warrant and South Africa’s international obligations. South Africa had previously chosen not to enforce an ICC warrant—in 2015, the South African government failed to arrest then-Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir after he attended an African Union conference in Johannesburg, despite an ICC warrant—so it was an open question in 2023. Preemptive and successful legal action instituted by opposition parties, however, obligated the South African government to arrest Putin should he attend.

Although Putin claimed that he decided to stay away from the summit to “avoid creating problems for friends,” this decision was only reached a few weeks before the summit after months of speculation—and diplomatic contortions—around his attendance.

The event underscored the complex local and geopolitical landscape in which the event took place, especially considering South Africa’s policy of nonalignment.

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Freedom of assembly, freedom of opinion, and democracy are not just American values, “they are human values. They are also African values,” said Succès Masra, the prime minister of the Republic of Chad, on Wednesday.

Formerly the leader of the opposition Transformers party, Masra fled to the United States in the aftermath of the “Black Thursday” crackdown on dissent by the military government in October 2022. Now, after negotiations between the opposition and Chad’s government brokered by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Masra has returned to his home country and was appointed prime minister of Chad’s transition government in January. In this role, Masra has been working toward Chad’s democratic transition and reforming the country’s governmental and electoral institutions. Masra has yet to announce whether he will be a candidate in the May 6 presidential elections.

Molly Phee, assistant secretary for African affairs at the US Department of State, opened the conversation with Masra, urging the international community to support Chad’s transition government as it seeks to build stronger, more inclusive, democratic institutions and serve as an example throughout the region. Below are more highlights from Masra’s discussion of Chad’s democratic transition, economic ambitions, and the role the country should play in the region, which was moderated by Rama Yade, the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

Democratic transition and reforms

• Masra said that the transitional government’s first priority was establishing governmental and electoral institutions. “Unless we have strong institutions, nothing sustainable can happen,” he said. The war in Sudan, he added, showed that “if everybody has weapons, it’s not enough to build a strong country. It’s important to make sure that institutions are also here to help.”
• These institutions include a new independent body for organizing elections and a reform to enhance the independence of the judiciary. “These are new tools that we are putting on the table to push for fair elections,” Masra said.
• Another aspect of the electoral reform initiatives is to “push for citizen involvement,” said Masra. “Our ambition is to train fifty thousand volunteers” to help with the elections in the next few weeks, he said, which will require help from institutions in the United States, civil society actors, and members of the African diaspora.
• “But we still have challenges ahead,” Masra acknowledged, which include financing the electoral process. “This is where we can also expect some support.”

Economic goals

• Masra outlined an initiative for “minimum development packages,” which would ensure that every village has a school, health system, clean water facility, road, and access to energy. Unless Chad “bets on education,” Masra said, “there is nothing sustainable we can accomplish yesterday, today, or tomorrow. The world is led by ideas.”
• “We want a Chad which could become tomorrow’s startup nation,” where both local and international actors want to invest, said Masra, who was formerly the chief economist at the African Development Bank. “This is not about philanthropy. This is about business.”
• Masra also highlighted the importance of facilitating trade among African countries, including promoting e-visas, ensuring free travel, expanding regional markets, and making the most of the African Continental Free Trade Area.

Chad’s international role

• Concerning the series of coups in the Sahel countries of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso, Masra said that “the reality of security and the obligation for leaders to respond to people’s needs remain the same.” Even during war, “people should continue to talk,” he said. “We speak to everybody, with the idea to use Chad as a regional player.”
• “The United States is a partner for our country, and I’m here to say we want to build a stronger partnership,” said Masra. Ongoing areas of cooperation between the United States and Chad, he said, include security, private sector development, and “pushing for a soft landing” in Chad “where people can choose their leaders.”
• “Africa must unite. This is mandatory,” Masra said, urging greater African involvement in global institutions. That means “it’s important to have a place” in the United Nations Security Council, he added.
• Before concluding, Masra called for “hope” for Chad, stating that “there is a new Chad, a new Africa, and we can build bridges” together.

Watch the full event

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Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Aggregate freedom in Kenya has increased substantially and constantly since 1995, but the data correctly show a marked structural change in 2010. This was a crucial year in the recent politico-economic history of the country as it marked the inauguration of the new constitution, which has been the driving force behind many of the trends shown in the Freedom Index and subindexes. The 2010 Constitution reformed Kenya’s highly centralized institutional architecture, creating a devolved and highly decentralized system. This ensured that lower levels of government (regions and counties) receive much higher levels of funding, that can be better allocated according to the needs of local populations.

The economic freedom subindex clearly presents a jump around 2010, mainly attributable to a significant increase in women’s economic freedom. Legal changes that accompanied the constitutional reform had important effects on women’s empowerment and freedom. The endorsement of the 2010 Constitution established vital rights and encouraged additional reforms towards greater legal gender equality, including reserving seats for women’s political participation and encouraging nondiscrimination and equality. For example, the constitution outlined new principles relating to land policy, including the elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs, and practices related to land. Financial inclusion of women is an important area of improvement, and the Central Bank data—based on various FinAccess Surveys—clearly show that women are becoming much more economically included and empowered. Also, when you look at the disaggregated data for different regions of the country, you find that the gender gap in financial access is actually declining in many counties in Kenya. The growing economic empowerment of women is also evidenced by increasing employment rates of women and a reduction in the gender wage gap in many professions. Legislative changes have allowed women to hold and manage property, and placed them on a more equal legal footing with men in matters relating to property. For example, the passage of the Land Act and Land Registration Act in 2012 increased women’s rights over marital property. Regarding access to education, the gender gap is closing very fast. For example, in many university courses, the proportion of women and men enrolling is now much more equal than was the case a decade ago. The new decentralized constitutional framework has been crucial in creating the conditions in which women’s freedoms can improve. The situation of women is significantly worse in rural areas, but now local and regional governments have the autonomy and resources to provide and generate economic opportunities for women at a devolved level.

The economic freedom subindex also shows a sustained increase in property rights protection, which seems to reflect the judicial reforms that have been introduced since the 1990s. In the last three decades, there has been a significant improvement in the speed of judicial processes, and in the reliability of the guarantees given to domestic and foreign owners. For example, since the inauguration of the new constitution in 2010, parliament has enacted four major land laws aimed at improving land property rights: the Land Act of 2012, the Land Registration Act of 2012, the National Land Commission Act of 2012, and the Community Land Act of 2016. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index also undoubtedly incentivized Kenyan governments in this period to improve the institutional architecture of the country in order to facilitate economic activity. For example, the move towards “e-government”—the myriad reforms aimed at digitalizing interactions between citizens and government agencies—received a big push in order to improve Kenya’s position in the Doing Business ranking. This was, in fact, achieved in several successive years. The recent digitization of land records in Kenya is a means to improving security, by requiring a landowner to approve all applications relating to a specific property. Digitized records will also reduce the cost and time of land transactions. Section 9 of the Land Registration Act of 2012 facilitated the coming wave of digitalization and e-government by providing the Registrar of Lands with the right to maintain relevant documents in a secure and accessible format, including in electronic files.

Political freedom shows a substantial increase during the 1990s, which captures the movement from a one-party political system to a multiparty system. This was a generalized change in Sub-Saharan Africa, with levels of political freedom increasing in several countries. But such changes are always complicated, because it is easy to introduce political competition on paper, but always difficult in practice. This was a period of great political agitation in Kenya, reflecting broader political liberalization across Africa, with a very intense push for constitutional reform from civil society, resulting in significant achievements. External pressures to liberalize the political space were also crucial.

Kenya is probably one of the countries in Africa with the highest levels of civil and political liberties. However, the data show a significantly lower score for civil liberties than for the rest of the indicators of political freedom. It is likely that this relates to the protests, campaigning, and activism before and after electoral periods, which reached a peak with the serious electoral violence of 2007–08. But in general, Kenya is a society in which civil and political freedom is high, where citizens can express freely their political views, with a vibrant opposition in evidence. Electoral results have been challenged various times in recent years, accompanied by judicial reviews of the electoral results after several recent elections.

The large increase in legal freedom observed in 2010 is single-handedly driven by improved judicial independence and effectiveness, and this again is a product of the new constitution. The judicial system has proven to be very independent from political pressures; the challenges to—and judicial reviews of—the electoral results are a clear sign of this. The clarity of the law also improved significantly during the constitutional reform discussions that crystalized in 2010, and that is also evident in the data. In 2015, the judiciary adopted a nationwide case-tracking tool which enhanced the level of judicial accountability. There has been an attempt to standardize and speed up the handling of cases.

But the decentralization of power brought about by the new constitution has also had a negative side, at least in the short term. This is because now there is an additional level of government, the regional level, which necessarily increases the bureaucracy in the country. Moreover, three levels of government means a significant effort of coordination is required in order to efficiently provide the public services that were concentrated in the central government. These difficulties explain why bureaucracy quality does not show a significant change after 2010. Also, more bureaucracy opens the door for more corruption, especially with such a large structural change in the institutional framework. In recent years, there has been a clear aim to improve bureaucratic quality—for example, with the push for e-government—but Kenya has still a lot of room for progress.

From freedom to prosperity

The rapid growth in income in Kenya starts in 2002, a critical year for the country. In 2002 the country experienced a major political transition when the president, who had run the country for twenty-five years, stepped down. The new leadership was very keen on detailed government planning. They introduced a long-term development plan, called Vision 2030, with the objective of making Kenya an upper middle-income country by the year 2030. It was based on some crucial pillars, one of them being innovation. Kenya has led the region in some critical sectors thanks to this forward-thinking approach. Today, approximately 54 percent of Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) is generated by the services sector, parts of which are particularly vibrant and innovative, like tourism and financial services. The latter is a great example. Thanks to the innovative tool of mobile money, financial inclusion increased from 25 percent of the population in 2006 to about 84 percent in 2021, according to the 2021 FinAccess Survey, one of the highest levels in the whole Sub-Saharan Africa region. Mobile money in Kenya, which gained local popularity through the M-PESA application, allows users to deposit, withdraw, transfer money, make payments for goods and services, and access credit through cell phones. Mobile money products have evolved considerably since their introduction to Kenya in 2007, with a considerable range of innovative products and mobile service providers emerging. The agricultural sector, even though it is still very important in terms of employment, has been declining in terms of its contribution to GDP in Kenya and in several Sub-Saharan African countries. For several decades it represented about 30 percent of GDP in Kenya, but this has declined to about 20 percent—a fact reflected in the country’s debasing of GDP, which was carried out in 2021. Kenya is also trying to diversify its exporting industries towards nontraditional sectors. Today, 40 percent of Kenya’s exports are within the region, and these are mostly manufactured goods. With a strong base in manufacturing, Kenya is uniquely placed to benefit from the recently launched African Continental Free Trade Area.

Regarding inequality, the country clearly benefited from the constitutional change of 2010, because the devolved system of government significantly reduced regional disparities. Historically, the northern part of the country, for example, has lagged behind in terms of development because of its severe (semi-desert) climatic conditions. With the new system, funds are more easily transferred and more effectively administered by the regional and local governments, and inequality between rural and urban areas has clearly been reduced. The process of financial inclusion mentioned above, which was given major impetus by the introduction of mobile money in 2007, has been a second driver of reduced inequality. Segments of the population at the lower end of the income distribution have benefited most from this process, because it has opened the door to financing opportunities to start businesses, increase human capital, and so on.

Minority rights are also better protected with the decentralized system of government. The 2010 Constitution enables the state to put in place affirmative action programs to protect minorities and marginalized groups. Communities and ethnic groups that were somewhat marginalized before have been empowered in different regions. Even at a political level, it is clear that there is an effort to include previously silenced communities. The work carried out by civil society organizations has also been crucial on this point, in terms of creating an awareness about minority rights and demands in different parts of the country. This was demonstrated by the broad-based civic education carried out during the constitutional review process that culminated in the 2010 Constitution.

One of the primary goals of the political leadership that took power after 2002 was to improve the level and quality of education in the country. The aim was to reach 100 percent enrollment in primary education, and to increase significantly the enrollment levels in secondary and university education. However, the starting point was very low, so there is still a long way to go, particularly in secondary and tertiary enrollment. According to UNICEF, before the COVID-19 pandemic, nationwide enrollment in primary education in Kenya was at 93 percent while secondary school enrollment was only at 53 percent. Another important aspect is that increasing enrollment at a very fast pace requires vast resources to ensure that the quality of the education pupils receive is high. And this is not always the case in Kenya, even though education forms a very large part of the government budget. Some educational indicators, like the number of teachers, have not kept up with the levels of enrollment. The pupil-to-teacher ratio remains very high in some Kenyan counties. For example, in Turkana County in northern Kenya, it is at 77:1 according to UNICEF. So, the big challenge for the country at present is to improve both quality and quantity.

Once again, the 2010 Constitution will have major effects on life expectancy, and health more generally, but these are probably going to take longer to materialize in the data. Moreover, the slowing of progress on the health indicator in the decade before the COVID-19 pandemic may be explained by the same reason. The implementation of healthcare is now decentralized and run by the regional governments, even though healthcare policy is still in the hands of the central government. It is not easy to start running a regional health service from scratch, and there is obviously a learning period when indicators may even deteriorate. Inadequate resources provided by the national government to the counties and understaffed health facilities in many areas remain critical challenges. But in the medium and long run, once the implementation constraints begin to ease, it seems likely that healthcare services will be delivered more efficiently, and health statistics will show the results.

The future ahead

One of the critical issues that Kenya faces now is how to keep improving productivity. I see manufacturing as an obvious area for improvement, and this should include growing its share of GDP. Today, it is slightly below 10 percent, and Kenya should almost double that. I think we have a big opportunity in Africa with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area. It would create tremendous opportunities for countries like Kenya that have some manufacturing base. Kenya is competing with manufactured goods from Asia and other places that have major cost advantages. Bigger markets, such as those that will become available through the African Continental Free Trade Area, can generate productivity improvements through export competition and also provide economies of scale benefits.

An important challenge for Kenya relates to the large share of informal employment. Moving part of these workers and firms towards formalization will ensure that economic opportunity and development are more stable. And, obviously, higher levels of formal employment and production generate larger and more stable sources of government revenue, as tax compliance is easier with formal sector firms. This will help the already firm path of fiscal consolidation that Kenya has followed in recent years. The current account deficit has also been declining, partly because of reduced imports, but also due to stronger and more competitive exports. This is a very promising path for Kenya, and the country now needs to take advantage not only of regional value chains, but also global value chains, particularly in areas like tourism where Kenya has long-standing experience and a diversity of tourist attractions.

But economic reform and development needs to be accompanied by continued institutional reform and transformation. Further pushing the inclusivity of institutions is the only way to ensure that increasing prosperity in Kenya is based on solid foundations and is therefore sustainable in the long run.

Robert Mudida is currently the director of the Research Department of the Central Bank of Kenya. He was a full-time academic for seventeen years, having taught and carried out extensive research at two leading universities in Africa: the University of Nairobi and Strathmore University. At Strathmore University he was full professor of political economy. He has published four books and numerous articles in top international peer-reviewed journals in the areas of political economy, financial economics, macroeconomics, and industrial organization.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

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Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

The gradual deterioration of freedom in South Africa, which started in the early 2000s and is reflected in the Freedom Index, encapsulates the evolution of the country. Regarding economic freedom, the severe drop in investment freedom is very likely due to the introduction of legislation requiring foreign investors to have local partners, and to give away equity on a large scale. The application of such requirements to more and more sectors explains the continuing erosion of investment freedom up until today.

The ability to move capital in and out of the country has been static or has slightly improved. Similarly, trade freedom has not suffered big changes during the period of analysis, and that is well captured by the flat trend of this indicator. The short-run fluctuations are probably due to the changing trade agreements with the European Union (EU), but these are modest. The slide in property rights protection that started around 2012 is explained by the introduction of efforts to amend the constitution to allow for “expropriation without compensation” of agricultural land. While a strong majority favored the amendment, parties could not agree on the specific way such a policy would be carried out, and it was finally left aside. Nonetheless, it obviously continues to be a major threat in the near future, as the African National Congress (ANC) is likely to lose its majority and may revert to a populist alliance that would raise the issue again.

The significant increase in women’s economic rights, up to an almost perfect score, may be correct at a legislative level. Nonetheless, the real situation may be worse for at least two reasons: First, the levels of criminality, and particularly gender-based violence, are today at an all-time high, which clearly reduces women’s actual freedom. Second, even if there are no legal restrictions on women’s participation in economic affairs, social and traditional norms may still severely limit their opportunities in some areas of the country. Consequently, the positive push that this indicator gives to the aggregate economic freedom subindex may be somewhat artificial, implying that the real trend in overall economic freedom is probably worse than currently shown.

The political freedom subindex shows a very flat trend, but with a mild deterioration apparent in the last few years. The evolution of the indicators in this subindex can shed some light on what is going on. Elections and political rights scores are very high in South Africa, and the slight negative trend may be attributed to political polarization, but overall, the electoral process and its guarantees are not severely affected. The “legislative constraints on the executive” indicator has a clear upward bump in the 2013–19 period, which probably reflects the failure of parliament to act on allegations of state capture during the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The publication of the State of Capture report in 2016 resulted in a national scandal, and the rejection of its conclusions by Zuma, who was later chastised by the Constitutional Court, and this may explain the initial increase on this indicator. The establishment of the Zondo Commission in 2018 can account for the additional increase up until 2020. The post-2020 fall can be explained by the failure of the state to take action against the many individuals exposed for corruption before the Commission, and the impunity with which COVID-19 funds were looted by senior officials. Hence, the fall after 2020 is capturing the failure of the government to implement the recommendations of the Commission in any meaningful way. Nonetheless, the very marked upward bump shown in the data, between 2015 and 2019, seems rather unrealistic as no specific legislative changes were introduced on this front.

A second clear fact highlighted in the political freedom data is the significant worsening of civil liberties since 2019. Government actions during the COVID-19 pandemic are surely behind the initial drop. The empowerment of the army to stop and search individuals as a means of restricting the spread of the disease generated many abuses, and even deaths in some encounters. The health restrictions imposed in South Africa—such as the prohibition on buying certain goods, and the severe lockdowns and limitations on free movement—were probably among the strictest in the world. It is not surprising that, even after lifting the COVID-related restrictions, South Africa’s score on civil liberties protection has not rebounded and has actually worsened. This is because, in recent years, there has been a strong move against civil society in proposed legislation. For example, legislation is planned that would require nongovernmental organizations to apply for state security clearance to prove that they are not acting in favor of foreign powers.

The visible deterioration of legal freedom in South Africa since 2008 is notable. In 2009 Jacob Zuma acceded to the presidency and, very early in his mandate, he started to appoint close collaborators to senior positions across the criminal justice system in an effort to protect himself and his cronies against prosecution. The indicator on bureaucracy quality and corruption adequately shows the erosion and capture of the state apparatus. Judicial independence being relatively high and constant throughout the period of analysis may be faithfully reflecting the fact that the High Court and the higher levels of the judicial system have been able to prevent their capture by the executive. But it is also very true that the judicial system in South Africa is not as efficient for the average citizen, and this fact may not be fully captured by this indicator. It could be that the decline in the clarity of the law since 2010 is picking up the overall uncertainty and opacity of the judicial process in regular cases, due to inefficient and very slow courts.

From freedom to prosperity

The Prosperity Index seems to portray a picture that is the complete opposite of my reading of South Africa’s recent development trajectory. The Index shows a fall in prosperity between 1995 and the global financial crisis of 2007–08, followed by a recovery in the last fifteen years. Instead, I believe that the first half of the period of analysis was relatively positive for the country, while the last ten to fifteen years saw a clear deterioration. A closer look at the indicators that make up the Prosperity Index shows that it is mainly the evolution of the health indicator that is shaping overall prosperity. Therefore, it is probably more enlightening to analyze each indicator separately than to rely on the aggregate score.

The evolution of income per capita somewhat vindicates my argument. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth was strong and stable up until 2007, thanks to a substantial reordering of the public sector budget. On the one hand, there was some fiscal tightening and consolidation through reduced overspends. On the other, President Mandela (in power 1994–99) introduced several social programs that had an important redistributive effect. President Mbeki (1999–2008) continued this policy path and South Africa achieved positive GDP growth rates for several years in the early 2000s. Another crucial factor that fueled South Africa’s economic success in this period was a substantial decline in the cost of borrowing. With the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 and the transition to a fully democratic system, South Africa’s credit rating was upgraded from close to junk to AAA. The increased borrowing capacity of the South African government helped create a quite substantial movement into the middle class, especially among black South Africans, who gained access to public sector jobs with rising wages. The resignation of Mbeki and the accession to power of Jacob Zuma, together with the worsening international environment during the 2007–08 financial crisis, halted abruptly the positive economic growth rates of the previous decade, and started a period of stagnation. The rating of South African debt deteriorated again and made further pay increases for public servants and other redistributive policies unsustainable.

The drastic dynamics of the health indicator are driven by the extremely different approaches to AIDS of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. The former was a denialist and refused to deal with AIDS for most of his term, relenting only once the courts ruled against him near the end of his presidency. When Zuma took office, the government finally accepted that AIDS was a major problem, and a comprehensive health policy was instituted to begin fighting the disease. This shift—combined with the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which began in 2003—played an important role as well in the dramatic increase in life expectancy from 2006. The severe impact of COVID-19 in South Africa, clearly greater than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa, does not necessarily imply a worse handling of the pandemic in the country. This is because COVID-19 disproportionately affected individuals with preexisting conditions, who represent a much greater share of South Africa’s population than is the case for the rest of the region. South Africa has a relatively higher cohort with so-called “first-world diseases” like diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, and so on, all of which contributed to higher mortality rates during the pandemic.

South Africa is a very unequal country, and the significant deterioration in terms of inequality during the first half of the period of analysis is very plausible. The main reason for such poor numbers is the dysfunctional labor market, including high levels of unemployment. There is a great divide in South Africa between those with a job and those without one. The expansionary policies of Mandela and Mbeki were intended to reduce inequality; they succeeded in expanding middle-class wealth but failed to deal with the growing number of people “outside” the labor market. Today South Africa has roughly three million civil servants, which represent close to half of the total number of taxpayers in the country. This somewhat artificial middle class that emerged since 1994 pulled away from those with limited job opportunities, worsening inequality. There were also some cases of incredible wealth creation among a very tiny elite, which widened the distribution even further.

The improvement in environmental quality is not impressive, clearly slower than the rest of the region. This is probably due to the fact that fossil fuels and solid fuels are still heavily used, especially among poorer households with no access to cleaner energy sources, as electricity generation has foundered. South Africa still operates a large fleet of coal-fired power stations and a fleet of carbon-intensive diesel generators, as the country has been unable to effectively transition to renewable sources of energy. So, the rise in this indicator may be more attributable to the fall in large industrial operations in the country than to a comprehensive policy focus towards a cleaner environment.

The important increase in the education indicator, of more than 20 points in the last twenty-five years, captures the massive push to increase enrollment rates at all levels of the educational system. Preschool has been an important policy focus, but also there has been a very substantial increase in fee subsidies for university students, so years of schooling are increasing at the intensive and extensive margins. Nonetheless, when we look at the quality of education, the assessment is not so positive. The standards required to pass to the next grade have been dramatically lowered. The deterioration in the quality of the education received by pupils is evidenced by the scores in global benchmarking tests, which paint a very different picture to the steady rise shown when measuring years of schooling.

The future ahead

The near future for South Africa will be determined by the evolution of the political situation. It is all about getting the politics right. The upcoming election in 2024 is going to be crucial for the country. It is very likely that we are going to see a change from a dominant party system to a coalition system. This may lead to some political instability in formal politics and parliament, but it will also lead to greater accountability and more political competitiveness. The direction the country will take is not obvious and will depend on which party or parties enter into coalition with the ANC, which is likely to remain the single largest party. The risk of the radical left party entering government is clear, with its support for arming Russia with South African weaponry, expropriation of whole sectors of the economy, and so on. If the ANC continues looking to the Communist Party and the trade unions for support, and builds a coalition with the populist left, there is a substantial risk of heading towards a downward political spiral, a rise of populism, and a sharp fall into a situation similar to that of Venezuela. Instead, if the political center is able to hold its electoral territory and becomes a suitable partner for the ANC, it would offer a completely different trajectory for South Africa. There is, for the first time, a serious effort to build a pre-­election pact between opposition parties, which may change the overall political calculation in favor of the center. Therefore, the electoral results of 2024, and the coalition outcomes, will be the key determinant of where South Africa will be in ten years.

South Africa’s fiscal situation is also a pressing problem that needs to be addressed if we are to avoid a major crisis. We are now on the verge of a fiscal cliff, with rising debt that will soon further constrain government spending. This will likely lead to a deterioration of the social climate, with worsening outcomes in areas like health and education. Again, a sensible government that can introduce structural reforms in the public sector and stabilize the fiscal situation, is of fundamental importance for South Africa.

Finally, South Africa’s global alignment will play a crucial role in its evolution in terms of freedom and prosperity. The importance given to being part of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is not helping South Africa as it weakens the country’s standing with other nations with whom it has a more favorable trade balance and to which it exports more finished products. The expansion of the BRICS group to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Argentina, and Ethiopia reinforces this negative trend. Moreover, China’s economic slowdown is leading to falling external demand for South African goods, especially minerals, threatening foreign exchange earnings. And being close to Russia and China is negatively impacting South Africa’s relations with other democracies—in the West and elsewhere—and making it more difficult to develop an exporting sector that is not so heavily dependent on China.

Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation, a think tank that seeks to strengthen African economic performance. He has directed numerous reform projects with African heads of state across the length and breadth of Africa. His latest books include Rich State, Poor State (2023), The Ledger: Accounting for Failure in Afghanistan (2022), and Expensive Poverty (2021), as well as a volume on South African scenarios, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly (2023).

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post South Africa needs political change to meet economic demands appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

The evolution of the Freedom Index for Sub-Saharan Africa closely resembles that of the global average since 1995, with a very mild convergence. The same is also true for the subindexes of economic, political, and legal freedom. This is already good news for the region, as the trends are positive, but this does not capture the full story of freedom development in Africa. This is because the big movement towards liberalization, especially in terms of economic freedom, took place during the 1980–2000 period, so largely before the starting point of the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes data set.

In 1970, all dimensions of economic freedom were extremely low in most of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1 below shows the evolution of trade freedom back to 1970, obtained from the same source used in the Freedom and Prosperity Indexes (the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index). The average score for the region at the beginning of the period was around 3.8 out of 10, significantly lower than the rest of the world (5.5). In the 1970s, governments were following counterproductive policies such as overvalued exchange rates or quantitative restrictions on trade. These policies were destroying any possibilities to develop an exporting sector because, with an overvalued exchange rate, exports were simply uncompetitive. Exporters would have to turn in their dollar earnings at an artificially low rate and, in many cases, they would have to resort to the black market to buy their imports. The number of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with a black market premium above 40 percent was very substantial.

A big wave of economic liberalization took place in the 1980–2000 period, with governments correcting the artificial distortions in their exchange rates and opening trade and financial flows. So, this first dramatic movement towards a more economically free environment is not captured by the economic freedom subindex, which mainly shows what we could call a second wave of liberalization after the year 2000. This has been mainly driven by increasing women’s economic rights, which have clearly improved in some countries of the region, but certainly not all. Investment freedom has also improved in the last ten years, making capital movements more efficient. This is evident when you observe that there are no countries today in Sub-Saharan Africa with black market premiums above 20 percent.

Figure 1. Trade freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970–2022

Property rights also show a mild improvement in recent decades, but the weak institutional environment portrayed by the legal freedom subindex probably represents the biggest constraint to further improvement nowadays. The very low and stagnant levels of all indicators of legal freedom, especially that of bureaucracy and corruption, impose a significant drag on Sub-Saharan Africa’s development. A critical aspect of legal freedom is security, a very unstable area in Africa. Religious and ethnic conflicts are always a risk in the region, and this generates a high level of uncertainty, which can have negative effects on investment and economic development.

The development of political freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa was not so great as economic liberalization, and the democratic institutional framework is rather weak in those places that transitioned to more inclusive political regimes. This is well captured by the fact that legislative constraints on the executive are significantly lower than the rest of the indicators of the political freedom subindex, and judicial independence is also low, suggesting that proper systems of democratic checks and balances are still not fully developed in most countries.

Overall, the story of the development of freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa has so far been very uneven, in two senses: First, there is large variability across countries in the region. Second, there is large variability among dimensions of freedom. Economic freedom really took off after 1980, but legal and political institutions have not really improved. And this situation imposes a constraint on development because there is complementarity among different areas, so reforms in one aspect need supporting reform in others if they are to be successful in the long run. Moreover, further progress in legal and political freedoms are not just means to achieving higher levels of material prosperity, but are in themselves a measure of well-being, which emphasizes the need for continuing liberalization in these areas.

From freedom to prosperity

The Prosperity Index shows a parallel evolution of the Sub-Saharan African region and the global average. Even if we would hope to see a stronger process of convergence, so that Sub-Saharan Africa would catch up with the rest of the world, parallel trends are already good news for the region. Compared to the situation before the 1980s, where Africa was significantly falling behind the global average, the fact that, in the last three decades, the region has been able to develop at a similar pace to other regions is a clear sign that the economic liberalization of the 1980–2000 period has paid off.

An extreme example of the trends of both freedom and prosperity is Ghana. Figure 2 shows what was happening with exchange rates and black market premiums over the last sixty-two years. By 1982, the real exchange rate had appreciated to a level that was more than one thousand percent higher than it is today. The black market premium on foreign exchange was also above a thousand percent. The consequences were disastrous. Ghana used to dominate the world market for cocoa. By 1982, Ghanaian cocoa growers were receiving only 6 percent of the world price, and cocoa exports had collapsed. Facing famine, Ghanaian leader Jerry Rawlins began reforms in 1984. The government devalued sharply the nominal exchange rate and thereby reduced the black market premium.

Figure 2. Black market premium and real exchange rate index in Ghana, 1960–2022

The economic liberalization coincided with a turning point for Ghana’s economy. As shown in Figure 3, Ghana experienced a sharp decline in per capita income from 1960 to 1983. After the reforms, Ghana registered a steady rate of economic growth that has continued ever since.

Ghana also undertook some political liberalization in 2000, and since then Ghana has had an unbroken series of competitive elections. This may also have contributed to Ghana’s steady growth in the new millennium.

Getting back to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, indicators like health and environment show a very rapid improvement throughout the period of analysis. It is true that the starting point was really low, and thus there remains ample room for improvement in the future. Foreign aid, which has clearly been ineffective in other areas, may have helped improve health and sanitation conditions, especially in rural areas. For example, early life mortality has significantly decreased in recent times, which accounts for an important share of the progress in overall life expectancy.

Figure 3. Cumulative logarithmic growth in per capital income in Ghana since 1960

Some progress has also been occurring in education, in terms of convergence with global averages in primary and secondary school enrollment. However, the education indicator of the Prosperity Index, which measures average years of education, does not fully show the region’s convergence towards the rest of the world. This may be due to faster expansions in college enrollment in other regions like Asia and Latin America compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. But the growth in the number of people enrolled in early levels of education in Africa is substantial. Nonetheless, another aspect of education not captured by the Prosperity Index is quality, and this is obviously an issue in Sub-Saharan Africa. When you consider quantity and quality, it is clear that there is still a lot of progress to be made.

The future ahead

The different dimensions of the Freedom Index very well identify the constraints and challenges of Sub-Saharan Africa’s development in the medium and long term. Economic liberalization has borne fruit lately, although further financial and trade integration of the region with the rest of the world should continue. But today the big challenge is to strengthen the process of democratization and institution building, and the necessary reforms in these areas are much harder to accomplish. The recent wave of military coups is not a promising sign, and there is ongoing conflict associated with Islamic movements in some areas. So, the situation regarding security and the maintenance of peace is a necessary condition for Sub-Saharan African development.

I think there is probably not going to be as much support for African development from international institutions and foreign countries as there was in the past (particularly in the 2000s), because there is a shift of focus towards other regions, like Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Also, I assume that the Israel-Hamas War will continue to focus attention towards the Middle East. Usually, things tend to go in cycles. I do not think that foreign support was all that successful in achieving economic growth, but aid probably deserves some of the credit for the progress on health and education, especially.

In relation to foreign influences in the region, I do not think that China’s Belt and Road Initiative will have very different results than the significant amounts of funds received by Sub-Saharan African countries from Western nations during the 1980–2010 period. Moreover, I think the same problems of debt repayment and default are likely to be repeated, this time with China’s investments. At the end of the day, for foreign investment and aid to successfully affect Africa’s economic development, it has to be directed to some productive uses. And this is not usually the case with this kind of heavily politicized financing.

Finally, the efforts to deepen economic and financial integration within the region are probably a good idea, as within-region trade is unusually low for neighboring countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. But it is certainly not an easy task, as the several unsuccessful attempts to promote free trade areas or common currencies in the region in the last several decades prove. This failure may be due to Africa’s burden of having too many countries, some of them very small states. This generates great difficulties in reaching agreements because there are multiple strong political interests. Institutional development and democratic reform may help in this sense, as deeper integration among African nations would probably benefit the majority of the population.

William Easterly is professor of economics at New York University. He is the author of The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor (2014), The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (2006), and The Elusive Quest for Growth (2001). He has published more than 70 peer-reviewed academic articles.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Sub-Saharan Africa grapples with development imperatives appeared first on Atlantic Council.

Table of contents

Evolution of freedom

Egypt has experienced a political roller-coaster in the decade following the Arab Spring. The militarization of power in politics has been a key feature of contemporary Egypt. At the end of 2010, massive demonstrations broke out against poverty, corruption, and political repression. These led to the ousting of President Mubarak, a former military officer. This was despite the important economic reforms Mubarak had embarked upon in his last few years in office, which had been lauded by the international community. President Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood movement succeeded Mubarak after free and fair elections in 2012. A year after Morsi’s election, Army General al-Sisi took power in a coup and has since ruled Egypt with an iron fist.

The evolution of the Freedom Index for Egypt is indeed marked by the events of 2011 and 2012. The Freedom Index experienced a steep increase—reflecting the Arab Spring and the free elections that followed—before falling sharply by almost 10 points, a result of the counterrevolution led by General al-Sisi. The political freedom subindex visibly drives the movements in the overall freedom score. The 10-point increase on this subindex in 2011 vanishes, with a subsequent plummeting of almost 15 points, evident in all indicators, but especially in political rights. Al-Sisi has repressed brutally all political opposition and activism.

Economic freedom shows a somewhat erratic evolution, echoing the country’s political instability. Economic freedom seems to improve after 2014 as al-Sisi embarked on a series of reforms. Nonetheless, al-Sisi’s tenure has seen numerous economic problems: The scores on property rights and women’s economic freedom were still extremely low in 2022, and there has been a renewed acceleration toward military control over the economy. Al-Sisi embarked on large infrastructure investments, hoping that these would stimulate durable economic growth. These investments have turned to bad debt. Add to that the fact that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have significantly reduced their aid to Egypt, making it nearly impossible to repay its ballooning debt and associated interest payments. The country is now at risk of a debt crisis.

Legal freedom presents a clear negative trend in Egypt since 2000, with this subindex losing around 10 points in that time. Clarity of the law, one of the most basic elements of the rule of law, receives a very low score throughout this period. The situation is echoed in the degradation of political freedom and the instrumentalization of the judicial system.

From freedom to prosperity

Just as on the freedom front, Egypt’s prosperity has been a roller-coaster. In what has become a familiar cycle, Egypt typically goes through periods of delayed macroeconomic stabilization followed by a balance-of-payments crisis. The country then calls on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout in exchange for drastic reforms. These so-called structural reforms often consist of cutting consumer subsidies (food and fuel), which helps consolidate budgets in the short run but leaves the structure of the economy—including vested interests and cronyism—unaltered. This, in turn, can lead to social instability and repression. The current episode is no different and does not augur well for addressing the social deficiencies affecting Egypt.

The control of the economy by the army is impeding its rapid and deep transformation.
Egypt’s prosperity score remains significantly below the regional average, although it has seen a sustained increase over the last twenty years, suffering only a small regress in 2013–15. There is still a 3-point gap between the country’s prosperity score and the MENA average.

There has been some limited progress in education, health, and the environment. The evolution of the income and education indicators in Egypt has been somewhat better than the average for the MENA region. In the latter case, Egypt has overcome a differential of 6.4 points with respect to the regional average in 2006 and is now almost 2 points above it. In terms of the health and environment components, the country scores visibly below the regional average, and the gap has actually widened since 1995. Minority rights protection dropped by almost 8 points after 2012, coinciding with the period of political turmoil, but most of that fall seems to have been recovered in the last three years.

The future ahead

Egypt will have to navigate very difficult macroeconomic challenges in next few years. The country is heavily indebted, adding to the already worrisome sociopolitical situation. Egypt is gearing up for elections in December 2023. It is likely that President al-Sisi will be re-elected, and although this would theoretically hand him a mandate for reform, it is unlikely he will do anything that would affect crony or military interests. Instead, al-Sisi might have to resort to further devaluation of the currency, which will ignite further inflation and hurt vulnerable households. What is more, it would create a damaging currency imbalance, adding to the cost of servicing foreign debts that are held in foreign currency.

Al-Sisi will have to find external sources of financing outside of capital markets, given the prohibitive spread on external borrowing. Financial aid from Gulf countries, which typically provided a lifeline, is no longer forthcoming. Gulf countries are looking to invest in strategic assets but also want to see reforms before doing more to support the country. Gulf partners are counting on the IMF to push for more market-oriented reforms.

While political reforms are unlikely given the current circumstances, deep economic reforms also seem doubtful. Indeed, they would be difficult as the militarization of politics and of the economy is entrenched. This stalled situation will continue to limit the country’s potential. It is imperative to re-embark on a balanced economic and political transition to avoid the domestic instability that could result from a frustrated youth. What is more, the geopolitical situation is also tense. The renewed escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict risks spilling over into Egypt. That could destabilize the country and spread to the whole region.

Rabah Arezki is a former vice president at the African Development Bank, a former chief economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa region, and a former chief of commodities at the the International Monetary Fund’s Research Department. He is now a director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Studies and Research on International Development and at Harvard Kennedy School.

Trackers and Data Visualizations

Jun 15, 2023

Freedom and Prosperity Indexes

The indexes rank 164 countries around the world according to their levels of freedom and prosperity. Use our site to explore twenty-eight years of data, compare countries and regions, and examine the sub-indexes and indicators that comprise our indexes.

The post Egypt grapples with political uncertainty under El-Sisi appeared first on Atlantic Council.

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Those developments are in the form of two significant agreements that Somaliland (an unrecognized republic in the north of Somalia that self-declared independence in 1991) struck with countries in the region. The developments could bring simmering conflicts to a boil or add significantly to regional instability in the Horn; on the other hand, they could potentially advance peace and prosperity in the region. The uncertainty about what will follow these agreements, even in the months after they were signed, is due cause for global leaders to monitor the situation closely.

A communiqué with Somalia

The first agreement is a communiqué, which followed a meeting between Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti on December 28 last year. In the communiqué, the countries’ officials agreed to resume diplomatic discussions, implement previous agreements, resolve ongoing conflicts, and bolster cooperation on security and organized crime. 

While initially promising, the deal has raised tensions for civilians across the region. Some Somalilanders I spoke with saw the agreement—which referred to the breakaway territory as the “northern regions” instead of the “Republic of Somaliland”—as a threat to Somaliland’s perceived sovereignty. Having the agreement signed by Somaliland’s minister of the interior, Mohamed Kahin Ahmed, instead of the foreign minister further signaled that the agreement was being approached as an internal Somali affair rather than an agreement between two sovereign entities. On their end, some Somalis were displeased that the communiqué referred to Somaliland’s delegation as the Government of Somaliland (rather than the Somaliland administration).

Abdi’s term as president of Somaliland has also been marred by delayed elections, causing controversy and leading some to believe he has no mandate to make such decisions. Opposition parties such as the Somaliland National Party (Waddani) and the Justice and Welfare party (UCID) have capitalized on this, accusing the president of jeopardizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both Abdi and Mohamud returned to their cities under scrutiny.

The Somalia-Somaliland communiqué’s calling on both parties to resolve ongoing conflicts brings to mind conflict in the regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn, where a violent war over sovereignty has tarnished Abdi’s (and Somaliland’s) international reputation. Some civilians in these regions would prefer to not be governed by Somaliland, but rather become their own federal member state of Somalia—a real threat to Somaliland’s fight for independence and a humanitarian burden to both Somalia and Somaliland. Resolution of these internal conflicts would benefit both Somaliland and Somalia.

An MOU with Ethiopia

The second agreement is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), signed by Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on January 2, granting Ethiopian naval forces access to twenty kilometers of Somaliland coastline for fifty years. In return, Abiy agreed that the Ethiopian government would engage in an “in-depth assessment” of Somaliland’s recognition. Somaliland also received a stake in Ethiopian Airlines.

Ethiopia has been eyeing sea access since Eritrea’s 1993 independence left Ethiopia without a coastline and reliant on Djibouti for port access. Abiy has repeatedly called Red Sea access an existential question for his country, worthy of holding talks with Eritrea; eventually, rumors that Ethiopia may invade Eritrea to secure port access spread, escalating regional tensions. Reestablishing a presence in the Red Sea with the MOU would not only benefit Ethiopian commercial interests, but also revive Abiy’s political legacy, which has been tainted by his handling of conflict in Tigray and the development of new crises in Amhara and Oromia.

Abdi returned from Addis Ababa to see thousands lining the streets, waving flags and expressing a patriotic fervor. If Ethiopia (an influential member of the African Union) were to recognize Somaliland, it could be a game-changer for the breakaway region, helping advance its quest to be recognized internationally, particularly as it faces pushback from Mogadishu. On the social platform X, some pro-Somaliland users prematurely celebrated Somaliland becoming the fifty-fifth state in Africa—despite it not having yet won any additional recognition globally. On January 7, Abdi convened a meeting of Somaliland’s political stakeholders to discuss the agreement, which a Somaliland official said showcased the president’s inclusive approach.

Despite these signs of support, things have not been entirely smooth sailing for Abdi. Protests occurred in the Somaliland city of Borama, where hundreds chanted “our sea is not for sale” in opposition to Ethiopian troops in their territory. Moreover, just days after the MOU was signed, the Somaliland minister of defense resigned in protest. This domestic Somaliland pushback challenges and complicates Abdi’s efforts to sell this deal as a complete victory for the Somaliland cause.

Somalia sees this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and Mohamud has already signed a law nullifying the MOU. This largely symbolic move is Somalia’s way of asserting its jurisdiction over Somaliland; Somalia views Ethiopian efforts to establish a presence in Somaliland as an attempt to illegally infringe on its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Somalia and Ethiopia have fought devastating territorial wars in the past, and this decision also invokes the trauma within this fraught relationship. Many in Somalia have boycotted Ethiopian Airlines. Somalia even forced an Ethiopian Airlines flight (which was carrying Ethiopian officials bound for Somaliland) back to Addis Ababa. If this deal fully materializes, it could undo progress Mohamud has made to reintegrate Somalia into international institutions, sort out domestic tensions, and fight terrorist group al-Shabaab: Somali officials suggested that al-Shabaab would take up arms following the MOU, with al-Shabaab leaders swiftly issuing a call to defend Somalia’s territory.

The global response begins to take shape

In the weeks since the signing of these agreements, Washington has seemingly stuck to its “one-Somalia” policy, with several statements by top US diplomats reiterating the United States’ support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. However, a US State Department official also said that the United States supported conversations between the people of Somalia and Somaliland about their shared future, leaving the door open for potential future support depending on the results of those conversations. This also comes on the heels of an informal softening of long-standing positions, as indicated by diplomatic visits to Somaliland, such as one by General Stephen Townsend, commander of US Africa Command, in May 2022.